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entitled 'Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2010: 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key 
Users: 

GAO-10-799: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-799, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), is to procure the next generation of 
geostationary operational environmental satellites, called 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. 
The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, 
which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 
approximately 2015. This new series is considered critical to the 
United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
weather forecasting through the year 2028. 

GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R acquisition; 
(2) evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans 
in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES 
data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate with them 
about the program’s status. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and 
program data and interviewed officials from NOAA, NASA, and other 
federal agencies that rely on GOES data. 

What GAO Found: 

NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but key instruments 
have experienced challenges and important milestones have been 
delayed. The GOES-R program awarded key contracts for its flight and 
ground projects, and these are in development. However, two 
instruments have experienced technical issues that led to contract 
cost increases, and significant work remains on other development 
efforts. In addition, since 2006, the launch dates of the first two 
satellites in the series have been delayed by about 3 years. As a 
result, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup 
satellite in orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in coverage 
if GOES-14 or GOES-15 fails prematurely (see graphic). 

Figure: Potential Gap in GOES Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES-13: 
Launch date: 2006; 
Post launch test period: 2006; 
Available as backup: 2007-2010; 
Operational period: 2010-2015. 

GOES-14: 
Launch date: 2009; 
Post launch test period: 2009; 
Available as backup: 201--2011; 
Operational period: 2012-2016. 

GOES-15: 
Launch date: 2010; 
Post launch test period: 2010; 
Available as backup: 2010-2015; 
Operational period: 2015-2020. 

GOES-R: 
Launch date: 2015; 
Post launch test period: 2015; 
Available as backup: 2016; 
Operational period: 2017-2020. 

GOES-S: 
Launch date: 2017; 
Post launch test period: 2017; 
Available as backup: 2017-2020; 
Operational period: 2020. 

Projected gap in backup coverage: Early 2015 through early 2016. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

Even though there may be a gap in backup coverage, NOAA has not 
established adequate continuity plans for its geostationary 
satellites. To its credit, NOAA has established a policy to always 
have a backup satellite available and high-level plans if that policy 
is not met. Specifically, in the event of a satellite failure with no 
backup available, NOAA plans to reduce to a single satellite and, if 
available, rely on a satellite from an international partner. However, 
NOAA does not have plans that include processes, procedures, and 
resources needed to transition to a single or an international 
satellite. Without such plans, NOAA faces an increased risk that users 
will lose access to critical data. 

While NOAA has identified GOES data users and involved internal users 
in developing and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, it has not 
adequately involved other federal users that rely on GOES data. 
Specifically, NOAA’s processes for developing and prioritizing 
satellite requirements do not include documented input from other 
federal agencies. Further, since 2006, the GOES-R program has 
undergone significant changes (such as the removal of certain 
satellite data products), but these have not been communicated to 
federal agencies. Until improvements are made in NOAA’s processes for 
involving key federal users, these users may not be able to meet 
mission requirements. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that NOAA address weaknesses in its continuity 
plans and improve its processes for involving other federal agencies. 
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Secretary of Commerce 
agreed with GAO’s recommendations and identified plans for 
implementing them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-799]. For more 
information, contact David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

GOES-R Is in Development, but Delays in Key Program Milestones Have 
Endangered Satellite Continuity: 

NOAA Has Not Established Adequate Continuity Plans for Its 
Geostationary Satellites: 

NOAA's Efforts to Involve External GOES Data Users, Prioritize Their 
Data Needs, and Communicate Program Status Have Shortfalls: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES: 

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006: 

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program: 

Table 4: Description of Flight Project Development Efforts, as of June 
2010: 

Table 5: Description of Ground Project Development Efforts, as of June 
2010: 

Table 6: Status of Flight Project, as of June 2010: 

Table 7: Status of Ground Project, as of June 2010: 

Table 8: Delays in Satellite Launch Dates: 

Table 9: Key GOES Data Users: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage: 

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern: 

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing: 

Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Development 
Efforts, as of June 2010: 

Figure 5: Continuity of Satellite Operations: 

Figure 6: Approximate Geographic Coverage in a Single GOES 
Configuration: 

Figure 7: Nine Current Satellite Products Removed from the GOES-R 
Program Baseline: 

Abbreviations: 

GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NESDIS: National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information 
Service: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NWS: National Weather Service: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 1, 2010: 

The Honorable Bart Gordon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ralph Hall:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Brad Miller:
Chairman:
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr.
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives: 

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical 
role in our nation's weather forecasting. These satellites--which are 
managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)--provide critical information on 
atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help 
meteorologists observe and predict global and local weather events. 
They also provide a means to identify severe storm conditions, such as 
hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track the movement and intensity of 
these storms once they develop. 

NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of 
geostationary satellites, called the Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series is to 
replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to 
reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2015. This new 
series is expected to mark the first major technological advance in 
GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered critical to the 
United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 
weather forecasting through the year 2028. 

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA's management 
of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine 
the status of the GOES-R acquisition, including cost, schedule, and 
performance trends; (2) evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate 
contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA's 
efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and 
communicate with them about the program's status. 

To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program 
documents, including acquisition plans, contractor performance reports 
on development efforts, and executive briefings. To evaluate whether 
NOAA has established contingency plans, we compared NOAA's contingency 
planning documentation to federal requirements and industry best 
practices and also met with key GOES data users to determine the 
potential impact of NOAA's plans on their data needs. To determine the 
adequacy of NOAA's efforts to identify GOES users, prioritize their 
data needs, and communicate program status, we compared relevant 
program documents, including acquisition plans, user requirements, and 
GOES user group meeting minutes, to industry best practices. We also 
interviewed key users of GOES data to determine whether NOAA's efforts 
to prioritize their data needs and communicate program status and 
changes were adequate. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental 
satellites have been used by the United States to provide 
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and 
forecasting. NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 
Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the civilian 
operational geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two 
separate programs, called GOES and the Polar-orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellites, respectively. 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in 
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a 
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in 
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily 
focused on the United States (see figure 1). These satellites are 
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data about the 
earth's atmosphere, surface, cloud cover, and the space environment to 
meteorologists and their audiences. They also observe the development 
of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and 
track their movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of 
property and life. Furthermore, the satellites' ability to provide 
broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric conditions over 
land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather forecasting operations. 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Illustration depicts the coverage and overlap of coverage of GOES-East 
and GOES-West. 

Sources: NOAA (data), MapArt (map). 

[End of figure] 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 
every few years (see table 1).[Footnote 1] NOAA's policy is to have 
two operational satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all 
times. 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES: 

Series name: Original GOES[B]; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987; 
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

Series name: GOES I-M; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001; 
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 

Series name: GOES-N; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2010; 
Satellites: 13, 14, 15, Q[C]. 

Series name: GOES-R; 
Procurement duration[A]: 2008-2017; 
Satellites: R, S. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite 
launch. 

[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate 
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES- 
2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and 
GOES-7. 

[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

[End of table] 

Five GOES satellites--GOES-11, GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15--
are currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-13 are operational 
satellites, with GOES-11 covering the west and GOES-13 the east. GOES- 
14 is currently a backup for the other two satellites should they 
experience any degradation in service. The final satellite in the 
series, GOES-15, is undergoing a post-launch test period until October 
2010, at which time it will also be put in on-orbit storage mode. GOES-
12 is at the end of its service life, but is being used to provide 
coverage of South America. The GOES-R series is the next generation of 
satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned for 
launch beginning in 2015. 

