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Equipping Security Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress 
and Faces Logistical Constraints' which was released on May 12, 2010. 

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Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on the 
Middle East and South Asia, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2010: 

Palestinian Authority: 

U.S. Assistance Is Training and Equipping Security Forces, but the 
Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints: 

GAO-10-505: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-505, a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and 
other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the 
Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary 
precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a 
Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the 
Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the 
office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the 
parties meet these obligations. 

GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security 
assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State’s efforts to measure 
the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors 
that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance 
programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional 
experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel, 
and Jordan. 

What GAO Found: 

State has allocated about $392 million to train and equip the PA 
security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure 
projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 
through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than $160 
million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA’s 
National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately $89 million to 
provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about $99 million to renovate or 
construct several PA installations, including two of the operations 
camps it plans to provide (see figure); and (4) about $22 million to 
build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning 
Directorate. State also requested $150 million for its programs for 
fiscal year 2011. 

Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security 
assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security 
conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not 
established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators 
to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the 
programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap 
obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such 
performance indicators to a number of factors, including the 
relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming, 
rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-
based indicators to measure and manage performance against program 
goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such 
indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance 
information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that 
they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign 
plan to be released in mid-2010. 

The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces 
logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these 
implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the 
limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical 
constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in 
the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely 
delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for 
infrastructure projects. State, USAID, and other international donors 
have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms, 
although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the 
security assistance programs. 

Figure: Status of USSC Security Assistance to the PA as of March 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph] 

Number of NSF battalions: Trained; 
Completed/underway: 5; 
Funded: 2; 
Planned: 3. 

Number of NSF battalions: Equipped; 
Completed/underway: 4; 
Funded: 3; 
Planned: 3. 

Number of NSF battalions: Garrisoned; 
Completed/underway: 2; 
Funded: 4; 
Planned: 3. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State and USSC data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that, as State develops the USSC campaign plan for 
providing security assistance to the PA, the Secretary of State should 
define specific objectives and establish outcome-based indicators 
enabling it to assess progress. 

State partially concurred with this recommendation. It agreed with the 
need for more performance-based indicators, but noted that factors 
outside its control influence progress. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-505] or key 
components. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-
3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S. Security Assistance to the PA Emphasizes Training, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure and also Supports Capacity Building: 

Although Improvements in West Bank Security Conditions Have Been 
Reported, State and USSC Have not Established Clear and Measurable 
Outcome-Based Performance Indicators: 

U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and 
Outpace Development of the Rule of Law: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: List of USSC Courses Provided to the PASF in the West 
Bank, July 2008 to March 2010: 

Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 
3rd and 4th Battalions: 

Appendix IV: State Comments on Draft Report: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Overview of the PASF: 

Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Security Assistance Funding for the 
Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Programs, Fiscal Years 
2007 through 2010 Appropriations: 

Table 3: Select PA Justice-Sector Reform Programs: 

Table 4: USSC-Sponsored Training Courses in the West Bank, July 2008 - 
March 2010: 

Table 5: Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3RD and 4TH 
Battalions: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of West Bank and Gaza and Surrounding Countries: 

Figure 2: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion Level Training in 
Jordan as of March 2010: 

Figure 3: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion-Level Equipping as of 
March 2010: 

Figure 4: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Operations Camps as of March 
2010: 

Figure 5: Map of Planned and Ongoing USSC-funded Infrastructure 
Projects: 

Figure 6: Location of NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho: 

Figure 7: U.S. Funded Construction at the NSF Operations Camp Near 
Jericho: 

Figure 8: Process for Equipment Approval and Delivery: 

Figure 9: Division of West Bank Territory by Oslo Area of Control and 
Israeli Settlements (2009): 

Abbreviations: 

ATA: Anti Terrorism Assistance Program (State Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security): 

BST: British Support Team: 

DOD: U.S. Department of Defense: 

ESF: Economic Support Funds: 

EUPOL COPPS: European Union Police Coordination Office for Palestinian 
Police Support: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

JIPTC: Jordan International Police Training Center: 

JSAP: Justice Sector Assistance Project: 

MTT: Mobile Training Team: 

NSF: National Security Forces: 

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs: 

PA: Palestinian Authority: 

PASF: Palestinian Authority Security Forces: 

PCP: Palestinian Civil Police: 

PG: Presidential Guard: 

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization: 

PRDP: Palestinian Reform and Development Plan: 

SLC: Senior Leaders Course: 

SPD: Strategic Planning Directorate: 

SPF: Special Police Force: 

SSWG: Security Sector Working Group: 

UN: United Nations: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USSC: U.S. Security Coordinator: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 11, 2010: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Dan Burton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $3.5 billion 
in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, providing humanitarian, 
development, and security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza. In 
2002, the United States outlined the principles for a performance-
based strategy for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This 
strategy--known informally as the Roadmap for Peace (Roadmap)--calls 
for an independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with the 
State of Israel and, among other things, presents a plan for 
establishing the security preconditions necessary for such a state. 
[Footnote 1] The United Nations, the United States, the European 
Union, and Russia--known as the Quartet on the Middle East[Footnote 
2]--as well as Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) endorsed the 
strategy in April 2003. To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap 
obligations and pave the way for a two-state solution, the Secretary 
of State created the Jerusalem-based office of the United States 
Security Coordinator (USSC) in 2005 to facilitate PA-Israeli 
cooperation and coordinate assistance for the Palestinian Authority 
Security Forces (PASF) provided by the United States and other 
international donors. Beginning in 2007, USSC and the State 
Department's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) have funded and helped train, equip, and 
house PA security personnel based in the West Bank. 

In this report, we (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security 
assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007; (2) assess State's 
efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and 
(3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. 
security assistance programs. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant documents and 
interviewed officials from State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, 
D.C., and in Israel, Jerusalem, Jordan, and the West Bank. We met with 
PA and Israeli government officials as well as recognized experts in 
Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To describe the nature and extent of U.S. 
security assistance, we also conducted site visits to observe U.S.- 
sponsored training and construction projects. To assess State's 
efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance 
programs, we examined whether State's approach identified and applied 
measurable outcome-based performance indicators to measure and manage 
performance against its results-oriented goals, which GAO has 
identified as a good management practice because it helps provide 
objective and useful performance information for decision makers when 
faced with limited resources and competing priorities.[Footnote 3] 

We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more 
detailed information about our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

State has allocated a total of approximately $392 million to train and 
equip the PASF, oversee construction of related infrastructure 
projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 
through 2010. State, through the USSC, has allocated more than $160 
million of the total to help fund the training of PASF units. As of 
January 2010, one Presidential Guard battalion and four National 
Security Forces (NSF) special battalions had received basic training 
in Jordan, and State plans to help fund training for six additional 
NSF special battalions beginning in 2010.[Footnote 4] Moreover, USSC 
has conducted or supported about 24 different specialized courses for 
PASF personnel in the West Bank since mid-2008. In addition, State has 
allocated almost $89 million of the total to provide the NSF and 
Presidential Guard with vehicles and nonlethal equipment, including 
uniforms with protective gear; operational equipment such as riot 
shields, batons, and hand cuffs; computers; tents; and basic first aid 
kits. The USSC expects to issue each battalion trained in Jordan an 
initial allotment of this equipment. As of March 2010, one battalion 
had received its full issuance of equipment, and four more were in the 
process of being equipped. State also has allocated approximately $99 
million of the total to fund and oversee the renovation or 
construction of several PASF installations, including two training 
centers and two operations camps. In addition, USSC and the PA plan to 
build seven more operations camps to house battalions that receive 
U.S.-sponsored training.[Footnote 5] Finally, State has allocated 
approximately $22 million of the total to build the capacity of the 
Ministry of the Interior, focusing on the creation of the Strategic 
Planning Directorate, a small group responsible for conducting longer-
term strategic planning for the Ministry and the PASF.[Footnote 6] 
State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional funding 
for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011 to continue 
these activities, including $56 million for training, $33 million for 
equipment, $53 million for infrastructure, and $3 million for 
strategic capacity building activities. 

Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security 
assistance has helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas 
of the West Bank, State and USSC have not established clear and 
measurable outcome-based performance indicators for assessing the 
progress of their security assistance programs for the PA. We have 
previously identified the development of such indicators as a good 
management practice because it helps provide objective and useful 
performance information for executive decision makers and overseers. 
State documents and annual mission strategic plans for the U.S. 
Consulate General in Jerusalem identify performance indicators for 
U.S. security assistance programs; however, the targets they set to 
measure progress toward these indicators focus on specific program 
outputs, such as the number of battalions or personnel trained and 
equipped, rather than on broader program outcomes such as helping the 
PA meet its Roadmap obligations to achieve the transformation of its 
security sector and create a professional, right-sized PASF.[Footnote 
7] U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on clear and 
measurable outcome-based performance indicators to a number of 
factors. For example, the PA plans and capacity for reforming, 
rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces are changeable and 
still in a relatively early stage of development, making it difficult 
for the PA to set targets that the USSC could use to measure the 
progress and effectiveness of its programs. Nevertheless, State and 
USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate such performance 
indicators to the extent possible in a USSC campaign plan being 
developed for release in mid-2010. 

The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces a 
number of logistical constraints that are largely outside of U.S. 
control, and these security assistance programs outpace efforts to 
develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. 
Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement and access 
of USSC personnel in the West Bank, a lack of a process to ensure 
approval and timely delivery of equipment shipments, and difficulties 
in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects in the 
relatively small portion of the West Bank in which the PASF is allowed 
to construct or maintain facilities. For example, State and USSC 
officials noted that the process for obtaining Government of Israel 
approval for the shipment and delivery of equipment for the PASF is 
lengthy and may hamper the timely arrival of U.S. shipments. Moreover, 
the USSC lacks the means to hold the Government of Israel or the PA 
accountable if shipments are delayed or approvals withheld.[Footnote 
8] Furthermore, U.S. and PA officials said sustaining the progress 
they have made with U.S. assistance in the security sector may be 
difficult due to the lack of capacity in the civil police and the 
justice sectors with which the USSC-supported security forces must 
operate. State, USAID, and other international donors have been 
assisting the PA with civil police and justice-sector reforms, 
although these programs are not proceeding at the same pace as the 
programs to train and equip the security forces and build the capacity 
of the Ministry of the Interior. 

As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security 
assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State 
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate 
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward 
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other 
things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, 
civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sector. 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are 
reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our 
recommendation, agreeing that more performance-based indicators are 
needed. Consistent with our report, State also cited that several 
factors outside of their control influence progress toward a number of 
meaningful performance-based indicators. 

Background: 

The Palestinian territories, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, cover 
2,402 square miles and have a combined population of over 4 million 
people.[Footnote 9] (See figure 1.) Both the PA and Israel administer 
areas within the West Bank. 

Figure 1: Map of West Bank and Gaza and Surrounding Countries: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map] 

The following are depicted on the map: 

West Bank: 
Ramallah. 

Israel: 
Haifa; 
Tel-Aviv; 
Jerusalem; 
Gaza; 
Gaza City; 
Golan Heights (Israeli occupied). 

UN Disengagement Observer Force Zone: 

Lebanon: 

Syria: 

Jordan: 

Egypt: 

Saudi Arabia: 

Sources: GAO (data); CIA and Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Security Assistance to PA since 1993: 

The U.S. government, along with other countries, has provided 
intermittent security assistance to the Palestinians since 1993. 

1993-2003: 

In 1993, the Oslo Accord called for limited Palestinian self-rule and 
security responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza.[Footnote 10] The 
subsequent 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
divided the West Bank into three zones and allotted civil and security 
responsibilities, to varying degrees, to the Israeli government and 
the PA. The Government of Israel allowed the PA to establish some 
security forces and coordinated with the PA on the establishment of 
limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States 
provided some non-lethal equipment and a small amount of funding for 
salaries to help the newly created PA security forces improve their 
professionalism and combat terrorism. Other countries provided the PA 
with security assistance focused on training and equipping the 
security forces. 

