GAO-10-390, Campaign Finance Reform: Experiences of Two States That Offered Full Public Funding for Political Candidates


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Report to the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General 
Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2010: 

Campaign Finance Reform: 

Experiences of Two States That Offered Full Public Funding for 
Political Candidates: 

GAO-10-390: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-390, a report to the Subcommittee on Financial 
Services and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 
Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first in the nation’s 
history where candidates seeking state legislative seats had the 
option to fully fund their campaigns with public moneys. In 2003, GAO 
reviewed the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona and found 
the programs’ goals were to (1) increase electoral competition; (2) 
increase voter choice; (3) curb increases in campaign costs; (4) 
reduce interest group influence; and (5) increase voter participation. 
GAO reported that while the number of candidates who participated in 
the programs increased from 2000 to 2002, it was too soon to determine 
the extent to which these five goals of the programs were being met. 
Senate Report 110-129 directed GAO to update its 2003 report. This 
report: (1) provides data on candidate participation and (2) describes 
changes in five goals of Maine’s and Arizona’s programs in the 2000 
through 2008 elections and the extent to which changes could be 
attributed to the programs. To address its objectives, GAO analyzed 
available data about candidate participation, election outcomes, and 
campaign spending for the 1996 through 2008 legislative elections in 
both states, reviewed studies, and interviewed 22 candidates and 10 
interest group officials selected to reflect a range of views. The 
interview results are not generalizable to all candidates or all 
interest groups. GAO is issuing an electronic supplement with this 
report—-GAO-10-391SP—-which provides data and summaries of statistical 
analyses conducted. 

What GAO Found: 

In Maine and Arizona, legislative candidates’ participation in the 
public financing programs, as measured by the percentage of candidates 
participating and the proportion of races with a participating 
candidate, increased from 2000 to 2008. Specifically, the 
participation rate of candidates in Maine’s general elections 
increased from 33 percent in 2000 to over 80 percent in 2006 and 2008. 
Meanwhile, the participation rate of candidates in Arizona’s general 
elections increased from 26 percent in 2000 to 64 percent in 2008. 
Also, the proportion of races with at least one candidate 
participating in the program generally increased from 2000 through 
2008. 

Figure: Percentage of Legislative Races with at Least One Candidate 
Participating in the Public Financing Programs, Maine and Arizona 
General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

State: Maine; 
Election year: 2000; 
Races with no participating candidates: 53%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 47%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Races with no participating candidates: 21%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 79%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Races with no participating candidates: 8%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 92%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Races with no participating candidates: 2%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 98%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Races with no participating candidates: 4%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 96%. 

State: Arizona; 
Election year: 2000; 
Races with no participating candidates: 47%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 52%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Races with no participating candidates: 38%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 62%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Races with no participating candidates: 33%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 67%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Races with no participating candidates: 25%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 75%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Races with no participating candidates: 18%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 82%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine and Arizona election results data. 

[End of figure] 

While there was some evidence of statistically significant changes in 
one of the five goals of Maine’s and Arizona’s public financing 
programs, we could not directly attribute these changes to the 
programs, nor did we find significant changes in the remaining four 
goals after program implementation. Specifically, there were 
statistically significant decreases in one measure of electoral 
competition—the winner’s margin of victory—in legislative races in 
both states. However, GAO could not directly attribute these decreases 
to the programs due to other factors, such as the popularity of 
candidates, which affect electoral outcomes. We found no change in two 
other measures of competition, and there were no observed changes in 
voter choice—the average number of legislative candidates per district 
race. In Maine, decreases in average candidate spending in House races 
were statistically significant, but a state official said this was 
likely due to reductions in the amounts given to participating 
candidates in 2008, while average spending in Maine Senate races did 
not change. In Arizona, average spending has increased in the five 
elections under the program. There is no indication the programs 
decreased perceived interest group influence, although some candidates 
and interest group officials GAO interviewed said campaign tactics 
changed, such as the timing of campaign spending. Data limitations, 
including a lack of comparable measures over time, hinder analysis of 
changes in voter participation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-390] or key 
components. To view the e-supplement online, click on GAO-10-391SP. 
For more information, contact William O. Jenkins Jr. at (202) 512-8777 
or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Legislative Candidates' Participation in Public Financing Programs in 
Maine and Arizona Increased from 2000 to 2008; Limited Data on 
Candidates Are Available: 

Changes in One Measure of Electoral Competition Could Not Be Directly 
Attributed to Maine's and Arizona's Public Financing Programs; No 
Overall Changes in Voter Choice, Campaign Spending, and Interest Group 
Influence, While Data Limitations Hinder Analysis of Changes in Voter 
Participation: 

Concluding Observations: 

Third Party Views and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: Objectives:
Overview of Our Scope and Methodology: Candidate Participation:
Electoral Competition:
Voter Choice:
Campaign Spending:
Interest Group Influence and Citizens' Confidence in Government: Voter 
Participation (Turnout): 

Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing Programs for Legislative 
Election Campaigns in Maine and Arizona: Maine's Public Financing 
Program:
Arizona's Public Financing Program: 

Appendix III: Information on Public Financing Programs for State 
Legislative Election Campaigns in Connecticut and New Jersey: 
Connecticut's Public Financing Program: New Jersey's Public Financing 
Program: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Bibliography: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the 2008 Election Cycle in Maine and Arizona: 

Table 2: States Offering Full Public Financing Programs during the 
2007 and 2008 Election Cycle: 

Table 3: Factors Maine Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 Elections: 

Table 4: Factors Maine Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
Not to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 
Elections: 

Table 5: Percentage of Winning Legislative Candidates by Participation 
and Incumbent Status in Maine General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Table 6: Factors Arizona Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 Elections: 

Table 7: Factors Arizona Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
Not to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 
Elections: 

Table 8: Percentage of Winning Legislative Candidates by Participation 
and Incumbent Status in Arizona General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Table 9: Margin of Victory Measures in Maine and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Measures over Time, and Differences in the Changes 
between Maine and Comparison States: 

Table 10: Margin of Victory Measures in Arizona and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Measures over Time, and Differences in the Changes 
between Arizona and Comparison States: 

Table 11: Percentage of Races Contested in Maine and Comparison 
States, Changes in the Percentages over Time, and Differences in the 
Changes between Maine and Comparison States: 

Table 12: Percentage of Races Contested in Arizona and Comparison 
States, Changes in the Percentages over Time, and Differences in the 
Changes between Arizona and Comparison States: 

Table 13: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Rates over Time, and Differences in the Changes between 
Maine and Comparison States: 

Table 14: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Rates over Time, and Differences in the Changes between 
Arizona and Comparison States: 

Table 15: Average Number of Legislative Candidates per District Race 
in Maine and Arizona Primary and General Elections, 1996 through 2008: 

Table 16: Percent of Races with Third-Party or Independent Candidates 
Receiving 5 Percent or More of Votes Cast in Maine General Elections, 
1996 through 2008: 

Table 17: Percent of Races with Third-Party or Independent Candidates 
Receiving 5 Percent or More of Votes Cast in Arizona General 
Elections, 1996 through 2008: 

Table 18: Maine and Arizona Voting-Age Citizens' Views on Influence of 
Interest Groups, among Those Aware of the Law: 

Table 19: Maine and Arizona Voting-Age Citizens' Views on Confidence 
in State Government, among Those Aware of the Law: 

Table 20: Characteristics of the State Legislatures in Maine, Arizona, 
and Their Respective Comparison States: 

Table 21: Questions Used for the Maine and Arizona Surveys: 

Table 22: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 Contributions 
for Maine Legislative Candidates in the 2008 Election Cycle: 

Table 23: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the Maine, 2008 Election Cycle: 

Table 24: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Maine's Public Financing 
Program in 2008: 

Table 25: Maine Reporting Requirements for Independent Expenditures in 
the 2008 Election Cycle: 

Table 26: Early Contribution Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 
Contributions for Arizona Legislative Candidates in the 2008 Election 
Cycle: 

Table 27: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the Arizona 2008 Election Cycle: 

Table 28: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Arizona's Public Financing 
Program in 2008: 

Table 29: Arizona Reporting Requirements for Individuals or 
Organizations Making Independent Expenditures in the 2008 Election 
Cycle: 

Table 30: Qualifying Contribution Requirements for Candidates in 
Connecticut's Legislative Elections in 2008: 

Table 31: Public Funding Available to Major Party Candidates in 
Connecticut Primary and General Elections in 2008: 

Table 32: Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of 
Races with at Least One Participating Candidate in Connecticut's 
Legislative General Election in 2008: 

Table 33: Participating Candidates in Connecticut's Public Financing 
Program in the Legislative General Elections in 2008: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Legislative Candidates' Participation in Maine's Public 
Financing Program in the Primary and General Elections, 2000 through 
2008: 

Figure 2: Public Financing Program Participation and Incumbency Status 
in Maine General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 3: Legislative Candidates by Political Party Affiliation and 
Participation Status in Maine Primary and General Elections, 2000 
through 2008: 

Figure 4: Legislative Candidates' Participation in Arizona's Public 
Financing Program in Primary and General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 5: Public Financing Program Participation and Incumbency Status 
in Arizona General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 6: Legislative Candidates by Political Party Affiliation and 
Participation Status in Arizona Primary and General Elections, 2000 
through 2008: 

Figure 7: Percentage of Legislative Races with at Least One Candidate 
Participating in the Public Financing Programs, Maine and Arizona 
General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 8: Comparison of Winner's Average Margin of Victory in 
Contested Legislative Races in Maine and Arizona with Respective 
Comparison States, General Election, 1996 through 2008: 

Figure 9: Comparison of Winner's Victory Margin in Contested 
Legislative Races in Maine and Arizona with Respective Comparison 
States, General Election, 1996 through 2008: 

Figure 10: Comparison of the Rates of Contested Legislative Races in 
Maine and Arizona with Respective Comparison States, General Election, 
1996 through 2008: 

Figure 11: Comparison of Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine and 
Arizona with Respective Comparison States, General Election, 1996 
through 2008: 

Figure 12: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine, 1996 
through 2008: 

Figure 13: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine by 
Candidate Status, 1996 through 2008: 

Figure 14: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine by 
Participation Status, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 15: Independent Expenditures in Maine Legislative Elections, 
2000 through 2008: 

Figure 16: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona, 2000 
through 2008: 

Figure 17: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona by 
Candidate Status, 2000 through 2008: 

Figure 18: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona by 
Participation Status, 2000 through 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

ACS: American Community Survey: 

Arizona's Act: Citizens Clean Elections Act: 

Connecticut's Act: Campaign Finance Reform Law of 2005: 

CPS: Current Population Survey: 

EAC: United States Election Assistance Commission: 

ELEC: New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission: 

Elections Project: George Mason University's United States Election 
Project: 

FEC: Federal Election Commission: 

GDP: gross domestic product: 

HAVA: Help America Vote Act: 

Maine's Act: Maine Clean Election Act: 

Nonparticipating candidates: candidates who did not participate in the 
public financing program: 

Participating candidates: candidates who participated in the public 
financing program: 

SE: standard error: 

SEEC: Connecticut State Elections Enforcement Commission: 

VAP: voting-age population: 

VEP: voting-eligible population: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 28, 2010: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

Public financing of political campaigns is a controversial issue that 
is viewed by supporters as a means of reducing the influence of money 
in politics while increasing the involvement of citizens in the 
political process and seen by opponents as a violation of free speech 
as well as a misuse of public funds. While public financing of 
political campaigns at the federal level applies only to presidential 
elections, some states have taken actions to implement programs to 
offer public financing intended to fund most campaign costs of 
candidates for certain state-level political campaigns.[Footnote 1] 
The 2000 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first instances in 
the nation's history where candidates seeking state legislative seats 
and certain statewide offices had the option to fully fund their 
campaigns with public moneys.[Footnote 2] Under the public financing 
programs in Maine and Arizona, "participating candidates" qualified 
for public financing and received a set amount of money for their 
primary and general election campaigns if they agreed to forgo private 
fundraising and obtained a minimum number of $5 donations from 
individual donors. In addition to their initial distribution of funds, 
participating candidates received matching funds from public moneys, 
based on spending by opposing privately financed ("nonparticipating") 
candidates, who engaged in traditional means, such as conducting 
fundraisers, to raise money from individuals, corporations, and 
political action committees. Participating candidates also received 
matching funds based on an individual's or group's reported 
independent expenditures, which are expenditures made that benefit an 
opposing candidate, but without coordination with the benefiting 
candidate. 

In 2003, we reviewed the public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona[Footnote 3] as mandated in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002.[Footnote 4] In our 2003 report, we identified five 
overarching goals of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs 
based on our review of the history of the programs and discussions 
with officials in each state. Generally, these goals were to (1) 
increase electoral competition by, among other means, reducing the 
number of uncontested races (i.e., races with only one candidate per 
seat in contention); (2) increase voter choice by encouraging more 
candidates to run for office; (3) curb increases in the cost of 
campaigns; (4) reduce the influence of interest groups and, thereby, 
enhance citizens' confidence in government; and (5) increase voter 
participation (e.g., increase voter turnout for elections). 

In 2003, we reported that while the number of legislative candidates 
who chose to use public financing for their campaigns increased from 
2000 to 2002, it was too soon to determine the extent to which the 
five goals of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs were 
being met. We concluded that with only two elections from which to 
observe legislative races, limited data were available to draw causal 
linkages to changes, if any, involving electoral competition, voter 
choice, campaign spending, interest group influence and citizens' 
confidence in government, and voter participation. 

Senate Report 110-129 directed GAO to revisit and update our 2003 
report to account for data and experiences of the past two election 
cycles.[Footnote 5] This report: 

* provides data related to candidate program participation, including 
the number of legislative candidates who chose to use public funds to 
run for seats in the 2000 through 2008 elections in Maine and Arizona 
and the number of races in which at least one legislative candidate 
ran an election campaign with public funds; and: 

* describes statistically measurable changes and perceptions of 
changes in the 2000 through 2008 state legislative elections in five 
goals of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs--(1) 
increasing electoral competition; (2) increasing voter choice; (3) 
curbing increases in the cost of campaigns; (4) reducing the influence 
of interest groups and enhance citizens' confidence in government; and 
(5) increasing voter participation--and the extent to which these 
changes could be attributed to the programs. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant studies and reports 
and interviewed researchers regarding state elections and campaign 
finance reform in the United States generally, as well as in Maine and 
Arizona specifically.[Footnote 6] A listing of the research and 
reports we reviewed is included in the bibliography. We reviewed 
pertinent statutes and documents, such as candidate handbooks and 
annual reports describing the Maine and Arizona public financing 
programs and interviewed state election officials responsible for 
administering the two programs. Through our discussions with Maine and 
Arizona state officials and our review of changes to the public 
financing statutes in both states from 2002 through 2009, we 
determined that the five goals of the public financing programs, as 
set out in our 2003 report, have not changed.[Footnote 7] In addition, 
based on our review of the literature and discussions with 
researchers, we concluded that there is little agreement on a 
standardized methodology to measure these five goals. Thus, we used 
many of the same measures as those in our 2003 report.[Footnote 8] 

We obtained data from Maine's and Arizona's Offices of the Secretary 
of State, the agencies responsible for supervising and administering 
state elections and activities, such as certifying state candidates 
for the ballot and tabulating official election results. We also 
obtained data from Maine's Commission on Governmental Ethics and 
Election Practices and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Commission, 
the agencies responsible for administering the respective state's 
public financing program. For both states we analyzed, to the extent 
possible, available statistical data about the 1996 through 2008 
legislative elections, including data related to candidate program 
participation, election outcomes, voter choice, and reported campaign 
spending.[Footnote 9] To assess the reliability of both states' data, 
we (1) performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and 
completeness; (2) reviewed related documentation such as system flow 
charts; and (3) worked closely with state officials to identify any 
data problems. When we found discrepancies, such as nonpopulated 
fields, we brought this to the states' attention and worked with state 
officials to correct the discrepancies before conducting our analyses. 
We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of our report. Although the public financing programs in 
Maine and Arizona cover both legislative and certain statewide 
offices, we limited the scope of our review to legislative candidates, 
since most of the elections for certain statewide offices[Footnote 10] 
occurred every 4 years and sufficient data would not have been 
available to conduct our analyses and draw conclusions. 

To assess changes in electoral competition in Maine and Arizona, we 
examined changes in three measures of electoral competition in state 
legislative races by comparing the two elections before public 
financing became available (1996 and 1998) to the five elections after 
public financing became available (2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008). 
The three measures we used were: (1) winner's margin of victory, which 
refers to the difference between the percentage of the vote going to 
the winning candidate and the first runner up; (2) percentages of 
contested races, which refers to the percentage of all races with at 
least one more candidate running than the number of positions 
available; and (3) incumbent reelection rates, which refers to the 
percentage of incumbents who were reelected in races that were 
contested. 

In addition to analyzing changes in electoral competition over time in 
Maine and Arizona, we analyzed general election data from 1996 through 
2008 from four comparison states that did not offer public financing 
programs for legislative candidates to determine if changes identified 
in Maine and Arizona were similar to or different from changes 
observed in the four comparison states during the same time period. We 
selected these four states (Colorado, Connecticut, Montana, and South 
Dakota) based on a number of factors, including geographic proximity 
to Maine or Arizona; structure of the state legislature, such as 
legislative districts with more than one representative; demographic 
characteristics; the presence of legislative term limits; and data 
availability.[Footnote 11] Specifically, we used two types of 
multivariate statistical models, fixed effects regression and 
hierarchical loglinear models, to evaluate how the competitiveness of 
races in Maine and Arizona changed after the implementation of public 
financing programs.[Footnote 12] Additional information about the two 
types of models we used to evaluate electoral competition, as well as 
other data and analyses related to the extent to which five goals of 
Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs were met can be viewed 
in an electronic supplement we are issuing concurrent with this report--
GAO-10-391SP. 

With regard to the campaign spending goal, we obtained available 
campaign spending and independent expenditure data from Maine and 
Arizona. We found that Maine's campaign spending data for the 1996 
through 2008 election cycles and independent expenditure data for the 
2000 through 2008 election cycles were sufficiently reliable. Due, in 
part, to several upgrades to Arizona's campaign finance data systems 
over the time period reviewed, we found that Arizona's campaign 
spending data for the 2000 through 2008 election cycles and 
independent expenditure data for the 2008 election cycle were 
sufficiently reliable with limitations as noted. For example, up to 
the 2008 election, Arizona's campaign spending database did not 
include precise data to identify and link each candidate to his or her 
campaign finance committee(s), the entities responsible for reporting 
candidates' contributions and spending.[Footnote 13] Further, the 
candidates' campaign finance committees can span several election 
cycles and include spending reports for races for the same or 
different offices, such as House or Senate. Thus, to the extent 
possible, we matched candidates and candidate campaign finance 
committees through electronic and manual means, identified and 
calculated relevant candidate spending transactions, and sorted the 
data by election cycle dates. Further, although the Arizona Secretary 
of State's office collected independent expenditure data from 2000 
through 2008, it did not collect data on the intended beneficiaries of 
independent expenditures until the 2008 election cycle. Therefore, we 
limited our analysis of independent expenditures to the 2008 
elections. We worked with state officials responsible for the public 
financing programs and campaign finance data systems in Maine and 
Arizona to develop our methodology. 

To obtain perspectives on the effects of public financing on interest 
group influence and citizens' confidence in government, we interviewed 
a nonprobability sample of 22 candidates who ran in the 2008 state 
legislative races in Maine and Arizona. We selected these candidates 
to reflect a range of those with different political party 
affiliations, those who did and did not use public financing, and 
those who won or lost in primary and general elections in Maine and 
Arizona. Further, we interviewed a nonprobability sample of 10 
interest group representatives in Maine and Arizona, which we selected 
to reflect a variety of industry sectors, such as communications or 
construction, and range of contributions made to political campaigns. 
While the results of these interviews cannot be generalized to reflect 
the views of all candidates or all interest groups in Maine and 
Arizona, the interviews provided us with an overview of the range of 
perspectives on the effects of the public financing programs. We also 
contracted with professional pollsters to survey representative 
samples of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona about their views 
of interest group influence and confidence in government.[Footnote 14] 

To examine changes in voter participation, we reviewed information 
about voter turnout data from the Census Bureau, Federal Election 
Commission, United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the 
American National Election Studies, and other resources, including two 
repositories of elections data and information--George Mason 
University's United States Election Project (the Elections Project) 
and the Center for the Study of the American Electorate.[Footnote 15] 
We identified these sources through our review of the literature and 
through discussions with researchers. To determine the extent to which 
changes in voter participation could be assessed over time, we 
reviewed documentation and research on these potential data sources, 
including information on collection and measurement of the voting-age 
or voting-eligible population and the type of turnout recorded. 
Finally, we examined data and methodologies for measuring changes in 
voter turnout and other forms of participation to determine whether 
changes in participation could be analyzed at the state level. We 
found that the different data sources required to calculate changes in 
turnout are not always comparable across sources and over time because 
of differences in the way that data are collected or changes in how 
turnout is defined. As such, there was no need to conduct electronic 
testing to further assess the reliability of the data for our 
purposes. This does not indicate that the data are unreliable for 
other purposes. We also discussed voter turnout calculations with 
state officials and researchers. Appendix I presents more details 
about our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through May 
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Public Financing Programs in Maine and Arizona: 

In November 1996, Maine voters approved a citizen's initiative--the 
Maine Clean Election Act (Maine's Act)--establishing a full public 
financing program to fund with public moneys the campaigns of 
participating candidates for the state legislature and governor. 
[Footnote 16] Similarly, in November 1998, Arizona voters passed the 
Citizens Clean Elections Act (Arizona's Act), establishing a full 
public financing program for participating candidates for the state 
legislature and various statewide offices, such as governor or 
secretary of state.[Footnote 17] Maine's Commission on Governmental 
Ethics and Election Practices and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission administer the respective state's public financing program, 
including certifying that candidates have met qualifications for 
receiving public funds. 

Legislative candidates[Footnote 18] who wish to participate in the 
respective public financing programs must be certified as a 
participating candidate. Certified candidates, among other things must 
(1) forgo self-financing and all private contributions, except for a 
limited amount of "seed money" prior to certification,[Footnote 19] 
and (2) demonstrate citizen support by collecting a minimum number of 
$5 contributions from registered voters.[Footnote 20] After being 
certified by the state as having met qualifying requirements, 
participating candidates receive initial distributions (predetermined 
amounts) of public funding and are also eligible for additional 
matching funds from public moneys based on spending by or for 
privately funded opponents. These matching funds, up to predetermined 
limits, are given to participating candidates when an opposing 
nonparticipating candidate exceeds the initial distribution of funds 
provided to the participating candidate during the primary or general 
election.[Footnote 21] Table 1 shows the public funding available to 
each participating candidate in the 2008 election cycle in Maine and 
Arizona. The calculation to assess whether matching funds for 
participating candidates are triggered is to include reported 
independent expenditures[Footnote 22] that, in general, are made on 
behalf of a nonparticipating or another participating candidate in the 
race by individuals, corporations, political action committees, or 
other groups. 

Table 1: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the 2008 Election Cycle in Maine and Arizona: 

State: Maine: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $1,504; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $3,008; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $4,512; 
General election: Initial distribution: $4,144; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $8,288; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $12,432. 

State: Maine: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $512; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $512; 
General election: Initial distribution: $1,658; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $1,658. 

State: Maine: Senate; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $7,746; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $15,492; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $23,238; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,078; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,156; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $57,234. 

State: Maine: Senate; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $1,927; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $1,927; 
General election: Initial distribution: $7,631; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $7,631. 

State: Arizona: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $12,921; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $25,842; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $38,763; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,382; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,764; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $58,146. 

State: Arizona: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]; 
General election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]. 

State: Arizona: Senate; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $12,921; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $25,842; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $38,763; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,382; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,764; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $58,146. 

State: Arizona: Senate; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]; 
General election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine and Arizona public financing laws and 
state data. 

Note: A contested race is a race with more than one candidate per seat 
in contention. 

[A] In Arizona, candidates in uncontested House and Senate races are 
only to receive an amount equal to the qualifying contributions for 
that candidate. 

[End of table] 

Various revenue sources are used to support the public financing 
programs. In Maine, state appropriations were the largest funding 
source, contributing 82 percent of total revenue in 2008. In Arizona, 
a surcharge on civil and criminal fines and penalties was the largest 
funding source, accounting for 59 percent of total revenue in 2008. In 
addition, funding for public financing programs comes from state 
income tax checkoff donations in both states. During the 2008 primary 
and general elections, participating legislative candidates in Maine 
received a total of almost $3 million, and participating legislative 
candidates in Arizona received a total of about $6 million. 

Before the passage of Maine's Act in 1996 and Arizona's Act in 1998, 
political campaigns in the two states were financed completely with 
private funds. There were no limitations placed on expenditures by 
candidates from their personal wealth. Under Maine's and Arizona's 
public financing laws, nonparticipating candidates are not limited in 
the amount they may spend from their personal financial resources on 
their own campaigns. While not faced with limits on the total amount 
of money that they can raise or spend, nonparticipating candidates are 
subject to certain limitations on the amount that an individual, 
corporation, or political committee can contribute to the campaigns of 
nonparticipating candidates, and nonparticipating candidates have 
additional reporting requirements. For example, in Maine, a 
nonparticipating candidate in the 2008 legislative elections could 
accept individual contributions of up to $250 per election, and in 
Arizona, a nonparticipating candidate could accept individual 
contributions of up to $488 per election. In both states, 
nonparticipating candidates must file certain reports with the state 
when their campaigns exceed certain statutory thresholds relating to, 
for example, expenditures or contributions.[Footnote 23] Appendix II 
provides information about the design and implementation of Maine's 
and Arizona's public financing programs. 

Perspectives on the Five Goals of Public Financing Programs in Maine 
and Arizona: 

While there is widespread agreement among researchers and state 
officials in Maine and Arizona with the goals of the public financing 
programs, there is little consensus about how to assess progress 
toward these goals and the effects of these programs. For example, 
research on the effects of state public financing programs in general 
has been limited because the programs vary widely and were implemented 
at different times, hindering comparability.[Footnote 24] With regard 
to Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs, research tends to 
be limited to a single state or a limited number of years, or produced 
by groups that support or oppose public financing.[Footnote 25] Thus, 
in revisiting our 2003 report, we describe the five goals of the 
public financing programs and include a discussion of proponents' and 
opponents' views on the effects of these programs. 

Increase Electoral Competition: 

One goal of the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona was to 
increase electoral competition, which refers to the level of 
competition for elected positions as demonstrated by whether races 
were contested (that is, involved more candidates than available 
positions) and by the percentage of the vote candidates received. For 
example, levels of electoral competition can vary from none at all in 
the case of an uncontested race, in which the sole candidate receives 
100 percent of the vote (less any write-in votes), to an election in 
which several candidates vie competitively for a position, each 
winning a significant portion of the votes. Proponents of public 
financing for campaigns contended that public funding could increase 
electoral competition by allowing candidates, especially candidates 
challenging incumbents, to overcome the financial hurdles that would 
otherwise prevent them from entering a race. Further, proponents 
argued that public financing promotes competition by giving more 
candidates the opportunity to effectively communicate with the 
electorate once they have entered the race. Additionally, some 
proponents asserted that increasing the pool of challengers would also 
increase the diversity of the candidate pool and consequently make 
some races more competitive by offering candidates that appeal to a 
broader range of voters. On the other hand, opponents asserted that 
public financing does not necessarily attract candidates who have a 
broad base of constituency support and therefore, even though more new 
candidates may enter races and win, the quality of representation 
these candidates offer may be questionable. 

Increase Voter Choice: 

Increasing voter choice, as measured by changes in the number of 
candidates per race and changes in the breadth of political party 
affiliations, such as third-party and independent candidates, 
represented in races, was a goal of public financing programs. 
Proponents of the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona 
contended that public funding of campaigns would encourage more 
individuals to run for office, thereby giving voters more choices on 
the ballot. Opponents asserted that an increase in the number of 
candidates on the ballot alone would not necessarily result in a more 
diverse selection of candidates, representation of a wider range of 
political views, or the guarantee that a broader array of issues would 
be debated in campaigns. 

Curb Increases in the Cost of Campaigns: 

The public financing programs in Maine and Arizona each were designed 
to have a two-pronged approach for the third goal--curbing increases 
in the costs of campaign spending. Each program: 

* imposed spending limits and certain other requirements on candidates 
who chose to participate in the public financing program, and: 

* reduced the total amount of money that nonparticipating candidates 
were allowed to accept from each campaign contributor. 

Proponents of the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona 
contended that escalating campaign costs helped deter candidates from 
running for office. The intended outcome of this approach was to lower 
the cost of running for office by reducing and capping the amount of 
money available for campaign spending. Opponents argued that worthy 
candidates will garner public support and therefore do not need public 
financing to run their campaigns. Opponents also cited concerns that 
rising campaign costs are overstated and that most campaign 
fundraising comes from individuals who give less than the legal limit. 

Reduce the Influence of Interest Groups: 

A fourth goal of the public financing programs in Maine and Arizona 
was to enhance the confidence of citizens in government by reducing 
the influence of interest groups in the political process. The public 
financing programs in Maine and Arizona imposed campaign contribution 
limits on participating candidates and reduced the need for 
participating candidates to raise funds from private donors, such as 
interest groups, with the intent of eliminating any undue influence, 
or the perception of influence, large campaign contributors may have 
on participating candidates. For instance, the "findings and 
declarations" section of Arizona's 1998 Act stated, among other 
things, that the then current election-financing system "effectively 
suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority of Arizona 
citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special interests" and 
"undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials." 
From an overall perspective, proponents asserted that public financing 
programs should enhance the confidence of citizens in government by 
increasing the integrity of the political process and the 
accountability of officials. 

On the other hand, opponents asserted that, under the traditional 
campaign financing system, the voices of citizens are represented 
through competing interest groups. Opponents further asserted there is 
no evidence that government-financed campaigns attract more worthy 
candidates than do the traditional system or that, once elected, the 
publicly financed candidates vote any differently as legislators than 
do traditionally financed candidates. Moreover, some opponents argued 
that interest groups can still assert influence on the political 
process through means other than contributing directly to candidates' 
political campaigns, such as contributions to political parties, 
independent expenditures on behalf of or for opposing candidates, as 
well as providing nonfinancial resources such as mobilizing members to 
volunteer for grassroots activities. 

Increase Voter Participation: 

Increasing voter participation, as indicated by increases in voter 
turnout, was the fifth goal of public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona. Proponents asserted that public financing increases voter 
participation by encouraging citizens to become involved in the 
political process and by increasing electoral competition. Proponents 
contended that the public financing programs increase communication 
between candidates and voters and encourage participating candidates 
or volunteers to go door-to-door to meet with voters and to collect $5 
qualifying contributions. As a result, citizens would feel more 
involved in the political process and would be more likely to vote in 
legislative elections. Further, proponents argued that increased 
competition resulting from public financing would also increase voter 
turnout because more voters would be attracted by a more diverse set 
of candidates. Opponents stated that research on public financing 
programs and their effect on voter turnout is limited or anecdotal, 
and there is no evidence that citizens will become more engaged in the 
political process and be more likely to vote. Further, opponents cited 
the declining number of taxpayers who voluntarily provide 
contributions to the presidential and state public financing programs 
on their income tax forms as a reflection of the public's waning 
participation and support. 

