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Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet 
Critical Warfighter Needs' which was released on May 4, 2010. 

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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2010: 

Warfighter Support: 

Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight 
and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs: 

GAO-10-460: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-460, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to 
mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more 
quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, 
Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised 
explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, 
organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD’s 
processes for meeting warfighters’ urgent needs. The Senate Armed 
Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD 
has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, 
and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall 
responsiveness of DOD’s urgent needs processes. To conduct this review 
GAO looked at three urgent needs processes—joint, Army, and the Marine 
Corps processes—visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs 
requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies. 

What GAO Found: 

Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are 
more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional 
acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the 
processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the 
effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not 
established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO 
found that DOD’s guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed 
and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and 
responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all 
phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited 
acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need 
solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable 
data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for 
collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not 
include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the 
performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request 
was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the 
absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD 
lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their 
performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions 
regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. 

In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found 
several challenges that could hinder DOD’s ability to rapidly respond 
to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the 
initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive 
adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should 
receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the 
combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting, 
submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not 
likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often 
face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely 
manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining 
funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time 
needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for 
joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing 
the department’s rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD 
with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has 
played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about 
when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated 
for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for 
determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the 
services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong 
leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel 
agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is 
responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding, 
cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote 
effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts 
to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result 
in significant delays. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take nine actions to improve 
DOD’s ability to assess how well its processes are meeting critical 
warfighter needs, address challenges with training, make decisions 
about when to use its rapid acquisition authority, and make 
reprogramming decisions to expedite fielding of solutions. DOD 
generally concurred with our recommendations and noted actions to be 
taken. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460] or key 
components. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield 
Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those 
Processes or of Fielded Solutions: 

Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the 
Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Case Studies of Selected Urgent Need Requests: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Iraq Freedom Funds Used to Fund Joint Urgent Need Solutions, 
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009: 

Table 2: Urgent Needs Funding through OSD's Rapid Acquisition 
Authority, 2005-2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Progression of Urgent Need Request: 

Figure 2: Improving Command and Control through Secure Satellite 
Phones (1 case study): 

Figure 3: X-ray Technology for Vehicle Checkpoints (2 case studies): 

Figure 4: Protecting Vehicle Occupants from Fires Caused by IEDs (1 
Case study): 

Figure 5: Detecting IEDs Using Existing Mine-Detection Technology (2 
case studies): 

Figure 6: Ability to Detect Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case 
study): 

Figure 7: Decreasing the Likelihood of Injury to Vehicle Gunners (1 
case study): 

Figure 8: Clearing Vegetation with a Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower (1 
case study): 

Figure 9: Providing Support for Ground Troops Through Aerial 
Surveillance (2 case studies): 

Figure 10: Responding to an Adaptive Enemy by Increasing Vehicle Armor 
(1 case study): 

Figure 11: Helping Marines Use Biometrics to Identify Individuals (1 
case study): 

Figure 12: Improving Tactical Radio Communications Involving Both 
Audio and Data (1 case study): 

Figure 13: Improving the Ability to See Clearly Under a Variety of 
Conditions Using Vision Enhancement Technology (1 case study): 

Figure 14: Resupplying Troops Under Dangerous Conditions through High- 
Tech Air Drops (2 case studies): 

Figure 15: Discouraging Adversaries or Crowds by Using Electromagnetic 
Radiation (2 case studies): 

Figure 16: Providing Advanced Video Surveillance Technology to the 
Theater (1 case study): 

Figure 17: Making Secure Satellite Communications Available from More 
Locations (1 case study): 

Figure 18: Improving Battlefield Communications Through Adaptive 
Satellite Technology (1 case study): 

Figure 19: Ability to Provide Improved Force Protection from 
Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case study): 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2010: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The dynamic nature of the enemy and tactical conditions encountered by 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to rapidly identify and field new capabilities as quickly as 
possible in order to prevent mission failure or loss of life. 
Warfighters have requested new capabilities such as intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance technology; technology to counter 
improvised explosive devices (IED); and command and control equipment 
for their operations. With the shift in priority for overseas 
operations from Iraq to Afghanistan--a theater that may pose more 
complex long-term challenges--deployed or soon-to-deploy units will 
likely continue to request critical capabilities to help them 
accomplish their missions. Warfighters currently rely on several 
processes, such as the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs 
processes, to request such critical capabilities. 

The Army's urgent needs process was established in 1987 but has been 
expanded since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism and 
currently receives an average of almost 300 requests per month. The 
Marine Corps established its process in 2003. In 2002, Congress 
directed the Secretary of Defense to create a process to rapidly meet 
the urgent needs of combatant commands and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff[Footnote 1]. In 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) established the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC[Footnote 2]) 
to overcome institutional barriers and provide timely, effective 
support to facilitate meeting the urgent material and logistics 
requirements which combatant commanders certify as operationally 
critical. Until 2008, OSD directed that the JRAC report to the 
Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), for monitoring and tracking joint urgent 
needs, facilitating the identification and resolution of issues, and 
providing regular status reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary 
of Defense. Since 2008, the Under Secretary realigned the JRAC within 
the Office of the Director for Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E) and the cell resides currently under the Director, Rapid 
Fielding. 

Congress provides funding for joint urgent needs related to countering 
improvised explosive devices through the Joint Improvised Explosive 
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), to which it has appropriated 
nearly $16 billion through fiscal year 2009. In our prior work, we 
have raised concerns about JIEDDO's management and operations and 
found that the organization lacks full visibility over all counter-IED 
initiatives throughout DOD, faces difficulties with transitioning its 
counter-IED initiatives to the military services, and lacks criteria 
for counter-IED training initiatives it will fund which affects its 
training investment decisions. We have recommended that DOD improve 
its visibility over all DOD's counter-IED efforts, work with the 
military services to develop a complete transition plan for 
initiatives, and define criteria for funding training initiatives. 
[Footnote 3] 

The possibility of similar issues involving DOD's process for meeting 
joint urgent needs that are not necessarily related to IEDs has raised 
congressional concerns about making similar resource investments in 
the JRAC at this time. In October 2008, Congress directed DOD to 
commission a study to assess the effectiveness of the department's 
processes for the generation of urgent operational need requirements, 
and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements. 
[Footnote 4] In July 2009, the Defense Science Board issued its report 
and made several findings regarding organizational, funding, 
acquisition, and oversight issues. In addition to our work on JIEDDO, 
we have also reported on challenges in the Army's and Marine Corps' 
processes to address urgent force protection needs, such as truck 
armor.[Footnote 5] Further, we reported on DOD's challenges to field 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.[Footnote 6] 

In light of Congress' continuing interest in the joint and military 
services' urgent needs processes to address requests for force 
protection capabilities, you asked us to review DOD's processes. Our 
objectives for this review were to determine 1) the extent to which 
DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs 
processes and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall 
responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. 

To conduct this review, we visited forces conducting operations in the 
U.S. Central Command's theater of operations and gathered information 
on how they identify, document, and submit urgent needs to their chain 
of command, and on the fielding and assessment of solutions in the 
theater. We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint, 
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to 
our standards for internal control in the federal government. We 
analyzed joint, Army, and Marine Corps data management systems in 
order to review the data collected on the time frames between decision 
points and to determine the responsiveness of each process in 
providing solutions to urgent warfighter needs. While our assessment 
of databases and systems used to process urgent needs requests showed 
that some data elements were accurate and supported by sufficient 
documentation, we found that other items for reporting specific urgent 
needs requests were incomplete, and not sufficiently reliable for 
reporting specific results here, or to support accurate, useful 
management reports related to overall results. As a result, we 
conducted our own case study reviews to assess DOD's responsiveness to 
urgent needs for a select sample of requests. We used data elements 
from the information systems that we had determined were sufficiently 
reliable to support the selection of case study candidates from the 
universe of joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests. We 
selected a nonprobability sample of 23 cases--11 joint, 6 Army, and 6 
Marine Corps--for review based on criteria that included the variety 
of needs, high visibility and priority of the needs, and needs 
submitted in more than one process. For each case study, we 
interviewed responsible officials at the appropriate joint or service 
organizations and collected key documentation related to seven phases 
of the process we identified: initiation of a request from a 
warfighting unit, endorsement of a need by theater command, validation 
by command-level leadership, approval of a solution at the 
headquarters level, identification and execution of a funding 
strategy, awarding of a contract, and production and initial fielding 
of urgent need solutions. We interviewed DOD and military service 
officials who are responsible for or are participants in the urgent 
needs processes, and we collected guidance and documentation on each 
process and the associated milestones and decision points. Although 
the Navy and Air Force each have their own urgent needs processes, the 
Army and Marine Corps have been the principle providers of U.S. ground 
forces conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and their 
respective processes as well as the joint process have received the 
majority of warfighter urgent needs requests. Therefore, we have 
focused our review on those three processes. We conducted this 
performance audit from June 2008 through March 2010 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more 
responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional 
acquisition procedures but is unable to fully assess how well the 
urgent needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to 
measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because 
it has not established an effective management framework for those 
processes. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government provide a framework for managing agencies' operations 
through detailed policies, procedures, and practices capable of 
offering reasonable assurance that the objectives of the agency are 
being achieved[Footnote 7]. While DOD has developed policies and 
procedures to implement its urgent needs processes, DOD's guidance is 
fragmented and outdated. The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have each issued guidance providing policies and 
procedures related to urgent needs processes. However, the guidance 
has not been updated since its creation, although significant changes 
in the urgent needs process have occurred since the guidance was 
issued. In addition, we found this guidance lacking in four areas: 

* First, guidance for the joint urgent needs process does not clearly 
define the roles and responsibilities of the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the military services in implementing, monitoring, and 
evaluating all phases of those processes. 

* Second, guidance for the joint process does not define or 
incorporate a statutory rapid acquisition authority that allows the 
waiver of various laws, policies, directives, and regulations that 
would impede the rapid acquisition and deployment of some needed 
equipment. 

* Third, guidance for the joint and Army processes does not include 
standards for collecting and managing data, resulting in data 
management systems that lack comprehensive, reliable information; are 
unable to track some key process milestones; and are incapable of 
producing accurate reports for management review, process 
improvements, and oversight. Our review of DOD's urgent needs data 
found that they could not be used to determine when solutions were 
funded, acquired, or fielded to theater. 

* Fourth, the joint urgent needs process does not include a formal 
method for joint decision makers to receive feedback on how well 
fielded solutions met urgent needs. Army officials monitor the 
performance of fielded solutions in response to its warfighters' 
urgent need requests--including those joint urgent needs that the Army 
sponsors--and the Marine Corps is also working to establish a similar 
process. While the Army makes its information available to joint 
decision makers, the information is Army-centric and does not provide 
DOD, JRAC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff with feedback assessing the extent 
to which the solutions met the joint urgent needs in the theater. In 
one case, DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an airborne 
counter-improvised explosive device, Angel Fire, for more than 18 
months, although it did not meet the warfighters' needs. 

In addition, we found that DOD's acquisition policy makes no reference 
to urgent needs or how program managers should respond to these needs. 
Finally, the Army has issued updated guidance for its urgent needs 
process that provides more detail regarding roles and 
responsibilities, but the Army lacks standard operating procedures for 
its headquarters officials to follow when processing urgent needs 
requests, and does not distinguish how different types of requests for 
solutions should be processed. Because DOD lacks comprehensive and 
updated guidance for its urgent needs processes, it does not have the 
tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working to 
address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to 
ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding 
the long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability. 

In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, we found 
that with the exception of one system all the solutions to our case 
studies were fielded within 2 years of being endorsed by a theater 
command. However, we identified several challenges that hinder DOD's 
ability to respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible. 

* First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and 
review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training, which 
can extend the amount of time required to draft and submit urgent 
needs requests, thereby extending the initiation phases of the joint 
and Army processes. The Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training 
states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training 
and be responsive to the needs of the Combatant Commanders across the 
full spectrum of operations.[Footnote 8] We found that while the Army 
requires selected officers to attend training on how to address 
requirements and identify resources for Army forces, officers at the 
brigade level responsible for drafting and submitting Army and joint 
urgent needs requests and those at the division level responsible for 
reviewing the requests prior to submission for headquarters approval 
are not likely to receive such training. As a result, once in theater, 
Army officers often face difficulties drafting, submitting, and 
reviewing the volume of urgent needs requests, which, according to 
Army officials, can be over 200 per month. 

* Second, funding has not always been available when needed to acquire 
and field solutions to joint urgent needs in part because OSD has not 
given any one organization primary responsibility for determining when 
to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or 
to execute timely funding decisions. Our prior work has demonstrated 
that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical to 
overcoming the deeply entrenched nature of the department's financial 
management challenges.[Footnote 9] In 11 of our 23 case studies--7 
joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps--obtaining funding was a challenge 
that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions to the 
theater. In a representative case, an effort to field urgently needed 
communications equipment to warfighters in Afghanistan took 474 days-- 
of which 131 days elapsed while JRAC resolved which service would fund 
the solution. Congress provided OSD with a rapid acquisition authority 
specifically for funding solutions to urgent needs, but OSD has used 
this authority only four times since fiscal year 2005. OSD's guidance 
for implementing the authority puts it in the position of responding 
to requests from DOD components, and JRAC officials told us that the 
services have shown little interest in requesting that OSD use the 
authority, effectively taking OSD out of the decision-making process. 
As a result, OSD may not have used its rapid acquisition authority to 
satisfy as many urgent needs as it otherwise could have. In addition 
to its rapid acquisition authority, OSD has the authority to reprogram 
funds for purposes other than those specified by Congress at the time 
of the appropriation, within certain dollar thresholds. However, in 
the absence of a high-level authority with primary responsibility for 
executing such reprogramming or transfer decisions, JRAC has faced 
challenges consistently securing cooperation from the services or 
other components to make funds available to field joint urgent needs. 
Our prior work has cited the establishment of a senior executive 
council as a best practice to facilitate leadership over decision 
making and conflict resolution.[Footnote 10] Without a departmentwide 
approach to addressing its funding challenges, DOD will continue to 
struggle to field timely solutions to problems that create risk to 
warfighter lives or mission failure. 