The outbreak of the second intifada (insurrection), which State 
reports resulted in the death of more than 3,000 Palestinians and 
about 1,000 Israelis between 2000 and 2004, disrupted security 
assistance efforts.[Footnote 11] In response to the intifada, the 
Israeli security forces reoccupied much of the West Bank previously 
ceded to PA control, set up hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks 
throughout the territory, erected a wall separating Israel and some 
Palestinian territory from the rest of the West Bank, and destroyed 
much of the Palestinian security infrastructure. As a result, Israeli-
Palestinian security cooperation ceased and other governments 
curtailed or halted their security assistance to the PA. Amid the 
violence, efforts to negotiate a Middle East peace agreement began in 
2000 at Camp David and continued until 2003. 

2003-2007: 

Security assistance efforts did not resume until after the PA, Israel, 
United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia agreed in 
2003 to implement the Roadmap for Peace, a U.S.-proposed performance- 
based strategy, which calls for an independent Palestinian state 
coexisting peacefully with the State of Israel and, among other 
things, provides a plan for establishing the security preconditions 
necessary to create an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap, 
among other things, obligates the PA and Israel to undertake specific 
actions to improve security as part of the ongoing Middle East peace 
process. In particular, the Roadmap obligates the PA to perform the 
following actions: 

* Issue an unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist 
in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional 
ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against 
Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end 
incitement against Israel. 

* Have its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained, 
targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those 
engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and 
infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal 
weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association 
with terror and corruption. 

* Consolidate all Palestinian security organizations into three 
services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister. 

In return, the Roadmap obligates the Israelis to perform the following 
actions: 

* Issue an unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two- 
state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state 
living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by 
President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against 
Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions are also to 
end incitement against Palestinians. 

* Take no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks 
on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and 
property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; 
destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other 
measures specified in the Tenet work plan;[Footnote 12] and: 

* Progressively withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from areas 
occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the 
status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000, as comprehensive 
security performance moves forward. Palestinian security forces to 
progressively redeploy to areas vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces. 

To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap obligations and pave the 
way for a two-state solution, the Secretary of State created the 
office of the USSC in 2005. The USSC, which operated with no project 
funding until mid-2007, initially focused on providing advice and 
guidance to the PASF on its reform efforts while also coordinating the 
programs of several other security donors. In addition, USSC officials 
coordinated and consulted with Israeli and Palestinian authorities in 
connection with the PA's assumption of responsibility for security in 
Gaza following Israel's August 2005 withdrawal. 

In January 2006, the Palestinian people elected a Hamas majority to 
the Palestinian Legislative Council.[Footnote 13] Following the 
results of the January 2006 election and the subsequent formation of a 
Fatah-Hamas unity government in 2007, the Quartet on the Middle East 
announced it would continue to provide support and assistance to the 
Hamas-led government only if the government would agree to 
nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and respect previous 
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements.[Footnote 14] Hamas never 
accepted these conditions. U.S. direct assistance to the Palestinians 
was reduced and restructured, with the focus shifting to providing 
humanitarian and project assistance indirectly through international 
and non-governmental organizations. During this time, USSC focused on 
coordinating international assistance aimed at improving Gaza's 
economy and helped coordinate the efforts of Israel, Egypt, and the PA 
to regulate and control the key Gaza border crossings. USSC also 
coordinated with Britain and Canada to provide training assistance to 
the PA's Presidential Guard, a security organization under the control 
of the PA president with responsibility for protecting PA officials 
and facilities and manning the border crossings. 

2007-2010: 

In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip. This led 
the PA President to issue an emergency decree suspending the operation 
of the PA government and appointing a new government, without Hamas 
participation, to administer the affairs of the West Bank during the 
state of emergency, under a politically independent Prime Minister. As 
a result, the United States decided to re-engage with the PA directly 
and increased the amount of U.S. assistance aimed at improving the 
economic and security climate in the West Bank and increasing the 
capacity of the PA. 

As described by USSC and State officials, the USSC's current mission 
is to: 

(1) facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and allay Israeli fears about 
the nature and capabilities of the PASF; 

(2) lead and coordinate international assistance for the PASF provided 
by the United States and other international donors to eliminate 
duplication of effort;[Footnote 15] and: 

(3) help the PA rightsize, reform, and professionalize its security 
sector by advising the PA and by training and equipping the PASF to 
meet the Palestinians' obligations outlined in the Roadmap. 

The head of the USSC, a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, also 
serves as the deputy for security issues to the U.S. Special Envoy for 
Middle East Peace.[Footnote 16] 

The office of the USSC has a core staff of approximately 45 personnel 
as of March 2010. Headquartered in Jerusalem, the USSC includes up to 
16 U.S. military personnel and several U.S. civilians. About 17 
military staff provided to USSC by Canada operate in the West Bank, 
and two or more British military personnel from Britain support the 
USSC at the PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah.[Footnote 17] USSC 
also maintains staff at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv as liaisons to 
the government of Israel. State's Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) maintains staff in Jerusalem to 
implement INL program funds, most of which underwrite USSC activities. 
About 28 INL-directed Dyncorps International contractors assist with 
USSC training programs in the West Bank and Jordan. Other INL staff 
and contractors manage equipment warehouse operations in Jerusalem and 
oversee construction projects in the West Bank under this program. 

PASF: 

Under the current president and prime minister, the PA formalized 
plans to reorganize and rebuild ministries and security forces in the 
West Bank with donor assistance between 2008 and 2010. The PA has 
consolidated a 23,000-strong security force under Presidential and 
Interior Ministry control, as called for in the Roadmap Agreement. 
[Footnote 18] As shown in figure 2, the PASF is comprised of uniformed 
services, civilian organizations, and intelligence offices.[Footnote 
19] 

Table 1: Overview of the PASF: 

Uniformed Services; 
Service: National Security Forces (NSF); 
Responsibilities: A lightly armed and equipped gendarmerie-style force 
charged with supporting the civil police; delivering law and order; 
and combating terrorism, short of acting as a true military force.[A] 
To include 10 special battalions, with approximately 500 troops each;
Reports to: Minister of Interior; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes. 

Uniformed Services; 
Service: Presidential Guard; 
Responsibilities: Elite force of about 2,300 personnel organized into 
4 battalions, each specialized in different functions, including 
protection of important PA officials and facilities, quick reaction, 
and some gendarmerie tasks;
Reports to: PA President; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes. 

Civilian Security Organizations; 
Service: Palestinian Civil Police; 
Responsibilities: Approximately 7,300 officers responsible for daily 
policing, including arresting criminals, controlling traffic, and 
keeping general order. A relatively small, special rapid deployment 
unit handles complex situations such as riots or counterterrorism 
activities;
Reports to: Minister of Interior; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No. 

Civilian Security Organizations; 
Service: Palestinian Civil Defense; 
Responsibilities: About 650 personnel responsible for common 
protection services, such as emergency rescue and fire department 
services;
Reports to: Minister of Interior; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes. 

Intelligence Agencies; 
Service: General Intelligence Service; 
Responsibilities: Responsible for collecting intelligence inside and 
outside the territories, conducting counterespionage, and serving as 
the Palestinian liaison with other governments' intelligence agencies;
Reports to: PA President; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No. 

Intelligence Agencies; 
Service: Preventive Security Organization; 
Responsibilities: Responsible for conducting counterterrorism efforts, 
monitoring opposition groups, and conducting reconnaissance and 
intelligence operations;
Reports to: Minister of Interior; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No. 

Intelligence Agencies; 
Service: Military Intelligence; 
Responsibilities: Responsible for arresting and interrogating 
opposition activists considered a threat to the PA;
Reports to: National Security Forces; 
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] Gendarmeries are specialized units of police with military skills 
to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds. 
According to a State document, the NSF serves as a "gendarme-like" 
organization and a back-up for the Palestinian civil police if the 
latter encounter overwhelming forces with heavier weapons than the 
police possess. The NSF is expected to function in small unit or 
company-size formations, in a military fashion, to support civil 
police to subdue civil disorders and address situations in which 
police Special Weapons and Tactics teams would ordinarily be used in 
the United States. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Security Assistance to the PA Emphasizes Training, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure and also Supports Capacity Building: 

The U.S. government, through USSC and INL has allocated over $160 
million in funding for the training of certain units of the PASF's 
uniformed services, primarily the NSF, since 2007. USSC has also 
helped provide State-funded vehicles and nonlethal individual and unit 
equipment to both the NSF and Presidential Guard, totaling about $89 
million. In addition, State has allocated approximately $99 million 
toward the renovation or construction of numerous PASF installations. 
Finally, USSC and INL have undertaken activities to increase the PA's 
capacity, including building the Ministry of Interior's capacity to 
plan and oversee the PASF and coordinate international donor 
assistance. State allocated $22 million in funding for these programs 
since 2007. (See table 1.) 

Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Security Assistance Funding for the 
Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Programs, Fiscal Years 
2007 through 2010 Appropriations (Dollars in millions): 

Project area: Training; 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $28.6; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $13.0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $22.6; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $13.5; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $42.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $41.0; 
Total FY 07-10: $160.7. 

Project area: Equipment (non-lethal); 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $22.6; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $12.0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: 0; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $7.0; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $30.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $17.0; 
Total FY 07-10: $88.6. 

Project area: Infrastructure; 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $18.6; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $18.4; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: 0; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $31.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $30.5; 
Total FY 07-10: $98.5. 

Project area: Strategic/capacity development; 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $6.0; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $4.0; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $3.5; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $2.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $6.5; 
Total FY 07-10: $22.0. 

Project area: Program development & support[G]; 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $10.6; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $5.0; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $1.0; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $1.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $5.0; 
Total FY 07-10: $22.6. 

Project area: Total; 
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $86.4; 
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $25.0; 
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $50.0; 
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $25.0; 
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $106.0; 
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $100.0; 
Total FY 07-10: $392.4. 

Source: INL. 

Note: All funding shown is from the International Narcotics Control 
and Law Enforcement appropriations (INCLE) for fiscal years 2007-2010. 

[A] Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. Law No. 
110-5, Feb. 5, 2007. Funds from the Economic Support Fund appropriated 
in Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2006 were transferred and consolidated into the 
fiscal year 2007 INCLE account pursuant to Presidential Determination 
No. 2007-11 of January 26, 2007. 

[B] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June 
30, 2008. 

[C] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June 
30, 2008. 

[D] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-8, March 11, 
2009. 

[E] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-32, June 
24, 2009. 

[F] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-117, Dec. 
16, 2009. 

[G] Program Development and Support includes overhead items such as 
salaries, travel, and housing for INL officials, program design costs, 
and a contribution to the consulate's personal security detail costs, 
which includes the security escorts and armored vehicles required for 
travel by U.S. government personnel in the region. 

[End of table] 

State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional INCLE 
funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011, 
including $56 million for training activities, $33 million for 
equipping, $53 million for infrastructure activities, and $3 million 
for strategic capacity building activities. 

USSC Supports Training Focused Mainly on the NSF: 

Since 2007, State, primarily through USSC, has allocated more than 
$160 million to support training of PASF units in Jordan and the West 
Bank. USSC has focused its training programs mainly on the NSF, and to 
a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard. 