Other States with Public Financing Programs: 

Since the 1970s, states and localities have offered a variety of 
programs providing public funds directly to candidates' campaigns for 
statewide and legislative races. A July 2009 Congressional Research 
Service report identified 16 states offering direct public funding to 
candidates using two major types of public financing 
frameworks.[Footnote 26] According to this report, 10 of these states 
offered public financing programs that were primarily designed to 
match candidates' private campaign contributions, thereby reducing the 
need for private fundraising.[Footnote 27] These programs varied 
widely, but generally the amount of public funds candidates received 
in this type of program depended on the amount the candidates raised 
and provided partial funding for candidates' campaigns. Seven of these 
16 states, including Maine and Arizona, offered full public financing 
programs for certain offices that provided fixed subsidies to 
candidates once they met basic qualifications.[Footnote 28] During the 
2007 and 2008 election cycle, these 7 states offered full public 
financing programs for candidates running for those statewide and 
legislative offices shown in table 2. 

Table 2: States Offering Full Public Financing Programs during the 
2007 and 2008 Election Cycle: 

State: Maine; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: Governor and all legislative offices. 

State: Arizona; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: Governor, secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, 
superintendent of public instruction, corporation commissioner, mine 
inspector, and all legislative offices. 

State: Connecticut; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: All legislative offices. 

State: New Jersey; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: Senate and General Assembly members in three legislative 
districts (14, 24, and 37), general election (pilot program). 

State: New Mexico; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: Public regulation commission and statewide judicial offices. 

State: North Carolina; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: State appellate and Supreme Court judicial offices, auditor, 
superintendent of public instruction, and insurance commissioner. 

State: Vermont; 
Offices for which candidates were eligible to receive full public 
funding: Governor and lieutenant governor. 

Source: GAO analysis of state laws. 

[End of table] 

Appendix III describes full public financing programs available in the 
2007 and 2008 legislative elections in the two states other than Maine 
and Arizona that offer them--Connecticut and New Jersey. 

Public Financing Proposals at the Federal Level: 

In nearly every session since 1956, Congress has considered 
legislation for public financing of congressional elections, although 
no law has been enacted. There are several bills pending in the 
current 111th session of Congress addressing public financing of 
congressional elections. Two of these are companion bills (H.R. 1826 
and S.752) respectively addressing elections to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate by proposing voluntary public funding 
systems with a mix of predetermined funding amounts, matching funds, 
and vouchers for the purchase of airtime on broadcast stations for 
political advertisements.[Footnote 29] Two other bills propose 
variations for funding House elections--H.R. 2056 proposes a voluntary 
public funding system for House elections, and H.R. 158 proposes a 
grant system to exclusively fully fund House campaigns during general 
elections.[Footnote 30] In July 2009 the House Administration 
Committee held hearings on H.R. 1826.[Footnote 31] These bills were 
referred to committees in 2009 and as of April 2010 were pending. 

Factors Influencing Effects of Public Financing Programs and Elections: 

Many factors, such as the popularity and experience of the candidates, 
can influence the competitiveness and outcomes of elections and the 
interpretation of the effects of public financing programs. For 
example, term limits--limits on the number of terms elected officials 
such as legislators can serve--and redistricting--the redrawing of 
state electoral boundaries such as those for legislative districts in 
response to the decennial census--are factors that complicate the 
interpretation of available data. Other factors not directly related 
to public or private financing can also affect electoral campaigns and 
outcomes, such as economic conditions or particularly controversial 
ballot initiatives. 

Legislative Candidates' Participation in Public Financing Programs in 
Maine and Arizona Increased from 2000 to 2008; Limited Data on 
Candidates Are Available: 

In Maine and Arizona, legislative candidates' participation in the 
public financing programs (measured by the percentage of candidates 
participating and the proportion of races with a participating 
candidate) increased from 2000 to 2008; although limited data on 
candidates' characteristics are available. Specifically, Maine 
candidates' participation rates more than doubled in the primary and 
general elections from 2000 to 2004 and remained high through 2008 
(over 70 percent); among incumbents, the majority participated from 
2002 through 2008; and more Democrats (rather than Republicans) 
participated. In Maine, participating candidates were more likely to 
win their races. In Arizona, candidates' participation rates more than 
doubled in the primary and general elections from 2000 to 2008, with 
higher percentages of challengers (rather than incumbents) and 
Democrats (rather than Republicans) participating. In Arizona, 
nonparticipating candidates were more likely to win their races than 
were participating candidates. Other than incumbency status and 
political party affiliation, states did not maintain data that would 
allow us to assess candidates' characteristics, such as their 
experience or demographic characteristics. 

Maine Legislative Candidates' Participation Increased from 2000 to 
2008: 

Maine Legislative Candidates' Participation Rates More Than Doubled in 
the Primary and General Elections from 2000 to 2004 and Remained High 
through 2008: 

The participation rate of legislative candidates (i.e., percentage of 
legislative candidates participating in the public financing program) 
in Maine's primary elections more than doubled in the first three 
election cycles after public financing became available.[Footnote 32] 
As shown in figure 1, the participation rate increased from 32 percent 
in 2000 to 72 percent in 2004 and remained over 70 percent from 2004 
to 2008. Similarly, the participation rate of legislative candidates 
in Maine's general elections more than doubled from 33 percent in 2000 
to 79 percent in 2004 and then remained over 80 percent for the 2006 
and 2008 elections. 

Figure 1: Legislative Candidates' Participation in Maine's Public 
Financing Program in the Primary and General Elections, 2000 through 
2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Primary elections: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 68%; 
participating: 32%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 48%; 
participating: 52%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 28%; 
participating: 72%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 26%; 
participating: 74%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 26%; 
participating: 74%. 

General elections: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 67%; 
participating: 33%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 38%; 
participating: 62%; 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 21%; 
participating: 79%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 19%; 
participating: 81%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 18%; 
participating: 82%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine election results data. 

Note: We excluded candidates who received zero votes and write-in 
candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. The number of 
Maine legislative candidates who ran in the primary election each year 
was: 369 candidates in 2000, 400 candidates in 2002, 429 candidates in 
2004, 410 candidates in 2006, and 402 candidates in 2008. The number 
of Maine legislative candidates who ran in the general election each 
year was: 350 candidates in 2000, 370 candidates in 2002, 391 
candidates in 2004, 387 candidates in 2006, and 369 candidates in 2008. 

[End of figure] 

Maine Candidates Cited a Range of Reasons Why They Chose to 
Participate or Not Participate in the Public Financing Program: 

When asked the main reasons for choosing to run their campaign with or 
without public funds in the 2008 election, the 11 candidates we 
interviewed in Maine offered a range of reasons why they chose to 
participate or not participate in the public financing program. Five 
of the 6 participating candidates cited difficulties associated with 
raising enough private funds to run a competitive campaign. Among the 
difficulties mentioned were the amount of time and energy required to 
fundraise, as well as the amount of funds needed to compete with a 
well-financed opponent. In addition, 4 of the 6 participating 
candidates said that participating in the public financing program 
allowed them to spend more time focusing on communicating with voters. 
For example, one candidate said that participating in the public 
financing program freed him up so he could focus on meeting with 
constituents and learning what issues were important to them, rather 
than having to spend his time asking for money. Further, 3 of the 6 
participating candidates said that they wanted to be free of the 
influence of interest groups or other campaign contributors, and 2 of 
these candidates felt that it was strategically advantageous to 
participate in the public financing program. One of these candidates 
explained that he did not want to have to spend time raising funds 
while his opponent could use the time to campaign and still receive 
the same amount of money. We also asked candidates about specific 
factors they may have considered when choosing to run their campaign 
with public funds. Table 3 presents the number of participating 
candidates who said that they had considered each of the following 
factors when they decided to participate in the public financing 
program. 

Table 3: Factors Maine Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 Elections: 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You did not want to feel obligated to 
special interest groups or lobbyists; 
Number of participating candidates: 5. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: Receiving public funds allowed you to 
spend more time discussing issues; 
Number of participating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You believe that the public financing 
program promotes the accountability of legislators to the public; 
Number of participating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: Other than collecting "seed money" and 
the $5 contributions, you are opposed to traditional methods of 
funding election campaigns; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: The matching funds provision of the 
program discouraged opponents, special interest groups, and lobbyists 
from campaigning against you; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You did not think you would be able to 
raise enough funds through traditional means to run a competitive 
campaign; 
Number of participating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You ran with public funding due to 
particular circumstances in your district; however, you still have 
strong reservations about supporting the overall goals of the public 
financing program; 
Number of participating candidates: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of candidate interview responses. 

Note: We interviewed 6 participating candidates in Maine. Candidates 
could select more than one response. 

[End of table] 

The 5 nonparticipating candidates we interviewed in Maine most 
frequently mentioned opposition to using public funds for election 
campaigns as one of the main reasons they chose not to participate in 
the public financing program in 2008. For example, 4 of the 5 
nonparticipating candidates said they were opposed to public financing 
of elections for a range of reasons, including concern over the 
state's fiscal situation. One nonparticipating candidate said he chose 
not to participate because he did not want restrictions on how he ran 
his campaign. He explained that he had more flexibility with private 
funds and could donate excess campaign funds to nonprofit 
organizations after the election. In addition, one candidate told us 
that he was not opposed to the public financing program, but did not 
participate because he did not intend to run a campaign and 
anticipated that another candidate would take his place before the 
general election.[Footnote 33] We also asked the 5 nonparticipating 
candidates if they considered any of the factors listed in table 4 
when they chose not to participate in the public financing program; 
their responses appear alongside each factor in the table. 

Table 4: Factors Maine Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
Not to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 
Elections: 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that public funds 
are better used for purposes other than election campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 5. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You are opposed to public 
funding of election campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that the public 
funding forces taxpayers to fund candidates they may not support; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that the use of 
public funds adds burdensome reporting requirements to election 
campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You did not want restrictions 
on your campaign spending; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You had sufficient funds 
without using public funds; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You are opposed to specific 
provisions of the public financing program; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You did not want to learn a 
new campaign finance system; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of candidate interview responses. 

Note: We interviewed 5 nonparticipating candidates in Maine. 
Candidates could select more than one response. 

[End of table] 

The Majority of Incumbents in Maine Participated in the Public 
Financing Program from 2002 through 2008: 

Incumbent candidates' participation in the public financing program in 
general elections in Maine generally increased from 2000 to 2008, with 
the majority of incumbent candidates participating in the program from 
2002 through 2008.[Footnote 34] As shown in figure 2, participating 
incumbent candidates, as a percentage of all candidates, increased 
from 10 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2008. 

Figure 2: Public Financing Program Participation and Incumbency Status 
in Maine General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 39%; 
Participating challengers: 23%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 28%; 
Participating incumbents: 10%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 22%; 
Participating challengers: 46%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 16%; 
Participating incumbents: 17%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 13%; 
Participating challengers: 53%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 8%; 
Participating incumbents: 25%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 12%; 
Participating challengers: 51%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 6%; 
Participating incumbents: 30%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 11%; 
Participating challengers: 53%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 7%; 
Participating incumbents: 29%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine election results data. 

Note: We define incumbents as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. Challengers are 
defined as any candidates who are not incumbents, regardless of 
whether they faced an opponent in their race. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. The total number of legislative candidates per 
general election per year was: 350 candidates in 2000, 370 candidates 
in 2002, 391 candidates in 2004, 387 candidates in 2006, and 369 
candidates in 2008. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Further, the percentage of participating incumbents grew from 27 
percent of incumbent candidates in 2000 to 80 percent of incumbent 
candidates in 2008. 

Participating Candidates in Maine Were Generally More Likely to Win: 

Participating incumbents and challengers in Maine's legislative races 
were generally slightly more likely to win than nonparticipating 
incumbents and challengers who ran in general elections held from 2000 
through 2008, as shown in table 5. 

Table 5: Percentage of Winning Legislative Candidates by Participation 
and Incumbent Status in Maine General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2000; 
Participating candidates: Number: 80; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 34%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 136; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 25%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2002; 
Participating candidates: Number: 169; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 33%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 81; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 32%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2004; 
Participating candidates: Number: 209; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 28%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 51; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 26%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2006; 
Participating candidates: Number: 198; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 25%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 48; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 19%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2008; 
Participating candidates: Number: 195; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 30%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 39; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 8%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2000; 
Participating candidates: Number: 36; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 97%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 98; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 92%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2002; 
Participating candidates: Number: 62; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 89%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 58; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 85%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2004; 
Participating candidates: Number: 99; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 88%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 32; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 88%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2006; 
Participating candidates: Number: 116; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 91%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 25; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 84%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2008; 
Participating candidates: Number: 108; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 93%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 27; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 93%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine election results data. 

Notes: Although there are differences in the percentages of 
participating and nonparticipating candidates, the information in this 
table does not provide evidence that program participation influences 
an individual candidate's likelihood of winning. 

[A] Indicates the percentage of candidates within the category who won 
their election. For example, in the 2000 general election, of the 80 
participating candidates who were challengers, 34 percent, or 27 
participating challenger candidates, won, and the remaining 66 
percent, or 53 participating challenger candidates, lost. 

[B] Challengers are defined as any candidates who are not incumbents, 
regardless of whether they faced an opponent in their race. 

[C] Incumbents are defined as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. 

[End of table] 

Democrats Participating at a Higher Rate in the Public Financing 
Program in Maine than Republicans: 

Since 2000, more Democrats than Republicans participated in the public 
financing program in Maine primary and general elections, in terms of 
the proportion of candidates who participated. For example, while the 
rate at which Republican legislative candidates in the primary 
elections participated in the public financing program increased by 
about 41 percentage points from 2000 to 2008 (from 22 percent to 63 
percent), the participation rate remains below that of Democrats, 
whose participation rate increased by about 48 percentage points in 
the primary election during the same period (from 39 percent to 87 
percent), as shown in figure 3. For both Democrats and Republicans, 
most of the growth in participation rates occurred between the 2000 
and 2004 legislative elections, whereas participation rates have been 
relatively stable over the past three election cycles (2004, 2006, and 
2008) in both the primary and general elections. For example, 
participation rates increased in the primary elections by about 4 
percentage points among Democrats (from 83 percent to 87 percent), and 
by 1 percentage point among Republicans (from 62 percent to 63 
percent) between the 2004 and 2008 election cycles. In all election 
years, more Democrats participated in the public financing program 
than Republicans did, in terms of the proportion of candidates who 
participated. 

Figure 3: Legislative Candidates by Political Party Affiliation and 
Participation Status in Maine Primary and General Elections, 2000 
through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Primary Elections: 

Democrats: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 61%; 
Participating: 39%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 38%; 
Participating: 62%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 13%; 
Participating: 87%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 13%; 
Participating: 87%; 

Democrats: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 13%; 
Participating: 87%; 

Republicans: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 78%; 
Participating: 22%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 59%; 
Participating: 41%; 

Republicans: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 38%; 
Participating: 62%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 39%; 
Participating: 62%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 37%; 
Participating: 63%. 

General elections: 

Democrats: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 56%; 
Participating: 44%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 30%; 
Participating: 70%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 14%; 
Participating: 86%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 8%; 
Participating: 92%; 

Democrats: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 8%; 
Participating: 92%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 77%; 
Participating: 23%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 45%; 
Participating: 55%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 29%; 
Participating: 71%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 27%; 
Participating: 74%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 28%; 
Participating: 72%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine election results data. 

Note: We excluded candidates who received zero votes and write-in 
candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. The number of 
Democratic candidates per primary election was: 193 in 2000, 196 in 
2002, 204 in 2004, 199 in 2006, and 204 in 2008; the number of 
Republican candidates per primary election was: 172 in 2000, 191 in 
2002, 202 in 2004, 200 in 2006, 184 in 2008; the number of Democratic 
candidates per general election was: 173 in 2000, 173 in 2002, 180 in 
2004, 186 in 2006, 184 in 2008; and the number of Republican 
candidates per general election was: 150 in 2000, 168 in 2002, 182 in 
2004, 178 in 2006, 166 in 2008. Percentages may not add to 100 because 
of rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Arizona Legislative Candidates' Participation Increased from 2000 to 
2008: 

Arizona Legislative Candidate Participation Rates More Than Doubled in 
the Primary and General Elections from 2000 to 2008: 

In Arizona, the participation rate of legislative candidates in 
primary elections doubled after the first election cycle when public 
financing became available, from 24 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 
2002.[Footnote 35] The participation rate then steadily increased over 
the next three elections to 59 percent in 2008, as shown in figure 4. 
Similarly, the participation rate of legislative candidates in 
Arizona's general elections almost doubled after 2000, when it was 26 
percent, to 49 percent in 2002, and then steadily increased over the 
next three elections to 64 percent in 2008. 

Figure 4: Legislative Candidates' Participation in Arizona's Public 
Financing Program in Primary and General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Primary elections: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 76%; 
Participating: 24%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 50%; 
Participating: 50%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 45%; 
Participating: 55%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 44%; 
Participating: 56%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 41%; 
Participating: 59%. 

General elections: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 74%; 
Participating: 26%; 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 51%; 
Participating: 49%; 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 48%; 
Participating: 52%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 47%; 
Participating: 53%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 36%; 
Participating: 64%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona election results data. 

Note: We excluded candidates who received zero votes and write-in 
candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. The number of 
Arizona legislative candidates who ran in the primary election each 
year was: 226 candidates in 2000, 222 candidates in 2002, 187 
candidates in 2004, 199 candidates in 2006, and 198 candidates in 
2008. The number of Arizona legislative candidates who ran in the 
general election each year was: 158 candidates in 2000, 150 candidates 
in 2002, 149 candidates in 2004, 158 candidates in 2006, and 159 
candidates in 2008. 

[End of figure] 

Arizona Candidates Cited a Range of Reasons Why They Chose to 
Participate or Not Participate in the Public Financing Program: 

The 11 candidates we interviewed in Arizona offered a range of reasons 
why they chose to participate or not participate in the public 
financing program when asked the main reasons for choosing to run 
their campaign with or without public funds in the 2008 election. Four 
of the 5 participating candidates we interviewed cited wanting more 
time to focus on interaction with voters when asked the main reasons 
for choosing to run their campaign with public funds in the 2008 
elections. One of these candidates explained that collecting the $5 
contributions strengthens candidates' connections to voters at the 
grass roots level. Candidates cited other reasons for participation. 
The desire to be free of the influence of interest groups or other 
campaign contributors was among the reasons 3 of the 5 candidates gave 
for participating in the public financing program. One candidate 
explained that participating candidates are not reliant on interest 
groups and are only beholden to their constituents. Three candidates 
said difficulties associated with raising adequate private funds to 
run a competitive election campaign was one of the reasons they chose 
to participate. For example, one candidate said that as a first-time 
candidate, he did not know how to raise money, so without the public 
financing program he would not have been able to compete against the 
incumbent candidate. Two candidates said it was strategically 
advantageous to participate in the public financing program. One of 
these candidates told us that he decided to participate in the public 
financing program because he would feel like he was funding his 
opponents if he raised private funds and the participating candidates 
in his race received matching funds based upon his spending. We also 
asked candidates about specific factors they may have considered when 
choosing to run their campaigns with public funds. Table 6 presents 
the number of participating candidates who said that they had 
considered each of the following factors when they decided to 
participate in the public financing program. 

Table 6: Factors Arizona Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 Elections: 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You did not want to feel obligated to 
special interest groups or lobbyists; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You did not think you would be able to 
raise enough funds through traditional means to run a competitive 
campaign; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: Receiving public funds allowed you to 
spend more time discussing issues; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You believe the public financing program 
promotes the accountability of legislators to the public; 
Number of participating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: Other than collecting "seed money" and 
the $5 contributions, you are opposed to traditional methods of 
funding election campaigns; 
Number of participating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: The matching funds provision of the 
program discouraged opponents, special interest groups, and lobbyists 
from campaigning against you; 
Number of participating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose to participate in the public financing 
program in the 2008 election: You ran with public funding due to 
particular circumstances in your district; 
however, you still have strong reservations about supporting the 
overall goals of the public financing program; 
Number of participating candidates: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of candidate interview responses. 

Note: We interviewed 5 participating candidates in Arizona. Candidates 
could select more than one response. 

[End of table] 

The 6 nonparticipating candidates we interviewed most frequently cited 
opposition to using public funds for election campaigns as one of the 
main reasons they chose to use private rather than public funds for 
their campaigns. Five of the 6 nonparticipating candidates said that 
they were opposed to using public funds for election campaigns for 
various reasons, which included the belief that public financing 
program forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they may not support, 
[Footnote 36] and the belief that funds could be better spent on 
government services, such as healthcare for children, or to reduce the 
state's deficit.[Footnote 37] In addition, 2 candidates said they did 
not participate because they did not want restrictions on how they ran 
their campaigns, such as the limit on the amount of money candidates 
may raise. Another candidate told us that he is opposed to the public 
financing program because he does not believe that the Citizens Clean 
Elections Commission should have the authority to remove legislators 
from office for violating the rules of the public financing program. 
Additionally, 1 nonparticipating candidate said that she did not 
participate because her primary race was uncontested, so the public 
financing program would provide meager resources and not enough for 
her to communicate with voters.[Footnote 38] We also asked the 6 
nonparticipating candidates if they considered any of the factors 
listed in table 7 when they chose not to participate in the public 
financing program; their responses appear alongside each factor in the 
table. 

Table 7: Factors Arizona Candidates Reported Considering When Deciding 
Not to Participate in the Public Financing Program in the 2008 
Elections: 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that public funds 
are better used for purposes other than election campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 5. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You had sufficient funds 
without using public funds; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 5. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You are opposed to specific 
provisions of the public financing program; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 5. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You are opposed to public 
funding of election campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that public 
funding forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they may not support; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 4. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You believe that the use of 
public funds adds burdensome reporting requirements to election 
campaigns; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 3. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You did not want restrictions 
on your campaign spending; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 2. 

GAO interview question: Were any of the following factors 
considerations when you chose not to participate in the public 
financing program in the 2008 election: You did not want to learn a 
new campaign finance system; 
Number of nonparticipating candidates: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of candidate interview responses. 

Note: We interviewed 6 nonparticipating candidates in Arizona. 
Candidates could select more than one response. 

[End of table] 

The Majority of Incumbents in Arizona Ran Privately-Financed Campaigns 
from 2000 through 2008: 

Incumbent candidates' participation in the public financing program in 
general elections in Arizona increased from 2000 to 2008; however, the 
majority of incumbent candidates did not participate in the program 
over these five election cycles. Figure 5 shows that participating 
incumbent candidates, as a percentage of all candidates, generally 
increased from 4 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in the 2008 general 
elections. 

Figure 5: Public Financing Program Participation and Incumbency Status 
in Arizona General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 43%; 
Participating challengers: 22%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 31%; 
Participating incumbents: 4%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 29%; 
Participating challengers: 42%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 22%; 
Participating incumbents: 7%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 24%; 
Participating challengers: 36%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 23%; 
Participating incumbents: 16%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 21%; 
Participating challengers: 39%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 26%; 
Participating incumbents: 15%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating challengers: 14%; 
Participating challengers: 47%; 
Nonparticipating incumbents: 21%; 
Participating incumbents: 18%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona election results data. 

Note: Incumbents are defined as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. Challengers are 
defined as any candidates who are not incumbents, regardless of 
whether they faced an opponent in their race. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. The total number of legislative candidates per 
general election per year was: 158 candidates in 2000, 150 candidates 
in 2002, 149 candidates in 2004, 158 candidates in 2006, and 159 
candidates in 2008. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Nonparticipating Candidates in Arizona Were Generally More Likely to 
Win: 

Nonparticipating legislative incumbents and challengers in Arizona 
were generally more likely to win than participating incumbents and 
challengers who ran in elections held from 2000 through 2008, as shown 
in table 8. 

Table 8: Percentage of Winning Legislative Candidates by Participation 
and Incumbent Status in Arizona General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2000; 
Participating candidates: Number: 35; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 23%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 68; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 43%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2002; 
Participating candidates: Number: 63; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 40%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 44; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 57%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2004; 
Participating candidates: Number: 54; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 35%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 36; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 39%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2006; 
Participating candidates: Number: 61; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 28%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 33; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 33%. 

Type of candidate: Challengers[B]; 
Election year: 2008; 
Participating candidates: Number: 74; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 31%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 23; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 30%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2000; 
Participating candidates: Number: 6; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 100%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 49; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 96%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2002; 
Participating candidates: Number: 10; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 70%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 33; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 100%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2004; 
Participating candidates: Number: 24; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 96%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 35; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 97%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2006; 
Participating candidates: Number: 23; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 91%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 41; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 100%. 

Type of candidate: Incumbents[C]; 
Election year: 2008; 
Participating candidates: Number: 28; 
Participating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 93%; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Number: 34; 
Nonparticipating candidates: Percent who won[A]: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona election results data. 

Notes: Although there are differences in the percentages of 
participating and nonparticipating candidates, the information in this 
table does not provide evidence that program participation influences 
an individual candidate's likelihood of winning. 

[A] Indicates the percentage of candidates within the category who won 
their election. For example, in the 2000 general election, of the 35 
participating candidates who were challengers, 23 percent, or 8 
participating challenger candidates, won, and the remaining 77 
percent, or 27 participating challenger candidates, lost. 

[B] Challengers are defined as any candidates who are not incumbents, 
regardless of whether they faced an opponent in their race. 

[C] Incumbents are defined as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. 

[End of table] 

Democrats Participating at a Higher Rate in the Public Financing 
Program in Arizona than Republicans: 

In Arizona primary and general legislative elections, more Democrats 
than Republicans participated in the public financing program, in 
terms of the proportion of candidates who participated, although, as 
shown in figure 6, the participation gap between Democrats and 
Republicans has narrowed since 2000. For example, the percentage of 
Democrats who participated in the public financing program during the 
primary election increased by about 30 percentage points (from 42 
percent to 72 percent) from 2000 to 2008, while the rate of 
participation among Republican candidates increased by about 41 
percentage points (from 9 percent to 50 percent) over the same period. 

Figure 6: Legislative Candidates by Political Party Affiliation and 
Participation Status in Arizona Primary and General Elections, 2000 
through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

Primary Elections: 

Democrats: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 58%; 
Participating: 42%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 40%; 
Participating: 60%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 37%; 
Participating: 63%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 31%; 
Participating: 70%; 

Democrats: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 28%; 
Participating: 72%; 

Republicans: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 91%; 
Participating: 9%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 59%; 
Participating: 41%; 

Republicans: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 46%; 
Participating: 54%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 59%; 
Participating: 51%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 50%; 
Participating: 50%. 

General elections: 

Democrats: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 54%; 
Participating: 45%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 37%; 
Participating: 63%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 34%; 
Participating: 56%. 

Democrats: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 28%; 
Participating: 73%; 

Democrats: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 18%; 
Participating: 82%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: 91%; 
Participating: 9%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: 66%; 
Participating: 34%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: 50%; 
Participating: 50%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: 57%; 
Participating: 43%. 

Republicans: Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: 48%; 
Participating: 52%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona election results data. 

Note: We excluded candidates who received zero votes and write-in 
candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. The number of 
Democratic candidates per primary election was: 95 in 2000, 99 in 
2002, 79 in 2004, 82 in 2006, and 93 in 2008; the number of Republican 
candidates per primary election was: 114 in 2000, 114 in 2002, 97 in 
2004, 108 in 2006, 94 in 2008; the number of Democratic candidates per 
general election was: 68 in 2000, 68 in 2002, 64 in 2004, 69 in 2006, 
74 in 2008; and the number of Republican candidates per general 
election was: 69 in 2000, 67 in 2002, 70 in 2004, 76 in 2006, 73 in 
2008. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

In Maine and Arizona, a Greater Proportion of General Election Races 
from 2002 through 2008 Had at Least One Publicly Financed Legislative 
Candidate Compared to 2000: 

The majority of general election races in both Maine and Arizona had 
at least one participating candidate in 2008, and the proportion of 
races with a participating candidate has generally increased from 2000 
through 2008 in both states. In Maine, the proportion of races with at 
least one participating candidate doubled over the five election 
cycles, from 47 percent in 2000 to 96 percent in 2008, as shown in 
figure 7. In Arizona, the proportion of races with at least one 
participating candidate increased steadily over the five election 
cycles from 53 percent in 2000 to 82 percent in 2008. 

Figure 7: Percentage of Legislative Races with at Least One Candidate 
Participating in the Public Financing Programs, Maine and Arizona 
General Elections, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 stacked vertical bar graphs] 

State: Maine; 
Election year: 2000; 
Races with no participating candidates: 53%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 47%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Races with no participating candidates: 21%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 79%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Races with no participating candidates: 8%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 92%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Races with no participating candidates: 2%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 98%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Races with no participating candidates: 4%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 96%. 

State: Arizona; 
Election year: 2000; 
Races with no participating candidates: 47%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 52%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Races with no participating candidates: 38%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 62%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Races with no participating candidates: 33%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 67%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Races with no participating candidates: 25%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 75%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Races with no participating candidates: 18%; 
Races with at least one participating candidate: 82%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine and Arizona election results data. 

Note: The total number of Maine races in each year was 186 (151 races 
in the House of Representatives and 35 in the Senate). The total 
number of Arizona races each year was 60 (30 in the House of 
Representatives and 30 in the Senate). 

[End of figure] 

Limited Data Are Available on Candidate or District Characteristics 
and Candidate Experience: 

Data limitations preclude providing additional information about 
legislative candidates or the districts in which they ran for office. 
For example, Maine and Arizona state officials did not maintain data 
to analyze candidates' experience (e.g., whether they had previously 
held public office with the exception of whether a candidate was an 
incumbent in a given election and political party affiliation); 
qualifications (e.g., education or work experience); wealth; or 
demographics (e.g., sex, age, race, or ethnicity). Additionally, data 
were not available to address issues specific to individual 
legislative districts, such as partisan composition, local ballot 
initiatives and candidates, as well as economic or demographic factors 
that could affect a candidate's participation in the public financing 
programs. 

Changes in One Measure of Electoral Competition Could Not Be Directly 
Attributed to Maine's and Arizona's Public Financing Programs; No 
Overall Changes in Voter Choice, Campaign Spending, and Interest Group 
Influence, While Data Limitations Hinder Analysis of Changes in Voter 
Participation: 

We used a variety of statistical techniques to measure changes in five 
goals of public financing before and after the implementation of 
public financing and found some evidence of statistically significant 
changes in one measure of electoral competition.[Footnote 39] For the 
rest, we found either no overall changes or data limitations precluded 
any analysis of changes. Specifically, there were differences in one 
of the measures used for the goal of increased electoral competition--
the winners' margin of victory decreased--but we could not attribute 
these differences directly to the public financing programs because 
needed data were limited or unavailable and there are certain factors 
that we could not measure, such as candidate popularity, which affect 
electoral outcomes. There were no statistically significant 
differences observed for the other measures of electoral competition: 
contestedness (number of candidates per race) and incumbent reelection 
rates. For three of the remaining four goals--increasing voter choice, 
curbing increases in campaign spending, and reducing the influence of 
interest groups and enhancing citizens' confidence in government--the 
measurable differences were not statistically significant overall. 
While there is no indication that the programs have decreased interest 
group influence, some candidates and interest group officials GAO 
interviewed said that campaign tactics have changed. We could not 
measure differences for the fifth goal--increasing voter 
participation--because of data limitations, including differences in 
how voter turnout has been measured over time for Maine and Arizona. 

