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entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Issues to Be Considered as DOD 
Modernizes Its Fleet of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles' which was released 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

November 2010: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Issues to Be Considered as DOD Modernizes Its Fleet of Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicles: 

GAO-11-83: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-83, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is acquiring two new tactical wheeled 
vehicles (TWV): the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain 
Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The $12.5 
billion M-ATV is for use in Afghanistan; JLTV is the future 
replacement for vehicles like the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV). 

GAO was asked to assess (1) DOD’s progress in rapidly acquiring and 
fielding M-ATVs, (2) JLTV’s expected features and cost compared to 
other TWV, and (3) the extent to which the current plans for M-ATV and 
JLTV are consistent with the services’ TWV investment strategies. GAO 
reviewed documents and held discussions with key officials to 
determine program strategies, costs, performance, and anticipated 
features; and compared M-ATV and JLTV plans with service strategies. 

What GAO Found: 

The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing 
vehicles ahead of schedule at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. No 
major issues have been identified in testing and early fielding. In 
developing the M-ATV acquisition strategy, lessons learned from the 
acquisition of MRAPs in Iraq were applied. Like the earlier MRAPs, the 
M-ATVs did not require technology development, a key factor in the 
program’s success. As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been 
delivered to the government and 4,379 had been fielded to units in 
Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. 
The urgent need for these vehicles resulted in their fielding and 
testing at the same time; however, source selection testing was 
conducted, and no vehicles were fielded until their safety was 
verified. 

Jointly managed by the Army and Marine Corps, JLTV is expected to 
provide protection levels that are comparable to the M-ATV but without 
loss of payload or automotive performance. JLTV’s acquisition costs 
are yet to be determined but are expected to be substantial. Unit 
costs could be over $800,000—somewhat less than M-ATV, with mission 
equipment making up more than half of the costs. Unlike M-ATV and 
earlier MRAPs, JLTV has demanding projected requirements that 
necessitate technological and engineering advances. Key challenges are 
whether the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability 
required yet stay within the weight limits for helicopter transport. 
Difficult tradeoffs in requirements may be necessary. At this point, 
it is a well-structured program with desirable features like a 
competitive technology development phase. This phase is scheduled to 
be completed by late fiscal year 2011, when DOD will decide if the 
program should enter the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase. That is the point where JLTV should clearly demonstrate that 
its projected requirements can be met with available resources. 
Evidence of that match would include a completed preliminary design 
review and a technology readiness assessment that shows all 
technologies to be fully mature. 

Current plans for M-ATV and JLTV dovetail with the objectives of the 
most recent Army and Marine Corps investment strategies. The 
implementation of those strategies, however, will be influenced by (1) 
the decision to continue producing new HMMWVs, recapitalize the 
existing HMMWV fleet, or both; (2) long-term funding for MRAP and M-
ATV sustainment, and (3) specific cost and capabilities of JLTV. The 
departmentwide strategy for TWVs that DOD plans to prepare would 
benefit greatly from the resolution of these issues. To the extent 
this strategy captures the knowledge gained by the services, the 
strategy can reconcile the aggregate affordability and other 
implications of the various tactical wheeled vehicle programs with the 
competing demands of the department. For example, at this point, the 
service strategies consider MRAP vehicles to be additive to the force 
structure, not offsetting quantities of HMMWVs or JLTVs. Any potential 
offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent they are 
supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition and 
support costs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) ensure that the JLTV program clearly 
demonstrates a match between requirements and resources; (2) stage the 
timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures key knowledge; 
and (3) include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could 
minimize the collective acquisition and support costs of the various 
TWV programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. 
DOD concurred with our recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-83] or key 
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD's Rapid Acquisition of M-ATVs Is Ahead of Schedule and No Major 
Performance Issues Have Been Identified to Date: 

JLTV Expected to Feature More Balanced Payload, Protection, and 
Performance Than Other Vehicles, but Transportability and Reliability 
Are Recognized Risks: 

Uncertainty about Future MRAP, HMMWV, and JLTV Decisions May Affect 
Planned TWV Investments: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Estimated Cost to Acquire 8,104 M-ATVs: 

Table 2: Summary of JLTV Categories and Subconfigurations: 

Table 3: Comparison of Expected JLTV Capabilities with Capabilities of 
Other Vehicles: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: M-ATV Deliveries and Fielding: 

Figure 2: M-ATV Developmental and Operational Test Schedule: 

Figure 3: JLTV Timeline of Selected Major Events: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

ECV: Expanded Capability Vehicle: 

EMD: engineering and manufacturing development: 

GFE: government-furnished equipment: 

GVW: gross vehicle weight: 

HMMWV: High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

JLTV: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle: 

M-ATV: MRAP All Terrain Vehicle: 

MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected: 

TWV: tactical wheeled vehicle: 

UAH: up-armored HMMWV: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 5, 2010: 

The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Gene Taylor: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Todd Akin: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Ground-based military operations generally use two kinds of vehicles: 
combat vehicles designed for a specific fighting function and tactical 
vehicles designed primarily for use by forces in support of tactical 
operations. Combat vehicles generally move on tracks versus wheels and 
include the Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting vehicle, and the Paladin 
self-propelled howitzer. Tactical vehicles generally move on wheels 
and include the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), 
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle, and families of 
trucks and trailers. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently in the process of 
acquiring two new tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV): the MRAP All 
Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). 
The M-ATV is being acquired in response to an urgent need to support 
operations in Afghanistan and has an estimated acquisition cost of 
$12.5 billion. The JLTV is being acquired to begin replacing the aging 
HMMWV fleet; the JLTV program is currently in the technology 
development acquisition phase with the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD) phase scheduled to start at the end of fiscal year 
2011. 

In July 2009, you requested that we assess (1) the current status of 
DOD's strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding M-ATVs, including 
estimated acquisition cost and demonstrated performance; and (2) 
JLTV's expected features and cost compared to that of other TWVs such 
as the M-ATV. In subsequent discussions with your staff, you also 
requested that we assess (3) the extent to which current plans for M-
ATV and JLTV are consistent with the broad objectives and strategies 
that the Army and Marine Corps have set out in their TWV investment 
strategies. 

To determine DOD's strategy for and progress in rapidly acquiring and 
fielding the M-ATV, we obtained and reviewed updated program documents 
and held discussions with system developers, acquisition officials, 
and contractor representatives. To determine the cost of the M-ATV, we 
obtained and reviewed cost estimates and held discussions with program 
officials. To determine the demonstrated performance of the M-ATV, we 
obtained and reviewed test reports and held discussions with test 
officials. To determine JLTV's expected features as it moves toward 
Milestone B in 2011, we obtained and reviewed updated program 
documents and held discussions with Army and Marine Corps acquisition 
and test officials. Using Army data, we prepared a table comparing 
JLTV's expected features and cost with those of the M-ATV and current 
generation HMMWV. To determine the extent to which current plans for M-
ATV and JLTV are consistent with Army and Marine Corps TWV investment 
strategies, we obtained and reviewed updated strategies and held 
discussions with Army and Marine Corps officials. More details about 
our scope and methodology are in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to November 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Army, which has over 250,000 TWVs, generally categorizes the 
vehicles as heavy, medium, and light. Heavy TWVs represent about 10 
percent of the Army's TWV fleet and include vehicles like the Heavy 
Equipment Transporter System, which is used to transport main battle 
tanks and other heavy equipment. Medium TWVs represent about 40 
percent of the Army's TWV fleet and include vehicles for hauling cargo 
and for launch and support platforms' weapon systems such as the High-
Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Light TWVs represent about 50 
percent of the Army's TWV fleet and currently consist of the HMMWV 
family of vehicles, which began production in 1983. The Army's HMMWV 
program also provides vehicles to satisfy Marine Corps and Air Force 
requirements. The HMMWV has gone through various upgrades during its 
nearly 30-year history and has served as DOD's primary wheeled vehicle 
for shelter carriers, command and control systems, light cargo and 
troop carriers, weapons carriers, and ambulances. This report 
addresses issues related to light tactical vehicles and the M-ATV. The 
M-ATV is not considered a light vehicle by its weight, but it is being 
used for functions typically done by light tactical vehicles. 

