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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Humanitarian Assistance:
Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United
States:
Humanitarian Assistance:
GAO-10-691:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-691, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and
compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food,
economic opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime. This
migration continues. Some North Koreans seek resettlement in other
countries, such as South Korea and the United States. To promote a
more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean
refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004.
In reauthorizing the Act in 2008, Congress found that delays in
processing North Korean refugees have led refugees to abandon their
quest for U.S. resettlement. GAO was asked to (1) assess the U.S.
government’s efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean
refugees who request resettlement in the United States from overseas,
and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum
to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do
so. GAO is issuing a separate classified annex to this report. GAO
analyzed data on North Korean refugees and asylees, interviewed agency
officials, and conducted fieldwork in Asia.
This report does not contain recommendations. The Departments of State
(State), Homeland Security, and Justice provided technical comments
and GAO incorporated these comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found:
The U.S. government has taken actions to facilitate the U.S.
resettlement of North Korean refugees from overseas, but processing
times did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 due in part to
some host countries’ policies. The United States opened cases for 238
North Korean refugee applicants from October 2004 through March 2010,
and 94 of these North Koreans arrived in the United States. As part of
its recent actions to facilitate the processing of North Korean
refugees, State has placed a high priority on these cases and provided
additional staff time and resources to process these cases. However,
according to U.S. officials, some U.S. requirements, such as
conducting and clearing security checks, can delay U.S. processing.
According to officials from the U.S. government and international
organizations, the policies of some host countries also can affect
U.S. processing of North Korean refugees. For example, some host
countries delay granting North Korean refugees permission to leave
their countries. Average processing times for North Koreans did not
improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most recent year for which
complete data were available (see below). State officials said that
one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in
fiscal years 2007 and 2008, resulting in longer average processing
times for cases created in those years. While processing times for
North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other
refugee populations, the processing times were generally comparable in
fiscal year 2008.
Table: Average Time to Process North Korean Refugees, Fiscal Years
2006 to 2008:
Case creation to U.S. arrival: Number of North Koreans who arrived in
the United States (by year of case creation);
FY 2006: 27;
FY 2007: 48;
FY 2008: 10.
Case creation to U.S. arrival: Average (number of days);
FY 2006: 133;
FY 2007: 399;
FY 2008: 314.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Department of State, Refugee
Processing Center.
[End of table]
From October 1, 2004, through March 2, 2010, at least 33 North Koreans
have sought asylum protection to remain in the United States, but the
actual number is likely higher. Of the 33 North Koreans, 9 individuals
have been granted asylum, 15 are still pending, and 9 are categorized
as “other decisions,” meaning their cases have been denied, dismissed,
or withdrawn, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) data. The actual number of individuals is likely higher for
several reasons including agencies’ difficulties in compiling
information. North Koreans can seek asylum protection through two
processes—the affirmative or the defensive. In the affirmative
process, individuals who are physically in the United States may
present an asylum application to USCIS and undergo a non-adversarial
interview to determine their eligibility for asylum. In the defensive
process, applicants request that the Department of Justice grant them
asylum as a defense against removal from the United States. USCIS data
do not include information on North Koreans who first claimed asylum
before an Immigration Judge in the defensive process.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-691] or key
components. For more information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-
9601 or melitot@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Although the U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate U.S.
Resettlement of North Korean Refugees, Processing Times Did Not
Improve:
At Least 33 North Koreans Have Applied for Asylum Status in the United
States, but the Number Is Likely Higher:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Resettlement Benefits Available to North Koreans in the
United States and South Korea:
Appendix III: Challenges Some Resettled North Koreans Face in
Assimilating in the United States and in South Korea:
Appendix IV: Data on North Koreans Who Have Resettled in South Korea
from the End of the Korean War through 2009:
Appendix V: Humanitarian Protection Status for North Koreans in the
United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan:
Appendix VI: The Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes in the
United States:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Entities and Key Functions in U.S. Refugee Processing and
Resettlement:
Table 2: North Korean Asylum Seekers Identified by USCIS from Fiscal
Year 2005 to Present:
Table 3: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in the United Kingdom for Calendar Years 2006 to September 30, 2009:
Table 4: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in Germany for Calendar Years 2000 to 2009:
Table 5: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in Canada for Calendar Years 2000 to 2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Countries in East Asia and the Pacific:
Figure 2: USRAP Steps for Processing North Koreans from Case Creation
to Arrival in the United States for Resettlement:
Figure 3: Status of North Korean Refugee Cases by Fiscal Year of Case
Creation, as of March 29, 2010:
Figure 4: Average Processing Times for North Korean Refugee Cases by
Fiscal Year of Case Creation, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008:
Figure 5: Average Processing Times for DHS Approval of North Korean
Cases by Fiscal Year of Case Creation, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2009:
Figure 6: Processing Times from Case Creation to Arrival: North Korean
Refugee Applicants Compared to Other Select Refugee Populations That
Require Similar Security Checks:
Figure 7: Processing Times from Case Creation to Arrival: North Korean
Refugee Applicants Compared to Other Select Refugee Populations in the
Region:
Figure 8: Highlights of Immediate Needs Benefits Available to
Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as of
March 2010:
Figure 9: Highlights of Cash and Medical Assistance Benefits Available
to Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as
of March 2010:
Figure 10: Highlights of Social and Employment Service Benefits
Available to Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South
Korea, as of March 2010:
Figure 11: Highlights of Other Benefits Available to Resettled North
Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as of March 2010:
Figure 12: Number of Resettled North Koreans in South Korea, Calendar
Years prior to 2000 through 2009:
Figure 13: Steps in the Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DRL: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor:
EOIR: Executive Office for Immigration Review:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INA: Immigration and Nationality Act:
IOM: International Organization for Migration:
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization:
NKHRA: North Korean Human Rights Act:
OPE: Overseas Processing Entity:
ORR: Office of Refugee Resettlement:
PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration:
RAPS: Refugees, Asylum, and Parole System:
State: Department of State:
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
USRAP: U.S. Refugee Admissions Program:
WRAPS: Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 24, 2010:
The Honorable John Kerry:
Chairman:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Sam Brownback:
United States Senate:
Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and
compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food,
economic opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime with a
history of human rights abuses.[Footnote 1] This migration continues
up to this day. The estimated number of North Koreans outside of the
country has ranged from the thousands to the hundreds of thousands at
any given time, according to nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and
scholars. Some of the North Koreans who have escaped from North Korea
desire to seek resettlement in other countries, such as the Republic
of Korea (known as South Korea)[Footnote 2] and the United States,
[Footnote 3] where they may be eligible for resettlement benefits.
[Footnote 4] North Korean refugees often face difficult and dangerous
journeys transiting to countries where they can seek resettlement.
Along the way, they are vulnerable to forced repatriation, human
trafficking, and lack of protection from the countries they transit
through.[Footnote 5] North Koreans face various economic, linguistic,
social, medical, and other challenges when resettling in the United
States and South Korea. However, some North Koreans have overcome
these challenges and achieved accomplishments such as obtaining higher
educational degrees.[Footnote 6]
To promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North
Korean refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act
(NKHRA) in 2004.[Footnote 7] This act:
* Authorized, in addition to funds otherwise available for such
purposes, up to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005 through
2012[Footnote 8] to provide assistance to support organizations or
persons that provide humanitarian assistance to North Koreans who are
outside of North Korea without the permission of the North Korean
government. These include refugees, defectors, migrants, orphans, and
victims of human trafficking. The act defined humanitarian assistance
as assistance to meet humanitarian needs, including, needs for food,
medicine, medicinal supplies, clothing, and shelter. (See classified
annex for details on the Department of State's (State) humanitarian
assistance to North Koreans outside of North Korea.)[Footnote 9]
* Clarified that North Koreans are not barred from eligibility for
refugee status or asylum in the United States on account of any legal
right to citizenship that they may enjoy under the South Korean
constitution.[Footnote 10] According to State, historically the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international
community, including the United States, have viewed South Korea as the
resettlement country of choice.
* Instructed the Secretary of State to facilitate the submission of
applications for admission of North Koreans seeking protection as
refugees. Prior to 2004, the United States had not resettled any North
Korean refugees in the United States.
In reauthorizing the NKHRA in 2008,[Footnote 11] Congress found that
few North Korean refugees had resettled in the United States as
opposed to South Korea[Footnote 12] from 2004 to 2007, and extensive
delays in assessing and processing the applications of North Korean
refugees for resettlement in the United States had led refugees to
abandon their quest for resettlement in the United States. In
addition, Congress found that the number of North Koreans to whom the
United States had granted asylum was fewer than the number of North
Koreans who had been granted asylum in other countries.[Footnote 13]
Based on your request, we (1) assessed the U.S. government's efforts
to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees who request
resettlement in the United States from overseas, and (2) determined
the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the
United States and the process by which they may do so. We are also
issuing a separate classified annex that provides additional
information pertaining to North Korean refugees.
To assess how the U.S. government processes North Korean refugees, we
reviewed documents from State and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) related to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). We also
interviewed officials from State, DHS, and international organizations
in Washington, D.C. and Asia as well as the regional Overseas
Processing Entity (OPE) that processes refugee applications to
understand the various steps in overseas and domestic refugee
processing. We also analyzed data from State's Worldwide Refugee
Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) to determine the processing times
for North Korean refugees.[Footnote 14] We calculated the processing
times for North Korean cases created between fiscal years 2006 and
2008 to show the total number of days between case creation and
arrival in the United States. We do not include cases created in
fiscal year 2009 because all the refugees have not arrived in the
United States and thus the data are not complete. In addition, we
calculated the processing times for North Korean cases created between
fiscal years 2006 and 2009 to show the total number of days between
case creation and DHS approval, which occurs before a refugee arrives
in the United States, because the data are complete through this step.
To determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to
remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so,
we reviewed documentation and data from U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) within DHS and from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ). We
also interviewed officials from these agencies and reviewed relevant
statutes. We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
provides a detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The U.S. government has taken actions to facilitate the U.S.
resettlement of North Korean refugees from overseas, but processing
times did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, due in part to
some host countries' policies. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from October 2004
to March 2010. Ninety-four individuals arrived in the United States,
107 withdrew their applications, 18 were rejected or denied, and 5
individual cases were closed. In addition, 14 individual cases were
pending, including 9 that were on hold awaiting medical or other
clearances. Within the last few years, State has taken actions to
facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees by placing a high
priority on North Korean cases, and providing additional staff time
and resources to process these cases. For example, State and OPE
officials said that in 2006, State created and funded a Korean-
speaking special caseworker at the regional OPE to focus specifically
on North Korean cases because they require more time than other
refugee cases. According to officials from the U.S. government and
international organizations, the policies of some host countries can
affect U.S. processing of North Korean refugees. For example, some
host countries delay granting exit permission for North Korean
refugees, or do not recognize any North Koreans as "refugees" and
limit access to them, according to U.S. officials. Total average
processing times--from the time the case was created to the time of
the North Korean's arrival in the United States--did not improve for
the 85 individual cases created in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 that
arrived in the United States. Processing times increased from an
average of 133 days in fiscal year 2006 to an average of 314 days in
fiscal year 2008. State officials said that one host country limited
U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008,
which resulted in longer average processing times for cases created in
those years. For those stages in the overseas process that are
primarily handled by the U.S. government, we also found that average
processing times did not improve. In addition, while processing times
for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some
other refugee populations, processing times were generally comparable
in fiscal year 2008.
