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entitled 'The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: U.S. Agencies Should
Take Further Actions to Contribute to the Effective Regulation and
Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo' which was released on October 4, 2010.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2010:
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo:
U.S. Agencies Should Take Further Actions to Contribute to the
Effective Regulation and Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
GAO-10-1030:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-1030, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Rich in minerals, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
has long been the site of one of the world’s worst humanitarian
crises. Since 1998, an estimated 5 million have died as a result of
the conflict. GAO was asked to examine the connection between minerals
trade and human rights abuses, and the efforts to help control the
trade.
This report assesses (1) how the key minerals are mined, transported,
and processed; (2) the links between the minerals trade, armed
conflicts, and human rights abuses; (3) measures the United States and
the international community have taken to control the trade and; (4)
challenges faced in controlling the trade. GAO reviewed and analyzed
reports, memorandums, and other documents and interviewed officials
from the Department of State (State), other United States agencies,
the United Nations (UN), and foreign governments as well as
representatives from nongovernmental organizations and industry.
What GAO Found:
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold are the key minerals mined in
eastern DRC. Tin, tantalum, and tungsten follow a similar supply
chain; they are mined by hand, sold to small-scale traders, carried by
porters, transported by truck or airplane to the border, and sold to
trading houses for export. The minerals transit DRC’s neighbors, such
as Rwanda, and most are processed in Asia and used in technology
products, such as mobile telephones. In contrast, according to U.S.
officials and others, most gold is smuggled out of the DRC and is
ultimately used by the jewelry industry.
Illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units commit
human rights abuses and are involved in the minerals trade. A UN
official stated that approximately 50 percent of the reported human
rights abuses are committed by Congolese army units; many soldiers in
these units have committed violations in the past as rebels, are
poorly integrated into the Congolese military, and are consistently
unpaid. To varying degrees, illegal armed groups and some military
units illicitly tax minerals at mines and mineral transport routes,
but they also make money illicitly taxing other trades, such as trade
in charcoal and timber. The minerals trade is not the root cause but
one of many factors perpetuating the conflict.
The United States and the international community, particularly the
UN, are working to help control the illicit minerals trade, but many
efforts are in the preliminary stage. State issued a “white paper” and
produced a map of mines and armed groups, but both should be improved.
The white paper lacks concrete, actionable steps regarding U.S.
contribution to help control the trade, and the map presents data that
need updating to enhance its usefulness. Provisions in the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No.
111-203) underscore the importance of U.S. agencies taking action to
help address the trade. The UN has made efforts to help control the
trade by imposing sanctions, deploying expert teams, and developing
mineral training centers. Others, such as a global tin industry
association and the DRC government, have also made efforts, but these
efforts are in the early stage.
Significant challenges, which are yet to be addressed, exist to
monitoring and controlling the minerals trade, including tracking the
mine of origin. For example, many mines are in remote areas, lack road
access, and are occupied by armed groups, making it challenging to
monitor mine activities. Tracking the origin of minerals will rely on
DRC mining officials, but these officials suffer from a lack of skills
and from corruption. U.S. and foreign officials and others said that
lack of security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure in
eastern DRC are significant challenges that, unless addressed, will
likely impede efforts to control the minerals trade. Addressing these
challenges requires measures to reform the security sector, improve
governance, and invest in infrastructure, but little progress has been
made in these areas.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
relevant agencies, (1) provide concrete, actionable steps to help
control the minerals trade, including addressing lack of security,
governance, and infrastructure, and (2) work with relevant
stakeholders to periodically update information on mines and armed
groups. State concurred with GAO’s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1030] or key
components. For more information, contact Loren Yager at (202) 512-
4347 or yagerl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten Follow the Same Supply Chain to Export,
While Gold Is Mostly Smuggled Out of the Country:
Illegal Armed Groups and Parts of the Congolese National Military
Commit Human Rights Abuses and Are Involved in the Minerals Trade:
United States and the International Community Are Working to Help
Monitor, Regulate, or Control the Minerals Trade, but Illicit Trade
Continues and Many Efforts Are Only Preliminary:
Significant Challenges to Monitoring, Regulating or Controlling the
Minerals Trade from Eastern DRC Have Yet to Be Addressed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of the DRC (Denoting the North Kivu and South Kivu
Provinces) and Its Neighboring Countries:
Figure 2: Typical Supply Chain for DRC-Origin Tin, Tantalum, and
Tungsten:
Figure 3: Cassiterite Ore (Containing the Mineral Tin) Being Prepared
for Export at a Trading House in Goma, DRC:
Figure 4: Transport of Cassiterite Ore (Containing the Mineral Tin)
from the Bisie Mine to Goma:
Abbreviations:
CNDP: Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress
for the Defense of the People):
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo:
FDLR: Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Ruwanda (Democratic Forces
for the Liberation of Rwanda):
ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region:
MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission:
UN: United Nations:
USGS: United States Geological Survey:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 30, 2010:
The Honorable Russell Feingold:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on African Affairs:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Sam Brownback:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Richard Durbin:
United States Senate:
The eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has
long been the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.
Since 1998, an estimated 5 million have died as a result of the
conflict. To help ease the hardships caused by years of conflict and
war, the United States has provided substantial aid to the DRC. In
2008, the United States provided more than $700 million in aid,
including both bilateral assistance and U.S. contributions to
multilateral organizations. In August 2009, the Secretary of State
traveled to the eastern portion of the DRC where she saw the
consequences of conflict firsthand and called for action. The United
States is the largest donor to the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO),[Footnote 1] contributing almost one-third of MONUSCO's $1
billion annual budget.
In 2006, Congress passed the Democratic Republic of Congo Relief,
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act. The act stated that it is the
policy of the United States to work for peace and security throughout
the DRC by supporting efforts to protect civilians, disarm illegal
armed groups, and hold accountable individuals and entities working to
destabilize the country. According to Department of State (State)
officials, improving security in the eastern portion of the DRC is
central to U.S. efforts.
However, in the minerals-rich North Kivu and South Kivu regions of the
country (hereafter called eastern DRC), illegal armed groups, as well
as some units of the Congolese national military, have reportedly
continued to commit severe human rights abuses, including mass
killings and rapes, and they also reportedly profit from the mining of
minerals there. Recognizing the continuing urgency of the human rights
situation and the need to take action, in July 2010, Congress included
in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
provisions pertaining to the trade of DRC conflict minerals.[Footnote
2]
You asked us to examine the minerals trade in eastern DRC; its
connection to human rights abuses; and national and international
efforts to monitor, regulate, or control the trade. Specifically, this
report assesses (1) the key minerals mined in eastern DRC and how
these minerals are mined, transported, and processed; (2) the extent
to which there are links between minerals extraction, armed conflicts,
and human rights abuses in eastern DRC; (3) the measures the United
States and other members of the international community have taken to
help monitor, regulate, or control the minerals trade and their
effectiveness; and (4) the challenges the United States and other
members of the international community face in monitoring, regulating,
or controlling the trade, and how these challenges are being addressed.
To respond to these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed reports,
memorandums, and other documents from relevant U.S. agencies; foreign
governments; multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations
(UN); nongovernmental organizations (NGO); academics; and industry
organizations. We interviewed officials from State, the Department of
Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. We traveled to the DRC, Rwanda, the
United Kingdom, and Belgium and interviewed U.S. agency officials,
foreign government officials, UN and other multilateral organization
officials, and representatives from NGOs and industry. We also
interviewed UN officials, MONUSCO officials, and U.S. officials of the
United States Mission to the United Nations in New York.
Due to the inaccessibility of many locations in eastern DRC and the
mining sites in particular, our analysis of conditions in eastern DRC
is based largely on the research that has been conducted by UN, U.S.,
and foreign government officials; NGOs; and academic researchers. We
interviewed U.S. and foreign officials who have experience in working
on eastern DRC issues and who were knowledgeable about the eastern DRC
minerals trade. We consulted with and reviewed reports by NGOs and
academic researchers who have worked extensively on DRC issues and on
the eastern DRC minerals trade in particular. Many of these NGOs and
researchers have conducted research on the eastern DRC minerals trade
on behalf of foreign governments or have worked in collaboration with
foreign governments. The UN, including MONUSCO, has had a substantial
and sustained presence in eastern DRC since 1999. In addition, we
believe that MONUSCO's consistent long presence in the DRC, its work
on monitoring human rights, and its logistical support for Congolese
national military efforts to eradicate illegal armed groups from
mining areas make it a valuable and reliable source of information on
matters related to conditions in the DRC in general and the mining
areas of the eastern DRC in particular. Appendix I provides more
detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The DRC is a vast minerals-rich nation, with an estimated 66 million
people in an area about one-quarter the size of the United States. It
was formerly a colony of Belgium and achieved independence in 1960.
For almost 30 years of the postindependence period, the DRC was known
as Zaire and was ruled by an authoritarian regime under Joseph Mobutu.
During the Mobutu regime, the nation's productive capacity shrank and
its ethnic tensions grew. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,
perpetrators of the genocide and refugees fled into eastern DRC.
The Mobutu regime was toppled in 1997 by Laurent Kabila, who led a
rebel group from eastern DRC with the assistance of Rwanda and Uganda.
Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and leadership shifted to his son,
Joseph Kabila. During the period of the senior Kabila's regime, the
nation experienced a period of civil war during which numerous rebel
groups---with the assistance of Rwanda, Uganda, and other neighboring
countries---captured significant parts of the DRC. The war continued
into the regime of Joseph Kabila, and it is estimated that by 2004,
about 4 million people had died as a result of the conflict.
To deal with the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, the UN has had a
large commitment to the DRC in the MONUSCO peacekeeping force, which
has been in place since 1999. MONUSCO has grown from an initial force
of about 5,500 troops to over 18,500 troops in 2010. Included within
its broad mission, MONUSCO is to facilitate civilian protection,
humanitarian assistance, and human rights monitoring---with particular
attention to vulnerable groups, including women, children, and
demobilized child soldiers. Among multiple priorities, MONUSCO is to
monitor the implementation and compliance with measures to curtail the
provision of support that illegal armed groups derive from their
involvement in the trade of natural resources. MONUSCO also has
provided logistical support for Congolese national military efforts to
eradicate illegal armed groups from mining areas.
After decades of instability and years of war, the central government
in Kinshasa currently has little administrative capacity and even less
control over remote regions, such as eastern DRC. The lack of control
is exacerbated by the long distances and the rudimentary
infrastructure, which make transportation and communication difficult.
Despite significant mineral deposits and agricultural potential in
eastern DRC, the region remains poor and susceptible to control by
armed groups. The North Kivu and South Kivu provinces of the DRC,
which border Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, have significant
natural resources, including mineral deposits (see figure 1). The
Kivus also reportedly have egregious cases of crimes against the
civilian population.
Figure 1: Map of the DRC (Denoting the North Kivu and South Kivu
Provinces) and Its Neighboring Countries:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
The map depicts the capital city, Kinshasa, as well as North Kivu
province and the city of Goma, and South Kiva province and the city of
Bukavu.
Source: Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten Follow the Same Supply Chain to Export,
While Gold Is Mostly Smuggled Out of the Country:
Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten, and Gold Are the Key Minerals Artisanally
Mined in Eastern DRC:
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold are the key minerals mined and
traded internationally from eastern DRC. The DRC has significant
deposits of the ores that contain tin, tantalum, and tungsten.
[Footnote 3] These minerals are artisanally mined, mostly in remote,
hard-to-reach areas that lack basic transport infrastructure.[Footnote
4] In eastern DRC, artisanal miners extract minerals from the ground
with rudimentary tools, such as picks, shovels, and hammers, and
sometime dig with their bare hands. In the absence of mechanization,
and without safety precautions, miners extract minerals from the
earth, often in harsh and dangerous conditions.[Footnote 5]
According to NGOs and academic researchers, artisanal mining has
become the primary subsistence activity in eastern DRC. Since the
beginning of the twentieth century, tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold
have been mined in eastern DRC. Historically, people in eastern DRC
relied on agriculture for subsistence; however, as security
deteriorated in the 1990s, according to a UN official, economic
activities besides mining became less feasible, and many in eastern
DRC turned to informal, artisanal mining for subsistence. Notably,
according to an NGO, the tantalum boom of 1998 through 2001 attracted
a significant number of miners who abandoned traditional agriculture
to work in the mines.
According to NGO reports, the actual number of artisanal miners in the
DRC is unknown. However, according to these reports, there are an
estimated 2 million artisanal miners in the DRC as a whole, of which
approximately 200,000 are in North Kivu. There are no reliable
estimates for the number of artisanal miners in South Kivu. Foreign
officials and researchers estimate that each artisanal miner supports
about five dependents, on average. According to data from the United
States Geological Survey (USGS), the DRC accounted for approximately
3.9 percent of tin mined worldwide and 8.6 percent of the tantalum
mined worldwide in 2009.[Footnote 6]
Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten Follow Similar Supply Chains Out of
Eastern DRC:
After tin, tantalum, and tungsten are excavated from the ground by
artisanal miners, they pass through the hands of intermediaries before
they are exported out of the DRC. Figure 2 shows a typical supply
chain for DRC-origin minerals. The minerals are usually bought by a
small-scale trader, called a négociant, who arranges transportation of
the minerals to trading towns. The minerals are packed into sacks,
generally weighing around 100 pounds, and porters carry the sacks by
foot through difficult terrain out of remote mining locations. The
minerals are often later transported by large trucks or airplanes to
trading towns.
Figure 2: Typical Supply Chain for DRC-Origin Tin, Tantalum, and
Tungsten:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Within the DRC:
Mines:
Small-scale traders:
Large-scale traders.
Neighbors:
Transit countries.
Smelter:
Product component:
Final product:
Consumer.
Source: GAO analysis of the minerals supply chain in eastern DRC.
[End of figure]
Next, minerals are sold to trading houses, called comptoirs, which are
larger scale traders authorized to export. According to NGO
representatives and academics, entities at each level of the minerals
trade supply chain can be prefinanced by those above them. For
example, it is very common for small-scale traders and porters to be
prefinanced by trading houses. The trading houses both buy and sell
minerals and are based in the provincial cities of Goma and Bukavu,
located on the DRC-Rwandan border. The trading houses also typically
perform some rudimentary processing of the minerals to prepare them
for export. The trading houses in Goma and Bukavu then export the
minerals, both legally (declared to DRC authorities) and illegally
(not declared), to minerals traders in neighboring transit countries,
such as Rwanda or Uganda. Figure 3 shows cassiterite ore (containing
the mineral tin) being prepared for export at a trading house in Goma,
DRC.
Figure 3: Cassiterite Ore (Containing the Mineral Tin) Being Prepared
for Export at a Trading House in Goma, DRC:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO (photograph).
[End of figure]
Case Study: Tin Ore Supply Chain from the Bisie Mine Site to Export:
Tin, tantalum, and tungsten are transported and traded via multiple
routes from numerous mines in eastern DRC. However, the Bisie mine
site located in a remote territory in North Kivu reportedly produces
up to 70 percent of the tin ore exported from Goma; it provides a good
case study in understanding a major tin ore supply chain from North
Kivu.
According to UN and U.S. agency officials, NGOs, and researchers,
after it has been mined, the tin ore is packed into sacks that
generally weigh 100 pounds and typically is carried on foot by porters
for about 45 kilometers through difficult terrain, a trek that can
take up to 2 days. Traders collect the minerals in a small trading
village, then drive the minerals to a makeshift runway where they are
loaded onto small airplanes and flown to Goma (see figure 4). In Goma,
after the quality of the material is determined, the minerals are
weighed and packaged for export by a trading house, usually in
container loads of 25 tons. From Goma, tin ore is transported by road
to either Rwanda or Uganda, then is exported to the world market.
Figure 4: Transport of Cassiterite Ore (Containing the Mineral Tin)
from the Bisie Mine to Goma:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
Indicated on the map are:
Mineral transport by road:
Mineral transport by air:
Major artisanal cassiterite mines.
Source: Nicholas Garrett, "Guns, sweat and tears in North Kivu's tin
ore mines," The Africa Report (October/November 2008), 42.
[End of figure]
Central and Provincial Governments Are Unable to Fully Tax the
Minerals Trade:
The DRC government, at the central and provincial levels, taxes some
of the minerals trade; however, due to various factors, they do not
tax all of the trade, according to DRC officials and an NGO report.
The five official Congolese agencies tasked with regulating the
minerals trade collect production and export figures, but the official
production figures, recorded at the mining sites differ considerably
from official figures recorded at subsequent points, according to an
NGO report. For example, according to an NGO report, tin registered
for 2006 exports from Goma was approximately 29 percent of the
production figure that had been registered at the mining site in
Walikale.[Footnote 7] According to these data, it would seem that
approximately 70 percent of the ore produced at Walikale was
unaccounted for at the point of export in Goma.
Congolese agencies responsible for levying and collecting legal taxes
on the minerals trade are impeded by volatile security conditions in
mining areas, poor infrastructure, weak capacity, and entrenched
corruption, according to U.S., and DRC officials, a foreign official,
and industry representatives. According to U.S. agency and DRC
officials, in many instances, mining officials cannot access mining
sites to regulate the trade due to security concerns and lack of road
access. Furthermore, according to U.S., DRC, and foreign officials and
a 2008 World Bank report, despite their official status, DRC officials
responsible for levying and collecting legal taxes on the minerals
trade are often unpaid and either underreport or fail to report
official mineral values to illicitly exact taxes for their personal
benefit. According to a UN official and NGO reports, some other DRC
authorities, who are not legally responsible for levying and
collecting taxes on the minerals trade, also extort revenue for their
personal benefit.
According to DRC officials, at the point of export, some legal taxes
are usually paid to government officials for tin, tantalum, and
tungsten; however, official figures on actual quantities exported are
often incorrect and underreported. According to academic researchers,
between 2007 and 2008, the Congolese state collected over $6 million
from the export of tin, tantalum, and tungsten from eastern DRC,
despite consistent estimated underreporting of quantities of exports
by approximately 35 percent.[Footnote 8] According to one report, due
to persistent underreporting and some smuggling, there is a
significant shortfall in the amount of legal tax collected by both the
central and provincial governments.
Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten Transit DRC's Neighboring Countries, Are
Processed Mostly in Asia, and Are Used in Technology Products:
From trading houses in eastern DRC, tin, tantalum, and tungsten are
transported by road, boat, or airplane to neighboring countries, such
as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. According to U.S. and foreign
officials and an NGO report, in these countries, DRC-origin minerals
are sometimes mixed with the same minerals of other national origin.
According to NGO reports, tin, tantalum, and tungsten are often
transported along established trade routes, such as routes from
eastern DRC through Uganda to Kenya, through Rwanda to Uganda and then
to Kenya, through Rwanda to Tanzania, and through Burundi to Tanzania.
According to an NGO report and an industry representative, DRC-origin
minerals and DRC-origin mixed minerals are then exported from transit
countries to smelters, which are located mostly in East Asia. Smelting
is the process by which a mineral is extracted from its ore through
heating the mineral beyond its melting point. At smelters, DRC-origin
tin, tantalum, and tungsten are mixed with the same minerals from
other countries. Once minerals have been processed at the smelters, it
is technically impossible to determine the minerals' country of origin.
According to an NGO report, tin and tantalum and---to a lesser extent,
tungsten---are then purchased by electronics manufacturing companies.
The electronics industry is reportedly the largest consumer of tin and
tantalum from eastern DRC. The minerals are used in the production of
technology products, such as mobile telephones and laptops. The
processed metals--for example, tin for solder--are used in electronic
components that are sold to electronics manufacturers and are
incorporated into technology products sold to the public. According to
a 2010 report, tungsten, while also used by the electronics industry,
is used by a more diverse group of industries and for a variety of
applications.[Footnote 9]
Most DRC-Origin Gold Is Smuggled Out of the Country and Used by the
Jewelry Industry:
DRC-origin gold follows more informal and clandestine supply chains
out of the country than tin, tantalum, and tungsten, according to an
NGO report. Because artisanally mined gold is reportedly found in very
small nuggets or gold dust in remote mining areas, it is easily
concealed in people's clothing or belongings, according to NGO
reports. According to an NGO report, gold mined in North Kivu and
South Kivu can be carried by hand, driven, or flown out of mining
sites to major trading centers, generally Bukavu, along with other
cargo. Once in Bukavu, traders sell gold to trading firms that reduce
obvious impurities, then smuggle the gold out of the country, usually
through Uganda and---to a lesser degree---through Burundi.
Occasionally, gold is also smuggled through Rwanda or other transit
countries.
Official export data on DRC-origin gold are extremely limited, and
U.S. agency officials, foreign officials, and NGO representatives said
that most gold from eastern DRC is smuggled out of the country.
According to NGO reports, 90 to 95 percent of gold mined in eastern
DRC is smuggled out of the country. A U.S. agency report stated that
estimated exports of gold from the DRC in 2008 were only 240
kilograms. However, according to a UN report, the DRC's senate
estimated that $1.24 billion worth of gold, equivalent to 40 tons, is
smuggled out of the DRC annually without any customs declaration.
Approximately 80 percent of gold from eastern DRC is reportedly
exported to the Middle East, especially Dubai, to produce gold
jewelry. According to a report produced by a research organization,
while the primary consumer of gold is the jewelry industry, some gold
is also used by other industries, including the electronics
industry.[Footnote 10]
Illegal Armed Groups and Parts of the Congolese National Military
Commit Human Rights Abuses and Are Involved in the Minerals Trade:
Illegal Armed Groups and Some Congolese National Military Units Commit
Serious Human Rights Abuses in Eastern DRC:
According to UN, U.S., and foreign officials and NGO representatives,
illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are
consistently and directly involved in human rights abuses against the
civilian population in eastern DRC.[Footnote 11] According to UN
officials and NGO representatives, many illegal armed groups, such as
the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)[Footnote 12]
and, until January 2009, the Congrés National pour la Défense du
Peuple (CNDP),[Footnote 13] have been involved in severe human rights
abuses against the civilian population. According to U.S. officials
and NGO representatives, there is a culture of impunity in eastern DRC
in which those who have committed human rights abuses do not face
justice for the crimes they have committed.
According to UN, U.S., and foreign officials and NGO representatives,
in terms of the numbers of reported human rights violations, it
appears that some units of the Congolese national military are among
the primary armed groups in eastern DRC committing violent acts and
severe human rights abuses. According to a UN official in the DRC,
based on information gathered in eastern DRC, approximately 50 percent
of the reported human rights violations are committed by Congolese
national army units. According to State's 2009 Human Rights Report,
some Congolese national military units committed many serious human
rights abuses with impunity, including unlawful killings,
disappearances, torture, and rapes. The report also stated that in
eastern DRC, some national military units summarily executed civilians
and killed civilians during clashes with illegal armed groups.
Furthermore, the report stated that military operations carried out in
2008 and 2009 were accompanied by a marked increase in human rights
abuses and killings by Congolese national military units. Citing
estimates by a coalition of more than 80 human rights and humanitarian
NGOs, the report further indicated that for each enemy combatant
disarmed during these military operations, 7 civilians were raped, 1
was killed, and 900 were forced to flee.
According to U.S. officials and NGO representatives, some Congolese
national military units in eastern DRC face significant challenges
that contribute to their involvement in human rights violations.
According to U.S. officials and NGO representatives, the Congolese
national military has absorbed over 50 former rebel groups as
prescribed by peace processes in the DRC. According to NGO
representatives, many of these soldiers committed human rights
violations in the past as rebels, are poorly integrated now into the
Congolese national military, and continue to commit human rights
violations. In addition, according to U.S. officials, NGOs, and
researchers, many units of the Congolese national military are
consistently unpaid, have never received training, keep their weapons
while off duty, and have developed and maintain cooperative economic
relationships with various illegal armed groups, such as the FDLR.
Complicating the situation, according to a 2009 UN Group of Experts
report, a U.S. agency official, and NGO representatives, many
Congolese soldiers have divided loyalties, in that former rebel
soldiers often remain loyal to commanders in their former command
structures. In eastern DRC, this situation is exemplified by the
absorption of the CNDP into the Congolese national military. Prior to
its absorption in January 2009, the CNDP was in direct conflict with
the DRC government. According to a U.S. agency official and UN
officials, even after their absorption into Congolese national
military units, many of these ex-CNDP soldiers are still poorly
integrated and remain loyal to their commanders in the former CNDP
command structure.
According to U.S. officials and NGO representatives, some extreme
violence, such as massacres of villages, rapes, and mutilations of
civilians, may also result from efforts of the illegal armed groups
and some units of the Congolese national military to generate fear and
consolidate control over economic activities, including mining
activities. For example, according to an NGO report, an August 2009
armed attack that ended in the deaths of 30 people and the wounding of
50 people at the Bisie mine site in North Kivu was linked to conflict
over control of mineral resources.[Footnote 14] According to UN
officials and NGOs, workers in mining areas operate in dangerous and
exploitative work environments where they are vulnerable to human
rights abuses perpetrated by illegal armed groups and some units of
the Congolese military. Miners work in mining areas that are often in
remote locations without viable transport infrastructure, thereby
making them vulnerable to human rights abuses. According to a UN
official and an NGO representative, illegal armed groups or the
military will sometimes force workers to continue working in
conditions that are unsafe.
Illegal Armed Groups and Some Congolese Military Units Generate Income
from Involvement in the Minerals Trade and Other Economic Activities:
According to UN, U.S., and foreign officials and NGO representatives,
some Congolese military units and illegal armed groups in eastern DRC
derive income, to varying degrees, from the minerals trade. According
to a high-level UN official, in general, the minerals trade accounts
for between 20 and 40 percent of armed groups' revenue. According to
U.S. agency officials, foreign government officials, and NGOs, units
of the Congolese military that are frequently not paid their salaries
generate income from their involvement in the minerals trade.
According to U.S. officials, a former head of the UN Group of Experts,
and NGO representatives, illegal armed groups---including the FDLR,
various illegal local militia or civil defense groups, and other
smaller illegal armed groups---also generate income from their
involvement in the minerals trade.
For example, according to a 2009 report, the FDLR earned up to 75
percent of its income from its involvement in the minerals trade (most
of it from the gold trade).[Footnote 15] The FDLR is now more involved
in the gold trade than in other minerals and generates a substantial
percentage of its income from gold, according to DRC and UN officials
and the 2009 report. A 2009 NGO report estimated that in 2008, illegal
armed groups and some Congolese military units cumulatively generated
between $137 million and $225 million from their involvement in the
trade of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold in North Kivu and South
Kivu,[Footnote 16] even though these minerals reportedly represented a
small fraction of the DRC's total mineral exports. According to a USGS
report, the DRC's broader minerals trade is worth billions of dollars
annually. According to data from USGS, in 2008, combined exports of
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold accounted for less than 4 percent of
the DRC's total mineral exports.[Footnote 17] This percentage suggests
that while tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold are important sources of
subsistence income for populations in the Kivus, these minerals are of
much more limited importance to the overall economy of the DRC.