In February 2005, Marine Corps combatant commanders identified an 
urgent operational need for armored tactical vehicles to increase crew 
protection and mobility of Marines operating in hazardous fire areas 
against improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and 
small arms fire. In response, the Marine Corps identified the solution 
as the up-armored HMMWV. Over the next 18 months, however, combatant 
commanders continued to call for more robust mine-protected vehicles. 
The solution to the requirement was the MRAP family of vehicles. 

MRAPs provide warfighters with platforms capable of mitigating the 
effects of improvised explosive devices, underbody mines, and small 
arms fire threats, which are currently the greatest casualty producers 
overseas. The MRAP family of vehicles consists of four categories: 
Category I for urban combat missions; Category II for convoy escort, 
troop transport, explosive ordinance disposal, and ambulance missions; 
Category III for clearing mines and improvised explosive devices; and 
the M-ATV for small-unit combat and tactical operations in complex and 
highly restricted rural, mountainous, and urban areas.[Footnote 1] The 
current M-ATV requirement is to rapidly acquire 8,104 vehicles for use 
primarily in Afghanistan. Delivery orders for production were awarded 
to a single contractor, Oshkosh Defense. Like the Category I, II, and 
III variants, vehicles are prepared to accommodate government-
furnished equipment during production at Oshkosh with government-
furnished equipment integrated at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command. 

In 2007, the Army reported that there were approximately 120,000 
HMMWVs in use by the services. The Army also reported that the need 
for additional armor for current operations, among other things, had 
pushed the use of the HMMWV far beyond its original purpose and 
capabilities. The effect of this employment, according to the Army, 
led to an imbalance in protection, payload, and performance; 
specifically, 

* protection: light vehicles required the adoption of supplemental 
armor; 

* payload: the supplemental armor reduced the vehicles' usable payload 
(including warfighters, mission equipment, and cargo); and: 

* performance: the supplemental armor degraded mobility, reliability, 
and maintainability, decreased fuel efficiency, decreased vehicle 
stability and safety, and decreased operational availability. 

The objective of the JLTV program is to address the HMMWV fleet's 
protection, payload, and performance imbalance within a transportable 
vehicle. JLTV is expected to provide comparable protection to the MRAP 
vehicles in most cases--the major exception being underbody 
protection--but with better payload and performance. 

To guide the future investment decisions related to JLTV and the M-
ATV, as well as other TWVs, the Army and Marine Corps have prepared 
investment strategies, which enable the services to synchronize their 
respective TWV programs to maximize the use of limited funding. The 
Army's most recent strategy was prepared in October 2009 and will be 
updated later this year. The Marine Corps prepared a TWV strategy in 
August 2008; an updated strategy is scheduled for release the end of 
this year. In 2008, the Army and Marine Corps also prepared a joint 
TWV investment strategy at the request of the Office of Management and 
Budget. DOD is also committed to preparing a comprehensive and unified 
strategy and implementation plan for making sound investment decisions 
for TWVs. 

In 2007, at the request of the Subcommittees, we were asked to assess 
the extent to which DOD had developed a DOD-wide TWV investment 
strategy. We found that DOD did not have such a strategy. To improve 
DOD's ability to plan for and manage the development, production, and 
sustainment of TWVs across the department, we recommended[Footnote 2] 
that the Secretary of Defense develop a DOD-wide strategy and 
implementation plan for making sound investment decisions for TWVs. 
DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating the following. 

* Upon completion of the ongoing TWV studies by the Army and Marine 
Corps, and the Analysis of Alternatives for Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicles, DOD will unite these efforts into a comprehensive strategy 
that dovetails with the services' equipping strategies. 

* DOD will endeavor to align requirements, resources, and acquisition 
strategies into a unified plan for TWV investment decisions. 

DOD's Rapid Acquisition of M-ATVs Is Ahead of Schedule and No Major 
Performance Issues Have Been Identified to Date: 

DOD has acquired and fielded the M-ATV as quickly as possible in 
response to an urgent need. This acquisition was successful on a 
number of fronts. Multiple vendors responded to the urgency; in June 
2009 the government awarded the first production delivery order to a 
single manufacturer--Oshkosh Defense--and the contractor has 
consistently delivered vehicles well ahead of schedule. The cost to 
acquire and field 8,104 M-ATVs is now estimated to be $12.5 billion. 
As it did for MRAP, DOD chose to begin fielding the M-ATV before it 
had completed developmental and operational testing due to the urgency 
of the requirement. Before fielding began in December 2009, however, 
ballistic testing did establish that the vehicles met the requirements 
for crew protection and vehicle survivability and automotive testing 
confirmed that the vehicles were generally safe to operate. No major 
issues have been identified in subsequent testing and the vehicles 
appear to be performing well in their operational environments. 

DOD's Acquisition Strategy Enabled Rapid Fielding: 

DOD expedited many M-ATV acquisition decisions because of the urgent 
nature of the requirement. In September 2008, combatant commanders 
identified a need for a lighter and more agile version of the MRAP--
one that offered at least the same protection as the MRAP but was 
better suited to the conditions in Afghanistan. In quick succession, 
the Joint Staff approved the requirement; the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed the Navy 
to procure and test vehicles against the requirement; and the Army 
released a request for proposal. In early 2009, the Army examined 
proposals, armor samples, and production representative vehicles and 
in April awarded fixed-price, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
contracts to five manufacturers for three additional vehicles for 
mobility and ballistic testing. 

In seeking sources for the vehicles, the government placed a strong 
emphasis on a desire for mature, nondevelopmental vehicles and 
contractor support for an accelerated program schedule--one of the 
lessons learned from the MRAP acquisition--according to the program 
manager. Fully functional prototypes had to be available quickly for 
test and evaluation. Of the evaluation criteria for awarding a 
contract, delivery schedule and production capability were second only 
to the technical performance requirement to provide MRAP-like 
protection. The first vehicles to be delivered were designated for 
testing that was necessary to ensure that vehicles were safe to 
operate before being operated by users. The next priority was to begin 
delivering vehicles for home station training, which was necessary 
before the vehicles could be fielded to users. Delivery of vehicles 
for theater use began shortly after and took place concurrently with 
delivery and fielding of vehicles for home station training. 

The government reserved the right to place production orders with 
multiple contractors as it had for the MRAP, but elected to issue a 
delivery order for production vehicles to a single contractor--Oshkosh 
Defense--after the vehicles completed the additional tests in June 
2009. The contractor delivered the first 46 vehicles the next month 
and the first vehicles arrived in theater in December 2009, about 15 
months after combatant commanders identified the need. By December, 
Oshkosh had ramped up delivery to its maximum of 1,000 vehicles per 
month and had delivered 300 more vehicles than planned in the first 6 
months of the effort. The contractor consistently exceeded planned 
deliveries and has begun to ramp production back down, with planned 
deliveries ending in November 2010. 

As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been delivered to the 
government and 4,379 vehicles had been fielded to units in 
Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. 
DOD took several actions to expedite fielding, including beginning the 
process of installing vehicle mission equipment during the 
manufacturing process--a lesson learned from the MRAP production. 
[Footnote 3] On MRAP vehicles, some work had to be done on the 
vehicles after production and before integration could begin, which 
took time. For example, wiring on the vehicles had to be reconfigured 
first to accommodate the mission equipment. On the M-ATV, the wiring 
was configured on the manufacturing line. Figure 1 compares planned 
and actual deliveries of vehicles to the vehicles fielded through 
August 2010, and the planned deliveries through November 2010. 