Changes in One Measure of Electoral Competition--Winner's Victory 
Margin--Could Not Be Directly Attributed to Public Financing Programs 
in Maine and Arizona, While No Significant Changes Were Observed in 
Two Other Measures of Electoral Competition: 

Overall, the margin of victory in legislative races decreased 
significantly in both Maine and Arizona compared to their respective 
comparison states after the public financing programs were 
implemented; however, we could not attribute these decreases directly 
to the public financing programs due to factors such as candidate 
popularity and changing economic conditions, which affect electoral 
outcomes. On the other hand, contestedness and incumbent reelection 
rates did not significantly change over time in Maine and Arizona. The 
candidates and interest group representatives we interviewed from 
Maine and Arizona provided various perspectives on the effect of the 
public financing programs on the advantage of incumbent candidates and 
the number of close races. 

For Legislative Races, the Margin of Victory Decreased in Maine and 
Arizona, While Contestedness and Incumbent Reelection Rates Did Not 
Change in both States: 

Margin of Victory: 

Overall, winner's margin of victory in races decreased significantly 
in both Maine and Arizona as compared to their respective comparison 
states after public financing was available; however, we could not 
attribute these decreases to the public financing programs due to 
factors such as the qualifications or experience of the candidates and 
Presidential and other top-ballot races, which could motivate certain 
citizens to vote, thereby influencing electoral outcomes. We used 
three different measures of margin of victory in our analyses: (1) the 
average margin of victory for contested races, (2) the percentage of 
close races (i.e., races decided by less than 10 percentage points), 
and (3) the percentage of races that were landslides (i.e., races 
decided by more than 20 percentage points).[Footnote 40] 

As shown in tables 9 and 10, the average margin of victory for 
contested elections declined from 22 percent before public financing 
(1996 and 1998) to 19 percent after public financing (from 2000 
through 2008) in Maine, and from 31 percent before public financing to 
27 percent after public financing in Arizona. These changes, decreases 
of about 3 percent in Maine and 4 percent in Arizona, were 
statistically significantly different from the changes in the 
comparison states for both Maine and Arizona, where the average margin 
of victory increased about 1 percent in both the Maine and Arizona 
comparison states.[Footnote 41] The adjusted differences in the 
changes between Maine and Arizona and their respective comparison 
states are derived from statistical models that account for other 
factors that may have explained the changes, and in the case of 
average margin of victory the adjusted difference is statistically 
significant. Our fixed effects statistical models take into account 
whether elections were for the House of Representatives or Senate, and 
whether the races included incumbents. However, our results may be 
sensitive to our choice of comparison states. More information on 
these models and our choice of states is presented in appendix I and 
the e-supplement accompanying this report, GAO-10-391SP. 

We obtained similar results when we measured the margin of victory by 
contrasting the percentages of close races (defined as competitive 
races with a margin of victory of less than 10 percentage points) and 
races that were landslides (defined as competitive races with a margin 
of victory exceeding 20 percentage points).[Footnote 42] Close races 
increased in Maine and Arizona after public financing was available, 
by about 9 and 6 percentage points respectively. The change observed 
in Arizona was significantly different from changes in the respective 
comparison states, where the percentage of close races increased only 
slightly or actually decreased. Landslide races also decreased in 
Maine (by 7 percentage points) and Arizona (by 12 percentage points). 
These changes were significantly different from the changes in the 
comparison states after controlling for the other factors in our model. 

Table 9: Margin of Victory Measures in Maine and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Measures over Time, and Differences in the Changes 
between Maine and Comparison States: 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: Before public financing; 
Maine: 22.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 28.5%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: After public financing; 
Maine: 19.2%; 
Comparison states[A]: 29.5%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: Change; 
Maine: -2.8%; 
Comparison states[A]: 1.0%; 
Observed difference in change: -3.8%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: -6.0%[D] (1.16). 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Maine: 23.1%; 
Comparison states[A]: 20.3%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: After public financing; 
Maine: 32.5%; 
Comparison states[A]: 23.9%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Change; 
Maine: 9.4%; 
Comparison states[A]: 3.6; 
Observed difference in change: 5.8%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: 7.6%[E] (3.43). 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Maine: 48.8%; 
Comparison states[A]: 56.7%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: After public financing; 
Maine: 42.1%; 
Comparison states[A]: 55.8%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Change; 
Maine: -6.7%; 
Comparison states[A]: -0.9%; 
Observed difference in change: -5.8%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: -9.4%[D] (2.17). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Notes: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidate 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. 

[A] The comparison states for Maine were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Connecticut (excluding 2008). 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[C] Margin of victory measures were estimated for single-member 
districts only. 

[D] Denotes adjusted differences which are significant at the .05 
level. Differences may not add due to rounding. 

[E] Denotes an adjusted difference which is significantly different 
than zero at the .10 level. 

[End of table] 

Table 10: Margin of Victory Measures in Arizona and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Measures over Time, and Differences in the Changes 
between Arizona and Comparison States: 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: Before public financing; 
Arizona: 31.1%; 
Comparison states[A]: 22.8%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: After public financing; 
Arizona: 26.9%; 
Comparison states[A]: 24.1%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Average margin of victory[C]; 
Period: Change; 
Arizona: -4.3%; 
Comparison states[A]: 1.3; 
Observed difference in change: -5.6%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: -6.2%[D] (.85). 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Arizona: 29.2%; 
Comparison states[A]: 30.8%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: After public financing; 
Arizona: 35.6%; 
Comparison states[A]: 28.1%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of close races (less than 10 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Change; 
Arizona: 6.4%; 
Comparison states[A]: -2.7%; 
Observed difference in change: 9.1%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: 11.9%[D] (2.43). 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Arizona: 47.2%; 
Comparison states[A]: 45.9%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: After public financing; 
Arizona: 35.6%; 
Comparison states[A]: 47.8%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Percent of landslide races (more than 20 percentage points margin of 
victory); 
Period: Change; 
Arizona: -11.7%; 
Comparison states[A]: 1.9%; 
Observed difference in change: -13.6%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: -19.6%[D] (3.20). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Notes: contested races are races with at least one or more candidate 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. 

[A] The comparison states for Arizona were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Colorado. 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[C] Margin of victory measures were estimated for single-member 
districts only. 

[D] Denotes adjusted differences which are significant at the .05 
level. Differences may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Figures 8 and 9 present the year-to-year outcomes (instead of the 
averages for before and after public financing) for the three margin 
of victory measures for Maine and its comparison states, and Arizona 
and its comparison states. 

Figure 8: Comparison of Winner's Average Margin of Victory in 
Contested Legislative Races in Maine and Arizona with Respective 
Comparison States, General Election, 1996 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Maine: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 25.6%;
Maine, public financing: 21.5%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 27.0%;
Maine, public financing: 22.1%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 28.1%;
Maine, public financing: 21.3%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 28.5%;
Maine, public financing: 18.7%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 29.2%;
Maine, public financing: 17.5%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 28.6%;
Maine, public financing: 18.2%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 26.8%;
Maine, public financing: 20.7%. 

Arizona: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 19.6%;
Arizona, public financing: 21.9%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 22.7%;
Arizona, public financing: 21.7%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 28.1%;
Arizona, public financing: 21.3%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 24.2%;
Arizona, public financing: 21.7%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 22.6%;
Arizona, public financing: 20.7%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 21.6%;
Arizona, public financing: 18.8%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 20.8%;
Arizona, public financing: 16.2%. 

Source: GAO analysis of state election results data. 

Note: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidate 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 9: Comparison of Winner's Victory Margin in Contested 
Legislative Races in Maine and Arizona with Respective Comparison 
States, General Election, 1996 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 line graphs] 

Margin of victory less than 10 percentage points: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 21.4%; 
Maine: 24.1%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 21.2%; 
Maine: 24.4%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 21.4%; 
Maine: 27.3%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 22.5%; 
Maine: 34.1%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 22.8%; 
Maine: 36.4%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 23.4%; 
Maine: 34.7%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 24.5%;
Maine: 29.0%. 

Margin of victory less than 10 percentage points: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 31.8%; 
Arizona: 27.1%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 30.8%; 
Arizona: 34.6%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 29.6%; 
Arizona: 36.4%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 28.3%; 
Arizona: 32.1%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 27.3%; 
Arizona: 28.8%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 26.9%; 
Arizona: 32.0%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 27.3%;
Arizona: 41.7%. 

Margin of victory more than 20 percentage points: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 54.9%; 
Maine: 45.5%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 57.2%; 
Maine: 49.9%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 58.2%; 
Maine: 48.7%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 57.3%; 
Maine: 40.0%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 57.4%; 
Maine: 36.4%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 56.5%; 
Maine: 39.0%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 54.8%;
Maine: 47.7%. 

Margin of victory more than 20 percentage points: 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 44.3%; 
Arizona: 51.2%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 47.5%; 
Arizona: 42.0%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 49.2%; 
Arizona: 37.3%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 49.5%; 
Arizona: 37.8%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 48.3%; 
Arizona: 38.7%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 47.1%; 
Arizona: 35.9%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 45.8%;
Arizona: 30.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of state election results data. 

Note: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidate 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. 

[End of figure] 

Contestedness: 

Changes in contestedness--the percentage of all races that had at 
least one more candidate running than the number of seats available--
in Maine and Arizona before and after public financing was available 
were no different from changes observed in comparison states. As shown 
in tables 11 and 12, before public financing was available (1996 and 
1998), 86 percent of the elections in Maine and 60 percent of the 
elections in Arizona were contested. The percentage of contested 
elections after public financing was available (from 2000 through 
2008) increased in both states, to 91 percent in Maine and 75 percent 
in Arizona.[Footnote 43] However, even after controlling for other 
factors, these increases, of 5 percentage points and 15 percentage 
points respectively, were not statistically different from the changes 
in comparison states where percentages of contested elections 
increased by about 5 and 12 percentage points. 

Table 11: Percentage of Races Contested in Maine and Comparison 
States, Changes in the Percentages over Time, and Differences in the 
Changes between Maine and Comparison States: 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: Before public financing; 
Maine: 86.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 73.2%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: After public financing; 
Maine: 91.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 78.4%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: Change; 
Maine: 5.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 5.2%; 
Observed difference in change: -0.2%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: 0 (5.19). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Note: contested races are races with at least one or more candidates 
running than the number of seats in contention. we excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. To indirectly control for open seats resulting 
from term limits, we excluded races with no participating incumbents. 
differences may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The comparison states for Maine were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Connecticut (excluding the 2008 elections). 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[End of table] 

Table 12: Percentage of Races Contested in Arizona and Comparison 
States, Changes in the Percentages over Time, and Differences in the 
Changes between Arizona and Comparison States: 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: Before public financing; 
Arizona: 60.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 71.5%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: After public financing; 
Arizona: 75.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 83.4%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of races contested; 
Period: Change; 
Arizona: 15.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 11.8%; 
Observed difference in change: 3.2%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: 3.3% (3.93). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Note: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidates 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. To indirectly control for open seats resulting 
from term limits, we excluded races with no participating incumbents. 
Differences may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The comparison states for Arizona were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Colorado. 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[End of table] 

Further, year-to-year changes in the percentages of contested 
elections in Maine and Arizona over time are not much different from 
in their comparison states before or after controlling for other 
factors, as shown in figure 10. 

Figure 10: Comparison of the Rates of Contested Legislative Races in 
Maine and Arizona with Respective Comparison States, General Election, 
1996 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 line graphs] 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 75.1%; 
Maine, public finance: 90.9%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 72.9%; 
Maine, public finance: 83.3%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 72.8%; 
Maine, public finance: 82.2%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 75.6%; 
Maine, public finance: 88.7%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 78.4%; 
Maine, public finance: 95.0%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 80.0%; 
Maine, public finance: 95.7%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 80.7%; 
Maine, public finance: 91.6%. 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 71.4%; 
Arizona, public finance: 62.7%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 75.7%; 
Arizona, public finance: 65.1%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 78.6%; 
Arizona, public finance: 67.0%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 80.6%; 
Arizona, public finance: 70.0%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 81.4%; 
Arizona, public finance: 71.7%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 84.1%; 
Arizona, public finance: 76.2%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 88.6%; 
Arizona, public finance: 83.8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of state election results data. 

Note: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidates 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. Differences may not add due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

Incumbent Reelection Rates: 

Incumbent reelection rates (i.e., the percentage of incumbents who 
were reelected among those incumbents who ran in contested races) did 
not change significantly in Maine and Arizona before and after public 
financing was available.[Footnote 44] We first examined the proportion 
of contested races with incumbents who won relative to all contested 
races with an incumbent candidate. As shown in tables 13 and 14, in 
Maine the percentage of races in which incumbents who were challenged 
were reelected was 88 percent before public financing was available 
and about 90 percent after it was available. In Arizona, the 
percentage was 98 percent before public financing and 97 percent 
after. Incumbent reelection rates in comparison states did not change 
over time--staying around 93 percent and 91 percent, respectively, in 
the two groups of comparison states. Further, our statistical model 
that tested the difference in change across time periods between the 
states with and without campaign financing provided no evidence of any 
statistically significant difference. 

Table 13: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Rates over Time, and Differences in the Changes between 
Maine and Comparison States: 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Maine: 88.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 93.2%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: After public financing; 
Maine: 89.5%; 
Comparison states[A]: 93.6%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: Change; 
Maine: 1.5%; 
Comparison states[A]: 0.4%; 
Observed difference in change: 1.1%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: 0.7% (2.04). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Note: Incumbents are defined as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. contested races are 
races with at least one or more candidates running than the number of 
seats in contention. We excluded candidates who received zero votes 
and write-in candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. 
differences may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The comparison states for Maine were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Connecticut (excluding 2008). 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[End of table] 

Table 14: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona and Comparison States, 
Changes in the Rates over Time, and Differences in the Changes between 
Arizona and Comparison States: 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: Before public financing; 
Arizona: 98.0%; 
Comparison states[A]: 91.0%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: After public financing; 
Arizona: 97.4%; 
Comparison states[A]: 92.0%; 
Observed difference in change: [Empty]; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: [Empty]. 

Outcome measure: Percent of incumbents reelected (for races where 
incumbents faced challengers); 
Period: Change; 
Arizona: -0.5%; 
Comparison states[A]: 0.9%; 
Observed difference in change: -1.4%; 
Adjusted difference in change (SE)[B]: -0.1% (2.70). 

Source: GAO analysis of election results data. 

Note: Incumbents are defined as candidates who held a seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. contested races are 
races with at least one or more candidates running than the number of 
seats in contention. We excluded candidates who received zero votes 
and write-in candidates whose names did not appear on the ballot. 
differences may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The comparison states for Arizona were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Colorado. 

[B] The adjusted differences are derived from statistical models that 
account for other factors that may have explained the changes. 
Standard errors (SE) appear in parentheses and are used in estimating 
the amount by which the outcomes would have varied due to chance alone. 

[End of table] 

Year-to-year changes in incumbent reelection rates for races in Maine 
and Arizona over time are basically unchanged and not much different 
from in their comparison states, as shown in figure 11. 

Figure 11: Comparison of Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine and 
Arizona with Respective Comparison States, General Election, 1996 
through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 line graphs] 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 94.3%; 
Maine, public finance: 89.0%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 94.9%; 
Maine, public finance: 90.6%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 95.0%; 
Maine, public finance: 90.6%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 94.4%; 
Maine, public finance: 88.4%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 94.6%; 
Maine, public finance: 87.9%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 94.5%; 
Maine, public finance: 89.4%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 94.2%; 
Maine, public finance: 92.9%. 

Election year: 1996; 
Comparison states: 93.2%; 
Arizona, public finance: 97.3%. 

Election year: 1998; 
Comparison states: 93.2%; 
Arizona, public finance: 96.2%. 

Election year: 2000; 
Comparison states: 93.1%; 
Arizona, public finance: 95.4%. 

Election year: 2002; 
Comparison states: 92.9%; 
Arizona, public finance: 94.6%. 

Election year: 2004; 
Comparison states: 92.8%; 
Arizona, public finance: 95.4%. 

Election year: 2006; 
Comparison states: 92.9%; 
Arizona, public finance: 96.2%. 

Election year: 2008; 
Comparison states: 93.0%; 
Arizona, public finance: 97.2%. 

Source: GAO analysis of state election results data. 

Note: Contested races are races with at least one or more candidates 
running than the number of seats in contention. We excluded candidates 
who received zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. Differences may not add due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

We found similarly and consistently high reelection rates when we 
considered individual incumbent reelection rates, the proportion of 
individual incumbents who won out of all incumbents who ran.[Footnote 
45] In Maine, 90 percent of all incumbents running in general 
elections races were reelected in the years before public financing 
was available, and 90.2 percent after. In Arizona, the individual 
incumbent reelection rate for general elections before public 
financing was available was 96.9 percent, compared to 96.1 percent 
after public financing was available. Research has shown that 
incumbent candidates may have an advantage over other candidates 
because of several factors, such as visibility in the media, name 
recognition, and the ability to perform services for constituents. 
Thus, the high incumbent reelection rates observed in these states 
despite the implementation of the public financing programs is not 
surprising. 

Many other factors we could not control in our analyses may affect 
electoral competition, including the popularity of candidates, extreme 
one-issue candidates, polarizing candidates, local ballot initiatives 
and issues, economic conditions, and other aspects of political 
context. Further, the size and statistical significance of our 
comparative results also may be affected by our choice of comparison 
states.[Footnote 46] Thus, we cannot say definitively whether any of 
the changes we observe can be attributed to the campaign financing 
programs. 

Candidates and Interest Groups Reported Various Perceptions on the 
Effect of Public Financing Programs on Electoral Competition: 

The candidates and interest group representatives we interviewed from 
Maine and Arizona provided various perspectives on the effect of the 
public financing programs on the advantage of incumbent candidates and 
the number of close races. 

Most candidates we interviewed in Maine (8 of 11) believed that the 
advantage of incumbent candidates neither increased nor decreased as a 
result of the public financing program. Further, 2 of 11 candidates 
said that incumbents' advantage had increased under the public 
financing program. Among the reasons candidates gave for incumbents' 
advantage was their access to resources, such as campaign databases; 
political party support; and officeholder privileges, such as a budget 
to distribute communications (e.g., mailers and newsletters) to 
constituents. On the other hand, 1 of the 11 Maine candidates said 
that the advantage of incumbents had decreased as a result of the 
public financing program since some incumbents have been defeated by 
participating candidates who may not have run for legislative office 
without public financing. 

Arizona candidates had mixed perceptions on the effect of the public 
financing program on incumbents' advantage. Four of 11 candidates said 
that the advantage of incumbents neither increased nor decreased as a 
result of the public financing program, citing incumbents' benefits 
such as name recognition, experience in running a successful election 
campaign, and access to funding. Three candidates said that 
incumbents' advantage increased. One of these candidates explained 
that participating incumbent candidates did not have to do as much 
outreach to voters as they would have if they needed to raise private 
funds. However, 3 candidates we interviewed stated that the advantage 
of incumbent candidates has decreased. Among the reasons given for the 
decrease in incumbents' advantage was that incumbents face more 
challengers under public financing. Another candidate agreed that 
incumbents had to work harder to defend their seats in the primary 
election; however, according to the candidate, incumbents' advantage 
had not changed in general elections since many legislative districts 
are either heavily Democratic or Republican. 

The majority of candidates we interviewed in Maine (9 of 11) thought 
that the number of close legislative races increased as a result of 
the public financing program and provided a range of explanations for 
why. For example, one candidate said that before the public financing 
program, some candidates would run unopposed because potential 
challengers lacked funds, but after public financing became available, 
more challengers have entered races and have run competitively. 
However, other candidates had different perspectives that were not 
consistent with the statistical data we observed--one candidate said 
that the number of close races decreased, and one candidate said that 
the number of close races neither increased nor decreased as a result 
of the public financing program. According to this candidate, the 
broader political climate influenced elections more than the public 
financing program. 

In Arizona, over half of the candidates (6 of 11) believed that the 
public financing program had increased the number of close races. 
Candidates attributed the increase to greater equality in financial 
resources among candidates, more candidates running for office, and 
more extensive discussion of the issues, among other reasons. On the 
other hand, in contrast with the data we observed, 3 candidates we 
interviewed said that the number of close races neither increased nor 
decreased as a result of the public financing program. Additionally, 2 
candidates said that the number of close races increased in the 
primary election, where, according to one candidate, there have been 
more challengers, but neither increased nor decreased in the general 
election, since many districts are heavily Republican or Democratic. 

Half of the interest group representatives we interviewed in Maine and 
Arizona (5 of 10) thought the closeness of races had not changed, 
although our data analysis did reveal changes. For example, an Arizona 
representative commented that the public financing program by itself 
had not changed the closeness of races and that redistricting and the 
ability of independents to vote in the primary has made the races 
closer. On the other hand, 2 of the 10 representatives believed that 
the closeness of races had changed. One representative from Maine 
stated that he believed there may be a few more close races because of 
the public financing program while an Arizona representative believed 
the closeness of races had changed in the primaries because more 
candidates have an opportunity to run with public financing and 
therefore may be more competitive. Finally, 2 of the 10 interest group 
representatives were unsure whether public financing had changed the 
closeness of races and 1 of the 10 interest group representatives did 
not respond. 

No Observed Changes in Increased Voter Choice in Terms of the Average 
Number of Legislative Candidates and the Percentage of Third-Party and 
Independent Candidates Represented in Races in Maine and Arizona: 

While increasing voter choice, as measured by changes in the number of 
candidates per race and changes in the breadth of political party 
affiliations represented in races, was a goal of public financing 
programs, there were no observed changes in these measures in Maine 
and Arizona after the public financing programs were available. 
However, as discussed later, candidates we interviewed provided a 
range of perspectives about the role of third-party and independent 
candidates. 

No Observed Changes in the Average Number of State Legislative 
Candidates per District Race: 

The average number of legislative candidates per primary and general 
election race in Maine and Arizona did not vary greatly over the seven 
election cycles examined--before (1996 and 1998 elections) and after 
(2000 through 2008 elections) the public financing programs became 
available, as shown in table 15.[Footnote 47] 

Table 15: Average Number of Legislative Candidates per District Race 
in Maine and Arizona Primary and General Elections, 1996 through 2008: 

State: Maine; 
Office: House of Representatives; 
Election (primary or general): Primary; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 1.1. 

State: Maine; 
Office: House of Representatives; 
Election (primary or general): General; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 2.0; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.8; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 1.8; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 2.0; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 2.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 2.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 2.0. 

State: Maine; 
Office: Senate; 
Election (primary or general): Primary; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.0; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 1.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 1.1. 

State: Maine; 
Office: Senate; 
Election (primary or general): General; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 2.0; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.9; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 2.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 2.0; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 2.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 2.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 2.1. 

State: Arizona; 
Office: House of Representatives; 
Election (primary or general): Primary[A]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 2.5; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 2.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 2.5; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 2.7; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 2.4; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 2.3; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 2.1. 

State: Arizona; 
Office: House of Representatives; 
Election (primary or general): General[B]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 3.4; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 3.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 3.4; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 3.3; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 3.3; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 3.4; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 3.5. 

State: Arizona; 
Office: Senate; 
Election (primary or general): Primary; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 1.3; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 1.3; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 1.4; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 1.2; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 1.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 1.1. 

State: Arizona; 
Office: Senate; 
Election (primary or general): General; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1996: 1.7; 
Average number of candidates per district race: Before public 
financing: 1998: 1.5; 
Average number of candidates per district race: [Empty]; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2000: 1.9; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2002: 1.7; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2004: 1.6; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2006: 1.9; 
Average number of candidates per district race: After public 
financing: 2008: 1.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine and Arizona election results data. 

Notes: The redistricting of Arizona's legislative districts, which 
included review and approval by the Department of Justice as well 
various court actions, in general, resulted in legislative districts 
being redistricted for the 2002 elections and additional revisions for 
the 2004 elections. Maine legislative districts boundaries were 
redrawn for the 2004 elections due to changes in the state's 
population. 

[A] Arizona has multimember House districts, in which two 
representatives are elected from each district. The two candidates 
receiving the most votes in the Arizona primary are the party nominees 
in the general election. For example, if three Republicans run in the 
primary, then the top two vote-getters advance to the general election. 

[B] The two candidates in each House district receiving the most votes 
in the general election are elected, regardless of their political 
party affiliation. 

[End of table] 

Percentage of Races with Viable Third-Party or Independent Candidates 
in Maine and Arizona Varied in Election Years before and after Public 
Financing Was Available, but Did Not Increase over Time: 

During the 1996 through 2008 legislative elections in Maine and 
Arizona, candidates from a variety of third parties and independents 
ran for office. In Maine, these candidates included Green Party 
members and independents.[Footnote 48] In Arizona, these candidates 
included members of the Green, Natural Law, Reform, and Libertarian 
Parties, as well as independents. As shown in tables 16 and 17, while 
there were some changes in the percent of races with third-party or 
independent candidates receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast--a 
proxy indicator for "viable" candidates--there were no discernible 
trends from 1996 through 2008 in Maine and Arizona.[Footnote 49] 

Table 16: Percent of Races with Third-Party or Independent Candidates 
Receiving 5 Percent or More of Votes Cast in Maine General Elections, 
1996 through 2008: 

Availability of public financing: Before public financing; 
Year: 1996; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 16; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 10.6%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 11.4%. 

Year: 1998; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 11; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 7.3%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 11.4%. 

Availability of public financing: After public financing; 
Year: 2000; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 20; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 13.2%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 3; 
Senate: Percent of races: 8.6%. 

Year: 2002; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 20; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 13.2%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 5; 
Senate: Percent of races: 14.3%. 

Year: 2004; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 22; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 14.6%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 11.4%. 

Year: 2006; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 15; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 9.9%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 5; 
Senate: Percent of races: 14.3%. 

Year: 2008; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 151; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 13; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 8.6%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 35; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 11.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine election results data. 

Note: We consider an independent or third-party candidate to be 
"viable" if the candidate received 5 percent or more of votes cast. 
This threshold is based on a typical standard for party ballot access 
and retention, and is distinct from whether a candidate is electable 
or highly competitive with other candidates. 

[End of table] 

Table 17: Percent of Races with Third-Party or Independent Candidates 
Receiving 5 Percent or More of Votes Cast in Arizona General 
Elections, 1996 through 2008: 

Availability of public financing: Before public financing; 
Year: 1996; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 4; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 13.3%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 13.3%. 

Year: 1998; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 3; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 10.0%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 3; 
Senate: Percent of races: 10.0%. 

Availability of public financing: After public financing; 
Year: 2000; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 8; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 26.7%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 4; 
Senate: Percent of races: 13.3%. 

Year: 2002; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 3; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 10.0%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 5; 
Senate: Percent of races: 16.7%. 

Year: 2004; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 6; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 20.0%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 3; 
Senate: Percent of races: 10.0%. 

Year: 2006; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 4; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 13.3%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 2; 
Senate: Percent of races: 6.7%. 

Year: 2008; 
House of Representatives: Total number of races: 30; 
House of Representatives: Number of races with at least one viable 
third-party or independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of 
votes cast: 3; 
House of Representatives: Percent of races: 10.0%; 
Senate: Total number of races: 30; 
Senate: Number of races with at least one viable third-party or 
independent candidate receiving 5 percent or more of votes cast: 2; 
Senate: Percent of races: 6.7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona election results data. 

Note: We consider an independent or third-party candidate to be 
"viable" if the candidate received 5 percent or more of votes cast. 
This threshold is based on a typical standard for party ballot access 
and retention, and is distinct from whether a candidate is electable 
or highly competitive with other candidates. Because Arizona has 
multimember House districts, these 30 elections represent 60 House 
seats. 

[End of table] 

Candidates Offered a Range of Perspectives about the Effect of Public 
Financing Programs on the Role of Third-Party and Independent 
Candidates and the Quality and Types of Candidates: 

The 22 candidates from Maine and Arizona we interviewed had mixed 
views on the role of third parties and independents in the 2008 
election and the quality and types of candidates running for election. 
The majority of candidates in Maine (7 of 11) and Arizona (7 of 11) 
said that the role of third parties and independents neither increased 
nor decreased as a result of the public financing programs. However, 
the other candidates had differing perspectives. For example, one 
candidate in Maine told us that public financing had increased the 
role of third-party and independent candidates as it has been 
particularly helpful for third-party candidates running against 
incumbent candidates. 

Additionally, several candidates provided comments about the effect of 
the public financing programs on the quality and type of candidates 
running for legislative office.[Footnote 50] For example, in Maine, 3 
of the 11 candidates told us that the public financing program had a 
positive effect on voter choice, by allowing a greater diversity of 
candidates to run for office and by improving the quality of political 
debate. On the other hand, 3 other Maine candidates thought the public 
financing program allowed candidates to run for office who were not 
credible or who were unqualified. In Arizona, 2 of the 11 candidates 
said that the public financing program allowed candidates that were on 
the extremes of the political spectrum to run and win, which has 
resulted in a more partisan and divided legislature. However, another 
candidate said that many of the participating candidates are 
experienced incumbent candidates. 

Average Legislative Candidate Spending Varied in Election Cycles under 
Public Funding Programs in Maine and Arizona; Independent Expenditures 
Increased in Maine, and Officials Reported Independent Expenditures 
Also Increased in Arizona: 

Average legislative candidate spending varied from year to year in 
Maine and Arizona in the five election cycles that occurred after 
public financing became available (2000 through 2008).[Footnote 51] In 
Maine, average candidate spending in House races decreased 
statistically significantly after public financing became available as 
compared to the two elections before public financing was available 
(1996 and 1998). However, we could not attribute this decrease to the 
public financing program because of other factors, such as reductions 
made to the amounts of funding publicly financed candidates received 
during the 2008 elections. Average candidate spending in Maine Senate 
races did not change significantly. In Arizona, data were not 
available to compare legislative candidate spending before 2000; 
however, in the five elections under the public financing program, 
average candidate spending has increased. Independent expenditures 
have increased fourfold in Maine, and state officials reported that 
independent expenditures have increased in Arizona since 2000. 
[Footnote 52] 

Average Maine Legislative Candidate Spending Decreased in House Races, 
but Did Not Change Significantly in Senate Races after Public 
Financing Became Available: 

While average legislative candidate spending varied from year to year 
in Maine, as shown in figure 12, in the five elections after public 
financing became available average candidate spending in House races 
decreased, while average Senate candidate spending did not change 
significantly compared to the two elections before public financing 
was available.[Footnote 53] Specifically, average candidate spending 
in Maine House races decreased from an average of $6,700 before public 
financing was available to an average of $5,700 after public financing 
became available. A state official told us that a 5 percent reduction 
in the set amount of public funding distributed to participating 
candidates for the general election likely contributed to the decrease 
in spending in the 2008 election. 

Figure 12: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine, 1996 
through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

Houses of Representatives: 

Before public financing: 

Election year: 1996; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $6,300. 

Election year: 1998; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $7,100. 

After public financing: 

Election year: 2000; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $5,000. 

Election year: 2002; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $5,900. 

Election year: 2004; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $5,800. 

