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entitled 'New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing
Facilities and Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements'
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Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
New Embassy Compounds:
State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities and Providing for
Operations and Maintenance Requirements:
GAO-10-689:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-689, a report to Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In response to the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies, the Department
of State (State) embarked on a multiyear, multibillion dollar program
to replace insecure and dilapidated diplomatic facilities. Since 2001,
State has constructed 52 new embassy compounds (NECs) under this
program, and moved over 21,000 U.S. government personnel into more
secure and safe facilities. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to
which new facilities match the space and functionality needs of
overseas missions and State’s actions to address space and
functionality challenges; and (2) operations and maintenance
challenges at these new facilities and State’s steps to address them.
GAO analyzed staffing data and other documentation for 44 NECs built
from 2001 to 2009 and interviewed State headquarters and embassy
officials at 22 of these 44 NECs to obtain information on their
functionality and operations and maintenance issues.
What GAO Found:
State has located nearly one-quarter of overseas staff in NECs, which
posts said are an improvement over older facilities. However, NECs do
not fully meet the space and functionality needs of overseas missions.
Current staffing levels exceed the originally-built desk—or office—
space at over half of the 44 NECs GAO analyzed. Post management has
dealt with space limitations by converting spaces, like conference
rooms, into offices, but 4 posts have had to retain space outside the
compound for staff that could not fit in the NECs. Also, officials at
almost all of the 22 NECs that GAO reviewed in depth reported some
spaces, like consular affairs spaces, did not fully meet their
functional needs. According to State officials, it is difficult to
predict changing foreign policy priorities that can affect staffing
levels, and the process for planning NECs has been unable to fully
account for these changes. Budget constraints also affected decisions
about the size of NECs and types of features provided. State has taken
some actions to improve NEC sizing, but does not have sufficient
flexibility in its staffing projection and design processes to better
address sizing challenges. To address problems with functionality,
State implemented a lessons learned program to analyze issues in
completed NECs and modify design criteria for future NECs, but State
has not completed, in a timely manner, planned evaluations that are
designed to identify such issues.
While NECs are state-of-the-art buildings, they have presented
operations and maintenance challenges, and the larger size and greater
complexity of NECs, compared to facilities they replaced, have
resulted in increased operations and maintenance costs. In 2010, State
developed its first long-range maintenance plan that identifies $3.7
billion in maintenance requirements over 6 years for all overseas
facilities, but it does not include time frames for implementing
identified maintenance projects or address increased operating costs.
Problems with testing, or “commissioning,” new building systems have
contributed to problems with building systems that do not function as
they should, causing higher maintenance costs. State strengthened its
commissioning process, though this change only applies to future NECs
and does not address problems at existing NECs. Further, State does
not currently recommission—or retest—NECs to ensure they are operating
as intended. In addition, more than half of the 22 NECs that GAO
reviewed in detail experienced problems with some building systems,
resulting in the need for premature repair and replacement. Through
its lessons learned program, State has changed some design criteria
for future NECs to avoid problems with building systems. Finally,
State has had problems hiring and training personnel who have the
technical skills necessary to manage the complex NEC systems. State
has taken initial steps to improve its staff hiring and training, but
does not have an overall plan to establish its NEC human resource
needs and the associated costs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take several actions to (1)
improve its processes for determining NEC size and ensuring that these
facilities are fully functional, and (2) address challenges in meeting
NECs' long-range operations and maintenance needs.
GAO received comments from the Department of State, which agreed with
our recommendations. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix II.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-689] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128,
fordj@gao.gov or Terrell G. Dorn (202) 512-6923, dornt@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NECs Do Not Fully Meet the Space and Functionality Needs of Overseas
Posts and State Actions Have Addressed Some, but Not All, Challenges:
NECs Are Challenging to Operate and Maintain; State Has Taken Steps to
Address These Challenges, but Problems Remain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: GAO comments:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Reasons for Off-Site Employees at Four Posts:
Table 2: Features Cited as Not Fully Meeting Posts' Functional Needs:
Table 3: State's Recent Modifications to Address Functionality
Challenges:
Table 4: NEC Utility Costs Pre-and Post-Move for NECs Completed in
2007 and 2008 (costs rounded to the nearest thousand):
Table 5: Changes Made by State to the Standard Embassy Design to Avoid
Problems with Building Systems on Future NECs:
Table 6: Locations of 44 NECs within GAO's Scope:
Figures:
Figure 1: Percentage Difference between Current NEC Staffing Levels
and As-Built Desks:
Figure 2: Desk Differential in 25 NECs with Staffing Levels Exceeding
As-Built Space by at Least 5 Percent:
Figure 3: As-Built Desks versus Current Staffing Levels for State and
other U.S. Government Agencies:
Figure 4: Space Alterations in Kigali, Rwanda, and Belmopan, Belize:
Figure 5: Issues with Warehouse Facilities:
Figure 6: Issues with Maintenance Shops:
Figure 7: Issues with Parking Areas:
Figure 8: Issues with Quality-of-Life Amenities:
Figure 9: Issues with Representational Space:
Figure 10: Issues with Consular Affairs Section:
Figure 11: Typical NEC Building Systems:
Figure 12: Sofia, Bulgaria, the first LEED-Certified U.S. Embassy:
Figure 13: Example of Condensation Causing Mold:
Figure 14: Example of Inadequate Maintenance of Air Supply Diffuser
and Cooling Units Added After System Failure:
Figure 15: NEC Fire Panel in Kigali, Rwanda, with Trouble and
Supervisory Lights Illuminated:
Figure 16: NEC Sofia, Bulgaria:
Figure 17: NECs Kigali, Rwanda, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti:
Abbreviations:
BME: Building Maintenance Expenses:
BOE: Building Operating Expenses:
DOE: Department of Energy:
ICASS: International Cooperative Administrative Support Services:
IG: Inspector General:
LEED: Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design:
LROMP: Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan:
M/PRI: Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation:
NEC: new embassy compound:
OBO: Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations:
PEPFAR: President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief:
SED: Standard Embassy Design:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 20, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
In the wake of 1998 terrorist bombings of embassies in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, that exposed the poor condition of and
security vulnerabilities at U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas, the
Department of State (State) began a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program to replace insecure and aging diplomatic facilities worldwide.
The goal of this program, the Capital Security Construction Program,
is to construct safe, secure, functional, and modern diplomatic
facilities at approximately 214 overseas posts as quickly as possible.
The program incorporates the requirements of the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999[Footnote 1] that calls
for new diplomatic facilities to be sufficiently sized to ensure that
all U.S. government personnel at the post are located on-site.
[Footnote 2] State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO),
which operates the program, also intends that these new embassy and
consulate compounds are efficient, state-of-the-art office buildings.
In 2006, we reported that State has made significant progress
constructing new facilities but that better planning is needed for
operations[Footnote 3] and maintenance[Footnote 4] requirements.
[Footnote 5] State supported our recommendation that it should develop
a plan that addressed the financial and human resources for meeting
the immediate and long-term operations and maintenance requirements
for new embassy compounds (NEC). Since 2001, OBO has completed 52
NECs, and moved more than 21,000 United States government personnel--
about one-quarter of those employees working overseas--into more
secure, safe, and functional facilities.[Footnote 6] OBO continues to
manage ongoing construction and design of 33 additional facilities.
In response to your request, we examined: (1) the extent to which NECs
match the space and functionality needs of overseas posts and the
actions State has taken to address any space and functionality
challenges, and (2) operations and maintenance challenges at NECs and
State's steps to address them.
To address these objectives, we reviewed program, planning, budget,
evaluation, and other analysis documents from State, as well as
previous GAO reports on State's embassy construction program. To
examine space needs, we analyzed data from State's capital security
cost-sharing program for 44 of the 52 completed NECs. Our analysis
does not include 8 completed NECs, which generally were excluded from
our scope because they are unique projects, such as the NECs in
Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan, or were recently completed in
fiscal year 2010. We also reviewed 22 of the 44 NECs in greater depth,
examining space, functionality, operations, and maintenance issues; we
reviewed these NECs in more detail based on factors such as their
geographic location and their history with staffing, functionality,
operations, or maintenance challenges. For these 22 locations, we
conducted site visits at 8 posts and teleconferences with 14 posts. As
part of our review of operations and maintenance issues, we reviewed
State documents and reports, including the Long-Range Overseas
Buildings and Maintenance Plans. In addition, we discussed the embassy
construction program with State officials in Washington, D.C.; from
OBO; regional bureaus; and Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing
and Innovation. Appendix I provides more information on our scope and
methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to July 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The United States maintains facilities at more than 260 diplomatic
missions, including embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic
offices, located around the world. More than 80,000 U.S. government
employees from 30 agencies depend on infrastructure that State
provides and maintains.
In 1998, terrorist bombings of embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
and Nairobi, Kenya, killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000
others. In 1998, State formed the Accountability Review Boards to
investigate the bombings. The Boards reported that unless security
vulnerabilities at U.S. embassies and consulates were addressed, U.S.
government employees and the public would remain at risk from
terrorist attacks at many overseas facilities. In 1999, the Secretary
of State formed the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel to appraise the
condition of overseas facilities and consider the future of U.S.
overseas representation. The Panel reported on the unsafe,
overcrowded, deteriorating, and "shockingly shabby" conditions of U.S.
embassies and consulates. Both the Boards and the Panel recommended
that State replace insecure and aging diplomatic facilities worldwide.
That same year, State embarked on a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program to replace overseas facilities. Through its Capital Security
Construction Program, administered by OBO, State intends to construct
new facilities at 214 overseas posts with the goal of providing safe,
secure, functional, and modern buildings as quickly as possible. The
program incorporates the requirements of the Secure Embassy
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 that calls for new
diplomatic facilities to be sufficiently sized to ensure that all U.S.
government personnel at the post are located on-site. In June 2006, we
reported that State had made significant progress in completing new
embassy and consulate compounds.[Footnote 7] As of April 2010, State
has completed 52 NECs and placed over 21,000 U.S. government
employees--or about one-quarter of the population working overseas--in
more safe, secure, and functional facilities.
To enable timely completion of its construction projects, OBO
typically uses the design-build project delivery method[Footnote 8]
and a Standard Embassy Design (SED) that can be adapted to accommodate
conditions at each project site.[Footnote 9] NECs generally consist of
a main office building (chancery), compound access control buildings,
utility buildings for mechanical and electrical systems, and Marine
Security Guard quarters (if a post has a Marine contingent). Depending
on the site, the project budget, and the needs of the post, a new
compound could also include a General Services support annex, a
warehouse, maintenance shops, recreation facilities, and employee and
public parking areas. Some compounds also include an annex building
for USAID or other program or agency functions. In 2003, we found that
staffing projections for NECs were developed without a systematic
approach or comprehensive rightsizing analyses, potentially resulting
in wrong-sized buildings, and recommended, among other things, that
State provide overseas posts with comprehensive guidance on developing
staffing projections for NECs.[Footnote 10] In 2004, State created the
Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI),
which now manages the process for developing NEC staffing projections.
In establishing project requirements, OBO obtains information on a
post's projected staffing from M/PRI, which works closely with
officials at the post, State's regional bureau, and other U.S.
government agencies to develop a 5-year projection of the post's
staffing needs based on an assessment of mission priorities and the
staffing levels required to pursue those priorities. With this
information, OBO outlines space requirements that define functional
needs for office (desks), common use (conference rooms, cafeteria),
support (janitor closet, mechanical rooms), and future growth space.
OBO uses this space requirements analysis to estimate the cost of each
project, which forms the basis for State's Capital Security
Construction Program budget request. At the time of State's budget
submission, OBO considers project requirements to be "locked," meaning
it intends to construct the facility according to the requirements
that were used to set the budget request. OBO generally locks project
requirements 2 years prior to awarding a contract for design-build
services.
In our June 2006 report on State's progress in constructing NECs,
[Footnote 11] we noted the comparatively higher utility consumption of
the new facilities caused, for example, by the need to continually
operate heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems--that may
not have existed in former facilities--to adequately condition spaces
in the sealed buildings.[Footnote 12] In addition, we reported that
posts have had to hire additional maintenance staff with the skills
and qualifications to maintain the state-of-the-art buildings. In
consideration of these and other factors, we estimated that once all
new diplomatic facilities were completed, total post-funded annual
operations and maintenance costs, adjusted to 2006 constant dollars,
could increase by at least $71 million and possibly by several times
more over those posts' previous facilities. Because we found that
State was slow to recognize the increased funding needed to operate
and maintain its new facilities and had not developed a comprehensive
plan that details long-term resource requirements necessary for
protecting its investment in the facilities, we recommended that the
Secretary of State develop an integrated and comprehensive facilities
plan that clearly specifies the financial and human resources for
meeting the immediate and long-term operations and maintenance
requirements for NECs. State agreed with our findings and indicated it
would take action to address the recommendation.
NECs Do Not Fully Meet the Space and Functionality Needs of Overseas
Posts and State Actions Have Addressed Some, but Not All, Challenges:
State is making progress moving staff into more secure and functional
facilities. However, we found that over half of the 44 NECs completed
from 2001 through 2009 have staffing levels that exceed the number of
desks originally provided by 5 percent or more. Additionally,
officials at nearly all of the 22 NECs we reviewed in greater depth
reported the design of some spaces--such as consular areas,
warehouses, or maintenance shops--did not fully meet their functional
needs. According to State officials, it is difficult to predict
changes in foreign policy priorities that can affect overseas staffing
levels, and the current process for planning NECs has been unable to
fully account for these changing needs. State officials also indicated
that budget constraints affected decisions about the overall size and
types of features provided in NECs. In some cases, space and
functionality challenges resulted in the need to conduct follow-on
projects after posts occupied the NEC, resulting in millions of
dollars of additional costs. State has taken steps to address some
space and functionality challenges, such as creating M/PRI to
standardize the process for projecting future staffing levels;
incorporating some additional flexibility for future growth into NECs;
and implementing a lessons learned program to analyze issues in
completed NECs and modify design criteria for future NECs. However,
sizing NECs remains challenging and State did not provide the
analytical basis for determining how much growth space should be
incorporated into an NEC. Additionally, State has not conducted
planned evaluations of completed NECs to ensure timely identification
of issues.
State Is Making Progress Locating Staff in More Secure and Functional
Facilities:
As of April 2010, State has moved over 21,000 people--or about one-
quarter of all overseas staff--into new facilities. State's Inspector
General (IG) and OBO have reported that posts are satisfied with many
aspects of their NECs, such as the improved security they provide. In
2008, State's IG reported that posts commented favorably about their
NECs and praised their design, space, and security.[Footnote 13] In
2007, OBO surveyed officials at posts with NECs, and occupants
responded positively about many aspects of their NECs, particularly
when compared with old facilities. For example, 86 percent of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "the
layout of the NEC is well designed compared with the previous
facility." Overall, respondents rated security improvements and the
fact that personnel were all located on a single compound as NECs' two
most important improvements to achieving their diplomatic mission. In
many cases, posts moved from facilities that were in poor condition,
insecure, and scattered throughout the city. State officials noted
that, in general, NECs are a dramatic improvement over older
facilities. For example, the former embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria,
consisted of seven buildings spread throughout the city that did not
meet current security standards and suffered from seismic and
structural deficiencies. In comparison, officials in Sofia noted the
NEC was one of the nicest buildings in Bulgaria. Additionally,
officials at overseas posts and State's regional bureaus commented on
the professional environment of the NECs. For example, officials at
overseas posts stated that NECs were a positive representation of the
United States' commitment to the host country. However, some officials
also pointed out that the external appearance of NECs can be imposing
and that increased security standards, including the fact that many
NECs are located far from city centers, in part to meet more stringent
security requirements, reduced the willingness of host government
officials to hold meetings at NECs.
As Originally Constructed, Over Half of NECs Did Not Have Enough Desks
for Current Staffing Levels, Resulting in the Need to Add Desks, Which
Has Had Some Negative Consequences:
Over half of the 44 NECs we analyzed did not have enough desk space to
meet current staffing needs. Post management has converted common
spaces, such as conference rooms or training rooms, into offices in
order to accommodate additional desks on the compound. However,
actions taken to accommodate additional staff have had some negative
consequences, such as the loss of common spaces.
Current Staffing Levels Exceed Originally Constructed Desk Space at
Over Half NECs:
While NECs are a long-term investment that State intends to serve a
post for decades, our analysis shows that most posts have filled their
originally constructed space within just a few years of occupying the
NEC. Over half (25 of 44) of the posts occupying NECs completed from
2001 through 2009 currently have more staff requiring desks than were
provided in the NEC's original construction.[Footnote 14]
Specifically, as indicated in figure 1, our analysis of data for all
44 posts in our scope shows that current staffing levels exceed as-
built desks--the number of desks provided when the NEC was
constructed--by 10 percent or more at 21 of the 44 posts and exceed as-
built desks by at least 5 percent at 4 additional posts.[Footnote 15]
Not all posts have exceeded the desk space initially provided. For
example, our analysis also shows 13 posts have current staffing levels
at least 5 percent below as-built desk space. However, officials at
overseas posts noted that having some excess space can be helpful, as
posts may require additional space over time and it provides
flexibility for post management to adapt to changing circumstances.
Figure 1: Percentage Difference between Current NEC Staffing Levels
and As-Built Desks:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Total NECs = 44.
Staffing levels higher than as-built desks:
21 NECs: more than 10 percent higher: 48%;
4 NECs: 5-10 percent higher: 9%.
Staffing levels approximately equal to as-built desks:
6 NECs: within 5 percent: 14%.
Staffing levels under (less than) as-built desks:
6 NECs: More than 10 percent under: 14%;
7 NECs: 5-10 percent under: 16%.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Numbers may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
As figure 2 demonstrates, our analysis shows a difference of more than
50 desks for 11 of the 25 posts in which current staffing levels
exceed as-built desk space by at least 5 percent.[Footnote 16]
Figure 2: Desk Differential in 25 NECs with Staffing Levels Exceeding
As-Built Space by at Least 5 Percent:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Current desk needs in excess of as-built desks: Staff levels exceed as-
built desks by 50 or fewer desk positions:
20 or fewer: 5.
21-50:
51-100:
More than 100:
Current desk needs in excess of as-built desks: Staff levels exceed as-
built desks by 50 or fewer desk positions:
21-50: 9.
51-100:
More than 100:
Current desk needs in excess of as-built desks: Staff levels exceed as-
built desks by 51 or more desk positions:
51-100: 8.
More than 100:
Current desk needs in excess of as-built desks: Staff levels exceed as-
built desks by 51 or more desk positions:
More than 100: 3.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
State typically plans NECs with some additional desk space for future
growth, but the amount of growth space provided fluctuated over time
and across posts. When the NECs we examined were designed, State
typically budgeted for NECs to include from 5 percent to 10 percent
additional desk space as future growth space.[Footnote 17] Some growth
space is designed as office space, with desks or cubicles installed
during construction, while other growth space may initially be
designed as conference rooms or file rooms, with the intention that
they can be converted to office space in the future, if needed.