Finally, we found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature 
technologies or with solutions that are technologically complex can 
lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. For 
example, the Combined Joint Task Force-82 in Afghanistan endorsed a 
request in October 2007 for a mounted explosive device detection 
system capable of detecting devices that were buried underground. 
However, 435 days passed before JIEDDO began initially fielding a 
solution because additional time was required to develop the 
experimental Husky Mounted Detection System. As with other roles and 
responsibilities we noted above, DOD guidance is unclear about who is 
responsible for determining whether technologically complex solutions 
fall within the scope of DOD's urgent needs processes. 

To help ensure that DOD's urgent needs processes achieve their 
objectives and are managed effectively, we are making six 
recommendations for OSD, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the military services, to improve guidance, data management, and 
feedback mechanisms. To address challenges at the initiation phase of 
the services' and joint urgent needs processes, we are also making a 
recommendation for the Army to update its training regimen for 
officers who initiate and review urgent needs requests. Finally, to 
more rapidly fund and field responses to urgent needs request, we are 
making two additional recommendations for OSD to designate an entity 
with primary responsibility for recommending use of OSD's rapid 
acquisition authority and to establish an executive council to make 
timely funding decisions on urgent need requests. In written comments 
on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four of our 
recommendations and partially concurred with five other 
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

Background: 

DOD's Established System for Weapon System Acquisition: 

DOD's strategy for planning, executing, and funding its weapon system 
acquisition programs relies on three principal decision-making 
systems. First, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) is a requirements system used to assess gaps in 
warfighting capabilities and recommend solutions to resolve those 
gaps. Second, the Defense Acquisition System is used to manage the 
development and procurement of weapon systems and other equipment. 
Third, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is 
used to allocate resources and is intended to provide a framework from 
which the department can articulate its strategy; identify force size, 
structure, and needed equipment; set program priorities; allocate 
resources to individual programs; and assess program performance. All 
three of these systems can incur lengthy time frames. For example, the 
requirements system can take an average of up to 10 months to validate 
a need. The acquisition system involves large budgets and generally 
meets materiel warfighter needs in 2 or more years, with some systems 
taking decades to develop and procure. The budgeting process is 
calendar driven, taking nearly 2 years from planning to the beginning 
of budget execution. We have previously reported on challenges the 
department faces within each of these systems.[Footnote 11] 

DOD Procedures for Rapidly Acquiring and Fielding Equipment to the 
Theater: 

Each of the military services has established processes to address 
urgent warfighter needs. Our review focuses primarily on the following: 

* The Army established its Operational Needs Statement process in 1987 
to provide a way for unit commanders to identify urgent needs for new 
materiel or new capabilities.[Footnote 12] The Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff G3/5/7 oversees the process. Prior to the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army received about 20 requests per year. 
From September 2006 to February 2010 the Army's database shows 6,712 
Operational Needs Statements containing 21,864 urgent needs requests 
that have been or are being processed to support operations in those 
two theaters. The Army's process supports deployed units, deploying 
units, and units conducting their assigned missions, and responds to a 
variety of urgent needs, from new capabilities to shortfalls of 
existing equipment in theater, to requests for training equipment for 
mobilizing units in the United States. Operational field commanders 
also use the Army's process to document the urgent need for a materiel 
solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that 
impacts upon mission accomplishment. In September 2006, the Equipment 
Common Operating Picture, an automated processing tool for Army urgent 
needs, became operational. This data management tool is a classified, 
Web-based application for processing urgent needs from the unit 
submitting the request through all phases of the process. According to 
the user's guide, the tool was designed to simplify requests, 
consolidate existing sources of information, and significantly speed 
the approval process while providing situational awareness to all 
involved in a request. 

* The Marine Corps created its Urgent Universal Needs Statement 
process in November 2003 to meet the immediate operational needs of 
deployed forces or forces preparing to deploy. The Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command oversees this process. The command establishes 
guidance and direction, and provides oversight to ensure solutions are 
effectively and efficiently delivered to the warfighter.[Footnote 13] 
The Marine Corps received 574 requests through the process between 
December 2001 and November 2009. In August 2007, the Marine Corps' 
Virtual Universal Urgent Needs Statement data management system for 
processing urgent needs requests became operational. The Corps 
developed this system as a result of a Lean Six Sigma continuous 
improvement initiative to replace the manually updated Combat 
Development Tracking System. 

In addition to the military services' urgent needs processes, The Bob 
Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (the 
Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA) directed the Secretary of Defense to create a 
process to rapidly meet the urgent needs of combatant commands and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, Section 806 of the act required 
the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures for the rapid 
acquisition and deployment of items that are currently under 
development by DOD or available from the commercial sector, and that 
are urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or to respond to 
significant and urgent safety situations.[Footnote 14] According to 
the legislation, the procedures should include a process for 
demonstrating, rapidly acquiring, and deploying items that meet the 
needs communicated by the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. In September 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the 
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) and the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) to create the Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC), later 
renamed the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, to facilitate meeting the 
urgent material and logistics requirements which combatant commanders 
certify as operationally critical. Subsequently, in November 2004, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense provided guidance on the procedures, 
roles, and responsibilities of the JRAC and on the identification and 
validation of urgent operational needs. The Deputy Secretary's memo 
defines urgent operational needs as urgent, combatant commander-
prioritized operational needs that, if left unfilled, could result in 
loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term 
military mission. The memo defines immediate warfighter needs as 
urgent operational needs requiring a timely materiel or nonmateriel 
solution in 120 days or less that, if left unfilled, could result in 
loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term 
military mission. An executive director leads JRAC and reports to the 
Director, Rapid Fielding, within DDR&E and under the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). JRAC's Core Group consists of full-
time professional staff and part-time senior executives and military 
officers from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), DOD General Counsel, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. An Advisory Group supports the Core Group and includes 
pertinent Under or Assistant Secretaries based on the specific need. 

Just weeks before the Deputy Secretary issued the November 2004 
guidance, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005 (the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA) was enacted. [Footnote 
15] It amended section 806 of the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA by providing 
the Secretary of Defense with a rapid acquisition authority to respond 
to combat emergencies. Under that authority, when the Secretary of 
Defense, without delegation, determines in writing that equipment is 
urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has 
resulted in combat fatalities, the Secretary is to use procedures 
developed under this section to accomplish the rapid acquisition and 
deployment of the needed equipment. The amendment states that whenever 
the Secretary makes the above determination, the Secretary shall 
designate a senior official to ensure that the needed equipment is 
acquired and deployed as quickly as possible, with a goal of awarding 
a contract within 15 days. Also, under the amendment, the Secretary is 
to authorize the senior official to waive certain provisions of law, 
policy, directive, or regulation that would unnecessarily impede the 
rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed equipment.[Footnote 16] 
The amendment also stated the "authority of this section may not be 
used to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating more than 
$100,000,000 during any fiscal year." In addition, the amendment 
stated that "[f]or acquisitions of equipment under this section during 
the fiscal year in which the Secretary makes the determination [that 
equipment is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability 
deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities] with respect to 
such equipment, the Secretary may use any funds available to the 
Department of Defense for that fiscal year." 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an instruction 
in July 2005 establishing policy and procedures to facilitate the 
assessment, validation, sourcing, resourcing, and fielding of 
operationally driven urgent, combatant command needs during the same 
fiscal year that a request is made.[Footnote 17] According to the 
instruction, combatant commanders involved in ongoing operations 
identify joint urgent needs as life-or combat mission-threatening 
needs based on unforeseen military requirements that must be resolved 
in days, weeks, or months. Under the instruction, a joint urgent need 
must be considered inherently joint in nature; for example, the need 
is theaterwide and/or spans multiple military services. Joint urgent 
needs must also fall outside of DOD's established guidance for weapon 
systems acquisition and the military services' established urgent 
operational needs processes. JRAC has applied its guidance to process 
joint urgent needs meeting these criteria. The instruction delegates 
shared oversight responsibility of the process to the Joint Staff J-8 
Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment; the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Deputy Comptroller for Program and 
Budget; and JRAC within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(AT&L). Data for joint urgent needs are managed through the CENTCOM 
Requirements Information Manager database system, which the command 
added to a preexisting Web site it managed in 2005. The database 
includes 283 joint urgent needs requests from August 2004 through 
February 2010. 

Urgent Needs Requests Across DOD Progress Through Similar Decision 
Points: 

The Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes have some 
distinctions in guidance, terminology, and data systems; however they 
share similar decision points. Although each of these urgent needs 
processes is distinct, we identified seven broad phases that we used 
to track the progression of each request over time and to compare 
performance across the Army's Operational Needs Statement process, the 
Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, and the Joint 
Urgent Operational Needs processes. These phases are: initiation, 
theater endorsement, command validation, headquarters approval, 
funding, contract award, and initial fielding. Urgent needs requests 
that result in fielded solutions typically move through the process as 
follows: 

* Initiation: Any of the three urgent needs processes can begin when 
either a warfighter in the theater of operations or an official at the 
theaterwide or combatant command level identifies a need and an 
officer with a rank of Colonel or higher submits the request into the 
relevant Army, Marine Corps, or joint process. The request could be 
for either a known, specific piece of equipment or for an unknown 
materiel or nonmateriel solution based on a description of a 
capability gap. 

* Theater Endorsement: Theater command leadership reviews, endorses, 
and forwards a request for component or combatant command validation. 
For example, a joint urgent needs request from a warfighter in Iraq 
would be reviewed and endorsed by the theater commands such as Multi 
National Force-West, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, or Multi National 
Force-Iraq. 

* Command Validation: Endorsed urgent needs requests from Iraq or 
Afghanistan are elevated to the appropriate commandwide leadership-- 
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central, or U.S. Marine Corps 
Central Command--for validation or rejection. 

* Headquarters Approval: Validated Army urgent needs requests are sent 
to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army G3/5/7 
directorate, while Marine Corps urgent needs are sent to the Marine 
Corps Requirements Oversight Council for its headquarters approval. 
The combatant commander sends joint urgent needs to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, who send the need to JRAC concurrently in order to alert it 
of the impending request. Upon headquarters approval, JRAC assigns the 
requests for capabilities related to countering improvised explosive 
devices to JIEDDO. For all other joint urgent needs, JRAC designates a 
military service to sponsor the procurement and fielding of a solution. 

* Funding: The military service or joint sponsor applies funds to the 
program office to begin the procurement of approved solutions. When 
funds are not already available, the services may obtain funding for 
an urgent need through the annual budget process, by reprogramming 
funds from other programs during the current fiscal year, or by 
requesting the Secretary of Defense to invoke the department's rapid 
acquisition authority. For joint urgent needs requests, JRAC may 
assist in identifying available funding as needed. In previous years, 
sponsors have also requested funding for urgent needs through the 
wartime supplemental appropriation. 

* Contract Award: The appropriate military service or joint program 
office develops and executes an acquisition strategy in order to 
procure the solution. Among other options, a new contract may be 
awarded using competitive procedures or as a sole source, as provided 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), or an existing contract 
could be amended or modified. [Footnote 18] The rapid acquisition 
authority may be available for the acquisition and deployment of some 
equipment. 

* Production and Initial Fielding: The program office manages the 
production and fielding of solutions to the theater. Some solutions 
may be readily available from current DOD inventory or from commercial 
vendors, while others may require modifications to existing equipment 
or substantial efforts to research, develop, and produce new 
technologies. 

Combatant commanders have sometimes made strategic or tactical changes 
that eliminate the need for a solution. Also, an urgent needs request 
could be addressed by existing equipment that was previously 
unavailable until changes in the combatant commander's plans and 
priorities resulted in the availability of the equipment in the 
theater. In addition, a joint urgent needs request that meets the 
criteria of another urgent needs process may be rerouted; for example, 
counter-IED capability gaps may be redirected to JIEDDO for resolution. 

Funding For Urgent Needs Was Formerly Made Available Through the Iraq 
Freedom Fund: 

Beginning in fiscal year 2003, Congress began appropriating funds to 
the Iraq Freedom Fund.[Footnote 19] Over 4 years, from fiscal year 
2005 to fiscal year 2008, OSD provided approximately $442.54 million 
from the Iraq Freedom Fund to DOD components seeking to fund solutions 
to joint urgent needs, as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Iraq Freedom Funds Used to Fund Joint Urgent Need Solutions, 
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009: 

Iraq Freedom Funds: 
2005: $157.08 million; 
2006: $115.66 million; 
2007: $136.60 million; 
2008: $33.20 million; 
2009: $0; 
2010: $0; 
Total: $442.54 million. 

Source: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. 

[End of table] 

In fiscal years 2005-2008, JRAC administered funds appropriated to the 
Iraq Freedom Fund to assist sponsors in funding solutions to 31, or 
about 30 percent of an estimated 102 approved joint urgent needs not 
related to countering improvised explosive devices.[Footnote 20] 
Beginning in fiscal year 2008, funding for joint urgent needs began to 
decline from less than $34 million to nothing in fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. When funds are not provided by one of the services or other DOD 
components, after the department's annual budget has been approved, 
OSD can fund urgent needs, among other ways, by invoking the rapid 
acquisition authority granted by Congress and/or by utilizing the 
department's existing authority to reprogram or transfer. 

DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield 
Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those 
Processes or of Fielded Solutions: 

Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are 
more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional 
acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the 
urgent needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to 
measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because 
it has not established an effective management framework for those 
processes. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government provides a general framework for management control of 
agencies' operations.[Footnote 21] In implementing this framework, 
management is responsible for developing detailed policies, 
procedures, and practices to fit their agency's operations and to 
ensure that those controls are built into and are an integral part of 
operations. Internal control, which is synonymous with management 
control, helps government program managers achieve desired results. 
However, we found that DOD's guidance for its joint urgent needs 
processes is fragmented and outdated, in addition to lacking other 
important internal controls. As a result, the department does not have 
the tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working 
to address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to 
ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding 
the long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability. 