Figure 1: M-ATV Deliveries and Fielding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph] 

Date: Pre-award; 
Planned deliveries: 25; 
Actual deliveries: 25. 

Date: July 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 45; 
Actual deliveries: 46. 

Date: August 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 50; 
Actual deliveries: 65. 

Date: September 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 100; 
Actual deliveries: 111. 

Date: October 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 385; 
Actual deliveries: 512. 

Date: November 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 664; 
Actual deliveries: 784. 

Date: December 2009; 
Planned deliveries: 1,000; 
Actual deliveries: 1,026; 
Fielded: 157. 

Date: January 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 1,000; 
Actual deliveries: 929; 
Fielded: 220. 

Date: February 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 1,000; 
Actual deliveries: 932; 
Fielded: 305. 

Date: March 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 975; 
Actual deliveries: 1,060; 
Fielded: 591. 

Date: April 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 1,000; 
Actual deliveries: 836; 
Fielded: 643. 

Date: May 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 500; 
Actual deliveries: 468; 
Fielded: 648. 

Date: June 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 270; 
Actual deliveries: 270; 
Fielded: 542. 

Date: July 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 217; 
Actual deliveries: 192; 
Fielded: 547. 

Date: August 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 282; 
Actual deliveries: 257; 
Fielded: 726. 

Date: September 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 269; 
Actual deliveries: 0. 

Date: October 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 269; 
Actual deliveries: 0. 

Date: November 2010; 
Planned deliveries: 53; 
Actual deliveries: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of Joint MRAP Vehicle Program data. 

[End of figure] 

M-ATV Acquisition Cost: 

As of June 2010, the cost to acquire the M-ATV is estimated to be 
about $12.5 billion through fiscal year 2024.[Footnote 4] Through 
fiscal year 2010, all costs continue to be resourced through 
supplemental funding across all services, except for program 
management costs--approximately $55 million in fiscal years 2010 
through 2015 to be budgeted into baseline service budgets. All other 
program costs will remain budgeted via annual supplemental requests 
until the services are able to determine long-term usage plans and add 
funding to their baseline budgets. It is not currently clear when the 
services will include MRAP and M-ATV operating and support costs in 
the base budgets. Table 1 summarizes the estimated acquisition costs. 

Table 1: Estimated Cost to Acquire 8,104 M-ATVs: 

(Then-year dollars in millions). 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; 
Through Fiscal year 2010: $5.0; 
Fiscal year 2011: $8.8; 
Fiscal year 2012: $8.6; 
Fiscal year 2013: $7.3; 
Fiscal year 2014: $6.8; 
Fiscal year 2015: $5.7; 
Fiscal year 2016 through Fiscal year 2024: $4.2. 

Procurement; 
Through Fiscal year 2010: $10,840.9; 
Fiscal year 2011: $382.8; 
Fiscal year 2012: $196.5; 
Fiscal year 2013: $200.6; 
Fiscal year 2014: $204.8; 
Fiscal year 2015: $163.8; 
Fiscal year 2016 through Fiscal year 2024: $430.5. 

Total; 
Through Fiscal year 2010: $10,845.9; 
Fiscal year 2011: $391.6; 
Fiscal year 2012: $205.1; 
Fiscal year 2013: $207.9; 
Fiscal year 2014: $211.6; 
Fiscal year 2015: $169.6; 
Fiscal year 2016 through Fiscal year 2024: $434.6. 

Source: MRAP Joint Program Office. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

The average unit cost for an M-ATV is about $1.4 million, including 
the vehicle, mission equipment, and transportation. Mission equipment--
which the program office estimates will cost about $4.3 billion-- 
includes communications and situational awareness subsystems. 
Procurement costs beginning in fiscal year 2011 are for expected 
upgrades to the vehicles. The estimate includes about $1.6 billion for 
fiscal years 2011 through 2018 to pay for upgrades to vehicles. For 
example, an increase in vehicle weight due to the addition of armor 
could in turn require upgrades to subsystems such as the independent 
suspension system and door assist. Other upgrades could include 
additional egress lighting, seat upgrades, and floor upgrades. 

M-ATV Testing and Fielding Was Highly Concurrent: 

Conventional DOD acquisition policy reflects a statutory requirement 
that weapons be tested before they are fully fielded to the user. 
[Footnote 5] However, due to the urgency of the requirement, and 
because the vehicle technologies and designs were mature, DOD began 
fielding the M-ATV in theater well before it completed the bulk of the 
planned testing. The test plan included ballistic tests, two phases of 
developmental tests, and operational test and evaluation. This 
approach resulted in a high degree of overlap between testing and 
delivery of the M-ATV. For example, 6,244 vehicles had already been 
placed on contract and 229 had been fielded before operational testing 
was completed in mid-December 2009.[Footnote 6] Developmental testing 
is scheduled to continue even as fielding is completed in December 
2010, according to an Army official. Figure 2 shows the concurrent 
nature of the overall test plan. 

Figure 2: M-ATV Developmental and Operational Test Schedule: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Source selection testing: 
01/2009 - 06/2009. 

First production delivery order: 
June, 2009. 

Developmental test phase 1: 
08/2009 - 12/2009. 

Initial operational test and evaluation: 
12/2009 - 12/2009. 

Developmental test phase 2: 
12/2009 - TBD. 

Ballistic testing: 
03/2009 - TBD. 

Cumulative vehicles fielded, FY 2010: 
October: 10; 
January: 229; 
April: 1,512; 
July: 3,526. 

Cumulative vehicles fielded, planned FY 2011: 
Unknown. 

Source: GAO analysis of Joint MRAP Vehicle Program data. 

Note: Additional testing may be needed to verify future upgrades. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's emphasis that the competing contractors provide only mature, 
nondevelopmental vehicles was a key element in achieving the M-ATV 
schedule objectives. According to program officials, source selection 
testing of all the contractors' prototype vehicles further mitigated 
the risk associated with the concurrent M-ATV production and test 
schedule. Testing evaluated component-and system-level vehicle 
survivability and crew protection, and included multiple ballistic 
events against armor samples and candidate vehicles. Source selection 
also included automotive testing--such as human factors, mobility, 
braking, and steering--of the prototype vehicles. Before fielding 
began for any production M-ATVs, additional ballistic testing between 
October and December 2009 established that the vehicles met the 
requirements for crew protection and vehicle survivability and 
automotive testing confirmed that the vehicles were generally safe to 
operate. 

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in a June 2010 live-
fire operational test and evaluation report, found that the M-ATV was 
operationally effective in the conduct of unit missions providing 
armored tactical mobility over Afghanistan terrain and that it 
demonstrated off-road mobility comparable to the up-armored HMMWV with 
the Expanded Capability Vehicle additional armor. The Director also 
found that the M-ATV was operationally suitable, although egress from 
the vehicle was difficult due to the location of some mission 
equipment, the height of the front seats, and potential damage to 
exterior door handles when the vehicle rolls over and there is no 
other means to open the door from the outside. 

M-ATV Is Performing Well in Theater but Will Be Challenged to Keep 
Pace with the Threat: 

M-ATV vehicles appear to be performing well in their operational 
environment, according to program officials who monitor incident 
reports from the field.[Footnote 7] Ballistic and automotive 
performance in the field mirrors that seen in testing. In addition, 
users report favorably on both aspects of the vehicles' performance. 
For example, a recent survey of users in theater found the vehicles 
are well accepted, have good mobility, and offer protection and 
survivability that is comparable to the MRAP. On the down side, users 
reported that visibility is limited and the vehicle is cramped, tall, 
and heavy. 