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously 
transmits raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are 
processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the 
satellite for broadcast to primary weather services and the global 
research community in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed 
data are also distributed to users via ground stations through other 
communication channels, such as dedicated private communication lines 
and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from 
the geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial 
terminals. 

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Depicted on the illustration: 

GOES satellite: 
Raw environmental data sent to ground station; 
Processed environmental data sent back to GOES; 
Processed environmental data broadcast to users. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

Overview of the GOES-R Program: 

NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of 
prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The 
system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user 
requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing 
satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements 
are expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of 
the observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire 
six different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these 
instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral 
Environmental Suite--were considered to be the most critical because 
they would provide data for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes 
the originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities. 

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006: 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key 
features include: 
* monitoring and tracking severe weather; 
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and; 
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 
simultaneously. 

Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite[A]; 
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface 
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key 
features include: 
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles of the 
rapidly evolving pre-storm convective environment to support forecasts 
and warnings of high-impact weather phenomena; 
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, 
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms; and; 
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor total lightning (in-
cloud and cloud-to-ground) activity over the United States and 
adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete dataset than previously 
possible. Key features include: 
* detecting lightning activity as an indicator of severe storms and 
convective weather hazard impacts to aviation, and; 
* providing a new capability to GOES for long-term mapping of total 
lightning that only previously existed on NASA low-earth-orbiting 
research satellites. 

Planned instrument: Magnetometer; 
Description: Expected to provide information on the general level of 
geomagnetic activity, monitor current systems in space, and permit 
detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm commencements, and 
substorms. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid 
in the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance 
and disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key 
features include: 
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles; 
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons 
and protons; and; 
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite[B]; 
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range 
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well 
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features 
include: 
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor 
solar storms, and; 
* providing improved imager capability. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled in September 
2006. 

[B] The Solar Imaging Suite was divided into two separate 
acquisitions, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and the Extreme 
Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor. 

[End of table] 

However, in September 2006, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and 
technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations 
that total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, 
could reach $11.4 billion.[Footnote 2] Specifically, NOAA reduced the 
minimum number of satellites from four to two, canceled plans for 
developing the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the 
number of planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the 
Solar Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. In light of the 
cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, NOAA decided to 
use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop certain satellite 
data products that were originally to be produced by this instrument. 
The agency estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion. 

Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the 
cost and scope of the GOES-R program.[Footnote 3] In May 2007, NOAA 
had an independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. 
After reconciling the program office's cost estimate of $7 billion 
with the independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency 
established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an 
increase of $670 million from the previous estimate. Further, in 
November 2007, to mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program 
officials decided to remove selected program requirements from the 
baseline program and treat them as contract options that could be 
exercised if funds allow. These requirements include the number of 
products to be distributed, the time to deliver the remaining products 
(product latency), and how often these products are updated with new 
satellite data (refresh rate). For example, program officials 
eliminated the requirement to develop and distribute 34 of the 68 
envisioned products, including aircraft icing threat, turbulence, and 
visibility. Program officials included the restoration of the 
products, latency, and refresh rates as options in the ground system 
contract that could be acquired at a later time. Program officials 
later reduced the number of products that could be restored as a 
contract option (called option 2) from 34 to 31 because they 
determined that two products were no longer feasible and two others 
could be combined into a single product. See table 3 below for an 
overview of key changes to the GOES-R program. 

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program: 

Baseline program, as of August 2006: 
Number of satellites: 4; 
Instruments: 
2 critical instruments: 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
* Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
4 noncritical instruments/suites: 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Imaging Suite (which included the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, 
and Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor); 
Number of satellite products: 81; 
Life-cycle cost estimate (in then year dollars): $6.2 billion-$11.4 
billion (through 2034). 

Revised program, as of September 2006: 
Number of satellites: 2; 
Instruments: 
1 critical instrument: 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
5 noncritical instruments/suites: 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
* Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Number of satellite products: 68; 
Life-cycle cost estimate (in then year dollars): $7 billion (through 
2028). 

Current program: 
Number of satellites: 2; 
Instruments: 
1 critical instrument: 
* Advanced Baseline Imager; 
5 noncritical instruments/suites: 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
* Magnetometer; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
* Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
* Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor.
Number of satellite products: 34 baseline; 31 optional;
Life-cycle cost estimate (in then year dollars): $7.67 billion 
(through 2028). 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

Acquisition Strategy: 

NOAA's original acquisition strategy was to award contracts for 
concept development of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would 
subsequently compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for 
overall system development and production. In keeping with this 
strategy, NOAA awarded contracts for concept development of the 
overall GOES-R system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in 
March 2007, NOAA revised its acquisition strategy for the development 
contract. In response to recommendations by independent advisors, the 
agency decided to separate the overall system development and 
production contract into two separate contracts--the spacecraft and 
ground system contracts. 

In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing 
technically advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for concept 
development for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently 
awarded development contracts for five instruments and, upon 
completion and approval by NASA, these instruments will be provided to 
the prime contractor responsible for the spacecraft of the GOES-R 
program. NASA will then work with the spacecraft contractor to 
integrate and test these instruments. The sixth instrument, the 
Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract. 

Program Office Structure: 

NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall 
mission success. However, since it relies on NASA's acquisition 
experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its 
programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management structure 
with NASA for the GOES-R program (see figure 3). NOAA also located the 
program office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the 
program office, there are two project offices that manage key 
components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and 
ground system project offices. The Flight Project Office, managed by 
NASA, is responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract 
and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground 
System Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground 
System contract and satellite data product development and 
distribution. 

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: staffing chart] 

Top level: Commerce and NASA. 

Second level, reports to Commerce: 
NOAA; 
Communication with: NOAA Program Management Council. 

Third level, reports to NOAA: National Environmental Satellite, Data, 
and Information Service; 
Communication with: 
Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council; 
NOAA Program Management Council; 

Third level, reports to NASA: Goddard Space Flight Center Management 
Council. 

Fourth level, reports to National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 
Information Service: GOES-R Program: System Program Director: NOAA; 
Deputy System Program Director: NASA; Assistant System Program 
Director: NOAA; 
Communication with: 
Program Scientist: NOAA; 
Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council. 

Fourth level, reports to National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 
Information Service: Program Scientist: NOAA. 

Fifth level, reports to GOES-R Program: 
Program Control Lead: NOAA; 
Program Mission Assurance Lead: NASA; 
Program Systems Engineering Lead: NASA; 
Contracts Lead: NOAA; 
Flight Project: Project Manager: NASA; Deputy: NOAA; 
Ground System Project: Project Manager: NOAA; Deputy: NASA. 

Source: NOAA. Program Scientist: NOAA 

[End of figure] 

Prior Report Noted Challenges with Instrument Development and 
Recommended Steps to Improve Management and Oversight: 

In April 2009, we reported that a key instrument had experienced 
technical challenges that led to cost overruns and schedule delays. 
[Footnote 4] Specifically, the Advanced Baseline Imager experienced 
problems with the quality of components in the focal plane module, 
mirrors, and telescope. As of November 2008, the contractor had 
incurred a cost overrun of approximately $30 million and delayed $11 
million worth of work. In addition, we found that the contractors for 
both the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning 
Mapper programs had not documented all of the reasons for cost and 
schedule variances in certain cost reports. At the time, we 
recommended that NOAA improve its ability to oversee contractor 
performance by ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule 
variances are fully disclosed and documented. Over the past year, NOAA 
has improved its ability to oversee contractor performance by, for 
example, ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are 
fully documented in contractor monthly variance reports. 