According to former members of UN Group of Experts teams, foreign
officials, and NGO representatives, illegal armed groups and some
units of the Congolese national military derive income from the direct
control or illicit taxation of mineral mining areas, of mineral
transport routes, and of numerous other economic activities. According
to NGO representatives, workers in mining areas are often obligated to
pay a percentage of their earnings as illicit taxes or to surrender
minerals mined on certain days to armed groups in control of the mines
or the local area. Foreign government officials and NGO
representatives reported that at mining sites, individual mining pits
are actually "owned," or at least controlled, by a commander from the
Congolese military or an illegal armed group. In addition, vendors at
mining sites, who charge miners exorbitant rates for food, shelter,
and other basic goods, are also obligated to pay illicit taxes to
armed groups in control of the mines or the local area.
According to UN officials and NGO representatives, illegal armed
groups and some units in the Congolese national military also derive
illicit income from extorting payment from civilians transporting
minerals at checkpoints along transit routes. Until the point of
export, individuals involved in the minerals trade are subject to
various forms of illicit taxation by illegal armed groups and
Congolese national military units. In a 2009 UN report, it was
estimated that local military commanders at the Bisie mine site can
earn up to $60,000 annually from these illicit taxes.[Footnote
18],[Footnote 19] UN officials also noted that illegal armed groups
and units of the Congolese national military that are involved in the
minerals trade do not act alone. These groups and units are involved
with Congolese and foreign businesses that control many economic
activities, including the minerals trade.
In addition to deriving income from the minerals trade, illegal armed
groups and Congolese military units also derive income from direct
control or illicit taxation of other diverse economic activities.
According to U.S. agency officials, foreign government officials, and
NGOs, some groups and units generate significant revenue through their
control of transport routes and their involvement in the agriculture,
cattle, charcoal, timber, sugar, and petroleum trades. According to a
nongovernmental research organization based in North Kivu, groups and
units are thoroughly entrenched in both import and export activities
and will control whatever economic activities are available and
lucrative. For example, according to a 2009 UN report, armed groups
are significantly involved in the charcoal trade. According to a
research organization, in 2009, the charcoal trade around Goma was
worth an estimated $25 million a year.[Footnote 20] In another
example, according to a former head of the UN Group of Experts, many
recently integrated members of the Congolese national military are
involved in the trade of tens of thousands of cattle worth from $300
to $900 each.[Footnote 21]
Minerals Trade Is One of Several Factors Fueling the Conflict in
Eastern DRC:
The minerals trade is one of several factors that contribute to
continuing human rights abuses and conflicts in eastern DRC. According
to U.S. officials and NGO representatives, while the minerals trade is
one of several economic activities perpetuating conflict by providing
resources to both illegal armed groups and some Congolese national
military units, it is not the root cause of conflict. Recent research
suggests that resource exploitation is a consequence of violent
conflict, rather than its cause, and may result from the breakdown of
the rule of law.[Footnote 22] As we have previously noted, many in
eastern DRC only turned to informal, artisanal mining for subsistence
as security in the country deteriorated. While cutting the illicit
incomes of certain illegal armed groups and some Congolese military
units would reduce the incentive for their members to remain in the
area, it is difficult to determine the extent to which their numbers
or involvement in human rights violations would be reduced.
According to U.S. officials, foreign officials, and NGO
representatives, other factors contribute to conflict in eastern DRC.
Factors contributing to conflict in eastern DRC include long-standing
land tenure conflicts; interethnic conflicts, including Hutu versus
Tutsi; and conflicts between Rwandan-speaking and non-Rwandan-speaking
peoples. According to a former head of the UN Group of Experts and
foreign officials, existing conflicts over land tenure were heightened
after the migration of approximately 1 million Rwandans into eastern
DRC following the 1994 genocide. This migration involved Hutus and
Tutsis and included Hutu elements that participated in the planning
and execution of the Rwandan genocide. It exacerbated existing
tensions between Rwandan communities in the DRC and other ethnic
groups, and tensions were intensified as a result of Rwanda's
occupation of eastern DRC from 1998 to 2002.
United States and the International Community Are Working to Help
Monitor, Regulate, or Control the Minerals Trade, but Illicit Trade
Continues and Many Efforts Are Only Preliminary:
State's Action Plan and Map of Mines Should Be Improved:
State's "White Paper" Is of Limited Usefulness in Communicating U.S.
Plans to Stakeholders:
According to State officials, State has drafted an internal document
entitled the Strategic Action Plan for Conflict Minerals in the
Eastern DRC that was approved by the Secretary of State in March 2010
and includes short-, medium-, and long-term diplomatic and
programmatic approaches. State's plan, communicated to external
audiences through a three-page white paper, provides an indication of
U.S. priorities but does not effectively communicate the steps that
the United States is planning to take in the region.[Footnote 23] GAO
has reported on the guidelines for information sharing and
communications as important aspects of federal internal controls. For
example, effective communications should include an adequate means of
communicating with, and obtaining information from, external
stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency
achieving its goals.[Footnote 24] The U.S. Congress is a critical
stakeholder for U.S. policy toward the DRC that, as we have previously
stated, has recently passed a law to address the minerals trade in
eastern DRC. Also, multilateral organizations and other U.S.
international partners are significant external stakeholders that can
have an important impact on the ability to achieve the goals the
United States shares with numerous other stakeholders in the region.
Our review of the white paper shows that it lacks concrete, actionable
steps that the United States could take to help address the lack of
security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure that U.S. and
foreign government officials have acknowledged as significant
challenges.[Footnote 25] For example, describing its plan on building
DRC capacity, State notes in the white paper that it is "exploring
bringing DRC mining officials to the U.S.," "may also seek the vice-
chairmanship of the Kimberley Process," and "seeks a new economic
officer at Embassy Kinshasa to focus on natural resource and
environmental issues." However, none of these three actions
demonstrates a firm commitment on behalf of the United States to
accomplish a goal. Moreover, State does not clarify how and to what
extent these actions will directly contribute to addressing the
challenge of weak governance or any of the other challenges that State
officials have acknowledged could impede efforts to monitor, regulate,
or control the minerals trade in eastern DRC. For example, given the
importance that most parties have placed on mining sector reform and
lack of capacity among DRC personnel, a more specific commitment by
the United States to assist in the training of DRC officials could
provide valuable information to other stakeholders about the
intentions of the United States to contribute to this capacity
building effort. Without this information, other stakeholders
considering capacity building efforts could be unable to determine how
U.S. efforts might complement ongoing international efforts.
As we have previously stated, information sharing is particularly
important when communication involves external stakeholders that may
have a significant impact on the agency's ability to achieve its
goals. In this case, Congress, as a critical stakeholder for U.S.
policy toward the DRC, has been active in discussions on the issue and
has also recently passed legislation mandating additional efforts of
agencies such as State and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). A staff of the Chairman of a key congressional subcommittee of
jurisdiction on DRC issues expressed concern about the lack of
concrete and actionable steps in State's action plan, based on the
white paper, for the United States to help address the challenges to
monitor, regulate, and control the minerals trade. This concern
existed at the time that Congress was considering the legislation
mandating additional agency actions related to eastern DRC under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.[Footnote
26] Also, multilateral organizations and other U.S. international
partners are significant external stakeholders that can have an
important impact on the United States achieving its goals toward the
DRC. While acknowledging that the United States has been supportive of
UN and other international efforts in the DRC, a foreign government
official and a UN official said they were unclear about whether and
how the United States plans to contribute to addressing the challenges
of insecurity, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure toward
addressing the conflict minerals situation in eastern DRC. Members of
the international community have made significant efforts in the
region, and success in addressing the many challenges in the region
will likely require close collaboration with the international
community.
State Has Produced an Initial Map of Mines but Has No Plans to Make
Improvements:
As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2010,[Footnote 27] State produced a map of mines occupied by armed
groups in eastern DRC, although State noted certain deficiencies with
the data. For example, on the map, State noted that there is
incomplete information on the number and location of mines, and that,
due to a lack of verifiable data, it is difficult to locate many mine
sites and to establish which mines are active. State also noted that
it is difficult to verify whether armed groups are present at mine
sites and are illicitly taxing the miners or porters as they move the
minerals due to their remoteness.
While we recognize the challenges associated with this project,
representatives of organizations with whom we spoke indicated the
importance of using the best available information on the location of
mines and of armed groups in the region.[Footnote 28] However, State
officials indicated that there are no plans to regularly update the
map, even though the source data may no longer reflect the current
mining and armed groups' activities. According to U.S. agency and UN
officials, the situation in eastern DRC is fluid and evolving; new
mines are being dug, old mines are being abandoned, and armed groups
can rapidly move to or withdraw from mines or mineral trading routes.