State's typical growth factor for NECs has fluctuated over time. Prior
to 2003, OBO typically planned for growth space equivalent to 10
percent of the projected desk space in an NEC. However, in 2003, due
to concerns about the high cost of the embassy construction program,
OBO reduced the growth space allowance to 5 percent of an NEC's
projected desk space needs. In 2008, OBO returned to a 10 percent
growth factor to provide a greater margin to accommodate unanticipated
growth. These policies only serve as general guides, though, and some
NECs received less growth space than is typically budgeted. For
example, in Bamako, Mali, State eliminated growth space in the
chancery in order to reduce total construction costs to meet
construction contractor bids that were higher than anticipated.
For the 25 posts in which current staffing levels exceed as-built
space by at least 5 percent, we found that, in general, the number of
State positions has grown more than the number of positions for all
other agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). As shown in figure 3, for the 25 posts
collectively, the number of current State desk positions exceeds as-
built desk space by more than 1,400 desks, or 38 percent.
Comparatively, the number of desk positions for all other U.S.
government agencies combined exceeds as-built desk space by about 200
desks, or 10 percent. Individually, we found a larger increase--both
in terms of absolute numbers and percentage increase--in the number of
State desk positions than in the number of other agency desk positions
at 20 of the 25 posts.
Figure 3: As-Built Desks versus Current Staffing Levels for State and
other U.S. Government Agencies:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
U.S. government agency: State;
As-built desks: 3,795;
Current desk positions: 5,237.
U.S. government agency: Other agencies;
As-built desks: 1,997;
Current desk positions: 2,198.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
Because our analysis groups all non-State agencies into a single
category, it may not highlight the changing make up of overseas posts.
While some non-State agencies have grown substantially, other agencies
have reduced their overseas presence. For example, according to one
State official, law enforcement agencies have increased their overseas
presence since September 11, 2001, while the Departments of the
Treasury and Transportation reduced their overseas staffing levels.
Additionally, some of the growth within State may have resulted from
consolidating administrative services once all agencies collocated at
the NEC. State has taken on additional administrative responsibilities
while other agencies were able to reduce administrative staff.
[Footnote 18]
Some State officials commented that the earliest-built NECs are more
likely to have space shortages, since it is difficult to project
staffing levels farther into the future and there has been more time
for the post to outgrow the space originally provided. However, we
found that the age of an NEC was not a major factor in explaining
space shortages. For example, while 4 of the 6 NECs completed from
2001 to 2003 have shortages of 5 percent or more, 8 of the 16 NECs
occupied since 2007 also have shortages of 5 percent or more.
Posts Have Used Growth Space, Converted Conference Rooms and Other
Common Spaces, and Reduced Cubicle Size to Locate Staff On-Compound:
We reviewed 22 posts in greater depth to determine how they found
office space for additional staff. At most of the 22 posts we
reviewed, State was able to find enough space on the new compound for
all additional staff. Current staffing levels exceed as-built desk
space by at least 5 percent in 15 of the 22 posts we reviewed. Eleven
of those posts were able to accommodate all desk positions on compound
by using growth space; converting common spaces, such as conference
rooms or training rooms, into offices; or reducing cubicle sizes.
Figure 4 provides examples of some spaces that posts have converted
into office space.
Figure 4: Space Alterations in Kigali, Rwanda, and Belmopan, Belize:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Left photo to right photo, Kigali, Rwanda: File room converted to
office space (before and after photos).
Above photo, Belmopan, Belize: Kitchen converted to office space.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
However, 4 of the posts we reviewed had to retain some office space
off-site. Table 1 lists the posts that have office space off-site, as
well as the reasons for doing so.
Table 1: Reasons for Off-Site Employees at Four Posts:
Post: Abuja, Nigeria;
Reason(s) some employees are off-site: Staffing levels at the post
outgrew the amount of space that was initially planned. Space
constraints in Abuja have been exacerbated by substantial delays in
construction of a USAID annex, which was planned concurrently with the
chancery but not funded at that time.[A] Currently, the post leases
off-site space for staff who cannot fit on-compound, including those
who will be located in the USAID annex. Even once the USAID annex is
completed, however, post management anticipates it will be too small
for their current needs, and some agencies will likely have to remain
off-site.
Post: Beijing, China;
Reason(s) some employees are off-site: Staffing levels at the post
outgrew the NEC before construction was completed. The post retained
one of the old embassy buildings to temporarily house the employees
that cannot fit in the NEC, and OBO plans to construct an additional
annex on the new compound.
Post: Berlin, Germany;
Reason(s) some employees are off-site: The size of the new chancery
was reduced due to budget limitations, resulting in a new facility
that could not accommodate all post staff. The post retained two old
facilities--an office building and a warehouse/General Services Office
annex building--to house staff and functions that could not fit in the
new facility.
Post: Kathmandu, Nepal;
Reason(s) some employees are off-site: The NEC site is not large
enough to accommodate a General Services Office annex and warehouse.
State was required to retain some of the old facilities, so it opted
to keep some functions, including a small number of desk positions, on
the old compound.
Source: GAO.
[A] Prior to the creation of the Capital Security Cost Sharing
program, which centralized funding for NEC construction, State built
new embassy compounds in separate stages, typically constructing USAID
annexes after construction began--or sometimes after construction was
completed--on the rest of the compound. For additional information,
see GAO, Embassy Construction: Achieving Concurrent Construction Would
Help Reduce Costs and Meet Security Goals, GAO-04-925 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 24, 2004).
[End of table]
In addition to potentially increasing the security risks for those
employees not on-compound, State officials noted that having employees
off-compound results in additional costs and can affect coordination
across the mission and reduce the efficiency of posts' operations
because embassy personnel have to spend more time in transit between
facilities. In the cases in which posts have some staff working off-
site, post management has had to either retain old facilities or lease
additional office space. In the case of Berlin, the most cost-
effective option for locating staff off-site--at an estimated cost of
$25 million--involved purchasing and renovating an office facility the
post had formerly leased. In Abuja, leasing off-site office space
costs over $800,000 per year.
Space Constraints and Actions Taken to Add Desks Have Had Some
Negative Consequences for Post Operations:
State officials noted that, because post management often has to
convert common areas, such as conference rooms or training rooms, into
offices to accommodate additional staff, posts may not have sufficient
meeting or training space. For example, regional bureau officials
stated that dedicated training rooms in NECs are often converted into
office space, but that having training space is important for embassy
operations. Officials also noted that other actions, such as having
staff share desks or locating new staff in available spaces far from
the rest of their agency or section, can result in operational
inefficiencies. For example, at one African post, some FBI staff have
to work in shifts in order to share a limited number of classified
computers.
Additionally, officials at some of the posts we reviewed expressed
concerns that space could increasingly become a consideration in
approving requests for new overseas positions, potentially reducing
the post's ability to execute its mission. In general, the vast
majority of new position requests are approved--over 97 percent of all
requests were approved in 2008 and 2009. In considering new position
requests, State advises Chiefs of Mission to consider space
availability, among other issues, and we found that a few position
requests at posts with NECs have been denied, at least in part,
because of space constraints. According to State data, in a few
instances, posts have cited resource limitations, including space
constraints, when denying requests for new overseas positions. Of the
seven posts that cited resource limitations when denying requests for
overseas positions in 2008 and 2009, three currently occupy NECs and
one is scheduled to move into an NEC with known space shortages in
2010. Some post officials also noted that space shortages can make it
difficult to accommodate short-term, or temporary duty, positions.
Officials noted that, in cases where the NEC has little or no
available office space, it can be difficult to find places for short-
term staff to work. At some posts, the number of short-term positions
can be quite large. For example, an official in Beijing, China, stated
that the post can have up to 100 short-term staff at the NEC on any
given day and finding desks for them can be challenging.
Officials at Nearly All Posts We Reviewed Reported the Design of Some
Spaces Did Not Fully Meet Their Functional Needs:
Though staff at overseas posts noted many aspects of NECs function
well, officials at 21 of the 22 posts we reviewed reported the design
of some spaces within the NEC did not fully meet their functional
needs, with an average of five functionality-related issues per post.
While officials reported a variety of different concerns about each of
the spaces, several officials noted an overarching concern that the
design of some spaces in the NEC failed to take into account local
conditions, such as weather or economic factors, or how the post would
ultimately use the space. Table 2 shows the six most commonly cited
issues.
Table 2: Features Cited as Not Fully Meeting Posts' Functional Needs:
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Warehouse;
Number of posts reporting issues: 16.
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Maintenance shops;
Number of posts reporting issues: 16.
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Parking;
Number of posts reporting issues: 16.
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Quality-of-life amenities (e.g., cafeteria, recreational
facilities);
Number of posts reporting issues: 14.
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Atrium and other representational space;
Number of posts reporting issues: 13.
Features commonly cited as not fully meeting posts' functional needs
at 22 NECs: Consular Affairs section;
Number of posts reporting issues: 11.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Figures 5 through 10 provide descriptions of some of the types of
issues post officials reported with each of the above functional areas.
Figure 5: Issues with Warehouse Facilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Size/No Warehouse:
Officials reported that some on-compound warehouses are too
small, in some cases resulting in the need to rent an additional
warehouse off-site or to use supplemental storage, such as
shipping containers, on compound. Additionally, some NECs do
not have a warehouse on compound, which can be challenging,
according to some post officials. It can result in added costs to
lease off-site space and one official noted that, because security
requirements prohibit American officers from working full time
from an off-site warehouse, one official noted it can be more
difficult to oversee warehouse operations when they are off
compound. Post officials also said increased transportation time
between facilities can result in inefficiencies.
Layout:
The layout of some NEC warehouses, including the type of
shelving provided or the configuration of the shelves, did not
meet posts’ needs.
To the right: In Nairobi, Kenya, it can take up to 2 hours for
staff to drive one way from the NEC to the off-site warehouse.
Consequently, post staff moved several shipping containers onto
the NEC (shown at right) to meet their more immediate storage
needs.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Issues with Maintenance Shops:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Size/Type of Shops:
Officials reported issues relating to the size or types of shops
provided, often noting that shops are too small for their intended
purpose, or space was not provided for one or more shops
needed for the post’s operations. For example, officials in
Panama City, Panama, said that no vehicle maintenance shop
was provided in the NEC. Additionally, some post officials said
having no maintenance shops at the NEC can pose challenges,
such as having to lease off-site space, resulting in reduced
efficiency associated with traveling between locations.
Design:
The design of some shops does not meet posts’ needs. For
example, in Accra, Ghana, officials noted that the welding shop
was not outfitted with adequate ventilation, so maintenance staff
cannot use it for its intended purpose.
To the right: The ceiling in the auto maintenance shop in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, is too low to fully extend the vehicle lift for
large vehicles like trucks.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Issues with Parking Areas:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Staff/Visitor Parking:
Some NECs do not have adequate parking for staff or visitors.
Some officials noted that, because many NECs are located far
from city centers where public transportation can be less
reliable, parking can take on an added importance.
Covered Parking:
Some officials reported their NEC has inadequate covered
parking for official armored vehicles. The vehicles’ armor coating
can be damaged by exposure to the intensive sun common at
some overseas posts. Having inadequate covered parking can
shorten the lifespan of the armor and result in costly
replacements or repairs.
To the right: In Belmopan, Belize, the NEC has only two covered
parking spaces for five armored vehicles.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Issues with Quality-of-Life Amenities:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Size/Design:
In some cases, officials noted the size or design of one or more
quality-of-life amenities, such as cafeterias and gyms or other
recreational facilities, was inappropriate given the number of
staff at the post or the availability of alternatives in the vicinity of
the NEC. Some officials noted that design problems resulted in
amenities that, while nice, were largely unused.
Features Not Provided:
In other cases, officials stated that some features were not
provided in the NEC. For example, in Abuja, Nigeria, the NEC
does not have a cafeteria, so the post is currently using two
shipping containers as a temporary replacement. According to
State officials, many overseas posts are located in places that
provide few commercial recreational options, making
quality-of-life amenities important for staff morale.
To the right: The commercial cafeteria in Belmopan, Belize,
which post staff estimated cost $1 million, has largely been
unused in the 3 years the NEC has been occupied. Post
management reported that the cafeteria is far too large for its
needs and that the relatively small size of the post, in
combination with its remote location, make it unlikely that the
post will be able to support a commercial vendor.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Issues with Representational Space:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Atrium:
Until 2006, the SED included a three- or four-story atrium,
which was intended, in part, as space to host representational
functions. While officials at some posts commented that the
atrium space was useful for representational events, officials at
other posts reported challenges associated with the atrium,
including that it is expensive to heat and cool, difficult to
maintain, and its long, narrow layout and location inside the
embassy, which requires additional security procedures for
guests and caterers, can make it difficult to use for events.
Other Representational Space:
Some NECs, including some that were planned prior to the
development of the SED or special projects like the NEC in
Berlin, do not have an atrium. Officials at some of these posts
also reported difficulties with hosting representational
functions at the NEC.
Executive Offices:
Officials reported that offices for the Ambassador and Deputy
Chief of Mission can be too small, making it difficult to use the
space for meetings.
To the right: Officials in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, reported that the
long, narrow layout of the atrium makes it difficult to host large
events in the space.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Issues with Consular Affairs Section:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Consular Interview Windows:
Some posts reported concerns about either the layout or number of
consular interview windows in the NEC. For example, some officials said
the layout of the desk area on the teller side of the window provided
little room for reviewing and processing papers and that poor acoustics
complicated transactions between consular staff and visitors.
Waiting Areas:
Officials reported issues with some consular waiting areas, such as
interior waiting areas that are too small or outdoor waiting areas that
have insufficient cover from sun or rain.
Supervisory Line of Sight:
Officials at four posts reported issues associated with consular
supervisors having a clear line of sight of the consular section.
According to a Consular Affairs official, a clear line of sight is
intended to improve management controls and prevent visa malfeasance.
Consular Affairs guidance notes that consular officers should be able
to easily see all the print areas, most work areas, most of the
interview windows, and have clear views from two or more angles into
the cashier booth, from their desks.
To the right: View from the office designed for the consular chief in
Belmopan, Belize, from which only two of the four consular windows and
none of the print areas or work areas are visible. As a result of this
obscured line of sight, the consular chief cannot use the office and,
instead, has moved to a cubicle in the main work area.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Challenges with Projecting Future Staffing Levels and Budget
Constraints Have Resulted in the Need to Conduct Follow-on Work:
According to State officials, it is difficult to predict changes to
staffing levels associated with shifting foreign policy priorities,
and the process for planning NECs has not been able to fully account
for those changes. State officials also indicated that budget
limitations contributed to decisions about the overall size and types
of features provided in NECs. In some cases, space and functionality
challenges resulted in the need to conduct follow-on projects,
resulting in millions of dollars of additional costs.
The Current Process for Sizing NECs Has Not Been Able to Fully Account
for Changing Foreign Policy Priorities:
According to State officials, the process for planning NECs has not
been able to fully account for changing staffing levels associated
with shifting foreign policy priorities. Because of the time required
to plan and construct an NEC, there can be a lag of multiple years
from the time staffing projections are finalized to the time a post
moves into an NEC. The process for projecting future staffing needs
starts with an assessment of mission priorities and the staffing
levels necessary for carrying out those priorities. Therefore, State
officials noted it can be very difficult to predict future staffing
levels when changes occur as a result of unexpected events or
initiatives. Officials at overseas posts, OBO, the regional bureaus,
and M/PRI all agreed that changes in U.S. foreign policy priorities
following the planning or construction of an NEC resulted in
significant growth at many posts, contributing to the differences
between current staffing levels and as-built desk space. According to
State officials, some posts have had large increases in staffing due
to recent initiatives, such as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) and recent State and USAID initiatives to
substantially increase their Foreign Service presences. For example,
according to officials in Kigali, Rwanda, the post's staffing
projections predicted that the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention would have 18 desk positions at the time the NEC opened,
but it actually had 34 desk positions when the NEC opened because of
increases associated with PEPFAR. Staffing levels have also reflected
changing needs in response to world events. For example, according to
an M/PRI report, following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, many law enforcement, security, and military agencies increased
their overseas presence. According to State officials, many of these
initiatives were not anticipated when NECs were planned.
Additionally, when staffing projections are prepared, an agency may
not have clearly planned for or articulated future needs. According to
State officials, some agencies have historically been better than
others in developing staffing projections and articulating the policy
justifications for staffing growth. However, other agencies have been
less clear in their planning, complicating State's ability to plan an
NEC. For example, State officials report that USAID frequently revises
its projected staffing levels, sometimes even after construction of a
facility has begun. Also, as our earlier analysis showed, at the posts
that have exceeded as-built desk space by at least 5 percent, State
has grown substantially more than other agencies, indicating it has
also been challenging for State to predict its own future staffing
levels.
State officials also noted that the staffing projections that
determine an NEC's size are not directly tied to the process for
approving actual staffing levels at each post.[Footnote 19] OBO sizes
NECs based on staffing projections provided in a post's rightsizing
report. While posts, tenant agencies, and the regional bureaus all
have input into the rightsizing process, M/PRI has final approval for
these staffing projections. However, State officials noted that the
Chief of Mission has authority over actual staffing levels at each
post and may approve positions beyond the levels planned for in the
NEC. According to State officials, in cases where M/PRI and the Chief
of Mission do not agree on the appropriate staffing levels for a post,
discrepancies can result between an NEC's planned size and the post's
actual staffing levels. For example, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the
post's initial projections anticipated the post would expand and
become a regional center. Both M/PRI and State's IG disputed the
premise that Addis Ababa should be a regional center, noting that
Nairobi, Kenya, already serves a regional role in East Africa. In
addition, M/PRI found the post's initial projections included
substantial growth even though the post had dozens of unfilled
positions. Therefore, the rightsized staffing projections anticipated
more limited growth, reducing the post's initial projections by 47
desk positions. However, the Chief of Mission continued to add new
positions at a rate even faster than the post initially projected and,
in 2009, OBO had to initiate changes after construction of the Addis
Ababa NEC had already begun in order to accommodate 96 additional desk
positions at a cost of about $13 million.
OBO officials report it is difficult to make changes to a project to
accommodate changing needs after the staffing projections have been
finalized. The NEC construction process typically requires a 2-year
lag from the time staffing projections are initiated to the time a
contract is issued and an additional 3-year lag between contract
issuance and the time a post moves into the NEC. When changes are
requested, State officials said State and other tenant agencies may
reassess the project to determine whether the requirements are
critical enough to warrant changing the project's planned schedule and
budget. In some instances, State officials reported changes could be
accommodated to the program and in other cases changes could not. OBO
officials noted it is easier to make changes to a project before a
contract has been awarded. While changes have been made to a few
projects after a contract has been issued, OBO officials stated it is
not preferable because it can increase costs and delay construction.