From October 1, 2004, to March 2, 2010, at least 33 North Koreans--
including their dependents (some of whom may not be North Korean)--
have sought asylum protection to remain in the United States, but the
actual number of cases is likely higher for several reasons including
agencies' difficulties in compiling asylum information. North Koreans
can seek asylum protection through two processes known as the
affirmative and the defensive. In the affirmative asylum process,
individuals who are physically in the United States, regardless of how
they arrived or their current immigration status, may present an
asylum application to DHS/USCIS and undergo an affirmative--or non-
adversarial--interview to determine their eligibility for asylum. In
the defensive asylum process, applicants request asylum as a defense
against removal from the United States and can be held in detention
while their case is processed. Individuals generally enter the
defensive asylum process in one of three ways: (1) as a referral to an
EOIR Immigration Judge following a finding of ineligibility in an
affirmative asylum application; (2) by claiming, at a U.S. border, a
credible fear of persecution or torture if returned to their home
country after being placed in expedited removal proceedings; or (3)
during removal proceedings as a defense to removal. Of the 33 North
Koreans DHS/USCIS identified as having applied for asylum in the
United States since fiscal year 2005 through either the affirmative
asylum or credible fear process, 9 individuals have been granted
asylum. However, the actual number of cases is likely higher than 33
because the individuals identified by DHS/USCIS include only those
whose claims originated with USCIS in the affirmative process or were
interviewed by a DHS/USCIS asylum officer at the border to determine
whether or not the individual had a credible fear of persecution or
torture. The DHS/USCIS data do not include information on North
Koreans who first claimed asylum before an EOIR Immigration Judge
during removal proceedings.
Background:
Estimates of the North Korean Population Outside of North Korea Vary:
Estimates of the numbers of North Koreans outside of North Korea have
varied widely over the past decade, according to NGOs and scholars.
Estimates have ranged from 6,000 to over 300,000, depending on the
source of the data and the time period in which the data were
collected. Scholars and NGOs said that a number of factors can
contribute to the variance in the estimates, including the following:
* Some countries in the region limit access to the North Korean
population, thereby preventing NGOs, international organizations, and
scholars from collecting comprehensive data. The UNHCR, the UN agency
dedicated to the protection of refugees, has little access to North
Korean refugees, according to UNHCR officials.[Footnote 15]
* Methodological variances among NGOs and scholars in accounting for
the numbers of North Korean refugees. In part because methodologies
are not readily shared among those who collect data, estimates on the
higher side could include North Koreans on the border who have been
double-counted because of the two-way flow of migration across the
border for economic purposes of finding work, according to scholars.
Conversely, scholars also said that some estimates might not include
those North Koreans who transit through the region fairly quickly on
their way to third countries for resettlement (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Countries in East Asia and the Pacific:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of Countries in East Asia and the Pacific]
The following countries are depicted on the map:
Burma;
Cambodia;
China;
Japan;
Laos;
Mongolia;
North Korea;
Philippines;
South Korea;
Taiwan;
Thailand;
Vietnam.
Source: Map Resources.
[End of figure]
* Difficulty obtaining comprehensive information on the estimates.
Scholars told us that because of the political sensitivities
surrounding the North Korean population outside of North Korea, those
collecting data on the population are hesitant to share their data for
fear they will reveal their sources or compromise their operations in
country. One scholar stated that it would be helpful if information on
estimates of North Koreans in the region could be shared among those
collecting the data so that methodological approaches could be
critiqued.
NGOs and scholars told us that, within the last couple of years, the
flow of North Koreans out of North Korea has slowed due to the
tightening of the border and stricter scrutiny of North Korean
migrants. One recent estimate noted that the current number of North
Koreans in the region might be between 6,000 and 16,000 at any given
time. Despite the tightening of the borders, NGOs and scholars pointed
out that North Koreans are still transiting through Asia to seek
resettlement in other countries.
Composition of North Koreans Resettling in South Korea Has Changed
over Time:
According to NGOs and South Korean officials, the composition of North
Koreans who have resettled in South Korea has changed over the past
decade. While the ratio of male and female North Koreans arriving in
South Korea in the early 2000s was closer to equal, South Korean data
show that the number of female refugees has steadily increased, with
77 percent of the total number of refugees entering South Korea for
resettlement being female in 2009. In addition, some of the more
recent North Korean arrivals tend to be family members of those North
Koreans who are already in South Korea. South Korean data indicate
that 75 percent of North Koreans who arrived in South Korea recently
range in age from 20 years to 40 years.
Various Entities Are Involved in the Processing and Resettlement of
Refugees:
The USRAP processes refugee applications for resettlement in the
United States through an interagency effort involving a number of
governmental and nongovernmental entities overseas and in the United
States. Table 1 provides a description of these entities and their
role in the USRAP process.
Table 1: Entities and Key Functions in U.S. Refugee Processing and
Resettlement:
Location: Overseas;
Entity: State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM);
Function: Has overall management responsibility for USRAP, including
referrals, background checks, and cooperative agreements with
nongovernmental partners.
Location: Overseas;
Entity: OPE;
Function: Prescreens referrals and applications by collecting and
verifying personal and family information, details of persecution or
feared harm, and information for security checks. OPEs are
international organizations or NGOs that operate under a cooperative
agreement with State.
Location: Overseas;
Entity: DHS/USCIS;
Function: Interviews refugee applicants to determine their eligibility
for U.S. admission.
Location: Domestic;
Entity: U.S. Resettlement Agencies;
Function: Place refugees with one of their affiliated offices and
provide initial services for the refugees' first 30 to 90 days in the
United States. They contribute cash or in-kind resources, such as
employment services, to supplement U.S. government funding.
Location: Domestic;
Entity: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)/Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR);
Function: Provides cash and medical assistance, employment services,
English language training, and other support services.
Source: GAO analysis of State, DHS, and HHS documents.
Note: DHS/USCIS officers (1) confirm the individual has access to the
USRAP; (2) adjudicate the individual's claim, including past
persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution; (3) review
inadmissible criteria under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA
Section 212); and (4) review whether or not the individual has been
firmly resettled in another country, which would be particularly
relevant for North Koreans who have availed themselves of their South
Korean citizenship.
[End of table]
USRAP's steps for processing North Korean refugees who have arrived in
the United States for U.S. resettlement are shown in figure 2.
[Footnote 16]
Figure 2: USRAP Steps for Processing North Koreans from Case Creation
to Arrival in the United States for Resettlement:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
1. OPE creates refugee case after receiving U.S. embassy referral.
2. OPE conducts prescreening interview.
3. IOM or an authorized physician conducts medical screening.
4. U.S. government conducts security checks.
5. DHS/USCIS conducts adjudication interview and renders a decision of
approve, hold, or deny for the refugee’s case.
6. If approved, OPE provides cultural orientation.
7. U.S. resettlement agency confirms U.S. resettlement location.
8. Foreign government grants exit permission.
9. IOM arranges travel to the United States.
10. Refugee travels to the United States.
11. Refugee arrives in the United States for resettlement.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by State, DHS, OPE, and
IOM.
Note: In some cases, medical screening has occurred at the same time
as the security checks and DHS/USCIS adjudication or before DHS/USCIS
adjudication.
[End of figure]
We provide further explanation of certain steps in the USRAP process
below.
* Case creation. North Koreans generally request consideration as
refugees from a U.S. embassy or from UNHCR. Under the USRAP, a U.S.
embassy submits a P-1 referral[Footnote 17] to State/PRM in
Washington, D.C., and the DHS/USCIS Refugee Affairs Division in
Washington, D.C., and they must concur in the granting of the USRAP
access to the refugee applicant. After this concurrence, State
requests or authorizes the OPE to create the case in the State's WRAPS
database. At this point, the refugee applicant begins the process for
consideration for admission to the USRAP.
* Security checks. Once the OPE prescreening interview is completed,
the OPE requests that U.S. government agencies conduct the required
security checks.
* DHS approval. After the prescreening interview and usually after the
security checks have been cleared, DHS/USCIS officers interview the
refugee applicants and make a recommendation of either "approve,"
"hold," or "deny" for the case. The USCIS District Director or Deputy
District Director must then review and agree with all recommendations
before the case decision can be finalized.[Footnote 18] DHS/USCIS will
not finalize approval for a case until all security checks have
cleared. Once required security checks and medical screening are
complete, and DHS/USCIS has determined that the refugee applicant is
eligible for resettlement to the United States, the OPE confirms the
resettlement location.
* Exit permission. After the United States has approved the refugee
for resettlement and after the individual is ready to travel, the U.S.
embassy or UNHCR requests exit permission from the government of the
country where the refugee is being processed. According to U.S.
officials involved in the processing of these cases, the exit
permission process often entails ongoing communications with that
government and can take several months.
* Arrival in the United States. Upon arrival in the United States,
U.S. resettlement agencies and HHS provide eligible refugees with
services and assistance, as noted in table 1.
Although the U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate U.S.
Resettlement of North Korean Refugees, Processing Times Did Not
Improve:
The USRAP opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from
fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. During this time
period, the U.S. government, particularly State, took actions to
facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees. However, the
policies of some host countries affect U.S. processing times for North
Korean refugees. From fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most current year
for which complete data were available, U.S. processing times did not
improve. In addition, while processing times for North Koreans were
lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other refugee
populations, processing times were generally comparable in fiscal year
2008.[Footnote 19]
The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Processed North Korean Refugee
Cases from Fiscal Years 2005 to 2010:
The USRAP processed a total of 238 North Korean refugee applicant
cases[Footnote 20] from fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29,
2010. During this time period, 94 of these individuals arrived in the
United States,[Footnote 21] 107 withdrew their applications, 18 were
rejected or denied, and 5 individual cases were closed.[Footnote 22]
In addition, 14 individuals were pending, including 9 that were on
hold awaiting medical or other clearances. Figure 3 shows the status
of North Korean refugee cases.
Figure 3: Status of North Korean Refugee Cases by Fiscal Year of Case
Creation, as of March 29, 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year of case creation: 2005;
Total Arrived in the United States: 0;
Total Hold: 0;
Total active: 0;
Other Closed or Inactive: 4;
Total Withdrawn: 0;
Total Denied (Closed): 0v
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 0.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2006;
Total Arrived in the United States: 27;
Total Hold: 0;
Total active: 0;
Other Closed or Inactive: 0;
Total Withdrawn: 2;
Total Denied (Closed): 1;
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 0.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2007;
Total Arrived in the United States: 48;
Total Hold: 0;
Total active: 0;
Other Closed or Inactive: 0;
Total Withdrawn: 81;
Total Denied (Closed): 9;
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 2.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2008;
Total Arrived in the United States: 10;
Total Hold: 0;
Total active: 0;
Other Closed or Inactive: 0;
Total Withdrawn: 11;
Total Denied (Closed): 0;
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 2.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2009;
Total Arrived in the United States: 9;
Total Hold: 2;
Total active: 4;
Other Closed or Inactive: 1;
Total Withdrawn: 9;
Total Denied (Closed): 4;
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 0.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2010;
Total Arrived in the United States: 0;
Total Hold: 7;
Total active: 1;
Other Closed or Inactive: 0;
Total Withdrawn: 4;
Total Denied (Closed): 0;
Total Rejected/Not qualified: 0.
Source: State Department, Refugee Processing Center, 2010.
[End of figure]
According to State, many North Koreans withdrew their applications
when they realized that (1) they would be found ineligible for
consideration because they had already been firmly resettled[Footnote
23] in South Korea or (2) resettlement in South Korea was faster and
entailed fewer requirements than U.S. resettlement. [Footnote 24]
All of the pending cases were created in fiscal years 2009 or 2010.
These include active cases, some of which are awaiting exit
permission, as well as cases that were put on hold. Cases may be on
hold because they are awaiting medical clearance or clearance for
other required security checks. According to U.S. and IOM officials,
some North Korean applicants were required to complete medical
treatment for tuberculosis, for which the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention requires 6 to 9 months of treatment before the
U.S. government grants medical clearance and permission to travel to
the United States.[Footnote 25]
The U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate the U.S.
Resettlement Process for North Korean Refugees:
The U.S. government, particularly State, has taken actions to
facilitate the U.S. resettlement process for North Korean refugees by
placing a high priority on North Korean cases and providing additional
resources to process these cases.
The U.S. Government Places a High Priority on the Processing of North
Korean Cases:
In response to the NKHRA, the U.S. government places a high priority
on the overseas processing of North Korean refugee cases, specifically
the processing stages involving OPE prescreening, security checks,
DHS/USCIS interviews, and U.S. resettlement agencies.