Election year: 2006; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $6,500. 

Election year: 2008; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $5,100. 

Senate: 

Before public financing: 

Election year: 1996; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $24,200. 

Election year: 1998; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $26,600. 

After public financing: 

Election year: 2000; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $22,600. 

Election year: 2002; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $22,300. 

Election year: 2004; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $29,100. 

Election year: 2006; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $26,300. 

Election year: 2008; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $22,900. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine campaign finance data. 

Note: We did not include any candidate who reported spending zero 
dollars or did not run in the general election in Maine. Spending 
includes both primary and general election expenditures. We adjusted 
all spending amounts for inflation using the gross domestic product 
(GDP) price index with 2008 as the base year. The 2004 Maine Senate 
spending average includes a nonparticipating candidate who spent 
$225,566. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in figure 13, spending by Maine legislative incumbent 
candidates, challengers, and open race challengers (i.e., candidates 
running in open races with no incumbent candidates) varied from year 
to year. 

Figure 13: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine by 
Candidate Status, 1996 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 vertical bar graphs] 

House of Representatives: 

Before public financing: 

Election year: 1996; 
Incumbent spending: $7,300; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $5,400; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $6,300. 

Election year: 1998; 
Incumbent spending: $8,000; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $6,300; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $6,500. 

After public financing: 

Election year: 2000; 
Incumbent spending: $5,600; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $4,100; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $5,100. 

Election year: 2002; 
Incumbent spending: $6,000; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $5,800
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $6,100. 

Election year: 2004; 
Incumbent spending: $6,000; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $5,800; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $5,700. 

Election year: 2006; 
Incumbent spending: $5,900; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $5,800; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $8,400. 

Election year: 2008; 
Incumbent spending: $4,600; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $5,100; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $5,700. 

Senate: 

Before public financing: 

Election year: 1996; 
Incumbent spending: $26,800; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $16,500; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $29,400. 

Election year: 1998; 
Incumbent spending: $28,300; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $17,800; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $29,400. 

After public financing: 

Election year: 2000; 
Incumbent spending: $19,100; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $21,000; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $26,600. 

Election year: 2002; 
Incumbent spending: $21,400; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $19,300; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $26,200. 

Election year: 2004; 
Incumbent spending: $27,100; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $36,200; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $25,100. 

Election year: 2006; 
Incumbent spending: $26,700; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $24,300; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $30,000. 

Election year: 2008; 
Incumbent spending: $24,500; 
Challenger running against incumbents: $19,700; 
Challenger in open races (no incumbents running): $25,700. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine campaign finance data. 

Note: Incumbents are candidates who held a seat from the previous 
legislative session in the same chamber. Challengers are candidates 
who ran against an incumbent candidate in the primary or general 
election. Open race challengers are candidates who did not run against 
an incumbent in either the primary or general election. Spending 
amounts do not include any candidate who reported spending zero 
dollars or did not run in the general election. Spending includes both 
primary and general election amounts and has been adjusted for 
inflation using the GDP price index, with 2008 as the base year. The 
2004 Maine nonparticipating Senate candidate spending average includes 
one candidate who spent $225,566. 

[End of figure] 

However, overall, the difference in average spending by incumbents and 
challengers narrowed in both House and Senate races after public 
financing became available. In addition, average spending by open race 
challengers was relatively higher than either incumbent or challenger 
spending averages in House races, but was not significantly different 
in Senate races in the elections after public financing became 
available. In Maine House races, incumbents spent $1,800 more on 
average than their challengers in the two elections before public 
financing became available. In comparison, the difference in average 
spending by incumbents and challengers was not statistically 
significant in the five elections under the public financing program. 
Open race challengers spent more on average ($6,100) than either 
incumbents, who spent an average of $5,600, or challengers running 
against incumbents, who spent an average of $5,400, in the five 
elections under the public financing program. Before public financing 
became available, incumbents spent an average of $7,700, more than the 
average amount spent by challengers ($5,900) or open race challengers 
($6,300) during the same period. 

The difference in average incumbent and challenger spending in Maine 
Senate races also decreased in the period after public financing 
became available. On average, incumbents spent nearly $10,500 more 
than their challengers in the two elections before public financing 
became available; however, after public financing became available, 
the difference between average incumbent and average challenger 
spending was not statistically significant. Similarly, spending by 
open race challengers in Senate races was not significantly different 
from spending by either incumbents or challengers in the elections 
after public financing became available. 

As figure 14 shows, average spending by participating and 
nonparticipating candidates varied in the five elections under the 
public financing program. However, overall, spending by participating 
candidates was not significantly different than spending by 
nonparticipating candidates in both Maine House and Senate races in 
the five elections under the public financing program. 

Figure 14: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Maine by 
Participation Status, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

House of Representatives: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: $5,200; 
Participating: $4,600. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: $6,100; 
Participating: $5,900. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: $5,500; 
Participating: $5,900. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: $7,200; 
Participating: $6,300. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: $4,700; 
Participating: $5,200. 

Senate: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: $26,100; 
Participating: $18,900. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: $20,500; 
Participating: $22,900. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: $46,500; 
Participating: $24,900. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: $24,600; 
Participating: $26,500. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: $9,600; 
Participating: $25,600. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine campaign finance data. 

Note: Spending amounts do not include any candidate who reported 
spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election. Spending 
includes both primary and general election amounts and has been 
adjusted for inflation using the GDP price index, with 2008 as the 
base year. The 2004 Maine nonparticipating Senate candidate spending 
average includes one candidate who spent $225,566. 

[End of figure] 

Independent Expenditures in Maine Legislative Races Increased from 
2000 through 2008: 

Independent expenditures in Maine legislative races have increased by 
about $500,000 in the five elections under the public financing 
program.[Footnote 54] As figure 15 shows, independent expenditures 
increased from about $150,000 in 2000 to a high of about $655,000 in 
2006, with a large increase occurring in the 2004 election. The 
Director of Maine's commission told us that he believes that the 
increase in 2004 was due principally to a change in the definition of 
independent expenditures.[Footnote 55] While independent expenditures 
decreased somewhat (by about $20,000) in the 2008 election compared to 
the 2006 election, the total amount remained high. 

Figure 15: Independent Expenditures in Maine Legislative Elections, 
2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Election year: 2000; 
Independent Expenditures: $154,000. 

Election year: 2002; 
Independent Expenditures: $248,000. 

Election year: 2004; 
Independent Expenditures: $601,000. 

Election year: 2006; 
Independent Expenditures: $655,000. 

Election year: 2008; 
Independent Expenditures: $635,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine campaign finance data. 

Note: Amounts include independent expenditures reported in Maine House 
or Senate races and have been adjusted for inflation with the GDP 
price index, with 2008 as the base year. 

[End of figure] 

Average Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending Increased since 2000: 

Average candidate spending in Arizona legislative races has generally 
increased in the five elections under the public financing program; 
[Footnote 56] however, we were not able to compare these spending 
levels to those in the period before public financing became 
available.[Footnote 57] As shown in figure 16, average candidate 
spending in Arizona House races has increased in each subsequent 
election since 2000, with the exception of 2006, when average spending 
declined about $1,000 from the previous election. In 2008, average 
spending increased to $48,700, a $13,000 increase from 2006. In 
Arizona Senate races, average candidate spending has been increasing 
following the 2002 election, after a decrease of about $10,000 in the 
2002 election. 

Figure 16: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona, 2000 
through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

House of Representatives: 

Election year: 2000; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $34,000. 

Election year: 2002; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $35,100. 

Election year: 2004; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $36,700. 

Election year: 2006; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $35,700. 

Election year: 2008; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $48,700. 

Senate: 

Election year: 2000; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $48,100. 

Election year: 2002; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $38,900. 

Election year: 2004; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $40,800. 

Election year: 2006; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $42,700. 

Election year: 2008; 
Average Legislative Candidate Spending: $48,900. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona campaign finance data. 

Note: Average spending includes both primary and general spending for 
candidates who ran in the general election and reported campaign 
transactions that totaled more than zero dollars to the Arizona 
Secretary of State. Candidates who agreed to spend $500 or less were 
not required to file campaign finance reports with the Secretary of 
State, according to Arizona Secretary of State officials. Spending has 
been adjusted for inflation using the GDP price index, with 2008 as 
the base year. 

[End of figure] 

State officials told us that the way candidates have spent campaign 
funds has changed since the implementation of the public financing 
program. For example, they said that candidates have coordinated their 
campaigns with other candidates in their district to maximize their 
campaign resources. For example, two Republican candidates for the 
Arizona House of Representatives may pool their campaign funds to send 
out one mailing in support of both candidates, rather than each 
candidate sending out separate mailings. 

Average spending by challengers and incumbents fluctuated from year to 
year, with challengers spending more in some elections, and incumbents 
spending more in other elections in both Arizona House and Senate 
races, as shown in figure 17. 

Figure 17: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona by 
Candidate Status, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

House of Representatives: 

Election year: 2000; 
Incumbents: $35,700; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $28,100; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $38,800. 

Election year: 2002; 
Incumbents: $37,800; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $32,400; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $36,000. 

Election year: 2004; 
Incumbents: $36,500; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $35,500; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $40,700. 

Election year: 2006; 
Incumbents: $34,400; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $35,500; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $40,900. 

Election year: 2008; 
Incumbents: $48,900; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $50,800; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $44,000. 

Senate: 

Election year: 2000; 
Incumbents: $40,600; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $39,800; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $60,100. 

Election year: 2002; 
Incumbents: $24,000; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $35,900; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $46,300. 

Election year: 2004; 
Incumbents: $34,800; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $37,800; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $55,000. 

Election year: 2006; 
Incumbents: $41,900; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $39,700; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $46,500. 

Election year: 2008; 
Incumbents: $41,400; 
Challengers running against incumbents: $40,200; 
Challengers in open races (no incumbents running): $67,400. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona campaign finance data. 

Note: Average spending includes both primary and general spending for 
candidates who ran in the general election and reported campaign 
transactions that totaled more than zero dollars to the Arizona 
Secretary of State. Candidates who agreed to spend $500 or less were 
not required to file campaign finance reports with the Secretary of 
State, according to Arizona Secretary of State officials. Incumbents 
are candidates who held a seat from the previous legislative session 
in the same chamber. Challengers are candidates who ran against an 
incumbent candidate in the primary or general election. Open race 
challengers are candidates who did not run against an incumbent in 
either the general or primary election. Spending has been adjusted for 
inflation using the GDP price index, with 2008 as the base year. 

[End of figure] 

Overall, there was no statistically significant difference between 
average incumbent and average challenger spending in either Arizona 
House or Senate races in the five elections under public financing. 
Further, spending by open race challengers in House races was not 
significantly different from spending by incumbents or challengers 
after public financing became available. However, in each of the five 
elections examined, average spending by open race challengers in 
Arizona Senate races was higher than average spending by incumbents or 
challengers, and overall, open race challengers spent between $14,600 
and $16,200 more on average than either incumbents or challengers. 

Participating candidates spent more on average than nonparticipating 
candidates in Arizona House, while in Senate races nonparticipating 
candidates spent more on average than participating candidates in some 
years and less in others, as shown in figure 18. Participating 
candidates in Arizona House races spent $44,500 on average, compared 
to nonparticipating candidates, who spent an average of $29,700 in the 
five elections under the public financing program. In Arizona Senate 
races, there was not a statistically significant difference between 
average spending by participating and nonparticipating candidates in 
the five elections examined. State officials said that the amount 
spent on independent expenditures has increased since 2000. Therefore, 
they stated that matching funds distributed to participating 
candidates for independent expenditures may account for some of the 
difference in average spending by participating and nonparticipating 
candidates. 

Figure 18: Average Legislative Candidate Spending in Arizona by 
Participation Status, 2000 through 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

House of Representatives: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: $31,700; 
Participating: $39,200. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: $28,600; 
Participating: $39,800. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: $23,200; 
Participating: $44,300. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: $25,200; 
Participating: $42,900. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: $41,000; 
Participating: $51,600. 

Senate: 

Election year: 2000; 
Nonparticipating: $50,400; 
Participating: $40,700. 

Election year: 2002; 
Nonparticipating: $33,800; 
Participating: $48,200. 

Election year: 2004; 
Nonparticipating: $32,900; 
Participating: $52,100. 

Election year: 2006; 
Nonparticipating: $40,100; 
Participating: $45,100. 

Election year: 2008; 
Nonparticipating: $49,400; 
Participating: $48,500. 

5ource: GAO analysis of Arizona campaign finance data. 

Note: Average spending includes both primary and general spending for 
candidates who ran in the general election and reported campaign 
transactions that totaled more than zero dollars to the Arizona 
Secretary of State. Candidates who agreed to spend $500 or less were 
not required to file campaign finance reports with the Secretary of 
State, according to Arizona Secretary of State officials. Spending has 
been adjusted for inflation using the GDP price index, with 2008 as 
the base year. 

[End of figure] 

Independent Expenditures Increased in Arizona According to State 
Officials: 

According to state officials, independent expenditures have increased 
in Arizona legislative elections under the public financing program. 
In 2008, independent expenditures in Arizona House and Senate races 
totaled $2,170,000.[Footnote 58] While complete data on independent 
expenditures specifically in legislative elections were not available 
for elections prior to 2008, state officials told us that independent 
expenditures have increased. Furthermore, in our 2003 report, the 
Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission identified independent 
expenditures in the 1998, 2000, and 2002 legislative and statewide 
elections.[Footnote 59] Independent expenditures in both legislative 
and statewide races totaled $102,400 in 1998, $46,700 in 2000, and 
$3,074,300 in 2002.[Footnote 60] We reported in 2003 that the increase 
in independent expenditures in the 2002 election was largely 
associated with the gubernatorial race, with more than 92 percent of 
the independent expenditures associated with two gubernatorial 
candidates. 

Candidates and Interest Group Representatives Had Mixed Perceptions 
about the Effect of Public Financing Programs on Campaign Spending: 

The candidates and interest groups we interviewed in Maine and Arizona 
had a range of experiences with and views on campaign spending, 
independent expenditures, and issue advocacy advertisements. 

Candidates' and Interest Groups' Views on Campaign Spending: 

While candidates and interest groups had varying views about whether 
campaign spending had increased in the 2008 elections, in general they 
indicated that equality in financial resources among candidates had 
increased in the 2008 election as a result of the public financing 
programs. In Maine, about half of the candidates (5 of 11) we 
interviewed said that campaign spending increased in the 2008 election 
as a result of the public financing program. Candidates provided a 
number of reasons for the perceived increase in campaign spending. For 
example, one candidate said that campaign spending increased because 
some participating candidates spent more than they would have if they 
had raised private funds for their campaigns. Another candidate noted 
that the amount of money spent by participating candidates has 
increased in some races because they received additional matching 
funds for independent expenditures made by interest groups. Spending 
by nonparticipating candidates may have increased in some cases as 
well, according to one candidate, since the presence of a 
participating candidate in the race forces nonparticipating candidates 
to take the election more seriously and spend more on their campaigns 
than they would have otherwise. However, 3 other candidates we 
interviewed in Maine contended that campaign spending had decreased. 
For example, one candidate noted that spending had decreased because 
of the spending cap placed on participating candidates. Three 
candidates felt that spending in Maine legislative races had neither 
increased nor decreased as a result of the public financing program. 
In one candidate's view, contribution limits have had a greater 
influence on spending than the public financing program. 

In Arizona, the majority of candidates (7 of 11) we interviewed 
believed that candidate spending increased in the 2008 election as a 
result of the public financing program. One nonparticipating candidate 
told us that, because of the matching funds provision of the public 
financing program, in 2008 he spent almost double the amount than he 
spent in any previous campaign in order to get out his message and 
outspend his participating opponent. Another candidate commented that 
the increase in independent expenditures has driven up campaign 
spending by triggering additional matching funds for participating 
candidates. On the other hand, 3 candidates felt that the public 
financing program led to a decrease in campaign spending in the 2008 
election. One participating candidate explained that she could have 
raised more money traditionally than she received from the public 
financing program. One candidate indicated that spending neither 
increased nor decreased. 

Regarding interest groups in Maine, two of the five representatives 
stated that candidate spending increased. One of these representatives 
commented that there has been an increase in money spent by candidates 
because there is more access to money and the races are more 
competitive. Further, this representative stated that the public 
financing program gives challengers an opportunity to level the 
playing field when running against incumbents. Participating 
candidates who would otherwise not be able to raise enough private 
money can run a well-financed campaign using public funds and have an 
opportunity to present their issues for debate in the race. On the 
other hand, three of the five interest group representatives stated 
that candidate spending neither increased nor decreased in the 2008 
election as a result of the public financing program. One of these 
representatives commented that the amount of money spent by candidates 
has not changed because limits are set by the legislature. However, 
this representative opined that the amount of money spent on behalf of 
the candidates in the form of independent expenditures had increased 
dramatically and consistently. He went on to say that the public 
financing program is reducing the disparity between the candidates who 
can raise the money and those candidates who cannot raise the money 
and that a candidate who is not serious can receive as much money as a 
serious candidate. 

In Arizona, four of the five interest group representatives believed 
that candidate spending increased as a result of the public financing 
program. For example, one of these representatives said that the 
public financing program has moved money from the candidates to 
independent expenditures, and that political parties are playing a 
significant role in this shift. Another interest group representative 
believed that candidate spending increased but was unsure if this 
increase was due to the public financing program, noting that 
increased campaign spending could be attributed to more competitive 
races or the rise in the cost of campaign materials due to inflation. 
Further, he noted that a pattern has emerged in which candidates run 
as participating candidates during their first election, and after 
being elected run subsequently as nonparticipating candidates. These 
legislators have name recognition and can raise the money required to 
run their campaigns and can also help other candidates get elected. On 
the other hand, one of the five representatives believed that campaign 
spending had neither increased nor decreased and that money has been 
redirected from the candidate campaigns to independent expenditures. 
He did not believe that his organization was spending any less money 
on campaigns. 

In general, candidates and interest group representatives in Maine and 
Arizona reported that equality in financial resources among candidates 
had increased in the 2008 election as a result of the public financing 
programs. In Maine, the majority of the candidates interviewed (7 of 
11) said that equality in financial resources among candidates 
increased as a result of the public financing program. Two candidates 
commented that candidates from different political parties compete on 
a roughly equal playing field under the public financing program. 
Another Maine candidate said that both nonparticipating and 
participating candidates spend about the same amount on their 
campaigns. However, 2 candidates we interviewed said that equality in 
financial resources had decreased as a result of the public financing 
program. According to one candidate, more money may be spent by 
political action committees than by candidates in a race, which can 
reduce equality. One nonparticipating candidate responded that the 
public financing program increased equality in financial resources 
among participating candidates, but decreased equality in financial 
resources among nonparticipating candidates, and 1 candidate was not 
sure how the public financing program had influenced equality in 
financial resources among candidates. 

In Arizona, about half of the candidates (6 of 11) thought equality in 
financial resources among candidates had increased. Two of these 
candidates commented that in their experience, candidates spent 
roughly the same, regardless of their political party affiliation or 
if they participated in the public financing program or used 
traditional means to finance their campaigns. On the other hand, 1 
candidate said that equality in financial resources had decreased, and 
commented that he was outspent by his participating opponents by a 
ratio of 13 to 1. Three of the 11 candidates we interviewed said that 
the equality in financial resources neither increased nor decreased as 
a result of the public financing program. For example, one candidate 
told us that incumbents continue to outspend their opponents and that 
nonparticipating candidates have developed strategies to maximize 
their financial advantage, such as raising funds at the end of the 
campaign so participating candidates have little time to spend 
matching funds. The remaining candidate was not sure about the change 
in resource equality. 

Seven of the 10 interest group representatives we interviewed in Maine 
(3 of 5) and Arizona (4 of 5) said that equality in financial 
resources among candidates as a result of the public financing 
programs had increased. For example, an Arizona interest group 
representative commented that the public financing law holds the 
candidates' financial resources even. On the other hand, 1 of the 5 
representatives from Maine stated that equality in financial resources 
among candidates decreased and commented that since monetary limits 
are set statutorily, it is the independent expenditures that skew the 
financial resources among candidates. Finally, 2 of the 10 
representatives, 1 from Maine and 1 from Arizona, believed that 
equality in financial resources neither increased nor decreased, while 
1 of these representatives further commented that even though 
financial resources stayed the same, some nonparticipating candidates 
had a financial advantage because they asked for larger donations from 
interest groups. 

Candidates' and Interest Group Representatives' Views on Independent 
Expenditures: 

Independent expenditures were of varying importance in the races of 
the candidates we spoke with. The majority of the Maine legislative 
candidates we interviewed (7 of the 11) reported that independent 
expenditures were of little or no importance to the outcome of their 
races in the 2008 election. One candidate explained that no 
independent expenditures were made on his behalf because he was 
perceived to be the likely winner. However, 2 candidates we 
interviewed said that independent expenditures were moderately 
important, and 2 candidates said that independent expenditures were 
extremely or very important to the outcome of their races in the 2008 
election. The candidates who had independent expenditures made in 
their races shared their experiences with us. One candidate said an 
independent expenditure made on his behalf could have possibly hurt 
his campaign since the expenditure was for a mailer that was poorly 
conceived and included a photograph of him that was of low quality. 
Another candidate who participated in the public financing program in 
Maine said that she and her participating opponent received large 
amounts of matching funds in response to independent expenditures made 
by business, trucking, state police, and equal rights groups that went 
towards mailings, television ads, and newspapers ads. However, the 
candidate thought that other factors played a greater role in the 
outcome of her election. 

In Arizona, independent expenditures reportedly played an important 
role in the outcome of 6 of the 11 candidates' races, with 5 
candidates saying that independent expenditures were moderately 
important and 1 candidate reporting that independent expenditures were 
extremely important. One of these candidates said that groups made 
independent expenditures on behalf of his opponent to produce a number 
of mailers as well as billboards and television commercials that hurt 
his election campaign by shifting the focus away from the issues that 
he had concentrated on. Another candidate said that groups made 
independent expenditures opposing her near the end of her 2008 
campaign; however, since she participated in the public financing 
program, she received matching funds and was able to respond. On the 
other hand, 5 candidates reported that independent expenditures were 
of little or of no importance in the outcome of their races. One 
candidate said that while there was a lot of money spent on 
independent expenditures in his race, the independent expenditures did 
not play a big role in the outcome of the election since roughly the 
same amount was spent on behalf of both him and his opponent. Another 
candidate explained that since she was an incumbent and her reelection 
was secure, not much was spent on independent expenditures in her race. 

Eight of the 10 interest group representatives in Maine (5 of 5) and 
Arizona (3 of 5) we interviewed said their groups made independent 
expenditures in support of candidates in the 2008 elections; although, 
the representatives had varying views about the influence the 
expenditures had on the outcome of the races. All 5 Maine interest 
group representatives made independent expenditures in the 2008 
elections, and all expenditures included mailers in support of 
candidates. Three of these 5 Maine representatives were not sure how 
much influence the expenditures had on the outcome of the elections. 
On the other hand, the remaining 2 representatives had different 
views. One Maine representative believed that her group's expenditures 
were effective in getting the candidate's message out to the voters. 
Finally, another Maine representative, who made several independent 
expenditures, said his experience was mixed, and the candidates he 
made independent expenditures on behalf of lost in more cases than 
they won. In Arizona, 3 of the 5 interest groups made independent 
expenditures. Two of these representatives said the expenditures were 
for mailers in support of candidates and believed that they were 
beneficial because the candidates won. The third representative said 
that his group made expenditures for both positive and negative 
mailers, and he believed that the expenditures were ineffective and 
was not sure what role they played in the outcome of the 2008 
elections. 

Candidates' Views on Issue Advocacy Spending: 

While Maine and Arizona legislative candidates we interviewed offered 
varying views on issue advocacy spending, 14 of the 22 candidates 
stated that issue advocacy advertisements were of little of no 
importance to the outcome of their races in the 2008 elections. Issue 
advocacy spending is often viewed as those forms of media 
advertisements that do not expressly advocate for or against a clearly 
identified political candidate. For example, such issue advocacy ads 
do not use terms like "vote for," "vote against," or "reelect." In 
general, courts have not upheld campaign finance law regulation of 
issue advocacy spending upon the reasoning that the rationales offered 
to support such regulations did not justify the infringement upon 
constitutional free speech protections.[Footnote 61] According to 
state officials in Maine and Arizona, neither Maine nor Arizona track 
issue advocacy spending. 

In Maine, 7 of the 11 candidates we interviewed reported that issue 
advocacy advertisements were of little or of no importance to the 
outcome of their races. One of these candidates explained that his 
race was not targeted by issue advocacy ads because he was expected to 
win and his opponent was not perceived to be very competitive. Another 
candidate we interviewed had a negative issue advocacy ad made in his 
race, but he did not think it affected the outcome of the election. 
The candidate told us the issue advocacy ad listed the tax increases 
he voted for alongside a smiling picture of him; however, according to 
the candidate, the ad only told half of the story, since the bill that 
contained the tax increases was revenue neutral and raised some taxes 
while lowering others. In contrast, 4 of the 11 candidates we 
interviewed said that issue advocacy was moderately important in their 
2008 races. For example, 1 of these candidates said that issue 
advocacy advertisements highlighting the candidates' positions on 
education issues was a factor in the outcome of his race. 

Similarly, in Arizona, the majority of candidates interviewed (7 of 
11) said that issue advocacy ads were of little or no importance to 
the outcome of their races in the 2008 election. For example, 1 
candidate told us that he did not think that issue advocacy ads made a 
difference in his race because the ads did not mention the candidates' 
names. Another candidate said that there were some issue advocacy ads 
that played an information role in his race by presenting a comparison 
of the candidates' beliefs; however, the candidate thought the ads 
were of little importance in the outcome of the election. On the other 
hand, 3 candidates said that issue advocacy ads were moderately 
important to the outcome of their races. According to one candidate, 
issue advocacy advertisements on crime, abortion, and education 
funding influenced the outcome of his race.[Footnote 62] 

Voting-Age Citizens, Candidates, and Interest Group Representatives We 
Interviewed Perceived That the Public Financing Programs Did Not 
Decrease Interest Group Influence or Increase Public Confidence, 
Although Some Reported That Campaign Tactics Have Changed: 

Our surveys of voting-age citizens and interviews with candidates and 
interest group representatives in Maine and Arizona indicated that the 
public campaign financing programs did not decrease the perception of 
interest group influence and did not increase public confidence in 
government.[Footnote 63] However, candidate and interest group 
representatives reported that campaign tactics, such as the role of 
political parties and the timing of expenditures, had changed. 

Perceived Interest Group Influence Did Not Decrease as a Result of the 
Public Financing Program: 

In 2009, the percentage of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona 
who said that the public financing law had greatly or somewhat 
increased the influence of special interest groups on legislators was 
not significantly different from those who said that the law had 
greatly or somewhat decreased special interest group influence. 
[Footnote 64] For example, among those polled in Maine in 2009, the 
percentage of voting-age citizens who said that the influence of 
interest groups greatly or somewhat increased was 17 percent, while 19 
percent said that the interest group influence had greatly or somewhat 
decreased, as shown in table 18. An additional 19 percent felt that 
the law had no effect on the influence of interest groups on 
legislators. In Arizona in 2009, 24 percent believed the public 
financing law greatly or somewhat increased the influence of interest 
groups, while 25 percent felt it greatly or somewhat decreased 
interest group influence. Additionally, 32 percent of those polled 
indicated that the public financing law had no effect on the influence 
of interest groups. 

Table 18: Maine and Arizona Voting-Age Citizens' Views on Influence of 
Interest Groups, among Those Aware of the Law: 

State: Maine; 

GAO survey questions and response options: To what extent do you think 
Maine's Clean Election Law has decreased or increased the influence of 
special interest groups on legislators? Would you say the Law has 
greatly decreased, somewhat decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat 
increased, or greatly increased the influence of special interest 
groups, or is it too soon to tell? 

Greatly increased: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 2%; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 2%. 

Somewhat increased: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 5; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 15. 

Had no effect: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 21; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 19. 

Somewhat decreased: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 21; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 13. 

Greatly decreased: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 4; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 6. 

Too soon to tell, unsure, or declined to answer: 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 46; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 46. 

State: Arizona; 

GAO survey questions and response options: To what extent do you think 
Arizona's Clean Election Law has decreased or increased the influence 
of special interest groups on legislators? Would you say the Law has 
greatly decreased, somewhat decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat 
increased, or greatly increased the influence of special interest 
groups? 

Greatly increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 4; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 6. 

Somewhat increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 12; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 18. 

Had no effect; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 25; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 32. 

Somewhat decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 9; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 22. 

Greatly decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 2; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 3. 

Too soon to tell, unsure, or declined to answer; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 48; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 19[B]. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: We included respondents who indicated that they were a lot, 
some, or a little aware of the respective states' public financing 
law. For Maine in 2009, the number of respondents for this question 
was 214, and the maximum 95 percent confidence interval for these 
survey results is plus or minus 6.7 percent. In 2002, the number of 
respondents for this question was 157, and the maximum 95 percent 
confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 8 
percent. For Arizona in 2009, the number of respondents for this 
question was 424, and the maximum 95 percent confidence interval for 
these survey results is plus or minus 5 percent. In 2002, the number 
of respondents for this question was 433, and the maximum 95 percent 
confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 5 
percent. 

[A] Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding. 

[B] The "too soon to tell" response option was offered in the 2002 
survey but was inadvertently omitted from the 2009 survey in Arizona. 

[End of table] 

Both Maine and Arizona candidates and interest group representatives 
had mixed views about changes in interest group influence as a result 
of the public financing programs in their states. In Maine, a little 
over half of the candidates (6 of 11) said that the likelihood that 
elected officials serve the interests of their constituents free of 
influence by specific individuals or interest groups neither increased 
nor decreased as a result of the public financing program. One of 
these candidates said the public financing program has not met the 
goal of decreasing the influence of interest groups, since interest 
groups will always find ways to influence legislators and the election 
process. However, 4 candidates we interviewed in Maine--all of whom 
participated in the public financing program--said that the likelihood 
that elected officials serve free of influence by individuals or 
groups greatly increased or increased. One of these candidates 
explained that participating candidates are more empowered to serve as 
they see fit and are less willing to listen to political party 
leadership. On the other hand, a different candidate said that the 
elected officials are less likely to serve free of influence by 
specific individuals or groups as a result of the public financing 
program. The candidate explained that under the public financing 
program, lobbyists and special interest groups have focused less on 
individual candidates, and more on winning favor with the Democratic 
and Republican party leadership. According to this candidate, interest 
groups are spending more, since the contribution limits do not apply 
to contributions to political parties. In turn, the candidate said 
that political parties are buying the loyalty of candidates by 
providing know-how, campaign staff, and polling data during the 
election. 