Budget Limitations Also Contributed to Space Constraints and
Functionality Issues:
Budget limitations also contributed to space constraints and
functionality issues in some NECs. According to OBO officials,
congressional and executive concerns about the high cost of the
embassy construction program were a primary reason for the 2003
decision to reduce the NEC growth factor from 10 percent to 5 percent.
Budget limitations also impacted decisions about the overall size of
the NEC at some posts with significant desk shortages. For example,
State officials noted that, the overall size of the NEC in Dushanbe,
Tajikistan--where, according to our analysis, current staffing levels
are more than double the number of desks initially provided--was
largely based on the planned budget.[Footnote 20] We identified 10
posts in which some spaces or features were reduced or eliminated
between the initial planning and final construction of the NEC. Some
NECs were significantly affected by budget limitations. In Berlin,
Germany, for example, more than one-third of the originally planned
space in the new facility was cut due to budget limitations.[Footnote
21] In Conakry, Guinea, functional spaces--including the cafeteria,
multipurpose room, and most conference rooms--were cut in order to
meet the project's planned budget. According to OBO officials,
programmatic support facilities, such as warehouses, recreational
facilities, and cafeterias, were eliminated from a project's scope
before any changes were made to office space. State officials noted
that, in some cases, reducing the scope of a project may have been
preferable to delaying the project.
Space and Functionality Challenges Resulted in the Need for Follow-on
Work at Some Posts:
In some cases, problems with space and functionality resulted in the
need to conduct follow-on work after the post moved into the NEC, such
as planning for a major redesign of interior space or constructing an
office annex or support facility, which has cost implications.
[Footnote 22] In particular, State has completed or plans to complete
new construction or major renovations in at least six of the 44
completed NECs within our scope. For example, State is constructing an
office annex in Beijing, China, to accommodate 318 additional desks at
a cost of $103 million. In Dushanbe, Tajikistan, OBO developed a plan
to rearrange space within the existing chancery to accommodate new and
projected desk positions, as well as build a warehouse and maintenance
shops on-compound. In total, OBO estimates the changes will cost about
$7.5 million, but notes that, even with the recommended changes to add
office space, there will be no available space for future growth
beyond the staffing levels projected for 2013. Additionally, in its
2010 Long Range Overseas Maintenance Plan, OBO identifies 96 needed
projects for the 22 posts we reviewed in greater depth at a total cost
of approximately $98 million. Most of the costs are attributable to
major rehabilitation projects, including $42 million in Frankfurt,
Germany, for renovations that were anticipated but not undertaken when
the post originally moved into the new facilities in 2005.[Footnote
23] Additionally, officials at 16 of the 22 posts we reviewed reported
they have already undertaken follow-on projects of varying size and
complexity to correct problems with their respective NEC.
State Has Begun to Take Actions to Address Space and Functionality
Challenges, but Not All Problems Have Been Fully Addressed:
State has recognized many of the problems related to space and
functionality and has taken actions that have resulted in
improvements, but not all problems have been fully addressed. To
improve NEC sizing, State created M/PRI to standardize the process for
projecting future staffing levels. Additionally, OBO has taken some
actions to incorporate additional flexibility for growth in NECs.
However, accurately projecting future staffing needs remains
challenging and State did not provide an analytical basis for
determining how much growth space is appropriate. To address
functionality challenges, OBO implemented a lessons learned program
that analyzes issues in completed NECs and, as appropriate, modifies
design criteria for future NECs. However, State has not ensured timely
identification of problems in completed NECs through reviews, like
post-occupancy evaluations.
State Has Taken Actions to Improve Sizing of NECs, but Challenges
Remain:
Through its creation of M/PRI in 2004, State standardized the process
for developing staffing projections for posts receiving an NEC. As we
noted in 2003, under State's prior process, State's headquarters gave
embassies little guidance on factors to consider in developing
projections, and U.S. agencies therefore did not take a consistent or
systematic approach to determining long-term staffing needs. M/PRI now
directs the process and has developed formal guidance on developing
staffing projections for posts. According to State officials, in
combination with the 2005 establishment of the Capital Security Cost
Sharing program, through which each agency with an overseas presence
contributes funds for construction on the basis of its overseas
staffing levels and the type of space occupied, changes made through
the rightsizing process have brought greater discipline to the
planning process and have provided greater incentive for State and
other agencies operating overseas to seriously consider their long-
term staffing needs. State has also undertaken efforts to work more
closely with tenant agencies to better understand their staffing
needs. For example, State now meets with officials from USAID on a
monthly basis to discuss future staffing needs.
OBO has also taken actions to incorporate some additional flexibility
for growth into NECs. According to OBO officials, the SED was changed
to incorporate more flexibility after the first year of its use. For
example, the first version of the SED included detailed floor plans
that dictated where offices and open workstations would be located.
However, in the SED's second year, OBO moved to a different approach
that focused on the overall size of the NEC but left greater interior
flexibility to rearrange office space. Recognizing the need to
reassess the amount of growth space provided in NECs, in 2008 OBO
increased the standard growth factor from 5 percent back to 10
percent, which it had been prior to 2003, to provide a greater margin
to accommodate unanticipated growth. According to State officials, OBO
has made an effort to be more accommodating to changing post needs
through the design and construction process, when possible. OBO
officials noted four cases in which they made changes to add space to
an NEC's design after the staffing projections were finalized.
However, officials also stated that, while they want to accommodate
posts' needs, OBO prefers to avoid making changes after the contract
has been issued because it is costly and can cause substantial delays.
While the implementation of a formal rightsizing process is an
important step to improving projections for sizing NECs, accurately
planning for future needs remains challenging. State officials
acknowledged it remains difficult to accurately project future
staffing needs. While only 6 of the 44 posts included in our scope
underwent a thorough rightsizing review when planning their NEC, our
analysis of staffing data at these posts suggests that accurately
projecting future staffing needs can still be difficult. We found that
current staffing levels exceed as-built desk space by at least 20
percent at four of the six posts that underwent a rightsizing review,
all of which were completed in 2008 or later.
OBO, M/PRI, and regional bureau officials agreed that the NEC planning
process should include a greater degree of flexibility to account for
unanticipated changes. OBO officials indicated it may be more
advantageous to plan buildings based on flexible bands that correspond
to a post's general size--for example, posts with a need of 200 to 250
desks might constitute one band--rather than focusing on a specific
desk count. Officials noted construction costs tend to come in bands
and such an approach could incorporate more flexibility than is
allowed in the current process. M/PRI officials also said that placing
less focus on a specific desk count in planning NECs could be
beneficial, as it would allow them to focus more resources on
assessing the potential for policy changes that could impact future
staffing levels.
Analytical Basis for Growth Factor Unclear:
While State revised the growth factor for NECs in 2008, officials did
not provide the analytical basis for determining how much growth space
is appropriate. OBO officials stated that, while the growth factor was
originally intended to provide space for future growth, even a 10
percent growth factor can be exhausted very quickly at many posts,
essentially providing some posts with no available growth space from
the moment they occupy the NEC. As our earlier analysis showed, nearly
half of all NEC posts have current staffing levels that exceed as-
built space by more than 10 percent, while some posts have staffing
levels lower than the initial projections. However, while the amount
of growth space provided is sometimes reduced based on budget or other
considerations, officials noted that State essentially applies a
uniform growth factor across all posts and does not adjust the growth
factor based on post-specific characteristics, such as a post's
geographic location or the presence of rapidly growing agencies or
functions, that might help forecast growth not explicitly planned for
in the staffing projections. State officials did not indicate they
have conducted any analysis of characteristics associated with rapid
growth at completed NECs, but officials from M/PRI acknowledged that
examining such characteristics could improve the process for sizing
NECs. OBO officials report they have considered changing the standard
growth factor based on certain post characteristics, such as adding 5
percent additional growth space at posts in which USAID has a
presence. While we could not identify clear industry or government
standards regarding how much growth space is appropriate, one agency--
the National Institutes of Health--recommends that in determining how
much flexibility should be incorporated into a building, one should
consider the cost of incorporating flexibility now compared with the
cost of renovating space in the future, among other factors. However,
according to State officials, State has no current plans to make any
changes to the NEC growth factor.
State Implemented a Lessons Learned Program to Improve Future NEC
Design:
In 2004, State implemented a formal lessons learned program that seeks
to improve the design of future NECs. According to OBO officials, the
program entails bringing together representatives from a variety of
technical disciplines within OBO to systematically evaluate issues
identified in completed NECs and, if appropriate, take action to
modify NEC design criteria to avoid similar problems in future
facilities. OBO identifies topics to evaluate through the lessons
learned program through a variety of sources, including post-occupancy
evaluations, contractor roundtables, and facilities management
industry best practices. Through the lessons learned program, State
identified many of the functionality issues at the posts we reviewed
and has taken action to change the design criteria for a number of
functional areas of future NECs. According to State officials, for
fiscal years 2005 through 2008, OBO implemented changes to design
criteria for over half of the issues identified through the lessons
learned program. OBO officials noted that, on average, the program
reviews about 500 issues of varying size and complexity per year.
Table 3 lists certain recent modifications that have been made through
the lessons learned program to address functionality challenges.
Table 3: State's Recent Modifications to Address Functionality
Challenges:
Features cited as not fully functional: Warehouses and maintenance
shops;
Selected actions taken: Developed an assessment tool to improve
planning of warehouses and maintenance shops;
Fiscal year implemented: Currently in pilot phase.
Features cited as not fully functional: Cafeterias;
Selected actions taken: Incorporated a food service study into the
planning phase to more accurately predict cafeteria needs;
Fiscal year implemented: 2010.
Features cited as not fully functional: Consular areas;
Selected actions taken: Redesigning consular teller windows to address
ergonomics and waiting area acoustics and improve microphone systems;
Fiscal year implemented: Currently in pilot phase.
Features cited as not fully functional: Atriums;
Selected actions taken: Converted from a 3-to 4-story atrium to a 2-
story gallery to make it easier to maintain and less costly to heat
and cool;
Fiscal year implemented: 2006.
Source: GAO analysis of State information.
[End of table]
Post-Occupancy Evaluations Provide a Useful Tool for the Lessons
Learned Program, but State Has Not Ensured Timely Completion of
Evaluations:
Evaluations of completed NECs are one mechanism for obtaining
information for the lessons learned program. State has undertaken post-
occupancy evaluations on some completed NECs to assess what aspects of
the building worked well and what aspects need improvement. State
officials reported post-occupancy evaluations are a very important
tool for identifying issues and noted that some of the design changes
they have initiated were based on issues identified through post-
occupancy evaluations. In conducting a post-occupancy evaluation on
the NEC in Yerevan, Armenia, for example, State reported it identified
a number of issues with the maintenance shops, which led to a
recommendation to examine how State could improve maintenance shops in
future NECs. In addition to post-occupancy evaluations, in 2008, OBO
initiated a "look back" study to identify issues and problems for
review through its lessons learned process with regard to the
planning, design, construction, and maintenance of 55 NECs and office
annexes completed from 2001 to 2007. For example, OBO officials report
that the look back study found posts have had issues with consular
windows, such as poor acoustics impacting the privacy afforded to visa
applicants. While the look back study was an important tool for
identifying issues in completed NECs, the study had some limitations.
For example, according to an OBO official, it was completed in a very
short time frame and the level of detail in its findings was
inconsistent across posts.
While State's efforts to implement the lessons learned program have
resulted in improvements, State has not ensured that reviews of
completed NECs are undertaken in a timely manner. Due to the time
required to contract and construct NECs, it can take 4 years for an
approved lessons learned recommendation to materialize as an
improvement in future NECs. Therefore, according to State officials,
timely identification of issues through OBO reviews, such as post-
occupancy evaluations, is critical to ensure that problems are not
repeated in future designs.[Footnote 24] We found that OBO has
completed a post-occupancy evaluation for 10 of the 44 NECs completed
since 2001 and has not completed any post-occupancy evaluations since
2008. OBO officials reported that OBO intended to complete 17 post-
occupancy evaluations of NECs in 2009, but did not complete any
because staff were diverted to other priorities. OBO officials also
report they plan to complete 9 post-occupancy evaluations of NECs in
2010; however, as of May, 2010--almost halfway through the year--no
evaluations have been completed.
NECs Are Challenging to Operate and Maintain; State Has Taken Steps to
Address These Challenges, but Problems Remain:
State has constructed NECs that are state-of-the-art buildings, built
in accordance with current building codes, security, and energy-
efficiency standards. The comparatively larger size of NECs, relative
to the facilities they replaced, and complexity of NEC building
systems have resulted in increases to operations and maintenance
costs. State has developed a plan that identifies future maintenance
requirements to protect the investments made in NECs but the plan does
not report on the increased operating costs, and likely future costs,
to operate NECs. NECs have also presented challenges for some posts
due to rushed testing of building systems--recognized in the industry
as "commissioning"[Footnote 25]--or poorly coordinated transfer of the
NEC from OBO to the post, which has contributed to operational issues
affecting building cooling and fire protection systems. More than half
of the 22 NECs we reviewed also have experienced problems operating
building systems, which have resulted in the need for earlier-than-
anticipated repair and replacement projects. State has made
organizational changes, revised its commissioning process, and changed
design criteria to avoid problems with future NECs. However, State has
not developed a plan to recommission or retest completed NECs to
ensure building systems are operating as efficiently as possible and
that outstanding and potential problems with NEC building systems,
such as the increased risk of failure of NEC cooling systems, are
being fully addressed. In addition, State has had problems in hiring
U.S. facility managers and hiring and training locally employed
maintenance staff that have the necessary technical skills to operate
and maintain an NEC's complex systems.
State Is Making Progress in Constructing Facilities That Meet Building
Codes and Security Standards and Support Federal Energy Reduction
Goals:
State constructs NECs in accordance with modern building codes, State
security standards, and federal energy-efficiency goals. The new
facilities are modern, state-of-the-art buildings that incorporate
technologically sophisticated building systems and are more secure
than the old embassies and consulates that would not meet current
codes and standards. (Figure 11 shows examples of the equipment that
support the sophisticated NEC building systems.)
Figure 11: Typical NEC Building Systems:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Power generation system (upper left); cooling system (upper
right); fire suppression system (lower left); water treatment system
(lower right).
[End of figure]
NECs are modern, state-of-the-art facilities designed and built in
accordance with the International Building Code, which guides design
of the facilities' structural components, fire and life safety
features, and seismic engineering provisions, among other elements.
For example, NECs have modern fire protection systems that require
fire pumps to protect multiple buildings on a typical 10-acre
compound. In addition, NECs are safer than older embassies because the
designs for NECs consider the seismic conditions in local areas to
enable the NECs to be constructed to withstand seismic events. The NEC
in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, for example, was one of the few facilities
to withstand the January 2010 earthquake in the country and was used
in support of recovery operations. Meeting modern code requirements by
including fire pumps and designing structural systems to withstand
seismic events contribute to NECs being larger than the facilities
they replaced. Additionally, NECs provide common areas (e.g.,
cafeterias, atriums, and recreational facilities) that also contribute
to the larger size of NECs.
NECs are constructed to meet security standards and, as a result, are
more secure than the facilities they replace because the buildings'
exteriors are hardened to provide blast protection, and windows and
doors also are designed to meet forced-entry and ballistic-resistance
standards. In addition, NECs' heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning systems are equipped with larger, technologically
sophisticated systems to filter potentially harmful airborne
contaminants and effectively create an air-tight environment within
the buildings. NECs also have redundant systems such as generators
that operate in the event of local power loss and provide storage for
water and fuel so that posts are capable of maintaining operations.
Some NECs receive services from local utility systems while others
must independently produce their own utility services. The NEC in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti, for example, operates its own utility systems that
enable it to generate electricity, produce potable water on-site, and
treat waste water. Constructing NECs to meet current security
standards, such as hardening structures and having built-in system
redundancies, contributes to NECs being more secure and larger than
the old facilities.
To meet federal energy mandates to reduce energy and water
consumption, NECs contain technologically sophisticated building
automation and energy management systems that control and monitor
heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting, and power systems.[Footnote
26] In addition, starting in 2008, State's goal is to design all new
NECs to meet the U.S Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) certification requirements related to
promoting energy efficiency and minimizing environmental impacts.
[Footnote 27] To date, State has constructed LEED-certified NECs in
Sofia, Bulgaria (see figure 12); Panama City, Panama; Brazzaville,
Republic of Congo; and Johannesburg, South Africa. State officials
report that the department has approximately 30 projects registered
with the LEED program and they expect many of the projects will
receive LEED certification over the next few years.[Footnote 28]
Figure 12: Sofia, Bulgaria, the first LEED-Certified U.S. Embassy:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Larger, More Technologically Complicated New Facilities Cost More to
Operate and Maintain than Those They Replaced:
The comparatively larger size of NECs and the complexity of their
building systems have resulted in higher operations and maintenance
costs than at the facilities they replaced. Costs of utilities,
maintenance staff, and service contracts are contributing to the cost
increases. In our review of 10 recently completed posts,[Footnote 29]
we found that total post-managed operations and maintenance costs were
about $12 million greater than at the facilities they replaced.
[Footnote 30] Utility costs (e.g., electricity, gas, fuel oil, water,
and sewer) increased on average $827,000--or about 250 percent--per
post. Each of the 10 posts experienced at least a 75 percent increase
in utility costs after moving into an NEC. Our analysis is consistent
with a State 2009 benchmarking study of approximately 165 overseas
posts that shows a trend of increasing operations and maintenance
costs. In addition, State's report shows that four of the five posts
with the highest utility costs (calculated on a gross square meter
basis) were NECs.[Footnote 31] Table 4, for NECs completed in 2007 and
2008, shows the pre-NEC utility costs approximately 1 year prior to
the move into the NEC compared to posts' fiscal year 2009 utility
costs.
Table 4: NEC Utility Costs Pre-and Post-Move for NECs Completed in
2007 and 2008 (costs rounded to the nearest thousand):
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Accra, Ghana;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $77,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $923,000;
Percentage increase: 1,099%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Kigali, Rwanda;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $178,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $1,624,000;
Percentage increase: 812%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Beijing, China;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $486,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $2,704,000[B];
Percentage increase: 456%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Berlin, Germany;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $324,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $1,373,000[C];
Percentage increase: 324%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Algiers, Algeria;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $96,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $375,000;
Percentage increase: 291%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Panama City, Panama;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $620,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $1,489,000;
Percentage increase: 140%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Port-au-Prince, Haiti;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $368,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $821,000;
Percentage increase: 123%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Managua, Nicaragua;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $619,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $1,338,000;
Percentage increase: 116%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Kathmandu, Nepal;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $234,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $425,000;
Percentage increase: 82%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Rangoon, Burma;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $263,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $464,000;
Percentage increase: 76%.