According to a senior MONUSCO official and an industry representative,
a map produced on the basis of the best available information at one
point in time is not particularly useful when trying to assess whether
the ongoing minerals trade in eastern DRC is conflict free. The
industry representative also said that a comprehensive spreadsheet
with the latest information on specific mines under the influence of
specific armed groups would be much more useful than a static map.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, enacted
in July 2010, underscores the importance of U.S. agencies taking
action to help address the trade of DRC conflict minerals. The act
includes provisions requiring the Secretary of State to (1) provide
Congress with a strategy to address the linkages between human rights
abuses, armed groups, the mining of conflict minerals, and commercial
products and (2) produce a map of mineral-rich zones, trade routes,
and areas under the control of armed groups in the DRC. Under the act,
U.S. firms are also required to ensure that the minerals they purchase
in the region are conflict free. State's ability to make incremental
improvements in subsequent updates of information on the location of
mines and armed groups could also serve as an indication of progress.
U.S. Companies Will Be Required to Declare DRC-Conflict Products, but
Industry Has Concerns about Meeting U.S. Time Frames:
The recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act[Footnote 29] also included provisions that mandate SEC
to create rules by April 2011 to require persons to disclose annually
whether any conflict minerals from the DRC or an adjoining country are
used in their products. Under the act, conflict minerals are defined
as coltan, cassiterite, wolframite, gold, and their derivatives.
[Footnote 30] The first full fiscal year after SEC creates these
rules, any U.S. entity that uses a conflict mineral for the
functioning or production of a product must annually disclose the
following to SEC: (1) due diligence measures taken, (2) independent
audits performed, (3) a list of "non-DRC conflict-free" products made,
(4) conflict mineral processing facilities, (5) the mineral country of
origin, and (6) the efforts made to determine the mine of origin. The
information must also be available on the entity's public Web site,
and disclosure will continue for at least 5 years or until the
President decides that no armed groups are benefiting from the
minerals trade.
Industry representatives have expressed uncertainty and concern about
meeting the time frames laid out in the act. First, a representative
of a global metal association expressed uncertainty whether the
regulations on disclosure will start in the next fiscal year, April
2011, or in the following fiscal year, April 2012. Second, there is
uncertainty about whether the actual regulations promulgated by SEC
will mirror the provisions laid out in the act. Third, there is
uncertainty about whether the act's provisions will be applied to a
broad range or narrow range of products. For example, industry
representatives claimed it is unclear (1) whether they will be
required to track every piece of coltan, cassiterite, wolframite,
gold, and their derivatives in every product they make or (2) if they
can make general purchasing policy decisions and declare products they
know "not to be DRC conflict free." Some in the industry are concerned
that if the regulations are applied to a broad range of products, it
will be almost impossible to meet the requirements of the regulations
and could lead to a de facto embargo. Finally, industry
representatives have expressed concern that the act's time frames are
making it harder to implement efforts already started, such as ITRI's
tin traceability scheme, pointing out that initiatives and efforts in
early stages will no longer be relevant if tight regulatory time
frames overtake their efforts.[Footnote 31]
We did not assess the potential effects of the act's provisions in
addressing the conflict minerals situation in eastern DRC, nor can we
assess the validity of the industry's claims. However, as we discuss
later in the report, we note that our research indicates that there
are significant challenges that, unless addressed, could undermine
efforts to develop an effective system to monitor, regulate, and
control the conflict minerals trade in eastern DRC.
Members of the International Community Are Working to Help Control the
Minerals Trade, but the Illicit Trade Continues and Many Efforts Are
in Preliminary or Proposal Stage:
International Community Has Made Efforts to Help Control the Minerals
Trade through UN Activities and the Contact Group on the Great Lakes
Region:
With U.S. support, the UN has made efforts to help monitor, regulate,
and control the minerals trade by imposing UN Security Council
sanctions, deploying UN Group of Experts' teams to eastern DRC, and
developing MONUSCO training centers. Major donor countries have
researched aspects of the DRC minerals trade through the Contact Group
on the Great Lakes Region (Contact Group).
Through UN Security Council sanctions, the international community has
targeted individuals and entities that support illegal armed groups in
eastern DRC through the illicit trade of natural resources.[Footnote
32] According to U.S. agency officials, the United States strongly
supports UN resolutions designed to target individuals and entities
involved in the illicit minerals trade in eastern DRC. In accordance
with UN Security Council resolutions, the United States established a
DRC sanctions program to impose financial sanctions and a travel ban
on various individuals and entities that contribute to conflict and
human rights abuses in the eastern DRC.
According to U.S. and UN officials, to help monitor the impact of
sanctions and determine whether additional sanctions are needed, the
UN periodically recruits consultants to serve on a Group of Experts
team. Each Group of Experts team examines the current situation in
eastern DRC and reports on the impact of UN sanctions on various
individuals and entities that contribute to conflict and human rights
abuses in eastern DRC. Their reports also provide details on the flow
of arms, related materiel, and illegal armed groups in eastern DRC.
According to U.S. and UN officials, these teams are important
investigative bodies and the United States strongly supports their
work.
In response to a proposal from the DRC government, the UN, through
MONUSCO, has developed plans to create five pilot mineral trading
centers in eastern DRC. The purpose of these centers is to create
secure areas close to mine sites where miners can sell their minerals
to small-scale traders, under the regulations, monitoring, and
relative safety of DRC mining and police officials. These centers will
allow DRC civilian agents to more closely regulate the minerals trade
and assess appropriate legal taxes closer to the mining sites.
Construction is under way at two mineral trading center sites, but
none are yet operational.
MONUSCO will fund, with support from bilateral donors, the five pilot
trading centers; however, according to a MONUSCO official, the plan
requires the DRC government to deploy trained, competent, and fairly
paid mining officials and police units to operate the centers.
According to MONUSCO officials, the trading centers will help
formalize, regulate, and contribute to a shift of the minerals trade
away from the control of armed groups by providing greater civilian
oversight and control of the trade along key trade routes. Based on
the success of the pilot trading centers, the next objective will be
to build trading centers throughout eastern DRC. The United States
diplomatically supports the development of mineral trading centers as
well as other efforts of the broader international community,
particularly the efforts of the UN, to help control the minerals
trade.[Footnote 33]
According to U.S. and foreign government officials, major donor
countries---including the United States---have worked collectively on
minerals trade issues and engaged the DRC government through the
Contact Group.[Footnote 34] The purpose of the Contact Group is to
coordinate the efforts of donors to optimize the impact of their aid
to the DRC. To help further research and address DRC minerals trade
issues, the Contact Group formed a task force on natural resources in
the Kivus chaired by the EU special envoy. According to a senior U.S.
agency official, the United States works closely with its partners on
the task force.
Representatives from task force countries researched (1) mapping of
mining sites and trading routes, (2) potential traceability and
certification schemes for minerals, (3) possible due diligence
procedures for international companies, and (4) opportunities to move
the minerals trade into a more legal trade. According to foreign
officials, the task force's major conclusions were that there is no
immediate solution to the problems in eastern DRC, and that the
challenges will require sustained commitment from the international
community, in cooperation with the DRC government. According to a
senior U.S. agency official, the task force more recently developed
recommendations to discuss with the DRC government, and members of the
task force met with DRC mining officials and talked about ways to
improve oversight of the mining sector.
Despite efforts of the international community, the illicit taxation
and exploitation of the minerals trade continues. Notwithstanding DRC
law, which prohibits Congolese national military units from engaging
in the minerals trade, and national and international laws, which
prohibit illegal armed groups from engaging in the trade, some
Congolese national military units and illegal armed groups continue to
profit from their illicit involvement.
Private Industry, the DRC Government, and Others Also Have Made
Efforts to Help Control the Minerals Trade, but Some Efforts Are in
the Preliminary or Proposal Stage:
Other efforts are being proposed or have been started by private
industry, the DRC government, and others to help monitor, regulate, or
control the minerals trade. In cooperation with the DRC government,
the global tin association--ITRI--has developed a three-phase tin
supply chain initiative designed to improve due diligence,
transparency, and traceability within the cassiterite (tin) supply
chain in the DRC. Phase 1 has been completed. It involved establishing
harmonized document requirements for trading houses to export
minerals, including written declarations confirming the lack of
involvement of illegal armed groups in their supply chains. According
to an ITRI representative, ITRI smelting companies will only buy tin
from DRC trading houses that provide the required documentation.
According to the same ITRI representative, phase 2 is in its
preliminary stage. ITRI's intent is to develop a system to trace the
origin of minerals from the mine site to the exporter (i.e., a trading
house in Goma or Bukavu) and to develop chain of custody data.
According to the ITRI representative, ITRI is currently trying to put
this system in place and has set up two pilot traceability projects,
in North Kivu and South Kivu.[Footnote 35] The primary purpose of this
system is to tag bags of minerals to identify their mine of origin,
then for these tags to follow the bags of minerals up to the point of
export. The ITRI representative said that phase 3 is just a proposal
at this point, but its concept is to assess social and environmental
factors at mine sites and to consider incentives and methods to
improve these factors. The ITRI representative also stated that the
initiative will eventually need an accurate and regularly updated list
of mine sites under the influence of armed groups; importantly, ITRI
does not have the capacity to generate this information. The situation
on the ground in eastern DRC changes quickly, ITRI will need a list of
specific mines considered free of the influence of armed groups so
that these minerals can be legitimately exported.