Battalion-Level Training in Jordan: 

The main component of the USSC training-related activities is 
battalion-level basic law enforcement and security training conducted 
at the Jordanian International Police Training Center outside Amman, 
Jordan. As of January 2010, the Jordanian International Police 
Training Center had trained four NSF battalions and one Presidential 
Guard battalion totaling about 2,500 personnel. The trained units 
include both existing units (Presidential Guard 3rd and NSF 2nd 
special battalions) and newly recruited battalions (NSF 3rd and 4th 
special battalions).[Footnote 20] This training consists of 19 weeks 
of basic training for all members of a battalion, which usually 
comprise approximately 500 troops.[Footnote 21] USSC officials told us 
that they currently plan to train a total of 10 NSF battalions at the 
Jordan center. State department officials reported that U.S. security 
assistance allocated to training from 2007 through 2010 covers the 
training of 7 of the proposed 10 battalions as shown in figure 2. This 
would allow one trained NSF special battalion to be deployed in each 
PA governorate in the West Bank (except in the municipality of 
Jerusalem, where the PA does not have security control) and one 
battalion to serve as a reserve for use as needed in any governorate. 

Figure 2: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion Level Training in 
Jordan as of March 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Number of NSF battalions to be trained (planned): 10; 
Number of NSF battalions funded for training: 7; 
Number of NSF battalions trained or undergoing training: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis of USSC data. 

[End of figure] 

The basic training includes a mix of classroom and practical exercises 
focused on the broad areas of firearms operations, crowd control, 
close quarters operations, patrolling, detainee operations, and 
checkpoint operations. This training is also designed to help the PA 
transform and professionalize its security forces by producing well 
trained, capable graduates able to perform security-related duties 
supporting the Palestinian Civil Police or other duties as directed by 
the PA. According to U.S. officials, the training is structured to 
train by battalion to foster unity of command and build camaraderie 
among the troops. Although USSC and INL designed the syllabus for this 
training in consultation with the PA, instructors from Jordan's Public 
Security Directorate conduct the training under the supervision of INL 
contractors. According to State and USSC officials, the United States 
fully vet all troops participating in USSC-sponsored training to 
ensure that no U.S. assistance is provided to or through individuals 
or entities that advocate, plan, sponsor, engage in, or have engaged 
in, terrorist activities.[Footnote 22] In addition, the PA, Israel, 
and Jordan also vet participants. 

Prior to the commencement of each battalion's basic training course, 
the program trainers conduct three concurrent 4-week preliminary 
training courses for the battalion's officers, noncommissioned 
officers, and drivers. These preliminary courses, intended to provide 
personnel the fundamental skills needed during the battalion training, 
focus on leadership skills for the officers and noncommissioned 
officers and advanced driving skills for the drivers. The Jordanian 
International Police Training Center also offers four 4-week 
concurrent specialized training courses for select graduates following 
their completion of the basic training course. 

Specialized Training in the West Bank: 

The USSC also supports and INL funds specialized courses in the West 
Bank to train and assist members of the NSF special battalions and 
some other PASF organizations in areas such as leadership, human 
rights, media awareness, equipment maintenance, and food service 
operations. Some of the courses continue specialized training for 
selected members of the NSF battalions that received basic training at 
the Jordanian International Police Training Center. However, other 
courses--including a senior leadership course and an intermediate 
leadership course--are open to all branches of the PA security 
services. The senior leadership course, first offered in late 2008, is 
a 2-month course for about 40 commanding officers from all branches of 
the PASF; as of February 2010, USSC had offered the course 6 times. 
International trainers taught the initial sessions, and a team 
comprised of PA and international instructors conducted the most 
recent senior leadership course. The intermediate leadership course is 
a new class for middle ranking and noncommissioned officers that 
adapts principles taught in the senior leaders' course. Altogether, 
USSC has conducted or supported 24 different specialized courses for 
PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and 
plans to continue sessions of many of these courses while offering at 
least two new courses by the end of 2010. Appendix II provides details 
on current and planned USSC courses. 

Other, smaller U.S. programs train Presidential Guard and Civil 
Defense troops. In 2008, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
provided limited training exclusively to the Presidential Guard 
through its Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.[Footnote 23] This 
training focused on police tactical unit operations, leadership 
development at the middle and senior levels, investigative skills, and 
crisis response capabilities to enhance the operational effectiveness 
of the Presidential Guard. Finally, USSC and INL plan to support 
limited civil defense training for the Palestinian Civil Defense corps 
at Jordan's regional civil defense training academy.[Footnote 24] 

USSC Provides the NSF and Presidential Guard with Nonlethal Individual 
and Unit Equipment: 

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $89 million to provide 
nonlethal equipment to 7 NSF battalions and the Presidential Guard. 
State plans to equip 10 NSF special battalions, as shown in figure 3. 
USSC is working to ensure that these security forces are properly 
equipped while garrisoned in their operations camps, and while 
operating throughout the West Bank. USSC intends to accomplish this by 
providing an initial issuance of nonlethal equipment to the battalions 
that have received basic training at the Jordanian International 
Police Training Center. As of March 2010, the USSC had provided the 
3rd Presidential Guard battalion with an initial issuance of 
equipment, and had provided partial issuances of equipment to the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, and 4th NSF special battalions. State also reported that 
they have submitted the 5th NSF special battalion's equipment package 
list to the Israeli government for approval. 

Figure 3: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion-Level Equipping as of 
March 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Number of NSF battalions to be equipped (planned): 10; 
Number of NSF battalions funded for equipment: 7; 
Number of NSF battalions fully or partially equipped: 4. 

Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data. 

[End of figure] 

USSC and INL, in consultation with the PA, developed the lists of 
equipment provided to each battalion, which the Government of Israel 
must also approve. The initial issuance of nonlethal individual and 
unit equipment for each NSF special battalion includes uniforms with 
protective gear and operational equipment, including riot shields, 
batons, and handcuffs as well as computers, tents, basic first aid 
kits, and support vehicles. (For a list of the specific equipment 
provided to an NSF battalion see appendix III.) USSC also provided the 
Presidential Guard battalion with a similar initial issuance of 
nonlethal individual and unit equipment, adapted for their mission 
specific needs. The USSC and INL also plan to provide search-and-
rescue vehicles to the PA civil defense forces. 

Because all U.S.-provided equipment is subject to end-use monitoring, 
INL officials and documents note that State maintains the right to 
examine the property and inspect the records that govern its use. In 
addition, the United States provided the PA with equipment and 
training to implement and maintain an inventory system to record and 
track all U.S. equipment deliveries and disbursements. 

USSC Supports Renovation and Construction of PASF Installations: 

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $99 million to renovate 
or construct PASF installations. The main focus of USSC and INL 
infrastructure activities is to fund and oversee construction of 
operations camps for 9 of the 10 NSF battalions trained at the 
Jordanian International Police Training Center.[Footnote 25] U.S. 
security assistance allocated to infrastructure from 2007 through 2010 
covers the renovation or construction of six of the proposed nine 
camps (see figure 4). The operations camps will serve as garrison 
facilities for the battalion as well as function as a base for 
conducting operations in the West Bank. 

Figure 4: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Operations Camps as of March 
2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Number of NSF operations camps planned: 9; 
Number of NSF operations camps funded: 6; 
Number of NSF operations camps started: 2. 

Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data. 

[End of figure] 

USSC and INL are also funding and overseeing the construction or 
renovation of training and ministry facilities in the West Bank. 
Figure 5 shows the six planned and six ongoing or completed 
infrastructure projects, including the two NSF operations camps, as of 
March 2010. 

Figure 5: Map of Planned and Ongoing USSC-funded Infrastructure 
Projects: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and associated information] 

Projects that are ongoing or completed: 

Jenin: NSF Operations Camp; Estimated completion: 4th quarter 2010. 

Ramallah: MOI/SPD Expanded Offices: Completed. 

Jerico: Nuweimah Training Center: Estimated completion phase I: July 
2010. 

Jerico: Presidential Guard Training College: Estimated completion: 
June 2010. 

Jerico: NSF Operations Camp; Estimated completion: June 2010. 

Hebron: Hebron NSF/SPF Renovation: Completion: Mid 2010. 

Projects that are proposed: 

Tulkarm: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp. 

Tubas: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp. 

Ramallah: Ramallah Civil Defense Center: In development. 

Ramallah: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp. 

Bethlehem: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp. 

Hebron: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp. 

Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps). 

[End of figure] 

The six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects include NSF 
operations camps, training facilities, and Ministry of Interior 
facilities, and account for about $41 million of the total allocated 
for infrastructure. They are in varying stages of completion; however, 
INL officials expect that all ongoing infrastructure projects will be 
completed by early 2011. 

NSF Operations Camps and Garrison Facilities: 

* Jericho NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp is to serve as the 
garrison for the 2nd Special Battalion. The camp is to accommodate 
approximately 750 personnel and provide workspaces, basic vehicle 
maintenance facilities, parking for approximately 145 squad vehicles 
and 40 large vehicles, clinical facilities, tactical communications 
facilities, separate officer berthing and accommodation spaces, a 
logistic warehouse facility, and K-9 animal housing spaces. State 
allocated about $11.3 million to this project, which USSC and INL 
expect to complete by mid-2010. (See figures 6 and 7.) 

* Jenin NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp will consist of two 
barracks buildings that will accommodate approximately 576 troops, one 
officers' accommodations building that will house over 100 officers, 
an operational center, mess hall, and gym. State allocated $11 million 
to this renovation, which USSC and INL officials expect to complete by 
the end of 2010. 

* Hebron NSF and Special Police Force (SPF) Building. In this joint 
NSF and Special Police Force building, the police occupy the ground 
floor and the NSF the first floor. The goal is to make this building 
habitable by units from the NSF special battalions deployed to Hebron 
and make it usable for its intended security functions, including the 
provision of a safe and secure operating environment, that is capable 
of being shared with other PA security services. State allocated 
$170,000 for this renovation, which USSC and INL expect to complete in 
mid-2010. 

Figure 6: Location of NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information] 

Depicted on the photograph: 
City of Jerico; 
Israeli Surveillance Tower; 
NSF Operations Camp; 
PA Civil Protection Center. 

Source: GAO photo. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: U.S. Funded Construction at the NSF Operations Camp Near 
Jericho: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information] 

Depicted on the photograph: 
City of Jerico; 
Construction at NSF Operations Camp; 
PA Civil Protection Center. 

Source: GAO photo. 

[End of figure] 

Training Facilities: 

* Nuweimah Training Center. The current training facility in Nuweimah 
is being refurbished and expanded with funding from INL, to serve as 
an NSF training facility. The facility is to include accommodations 
for approximately 2,000 troops and 24 classrooms for approximately 
1,500 students. The PA's initial plan was to renovate two NSF basic 
training facilities in Jericho--Nuweimah and Alami. However, according 
to an INL official the PA and USSC decided not to renovate the Alami 
site, owing to difficulties in securing needed land titles, and 
instead to shift all funds to Nuweimah. State allocated about $8 
million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by 
early 2011. 

* Presidential Guard Training College (Jericho). The PA intends to use 
the college to house and train 500 law, order, and security personnel 
at any given time. This facility has classroom space and 
accommodations for 250 personnel, as well as dining and support 
facilities for 500 personnel. State has allocated about $9 million to 
construct this facility. According to an INL official, original work 
on the facility was carried out by the UN Office for Project Services, 
under INL supervision.[Footnote 26] This facility is currently fully 
operational, and USSC and INL expect construction to be complete by 
mid-2010. 

Ministry Facilities: 

* Ministry of Interior's Strategic Planning Directorate renovation 
(Ramallah). USSC is renovating space in the Ministry of Interior to 
provide additional office space and a training hub for the Strategic 
Planning Directorate. The renovation is to add 90 spaces for new staff 
and two large classrooms, a meeting room, and a security room. State 
allocated $1.1 million to this renovation, which was completed in 
February 2010. 

To spend the remaining $58 million in infrastructure funding, USSC and 
INL proposed additional projects, including building NSF operations 
camps in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Tubas, and a civil 
defense center in or near Ramallah. However, one U.S. official told us 
that, because of difficulties in obtaining suitable land and other 
delays, the USSC is reviewing other options for the NSF operations 
camps, including constructing temporary operations camps until a 
permanent site can be identified or renovating existing joint security 
force facilities to allow them to be used to garrison NSF special 
battalions. As of March 2010, preliminary design work had begun on a 
temporary operations camp near Tubas. 