* OPE prescreening. State has directed the OPE to prioritize the
prescreening interviews of all North Korean cases at the start of the
process. To do so, the OPE schedules and conducts the prescreening
interview for North Korean cases before all other refugee cases on its
list, according to OPE officials.
* Security checks. State has prioritized the security checks for some
North Korean cases. State/PRM told us they usually expedite the
security checks for some North Korean cases that have been pending for
more than 2 or 3 months. Conducting and clearing security checks
involve a number of federal agencies, and this stage in USRAP can
create delays in U.S. processing times, according to U.S. officials.
[Footnote 26]
* DHS/USCIS interviews. State and DHS/USCIS prioritize North Korean
cases by scheduling USCIS adjudication interviews with them before
other refugee cases. According to DHS/USCIS officials, doing so can
save a month or more in overall processing time. In addition, to
expedite some North Korean cases that are urgent or of humanitarian
concern, DHS/USCIS may conduct interviews before the security checks
are cleared, whereas the standard protocol for most refugee
populations is to conduct the USCIS interview afterwards.
* U.S. resettlement agencies' assurance. A final part of the process
that State has prioritized is finding and confirming the resettlement
location and resettlement agency support[Footnote 27] for North Korean
refugees who will soon arrive in the United States. For North Korean
cases, State/PRM requests that U.S. resettlement agencies confirm the
location and support upon arrival within 1 week, whereas this
confirmation can take up to 4 weeks for other refugee populations,
according to State/PRM.
The U.S. Government Provides Additional Staff Time and Resources to
Process North Korean Refugees:
The U.S. government provides additional resources to process North
Korean refugee applicant cases. A State/PRM official told us that,
overall, each North Korean case usually requires more of State's time
and resources than a comparable refugee case from another country.
According to another State/PRM official, North Korean cases at one
point comprised 1 percent of State/PRM's caseload in the region but 20
percent of PRM's time. Since UNHCR is not permitted to access North
Koreans in some of the countries in the region, State and DHS take
over the refugee referral role. U.S. officials are also more involved
in obtaining exit permission for North Koreans in some countries than
they are for other refugee populations for which UNHCR or IOM
typically assists with this step of the process. Because North Korean
refugee cases are more labor intensive than other refugee cases,
State/PRM and OPE officials said that in 2006, State created and
funded a Korean-speaking special caseworker at the regional OPE to
focus specifically on North Korean cases. According to officials at
the regional OPE, North Koreans are the only population to which this
OPE dedicates a special caseworker. The special caseworker facilitates
processing by often serving as an interpreter during the prescreening
and DHS/USCIS interviews or interactions with U.S. staff. In addition,
the special caseworker sends a biweekly status report to State/PRM and
DHS/USCIS and, as of early 2010, was in the process of establishing
monthly meetings with the North Koreans to update them on the status
of their case. As a result, processing of these cases is now more
efficient, according to U.S. and OPE officials. Additionally,
officials from U.S. and international organizations must spend time
traveling to different locations in the region to process some North
Korean refugee applicants, since North Koreans are often housed in
shelters or immigration detention centers located throughout the
region rather than a few refugee camps concentrated in one country.
[Footnote 28] According to U.S. officials and international
organizations, these trips can also lengthen the processing times for
these cases.
Policies of Some Host Countries Affect U.S. Processing of North Korean
Refugees:
Some host countries' policies affect the processing of North Korean
refugee cases, according to officials from the U.S. government and
international organizations. For example:
* Some host countries delay granting exit permission for North Korean
refugees, which can add months to overall processing times, according
to U.S. officials. These officials also told us that some host
countries often delay granting exit permission because they do not
want to become "magnets" for more North Koreans and do not want to
facilitate the movement of North Korean refugees from the host country
to the United States. In addition, State officials told us that some
host countries grant exit permission to North Koreans seeking
resettlement in South Korea faster than those seeking U.S.
resettlement, thus leading to faster processing times for the South
Korean-bound North Koreans.
* Some host countries consider North Korean refugee issues to be
sensitive and prefer that these issues be handled discreetly,
according to U.S. officials. Due to these sensitivities, U.S.
officials have told us that processing North Korean cases often
requires a high level of U.S. involvement. For example, State
officials described North Korean refugee cases in which the U.S.
government and host countries communicated intensively over extended
periods of time before the U.S. government received permission to
process these cases or received exit permission in these countries.
According to U.S. officials, one reason for these countries'
reluctance to assist in the U.S. processing of North Korean cases is
concern about creating tensions with the North Korean government.
* Some host countries do not recognize any North Koreans as "refugees"
and limit access to them. Some host governments consider North Koreans
to be illegal or economic migrants, and thus do not offer them
protection as refugees. Some of these countries are also not parties
to the UN Protocol and Convention on Refugees and do not allow UNHCR
access to North Korean refugees, according to UNHCR officials. In some
of these countries, UNHCR does not assist the United States during the
processing of North Korean refugee applicant cases. U.S. and OPE
officials told us that some countries can also limit U.S. government
and international organizations' access to North Korean refugee
applicants by requiring them to request permission for meetings with
these refugees during processing, which can cause delays.
U.S. Processing Times for North Korean Refugees Did Not Improve from
Fiscal Year 2006 to 2008, and Were Generally Comparable to Those of
Some Other Refugee Populations in Fiscal Year 2008:
Overall, average processing times did not improve for the 85 cases
created in fiscal years 2006 to 2008 that arrived in the United
States.[Footnote 29] Average processing times increased from 133 days
in fiscal year 2006 to 314 days in fiscal year 2008 (see figure 4).
[Footnote 30] State officials said that one host country limited U.S.
government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008,
which resulted in longer average processing times for cases created in
those years.
Figure 4: Average Processing Times for North Korean Refugee Cases by
Fiscal Year of Case Creation, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year of case creation: 2006; (N = 27);
Average number of days: 132.8;
Median number of days: 154.5.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2007; (N = 48);
Average number of days: 399;
Median number of days: 361.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2008; (N = 10);
Average number of days: 314.4;
Median number of days: 273.5.
Source: State Department, Refugee Processing Center, 2010.
Notes:
We did not include processing times for fiscal year 2009 cases because
the data are not complete. Six pending cases from fiscal year 2009 had
not arrived in the United States at the time that State provided us
with data, and therefore are not included in the data. As of March 29,
2010, these six cases had been in the process for U.S. resettlement
for an average of 334 days. Since March 29, 2010, four of these six
individual cases have arrived in the United States.
N = the number of North Korean refugees in the sample size for each
fiscal year.
[End of figure]
Furthermore, for those stages in the overseas process that are
primarily handled by the U.S. government[Footnote 31]--the stages
between case creation and DHS approval--we found that average
processing times did not improve from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year
2009. Average processing times in fiscal year 2009 (147 days) were
faster than in fiscal years 2007 (284 days) and 2008 (192 days), but
slower than in fiscal year 2006 (65 days) (see figure 5).[Footnote 32]
The time period from case creation to DHS approval includes all of the
pending cases that were created in fiscal year 2009 that were excluded
from figure 4.[Footnote 33]
Figure 5: Average Processing Times for DHS Approval of North Korean
Cases by Fiscal Year of Case Creation, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year of case creation: 2006; (N = 28);
Average number of days: 65.3;
Median number of days: 65.5.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2007; (N = 54);
Average number of days: 283.7;
Median number of days: 198.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2008; (N = 10);
Average number of days: 191.6;
Median number of days: 154.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2009; (N = 15);
Average number of days: 146.8;
Median number of days: 173.
Source: State Department, Refugee Processing Center, 2010.
Note: N = the number of North Korean refugees in the sample size for
each fiscal year.
[End of figure]
Processing Times for North Korean Refugees in Fiscal Year 2008
Generally Comparable to Those of Some Other Refugee Populations:
According to State data from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, processing
times for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were generally comparable
to those of some other refugee populations that require similar
security checks, as well as to those of some other refugee populations
in the region. (See figs. 6 and 7.) When compared to two other refugee
populations that require similar security checks--Iraqi and Sudanese
refugees--there were greater disparities in average processing times
in fiscal year 2006 compared to fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however
disparities have lessened over time. For example, in fiscal year 2006,
average processing times for North Koreans were 287 days faster than
average processing times for Iraqis, but were 74 days slower than
these times for Iraqis in fiscal year 2008.
Figure 6: Processing Times from Case Creation to Arrival: North Korean
Refugee Applicants Compared to Other Select Refugee Populations That
Require Similar Security Checks:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year of case creation: 2006;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 132.8 days;
Iraqi refugees, N=27,061: 420.2 days;
Sudanese refugees, N=1,188: 373.2 days.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2007;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 399 days;
Iraqi refugees, N=27,061: 287 days;
Sudanese refugees, N=1,188: 343.4 days.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2008;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 314.4 days;
Iraqi refugees, N=27,061: 240.3 days;
Sudanese refugees, N=1,188: 297.1 days.
Source: State Department, Refugee Processing Center, 2010.
Notes:
N=the number of refugees in the sample size for all fiscal years
combined.
The number of refugees represented in the graphic are--North Koreans:
FY 2006=27, FY 2007=48, FY 2008=10; Iraqis: FY 2006=84, FY 2007=7,991,
FY 2008=18,986; Sudanese: FY 2006=562, FY 2007=256, FY 2008=370.
[End of figure]
Processing times for North Koreans in fiscal year 2008 were also
generally comparable to those of three other refugee populations who
are processed in the region, namely Burmese, Chinese, and Vietnamese
refugees. While there were disparities in average processing times for
North Korean refugees compared to these populations in fiscal year
2006, these disparities lessened over time. For example, in fiscal
year 2006, average processing times for North Koreans were 424 days
faster than average processing times for Burmese, but only 23 days
faster in fiscal year 2008. There are substantially fewer North Korean
refugee cases than Iraqi, Sudanese, Burmese, or Vietnamese refugee
cases, as described in the notes to figures 6 and 7.
Figure 7: Processing Times from Case Creation to Arrival: North Korean
Refugee Applicants Compared to Other Select Refugee Populations in the
Region:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year of case creation: 2006;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 132.8 days;
Burmese refugees, N=51,250: 557.3 days;
Chinese refugees, N=130: 300.5 days;
Vietnamese refugees, N=4,531: 484.7 days.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2007;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 399 days;
Burmese refugees, N=51,250: 361.1 days;
Chinese refugees, N=130: 364.4 days;
Vietnamese refugees, N=4,531: 533.2 days.
Fiscal year of case creation: 2008;
North Korean refugees, N=85: 314.4 days;
Burmese refugees, N=51,250: 337.4 days;
Chinese refugees, N=130: 420.1 days;
Vietnamese refugees, N=4,531: 326.9 days.
Source: State Department, Refugee Processing Center, 2010.
Notes:
N=the number of refugees in the sample size for all fiscal years
combined.
The number of refugees represented in the graphic are--North Koreans:
FY 2006=27, FY 2007=48, FY 2008=10; Burmese: FY 2006=5,390, FY
2007=31,069, FY 2008=14,791; Chinese: FY 2006=32, FY 2007=39, FY
2008=59; Vietnamese: FY 2006=2,331, FY 2007=1,350, FY 2008=850.
[End of figure]
A number of factors can affect processing times for all refugee
populations, including North Koreans as described earlier. While we
discussed factors that affect processing times of North Korean cases,
the factors affecting other populations were outside the scope of our
review.
At Least 33 North Koreans Have Applied for Asylum Status in the United
States, but the Number Is Likely Higher:
In the United States, North Koreans have applied for asylum protection
through two processes--the affirmative and the defensive. DHS/USCIS
identified 33 North Koreans who have applied for asylum in the United
States from October 2004 through March 2010, but the actual number is
likely higher.