NECs completed in 2007 and 2008: Total;
Pre-NEC utility cost: $3,265,000;
Post-NEC utility cost (FY 2009)[A]: $11,536,000;
Percentage increase: 253%.
Source: GAO analysis of costs, as reported by posts.
[A] Posts were asked to report utility costs separate from lease costs
for old facilities that were vacated as a result of consolidating onto
a new compound. Posts may or may not have included utilities costs for
leased facilities.
[B] Beijing provided actual cost data for 11 months of operation in
2009.
[C] Berlin provided cost data based on extrapolating actual cost data
for 10 months.
[End of table]
State officials noted that while building systems in NECs are more
energy efficient compared to systems in buildings that were replaced,
operating conditions cause them to consume a greater amount of energy
due to, for example, additional security equipment such as security
gates, lighting, cameras, and vehicle barriers that all require power.
Further, NECs are physically larger than replaced facilities, meaning
that costs to heat and cool the NECs will be greater. In addition, the
air filtration equipment needed to maintain the sealed environment in
NECs is about 50 percent larger in size and costs about 40 percent
more to operate than if the filtration systems were not installed.
Maintenance Staff Costs Are Increasing at NECs:
The costs for maintenance staff increased by approximately $200,000 on
average at the 10 posts for which we analyzed cost data because of the
need to hire additional facilities staff to operate and maintain the
NECs. For example, officials in Kigali, Rwanda, reported the size of
its facilities staff prior to occupying the NEC was 20. Kigali now has
50 facilities maintenance staff as a result of the larger chancery and
increased staff housing. Fourteen of those staff are dedicated solely
to the NEC operations and maintenance. The additional annual cost for
those 14 positions solely dedicated to NEC maintenance in Kigali was
approximately $236,000.
Service Contracts Are Needed to Support Some NEC Maintenance:
For fiscal year 2011, to ensure proper maintenance of systems and
equipment at NECs, OBO estimates that posts would spend approximately
$150,000, on average, to fund maintenance service contracts. Posts use
service contracts to obtain technicians to maintain some systems, like
elevators and building automation systems, that may not have existed
at the older facilities. Some posts also use service contracts to
obtain maintenance service from regional sources when they are unable
to find skilled labor to hire locally. Because some posts' maintenance
personnel may not be capable of fully addressing all maintenance
requirements of an NEC's technically sophisticated systems, use of
maintenance service contracts enables posts to obtain contractors that
can perform specialized maintenance, such as conducting infrared
testing on equipment temperatures.
State Has Developed Its First Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan,
but Plans Are Incomplete:
State's Strategy to Maintain NECs Includes Revisions to Processes for
Funding Routine Maintenance and Service:
In fiscal year 2010, partly in response to our 2006 recommendation,
OBO developed its first Long-Range Overseas Maintenance Plan (LROMP)
to support State in budgeting for what OBO reports in the plan as an
"investment protection" strategy for the multibillion dollar
investment made in constructing NECs. The LROMP outlines facility
maintenance needs--characterized as "non-capital projects"--over a 6-
year planning horizon for NECs as well as older facilities at posts
not scheduled to move into an NEC.[Footnote 32] State intends to
update the plan annually as a companion document to the Long-Range
Overseas Buildings Plan which outlines State's capital construction
plan for building new embassies over the same period. The plan is
intended to inform State's budget requests beginning with the fiscal
year 2011 budget request. The plan currently identifies over 3,300
potential projects for the period from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal
year 2015. Overall, the plan presents what State characterizes as "the
universe of requirements" (i.e., based on approximately 5,200
facilities located in over 260 locations) identified in fiscal year
2010, which total just over $3.7 billion. State has also identified a
number of areas where the LROMP needs to be improved in next year's
edition, such as ensuring that posts have accurately identified all
their maintenance requirements, better defining costs for major
rehabilitation projects (e.g., costs to move staff into temporary
space during a project), and better automating the process for
escalating or reducing project costs as proposed projects move between
fiscal years.
In addition to identifying future maintenance projects, State has
taken action to improve its processes for establishing budgets targets
for (1) determining and allocating funding for posts' routine
maintenance and repair and (2) setting funding targets for posts'
maintenance service contracts. The LROMP reports that starting with
its fiscal year 2011 budget request, State changed its approach for
setting posts' annual routine maintenance and repair budgets that fund
maintenance activities that are considered routine, recurring, and
minor, and that are managed by posts, such as painting and weather
stripping. Historically, routine maintenance and repair funds were
allocated to posts by simply escalating prior year funding levels
without consideration for factors such as the age of posts'
facilities. Under a new approach, a more objective determination of
posts' budget levels is made based upon factors such as the age and
current condition of posts' facilities, the amount of space needed to
be maintained, and an index for geographic costs considerations, such
as the costs to procure or ship maintenance materials in the region.
Under this new approach, State identified a requirement of $98 million
for fiscal 2011 to support routine maintenance and repair at overseas
posts, more than double the amount of State's 2009 budget of $44.5
million for routine maintenance and repair. The LROMP also reports
that, starting in fiscal year 2009, State took action to establish a
new cost category for Building Maintenance Expenses (BME)[Footnote 33]
in order to improve how it budgets, funds, and captures costs for
preventative maintenance service contracts (e.g., service contracts
for elevators, generators, fire protection systems, and building
automation systems) at overseas posts. The new process places the
responsibility for setting State's budget targets for maintenance
service contracts with OBO as opposed to posts and other agencies;
other agencies at posts are still required to fund their share of the
maintenance service contracts. State made the decision to fund its
agency's share of the maintenance service contracts out of existing
OBO funding in order to protect the investment made in NECs. According
to a senior State official, development of the LROMP, as well as the
shifting of responsibilities to OBO for setting funding targets for
State's share of posts' maintenance service contracts, should be seen
as moving State toward clarifying at least the maintenance
requirements for overseas posts.
State's Plan Does Not Provide Planning Time Frames to Implement
Projects:
While the LROMP has begun to outline maintenance requirements, and
does prioritize projects, our analysis of the plan found it does not
provide an indication as to when projects would be executed over the 6-
year period and the likely implications of delaying projects due to
lower-than-anticipated budgets. Rather, the plan outlines the
"universe of requirements" of 3,300 potential projects at a cost of
nearly $3.7 billion over a 6-year period. A senior State official
acknowledged the plan does not indicate in what specific fiscal years
projects are planned to be implemented.[Footnote 34] He noted that
undertaking the first edition of the LROMP was itself a major
undertaking and getting posts to identify maintenance requirements was
challenging. Without some detail on the planned time frames to
implement some of the maintenance projects, for at least the current
fiscal year and pending budget year, the usefulness of the plan in
supporting State's budget requests is diminished.
State's Plan Does Not Address Increasing Costs to Operate NECs:
While the LROMP is a step toward providing insight into the
maintenance resources needed to protect the investment in NECs, we
found it does not provide insight into operating costs, such as the
costs for utilities.[Footnote 35] In 2007, OBO took action to create a
utility database to capture some of posts' annual operating costs as
well as posts' energy and water consumption data; however, our review
of database reports shows that many posts have reported incomplete or
missing data for recent years, including data for some of the NECs we
reviewed. OBO prepared a 2009 benchmarking study that may enable State
to focus on reducing operating expenses at posts with high costs.
[Footnote 36] However, according to OBO, except for providing posts
with first-year operating cost estimates for individual NECs, planning
for operations is not an area that OBO officials feel they can address
directly, as it is outside OBO's program area of responsibility.
[Footnote 37] State and other agencies at overseas posts are
responsible for funding operations through the International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) process,[Footnote
38] while OBO is responsible for funding maintenance. Following
State's briefing of the LROMP to its Industry Advisory Panel, one of
the panel members representing a leading international facilities
management organization commented that he felt that State's plan was
missing the "operations piece." He reported that his organization
found that building owners must plan for both operations and
maintenance and remarked that, while the LROMP does outline future
maintenance budget needs, it does not provide insight into future
operations costs.
Problems in Commissioning and Transferring the Early NECs from OBO to
Post Posed Potential Safety Risks and Hindered Efficient Operations:
NECs have presented operations and maintenance challenges for posts
due to problems, in part, related to the inspection, testing, and
documentation of building systems--recognized in the construction
industry and by the federal government as "commissioning." In 13 of
the 22 posts we reviewed, we found problems that were linked, in part,
to commissioning. State's Inspector General identified significant
problems with the commissioning process in its 2008 report on OBO's
operations, citing it as the most maligned issue raised by posts with
NECs.[Footnote 39] Officials at NECs report they have had to contend
with operational issues, including some systems not functioning
properly due to commissioning-related issues. Officials' concerns
regarding commissioning relate to operational issues they have
experienced with critical systems, such as NEC cooling, building
automation, and fire protection systems. Prior to September 2008, the
commissioning agents did not work for State directly, but rather were
hired by the construction contractors. Furthermore, we found there
were problems when NECs were transferred from OBO to post, such as the
facility managers not receiving accurate drawings of the NEC to
support maintenance.
Commissioning of Critical NEC Building Systems Has Been Challenging:
At more than half the posts we reviewed, we found problems related, in
part, to the commissioning of heating, ventilation, and cooling
systems and the building automation systems controlling those systems.
For example, in Berlin, Germany, the facility manager told us that,
nearly a year after taking occupancy, the embassy's building
automation system has had ongoing operational problems, resulting in
it not being able to fully control NEC mechanical systems. He believes
these problems should have been identified during commissioning. He
further noted that OBO is providing funding for a contractor to
continue to work on the programming of the building automation system.
In Sofia, Bulgaria, one official noted the building automation system
as commissioned and transferred by OBO was not programmed to provide
for the most efficient operation of heating and cooling systems and
that it took time for maintenance staff to learn how to adjust the
system and achieve energy savings by optimizing the system. Similarly,
in Yaoundé, Cameroon, officials reported that the building automation
system was only recently programmed--nearly 4 years after the NEC was
completed--to run the NEC's cooling system at a reduced level during
periods of low occupancy such as during nights and on weekends. Post
officials reported this change allowed them to save $4,000 per month
($48,000 per year) in utility costs. In addition, the embassy in
Kathmandu, Nepal, reported that systems were not commissioned for
efficient operation and that maintenance staff had to undertake their
own efforts to optimize operations of the new chancery's building
automation, cooling, and power generator systems, resulting in reduced
energy consumption and savings of approximately $58,000 in electrical
energy costs and $84,000 in diesel fuel costs between approximately
November 2008 and May 2009.
Prior to 2009, commissioning responsibilities for fire protection
systems resided with OBO's Office of Design and Engineering, rather
than OBO's Office of Fire Protection, which is largely responsible for
inspections of existing fire protection systems, supporting posts in
maintaining those systems, and investigating fires. While OBO's Office
of Design and Engineering had fire protection engineers verifying
compliance with contract documents in an effort to ensure fire systems
were commissioned before NECs were occupied, OBO officials reported
those staff engineers did not have the direct authority to prevent
occupancy of NECs. Also, while commissioning of fire protection
systems may have been conducted before post personnel moved into the
NECs, post officials reported many problems with those systems shortly
after commissioning, including false alarms, problems with fire alarm
panels, and some fire devices (e.g., smoke detectors) not being
connected. In its written responses to our questions, OBO's Office of
Fire Protection reported that some early NECs were occupied without
the correction of critical deficiencies.
In its review of OBO and its survey of overseas NECs, the State IG
also reported there were numerous comments about NEC fire systems not
being fully ready at occupancy.[Footnote 40] Embassy officials in
Panama City, Panama, reported to us that when post personnel moved
into the NEC, the fire alarm system in the warehouse was not hooked
up, some smoke detectors were not installed, and the fire alarm panels
were problematic. They believe that schedule pressures led to
occupying the NEC before issues were fully resolved. Officials at 3
NECs we reviewed told us that OBO's fire engineers, or its
contractors, had visited their post to help fix problems that occurred
after moving into the NECs.
State's Commissioning Approach Lacked Independence:
State reported that until 2008 the testing and commissioning of NECs
was largely an activity controlled by OBO's project director and the
construction contractor who employed the commissioning agent, rather
than a third-party independent entity working for State. Department of
Energy (DOE) federal facilities commissioning guidance states that the
use of independent third-party commissioning agents is the most common
option used by federal agencies for conducting commissioning.[Footnote
41] The guidance also states that for large projects with highly
sophisticated systems, the savings to the government by employing an
independent agent typically outweigh the government's cost to obtain
those commissioning services. DOE further reports that using an
independent commissioning agent provides an independent judge, with a
minimum possible conflict of interest, and avoids instances when
contractors perform commissioning activities on their projects and
evaluate their own work. Some State officials further stated that the
completion of the commissioning tests may have been subject to
pressures driven by OBO officials wanting to complete projects on
schedule and that in some cases commissioning was not completed before
staff moved into the NECs. OBO officials reported that starting in
2008, State generally extended the duration of NEC project schedules
by 4 to 5 months, in part, to allow more time for commissioning and
transfer activities at the end of projects.[Footnote 42]
Some posts questioned the independence of commissioning agents that
were working for the construction contractor.[Footnote 43] Officials
at the NEC in Managua, Nicaragua, believe that OBO's former
commissioning process resulted in many problems that post officials
have had to resolve. For example, they said post had to hire a
contractor to fix problems with air pressurization controlled by the
building's air handling and ventilation system, which they said is due
to the incorrect set up of the building automation system. They
believe there would have been fewer problems after moving into the
building had OBO used an independent commissioning agent. In addition,
in response to our written questions on what could have been done
differently to eliminate operations and maintenance problems that
occurred, embassy officials in Belmopan, Belize, indicated that OBO
should have hired an independent commissioning agent, which they
believe would have resulted in OBO identifying many of the problems
that post staff identified on their own after occupying the NEC.
Several Posts Reported the Transfer of an NEC from OBO to the Post
Resulted in a Lack of Information:
In addition to commissioning issues, we found that at 11 of 22 NECs,
transferring[Footnote 44] of completed facilities from OBO's on-site
project director, who managed the construction of the NEC, to posts
and their facility managers was not always well coordinated or without
problems, resulting in some information--such as preventative
maintenance plans, operations and maintenance manuals for building
systems, and as-built drawings--either not being turned over to the
maintenance staff or being incomplete. In addition, officials at many
posts reported that the training for NEC maintenance staff to support
effective operations and maintenance activities is inadequate. OBO
officials acknowledged there has been a wide variance in the
completeness and accuracy of construction contractors' turnover
documents. In particular, we found:
* 6 of 22 posts had not received preventive maintenance plans;
* 8 of 22 posts did not receive as-built drawings that accurately
reflect details of the final construction; and:
* 16 of 22 posts thought that the basic familiarization training on
new building systems provided by construction contractors to local
facilities staff, by itself, is insufficient to fully train staff.
Among the problems reported by post officials were cases when
maintenance plans were not fully loaded into the NEC's computerized
maintenance management system.[Footnote 45] As a result of not having
complete information about system components (e.g., equipment make and
model, required maintenance, and location in the facility), facilities
staff at three posts we visited reported staff had to populate the
incomplete maintenance databases, an effort that required posts'
maintenance staff to populate the databases themselves with
information such as the location of equipment, the manufacturer, and
the required preventative maintenance that needed to be undertaken on
the systems. In Belmopan, Belize, for example, post officials said
that wiring diagrams for the building automation system showing the
connections between it and the NEC building systems it controlled were
not provided with the as-built drawings. As a result, the facilities
staff must use a trial-and-error approach to determine how the system
is configured, which makes it difficult for them to respond in
emergency situations.
State Revised Its Commissioning and Transfer Processes for Future
NECs, but Issues with Completed NECs Remain:
State Strengthened Its Processes for Commissioning and Transferring
NECs and Made Organizational Improvements:
OBO has recognized and taken action to address posts' concerns
regarding issues related to past commissioning and turnover of the
early NECs. Senior OBO officials emphasize that while they believe
that on-site project directors fully enforced contract requirements
related to commissioning, there may have been some instances when
commissioning by the construction contractor was rushed. In 2008, OBO
changed its process for commissioning NECs; OBO now contracts with
independent commissioning agents to oversee the commissioning process
on behalf of the government and provide a more independent assessment
of the testing of building systems than State had in the past. In
2009, in briefing its Industry Advisory Panel, OBO's Director reported
there was a disconnect between OBO's on-site project directors, who
oversaw construction, and posts' facility managers with regard to
expectations on system performance and turnover documentation that
resulted in instances of each blaming the other for building systems'
problems. In recognition of the organizational disconnect between
those constructing the NECs and those maintaining them, the OBO
Director combined OBO's Office of Construction Management and its
Office of Facility Management under a single managing director to
improve communication, coordination, and efficiency related to both
commissioning and turnover of completed projects from OBO's
construction project directors to posts and their facility managers.
In addition, given issues with commissioning and maintenance of fire
protection systems, OBO's Director removed the fire engineers from
OBO's Office of Design and Engineering and assigned them to OBO's
Office of Fire Protection. In written comments to us, OBO officials
reported those staff engineers did not have the direct authority to
prevent occupancy of NECs. According to the director of the Office of
Fire Protection, starting in January 2009, that office now has full
authority for overseeing commissioning tests of the fire protection
systems in NECs and provides the final approval authority on
acceptance of those systems prior to issuance of a certificate of
occupancy that allows post to move into the NEC. Furthermore, that
office is organized so that staff conducting and overseeing
commissioning reviews and testing are fully independent of the fire
protection engineers who conduct the design and construction reviews
of the fire protection systems to support the on-site construction
project director. This is to ensure OBO's fire commissioning officials
are not pressured by project director concerns related to completion
schedules and that they have an independent perspective on the project.
OBO has also made changes to the process it uses to transfer a
completed NEC to post. For example, in 2009 it established an NEC
Transition Program and a new Transition Division, with the intent to
assign an on-site Operations and Maintenance Transition Coordinator--6
months before, and 6 months after an NEC opens--to assist posts, the
project director, and the incoming facility manager during the
turnover to ensure, among other things, that maintenance staff receive
required maintenance manuals, maintenance plans, and as-built
drawings. The individual will also serve as coordinator with OBO
headquarters to assist post management and the facility manager in
resolving contractor punch lists and warranty issues that may still be
at issue after a post has moved into the NEC and OBO's project
director has departed.[Footnote 46]
In 2009, OBO also updated its standard operating procedures governing
the responsibilities of all parties involved in the transfer of NECs
from the project director to the post facility manager and provided
additional guidance to smooth the transition process of NECs. OBO
officials also reported they now conduct a warranty inspection site
visit approximately 8 to 11 months after construction to ensure all
warranty-related issues have been addressed before the contractor's 1-
year warranty period expires. OBO officials report that NECs that are
completed in fiscal year 2010 would be the first set of projects where
the changes made to the commissioning process should be evident and
result in fewer issues after posts move into the NECs.