USSC Has Centered Capacity Building Programs on Interior Ministry: 

Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $22 million for capacity-
building activities, focused mainly on creating the Ministry of 
Interior's Strategic Planning Directorate. The Minister of Interior 
oversees all the security forces reporting to the PA prime minister. 
According to an INL document, the directorate conducts strategic 
planning to support security decision making at the executive and 
ministry level to help the PA establish law and order and facilitate 
other longer-term security-sector reforms. The directorate is staffed 
by individuals with strategic planning, logistics capability, and 
other expertise. According to USSC officials, when Gaza fell to Hamas 
in mid-2007 and the PA President issued presidential decrees declaring 
a state of emergency, suspending the current government, and forming a 
new, more moderate government, the Ministry of Interior lost its 
entire staff, leaving the newly appointed minister the task of 
building an entirely new ministry. INL-funded activities include 
providing technical assistance to the Strategic Planning Directorate, 
in particular, funding and assigning six international technical 
advisors to work within the directorate, and training for Ministry and 
Strategic Planning Directorate staff. According to State documents and 
officials, as of April 2010, after 2 years of service, the contracts 
of all six of these advisors had expired, and, at the request of the 
Minister of Interior, State did not renew them. According to a State 
official, the Minister of Interior stated in January 2010 that this 
effort had been concluded to the Ministry's satisfaction, so there are 
no plans to replace these advisors. He noted that State has offered to 
make technical assistance available on an ad hoc basis and at the 
request of the Minister, and, along with other international donors, 
plans to continue to fund other training and equipping efforts at the 
Ministry in fiscal year 2011. 

In addition to forming the Strategic Planning Directorate, USSC and 
INL have undertaken other programs to increase the PA's capacity. 
Examples include the following: 

* USSC and INL are providing assistance in building the PA's capacity 
to coordinate international security assistance. As part of this 
effort, USSC serves as a technical advisor to a security sector aid- 
coordinating body co-chaired by the Interior Minister and the 
government of the United Kingdom. 

* USSC and INL are supporting a Canadian-funded effort to develop PASF 
capacity at the governorate level through the creation of Joint 
Operations Centers, which are intended to give PASF area commanders in 
each governorate the command and communications facilities necessary 
to conduct integrated security operations. 

* In support of the PA justice sector, INL launched a $1.5 million 
small scale justice sector assistance project in Jenin.[Footnote 27] 
The program provides technical assistance, training, and modest 
amounts of equipment to improve capacity of the police to conduct 
criminal investigations and help the public prosecutor's office manage 
its caseload. A U.S. official reported that this program could be 
replicated if successful in other governorates. 

Although Improvements in West Bank Security Conditions Have Been 
Reported, State and USSC Have not Established Clear and Measurable 
Outcome-Based Performance Indicators: 

U.S. and international officials have observed improved security 
conditions in some areas of the West Bank since the PA began deploying 
units trained and equipped with USSC assistance, although they 
acknowledge these improvements may not be directly or wholly 
attributable to USSC programs. However, State and USSC have not 
assessed how their programs contribute to the achievement of the PA's 
Roadmap obligations because they have not developed clear and 
measurable outcome-based performance indicators and targets linking 
their program activities to stated U.S. program objectives. 

Numerous U.S. and International Officials Observed Improved Security 
Conditions in the West Bank since PA Began Deploying USSC-Trained and 
Equipped Units: 

Numerous U.S., PA, Israeli, and other government officials stated that 
both the PA and the Government of Israel are satisfied with the impact 
USSC-trained and -equipped PASF battalions have had on improving the 
security conditions in the West Bank. PA and U.S. officials cited 
these improvements as examples of how U.S. security assistance is 
aiding PA progress toward attaining its security obligations under the 
Roadmap, including having its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus 
begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations to dismantle 
terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. These improved conditions 
include the following. 

* Better PASF capacity to control potentially violent situations. 
According to U.S., international, PA and Government of Israel 
officials, USSC-supported and -trained PASF units contributed 
successfully to restored security and conducted counterterrorism 
operations in Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas between 2008 
and 2009.[Footnote 28] Several U.S. and international officials also 
noted the lack of spontaneous or organized violence in PASF-controlled 
areas in response to the December 2008 through January 2009 Israeli 
incursion into Gaza was an indicator of the PASF's growing capacity to 
anticipate and handle large scale demonstrations and limit potential 
violence. 

* Fewer Israeli government checkpoints. Several U.S. officials 
suggested that the USSC also could point to some indicators as 
measures of the growing effectiveness of USSC-supported security 
forces, including the decline in the key manned Israeli security 
checkpoints in the West Bank. However, the officials stated they could 
not independently verify the validity or accuracy of the reported 
declines, nor would they directly attribute these outcomes to USSC 
activities.[Footnote 29] 

* Revived economic activity. According to PA and U.S. officials and 
documents, the subsequent revival of private investment in Jenin, 
Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas where USSC-trained and -equipped 
PASF battalions were deployed is another indicator that USSC 
assistance has influenced the security situation, although a senior PA 
official noted that PA fiscal policies may have also contributed to 
this revival. 

* Improved public attitudes toward security forces. In addition, both 
State and PA officials noted that Palestinian polling suggests 
people's views of the PASF have improved, and a State report cited 
such a poll as indicating growing understanding and confidence of the 
West Bank populace in their security forces. 

State and USSC Officials Have Not Established Clear and Measurable 
Outcome-based Performance Indicators for PA Security Assistance: 

Although State and USSC report on PASF program outputs such as the 
number of personnel vetted, trained, and equipped, USSC has not 
defined or established outcome-based performance measures to assess 
the progress, impacts, and estimated costs of achieving USSC 
objectives. For example, USSC documents and officials note that USSC 
objectives include helping the PA create right-sized, professional 
security forces in support of its Roadmap obligations but do not 
specify measurable outcome-based program performance indicators. 
[Footnote 30] USSC and State officials attributed the lack of clear 
and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and their 
associated targets for their programs to three factors--(1) changing 
force requirements, (2) the early stages of PA planning and its 
limited capacity to rebuild and sustain its security forces, and (3) 
lack of detailed guidance from State about USSC program objectives, 
time frames, and reporting requirements. 

First, the PA's planned force requirements have undergone several 
revisions. According to a U.S. official, and as U.S. and PA documents 
demonstrate, the planned size and composition of the NSF has changed 
from seven special battalions (five in the West Bank, two in Gaza) in 
early 2007, to five special battalions solely in the West Bank after 
the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007. According to State officials 
and documents, the PA increased the number of battalions for the West 
Bank from five to seven by mid-2008, although the projected total 
number of personnel remained at 3,500 as each battalion was reduced in 
size from 700 to 500 personnel in part to create smaller units better 
suited for the urban environment in which they would operate. In 2009, 
the PA raised the projected size of the NSF to 10 special battalions, 
according to USSC officials.[Footnote 31] Some State officials and 
documents also noted that the PASF has not clarified the role of the 
Presidential Guard and that some of its units had assumed gendarmerie 
tasks beyond its original mandate, which may overlap with NSF 
responsibilities. 

The revised and unclear requirements reflect that the parties to the 
Roadmap agreement--the PA and Israel--have not agreed on common 
measures to assess progress in meeting their Roadmap security 
obligations, according to USSC officials. For example, a September 
2008 USSC report noted that the Government of Israel and the PA have 
not developed "effects-based metrics" needed to define a successful 
PASF security or counterterrorism effort under the Roadmap.[Footnote 
32] State officials stated that the Government of Israel prefers not 
to establish objectives or measures that might limit its flexibility 
to conduct security operations within the West Bank. 

Second, the PA's plans and capacity to reform, rebuild, and sustain 
its security forces are still in a relatively early stage of 
development.[Footnote 33] As a result, State and USSC officials said 
it is difficult to set outcome-based targets to measure the progress 
or outcomes of their programs. For example, the PA's capacity to 
direct its own transformation was lacking until recently. According to 
a senior PA official, the Minister of the Interior did not consolidate 
within the ministry the authority to request, accept, and coordinate 
all foreign donor security assistance until August 2009. 

Third, USSC officials said that State did not give USSC a "blueprint" 
for attaining defined and measurable objectives for its programs 
within a set period of time, or for estimating the amount and type of 
resources needed to achieve such USSC goals as aiding in the 
transformation of the PA security sector and the creation of a 
professional, right-sized security force. According to State, this 
stemmed from the absence of a requirements-based budget allocation 
process for USSC programs until 2008. Since then, however, State 
officials said they required USSC and INL to provide performance 
indicators beginning with the fiscal year 2009 Jerusalem mission 
strategic plan. Furthermore, a senior USSC official said they had 
little incentive to emphasize or develop performance targets because 
State had shown little interest in tracking performance in the past; 
in fact, regular monthly reports from USSC to State on its activities 
resumed only in November 2009 after a hiatus of more than a year. 

Despite these factors, deriving indicators to measure and manage 
performance against an agency's results-oriented goals has been 
identified by GAO as good management practice because it would help 
provide objective and useful performance information for decision 
makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities. 
[Footnote 34] GAO has previously reported that while agency managers 
encounter difficulties in setting outcome-oriented goals or collecting 
useful data on expected results in general, it is difficult to design 
effective strategies or measure the impact of programs without 
them.[Footnote 35] State and USSC officials noted that USSC was 
developing a campaign plan for release in mid-2010 to help the 
Palestinians implement their own revised security strategy--which was 
still not released as of March 2010-and expected the plan to 
incorporate performance indicators to the extent possible. According 
to U.S. military doctrine, effective planning cannot occur without a 
clear understanding of the desired end state and the conditions that 
must exist to in order to end the operation. Moreover, a campaign plan 
should provide an estimate of the time and forces required to reach 
the conditions for mission success or termination. Determining when 
conditions are met requires "measures of effectiveness," such as 
outcome-based performance measures.[Footnote 36] GAO has reported on 
the importance of outcome-based performance indicators as a key 
characteristic of effective national security strategy planning and a 
necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based 
on these strategies (see list of related GAO products at end of 
report). 

Although the fiscal year 2010 Jerusalem mission strategic plan 
identifies performance indicators for U.S. security assistance 
programs, the targets to measure progress towards achieving these 
indicators focus on program outputs rather than program outcomes. For 
example, the plan identified the performance indicator "building 
Palestinian security capabilities" to assess progress toward achieving 
State's broader goal of reforming Palestinian security forces to 
improve law and order and reduce terrorism.[Footnote 37] However, this 
indicator is measured based on output targets such as "completing the 
training and equipping of at least one PG and one NSF battalion" in 
fiscal year 2008 rather than on outcomes such as reduced terrorism as 
measured by, for example, changes in the number of terrorist-related 
incidents or changes in crime rates. Moreover, neither the performance 
plan nor USSC documents establish measurable outcome targets for 
assessing progress towards such stated USSC objectives as creating a 
"right-sized, professional" security force or helping the PA transform 
its security sector. Nor do these plans and documents contain 
information on expected time frames or estimated total costs for 
achieving these goals.[Footnote 38] 

State and USSC officials acknowledged that it would be useful to 
describe the impacts of U.S. security assistance on such outcomes as 
reductions in the number of Israeli security checkpoints in the West 
Bank. Similarly, they acknowledged it would be useful to tailor some 
survey questions to establish baselines and assess over time the 
extent to which polling data suggesting growing Palestinian confidence 
in their security can be attributed to the conduct and actions of USSC-
trained PASF personnel, but noted the difficulty in separating the 
impact of U.S. security assistance from the impact of such external 
factors as Israeli political and security actions. In March 2010, 
State and USSC officials said that they had tasked an officer to 
clarify how USSC activities achieve State objectives and to improve 
reporting on USSC performance. 