North Koreans Have Sought Asylum Protection in the United States
through Both the Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes:
North Koreans have sought asylum status in the United States through
either the affirmative or defensive process. The asylum process for
North Koreans is generally similar to that of individuals of other
nationalities, except that DHS/USCIS conducts an additional review of
North Korean cases.
Affirmative Asylum Process:
In the affirmative asylum process, individuals, including North
Koreans, who are physically in the United States--regardless of how
they arrived or their current immigration status--may present an
asylum application to DHS/USCIS. Following the initiation of
background checks, a DHS/USCIS asylum officer conducts a non-
adversarial interview with the applicant to verify the applicant's
identity, determine whether the applicant is eligible for asylum, and
evaluate the credibility of the applicant's asylum claim. If the
asylum officer finds the applicant is eligible for asylum, the officer
issues an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States.
If the asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum but
the applicant is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the asylum
officer denies the claim and the applicant can remain in the United
States under the terms of his or her lawful status.[Footnote 34]
However, if the applicant is determined to be ineligible for asylum
and does not otherwise have a lawful immigration status, then the
applicant is placed in removal proceedings and the case is referred to
an EOIR Immigration Judge for a hearing.
Defensive Asylum Process:
Through the defensive asylum process, applicants, including North
Koreans, request asylum as a defense against removal from the United
States and can be held in detention while their case is processed.
According to DHS/USCIS officials, individuals generally enter the
defensive asylum process in one of three ways: (1) as a referral to an
EOIR Immigration Judge following a finding of ineligibility in an
affirmative asylum application; (2) by asserting a claim of asylum
after they are apprehended in the United States and placed into
removal proceedings because they are in violation of their immigration
status or do not have proper documentation; or (3) after being
detained at a port of entry without proper documentation or
apprehended near a port of entry within 14 days of their illegal
entry, being placed in expedited removal proceedings,[Footnote 35] and
asserting a fear of return or intention to apply for asylum and after
a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they have a credible fear of
persecution[Footnote 36] or torture.[Footnote 37] Adjudication of
asylum claims in immigration court is "adversarial" in that the EOIR
Immigration Judge receives the applicant's claim and then hears
arguments about the applicant's eligibility for asylum from the
applicant and the U.S. government, which is represented by a
DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorney. The EOIR
Immigration Judge then makes an eligibility determination, which can
be appealed by either the applicant or the U.S. government.
Immigration Judges can grant asylum to applicants, allowing them to
stay in the United States, or deny asylum and order them to be removed
from the United States unless they qualify for another form of relief.
DHS/ICE enforces alien detention and removal. Appendix VI provides
more information about the affirmative and defensive asylum processes.
Additional Level of Review for North Korean Asylum Cases:
North Koreans and North Koreans with South Korean citizenship claiming
asylum through the affirmative process or who claim a credible fear of
persecution or torture during expedited removal proceedings receive an
additional level of review at USCIS Asylum Division headquarters.
[Footnote 38] DHS/USCIS officials stated that, because North Korean
asylum seekers may attract national media attention or a high-level
U.S. government interest, USCIS headquarters must review North Korean
asylum cases before rendering a final decision. DHS/USCIS asylum field
offices send the USCIS Asylum Division headquarters a packet
containing the asylum application or credible fear worksheet, a draft
assessment of the case, and other supporting documents. Asylum
officers at USCIS headquarters review the case to ensure that proper
procedures were followed and the decision on the case is legally
sufficient. According to DHS/USCIS officials, North Korean asylum
cases follow the same process as affirmative asylum cases of other
nationalities apart from this case review.
Since some North Koreans seeking asylum have citizenship in both North
Korea and South Korea, according to USCIS and EOIR officials, U.S.
asylum decisions for North Koreans can be affected by the issues of
dual citizenship. Under U.S. law, North Koreans holding South Korean
citizenship must establish a fear of persecution or torture in South
Korea, as well as North Korea, to obtain asylum in the United
States.[Footnote 39] Historically, UNHCR and the international
community, including the United States, viewed South Korea as the
third-country resettlement of choice. The constitution of the Republic
of Korea, known as South Korea, states that the territory of South
Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.
According to South Korean officials, since the South Korean
constitution considers all Koreans on the Korean Peninsula, including
North Koreans, to be citizens of South Korea, North Koreans generally
are entitled to South Korean citizenship, with some exceptions.
However, the 2004 NKHRA sought to clarify that North Koreans are not
barred from eligibility for refugee or asylum consideration in the
United States on account of any legal right to citizenship that they
may enjoy under the South Korean constitution.[Footnote 40]
Accordingly, USCIS and EOIR officials told us that North Korean
citizens applying for asylum who have not availed themselves of South
Korean citizenship only need to establish a fear of persecution or
torture in North Korea, while those North Koreans who have availed
themselves of South Korean citizenship must establish a fear of
persecution or torture in both countries.[Footnote 41] USCIS and EOIR
make a determination regarding the North Korean applicant's
citizenship before determining eligibility for U.S. asylum. DHS/USCIS
officials stated that at least one North Korean with South Korean
citizenship was placed in the defensive asylum process after the
individual was found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture
in both North and South Korea. According to EOIR data, the North
Korean was granted asylum.
The Number of North Koreans Who Have Sought Asylum in the United
States Is Likely Higher than 33:
DHS/USCIS identified 33 North Koreans--including their dependents
(some of whom may not be North Korean)--who have sought asylum in the
United States since fiscal year 2005 through either the affirmative
asylum or credible fear process.[Footnote 42] Of the 33 North Korean
asylum seekers, 9 have been granted asylum, 15 are pending, as of
March 2, 2010, and 9 individual cases were closed or resolved for
other reasons ("other decisions").[Footnote 43] A North Korean
applicant receives a grant of asylum if USCIS or the EOIR Immigration
Judge determines that the applicant is eligible for asylum. The asylee
can remain in the United States indefinitely unless asylum is
terminated. The 33 North Korean asylum seekers comprise a total of 25
asylum cases, of which 7 cases were granted asylum.[Footnote 44]
Furthermore, 24 North Koreans originally sought asylum through the
affirmative asylum process. Nine North Koreans were placed in the
credible fear process, and when found eligible, applied for asylum
with EOIR in the defensive asylum process. Table 2 provides a summary
of the outcomes for North Korean asylum seekers since fiscal year 2005.
Table 2: North Korean Asylum Seekers Identified by USCIS from Fiscal
Year 2005 to Present:
Granted;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 4;
FY 2007: 2;
FY 2008: 2;
FY 2009: 1;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 9.
Pending;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 2;
FY 2007: 2;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 9;
FY 2010[A]: 2;
Total: 15.
Pending: USCIS;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 0;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 4;
FY 2010[A]: 1;
Total: 5.
Pending: EOIR;
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 2;
FY 2007: 2;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 5;
FY 2010[A]: 1;
Total: 10.
Other decisions:
FY 2005: 5;
FY 2006: 2;
FY 2007: 2;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 9.
Other decisions: Credible fear withdrawn/removed[B]:
FY 2005: 1;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 0;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 1.
Other decisions: Negative credible fear/removed[C]:
FY 2005: 3;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 1;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 4.
Other decisions: Asylum denied by USCIS[D]:
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 2;
FY 2007: 0;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 2.
Other decisions: Asylum denied by EOIR:
FY 2005: 1;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 0;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 1.
Other decisions: Asylum dismissed as abandoned by USCIS:
FY 2005: 0;
FY 2006: 0;
FY 2007: 1;
FY 2008: 0;
FY 2009: 0;
FY 2010[A]: 0;
Total: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS, ICE, and EOIR data.
[A] Fiscal year 2010 includes data from October 1, 2009 through March
2, 2010.
[B] According to USCIS, the applicant was placed in expedited removal,
withdrew his credible fear case, and was removed from the United
States.
[C] According to USCIS, of the four individuals found not to have a
credible fear of persecution or torture by an asylum officer, only one
individual requested an Immigration Judge review of the officer's
decision.
[D] If a DHS/USCIS asylum officer denies the claim, the applicant can
remain in the United States under the terms of his or her lawful
status.
Notes:
Data above include all North Korean affirmative asylum and credible
fear cases. North Koreans who first claimed asylum during removal
proceedings as a defense to removal are not included in the above data.
Data above were compiled by DHS/USCIS using asylum applicants' country
of nationality rather than country of birth. Individuals born in North
Korea but holding citizenship in another country may not be included.
Data above do not reflect any changes in the applicants' country of
nationality made by EOIR or ICE during subsequent stages of the asylum
process or during alien deportation or removal.
Fiscal year refers to either the date in which the individual or
principal applicant filed a completed affirmative asylum application
with DHS/USCIS or the date in which an individual was referred to DHS/
USCIS for the credible fear process.
[End of table]
The number of North Korean asylum seekers since October 1, 2004, is
likely higher than 33 because that number includes only individuals
whose asylum claims originated with DHS/USCIS and does not include
defensive asylum claims that originated with EOIR. Compiling complete
data on North Korean asylum cases is difficult for the following
reasons:[Footnote 45]
* A comprehensive database representing all asylum cases from both the
affirmative and defensive processes does not exist. For example, the
North Korean cases identified by DHS/USCIS include only those that
originated with USCIS in the affirmative process or that were
interviewed by a DHS/USCIS asylum officer at the border to determine
whether or not the individual had a credible fear of persecution or
torture, according to USCIS officials. Therefore, the USCIS data do
not include information on North Koreans who first claimed asylum
defensively in front of an EOIR Immigration Judge during removal
proceedings. According to EOIR officials, EOIR would have to manually
review files for cases in the defensive process in each immigration
court district across the United States to determine with certainty
the number of asylum applicants born in North Korea.[Footnote 46]
* Asylum statistics may not reflect changes made in the asylum
applicants' personal information during the asylum process or during
alien detention and removal. For example, DHS/USCIS officials said
that their data would not reflect any changes made by EOIR or DHS/ICE
to an applicant's personal information during the defensive process,
such as a change in an applicant's country of nationality. However,
USCIS makes changes to personal data if it is discovered while the
case is in the affirmative asylum and credible fear processes with
DHS/USCIS, according to USCIS officials. USCIS identified one credible
fear applicant listed as North Korean in the USCIS database who was
later determined to be South Korean by DHS/ICE.
The difficulties that EOIR faces in compiling comprehensive North
Korean asylum statistics are reflected in the reports required under
the 2004 NKHRA.[Footnote 47] EOIR officials stated they provide North
Korean asylum statistics to State for the report on an annual basis
but, because of the many problems associated with compiling
comprehensive statistics on North Korean asylum cases, State has
generally not presented the number of North Korean asylum applications
filed or granted since fiscal year 2005. According to the reports to
Congress, "the issues surrounding claims by individuals of North
Korean origin are complex." The reports further state that, to protect
the identities of individual applicants, DHS and DOJ officials could
provide information on North Korean asylum cases to Members of
Congress in an oral briefing by request, rather than in a written
report. While USCIS Asylum Division headquarters has not provided such
an oral briefing, other USCIS and DHS offices have conducted such
briefings, according to USCIS. DOJ/EOIR officials told us they have
never provided such an oral briefing.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services. State, DHS,
and DOJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated
throughout the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the Secretaries of State, Homeland Security,
Justice, and Health and Human Services. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In this report, we (1) assess the U.S. government's efforts to
facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees overseas for
resettlement in the United States, and (2) determine the number of
North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States
and the process by which they may do so. Because Congress passed the
North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) in 2004, we focused our data
collection efforts on fiscal years 2005 through 2010.
To assess how the U.S. government processes North Korean refugees, we
reviewed documents from the Departments of State (State) and Homeland
Security (DHS) related to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).