Although the vehicle appears to be performing well in the operational 
environment, future challenges for the M-ATV include keeping pace with 
the evolving threat. The vehicle meets the current performance 
specifications and requirements, but the enemy keeps changing its 
tactics, according to the acquisition officials. The officials note 
that as the requirement for protection increases, for example, armor 
will have to be added, especially underbody--an effort that is already 
under way. They further note that modifying M-ATV vehicles in 
Afghanistan will be more difficult than it was to modify the MRAP in 
Iraq because Afghanistan has less infrastructure and fewer facilities 
to support it. According to acquisition officials, as the number of M- 
ATV in theater increases, this will be a challenge. 

JLTV Expected to Feature More Balanced Payload, Protection, and 
Performance Than Other Vehicles, but Transportability and Reliability 
Are Recognized Risks: 

A comparison of JLTV's capabilities with those of the M-ATV and HMMWV 
indicates the JLTV is expected to offer protection levels comparable 
to the M-ATV at a weight nearer to the HMMWV. The JLTV is early in its 
development and its acquisition cost has not yet been determined, but 
is expected to be substantial. The JLTV acquisition strategy calls for 
an incremental, knowledge-based approach, reflective of best 
practices. The services have recognized transportability and 
reliability as risks and are considering design and requirement 
tradeoffs to reduce these risks. For example, to meet the 
transportation requirement, the services have made the decision to 
focus on a four-passenger vehicle in the first increment rather than a 
six-passenger vehicle. Testing of prototypes from each of the 
contractor teams is under way and is being used to validate and refine 
requirements and to reduce technical risks prior to the EMD phase. 
Scheduled to start in late fiscal year 2011, the EMD phase is a 
crucial point for the program. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established several exit 
criteria that must be completed prior to competitively awarding 
contracts for the EMD phase. 

JLTV Acquisition Strategy Is Incremental: 

The Army and Marine Corps are pursuing an incremental development 
approach for JLTV that would feature a basic capability initially--
with enhanced force protection, increased fuel efficiency, greater 
payload, and other improvements to be added in later increments. DOD 
acquisition policy[Footnote 8] defines an increment as a militarily-
useful and supportable operational capability that can be developed, 
produced, deployed, and sustained. As we have observed in an earlier 
report, each increment will need to provide needed capabilities within 
cost and schedule projections and be justifiable on its own.[Footnote 
9] 

The services currently plan to acquire 60,383 vehicles in the first 
increment of JLTV. For that first increment, three categories of JLTV 
vehicles are being developed with different payload capabilities and 
expected use. The Category A vehicle is expected to have a payload of 
3,500 pounds and is being developed for general-purpose mobility to 
move reconnaissance and surveillance teams. The Category B vehicle is 
expected to have 4,000 to 4,500 pounds of payload capability and is 
being developed to move infantry, weapons, security forces, and 
tactical command and control. The Category C vehicle is a utility 
vehicle being developed for combat support missions and is planned to 
carry shelters and light cargo and operate as an ambulance. Table 2 
summarizes the different JLTV categories and subconfigurations. 

Table 2: Summary of JLTV Categories and Subconfigurations: 

Category A: 
Mission area: Battlespace Awareness; 
Payload: 3,500 pounds; 
Subconfigurations: 
General-Purpose Mobility; (4 seat)[shaded]. 

Category B: 
Mission area: Force Application; 
Payload: 4,000-4,500 pounds; 
Subconfigurations: 
Infantry Carrier, Fire Team; (6 seat)[shaded]; 
Reconnaissance--Army (6 seat); 
Command and Control; On the Move (4 seat)[shaded]; 
Integrated Target Acquisition System; Tube-launched Optically-tracked 
Wire-guided missile (4 seat); 
Utility--Marine Corps (2 seat); 
Ambulance (3 seat + 2 Litters). 

Category C: 
Mission area: Focused Logistics; 
Payload: 5,100 pounds; 
Subconfigurations: 
Shelter Carrier/Utility/Prime Mover (2 seat)[shaded]; 
Ambulance (3 seat + 4 litter). 

Source: JLTV Program Office. 

Note: Shaded areas indicate that program focus during technology 
development phase is on these subconfiguration vehicles. 

[End of table] 

The Army awarded JLTV technology development contracts to three 
industry teams[Footnote 10] in October 2008, for a total of $263.7 
million; however, a bid protest delayed the actual start of work until 
February 2009. The 36-month technology development effort features 
competitive prototyping. It includes 15 months for design and build 
and 12 months for testing prototype vehicles. Prototype testing is 
under way at the Aberdeen and Yuma test facilities. 

Figure 3: JLTV Timeline of Selected Major Events: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

October 2008: 
Technology development contracts awarded. 

May 2010: 
Prototypes delivered. 

May 2010: 
Performance and reliability testing began. 

September 2011: 
Milestone B. 

August 2014: 
Milestone C. 

December 2016: 
Initial operational capability. 

Source: Army Joint Combat Support Systems. 

[End of figure] 

The services plan for a full and open competition to select two 
contractors for the EMD phase and one contractor from those two will 
be selected for the production phase. DOD is planning the Milestone B 
decision for JLTV during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011, with 
a contract award scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. 
The EMD phase is scheduled to last almost 3 years and culminate with a 
Milestone C decision point in late fiscal year 2014. A fixed-price 
production contract is expected to be awarded in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2015. The initial operating capability is expected early 
in fiscal year 2017. An analysis of alternatives for the JLTV is 
required to support a Milestone B decision on the program and will be 
provided to DOD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation group 60 days 
in advance of the Defense Acquisition Board review. The purpose of the 
analysis of alternatives is to assess alternatives for capitalizing 
the fleets of light tactical vehicles currently operated by the four 
services. 

At Milestone B, DOD may consider an early start of initial production 
for a JLTV variant if technical maturity and risks are deemed 
appropriate. That would assume that JLTV prototypes would be at a high 
level of technical maturity and their designs very stable. Currently, 
it is unknown how this would affect the contractor competition plans, 
which call for two contractors to proceed through EMD. 

JLTV to Offer Protection Comparable to M-ATV and More Protection Than 
HMMWV: 

JLTV is being designed to protect its occupants from the effects of 
mines and improvised explosive devices without sacrificing its ability 
to carry a payload or its automotive performance, which has not been 
the case with other TWVs. The improved balance of capabilities 
expected from the JLTV is summarized in table 3, which compares the 
capabilities of the M-ATV, the JLTV, and the current generation of 
HMMWVs. 

Table 3: Comparison of Expected JLTV Capabilities with Capabilities of 
Other Vehicles: 

Capability: Turning radius (feet); 
M-ATV: 54; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 25; 
JLTV: 25. 

Capability: Payload (pounds); 
M-ATV: 4,000; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 1,800--3,950; 
JLTV: 3,500--5,100. 

Capability: Gross vehicle weight (GVW) (pounds); 
M-ATV: 32,500; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 12,100--14,800; 
JLTV: 19,950--23,950 (estimated). 

Capability: Maximum speed at GVW (miles per hour)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 65; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 63.8; 
JLTV: 70. 

Capability: Minimum range (miles)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 300; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 250; 
JLTV: 400. 

Capability: Transportable at GVW (internally, externally); 
M-ATV: C-130 w/waiver; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: C-130, CH-53, CH-47; 
JLTV: C-130, CH-53, CH-47F. 

Capability: Transportable on height-restricted decks; 
(76 inches); 
M-ATV: No; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: Yes - some versions; 
JLTV: Yes[B]. 

Capability: Reliability (mean miles between operational mission 
failure)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 600; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 800-2,250; 
JLTV: 4,500-5,170. 