U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and 
Outpace Development of the Rule of Law: 

Logistical constraints on personnel movement and access, equipment 
delivery, and acquisition of land for infrastructure projects 
challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. In 
addition, State, USSC, and international officials and documents note 
that programs to develop the capacity of the civil police and the 
justice sector are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security 
sector reform programs. 

U.S. Security Assistance Faces Several Logistical Constraints: 

Logistical constraints--largely outside U.S. control-involving 
personnel movement and access, equipment approval and delivery, and 
land acquisition challenge the implementation of U.S. security 
assistance in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Constraints on Personnel Movement and Access: 

State travel restrictions and Israeli Defense Force security 
checkpoints limit the movement and access of U.S. personnel into and 
within the West Bank. State restricts U.S. government personnel travel 
into and within the West Bank and requires that they travel in armored 
vehicles with security teams when traveling to State designated high 
threat areas. However, such restrictions do not apply to personnel 
from other countries supporting the USSC, such as the United Kingdom 
and Canada, according to State officials. As a result, according to 
U.S. officials, USSC relies on non-U.S. personnel to visit Palestinian 
security leaders on a daily basis, gauge local conditions, and conduct 
training in the West Bank. Israeli security checkpoints when traveling 
into and out of the West Bank border also limit U.S. government 
personnel movement and access, according to U.S. officials. For 
example, on more than one occasion, U.S. government delegations, 
including staff from USSC and State, were prevented from entering or 
exiting the West Bank, according to USSC and State officials. PA 
officials also face movement and access difficulties crossing at 
Israeli checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank, 
which hampers the ability of USSC to meet with PA outside of the West 
Bank. 

Delays in Equipment Approval and Delivery: 

While a process exists for equipment approval and delivery as shown in 
figure 8, U.S. officials said problems affecting the approval and 
delivery of equipment have hampered USSC's ability to equip the PASF 
in a timely manner. USSC officials noted that without a significant 
effort at a higher political level to streamline this process, delays 
will frequently occur with little recourse available to USSC. 

Figure 8: Process for Equipment Approval and Delivery: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Process: 

USSC or INL requests pre-approval; 
Israel grants approval: No: 
USSC or INL modifies request (potential delay); 
Israel grants approval: Yes: 

INL contractor is responsible for procuring equipment and shipping to 
Israel: 

Israel grants customs approval (USSC or INL stores equipment until it 
passes customs inspections: potential delay). 
No approval: USSC or INL changes equipment to pass customs (potential 
delay); 
Approval: 

Israel inspects equipment at checkpoints and border crossings 
(potential delay): 

INL contractor ships to destination. 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Source: GAO analysis of USSC data. 

[End of figure] 

Delays in equipment approval and delivery have occurred throughout 
this process, for example: 

* Delays in approval. An absence of agreed-upon terms for the approval 
of equipment requests, such as equipment specifications or a set 
timeframe to make approval decisions, has resulted in delayed Israeli 
approval of shipments of USSC and other donor equipment, according to 
U.S. and other donor officials.[Footnote 39] For example, State and EU 
donor officials told us that the Government of Israel has not agreed 
to specific procedures for pre-approval of equipment orders as it 
prefers to continue to approve or deny each equipment request on a 
case-by-case basis. According to an Israeli official, each equipment 
request must be reviewed on its own merits, as specifications can 
change. For example, an Israeli official stated that although the 
Government of Israel had approved procurement of a shipment of 
raincoats, it did not guarantee the approval of future shipments of 
raincoats of comparable types and quantities. In addition, because the 
parties have not agreed on time frames for submitting or approving 
equipment requests, significant differences between the amounts of 
time needed to approve various items have constrained USSC's ability 
to estimate equipment delivery dates. For instance, some vehicles 
ordered for the Presidential Guard and NSF 2nd Special Battalion in 
March 2008 were delivered in June 2008 while others were not delivered 
until January 2009. On the other hand, USSC officials said in March 
2010 that the time needed to complete the approval process has 
declined from approximately 3 months to 2 weeks for items that had 
been approved in prior shipments by the Israeli government. 
Nevertheless, these officials note there is no guarantee that 
previously approved items will continue to be approved by the 
Government of Israel. For example, they noted that as of November 2009 
INL has paid at least $176,000 to store a $2.3 million shipment of 
approximately 1,400 radios and associated gear that the Israeli 
government approved for delivery, but was then impounded by Israeli 
customs upon arrival in port in early 2009 after the Government of 
Israel revoked this approval.[Footnote 40] 

* Delays in delivery. Delays have occurred at Israeli customs and 
during shipment into the West Bank, constraining USSC's mission of 
properly equipping the NSF and Presidential Guard, according to 
officials we spoke with. USSC officials stated that shipping items to 
Israel takes about 1 month by sea and as little as 1 day by air from 
the United States. However, USSC officials also stated that while the 
time needed for Israeli customs to approve shipments averages about 2 
months, approval can take up to a year or more for items that require 
modification by the Israelis in order to pass Israeli customs 
inspections. For example, USSC officials noted that vehicles and 
trailers were held up as Israeli customs required modifications to 
their lights, brakes, and other specifications before they would 
release them. According to an Israeli official, the PA also 
contributes to the equipment delays at customs by not following the 
shipment instructions in the approved requests. For example, in one 
case equipment was shipped with other types of goods destined for the 
West Bank and the quantity of equipment was lower than the approved 
amount. In another case, the shipper consolidated a shipment of PASF 
items with items for other customers. The increasing number of 
equipment deliveries in 2009 has also added to the delays in clearing 
customs, according to the Israeli government official. Additional 
unexpected delays in delivery have occurred when Israeli customs 
inspectors have not released equipment shipments they have approved, 
according to USSC and INL officials.[Footnote 41] These officials told 
us that security inspections required at Israeli border crossings and 
checkpoints in the West Bank have also delayed delivery. USSC and INL 
officials noted that they have taken steps to improve their ability to 
deliver equipment on time, including: developing standardized NSF 
battalion equipment packages to minimize Israeli opportunities to 
question equipment specifications; requiring the contracted freight 
forwarder in Virginia to check every item against shipment manifests 
prior to shipment; and making greater use of airfreight delivery. In 
addition, USSC officials said they have shortened the lead times 
needed to procure and ship equipment over time by pre-ordering items 
previously approved by the Israelis to be included in later shipments. 

Moreover, USSC, INL, and PA officials and staff have found it 
difficult to check on the status of the shipment or to hold parties 
accountable for delays, according to USSC officials. These officials 
stated that conflict appears to exist between various Israeli 
government departments related to the equipping process, which 
periodically results in unexplained delays in equipment release or 
approval. According to USSC, it is unclear with whom USSC or PA 
officials should speak to seek redress for unexplained equipment 
delays; as a result, delays are often elevated to high level U.S. and 
Israeli officials, who then negotiate a resolution. These delays have 
hampered USSC's ability to equip the trained NSF and Presidential 
Guard battalions in a timely manner. While the USSC planned to deliver 
equipment to these battalions upon their graduation from JIPTC, some 
of these battalions have operated for several months after graduation 
without all of their needed equipment. For example, INL ordered 
equipment for the PG 3rd battalion and NSF 2nd special battalion in 
December 2007 to be distributed at the time of their May 2008 
graduation; however, USSC and INL officials noted that although these 
two battalions had received all of their vehicles as of March 2010, 
they had yet to receive 14 percent of their equipment. As of March 
2010, the 3RD and 4TH NSF special battalions that had completed 
training in Jordan prior to December 2010 had received over 90 percent 
of their vehicles but only 44 to 50 percent of their other equipment, 
according to State officials. These officials said that the 1ST NSF 
special battalion, which graduated in January 2010, had not received 
any of the purchased vehicles and only 2 percent of its other 
equipment as of March 2010.[Footnote 42] 

INL officials stated that these equipment shortfalls had not 
significantly affected the ability of the NSF special battalions to 
operate once they were deployed back to the West Bank. However, they 
acknowledged that these units had been deployed to the field lacking 
critical items, such as helmets, armored vests, and communications 
gear, that had been proposed, and in some cases procured, by the USSC 
and INL but had not been approved for delivery by the government of 
Israel. 

Constraints on Land Acquisition: 

The completion of U.S.-funded infrastructure projects has been delayed 
by constraints on acquiring land in the West Bank that are largely 
outside of U.S. control, according to USSC, INL, and PA officials. 
Israel must approve the location of all proposed facilities and does 
not set formal standards by which locations are approved, according to 
USSC officials. These officials also said the PA is largely limited to 
building in Oslo Area A, which is solely under PA authority but 
comprises less than 20 percent of the West Bank's territory. USSC 
officials also stated that it is difficult to determine whether a 
proposed installation site includes land solely in Area A. In 
addition, the Government of Israel requires that the proposed 
installation sites must not be near Israeli settlements or access 
routes. After the Government of Israel approves an installation site, 
USSC officials stated they face a lengthy Palestinian process for 
establishing ownership rights and obtaining legal title to the land. 
These officials noted that conflicting land and property claims on the 
site also create a challenge to acquiring land for PA infrastructure 
projects. Figure 9 depicts areas where the PA usually can acquire land 
for security installations in the West Bank (area A) and areas where 
it cannot (areas B and C). 

Figure 9: Division of West Bank Territory by Oslo Area of Control and 
Israeli Settlements (2009): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

The following are indicated on the map: 

Israeli settlements: 

Area A: PA civil and security authority. 

Area B: PA civil authority and Israeli security authority. 

Area C: Israeli civil and security authority. 

PA: Indicates Palestinian Authority. 

Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps). 

[End of figure] 

Because of these restrictions and delays, USSC and INL officials said 
efforts to develop NSF operations camps beyond the two already under 
construction remain stalled as of March 2010. Owing to delays in 
acquiring suitable land for permanent camps and the need to house 
newly trained battalions, USSC and INL officials said they have built 
temporary operations camps. Similarly, because of delays in land 
acquisition, USSC and INL canceled renovation plans of an NSF facility 
in Alami and redirected the funding to the Nuweimah facility, 
according to an INL official. Originally designed to house 700 
trainees, Nuweimah will be expanded to house 2,000 trainees upon 
completion in fiscal year 2011. To work around restricted property in 
certain urban areas, the USSC and INL are planning to construct or 
renovate multistory buildings within urban-based security compounds 
known as muquata'as. This effort is underway or being planned for 
compounds in Tulkarm and other urban locations. As a result, some U.S.-
funded PASF centers are holding more troops than originally planned 
and facilities are being built in a way that allows them to be 
expanded upon if needed, according to USSC and INL officials. These 
land acquisition problems constrain USSC's goal to provide housing for 
each of the NSF special battalions upon their completion of training 
in Jordan. 

Capacity Development of PA Civil Police and Justice Sector Is Limited: 

U.S. and international officials noted that PA civil police and 
justice sector reforms are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. 
security sector reforms. 

* Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) capacity is limited. According to 
EUPOL COPPS advisors, the PCP lags behind all other Palestinian 
security forces in funding for infrastructure and equipment. Although 
infrastructure exists, such as joint operation centers and prison 
facilities, about 60 new police stations need to be rebuilt or 
constructed and existing facilities need to be refurbished, according 
to a USSC document. The PCP also have difficulties obtaining certain 
types of equipment, such as finger printing equipment, radios, and 
personal protective equipment, according to EUPOL COPPS. Also, the 
judicial police--charged with serving court orders, protecting judges 
and judicial facilities, and transporting prisoners--lack vehicles and 
operating capabilities outside of Ramallah, according to a USSC 
report. According to a U.S. official, a decision was made in 2008 to 
increase the size of the NSF in the West Bank from 5 to 10 NSF special 
battalions in part to compensate for the lack of PCP capacity. 