We also interviewed officials from State's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM); State's Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs; State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;
State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; State's
Office of the Special Representative for North Korea Policy; DHS
Security Advisory Opinion Review Board; and DHS/U.S. Citizenship and
Immigrations Services (USCIS). Additionally, in Asia we interviewed
representatives from the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and
the regional Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) to understand the
various steps in overseas and domestic refugee processing. We spoke
with both U.S.-and South Korean-based nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), academics, think tanks, and resettled North Koreans living in
the United States to learn about the characteristics of the North
Korean refugee population; the challenges that North Korean refugees
face in their journeys from North Korea to gain access to refugee
admissions processing in Asia; and factors that North Koreans consider
when deciding in which country to resettle. We also analyzed aggregate
and country-specific data from State's Worldwide Refugee Admissions
Processing System (WRAPS) to determine the processing times for North
Korean refugees from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. We asked State to
provide us WRAPS data on an individual level because some cases in
WRAPS include more than one individual. To determine the reliability
of WRAPS data on North Korean refugees, we interviewed State/PRM and
OPE officials who input, monitor, and use these data about procedures
for collecting data and ensuring their accuracy. We also reviewed the
data at various stages of the refugee resettlement process and
analyzed the WRAPS Privacy Impact Assessment.[Footnote 48] We
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to calculate the
processing times for North Korean cases created (1) between fiscal
years 2006 and 2008 for the total number of days between case creation
and arrival in the United States, and (2) between fiscal years 2006
and 2009 for the total number of days between case creation and DHS
approval of the case. We made this determination because decisions on
DHS approval had been made for all pending cases created in fiscal
year 2009 and prior years, but not all of the pending cases that were
created in fiscal year 2009 had arrived in the United States, and
therefore we did not have complete data on arrivals for that year.
However, although we worked to identify delays in U.S. processing
through interviews and an examination of the aggregate data, we did
not have access to individual-level data on the factors that might
influence processing times. Consequently, we were not able to probe
these factors using statistical modeling techniques, and cannot
comment on the extent to which changes in processing times might be
attributable to factors such as State Department or Asian countries'
actions.
To determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to
remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so,
we reviewed relevant statutes as well as documentation and data from
USCIS and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS
and from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the
Department of Justice (DOJ). We also interviewed officials from these
agencies. We analyzed data from USCIS's Refugees, Asylum, and Parole
System (RAPS) to determine the number of North Korean affirmative
asylum applicants processed from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. To
determine the reliability of RAPS data on North Korean asylum
applicants, we interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their procedures
for collecting affirmative asylum application data and ensuring their
accuracy. In addition, we asked about data limitations and analyzed
the RAPS Privacy Impact Assessment[Footnote 49] and System of Records.
[Footnote 50] We also obtained data from USCIS's Asylum Prescreening
System (APSS) to determine the number of North Korean credible fear
applicants processed between fiscal years 2005 and 2010. To determine
the reliability of APSS data on North Korean asylum applicants, we
interviewed DHS/USCIS officials about their procedures for collecting
the credible fear data and ensuring their accuracy. USCIS databases
contain data on all citizens of North Korea in both affirmative and
credible fear cases, according to USCIS. We requested data on North
Korean asylum cases in the defensive process from EOIR. However, EOIR
was not able to provide comprehensive data on its North Korean asylum
cases without a manual review of individual cases. According to EOIR
officials, asylum applicants with North Korea as their country of
birth may have been categorized as South Koreans in EOIR databases
because, in accordance with eligibility requirements in the INA, the
database only tracks country of nationality and not birth, making a
manual review necessary to provide accurate data. EOIR officials also
stated that they did not have resources necessary to perform a manual
review. We determined that the RAPS and APSS data were sufficiently
reliable to report on the North Korean affirmative asylum cases and
credible fear cases from fiscal years 2005 to 2010. However, these
data may not represent all North Korean asylum cases filed during this
time period because EOIR was not able to provide data on North Koreans
who first claimed asylum defensively in front of an EOIR Immigration
Judge.
To describe the resettlement benefits offered to North Korean refugees
both in the United States and in South Korea and to describe the
resettlement experiences of North Koreans, which are discussed in
appendixes II and III of this report, we reviewed relevant laws,
regulations, and policies regarding government-funded refugee
resettlement programs in both countries. We obtained documentation and
spoke with officials at State/PRM and the Department of Health and
Human Service's (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Through
field work in South Korea, we met with South Korean officials from the
Ministry of Unification to discuss the assistance and social services
that the South Korean government provides to North Koreans.
Information on South Korea's resettlement program to North Koreans was
provided by the South Korean Ministry of National Unification and was
not independently verified. We also visited the Hanawon Social
Adaptation Education facility, a South Korean government-run facility,
to observe the social adaptation training provided to North Koreans
and the Hangyeore Middle and High School to see how North Korean
students receive special educational courses to prepare them for
entrance into the South Korean school system. In addition, we spoke
with six resettlement agencies that have resettled North Koreans in
the United States: Episcopal Migration Ministries, International
Rescue Committee, Church World Service, Lutheran Immigration and
Refugee Service, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and World
Relief. We met with NGOs in both the United States and South Korea who
provide services to resettled North Koreans to discuss the challenges
that they have faced in serving this population. We also interviewed
several North Korean refugees who have resettled in the United States
about their experiences. Their views or experiences may not be
representative of all North Korean refugees. German, British,
Japanese, and Canadian foreign officials and embassies provided us
with data on North Koreans who have sought humanitarian protection in
countries other than the United States. We did not conduct a data
reliability assessment on this information because we are providing
these data for background purposes only.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to June 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Resettlement Benefits Available to North Koreans in the
United States and South Korea:
Both the United States and South Korea offer resettlement benefits to
North Koreans that cover immediate needs assistance, cash and medical
assistance, social and employment services, and other needs. By law,
U.S. resettlement assistance and services are provided to refugees
without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political
opinion.[Footnote 51] North Koreans receive the same benefits and
access to federal programs as all other refugee populations.[Footnote
52] The United States, which resettles more refugees than any other
country, resettled refugees from 69 countries in fiscal year 2008,
according to State. The 99 North Koreans who have resettled in the
United States represent a very small portion of the approximately
260,000 refugees resettled in the United States since fiscal year
2006.[Footnote 53]
Almost all of the refugees in South Korea are North Korean, and South
Korea's resettlement program was specifically created to provide
benefits and services for North Koreans.[Footnote 54] Approximately
18,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea since the 1950s,
while only 268 individuals who were not from North Korea have been
granted refugee or humanitarian status in South Korea since 1994,
according to South Korean government officials. The South Korean
Ministry of Unification manages the resettlement program, and almost
50 percent of the Ministry's budget is allocated for the resettlement
of North Koreans, according to Ministry reports. According to South
Korean officials, the government has tailored its resettlement program
to specifically reflect the changing needs of resettled North Koreans
over time.
Both governments' resettlement benefits cover immediate needs (figure
8), cash and medical assistance (figure 9), social and employment
services (figure10), and other benefits (figure 11).[Footnote 55]
Figure 8: Highlights of Immediate Needs Benefits Available to
Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as of
March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Immediate needs - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program:
Program: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration reception and
placement services[A];
Description: Reception at airport. Transportation to resettlement
destination;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Upon
arrival.
Program: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration reception and
placement services[A];
Description: $1,100 to provide for initial food, housing, necessary
clothing; referrals to medical, training, and other social service
programs;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
3 months.
Immediate Needs - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans:
Program: Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility;
Description: 12-week government-run training course that covers topics
such as initial settlement support; mental stability and health
education; career guidance and basic vocational training; and
introduction to South Korean society and overcoming socio-cultural
differences;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Upon
arrival.
Program: Hana Centers;
Description: 3-week course focusing on local services and assistance
and adapting to society;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 3
weeks.
Program: Resident Registration;
Description: Issuance of permanent residence and resident registration
card;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Immediate.
Program: Apartment and Leasing Support;
Description: Leased apartment and $11,456 for security deposit;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
50 years.
Program: Resettlement Assistants;
Description: Two assistants offer intensive resettlement support after
family moves into community;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 6
months.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by PRM, HHS, and the
South Korean Ministry of Unification.
[A] PRM's reception and placement benefits are not subject to
financial eligibility criteria.
[End of figure]
Immediate Needs Assistance:
Both the United States and South Korea provide benefits to address the
immediate needs of resettled North Koreans (see figure 8). Refugees
are eligible for State/PRM-funded basic needs support and services
when they arrive in the United States. As of January 1, 2010,
State/PRM provided the resettlement agencies with $1,800 per refugee
to cover the direct and administrative costs of these services, of
which at least $1,100 must be designated for the direct support of the
refugee's short-term living expenses.[Footnote 56] To facilitate North
Koreans' resettlement, the South Korean government established the
Hanawon Social Adaptation Education facility in 1999 to provide North
Koreans with a 12-week training course before they resettle in local
communities. The Hanawon curriculum is divided into four categories:
mental stability and health education, career guidance and basic
vocational training, introduction to South Korean society and
overcoming socio-cultural differences, and initial settlement support.
Following graduation from Hanawon and resettlement in a South Korean
community, North Koreans may continue their education through local
Hana Centers that provide an additional 3 weeks of job and employment
training.[Footnote 57] South Korea helps North Koreans find rental
units and provides the security deposit as well as the resettlement
assistants who offer additional support after a family moves into a
South Korean community.
Figure 9: Highlights of Cash and Medical Assistance Benefits Available
to Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as
of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Cash and Medical Assistance - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program:
Program: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF);
Description: Time-limited cash assistance and other support services
for qualifying low-income individuals with dependent children. 2008
TANF levels by state ranged from $170 to $923 per month for a single-
parent family of three[A];
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
5 years.
Program: Supplemental Security Income (SSI);
Description: Cash assistance to low-income individuals who are aged,
blind, or disabled;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
7 years[B].
Program: If ineligible for TANF or SSI, then...Refugee Cash Assistance
(RCA);
Description: Program similar to TANF for refugees who do not qualify
for TANF;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
8 months.
Program: Medicaid/Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)[C];
Description: Health care coverage for qualifying low-income
individuals;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
7 years.
Program: If ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP, then...Refugee Medical
Assistance (RMA);
Description: Program similar to Medicaid for refugees who do not
qualify for Medicaid;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
8 months.
Cash and Medical Assistance - South Korean Resettlement Program for
North Koreans:
Program: Financial Assistance;
Description: One-time payment of $2,644 at graduation from Hanawon,
with an additional $2,644 in quarterly installments;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 1 year.
Program: Additional Benefits for the Disabled;
Description: Payment of $13,571 over a 5-year period for eligible
North Koreans with disabilities;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 5
years.
Program: Additional Benefits for the Elderly;
Description: Payment of $6,345 over a 5-year period for individuals
over 60 years of age at graduation from Hanawon;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 5
years.
Program: Minimum Living Support;
Description: Cash assistance of $353 a month for qualifying low-income
families;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely.
Program: Medical Care;
Description: Free medical services at South Korean hospitals for
qualifying low-income families;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by HHS and the South
Korean Ministry of Unification.
[A] TANF levels by state were compiled by the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. These figures represent the TANF payments provided
by states in July 2008 for a single-parent family of three by month.
[B] The SSI Extension for Elderly and Disabled Refugees Act (Pub. Law
No. 110-328) provides additional benefits for up to 2 years, and in
certain cases 3 years, for qualifying immigrant SSI recipients who
meet certain requirements. This extension is effective from October 1,
2008, until September 30, 2011, after which time noncitizens'
eligibility reverts to 7 years.
[C] Refugees are eligible for emergency Medicaid from the date of
their arrival in the United States, if they otherwise meet the
eligibility requirements for their state's Medicaid program.
Notes:
This figure does not include all exceptions to the general eligibility
time frames for refugees to receive federal programs in the United
States. Rather, we included those exceptions most relevant to refugees
who entered the United States since 2005.
In general, to receive benefits in the United States, refugees must
meet all financial and nonfinancial eligibility criteria of each
program. In addition, once refugees obtain citizenship, their
eligibility for SSI, TANF, Medicaid, CHIP, or Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) is the same as the eligibility for any U.S.
citizen.