In that same report, we also found that NOAA had delayed key GOES-R 
program milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, which 
was delayed from December 2014 to April 2015. Program officials 
attributed these delays to providing more stringent oversight before 
releasing the request for proposals for the spacecraft and ground 
system, additional time needed to evaluate the contract proposals, and 
funding reductions in fiscal year 2008. We reported that, as a result 
of these delays, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a 
backup satellite in orbit at all times. Specifically, in 2015, NOAA 
expected to have two operational satellites in orbit, but it would not 
have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. As a 
result, any further delays in the launch of the first satellite in the 
GOES-R program would increase the risk of gaps in satellite coverage. 

GOES-R Is in Development, but Delays in Key Program Milestones Have 
Endangered Satellite Continuity: 

The GOES-R program has continued to make progress in the development 
of its major projects, but key instruments have experienced technical 
issues and significant work remains to be completed. Further, key 
program milestones, including the launch dates for the first two 
satellites in the series, have been further delayed. As a result, NOAA 
may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in 
orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if 
an existing satellite fails prematurely. 

Progress Continues to Be Made on GOES-R Procurement, but Much Work 
Remains to Be Completed on the Flight and Ground Projects: 

NOAA and NASA have made progress on the procurement of its two major 
projects--the flight project and the ground project. The flight 
project includes contracts for the development of the five key 
instruments and spacecraft[Footnote 5] while the ground project 
includes contracts for the development of key systems needed for the 
on-orbit operation of the satellites, receipt and processing of 
information, and distribution of satellite data products to users. 

For the flight project, between September 2004 and December 2008, the 
GOES-R program awarded contracts for the five key instruments and 
spacecraft. The contractors are making progress in completing key 
milestones in developing these components. However, due to bid 
protests of the award of the spacecraft contract in December 2008, 
work on the contract did not begin until August 2009. As a result of 
these delays, NOAA later approved a 6-month delay in the launch date 
for the first satellite (GOES-R), from April 2015 to October 2015, and 
the second satellite (GOES-S), from August 2016 to February 2017. 
Program officials stated that the estimated program life-cycle cost 
estimate remains steady at $7.67 billion. Table 4 describes the 
development contracts for the flight project, including their contract 
award date, and their cost and schedule estimates. 

Table 4: Description of Flight Project Development Efforts, as of June 
2010: 

Instruments: 

Flight project component: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the Earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover; 
Contract award date: Sept. 2004; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $255 million. 

Flight project component: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid 
in the prediction of disturbances and disruptions of radio 
communications and navigation systems; 
Contract award date: Aug. 2006; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $51 million. 

Flight project component: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Description: Expected to provide real-time measurement of solar 
activity in the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-ray spectrum; 
Contract award date: Aug. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $55 million. 

Flight project component: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Description: Expected to observe the sun's ultraviolet emissions and 
provide early detection and location of flares and coronal mass 
ejections; 
Contract award date: Sept. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: Oct. 2012; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $112 million. 

Flight project component: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over 
the United States and adjacent oceans; 
Contract award date: Dec. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: Sept. 2012; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $58 million. 

Flight project component: Spacecraft; 
Description: Expected to provide the platform for instruments and 
communication systems. The spacecraft contract also includes 
development of the sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, which is 
expected to measure the magnitude and direction of the Earth's 
magnetic field; 
Contract award date: Dec. 2008; 
Scheduled completion date: Sept. 2015; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $691 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

For the ground project, a contract for one of three key subcomponents, 
the Core Ground System, was awarded in May 2009, and contracts for the 
two other subcomponents are planned to be awarded in July 2010. The 
Core Ground System is of critical importance because it provides for 
command and control and ground processing capabilities for GOES-R 
satellites and instruments. Table 5 describes the development 
contracts for the ground project, including their contract award date, 
and their cost and schedule estimates, while figure 4 depicts the 
schedule for both the overall GOES-R program as well as the flight and 
ground projects. 

Table 5: Description of Ground Project Development Efforts, as of June 
2010: 

Ground project component: Core Ground System; 
Description: Expected to (1) provide command and control of GOES-R 
satellites and instruments, (2) receive and process information from 
the instruments and spacecraft, and (3) distribute satellite data 
products to users; 
Contract award date: May 2009; 
Scheduled completion date: Sept. 2015; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): $615 million. 

Ground project component: GOES-R Access Subsystem; 
Description: Expected to provide ingestion of data and distribution 
for GOES-R products and data to authorized users. When completed, this 
subsystem will be integrated into the Core Ground System; 
Contract award date: Planned July 2010; 
Scheduled completion date: Planned June 2016; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): n/a. 

Ground project component: Antennas; 
Description: Expected to provide six new antenna stations and modify 
four existing antennas to receive GOES-R data. The antenna contract is 
also expected to include the construction of related infrastructure, 
software development for control systems, and maintenance; 
Contract award date: Planned July 2010; 
Scheduled completion date: Planned June 2016; 
Original contract cost (excludes award fees): n/a. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Development 
Efforts, as of June 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Program start: 2003; 
Key instruments complete: 2012; 
GOES-R launch: 2015; 
GOES-S launch: 2017; 
Program end: 2028. 

Flight project: Key instruments: 
* Advanced Baseline Imager: 2004-2012; 
* Space Environmental In-Situ Suite: 2006-2012; 
* Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor: 2007-2012; 
* Solar Ultraviolet Imager: 2007-2012; 
* Geostationary Lightning Mapper: 2007-2012; 
* Spacecraft: 2008-2015. 

Ground project: 
* Core Ground System: 2009-2015; 
* GOES-R Access Subsystem: 2010-2016; 
* Antennas: 2010-2016. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

Flight Project--Progress Made, but Two Instruments Have Experienced 
Technical Challenges: 

The GOES-R program has continued to make progress on the development 
of the spacecraft and five key instruments. After starting work on the 
spacecraft contract in August 2009, the contractor worked to establish 
the initial cost and schedule baseline and completed a key program 
milestone intended to demonstrate that the spacecraft concept meets 
mission requirements. The contractor is currently conducting 
preliminary design activities and plans to assess the readiness of the 
program to proceed with detailed design activities in January 2011. In 
addition, three instruments, the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance 
Sensor, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager, and the Space Environmental In- 
Situ Suite have recently completed critical design reviews. Completion 
of this review is intended to demonstrate that the instruments' 
detailed design is appropriate to support proceeding to full-scale 
fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing. 