For Arizona, about half of the candidates interviewed (5 of 11) said 
that the public financing program did not affect the likelihood that 
elected officials serve the interests of their constituents free of 
influence by specific individuals or groups. One of these candidates 
said that the influence of special interest groups still exists, even 
if it does not come in the form of direct contributions. She explained 
that interest groups approach candidates with questionnaires and ask 
them to take pledges on different policy issues and also send their 
members voter guides and scorecards that rate candidates. Two other 
Arizona candidates we interviewed commented that under the public 
financing program, interest groups have been contributing to campaigns 
in different ways, such as providing campaign volunteers, and 
collecting $5 qualifying contributions for participating candidates. 
In contrast, 4 of the 11 candidates said that the likelihood that 
elected officials serve the interests of their constituents had 
decreased as a result of the public financing program. One of these 
candidates explained that the role of interest groups has increased, 
as they have become very skilled at producing advertisements with 
independent expenditures. On the other hand, 2 candidates we 
interviewed said that the public financing program increased the 
likelihood that elected officials serve the interests of their 
constituents free of influence by specific individuals or groups. One 
of these candidates said that in her experience as a participating 
candidate and state senator, interest groups are not "in her ear all 
of the time," and legislators are free to make decisions based on the 
interests of their constituents. 

With regard to Maine interest groups we interviewed, the five 
representatives we interviewed had varying views about the likelihood 
that elected officials serve the interests of their constituents free 
of influence by specific individuals or interest groups and about 
changes in interest group influence as a result of the public 
financing program. Two representatives believed that the likelihood 
that elected officials serve the interests of their constituents free 
of influence had increased, and one representative stated that it had 
decreased. The two remaining representatives stated that it had 
neither increased nor decreased. One of these representatives 
commented that candidates are predisposed to certain issues based on 
their core beliefs and there is not any correlation between public 
financing and the likelihood that the elected officials will serve the 
interests of their constituents free of influence. With regard to 
changes in interest group influence, three Maine representatives 
stated that they have less of a relationship with candidates. One of 
these three representatives stated that interest groups are one step 
removed from the candidate because to make independent expenditures 
they cannot directly coordinate with the candidate. As a result, this 
representative further stated that interest groups have established 
stronger relationships with political parties. Another of these 
representative believed that the public financing program has slightly 
decreased the role of interest groups because money tends to be 
funneled through the political parties. Also, there has been more 
emphasis on interest groups giving their endorsements of candidates 
rather than giving them money. 

With regard to Arizona interest groups we interviewed, four of the 
five representatives said that the likelihood that elected officials 
serve the interests of their constituents free of influence by 
specific individuals or interest groups neither increased nor 
decreased as a result of the public financing program. One of the five 
representatives stated that the likelihood that elected officials 
serve the interests of their constituents had decreased but did not 
elaborate. Regarding interest group influence, two of the five 
representatives expressed opinions about whether changes in interest 
group influence as a result of the public financing programs have 
occurred. For example, one of these representatives stated that prior 
to the public financing program, interest groups made direct 
contributions to the candidates, but now they have to make independent 
expenditures or give money to the political parties. This 
representative stated that public financing has led to fringe 
candidates entering races and has caused a polarization in the 
legislature that has decreased the role of interest groups. Another 
representative stated that the interest groups do not directly support 
the candidate's campaigns and, instead, make independent expenditures. 
He also stated that there has also been an increased emphasis on 
volunteer campaign activities in which interest groups use their 
members to help certain candidates. 

Public Confidence in Government Did Not Increase as a Result of the 
Public Financing Programs in Maine and Arizona: 

In 2002 and 2009, the percentage of voting-age citizens in Maine and 
Arizona who said that their confidence in state government had 
somewhat or greatly decreased was not significantly different from 
those who said that their confidence had somewhat or greatly increased 
as a result of the public financing law. Additionally, the predominant 
response in both states was that respondents did not believe that the 
public financing program had any effect on their confidence in state 
government, as shown in table 19. For example, in Maine in 2009, the 
percentage of voting-age citizens who stated that the public financing 
law had no effect was 42 percent while the percent who felt that their 
confidence had somewhat or greatly increased was 20 percent, and the 
percent who felt their confidence had somewhat or greatly decreased 
was 15 percent. In Arizona, the percentage of voting-age citizens who 
stated that the public financing law had no effect was 39 percent in 
2009, while the percent who felt that their confidence had somewhat or 
greatly increased was 26 percent, and the percent who felt their 
confidence had somewhat or greatly decreased was 22 percent. 

Table 19: Maine and Arizona Voting-Age Citizens' Views on Confidence 
in State Government, among Those Aware of the Law: 

State: Maine; 

GAO survey questions and response options: To what extent has Maine's 
Clean Election Law increased or decreased your confidence in state 
government? Would you say the Law has greatly increased, somewhat 
increased, has had no effect, has somewhat decreased, or greatly 
decreased your confidence in state government or is it too soon to 
tell? 

Greatly increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 2%; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 3%. 

Somewhat increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 15; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 17. 

Had no effect; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 39; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 42. 

Somewhat decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 5; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 6. 

Greatly decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 3; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 9. 

Too soon to tell, unsure, or declined to answer; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 35; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 23. 

State: Arizona; 

GAO survey questions and response options: To what extent has 
Arizona's Clean Election Law increased or decreased your confidence in 
state government? Would you say the Law has greatly increased, 
somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat decreased, or 
greatly decreased your confidence in state government? 

Greatly increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 2; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 3. 

Somewhat increased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 19; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 23. 

Had no effect; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 33; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 39. 

Somewhat decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 9; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 11. 

Greatly decreased; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 5; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 11. 

Too soon to tell, unsure, or declined to answer; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2002: 30; 
Percent of voting age citizens[A]: 2009: 13[B]. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: We included respondents who indicated that they were a lot, 
some, or a little aware of the respective states' public financing 
law. For Maine in 2009, the number of respondents for this question 
was 214, and the maximum 95 percent confidence interval for these 
survey results is plus or minus 6.7 percent. In 2002, the number of 
respondents for this question was 157, and the maximum 95 percent 
confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 8 
percent. For Arizona in 2009, the number of respondents for this 
question was 424, and the maximum 95 percent confidence interval for 
these survey results is plus or minus 5 percent. In 2002, the number 
of respondents for this question was 433, and the maximum 95 percent 
confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 5 
percent. 

[A] Totals may not equal 100 due to rounding. 

[B] The "too soon to tell" response option was offered in the 2002 
survey, but was inadvertently omitted from the 2009 survey in Arizona. 

[End of table] 

In Maine and Arizona, over half of the candidates we interviewed 
reported that the public's confidence in government had not changed as 
a result of the public financing programs. Over half of the candidates 
in Maine (6 of 11) said the public's confidence in government neither 
increased nor decreased as a result of the public financing program. 
One of these candidates explained that he did not think many people 
were aware of the public financing program. Three of the 11 candidates 
said that the public's confidence in government decreased in 2008 
because of the public financing program. According to one candidate, 
people have been disappointed with the quality of the candidates, and 
their confidence in government has decreased as a result. On the other 
hand, 2 of the 11 candidates said that the public financing program 
increased the public's confidence in government. 

In Arizona, 7 of the 11 candidates interviewed said that the public's 
confidence in government neither increased nor decreased as a result 
of the public financing program. The remaining 4 candidates were 
divided. Two candidates said that the public's confidence in 
government greatly increased or increased as a result of the public 
financing program. One of these candidates commented that the public 
financing program goes beyond providing public financing by providing 
a public forum and publications that play an important role in 
informing voters about the races and candidates. However, 2 candidates 
said that the public's confidence in government has decreased as a 
result of the public financing program. One of these candidates said 
that the public financing program resulted in a more divisive 
government, which has slightly decreased the public's confidence in 
government. 

Candidates and Interest Groups Representatives Reported Campaign 
Tactics Changed as a Result of the Public Financing Programs: 

Candidates and interest group representatives in Maine and Arizona 
provided a range of perspectives on how campaign tactics have changed 
under the public financing programs. Their observations included 
changes in how money is spent and the role of political parties and 
the timing of campaign activities.[Footnote 65] 

Candidates in both Maine and Arizona identified changes regarding how 
money is spent and the role of political parties since the 
implementation of the public financing programs. For example, in 
Maine, one candidate told us that private funding that would have gone 
directly to fund candidate campaigns has been redirected to political 
parties, who strategically focus their resources in certain races to 
help elect their candidates. Candidates reported that political 
parties have helped support candidates by providing advice, polling 
services, campaign volunteers, distributing campaign literature, and 
making automated telephone calls to constituents on behalf of 
candidates. According to another Maine candidate, political parties 
are advising candidates to participate in the public financing program 
so that the political parties and political action committees can 
raise more money for their organizations.[Footnote 66] However, other 
candidates had different perspectives on the role of political parties 
under the public financing program. For example, one candidate told us 
that since participating candidates receive public financing, they are 
less dependent on political parties for money, less willing to listen 
to the party leadership, and are more empowered to make their own 
decisions. 

Candidates in Arizona reported similar changes in how money is spent 
and the role of political parties. For example, one candidate 
commented that now more money is being funneled through the political 
parties rather than being directly provided to the candidates. Another 
candidate said that political parties have used the public financing 
program as a vehicle, explaining that when candidates use public funds 
for their campaigns, the money that would have normally gone to the 
candidate is now diverted to other candidates or causes. According to 
one candidate, after public financing, political parties are more 
active and have more extensive field operations to support candidates 
in a greater number of districts. Further, four candidates said that 
political parties are gaming the public financing system to maximize 
support for their candidates. For example, one candidate explained 
that if two Republican candidates or two Democratic candidates were 
running in the same multimember district, then partisan groups could 
make independent expenditures on behalf of one candidate that would 
trigger matching funds for the other participating candidate. However, 
two candidates said their party did not get involved in their races in 
the 2008 election, and one candidate said she did not observe any 
change in the role of political parties since the implementation of 
the public financing program. Furthermore, one candidate said that 
under the public financing program, candidates have more independence 
from political parties, noting that she relies on support from a broad 
constituency in her district, not just from her political party. 

Interest group representatives in both Maine and Arizona identified 
changes regarding how money is spent and the role of political parties 
since the implementation of the public financing programs. For 
example, in Maine, one interest group representative stated that the 
group coordinates its expenditures through the party caucus committees 
and other interest groups. He said that substantial contributions from 
the caucuses are now made to candidate campaigns without the 
candidates' knowledge. These committees are also engaged in public 
polling on an ongoing basis to identify voting patterns and 
constituent concerns in order to identify candidates to support. 
Another representative stated that because she made contributions to 
the political party, she does not have a way to know how her political 
action committee money is being spent because the committee makes 
independent expenditures on behalf of the candidate. Further, she 
stated that for participating candidates, the only thing an interest 
group can do is give an endorsement. In turn, participating candidates 
use these endorsements in their campaign advertisements. On the other 
hand, one representative said that there has not been much difference 
in campaign tactics since public financing has been available, and 
another representative said that the same tactics, such as direct 
mailers and going door-to-door for monetary solicitations, have been 
used. 

Interest group representatives in Arizona similarly reported that 
public financing has changed campaign strategies. For example, one 
representative said that there is an increased reliance on volunteer 
activities, especially for statewide races. This representative stated 
that the amount of public funds for statewide candidates is not 
adequate, so candidates must rely on volunteers to get their message 
out. Volunteer activities, such as handing out flyers door-to-door or 
working phone banks to call voters, have become increasingly 
important. Another representative stated that since more candidates 
are participating in the public financing program and cannot accept 
direct contributions, there is more money available to 
nonparticipating candidates. He has noticed that nonparticipating 
candidates are asking for more money from interest groups than before 
public financing. According to another representative, campaign 
strategies are evolving. For example, a recent strategy has been the 
teaming of public and private candidates to maximize their resources 
such as on mailers. 

Candidates and interest group representatives in Maine and Arizona 
also commented on how the public financing program has changed the 
timing of some campaign activities. In Maine, three candidates said 
that candidates or interest groups are changing the timing of spending 
in order to minimize either the amount or the effectiveness of 
matching funds distributed to opponent participating candidates. For 
example, one participating candidate told us that supporters of his 
opponent distributed mailers right before the date when communications 
that support or oppose clearly identified candidates are presumed to 
be independent expenditures and trigger matching funds for 
participating opponents. Another strategy, according to one candidate, 
is for nonparticipating candidates or interest groups to spend money 
in the days immediately before the election, when participating 
candidates' ability to use the money is effectively restricted due to 
time constraints. In response, one candidate told us that 
participating candidates have television, radio, or other 
advertisements ready in case they receive additional matching funds 
that need to be spent quickly. 

In Arizona, five candidates said that the tactics surrounding the 
timing of campaign spending have changed since the implementation of 
the public financing program. For example, one candidate said that the 
start of the campaign season is determined by the date on which 
spending by or on behalf of candidates triggers matching funds. In 
addition, one candidate explained that nonparticipating candidates 
have changed the timing of fundraising efforts, so that more funds are 
raised at the end of campaign, when it is more difficult for 
participating candidates to spend matching funds effectively. As in 
Maine, one candidate in Arizona said that participating candidates 
have responded to this tactic by preparing advertisements ahead of 
time, just in case they receive additional matching funds. 

Interest group representatives in Maine and Arizona also commented on 
how the public financing program has changed the timing of some 
campaign activities. In Maine, one interest group representative 
stated that candidates were strategically timing their advertisements 
to gain a competitive advantage. For example, candidates are thinking 
about from whom to get their seed money, and when to qualify for the 
money. In addition, usually, incumbents have an advantage because they 
can send out newsletters to constituents close to the election without 
triggering matching funds. This representative stated the biggest 
consideration regarding campaign strategies is how and when matching 
funds will be triggered by the independent expenditures. She said that 
independent expenditures are made in the last 5 days before an 
election on the assumption that the opposing participating candidate 
cannot make effective use of the matching funds. In Arizona, one 
interest group representative said that generally nonparticipating 
candidates control the timing of their fundraising and spending, and 
participating candidates make plans to spend matching funds to counter 
last-minute attack advertisements. 

Data Limitations and Differences in Measurement Hinder Analysis of 
Changes in Voter Participation in Maine and Arizona: 

While increasing voter participation, as indicated by increases in 
voter turnout, was a goal of public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona, limitations in voter turnout data, differences in how voter 
turnout is measured across states and data sources, and challenges 
isolating the effect of public financing programs on voter turnout 
hindered the analysis of changes over time. 

Voter turnout is typically calculated as a percentage of the voting-
age population (VAP) or voting-eligible population (VEP) who cast a 
ballot in an election.[Footnote 67] The calculation of changes in 
voter turnout over time depends less on the specific data used for the 
numerator and denominator than it does on the consistency of how these 
data were collected over time and the use of comparable time frames 
and types of elections (e.g., presidential and congressional races). 
[Footnote 68] However, data reporting issues, changes in measurement, 
and other factors affect the calculation of voter turnout estimates. 

With respect to data limitations, data on voter turnout are not 
consistent across states or data sources. Depending on the source, the 
numerator of the turnout calculation (i.e., who cast a ballot in an 
election) may include the total number of approved ballots cast, the 
number of ballots counted whether or not they were approved, self- 
reports of voting information, or the number of ballots cast for the 
highest office on a ticket, such as for president. For example, 
official voter turnout data compiled by the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) are based on surveys of states; however, states vary 
in their policies, for example, related to voter registration, as well 
as in which turnout statistics they report.[Footnote 69] Some states 
report voter turnout as the highest number of ballots counted, whereas 
other states report voter turnout as the number of votes for the 
highest office. Further, which specific statistic is reported is not 
necessarily constant over time. For example, EAC data prior to 2004 
provide voter turnout based on the number of votes for the highest 
office on the ticket. Beginning in 2004, EAC reported total ballots 
cast, counted, or total voters participating for Maine and Arizona, 
but has not consistently reported the vote for highest office in these 
states. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) also provides 
information on turnout for federal elections, but the specific highest 
office in a given state and year could be for a state office such as 
governor that would not be reported along with federal election 
results. 

Other voter turnout statistics, including those based on surveys of 
U.S. residents as part of the Census Bureau's Current Population 
Survey (CPS) or the American National Election Studies, rely on 
respondents' self-reports of voting behavior.[Footnote 70] However, 
self-reports of voting behavior are subject to overreporting because 
many respondents perceive that voting is a socially desirable 
behavior. Additionally, estimates of voting based on self-reports can 
fluctuate depending on the wording of the question used in a survey. 
Further, survey results are generalizable only to the population 
covered by the survey, or sampling, frame.[Footnote 71] The CPS 
sampling frame excludes individuals living in group quarters such as 
nursing homes, meaning that estimates of turnout based on CPS data 
would not include turnout among these individuals. Data on other forms 
of voter participation, such as volunteering for a campaign, 
contacting media, donating money, fundraising, and contacting 
representatives on issues of concern, are limited because they are 
rarely collected with the express purpose of making state-level 
estimates, and surveys with this information are not usually designed 
in a manner to allow comparison across individual states over many 
years. 

In addition, measurements of the denominator of voter turnout differ 
with respect to whether citizenship or other factors that affect 
eligibility are taken into account. Turnout estimates produced by the 
Census Bureau have historically used the VAP as a denominator, which 
includes those U.S. residents age 18 and older. In theory, a more 
accurate estimate of voter turnout can be made by adjusting VAP to 
account for the statutory ability of individuals to vote, in 
particular by removing noncitizens from the estimate. This is 
particularly important at the state level because the proportion of 
noncitizens varies across states and over time.[Footnote 72] However, 
the practical application of such adjustments may be complicated by 
the timing of available data relative to the date of the election or 
by other data limitations. For example, although the Census Bureau 
began to produce estimates of a citizen VAP for EAC in 2004, the 
estimate is calculated as of July 1 of the election year and does not 
adjust for population changes that may occur between July and the time 
of the election. Other alternatives for adjusting VAP for citizenship 
include calculating estimates between decennial Census surveys. The 
Census data currently provided to EAC include adjustments for 
citizenship based on another alternative, the American Community 
Survey (ACS).[Footnote 73] The ACS uses a different sampling frame 
than other surveys used to adjust for citizenship, such as the CPS, 
and has slightly different estimates of citizenship.[Footnote 74] In 
addition to adjustments for citizenship, researchers have also 
adjusted VAP to account for other factors that affect eligibility to 
vote, including state felony disenfranchisement laws, and overseas 
voting, among others. To make these adjustments, researchers use 
alternative data sources such as information on the population in 
prison from the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics; 
however, these adjustments cannot always be applied similarly because 
of differences across states over time (such as in the proportion of 
probationers that are felons). 

Lastly, changes in voter turnout cannot be attributed directly to 
public funding as there are a number of factors that affect voter 
turnout. Voter turnout can be affected by demographic factors such as 
age, income, how recently a person registered to vote, and previous 
voting history. For example, studies have shown that much higher 
percentages of older Americans vote than do younger citizens. Voter 
turnout can also be influenced by a broad range of contextual factors, 
including the candidates and their messages, mobilization efforts, 
media interest, campaign spending, and negative advertising. These 
potential confounding factors, along with aforementioned difficulties 
in calculating precise and consistent turnout information at the state 
level, prevented us from quantifying the extent to which, if any, 
Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs affected these states' 
voter turnout. Additional information about factors influencing the 
determination of changes in voter participation in Maine and Arizona 
can be found in the e-supplement accompanying this report--GAO-10-
391SP. 

Concluding Observations: 

Seven years ago our 2003 report concluded that with only two elections 
from which to observe legislative races--2000 and 2002--it was too 
early to precisely draw causal linkages to resulting changes. Today, 
following three additional election cycles--2004, 2006, and 2008--the 
extent to which there were changes in program goals is still 
inconclusive. There were no overall observable changes in three of the 
four goals, and we cannot attribute observed changes with regard to 
the winner's victory margin in Maine and Arizona to the public 
financing programs because other factors, such as changing economic 
conditions and candidate popularity, can vary widely and affect 
election outcomes. Further, essential data needed, such as uniform 
voter registration and turnout data across states, do not currently 
exist to enhance analyses conducted and, in the case of the fifth 
goal, increasing voter participation, to allow for analysis of 
changes. While undertaking considerable efforts to obtain and assemble 
the underlying data used for this report and ruling out some factors 
by devising and conducting multiple analytic methods, direct causal 
linkages to resulting changes cannot be made, and many questions 
regarding the effect of public financing programs remain. 

Public financing programs have become an established part of the 
political landscape in Maine and Arizona and candidates have chosen to 
participate or not participate based on their particular opponents and 
personal circumstances and values. The public financing program is 
prevalent across these states, and in each election cycle new 
strategies have emerged to leverage aspects of the public financing 
program by candidates and their supporters to gain advantage over 
their opponents. The trend of rising independent expenditures as an 
alternative to contributing directly to candidates is clear and its 
effect is as yet undetermined. 

Third-Party Views and Our Evaluation: 

We requested comments on this draft from the Maine and Arizona Offices 
of the Secretary of State and the commissions overseeing the public 
financing programs in each state. We received technical comments from 
the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. We did not receive any comments from the other 
agencies. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and subcommittees. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

William O. Jenkins, Jr. 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Objectives: 

In accordance with the congressional direction specified in Senate 
Report 110-129 to revisit and update our 2003 report on the public 
financing programs in Maine and Arizona[Footnote 75] to account for 
data and experiences of the past two election cycles,[Footnote 76] 
this report: 

* provides data related to candidate program participation, including 
the number of legislative candidates who chose to use public funds to 
run for seats in the 2000 through 2008 elections in Maine and Arizona 
and the number of races in which at least one legislative candidate 
ran an election with public funds; and: 

* describes statistically measurable changes and perceptions of 
changes in the 2000 through 2008 state legislative elections in five 
goals of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs--(1) 
increasing electoral competition by, among other means, reducing the 
number of uncontested races (i.e., races with only one candidate per 
seat in contention); (2) increasing voter choice by encouraging more 
candidates to run for office; (3) curbing increases in the cost of 
campaigns; (4) reducing the influence of interest groups and, thereby, 
enhance citizens' confidence in government; and (5) increasing voter 
participation (e.g., voter turnout)--and the extent to which these 
changes could be attributed to the programs. 

Overview of Our Scope and Methodology: 

To obtain background information and identify changes since our 2003 
report, we conducted a literature search to identify relevant reports, 
studies, and articles regarding the public financing programs in Maine 
and Arizona, as well as campaign finance reform issues generally, 
which had been published since May 2003 when our report was issued. 
Based on our literature review, discussions with researchers who have 
published relevant work on public financing programs or state 
legislatures, and suggestions by state officials in Maine and Arizona, 
we interviewed 9 researchers[Footnote 77] and 17 representatives of 
advocacy groups and other organizations concerned with campaign 
finance reform or issues related to state legislative elections. 
[Footnote 78] See the bibliography for a listing of the reports and 
studies we reviewed. 

We reviewed the state statutes governing the public financing program--
Maine's Clean Election Act and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act--
from 2002 through 2009 and other documentation related to the public 
financing program, such as candidate handbooks and annual reports, to 
determine any changes in the programs since our 2003 report. In 
addition, we interviewed state election officials in the commissions 
responsible for administering the two programs--Maine's Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and Arizona's Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission. We also interviewed officials in Maine's 
and Arizona's Offices of the Secretary of State, the agencies 
responsible for supervising and administering state elections 
activities, such as tabulating official election results. Through our 
discussions with Maine and Arizona state officials and our review of 
changes to the public financing statutes in both states from 2002 
through 2009, we determined that the five goals of the public 
financing programs, as set out in our 2003 report, have not changed. 
[Footnote 79] 

We reviewed the Web sites of Maine's Commission on Governmental Ethics 
and Election Practices (www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona's Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission (www.azcleanelections.gov) to obtain 
information on the public financing programs, such as candidate 
handbooks and forms necessary in order to run for office. 
Additionally, we reviewed information on state elections on the Web 
sites of Maine's Secretary of State (http://www.maine.gov/sos) and 
Arizona's Secretary of State (http://www.azsos.gov). Officials from 
these state agencies told us that their respective Web sites were 
current and reliable for our review. 

In addressing the objectives, we obtained and analyzed, to the extent 
possible, available statistical data from Maine's and Arizona's 
commissions and Secretaries of State offices on candidate program 
participation, election outcomes, and reported campaign spending from 
the 1996 through 2008 state legislative elections. We assessed the 
quality and reliability of electronic data provided to us by officials 
in Maine and Arizona by performing electronic testing for obvious 
errors in accuracy and completeness; validating the data using other 
sources; and reviewing the associated documentation, such as system 
flow charts. We also interviewed state officials about their data 
systems and any issues or inconsistencies we encountered with the 
processing of the data. When we found discrepancies, such as 
nonpopulated fields, we worked with state officials to correct the 
discrepancies before conducting our analyses. Based on these tests and 
discussions, we determined that the data included in the report were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Although the public financing 
programs in Maine and Arizona cover both legislative and certain 
statewide offices, we limited the scope of our review to legislative 
candidates, since most of the elections for statewide offices occurred 
every 4 years and sufficient data would not have been available to 
conduct our analyses and draw conclusions.[Footnote 80] 

To obtain candidates' and interest groups' perspectives about the 
public financing programs, we conducted telephone interviews with a 
nonprobability sample of 22 out of 653 candidates who ran in 2008 
state legislative primary and general elections in Maine (11 out of 
452 candidates) and Arizona (11 out of 201 candidates). We conducted 
interviews with candidates from each state from June through September 
2009. We selected these candidates to reflect a range of those who did 
and did not use public financing, won or lost in primary and general 
elections, had different political party affiliations, ran for 
election in different legislative chambers, and were incumbents and 
challengers. In our interviews, we asked similar, but not identical, 
questions to those from our 2003 report.[Footnote 81] Specifically, we 
included questions about the candidates' views on factors influencing 
their decision to participate or not participate in the public 
financing program, the effects of the public financing program on 
electoral competition and campaign spending, and changes in the 
influence of interest groups on elections. We coded the candidates' 
responses to the interview questions and conducted a content analysis 
to categorize responses and identify common themes. 

Further, we interviewed a nonprobability sample of 10 interest group 
representatives--5 in Maine and 5 in Arizona. In Maine, we selected 
these interest groups from a listing of approximately 80 registered 
interest groups provided by a Maine state official. In Arizona, we 
selected interest groups from a total of approximately 220 interest 
groups, which we identified through the Arizona Secretary of State 
campaign finance Web site as contributors to campaigns during the 2008 
election cycle.[Footnote 82] We selected these interest groups based 
on several factors, including industry sectors, such as communications 
or construction, range of contributions made to political campaigns, 
and availability and willingness of the representatives to participate 
in our interviews. Results from these nonprobability samples cannot be 
used to make inferences about all candidates or interest groups in 
Maine and Arizona. However, these interviews provided us with an 
overview of the range of perspectives on the effects of the public 
financing programs. Results from the candidate interviews are included 
in report sections regarding candidate participation, voter choice, 
electoral competition, campaign spending, and interest group 
influence. Results from the interest group interviews are included in 
report sections regarding electoral competition, campaign spending, 
and interest group influence. 

Further details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding 
each of the objectives are presented in separate sections below. 

Candidate Participation: 

To provide data related to candidate program participation, including 
the number of legislative candidates who chose to use public funds to 
run for legislative seats ("participating candidates") in the 2000 
through 2008 elections in Maine and Arizona and the number of races in 
which at least one candidate ran an election with public funds, we 
obtained data from Maine's and Arizona's commissions and Offices of 
the Secretary of State. Specifically, for each state, we obtained or 
calculated data showing: 

* the number of legislative candidates who chose to use public funds 
to run for seats in the 2000 through 2008 elections,[Footnote 83] 

* the seats (i.e., House or Senate) for which they were candidates, 

* the political party affiliation of the candidates, 

* whether the candidates were incumbents[Footnote 84] or challengers, 

* whether the candidates were successful in their races, and: 

* the number of races in which at least one legislative candidate ran 
an election with public funds. 

As used in our report, "challengers" consist of all nonincumbent 
candidates. Thus, a candidate who was not an incumbent is called a 
challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent. Also, in 
counting races to calculate the proportion of races with at least one 
participating candidate, we included all races in which there was a 
candidate on the ballot regardless of whether or not the candidate 
faced a challenger. Additionally, we eliminated from our analyses all 
candidates with zero votes and write-in candidates whose names did not 
appear on the ballot. 

Electoral Competition: 

In designing our approach to assess electoral competition, we first 
reviewed literature published since our 2003 report and interviewed 
researchers and representatives of organizations and advocacy groups 
who are concerned with public financing and campaign finance reform 
issues in general. Specifically, we reviewed articles and interviewed 
researchers and representatives of organizations concerned with public 
financing issues who had conducted studies and research on electoral 
competition in states. Based on our review of the literature and these 
discussions, we concluded that there is no agreement on a standardized 
methodology to measure electoral competitiveness in state legislative 
elections. Thus, we used many of the same measures of electoral 
competition as those in our 2003 report, including the: 

* winners' victory margins, which refers to the difference between the 
percentage of the vote going to the winning candidate and the first 
runner up; 

* percentages of contested races; which refers to the percentage of 
all races with at least one more candidate running than the number of 
seats in contention; and, 

* incumbent reelection rates, which refers to the percentage of 
incumbents who were reelected.[Footnote 85] 

To assess changes in electoral competition in Maine and Arizona, we 
examined changes in these three measures of electoral competition in 
state legislative races by comparing the two elections before public 
financing became available to the five elections with public 
financing. However, unlike our 2003 report, we obtained and analyzed 
general election data from 1996 through 2008 from four comparison 
states that did not offer public financing programs for legislative 
candidates to determine if changes identified in Maine's and Arizona's 
general election outcomes for that same time period were similar to or 
different from changes observed in the four comparison states. 
[Footnote 86] 

Four Comparison States: 

We selected the four comparison states--Colorado, Connecticut, 
Montana, and South Dakota--based on a number of factors, including 
geographic proximity to Maine or Arizona; the capacity of the state 
legislature;[Footnote 87] the presence of legislative term limits; 
structure of the state legislature, such as legislative districts with 
more than one representative; and district size. In selecting our 
comparison states, we also reviewed other factors such as demographic 
and economic characteristics, including age, race, and poverty levels, 
and urban/rural population distribution, and recommendations from 
researchers and experts with knowledge of state legislatures we 
interviewed. Although all states were potentially candidates for 
comparison to Maine and Arizona, we eliminated some states (such as 
those with odd-year election cycles or a unicameral legislature) from 
our review because of their dissimilarity to Maine and Arizona, and 
focused primarily on those states that were recommended to us by 
researchers and experts we interviewed with knowledge of state 
legislatures. We also considered whether a state had reliable 
electronic data that covered the 1996 through 2008 general elections 
and whether the state was able to provide the data to us within the 
time frame of our review. No state we considered perfectly matched 
Maine or Arizona across the full range of characteristics we reviewed. 
Table 20 summarizes some of the characteristics we used to select the 
four comparison states for comparison to Maine and Arizona. 

Table 20: Characteristics of the State Legislatures in Maine, Arizona, 
and Their Respective Comparison States: 

State: Maine; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: Yes; 
Legislative capacity[A]: III; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (both chambers); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 8, 400; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 36,400. 

State: Connecticut; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No[C]; 
Legislative capacity[A]: II; 
Term limits: No; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (both chambers); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 22,600; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 94,600. 

State: Montana; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No; 
Legislative capacity[A]: III; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (both chambers); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 9,000; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 18,000. 

State: South Dakota; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No; 
Legislative capacity[A]: III; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (Senate); 
Multimember[D] (House); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 10,800; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 21,600. 

State: Arizona; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: Yes; 
Legislative capacity[A]: II; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (Senate); 
Multimember (House); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 85,500; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 171,000. 