Capability: Operational availability (percentage)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 80; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 90; 
JLTV: 95. 

Capability: Power generation-on-board/exportable (kilowatt)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 12.7/0; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 1.2/0; 
JLTV: 20/10. 

Capability: Ground clearance (inches)[shaded]; 
M-ATV: 13.6; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 13-17; 
JLTV: 24. 

Capability: Underbody protection[C]: Mines; 
M-ATV: 3; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 2; 
JLTV: 3. 

Capability: Underbody protection[C]: IED; 
M-ATV: 3; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 1; 
JLTV: 2. 

Side protection[C]: IED; 
M-ATV: 4; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 4; 
JLTV: 4. 

Side protection[C]: EFP; 
M-ATV: 3; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 2; 
JLTV: 1. 

Side protection[C]: RPG; 
M-ATV: 1; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 1; 
JLTV: 2. 

Side protection[C]: Small arms; 
M-ATV: 4; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: 4; 
JLTV: 4. 

Capability: Estimated base price per system (without GFE and other 
costs); 
M-ATV: $445,000; 
Current generation HMMWVs[A]: $186,000; 
JLTV: $306,000-$332,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army information. 

Note: Those capabilities where JLTV is projected to be better than the 
other two vehicles have been highlighted. 

[A] Expanded Capability Vehicle (ECV)/up-armored HMMWV (UAH) with the 
B-Kit armor. 

[B] An adjustable suspension system will permit JLTV to meet this 
requirement. 

[C] The numbers indicate protection levels. The higher the number, the 
better protection level. 

[End of table] 

Our comparison of TWV capabilities indicates that the JLTV 
capabilities are expected to balance personnel protection, payload, 
and performance, provide defensive measures covering troops while in 
transport, and increase payload capability. In the performance area, 
JLTV is intended to be better than the M-ATV and HMMWV in terms of 
turning radius, cross-country speed, acceleration, minimum range, 
power generation, and ground clearance. In addition, JLTV operational 
availability is intended to be better than both other vehicles. The 
JLTV's payload, protection, and performance will be equal to or better 
than the Expanded Capability Vehicle (ECV)/Up-armored HMMWV (UAH) in 
all categories.[Footnote 11] 

Unlike the M-ATV, the HMMWV is and the JLTV is planned to be 
transportable by helicopter. JLTV's level of protection is expected to 
be significantly better than ECV/UAH, especially the underbody 
protection. The JLTV payload requirement is a minimum of 3,500 pounds 
for its general-purpose mobility vehicle and 5,100 pounds for its 
utility vehicle. Those levels are comparable to the M-ATV payload and 
better than the HMMWV levels. The reliability of the JLTV is projected 
to be 3,900 miles better between operational mission failures than the 
M-ATV and more than 2,250 miles better between operational mission 
failures than the ECV/UAH. 

Achieving Transportability and Reliability Requirements Is a 
Recognized Program Risk: 

Unlike the M-ATV, the JLTV program will need to demonstrate emerging 
technologies to determine if it can meet its proposed requirements. 
The services are not directly developing new technologies for JLTV, 
but are expecting the competing contractors to use new and existing 
technologies in their prototype vehicles. The purpose of the JLTV 
technology development phase is to validate the maturity of those 
technologies and to provide test data to evaluate the technical risks 
in meeting the proposed requirements for the JLTV family of vehicles. 
The knowledge gained from the tests will be used to assess the 
capability of meeting critical requirements such as force protection, 
mobility, transportability, reliability and maintainability, and 
technical performance. 

The Army Test and Evaluation Command is conducting JLTV testing at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground and Yuma Proving Ground. Ballistic testing of 
samples of the vehicle armor began in September 2009 and has been 
completed, but results are not yet available. Ballistic testing of 
vehicle hulls began in December 2009 at Aberdeen. The three 
contractors delivered prototype vehicles in May to Aberdeen and Yuma 
and testing has begun. Vehicle performance testing is being conducted 
at Aberdeen and reliability, availability, and maintainability testing 
is being conducted at Yuma. On the basis of the initial analysis of 
physical characteristics, the majority of the prototypes are within 
the current limits for vehicle weight. Testing on the prototypes is 
expected to last about a year and a formal test report will be issued 
at the end of testing. Interim reports will be issued throughout the 
year. 

The technology development phase is currently scheduled for completion 
in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011, to be followed by the 
Milestone B decision review. According to direction from the milestone 
decision authority, the following technology development phase exit 
criteria are expected to be completed for the Milestone B decision 
point: 

* approval of the appropriate capabilities development document, 
supported by analysis from technology development work, 

* demonstration of a technology readiness level 6 or higher for all 
critical technologies in an integrated system,[Footnote 12] 

* an assessment of commonality across the JLTV family of vehicles, and: 

* an assessment of the technical risks relevant to entering initial 
production. 

Under best acquisition practices,[Footnote 13] the JLTV program would 
need to achieve a match between its requirements and available 
resources (technologies, money, and schedule) at the Milestone B 
decision point and before proceeding into the EMD phase. During the 
remainder of the technology development phase, the task for the JLTV 
program will be to determine, through the system engineering process, 
whether the proposed requirements can be met with the resources 
expected to be available including existing technologies. If that 
match cannot be demonstrated, the program may have to adjust the 
requirements to more achievable levels or increase its estimate of 
resources needed. Fully resolving these questions with knowledge at 
the Milestone B point is a key to establishing a sound business case 
for the JLTV program. Such knowledge would include a completed 
preliminary design review, evidence of robust system engineering 
analyses, and a technology readiness assessment. Our prior work has 
consistently shown that a sound business case is a critical 
determinant of a program's ultimate success.[Footnote 14] The JLTV 
program has identified risks in achieving some of its key requirements 
and is considering trade-offs in vehicle designs and requirements. 

Transportability and force protection are key performance parameters 
for JLTV, but the vehicle's currently projected weight may preclude 
its transport by rotary wing aircraft. The vehicle's weight is driven 
by the level of force protection expected from JLTV. Force protection 
is achieved with armor and the currently available armor is heavier 
than desired. JLTV vehicles are being designed with a basic layer of 
armor that is integrated with the chassis and additional armor that is 
bolted on over that basic layer of armor. Transportability by rotary 
winged aircraft is a critical joint requirement, with the potential 
that the Marine Corps could withdraw from the program if rotary wing 
transport of JLTV is not possible. The services are using 15,600 
pounds, the lift capacity of the CH-47F, to determine the maximum 
transport weight of the vehicle. The transport weight differs from the 
gross vehicle weight in that the add-on armor is removed prior to 
transport by aircraft. However, the JLTV program is concerned that the 
transport weight may be in excess of the CH-47F's lift capacity. In 
order to meet the weight limit, the services are considering design 
and requirement trade-offs. Although a six passenger Category B 
vehicle was the original joint priority, the services are now focusing 
on a four-passenger vehicle, at least initially. According to program 
officials, the technology will not have advanced far enough to make 
armor light enough to build a six-passenger vehicle with the needed 
protection level and at a transport weight that can be transported by 
the CH-47F. As a result, the services are proposing to build a four-
passenger vehicle in the first increment. A six-passenger vehicle is 
still under consideration by the Army for the first increment; 
however, it would not be in the initial procurement. Progress in armor 
technology development and demonstration--and its impact on JLTV force 
protection and transportability requirements--will be evaluated 
throughout the technology development phase and at the Milestone B 
review.
The JLTV requirement for operational availability has been set at 95 
percent and is considered a key performance parameter. JLTV 
reliability is a key system attribute and is an element within 
operational availability. The original technology development 
requirement was 4,500 mean miles between operational mission failures 
for the Category B vehicles and 6,100 miles for the Category A and C 
variants. This level of reliability may be aggressive since it is two 
to three times greater than the reliability levels for other tactical 
vehicles. For example, the M-ATV requirement is 600 miles between 
failures and at least one version of the ECV/UAH has a reliability of 
less than 1,300 miles between failures. If the JLTV reliability 
metrics cannot be met, availability will suffer and total ownership 
cost, another key system attribute, could increase significantly. 
While contractor modeling suggests that JLTV will meet its 
requirements at the subcomponent level, program officials remain 
uncertain. The services are conducting extensive reliability testing 
of JLTV prototypes during the technology development phase. However, 
according to program officials, the reliability requirement is up for 
reconsideration and may need to be adjusted. Also, the services have a 
plan to increase the reliability for EMD. 