Two other instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and the 
Geostationary Lightning Mapper--have experienced significant technical 
issues, which have resulted in cost increases and schedule delays to 
the contractors' performance baselines. The Advanced Baseline Imager 
program has experienced technical issues primarily related to 
underestimating the design and development complexity of two 
components--the focal planes and telescope, which led to cost 
increases and delays in developing the prototype model. As a result, 
in September 2009, the program office rebaselined the cost and 
schedule targets of the Advanced Baseline Imager program.[Footnote 6] 
This increased contract costs from the most recent estimate of $375 
million to $537 million, an increase of $162 million, and delayed the 
completion of the prototype model from March 2010 to December 2010. 
Program officials reported that the rebaseline did not affect the 
instrument's completion date and that they have sufficient contingency 
reserves to address the cost overruns experienced to date, meaning 
that these system-specific cost overruns will not affect the overall 
GOES-R program's cost.[Footnote 7] The program is currently testing 
the prototype model and plans to conduct an updated critical design 
review in January 2011 to validate any required design changes as a 
result of testing.[Footnote 8] 

The Geostationary Lightning Mapper experienced technical issues 
primarily related to underestimating the design complexity of the 
instrument, as well as an architecture change that significantly 
increased the electronics design and fabrication cost. As a result, in 
March 2010, the program office rebaselined the cost and schedule 
targets of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper program, which increased 
contract costs from $71 million to $157 million, an increase of about 
$86 million, and delayed the contract completion from June 2012 to 
September 2012--a 3-month delay.[Footnote 9] According to GOES-R 
program officials, contingency funds are available to cover these 
changes and they will not affect the overall cost or schedule of the 
GOES-R program. In addition, the program replaced the development of a 
prototype model with an engineering development unit, which requires 
less rigorous development procedures and testing requirements. For 
example, the planned engineering development unit is not required to 
undergo comprehensive environmental testing to validate that the 
instrument will meet mission objectives in the launch and space 
environment. According to GOES-R program officials, this decision was 
made to reduce program risk because the schedule for development of 
the prototype model and production model would have otherwise 
overlapped--thus reducing the inherent benefits of a prototype model. 
However, the lack of a prototype model increases the risk that design 
issues that would have been identified during more comprehensive 
testing will surface in the production model, when it is too late to 
make changes. 

The status and program-identified risk level of each of the components 
of the flight project is described in table 6. 

Table 6: Status of Flight Project, as of June 2010: 

Instruments: 

Component: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Status: This instrument was rebaselined in September 2009 due to 
continued technical issues related to underestimating the design and 
development complexity of two components--the focal planes and 
telescope. Currently, the program is testing a prototype model, which 
is planned to be completed in October 2010. An updated critical design 
review is planned for December 2010. This instrument is to be 
delivered for integration on the spacecraft by June 2012; 
Program-identified risk level:
Cost: low; 
Schedule: medium; 
Technical: low. 

Component: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Status: This instrument completed a critical design review in June 
2010 and is currently conducting development and testing activities. 
This instrument is to be delivered for integration on the spacecraft 
by June 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Component: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Status: This instrument completed a critical design review in November 
2009 and is currently conducting development and testing activities. 
This instrument is to be delivered for integration on the spacecraft 
by June 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Component: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Status: This instrument completed a critical design review in December 
2009 and is conducting development and testing activities. This 
instrument is to be delivered for integration on the spacecraft by 
October 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Component: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Status: This instrument was rebaselined in March 2010 due to technical 
issues related to underestimating the design complexity of the 
instrument. Currently, the program is conducting development and 
testing activities. A critical design review is planned for November 
2010. This instrument is to be delivered for integration on the 
spacecraft by September 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: medium; 
Technical: medium. 

Component: Spacecraft; 
Status: Due to protests of the contract award, the start of the 
spacecraft contract was delayed 8 months to August 2009. Subsequently, 
the contractor worked to establish the initial cost and schedule 
baseline and completed a key program milestone intended to demonstrate 
that the spacecraft concept meets mission requirements. A preliminary 
design review for the spacecraft is planned for January 2011. The 
spacecraft is planned to be completed by September 2015; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Sources: NOAA and NASA data. 

[End of table] 

Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data 
[Footnote 10] showed that most components of the flight project were 
on track between May 2009 and April 2010. Specifically, contractors 
for three instruments--the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance 
Sensor, the Space Environmental In-Situ Suite, and the Solar 
Ultraviolet Imager--and the spacecraft are generally meeting cost and 
schedule targets. The other two instruments, the Advanced Baseline 
Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, are meeting their 
revised cost and schedule targets since completing their rebaselining 
efforts in September 2009 and March 2010, respectively. 

Ground Project--Development Is Under Way, but Important Work Remains 
to Be Done: 

Development of the ground project is under way. After awarding the 
contract for the Core Ground System in May 2009, the contractor has 
been conducting system definition activities and plans to conduct a 
preliminary design review in February 2011 to assess the readiness of 
the program to proceed with detailed design activities. 

However, the awards of two additional ground project contracts have 
been delayed and important work remains to be completed. For example, 
contract award for the GOES-R Access Subsystem has slipped 6 months, 
from January 2010 to July 2010. These delays were due, in part, to 
delays in releasing the request for proposals. Award of the antennas 
contract has also been delayed by 3 months. Both contracts are 
critical to ensuring that GOES-R data are received, stored, and 
distributed to users. The status and program-identified risk level of 
each of the components of the ground project is described in table 7. 

Table 7: Status of Ground Project, as of June 2010: 

Component: Core Ground System; 
Status: After the contract award for this system in May 2009, the 
contractor has been conducting system definition activities and plans 
to conduct a preliminary design review in February 2011. A critical 
design review is planned for September 2011; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Component: GOES-R Access Subsystem; 
Status: Originally planned for award in January 2010, this contract is 
scheduled to be awarded in July 2010--a delay of about 6 months. These 
delays were due, in part, to delays in releasing the request for 
proposals. The GOES-R Access Subsystem is planned for completion in 
June 2016; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Component: Antennas; 
Status: This contract was originally planned for award in April 2010 
but has been delayed to July 2010. According to program officials, 
these delays are due, in part, to delays in developing the system's 
requirements and releasing the request for proposals. GOES-R antennas 
are expected to be completed by June 2016; 
Program-identified risk level: 
Cost: low; 
Schedule: low; 
Technical: low. 

Sources: NOAA and NASA data. 

[End of table] 

Our analysis of contractor-provided earned value management data for 
the Core Ground System indicates that cost and schedule performance 
were generally on track between June 2009 and April 2010. Between 
these dates, the contractor for the Core Ground System completed work 
slightly under budget. 

Continued Delays in Launch Dates Put the Continuity of Satellite 
Operations at Risk: 

Over the last few years, NOAA has delayed the satellite launch dates 
several times. We previously reported that, since 2006, the launch of 
the first satellite had been delayed from September 2012 to April 2015-
-a slip of more than 30 months.[Footnote 11] These delays were due, in 
part, to delays in releasing the requests for proposals for the 
spacecraft and Core Ground System and additional time needed to 
evaluate the contract proposals. Since our last report, NOAA further 
delayed key GOES-R program milestones by 6 months, including the dates 
when the first two satellites in the series would be available for 
launch. These recent delays were due to bid protests of the award of 
the spacecraft contract in December 2008, which delayed the start of 
work until August 2009. In order to allow sufficient time for the 72- 
month development cycle required for the spacecraft, NOAA approved a 6-
month delay in the launch dates for the first two satellites in the 
series. Table 8 identifies the delays in the satellite launch dates 
over time. 

Table 8: Delays in Satellite Launch Dates: 

First satellite launch (GOES-R); 
As of June 2006: Sept. 2012; 
As of July 2007: Dec. 2014; 
As of March 2009: Apr. 2015; 
As of November 2009: Oct. 2015. 