State: Colorado; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No; 
Legislative capacity[A]: II; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (both chambers); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 66,200; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 122,900. 

State: Montana; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No; 
Legislative capacity[A]: III; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (both chambers); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 9,000; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 18,000. 

State: South Dakota; 
Public financing available for legislative candidates: No; 
Legislative capacity[A]: III; 
Term limits: Yes; 
Contribution limits: Yes; 
Single or multimember districts (chamber): Single (Senate); 
Multimember (House); 
Number of constituents per House district[B]: 10,800; 
Number of constituents per Senate district[B]: 21,600. 

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures. 

[A] Reflects the National Conference of State Legislatures' 
categorization of legislative capacity, which uses a color-coding 
system to signify differences among the 50 states. Category I (red) 
legislatures generally require legislators to spend 80 percent or more 
of a full-time job working as legislators, have the largest ratio of 
legislative office staffs to number of legislators, and generally have 
the highest compensation. Category II (white) legislatures generally 
require legislators to spend more than two-thirds of a full-time job 
working as legislators, have intermediate-sized staff, and compensate 
legislators at a rate which usually not enough to allow them to make a 
living without having other sources of income. Category III (blue) 
legislatures generally require legislators to spend the equivalent of 
half of a full-time job doing legislative work, have relatively small 
staffs, and offer low levels of compensation. See National Conference 
of State Legislatures, Full and Part-Time Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=16701.(accessed on Jan. 22, 2010). 

[B] Constituents per district are as of 2000. 

[C] Public financing was available to candidates running in 
Connecticut's 2008 legislative elections for the first time. 

[D] The exception are two House districts, which are subdivided into 
single-member districts. 

[End of table] 

We conducted analyses, to the extent possible, of the four comparison 
states' election data for 1996 through 2008 for comparison with Maine 
and Arizona to determine whether any trends or patterns observed in 
states with public financing were also seen in the four comparison 
states that do not have public financing programs.[Footnote 88] For 
our analyses, we compared Maine with the election outcomes of 
Connecticut, Montana, and South Dakota. We compared Arizona with the 
election outcomes of Colorado, Montana, and South Dakota.[Footnote 89] 
Generally, when conducting these analyses, we separated House and 
Senate elections and grouped Maine's and Arizona's election outcomes 
before the public financing program became available (1996 and 1998 
elections) and election outcomes after public financing (2000 through 
2008) with election outcomes in the comparison states during the same 
time periods. 

Victory Margins: 

We measured victory margins in three ways. First, we calculated the 
average margin of victory for contested elections, defined in single- 
member districts as the difference in the number of votes between the 
winner and first runner up, divided by the total vote count. This 
measure is generally equivalent to the calculation of margin of 
victory in our 2003 report.[Footnote 90] For multimember districts, we 
defined the margin of victory as the number of votes going to the 
second winner minus the number of votes going to the runner up, 
excluding the number of votes going to the first winner from the 
denominator. Second, we compared whether changes in the margin of 
victory had an effect on the competitive nature of elections as 
defined by the distribution of the vote outcome between the winner and 
first runner-up. We compared close elections--defined as a difference 
of less than 10 percentage points in votes between the winning and 
losing candidates--with elections that were not as close--10 
percentage points or more difference in votes between the winning and 
losing candidates. Third, we compared "landslide elections" or races 
with decisive winners--defined as a difference of more than 20 
percentage points in votes between the winning and losing candidates--
with elections that were not landslides--defined as 20 percentage 
points or less difference in votes between the winning and losing 
candidates. 

Number of Contested Races: 

We measured the number of contested races by contrasting elections in 
which the number of candidates exceeded the number of seats available 
in the race with elections in which the number of candidates was equal 
to the number of seats available. 

Incumbent Reelection Rates: 

We measured incumbent reelection rates in two ways. First, for those 
general election races with incumbents that were contested, we 
calculated the percentage of races with incumbents who won compared to 
all races with incumbents.[Footnote 91] Second, we calculated the 
percentage of individual incumbents who won, relative to all 
incumbents who ran.[Footnote 92] To assess whether our calculations of 
incumbent reelection rates were sensitive to redistricting that forced 
incumbents from formerly separate districts to run against each other, 
we calculated the individual incumbency reelection rate excluding 
incumbents who participated in races with more incumbents than seats. 
[Footnote 93] Although we were not able to assess other potential 
effects of redistricting on incumbent reelection rates, such as those 
caused by demographic changes in a candidates' constituency, we 
conducted a limited analysis of geographic changes in state 
legislative district boundaries.[Footnote 94] 

Multivariate Analyses: 

We used two types of multivariate statistical methods, fixed effects 
regression and hierarchical loglinear models, to evaluate how the 
competitiveness of races in Maine and Arizona changed after the 
implementation of public financing programs.[Footnote 95] Although 
multivariate methods do not allow us to directly attribute changes in 
outcomes to states' public financing programs, they do allow us to 
assess whether changes in Maine and Arizona were unique relative to a 
set of comparison states, controlling for other factors, and whether 
the observed changes were different from what would have occurred by 
chance. Our statistical models and estimates are sensitive to our 
choice of comparison states for Maine and Arizona, thus researchers 
testing different comparison states may find different results. 

We estimated fixed effects regression models to rule out broad groups 
of variables that may explain the patterns in our data without 
directly measuring them. Fixed effects models account for unmeasured 
factors that do not change over time (such as the structure of the 
state legislature), or that change in the same way (such as which 
party controls the U.S. Congress), for all states or legislative 
districts. This feature is particularly useful for our analysis 
because comprehensive and reliable data are not available on many of 
the factors that affect the competitiveness of state elections, such 
as long-term district partisanship, local economic conditions, and 
candidate quality. 

We estimated a variety of fixed effects models to gauge the 
sensitivity of the results to different assumptions and alternative 
explanations. These included the following: 

* Models that included fixed effects for districts and each 
combination of state and chamber of the legislature. These models 
estimate the district effects separately than the state effects. 
[Footnote 96] 

* Models that excluded multimember districts. These models confirm 
that our results are not sensitive to our choice of measure of margin 
of victory for multimember districts. 

* Models that logged the margin of victory to normalize the data to 
account for outlying data. These models reduce the potential influence 
of highly uncompetitive races. 

* Models that excluded races with no incumbent running for reelection. 
These models account for the possibility that term limits influenced 
whether a race was contested because they exclude those seats that 
were open because of term limits. 

* Models that excluded races from Connecticut in 2008 when public 
funding became available. Full public financing was available for the 
first time to state legislative candidates in the 2008 elections in 
Connecticut. 

* Models that excluded races in which the number of incumbents 
exceeded the number of available seats. These models confirm that our 
results are not sensitive to our definition of an incumbent "win" when 
more incumbents than available seats participated in a race. 

We included fixed effects for each year and, where appropriate, 
controlled for whether an incumbent was running for reelection. We 
estimated the models of both continuous and binary outcomes using 
linear probability models and robust variance estimators, due to the 
fact that all of our covariates are binary (i.e., all of the variables 
stand for the presence or absence or something, such as incumbency). 
[Footnote 97] 

We also estimated loglinear models to evaluate the changes in these 
outcomes in House and Senate elections in Maine, Arizona, and the four 
comparison states. In our analyses, we fit hierarchical models to the 
observed frequencies in the different four-way tables or five-way 
tables formed by cross-classifying each of the four outcomes by state 
(Arizona vs. other states and Maine vs. other states), chamber (Senate 
vs. House), time period (before public financing programs were 
available in elections prior to 2000 and after public financing 
programs were available in 2000 and later elections), and whether an 
incumbent was or was not involved in the race. 

We followed procedures described by Goodman (1978) and fit 
hierarchical models that placed varying constraints on the odds and 
odds ratios that are used to describe the associations of state, 
chamber, and time period with each outcome.[Footnote 98] Ultimately, 
we chose from among these different models a "preferred" model that 
included factors that were significantly related to the variation in 
each outcome and excluded those factors that were not.[Footnote 99] 

We are issuing an electronic supplement concurrently with this report--
GAO-10-391SP. In addition to summary data on election outcomes in 
Maine and Arizona, the e-supplement contains additional discussion on 
the following issues: 

* summary tables of the election data obtained from the four 
comparison states; 

* fixed effects model assumptions, sensitivity analysis, and results; 

* loglinear model methods and results; 

* margin of victory measures in multimember districts; 

* incumbency reelection rates and the potential effect of district 
boundary changes following the 2000 Census; and: 

* voter turnout calculations and data. 

Voter Choice: 

To determine whether public financing encouraged more state 
legislative candidates to run for office, we calculated the average 
annual number of candidates per legislative primary and general 
election races for seven election cycles, including two elections 
preceding the public financing program--1996 and 1998--and five 
elections after public financing became available--2000 through 2008. 
Also, to determine whether there were different types of candidates 
running for office, we compared the percentage of races with third-
party or independent legislative candidates who received at least 5 
percent of votes cast for each of these seven election cycles. We 
chose our threshold based on research and interviews with state 
officials that suggested 5 percent of votes is commonly required for 
parties to gain access to and retain ballot placement. Ballot 
placement is critical in that it enables voters to use party 
information to make voting decisions, and allows them to see 
alternative party candidates at the same level as major party 
candidates without having to recall a specific candidate name. This 
definition of viability focuses on voter choice, and is distinct from 
whether a candidate is "electable" or competitive with other 
candidates. 

Campaign Spending: 

To determine changes in candidate spending, we obtained available 
campaign spending and independent expenditure data from Maine and 
Arizona.[Footnote 100] Specifically, we obtained summarized campaign 
spending and independent expenditure data from Maine's Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, the state agency 
responsible for campaign spending reports. We found that Maine's 
campaign spending data for the 1996 through 2008 election cycles and 
independent expenditure data for the 2000 through 2008 election cycles 
were sufficiently reliable. In Arizona, we obtained campaign spending 
and independent expenditure data from the Secretary of State's office. 
Due, in part, to several upgrades to Arizona's campaign finance data 
systems over the time period reviewed, we found that Arizona's 
campaign spending data for the 2000 through 2008 election cycles and 
independent expenditure data for the 2008 election cycle were 
sufficiently reliable, with limitations as noted. For example, up to 
the 2008 election, Arizona's campaign spending database did not 
include precise data to identify and link each candidate to his or her 
campaign finance committee(s), the entities responsible for reporting 
candidates' contributions and spending.[Footnote 101] Further, the 
candidates' campaign finance committees can span several election 
cycles and include spending reports for candidates who ran in several 
races for the same or different offices, such as House or Senate. 
Thus, to the extent possible, we matched candidates and candidate 
campaign finance committees through electronic and manual means, 
identified and calculated relevant candidate spending transactions, 
and sorted the data by election cycle dates. Further, although 
Arizona's Secretary of State office collected independent expenditure 
data from 2000 through 2008, it did not collect data on the intended 
beneficiaries of independent expenditures until the 2008 election 
cycle. Therefore, we limited our analysis of independent expenditures 
to the 2008 elections since we could not identify which candidates 
benefited from the expenditure. We worked with state officials 
responsible for the public financing programs and campaign finance 
data systems in Maine and Arizona to develop our methodology for 
analyzing these data. These officials reviewed summaries we wrote 
about their respective databases and agreed that they were generally 
accurate and reliable. 

We calculated the average House and Senate legislative candidates' 
spending in Maine for seven election cycles, from 1996 through 2008 
and in Arizona for five election cycles, from 2000 through 2008. For 
comparisons across years and to observe any trends, we adjusted all 
candidate spending for inflation with 2008 as the base year using the 
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic 
product implicit price deflator. 

Interest Group Influence and Citizens' Confidence in Government: 

To assess changes in interest group influence and citizens' confidence 
in government, we included questions in our interviews with candidates 
in Maine's and Arizona's 2008 elections and interviews with interest 
groups in both states. Also, we contracted with professional pollsters 
who conducted omnibus telephone surveys with representative samples of 
voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona.[Footnote 102] Generally, 
this polling effort was designed to determine the extent to which 
voting-age citizens in each state were aware of their state's public 
financing program and to obtain their views about whether the program 
has decreased the influence of interest groups, made legislators more 
accountable to voters, and increased confidence in government. 

In order to compare responses, the survey consisted of largely similar 
questions to those asked for our 2003 report.[Footnote 103] The 
questions for Maine and Arizona were identical, except for some minor 
wording differences customized for the respective states, as shown in 
table 21.[Footnote 104] Follow-up questions (e.g., questions 2, 3, and 
4 in each set) were not asked of any individual who, in response to 
question 1, acknowledged knowing "nothing at all" about the applicable 
state's clean election law or was unsure or declined to answer. Since 
we pretested largely similar questions with members of the general 
public for our 2003 report, we did not pretest questions for this 
effort. 

Table 21: Questions Used for the Maine and Arizona Surveys: 

State: Maine; 

Questions asked of voting-age citizens: 

1. I would like to ask you about Maine's clean election law. This law 
provides campaign money to candidates running for governor and for 
candidates to the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, 
some, a little, or nothing at all about Maine's clean election law? 

2. Now, I would like to ask you about Maine legislators in general who 
ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2008 elections. Would you 
say that these state legislators who received public funds have been 
much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable to 
voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 
made any difference? 

3. To what extent do you think Maine's clean election law has 
decreased or increased the influence of special interest groups on 
legislators? Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat 
decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly 
increased the influence of special interest groups, or is it too soon 
to tell? 

4. To what extent has Maine's clean election law increased or 
decreased your confidence in state government? Would you say the law 
has greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has 
somewhat decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state 
government, or is it too soon to tell? 

State: Arizona; 

Questions asked of voting-age citizens: 

1. I would like to ask you about Arizona's clean election law. This 
law provides campaign money to candidates running for statewide 
office, such as the Corporation Commission or governor and for 
candidates to the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, 
some, a little, or nothing at all about Arizona's clean election law? 

2. Now, I would like to ask you about Arizona legislators in general 
who ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2008 elections. Would 
you say that these state legislators who received public funds have 
been much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable 
to voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 
made any difference? 

3. To what extent do you think Arizona's clean election law has 
decreased or increased the influence of special interest groups on 
legislators? Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat 
decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly 
increased the influence of special interest groups? 

4. To what extent has Arizona's clean election law increased or 
decreased your confidence in state government? Would you say the law 
has greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has 
somewhat decreased, or greatly increased your confidence in state 
government. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Contracted Polling Organizations: 

To conduct the Maine poll, we contracted with Market Decisions 
(Portland, Maine), the same polling organization that conducted the 
Maine poll for our 2003 report. During October 19, 2009, to November 
2, 2009, the firm completed 404 telephone interviews with randomly 
selected adults throughout Maine. The sample of the telephone numbers 
called was based on a complete updated list of telephone prefixes used 
throughout the state. The sample was generated using software designed 
to ensure that every residential number has an equal probability of 
selection. When a working residential number was called, an adult age 
18 or older in the household was randomly selected to complete the 
interview. The 404 completed interviews represent a survey response 
rate of 42.5 percent. 

To conduct the Arizona poll, we contracted with Behavior Research 
Center, Inc. (Phoenix, Arizona), the same polling organization that 
conducted the Arizona poll for our 2003 report. During September 9 
through 18, 2009, the firm completed telephone interviews with 800 
heads of households in Arizona. To ensure a random selection of 
households proportionately allocated throughout the sample universe, 
the firm used a computer-generated, random digit dial telephone 
sample, which selected households based on residential telephone 
prefixes and included all unlisted and newly listed households. 
Telephone interviewing was conducted during approximately equal cross 
sections of daytime, evening, and weekend hours--a procedure designed 
to ensure that all households were equally represented regardless of 
work schedules. Up to five separate attempts were made with households 
to obtain completed interviews. The 800 completed interviews represent 
a survey response rate of 42.98 percent. 

Survey Error: 

All surveys are subject to errors. Because random samples of each 
state's population were interviewed in these omnibus surveys, the 
results are subject to sampling error, which is the difference between 
the results obtained from the samples and the results that would have 
been obtained by surveying the entire population under consideration. 
Measurements of sampling errors are stated at a certain level of 
statistical confidence. The maximum sampling error for the Maine 
survey at the 95 percent level of statistical confidence is plus or 
minus 6.7 percent. The maximum sampling error for the Arizona survey 
at the 95 percent level of statistical confidence is plus or minus 5 
percent. 

Voter Participation (Turnout): 

To examine changes in voter participation, we reviewed information 
about voter turnout data from the Census Bureau, Federal Election 
Commission, United States Election Assistance Commission, the American 
National Election Studies, and other resources, including two 
repositories of elections data and information--George Mason 
University's United States Election Project (the Elections Project) 
and the Center for the Study of the American Electorate.[Footnote 105] 
We identified these sources through our review of the literature and 
through discussions with researchers. To determine the extent to which 
changes in voter participation could be assessed over time, we 
reviewed documentation and research on these potential data sources, 
including information on collection and measurement of the voting-age 
population (VAP) or voting-eligible population (VEP) and the type of 
turnout recorded. Finally, we examined data and methodologies for 
measuring changes in voter turnout and other forms of participation to 
determine whether changes in participation could be precisely measured 
at the state level. We found that the different data sources required 
to calculate changes in turnout are not always comparable across 
sources and over time, because of differences in the way that data are 
collected or changes in how turnout is defined. As such, there was no 
need to conduct electronic testing to further assess the reliability 
of the data for our purposes. This does not indicate that the data are 
unreliable for other purposes. We also discussed voter turnout 
calculations with state officials and researchers. Additional detail 
about our work related to voter participation is included in the e- 
supplement to this report--GAO-10-391SP. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through May 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing Programs for Legislative 
Election Campaigns in Maine and Arizona: 

Maine voters, by a margin of 56 percent to 44 percent, passed the 
Maine Clean Election Act[Footnote 106] (Maine's Act) in November 1996. 
Arizona voters, by a margin of 51 percent to 49 percent, passed the 
Citizens Clean Elections Act[Footnote 107] (Arizona's Act) in November 
1998. These ballot initiatives established optional financing programs 
for candidates desiring to use public funds to finance their campaigns 
as an alternative to traditional fundraising means, such as collecting 
contributions from individuals or political action committees. The 
Maine and Arizona programs were the first instances of state programs 
that offered public funding intended to fully fund most campaign costs 
of participating candidates seeking state legislature seats and 
certain statewide offices.[Footnote 108] Both states' public financing 
programs became available for candidates beginning with the elections 
in 2000. 

Generally, participating candidates--those candidates who forgo 
private fund raising and who otherwise qualify to take part in the 
respective state's public financing program--are to receive specified 
amounts of money for their primary and general election campaigns. 
Under Maine's and Arizona's laws, nonparticipating candidates--those 
candidates who choose to continue using traditional means for 
financing campaigns--are subject to certain limits on contributions 
and reporting requirements. 

This appendix provides an overview of the public financing programs 
for legislative election campaigns in Maine and Arizona. Detailed 
information is available on the Web sites of the state agencies 
responsible for administering the respective program--Maine's 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices 
(www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission (www.azcleanelections.gov). 

Maine's Public Financing Program: 

Purposes of Maine's Public Financing Program: 

Other than noting that the public financing program is an alternative 
financing option available to certain candidates, Maine's Act has no 
section that specifically details the purposes, goals, or objective of 
the law. To get the initiative on the ballot, a coalition of interest 
groups, the Maine Voters for Clean Elections, collected about 65,000 
signatures.[Footnote 109] At that time, the coalition and other 
proponents advertised that the public financing program would "take 
big money out of politics" by limiting what politicians spend on 
campaigns, reducing contributions from special interests, and 
increasing enforcement of election laws. They said that the 
initiative, if passed, would decrease the influence of wealthy 
individuals, corporations, and political action committees in 
politics, and would level the playing field so that challengers would 
have a chance against incumbents. They asserted that politicians would 
then spend more time focusing on the issues that affect all of their 
constituents rather than spend time on pursuing money for their 
campaigns. Further, proponents also advertised that the public 
financing program would allow candidates who do not have access to 
wealth the opportunity to compete on a more equal financial footing 
with traditionally financed candidates, restore citizen's faith and 
confidence in government, and give new candidates the opportunity to 
run competitively against incumbents. In 2003 we reported that 
according to Maine state officials and interest group representatives 
we interviewed there was not any organized opposition to the 
initiative when it was on the ballot.[Footnote 110] 

A 2007 report by the Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and 
Election Practices reaffirmed that the goals of the program are 
generally to increase the competitiveness of elections; allow 
participating candidates to spend more time communicating with voters; 
decrease the importance of fundraising in legislative and 
gubernatorial campaigns; reduce the actual and perceived influence of 
private money in elections; control the increase of campaign spending 
by candidates; and allow average citizens a greater opportunity to be 
involved in candidates' campaigns.[Footnote 111] 

Requirements to Receive Public Funding in Maine: 

In Maine, candidates who wish to participate in the state's public 
financing option and receive funds for campaigning must first be 
certified as a Maine Clean Election Act candidate. Certified 
candidates, among other things, must (1) forgo self-financing and all 
private contributions, except for a limited amount of "seed money," 
which are funds that may be raised and spent to help candidates with 
the qualifying process prior to certification, and (2) demonstrate 
citizen support by collecting a minimum number of $5 contributions 
from registered voters. For example, as table 22 shows, to qualify for 
public financing during the 2008 election cycle, a candidate in a 
Maine House race had to gather $5 qualifying contributions from at 
least 50 registered voters, and could raise no more than $500 of seed 
money. 

Table 22: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 Contributions 
for Maine Legislative Candidates in the 2008 Election Cycle: 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Seed money limits (dollars): Total cap: $500; 
Seed money limits (dollars): Individual contribution limit: $100; 
Number of Qualifying contributions: 50. 

Office: Senate; 
Seed money limits (dollars): Total cap: $1,500; 
Seed money limits (dollars): Individual contribution limit: $100; 
Number of Qualifying contributions: 150. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine public financing laws. 

Note: To help with the qualifying process, candidates seeking to be 
certified to receive public funding may raise and spend limited 
amounts of seed money. 

[End of table] 

Amounts of Allowable Public Funding for Participating Candidates in 
Maine: 

After being certified by the state as having met qualifying 
requirements, participating candidates receive initial distributions 
(predetermined amounts) of public funding and are also eligible for 
additional matching funds based on spending by privately funded 
opponents in conjunction with independent expenditures against the 
candidate or on behalf of an opponent. 

For example, in Maine's 2008 election each participating candidate in 
a contested race for the House of Representatives (i.e., a race with 
more than one candidate per seat in contention) received an initial 
distribution of public funds in the amount of $1,504 for the primary 
election and an amount of $4,144 for the general election.[Footnote 
112] Also, under Maine's Act, the maximum allowable matching funds 
available to a participating candidate in a legislative race were 
capped at double the initial distribution that the candidate received 
for his or her contested race, as shown in table 23. 

Table 23: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the Maine 2008 Election Cycle: 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $1,504; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $3,008; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $4,512; 
General election: Initial distribution: $4,144; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $8,288; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $12,432. 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $512; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $512; 
General election: Initial distribution: $1,658; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $1,658. 

Office: Senate; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $7,746; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $15,492; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $23,238; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,078; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,156; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $57,234. 

Office: Senate; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $1,927; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $1,927; 
General election: Initial distribution: $7,631; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $7,631. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine public financing laws. 

Note: A contested race is a race with more than one candidate per seat 
in contention. 

[End of table] 

Under Maine's Act, prior to being amended in 2009, the commission was 
required to recalculate the initial distribution amounts at least 
every 4 years, based upon average expenditures in similar races in the 
two previous election cycles. Under this statute, the commission was 
not required to recalculate the initial distribution amounts in 2008 
and intended to use the same payment amounts as in 2006. However, 
according to a state official, due to a shortfall in the state's 
General Fund budget, the Maine State Legislature approved a 5 percent 
reduction in the general election distribution amounts, which took 
effect in the 2008 legislative elections. Beginning in the 2012 
elections, in response to a 2009 amendment, the state will be required 
to recalculate the initial distribution amounts every 2 years taking 
into account several factors such as average candidate spending and 
increases in costs of campaigning. 

Matching funds are triggered when required reports show that the sum 
of a privately funded opponent's expenditures or obligations, 
contributions and loans, or fund revenues received exceeds a 
participating candidate's sum of fund revenues. Further, the 
calculation used to assess whether matching funds are triggered is to 
include reported independent expenditures that benefit an opponent's 
campaign. Generally, independent expenditures are any expenditures 
made by individuals or groups, other than by contribution to a 
candidate or a candidate's authorized political committee, for any 
communication (such as political ads or mailings) that expressly 
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 
[Footnote 113] During the final weeks before an election, the 
definition of independent expenditure expands beyond express advocacy 
to include a broader range of communications directed to the public. 

In 2008, a total of about $3 million in public funds was authorized 
for the 332 participating candidates who ran in the Maine primary or 
general elections for state legislature. 

Revenue Sources for Maine's Public Financing Program: 

Various revenue sources are used to support Maine's public financing 
program. As table 24 shows, appropriations were the largest funding 
source in Maine in 2008. Table 24 also indicates that in 2008, about 6 
percent of Maine's funding came from state income tax checkoff 
donations and other voluntary donations. This included $194,970 in 
funding from state income tax checkoff donations, which represented 
about 7 percent of the 665,503 total returns filed in tax year 2007 in 
the state. 

Table 24: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Maine's Public Financing 
Program in 2008: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Revenue sources: Appropriations: On or before January 1st of each 
year, the State Controller is to transfer $2 million from the General 
Fund to a special dedicated fund (the Maine Clean Election Fund); 
Annual revenue: $2,700; 
Percentage: 82%. 

Revenue sources: Tax checkoffs: Under a tax checkoff program, a Maine 
resident can designate that $3 be paid to the Maine Clean Election 
Fund. A husband and wife filing jointly may each designate $3; 
Annual revenue: $200; 
Percentage: 6%. 

Revenue sources: Qualifying contributions: The $5 qualifying 
contributions collected by candidates are deposited in the Maine Clean 
Election Fund; 
Annual revenue: $128; 
Percentage: 4%. 

Revenue sources: Miscellaneous: Other income includes interest earned, 
specified fines and penalties, and seed money collected by candidates 
and deposited in the Maine Clean Election Fund; 
Annual revenue: $256; 
Percentage: 8%. 

Revenue sources: Total; 
Annual revenue: $3,284; 
Percentage: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine public financing laws. 

Notes: The cash balance in the Maine Clean Election Fund on December 
31, 2007, was $4,092,547. In addition to the annual transfer of $2 
million on January 1, 2008, the commission requested an advance on the 
annual transfer due on January 1, 2009, in order to have enough funds 
to cover the payments of matching funds to candidates in the 2008 
general elections. The legislature authorized the transfer of $700,000 
to occur in August 2008. The 2008 election cycle involved only 
legislative races. It was not a gubernatorial election year. Annual 
revenue dollars are rounded. 

[End of table] 

Administration of Maine's Public Financing Program: 

Maine's Act utilizes a commission, the Maine Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, to implement the public 
financing program and enforce provisions of the act. The commission 
consists of five members appointed by the Governor. Nominees for 
appointment to the commission are subject to review by the joint 
standing committee of the state legislature having jurisdiction over 
legal affairs and to confirmation by the state legislature. The 
commission is to employ a director and a staff to carry out the day-to-
day operations of the program. In addition to financing election 
campaigns of candidates participating in the public financing program, 
the Maine Clean Election Fund is also to pay for administrative and 
enforcement costs of the commission related to Maine's Act. In 2008, 
the commission's total expenditures from the fund were $3,357,472, 
including $552,426 in personnel, technology, and other administrative 
costs. 

Reduced Contribution Limits and Additional Reporting Requirements for 
Nonparticipating Candidates in Maine: 

Before the passage of Maine's Act, political campaigns were financed 
completely with private funds. There were no limitations placed on 
expenditures by candidates from their personal wealth. Under Maine's 
Act, nonparticipating candidates are not limited in the amount they 
may spend from their personal financial resources on their own 
campaigns. While not faced with limits on the total amount of money 
that they can raise or spend, nonparticipating candidates are subject 
to certain limitations on the amount that an individual, corporation, 
or political committee can contribute to the campaigns of 
nonparticipating candidates. In the 2008 elections, for example, a 
nonparticipating candidate for the state legislature could accept up 
to $250 from a donor per election. Prior to the 2000 election, the 
candidates could have collected up to $1,000 from individuals and up 
to $5,000 from political committees and corporations.[Footnote 114] 

Additional reporting requirements are placed on nonparticipating 
candidates who have one or more participating opponents. For example, 
a nonparticipating candidate with a participating opponent must notify 
the commission when receipts, spending, or obligations exceed the 
initial allocation of public funds paid to the participating opponent. 
Further, the nonparticipating candidate must file up to three 
additional summary reports so that the commission can calculate 
whether the participating opponent is entitled to receive any matching 
funds. 

Maine Reporting Requirements for Independent Expenditures: 

Under Maine law, individuals or organizations making independent 
expenditures in excess of $100 during any one candidate's election 
must file reports with the state. Reporting requirements for 
independent expenditures are important for helping to determine if 
matching funds are triggered. Independent expenditures are generally 
defined as any expenditure for a communication, such as campaign 
literature or an advertisement that expressly advocates the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is made independently 
of the candidate, the candidate's committee, and any agents of the 
candidate. However, under Maine's campaign finance laws, expenditures 
by a group or individual to design, produce, or disseminate a 
communication to support or oppose a clearly identified candidate 
during the final weeks before an election with a participating 
candidate will be presumed to be independent expenditures, even if the 
communication does not expressly advocate a candidate's election or 
defeat. This "presumption period" was first implemented in the 2004 
Maine election. In 2008, the presumption period was 21 days before a 
primary election and 35 days before a general election. The law 
relating to the presumption period for a general election increased 
the period from 21 to 35 days in 2007. As table 25 shows, Maine has 
reporting requirements based upon the amount and timing of the 
independent expenditures to help ensure that participating candidates 
receive any additional matching funds they may be eligible for in a 
timely manner, particularly in the days before the election. 

Table 25: Maine Reporting Requirements for Independent Expenditures in 
the 2008 Election Cycle: 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditure of more 
than $250 in aggregate per candidate per election made within the 
presumption period; 
Reporting requirement: Report within 24 hours. 

Independent expenditure description: Any independent expenditure, 
regardless of the amount, for a candidate who has over $250 in 
aggregate independent expenditures in an election; 
Reporting requirement: Report within 24 hours. 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditures 
aggregating in excess of $100 per candidate in an election but not in 
excess of $250; 
Reporting requirement: Reported in campaign finance report that covers 
the date the independent expenditure was made. 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditures made 
during the 13-day period before an election; 
Reporting requirement: Report within 24 hours. 

Source: GAO analysis of Maine campaign finance laws. 

[End of table] 

Arizona's Public Financing Program: 

Purpose of Arizona's Public Financing Program: 

Arizona's Act contains a "findings and declarations" section that 
addresses the intent of the program. Specifically, the "findings" 
subsection of the Citizens Clean Elections Act, passed by voters in 
1998, noted that the state's then-current election financing-system: 

* allows elected officials to accept large campaign contributions from 
private interests over which they have governmental jurisdiction; 

* gives incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers; 

* hinders communication to voters by many qualified candidates; 

* effectively suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority 
of Arizona citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special 
interests; 

* undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials; 

* costs average taxpayers millions of dollars in the form of subsidies 
and special privileges for campaign contributors; 

* drives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging 
otherwise qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to 
special interest funding; and: 

* requires that elected officials spend too much of their time raising 
funds rather than representing the public. 