Changes to the Commissioning and Transfer Processes Do Not Address
Completed NECs:
While OBO has taken action to change its commissioning process, the
changes do not address problems that resulted at NECs completed under
the old process. We note that DOE's commissioning guide for federal
agencies states that federal facilities should be recommissioned every
3 to 5 years and that the costs associated with commissioning the
systems again--effectively a tune-up of the building--will typically
be recaptured in about 2 years as the tune-up results in energy cost
savings. More than a third of completed NECs are now nearly 5 years
old, but OBO has not undertaken any complete recommissioning of NECs
despite the many reported issues with some NECs' building cooling,
fire protection, and other systems. While OBO has undertaken some
limited recommissioning on individual systems--such as systems in
Beijing, China; Conakry, Guinea; and Phnom Penh, Cambodia--one
official noted that the problems with one system sometimes have
linkages to others. Industry commissioning experts cite that, while
some building owners (e.g., the federal government) do undertake
limited commissioning on existing building systems, focusing on a
single system does not typically result in a facility that operates
optimally overall; an integrated approach maximizes positive results
to ensure the building is operating efficiently and safely.[Footnote
47] For example, the building cooling system may be affected by
electrical power conditioning problems. One OBO management official
indicated that he would like State's goal to be to recommission NECs
every 5 years but further noted there is no established budget for
recommissioning. In our review of State's Long-Range Overseas
Maintenance Plan, we found the plan did not include any proposed
prioritization, schedule, or costs for recommissioning completed NECs.
OBO officials affirmed they are not performing recommissioning on a 5-
year basis and do not have a formal plan to recommission NECs.
[Footnote 48]
Several NECs Had Problems with Building Systems, Including Failures
That Disrupted NEC Operations:
More than half of the 22 NECs we reviewed have experienced problems
with operating critical building systems, which have resulted in the
need for projects to repair or replace some systems. The problems
involved three building systems, including NEC cooling systems, fire
alarm systems, and security doors and windows, and were common across
many of the NECs we reviewed. In particular, we found that:
* 14 of 22 NECs had problems with their cooling systems--specifically
the chillers[Footnote 49]--not performing as intended, including
failing completely;
* 16 of 22 NECs had false alarms or other recurring problems with the
fire alarm systems; and:
* 16 of 22 NECs had problems with their forced-entry and ballistic-
resistant security doors or windows.
These problems, some that should have been caught during
commissioning, have caused varying levels of disruption to post
operations, ranging from nuisances caused by false fire alarms to
substantial disturbance resulting from chiller failures that have
caused flooding with damage to property and equipment.
Posts Have Had Numerous Problems with NEC Building Cooling Systems:
According to a 2007 OBO study, NECs have experienced numerous failures
with the buildings' cooling systems that are due to problems with the
air conditioning chiller units. The report shows that over 100
chillers, installed since 2001, have either failed or experienced
serious operating problems. OBO identified 22 completed NECs that have
experienced problems that affected the proper operation of the units,
including chiller failures. At the NEC in Panama City, Panama, for
example, post officials noted that one of the chillers failed on
several occasions, resulting in critical spaces being flooded with
water used within the cooling system and causing damage to equipment.
One post official further noted that to adequately address the
problem, major portions of the cooling system had to be redesigned and
that OBO is planning to replace the system in 2010. In 2009, OBO
funded emergency repairs of two chillers that failed in Conakry,
Guinea, at a reported cost of $250,000. In 2008, State's IG reported
that in Abuja, Nigeria, chillers did not work properly for at least 2
years after the post opened. One OBO official reported that a new
chiller is planned to be installed in Abuja sometime in 2010.
OBO officials identified that most chiller problems are associated
with a single manufacturer's units and characterized some problems as
"latent defects," meaning that the problems were not detectable at the
time of inspection and acceptance. Circuit board burn outs,
refrigerant loss or leakage, defective refrigerant valves, and
compressor failures have led to failures of the chillers. OBO reports
that the manufacturer has addressed some of the problems with the
chillers during the one year warranty period. However, our review of
OBO reports found that some chillers have been replaced prior to the
units' expected useful life, which is estimated to be at least 25
years. Our review found that OBO has already identified a need to
replace chillers in Yaoundé, Cameroon (completed in 2005), and
Kathmandu, Nepal (completed in 2007). In interviews with OBO, the
chief of the mechanical engineering branch reported that OBO is
starting to develop a program to replace chillers where critical
problems exist; however, OBO does not yet have a clear idea of which
posts will definitively need their chillers replaced. OBO's 2007 study
estimated the cost to replace a single post's chillers to range from
$500,000 to over $1 million.
Our review of OBO's study on chillers found OBO's mechanical
engineering branch was neither fully involved in the selection and
approval of chillers as proposed by the contractor nor the
commissioning of building cooling systems. In addition, OBO's
mechanical engineering branch chief noted the NEC design
specifications for chillers were "not as tight as they perhaps could
have been." In some instances, he noted the building cooling systems
were oversized resulting in chillers not operating properly. Those
issues reveal that some problems State experienced were not due solely
to problems with the units but rather were also due, in part, to
problems with OBO's internal processes. In addition, both OBO and post
officials have reported that local facilities staff at some posts may
not have the requisite technical skills to adequately maintain the
chillers and could have also contributed to problems posts
experienced. An OBO official reported that the design criteria for
NECs prior to 2007 allowed contractors to install either water-cooled
or air-cooled chillers based on life-cycle cost
considerations.[Footnote 50] They further reported that maintaining
water-cooled chillers is challenging due to technical issues, such as
having to treat the water-cooled systems by using potentially
hazardous chemicals. In 2007, after learning of the problems that
facilities staff had maintaining the water-cooled systems, OBO changed
its design criteria to require air-cooled chillers to be installed in
future NECs. OBO based its decision on its conclusion that the units
are less difficult to operate, in part, due to not having cooling
towers to maintain. OBO reported that water-cooled systems will no
longer be used in NECs, despite being generally more cost effective
with regard to energy use. OBO officials believe there is no case
where energy savings of using water cooled chillers would outweigh the
costs of maintaining those systems.
In addition to problems with chillers, we found evidence of other
issues related to the NECs cooling systems, including temperature
control problems, building air pressure issues, condensation on pipes
and in ductwork, mold, and inadequate cooling of computer server
rooms. Some of the contributing factors include design and
installation issues and lack of required preventative maintenance on
the systems. (See figs. 13 and 14 for examples of problems we found
that are related to the design, installation, operation, or
maintenance of the NEC cooling systems.)
Figure 13: Example of Condensation Causing Mold:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Condensation from chilled water piping (left) causes mold to
grow on ceiling tiles (right).
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Example of Inadequate Maintenance of Air Supply Diffuser
and Cooling Units Added After System Failure:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Inadequate maintenance of an air supply diffuser (left) and two
supplemental cooling units (right) added by post maintenance staff to
the computer server room after the NEC cooling system failed.
[End of figure]
Fire Alarm Systems at Many Posts Have Been Problematic:
Several posts we reviewed have experienced false alarms or other
repeated problems with operations of their fire alarm systems. These
alarms disrupt operations--particularly consular services and
classified operations--when post personnel need to cease activities
and secure classified materials and workspaces prior to evacuating the
building in the event of an alarm. Embassy officials in Sofia,
Bulgaria, reported, for example, repeated false alarms during the
first 4 years of occupancy that took several visits from OBO and
contractor teams to troubleshoot and resolve.[Footnote 51] In Yaoundé,
Cameroon, officials reported they experienced four false alarms per
week and that OBO spent $120,000 on repairs to the NEC fire alarm
system.[Footnote 52] At one NEC, officials said the ambassador would
advise people he was meeting with that the NEC fire alarm system had
problems and they need not evacuate the building unless the public
address system indicated there was an actual fire incident.
In addition to false alarms, several NECs have had repeated problems
with fire alarm control panels, with illuminated "trouble" or
"supervisory" lights, or the sounding of an alarm on the panel that
signals a problem with the system.[Footnote 53] OBO fire officials
report that the problems with the fire alarm control panels are
related to one manufacturer's products that are complex to operate and
cannot easily be corrected by the maintenance staff because of special
tools and programming codes from the manufacturer that are needed to
troubleshoot and fix the problems. These alarms can cause disruptions.
For example, in Kigali, Rwanda, the General Service Officer who
oversees warehouse operations commented that the fire alarm control
panel in the warehouse routinely sounds an audible alarm. The alarm is
very loud and disturbing to warehouse staff. While the alarm has been
reset many times, she noted it has been an issue since the facility
was completed in 2008. During our visit, we found the panel had both
trouble and supervisory lights lit. Post facilities personnel noted
they have been waiting for nearly 8 months for OBO to find a solution.
Figure 15 shows the fire alarm control panel at Kigali, Rwanda, which
we observed had warning lights indicating a condition in the system
that requires attention. Similar trouble and supervisory conditions
were found at some of the other posts we visited as well.
Figure 15: NEC Fire Panel in Kigali, Rwanda, with Trouble and
Supervisory Lights Illuminated:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
OBO fire officials report that while they assess most problems as
being minor in nature, they report there are some problems that are
more significant and require extensive troubleshooting by trained
technicians. Fixing the problems is complicated by most posts' lack of
qualified and experienced staff to perform testing and maintenance of
the complex fire protection systems. As a result, OBO staff or
contractors must be sent to posts to resolve the problems. In
discussions with OBO's fire officials, they noted they are aware of
many of the past problems with false alarms and are trying to address
them; however, higher priorities to conduct final acceptance testing
on NECs under construction has slowed their ability to respond to the
problems as quickly as they would like.
NEC Security Doors and Windows Had Problems and Replacements Are Under
Way:
More than half the posts we reviewed have encountered problems with
their security forced-entry and ballistic-resistant doors and windows,
including problems with doors malfunctioning and window glass
cracking. State officials reported, as the NEC program grew and the
demand for security doors and windows increased, recurring problems
with the doors and windows became evident as projects were completed.
Problems with doors and windows relate to a combination of design,
manufacturing, and installation defects. For example, doors used in
early NECs were fitted with hinges that were incapable of supporting
the door's weight and prone to premature failure, especially in high-
traffic areas such as main lobbies and the consular applicant waiting
areas. Doors installed at NECs built prior to 2005 also presented
maintenance challenges because their design specifications did not
adequately allow for adjustment to keep doors properly aligned in
relation to the door frame and building structure. State has revised
its specifications to ensure the doors are installed correctly and
that they allow for future adjustment to properly maintain the doors.
Similarly, windows used at early NECs exhibited manufacturing defects
that contributed to their cracking, especially in locations with high
temperatures. Also, because some contractors were not experienced with
these products, doors and windows were not always installed correctly,
and as a result, did not operate properly after the facilities were
occupied.
While OBO expects fewer problems with security doors and windows in
the future because of improvements made to design specifications,
manufacturing processes, and installation techniques, it is
systematically managing efforts to repair or replace defective doors
and windows at several existing NEC locations.[Footnote 54] For
example, in Yaoundé, Cameroon, OBO reports that it funded a project to
replace 24 doors at a cost of approximately $840,000. In Kathmandu,
Nepal, 30 windows cracked shortly after the NEC opened in 2007, and
post officials report OBO is planning to replace them. Going forward,
our review shows that OBO plans to repair or replace security doors
and windows in at least 16 additional NEC locations at a total
estimated cost of $25 million (see figs. 16 and 17).[Footnote 55]
While some replacements are reported by OBO officials as being driven
by an increase in the security standards since the NECs were
completed, it is unclear the extent to which replacements are also due
to poor performance of those products or deficiencies in the design
criteria for the doors in early NECs.[Footnote 56]
Figure 16: NEC Sofia, Bulgaria:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: New security doors being installed (left) and old security doors
removed (right) at the time of our visit.
[End of figure]
Figure 17: NECs Kigali, Rwanda, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
Note: Cracked security windows at NEC Kigali, Rwanda (left), and Port-
au-Prince, Haiti, prior to 2010 earthquake (right) at the time of our
visits.
[End of figure]
State Has Taken Steps to Avoid Future Problems with Building Systems:
As previously discussed, State has a lessons learned process that
examines issues and problems with past projects so as to inform future
designs of NECs. OBO officials have acknowledged the numerous issues
posts reported, such as problems with building cooling systems, fire
alarm panels, and security doors and windows. We found that OBO has
taken action to change the SED design and contract requirements that
govern future NECs with regard to all three of those building systems.
Table 5 outlines some of the changes that have been made through the
lessons learned program to avoid the problems that exist with the
underperformance or failure of building systems in earlier NECs;
however, due to the time required to contract and construct NECs, it
typically takes 4 years before these changes are evident in completed
NECs. While changes to SED design criteria for future projects do not
resolve problems with completed NECs, interviews with OBO officials
and our review of State's LROMP show evidence that OBO is trying to
address some of the problems with chillers and security windows and
doors through planned replacement projects, a few of which have
already been completed. OBO fire officials are also working with posts
to develop maintenance contracts to assist in troubleshooting
maintenance problems with NEC fire alarm systems.
Table 5: Changes Made by State to the Standard Embassy Design to Avoid
Problems with Building Systems on Future NECs:
Problem area: Building cooling systems;
Selected actions taken: Changed requirements to require contractors to
provide only air-cooled, rather than water-cooled, chillers. OBO staff
report that while less energy efficient, air-cooled chillers will be
easier to operate and maintain and will reduce water consumption;
Fiscal year implemented[A]: 2007.
Problem area: Fire alarm control panels;
Selected actions taken: Changed the requirements for fire alarm
panels, removing language that may have restricted contractors to
procuring units from one manufacturer. OBO staff report that other
manufacturers' units may be less difficult to maintain;
Fiscal year implemented[A]: 2008.
Problem area: Security doors and windows;
Selected actions taken: Instituted a Government Procured Equipment
program for security doors and windows with the intent to improve
performance of those products in more recent NECs. Modified
requirements to require contractors to provide a certified installer
to train installation crews on job sites;
Fiscal year implemented[A]: 2005.
Source: GAO analysis of State information.
[A] While changes to the design requirements have been made, due to
the time required to contract for and construct NECs, it typically
takes 4 years before results are evident in completed NECs.
[End of table]
State Faces Challenges in Hiring and Training NEC Facilities Staff and
Lacks a Plan to Fully Address Challenges:
State has experienced problems in hiring U.S. Foreign Service facility
managers and the locally employed maintenance staff that possess
needed technical skills to operate and maintain the NECs. In addition,
the local maintenance staff need more training on operating the
sophisticated NEC building systems. As a result, facilities may be
operating suboptimally and important maintenance activities may be
compromised, leaving NECs at risk of not performing as expected. We
found that State's LROMP does not identify costs or a schedule to
address the training needs of local maintenance staff to ensure the
investment in NECs is protected. If State cannot hire enough facility
managers and local maintenance staff with the technical skills and
qualifications needed to understand the NEC building systems and also
train the local facilities staff responsible for operating and
maintaining those sophisticated systems, State puts at risk the
investment made in those NECs, the safety of the people operating and
working in the facilities, and the ability of U.S. government
employees to conduct their work.
State Faces Challenges Hiring Qualified U.S. Foreign Service Facility
Managers and Local Maintenance Staff:
State officials reported that, based on sophisticated building systems
installed in NECs, State's hiring criteria needed to be strengthened
for U.S. facility managers and, further, hiring appropriate staff has
proven to be a slow process. Specifically, State now requires that
newly hired facility managers have a degree in facilities management
or a related engineering field. OBO currently has approximately 170
facility managers, of which approximately 145 are assigned to overseas
posts and some facility managers have regional duties supporting more
than one post; however, to meet its intent of placing specially
qualified facility managers at every large embassy and consulate
worldwide, OBO is undertaking a long-term recruitment and hiring
effort. OBO officials reported a goal to hire 20 facility managers in
fiscal year 2009, 20 in fiscal year 2010, and 24 total for fiscal
years 2011 to 2015.[Footnote 57] However, OBO has fallen short of
achieving its hiring goals. In fiscal year 2009, for example, OBO
reported that it hired 11 facility managers (i.e., just over half of
its goal), and as of May 2010, OBO had hired a total of 6 facility
managers relative to its fiscal year 2010 goal of 20. Some of the
challenges and delays in hiring were due to the process of developing
new position descriptions that require facility managers to have a
degree in facilities management or a related engineering field, and
working with State's human resources department to get those new
qualifications requirements approved.
Overseas posts are responsible for hiring locally employed maintenance
staff and sometimes face challenges hiring individuals with the
technical skills and experience required to operate NECs' complex
systems. OBO officials report a key issue with NEC maintenance, which
they believe has contributed to the problems with some systems, is
that posts have not been able to hire appropriately qualified local
staff. OBO provides individual posts with a recommended maintenance
staffing plan and advises posts that, because NECs are large and have
sophisticated building systems, posts should be prepared to hire
additional staff to properly support the maintenance needs when an NEC
opens. State's IG, in surveying posts with NECs about whether they had
hired the required maintenance staff, found that several did not hire
the required maintenance staff due to budget constraints or had not
hired them by the time the NEC initially opened.[Footnote 58]
As noted previously, local staffing costs at NECs increased by
approximately $200,000, on average, at 10 posts we reviewed because of
the need to hire additional local maintenance staff.[Footnote 59]
State's Inspector General reported that the level and quality of
maintenance services appears to be determined by available ICASS funds
rather than need, and a few posts reported concerns that ICASS budgets
did not keep pace with increased NEC staff needs. Some posts also
reported that it can be difficult in some less developed countries to
find qualified maintenance technicians to hire. OBO officials reported
to us that part of the reason why posts face problems hiring local
maintenance staff in a timely manner is these additional positions
must be approved by other agencies located at the post through ICASS.
OBO officials also indicated that in some cases, the salaries needed
to get qualified technical staff--such as a building automation
operator--have created difficulties for posts when it would require
paying the new hire more than senior local staff in other offices
within the embassy.
To address hiring challenges related to facility manager positions,
OBO officials report they are reaching out to industry facilities
management associations and universities to increase the number of
potential applicants that apply for the positions. As we reported,
State did not meet its fiscal year 2009 goal for hiring new facility
managers and may not meet its goal for fiscal year 2010. Starting in
2009, OBO reports that the new Operations and Maintenance Transition
Coordinators assigned to each project will assist posts' management
officials in hiring additional local maintenance staff as needed;
however, OBO officials reported that the approval and hiring of local
facilities staff, to include setting salaries, remains an ICASS
decision and is not under OBO's control.