DOD's Guidance for the Joint Urgent Needs Process Is Fragmented and 
Outdated: 

Existing guidance for the joint urgent needs process is fragmented 
among several documents and is outdated, which is inconsistent with 
federal internal control standards that prescribe the establishment of 
a clearly defined organizational structure that provides a framework 
to achieve agency objectives. We found that guidance for DOD's urgent 
needs processes is widely dispersed among several memoranda from the 
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and an instruction from the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, OSD's guidance describing how 
joint urgent needs should be processed is contained in memoranda 
issued in September and November 2004, and March 2005. In addition, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction in 
July 2005 establishing the policies and procedures for warfighters in 
the theater and combatant commanders to identify, review, and approve 
joint urgent needs.[Footnote 22] As a result, the guidance does not 
frame a cohesive common operating picture that explains how the 
process should function. 

Further, neither the November 2004 memo nor the Chairman's instruction 
have been updated since their creation, although significant changes 
in the urgent needs process have occurred since both were issued. Once 
received and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a joint urgent 
need is handed off to JRAC for disposition through additional phases 
of the process that address funding, acquisition, and fielding as 
outlined in Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda. The Deputy 
Secretary of Defense memo from November 15, 2004, outlined procedures 
for JRAC to follow in facilitating joint urgent needs and included a 
provision directing that the guidance remain in effect for 3 years 
after it had been approved, at which time a determination will be made 
as to the continued existence of JRAC. However, OSD has not released 
additional guidance or amended the current guidance to address this 
provision, and JRAC continues to operate and facilitate the urgent 
needs process, more than 5 years after the guidance was issued. 

According to GAO's Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, 
one of the steps management can take to ensure consistency with 
internal controls is to periodically evaluate the organization 
structure and make changes as necessary in response to changing 
conditions.[Footnote 23] Neither the November 2004 memo nor the 
Chairman's instruction have been updated to incorporate guidance 
regarding how the rapid acquisition authority is to be implemented. 
[Footnote 24] Among other things, the operational guidance for the 
joint urgent needs process could delineate for potential requestors 
the advantages of using the authority, the circumstances under which a 
request for the use of the authority should be contemplated, what 
factors might persuade the Secretary that a given request is a good 
candidate for the use of the authority, as well as how and when the 
use of waivers would be appropriate under the rapid acquisition 
authority. This kind of information could be useful to officials 
assigned the responsibility of processing urgent need requests and 
finding funds for those requests. 

In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense memo defines immediate 
warfighter needs as urgent operational needs requiring a timely 
solution within 120 days or less. According to JRAC officials, because 
they have found it difficult to complete all phases of the joint 
process and field a solution in 120 days, in practice, they have 
modified this time frame by extending it to between 120 days to 2 
years. The modification of this time frame occurred informally, and 
has not been documented in guidance. Also, it remains unclear whether 
OSD approval is required to change the time frame or whether authority 
is delegated to JRAC to make this change, which affects the standard 
for timeliness in meeting urgent warfighter needs. Additionally, the 
November 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum defines 
differently the terms urgent operational need and immediate warfighter 
need. Officials relate that, in practice, there is no longer a 
distinction between the two and both have been subsumed in the term 
joint urgent operational need, and are treated as one and the same. 
JRAC staff completed a Lean Six Sigma study of the joint urgent needs 
process. According to JRAC officials, they plan to use the findings of 
that study to guide improvements to the process. However, because this 
effort is still ongoing, it is unclear to what extent any actions 
taken as a result of this study will address the issues we have 
identified. As a result of its current organizational structure and 
lack of comprehensive, updated guidance, DOD cannot be assured that 
the objectives of the joint urgent needs process are being achieved as 
effectively as possible. 

DOD's Guidance Does Not Clearly Define Roles and Responsibilities: 

Urgent needs guidance for the joint process does not clearly define 
the roles and responsibilities of OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the military services in implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all 
phases. Federal internal control standards call for clearly 
established areas of authority, responsibility, and appropriate lines 
of reporting for federal programs. For example, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction directed the creation of the Budget 
Office Director's Board within the Joint Staff to adjudicate funding 
during the same fiscal year that a request is made for solutions for 
joint urgent needs. According to the Chairman's instruction, the board 
is responsible for reviewing and approving recommendations to fund 
joint urgent needs, and to direct the reprogramming of funding from 
military services' or agencies' budgets to do so.[Footnote 25] 
However, this board has never convened, and JRAC has assumed 
responsibility for identifying funding to procure solutions to joint 
needs. The November 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum states 
that the JRAC is to assist in resolving issues impeding the resolution 
of joint urgent needs, but the memorandum does not give JRAC the 
authority or responsibility for identifying funding for solutions. 
Rather, the guidance states that the military services, defense 
agencies, and combatant commands are responsible for funding solutions. 

Further, the Chairman's instruction and the November 2004 Deputy 
Secretary of Defense memorandum are inconsistent regarding the scope 
of solutions for joint urgent needs. For example, the Chairman's 
instruction includes criteria for the scope of solutions to joint 
urgent needs, stipulating that they should not involve the development 
of a new technology or capability. The instruction further states that 
the acceleration of a new technology in progress or the minor 
modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar 
mission is within the scope of solutions to joint urgent needs. 
However, the November 2004 memorandum that governs the process after 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the need does not prescribe such a 
limitation on the scope of solutions. According to JRAC officials, 
they have nonetheless received approved joint urgent needs where the 
proposed solutions are currently on hold due to their technological 
complexity. In the absence of clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, the department faces difficulty in ensuring that the 
joint process is implemented efficiently and effectively and in 
identifying the appropriate personnel who are accountable for 
operations, stewardship of resources, and achieving results. 

DOD Guidance for the Joint Process Does Not Describe the Rapid 
Acquisition Authority: 

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, military services that 
sponsor solutions to joint urgent needs may use the rapid acquisition 
authority to expedite the acquisition and fielding of solutions. 
However, this authority is not defined or incorporated in DOD's 
guidance for the joint urgent needs process. Internal control 
standards cite the importance of policies and procedures that enforce 
management's directives, and become integral to an agency's 
accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving 
effective results.[Footnote 26] Once joint urgent needs are approved 
by the Joint Staff and passed on to JRAC for disposition, JRAC assigns 
military services to sponsor the acquisition and fielding of solutions 
to address those needs. Upon the Secretary of Defense's approval, the 
military services may use the rapid acquisition authority created by 
the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA.[Footnote 27] That legislation states that 
the Secretary of Defense is to use procedures developed under the 
authority of that legislation to rapidly acquire and deploy urgently 
needed equipment to eliminate a combat deficiency that has resulted in 
combat fatalities and, if necessary, to waive laws, policies, 
directives, or regulations addressing the solicitation and selection 
of sources and the award of the contract, in order to rapidly acquire 
and deploy the equipment. As a result of DOD not including the rapid 
acquisition authority in its guidance, program managers may not be 
aware of all procedures available to them for fielding solutions 
quickly to the theater. 

DOD's Guidance for the Urgent Needs Processes Does Not Include 
Standards for Collecting and Managing Data: 

The online data management systems of the joint and Army urgent needs 
processes lack comprehensive, complete, and reliable information on 
the achievement of key process phases, as well as the ability to 
generate reports to track key dates and activities because DOD 
guidance has not established standards for the collection and 
management of urgent needs data. GAO's Standards for Internal Control 
cites the significance of accurately documenting events and creating 
and maintaining records as evidence of the execution of agency 
activities.[Footnote 28] In addition, those standards call for the 
proper classification of transactions and events that includes 
appropriate organization and formatting of information from which 
reports and statements are prepared. Relevant, reliable, and timely 
communications and effective information technology management are 
critical to achieving useful, reliable, and continuous recording and 
communication of information. However, the milestone data located in 
the joint and Army databases are often incomplete and unreliable. 
Although both joint and Army systems generally contain documentation 
to support completion of milestones at the early phases of the 
processes such as theater command endorsement and headquarters 
leadership approval, once a request is delegated to the acquisition 
community for procurement and fielding, visibility into subsequent 
actions is largely lost. For example, the joint system rarely contains 
detailed information and support documentation regarding the funding, 
contract award, or production and fielding of solutions. Additionally, 
the Army database does not contain information regarding acquisition 
milestones following the approval of a funding strategy. As a result, 
data limitations can prevent managers and decision makers of the 
urgent needs processes from assessing the overall responsiveness and 
effectiveness of their processes. 

Further, Army policy instructs system managers to close out requests 
120 days after the scheduled fielding date if no information regarding 
actual fielding is received. This may result in the closure of some 
requests without confirmation of whether or not solutions were 
actually fielded. Although the joint system contains the most detailed 
qualitative data of any of the three systems we reviewed, the dates 
cited for specific milestones do not reflect the dates on which those 
milestones were achieved, and instead reflect the dates the milestones 
were recorded in the joint system's electronic record. Consequently, 
the dates regarding the funding, acquisition, and fielding of 
solutions are vague or inaccurate, and the database usually lacks 
documentation to support the dates listed. Additionally, the joint and 
Army systems lack a capability to produce either management summary 
reports or complete historical information regarding the completion of 
phases, which prevents DOD from measuring responsiveness over time and 
initiating process improvements. Furthermore, managers of the Army, 
Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes lack visibility into 
other urgent needs data systems across the department, which limits 
their ability to determine if possible solutions to their urgent needs 
might have already been developed through other processes. Finally, 
none of the data systems we reviewed include information regarding the 
effectiveness of fielded solutions. As a result, DOD process managers 
are unable to identify potentially systemic problems that could 
otherwise be mitigated by process improvements and updates. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC are exploring information-sharing 
concepts and data exchange capabilities among DOD's urgent needs data 
systems with the modification of DOD's Knowledge Management Database 
System to improve visibility into urgent needs requests across the 
department. However, these improvements are in the very early stages, 
and according to DOD officials it is uncertain when these efforts will 
be completed. Therefore, DOD's urgent needs database systems will 
continue to lack various characteristics and capabilities that would 
enable process managers to better assess the performance of their 
processes in responding to warfighter requests. 

DOD's Guidance Does Not Include a Formal Method for Providing Feedback 
on How Well Fielded Solutions Are Meeting Warfighter Needs: 

The joint urgent needs process does not include a formal method for 
joint decision makers to receive feedback on how well fielded 
solutions have met the urgent needs for which they were requested. The 
Army assesses the performance of solutions that are fielded through 
its urgent needs process as well as those solutions from the joint 
process that the Army sponsors, and the Marine Corps is working to 
develop a similar performance assessment process. However neither 
service's assessment process includes a mechanism for providing 
actionable performance feedback to joint decision makers. Internal 
control standards emphasize the importance of routine feedback and 
performance monitoring when assessing process effectiveness, and they 
direct agencies to assess the quality of performance over time. Such 
assessments can occur during normal operations and include regular 
management and supervisory activities. 

While the Army makes information from its assessment process available 
to joint decision makers, the information is narrowly focused on 
issues specific to Army personnel and processes, and as such does not 
provide DOD, JRAC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff with feedback assessing 
the extent to which those solutions met the joint urgent needs of the 
combatant command or whether given solutions should be sustained for 
the long term and acquired in the future through DOD's established 
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition process. We have previously 
reported that the department's established requirements process, 
JCIDS, has not met its objectives to identify and prioritize 
warfighting needs from a joint capability perspective.[Footnote 29] In 
2008, we reported that capabilities continue to be driven primarily by 
the individual services and that DOD may be losing opportunities to 
improve joint warfighting capabilities. In responding to our 2008 
report, DOD stated that identifying and prioritizing joint 
capabilities occurs through multiple processes within and outside 
JCIDS, including the joint urgent needs process. However, without a 
joint warfighter perspective on performance, there is not sufficient 
information to adequately assess whether a capability should 
transition to an acquisition program, particularly when the sponsoring 
service would like to phase out or terminate support of the capability. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff officials recognize the need for performance 
feedback on joint solutions; however, its previous attempt to 
establish a process for collecting performance feedback was 
unsuccessful. In 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to craft a 
feedback loop as part of an update to the Chairman's instruction for 
joint urgent needs. The draft revision failed to obtain DOD-wide 
approval and was canceled--in part due to disagreement over the 
feedback process outlined in the draft instruction. According to Joint 
Staff and JRAC officials, the combatant commands contended that their 
resources were focused on planning and managing contingency 
operations, and that providing feedback was a military service 
responsibility under Title 10. Conversely, according to officials the 
military services believed that since solutions addressed joint urgent 
needs, feedback should be provided by the user, the combatant command. 
Nevertheless, in 2008, the Joint Staff reinitiated its effort to 
revise the Chairman's instruction and establish a feedback mechanism 
for joint urgent needs solutions. The draft revision was in 
coordination within the department at the time of our report. 

In May 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Central 
Command to establish a joint requirements liaison office as a pilot 
program within its Afghanistan joint task force to assist in 
processing Army and joint urgent needs statements. At the time of our 
report the program had not begun operations, and it was unclear 
whether it would collect performance feedback on joint solutions as 
part of its operations. Without adequate feedback information from the 
theater that addresses how well fielded solutions address the risks to 
warfighters and to their missions and whether solutions will be 
necessary for the future, DOD cannot assess the performance of the 
joint urgent needs process in meeting immediate and future warfighter 
needs. Feedback provided by commanders in the field would better 
enable Joint Staff and military service officials to determine if 
solutions are effective, and whether they need to be sustained, 
adopted as a formal acquisition program, or suspended. In one case, 
DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an airborne counter-
improvised explosive device for more than 18 months, although it did 
not meet the warfighters' needs. Joint officials stated that the 
service did not track the operational effectiveness of the solution, 
called Angel Fire, and failed to provide feedback after initial 
fielding. The Angel Fire system provided a daytime-only solution, and 
did not meet the warfighter's request for a 24-hour surveillance 
capability. The warfighter then rescinded the urgent needs request in 
December 2008 and the Angel Fire aircraft were scheduled for removal 
from the theater to the United States. Internal controls prescribe 
that ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of operations to 
support timely actions when problems occur or require follow-up. 
Feedback information can help prevent the inefficient use of resources 
when participants spend time and funding on a solution that is 
ineffective. 