JLTV Cost Is Not Yet Known but Will Be Substantial and Affect 
Affordability: 

JLTV investment to date has been modest--about $300 million for the 
technology development phase through fiscal year 2010. However, JLTV 
funding will be expanding in the coming years. From fiscal years 2011 
through 2015, an additional $580 million will be needed for JLTV 
development through the EMD phase. JLTV production funding is 
currently projected to start in fiscal year 2013. Through fiscal year 
2015, the services are projecting JLTV procurement funding of about 
$2.7 billion. 

JLTV's total acquisition costs could ultimately be substantial. The 
target unit production cost for JLTV ranges from $306,000 to $332,000, 
depending on vehicle category. That compares to the base M-ATV unit 
price of about $445,000. The JLTV target cost does not include general 
and administrative cost and fees. Armor kits and mission equipment 
packages are also additional, which have not yet been determined. As a 
reference point, the cost of government-furnished equipment averaged 
$532,000 per vehicle for the M-ATVs. If similar costs apply to JLTV, 
its procurement unit cost could be in excess of $800,000. 

An independent cost estimate will be developed in support of Milestone 
B decision review; however, the vehicle cost will be substantial when 
calculating the cost of the first increment. The joint requirement is 
for 60,383 vehicles to be bought and fielded by fiscal year 2022. 
Using the lowest projected vehicle cost of $306,000, the cost of 
60,383 JLTV vehicles would be almost $18.5 billion and much more when 
government-furnished equipment[Footnote 15] and other costs are 
included. 

JLTV's affordability will be a key determination at the Milestone B 
decision point. The services and DOD will have to balance the cost of 
the JLTV against other service needs. The cost could determine whether 
to continue with the program as planned, look at other ways of meeting 
the requirements, or buy fewer vehicles. 

Uncertainty about Future MRAP, HMMWV, and JLTV Decisions May Affect 
Planned TWV Investments: 

The acquisition plans for both the M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with 
the services' TWV strategies, which emphasize maintaining a balance of 
performance, payload, and protection capabilities across their TWV 
fleets as they continue to adjust to the improvised explosive devices/ 
roadside bomb threats. M-ATV fulfills a short-term, joint, urgent 
operational need in support of current operations and JLTV is the long-
term solution for the joint services to replace the HMMWV. The 
strategies indicate that the services plan to recapitalize older 
HMMWVs in the inventory, integrate MRAPs, including M-ATVs, into their 
respective fleet mixes, and acquire JLTVs if costs and performance 
goals can be achieved. However, those assumptions could be affected by 
several forthcoming decisions and events, including those related to 
(1) the development of revised plans for continued production of new 
HMMWVs or recapitalization of older HMMWVs; (2) the availability of 
sufficient funds in the base budgets for the operation and support of 
those MRAP vehicles to be integrated into the service fleets; and (3) 
the extent to which the JLTV program can meet cost, schedule, and 
performance expectations. These events and decisions could change how 
and when the strategies are implemented as well as the specific 
composition of the TWV fleets in the coming years. 

Current Service Strategies Are Based on Four Tenets and Highlight Need 
for Affordability: 

The Army's October 2009 strategy reiterated that the 2008 Army and 
Marine Corps joint TWV investment strategy was based on four tenets: 

* Take maximum advantage of existing platforms by recapitalizing their 
platforms and introducing product improvements. 

* Plan for the integration of MRAP vehicles into the fleet mixes. 

* Emphasize a mixed fleet approach that spans the "iron triangle" of 
protection, payload, and performance. 

* Transition to a fleet of tactical vehicles that have scalable 
protection (integrated A-kit and add-on-armor B kits). 

Both services have also acknowledged that planning uncertainties 
included JLTV cost and performance, and emphasize the need for the 
adoption of TWV strategies that are affordable as a whole. The Army 
strategy states that in an era of constrained financial support and 
ever-increasing materiel costs, it will work to control cost growth 
and variant complexity within the TWV fleet. The Marine Corps strategy 
states that the underlying guidance for the strategy requires the 
fielding of an affordable fleet of ground combat and tactical vehicles 
that provide required capabilities and adequate capacity. Each of the 
underlying tenets, as well as the consideration of affordability, may 
be affected by one or more forthcoming events and decisions. 

Uncertainty about the Future of HMMWV Production and Recapitalization 
Programs: 

The first tenet of the respective Army and Marine Corps strategies is 
that the services would recapitalize existing platforms and introduce 
product improvements. In fiscal year 2010, the Army planned to 
reprogram approximately $560 million to the HMMWV Recapitalization 
program, $13 million to initiate a competitive effort to assess 
alternative solutions to recapitalize up-armored HMMWVs, and use the 
remaining funds to support other unspecified Army priorities. The 
HMMWV Recapitalization program converts older utility HMMWVs into 
upgraded configurations. Begun in 2004, approximately 30,000 vehicles 
have been recapitalized at a cost of approximately 35 percent of the 
value of a new production light-utility vehicle. The strategy also 
reported that the recapitalized vehicles are "like-new" and will serve 
the Army for an additional 15 years. In January 2010, the Army also 
began a pilot program to recapitalize up-armored HMMWVs to the same 
level of performance and protection as the newest production up-
armored HMMWVs. 

Subject to the approval of the requested reprogramming and the 
availability of funds, the Army planned to continue the 
recapitalization of nonarmored HMMWVs and the up-armored HMMWVs to 
ensure continued sustainment of the HMMWV fleet in the near term, and 
competitively procure and test prototypes that demonstrate 
survivability improvements that may be possible on the expanded- 
capability vehicle HMMWV chassis. However, because the Army's 
requested reprogramming action has been denied by the Congress, all 
recapitalization plans have been suspended pending the development of 
revised plans for the HMMWV production and recapitalization programs. 
Until the scope and cost of those plans are clarified, it may be 
difficult for the services to identify the funds that may be available 
to support other TWV needs, such as long-term funding for MRAP and M- 
ATV operations and support, and to define what they can afford in 
terms of JLTV procurement. 

Long-term Funding for MRAP and M-ATV Operations and Support: 

The second underlying tenet of the services' TWV strategies involves 
the planning for the integration of MRAP vehicles (including the M-
ATV) into the fleet mixes. By the end of fiscal year 2010, the Army 
and Marine Corps will have invested $35.7 billion to acquire the MRAP 
family of vehicles and most of these vehicles have been delivered to 
units operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, improved suspension 
systems have been added on some original MRAP vehicles to maintain 
acceptable levels of protection while improving automotive performance. 

In general, DOD considers the MRAP vehicle an important part of the 
tactical vehicle portfolios, but not one that replaces the need for 
other vehicles in the force structure, such as HMMWVs or JLTVs. 
Despite the significant investment in MRAP vehicles, it is not likely 
that MRAPs would be used to offset quantities of JLTVs, although MRAPs 
may be able to offset some quantities needed for route clearance, 
explosives ordinance disposal, and medical evacuation units. In 
addition, the continuation of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will 
influence the quantities of MRAP vehicles available for integration 
into the services' force structures, the pace of the integration, and 
the funding for operations and support costs by the services. 