State Faces Challenges in Training Maintenance Staff to Operate and
Maintain the NECs:
State officials report that prior to 2008, the department had not
focused on training and career development needed for its facilities
maintenance personnel. While State had provided training in the areas
of management and leadership for facility managers, there was no
formal training program available that provided technical training on
the sophisticated NEC systems and State policies governing overseas
facility management in an embassy environment. In addition, there were
no training programs for local maintenance staff. State has started to
take action to address some of the challenges, but OBO officials
report those actions will not fully address the needs of local
maintenance personnel. In 2008, OBO developed a training program for
State's facility managers. Unlike local maintenance staff, OBO
officials report they are directly responsible for training and career
development for facility managers. OBO officials recognized the need
to provide more training for facility managers and report that newly
hired facility managers now attend courses at the Foreign Service
Institute and receive specialized training in areas such as (1)
building automation systems; (2) heating, cooling, and ventilation
systems; and (3) fire protection systems. In addition, facility
managers receive training on overseas facilities management related to
specific State regulations governing maintenance budgets and the
maintenance protocols for classified areas.
Training of the local maintenance staff remains a problem.[Footnote
60] As noted earlier, the basic familiarization training provided by
the NEC construction contractor during the time of commissioning and
prior to transfer is not sufficient by itself to fully train the local
maintenance staff on the building systems. As a result, operation of
building automation systems, in particular, has been challenging for
posts. Our review of OBO reports and interviews with posts show that
14 of the 22 NECs we reviewed encountered problems with operating
building automation systems.[Footnote 61] For example, embassy
officials in Kigali, Rwanda, report that personnel will have
difficulty learning enough programming on the system to facilitate
programming replacement components in the event the original
components fail; they report that emergencies may not enable post to
wait for a service contractor or OBO to travel to post to troubleshoot
or fix problems. One of State's contractors noted that sufficiently
operating and maintaining the building automation system is
challenging, since it requires training and knowledge of both
mechanical engineering and advanced computer programming. He reported
that at some NECs he finds sensors, controllers, and equipment that
have been shut off by facilities staff who have not had adequate
training on the systems and may not understand the implications when
components are merely turned off. For example, shutting a component
down may restrict fresh air being provided to a closed office.
We found that State's LROMP does not identify needed resources and
costs to meet the training needs of local maintenance staff at NECs.
OBO officials recognize that NEC building systems require extensive
training to operate. OBO officials also recognize that if the local
maintenance staff are not trained properly, the condition and
operation of the NECs will be affected; however, OBO officials report
they do not receive funding to train overseas maintenance staff, as it
is an ICASS responsibility. Regardless, in 2009, OBO took some initial
action to address some of the training deficiencies of local
maintenance personnel and reported that it would be providing posts'
local staff with access to online training in areas such as water and
wastewater treatment, environmental security protection systems,
building automation systems, and work order management. However, two
of these courses came online only recently and one is still in
development; therefore, the action is too recent to assess in terms of
the number of staff trained and the effectiveness of the training.
[Footnote 62] OBO officials also reported that they have just begun
discussions with a facility management training provider to explore if
they can develop facility maintenance courses that could be made
available to posts' local staff. Again, the actions are too recent to
assess in terms of their effectiveness.
According to State officials, they are trying to compensate for the
lack of technical skills of the local staff through the use of
regional maintenance programs and posts' maintenance service
contracts;[Footnote 63] however, that may not be the most cost-
effective solution. For example, State's IG reported that the U.S.
embassy in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, did not have trained personnel to
maintain the critical elements of the NEC's heating and cooling
systems and that post had to bring in a contractor from South Africa
for emergency repairs at a cost of about $9,000 per visit. OBO
officials reported they are exploring the idea of making use of OBO's
facility managers to act as trainers to control costs as OBO does not
have dedicated funding to train posts' local maintenance staff.
According to OBO officials, some of OBO's efforts to provide more
training to local maintenance staff are being funded out of existing
NEC project funds. Starting in 2009, OBO began to set aside 0.1
percent of NEC project funding--which would equate to $100,000 on a
$100 million NEC project--to provide additional training, but OBO
officials acknowledged it alone will not be sufficient to fully train
local maintenance staff. OBO officials further noted that, while ICASS
should normally fund the training of local staff, OBO is funding what
it can to try to address some of the local staff training needs.
Conclusions:
State has built 52 NECs that are more secure, safe, and functional for
U.S. government personnel working overseas. Constructing such
facilities that meet stringent requirements, such as building codes,
security standards, and energy-efficiency goals, has been a
significant undertaking requiring billions of dollars and sustained
effort over nearly 10 years. However, State has encountered a number
of challenges in building NECs that are the appropriate size for
immediate and long-term staffing levels and in planning for the
increased operational and maintenance needs of these new,
technologically sophisticated buildings. As a result, State has had to
build additional office space at some locations, and may need to
construct more, and has also faced higher operating, maintenance, and
repair costs. Currently, the process to determine the size of an NEC
does not allow enough flexibility to ensure that NECs have sufficient
space to accommodate staffing changes related to ever-shifting foreign
policy priorities. State has not analyzed post-specific
characteristics in completed projects that have been associated with
rapid staff growth, such as geographic location, nor have officials
been able to explain the analytical basis for determining the amount
of growth space to include in building an NEC. In addition, overseas
officials have found that the design of some spaces does not fully
meet functional needs. While State has been able to identify and
address certain design issues, identifying these design problems
earlier, by, for example, conducting timely post-occupancy evaluations
in accordance with State's plans, is crucial to avoid similar problems
in future NECs. Since State expects NECs to support U.S policy efforts
for several decades, it is important that the facilities are large
enough to safely and securely house the changing number of overseas
staff in a manner in which staff are able to effectively carry out
their missions.
State has not fully addressed the increased operations and maintenance
requirements of the more technologically sophisticated NECs. Problems
with commissioning and transferring the NECs from the contractors to
the posts have resulted in some building systems that do not function
as they should and led to added costs to repair and replace systems,
contributed to higher operating costs, and created potential safety
risks for staff. State has made changes to building design
requirements to avoid future problems with NEC building systems.
However, since changes can take at least 4 years to materialize in
completed NECs, due to time to contract for and construct NECs, the
changes are too recent to assess. State does not have a formal plan to
recommission, or retest, the building systems at NECs that have
already been completed. Recommissioning NECs would help ensure that
the systems operate as efficiently as possible and that the problems
with building systems are being fully addressed. State's recent LROMP
outlines--for the first time--NEC maintenance costs over a number of
years and identifies the need for improvements in future editions, but
it does not establish a time table for when specific projects should
be completed which would help to further strengthen the planning
process. In addition, the LROMP is focused solely on maintenance costs
and does not address operating costs, resulting in an incomplete
assessment of all costs associated with the functioning of NECs.
Finally, without a plan that comprehensively outlines all human
resources required to operate and maintain NECs, including identifying
hiring and training needs, State will have difficulty ensuring NECs
operate in an efficient and cost-effective manner. As State continues
building NECs and strives to maintain those already constructed,
addressing these challenges is important to provide U.S. employees
with a secure and dependable working environment and ensure that State
protects the country's investment in these facilities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to strengthen the operations of the extensive U.S. program
that provides for new embassy compounds around the world, we recommend
that the Secretary of State take the following six actions.
* Take steps to improve the process for determining the appropriate
size for an NEC, including reassessing the analytical basis for
projecting future staffing levels and determining how much growth
space is allocated.
* Ensure that OBO conducts post-occupancy evaluations of completed
NECs as planned.
* Develop a plan to recommission those NECs completed before 2008 to,
for example, resolve any problems posts may still have with building
systems, and ensure that the operating costs are not being incurred
unnecessarily as a result of building systems that are not operating
as efficiently as intended.
* Identify time frames for implementing the maintenance projects that
are outlined in the LROMP.
* Expand on future editions of the LROMP to include reporting on
operating costs to allow for a more complete assessment of the costs
to maintain and operate NECs.
* Develop a human resource plan that addresses the requirements and
cost implications for hiring required NEC facilities maintenance staff
and sufficiently training the local maintenance staff.
Agency Comments:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of State. State said that the report contains helpful input
about its program to build NECs which State will use to further its
efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.
State concurred with our principle findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. For example, State wrote it will work to identify
time frames for implementing the LROMP maintenance projects, develop a
system to compile and report on operating costs, and undertake human
resource planning to hire and train local maintenance staff. State
further outlined specific actions that begin to address our
recommendations in a few instances. For example, State said it is
currently conducting post-occupancy evaluations at three posts and
plans to evaluate at least six more by the end of 2010. In addition,
State said it is conducting two pilot recommissioning studies, and
plans to conduct two more studies in fiscal year 2011 if funding is
available. State provided additional clarifying and technical comments
on a number of points, which we have incorporated throughout the
report, as appropriate. Many of State's comments we had already
acknowledged in our report. State's complete comments, along with our
responses to specific points, are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary
of State. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4268, fordj@gao.gov, or Terrell G.
Dorn at (202) 512-6923, dornt@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Other GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by:
Terrell G. Dorn, PE:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the extent to which
new diplomatic facilities match the space and functionality needs of
overseas posts and the actions State has taken to address any space
and functionality challenges; and (2) operations and maintenance
challenges at these new facilities and State's steps to address them.
Our scope included new facilities at 44 posts that State's Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) refers to as New Embassy Compounds
(NEC), New Consulate Compounds, and New Office Buildings. In addition,
we included any facility OBO refers to as a Newly Acquired Building if
the purchase and renovation of such a facility were intended to locate
all U.S. government employees at a new and single location.[Footnote
64] We included all posts for which construction began in or after
fiscal year 1999 and were completed by September 30, 2009.[Footnote 65]
To obtain information on space, functionality, and operations and
maintenance challenges identified at NECs within our scope, we
reviewed State's 2008 Revalidation Look Back Study, which identified
issues and problems, as well as successes, with regard to the
planning, design, construction, and maintenance of the new facilities.
The study took place between August and October 2008 and identified 23
challenges as frequently occurring throughout completed NECs. We also
conducted interviews with officials at OBO and State's regional
bureaus and reviewed other documentation, including the State
Inspector General's (IG) inspection of OBO;[Footnote 66] IG post
inspection reports; posts' responses to a March 2008 IG satisfaction
survey; posts' lessons learned cables; rightsizing reports; and post-
occupancy evaluations of some completed projects.
To obtain more detailed information on space, functionality, and
operations and maintenance challenges, we reviewed 22 NECs, or one-
half of the posts within our scope, in greater depth. We selected
these posts based on interviews with regional bureau officials,
reviews of rightsizing reports and 2008 staffing data, OBO and OIG
reports on embassy operations and maintenance issues, OBO's
Revalidation Look Back study, and past GAO reviews of the NEC program.
In addition to selecting posts with many identified space,
functionality, and operations and maintenance problems, we also
selected some posts with few identified problems to be able to analyze
a range of experiences. Geographical diversity of posts and project
type[Footnote 67] were also factors in determining which posts to
contact.
Of the 22 posts we reviewed in greater depth, we conducted site visits
at 8 posts and conducted teleconference interviews with 14 posts. In
addition to contacting officials at each post, we interviewed
officials at the regional bureaus in Washington to obtain information
on space, functionality, and operations and maintenance challenges at
posts that we were unable to contact, as well as to gain further
insight on how these challenges affect their respective regions as a
whole.
Table 6 lists all 44 NECs within our scope and identifies those we
visited or interviewed via teleconference.
Table 6: Locations of 44 NECs within GAO's Scope:
Region: Africa;
New Embassy Compound:
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire.
Abuja, Nigeria (Visited by GAO).
Accra, Ghana (Visited by GAO).
Bamako, Mali.
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo.
Cape Town, South Africa.
Conakry, Guinea.
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Freetown, Sierra Leone.
Johannesburg, South Africa.
Kampala, Uganda (Visited by GAO).
Kigali, Rwanda (Visited by GAO).
Lome, Togo (Visited by GAO).
Luanda, Angola.
Nairobi, Kenya (Visited by GAO).
Yaoundé, Cameroon (Visited by GAO).
Region: East Asia and the Pacific:
New Embassy Compound:
Beijing, China (Visited by GAO).
Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Visited by GAO).
Rangoon, Burma (Visited by GAO).
Region: The Americas:
New Embassy Compound:
Belmopan, Belize.
Bridgetown, Barbados.
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.
Kingston, Jamaica.
Managua, Nicaragua (Visited by GAO).
Panama City, Panama (Visited by GAO).
Port-Au-Prince, Haiti (Visited by GAO).
Quito, Ecuador.
Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Region: Middle East and North Africa:
New Embassy Compound:
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
Algiers, Algeria (Visited by GAO).
Tunis, Tunisia.
Region: South and Central Asia:
New Embassy Compound:
Astana, Kazakhstan (Visited by GAO).
Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Kathmandu, Nepal (Visited by GAO).
Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Visited by GAO).
Region: Europe and Eurasia:
New Embassy Compound:
Berlin, Germany (Visited by GAO).
Bern, Switzerland.
Frankfurt, Germany.
Istanbul, Turkey.
Skopje, Macedonia.
Sofia, Bulgaria (Visited by GAO).
Tbilisi, Georgia (Visited by GAO).
Yerevan, Armenia.
Zagreb, Croatia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the extent to which initially constructed desk space matched
posts' current desk space needs, we compared State data on the number
of desks originally built at each post with current authorized
collocated desk positions, as reported in each post's 2009 submission
of staffing data for the purposes of determining each overseas
agency's charges for the Capital Security Cost Sharing program for all
44 posts within our scope. We interviewed knowledgeable State
officials and reviewed our analysis with the 22 posts we interviewed,
OBO, and each of the regional bureaus and determined that both data
sources were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, we
identified a few limitations to our analysis, including: (1) in a
small number of cases, current staffing data for other agencies,
particularly the U.S. Agency for International Development, may not be
completely accurate; (2) the data are based on a single point in time
and subsequent changes may have occurred that altered the conditions
at posts; (3) the as-built data may not have captured all changes made
during construction and do not include planned growth space; and (4)
the current staffing data report authorized positions representing the
post's total need if all positions were filled, but some positions may
not be filled. However, our checks found only a small number of
inaccuracies in either source, most of which, in our judgment, had
little impact on our overall findings. In addition, we interviewed
officials at State's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and
Innovation (M/PRI) and OBO to discuss their respective roles in
planning for the space needs of NECs.
To examine functionality challenges, we asked officials at the 22
posts we contacted open-ended questions about functionality concerns.
We then summarized functionality challenges that were commonly
identified during our interviews and site visits. These ranged from
the amount of controlled access and noncontrolled access space
available at NECs to issues with the NEC's quality-of-life facilities.
Our methodology may not have captured all challenges experienced at
all of the posts we reviewed, as post officials might have only
reported the challenges they deemed to be most significant.
To analyze challenges found in operating and maintaining NECs, we
quantified common challenges found across the 22 posts we contacted,
based on officials' responses to open-ended questions in our
interviews and site visits, as well as our review of documentation,
including State IG reports and the Revalidation Look-Back study. These
challenges ranged from problems with forced-entry and ballistic-
resistant doors and windows to the process of turning over the NEC
from the construction contractor and OBO to the posts. Our methodology
may not have captured all challenges experienced at all of the posts
we reviewed, as post officials might have only reported the challenges
they deemed to be most significant.
In addition, we analyzed operations and maintenance cost data from 10
NECs opened in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. We asked officials to
provide fiscal year 2009 data on operating expenses (e.g. cost for
utilities such as electric, gas, water, and sewer as well as other
costs like grounds keeping and janitorial services), costs for
maintenance service contracts (e.g. elevator service contract), and
the cost of hiring additional facilities maintenance staff (e.g.
building automation system operator) for the NEC. We also asked for
data on each of these expenses for the last full fiscal year in which
the post operated from its previous facilities. Because these NECs
were completed recently, inflation and other time-related issues, such
as price changes, did not play a significant factor in our comparison
of 2009 costs at the NECs with the last full year of operation in the
previous facilities, and thus the reported cost are not adjusted for
inflation or currency fluctuations. We discussed potential
discrepancies in the data with post officials and tested the data for
internal consistency. Although in some cases, posts may or may not
have included utilities costs for leased facilities, we determined
that unreported utility costs for leased facilities would not
materially impact our findings. We determined the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of demonstrating that the
operating costs of the 10 NECs were substantially higher than the
costs of the facilities they replaced.[Footnote 68] Due to concerns
about OBO having complete and accurate data on posts' expenses, we
obtained the cost data directly from posts.
Finally, to identify actions State has taken to address space,
functionality and operations and maintenance challenges, we
interviewed State officials at OBO, the regional bureaus, and M/PRI.
In addition, we reviewed documentation of programs or initiatives that
State has developed to address identified challenges.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
June 28, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "New
Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities and
Planning for Operations and Maintenance Requirements," GAO Job Code
320750.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Christina Maier, Program Analyst, Office of Overseas Building s
Operations at (202) 875-5752.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO — Jess Ford:
OBO — Adam Namm (Acting):
State/OIG — Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
New Embassy Compounds:
State Faces Challenges in Sizing Facilities and Planning for
Operations and Maintenance Requirements (GAO-10-689, GAO Code 320750):
Introduction:
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the
subject draft report. Overall, the report contains helpful input about
the Department's ongoing Capital Security Construction Program to
build New Embassy Compounds (NECs) and New Consulate Compounds (NCCs).
We will use GAO's findings to further our efforts to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Department's operations. We offer
the following comments:
Construction Progress:
The Department is pleased that GAO acknowledges State's progress in
constructing NECs, NCCs, and annexes — 72 since 2001 — and moving over
21,000 staff into safer, more secure, and functional facilities. GAO
also reiterates the findings of a State Office of Inspector General
study where posts with NECs praised their design, space, and security,
and found NECs to be a dramatic improvement over older facilities.
Other Comments:
Planning for Maintenance: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) believes it has made measurable progress in planning for
maintenance and operations since GAO's 2006 study.{Footnote 1]
In March 2010, OBO issued the first Long-Range Overseas Maintenance
Plan (LROMP). The inaugural LROMP is a comprehensive strategic
planning document, focused on the management of $3.7 billion in
deferred and planned maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation needs.
The plan aims to ensure the $10+ billion invested in constructing new
facilities since 2001 is protected through proper maintenance as well
as ensure legacy facilities not planned for replacement receive
appropriate maintenance and operations funding. The LROMP identifies
post-by-post prioritized needs for more than 3,500 projects and is a
companion publication to the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan
(LROBP).