DOD Has Not Integrated Its Joint Urgent Needs Procedures in its 
Departmentwide Policies: 

We also found that DOD's acquisition policy makes no reference to 
urgent needs or how program managers should respond to these needs. 
The department's acquisition policy is articulated in two principal 
documents: DoD Directive 5000.01[Footnote 30] which describes 
management principles and mandatory policies and procedures for 
managing all acquisition programs, and DoD Instruction 5000.02 
[Footnote 31] which describes the operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, published by DOD, 
complements these two policy documents and provides best business 
practices for the acquisition community. According to the Guidebook, 
the objective of the Defense Acquisition System is to rapidly acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements 
to mission capability at a fair and reasonable price, and that the 
fundamental principles and procedures that the department follows in 
achieving those objectives are described in DoD Directive 5000.01 and 
DoD Instruction 5000.02. However, we reviewed these documents and 
found no discussions about or references to the joint urgent needs 
process. As a result of DOD's acquisition policy not referencing to 
urgent needs guidance, program managers may be unaware of the range of 
options that may be available for responding to urgent warfighter 
needs and be unable to assess when use of the urgent needs process may 
be appropriate. 

Army Guidance for Its Urgent Needs Process Lacks Several Elements: 

Until very recently, Army Regulation 71-9, the guidance for force 
development and materiel requirements that governs the Army urgent 
needs process, had not been updated, predating Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and Operation Enduring Freedom. To support these operations, the Army 
expanded the scope of its urgent needs process in late 2003 beyond 
providing solutions to address capability gaps identified by the 
warfighter as an urgent need to including requests for items already 
available to units deploying for nonstandard missions. For example, an 
artillery unit deploying as an infantry unit will need fewer 
howitzers, but will need a greater number of armored vehicles. Other 
equipment may be necessary for counter-insurgency operations, but 
these items are not included in the unit's authorized list of 
equipment known as its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. 

Before the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army headquarters staff 
processed less than 10 urgent needs requests per year, but this figure 
escalated significantly in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq and 
has continued to increase to about 290 per month in 2009. The volume 
of requests and the speed of change have strained the Army's urgent 
needs process. During our review, we found that Army Regulation 71-9 
was ambiguous regarding time frames for approving urgent needs 
requests, did not sufficiently define roles and responsibilities, and 
did not sufficiently recognize or distinguish between how urgent needs 
requests for new warfighter capabilities should be processed from more 
routine requests for equipment that is readily available. In a 2007 
report, the Army Audit Agency also addressed these deficiencies and 
recommended corrective actions.[Footnote 32] 

The Army issued updated guidance for its urgent needs process on 
December 28, 2009, as we were completing our report. Headquarters 
staff now has a goal to provide an "initial response" within 14 days 
of receiving a request, and in total there is a 120-day goal for 
reviewing requests, but that goal can be changed to 30 days where "the 
urgency of warfighter needs dictate a more rapid response."[Footnote 
33] While the updated guidance does provide more detail regarding 
roles and responsibilities, the Army still lacks standard operating 
procedures for Army headquarters officials to follow when processing 
urgent needs requests. Furthermore, while the updated guidance 
recognizes the dual use of the urgent needs process to address 
capability gaps and requests for items already available to units 
deploying for nonstandard missions, it does not distinguish how these 
different types of requests for solutions should be processed. 
Consequently, Army leadership continues to lack a means of assuring 
that its process is meeting warfighter needs as efficiently and 
effectively as possible and is consistent with internal control 
standards. 

Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the 
Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs: 

During our field work in Iraq as well as our analysis of 23 urgent 
needs case studies, we found several challenges that hinder DOD's 
ability to respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible. 
We reviewed the joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes 
across each of their seven phases and found that, with the exception 
of the Active Denial System, the urgent needs in all of our case 
studies were met by the initial fielding of solutions within 2 years 
of theater endorsement--which is within JRAC's modified time frame. 
The highest potential for extended response times occurred in the 
initiation and funding phases due to insufficient training, the lack 
of timely funding decisions, and other factors. Our case study 
analysis also demonstrated that attempts to meet urgent needs with 
immature technologies or with solutions that are technologically 
complex can lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to 
urgent needs. 

Not All Personnel Involved in the Urgent Needs Process Receive 
Adequate Training: 

Army personnel who utilize the joint and Army urgent needs processes 
do not receive adequate training on how to select which process to use 
to request a solution for an urgent need and how to submit and review 
requests. To acquire needed equipment, units may submit requests for 
theater-provided equipment or pursue new capabilities through the 
Army's rapid equipping force process which equips operational 
commanders with commercial off-the-shelf and existing solutions, or 
the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command's weapons loan 
program, in addition to one of the three urgent needs processes. 
According to Army theater command officials, some warfighters who need 
to request a critical capability do not know how to select the process 
most appropriate for their situation, and officers responsible for 
reviewing and processing the documentation in the theater do not 
receive adequate training on how the processes should function, which 
may result in inefficiencies and delays in fielding solutions to 
critical needs. 

In addition, the Army has expanded the scope of its urgent needs 
process beyond the requests for new solutions to address capability 
gaps, to address equipment shortfalls resulting from units deploying 
in nonstandard roles. For example, an artillery unit may be deployed 
to perform a force protection mission, requiring a different mix of 
equipment than what is authorized to carry out its artillery mission. 
As we have previously reported, units are currently being deployed in 
nonstandard roles, and this has caused challenges across the force, in 
part because deploying units in nonstandard roles often encounter 
unanticipated equipment needs.[Footnote 34] According to Army 
requirements officials, the result has been a dramatic increase in the 
volume of urgent needs requests from 10 per year prior to September 
11, 2001, to about 290 per month in 2009. However the Army has not 
increased the number of staff available from prewar levels to provide 
support at headquarters despite the rising volume of requests. With 
the expansion of the scope of the urgent needs process, the Army found 
an increasing number of invalid requests because users do not 
understand what type of equipment can be requested through this 
process. According to Army requirements officials, about 97 percent of 
the Army urgent needs statements are requests for the reallocation of 
equipment already available. They estimated over 557,000 pieces of 
equipment have been requested through the Army process alone. Further, 
theater command officials stated that the increased number of requests 
has also contributed to processing backlogs of urgent needs in 
theater, when the requests might have been more quickly addressed by 
theater-provided equipment or by the weapons loan program. Army 
officials stated that prior to deployment, replacement personnel are 
informed that a user's guide and help desk are available for the 
Army's Equipment Common Operating Picture data system used to process 
Army urgent needs requests. Theater command officials said uncertainty 
over how to address needs often results in officers submitting a 
larger number of urgent needs requests early in a unit's deployment. 
This uncertainty, combined with confusion regarding the different 
sources and processes available to address capability gaps or 
equipment shortfalls, can result in the inefficient use of resources 
and prolonged amounts of time needed to request and receive critical 
capabilities. 

According to DOD's strategic plan for transforming training, deploying 
personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to 
the needs of the combatant commander across the full spectrum of 
operations.[Footnote 35] The prevailing principle of this strategic 
plan states that no one should experience a task in a real-world 
operation without having previously experienced that task in training 
or education. However, during our field work in Iraq we found that the 
requirements officers who prepare urgent needs requests at the brigade 
level--where most urgent needs requests originate--are not well 
trained in the processes.[Footnote 36] Marine Corps officials told us 
that they provide insufficient predeployment training on preparing and 
reviewing urgent needs documentation for their own and joint 
processes, and Army officials told us that Army requirements officers 
responsible for drafting and submitting urgent needs requests at the 
brigade level do not receive formal training on these processes prior 
to deployment. According to theater command officials, requirements 
officers deploying overseas must learn the process on the job. 
Frequent rotations of force management officers at the division level 
responsible for reviewing brigade-level requests further increase the 
likelihood of extended time frames for approving urgent needs and 
fielding solutions, as the already steep learning curve recurs each 
time a new reviewing official is deployed into the theater. We found 
that lack of knowledge about how and under what circumstances to 
prepare an urgent needs request, especially among recently deployed 
personnel, may cause reviewing officers to initially reject requests. 
In turn, some reviewing officers, who themselves have not received 
adequate training, may reject urgent needs applications based on 
personal preferences. As a result, reviewers may receive multiple 
resubmissions of requests related to the same urgent need, increasing 
the overall amount of time needed to field solutions to the theater. 
Although information that would have allowed us to determine what 
factors contributed to the time frames for processing urgent needs in 
the theater was unavailable, in the 13 case studies for which we were 
able to obtain documentation, we observed that the time between the 
creation of a joint urgent need document and theater command-level 
endorsement varied widely from as few as 6 days to as many as 446 days. 

Moreover, senior force management officers in theater at the division 
level or higher who are responsible for reviewing and processing 
urgent needs requests may have received limited exposure to the urgent 
needs process as part of force management training. [Footnote 37] In 
some cases, force management officers in theater, who are trained in 
the organization and execution of requirements determination, force 
structuring, and combat development, are employed in the urgent needs 
review process either on a part-time or full-time basis. However, the 
formal urgent needs process training they receive is limited to an 
hour-and-a-half introductory segment within a 14-week course. In 
addition, officials responsible for the force management training 
course stated that the course focuses on duties performed in the 
United States, rather than those that will be required as part of a 
deployed task force. Further, the division-level training segment on 
the urgent needs process has only been included in the course since 
2005 and officers who completed the 14-week course prior to 2005 are 
exempt from repeating it. According to Army training officials, no 
provision has been made to update force management officers on the 
urgent needs elements of the course or to train them on the joint 
urgent needs process. As a result, most force management officers 
arriving in theater to review and process urgent needs requests at the 
division level or higher, like their counterparts at the brigade 
level, must learn about reviewing and processing urgent needs on the 
job, and likewise this pattern tends to repeat itself with each 
rotation of new forces to the theater. 

The previous commander of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq recognized in 
2008 that warfighters in the theater needed assistance in requesting 
critical capabilities. On September 16, 2008, he wrote a memorandum to 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense that recommended the establishment of 
a joint requirements liaison office in theater to assist the 
warfighter in identifying capability or equipment shortfalls and in 
preparing Army and joint urgent needs statements. On April 20, 2009, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense responded by directing the Commander, 
U. S. Central Command; in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff; Under Secretaries of Defense (for Personnel and Readiness, 
and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); and the Commander, U.S. 
Forces-Afghanistan, to create a pilot joint requirements liaison 
program in Afghanistan to assist in the identification of capability 
and equipment needs via the military services' and joint urgent needs 
processes. Officials in theater said that these liaison offices would 
function at the division level or higher; however, since most urgent 
needs requests are generated at lower levels, the joint requirements 
liaison office will not eliminate the need to address the lack of 
training at both the division and brigade levels. We have reported in 
the past that military personnel have received limited or no training 
on key operational functions--such as using and managing deployed 
contractors--as part of their predeployment training or professional 
military education.[Footnote 38] Similarly, improved training on the 
appropriate use of the urgent needs process and how to craft urgent 
needs documentation can improve the overall timeliness of addressing 
capability gaps and delivering solutions to help ensure that 
warfighters receive critical capabilities as quickly as possible. 

Funding Has Not Always Been Available to Field Urgent Needs Solutions 
in Part Because OSD Has Not Taken Actions to Ensure Timely Funding 
Decisions: 

After urgent needs requests have been approved by service headquarters 
or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the funding needed to field solutions 
to those needs has not always been provided in a timely manner. 
Although urgent needs can be funded in a variety of ways, the funding 
phase for some urgent needs requests--through the joint process in 
particular--is often lengthy. This is due in part because OSD has not 
designated any one organization with primary responsibility for 
determining when to implement the department's statutory rapid 
acquisition authority or to execute other timely funding decisions. 

In 11 of our 23 case studies--7 joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps-- 
obtaining funding was a challenge that increased the amount of time 
needed to field solutions to the theater.[Footnote 39] In a 
representative example from our case studies (which comprised a 
nonprobability sample, and thus are not representative of urgent needs 
requests as a whole), it took 474 days to field communications 
equipment to warfighters in Afghanistan after the request was endorsed 
by theater command. During that time, JRAC delayed assigning a sponsor 
for that joint urgent need for 131 days because it was unable to 
resolve which service would fund the solution. JRAC officials told us 
that, although the services and components assigned to sponsor joint 
urgent needs solutions have never refused to fill that role, assigned 
sponsors sometimes allow requests to wait--up to 2 years--until the 
next budget cycle. In one of the more extreme cases we found, it took 
509 days for the Army to field a solution to a joint urgent need for 
mobile explosive scanning equipment. Within that time, the Army took 
293 days after the solution was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to reprogram the necessary funding and an additional 4 months to award 
a contract for the equipment. In another joint case, it took almost a 
year after theater endorsement to field an aerial surveillance 
capability known as Angel Fire. Of that time, approximately 5 months 
was spent awaiting funding--in addition to 2 months the Marine Corps 
spent pursuing its own funding strategy prior to approval of the joint 
request. The Marine Corps began efforts to fund Angel Fire in July 
2006, with the intent of seeking full funding from JIEDDO. However, a 
Deputy Secretary of Defense decision prevented JIEDDO from funding the 
purchase of platforms, such as vehicles or aircraft, so this urgent 
need request was split into two--$19.5 million for the development of 
surveillance sensors and platform integration submitted through the 
joint process and approximately $15 million for aircraft and services 
through the Marine Corps process. Funding of approximately $34.5 
million was finally arranged in February 2007. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned JRAC the responsibility of 
helping to resolve issues that could prevent timely and effective 
warfighting support but did not give JRAC the authority to allocate 
funding for solutions. As a general rule, JRAC forwards approved 
solutions aimed at countering IEDs to JIEDDO,[Footnote 40] which 
receives funding through its own direct appropriation.[Footnote 41] 
According to JRAC officials, 123 or approximately 55 percent of the 
estimated 225 joint urgent needs requests it has received since 2004 
have been related to IEDs. JRAC delegates the other 45 percent of 
approved joint solutions for critical needs, such as intelligence 
surveillance and recognizance, biometerics, communications, and force 
protection, to the military services, geographic combatant commands 
such as U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or 
other DOD components who sponsor the funding and fielding of 
solutions. In addition to the department's annual budget process and 
congressional appropriations dedicated to efforts to counter IEDs, DOD 
may rapidly fund non-counter IED joint urgent needs by invoking the 
rapid acquisition authority granted by Congress, by using the 
department's authority to reprogram funds except as otherwise 
precluded by law, or by using any applicable statutory authority to 
transfer funds from another appropriation. OSD has, however, allowed 
the military services or other DOD components to make most of the 
decisions about when to initiate these funding options. 