According to State and international officials, the NSF and the PCP do 
not coordinate programs to a large extent. Although the NSF receives 
training on operating with the PCP at JIPTC and PCP are trained on 
operating with NSF at many different levels, including at USSC- 
sponsored courses, the NSF and PCP coordination needs to be 
strengthened, according to U.S. and other officials. While an INL 
official said the PA is taking efforts to increase coordination 
between these two security forces through the Interior Ministry's 
Strategic Planning Directorate, the PCP's lack of communication 
equipment, such as radios, limits coordination. A EUPOL COPPS official 
told us that it is difficult for the PCP to obtain radios and 
frequencies and such a lack of communication equipment constrains the 
building of a sophisticated and well-equipped civil police force. 

* Justice sector capacity is limited. The PA justice sector still 
lacks sufficient infrastructure, organization, and updated laws, 
according to PA, U.S., and international documents and officials. 
[Footnote 43] Justice-sector infrastructure, such as facilities and 
courts in each governorate, require upgrades and improvements by 2011, 
according to USSC. U.S. and foreign officials told us that to improve 
justice-sector organization, the PA needs to more clearly define the 
roles of its government agencies. According to a USSC report, 
cooperation between the elements of the criminal justice system--the 
courts, police, and prosecutors--is poor. In addition, USSC reported 
that the physical separation of government agencies within and between 
governorates results in poor coordination.[Footnote 44] USSC further 
reported that the lack of clarity and consistency in PA laws and the 
lack of a working legislature also undermine PA civil police and 
justice-sector capacity. USSC reported that the PASF, including the 
civil police, are constrained in their ability to conduct security 
operations and to detain persons who present a security threat and the 
justice sector is constrained in convicting such persons because 
Palestinian laws on some related issues are vague and sometimes 
contradictory. However, such laws cannot be reviewed and updated until 
after a new Palestinian Legislative Council is installed.[Footnote 45] 

Moreover, a State document noted that the civil police and justice- 
sector capacity limitations have become a matter of greater concern as 
it has become apparent that other donors are not providing the 
necessary civil policing, justice-sector, and other pledged assistance 
necessary to keep pace with the progress the U.S. security assistance 
programs are achieving. According to U.S. and PA officials and 
documents, sustaining the progress they have made with U.S. assistance 
in the security sector may be difficult unless the lack of capacity in 
the civil police and the justice sectors with which the USSC-supported 
security forces must operate are addressed. To help address some of 
these gaps, State officials said State had recently reinforced its 
role for facilitating coordination among U.S. agencies and 
international donors for justice-sector issues. Examples of U.S. and 
international justice-sector reform programs include: the INL's 
Justice Sector Assistance Project, USAID's Rule of Law and Justice 
Enforcement Program, EUPOL COPPS' civil police and rule of law 
program, and the Canadian International Development Agency's "Sharaka" 
Program, as shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Select PA Justice-Sector Reform Programs: 

Donor/program: U.S. INL Justice Sector Assistance Project; 
Description: Improve the capacity of the Jenin justice sector, 
primarily the police and public prosecution, to investigate and 
prosecute cases to reduce the current case backlog through technical 
assistance, training, and modest amounts of equipment. Plans to expand 
program to strengthen cooperation between criminal investigators and 
prosecutors. 

Donor/program: USAID Rule of Law and Justice Enforcement Program; 
Description: Build the management capacity and case management system 
of the courts and increase public confidence in the justice sector 
through outreach programs. 

Donor/program: EUPOL COPPS; 
Description: Advise and monitor the functioning of the PA justice 
sector through the Civil Police, the Ministry of Justice, the 
prosecutor's offices, and courts. 

Donor/program: Canadian International Development Agency "Sharaka" 
Program; 
Description: Provide training, equipment, infrastructure, information 
technology systems, and support to the Office of Attorney General and 
the Public Prosecution Service. Also provide support to forensics and 
courthouses. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. and international program documents. 

[End of table] 

Conclusion: 

In fiscal years 2007 through 2010, State allocated approximately $392 
million in USSC assistance to support U.S. strategic goals and Roadmap 
objectives in the Middle East, and has requested $150 million more for 
fiscal year 2011. Most of this assistance has supported training and 
equipping new PASF battalions deployed in the West Bank. Although U.S. 
and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has 
helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West 
Bank and is progressing faster than PA civil police and justice sector 
reforms, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable 
outcome-based performance indicators to assess and report on the 
progress of their security assistance. As such, it is difficult for 
State and the USSC to gauge whether or not their security assistance 
programs are helping the PA achieve its Roadmap obligations to 
undertake security sector transformation and create a right-sized, 
professional security force. Establishing and tracking outcome-based 
performance measures in the proposed USSC campaign plan would help 
inform decisions about the costs, progress, and impact of U.S. 
security assistance to the PA particularly given that this assistance 
is progressing faster than the PA civil police and justice-sector 
reforms. 

Recommendations: 

As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security 
assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State 
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate 
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward 
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other 
things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, 
civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors. 

Agency Comments: 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are 
reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our 
recommendation that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based 
indicators and track them over time. State commented that they 
recognize the need for such indicators and have tried to develop ones 
that are meaningful at this stage of the program's development. For 
example, State mentioned that they have included broad performance 
measures in the Mission Strategic Plan. INL has also factored 
performance measures into all of its funding obligating documents. 
State, however, accepts our point that these measures should be more 
performance-based. Now that trained and equipped security force units 
are in place, State anticipates developing meaningful security-related 
baseline data for measuring the progress of U.S. sponsored trained 
units. State further commented that they have already started to do 
this with the Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to 
generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the 
cases they prosecute. In addition, State commented that INL is in the 
process of crafting a new Letter of Agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority. This letter is to contain project goals, objectives, and 
milestones that reflect the program's recent and anticipated future 
growth in size and complexity. 

State cautioned that, as we reported, several factors outside of 
State's control influence progress toward the most meaningful 
performance-based indicators. State noted that while security 
assistance provided by the United States can strengthen the 
capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate 
increasingly in certain areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be 
able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the 
direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, State added, such 
an agreement depends on a range of political, economic, and social 
factors that encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and 
security capabilities U.S. assistance gives the PA security forces. 
State also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contribution to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

David Gootnick: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority since 2007, we reviewed relevant documents and 
interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State) and 
Defense (DOD), the Office of the United States Security Coordinator 
(USSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
Washington, D.C., in the West Bank, at the U.S. Consulate in 
Jerusalem, and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Amman, Jordan. We 
also met with PA, Israeli, and Jordanian government and security 
officials as well as recognized experts in Israeli-Palestinian 
affairs. We reviewed State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget justifications for fiscal years 2008 
through 2010 to determine the levels of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding allocated to USSC and INL security 
assistance programs in the West Bank. We determined that the INCLE 
funding allocation data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To describe the nature and extent of the training programs, we 
reviewed INL, USSC, and contractor status report documentation and 
conducted site visits to observe U.S.-sponsored training at the 
Jordanian International Police Training Center. We reviewed examples 
of training reports, student surveys, and after action reports used by 
USSC contractors to review the performance of their trainees during 
and after every National Security Forces (NSF) training session. To 
describe the status of USSC programs to equip the NSF, we reviewed 
equipment delivery lists, contractor statements of work, equipment 
delivery work orders, and summaries of equipment end use monitoring 
reports. We interviewed INL, USSC, Palestinian Authority Security 
Forces (PASF), and Jordanian officials about the status of equipment 
deliveries. To describe the status of the construction of PASF 
installations, we reviewed the August 2007 "Framework Agreement" 
signed between the Secretary of State and the PA Prime Minister as 
well as INL contract summary data and progress reports; visited 
construction projects in and around the city of Jericho; and 
interviewed PA and INL contract staff about project objectives, plans, 
and funding issues. We assessed the reliability of the data on the 
battalions trained and equipped by the USSC, and on the infrastructure 
construction data provided by INL. We did not assess the reliability 
of the data on the current size and structure of the PASF because we 
are presenting them for background purposes only. 

To assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security 
assistance programs, we examined whether its approach identified and 
applied measurable performance indicators necessary to gauge results-- 
as called for in a number of GAO products listed at the end of this 
report. These reports state that developing and applying outcome-based 
performance indicators are (1) a management best practice; (2) one of 
the key characteristics of effective national security strategy 
planning, particularly when developing counterterrorism strategies; 
and (3) a necessary component of developing and executing campaign 
plans based on these strategies. We also reviewed other GAO reports 
assessing the extent to which other U.S. assistance projects develop 
and apply results-based performance indicators. We reviewed the 
strategic plans for State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the 
mission performance and the mission strategic plans for the U.S. 
Consulate in Jerusalem for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, as well as 
the four monthly activity reports the USSC has produced between 
November 2009 and March 2010. We examined United Nations Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data and an Israeli Ministry of 
Defense report for changes in the number of Israeli roadblocks within 
the West Bank from 2007 to 2009. 

To determine factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. 
security assistance to the Palestinian Authority, we analyzed reports, 
conference presentations, and U.S. government sponsored studies to 
identify issues that affect U.S. programs. We conducted interviews 
with State, INL, and USSC officials in Washington, D.C., and in the 
field. We also met with Israeli, PA, Jordanian, and other 
international officials during our fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank, 
Jerusalem, and Jordan. To assess logistical constraints, we reviewed 
relevant UN and State documents on access and movement; INL and USSC 
documents on the logistics of providing equipment to the PA; and met 
with USSC officials to discuss challenges in acquiring land for U.S.-
funded infrastructure in the West Bank. To illustrate the U.S.-funded 
equipment approval and delivery process, we developed a schematic 
representation and identified points during which the process may 
experience problems based on discussions with U.S., Israeli, and PA 
officials. We consulted with INL and USSC officials and incorporated 
their comments into our representation of the equipment approval and 
delivery process. To assess the capacity of the PA police and justice 
sector and its impact on U.S. security assistance, we reviewed 
documents from and met with USSC, Israeli, PA, and international 
officials. To examine the pace of U.S. and international assistance to 
the PA civil police and justice sector, we also reviewed State 
documents and met with current PA police and justice sector donors, 
including USAID, INL, and EUPOL COPPS. 

We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: List of USSC Courses Provided to the PASF in the West 
Bank, July 2008 to March 2010: 

Table 4 shows the 24 different specialized courses the USSC has 
conducted or supported for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-
2008 and March 2010, and the two additional courses it planned to 
offer as of March 2010. 

Table 4: USSC-Sponsored Training Courses in the West Bank, July 2008 - 
March 2010: 

Course title: PASF Senior Leaders Course; 
Approximate course length: 60 days; 
Start date: Oct. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: 6 courses held with selected PASF 
personnel. 

Course title: PASF Intermediate Leaders Course; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Feb. 2010; 
Approximate number trained: 2 courses held with selected PASF 
personnel. 

Course title: Human Rights/Use of Force; 
Approximate course length: 35 hours; 
Start date: Mar. 2010; 
Approximate number trained: 40 PASF students. 

Course title: HQ Staff Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: July 2008; 
Approximate number trained: Selected staff from 4 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Advanced Staff Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Oct. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: Selected staff from 3 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Intermediate English Language Training; 
Approximate course length: 10 weeks; 
Start date: Sept. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: 86 students. 

Course title: Advanced English Language Training; 
Approximate course length: 10 weeks (or 5 weeks intensive); 
Start date: Nov. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: 108 students. 

Course title: Map Reading and Symbols; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: July 2009; 
Approximate number trained: 40 NSF students. 

Course title: Media Awareness Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: March 2010; 
Approximate number trained: 20 PASF students. 

Course title: Medical Refresher Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Feb. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Basic Lifesaver First Aid; 
Approximate course length: 5 days; 
Start date: Nov. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: 80 students. 