As part of its efforts to demilitarize and formalize the mining
sector, the DRC government has recently deployed mining officials to
eastern DRC and is planning a project with the World Bank to increase
the technical capacity of DRC mining sector governance. Working with
the World Bank and the United Kingdom's Department for International
Development, the DRC government plans to implement project PROMINES.
The aim of the project is to build the capacity of DRC mining
officials and to encourage the mining sector to become more formal and
transparent, including in eastern DRC. According to a senior State
official, this could be beneficial in eastern DRC because it is
vitally important to increase the capacity of DRC mining officials to
monitor the minerals trade in eastern DRC.
The German government's Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural
Resources, through a cooperation agreement with the DRC government,
has launched a pilot mineral certification project for South Kivu.
This scheme will be similar to a pilot mineral certification scheme
for small mines that German officials have launched in Rwanda. In
addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is drafting due diligence guidelines on supply chain management
for companies extracting materials from conflict zones and fragile
states. While not yet fully developed or designed exclusively for
companies involved in the minerals trade in eastern DRC, OECD
representatives said that these guidelines will be an important
contribution from governments to private industry on how the minerals
trade should be conducted following the appropriate due diligence
guidelines.[Footnote 36]
A Central African multilateral organization, the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), has worked with a
prominent NGO to develop a proposal for a regional tracking and
certification scheme for conflict minerals after the minerals have
been exported from the DRC.[Footnote 37] According to a senior U.S.
agency official, ICGLR has sometimes been dismissed by many in the
international diplomatic community as lacking capacity and not being
effective in implementing initiatives. Nonetheless, the senior U.S.
agency official said that U.S. officials who attended the last ICGLR
meeting reported that the group had reached an agreement on major
points to develop a strategy on handling the region's minerals
trade.[Footnote 38] The goal is to create a Central African regional
certification scheme for minerals, with a common set of rules.
[Footnote 39]
Significant Challenges to Monitoring, Regulating or Controlling the
Minerals Trade from Eastern DRC Have Yet to Be Addressed:
A Number of Challenges Exists to Tracking Minerals' Mine of Origin:
According to U.S. agency officials, foreign government officials, and
others, it will be very difficult to correctly identify and track the
origin of minerals from specific mines to points of export in Goma or
Bukavu. There are a number of challenges to tracking the mine of
origin for minerals artisanally mined in eastern DRC:
* Artisanal mining in eastern DRC is rudimentary. No paperwork exists
at the mines that reliably documents which minerals are extracted from
which mine sites.
* Due to the remoteness of the mine sites and the lack of
infrastructure, especially the lack of roads to the sites, it is
virtually impossible for DRC mining officials, representatives from
international organizations, or others to consistently monitor mine
activities at many sites.
* The presence of some Congolese national military units and illegal
armed groups at the mine sites pose a security threat to DRC officials
or representatives from international organizations who might be
present at the sites.
* According to U.S. agency officials and industry representatives,
certification schemes rely on the active participation and cooperation
of DRC mining officials. However, according to U.S. agency officials
and representatives of artisanal miners, DRC mining officials suffer
from a lack of capacity, such as an insufficient number of trained
mining officials and mining police to cover the mines, and endemic
corruption.
* Identifying and tracking the mine of origin for gold would be
especially difficult because gold is typically found in very small
nuggets or as gold dust that is usually smuggled out of eastern DRC.
According to an industry representative, to date, no entity in the
international community has proposed a certification scheme for gold.
The difficulty of tracking the mine of origin for gold is important
because, according to UN officials, illegal armed groups, such as the
FDLR, that have engaged in some of the most brutal and egregious human
rights violations are reportedly heavily involved in the gold trade.
While Congolese military units seized tin and tantalum mines during
military offenses in 2009, much of the gold trade remains under the
control of illegal armed groups.[Footnote 40]
Lack of Security, Weak Governance, and Lack of Infrastructure Are
Significant Challenges That, Unless Addressed, Will Likely Hamper
Efforts to Monitor, Regulate, or Control the Minerals Trade:
Lack of Security, Weak Governance, and Lack of Infrastructure Are
Significant Challenges:
Unless they are effectively addressed, U.S. agency officials, foreign
government officials, and others have identified lack of security,
weak governance, and lack of infrastructure as significant challenges
that will likely hamper efforts to monitor, regulate, or control the
minerals trade. According to U.S. agency officials, UN officials, and
others, the minerals trade cannot be effectively monitored, regulated,
or controlled as long as armed groups and some units of the Congolese
national military continue to commit human rights violations and
exploit the local population at will.
In addition, U.S. and foreign government officials have also indicated
that weak governance and lack of state authority in eastern DRC is a
significant challenge. According to UN officials, if Congolese
military units are withdrawn from mine sites, civilian DRC officials
will need to monitor, regulate, and control the minerals trade. Such
effective civilian oversight will not occur if civilian officials in
eastern DRC continue to be corrupt, to be severely underresourced, or
to lack the necessary skills to perform their duties. U.S. and foreign
government officials also said that lack of infrastructure in eastern
DRC, especially road access to mining sites, is a significant
challenge. According to U.S. agency officials and industry
representatives, the minerals trade cannot be effectively monitored,
regulated, or controlled unless civilian DRC officials,
representatives from international organizations, and others can
readily access mining sites to check on the enforcement of laws and
regulations and to ensure visibility and transparency at the sites.
The challenges of insecurity, weak governance, and lack of basic
infrastructure in eastern DRC were also identified in a GAO 2007
report, which pointed out that some of these challenges have to do
with the vast expanse of territory in the region and the associated
difficulties in implementing programs.[Footnote 41] In addition, the
DRC shares borders with several nations that have played important
roles in either the stability or the instability of the country, so
the participation and cooperation of these nations are essential.
[Footnote 42] The success of efforts to monitor, regulate, or control
the minerals trade will ultimately depend upon the DRC government's
cooperation, commitment, and actions.
Three Interrelated Actions Are Necessary to Address Challenges, but
Little Progress Has Been Made:
U.S. agency officials, foreign government officials, and others told
us that the following three interrelated actions are necessary to
address the challenges of lack of security, weak governance, and lack
of infrastructure in eastern DRC: (1) comprehensive security sector
reform, (2) measures to increase the capacity of civilian DRC
officials, and (3) investments in infrastructure.[Footnote 43]
According to U.S. and UN officials, through security sector reform,
units in the Congolese national military need to be transformed from
acting as predators against the civilian population into a force that
refrains from committing human rights abuses. Security sector reform
includes a withdrawal of Congolese military units to barracks in
locations away from the mines, regular pay and support of the troops
from the government, and comprehensive training for the troops to not
engage in human rights violations and sexual and gender-based violence.
To address the lack of security, the United States and other donors
are making some efforts to train specific Congolese national military
units, and the UN hopes to provide some barracking of Congolese
military units. For example, the United States and Belgium are
providing training to certain Congolese national military units.
However, according to U.S. and foreign government officials, while
security sector reform is a critically important long-term issue,
there has been very little progress to date. According to foreign
government officials, some units trained by foreign donors in the past
quickly resumed behaviors of committing human rights violations after
their training was completed. This was, in part, because the units
were not consistently paid by the DRC government after their training.
A senior U.S. official said that, recently, the United States has
reached broad agreement with other training countries to coordinate
their efforts, and that the United States is pushing the DRC
government to take responsibility for security sector reform.
To address weak governance, U.S. and foreign government officials said
measures to increase the capacity of civilian DRC officials, including
efforts to reestablish military and civil law and justice, and the
training of law enforcement officials are needed.[Footnote 44] The DRC
government is making some attempts to improve governance by deploying
mining officials in eastern DRC and pursuing the PROMINES project with
the World Bank. According to a UN official, through the DRC
stabilization plan, the UN hopes to enhance the Congolese police
presence and build some administrative buildings in eastern DRC.
However, these efforts are still mostly in the pilot stage.
To address lack of infrastructure, U.S. and DRC officials stated that
investments in infrastructure, especially developing and improving
roads to mine sites, are needed to facilitate access. Reliable roads
will facilitate visibility and transparency at mine sites by allowing
civilian DRC officials, representatives from international
organizations, and others faster and easier access to the mines and
will reduce opportunities for civilians transporting minerals to be
exploited by armed groups. According to a UN official, the UN hopes to
build some basic infrastructure in eastern DRC, including roads,
through the DRC stabilization plan. However, these efforts are still
mostly in the pilot stage.
Conclusions:
In eastern DRC, diggers using basic tools or their hands mine tin,
tantalum, tungsten, and gold to sell for export to the world market.
Illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are
involved in the trade of these minerals. These groups and units
continue to commit serious human rights abuses and engage in violence
against civilians. However, the minerals trade is only one of several
economic activities perpetuating conflict. The United States has
provided substantial humanitarian aid to the DRC; the Secretary of
State visited eastern DRC and called for action; and the United
Nations has a large peacekeeping force in the DRC, to which the United
States is the largest donor. However, the eastern DRC continues to be
plagued by violence against the civilian population from state and
nonstate armed groups exploiting the minerals in the region. Due to
the urgency of the situation, the DRC government, industry groups, and
the international community---including the United States---are making
efforts to regulate and control the minerals trade in eastern DRC.