Second satellite launch (GOES-S); 
As of June 2006: Apr. 2014; 
As of July 2007: Apr. 2016; 
As of March 2009: Aug. 2016; 
As of November 2009: Feb. 2017. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

While NOAA's policy is to have two operational satellites and one 
backup satellite in orbit at all times, continued delays in the launch 
of the first GOES-R satellite could lead to a gap in satellite 
coverage. This policy proved useful in December 2008, when NOAA 
experienced problems with GOES-12, but was able to use GOES-13 as an 
operational satellite until the problems were resolved. However, 
beginning in April 2015, NOAA expects to have two operational 
satellites in orbit (GOES-14 and GOES-15), but it will not have a 
backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched and completes an 
estimated 6-month post-launch test period--resulting in a 12-month gap 
during which time a backup satellite would not be available. Figure 5 
below depicts this gap in backup coverage. 

Figure 5: Continuity of Satellite Operations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES-13: 
Launch date: 2006; 
Post launch test period: 2006; 
Available as backup: 2007-2010; 
Operational period: 2010-2015. 

GOES-14: 
Launch date: 2009; 
Post launch test period: 2009; 
Available as backup: 201--2011; 
Operational period: 2012-2016. 

GOES-15: 
Launch date: 2010; 
Post launch test period: 2010; 
Available as backup: 2010-2015; 
Operational period: 2015-2020. 

GOES-R: 
Launch date: 2015; 
Post launch test period: 2015; 
Available as backup: 2016; 
Operational period: 2017-2020. 

GOES-S: 
Launch date: 2017; 
Post launch test period: 2017; 
Available as backup: 2017-2020; 
Operational period: 2020. 

Projected gap in backup coverage: Early 2015 through early 2016. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

Note: GOES-11 and GOES-12 are currently operating beyond their 
expected lifespans. However, GOES-12 is no longer supporting U.S. 
operations; it was moved to provide coverage of South America. 

[End of figure] 

If NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational 
satellites before GOES-R is in orbit and operating, it will need to 
rely on older satellites that are beyond their expected operational 
lives and therefore may not be fully functional. Any further delays in 
the launch of the first satellite in the GOES-R program would likely 
continue to increase the risk of a gap in satellite coverage. 

NOAA Has Not Established Adequate Continuity Plans for Its 
Geostationary Satellites: 

While federal policy and industry best practices call for the 
development of plans for continuing essential operations during a 
disruption or emergency, NOAA has not developed adequate continuity 
plans for its geostationary satellites for the period of time when 
there will be no backup in orbit. Planning for the continuity of 
operations facilitates the performance of an organization's essential 
functions during emergency events or other situations that disrupt 
normal operations.[Footnote 12] Federal policy requires agencies to 
develop and document continuity of operations plans for essential 
functions that provide, among other things, a description of the 
resources, staff roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the 
plan's implementation. NOAA has defined providing satellite imagery in 
support of weather forecasting as one of its essential functions. 

NOAA has developed continuity plans for the ground systems used to 
operate and process data from geostationary satellites. Specifically, 
NOAA's continuity plans for its Satellite Operation Control Center and 
its Environmental Data Processing Center describe plans to transfer 
critical functions to a backup facility during an emergency. Both of 
these continuity plans contain, among other things, descriptions of 
the alternate locations for performing key functions, resources, and 
implementation procedures. 

In addition to planning for the continuity of its ground systems, NOAA 
has established a policy to ensure the continuity of its geostationary 
satellites--and high-level plans if that policy is not met. As 
previously mentioned, NOAA's policy is to have two operational 
satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times. That way, 
if an operational satellite fails, the backup satellite would be moved 
into place to pick up operations. However, if there is no backup 
satellite in orbit--as is expected to be the case during the year 
leading up to when GOES-R becomes operational--NOAA officials stated 
that they would move the single remaining operational satellite to the 
middle of the continental United States. According to NOAA officials, 
this would provide sufficient coverage of the continental United 
States, but would provide limited coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans (see figure 6). In addition, NOAA would contact other nations 
to request that a spare geostationary satellite, if available, be 
positioned to provide temporary coverage of the coastal regions, as 
well as the oceans.[Footnote 13] 

Figure 6: Approximate Geographic Coverage in a Single GOES 
Configuration: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Illustration depicts the following for a Single GOES: 
Single satellite coverage footprint; 
Lost coverage area. 

Sources: NOAA (data), MapArt (map). 

[End of figure] 

However, NOAA has not established continuity plans for its 
geostationary satellites that describe the resources, staff roles, 
procedures, and timetables needed for the plan's implementation. This 
is important because there are many procedures and coordinating 
activities that NOAA would need to perform to ensure the continuity of 
geostationary satellite data in the event of a satellite failure with 
no backup available. For example, the transition to a single satellite 
would require NOAA, at a minimum, to inform users of changes to the in-
orbit configuration through various methods, including users groups 
and Web site postings. Alternatively, the transition to an 
international satellite would require modifications to the software 
code of several processing systems to account for expected differences 
in spectral channels, refresh rate, resolution, and coverage areas due 
to the repositioning of the satellites. Further, all geostationary 
satellite data products would need to be reverified and validated to 
account for differences in product coverage. Lastly, NOAA would have 
to notify GOES data users of differences in satellite capabilities, 
such as the loss of space weather instruments and data, and changes to 
viewing angles caused by satellite positions that are different from 
current GOES locations. For example, the orbital location of an 
international satellite positioned in a backup configuration may 
provide a less comprehensive view due to the more severe observing 
angle over the United States. 

In addition, NOAA's lack of continuity plans has precluded the agency 
from documenting and communicating the operational impact of its plans 
to reduce to a single satellite and rely on an international 
satellite. For example, a single satellite configuration would reduce 
coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where satellite data 
provide critical warnings of approaching severe weather, such as 
tropical cyclone and hurricane activity. According to air traffic 
officials from the Federal Aviation Administration, the reduction to a 
single satellite would have a significant impact on the agency's 
ability to make informed aviation planning decisions over the ocean 
areas surrounding the continental United States. In addition, 
transitioning to an international satellite would be dependent on the 
availability of foreign satellites and it could take several months to 
reposition an international satellite to provide backup coverage. 
Furthermore, foreign satellites lack capabilities currently available 
to GOES users, such as instruments that provide space weather 
information. For example, the National Weather Service's (NWS) Space 
Weather Prediction Center relies solely on space weather data from 
GOES for two-thirds of its data products, which are critical to 
providing warnings of severe space weather that may impact airline and 
maritime communication, satellite operations, and astronaut safety. 

According to the Deputy Director of the Office of Satellite 
Operations, continuity plans for geostationary satellites have not 
been established because the transition to single satellite and to an 
international satellite has been done previously. Specifically, in 
1989, after the failure of GOES-6, NOAA repositioned GOES-7 to the 
middle of the continental United States. Subsequently, in 1991, the 
European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites and the European Space Agency repositioned the Meteosat-3 
satellite to backup NOAA's aging GOES-7 satellite in order to provide 
coverage of the Atlantic Ocean in case GOES-7 failed before a 
replacement could be launched and placed into operation. While this 
accomplishment has merit, current GOES and their related ground 
processing systems are increasingly complex and have enhanced 
capabilities as compared to earlier satellites, such as ability to 
capture and process higher resolution images of weather patterns and 
atmospheric measurements. In addition, there are likely new staff who 
will not be able to rely on the 1989 and 1991 experiences. 
Establishing continuity plans that describe the resources, staff 
roles, procedures, and timetables needed for the plans' implementation 
(as required by federal policy) would better ensure that NOAA can 
continue to provide these critical capabilities in the event of a 
satellite failure. 