Further, the "declarations" subsection of Arizona's 1998 Act stated 
that: "the people of Arizona declare our intent to create a clean 
elections system that will improve the integrity of Arizona state 
government by diminishing the influence of special interest money, 
will encourage citizen participation in the political process, and 
will promote freedom of speech under the U.S. and Arizona 
Constitutions. Campaigns will become more issue-oriented and less 
negative because there will be no need to challenge the sources of 
campaign money." 

Requirements to Receive Public Funding in Arizona: 

As in Maine, Arizona candidates who wish to participate in the state's 
public financing option and receive funds for campaigning must first 
be certified as a Clean Election candidate. Certified candidates, 
among other things, must (1) forgo self-financing and all private 
contributions, except for a limited amount of "early contributions," 
which are funds that may be raised and spent to help candidates with 
the qualifying process prior to certification, and (2) demonstrate 
citizen support by collecting a set number of $5 contributions from 
registered voters. To qualify for public financing during the 2008 
election cycle, a candidate for Arizona's House of Representatives had 
to gather at least 220 qualifying $5 contributions, and could collect 
no more than $3,230 in early contributions, as shown in table 26. 

Table 26: Early Contribution Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 
Contributions for Arizona Legislative Candidates in the 2008 Election 
Cycle: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Early contribution limits: Total cap: $3,230; 
Early contribution limits: Individual contribution limit: $130; 
Number of Qualifying contributions: 220. 

Office: Senate; 
Early contribution limits: Total cap: $3,230; 
Early contribution limits: Individual contribution limit: $130; 
Number of Qualifying contributions: 220. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona public financing laws and Citizens 
Clean Election Commission data. 

Note: To help with the qualifying process, candidates seeking to be 
certified to receive public funding may raise and spend limited 
amounts of early contributions. The amount of allowable early 
contributions are established in statute and adjusted for inflation 
every 2 years. 

[End of table] 

Amounts of Allowable Public Funding for Participating Candidates in 
Arizona: 

After being certified by the state as having met qualifying 
requirements, participating candidates receive initial distributions 
(predetermined amounts) of public funding and are also eligible for 
additional matching funds when an opposing nonparticipating candidate 
exceeds the participating candidate primary or general election 
spending limits.[Footnote 115] 

In Arizona's 2008 elections, each participating candidate for the 
House of Representatives or Senate who was in contested party primary 
elections (i.e., races with more than one candidate per seat in 
contention) received an initial distribution of public funds in the 
amount of $12,921. After the primary, successful major party 
candidates who were in a contested general election race then received 
an additional $19,382, as shown in table 27.[Footnote 116] Independent 
candidates received 70 percent of the sum of the original primary and 
general election spending limits. Unopposed candidates (i.e., those in 
an uncontested race) received only the total of their $5 qualifying 
contributions as the spending limit for that election. 

Table 27: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
the Arizona 2008 Election Cycle: 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $12,921; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $25,842; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $38,763; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,382; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,764; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $58,146. 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]; 
General election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]. 

Office: Senate; 
Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: $12,921; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $25,842; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $38,763; 
General election: Initial distribution: $19,382; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: $38,764; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: $58,146. 

Office: Senate; 
Type of race: Uncontested; 
Primary election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
Primary election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
Primary election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]; 
General election: Initial distribution: [A]; 
General election: Maximum allowable matching funds: [A]; 
General election: Total maximum allowable public funds: [A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona public financing laws and Citizens 
Clean Election Commission data. 

Notes: A contested race is a race with more than one candidate per 
seat in contention. 

[A] In Arizona, candidates in uncontested House and Senate races are 
only to receive an amount equal to the qualifying contributions for 
that candidate. 

[End of table] 

Participating candidates also received additional matching funds up to 
predetermined limits when an opposing nonparticipating candidate 
exceeded the primary or general election spending limits.[Footnote 
117] Matching funds were also provided to participating candidates 
when independent expenditures were made against them or in favor of 
opposing candidates in the race. The calculation to assess whether 
matching funds for participating candidates are triggered is to 
include reported independent expenditures that, in general, are made 
on behalf of nonparticipating or another participating candidate in 
the race by individuals, corporations, political action committees, or 
other groups. A January 2010 federal district court ruling held 
Arizona's Citizens Clean Election Act to be unconstitutional.[Footnote 
118] More specifically, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona held that Arizona's matching funds provision burdens First 
Amendment speech protections, is not supported by a compelling state 
interest, is not narrowly tailored, is not the least restrictive 
alternative, and is not severable from the rest of the statute thereby 
rendering the whole statute unconstitutional. On May 21, 2010, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court ruling on the basis that the matching funds provision imposes 
only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights, and bears a 
substantial relationship to the state's interest in reducing political 
corruption.[Footnote 119] 

In total, about $6 million in public funds was distributed in 2008 to 
the 120 participating candidates for the Arizona legislature. 

Revenue Sources for Arizona's Public Financing Program: 

Arizona's public financing program is supported through various 
revenue sources. As table 28 shows, a surcharge on civil and criminal 
fines and penalties was the largest funding source. Table 28 also 
indicates that in 2008, $6.6 million, or about 39 percent of the 
fund's revenue, came from state income tax checkoff donations and 
other voluntary donations. 

Table 28: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Arizona's Public Financing 
Program in 2008: 

Revenue sources: Fines and penalties: This source is comprised of a 10-
percent surcharge imposed on certain civil and criminal fines and 
penalties. Collections go in the Citizens Clean Elections Fund; 
Annual revenue (dollars in thousands): $10,096; 
Percentage: 59%. 

Revenue sources: Tax checkoffs and donations: By marking an optional 
checkoff box on their state income tax returns, Arizona taxpayers can 
make a $5 contribution to the Citizens Clean Elections Fund. A 
taxpayer that checks this box receives a $5 reduction ($10 if filing 
jointly) in the amount of tax. Also, taxpayers may redirect a 
specified amount of owed taxes--up to 20 percent or $550 (ceiling 
adjusted periodically), whichever is greater--to the Citizens Clean 
Election Fund and receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit; 
Annual revenue (dollars in thousands): $6,638; 
Percentage: 39%. 

Revenue sources: Qualifying Contributions: The $5 qualifying 
contributions collected by participating candidates are deposited in 
the Citizens Clean Elections Fund; 
Annual revenue (dollars in thousands): $229; 
Percentage: 1%. 

Revenue sources: Miscellaneous: Other income includes civil penalties 
assessed against violators of the Citizens Clean Elections Act; 
Annual revenue (dollars in thousands): $37; 
Percentage: 0%. 

Revenue sources: Total; 
Annual revenue (dollars in thousands): $17,001; 
Percentage: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona public financing laws. 

Note: Annual revenue dollars are rounded. Percentages may not add to 
100 due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Administration of Arizona's Public Financing Program: 

Arizona's Act established the Citizens Clean Elections Commission to 
implement the public financing program and enforce provisions of the 
act. The commission consists of five members selected by the state's 
highest-ranking officials of alternating political party affiliation. 
[Footnote 120] No more than two commissioners may be from the same 
political party or county, and commissioners may not have run for or 
held office, nor been appointed to or elected for any office for the 5 
years prior to being chosen as a commissioner. One new commissioner is 
to be appointed each year. As established by Arizona's Act, the 
commission is to employ an Executive Director to facilitate 
administration of the program. The Executive Director is responsible 
for, among other things, educating and assisting candidates in 
compliance with the act's requirements, limits, and prohibitions, 
assisting candidates in participating and obtaining public funding, as 
well as determining additional staffing needs and hiring accordingly. 
Arizona's Act caps commission spending for a calendar year at $5 times 
the number of Arizona resident personal income tax returns filed the 
previous calendar year.[Footnote 121] Of that amount, the commission 
may use up to 10 percent for administration and enforcement activities 
and must use 10 percent or more for voter education activities. The 
remainder of commission spending goes to participating candidates' 
campaign funds. In calendar year 2008, the commission's expenditures 
totaled $14,741,043--$850,447 for administration and enforcement, 
$6,179,857 for voter education, and $7,710,739 for campaign funds. 
With regard to the $7,710,739 spent for campaign funds in 2008, 
$1,715,395 was for statewide candidates and $5,995,344 was for 
legislative candidates. 

The commission's responsibility for administering and enforcing 
Arizona's Act covers related contribution limits, spending limits, and 
reporting requirements that affect both participating and 
nonparticipating candidates. Cases of possible violations may be 
initiated with the commission in one of two ways: (1) either by an 
external complaint or (2) through information that comes to the 
commission's attention internally. The commission may assess civil 
penalties after investigating compliance matters and finding probable 
cause of a violation unless the candidate comes into compliance within 
a set time frame or settlement agreement is reached. Under certain 
circumstances, the commission can remove a legislator from office for 
violating specified Arizona Clean Elections Act spending or 
contribution limits. For example, the commission, for the first time, 
acted to remove a state legislator from office for exceeding spending 
limits by over 10 percent--about $6,000--in his publicly funded 
election campaign during the 2004 primary election. The commission's 
action was upheld by an Arizona administrative law judge and an appeal 
by the legislator was unsuccessful in the Arizona court system. 
[Footnote 122] 

Reduced Contribution Limits and Additional Reporting Requirements for 
Arizona Nonparticipating Candidates: 

Before the passage of Arizona's Act, political campaigns in Arizona 
were financed completely with private funds. There were no limitations 
placed on expenditures by candidates from their personal wealth. Under 
Arizona's public financing laws, nonparticipating candidates are not 
limited in the amount they may spend from their personal financial 
resources on their own campaigns. While not faced with limits on the 
total amount they can spend on their own campaigns, nonparticipating 
candidates are subject to certain limitations on the amounts of 
contributions they can accept. For example, in Arizona, contributions 
from individuals were limited to $488 per donor for nonparticipating 
candidates for the state legislature for the 2008 election cycle. The 
Arizona act reduced the limits on individual contributions to 
nonparticipating candidates by 20 percent. 

Nonparticipating candidates have additional reporting requirements. 
For example, a nonparticipating candidate opposed by a participating 
candidate, must, in general, file a report with the Secretary of State 
if the campaign's expenditures before the primary election exceed 70 
percent of the original primary election spending limit imposed on a 
participating opponent or if the contributions to a nonparticipating 
candidate has exceeded 70 percent of the original general election 
spending limit. 

Arizona Reporting Requirements for Independent Expenditures: 

Under Arizona law, individuals or organizations making independent 
expenditures must file reports with the Secretary of State. According 
to commission officials, the commission coordinates with the Secretary 
of State to determine if participating candidates are eligible for 
matching funds based upon independent expenditures opposing 
participating candidates or supporting other candidates in their race. 
Under Arizona law, independent expenditures are generally defined as 
expenditures such as campaign literature or advertisements that 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate that is made independently of the candidate, the candidate's 
committee, and any agents of the candidate. As table 29 shows, the 
amount and timing of the independent expenditure in relation to the 
election dictates when and how the independent expenditure must be 
reported. 

Table 29: Arizona Reporting Requirements for Individuals or 
Organizations Making Independent Expenditures in the 2008 Election 
Cycle: 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditures relating 
to a particular office exceeding $610 in aggregate in an election 
cycle, which includes both the primary and general elections; 
Reporting requirement: Reported in campaign finance reports that cover 
the date the independent expenditure was made. Supplemental reports 
required each time previously unreported independent expenditures 
exceed $1,000. 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditures relating 
to any one candidate or office made within 10 days before the primary 
or general election; 
Reporting requirement: Report within 24 hours. 

Independent expenditure description: Independent expenditures less 
than $610 in aggregate relating to a particular office in an election 
cycle; 
Reporting requirement: Not required to be reported. 

Source: GAO analysis of Arizona campaign finance laws and implementing 
rules. 

[End of table] 

In addition, according to commission and state officials, Arizona has 
made changes intended to improve and clarify the process of reporting 
independent expenditures, given their importance in determining 
matching fund disbursements under the public financing program. For 
example, these officials told us that they made a number of updates to 
the office's campaign finance system for the 2008 election to help 
improve the reporting and tracking of independent expenditures and the 
timely disbursement of matching funds to participating candidates. One 
update required individuals or committees making independent 
expenditures to report the unique identification number of the 
candidate that is the beneficiary of an independent expenditure. A 
Secretary of State official told us that prior to the 2008 election 
the beneficiary of the independent expenditure was inconsistently 
identified in a text field, and there was no systematic way to 
distinguish independent expenditures made on behalf of specific 
candidates or ballot initiatives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Information on Public Financing Programs for State 
Legislative Election Campaigns in Connecticut and New Jersey: 

After Maine voters passed the Maine Clean Election Act[Footnote 123] 
in November 1996 and Arizona voters passed the Citizens Clean 
Elections Act[Footnote 124] in November 1998, a similar public 
financing law[Footnote 125] (Connecticut's Act) was introduced in the 
Connecticut state legislature in October 2005 and enacted in December 
2005, establishing the Citizens' Election Program. Connecticut's Act 
established an optional financing program for candidates for the state 
legislature beginning in 2008 and certain additional statewide offices 
beginning in 2010 to use public funds to finance their campaigns as an 
alternative to traditional fundraising means, such as collecting 
contributions from individuals or political action committees. In 
addition, the New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project was 
enacted into law in August 2004[Footnote 126] and the 2007 New Jersey 
Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project Act[Footnote 127] was enacted 
into law in March 2007. These acts respectively established pilot 
projects offering optional public financing of campaigns for 
candidates seeking election to the General Assembly from certain 
legislative districts for the 2005 election and for candidates seeking 
election to the General Assembly and the Senate from certain 
legislative districts in the 2007 election. 

Detailed information is available on the Web sites of the state 
agencies responsible for administering the respective programs-- 
Connecticut's State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC) 
(www.ct.gov/seec/site/default.asp) and New Jersey's Election Law 
Enforcement Commission (www.elec.state.nj.us). 

Connecticut's Public Financing Program: 

Purpose of Connecticut's Public Financing Program: 

Connecticut's Act established the Citizens' Election Program, which 
offered full public financing[Footnote 128] for participating 
candidates for the House of Representatives and Senate of the state 
legislature, also known as the General Assembly, beginning in 2008, 
and will expand to certain statewide offices, such as governor and 
attorney general, beginning in 2010.[Footnote 129] Connecticut's State 
Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC) outlined the following goals 
of the public financing program: 

* to allow candidates to compete without reliance on special interest 
money, 

* to curtail excessive spending and create a more level playing field 
among candidates, 

* to give candidates without access to sources of wealth a meaningful 
opportunity to seek elective office in Connecticut, and: 

* to provide the public with meaningful and timely disclosure of 
campaign finances.[Footnote 130] 

Requirements of the Public Funding Program in Connecticut: 

In Connecticut, candidates for the state legislature who wish to 
receive public funds for campaigning must qualify by, among other 
things, (1) raising a certain total amount of money, in amounts 
between $5 and $100, in qualifying contributions from individuals, and 
(2) collecting a certain number of these qualifying contributions from 
individuals who reside in the district for which the candidate seeks 
legislative office, as shown in table 30. In addition, candidates can 
contribute a limited amount of personal funds to their candidate 
committees before applying for the initial distribution of public 
funds. The maximum amount of personal funds allowed per candidate 
varies depending on the office sought. Any allowable amount of 
personal funds a candidate contributes is not considered as part of 
the qualifying contributions, and reduces the initial distribution by 
a corresponding amount. 

Table 30: Qualifying Contribution Requirements for Candidates in 
Connecticut's Legislative Elections in 2008: 

Office: House of Representatives; 
Total minimum amount of qualifying contributions (dollars)[A]: $5,000; 
Minimum number of individual qualifying contributions from individuals 
residing in the candidate's legislative district: 150; 
Maximum amount allowable from candidate's personal funds (dollars): 
$1,000. 

Office: Senate; 
Total minimum amount of qualifying contributions (dollars)[A]: $15,000; 
Minimum number of individual qualifying contributions from individuals 
residing in the candidate's legislative district: 300; 
Maximum amount allowable from candidate's personal funds (dollars): 
$2,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of Connecticut public financing law. 

[A] Contributions are to be in amounts between $5 and $100 from 
individuals. Qualifying contributions must be monetary and do not 
include in-kind contributions. 

[End of table] 

After meeting the requisite qualifications and meeting the ballot 
requirements administered by the Secretary of State, participating 
candidates from major political parties may receive initial 
distributions of public funding as shown in table 31. Minor party 
candidates can receive varying amounts of public funding[Footnote 131] 
depending on whether they meet certain requirements.[Footnote 132] For 
elections held in 2010 and thereafter, SEEC is to adjust the amount of 
public funding for legislative candidates every 2 years to account for 
inflation. 

Table 31: Public Funding Available to Major Party Candidates in 
Connecticut Primary and General Elections in 2008: 

Office: State Representative; 
Primary election[A]: $10,000; 
General election[B]: $25,000. 

Office: State Senator; 
Primary election[A]: $35,000; 
General election[B]: $85,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of Connecticut public financing law. 

[A] If the participating candidate is in a party-dominant district 
(defined as districts in which the percentage of active registered 
district voters who are enrolled in a major party exceeds the 
percentage of active registered district voters enrolled in another 
major party by at least 20 percentage points), then the amount of 
public funding for a primary election increases to $25,000 for a state 
representative candidate and to $75,000 for a state senator candidate. 

[B] If the participating candidate is unopposed in the general 
election, the amount of public funding is reduced by 30 percent. If 
the participating candidate's opponent is from a minor party or has 
not raised funds in an amount equal to the qualifying contribution 
thresholds, then the amount of public funding is reduced by 60 percent. 

[End of table] 

Participating candidates are also eligible for supplemental public 
funding up to certain specified amounts, based on spending by 
nonparticipating or participating opposing candidates whose aggregate 
contributions, loans, or other funds received or spent exceed the 
applicable spending limit--the amount of qualifying contributions plus 
applicable full initial distribution for a participating candidate in 
that race. In addition, on the basis of required independent 
expenditure reports or a SEEC determination, a participating candidate 
can also receive additional matching funds, in general, if such 
independent expenditures are made with the intent to promote the 
defeat of the participating candidate. Such additional funds are to be 
equal to the amount of the independent expenditure but may not exceed 
the amount of the applicable primary or general election grant for the 
participating candidate. If such independent expenditures are made by 
an opposing nonparticipating candidate's campaign, additional matching 
funds are only to be provided if the nonparticipating candidate's 
campaign expenditures plus the amount of independent expenditures, 
exceed the applicable initial public funding amount for the 
participating candidate.[Footnote 133] 

Revenue Sources and Expenditures Made from Connecticut's Public 
Financing Program Fund: 

The primary revenue source for Connecticut's public financing program 
is derived from the sale of abandoned or unclaimed property in the 
state's custody, such as funds left in saving or checking accounts; 
stocks, bonds, or mutual fund shares; and life insurance policies. As 
of March 3, 2010, the Citizens' Clean Election Fund has about $43 
million, a fund established by Connecticut's Act for the public 
financing program. In addition, the Citizens' Election fund receives 
funds from voluntary contributions and interest earned on the fund's 
assets, and if the amount from the sale of abandoned or unclaimed 
property is less than the amounts specified under state law to be 
transferred to the Citizens' Election Fund, then the difference is to 
be made up from corporation business tax revenues. During the 2008 
election cycle, about $8.3 million was distributed to 250 
participating candidates in the general election and about $3 million 
was expended for SEEC administrative costs.[Footnote 134] 

Candidate Participation in Connecticut's Public Financing Program in 
2008: 

About three-fourths (250 of 343) of legislative candidates in 
Connecticut's general election participated in the public financing 
program, and there was at least one participating candidate in over 80 
percent of the races, as shown in table 32. 

Table 32: Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of 
Races with at Least One Participating Candidate in Connecticut's 
Legislative General Election in 2008: 

Candidates and races: 

Candidates[A]: Nonparticipating; 
Number: 93; 
Percentage: 27%. 

Candidates[A]: Participating; 
Number: 250; 
Percentage: 73%. 

Candidates[A]: Total; 
Number: 343; 
Percentage: 100%. 

Races[B]: With no participating candidates; 
Number: 34; 
Percentage: 18%. 

Races[B]: With at least one participating candidate; 
Number: 153; 
Percentage: 82%. 

Races[B]: Total; 
Number: 187; 
Percentage: 100%. 

Source: Data provided by the State Elections Enforcement Commission. 

Note: Connecticut has 151 House districts and 36 Senate districts. 

[A] In counting participating candidates, we include candidates who 
joined the program but did not apply for grants. A few chose not to 
apply because they were unopposed and did not need the funds, and a 
few did not apply because they did not reach the qualifying thresholds. 

[B] In counting election races, we included all 187 districts in which 
there was a candidate on the ballot regardless of whether or not the 
candidate faced a challenger. 

[End of table] 

Of the participating legislative candidates in Connecticut's general 
election, more than half, or 130 of 250 candidates, were incumbents. 
Of those participating candidates who were elected to office, about 95 
percent of the incumbents were elected, or 123 of 130 participating 
incumbent candidates, and about 23 percent of the challengers were 
elected, or 28 of 120 participating challenger candidates, as shown in 
table 33. 

Table 33: Participating Candidates in Connecticut's Public Financing 
Program in the Legislative General Elections in 2008: 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents: 
House of Representatives: 101; 
Senate: 29; 
Total: 130. 

Number of challengers: 
House of Representatives: 94; 
Senate: 26; 
Total: 120. 

Total: 
House of Representatives: 195; 
Senate: 55; 
Total: 250. 

Participating candidates elected: 

Number of participating incumbents elected: 
House of Representatives: 95; 
Senate: 28; 
Total: 123. 

Number of participating challengers elected: 
House of Representatives: 24; 
Senate: 4; 
Total: 28. 

Total: 
House of Representatives: 119; 
Senate: 32; 
Total: 151. 

Source: GAO analysis of Connecticut state reports. 

[End of table] 

New Jersey's Public Financing Program: 

Purpose of New Jersey's Public Financing Program: 

In 2004, the New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project was 
enacted into law and established an optional public financing program 
for General Assembly candidates in two legislative districts in the 
2005 general election.[Footnote 135] Under New Jersey's 2005 public 
financing program for legislative candidates, the state Democratic 
party chairperson and the state Republican chairperson each chose one 
district to participate in the program. In one of the selected 
districts, two out of the four candidates for the state Assembly 
qualified for public funds, and in the other district, no candidates 
qualified.[Footnote 136] In 2007, the state legislature expanded the 
number of districts covered by the program to Senate and General 
Assembly candidates in three legislative districts and made several 
changes in the program, such as decreasing the number of contributions 
each candidate was required to collect from registered voters in his 
or her district.[Footnote 137] 

The goals of the 2007 New Jersey Clean Elections Pilot Project are: 

* to end the undue influence of special interest money, 

* to improve the unfavorable opinion of the political process, and: 

* to "level the playing field" by allowing ordinary citizens to run 
for office. 

Requirements of the Public Financing Program in the 2007 New Jersey 
Clean Elections Pilot Project: 

To participate in the 2007 Clean Elections Pilot Project, candidates 
needed to, among other things, (1) file a declaration of intent to 
seek certification with the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement 
Commission (ELEC), the agency responsible for the public financing 
program; (2) agree to participate in at least two debates; and (3) 
after certification, limit their expenditures to the amounts raised as 
"seed money" and qualifying contributions, and public funds received 
from the fund. During the qualifying period, candidates may accept 
seed money contributions of $500 or less from individuals registered 
to vote in New Jersey, but in aggregate seed money contributions may 
not exceed $10,000.[Footnote 138] A candidate seeking certification 
must obtain at least 400 contributions of $10 (i.e., $4,000) to 
receive the minimum amount of public funds available and at least 800 
contributions of $10 (i.e., $8,000) to receive the maximum amount of 
public funds. The contributions must be from registered voters from 
the legislative district in which the candidate is seeking office. In 
addition, if two state Assembly candidates from the same party are 
running in the same legislative district, they both must agree to 
participate in the public financing program to become certified and 
eligible to receive public funds. 

The amount of public funds received by a certified candidate depended 
upon several criteria: (1) whether or not the candidate is opposed, 
(2) whether or not the candidate is a major party candidate, and (3) 
whether the candidate ran in a "split" district, one that, in general, 
was selected jointly by members of the majority and minority parties 
in the legislature. After being certified, a candidate nominated by a 
political party who has also received at least 400 qualifying 
contributions would receive a grant amount of $50,000 if opposed and 
$25,000 if unopposed. If the candidate were running in a "competitive" 
district, then such a candidate could collect funding in equal 
proportion to the number of remaining qualifying contributions (after 
the initial 400) up to a maximum of 800 qualifying contributions for a 
total amount of public funds not to exceed the average amount of money 
spent by all candidates in the two preceding general elections for 
those offices. If a candidate is running in one of the two "nonsplit" 
districts, that is, one district selected by the members of the 
majority political party, and one district selected by the members of 
the minority political party, then the candidate could collect funding 
in equal proportion to the number or remaining qualifying 
contributions (after the initial 400) up to 800 qualifying 
contributions for a total not to exceed $100,000.[Footnote 139] 
Qualifying contribution amounts received would be deducted from grant 
amounts. For example, if a candidate raised 400 $10 qualifying 
contributions, the amount dispersed to the candidate would be $46,000 
($50,000 minus $4,000 collected in qualifying contributions). 

Participating candidates may also receive additional funds under 
certain circumstances. When a campaign report of a nonparticipating 
candidate shows that the aggregate amount of contributions exceeds the 
amount of money provided to an opposing participating candidate, ELEC 
may authorize an additional amount of money equivalent to the excess 
amount, up to a maximum of $100,000 to each opposing participating 
candidate in the same district as the nonparticipating candidate. 
[Footnote 140] In addition, when a participating candidate files a 
written and certified complaint to ELEC, and ELEC determines that (1) 
a nonparticipating candidate is benefiting from money spent 
independently on behalf of the nonparticipating candidate or that (2) 
a participating candidate is the subject of unfavorable campaign 
publicity or advertisements by an entity not acting in concert with 
the opposing nonparticipating candidate, ELEC may authorize an 
additional amount of money up to a maximum of $100,000 to the opposing 
participating candidate in the same legislative district who is not 
benefiting from the expenditure. 

Revenue Sources and Expenditures for the 2007 New Jersey Clean 
Elections Pilot Project: 

For the 2007 pilot project, the New Jersey state legislature funded 
the program with approximately $7.7 million from the state's general 
funds. In addition, voluntary donations, earnings received from the 
investment of money in the fund, and fines and penalties collected for 
violations of the public financing program are also sources of 
revenue. All unspent money is to be returned to the fund. About $4 
million was distributed to participating candidates for the 2007 pilot 
project. According to a state official, New Jersey's public financing 
program, which contains matching funds provisions, was not 
reauthorized for the 2009 elections due to both concerns about a 
federal district court ruling holding that the matching funds 
provisions of Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act to be 
unconstitutional, as well as state budget constraints. 

Participation in the 2007 New Jersey Clean Elections Pilot Project: 

In the 2007 Pilot Program, 16 of the 20 legislative candidates running 
for office in the three legislative districts participated in the 
program, and every winning candidate participated. Two of the 16 
participating candidates received funds in addition to their initial 
distribution of public funds due to independent expenditures made on 
behalf of opposing nonparticipating candidates. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Mary Catherine Hult, Assistant 
Director; Nancy Kawahara; Geoff Hamilton; Tom Jessor; Grant Mallie; 
Heather May; Amanda Miller; Jean Orland; Anna Maria Ortiz; Doug 
Sloane; Michelle Su; Jeff Tessin; Adam Vogt; and Monique Williams made 
significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

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[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] These funds, in theory, were intended to be sufficient to cover 
most campaign costs, and these programs are often referred to as full 
public financing programs. 

[2] Both programs became law through the respective state's ballot- 
initiative process--Maine's program in 1996 and Arizona's program in 
1998. 

[3] GAO, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States That 
Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453] (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 
2003). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 

[5] S. Rep. No. 110-129, at 73 (2007). Since the Senate Report was 
issued in 2007, the report language referred to the past two election 
cycles, 2004 and 2006. However, due to the timing of our work, we 
included the past three election cycles in our report--the 2004, 2006, 
and 2008 election cycles. 

[6] Specifically, we interviewed nine researchers who have published 
relevant work on public financing or state legislatures, whom we 
selected based on our review of the literature and suggestions from 
state officials in Maine and Arizona and other researchers. We 
interviewed researchers to, among other things, obtain information 
about the methods and approaches they used to study public financing 
programs or electoral outcomes. 

[7] There may be other goals of public financing programs, such as 
increasing the amount of time candidates spend with constituents. 
However, we did not measure or assess these goals as we focused our 
review on revisiting the five goals identified in our 2003 report. 

[8] For more information about our 2003 report, please see GAO-03-453. 
Additional discussion about the measures we used for this report is 
included in appendix I. 

[9] We analyzed data from 1996 through 2008 to compare two elections 
before public financing became available (1996 and 1998) to the five 
elections after public financing became available (2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, and 2008). 

[10] In Maine, public financing is available for candidates for state 
legislative offices and governor. In Arizona, public financing is 
available for candidates running for the following statewide offices: 
legislature, governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state 
treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, state mine inspector, 
and corporation commissioners. 

[11] The comparison states for Maine were South Dakota, Montana, and 
Connecticut, and the comparison states for Arizona were South Dakota, 
Montana, and Colorado. Connecticut's 2008 election results were not 
included in our analyses since public financing for legislative 
candidates became available for the first time in the 2008 election 
cycle and were not comparable. 

[12] Fixed effects models compare how an outcome changes over time 
within states or legislative districts, in our case. Fixed effects 
models allow us to conclude that differences between states or 
districts at one point in time, such as laws, could not have affected 
the outcomes. We can rule out these factors because we only compare 
how the outcomes change within one state or district versus another, 
not how the outcomes differ at one time. Hierarchical loglinear 
regression models involve comparing the relative fit of simpler models 
with more complex models for the purpose of determining which factors 
do and do not have significant direct or indirect (i.e., interactive) 
effects on the outcomes of interest. 

[13] For example, data from Arizona's campaign finance reports 
identify the candidate committee number and name of the committee, 
such as "Smith for State Senator," but not the individual candidate by 
name, such as "John Smith," or candidate number assigned by the 
Secretary of State. 

[14] We contracted with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 
representative samples of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona. 
This polling effort, which duplicated questions asked for our 2003 
report, was designed to obtain citizenry views about the effect of the 
public financing program on the influence of interest groups and 
citizens' confidence in government. For our analysis, we included 
those respondents who said they knew a lot, some, or a little about 
the public financing law. 

[15] Voter turnout is generally defined as the percentage of the 
voting-age population (VAP) or voting-eligible population (VEP) 
(voting-age citizens who are not statutorily disqualified from voting) 
who cast a ballot in an election. These sources collect or compile 
information on VAP, VEP, voter registration, ballots cast or counted, 
or self-reported voting behavior. 