[End of figure]
Cash and Medical Assistance:
Both the United States and South Korea provide resettled North Koreans
with cash and medical assistance (see figure 9). North Korean refugees
may be eligible for a number of longer-term U.S. federal public
benefit programs--including TANF, Medicaid and CHIP, and SSI for up to
7 years generally, depending on the program and the state.[Footnote
58] Refugees who are not eligible for TANF, SSI, Medicaid, or CHIP may
be eligible for ORR funded Refugee Cash Assistance[Footnote 59] and
Refugee Medical Assistance for up to 8 months, according to HHS. In
South Korea, resettled North Koreans receive a one-time financial
benefit, or endowment, valued at approximately $5,000 upon their entry
into South Korean society. Qualified low-income families also receive
free medical care indefinitely at South Korean hospitals as well as
minimum living support of $353 per month indefinitely.
Figure 10: Highlights of Social and Employment Service Benefits
Available to Resettled North Koreans in the United States and in South
Korea, as of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Social and Employment Services - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program:
Program: Office of Refugee Resettlement social services[A];
Description: Emphasis on securing early employment for refugees,
including employment preparation and job placement and retention
services;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
5 years [B,C];
Social and Employment Services - South Korean Resettlement Program for
North Koreans:
Program: Employment Incentive[D];
Description: Financial incentive for maintaining stable employment for
at least 6 months; maximum of $19,740 in combination with job training
incentive;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
3 years.
Program: Job Training Incentive[D];
Description: Financial incentive for undergoing at least 500 hours of
job training, including acquiring technical licenses; up to $19,740 in
combination with employment incentive;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
5 years.
Program: Hana Centers;
Description: Services including psychological counseling, job
training, and employment assistance;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
1 year.
Program: Half Wage Subsidy;
Description: Companies hiring a North Korean employee receive a
subsidy equivalent to half of the employee's wages;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
3 years.
Program: Residence Counselor;
Description: Provides assistance with securing government-issued
documents and accessing financial and medical assistance;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely.
Program: Employment Counselor;
Description: Provides assistance on accessing vocational training and
finding jobs;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by HHS and the South
Korean Ministry of Unification.
[A] ORR social service benefits are not subject to financial
eligibility criteria.
[B] Refugee eligibility for ORR social services ends when they obtain
U.S. citizenship.
[C] ORR social services include citizenship and naturalization
preparation services as well as referral and interpretation services,
which may be offered beyond 5 years.
[D] The employment and job training incentives are provided per
individual.
[End of figure]
Social and Employment Services:
Both the United States and South Korea provide social and employment
services for resettled North Koreans (see figure 10). In the United
States, ORR social services emphasize the preparation of refugees for
job placement and retention. In addition, ORR's program offers a wide
range of services that include employability services, such as English
language instruction, vocational training, and on-the-job
training.[Footnote 60] North Koreans in South Korea may also access
social and employment services. For example, North Koreans may receive
financial payments as incentives for maintaining stable employment or
undergoing job training, including acquiring technical licenses. The
combined maximum value of these incentives is about $20,000. The Hana
Centers also provide psychological counseling to North Koreans for up
to 1 year following their resettlement. The South Korean government
also pays companies half of the wages of their North Korean employees
for up to 3 years.
Figure 11: Highlights of Other Benefits Available to Resettled North
Koreans in the United States and in South Korea, as of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Other Benefits - U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program:
Program: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP);
Description: Food assistance for qualifying low-income individuals;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely.
Other Benefits - South Korean Resettlement Program for North Koreans:
Program: Provincial Residence Subsidy;
Description: Subsidy of up to $2,291 for resettling outside of the
capital city, Seoul;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): 2
years following resettlement.
Program: Personal Safety Counselor;
Description: Local police officer provides protection;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely;
Program: Tuition Assistance;
Description: Full tuition at public middle school, high school, and
university; half tuition at private university;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years):
Eligible indefinitely, age limits may apply.
Program: Hangyeore Middle and High School;
Description: Boarding school for North Korean students to prepare them
for the transition to the South Korean school system;
Benefits eligibility timeline (from date of arrival, in years): Up to
2 years, age limits may apply.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by HHS and the South
Korean Ministry of Unification.
Notes:
This figure does not include all exceptions to the general eligibility
time frames for refugees to receive federal programs in the United
States. Rather, we included those exceptions most relevant to refugees
who entered the United States since 2005.
In general, to receive benefits in the United States, refugees must
meet all financial and nonfinancial eligibility criteria of each
program. In addition, once refugees obtain citizenship, their
eligibility for SSI, TANF, Medicaid, CHIP, or SNAP is the same as the
eligibility for any U.S. citizen.
[End of figure]
Other Benefits:
North Korean refugees in the United States and South Korea may receive
additional benefits (see figure 11). For example, eligible refugees in
the United States can qualify for food assistance under SNAP. Aside
from the major federal benefit programs available to eligible
refugees, there are additional programs such as school lunch programs
for children of eligible refugees. The South Korean government
provides North Koreans with a personal safety counselor for protection
indefinitely as well as a subsidy to resettle outside of the capital
city, Seoul. In addition, the South Korean government may provide long-
term tuition assistance for those North Koreans attending higher
education institutions. Notably, the South Korean government has
established a system to support the education and integration of North
Korean children. For example, the government-funded Hangyeore Middle
and High School, established in 2006, was specifically designed to
address the needs of North Korean students and serve as a transition
school until the students are ready to enter regular South Korean
schools. Children at Hangyeore stay at the boarding school for 6
months to 2 years depending on their individual performance. According
to the school's principal, the school's mission is to (1) match the
age group of the students with their abilities in school, (2) enhance
students' learning capabilities, (3) help students to overcome
cultural differences, and (4) help students to heal psychologically.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Challenges Some Resettled North Koreans Face in
Assimilating in the United States and in South Korea:
North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and in South
Korea come from an isolated society with limited or no exposure to
capitalism and can therefore face economic difficulties. According to
some of the North Korean refugees we spoke with in the United States,
they have encountered difficulties finding jobs and affording basic
living expenses. South Korean and U.S. officials also noted that North
Koreans in South Korea have high rates of unemployment. In addition,
North Koreans also have difficulties learning basic day-to-day skills,
such as using supermarkets, credit cards, and public transportation.
According to NGOs and government officials, North Koreans face
linguistic, cultural, and social challenges in both the United States
and South Korea. For example, North Koreans who are now resettled in
the United States told us about their struggles adjusting to a new
language and culture. Even in South Korea, North Koreans face
difficulties with the Korean language due to the differences in
dialects. In addition, North Koreans in South Korea face social
problems and have higher school drop-out, crime, and alcoholism rates,
according to South Korean and U.S. government officials.
Obtaining medical care has also been a challenge for some North
Koreans. Since some North Koreans arrive in the United States in poor
health and have suffered traumatic and stressful experiences,
obtaining and affording medical care has been important, according to
resettled North Korean refugees and NGOs. State/PRM, OPE, and IOM
officials have told us that some North Koreans face mental health
issues and psycho-social problems, in addition to physical problems.
Some North Koreans who have resettled in the United States and South
Korea have overcome some of the challenges of assimilating into a new
culture and society and have achieved accomplishments such as
obtaining higher educational degrees. According to an NGO, some North
Koreans who have resettled in the United States have passed their
General Educational Development Test or are attending community
college. Moreover, during our fieldwork in South Korea we heard of 10
North Korean students who attended medical school in South Korea after
finishing high school. In addition, some resettled North Koreans have
become business owners, according to NGO and South Korean government
sources. Finally, some resettled North Koreans have established or
work for NGOs in South Korea that assist other resettled North
Koreans. For example, Dr. Lee Ae-Ran, the first female North Korean
defector to receive a doctoral degree in South Korea, has established
a number of organizations to assist other North Koreans in South
Korea. She was awarded the 2010 U.S. State Department International
Women of Courage award for her accomplishments.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Data on North Koreans Who Have Resettled in South Korea
from the End of the Korean War through 2009:
As illustrated in figure 12, approximately 18,000 North Koreans have
resettled in South Korea since the end of the Korean War, according to
South Korean government data.[Footnote 61] The number of North Koreans
resettling in South Korea has increased since 2000 with some years,
namely calendar years 2004 and 2006, seeing an annual increase of 46
percent or more. The number of North Korean refugees arriving in South
Korea increased 5 percent from calendar years 2008 to 2009. [Footnote
62]
Figure 12: Number of Resettled North Koreans in South Korea, Calendar
Years prior to 2000 through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Calendar year: Before 2000: 1,407;
Calendar year: 2001: 583;
Calendar year: 2002: 1,138;
Calendar year: 2003: 1,281;
Calendar year: 2004: 1,894;
Calendar year: 2005: 1,383;
Calendar year: 2006: 2,018;
Calendar year: 2007: 2,544;
Calendar year: 2008: 2,809;
Calendar year: 2009: 2,952.
Source: South Korean Ministry of Unification.
[End of figure]
According to data from the South Korean government, 81 percent of the
resettled North Koreans in South Korea are from the Hamgyeong Province
in the northeast area of North Korea. In recent years, the percentage
of North Korean refugees who are women has increased from about 50
percent in 2001 to about 77 percent in 2009, according to South Korean
data.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Humanitarian Protection Status for North Koreans in the
United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan:
This appendix provides data on North Korean applicants for
humanitarian protection status in the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada,
and Japan. Humanitarian protection status includes refugee status,
asylum status, and other immigration statuses governments extend on
humanitarian grounds. Each country has different definitions of
refugee or asylum seeker; thus, countries' data are not directly
comparable.[Footnote 63]
The United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Japan have provided North
Koreans with a humanitarian protection status to allow them to remain
in their countries. As shown in table 3, from calendar year 2006 to
September 30, 2009, the United Kingdom received a total of 665
applications filed by North Koreans for a humanitarian protection
status. According to the British Embassy, the United Kingdom granted
350 North Korean cases humanitarian protection status during this time
period.[Footnote 64]
Table 3: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in the United Kingdom for Calendar Years 2006 to September 30, 2009:
Cases filed;
2006: 45;
2007: 410;
2008: 185;
2009: 25;
Total: 665.
Cases granted;
2006: 20;
2007: 155;
2008: 175;
2009: 0;
Total: 350.
Source: British Embassy in Washington, D.C.
Notes:
Data reflect North Korean cases and not individuals. Data on cases
granted reflects initial decisions, excluding the outcome of appeals
or other subsequent decisions. All cases were filed within the United
Kingdom.
Calendar year 2009 data show case information up to September 30,
2009. The British Embassy provided data for calendar years 2006
through September 30, 2009.
[End of table]
From calendar years 2000 through 2009, 329 North Korean individuals
applied for a humanitarian protection status in Germany, as shown in
table 4. German Embassy officials informed us that Germany granted a
humanitarian protection status to 189 North Korean individuals from
calendar years 2000 through 2003. Since calendar year 2003, two North
Koreans have been granted a humanitarian protection status in
Germany.[Footnote 65]
Table 4: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in Germany for Calendar Years 2000 to 2009:
Individuals filed;
2000: 92;
2001: 84;
2002: 82;
2003: 24;
2004: 25;
2005: 8;
2006: 3;
2007: 3;
2008: 3;
2009: 5;
Total: 329.
Individuals granted;
2000: 56;
2001: 53;
2002: 51;
2003: 29;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 0;
2007: 0;
2008: 0;
2009: 0;
Total: 191.
Source: German Embassy in Washington, D.C.
Note: Data reflect North Korean individuals and not cases. All
individuals filed within Germany. Asylum cases that are still pending
in one year carry over to the next year.
[End of table]
As shown in table 5, from calendar years 2000 through 2009, 217 North
Korean individuals applied for humanitarian protection status in
Canada. According to a Canadian official, the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board had granted 76 of these North Koreans humanitarian
protection status, with 66 granted in calendar year 2009.
Table 5: North Koreans Applying for a Humanitarian Protection Status
in Canada for Calendar Years 2000 to 2009:
Individuals filed;
2000: n/a;
2001: n/a;
2002: n/a;
2003: 3;
2004: 0;
2005: 1;
2006: 26;
2007: 113;
2008: 31;
2009: 43;
Total: 217.