However, many of these efforts are in the preliminary or proposal
stage, and significant challenges exist that could undermine their
efficacy---including insecurity, weak governance, and lack of
infrastructure in eastern DRC.
Recent actions by State, including its summarizing U.S. plans in a
three-page white paper, and producing a map of mines and armed groups,
demonstrate the U.S. government's interest and engagement in working
with other stakeholders to address the deadly conflict in the minerals-
rich eastern DRC. However, the white paper does not go far enough to
provide concrete, actionable steps, including steps the United States
will take to contribute to addressing the challenges of lack of
security, weak governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC
that could impede efforts to monitor and regulate the minerals trade.
Addressing these challenges will require close collaboration between
the United States and other stakeholders; thus, providing a more
concrete, actionable plan would enable U.S. partners to determine how
U.S. efforts might complement their own. Also, State's map of mines
and armed groups, notwithstanding the noted limitations, is a step in
the right direction. However, while State may have used the best
available data for the map, the document presents information at a
point in time, whereas U.S. and UN officials have acknowledged the
fluidity of the situation in the mining areas. Periodically updating
the information to capture the changing situations of the mines and
armed groups may contribute to increased transparency and enhance the
efforts to monitor and regulate the mining sector. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which requires the
Secretary of State to provide Congress with a strategy and to produce
a map of mineral-rich zones, underscores the importance of the United
States taking further action, in collaboration with other
stakeholders, to help address the trade of DRC conflict minerals.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To respond to the urgent humanitarian crises and reinforce U.S.
commitment to work for peace and security in eastern DRC, in
collaboration with the DRC government and international partners, we
recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads
of other relevant U.S. agencies, take the following action:
* Provide Congress and other international stakeholders with concrete,
actionable steps that the United States could take to help monitor,
regulate, and control the minerals trade in eastern DRC, including
steps to help address the challenges of lack of security, weak
governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC.
Recognizing the role that timely information on mines and armed groups
could play in monitoring, regulating, and controlling the conflict
minerals trade in eastern DRC, we recommend that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and working with
other relevant international stakeholders, take the following step:
* Make every effort to periodically update information based on the
best available data on mines, armed groups, and mineral trading routes
subject to illicit taxation by illegal armed groups or Congolese
military units.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of State,
Department of Defense, United States Agency for International
Development, Department of the Treasury, and the United States Trade
Representative for their review and comment. We received written
comments from State that are reprinted in appendix II. State concurred
with our first recommendation that the Secretary of State provide
Congress and other international stakeholders with concrete,
actionable steps the United States could take to help monitor,
regulate, and control the minerals trade in eastern DRC, including
steps to help address the challenges of lack of security, weak
governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC. State also
concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and working with other
relevant international stakeholders, make every effort to periodically
update information, based on the best available data, on mines, armed
groups, and mineral trading routes subject to illicit taxation by
illegal armed groups and Congolese military units. State stated that
it is taking steps, in coordination with the DRC government, other
partners, and regional initiatives, to help address the illicit trade
in minerals. State also stated that the Department will develop and
share the strategy and map of mineral-rich zones that are required by
the Dodd-Frank Act. State noted, however, that the Department's
ability to address these problems is constrained by its insufficient
resources and lack of access to relevant areas of the DRC. The United
States Trade Representative and the United States Agency for
International Development had no comments on this report. However, the
United States Agency for International Development stated that the
agency will use the information in this report to inform future
programming. We received technical comments from Treasury, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and other interested parties. We also will make copies
available to others on request. In addition, this report will be
available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Loren Yager, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine the minerals trade in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), its connection to human rights violations; and
national and international efforts to monitor, regulate, or control
the trade, we assessed (1) the key minerals mined in eastern DRC and
how these minerals are mined, transported, and processed; (2) the
extent to which there are links between minerals extraction, armed
conflicts, and human rights abuses in eastern DRC; (3) the measures
that the DRC, the United States, and the international community have
taken to monitor, regulate, or control the minerals trade and their
effectiveness; and (4) the challenges and limitations that the DRC,
the United States, and the international community face in monitoring,
regulating, or controlling the trade, and how these challenges are
being addressed. To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed
various reports, memorandums, and other documents from relevant U.S.
agencies; foreign governments; multilateral organizations, such as the
United Nations (UN); nongovernmental organizations; and industry
organizations. We interviewed officials from the Department of State
(State), the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for
International Development, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury),
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative.
We reviewed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010; Treasury's DRC sanctions regulations; State documents and
reports, including State Country Reports on Human Rights; United
States Geological Survey's Mineral Commodities Summaries and Minerals
Yearbooks; other documents, cables, reports, and memorandums from
relevant U.S. agencies; reports issued by the UN Group of Experts on
the DRC; and World Bank reports and program documents. We also
reviewed various documents and reports on the global tin association's
tin traceability initiative for eastern DRC. In addition, we reviewed
numerous reports by nongovernmental agencies, subject matter experts,
and academics on a variety of issues related to eastern DRC.
During the course of our review, we traveled to London (United
Kingdom), Brussels (Belgium), Goma (eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo), and Kigali (Rwanda) and interviewed U.S. agency officials,
various foreign government officials, officials from multilateral
organizations, and representatives from both western and local
nongovernmental organizations and industry. We also interviewed UN
officials, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) officials, and U.S.
officials of the United States Mission to the United Nations in New
York. We interviewed a number of current and former members of the UN
Group of Experts panels. The UN and MONUSCO, in particular, have had a
substantial, long-term presence in eastern DRC for the past decade
that positions them as the leading subject matter experts on the
situation on the ground in eastern DRC. The Human Rights Division of
MONUSCO, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, has operated on
the ground in the DRC since 1996 and monitors, investigates, and
reports on human rights abuses by means of its in-country network,
which includes more than 120 human rights officers throughout the DRC;
military observers; and working relationships with nongovernmental
organizations. Also, the UN Panel of Experts and, subsequently, the UN
Group of Experts have examined the link between natural resource
exploitation in the DRC and conflict since 2000.
Because of the inaccessibility of many locations in eastern DRC and
the mining sites, in particular, our analysis of conditions in mining
areas is based largely on in-depth research and site visits conducted
by representatives from various western and local nongovernmental
organizations, UN officials, U.S. and foreign government officials,
and international subject matter experts.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
September 17, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take
Further Actions to Contribute to Effective Regulation and Control of
the Minerals Trade in Eastern DRC," GAO Job Code 320728.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Adam Keith, Desk Officer, Bureau of African Affairs at (202) 647-4966.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Barbara Retzlaff:
cc: GAO — Loren Yager:
AF — Johnnie Carson:
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take
Further Actions to Contribute to Effective Regulation and Control of
the Minerals Trade in Eastern DRC (GAO-10-1030, GAO Code 320728):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on
GAO's draft report entitled "The Democratic Republic of the Congo:
U.S. Agencies Should Take Further Actions to Contribute to Effective
Regulation and Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern DRC."
The GAO report recommends the following to the Secretary of State:
Recommendation 1: Provide Congress and other international
stakeholders concrete, actionable steps the U.S. could take to help
monitor, regulate, and control the minerals trade in eastern DRC,
including steps to help address the challenges of lack of security,
weak governance, and lack of infrastructure in eastern DRC.
Recommendation 2: Make every effort to periodically update
information, based on the best available data, on mines, armed groups,
and mineral trading routes subject to illicit taxation by illegal
armed groups of Congolese military units.
Response:
We concur with the report's recommendations. The Department is taking
steps, in coordination with the DRC government, other partners, and
regional initiatives, to help address the illicit trade in minerals.
The Department will develop and share the strategy and map of mineral-
rich zones that are required by the Dodd-Frank Act. We will also
coordinate our efforts bilaterally and in multilateral forums with the
DRC government and with other key partners working in the security,
mining, and infrastructure sectors.
The Department concurs with the report's observations regarding the
complexity of monitoring and controlling the minerals trade in eastern
DRC. It highlights, though only very broadly, many of the key
challenges, including insecurity, limited civil government authority,
and lack of infrastructure. The report also correctly notes that the
minerals trade is only one of several factors perpetuating the
conflict and is not the root cause. The unique challenges and
different supply chain for gold are sufficiently highlighted, which is
important given the key role of gold relative to other minerals as a
source of revenue for armed groups.
The Department would emphasize that the ability of U.S. agencies and
their partners to help the DRC government effect rapid change in the
context of systemic institutional weakness is limited. We also note
that our ability to address these problems is constrained by our
insufficient resources and the lack of access to relevant areas of the
DRC. Coordinating our efforts with the DRC government and its other
partners is thus critical to ensuring that our leverage is maximized.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Loren Yager, (202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara, Assistant
Director; Ian Ferguson; Qahira El'Amin; Michael Hoffman; Ernie
Jackson; and Karen Deans made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] From its creation in 1999 to July 2010, the United Nations'
deployment was called the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. On July 1, 2010, the deployment's
name was changed to the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
[2] Pub. L. No. 111-203, signed into law on July 21, 2010. That act
contains provisions that require the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations, no later than 9 months
after the enactment of the act, requiring persons to disclose annually
to SEC if any conflict minerals from the DRC or an adjoining country
are used in the products of those companies, and to make such
information publicly available. In addition, the act requires the
Secretary of State to (1) provide Congress with a strategy to address
the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups, the mining of
conflict minerals, and commercial products and (2) produce a map of
mineral-rich zones, trade routes, and areas under the control of armed
groups in the DRC.