Course title: First Responder; 
Approximate course length: 6-8 weeks; 
Start date: Dec. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: 80 students. 

Course title: Tactical Logistics; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: June 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Basic Driver Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Oct. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions, 
120 NSF students, 120 PASF students. 

Course title: Vehicle Maintenance; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: March 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 battalions. 

Course title: 15 Ton Drivers Training; 
Approximate course length: 15 weeks; 
Start date: Nov. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: 30 NSF students. 

Course title: Recovery Vehicle Training; 
Approximate course length: 3-4 months; 
Start date: May 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Fleet Management; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Dec. 2008; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Equipment Maintenance; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Nov. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 1 NSF battalion. 

Course title: Warehouse Management; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Feb. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions. 

Course title: Training/Training Management; 
Approximate course length: N/A; 
Start date: Planned; 
Approximate number trained: N/A. 

Course title: Communications Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: March 2010; 
Approximate number trained: 150 NSF students. 

Course title: Communications Maintenance; 
Approximate course length: 4 months; 
Start date: March 2010; 
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010. 

Course title: Computer Skills Training; 
Approximate course length: 30 days; 
Start date: Dec. 2009; 
Approximate number trained: 20 students. 

Course title: Food Service Operations; 
Approximate course length: 4 months; 
Start date: Feb. 2010; 
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010. 

Course title: Nutrition Training; 
Approximate course length: 3 months; 
Start date: Planned; 
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010. 

Source: GAO analysis of USSC data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 
3RD and 4TH Battalions: 

Table 5 shows the type and quantity of equipment approved for the NSF 
3RD and 4TH battalions. USSC procures an initial issuance of equipment 
for battalions trained with U.S. funds at the Jordanian International 
Police Training Center adjusting the issuance slightly for each 
battalion. An average battalion consists of 500 troops. 

Table 5: Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3RD and 4TH 
Battalions: 

Vehicles: 

Description: Ambulances; 
Quantity: 3. 

Description: 4-Door Sedan (Surveillance vehicle); 
Quantity: 8. 

Description: Isuzu D-MAX 4x4 Supercrew Truck; 
Quantity: 64. 

Description: Benches, rack systems and tarps for Isuzu D-MAX; 
Quantity: 64. 

Description: 3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4; 
Quantity: 15. 

Description: 3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4; 
Quantity: 15. 

Description: Prisoner transport van (Paddy Wagon); 
Quantity: 2. 

Description: Tow Truck; 
Quantity: 2. 

Description: Generator trailer; 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: Water trailer, 500 gallon; 
Quantity: 5. 

Description: Tool Box, truck mounted; 
Quantity: 2. 

Organizational (Recon Platoon): 

Description: Video camera/Camcorder (No tape); 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: 4GB Memory stick for cameras, camcorders; 
Quantity: 8. 

Description: Camera; 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: 10 X 50 Binoculars; 
Quantity: 16. 

Specialty Equipment: 

Description: Extendable mirror; 
Quantity: 12. 

Description: Rappelling gloves; 
Quantity: 68. 

Description: Grenadier gloves; 
Quantity: 15. 

Description: Rappelling harness system; 
Quantity: 68. 

Police Entry Equipment: 

Description: Dual Handled Entry Sledge/Door Ram; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Climbing Rope; 
Quantity: 10. 

Description: Climbing Ladders; 
Quantity: 10. 

Description: Brean-N-Rake Entry Bar for windows; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Dynamic Entry Back Kit (cutters, sledge, bar); 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Close Quarter Dynamic Entry Sledge; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Hydraulic Spreaderbar (doorway); 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Gorilla Entry Bar (doorway); 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Ballistic Entry Shield (Level IIIA); 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Fence Climbing Kit; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Dynamic Entry Sledge (Regular); 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Ladder, Telescopic; 
Quantity: 6. 

General Equipment: 

Description: Mobile Light Trailer; 
Quantity: 10. 

Description: Handheld Spot Lights (rechargable); 
Quantity: 100. 

Description: Road Cones; 
Quantity: 100. 

Description: Metal Bars for checkpoints; 
Quantity: 50. 

Description: Spike Strips; 
Quantity: 30. 

Description: Metal Detectors; 
Quantity: 24. 

Description: Steel Handcuffs; 
Quantity: 500. 

Description: Head Flashlights (rechargable); 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Bullhorns; 
Quantity: 10. 

Description: Camera, Snake; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Handheld Monitor; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Spotting Scope with camera adapter; 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: Rubber training mat; 
Quantity: 1. 

Description: Printer; 
Quantity: 5. 

Description: Scanner/Fax; 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: Copier Machine; 
Quantity: 2. 

Description: Projectors; 
Quantity: 4. 

Description: Wallboards; 
Quantity: 14. 

Description: Paper Shredder; 
Quantity: 3. 

Description: DVD Player/VCR; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Laminator; 
Quantity: 2. 

Description: Laptops; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Desktops; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Water Coolers; 
Quantity: 30. 

Description: Television; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: Road Emergency Kit (triangle, fire ext., reflective vest); 
Quantity: 64. 

Description: Rain Tarp; 
Quantity: 15. 

Description: Washer and Dryer; 
Quantity: 1. 

Medical Equipment: 

Description: Tactical Trauma Kit; 
Quantity: 15. 

Description: First Responder Kit; 
Quantity: 120. 

Description: Resuscitation Mannequin; 
Quantity: 2. 

Description: Litter, Non-Rigid Poleless; 
Quantity: 20. 

Description: Litter, Folding Rigid Aluminum Nylon; 
Quantity: 8. 

Description: Litter, Stand; 
Quantity: 8. 

Description: Litter, Straps; 
Quantity: 6. 

Description: First Aid Kits, small, individual, with case; 
Quantity: 550. 

Riot Gear: 

Description: Riot Shield; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Riot Helmet; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Riot Gloves; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Knee Pads; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Elbow Pads; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Riot Control Gas Mask; 
Quantity: 300. 

Description: Gas Mask Cartridges (2 per person); 
Quantity: 600. 

Description: Riot Baton; 
Quantity: 300. 

Individual Equipment: 

Description: Helmets, Level I; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Body Armor, Level II; 
Quantity: 550. 

Uniforms: 

Description: PT Gear (shorts, shirt, track suit, shoes, socks); 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Field Jacket; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Rain Suit; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Patch, Palestinian flag; 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Patch, NSF; 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Patch, Battalion; 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Patch, eagle logo, on beret; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Boots; 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Beret; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Ball cap, BDU; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Military sweater; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Coveralls; 
Quantity: 20. 

Description: Cold Weather Suit; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Undershirt, Cotton, Green (3 per person); 
Quantity: 1,650. 

Description: Undershirt, CW Green, POLYPRO; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Trousers, Green, 70% cotton (2 per person); 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Shirt, Green with pockets, 70% cotton (2 per person); 
Quantity: 1,100. 

Description: Socks, black, 100% cotton (3 pairs per person); 
Quantity: 1,650. 

Description: Scarf, wool, knit; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Drawers, Olive drab, 100% cotton (3 per person); 
Quantity: 1,650. 

Description: Drawers, CW POLYPRO; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Cap, watch, black, fleece; 
Quantity: 550. 

Standard Issue: 

Description: Sleeping bag; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Tactical Vest; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Canteens, with case; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Mission bag; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Tent, GP Medium; 
Quantity: 20. 

Description: Web belts; 
Quantity: 1,050. 

Description: Foam sleeping pad; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Poncho liner; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Bag, Duffle; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Bag, barracks (laundry); 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Cup, canteen; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Towels; 
Quantity: 1,050. 

Description: Bag, waterproof; 
Quantity: 550. 

Description: Sheets; 
Quantity: 1,000. 

Source: USSC. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: State Comments on Draft Report: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

April 26, 2010: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, 
"Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping 
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces 
Logistical Constraints," GAO Job Code 320683. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Steve Peterson, Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 736-4376. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: GAO — David B. Gootnick: 
INL — David Johnson: 
State/OIG — Tracy Burnett: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping 
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces 
Logistical Constraints (GAO-10-505, GAO Code 320683): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled 
"Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping 
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces 
Logistical Constraints." Supporting the Palestinian development of the 
Palestinian Authority's (PA) Security Forces in accordance with the 
goals and objectives of the Roadmap for Peace supports the U.S. 
Government's foreign policy and national security priorities. It is a 
component in our overall effort to promote a two state solution where 
the Palestinian State lives side by side in peace and security with 
Israel. For this reason and in light of the foreign assistance funding 
Congress has appropriated for the Palestinian Authority Security 
Forces, we welcome the GAO's review of our programs and the 
opportunity to improve upon our efforts. 

The Department of State partially concurs with the recommendation of 
the GAO report that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based 
indicators and track them over time. More specifically, that State 
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate 
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward 
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things 
weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil 
police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors. State includes 
performance measures and indicators for its programs, but would agree 
that they could be further refined. We appreciate the fact that the 
report acknowledges several challenges, including the still early 
stage of the program's development, its fluidity, and the complex 
political and security environment. 

State recognizes the need for such indicators and has tried to develop 
ones that are meaningful at this stage of the program's development. 
For instance, every year since this program became operational in 
August 2007, we have included broad performance measures in the 
Mission Strategic Plan. INL also factors performance measures into all 
of its funding obligating documents: contracts with DynCorp 
International and DPK, amended letters of agreement with the 
Government of Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, and implementation 
letters with the Palestinian Authority. We accept GAO's point, 
however, that these measures should be more performance-based and now 
that trained and equipped security force units are in place, we 
anticipate developing meaningful security-related baseline data for 
measuring the progress of these units. We have already started to do 
this with our Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to 
generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the 
cases they prosecute. In addition, INL is in the process of crafting a 
new Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the Palestinian Authority that will 
contain project goals, objectives, and milestones that reflect the 
program's recent and anticipated future growth in size and complexity. 
This LOA will replace the existing one that has been in effect since 
2005, including several amendments. 

We would like to caution, however, that as the report notes, there are 
several factors we cannot control that influence progress toward the 
most meaningful performance-based indicators. According to the 
Roadmap, "comprehensive security performance" will be measured over 
time by the redeployment of Palestinian security forces to areas 
vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces. While security assistance 
provided by the United States — and other donors — can strengthen the 
capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate 
increasingly in these areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be 
able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the 
direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, such an agreement 
depends on a range of political, economic, and social factors that 
encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and security 
capabilities our assistance gives the PA security forces. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Michael 
Maslowski; Jillena Roberts; Martin De Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Reid L. 
Lowe; and Joseph P. Carney made key contributions to this report. 
Etana Finkler provided technical support. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

The following GAO reports discuss how outcome-based performance 
indicators can be developed and applied as a management best practice: 

Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects 
are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1034] (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 
2007). 

Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign 
Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and 
Security Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-437] 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006). 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation 
for Achieving Greater Results. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 
2004). 

The following GAO reports describe outcome-based performance 
indicators as one of the characteristics of effective national 
security strategy planning: 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 
Achieve U.S. Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2006). 

Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

The following reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as 
a necessary component of campaign planning and execution: 

Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to 
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 
2008). 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains 
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008). 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] "Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," (UN Document S/2003/529, May 7, 
2003). Among other things, this agreement obligated the Israelis and 
Palestinians to undertake a series of coordinated steps to disengage 
Israeli troops from areas in the Palestinian territories occupied 
after the 2000 intifada (insurrection) and replace them with 
consolidated and retrained PA security forces operating under the 
direction of the PA Interior Minister. 

[2] The Quartet is involved in mediating the peace process between the 
State of Israel and the PA. 

[3] GAO has described how such outcome-based performance indicators 
can be developed and applied to program planning and management in a 
number of reports. GAO has also reported that performance indicators 
are one of the characteristics of effective U.S. national security 
strategic planning and a necessary component of campaign plans created 
to execute those strategies. See list of related GAO products at the 
end of the report. 