Individuals granted;
2000: n/a;
2001: n/a;
2002: n/a;
2003: 1;
2004: 0;
2005: 1;
2006: 0;
2007: 1;
2008: 7;
2009: 66;
Total: 76.
Source: Office of the Director General, Refugees Branch, Citizenship
and Immigration Canada.
Note: Data reflect North Korean individuals and not cases. All
individuals filed claims within Canada. Asylum cases that are still
pending in one year carry over to the next year.
[End of table]
Japanese officials informed us that over 100 North Koreans have
entered Japan on humanitarian grounds.[Footnote 66] They did not
provide us with additional information.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: The Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes in the
United States:
Individuals can acquire asylum status in the United States through
either the affirmative process or the defensive process. Figure 13
outlines the steps involved in both the affirmative and defensive
asylum processes.
Affirmative Asylum Process:
In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically in
the United States, regardless of how they arrived or their current
immigration status, may present an asylum application to DHS/USCIS.
Following the initiation of background checks, a DHS/USCIS asylum
officer conducts a non-adversarial interview with the applicant to
verify the applicant's identity, determine whether the applicant is
eligible for asylum, and evaluate the credibility of the applicant's
asylum claim. DHS/USCIS asylum officers can also request a comment
letter from State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)
on a particular case.[Footnote 67] These comment letters help inform
the asylum officers' decisions on cases by providing information on
general country conditions and information specific to an individual
applicant's situation that may not be accessible from other sources.
In the case of dual citizenship, the DRL comment letter could include
information on both countries. If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds
the applicant is eligible for asylum,[Footnote 68] the officer issues
an approval and the applicant can remain in the United States. If the
DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds the applicant is ineligible for asylum
but the applicant is otherwise in lawful immigration status, the
asylum officer issues a Notice of Intent to Deny to the applicant, who
then has 16 days to provide a rebuttal. The DHS/USCIS asylum officer
considers the rebuttal, if any, prior to issuing a final denial or
grant of asylum. If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer issues a final denial
of asylum status, the applicant can remain in the United States under
the terms of his or her lawful status. However, if the applicant is
determined to be ineligible for asylum and does not otherwise have a
lawful immigration status, then the applicant is placed in removal
proceedings and the case is referred to an Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) Immigration Judge for a hearing.
Defensive Asylum Process:
Through the defensive asylum process, applicants request asylum as a
defense against removal from the United States and can be held in
detention while their case is processed. According to DHS/USCIS
officials, individuals are generally placed in the defensive asylum
process in one of three ways.
* DHS/USCIS can refer them to an EOIR Immigration Judge after a
finding of ineligibility in an affirmative asylum application.
* They can assert a claim of asylum after they are apprehended in the
United States and placed into removal proceedings because they are in
violation of their immigration status or do not have proper
documentation.
* DHS can place them in the defensive asylum process if they are
detained at a port of entry without proper documentation or are
apprehended near a port of entry within 14 days of their illegal
entry,[Footnote 69] they are being placed in expedited removal
proceedings they assert a fear of return or intention to apply for
asylum, and after a DHS/USCIS asylum officer finds that they have a
credible fear of persecution[Footnote 70] or torture ("the credible
fear process").[Footnote 71]
Adjudication of asylum claims in immigration court is "adversarial" in
that the EOIR Immigration Judge receives the applicant's claim and
then hears arguments about the applicant's eligibility for asylum from
the applicant and the U.S. government, which is represented by a
DHS/ICE attorney. The Immigration Judge then makes an eligibility
determination, which can be appealed by either the applicant or the
U.S. government.[Footnote 72] Immigration Judges can grant asylum to
applicants, allowing them to stay in the United States, or deny asylum
and order them to be removed from the United States unless they
qualify for another form of relief.[Footnote 73] DHS/ICE enforces
removal orders by coordinating alien deportation and repatriation.
Figure 13: Steps in the Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Processes:
[Refer to PDF for image: process map]
USCIS - Affirmative Asylum Process:
1. Individual files asylum application at USCIS Service Center.
2. USCIS conducts removal proceedings background checks and schedules
interview with applicant.
3. USCIS can request comment letter from State DRL.
4. USCIS asylum officer conducts a non-adversarial interview with the
applicant.
5. USCIS asylum officer determines whether or not the applicant is
eligible for asylum, and USCIS headquarters reviews this decision
prior to its issuance[A]. Granted: go to #6. Denied: go to #7.
6. If decision is to grant asylum: Asylum granted.
7. If decision is to not grant asylum: Is the applicant in the U.S.
legally? If yes, go to #8. If no: go to #9.
8. USCIS sends a Notice of Intent to Deny to the applicant, who has 16
days to respond. USCIS considers any response received before making
the final decision to grant or deny asylum status. If denied, the
applicant may stay in the United States as long as he or she remains
in legal status.
9. USCIS places applicant in removal proceedings and refers the
application to an immigration judge for a hearing.
EOIR-Defensive Asylum Process:
10. Individual submits an asylum claim before an Immigration Judge
after being placed in removal proceedings.
11. At or near a U.S. border, individual claims a credible fear of
persecution or torture if returned to home country after being placed
in expedited removal proceedings.
12. USCIS asylum officer interviews applicant and determines whether
or not he or she has a credible fear of persecution or torture, and
USCIS headquarters reviews this decision prior to its issuance[B].
If no: go to #13. If yes: go to #14.
13. USCIS asylum officer determines that the applicant does not have
a credible fear of persecution or torture and the alien is ordered
to be removed from the United States[C].
14. An Immigration Judge holds a hearing, hears asylum applicant's
claim and any concerns about the validity of the applicant's claim
raised by the U.S. government, and makes a decision. If granted, go to
#15. If denied, go to #16.
15. Asylum or other relief granted. DHS can appeal decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 days.
16. Asylum or other relief denied. Applicant can appeal decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 days.
17. Is the Board of Immigration Appeals decision favorable to the
applicant?
If yes: go to #18. If no: go to #19.
18. Applicant is eligible for asylum or other relief; case is remanded
to the immigration court for rehearing.
19. Applicant can file a petition within 30 days for review of
decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS and EOIR data.
[A] USCIS Asylum Division headquarters reviews affirmative asylum
decisions for North Koreans and North Koreans with South Korean
citizenship before issuing the decision.
[B] USCIS Asylum Division headquarters reviews all credible fear
decisions for North Koreans and North Koreans with South Korean
citizenship before issuing the decision.
[C] The applicant may request that an EOIR Immigration Judge review
the DHS/USCIS asylum officer's determination that the alien does not
have a credible fear of persecution or torture. The Judge may sustain
the officer's decision or vacate the decision, allowing the applicant
to apply for asylum in court, according to USCIS.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the persons named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant
Director; Andrea Miller; Teresa Abruzzo; Georgina Scarlata; Debbie
Chung; Martin de Alteriis; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions to
this report. Technical assistance was provided by Muriel Brown, Etana
Finkler, Mike Maslowski, Chhandasi Pandya, and Jena Sinkfield.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] An estimated 600,000 to over 2 million North Koreans were killed
by the famine. Department of State and nongovernmental organization
reports have described these conditions. For example, see Final Report
of Jay Lefkowitz, U.S. Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea,
January 17, 2009.
[2] The constitution of the Republic of Korea, known as South Korea,
states that the territory of South Korea shall consist of the Korean
Peninsula and its adjacent islands. According to South Korean
officials, since the South Korean constitution considers all Koreans
on the Korean Peninsula, including North Koreans, to be citizens of
South Korea, North Koreans generally are entitled to South Korean
citizenship, with some exceptions.
[3] North Koreans may seek resettlement in the United States as
refugees. The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended,
defines a refugee as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42).
[4] See appendix II for a description of these benefits.
[5] Report to the U.N. General Assembly on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, August 22, 2008,
A/63/322 and Report to the Human Rights Council on the Human Rights
Situation that Require the Council's Attention, February 24, 2009,
A/HRC/10/18.
[6] See appendix III for a more detailed discussion of some of the
challenges that resettled North Koreans have faced assimilating in
South Korea and the United States, as well as successes some resettled
North Koreans have achieved.
[7] Pub. Law No. 108-333, October 18, 2004.
[8] The act originally authorized funding through 2008 but the North
Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 extended the
authorization through 2012. See Pub. Law No. 110-346, Sec. 10, October
7, 2008.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-690C].
[10] Under U.S. law, the legal standard for a refugee and asylee are
the same, but noncitizens must apply for refugee status from outside
the United States, and for asylum status from within the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).
[11] North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. Law
No. 110-346, October 7, 2008.
[12] App. IV provides data on North Koreans who have resettled in
South Korea.
[13] North Koreans have sought humanitarian protection, which includes
refugee status, asylum status, and other immigration statuses extended
on humanitarian grounds, in other countries besides the United States
and South Korea. See appendix V.
[14] For the purposes of this report, the term "processing time"
refers to the time that elapses between the creation of a case for a
refugee to be considered for resettlement in the United States and the
arrival of the refugee in the United States.
[15] Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article II of the
1967 Refugee Protocol provide UNHCR with a role in supervising the
application of those treaties. UNHCR's Statute (as adopted in UN
General Assembly resolution 428(V) of Dec. 14, 1950) sets forth its
mandate and provides the "foundation" for international refugee
protection by UNHCR. According to the Convention, a refugee is a
person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country."
[16] We provide additional details on USRAP's steps for processing
North Korean refugee cases for U.S. resettlement in a classified annex
to this report.
[17] Priority 1 (P-1) includes all cases individually identified and
referred to the USRAP by UNHCR, a U.S. embassy, or an NGO, according
to State.
[18] Once the USCIS District Director or Deputy District Director
approves or denies the decision for a North Korean, USCIS requires the
USCIS field office to inform USCIS in Washington, D.C., of its
decision.
[19] We provide additional details pertaining to North Korean refugee
processing in the classified annex to this report.
[20] For the purposes of this report, the term "refugee case" refers
to an individual, although State uses it to refer to a processing
unit, which includes family members of principal applicants.
[21] Of these 94 individual refugee cases, 9 arrived in fiscal year
2006, 22 arrived in fiscal year 2007, 37 arrived in fiscal year 2008,
25 arrived in fiscal year 2009, and 1 arrived in fiscal year 2010.
Five additional North Koreans arrived in the United States in April
2010, which is not reflected in the 94 arrivals because these
individuals arrived after State provided us with case status data.
[22] These five closed cases include deactivated and inactive cases
and do not include cases that were closed because they were denied.
[23] Generally an alien is considered to be "firmly resettled" if,
prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into another
country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent
resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent
resettlement. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15. For example, North Korean refugees
who have availed themselves of their South Korean citizenship are
considered firmly resettled in South Korea.
[24] Eighty-one of these cases withdrew in fiscal year 2007. According
to State, these cases were likely withdrawn due to the reasons cited.
[25] Officials from State and international organizations have told us
that this required medical treatment can lengthen processing times.
[26] According to State/PRM and DHS/USCIS officials, conducting and
clearing security checks can lengthen processing times for all
populations that require these checks, and backlogs of security checks
that were pending clearance have created delays for a number of
refugee populations in the past, including North Koreans. Delays in
clearing a security check can be caused by name duplication, multiple
aliases, incomplete birth date or birthplace, and the addition of new
and contradictory information provided by the refugee throughout the
security check process. According to U.S. officials, a new security
check must be conducted whenever a refugee introduces new or
contradictory information in the fields identified above.
[27] Resettlement agency support includes assistance provided to
refugees to cover necessary expenses and living costs for the first 30
days in the United States. This assistance can last up to 3 months.
[28] For example, U.S. processing of Burmese refugees is concentrated
among refugee camps along the Thai-Burmese border.