OSD Has Not Actively Pursued the Use of Its Rapid Acquisition 
Authority: 

OSD has not frequently used the rapid acquisition authority that 
Congress made available specifically for rapidly fulfilling 
warfighters' operational needs. In amending the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA, 
the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA provided the Secretary of Defense a rapid 
acquisition authority. [Footnote 42] Under this authority, OSD can use 
any funds available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year 
to accomplish the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment that 
is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that 
has resulted in combat fatalities.[Footnote 43] 

Our review of the Secretary of Defense's use of rapid acquisition 
authority over the past 5 years shows that DOD has used that authority 
four times to obligate $170 million for three projects, as shown in 
table 2. [Footnote 44] 

Table 2: Urgent Needs Funding through OSD's Rapid Acquisition 
Authority, 2005-2009: 

Years: 2005; 
Authority used (in Millions): $10; 
Capability: Scorpion[A]; 
Service sponsor: Army; 
Source of funding: Procurement. 

Years: 2006; 
Authority used (in Millions): $18; 
Capability: CREW[B]; 
Service sponsor: Navy; 
Source of funding: JIEDDO. 

Years: 2007; 
Authority used (in Millions): 0; 
Capability: [Empty]; 
Service sponsor: [Empty]; 
Source of funding: [Empty]. 

Years: 2008; 
Authority used (in Millions): $94; 
Capability: Sky Warrior[C]; 
Service sponsor: Army; 
Source of funding: Procurement. 

Years: 2009; 
Authority used (in Millions): $48; 
Capability: Sky Warrior; 
Service sponsor: Army; 
Source of funding: Procurement. 

Years: Total; 
Authority used (in Millions): $170. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Scorpion jammer is a handheld capability that counteracts remote- 
controlled explosive devices. 

[B] Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED) 
Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems are electronic jammers designed to 
prevent the initiation of remote controlled IEDs. 

[C] Sky Warrior is an unmanned aerial vehicle with intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and tactical strike capabilities. 

[End of table] 

OSD plays a reactive, rather than proactive, role in the use of its 
rapid acquisition authority, while many approved urgent needs requests 
aimed specifically at preventing combat fatalities wait for funding. 
Rather than identifying cases eligible for funding through the rapid 
acquisition authority at a high level, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense issued an implementing memorandum for its rapid acquisition 
authority that directed JRAC to recommend cases for the use of this 
authority to the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), based on requests 
from the military departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, Under Secretaries of Defense, and other OSD directorates, 
agencies, and activities. Consequently, the services are in a position 
to limit the number of funding requests for urgent needs that reach 
OSD. Moreover, JRAC officials we spoke with said that the services 
have shown little interest in requesting the use of rapid acquisition 
authority to begin funding joint urgent needs because the acquisition 
strategy and funding of existing programs could be disrupted, 
preferring instead either to reprogram funds themselves or, in most 
cases, to await funding through DOD's annual budget for overseas 
contingency operations.[Footnote 45] As a result, OSD is effectively 
taken out of the process of deciding which urgent needs request should 
be considered for funding through the rapid acquisition authority. As 
previously noted, obtaining initial funding was the primary challenge 
to rapidly fielding solutions for 11 of the 23 cases we studied. By 
not employing its rapid acquisition authority more frequently, OSD may 
not have enabled the acquisition of as many urgent needs solutions as 
it otherwise could have. 

In a December 2007 action memorandum requesting the support of OSD and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in stabilizing JRAC's leadership, staffing, 
and funding, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command noted that, 
at that time--over 2 months into fiscal year 2008--the Command was 
aware of 38 joint urgent needs from fiscal year 2007 that remained 
unresolved because of funding shortages. Further, the Deputy Commander 
predicted that JRAC would be unable to address urgent warfighting 
needs that had already been submitted or were emerging in fiscal year 
2008. 

To help resolve funding shortages, the Deputy Commander recommended in 
2007 that OSD and the Joint Staff provide JRAC with, among other 
things, executive leadership and funds to support the combatant 
commands and the warfighter. Our prior work has demonstrated that, 
given the long-standing and deeply entrenched nature of the 
department's financial management challenges, combined with the 
numerous competing DOD organizations--each operating with varying, 
often parochial views and incentives--strong leadership from the 
Secretary of Defense over resource control is critical.[Footnote 46] 
Without greater high-level participation in the decision-making 
process over when to invoke, or not to invoke, its rapid acquisition 
authority, OSD will continue to play a reactive, rather than 
proactive, role in the timely use of DOD resources to meet urgent 
warfighter needs. 

OSD Has Not Provided Leadership Over Reprogramming Appropriated Funds 
to Meet Joint Urgent Needs: 

Apart from the Secretary's rapid acquisition authority, DOD has a 
reprogramming authority, but the military services are reluctant to 
reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to 
joint urgent needs, and OSD has not exercised its authority to do so. 
The Secretary of Defense--and in some cases the military departments 
and defense agencies--have the authority to reprogram funds for 
purposes other than those originally specified by Congress without 
prior congressional approval as long as the reprogrammed amount 
remains below established dollar thresholds. Reprogrammed funds may be 
used to initiate a new procurement program, subprogram, or 
modification as long as the estimated cost is less than $20 million 
for the first 3 years. DOD may also use reprogrammed funds to start a 
new research, development, testing, and evaluation program, project, 
or subproject if the estimated cost for the first 3 years is less than 
$10 million. In cases where the amount of funding needed exceeds 
established thresholds, DOD may seek congressional approval. In fiscal 
year 2009, for example, JRAC--as facilitator of the urgent needs 
process, including funding---reviewed and worked with Joint Staff, the 
military services, JIEDDO, and the combatant commands to prioritize 
urgent needs DOD-wide. This effort resulted in a congressionally 
approved end-of-year reprogramming action of $624 million from Army 
and Defense-Wide Operation and Maintenance accounts that could be 
reapplied to the Other Procurement, Army procurement account to obtain 
force protection capabilities for warfighters in Afghanistan. 

However, in the absence of a high-level authority with primary 
responsibility to execute such reprogramming or transfer decisions, 
JRAC has faced challenges consistently securing cooperation from the 
services or other components to initiate other reprogramming actions 
to make funds needed to field joint urgent needs available in a timely 
manner. Military service officials we spoke with said that they are 
reluctant to use their own funds to initiate acquisition of a joint 
urgent need without first receiving assurance that funding will be 
replaced during the next budget cycle. According to those officials, 
without such assurance, the acquisition strategy of existing programs 
could be disrupted. Our prior work on interagency collaboration has 
shown that top-level leadership--such as that provided by OSD and its 
Deputy or Under Secretaries--is a necessary element for sustaining 
collaboration among federal agencies, including among DOD components, 
particularly when effective interagency coordination is needed to 
better leverage resources.[Footnote 47] This work has also found that 
midlevel agencies, such as JRAC, can not guide policies at a high 
enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation. 

Although JRAC was initially created with direct reporting 
responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), the Under 
Secretary realigned JRAC in March 2008 to report to the Director of 
the Rapid Reaction Technology Office, within the Office of the 
Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). In July 2009, 
JRAC and the Rapid Reaction Technology Office were both realigned 
under the Director of Rapid Transition to accomplish the 
responsibilities of DDR&E, which were expanded to include oversight of 
the Systems Engineering Development Test and Evaluations functions. 
Currently, the JRAC resides under the Director, Rapid Fielding. 
According to JRAC officials, the most recent realignment will help the 
department better anticipate emerging threats and ensure the 
technology needed to counter urgent threats is mature before the 
threat fully materializes, as well as improve the synergy between the 
requirements, acquisition, and research communities. However, JRAC's 
most difficult challenge, according to its Director, continues to be 
prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources needed to 
execute a solution, which is the responsibility of the DOD components. 

Referring to JRAC as "mission essential" for effective coordination 
with the services, JIEDDO, and other agencies addressing urgent 
warfighter needs, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command has 
called for a permanent organizational structure led by a senior leader 
capable of coordinating, influencing, and directing actions. We and 
others have found that establishing a senior executive council is a 
best practice that can provide an implementation team--such as JRAC-- 
access to senior leadership while reinforcing the team's 
accountability for successfully implementing the program.[Footnote 48] 
An executive council can set policies, ensure that decisions are made 
quickly, resolve conflicts that arise, review and approve plans, and 
monitor and report progress back to top leaders of the organization. 
Members of such a council, which could include both political and 
career executives within the organization, would work with the 
department Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other high-level 
appointees to develop a leadership direction and communicate the 
leadership's position. 

Without a departmentwide approach to addressing its funding 
challenges, DOD will continue to struggle to field timely solutions to 
problems that create risk to warfighter lives or mission failure. 
Further, extended time frames in identifying and securing funding for 
solutions to joint urgent needs and challenges to JRAC's mission will 
persist. Conversely, a JRAC with support from an interagency executive 
council with the means to better leverage funding from across DOD, all 
under the oversight of top-level DOD officials, would be in an 
improved position to provide timely solutions to meet the urgent needs 
of warfighters while assuring effective use of DOD resources. 

Technological Immaturity or Complexity of Potential Solutions Can Lead 
to Longer Response Times: 

In 14 of 23 case studies we conducted (8 joint, 2 Army, and 4 Marine 
Corps), technological immaturity or complexity was a factor that led 
to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. In the 8 
technologically challenged joint urgent needs cases we found, 
solutions for 2 requests--both related to the Active Denial System--
were never fielded because the capability was technologically immature 
and could not be adequately sized or adapted for operational use in a 
wartime environment and under changing theater conditions. Solutions 
for the remaining 6 technologically challenged joint urgent needs were 
eventually fielded, but the average response time from theater 
endorsement to fielding ranged from 320 to 497 days with an average of 
393 days. In one of the more protracted cases, the Combined Joint Task 
Force-82 in Afghanistan endorsed a request on October 20, 2007, for an 
improvised explosive device detection system capable of detecting 
devices that were buried underground. However, following JRAC's 
request that JIEDDO accept responsibility for providing a solution, 
497 days passed before JIEDDO began initially fielding a solution 
because additional time was required to develop the experimental Husky 
Mounted Detection System. In a recent DOD Inspector General report, 
the Inspector General determined that JIEDDO decided to produce the 
system in large numbers before determining its operational 
effectiveness and suitability.[Footnote 49] Nevertheless, while these 
cases exceeded the original 120-day fielding target expressed in both 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD guidance, they fall within the 2-year 
time frame used by JRAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Guidance for the Army process does not address the technological 
complexity or maturity of a potential solution to an urgent need. 
Guidance for the Marine Corps process states that capability gaps and 
solutions to urgent needs are not restricted to commercially available 
equipment or technologies and may require the rapid development of new 
capabilities. Conversely, when Congress directed the Secretary of 
Defense to prescribe procedures for the rapid acquisition and 
deployment of urgently needed items in the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA, it 
specified that those items should be either currently under 
development by DOD or already available from the commercial sector. 
Further, DOD guidance on the scope of its joint urgent needs process 
states that urgent operational solutions should not involve the 
development of a new technology or capability. However, the 
acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration or the 
minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar 
mission is within the scope of the joint process.[Footnote 50] 

According to JRAC and military service sponsors for solutions to joint 
urgent needs, requests are becoming increasingly more technologically 
complex. As of June 2, 2009, JRAC indicated that approximately 20 
joint urgent needs were sufficiently impacted by technological 
development concerns that their projected fielding date is uncertain. 
For example, one urgent need request asked for explosive ordinance 
disposal suits and helmets equipped with night vision capability. The 
Multi-National Force Iraq submitted the request in May 2005. 
Initially, the Army worked with the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts to 
develop a prototype to meet the warfighter's need, but this effort 
proved unsuccessful. In March 2007, U.S. Central Command consolidated 
the initial urgent need with two additional urgent needs requests it 
had received from the theater for bomb suit helmets with night vision 
capability. In April 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC 
validated and approved the urgent need request and assigned it to 
JIEDDO, which has thus far been unable to develop a successful 
prototype. 

We have reported on the department's success in fielding MRAPs in 
response to an urgent need, and stated that, among several factors 
contributing to the success of the program were that 1) DOD kept the 
requirements simple, clear, and flexible and did not dictate a single 
acceptable solution, and 2) the department made sure that only mature 
technologies and stable designs were used by setting a very short and 
inflexible schedule.[Footnote 51] In addition, the Defense Science 
Board reported recently that any rapid response to an urgent need must 
be based on proven technology and robust manufacturing processes 
because attempts to squeeze new technology development into an urgent 
time frame create risks for delays and ultimately may not adequately 
address an existing capability gap. The board stated in its report 
that, in order to achieve initial deployment of a solution in weeks or 
months, technology must be sufficiently mature and likely filled by 
commercial or government off-the-shelf products, or foreign government 
sources. Further, the board stated that needs that cannot be met with 
mature technology should be handed to the defense science and 
technology community as a high priority for further development. 
Sponsors for joint solutions we spoke with expressed concerns that the 
maturity of the technology associated with approved urgent needs 
solutions is often overstated, ultimately requiring further 
integration, development, and testing before the solutions can be 
successfully acquired and produced. The board advocated a triage 
process to differentiate between different urgent needs and determine 
whether an urgent need should be addressed through expedited 
acquisition procedures or the department's traditional acquisition 
system. 