[3] Tin is found in cassiterite ore, tantalum is typically found in
columbite-tantalite ore, and tungsten is usually found in wolframite
ore. Quite often, cassiterite ore and columbite-tantalite ore
(commonly referred to as coltan) are found together. However,
columbite-tantalite ore can also be found with wolframite ore. Other
precious and semiprecious stones, including diamonds and amethysts,
are also found in eastern DRC; however, tin, tantalum, tungsten, and
gold are the main minerals mined and traded there.
[4] Artisanal mining is a form of mining that is characterized by a
lack of mechanization or capital investment.
[5] In addition, according to NGO representatives, some child labor
occurs at mining sites.
[6] According to a USGS report, DRC is not among the top producers of
tungsten or among the countries with the largest deposits of tungsten.
[7] Aloys Tegera and Dominic Johnson, Pole Institute, Rules for Sale:
Formal and Informal Cross-border Trade in Eastern DRC (May 2007), 52.
[8] Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, Resource Consulting
Services, Trading Conflict for Development: Utilizing the Trade in
Minerals from Eastern DR Congo for Development (April 2009), 32.
[9] Tungsten is used heavily in cemented carbides ("hard metals") for
hard dies, tools, gauges, and bits and in the production of tungsten
steels, which are used in fabricate components in the aerospace
industry.
[10] Business for Social Responsibility, Conflict Minerals and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Supply Chain, Government and
Capacity Building: An Overview for Participants in the DRC Conflict
Minerals Forum, Business for Social Responsibility (May 2010), 8.
[11] MONUSCO officials and UN expert panels, leading subject matter
experts on the situation on the ground in eastern DRC, have
substantiated this information. See appendix I for more information on
the UN's and MONUSCO's substantial, long term presence in eastern DRC.
[12] The FDLR includes soldiers and officers from the former pro-Hutu
Rwandan regime that planned and carried out the Rwandan genocide
predominantly against Rwandan Tutsis.
[13] The CNDP, a generally pro-Tutsi rebel group in eastern DRC, was
officially absorbed into the Congolese national military in January
2009.
[14] David Sullivan and Noel Atama, The Enough Project (Center for
American Progress), Digging In: Recent Developments on Conflict
Minerals, (January 2010).
[15] Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, Resource Consulting
Services, Trading Conflict for Development: Utilizing the Trade in
Minerals from Eastern DR Congo for Development (April 2009), 6.
[16] The Enough Project (Center for American Progress), A
Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals [hyperlink,
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-
conflict-minerals-strategy-paper] (Apr. 24, 2009).
[17] To the extent that a significant amount of the minerals are
underreported and/or smuggled out of eastern DRC, this statistic could
underestimate the export value of these minerals from eastern DRC.
According to the same USGS report, cobalt, copper, crude petroleum,
and diamonds accounted for about 96 percent of mineral exports from
DRC in 2008.
[18] This estimate is based on industry estimates of an average of 500
tons a month of tin production from the Bisie mine.
[19] Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/2009/603), United Nations Security Council (Nov.
23, 2009), 50.
[20] Center on International Cooperation, "Mining and Conflict in
Eastern DR Congo" (April 2009), 1.
[21] Jason Stearns "Why Legislation on Mineral Trade is a Good Thing"
Weblog. Congo Siasa, [hyperlink, http://congosiasa.blogspot.com] (July
26, 2010).
[22] Earlier studies argued that mineral wealth caused civil war;
however, these studies used measures of natural resource wealth that
have significant limitations. A recent study, which used an improved
measure of natural resource abundance, found that "resource-rich
countries have on average a lower propensity to enter a civil war, but
countries that end up with civil strife will experience increasing
dependence on [natural resources]." See Christa N. Brunnschweiler and
Erwin H. Bulte, "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource
Abundance, Dependence, and the Onset of Civil Wars," Oxford Economic
Papers , vol. 61 (2009). Other evidence indicates that the "resource
curse" afflicts countries with weak institutions, such as corruption
and limited rule of law, and that countries with more effective
institutions see faster economic growth from resource exports. See
Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, "Institutions and the
Resource Curse," The Economic Journal, vol. 116 (2006).
[23] According to State, the plan is intended to be one element of
State's larger strategy on the DRC and builds on past and ongoing
activities. We requested the plan from State, but State provided us
with the three-page white paper which State said is a publicly
available document that describes U.S. plans for eastern DRC.
Therefore, GAO's assessment of State's Strategic Action Plan relies on
an examination of the white paper and on testimonial evidence from
State officials on the plan.
[24] Federal internal controls provide standards and an overall
framework for establishing and maintaining internal controls and for
identifying and addressing major performance and management challenges
in government. See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD0021.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[25] The white paper includes the following six focus areas: (1)
increasing public statements about the conflict minerals trade, (2)
enhancing diplomatic efforts to target the conflict minerals trade,
(3) encouraging responsible natural resources trade, (4) supporting
the UN Mission in the DRC, (5) building capacity of the DRC
government, and (6) protecting small-scale artisanal miners and mining
communities.
[26] Pub. L. No. 111-203.
[27] See section 1252 of the National Defense Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, enacted on October 28, 2009. The
act states that "the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, should, consistent with the recommendation from
the United Nations Group of Experts on the [DRC] in their December
2008 report, work with other member states of the United Nations and
local and international nongovernmental organizations...to produce a
map of mineral-rich zones and areas under the control of armed groups
in the [DRC]..."
[28] The map is based on data from a July 2009 study by the
International Peace Information Service, which is a Belgian
nongovernmental organization.
[29] Pub. L. No. 111-203.
[30] In addition, the Secretary of State can add other minerals or
their derivatives to the list if the Secretary determines that they
are financing conflict in the DRC or an adjoining country.
[31] ITRI is dedicated to supporting the tin industry and expanding
tin use. It is largely funded by†tin producers and smelters, and its
primary goal is to ensure an†innovative, competitive, and sustainable
market for tin. As of March 2010, ITRI's members included Omsa
(Bolivia), Malaysia Smelting Corp, Thailand Smelting & Refining, PT
Koba Tin (Indonesia), PT Timah (Indonesia), Minsur S.A. (Peru),
Metallo-Chimique (Belgium), Fenix Metals Limited (Poland), Yunnan
Chengfeng (China), Yunnan Tin (China), and Talison (Australia).
According to an ITRI representative, ITRI members have agreed to
follow the requirements of the initiative.
[32] The UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1857 in December 2008, which
allows the UN Security Council to impose financial and travel
restrictions on various individuals and entities, including those
"supporting the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural
resources." According to a UN official, as of June 2010, the list of
individuals and entities targeted by DRC sanctions was last updated in
March 2009.
[33] According to State officials, State has been engaged in
significant diplomatic outreach to the DRC and neighboring countries.
In the last 6 months, dozens of senior State officials have traveled
to the region. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs met with DRC President Joseph Kabila in April 2010 to
discuss the U.S. priority on improving the security situation in the
eastern DRC and concern about illegal exploitation of natural
resources. In addition, the Senior Advisor for the Great Lakes region
traveled to Europe and New York to work with U.S. partners and UN
officials on issues of common interest.
[34] The Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region is composed primarily
of officials from donors to the DRC--namely, the United States,
European countries, and the UN.
[35] In cooperation with the tantalum industry, ITRI is looking for a
tin-tantalum mine in South Kivu for a pilot project that will involve
the miners tagging both tin and tantalum.
[36] State officials reported that they reviewed and provided comments
on these proposed due diligence guidelines to OECD representatives.
[37] International Conference on the Great Lakes Region member
countries include Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic,
Republic of the Congo, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Zambia.
[38] According to the senior U.S. agency official, the major points
included (1) developing a regional database of mineral imports and
exports, (2) developing the capacity to track and monitor regional
trade in minerals, and (3) establishing independent monitors for the
system.
[39] At the ICGLR meeting, it was suggested that the U.S. convene
meetings between Central Africa regional government officials,
experts, and end-users of the minerals. State reported that it is
working to set up these meetings with high-level State representation.
[40] According to a MONUSCO official, illegal armed groups' control of
much of the gold trade is due, in part, to the fact that the gold
mines are often found deep in the jungle and can be spread over a very
wide area that would be difficult for Congolese military units to
control.
[41] GAO, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment
Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy
Objectives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-188]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2007).
[42] The DRC is bordered by Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Central African
Republic, Republic of the Congo, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, and Burundi.
[43] The current illegal taxation of mining and transport of minerals
in eastern DRC means that minimal revenue is returned to the DRC
central or provincial governments. The lack of revenue from mining
compounds the challenges these governments face in implementing
reforms of the security and civilian governance sectors and making
infrastructure investments.
[44] According to UN officials, human rights abuses are reportedly
committed by some Congolese soldiers as well as by some civilian DRC
officials.
[End of section]
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