Without continuity plans, NOAA may not be able to fully meet its 
mission-essential function of providing satellite imagery in support 
of weather forecasting. This could have a devastating affect on the 
ability of meteorologists to observe the development of severe storm 
conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and track their movement 
and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. In 
addition, the loss of a single satellite could affect many satellite 
data users outside NOAA, including the Federal Aviation 
Administration, which use satellite-provided weather data for air 
traffic management, and the U.S. Forest Service (within the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture), which uses satellite-provided weather data 
to predict and prevent wildfires and mitigate their damage. 

NOAA's Efforts to Involve External GOES Data Users, Prioritize Their 
Data Needs, and Communicate Program Status Have Shortfalls: 

NOAA has identified key GOES data users and involved internal users in 
defining and prioritizing the GOES-R program requirements, but lacks a 
comprehensive approach for eliciting and prioritizing the satellite 
data needs of external users. Further, while NOAA has taken steps to 
communicate program status and changes to all GOES data users, 
important changes to currently available GOES data products have not 
been adequately communicated to external users. Until these weaknesses 
are addressed, NOAA faces the increased risk that its satellite 
acquisitions may not meet the needs of key GOES data users. 

Key GOES Data Users Have Been Identified, but Efforts to Involve Other 
Federal Agencies and Prioritize Their Data Needs Are Not Sufficient: 

Leading organizations routinely identify relevant operational users 
and involve these users in key program activities, including 
requirements definition.[Footnote 14] Moreover, best practices call 
for eliciting the needs of operational users and developing these 
needs into prioritized requirements. Prioritized requirements should 
serve as the basis for determining project scope and can help to 
ensure that requirements critical to key users are addressed quickly. 

Key GOES data users can be categorized into three tiers. The first 
tier includes internal NOAA users that depend on GOES data for their 
primary mission, such as NWS. The second tier includes other federal 
agencies that depend on GOES data for their primary mission, such as 
the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. The 
third tier includes all other users that receive GOES data, including 
private industry and universities. See table 9 below for descriptions 
and examples of each tier of GOES data users. 

Table 9: Key GOES Data Users: 

Tier: 1; 
Description: NOAA users who depend on GOES data for their primary 
mission; 
Examples: 
* NWS; 
* NESDIS; 
* Other NOAA offices (e.g., NOAA Marine and Aviation Operations, NOAA 
Ocean Service, etc.). 

Tier: 2; 
Description: Other federal agencies that depend on GOES data for their 
primary mission; 
Examples: 
* Department of Defense; 
* Department of Homeland Security; 
* Department of the Interior; 
* Federal Aviation Administration; 
* Environmental Protection Agency; 
* U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

Tier: 3; 
Description: All other users who receive GOES data; 
Examples: 
* Universities; 
* Research institutions; 
* Private industry; 
* News media; 
* Broadcasters; 
* General public. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

In formulating the GOES-R program, NOAA primarily involved internal 
NOAA users (tier 1) in requirements definition activities, but did 
receive input from one other federal agency, the Department of 
Defense. Beginning in 1998, NOAA collected high-level system 
requirements from NWS. Over the next few years, NOAA continued to 
collect and refine these requirements by including input from other 
NOAA offices, including NESDIS, NOAA Ocean Service, NOAA Research, 
NOAA Fisheries, and NOAA Marine and Aviation Operations. Also, in 
February 2003, the Department of Commerce requested that the 
Department of Defense provide a consolidated list of its environmental 
information needs, including those data needs that could be met by 
geostationary satellites. This input, combined with that of NOAA's 
offices, served as the basis for the 2004 GOES-R Program Requirements 
Document, which represented a preliminary set of GOES-R requirements. 

In June 2007, prior to entering the development phase of the GOES-R 
program lifecycle, the Deputy Undersecretary for Commerce Oceans and 
Atmosphere approved a baseline set of prioritized GOES-R requirements 
(known as the Level 1 Requirements).[Footnote 15] Efforts to 
prioritize the Level 1 Requirements were led by a working group of 
representatives from various NOAA organizations. This working group 
categorized the requirements into four priority levels according to 
the importance of each requirement to NOAA, as well as the 
requirements contribution to the GOES-R series. 

However, other than the Department of Defense's input into the 2004 
version of the requirements, external users that rely on GOES data 
were not adequately involved in the GOES-R requirements definition or 
prioritization process. According to NOAA officials, input to the 
requirements from other federal agencies (tier 2) and other interested 
users (tier 3) was collected via casual conversations between NOAA 
offices and these users, as well as during GOES User Conferences, 
which were held to educate and obtain input from prospective GOES-R 
users. While these methods are reasonable for eliciting input from 
tier 3 users, federal agencies that rely on GOES data to meet unique 
mission requirements warrant documented input to the GOES-R 
requirements. For example, the U.S. Forest Service relies on GOES for 
fire monitoring and detection capabilities to sustain an estimated 193 
million acres of the nation's forests and grasslands. According to 
U.S. Forest Service officials, the lack of a structured process for 
their agency to provide input into the requirements definition process 
has made it difficult to ensure that its requirements have been and 
will be implemented. 

Further, NOAA did not account for the priority data needs of other 
federal users in prioritizing the Level 1 requirements. As previously 
mentioned, the priorities of the requirements were established by the 
GOES-R requirements working group. However, this group only includes 
membership from NOAA offices, such as NWS and NESDIS, and does not 
include membership from other federal agencies. According to GOES-R 
program officials, the Level 1 Requirements are intended to reflect 
the priorities of NOAA users, primarily those of NWS, and the 
assumption is that other users will adapt to the data provided by 
NOAA. However, given the unique missions of other federal agencies and 
their reliance on GOES data to meet their missions, input into the 
prioritization of GOES-R requirements is critical to ensure that GOES-
R will meet the needs of their organizations. 

The lack of involvement by federal agencies in GOES-R requirements 
definition and prioritization is due to weaknesses in NOAA's processes 
for defining and prioritizing satellite data requirements. 
Specifically, the lack of a structured process for eliciting the data 
needs of key operational users inhibits NOAA's ability to produce 
prioritized requirements that reflect the needs of other federal 
agencies that depend on these satellites. Without improvements in 
these processes, NOAA's satellite acquisitions may not fully meet the 
needs of important GOES data users. 

NOAA Has Not Effectively Communicated with Other Federal Agencies: 

While NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes 
to internal and external GOES data users, important changes to 
currently available GOES data products have not been communicated to 
key external users. According to industry best practices, programs 
should regularly communicate program status to relevant operational 
users.[Footnote 16] Moreover, best practices call for identifying and 
documenting deviations from plans and communicating significant issues 
to relevant operational users. 

NOAA has taken steps to communicate program status and changes to GOES 
data users. For example, the GOES-R requirements working group was 
established to identify and represent NOAA user requirements and 
serves as a forum for communication of GOES-R requirements status and 
changes with internal NOAA users. Another initiative, known as the 
GOES-R Proving Ground, engages the NWS forecast and warning community 
in preoperational demonstrations of selected capabilities anticipated 
from GOES-R. Through this program, NWS users are given the ability to 
test and evaluate expected GOES-R capabilities, such as lightning 
detection, before the satellites are operational. Lastly, GOES User 
Conferences are held to educate and obtain input from any prospective 
GOES users, including other agencies, universities, and industry. 

However, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes over the 
course of its acquisition lifecycle, and these changes have not been 
communicated to GOES data users outside of NOAA. As previously 
mentioned, in 2007, program officials removed requirements from the 
baseline program to treat them as a contract option that could be 
exercised if funds allow (known as Option 2). These changes resulted 
in a baseline program of 34 satellite data products and 31 Option 2 
products. However, NOAA did not communicate the removal of these 
products to external federal agencies. In addition, 9 Option 2 
products are currently available to GOES data users, which means that 
users may lose access to these products if the contract option is not 
exercised. These 9 products are critical to measuring cloud 
properties, infrared radiation, and sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere. 
However, NOAA did not inform external federal agencies about the 
potential loss of these products. See figure 7 for a description of 
the 9 currently available products removed from the GOES-R program 
baseline. 

Figure 7: Nine Current Satellite Products Removed from the GOES-R 
Program Baseline: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated vertical bar graph] 

Planned satellite products: 
Option 2 new products: 22; 
Option 2 existing products: 9: 
Baseline new products: 6; 
Baseline existing products: 28. 

Option 2 existing products: 

Product: Cloud Ice Water Path; 
Description: A measure of the equivalent water mass of the ice 
particles in a vertical column through the cloud. 

Product: Cloud Layers/Heights; 
Description: The heights of the cloud layer bases above local terrain 
or above mean sea level. 

Product: Cloud Liquid Water; 
Description: The amount of liquid water per unit volume of air. 

Product: Cloud Type; 
Description: The main characteristic form of a cloud used in its 
identification. 

Product: Low Cloud and Fog; 
Description: Low cloud is defined as clouds with a mean height level 
which is between the earth’s surface and 6,500 feet. Fog is defined as 
clouds in contact with the earth’s surface. 

Product: Downward Longwave Radiation: Surface; 
Description: The downward component of infrared radiation across a 
given surface. 

Product: Upward Longwave Radiation: Surface; 
Description: Outgoing/emitted infrared radiation at the earth’s 
surface. 

Product: Upward Longwave Radiation: Top of Atmosphere; 
Description: Outgoing/emitted infrared radiation at the top of the 
atmosphere. 

Product: Sulfur Dioxide Detection; 
Description: Detection of sulfur dioxide, which is a non-inflammable 
colorless gas that can lead to acid rain. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

According to GOES-R program officials, the decision to make these 
products part of the contract option was based on NOAA's input and was 
approved by the requirements working group. However, key GOES data 
users at other federal agencies that currently rely on these products 
have not been involved in, nor told of, these changes. For example, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture uses cloud-based products (such as 
cloud liquid water) to develop weather forecasts used by farmers and 
radiation-based products (such as upward longwave radiation) for 
streamflow simulation modeling. In addition, the Department of Defense 
relies on the cloud-based products (such as cloud type and cloud 
heights) as input into weather prediction models for forecasting of 
high-altitude winds, which are used to navigate ships and planes. 

If the contract option is not exercised, these agencies will not have 
access to these GOES data products that they currently utilize. If 
this occurs, GOES-R program officials stated that GOES data users may 
be able to get these products via the Internet from NESDIS, but added 
that the details for this alternative have not been determined because 
the program expects to receive approval from NESDIS to exercise this 
contract option by December 2010. Given that these products are 
currently available to GOES data users, any significant changes to 
these products should be communicated to these users to ensure that 
they have sufficient time to implement workarounds or determine other 
sources for the data. Without communicating significant changes, other 
federal agencies may lose access to critical data products needed to 
meet mission requirements. 

Conclusions: 

Over the last few years, the GOES-R program has continued to make 
progress on key development efforts, but much work remains to be 
completed. While the GOES-R program has awarded most development 
contracts, two instruments have experienced technical challenges that 
led to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on the 
program's flight and ground projects. In addition, continued delays in 
the launch date of the first two satellites in the GOES-R series have 
endangered satellite continuity because these delays extend the time 
in which there will not be a backup satellite in orbit. Any further 
delays in the launch of the first satellite in the GOES-R program 
increases the risk of a gap in satellite coverage. 

The risk of a gap in coverage is further exacerbated because NOAA has 
not established adequate continuity plans. While NOAA plans to reduce 
to a single satellite and, if available, rely on an international 
satellite, these plans have weaknesses, including a lack of continuity 
plans needed to support geostationary satellite operations during an 
emergency. Until these weaknesses are addressed, NOAA faces a 
potential 12-month gap where it may not be able to provide critical 
geostationary data needed for predicting global and local weather 
events in the event of a satellite failure. 

Finally, NOAA has taken steps to identify GOES data users, prioritize 
their data needs, and communicate program changes, but has not 
adequately involved or communicated with key external users. For 
example, while NOAA involved internal users in its process for 
defining and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, improvements are 
needed in these processes to ensure that other federal agencies that 
rely on GOES data have a means to provide documented input to the 
requirements and the prioritization of those requirements. Further, 
while NOAA has taken steps to communicate with GOES data users, it has 
not established processes to notify other federal agencies of GOES-R 
program status and significant changes. Until these improvements are 
made, important GOES users may lose access to critical data products 
and future GOES acquisitions may not meet the mission requirements of 
these users. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve NOAA's ability to maintain geostationary satellites 
continuity and improve efforts to involve key GOES data users, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator 
to ensure that the following three actions are taken: 

* Develop and document continuity plans for the operation of 
geostationary satellites that include the implementation procedures, 
resources, staff roles, and timetables needed to transition to a 
single satellite, an international satellite, or other solution. 

* Establish processes for satellite data requirements definition and 
prioritization to include documented input from external federal 
agencies that rely on GOES data on future satellite acquisitions. 

* Establish and implement processes to notify these agencies of GOES-R 
program status and changes. 

Agency Comments: 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA's comments. The department 
agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement 
them. For example, the department stated that NOAA will develop a plan 
for transitioning to a single satellite that leverages existing 
contingency agreements with its international partners. In addition, 
the department stated that NOAA will document a process to define and 
prioritize the requirements of other federal agencies and provide 
these users with updates on GOES-R program status and changes. The 
department's comments are provided in appendix II. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 
other interested parties. The report also will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series acquisition, 
including cost, schedule, and performance trends; (2) evaluate whether 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has 
established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) 
assess NOAA's efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their 
data needs, and communicate with them about the program's status. 

To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated various 
programmatic and technical plans, management reports, and other 
program documentation. We reviewed the cost and schedule estimates 
(including launch dates), planned system requirements, and monthly 
executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed agency 
officials from NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to determine key dates for future GOES-R 
acquisition efforts and milestones and progress made on current 
development efforts. Furthermore, we analyzed the earned value data on 
development efforts contained in contractor performance reports 
obtained from the program. To perform this analysis, we compared the 
cost of work completed with budgeted costs for scheduled work for a 12-
month period to show trends in cost and schedule performances. To 
assess the reliability of the cost data, we compared it with other 
available supporting documents (including monthly program management 
reviews); electronically tested the data to identify obvious problems 
with completeness or accuracy; and interviewed program officials about 
the data. For the purposes of this report, we determined that the cost 
data were sufficiently reliable. We did not test the adequacy of the 
agency or contractor cost-accounting systems. 

To evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans, 
we analyzed relevant continuity planning documentation, agreements 
with international partners, and meeting reports from the Coordination 
Group for Meteorological Satellites.[Footnote 17] In addition, we 
compared NOAA's continuity of operations plans to federal policy and 
industry best practices to determine the extent to which the plans 
will ensure the continuity of critical functions related to 
geostationary satellites in the event of a satellite failure.[Footnote 
18] We met with NOAA officials responsible for continuity of 
operations planning and coordination with international partners, as 
well as GOES data users within NOAA and at other federal agencies to 
determine the potential impact of NOAA's plans on their data needs. 

To determine the adequacy of NOAA's efforts to identify GOES users, 
prioritize their data needs, and communicate program status, we 
analyzed relevant program documents, including acquisition plans, user 
requirements, and GOES user group meeting minutes. We compared NOAA's 
efforts to industry best practices to determine the extent to which 
users were appropriately identified and involved in program 
activities.[Footnote 19] We also interviewed key users of GOES data to 
determine whether NOAA's efforts to identify and prioritize their data 
needs and communicate program status and changes were adequate. In 
consultation with NOAA officials, we identified key GOES users at 
organizations within NOAA and other federal agencies that depend on 
GOES data for their primary mission. We selected three organizations 
within NOAA that are primarily responsible for environmental satellite 
data acquisition, processing and exchange, and environmental research. 
These organizations include the National Weather Service, National 
Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service, and the Office 
of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. We also identified federal 
government users outside of NOAA with the largest funding levels for 
meteorological operations in fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 20] These 
agencies were the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Transportation (including the Federal Aviation Administration). On the 
basis of discussions with GOES-R program officials and the Office of 
the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, we then selected additional 
federal agencies that rely extensively on GOES data to meet their 
mission requirements. These agencies include the Department of the 
Interior (including the U.S. Geological Survey and Bureau of 
Reclamation), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (including the 
U.S. Forest Service). 

We primarily performed our work at the Department of Defense, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, NOAA, NASA, 
and U.S. Department of Agriculture offices in the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area. In addition, we conducted work at Department of 
Defense weather agencies in Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska and 
Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. We conducted this performance audit 
from October 2009 to September 2010, in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department Of Commerce: 
The Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 
	
August 3, 2010: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled "Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in 
Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users" (GA0-10-799). 

On behalf of the Department of Commerce, I have enclosed the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments on the 
draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Gary Locke: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

Comments to the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in Continuity Planning 
and Involvement of Key Users" (GAO-10-799/September 2010): 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

The draft General Accountability Office (GAO) report states, "To 
improve the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) 
ability to maintain geostationary satellite continuity and improve 
efforts to involve key Geostationary Operational Environmental 
Satellite (GOES) data users, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Commerce direct the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and 
Atmosphere to ensure that the following three actions are taken:" 

Recommendation 1: Develop and document continuity plans for the 
operation of geostationary satellites that include the implementation 
procedures, resources, staff roles, and timetables needed to 
transition to a single satellite, an international satellite, or other 
solution. 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will develop 
a plan to implement a single satellite strategy of operations if there 
is a significant delay in the launch of GOES-R. This plan will include 
several operational options, taking into account the potential support 
of international partners through already existing contingency 
agreements with such partners. Also, NOAA will consult the user 
community to determine the best location and operational schedule of a 
single spacecraft to meet their requirements. The plan will address 
timely notification to users regarding all relevant operational 
changes. 

Recommendation 2: Establish processes for satellite data requirements 
definition and prioritization to include documented input from 
external Federal agencies that rely on GOES data on future satellite 
acquisitions. 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will 
document a process to define and prioritize requirements to include 
documented input from NOAA, other Federal agencies, and non-Federal 
users for satellite data from future GOES satellites. 

Recommendation 3: Establish and implement processes to notify these 
agencies of GOES-R program status and changes. 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. The GOES-R 
Program will continue to present program status and changes to the 
broader user community at the GOES-R Users Conference, the NOAA Direct 
Read-out Conference, and other topical meetings at which the user 
community is typically in attendance. The GOES-R System Program 
Director will provide an annual program status to the Office of the 
Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM), which will be responsible 
for its distribution to agencies that will be users of GOES-R data and 
products. In addition, the Director of the OFCM has offered to convene 
a meeting of these agencies at which a briefing on the program status 
and changes can be presented. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact name above, individuals making 
contributions to this report included Colleen Phillips (Assistant 
Director), Clayton Brisson, William Carrigg, Neil Doherty, Rebecca 
Eyler, Franklin Jackson, Jonathan Ticehurst, and Adam Vodraska. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet 
when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in orbit. 

[2] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other 
Satellite Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1129T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 
2006) and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps 
Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 6, 2006). 

[3] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Acquisition Has Increased Costs, Reduced Capabilities, and Delayed 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-596T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2009);Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements 
Needed in Management and Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 
2009); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Further 
Actions Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-183T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 
2007); and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Progress Has Been Made, but Improvements Are Needed to Effectively 
Manage Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-18] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2007). 

[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323]. 

[5] A sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is planned to be developed 
as part of the spacecraft contract. 

[6] This is the Advanced Baseline Imager program's third rebaseline. 
The program office rebaselined the cost and schedule of the program in 
February 2007 and rebaselined the program schedule again in March 
2008. In addition, contract costs increased from $255 million to $375 
million--a total increase of about $120 million--in part, because of 
the February 2007 rebaseline and other contract modifications. 

[7] As of May 2010, the GOES-R program office reported that the flight 
project had contingency reserves of approximately $455 million. 

[8] The first critical design review for this instrument occurred in 
February 2007. 

[9] Contract costs increased from $58 million to $71 million--a total 
increase of about $13 million, as a result of contract modifications 
negotiated, in part, to reduce program risk. 

[10] Earned value management integrates the investment scope of work 
with schedule and cost elements for investment planning and control. 
The method compares the value of work accomplished during a given 
period with that of work expected in the period. Differences in 
expectations are measured in both cost and schedule variances. The 
Office of Management and Budget requires agencies to use earned value 
management as part of their performance-based management system for 
any investment under development or with system improvements under way. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-18], and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323]. 

[12] Department of Homeland Security, Federal Continuity Directive 1: 
Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements 
(February 2008); and Software Engineering Institute, Capability 
Maturity Model@ Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.2, CMU/SEI-2007-
TR-017 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2007). 

[13] NOAA has reciprocal agreements with the European Organisation for 
the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites and the Japan 
Meteorological Agency to temporarily provide a backup geostationary 
satellite on a best-effort basis, if one is available. 

[14] GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework 
for Assessing and Improving process Maturity, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2004); and Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model@ 
Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.2, CMU/SEI-2007-TR-017 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2007). 

[15] The GOES-R Level 1 requirements were later updated in July 2008, 
December 2008, and August 2009. 

[16] Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model@ 
Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.2, CMU/SEI-2007-TR-017 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2007). 

[17] The Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites is a forum 
for the international exchange of technical information on 
geostationary and polar orbiting meteorological satellite systems. 

[18] Department of Homeland Security, Federal Continuity Directive 1: 
Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements 
(February 2008); and Software Engineering Institute, Capability 
Maturity Model@ Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.2, CMU/SEI-2007-
TR-017 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2007). 

[19] Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model@ 
Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.2, CMU/SEI-2007-TR-017 
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: November 2007). 

[20] Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, The Federal 
Plan for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, Fiscal Year 
2009, FCM-P1-2008 (Washington, D.C.: October 2008). 

[End of section] 

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