Both of the services' processes include procedures for reviewing 
whether a potential solution that requires the development of a new 
technology should be sustained for the long term, across the service, 
as a formal acquisition program. Army and Marine Corps officials 
involved in their respective urgent needs processes stated that they 
prefer urgent needs requests that cite capability gaps rather than 
specific solutions in order to provide the warfighter with flexibility 
to utilize creative solutions that may be inexpensive and readily 
available but unknown to the warfighter. CJCSI 3470.01 is unclear 
about who should be responsible for applying the technological 
maturity criteria, and based on our case studies it remains unclear 
who is responsible during the review, endorsement, and approval phases 
to apply the criteria, remove those urgent needs that fall outside of 
the scope of the process, and recommend a different approach.[Footnote 
52] Based on the results of our case studies, we found that attempts 
to meet urgent needs with technologically complex or immature 
technologies risk prolonging the fielding of solutions, and could 
result in fielding a capability too late to effectively address 
rapidly changing theater conditions. As we state earlier in this 
report, DOD lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities for 
managing DOD's urgent needs processes in general. As a result, the 
department faces difficulty in ensuring that the joint process is 
implemented efficiently and effectively and in identifying the 
appropriate personnel who are accountable for operations, stewardship 
of resources, and achieving results. 

Conclusions: 

Due to rapidly changing battlefield threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Congress has recognized DOD's need to be more nimble in its response 
to warfighter requests for urgently needed capabilities than the 
department's usual acquisitions process allows. Similarly, DOD's 
leadership has recognized the importance of rapidly procuring 
solutions to meet warfighter needs during contingency operations. 
Although the establishment of the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent 
needs processes improved capabilities available to the warfighter, 
without improvements to the management framework to incorporate 
additional internal control standards, DOD risks fielding solutions 
that are either too late to do good or that do not successfully meet 
warfighter needs. In the absence of consolidated and updated 
departmentwide guidance permanently establishing its joint urgent 
needs process, and clearly delineated roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities of various stakeholders, the department will continue to 
face challenges implementing the process, monitoring the process to 
ensure efficiency and effectiveness in each of its phases, and 
evaluating results. In addition, unless DOD's joint urgent needs 
guidance and acquisition policy clearly communicate the availability 
of the rapid acquisition authority that the services and the JRAC can 
use to meet urgent needs, the services could continue to miss 
opportunities to quickly field urgently needed solutions to the 
theater of operations and inadvertently increase costs by 
unnecessarily prolonging the acquisition process. Furthermore, without 
more comprehensive, complete, and reliable data that can be used to 
accurately track and document key process milestones, as well as to 
create reports for management review, DOD will continue to lack the 
ability to oversee and track the progress of individual requests or to 
determine which phases of the process, if any, might need adjustments 
to prevent unnecessary delays. Finally, a formal mechanism for 
soliciting and collecting feedback from servicemembers in theater is 
essential for determining how well fielded solutions are meeting 
warfighter requests as well as ensuring that the resources invested in 
the urgent needs process are achieving the desired results. 

For the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes, 
challenges in the initiation and funding phases, in particular, can 
significantly increase the number of days--or weeks, or months--that 
elapse between the time a warfighter submits an urgent request and the 
time a solution is fielded. When the personnel responsible for 
documenting and reviewing urgent needs requests do not receive needed 
training before arriving in the theater of operations, they can become 
quickly overwhelmed by the volume of requests, leading to backlogs, 
errors, and delays. Unless DOD takes steps to ensure that both unit 
requirements officers and senior force management officers responsible 
for processing urgent needs requests receive training on appropriate 
uses of the service and joint processes, as well as how to craft 
related documentation, before they arrive in theater, warfighter 
requests are likely to continue to face delays early in those 
processes. More consistent predeployment training would be an 
important step toward ensuring that warfighters receive critical 
capabilities as quickly as possible. Moreover, in the absence of OSD 
leadership on recommending when to use the rapid acquisition authority 
Congress provided the department specifically for the purpose of 
funding solutions to urgent needs, some requests that have been 
validated as urgent may continue to experience increasing time frames 
during the funding phase of the process. Until OSD begins to play a 
proactive, rather than a reactive role in the use of its rapid 
acquisition authority, urgent requests that have been assigned to one 
of the services or components for funding are likely to continue to 
compete with longer-term service programs and, in some cases, wait 
until the next annual budget process to be funded from the base budget 
for the next fiscal year. Similarly, without a means to secure 
cooperation from the services and other DOD components to reprogram 
and transfer funds to meet joint urgent needs, JRAC will continue to 
face challenges in providing timely solutions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine 
actions: 

To improve the department's ability to fully assess how well the 
urgent needs processes are addressing critical warfighter deficiencies 
and to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater, 
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, military 
services, and other DOD components, as necessary, take the following 
actions to permanently establish the joint urgent needs process and to 
improve consistency with federal internal control standards: 

* Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, 
and other DOD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or 
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is 
accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all 
phases of the process--including applying the technological maturity 
criteria. 

* Include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to 
officials responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests. 

* Develop and implement standards for accurately tracing and 
documenting key process milestones such as funding, acquisition, 
fielding, and assessment, and for updating data management systems to 
create activity reports to facilitate management review and external 
oversight of the process. 

* Develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel, for 
the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and JRAC on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs. 

To better inform DOD personnel of the options for acquiring 
capabilities to meet warfighters' needs, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense amend DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 
5000.02 to reflect that officials responsible for acquisition of 
urgently needed equipment may need to consider using joint urgent 
processes, including rapid acquisition authority. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Secretary of 
the Army to amend the urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation 
71-9 to include distinct performance standards that distinguish how 
different types of urgent needs, such as nonstandard mission equipment 
shortages and new capabilities, should be processed, and to develop 
and implement standard operating procedures for headquarters officials 
to use when processing urgent needs requests. 

To better address training challenges the department faces in 
preventing process delays and improving its ability to more quickly 
field solutions to the theater, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to update training procedures 
to include instruction for unit requirements officers regarding the 
development of joint and Army urgent need statements in order to 
ensure that these personnel are prepared to effectively draft urgent 
requirement documents upon arrival in theater. 

To more rapidly field urgent needs solutions aimed at eliminating 
deficiencies that have resulted in combat fatalities, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense amend its implementing memorandum for 
the department's rapid acquisition authority to designate an OSD 
entity, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, with primary 
responsibility for recommending to the Secretary of Defense when to 
implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority--as 
provided in Pub. L. No. 108-375--as urgent needs are validated by the 
Joint Staff. 

To expedite the funding needed to field approved solutions to joint 
urgent needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense create an 
executive council to include the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), the Director of JRAC, the Comptrollers of each of the 
military services, and other stakeholders as needed, and appoint a 
chair for the purpose of making timely funding decisions as urgent 
needs are validated by the Joint Staff. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four 
of our recommendations and partially concurred with five other 
recommendations. Technical comments were provided separately and 
incorporated as appropriate. The department's written comments are 
reprinted in appendix III. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to clearly define roles, 
responsibilities, and accountability through the issuance of new or 
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. The department stated 
that it is developing new DOD policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 
updating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational 
Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to clearly define roles and 
responsibilities of all DOD components. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to include rapid acquisition 
authority procedures available to officials responsible for meeting 
joint urgent need requests in the issuance of new or updated OSD and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. In its response, the department noted 
that it is developing additional DOD policy to facilitate the use of 
rapid acquisition authority and has issued guidance to Service 
Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of rapid acquisition 
authority is considered when necessary to address urgent needs. While 
we agree that the proposed action is a good step towards addressing 
our recommendation, we also believe, as we recommended, that DOD 
should include these procedures in the new urgent needs policy it is 
also developing in order to better inform program managers of all 
procedures available to them for fielding solutions quickly to the 
theater and to follow internal control standards that cite the 
importance of policies and procedures that enforce management's 
directives and integrate accountability for achieving effective 
results. 

DOD concurred with our recommendations to develop and implement 
standards for accurately tracing and documenting key process 
milestones and for updating data management systems; and to develop an 
established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military 
services to use. The department stated that it is developing new DOD 
policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman's 
instruction to establish requirements for oversight and management of 
the fulfillment of urgent needs from initiation, operational 
assessment, fielding, and ultimate disposition. DOD stated further 
that visibility of actions of the DOD components to fulfill urgent 
needs is expected to be incorporated into new DOD policy and should 
improve the ability for OSD to provide oversight of the fulfillment of 
urgent needs and satisfaction of the warfighter's requirements. We 
agree that new and updated policy is a good first step to addressing 
these deficiencies. However, it is not clear from DOD's response if 
the updated policies will directly establish standards for collecting 
accurate data and updating data systems, and include a method for 
obtaining feedback from the warfighter. Unless these components are 
part of DOD's revised policies, DOD will still fall short of being 
able to fully oversee and manage the urgent needs processes and will 
remain inconsistent with internal control standards. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to amend DOD Directive 
5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that officials 
responsible for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may need to 
consider using joint urgent processes, including rapid acquisition 
authority. The department noted that it is developing new DOD policy 
to establish responsibilities for oversight and management of the 
fulfillment of urgent needs and the utilization of rapid acquisition 
authority. DOD stated further that this policy development is expected 
to result in a DOD directive that will be separate from the DOD 
Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02. While we agree that 
DOD's effort to develop new policy for the urgent needs process is a 
positive step, as stated in our report, the DOD acquisition directive 
and instruction represent the overarching guidance for the Defense 
Acquisition System. As such, we continue to believe that these 
documents should also be amended to better inform program managers of 
the range of options available to respond to urgent warfighter needs. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend the Army's 
urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation 71-9 to include 
distinct performance standards that distinguish how different types of 
urgent needs should be processed, and to develop and implement 
standard operating procedures. The department stated that, in December 
2009, the Army updated its regulation and partially addressed our 
recommendations. DOD stated further that upon issuance of additional 
DOD policy and an update to the Chairman's instruction, additional 
changes to the Army regulation and other DOD components policies may 
be required. We are aware of the Army's update to its regulation and 
reviewed it prior to issuance of our draft to DOD. Based on our 
review, we found that the updated regulation did not address the lack 
of distinct performance standards and standard operating procedures. 
Therefore, we continue to support our recommendation to further amend 
the regulation to address these issues. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update the Army's 
training procedures regarding the development of joint and Army urgent 
need statements. The department noted that the proposed direction by 
the Secretary of Defense should be to all military department 
secretaries as well as the heads of other DOD components because our 
findings based upon the assessment of the Army's urgent needs 
processes are applicable across the department. DOD acknowledged that 
training and improved instructions for all DOD component personnel 
involved in the generation of urgent needs requirements and their 
fulfillment would improve the department's ability to respond to the 
warfighter's urgent needs. The department stated further that it is 
developing additional DOD policy that will direct DOD components to 
develop procedures for urgent operational needs and the implementation 
steps of these procedures will be monitored by OSD to ensure they are 
accomplished and include the training we recommended. While our 
evaluation focused specifically on Army practices, we agree that if 
the Secretary has determined deficiencies in training present a 
capability gap across DOD in the urgent needs process, updated 
training procedures for all department personnel involved in the 
process are appropriate. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend its 
implementing memorandum for the department's rapid acquisition 
authority to designate an OSD entity with primary responsibility for 
recommending when the authority should be implemented. The department 
stated that it is developing additional DOD policy to facilitate the 
use of rapid acquisition authority and has issued guidance to Service 
Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of rapid acquisition 
authority is considered when necessary to address urgent needs. DOD 
noted further that it is continuing to evaluate the need for 
legislative changes to enhance rapid acquisition authority. While we 
recognize DOD's efforts to develop additional policy, issue guidance, 
and evaluate potential legislative changes, we continue to support our 
recommendation that the Secretary designate an OSD entity to recommend 
when this authority should be implemented. During our evaluation, we 
found that unless OSD plays a proactive role in identifying cases 
eligible for this authority rather than a reactive role, requests for 
urgent needs may not be funded in a timely manner due to other 
competing service priorities. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to create an executive 
council to make timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated 
by the Joint Staff. The department noted that it is developing 
additional DOD policy that is expected to clarify processes for 
funding urgent needs, and intends to use established senior governance 
councils to achieve the goal of the recommendation rather than 
establish a new council. We did not evaluate the roles and missions of 
these existing senior governance councils as to the extent they 
constitute the appropriate body to address funding solutions for 
urgent needs. We agree in principle with the intent to utilize 
existing councils to make timely funding decisions for urgent needs as 
long as those councils have the authority to directly address our 
recommendation and their membership includes those offices we cited. 
The department also recommended we change language in our report from 
"...as solutions are validated by the Joint Staff to "...as needs are 
validated by the Joint Staff" because the Joint Staff does not 
validate solutions but the requirements, or needs. We incorporated 
this language in our final report. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available 
at no charge on GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@GAO.GOV. Contact 
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a 
means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes we 
conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed 
relevant DOD, joint, and military service officials. During this 
review we focused on urgent wartime needs submitted through the joint, 
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes as these are the 
processes most frequently used, and commanders used the Air Force and 
Navy urgent needs processes much less frequently. Air Force officials 
stated they had one active request under their urgent needs process 
when we began our review, and Navy officials stated they had eight 
active requests under their urgent needs process when we began our 
review. We visited forces conducting operations in the U.S. Central 
Command area of responsibility and gathered information on how they 
identify, document, and submit urgent requests through the urgent 
needs processes, and on the fielding and assessment of solutions in 
the theater. We conducted site visits to joint, Army, and Marine Corps 
offices responsible for the respective urgent needs processes, as well 
as offices of officials who participate in reviewing urgent needs 
requests and developing funding strategies and solutions to be 
fielded. We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint, 
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to 
our standards for internal control in the federal government.[Footnote 
53] We also compared actual practices, tools, and data systems used to 
manage the joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes to our 
internal control standards. We assessed the reliability of the 
databases and information systems used to process urgent needs 
requests by 1) interviewing knowledgeable officials, 2) reviewing data 
system guidance and procedures when they were available, and 3) 
conducting limited electronic testing that included comparing values 
from source documentation with data elements in the data systems. 
While our assessment of databases and systems used to process urgent 
needs requests showed that some data elements were accurate and 
supported by sufficient documentation, we found that other items for 
reporting specific urgent needs requests were incomplete, and not 
sufficiently reliable for reporting specific results here, or to 
support accurate, useful management reports related to overall 
results. As a result, we determined that we would conduct case studies 
of selected urgent needs requests to provide insights related to this, 
and the following objective. We used data elements from the 
information systems that we had determined were sufficiently reliable 
to support the selection of case study candidates from the universe of 
joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests. 