[29] While a total of 238 North Korean refugee cases were created and
processed under the USRAP, data on processing times are based on the
85 cases created in fiscal years 2006 to 2008 that arrived in the
United States. We do not include cases created in fiscal year 2009
because the case data are not complete.
[30] Variances in the policies of countries where North Koreans are
processed can affect year-to-year comparisons of processing times.
[31] These stages exclude the amount of time it takes for a foreign
government to grant exit permission to North Korean refugees.
[32] Although average processing times fell between fiscal year 2008
and fiscal year 2009, the median processing time rose, which means
there was no definitive improvement in 2009.
[33] We have complete data through fiscal year 2009 for the processing
times of North Korean cases that pertain to the stages between case
creation and DHS approval.
[34] According to USCIS, the asylum officer first issues a Notice of
Intent to Deny to the applicant, who then has 16 days to provide a
rebuttal. The asylum officer considers the rebuttal, if any, prior to
issuing a final denial or grant of asylum.
[35] Expedited removal is a provision in the INA. See INA Section
235(b)(1)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). With certain
exceptions, this provision allows an immigration officer to remove an
arriving alien from the United States without further hearing or
review if the officer determines that the alien is inadmissible
because the alien lacks proper documentation or committed fraud or
willful misrepresentation of the facts to gain admission into the
United States, unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply
for asylum or a fear of persecution or torture.
[36] Under the INA, the "credible fear of persecution" means "there is
a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the
statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such
other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum" under the INA. See Section
235(b)(1)(B)(v), and 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(B)(v).
[37] If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer determines that the alien does
not have a credible fear of persecution or torture, the alien may
request that an Immigration Judge review the asylum officer's
decision. The Judge may sustain the officer's decision or vacate the
decision, allowing the applicant to apply for asylum as a defense to
removal, according to USCIS.
[38] The USCIS Asylum Division also requires headquarters quality
assurance review for 10 categories of affirmative cases and certain
subcategories of credible fear cases, in addition to these North
Korean cases.
[39] Under the INA, asylum relief may be granted to qualified
applicants who can establish they are unable or unwilling to return to
their country of nationality because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See §
208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b) and §101(a)(42)(A), and 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A).
[40] See Section 302 of the 2004 NKHRA. The House report accompanying
the 2004 NKHRA also noted that the legislation did not change U.S.
law, "but makes it clearer, explicitly endorsing the approach of U.S.
Immigration Courts in proceedings involving North Koreans, in which
their asylum claims were adjudicated with reference to the actual
circumstances they face inside North Korea. It is meant to put to rest
the erroneous opinion (proposed by some State Department personnel)
that, because North Koreans may be able to claim citizenship if and
when they relocate to South Korea, they must be regarded as South
Koreans for U.S. refugee and asylum purposes, irrespective of whether
they are able or willing to relocate to South Korea."
[41] Case law before the Board of Immigration Appeals in 2007 also
spoke to this issue. In Matter of K-R-Y-and K-C-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 133
(BIA 2007) the Board looked, in part, at whether the respondents were
precluded from establishing asylum as to North Korea because they had
acquired South Korean citizenship. The Board looked to section 302(b)
of the 2004 NKHRA which states, in part, "...a national of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall not be considered a
national of the Republic of Korea." The Board found that section 302
of the 2004 NKHRA does not apply to North Korean asylum applicants who
have availed themselves of citizenship in South Korea. In support of
its position, the Board cited section 302(a) of the NKHRA stating,
"The NKHRA states that it is 'not intended...to apply to former North
Korean nationals [such as the respondents] who have availed themselves
of those rights' i.e. taken advantage of the opportunity to seek and
accepts South Korean citizenship." As such, the Board found that the
respondents were precluded from establishing eligibility for asylum as
to North Korea because they were firmly resettled in South Korea. See
24 I&N Dec. 133, 136 (BIA 2007). Generally an alien is considered to
be "firmly resettled" if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or
she entered into another country with, or while in that country
received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some
other type of permanent resettlement. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15.
[42] The 33 North Korean asylum seekers identified by USCIS include
only North Koreans whose claims originated with USCIS in the
affirmative process or the credible fear process. The North Korean
affirmative asylum seekers in USCIS's database system have North Korea
listed as their country of nationality. In addition, the North Korean
asylum seekers in the credible fear process have North Korea listed as
one of their countries of nationality. The affirmative asylum seekers
include two dependent spouses and two dependent children who are
listed as citizens of South Korea. Dependents are not required to
establish eligibility for asylum independently from the principal
applicant and can be citizens of any country. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.21.
[43] Pending applications include those on which a decision has not
yet been rendered by either USCIS or EOIR. Applications in the "other
decisions" category include those that have been denied asylum,
dismissed, found to have a negative credible fear, or withdrawn.
[44] According to USCIS officials, a USCIS asylum case generally
consists of the principal applicant, and may include his or her
spouse, and/or unmarried children under the age of 21 ("dependents")
located in the United States.
[45] Prior to October 22, 2004, USCIS databases did not distinguish
between North Korea and South Korea, but rather identified "Korea" as
the country of nationality and the country of birth. North Korean
asylum applications filed prior to this date may not be clearly
identified in USCIS databases, according to DHS/USCIS officials.
[46] USCIS maintains two databases, one that contains information on
all affirmative asylum cases and another that contains information on
credible fear cases. EOIR maintains a separate database that contains
information on all defensive asylum cases. USCIS and EOIR databases do
not share complete information on asylum cases and, as a result, the
information gathered from either database is not representative of the
entire universe of North Korean asylum cases. See appendix I for
further details on USCIS's and EOIR's databases.
[47] Section 305 of the 2004 NKHRA requires that the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Homeland Security submit a joint report to
appropriate congressional committees and the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees each year that includes the number of aliens who
are nationals or citizens of North Korea who have applied for
political asylum and the number who were granted political asylum.
State takes the lead in compiling and transmitting these reports to
Congress.
[48] The E-Government Act of 2002 requires federal agencies to conduct
privacy impact assessments for systems or collections containing
personal information.
[49] The E-Government Act of 2002 requires federal agencies to conduct
privacy impact assessments for systems or collections containing
personal information. A privacy impact assessment includes information
such as the characterization of the information in the system,
including how data are collected and maintained; the use of the
information and the accuracy of the data being used; how long the
system retains data after collection; the scope of internal DHS data
sharing; the content, scope, and authority for information sharing
external to DHS; and technical safeguards and measures.
[50] A system of records includes information such as system location,
categories of individuals in the system, categories of records in the
system, authority for maintenance of the system, purposes,
retrievability, safeguards, and retention and disposal of information.
[51] See 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(5).
[52] In addition to such assistance, North Koreans and other refugee
groups may be eligible for federal public benefit programs, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Medicaid and Children's
Health Insurance Program, depending on the program and the state in
which they reside.
[53] The number of North Koreans who have resettled in the United
States is as of April 2010.
[54] South Korea's resettlement support is based on the 1997 Act on
the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North
Korea, according to South Korean officials.
[55] For the U.S. resettlement assistance we looked at State/PRM-
funded benefits as well as the major federal benefits available to
eligible refugees, according to HHS. We do not provide an all-
inclusive listing of benefits, since this was outside of the scope of
our review. For some of the benefits in the United States, we have
incomplete information, including funding levels, since some of the
benefits offered are contingent upon the state that the refugee
resides in. In addition to the resettlement benefits that the United
States and South Korea offer, NGOs in both countries also provide
assistance to North Koreans. According to North Koreans in the United
States as well as U.S. resettlement agencies, the Korean-American
community has provided additional support to resettled North Koreans.
This support has included employment assistance, English language
training, transportation, interpretation, cultural orientation, and
financial support to attend classes. In South Korea, 67 NGOs have
formed the "NGO Network for Supporting North Korean Defectors" to
coordinate programs and establish an effective support system for
North Koreans.
[56] According to State/PRM, its assistance typically lasts for 30
days, but support may continue for up to 90 days. Prior to January 1,
2010, State/PRM provided resettlement agencies with $900 per refugee
to cover direct and administrative costs of assistance.
[57] The South Korean government operated six Hana Centers as a pilot
project in 2009 and plans to expand the program to thirty centers.
[58] While TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI all serve low-income people,
the financial eligibility thresholds, or income limits, for these
benefits differ. Specifically, TANF's income limit varies by state.
Medicaid income limits can also vary by state, as well as by type of
recipient. For example, the Medicaid income limits for children at
this time generally range from 100 to 185 percent of the federal
poverty guidelines, depending on age. The SNAP income limit is
generally set at 130 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. In
contrast, SSI's income limit is set at a fixed dollar amount.
[59] According to ORR officials, adults without dependent children are
the most frequent cases of individuals who do not qualify for TANF,
but who qualify for the Refugee Cash Assistance program.
[60] ORR provides states with funding to make grants and contracts
with local community and faith-based organizations to deliver social
services to refugee clients, according to ORR.
[61] The South Korean government tracks North Korean arrivals by
calendar year. Before calendar year 2001, the South Korean government
provides a cumulative total of the number of North Koreans who arrived
in South Korea in the years leading up to and including calendar year
2000.
[62] We are providing these data for background purposes only. For
that reason, and because it was provided by a foreign government, we
did not attempt to assess the reliability of the data.
[63] We are providing these data for background purposes only. For
that reason, and because they were provided by foreign governments, we
did not attempt to assess their reliability.
[64] British data pertain to North Korean cases and not individuals.
[65] According to German officials, 1,391 North Koreans resided in
Germany as of December 31, 2008. Most of these North Koreans reside in
Germany using an immigration status not related to humanitarian
protection.
[66] According to Japanese officials, the Government of Japan provides
humanitarian protection to North Korean refugees based on the "Law to
Address the Abduction Issue and Other North Korean Human Rights
Violations" enacted in June 2006. According to these officials,
Article 6, Section 1 of the Law defines "North Korean refugees" as
"people who have escaped from North Korea and for whom the Government
of Japan recognizes the necessity for protection and assistance from a
humanitarian perspective."
[67] Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.11, USCIS may request a State/DRL
comment letter at the agency's discretion. Prior to April 6, 2009,
USCIS was required by regulation to submit a copy of all asylum
applications to State/DRL who had the option to provide comments.
[68] All asylum decisions are reviewed by a supervisory asylum officer
prior to issuance of the decision.
[69] DHS is authorized to place aliens in expedited removal
proceedings who are encountered by an immigration officer within 100
air miles of the U.S. international land border and who have not
established to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that they
have been physically present in the United States continuously for the
14-day period immediately prior to the date of the encounter.
[70] Under the INA, the "credible fear of persecution" means "there is
a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the
statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such
other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum." See Section 235(b)(1)(B)(v), and 8
U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(B)(v).
[71] If the DHS/USCIS asylum officer determines that the alien does
not have a credible fear of persecution or torture, the alien may
request that an Immigration Judge review the asylum officer's
decision. The Judge may sustain the officer's decision or vacate the
decision, allowing the applicant to apply for asylum as a defense to
removal, according to USCIS.
[72] If the applicant or DHS disagrees with the Immigration Judge's
decision, either party may appeal the decision to EOIR's Board of
Immigration Appeals. If the Board's decision is adverse to the
applicant, he or she may file an appeal with the federal circuit
courts of appeal.
[73] GAO previously reported that, across immigration courts, seven
factors significantly affected asylum outcomes: (1) whether the asylum
application was first filed affirmatively with DHS's asylum office or
defensively with DOJ/EOIR's immigration court; (2) the nationality of
the applicant; (3) the time period in which the asylum decision was
made; and whether the applicant (4) had representation, (5) filed the
application within 1 year of entry to the United States, (6) claimed
dependents on the asylum application, and (7) had ever been detained
(defensive cases only). Across Immigration Judges, in addition to
these seven factors, two other factors significantly affected asylum
outcomes: (1) the gender of the Immigration Judge and (2) the length
of experience as an Immigration Judge. GAO, U.S. Asylum System:
Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes across Immigration
Courts and Judges, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-940]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008).
[End of section]
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