[4] The NSF is the largest uniformed service within the PASF. A 
battalion is made up of approximately 500 troops. 

[5] State plans to build a total of nine operations camps for the 10 
planned NSF battalions; State expects the 10th battalion to be 
deployed in other installations as a reserve force. 

[6] State also allocated about $23 million for overhead items such as 
program design costs and the security escorts and armored vehicles 
State requires for U.S. government personnel to travel in the region. 

[7] We have previously defined output measures as measures of an 
agency's products or services; outcome measures demonstrate to an 
external party whether the agency is achieving its intended results. 
See Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 10, 2004). 

[8] Approval process and delivery delays also constrain the efforts by 
other donors to provide the Presidential guard and NSF with light 
weapons and other lethal equipment. PA officials said the security 
forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor efforts to 
transform the security sector would be significantly hampered if these 
forces could not be fully armed. 

[9] An additional 187,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank as of 
2009. 

[10] The Oslo Accord called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
parts of Gaza and the West Bank and the creation of the Palestinian 
Interim Self-Government Authority. 

[11] The first intifada refers to the Palestinian insurrection against 
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza between 1987 and 
1993. 

[12] The Tenet work plan refers to the plan to implement a cease-fire 
and restore security cooperation drawn up by then-Central Intelligence 
Agency Director George Tenet. The PA and the Government of Israel 
agreed to the work plan in June 2002. 

[13] Hamas is a U.S. designated terrorist organization. Provisions in 
U.S. annual appropriations have placed restrictions on funds being 
provided to Hamas. The most recent provision placed restriction on 
funds being provided to Hamas, a Hamas-controlled entity, or any power-
sharing government of which Hamas is a member, though assistance may 
be provided to such a power-sharing government if the President 
certifies that Hamas has taken certain steps such as publicly 
acknowledging the Jewish state of Israel's right to exist, or for 
national security reasons. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, 
Public Law No. 111-117, December 16, 2009. Likewise, U.S. law also 
places restrictions on assistance to a Hamas-controlled Palestinian 
Authority unless the President certifies that certain steps have been 
met or for national security reasons. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378b. 

[14] Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser 
Arafat, has been the largest and dominant faction in the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969. The PLO recognized the right 
of Israel to exist in 1993. Since the establishment of the PA and 
limited self-rule in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except for the 
period of Hamas participation during 2006 and 2007. 

[15] USSC security assistance activities are conducted in conjunction 
with a broader international effort to implement PA security-sector 
reforms and develop government capacity. State, USAID, Canada, and 
other international donors provide assistance for the PA justice and 
penal systems, according to U.S. officials, while the European Union 
advises and coordinates training and other assistance for the civil 
police. The international community pledged $242 million at the June 
2008 donor conference to support rule of law efforts and the 
Palestinian Civil Police through fiscal year 2011. In particular, the 
European Union's Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police 
Support (EUPOL COPPS) is coordinating member nation efforts to 
increase the capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police with equipment 
donations and training support. Moreover, according to State 
documents, the PA Ministry of the Interior reported 16 countries and 
international organizations sponsored or conducted training sessions 
for PASF personnel between late 2008 and early 2009. 

[16] In January 2009, the President appointed a Special Envoy for 
Middle East Peace who named the head of the USSC as his deputy for 
security issues. In this role the USSC head is responsible for, among 
other things, ensuring that U.S. security assistance efforts are 
effective and fully integrated with other political and economic 
efforts being undertaken by the U.S. government in support of the PA 
and peace in the region. However, the USSC formally reports through 
State's Near East and Asia Bureau. 

[17] DOD limits the participation of U.S. military personnel in the 
USSC to 16, according to State and DOD officials. The Canadian Forces' 
Operation Proteus provides military officers in support of the USSC, 
including mobile observation teams deployed to the West Bank. USSC 
officials stated that Turkey also contributed military officers in 
support of the USSC. 

[18] The force of 23,000 personnel represents a significant decrease 
from the 86,000 active and retired personnel on the PASF payroll in 
early 2007, according to State sources. 

[19] The PASF operates under the concept of policing primacy. This is 
a metropolitan police concept from the United Kingdom, applied in the 
West Bank by the European Union to define the PASF as a national-level 
policing organization that has all of the capabilities, minus an army, 
required to deliver law and order in accordance with Roadmap security 
obligations for a new Palestinian state. 

[20] The term "special battalion" distinguishes the new USSC-trained 
and -equipped units from the older NSF units these new battalions are 
replacing. 

[21] The newly recruited battalions also receive preliminary training 
in the West Bank prior to their arrival in Jordan. 

[22] We have reported previously on the extent to which USAID vetting 
procedures for its Palestinian aid program contractors complied with 
its antiterrorism policies, and the extent to which State and UN 
policies and procedures conform with U.S. statutory requirements that, 
among other things, no Palestinian refugee who has engaged in any act 
of terrorism receives funding. See GAO, Measures to Prevent 
Inadvertent Payments to Terrorists under Palestinian Aid Programs Have 
Been Strengthened, but Some Weaknesses Remain, GAO-09-622 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 19, 2009). 

[23] In fiscal year 2007, INL provided $4.6 million for this training. 
While State budget documents note that the department allocated $2.5 
million from its fiscal year 2010 budget for anti-terrorism 
assistance, State officials noted that they intend to reprogram those 
funds as they had no plans to conduct anti-terrorism activities with 
the PA in 2010. 

[24] USSC has also funded the participation of PASF officials at a 
number of conferences and seminars in 2008 and 2009 on security and 
terrorism issues at the George C. Marshall European Center for 
Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and at the National Defense 
University's Near East-South Asia Center in Washington, D.C. 

[25] State expects the 10th battalion to be deployed in other 
installations as a reserve force. 

[26] The UN's Office for Project Services oversaw the initial 
construction. State and PA officials said they replaced this office 
with Palestinian contractors due to concerns about the quality of the 
building construction. GAO previously reported that this UN office had 
not assessed the effectiveness of management reforms undertaken to 
address key concerns raised by various audits and investigations of 
its operation. See UN Office for Project Services: Management Reforms 
Proceeding but Effectiveness Not Assessed, and USAID's Oversight of 
Grants Has Weaknesses, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-168] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 
2009). 

[27] The Justice Sector Assistance Program in Jenin is designed to 
enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PA justice sector. It 
seeks to build on INL's previous assistance to the PASF by improving 
the capacity of the Jenin justice sector, primarily the police and 
public prosecution, to more effectively and transparently investigate 
and prosecute cases. 

[28] PA units initiated some security operations before they received 
USSC assistance. For example, the PASF initiated an ongoing effort to 
secure Nablus in November 2007, before the start of USSC-sponsored 
training. 

[29] While State officials agreed that there has been a decline in the 
number of significant roadblocks, there is not a common agreement on 
the number or the definition of what constitutes a significant 
roadblock. Some officials stated they based this assessment on data 
from the government of Israel indicating the number of such roadblocks 
declined from 41 to 14, although the United Nations Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports do not highlight 
this particular decline. OCHA reported that the total number of 
barriers (including staffed and unstaffed checkpoints, roadblocks, and 
mobile or other temporary barriers) rose from 561 in October 2007 to 
630 in September 2008, before decreasing to 578 by October 2009. The 
number of staffed checkpoints (both within the West Bank and along the 
security barricade separating it from Israel) decreased from 93 to 69 
in the same period between September 2008 and October 2009. 

[30] GAO defines performance measurement as the ongoing monitoring and 
reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward 
preestablished goals, and is typically conducted by program or agency 
management. Program measures or indicators may address, among others, 
the direct products and services delivered by a program (outputs), or 
the results of those products and services (outcomes). See GAO, 
Performance Measurement and Evaluation, Definitions and Relationships, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-739SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2005). 

[31] According to a former USSC official, the PA also decided to 
increase the size of the NSF in part to compensate for perceived 
shortfalls in civil police capabilities. 

[32] For example, PA officials expressed concerns about their ability 
to conduct effective counterterrorism efforts, and the USSC has 
contemplated additional counterterrorism programs in the West Bank and 
considered further developing specialized counterterrorism units to 
conduct high-risk arrests and other specialized duties. However, an 
Israeli official stated that his government is not in favor of the 
counterterrorism courses proposed by the USSC. State noted a final 
decision by the U.S. government on holding these courses had not yet 
been made as of April 2010. 

[33] For example, the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) 
for 2008 through 2010, which set out basic, broad goals for Security 
Sector Reforms, was only adopted in 2007. The more detailed Plan for 
the Reorganization, Restructuring and Development of the Palestinian 
Security Establishment proposed in 2008 to develop the broad 
objectives set in the PRDP, may undergo further revision as a result 
of a PASF strategic review undertaken in January 2010, according to 
USSC officials. 

[34] GAO described how such performance indicators can be developed 
and applied in a number of reports, including Security Assistance: 
State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing 
Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-437] (Washington, D.C.: 
April 2006). See list of related GAO products at the end of the report. 

[35] Previous GAO reports have noted that effective U.S. government 
strategies encompass certain desirable characteristics, including 
providing outcome-related performance measures that address priorities 
and milestones for progress; identify risks; and assess plans to 
integrate U.S., international, and host country efforts. For a full 
description of these characteristics, see GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More 
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2006). 

[36] See DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 
26, 2006); and GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq 
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2008). 

[37] GAO has highlighted the importance of establishing specific 
outcome-based performance measures in the development of national and 
multinational strategies to combat terrorism. See the list of related 
GAO products at the end of the report. 

[38] While the mission strategic plan for fiscal year 2011 did set as 
a target that NSF battalions be "fully equipped and housed" in fiscal 
year 2010, USSC plans as of February 2010 do not reflect this as a 
goal. 

[39] USSC and INL officials noted that other factors have also delayed 
the approval and delivery of equipment, including the lead times 
needed to redress shortfalls in manufacturers' stocks, the time needed 
to identify foreign vendors and obtain waivers for orders placed for 
items not available in the United States, and the limited availability 
of ships that meet program requirements that they be U.S.-flagged 
carriers and in compliance with Israeli port restrictions (e.g., 
prohibitions on the docking of ships that have visited certain Arab 
ports 6 months prior to arrival in Israel). 

[40] An Israeli government official stated that the radios were 
impounded to insure their transmission frequencies do not interfere 
with Israeli or Jordanian frequencies. State noted that the radios 
remained impounded as of March 2010, even though the radios will be 
programmed to Government of Israel approved frequencies. 

[41] State noted in some cases Israeli customs inspectors impounded 
approved shipments of equipment to verify whether or not some approved 
items were missing from the shipment. 

[42] Efforts by other donors to provide the PG and NSF with light 
weapons and other lethal equipment have similarly been constrained by 
the approval process and delivery delays. For example, a USSC official 
noted a shipment of 1,000 AK-47 rifles approved by the Israeli 
government had been detained in customs. PA officials said the 
security forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor 
efforts to transform the security sector would be significantly 
hampered if these forces could not be fully armed. An Israeli Ministry 
of Defense official disputed this assertion, contending that the PASF 
had sufficient weapons. 

[43] The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan of 2008 - 2010 
created a justice-sector program, "Justice Now," which focuses on 
elements such as justice-sector infrastructure and capacity 
development. 

[44] For example, according to a USSC report, the physical separation 
between the elements of the criminal justice sector in Jenin may form 
an obstacle to personal and professional cooperation, and impedes the 
ability of external actors to effectively monitor or assist criminal 
justice-sector reform. 

[45] The Palestinian Legislative Council's term expired in January 
2010 and no elections have yet been held to replace it. According to 
State officials, elections for both the President of the PA and the 
Legislative Council await resolution of issues concerning the scope 
and conduct of the elections and the eligibility of voters in Hamas- 
controlled Gaza to participate. 

[End of section] 

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