To determine what challenges, if any, have affected the overall 
responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes we analyzed joint, 
Army, and Marine Corps data management systems in order to review the 
data collected on the time frames between decision points and 
determine how timely and effective each process was for providing 
solutions to urgent warfighter needs. To conduct this analysis we 
selected a nonprobability sample of cases to review from a universe of 
49 Joint Urgent Operational Needs, 4,054 Army Operational Needs 
Statements, and 524 Marine Corps Universal Urgent Need Statements. Our 
selected cases included 11 joint, 6 Army, and 6 Marine Corps for a 
total of 23 urgent needs cases reviewed. To ensure that the case 
studies reflect the current DOD urgent response processes as much as 
possible, we selected cases that were submitted after the latest 
iteration of updates in each process. We considered urgent needs 
requests initiated in the Marine Corps process after September 1, 
2006; initiated in the Army process after October 1, 2006; and 
initiated in the joint process after August 1, 2006. We then 
eliminated 1) requests for which solutions have not been fielded and 
2) requests for items that the Army already procures. We selected 
cases for which solutions have not been produced in order to explore 
aspects of the process based on their visibility, cost, and scope. We 
selected cases in order to represent distinct types of needs such as: 
Command and Control; Force Protection; Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance; Counter-Improvised Explosive Device; Logistical 
Support; and Miscellaneous (such as nonlethal weapons or other items 
not so easily categorized). We also selected cases where duplication 
of effort appeared possible, and urgent needs requests that commanders 
in Iraq or Afghanistan identified as high priority. Assessments of the 
selected cases were based on a comparison of the time required to 
achieve key objectives in completing the urgent needs process against 
stated goals and interviewing knowledgeable officials regarding the 
relative ease or difficulty in accomplishing these objectives, as well 
as end users in theater regarding the sufficiency of fielded 
solutions. In order to allow for comparison across the joint and 
service urgent needs processes, we constructed a chronology of each 
urgent need beginning with initiation of the urgent needs process and 
culminating with the initial fielding of a solution in theater, if 
applicable. Since each urgent needs process within DOD is distinct and 
uses differing terms and procedures, we used a consistent approach to 
demonstrate progression between key events and decision points across 
time lines from initiation of an urgent need request to initial 
fielding of a solution However, in collecting data for our case 
studies, we found that documentation regarding the initial theater 
recognition of an urgent need was inconsistent and often unavailable. 
For further details and the results of our case studies see appendix 
II. 

We interviewed officials from the Department of Defense; the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff; all four of the military services; two selected 
combatant commands; and military activities participating in ongoing 
military operations. The specific offices and military activities we 
interviewed and obtained information from include the following: 

* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, Arlington, Va.;
- Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Innovation & Technology Transition, Arlington, Va.;
- Joint Rapid Action Cell, Arlington, Va.
- Rapid Reaction Technology office, Arlington, Va. 

* Defense Information Systems Agency, Falls Church, Va. 

* U.S. Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Roslyn, 
Va. 

* U.S. Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Operations:
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, Force Development:
- U.S. Army, 224th Military Intelligence Battalion:
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology), Crystal City, Va. 

* U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich. 

* U.S. Army, 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade, Headquarters, Camp 
Liberty, Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq. 

* U.S. Army, 18th Airborne Corps, 525th Battlefield Surveillance 
Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C. 

* U.S. Army, 15th Military Intelligence Battalion, Joint Base Balad, 
Iraq. 

* U.S. Army, Army Requirements and Resourcing Board Council of 
Colonels. 

* U.S. Army, Program Executive Office for Ammunition, Picatinny 
Arsenal, N.J. 

* U.S. Army, Communications Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J. 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Fla. 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Capability Development Command, 
Quantico, Va. 

* U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, Rapid Capability Development 
and Deployment, Arlington, Va. 

* U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Requirements 
Division, Arlington, Va.
- U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Va. 

* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and 
Assessment Directorate (J8), Capabilities and Acquisition Division, 
Arlington, Va. 

* Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Crystal City, 
Va.
- Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Va. 

* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Fla. 

* Multi-National Corps-Iraq; Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. 

* Commander, Multi-National Forces-West, Al Asad Air Base, Anbar 
Province, Iraq. 

* Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. 

* Multi-National Division-Central, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. 

* Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Science and Technology (MND S&T); Camp 
Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. 

* U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to March 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Case Studies of Selected Urgent Need Requests: 

We selected 23 urgent need requests as case studies to illustrate 
issues that may impact the amount of time required to provide 
solutions to the warfighter. We reviewed 6 Army, 6 Marine Corps, and 
11 joint requests.[Footnote 54] Although each of these urgent needs 
processes is distinct, we identified seven broad phases that we used 
to track the progression of each request over time and to compare 
performance across the Army's Operational Needs Statement process, the 
Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, and the Joint 
Urgent Operational Needs processes. These phases are: initiation, 
theater endorsement, command validation, headquarters approval, 
funding, contract award, and initial fielding. Figure 1 illustrates 
these phases. 

Figure 1: Progression of Urgent Need Request: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Initiation: 
Warfighting unit submits an urgent need statement for theater command 
level review. 

Theater endorsement: 
Theater command endorses and forwards need statement to appropriate 
component or combatant command. 

Command validation: 
Component or combatant command validates need statement and forwards 
to service or joint headquarters staff. 

Headquarters approval: 
Service or joint headquarters staff develops and approves a solution 
and funding strategy. 

Funding: 
Service or joint sponsor applies funds to program office for 
procurement of solution. 

Contract award: 
Service or joint program office develops and executes an acquisition 
strategy. 

Production and initial fielding: 
Program office manages the production and delivery of solution to 
theater. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

For each of our 23 case studies, we tracked the progress of an urgent 
need request beginning with the initiation of an urgent needs process 
and culminating with the initial fielding of a solution, if any. Each 
of the figures that follow represents the case studies we selected, 
describing an identified need or capability gap, the proposed 
solution, and a brief description of challenges, if any, affecting the 
ability of the urgent needs process(es) in question to rapidly field a 
response to that request, and a photograph. Although each urgent needs 
request is unique some of the requests we reviewed were closely 
related. Where appropriate we combined these case studies in our 
discussion below.[Footnote 55] Challenges, if any, to providing a 
solution for an urgent needs request were identified in discussions 
with agency officials and supported by our review of the request's 
progress through each phase of the process. Further information on our 
methodology can be found in appendix I. Issues associated with funding 
and technical complexity were the most frequent challenges affecting 
the response or causing delays. 

Figure 2: Improving Command and Control through Secure Satellite 
Phones (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Officer using an Iridium 
Satellite Telephone] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Army: 
Date of theater endorsement: 12/04/2006: 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 175 days. 

Urgent need: Improve command and control capability at remote 
locations: 
Military personnel require a method for communicating with each other 
in areas without established infrastructure or in case of a break-down 
in existing communications capabilities. 

Solution: Secure Satellite Communication Handsets (Iridium Phones): 
Iridium phones provide secure communications, enabling command and 
control of military personnel in the absence of established 
infrastructure and act as an emergency back-up to established 
communication. 

Challenge(s), if any: Lengthy approval and order processes: 
Although Iridium Phones are readily available and units purchase them 
with their own funds, an Army regulation requires units to submit 
requests for Iridium satellite telephones through the Army’s 
operational urgent needs process to assure operational security and 
system integrity and then, after that request has been approved, to 
initiate an order through the Directorate of Information Management to 
procure them. However, before the directorate will approve an order 
for fulfillment, it must independently validate that the unit placing 
the order has an approved urgent needs request. Requiring an approved 
urgent needs request and an independent validation of the approved 
request before filling the order affected the response time for this 
urgent needs request. 

Source: U.S. Air Force (photo). 

[A] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 25-1, 
Information Management: Army Knowledge Management and Information 
Technology (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2008). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: X-ray Technology for Vehicle Checkpoints (2 case studies): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Z-backscatter Van at security 
checkpoint in Iraq] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Army; 
Date of theater endorsement: 6/17/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 501 days. 

Case study B: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 6/09/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 509 days. 

Urgent need: Capability to reveal hidden items or people at 
checkpoints: 
The Iraq Multi-National Division-Center requested 12 Z-Backscatter 
vans through the Army urgent needs process to be used at security 
checkpoints during counter-insurgency operations. Multi-National Corps-
Iraq submitted a separate joint request for 10 additional Z-
Backscatter vans in part to support a safe environment for Iraqi 
elections. 

Solution: Z-Backscatter Vans: 
The Z-Backscatter uses X-ray technology mounted on a van chassis. This 
device produces bright, photo-quality images to reveal the presence of 
hidden people and/or contraband in vehicles or cargo containers. The Z-
Backscatter can also be used to detect explosives, weapons, and drugs. 
The request for this equipment noted that it was available as a 
commercial off-the-shelf item. 

Challenge(s), if any: Funding: 
It took approximately 251 days after the 12 vans were approved for the 
Army to provide funding and 293 days after the 10 vans were approved 
through the joint process because these requests—22 vans in total— 
were combined with requests for 55 other nonintrusive inspection 
systems. Funding for all 77 items requested was divided into 3 
installments from July 2007 through April 2008. Although the Z-
Backscatter vans were listed as a high priority by theater commanders, 
they were funded in the last installment. 

Source: GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Protecting Vehicle Occupants from Fires Caused by IEDs (1 
Case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Crew compartment fire suppression 
system with manual activation and battery back-up installed in a 
HUMVEE] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Army; 
Date of theater endorsement: 08/13/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 521 days (to provide a solution 
for Humvees—one of 17 vehicle types in this urgent needs request). 

Urgent need: Capability to prevent casualties from vehicle fires: 
Improvised explosive devices can ignite fuel or tires, causing vehicle 
fires. 

Solution: Tactical vehicle fire protection: 
Existing High Mobility, Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees) have 
been retrofitted with upgraded fire suppression equipment for their 
crew compartments, while solutions are being integrated into new 
vehicles. Many of the refinements necessary have already been adopted, 
as other efforts continue to address the threat across a variety of 
vehicle platforms as technology develops. 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, funding: 
This request applied to over 48,000 vehicles including tracked 
vehicles, such as Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and wheeled 
vehicles such as Humvees, Route Clearance Vehicles, Heavy Equipment 
Transporters, Medium Tactical Vehicles, and Palletized Loading Systems 
(forklifts) to name a few. In addition to the magnitude of the 
request, the solutions are technically complex. For example, one of 
the solutions involved providing a fire suppression system for the 
crew compartments of those vehicles that suppresses or extinguishes 
any fire present while allowing crew members to safely evacuate. In 
addition, this system was combined with back-up systems to allow fire 
suppression equipment to be manually activated despite engine or power 
failure. Further, it took time for program managers to develop 
solutions that were not too complex or too varied to sustain in 
theater. Some solutions (such as the one depicted at left) have 
already been fielded, but Army officials told us that the request for 
this capability may take many years to address. 

To upgrade existing vehicles, program managers used about $14 million 
in funds already appropriated for vehicle maintenance and 
modifications to modify vehicles already in use. However, more money 
will be needed to provide fire suppression capabilities for the 17 
varieties and almost 49,000 individual vehicles covered in this 
request. 

Source: U.S. Army (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: Detecting IEDs Using Existing Mine-Detection Technology (2 
case studies): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: “Husky” Mine Detection Vehicle] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Army; 
Date of theater endorsement: 10/04/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 454 days. 

Case study B: 
Process used: Marine Corps; 
Date of theater endorsement: 6/14/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 581 days. 

Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive 
devices: 
Army forces operating in Afghanistan determined that the emerging 
threat from IEDs in that theater was from devices whose main charge is 
triggered by a pressure plate. 

Solution: Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD): 
The IVMMD or “Husky” was built for the South African National Defense 
Forces. Designed for a single occupant, the body of the IVMMD is 
constructed of heavy gauge steel, contoured in a "V" shape to minimize 
vehicle resistance to an explosion. The front and rear axles are 
attached to the vehicle by open steel frameworks that offer little 
resistance to an explosive force. 

Challenge(s), if any: Limited production schedule: 
At the time these urgent needs requests were being fulfilled, 
production was limited because there was only one manufacturing source 
for these vehicles, which was operating at full capacity. These 
vehicles were initially resourced as a commercial off-the-shelf 
solution, and a contract was in place with the vendor. However, a lack 
of flexibility in the production schedule contributed to lengthy time 
lines between contract award and fielding. Officials stated that as 
demand for this type of vehicle grew, other companies began to 
manufacture similar V-shaped vehicles. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 6: Ability to Detect Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case 
study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Husky-Mounted Detection System] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 10/20/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 497 days. 

Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive 
devices: 
Army forces in Afghanistan determined an emerging threat from IEDs in 
that theater was from buried IEDs, whose main charge is triggered by a 
pressure plate. 