The military services continue to refine their plans to integrate the 
M-ATV--and its predecessor, the MRAP--into the force structure. As of 
June 2010, the Army had more than 19,800 M-ATV and MRAP vehicles in 
the theater and in the continental United States. The Marine Corps has 
a combined MRAP and M-ATV fleet of about 3,300 vehicles. Both services 
acknowledge the potential operating and support costs as a factor that 
could affect implementation of their plans. Thus far, most of the cost 
to acquire, field, operate, and sustain the M-ATV and the MRAP has 
been funded through supplemental appropriations. However, beginning in 
2012, the services will likely assume at least part of the operation 
and sustainment costs for these vehicles, according to MRAP Joint 
Program Office officials. 

While the cost to operate and sustain the vehicles for their expected 
service life will depend on the military services' specific plans to 
integrate the vehicles into their force structures, the MRAP joint 
program office estimates that the cost to operate and maintain the 
vehicles through 2024 will be about $10.8 billion. With much of it 
currently funded out of supplemental appropriations, the services have 
expressed some concerns about their ability to fund operations and 
support costs for TWVs in the out years within base budget requests. 
For example, Marine Corps officials acknowledged that the projected 
cost to sustain their tactical vehicle fleet contributed to a decision 
to reduce the quantities of tactical vehicles by 30 percent over the 
next few years. A senior Army headquarters official told us that the 
Army would likely be requesting funds for sustainment in its overseas 
contingency operations budget request for fiscal year 2012 to 
supplement sustainment in its base budget. 

JLTV Identified as a Key Future Capability, but It Has Cost and 
Performance Uncertainties: 

The strategies' third and fourth tenets of rebalancing payload, 
performance, and scalable protection are intended to be provided by 
JLTV. Both the Army and Marine Corps TWV investment strategies 
identify JLTV as an important future capability. Both services have 
acknowledged that planning is complicated by current JLTV cost and 
performance uncertainties. The strategies recommend the scheduling of 
dates within the yet to be developed TWV Modernization Strategy by 
which current/legacy light tactical vehicles will no longer be 
procured and the procurement focus switched to JLTV variant 
production. The Army's October 2009 strategy identifies the JLTV Force 
Application vehicles as the objective solution for the armament 
carrier mission. The strategy states that this payload category is the 
Army's number one priority for development and fielding. However, as 
discussed previously, this category of JLTV vehicles is at risk of not 
meeting the transportability requirement due to their projected weight 
and the projected requirement for reliability is two to three times 
greater than other tactical vehicles. 

Implications for DOD-wide TWV Strategy: 

Last year, we reported that DOD does not have a comprehensive TWV 
investment strategy and concluded that the development of a strategy 
would be beneficial to DOD and the services in minimizing the 
potential for unplanned overlap or duplication.[Footnote 16] In 
commenting on the report, DOD stated that it plans to prepare a 
departmentwide strategy for making sound TWV investment decisions that 
it says will dovetail with the services' equipping strategies and will 
endeavor to align requirements, resources, and acquisition strategies 
into a unified plan. However, as of September 2010, DOD has not yet 
set a timetable for completing the strategy. 

In recommending such a strategy and implementation plan in 2009, we 
noted that DOD should: 

* assess and prioritize the capabilities and requirements of similar 
vehicles needed in the near and long term; 

* estimate the funding, time, and technologies that will be required 
to acquire, improve, and sustain these systems; 

* balance protection, payload, and performance needs with available 
resources, especially for light tactical vehicles; and: 

* identify contingencies in case there are development problems, 
delays with key systems, or funding constraints. 

There are several issues specific to TWVs which will likely influence 
the DOD-wide strategy. These include the near-term decisions and 
events related to the continued production or recapitalization of 
HMMWVs, the operational requirements for MRAPs (to include the M-ATV), 
and the projected cost and capabilities of the JLTV family of 
vehicles. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has recently announced 
several initiatives to free-up funds for modernization and to create 
efficiencies in programs. This is a contingency that may also have an 
influence on the DOD-wide strategy by reinforcing the need to minimize 
the potential for unplanned overlap or duplication. For example, up 
until now, the services have not considered the vehicles in the MRAP 
family--with the exception of some vehicles planned for use by route 
clearance, explosives ordinance disposal, and medical evacuation 
units--to offset the need for or replace other TWVs. Given the high 
potential cost of the JLTV, an offset could offer substantial savings, 
albeit with potential performance tradeoffs. To illustrate, a 5 
percent reduction in JLTV quantities could save nearly $2.5 billion, 
assuming a unit cost of $800,000; a 10 percent reduction could save 
nearly $5 billion. While the Army and Marine Corps have completed and 
continue to conduct engineering, cost, funding, and vehicle mix 
analyses, neither service has performed a formal cost-benefit analysis 
to consider savings from JLTV offsets or costs of increasing 
recapitalization of existing vehicles. 

Conclusions: 

The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing 
vehicles early and at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. Common to 
the success of the larger MRAP vehicles produced earlier, the M-ATV 
program did not have new technologies to develop. JLTV is a well-
structured program with desirable features, such as a competitive 
technology development phase with an incremental approach to fielding 
increasingly capable vehicles. Unlike the M-ATV and MRAP, JLTV has 
demanding requirements--to provide MRAP-like protection at HMMWV-like 
weight--that necessitate technological and engineering advances. It is 
less certain, then, that at the conclusion of the technology 
development phase, a JLTV solution will emerge that provides all of 
the performance required, yet stay within weight limits and deliver 
the desired high reliability. Before the decision can be made to 
proceed into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, the 
precursor to production, DOD may find that tradeoffs are necessary to 
match JLTV requirements with available resources (including time, 
money, and technical knowledge). 

The knowledge of what is achievable with JLTV should be in hand by 
late fiscal year 2011. Also, by that time, the services should have a 
better understanding of (1) the scope and cost of the HMMWV 
recapitalization or production effort, and (2) the placement of the 
MRAP family of vehicles in the services' force structures, including 
funding in base budgets for operating and support costs. To the extent 
the DOD-wide TWV strategy captures the knowledge gained from these 
activities, it can provide a sound guide for making near-term 
decisions that facilitate attainment of longer term objectives. In so 
doing, the DOD-wide strategy can help reconcile the aggregate 
affordability and other implications of these programs with the 
competing demands of the department. Specifically, any potential 
offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent they are 
supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition and 
support costs. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense: 

* Enhance the prospects for the successful outcome of the JLTV program 
by ensuring that the JLTV program clearly demonstrates at the 
Milestone B decision point that it has achieved a match between its 
requirements, particularly the transportability and reliability 
requirements, and available resources (technologies, funding, and 
schedule) before beginning its EMD phase. 

* Stage the timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures 
the knowledge gained during the year from the JLTV technology 
development phase, as well as from the decisions made on the HMMWV and 
MRAP programs. 

* Include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could minimize 
the collective acquisition and support costs of the various TWV 
programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. 
Such cost-benefit analysis should provide an estimate of dollar 
savings for various options for offsetting JLTV quantities in favor of 
recapitalizing existing vehicles. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In its comments on our draft report, DOD concurred with all of our 
recommendations. DOD's response is reprinted in appendix II. 

On our recommendation that the JLTV program clearly demonstrate that 
it has achieved a match between its requirements and available 
resources, DOD concurred and noted that this is a Milestone B 
requirement. We made the recommendation because the requirements for 
JLTV transportability and reliability are recognized risks and 
tradeoffs will be needed to achieve an appropriate balance of 
requirements and resources at the Milestone B decision point. Such 
tradeoffs will need to be supported by quantifiable evidence and 
rigorous analysis. 