We have also accomplished the following:
* Studied and refined our estimates of future NEC operating costs;
* Enhanced the qualifications needed to become a Facility Manager
(FM), including requiring an engineering or facility management degree;
* Instituted a new training curriculum for FMs at the Foreign Service
Institute;
* Hired 11 new FMs who have completed the new curriculum, 6 are
currently enrolled, 20 will begin class in August 2010 and there are
10 slots for a class in March 2011;
* Realigned the FM reporting structure at post in that FMs now report
to management;
* Developed on-line training courses for locally employed maintenance
staff at post and are developing an augmented, blended learning
program;
* Improved our NEC staffing studies to provide post with guidance on
hiring and training appropriate staff to maintain the NECs;
* The Lessons Learned Program has shortened the period for including
changes into the program; and;
* Adjusted the parametric model for estimating costs by including FY
09 construction award and project closeout data.
While the Department realizes that there is still room for improvement
in our maintenance planning, we believe we have made substantial
progress in this area. We will work to address GAO's recommendations
on identifying time frames for implementing the LROMP maintenance
projects, developing a system to compile and report on operating
costs, and undertake human resource planning to hire and train local
maintenance staff.
Increased Maintenance Costs: [See comment 1] OBO is aware that posts
with NECs are experiencing increased operating costs because the
facilities are often larger to accommodate a growing overseas civilian
USG presence, and are equipped with state-of-the art building systems
and environmental security protection. While it may appear that costs
are higher, they can actually be less on a per square meter basis,
which is the standard industry measure. Using the industry recognized
Whitestone Facility Maintenance and Repair Cost Reference 2009 — 2010,
the maintenance costs for a medium sized NEC (approximately 11,600
gross square meters) have been precisely defined. Maintenance costs
were carefully estimated, using the Standard Embassy Design drawings
and specifications for a medium-sized NEC with the following building
sizes:
* New Office Building: 7,555 GSM;
* Marine Security Guard Quarters: 721 GSM;
* Utility Building: 698 GSM;
* Warehouse: 2,071 GSM;
* 3 Compound Access Control Units 566 GSM.
The results for the maintenance cost per gross square meter are:
* $26.10 per gross square meter for an NEC;
* $29.50 per gross square meter for the equivalent Washington DC-area
buildings as noted above.
While maintenance costs have increased at NECs, maintenance has
historically not been funded at a level to thoroughly address all
needs. It is possible that the percent increase in maintaining NECs
might have been less if the old facilities had been fully maintained.
In addition, some maintenance funding intentionally decreases toward
the end of occupancy of the older facilities, as OBO and post decide,
for cost savings, to not fully maintain or upgrade systems in a
building about to be vacated, thus making the NEC maintenance costs
seem comparatively higher.
NECs are Safer: [See comment 2] On page 42 of the draft report, GAO's
subheading notes that problems in NEC commissioning "posed potential
safety risks." State notes that any safety risks discussed by GAO
would have been much less in the NEC than the safety risks posed by
the aging, deteriorated facilities that the NEC replaced. For example,
as GAO reports, the fire alarm systems at posts were problematic with
false indicator lights, etc.; however, the NEC buildings were also
equipped with fully operational fire sprinkler systems, which most of
the previous embassy buildings did not have. Thus, the NEC provided a
much improved level of safety. We are concerned that this subheading
would lead a reader to conclude that we moved staff into unsafe
facilities, and request that GAO delete the phrase [Posed Potential
Safety Risks and].
GAO's Recommendations:
The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take the following six
actions:
1. Improve the process for determining the appropriate size for an
NEC, including reassessing the analytical basis for projecting future
staffing levels and determining how much growth space is allocated.
Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation and has
evaluated both staffing projections and the development of growth
factors for office space.
The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI)
has reviewed the posts with capital security projects that began after
the inception of the Office of Rightsizing. The analysis includes
sixteen posts with OBO projects that will be completed by the end of
2010 and shows a narrower margin of error--between the rightsized
number and the staff actually moved into the building--1.2 percent for
U.S. direct-hire positions in aggregate. For all types of positions,
the data show an average discrepancy of only 3.4 percent, well within
OBO's ten percent growth margin. [See comment 3]
We view this as a success, a validation of the Department's
rightsizing efforts and an indication that the problem of inadequate
office space is gradually being resolved. However, we also note that
the effort to predict future office space needs will always contain
some uncertainties, that staffing projection discrepancies will
occasionally exceed ten percent, as they have in four of the sixteen
"rightsized" posts included in the above-referenced analysis. The
discrepancies at these four posts were wide enough to skew the
standard deviation for all positions beyond the 10 percent range--
12.5% for posts with staffing overages and 14.8% for all posts. NECs
are being built in the most volatile areas of the world which makes it
more difficult to plan for future needs — mission priorities can
change and programs can expand or contract in a short period of time.
Dramatic changes at a minority of posts will affect our overall
success rate at all posts.
M/PRI's strategic plan for the next five years includes a greater
emphasis on pro-active analysis and objective comparisons. We also
hope to move from our current focus on individual posts towards
analyzing and projecting global staffing trends.
OBO has recently increased the amount of growth factored into its
space programs. While OBO still utilizes a 10-percent growth factor
(i.e. taking the approved desk total and adding an additional 10-
percent of space to the total required for the number of desks), it
has changed the formula so that each desk position creates 25 usable
square meters of growth space (vice the previous factors of 6.5 or
10.8 net square meters). This is in recognition that growth desk
positions have a ripple effect across the entire space program, and
this change will provide more flexibility to posts. This change will
be applied to all projects in FY11 and beyond and for FY10 projects as
budget and schedule permits. The growth space will be allocated
proportionally to include basic desk space, designated support space,
and common areas. We note that because this change is being made for
projects in FY 2011 (and beyond) and possibly some FY 2010 projects,
the impact of this increase cannot be evaluated until FY 2014 at the
earliest. However, as new information comes to light from the Lessons
Learned Program (to include the Post Occupancy Evaluation process),
OBO will continue to evaluate the results and determine whether this
should be refined further. OBO remains aware that the fluidity in
staffing projections creates a risk that some facilities may end up
with excess space, as GAO found in its recent study of courthouses.
[Footnote 2] This would appear to be validated by the GAO's finding
that only 13 of the 44 NECs they surveyed were under-occupied by five
percent or more; however, it should be noted that this would allow for
future growth space. [See comment 4]
2. Ensure that OBO conducts post-occupancy evaluations of completed
NECs as planned.
Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. As of the
date of these comments, an OBO team is in the field conducting post-
occupancy evaluations (POEs) at three Western Hemisphere posts. We
plan to conduct two more POE trips — to Western Hemisphere and African
regions — to evaluate 6 to 8 more posts by the end of calendar year
2010. OBO envisions conducting 9 to 12 POEs per year, and accelerating
the schedule to conduct additional POEs depends on the availability of
resources.
Prior to 2008, available resources allowed 0130 to perform on average
four POEs per year. In 2008, OBO undertook a "Revalidation Look-Back"
of the 55 NECs, NCCs, annexes, and other diplomatic facilities that
had been completed between 2001 and 2006. This look-back provided a
valuable overview of some overarching issues being encountered by
posts as they occupied their new facilities, and allowed OBO to
implement improvements in areas such as consular operations, food
service, warehouses, and maintenance shops. Much of 2009 was directed
toward integrating the Revalidation Look-Back into the first edition
of the LROMP (produced in March 2010), and conducting in-depth studies
of the maintenance shop and warehouse issues identified during the
look-back. In late 2009 and early 2010, OBO developed enhanced survey
questionnaires and a new web-based application to facilitate
communication with post and improve upcoming POEs.
3. Develop a plan to recommission those NECs completed before 2008 to,
for example, resolve any problems posts may still have with building
systems, and ensure that the operating costs are not being incurred
unnecessarily as a result of buildings systems that are not operating
as efficiently as intended.
Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation and will
conduct recommissioning studies as resources allow. OBO is currently
conducting two pilot recommissioning studies, and plans to conduct two
more studies in FY 2011, if funding is available. We estimate that
each initial study will cost approximately $150,000 to $200,000.
Current plans are to seek funding in FY 2012 and beyond to conduct 10
recommissioning studies each fiscal year.
4. Identify time frames for implementing the maintenance projects that
are outlined in the LROMP.
Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. Upon
receiving funding for requirements set out in the LROMP, the program
will be executed similarly to the implementation of the LROBP. The
timeline for implementing projects will be established concurrent with
availability of funds.
5. Expand on future editions of the LROMP to include reporting on
operating costs to allow for a more complete assessment of the costs
to maintain and operate NECs. [See comment 5]
Response: OBO provides estimated costs to operate a NEC to the regional
bureaus before each new facility opens. Three major cost components
are used in the development of the Building Operating Expense (BOE)
estimates for NEC/NCCs:[Footnote 3] [See comment 6]
* Locally Employed (LE) Staff Maintenance Labor Costs — Posts' labor
costs to maintain equipment within the embassy compound;[Footnote 4]
(costs assume that all equipment is installed and commissioned per the
design intent); cost of providing proper preventative maintenance (90%
of available work hours for the first year); and the cost of training
facility management LE Staff.
* Local Service Contract Costs - includes local service maintenance
contracts for grounds maintenance and landscaping; solid waste
removal; custodial services; pest control; and pavement and sidewalk
maintenance (sweeping and snow removal, if applicable). Contracts are
dependent upon approval of funding by the post ICASS (International
Cooperative Administrative Support Services) council.
* Utility Cost - estimates depend on local climate data; number, type,
and size of the compound's buildings; includes heating and cooling
loads, water use. Calculated to include variables such as inflation;
utility rates, and average power and water consumption by NEC occupants.
After the NEC opens, the actual operating costs are tracked by the
post, the regional bureau, and ICASS. However, limitations on the
availability of actual cost data, due in part to the complexities of
the multi-agency ICASS structure, makes the tracking of actual
operating costs a challenge. The Department is reviewing options for
efficiently capturing these costs currently resident in multiple data
systems.
6. Develop a human resource plan that addresses the requirements and
cost implications for hiring required NEC facilities maintenance staff
and sufficiently training the local maintenance staff.
Response: The Department agrees with this recommendation. The
Department has not been as diligent as necessary in hiring and
training local maintenance staff. For NECs, OBO develops a staffing
plan that details the number of staff and type of skills needed, which
is provided to post and the Regional Bureau 15 to 18 months before the
NEC opens. Post then hires the needed staff, which is funded by ICASS
and D&CP funds. Because of resource limitations, staffing needs can go
unfulfilled. This issue will be further addressed by OBO, the Regional
Bureaus, ICASS, and the Bureau of Resource Management.
In FY 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee in S. Rept. 110-425,
accompanying S. 3288, cited GAO's 2006 report on NEC construction and
its finding that State does not clearly identify the projected
operations and maintenance costs for NECs. The Committee directed
State to report on this issue, including whether ICASS is effective in
supporting post maintenance, given that it is a voluntary system. The
Committee also considered how a dedicated funding system for
maintenance, akin to the cost-sharing program for construction, could
be adapted to fully fund necessary maintenance. OMB and the Department
have begun working on a possible cost-sharing mechanism for
maintenance costs. Such a cost-sharing scheme would necessitate
developing a comprehensive human resources plan for hiring and
training maintenance staff, as well as the universe of other
maintenance requirements. [See comment 7]
As GAO reports, OBO has enhanced its qualifications for Foreign
Service FMs, requiring them to have an engineering or facility
management degree. OBO is making progress in recruiting and hiring
new, degreed FMs. Eleven have completed the FM training course at the
Foreign Service Institute established in 2009, and six more are
currently enrolled. There will be 20 more FMs in the September 2010
training course, 10 expected in the February 2011 course, and 10 per
year in the following years. This influx should allow posting FMs at
all of our NECs/NCCs and many legacy facilities, with posts not having
a resident FM serviced by a regional FM. Addressing increased demands
for emerging posts in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to be a challenge
in balancing resources.
As GAO reports, OBO has developed and is developing on-line training
courses intended to assist maintenance staff at post in carrying out
their duties. We are also working with a contractor on a proposal to
further augment our training program. As is standard practice, the OBO
Project Director on each NEC project will continue to provide system-
specific familiarization training for the LE Staff, in addition to
basic training on mechanical and electrical principles and systems
provided by the engineers on the OBO Project Director's staff.
Rightsizing Projections Versus June 2010 Staffing:
(Capital Security Projects Completed As OF CY-2010):
Post: Panama[A];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Oct-03;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jun-07;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 175;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 164;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -6.3%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 412;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 420;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 1.9%.
Post: Kigali;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Mar-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jan-08;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 61;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 49;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -19.7%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 244;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 254;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 4.1%.
Post: Tbilisi;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Oct-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jul-08;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 104;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 112;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 7.7%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 668;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 641;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -4.0%.
Post: Brazzaville;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Mar-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Nov-08;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 11;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 15;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 36.4%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 145;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 185;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 27.6%.
Post: Johannesburg;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Jan-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Dec-08;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 43;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 30;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -30.2%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 143;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 110;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -23.1%.
Post: Skopje;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Nov-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Mar-09;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 66;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 74;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 12.1%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 304;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 324;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 6.6%.
Post: Ouagadougou[D];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Nov-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jan-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 31;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 25;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -19.4%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 146;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 159;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 8.9%.
Post: Antananarivo[B];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: May-07;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Mar-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 49;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 40;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -18.4%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 253;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 249;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -1.6%.
Post: Khartoum[C];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Aug-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Mar-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 82;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 75;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -8.5%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 305;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 322;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 5.0%.
Post: Sarajevo[D];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Oct-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: May-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 92;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 102;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 10.9%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 331;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 346;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 4.5%.
Post: Mumbai[B];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Oct-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jun-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 74;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 69;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -6.8%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 340;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 306;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -10.0%.
Post: Karachi[B];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Mar-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jun-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 32;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 49;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 53.1%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 204;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 247;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 21.1%.
Post: Addis Ababa[D];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Jul-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jul-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 153;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 147;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -3.9%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 679;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 732;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 7.8%.
Post: Riga[B];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Feb-07;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Jul-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 50;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 39;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -22.0%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 168;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 165;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -1.8%.
Post: Lusaka;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Jul-06;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Nov-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 76;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 94;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 23.7%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 359;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 373;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 3.9%.
Post: Suva[B];
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Rightsizing Review Date: Apr-05;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Project Completion Date: Nov-10;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 20;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 22;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 10.0%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 78;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 110;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 41.0%.
Post: Totals:
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 1,119;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 1,106;
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): -1.2%;
All Positions: Original Rightsized Projections: 4,779;
All Positions: Current Positions in Chancery: 4,943;
All Positions: Percent Difference (+/-): 3.4%.
Projected completion later in CY-2010, current staffing includes OBO
construction managers (Data source: original rightsizing reviews, Jun
2010 post profiles data; rev. 6-23-2010)
[A] Rightsizing review clone by WID before current rightsizing program
began.
[B] Temporary OBO construction teams not counted.
[C] Government employee guard force positions not counted (other
missions have contract guards.)
[D] Temporary OBO construction teams and guard positions not counted.
The above figures do not include Peace Corps, whose offices are never
co-located in the chancery.
Standard deviation (posts with staffing overages):
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: 17.1%;
All Positions: 12.5%.
Standard deviation (all posts):
U.S. Direct-Hire Positions: 22.8%;
All Positions: 14.8%.
Footnotes:
[1] Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New
Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and
Maintenance Requirements; GAO-06-641, June 30, 2006.
[2] Federal Courthouse Construction: Preliminary Results Show Be
Planning, Oversight, and Courtroom Sharing Could Help Control Future
Costs; GAO-10-753T, May 25, 2010.
[3] 6 FAH-5 H-405.1-11 defines BOE as "Expenses incident to occupying
buildings and grounds, but not including improvements. repair or
maintenance costs beyond those minor operating system repairs and
preventive maintenance identified in the ICASS Handbook."
[4] To obtain a total post operations and maintenance (O&M) cost,
additional maintenance labor costs, utility costs, and maintenance
spare parts costs must be added to the O&M cost estimates listed for
all posts that have GO and LTL properties outside the NEC/NCC walls.
The following are GAO's comments to the Department of State's letter
dated June 28, 2010.
GAO comments:
1. We do not dispute that NEC maintenance costs may be in line with
those for similar facilities as suggested by OBO's analysis. Rather,
our intent in comparing operations and maintenance costs of NECs to
those at the facilities they replaced is to show that because of their
larger size and the increased complexity of building systems, among
other factors, NEC operations and maintenance costs are higher. Our
analysis of utility costs indicates, for example, that NECs have a
comparatively higher utility demand than previous facilities and pay
correspondingly higher amounts for utilities. As the higher costs to
operate and maintain NECs present long-term budget implications, we
believe it is important for State to continue its efforts, as it has
begun to do with the recent development of its Long Range Overseas
Maintenance Plan (LROMP), to comprehensively plan for the long-term
resource requirements necessary for protecting its investment in NECs.
2. We acknowledge that NECs provide an improved level of safety
compared to the facilities they replaced. However, the intent of our
discussion is to convey that safety concerns, particularly concerning
the operation of fire protection systems, were apparent at some of the
earlier NECs as a result of deficiencies with the commissioning
process. For example, OBO's Office of Fire Protection reported that
some early NECs were occupied without the correction of critical
deficiencies affecting operation of their fire protection systems, a
situation that we believe would not have occurred if commissioning had
been properly conducted. Because of the paramount importance of
safety, we believe it is necessary to report on issues that
potentially result in reduced safety levels.
3. We support State's intention to place greater emphasis on proactive
analysis and objective comparison. State concludes that its analysis
of the 16 NECs planned since the inception of M/PRI, many of which are
still under construction, indicates that "the problem of inadequate
office space is gradually being resolved." However, State's analysis
does not clearly demonstrate whether these NECs match the space needs
of overseas posts. For example, State's analysis includes all
positions at overseas posts and does not distinguish between those
positions that require office space in the NEC (referred to in our
report as "desk" positions) and those, such as warehouse or
maintenance personnel, that do not. While such an analysis could be
appropriate for determining whether the rightsizing process is
resulting in greater accuracy projecting overall staffing levels, it
is does not provide a clear picture of whether the amount of office
space that was planned for the NECs is adequate for current office
space needs.
In addition to having concerns that State's analysis may not provide a
clear assessment of space requirements, we also believe that the
results of State's analysis do not indicate that NECs planned under
rightsizing will face fewer space challenges than their predecessors.
For example, State's analysis of all positions shows that 7 of the 16
(44 percent) NECs planned under rightsizing have at least 5 percent
more staff than were included in the initial projections, even though
none of the NECs planned under rightsizing is more than 3 years old
and many are still under construction. Our analysis of 44 completed
NECs showed that over half have current desk space needs that exceed
the amount of desk space constructed by at least 5 percent.
Additionally, we found that 4 of the 6 NECs completed since the
inception of M/PRI had current staffing levels that exceeded
constructed desk space by more than 20 percent. We believe that both
our analysis and State's analysis support our finding that many NECs
have already run out of desk space and, therefore, the planning
process might benefit from additional analysis of the relationship
between post-specific characteristics and staffing growth.