[16] Maine Clean Election Act, 21-A M.R.S. § 1121 et seq. 

[17] Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, A.R.S. § 16-940 et seq. 

[18] Unless indicated otherwise, references in this report to 
legislative candidates refer to state legislative (House of 
Representatives or Senate) candidates. 

[19] Seed money refers to contributions received by candidates to help 
with the qualifying process prior to certification. In the Maine 2008 
elections, House candidates were allowed to accept private donations 
of no more than $100 per individual with a cap of total seed money 
contributions of $500. For Senate candidates, individual contributions 
were limited to $100 with a cap of total seed money of $1,500. In 
Arizona, these contributions are known as "early contributions," and 
the base amounts are established by statutory formula and adjusted for 
inflation every 2 years. The adjusted amount of early contributions 
for Arizona's 2008 House and Senate candidates was limited to $130 per 
individual and a cap of total early contributions per candidate of 
$3,320. 

[20] In Maine, House candidates needed to collect a minimum of 50 $5 
contributions, and Senate candidates needed to collect a minimum of 
150 $5 contributions to qualify for public financing for the 2008 
elections. In Arizona, both House and Senate candidates needed to 
collect a minimum of 220 $5 contributions to qualify for public 
financing for the 2008 elections. In both states, the $5 contributions 
are deposited in the respective states' clean elections fund. 

[21] A January 20, 2010, federal district court ruling (McComish v. 
Brewer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4932 (D. Ariz, Jan. 20, 2010)) held 
Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act to be unconstitutional. More 
specifically, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held 
that the matching funds provision of Arizona's Citizens Clean Election 
Act burdens the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, is not supported 
by a compelling state interest, is not narrowly tailored, is not the 
least restrictive alternative, and is not severable from the rest of 
the statute thereby rendering the whole statute unconstitutional. On 
May 21, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court ruling on the basis that the matching funds 
provision imposes only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights, and 
bears a substantial relationship to the state's interest in reducing 
political corruption. (2010 U.S. appendix LEXIS 10442 (9TH Cir. Ariz. 
May 21, 2010)). 

[22] Of note, in relation to independent expenditures, a January 21, 
2010, Supreme Court decision (Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 U.S. (2010), 2010 U.S. LEXIS 766 (Jan. 21, 2010)), 
held that a prohibition in federal campaign finance law on corporate 
or union independent expenditures for speech that is an 
"electioneering communication" or that expressly advocates the 
election or defeat of a candidate, is an unconstitutional infringement 
upon the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections. 

[23] In Maine, a nonparticipating candidate must notify the Maine 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices when his or 
her receipts, spending, or obligations exceed the commission's initial 
allocation of public funds to a participating candidate. In Arizona, a 
nonparticipating candidate opposed by a participating candidate must, 
in general, file a report if the campaign's expenditures before the 
primary election have exceeded 70 percent of the original primary 
election spending limit imposed on a participating opponent or if the 
contributions to a nonparticipating candidate have exceeded 70 percent 
of the participating candidate's original general election spending 
limit. 

[24] R. Sam Garrett, Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns: 
Overview and Analysis, RL33814 (Congressional Research Service, July 
24, 2009), 42. 

[25] Donald A. Gross, Robert K. Goidel, and Todd G. Shields. "State 
Campaign Finance Regulations and Electoral Competition," American 
Politics Research, vol. 30, no. 2 (March 2002). 

[26] Garrett, Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns: Overview 
and Analysis. This report noted that the number of states offering 
"public financing" depends on how the term is defined and whether 
assistance to candidates or candidates and political parties are 
included. 

[27] The 10 states offering partial public financing of candidates' 
campaigns are: Hawaii, Florida, Nebraska, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey (gubernatorial campaigns), Rhode 
Island, and Wisconsin. 

[28] Full public financing programs are also known as "clean money, 
clean elections" programs, which is also a national initiative 
developed by the interest group Public Campaign. 

[29] H.R. 1826 and S. 752 (both entitled "Fair Elections Now Act") 
would not impose spending limits on participants, provided that their 
private fundraising, in general, was limited to contributions of no 
more than either $100 per election per individual or an amount 
determined by the legislation's implementing entity. 

[30] H.R. 158 (Let the Public Decide Clean Campaign Act) would mandate 
public financing during House general elections by, in general, 
prohibiting candidate spending other than from a proposed public 
financing fund, which would provide grants to candidates or under 
provisions authorizing certain contributions from state and national 
party committees. 

[31] After the Committee on House Administration's July 2009 hearing 
on H.R. 1826, the bill was referred to the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. 

[32] Maine's state legislature consists of 151 seats in the House of 
Representatives and 35 seats in the Senate. Members in all 186 
legislative seats serve 2-year terms. Thus, in primary and general 
elections, which are held biannually (i.e., in each even-numbered 
year), all legislative seats are on the ballot. 

[33] Under Maine law, candidates may withdraw from an election and 
under certain conditions another candidate may be nominated by a 
political committee to replace that candidate on the ballot. 

[34] In our analyses of Maine and Arizona election results data, we 
defined an incumbent as a candidate who held the seat from the 
previous legislative session in the same chamber. We defined a 
challenger as any candidate who was not an incumbent, regardless of 
whether he or she faced an opponent. 

[35] Arizona's state legislature consists of 60 seats in the House of 
Representatives and 30 seats in the Senate. Members in all 90 
legislative seats serve 2-year terms. Thus, in primary and general 
elections, which are held biannually (i.e., in each even-numbered 
year), all legislative seats are on the ballot. 

[36] This argument was reviewed and rejected by the Arizona Supreme 
Court in May v. McNally, 55 P. 3d 768 (Ariz. 2002). 

[37] The largest source of revenue for Arizona's public financing 
program is a surcharge on civil and criminal fines and penalties for 
the 2008 elections. The program is not supported by legislative budget 
appropriations from the state's general fund. 

[38] Under Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act, a participating 
candidate in an unopposed primary election is eligible to receive an 
amount equal to five dollars times the number of qualifying 
contributions that were certified by the Arizona Citizens Clean 
Elections Commission on behalf of the participating candidate. 

[39] The primary modeling techniques we used to measure changes in 
competition--fixed effects regression models and hierarchical 
loglinear models--were largely consistent in their results, but not 
entirely consistent. Both techniques offered no evidence of 
differential changes between the public financing states and 
comparison states in the contestedness of elections or in the 
incumbent reelection rates, but offered some evidence of differential 
change related to the margin of victory. The results from the 
loglinear models are somewhat weaker than the results of the fixed 
effects models. Additional information about the two types of models 
used are presented in appendix I and in an electronic supplement we 
are issuing concurrent with this report--GAO-10-391SP. 

[40] We calculated margin of victory in multimember districts to 
reflect the difference between the second winner and the runner up. We 
tested our statistical models including and excluding multimember 
districts and found that our results were robust across different 
models. 

[41] We calculated the average for each measure of electoral 
competition across all elections before public financing was available 
and after public financing was available. We then calculated the 
average change that took place across the two different periods in the 
states. We then estimated the difference in the change that took place 
between Maine and its comparison states and between Arizona and its 
comparison states. 

[42] In reviewing the literature and consulting with researchers, 
there is no standard or accepted measure or definition of a close race 
or landslide. We based our selection of these definitions on 
literature and discussions with researchers. This research suggested 
that a 10 percentage point difference would indicate a reasonable 
measure of competitiveness in a district. The largest range used by a 
researcher to indicate competitiveness was 20 percentage points; thus 
our definition of a landslide is those races that exceeded this 
threshold. 

[43] Because Arizona has multimember House districts (where two 
representatives are elected from each district), a contested race was 
one in which three candidates ran, since two candidates would be 
elected. 

[44] We counted races with multiple incumbents running against each 
other, and multimember district races where one incumbent won but the 
other did not, as incumbent wins for the purposes of our statistical 
analysis. These events, which are enumerated in the electronic 
supplement accompanying this report--GAO-10-391SP--were relatively 
infrequent and we do not have reason to believe they would change the 
interpretation of our results. 

[45] Individual incumbent reelection rates remained high when we 
factored in the number of incumbents running in primary elections. 
However, because incumbents may choose to run (or not to run) in a 
general election regardless of whether they win a primary election, 
and because some uncontested incumbents do not participate in 
primaries, we did not calculate a conditional incumbent reelection 
rate for those general election incumbents who also ran in primaries. 

[46] For further discussion on how we selected the specific comparison 
states, see appendix I. 

[47] Data on candidates' demographic characteristics (e.g., race and 
sex) were not routinely collected by the Maine and Arizona Secretary 
of State offices during the seven election years examined (1996 
through 2008). Therefore, we did not compare these demographics of 
candidates in the elections before and after the implementation of the 
public financing programs. 

[48] In Maine, independent candidates who are not enrolled in a party 
are also known as unenrolled candidates. 

[49] We consider an independent or third-party candidate to be 
"viable" if the candidate received 5 percent or more of votes cast. 
This threshold is distinct from whether a candidate is electable or 
highly competitive with other candidates. We chose this in light of 
interviews with state officials and research suggesting that garnering 
5 percent of votes cast is a common standard for a party to attain and 
retain ballot access at the state level, which is key in establishing 
voter awareness and institutional credibility for a party. 

[50] Not all candidates commented on changes in candidate quality. 

[51] These data reflect what the candidate spent--either from the 
public financing program for participating candidates or from 
traditional fundraising for nonparticipating candidates. Spending 
amounts presented for both Maine and Arizona candidates include both 
primary and general election spending for candidates that participated 
in the general election and reported spending more than zero dollars. 
Spending amounts have been adjusted for inflation using the gross 
domestic product (GDP) price index, with 2008 as the base year. 

[52] For the Maine 2008 election cycle, independent expenditures were 
defined as any expenditure "made by a person, party committee, 
political committee or political action committee, other than by 
contribution to a candidate or a candidate's authorized political 
committee, for any communication that expressly advocates the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and is presumed in races 
involving a candidate who is certified as a Maine Clean Election Act 
candidate … to be any expenditure made to design, produce, or 
disseminate a communication that names or depicts a clearly identified 
candidate and is disseminated during the 21 days, including election 
day, before a primary election; the 35 days including election day, 
before a general election; or during a special election until and on 
election day." For the Arizona 2008 election cycle, independent 
expenditures were defined, in pertinent part, as expenditures "by a 
person or political committee, other than a candidate's campaign 
committee, that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate, that is made without cooperation or 
consultation with any candidate or committee or agent of the candidate 
and that is not made in concert with or at the request or suggestion 
of a candidate, or any committee or agent of the candidate." 

[53] Expenditures by publicly financed candidates were made from 
funding provided by initial distributions of public funds for the 
primary and general election, as well as matching funds provided as a 
result of any independent expenditures made on behalf of their 
opponents. 

[54] In 2003 we reported that according to the Director of Maine's 
commission for 1998 and earlier years, the amounts of reported 
independent expenditures in the state were negligible. See GAO-03-453. 

[55] A 2003 change in Maine election law, in place for the 2004 Maine 
elections, expanded the definition of an independent expenditure to 
include any expenditure made to design, produce, or disseminate a 
communication that names or depicts a clearly identified candidate 
made within specified time periods close to an election, even if the 
communication does not expressly advocate a candidate's election or 
defeat. The period in which these kinds of communications are presumed 
to be independent expenditures is different for the primary and 
general elections. For additional details, please refer to appendix II. 

[56] In Arizona, neither the Secretary of State nor the commission 
responsible for administering the public financing program calculates 
candidate spending in each election. We calculated candidate spending 
by adding candidate committee expenditures that were deemed to be 
campaign-related and were made within specific time frames that 
corresponded to the election years in which the candidate ran. 
However, there may be some inconsistencies in how certain types of 
expenditures were reported, since each candidate committee was 
responsible for self-reporting financial transactions. We excluded 
candidates who agreed to spend $500 or less because, according to 
Arizona Secretary of State officials, these candidates were not 
required to submit campaign finance reports. 

[57] In 2003, we reported candidate spending data for 1996 and 1998. 
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453]. However, we 
could not replicate these data because state officials told us that 
their computer systems had undergone several upgrades and the data 
were no longer available. 

[58] While the Arizona Secretary of State's campaign finance data 
system has captured independent expenditures made by individuals and 
others since 2000, the candidates benefiting from the expenditures 
were not systematically identified until the 2008 election cycle. 

[59] In 2003, we reported independent expenditures for legislative and 
statewide elections in Arizona in 1998, 2000, and 2002, which were 
determined by hard-copy campaign finance reports submitted to the 
Arizona Secretary of State. See GAO-03-453. State officials verified 
these reports, but could not determine whether these reports 
represented all independent expenditures made for these years. State 
officials told us that their computer systems had undergone several 
upgrades, and these data could not be retrieved. 

[60] The independent expenditures in Arizona statewide and legislative 
elections were adjusted for inflation using the GDP price index with 
2008 as the base year. 

[61] See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Human Life of 
Wash. v. Brumsickle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4289 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 
2009); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 

[62] One candidate did not answer the question. 

[63] For the purpose of our analysis, we included respondents from our 
surveys of voting-age citizens who indicated that they were a lot, 
some, or a little aware of the respective state's applicable public 
financing law. 

[64] We contracted with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 
projectable samples of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona. This 
polling effort, which duplicated questions asked for our 2003 report, 
was designed to obtain citizenry views about the effect of the public 
financing program on the influence of interest groups and citizens' 
confidence in government. For our analysis, we included those 
respondents who said they knew a lot, some, or a little about the 
public financing law. See appendix I for more information about this 
polling effort. 

[65] Not all of the candidates or interest group representatives 
interviewed commented on changes in how money is spent, the role of 
political parties, and the timing of campaign activities under the 
public financing program. 

[66] In Maine, legislators may form leadership political action 
committees. Legislators, including those who participate in the public 
financing program, may raise money for their leadership political 
action committees, but they may not spend the money in their own 
campaigns. State officials told us that these leadership committees 
often spend money to help elect other candidates from the same party. 

[67] VAP includes U.S. residents age 18 and older. VEP accounts for 
the statutory ability of individuals to vote. Depending on the 
specific measure, estimates of VEP may exclude noncitizens, criminals 
disqualified under state felon disenfranchisement laws, or other U.S. 
residents of voting age who are disqualified from voting. 

[68] Historically, voter turnout is higher in presidential years than 
in years without a presidential election. 

[69] EAC was established by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). EAC is an independent, 
bipartisan commission responsible for, among other things, developing 
guidance to meet HAVA requirements, serving as a national 
clearinghouse of information about election administration, and 
certifying voting systems. 

[70] CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by 
the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics on the labor force 
characteristics of the U.S. population. Estimates obtained from the 
CPS include those on employment, unemployment, earnings, as well as 
other subjects including voting and registration. American National 
Election Studies conducts national surveys of the American electorate 
in election years, among other things. 

[71] The sampling frame is the source of information used in selecting 
those households or individuals for a survey sample. While an ideal 
sampling frame would include all individuals or units from the target 
population of interest, most sampling frames are limited to some 
available subset of the population. 

[72] Citizenship rates vary across states and adjusting VAP to create 
a "citizen VAP" can lead to changes in state-level estimates of voter 
turnout. 

[73] ACS is a nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau 
that collects population, economic, social, demographic, and housing 
information every year instead of every 10 years. ACS began testing in 
1996 and was fully implemented to allow for small area estimates in 
2005. Census has combined original ACS data with supplementary data to 
create an ACS data file suitable for state level estimates starting in 
2000. 

[74] The ACS sampling frame includes some individuals excluded from 
the CPS, including residents of group quarters such as nursing homes, 
prisons, and college dormitories. 

[75] GAO, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States 
That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453] (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 
2003). 

[76] S. Rep. No. 110-129 at 73 (2007). Since the Senate Report was 
issued in 2007, the report language referred to the past two election 
cycles, 2004 and 2006. However, due to the timing of our work, we 
included the past three election cycles in our report--2004, 2006, and 
2008. 

[77] We interviewed Thomas M. Carsey, Robert E. Hogan, Ruth S. Jones, 
Ray J. La Raja, Neil Malhotra, Kenneth R. Mayer, Michael P. McDonald, 
Richard G. Niemi, and Peverill Squire. These researchers have 
conducted studies or research on public financing programs, electoral 
outcomes, or state legislatures. 

[78] We interviewed representatives from the Campaign Finance 
Institute, Center for Governmental Studies, Clean Elections Institute, 
Congressional Research Service, Goldwater Institute, Institute for 
Justice (Arizona Chapter), League of Women Voters of Arizona, Maine 
Citizens for Clean Elections, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, National Institute on Money in State Politics, and 
Public Campaign. 

[79] There are other goals of public financing programs, such as 
increasing the amount of time candidates spend with voters. However, 
we did not measure these goals or assess the extent to which they may 
have been met because we focused our review on updating those goals we 
identified in our 2003 report. 

[80] In Maine, public financing is available for candidates for state 
legislative offices and governor. In Arizona, public financing is 
available for candidates running for the following statewide offices: 
legislature, governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state 
treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, state mine inspector, 
and corporation commissioners. 

[81] For our 2003 report, we conducted a mail survey of all candidates 
for office in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections. Due to different 
methods used, the results from the candidate survey presented in our 
2003 report and the results from the telephone interviews are not 
comparable. 

[82] We identified interest groups that made contributions during the 
2008 election cycle, November 2006 through November 2008. 

[83] We used state-level data on individual elections and candidates 
to generate a rate of participation in public financing programs. 

[84] For purposes of this report, we defined an incumbent as a 
candidate who held a seat from the previous legislative session in the 
same chamber. 

[85] In our 2003 report, we measured winners' victory margins by 
determining the difference between the percentage of votes received by 
the winning incumbents and the second-place finishers and defined a 
competitive race as one in which the difference in the percentage of 
the vote garnered between the winning incumbent and the runner-up was 
15 points or less. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453]. 

[86] We did not compare primary election outcomes since the states' 
systems for nominating candidates for the general election differ 
considerably and therefore are not comparable. 

[87] The National Conference of State Legislatures defines legislative 
capacity as the ability of the legislature to function as an 
independent branch of government, capable of balancing the power of 
the executive branch and having sufficient information to make 
independent, informed policy decisions. Factors such as the amount of 
time legislators spend on legislative work, annual compensation, and 
the ratio of legislative staff to number of legislators, can affect 
the level of legislative capacity. 

[88] We assessed the reliability of the data from each of the four 
comparison states by performing electronic testing for obvious errors 
in accuracy and completeness; validating the data using other sources; 
reviewing the associated documentation, such as system flowcharts; and 
interviewing state officials about their data systems. We found the 
data to be sufficiently reliable for our analyses. 

[89] Connecticut's 2008 election is omitted from our comparative 
multivariate analyses, since full public financing was available for 
the first time to state legislative candidates in the 2008 election 
cycle. The results from the analyses excluding Connecticut in 2008 are 
consistent with those that include it. 

[90] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453] for more 
information. 

[91] Races with more incumbents than seats available, and races in 
multimember districts where only one of two incumbents running won, 
were classified as "wins." Given the infrequency of these events, we 
do not have reason to believe that classifying these events as losses 
would have an effect on our statistical analyses. 

[92] To account for incumbents who lost in primary elections, we also 
calculated the individual incumbent reelection rate for all incumbents 
running including all incumbents who participated in primary elections 
and found similarly high reelection rates. Primary processes vary 
across states and parties. While most general election incumbents in 
Maine, Arizona, Colorado, and Montana had competed in a primary, a 
large proportion of incumbents in general elections in Connecticut and 
South Dakota were not participants in primaries. Additionally, several 
incumbents who won primaries did not run in general election races, 
while several who lost primaries nevertheless ran in the general 
election. 

[93] In 2004, three of Maine's general election races (two House and 
one Senate), as well as two of Montana's House primary races and one 
of Montana's House general election races involved paired incumbents. 
In 2002, one primary and one general election in Connecticut involved 
paired incumbents. Also in 2002, three Arizona House primary elections 
and one each in a South Dakota House primary and general race involved 
more incumbents than seats available. South Dakota also had a primary 
in 2000 with more than one incumbent that was not likely a result of 
redistricting. Colorado experienced no multiincumbent races following 
the 2000 Census. 

[94] We examined district boundary changes following the 2000 Census 
in Arizona, South Dakota, Colorado, and Connecticut. Our analysis 
revealed that the average district in Arizona experienced a much 
higher degree of geographic change than districts in other states. 
Electronic boundary files were not available for legislative 
boundaries in Maine and Montana prior to the boundaries based on the 
2000 Census. 

[95] Fixed effects models compare how an outcome changes over time 
within states or legislative districts, in our case. Fixed effects 
models allow us to conclude that differences between states or 
districts at one point in time, such as laws, could not have affected 
the outcomes. We can rule out these factors because we only compare 
how the outcomes change within one state or district versus another, 
not how the outcomes differ at one time. Hierarchical loglinear 
regression models involve comparing the relative fit of simpler models 
with more complex models for the purpose of determining which factors 
do and do not have significant direct or indirect (i.e., interactive) 
effects on the outcomes of interest. 

[96] Redistricting following the release of data from the 2000 
decennial Census complicates the use of district fixed effects because 
district boundaries are not guaranteed to have stayed the same. We 
used both types of fixed effects as a sensitivity analysis, in part to 
maximize control, but we acknowledge that, for the district fixed 
effects models, the assumption that district boundaries did not change 
substantially may not hold. 

[97] Linear probability models and robust variance estimators are 
statistical methods to determine the best fit line or curve that 
corresponds to the data and to test assumptions about the models used, 
respectively. 

[98] See Leo A. Goodman, Analyzing Qualitative/Categorical Data 
(Lanham, Maryland: Abt Books, 1978). These procedures compare models 
hierarchically to determine which, if any, set of variables can 
adequately predict variation in the outcome. In general, more 
parsimonious models (those with fewer variables) are preferable to 
those with more variables, so long as excluding variables does not 
erode how well the model fits the observed data. 

[99] We used likelihood ratio chi-squared tests to identify which 
models significantly explained variation. 

[100] In general, independent expenditures are expenditures made by an 
individual or group other than by contribution to the candidate, that 
benefits a candidate, but without coordination with the benefiting 
candidate. Participating candidates in Maine's and Arizona's public 
financing programs receive matching funds based in part on independent 
expenditures made that benefit an opposing candidate. 

[101] For example, data from Arizona's campaign finance reports 
identify the candidate committee number and name of the committee, 
such as "Smith for State Senator," but not the individual candidate by 
name, such as "John Smith," or candidate number assigned by the 
Secretary of State. 

[102] An omnibus survey is a survey that includes questions on a 
number of topics. 

[103] For our 2003 report, we also contracted with pollsters to 
conduct omnibus telephone surveys in Maine and Arizona in 2002. See 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453] for more 
information about our 2002 surveys and results. For this report, 
Arizona respondents were inadvertently not given the option of "too 
soon to tell" when asked about the extent to which the clean election 
law has decreased or increased the influence of interest groups and 
increased or decreased their confidence in state government. 

[104] In designing the questions, we used the term "clean election" 
because this wording has been widely used in the media, was used in 
the ballot initiatives, and also is part of the title of the 
respective state's laws. Thus, in reference to voter awareness, the 
term "clean election" likely is more commonly recognized than an 
alternative term such as "public financing program." 

[105] Voter turnout is generally defined as the percentage of the 
voting-age population (VAP) or voting-eligible population (VEP) 
(voting age citizens who are not statutorily disqualified from voting) 
who cast a ballot in an election. These sources collect or compile 
information on VAP, VEP, voter registration, ballots cast or counted, 
or self-reported voting behavior. 

[106] Maine Clean Election Act, 21-A M.R.S. § 1121 et seq. 

[107] Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, A.R.S. § 16-940 et seq. 

[108] In contrast, some states offer partial public funding programs 
that provide candidates with a portion, but not most, of the money 
expected to be necessary to run a campaign, generally by matching 
private contributions with public money at various ratios. 

[109] The coalition of interest groups included the American 
Association of Retired Persons (Maine Chapter), Maine A.F.L.-C.I.O., 
League of Women Voters of Maine, Common Cause/Maine, Natural Resources 
Council of Maine, Maine People's Alliance, Money and Politics Project, 
and Peace Action Maine. 

[110] GAO, Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States 
That Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-453] (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 
2003). 

[111] State of Maine, Report of the Commission on Governmental Ethics 
and Election Practices, 2007 Study Report: Has Public Funding Improved 
Maine Elections? Augusta, Maine, 2007. 

[112] Most (281 of the 300) of the legislative primary elections for 
Maine's House of Representatives in 2008 were uncontested. 

[113] For example, express advocacy includes the use of phrases such 
as "vote for the governor," "reelect your representative," "support 
the democratic nominee," "cast your ballot for the Republican 
challenger," "defeat the incumbent," or "vote pro-life" or "vote pro-
choice," if accompanied by a list of pro-life or pro-choice 
candidates. Clearly identified means the candidate's name or image 
appears in the communication; or that the candidate's identity is 
apparent by unambiguous reference. 

[114] The contribution limit will increase to $350 per donor for the 
2010 legislative elections in Maine. 

[115] Participating candidates for the state legislature could also 
use $610 of their personal moneys for their campaigns in 2008. 

[116] The Secretary of State is to adjust the base amount, established 
in Arizona's Act, for inflation every 2 years. 

[117] During the 2008 primary election period, participating 
candidates were to receive matching funds in the amount equal to any 
excess of the opposing nonparticipating candidate's reported spending 
over the primary election spending limit, as previously adjusted, less 
6 percent for the nonparticipating candidate's fundraising expenses 
and less the amount of early contributions raised for the 
participating candidate for that office. During the 2008 general 
election period, participating candidates were to receive matching 
funds in the amount equal to any excess of the reported difference 
over the general election spending limit, as previously adjusted, and 
less 6 percent for the opposing nonparticipating candidate's 
fundraising expenses. 

[118] McComish v. Brewer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4932 (D. Ariz. Jan. 
20, 2010). 

[119] McComish v. Bennett, 2010 U.S. appendix LEXIS 10442 (9TH Cir. 
Ariz. May 21, 2010). 

[120] In Arizona, the highest ranking office is governor, which is 
succeeded by the secretary of state, attorney general, state 
treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, corporation 
commissioners in the order of seniority, mine inspector, Senate 
majority and minority leaders and House majority and minority leaders. 
The commissioners that served in 2009 were variously appointed by the 
governor, secretary of state, or attorney general, who were the 
highest-ranked Republican and Democrat at the time of the appointments. 

[121] The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission may exceed the 
expenditure limit during a calendar year, provided that it is offset 
by an equal reduction of the limit during another calendar year within 
the same 4-year period beginning January 1 immediately after a 
gubernatorial election. 

[122] See, e.g., In the Matter of: David Burnell Smith, Administrative 
Law Judge Decision, No. 05F-040023-CCE (August 2005); Smith v. Arizona 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission, 132 P.3d 1187 (Ariz. 2006). 

[123] Maine Clean Election Act, 21-A M.R.S. § 1121 et seq. 

[124] Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, A.R.S. § 16-940 et seq. 

[125] C.G.S. § 9-700 et seq. 

[126] P.L. 2004, c.121, August 11, 2004. 

[127] P.L. 2007, c.60, March 28, 2007. 

[128] This type of program has been referred to as a "full" public 
campaign financing program. Full public campaign financing programs, 
in theory, are generally intended to be sufficient to cover most 
campaign costs. In contrast, some states offer partial public funding 
programs that provide candidates with a portion, but not most, of the 
money expected to be necessary to run a campaign, generally by 
matching private contributions with public money at various ratios. 

[129] These statewide offices are Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Attorney General, State Comptroller, State Treasurer, and Secretary of 
the State. The next election for these offices will be held in 2010. 

[130] In addition to administering the public financing program, SEEC 
has a number of other responsibilities, including the investigation of 
possible violations of the election laws and the inspection of 
campaign finance records and reports. The governor and the four 
highest ranking leaders of the General Assembly each make appointments 
to the five-member Commission. 

[131] If a candidate for the same office representing the same minor 
party in the prior election received at least 20 percent of the votes 
cast for that office, the eligible minor party candidate in the 
current election may receive the same amount of public funds for the 
general election campaign as the major party candidates. If a 
candidate for the same office representing the same minor party in the 
prior election received at least 10 or 15 percent of the votes cast 
for that office, the current minor party candidate may receive one-
third or two-thirds respectively of the amount of public funds for the 
general election campaign as the major party candidates and may 
continue to collect contributions meeting the criteria for qualifying 
contributions to make up the difference between the amount received 
and the amount of the full grant. Eligible petitioning party 
candidates, those not nominated by a major or minor political party, 
who secure a place on the ballot by filing a requisite nominating 
petition, are eligible to receive funding similar to that of eligible 
minor party candidates. Additionally, if a minor party for the same 
office represents the same minor party in the prior election received 
less than 10 percent of the votes cast for that office, the current 
minor party candidate may collect signatures on a nominating petition 
in order to qualify for a grant. 

[132] An August 27, 2009, federal district court ruling (Green Party 
of Connecticut, v. Garfield 648, F. Supp. 2d 298 (2009)) held that the 
Connecticut public financing program placed an unconstitutional 
discriminatory burden on minor party candidates' First Amendment 
protected right to political opportunity by enhancing major party 
candidates' relative strength beyond their past ability to raise 
contributions and campaign, without imposing any countervailing 
disadvantage to participating in the public funding scheme. This case 
was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
September 2009. 

[133] An independent expenditure, in general, is an expenditure that 
is made, without the consent, knowing participation, or consultation 
of a candidate or agent of a candidate committee. Independent 
expenditures, to promote the success or defeat of a candidate's 
campaign, in excess of $1,000 in the aggregate must be reported to 
SEEC by the person or entity that makes the expenditure. 

[134] According to the Director of the Connecticut Citizens' Election 
Program, approximately $1 million was returned as surplus funds to the 
Citizens' Election Fund from public grant funds distributed for the 
2008 election cycle. The surplus funds were returned in calendar years 
2008 and 2009. 

[135] New Jersey has 40 legislative districts with one senator and two 
Assembly members in each district, and elections are held in odd- 
numbered years. Each Assembly member has a 2-year term and each 
senator has a 4-year term. 

[136] The 6th and 13th legislative districts were selected for the 
2005 pilot project. 

[137] The three legislative districts selected for the 2007 pilot 
project were the 14th, 24th, and 37th districts. 

[138] Candidates were permitted to use previously raised and reported 
contributions of $500 or less from New Jersey registered voters for 
this purpose. All seed money contributions must be reported at the 
same time as qualifying contributions. 

[139] Certified independent candidates receiving at least 400 
qualifying contributions would receive $25,000 or, if unopposed, 
$12,500. Thereafter, the independent candidate would receive an amount 
in equal proportion to the number of remaining qualifying 
contributions up to a maximum of 800 contributions, for a maximum 
amount of $50,000. 

[140] These additional funds are also known as rescue money. 

[141] McComish v. Brewer, No. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4932 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 20, 2010). On May 21, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court ruling on the basis that the 
matching funds provision imposes only a minimal burden on First 
Amendment rights, and bears a substantial relationship to the state's 
interest in reducing political corruption. (2010 U.S. appendix LEXIS 
10442 (9TH Cir. Ariz. May 21, 2010)). 

[End of section] 

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