Regarding our recommendation on the DOD-wide TWV strategy, DOD 
concurred, noting that the DOD-wide TWV strategy will not be limited 
to the JLTV, HMMWV, and MRAP vehicles and will leverage the Army TWV 
strategy to be released shortly. We agree that because of the size of 
its TWV fleet and acquisitions, it seems reasonable for DOD to 
leverage knowledge from the Army strategy. However, in the end, it is 
essential for DOD to ensure that the services' desire to have the most 
modern, capable TWVs is balanced with fiscal realities. 

On our final recommendation that calls for cost-benefit analyses to 
reduce the risk of unplanned overlap and duplication among the TWV 
programs, DOD concurred and stated that the JLTV program is conducting 
an Analysis of Alternatives that explores potential offsets to JLTV 
quantities, including those related to the placement of MRAPs in 
authorized brigades. DOD also notes that the recapitalization of 
existing vehicles is a major component of an affordable TWV strategy. 
We appreciate DOD's initiatives to manage its TWV portfolio in a 
balanced and affordable manner. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 
Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that 
have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also 
send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and 
Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Major contributors to this report included 
William Graveline, Assistant Director; Dayna Foster; Danny Owens; Bob 
Swierczek; Hai Tran; Paul Williams; and Marie Ahearn. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy for and 
progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), we obtained and reviewed 
program documents and held discussions with system developers, 
acquisition officials, and contractor representatives. To determine 
the cost of M-ATV, we obtained and reviewed cost estimates and held 
discussions with program officials. To determine the challenges that 
remain for the M-ATV program, we held discussions with system 
developers, acquisition officials, and technologists. Discussions were 
held with officials from Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, Arlington, Virginia; Army Tank and Automotive 
Command, Research, Development and Engineering Center, Warren, 
Michigan; Defense Contract Management Agency, Oshkosh, Wisconsin; 
Joint MRAP Vehicle Program Office, Stafford, Virginia; Marine Corps 
Combat Development Center, Quantico, Virginia; Marine Corps Systems 
Command, Quantico, Virginia; and Oshkosh Corporation, Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin. To determine the demonstrated performance of the M-ATV, we 
obtained and reviewed test reports and held discussions with officials 
from the Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Test Center, 
Aberdeen, Maryland; and the National Ground Intelligence Center, 
Charlottesville, Virginia. 

To determine the expected features of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 
(JLTV) as it moves toward Milestone B in fiscal year 2011, we obtained 
and reviewed updated program documents and held discussions with Army 
and Marine Corps acquisition and test officials. Using comparison data 
provided by Army officials, we prepared a table comparing JLTV's 
expected features and cost with those of the M-ATV and current 
generation High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle. We held 
discussions with officials from the Army, Program Manager, Tactical 
Vehicles, Warren, Michigan; Army, Product Manager, Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan; and the 
Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, 
Maryland. 

To determine the extent to which current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are 
consistent with Army and Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicle 
investment strategies, we obtained and reviewed updated strategies and 
held discussions with DOD, Army, and Marine Corps officials. 
Discussions were held with officials from the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; 
Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G8, Arlington, Virginia; 
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and Marine Corps Systems Command, 
Quantico, Virginia. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to November 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 	
3010 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3010: 

November 2, 2010: 
		
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-11-83, "Defense Acquisitions: Issues To Be Considered as 
DoD Modernizes Its Fleet of Tactical Vehicles," dated September 21, 
2010 (GAO Code 120854). 

The Department concurs with the three recommendations. The rationale 
for our position is enclosed. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point 
of contact for this effort is Ms. Deb Struck, Deborah.Struck@osd.mil, 
571-256-4195. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Darlene Costello, for: 

David G. Ahern: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated September 21, 2010: 
GAO-11-83 (GAO Code 120854): 

"Defense Acquisitions: Issues To Be Considered As DOD Modernizes
Its Fleet Of Tactical Vehicles" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense:
Enhance the prospects for the successful outcome of the JLTV program 
by ensuring that the JLTV program clearly demonstrates at the 
Milestone B decision point that it has achieved a match between its 
requirement, particularly the transportability and reliability 
requirements, and available resources (technologies, funding, and 
schedule) before beginning its engineering and manufacturing 
development phase. 

DOD Response: Concur. This is a Milestone B requirement. 

Recommendation 2: Stage the timing of the DoD-wide TWV strategy so 
that it captures the knowledge gained during the year from the JLTV 
technology development phase, as well as from the decisions made on 
the HMMWV and MRAP programs. 

DOD Response: Concur. The DoD-wide TWV strategy will not be limited to 
the JLTV, HIVIMWV and MRAP vehicles and will leverage the Army TWV 
Strategy to be released shortly. 

Recommendation 3: Include in the DoD-wide TWV strategy "a cost-benefit 
analysis that could minimize the collective acquisition and support 
costs of the various TWV programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned 
overlap or duplication. Such cost-benefit analysis should provide an 
estimate of dollar saving for various options for offsetting JLTV 
quantities in favor of recapitalizing existing vehicles." 

DOD Response: Concur. The JLTV program is conducting an Analysis of 
Alternatives that explores potential offsets to JLTV quantities. The 
analysis includes several studies that will be looking at the 
placement of MRAPs in authorized Brigades, further reducing the total 
requirement for JLTVs. The Army's TWV Strategy and TWV Acquisition 
Strategy report to Congress both recognize the recapitalization of 
existing vehicles is a major component of an affordable TWV Strategy. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For a more detailed description of Category I, II, and III 
vehicles, see GAO, Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Vehicles, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-884R] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2008). 

[2] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs a Unified 
Strategy for Balancing Investments in Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-968R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2009). 

[3] The M-ATV vehicles, like MRAPs, are purchased without mission 
equipment--such as communications and situational awareness 
subsystems--which must be added before the vehicles can be fielded to 
the user. The military services buy the subsystems for their vehicles 
and provide them as government-furnished equipment (GFE) to be 
installed at a government integration facility located at the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command in Charleston, South Carolina. 

[4] This cost reflects the M-ATV only and does not include funds 
already expended on earlier versions of the MRAP or the estimated cost 
to operate and support MRAP for the expected life of the vehicle. 

[5] Successful development test and evaluation to assess technical 
progress against critical technical parameters, early operational 
assessments, and where proven capabilities exist, the use of modeling 
and simulation to demonstrate system integration are critical prior to 
beginning production. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

[6] Operational testing took place in the second and third weeks of 
December 2009. 

[7] Specific details on performance cannot be addressed in this report 
due to security classification. 

[8] DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

[9] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Decisions Needed to Shape Army's Combat 
Systems for the Future, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-288] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 
2009). 

[10] The teams are BAE Systems Land & Armaments, Ground Systems 
Division; General Tactical Vehicles, a joint venture between General 
Dynamics Land Systems and AM General; and Lockheed Martin Systems 
Integration. 

[11] The HMMWV has evolved since its initial introduction in 1984 to 
add greater protection against improvised explosive devices. The UAH/ 
ECV is a newer version of the HMMWV. 

[12] The services have not yet identified specific critical 
technologies for JLTV. They have identified technology categories for 
each of the key performance parameters. For example, the underbody 
armor technology category has been associated with the 
transportability critical performance parameter. 

[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010) and Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must 
Balance Its Needs with Available Resources and Follow an Incremental 
Approach to Acquiring Weapon Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-431T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 
2009). 

[14] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership is Key to Planning 
and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-522] (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 
2010). 

[15] The specific government-furnished equipment to be used in JLTV 
has not yet been determined. 

[16] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs a Unified 
Strategy for Balancing Investments in Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-968R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2009). 

[End of section] 

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