4. We acknowledge OBO's intention to revise the growth factor formula,
which would provide additional space in NECs. However, this does not
address our concern that OBO has not provided any analytical basis to
demonstrate that a growth factor of 10 percent, applied uniformly
across all projects, is appropriate.
5. We support State's initial effort in taking action to identify and
prioritize its maintenance needs as documented in its first edition of
the LROMP. Establishing a timeline concurrent with availability of
funds would provide greater transparency for projects to be initiated
during a specific funding period. However, we also believe State
should consider outlining notional implementation time frames for
requirements identified over each of the future budget years covered
by the LROMP, including those years for which future funding is not
certain. By identifying notional time frames, based on forecasted
budget scenarios and not solely on available funds, we believe State
will be better able to demonstrate whether the plan can effectively be
resourced by future anticipated budget scenarios or whether
maintenance requirements potentially exceed likely funding scenarios.
We believe such an approach would strengthen State's efforts to show
how timely investments in maintenance can protect the multibillion
dollar investment State is making in constructing NECs.
6. We support OBO's efforts in developing first-year operating cost
estimates for NECs when they open. However, we still maintain State
needs to develop an assessment of future operating costs that is
included in the LROMP. A plan that outlines future operating costs is
particularly important since, as our analysis shows, the operating
costs at NEC posts have clearly increased relative to the facilities
they replaced. By developing estimates of future years' operating
costs and combining those with estimates of future maintenance costs
that State has already outlined in its LROMP, we believe State will
have a more complete assessment of the financial resources that State
and other contributing agencies will need in future budget years to
operate and maintain overseas facilities.
7. We maintain that State needs a human resources plan for NEC
facilities maintenance staff, regardless of the funding mechanism.
Such a plan, that addresses cost implications for hiring and training
necessary staff, could assist State in better identifying the
necessary financial resources and planning to address resource
limitations.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202) 512-
4268 or fordj@gao.gov:
Terrell G. Dorn, Director, Physical Infrastructure, (202) 512-6923 or
dornt@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, Leslie Holen, Assistant
Director; Michael Armes, Assistant Director; John Bauckman; Sam
Bernet; Raj Chitikila; Kalvin Jenhung Lo; Kara Marshall; Christina
Werth; and Richard Winsor made key contributions to this report. In
addition, Joe Carney, Martin de Alteriis, Mark Dowling, and Faye
Morrison provided technical or legal assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] H.R. 3427 (106th Cong.), Title VI (H.R. 3427 was incorporated by
cross-reference in the conference report to H.R.3194 [Div. B]. H.R.
3194, the Fiscal Year 2000 Consolidated Appropriations bill, became
Public Law 106-113 on Nov. 29, 1999). State elaborates on these
requirements in the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Handbook,
12 FAH-5.
[2] Agencies may request a waiver to the collocation requirement if
security conditions permit and it is determined that U.S. national
interests are best served by locating personnel outside new facilities.
[3] Within the Department of State, Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
falls under two main categories of funding: (1) Building Operating
Expenses (BOE) and (2) Maintenance and Repair (M&R). The term
"operations and maintenance" is used to describe both aspects of
running a facility. BOE (i.e., operations) includes costs associated
with occupying a facility to include utilities, janitorial services,
trash collection, grounds care, the labor costs of locally employed
maintenance staff, and maintenance service contracts (i.e., Building
Maintenance Expenses) for building systems (e.g., elevators,
generators, etc.). BOE costs, for facilities shared by State and other
agencies, are funded through posts' International Cooperative
Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system.
[4] Maintenance and Repair (M&R), which is funded by OBO, includes
those maintenance activities that a landlord would take to maintain a
property in acceptable condition. M&R funds services and materials for
items of a recurring nature such as painting and minor repairs to
building systems.
[5] GAO, Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing
New Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and
Maintenance Requirements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-641] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2006).
[6] The term "NEC" refers to all new facilities--including new embassy
compounds, new consulate compounds, new office buildings, and newly
acquired buildings--constructed for the purposes of locating all U.S.
government employees at a new and single location. Further, for the
purposes of this report, the term "post" refers to the entirety of the
U.S. government's operations in an overseas location.
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-641].
[8] The design-build project delivery method reduces project cycle
time by combining design and construction in a single contract award
and allows contractors to begin construction before the building
design is complete.
[9] In 2002, OBO implemented the SED to expedite the planning, design,
and construction of NECs. The SED is a template that standardizes the
basic plans for the structural, spatial, safety, and security
requirements for each NEC. Since 2002, there have been three primary
SED classes--small, medium, and large--based on the size and cost of
the facility. Each size has a predefined project schedule and
duration. In 2004, State introduced a fourth class of SED, called
Extra Large or Special SEDs, for construction that generally exceeds
the size and cost of large SEDs. Finally, in 2007, State introduced
the Standard Secure Mini Compound, which is generally smaller and less
costly than a small SED. See GAO, Embassy Construction: Additional
Actions Are Needed to Address Contractor Participation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-48] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16,
2009) for additional information on SED.
[10] GAO, Embassy Construction: Process for Determining Staffing
Requirements Needs Improvement, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-411] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7,
2003).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-641].
[12] NEC windows are nonoperable and thus cannot be opened to allow
fresh air in, and the security requirements to filter and pressurize
the air within an NEC effectively creates a sealed building.
[13] U.S. State Department, Office of the Inspector General, Report of
Inspection: Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Report Number:
ISP-I-08-34 (Washington, D.C., August 2008).
[14] State plans NECs based on projections of the number of "desk"
positions--or positions that will require an assigned office or
workspace--that will occupy the facility.
[15] "Current staffing levels" refers specifically to authorized
positions at overseas posts that post management indicated required a
desk on the compound in 2009 staffing data. There may be a discrepancy
between the number of positions that are authorized and the number of
positions that are actually filled; however, State's staffing data do
not provide sufficient detail for us to distinguish between the two.
Some positions at overseas posts, such as guards or some facilities
maintenance positions, do not require a desk and, therefore, are not
included in our analysis of current staffing levels.
[16] The 11 posts with a difference of more than 50 desks are Abu
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Abuja, Nigeria; Beijing, China; Berlin,
Germany; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Frankfurt,
Germany; Nairobi, Kenya; Skopje, Macedonia; Tblisi, Georgia; and
Tunis, Tunisia.
[17] Growth space is not included in our analysis of as-built desk
space.
[18] Administrative support services are primarily provided through
the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS)
system. ICASS functions are most commonly covered by State and,
therefore, most ICASS positions are listed under State. As staffing
levels at a post increase, there is often a corresponding increase in
ICASS positions, which accounts for some of the increase in State
positions.
[19] The precise structure of a mission is determined by the Chief of
Mission through the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD-38)
process, which provides authority for the Chief of Mission to
determine the size, composition, or mandate of personnel operating at
the mission.
[20] OBO officials noted that OBO received the amount of money it
requested for the facility.
[21] As a result of these space reductions, some staff are located off-
site in Berlin. Post management noted that the most cost-effective
option for locating staff off-site--at an estimated cost of $25
million--involved purchasing and renovating an office facility the
post had formerly leased.
[22] While OBO has not conducted a formal study comparing the costs of
initially building a larger space with building an annex at a later
date, OBO officials noted it is generally cheaper to increase the size
of a single building than build a separate building because of the
fixed costs that come with each building.
[23] In Frankfurt, Germany, State rehabilitated an old military
hospital for use as the new Consulate, rather than construct a new
facility. OBO officials noted that State undertook the initial
renovation project in Frankfurt with the knowledge that additional
work would be required following the post's move-in.
[24] Some other U.S. government agencies, such as the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC), require post-occupancy evaluations for all
facilities above a certain cost threshold--$10 million for NIH and $5
million for NAVFAC. Additionally, the proposed Embassy Design and
Security Act, (S. 3210, introduced in the Senate on April 15, 2010),
would require that State conduct post-occupancy evaluations of each
completed facility.
[25] Commissioning is a process of assuring by testing, verification,
and documentation that systems perform according to the design and the
building owner's operational needs, including the preparatory training
of facilities personnel. Commissioning is generally performed by a
third party. If commissioning is improperly performed, the owner
(i.e., State) is at risk of taking possession of a facility with
building systems that may not be installed correctly, are defective,
or are not integrated to operate optimally and efficiently. In
addition, essential training and documentation on the systems might
not be provided to operations and maintenance staff. In such cases of
improperly performed commissioning, energy efficiency is reduced and
the performance of the facility fails to meet owner and occupant
expectations.
[26] Building automation systems (BAS), also known as energy
management control systems, provide centralized control--through the
use of BAS software and hardware (e.g., computer, modems, sensors,
controllers, and printers)--to monitor and adjust building systems
(e.g., temperature settings and schedules for running equipment)--such
as a building's cooling systems. A BAS is intended to optimize the
integrated performance of the individual equipment components that
comprise the system. Data can be recorded so they can be analyzed. The
Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program indicates
that the objective of a BAS is to achieve an optimal level of occupant
comfort while minimizing energy use.
[27] The U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design green building rating system defines sustainable
features for buildings and includes a set of performance standards
that can be used to certify the design and construction of buildings.
By meeting the standards during facility design and construction,
builders can earn credits and become certified in accordance with an
established four-level scale--certified, silver, gold, and platinum.
[28] Projects registered include both completed projects and projects
where construction has not yet been completed.
[29] For projects completed in 2007 or 2008, we compared operations
and maintenance costs for the last full year of operation in the old
facility with NEC operations and maintenance costs for fiscal year
2009.
[30] The total reported is the aggregate nominal cost increase
associated with operating and maintaining NECs and is not adjusted for
inflation due to the short time frames involved. OBO officials report
that the maintenance of older facilities may not have been fully
funded at appropriate levels and that there might not have been such a
large cost increase with the NECs if the old facilities had been
properly maintained
[31] U.S. State Department, Benchmarking: Operations and Maintenance
Costs (Sept. 1, 2009). The four posts identified are Beijing, China;
Belmopan, Belize; Bridgetown, Barbados; and Panama City, Panama.
Beijing's cost did not fully reflect 1 full year of occupancy as the
NEC did not open until August 2008.
[32] State's LROMP also outlines a "legacy maintenance strategy" for
maintaining older facilities that will not be replaced by an NEC in
the near future.
[33] BME is a category of cost within Building Operating Expenses
(BOE) that is used to capture costs attributable to occupying
buildings and grounds. BOE includes costs for facilities maintenance
staff, custodial and trash services, fuel, utilities, applicable
government assessments and taxes, insurance on real property, and
service contracts on building systems (i.e., BME).
[34] One member of OBO's Industry Advisory Panel suggested State
consider examining the sequencing of projects relative to other
requested projects in a given facility, as it could affect when a
building owner (e.g., State) funds and executes projects. For example,
he stated that an owner may want to fund projects to replace windows
and lighting first before upgrading the building's mechanical plant;
otherwise, the owner may overdesign the mechanical components being
replaced by failing to have considered performance efficiencies
resulting in reduced heating and cooling needs that would be gained by
replacing the other two systems.
[35] Executive Order 13327, Federal Real Property Asset Management
(signed in 2004) established a Federal Real Property Council (FRPC)
that requires agencies to report the annual operating costs, among
other data, for their real property assets. In 2008, State's Inspector
General reported that the Department's reporting of annual operating
costs to the FRPC was inaccurate. See ISP-08-34.
[36] State's 2009 benchmarking study examined operating and
maintenance costs at overseas posts (both NEC and non-NEC posts);
however, the study looked at just over 160 posts (out of over 240
posts) due, in part, to data on costs not being reported by some posts.
[37] OBO prepares first-year operating cost estimates for individual
NECs based on when an NEC is expected to be completed. Those operating
cost estimates are provided to posts and also reported in State's Long-
Range Overseas Buildings Plan. In its 2008 review of OBO, State's IG
reported that 12 of 17 posts (that took occupancy of an NEC after
January 2005) stated that either no estimates were provided, or if
they were, the estimates were not accurate. See ISP-08-34.
[38] The funding responsibilities for the NEC operating costs (i.e.,
BOE) at posts are not an OBO responsibility but rather are shared
costs paid by State's regional bureaus, diplomatic security and
consular programs, and other government agencies at post through
ICASS. OBO staff characterized the ICASS system as providing each
agency at post with a vote, which may make it difficult for OBO and
the facilities managers to convince the ICASS council to approve the
funding for additional maintenance staff.
[39] ISP-I-08-34.
[40] ISP-08-34.
[41] The DOE, Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) mission is to
facilitate the federal government's implementation of sound, cost-
effective energy management and investment practices to enhance the
nation's energy security and environmental stewardship. DOE/FEMP
prepared: Commissioning for Federal Facilities - A Practical Guide to
Building Commissioning, Recommissioning, Retro-Commissioning, and
Continuous Commissioning (Washington, D.C.).
[42] In previous GAO work examining embassy construction, we found
that 7 of 15 State construction contractors reported to us that
getting a timely response from OBO on final commissioning approvals
was a major or moderate challenge. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-48].
[43] OBO officials indicate OBO's construction contracts did call for
an "independent" agent to do commissioning; however, because those
commissioning services were obtained by the construction contractor
under contract to OBO, posts felt those agents were not independent of
the construction contractors.
[44] The "transfer" of an NEC is commonly referred to in OBO guidance
as the "turnover" of the NEC.
[45] DOE reports computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS)
automate many functions performed by facilities staff, such as
maintenance work order generation and tracking, inventory control,
document storage, warranty management, maintenance management, and
tracking costs. DOE reports that benefits of a CMMS include achieving
a higher level of maintenance, more efficient use of staff, and
maintaining optimal equipment performance to include reducing downtime
and extending equipment life. DOE reports that one common pitfall
associated with CMMS is inadequate training of staff on the CMMS.
[46] A punch list identifies tasks, usually minor, to be completed by
the construction contractor at the end of a project.
[47] Building Commissioning Association, Best Practices in
Commissioning Existing Buildings, August 18, 2008.
[48] State officials report they anticipate requesting funding for
recommissioning NECs in their fiscal year 2012 budget request. OBO
officials noted that such a plan would require approval by State and
the Office of Management and Budget.
[49] A chiller is a refrigeration system that cools water similar to
an air conditioner. Once cooled, chilled water has a variety of
applications such as cooling the air within a facility. Two to three
chillers, associated piping, cooling towers (if installed), and water
pumps make up a typical NEC chiller plant.
[50] Two common methods used to provide air conditioning are "water-
cooled" chillers that use water towers, recirculated water, and
compressors to condense refrigerant fluid, and "air-cooled" chillers
that use compressors and fans to draw air over finned coils to
condense refrigerant.
[51] Post officials noted that while the situation has improved and
alarms have not been triggered recently, the fire panel indicates
there is still a problem with the system.
[52] OBO officials reported that both Sofia (fiscal year 2001
contract) and Yaoundé (fiscal year 2005 contract) were two of State's
earlier projects.
[53] The main fire alarm control panels are typically installed within
NEC's main security post and subordinate panels are installed in other
locations like the warehouse. Trouble lights could signify a
relatively minor problem with the fire alarm system, like a dirty
smoke detector, or a more serious problem such as the loss of power to
a smoke detector that may prevent it from working. Supervisory lights
are generally more serious indicators of a problem within the fire
suppression system such as the fire pump running or a closed sprinkler
valve. An audible alarm sounding at the panel gives post personnel
another indication that there is a condition within the system that
should be examined.
[54] Some doors and windows have been replaced under warranty at
contractors' expense, while others have been replaced via follow-on
projects at government expense.
[55] Estimated costs are based on data within OBO's Long-Range
Overseas Maintenance Plan, for fiscal years 2010 to 2015.
[56] In 2006, the security requirements for Marine Security Guard
Quarters were strengthened. In 2007, the security requirements for
Compound Access Control facilities were strengthened.
[57] OBO officials report that they estimate the average cost for
hiring an additional overseas facility manager is approximately
$330,000 annually. Costs generally include salary, benefits, overseas
housing costs, travel and moving expenses, training, and education
allowances for dependents. Based on OBO's stated goal of hiring 20
additional facility managers in fiscal year 2009, that added cost
would amount to $6.6 million annually for just those additional U.S.
facility managers. Costs for State's overseas facility managers are
directly funded by OBO and not by posts or ICASS.
[58] ISP-I-08-34.
[59] Costs for locally employed facilities staff are funded through
ICASS as a shared cost paid by State and other federal agencies.
[60] State reports that the facility manager courses are available to
locally employed staff on a space available basis but that the first
priority is newly hired facility managers. According to a State
official, the Foreign Service Institute will initiate additional
sessions if the number of waitlisted requests justifies the need.
However, funding to pay for the costs of travel and training of posts'
local staff may still need to be identified.
[61] DOE reports that building automation system operators must be
fully trained on the system's capabilities in order to optimize and
realize energy efficiency of the new system and that refresher
training is needed.
[62] In May 2010, State officials reported that development of online
facilities training for work order management and environmental
security protection systems was completed and is now available to
overseas posts staff.
[63] State's International Maintenance Assistance Program and its
recently created African Regional Maintenance Program (ARMP) dispatch
maintenance contractors to support overseas posts maintenance needs.
ARMP is uniquely focused on support for 15 NEC posts in Africa.
[64] In this report, we use the term NEC to universally include NEC,
New Consulate Compound, New Office Building, and Newly Acquired
Building projects.
[65] The following posts that met our definition of an NEC were
excluded from our review: 1) Posts, such as Doha, Qatar, where
construction began and/or funding was provided before 1999; 2)
Embassies Baghdad, Iraq and Kabul, Afghanistan, where operations are
not reflective of normalized post operations and/or funding was
obtained entirely through supplemental appropriations; 3) Facilities
referred to by OBO as Standard Secure Mini Compounds (SSMC) or unique,
small compounds that were precursors to the SSMC design (Koror, Palau
and Kolonia, Federated States of Micronesia); and 4) NECs in which the
post moved into the new facilities after September 30, 2009
(Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; Antananarivo, Madagascar, and Khartoum,
Sudan). Additionally, we excluded posts in Lima, Peru; Athens, Greece;
Bogota, Columbia; and Tirana, Albania where annexes were built on or
adjacent to facilities built prior to 1999; and an Interim Office
Building in Dili, Timor-Leste.
[66] United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations, ISP-I-08-34, (Washington, D.C., August
2008).
[67] Project type refers to the type of design and construction
contracts, such as design-bid-build or design-build, which may make
use of a standard embassy design.
[68] OBO officials report that the maintenance of older facilities may
not have been fully funded at appropriate levels and that there might
not have been such a large cost increase with the NECs if the old
facilities had been properly maintained.
[End of section]
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