Solution: Husky-Mounted Detection System (HMDS): 
HMDS is a counter-IED/counter-mine system that can detect underbelly 
IEDs, pressure plates used to detonate IEDs, and antitank landmines 
buried in primary and secondary roads. HMDS provides advanced high-
performance ground penetrating radar to detect buried threats, 
including IEDs that are constructed of bulk explosives and pressure 
plates and provides location marking of the buried threats. 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity: 
Joint forces in Afghanistan requested an improvised explosive device 
detection system that could be mounted on Husky mine detection 
vehicles such as those discussed in fig. 4. A joint urgent needs 
official stated that technical complexity resulted in delays as the 
proposed solution required time for development, testing, and 
performance assessment of the experimental HMDS prior to them making a 
decision to purchase it in large numbers. Testing for the HMDS 
officially began in March 2008. JIEDDO approved the purchase of 30 
systems in September 2008. The first HMDS arrived at Bagram Airfield 
in Afghanistan in February 2009. 

Source: U.S. Army (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: Decreasing the Likelihood of Injury to Vehicle Gunners (1 
case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Humvee with FK-7 installed]
	
Case study A: 	
Process used: Army; 	
Date of theater endorsement: 12/17/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 409 days. 	
		
Urgent need: Additional protection for crews of up-armored vehicles: 
This protection was requested to decrease the likelihood of injury to 
vehicle gunners from small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, hand 
grenades, rocks, extreme weather, and fragmentation resulting from 
explosions. 

Solution: Objective Gunners' Protection Kit and Fragmentation Kit #7: 
These solutions are the latest in a series of efforts to provide 
additional protection to crews operating up-armored High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees). 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity: 
This solution includes an Objective Gunner Protection Kit, upgrades to 
external armor on the roof and sides, a windshield that is releasable 
from the interior for rapid egress, improved door handles, and a fire 
suppression system. In addition, the weight of added armor requires 
adjustments to the suspension and drive-train of the vehicle—including 
new brakes, an improved suspension, and new tires—and existing armor 
or other features may need to be removed or altered. One unit we 
interviewed indicated that it took between 1.5 and 2 weeks to complete 
the installations. The initial request to provide additional armor for 
130 vehicles was increased at the theater endorsement phase of the 
process to over 15,000 vehicles, and again at the Command validation 
level to almost 19,000 vehicles to improve existing Humvees and Mine 
Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles being used in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In October 2008, Army Headquarters approved the purchase 
of about 10,000 kits. By February 2009, 125 kits had been shipped and 
installation had begun. 

Source: GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 8: Clearing Vegetation with a Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower (1 
case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: "Ground Torch" being used in Iraq 
(trailer not pictured)] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Army; 			
Date of theater endorsement: 02/11/2008; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 504 days. 			 

Urgent need: Capability to remove vegetation to reduce the threat from 
improvised explosive devices: 
Units identified the need to clear vegetation from the banks of 
irrigation channels and other locations to deny insurgents the ability 
to conceal improvised explosive devices and eliminate hiding places 
for people who could trigger such devices. 

Solution: "Ground Torch" Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower: 
Marine Corps personnel, and some Army units, have used a commercial 
off-the shelf flame-thrower, used in forestry, for this purpose. 

Challenge(s), if any: Funding: 
An incremental approach was used to fund this solution. The Army's 
Rapid Equipping Force provided $68,500 in September 2008 to purchase 
and test a prototype system. The Army provided another $500,000 in 
October 2008. Finally, $1.3 million was provided from Fiscal Year 2008 
Omnibus funding to field and support 10 systems for 1 year When it 
became apparent that testing would be successfully completed, a 
competition was conducted and a contract was awarded in January 2009. 
Army officials stated that efforts to arrange funding continued 
through March 2009—-almost a year after approval of the urgent needs 
request. The Army delivered the first two systems to the theater of 
operations in late June 2009. 

Source: U.S. Army (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 9: Providing Support for Ground Troops Through Aerial 
Surveillance (2 case studies): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Angel Fire Platform vehicle] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 09/15/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding (of a partial solution): 357 days. 

Case study B: 
Process used: Marine Corps; 
Date of theater endorsement: 09/15/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding (of a partial solution): 357 days. 

Urgent need: Around-the-clock aerial surveillance: 
Ground troops requested the ability to detect snipers on rooftops or 
enemy mortar teams beyond their line of sight, enabling them to 
respond to such threats in near-real time, and to review recent 
activity. 

Solution: Angel Fire System: 

Engineers at the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory were the early developers of this solution. Angel 
Fire is designed to provide a wide field of view, and persistent 
aerial surveillance in support of ground troops at the tactical level. 
The solution provided was for daytime use only rather than for an 
around-the-clock capability as requested. 

Challenge(s), if any: Funding, technical complexity: 

In November 2005, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command began 
pursuing a new aerial surveillance capability that could deploy within 
6 months to a year. U.S. Strategic Command and the Office of Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Defense 
Acquisition Challenge program provided initial support to develop the 
capability. In July 2006— 2 months prior to theater endorsement—the 
Marine Corps began efforts to deploy Angel Fire, with the intent of 
seeking full funding from JIEDDO. However, a Deputy Secretary of 
Defense decision prevented JIEDDO from funding the purchase of 
platforms, such as vehicles or aircraft, so the urgent need request 
was split into two requests—one followed the joint process to allow 
JIEDDO to fund $19.5 million for the development of
surveillance sensors and platform integration, and the other through 
the Marine Corps process to fund approximately $15 million for 
aircraft and services. Funding of approximately $34.5 million was 
finally arranged about 6 months later in February 2007. 

Furthermore, the technical complexity of the Angel Fire system caused 
the Marine Corps and joint processes to close their urgent needs 
requests without having received a solution that met the warfighter 
need. JIEDDO determined as early as December 2006 that it would be 
unable to meet the need for night-time surveillance because the 
infrared sensors were too technologically immature. Although the 
Marine Corps and JIEDDO continued to invest in the program, further 
studies showed that infrared resolution was too low quality to satisfy 
the requirement. According to JIEDDO officials, as of March 2009, the 
four aircraft equipped with daytime sensors, which had been deployed 
to Iraq, were scheduled to be relocated to the United States, and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence did not recommend 
deploying Angel Fire to Afghanistan. 

Source: U.S. Air Force (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Responding to an Adaptive Enemy by Increasing Vehicle Armor 
(1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs: Under-Carriage IED Blast-
Protection; MTVR with blast protection] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Marine Corps; 
Date of theater endorsement: 10/05/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 564 days. 

Urgent need: Force protection from improvised explosive device: 
Medium Tactical Vehicles were equipped with rollers attached to the 
front of vehicles as last-chance mitigation to defeat mines or 
pressure-activated IEDs by initiating the blast in front of the cab of 
the vehicle rather than underneath it. This urgent needs request was 
initiated in anticipation of enemy adapting so that the vehicle cab 
would still be affected by the blast. 

Solution: Medium Tactical Vehicle-Replacement (MTVR) Force Protection 
from Improvised Explosive Devices: 
Vehicles with higher clearances and heavier under-carriages were 
recognized as better protection against the threat. 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity: 
As with any vehicle-related up-armoring effort, the need to provide 
increased blast protection on MTVRs involved a certain degree of 
technical complexity. First, the armor protection itself had to be 
developed to protect servicemen from under-carriage IED blasts. Next, 
the vehicle variants had to be evaluated to determine if redesigning 
the vehicle to accommodate additional weight on the under-carriage was 
necessary. Finally, the solution had to be tested and a method for 
systematically retrofitting the MTVRs had to be developed. The armor 
systems eventually approved were integrated kits made of 
metal/composite panel armor capable of withstanding small arms, IED, 
and mine blasts as a permanent modification to the vehicle. 

An estimated lead time of at least 6 months was required for 
production. Adding to the complexity of fielding solutions rapidly, 
the First Marine Expeditionary Force's initial urgent needs request to 
protect 110 vehicles was later increased to cover every MTVR in 
theater, with the exception of wrecker variants—approximately 1,050 
vehicles. The first 80 blast protection kits were received in theater 
in April 2008. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Helping Marines Use Biometrics to Identify Individuals (1 
case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Individual performing identity 
verification with an Iris scanner] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Marine Corps; 
Date of theater endorsement: 05/25/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 177 days. 

Urgent need: Assistance in using biometric identification equipment: 
Biometric tools have been helping Marines to positively identify 
persons of interest or high-value individuals for several years. 
However, Marines required additional support at the battalion level to 
effectively and consistently operate systems such as the biometric 
automated tool kit because units may not have been sufficiently 
staffed or trained to use these technically complex tools in a manner 
consistent with their concept of operations. 

Solution: Biometric Support Personnel: 
Provide contract personnel to work as network and database 
administrators, subject matter experts, and trainers for Marines and 
unit staff members, and to provide recommendations on the effective 
use of biometric systems. 

Challenge(s), if any: No significant issues were identified: 
Technical complexity did not significantly delay the ability of the 
Marine Corps' urgent needs process to respond to this request.
In May 2007, Multi-National Forces West in Iraq initiated an urgent 
needs request for 17 contract personnel to work as network and 
database administrators for the biometric systems. In August 2007, 
Marine Corps Systems Command awarded a contract for supplies and 
services to support the Biometric Automated Tool Kit, including 
providing biometric system administrators. The biometric system 
administrators arrived in theater in November 2007. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Improving Tactical Radio Communications Involving Both 
Audio and Data (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: PRC 150 Remote Interface] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Marine Corps; 
Date of theater endorsement: 06/26/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 314 days. 	
	
Urgent need: Remote radio operation support for newer equipment: 
Marines rely heavily on tactical radio communications. In Iraq, 
divisions used "antenna hills" as remote radio signal relays to and 
from combat operations centers. This prevented enemy forces from using 
electronic emissions to target Marines. However, newer radios, capable 
of transmitting data as well as audio, could not be relayed in this 
manner. 

Solution: Portable Radio Communications Remote Interface (PRC-150 
Remote Control): 
Although officials indicate that ideally, an urgent needs request 
should cite a capability gap, in this case, the warfighter identified 
a specific item—Harris RF 5800-RC 111 remote control devices. These 
devices can provide full remote control capability for compatible 
radios and accommodate a variety of data link options when combined 
with commercial off-the-shelf equipment. 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity: 
Technical complexity exists in any effort to remotely relay electronic 
signals. This is particularly true when developing a rugged system 
capable of surviving extreme temperatures and a marine environment. In 
this case, the requested capabilities also included high-speed data 
transmission, which had not been available with earlier remote radios. 
There was only one known system available that could provide the 
capability requested, but a longer lead time was required to 
manufacture components, such as chips and circuit boards, and to 
perform testing. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Improving the Ability to See Clearly Under a Variety of 
Conditions Using Vision Enhancement Technology (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Individual Weapon Night Sight-
Thermal] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Marine Corps; 		
Date of theater endorsement: 11/18/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 621 days. 		 

Urgent need: Improved ground-based threat recognition and targeting 
capability: 
Forces wanted the ability to better detect and recognize targets under 
varying conditions. Marine Corps Systems Command had been working for 
several months to develop such a capability before a draft urgent 
needs request was prepared for the Marine Corps' urgent needs process. 

Solution: Individual Weapon Night Sight-Thermal: 
The Individual Weapon Night Sight-Thermal is an in-line clip-on 
thermal sight designed to detect and recognize targets and threats at 
300 meters without affecting the sight picture in all lighting 
conditions, including total darkness, and atmospheric obscurants such 
as smoke and fog. Because thermal optics are not subject to background 
light "wash-out", they are ideal for use in both day and night 
lighting conditions. 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, contracting delays: 
The solution called for the device to be used in two modes: 1) hand 
held—to search for hostile persons, false wails, weapons and ammo 
caches, and IED indicators and 2) as a rifle clip-on for target 
engagement. Production and performance issues, such as achieving the 
needed sight resolution and modifications to improve reliability in 
the field, needed to be resolved and prototypes tested before any 
design for a large-volume production of sights could be approved. 
After initial fielding began in July 2008, field-tested units were 
sent back for a design change. In addition, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures had to be developed along with the solution, and a program 
of instruction was needed to teach Marines how to program the sight, 
acquire targets, and recognize activities associated with IEDs. Marine 
Corps officials stated that feedback on the usefulness of the sights 
has been mixed. 

Rapid acquisition authority was not used, and nine separate companies 
responded to the request for proposal. The source selection for a 
contractor took almost 10 months. A contract for 2,192 systems was 
awarded in November 2007. Moreover, the contractor had difficulty 
obtaining a key component used in making sights, vision enhancement 
chips, which were in short supply, due in part to competition with a 
higher-priority urgent need. By March 2009, only 528 thermal sights 
had been delivered to Iraq and a few hundred had been sent to training 
facilities in the United States. By April 2009, the Commander, Marine 
Forces, Central Command directed 873 thermal sights to be shipped to 
Afghanistan, and those sights had been delivered. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 14: Resupplying Troops Under Dangerous Conditions through High- 
Tech Air Drops (2 case studies): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Joint Precision Air Drop System] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 02/22/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 335 days. 
	
Case study B: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 12/20/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 320 days. 

Urgent need: Resupply capability if traditional methods cannot be used: 
Mountainous terrain, poor roads, bad weather, and enemy forces can 
hinder standard airdrop or ground-based resupply missions to units in 
remote parts of Afghanistan. Precision-guided air drops were needed to 
expand coalition Forward Operating Bases into remote and austere 
environments. 

The Army and the Air Force were both interested in this solution. 

Solution: Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS): 
The "Screamer" JPADS system with a payload capacity of up to 2200 
pounds with a standoff range of 14 Km could be fielded quickly as an 
interim solution, and had a history of success. However, officials 
stated it was not supportable or sustainable over time. 

The "Firefly" JPADS system is capable of delivering a payload of up to 
2,100 pounds with twice the standoff distance, twice the time aloft, 
improved accuracy, and could be set for automatic or directionally 
controlled landings. The Firefly was selected for longer-term 
development. 

Challenge(s), if any: Funding, technical complexity: 
Some delays occurred as Army headquarters refused to fund the 
capability and returned the request to the Commander, U.S. Army 
Central Command, recommending that it be resubmitted through the Joint 
urgent needs process. Although the original proposal for 50 "Screamer" 
systems estimated a cost of $4.5 million, due to the critical nature 
of the need and the desire to have the solution in theater prior to 
the onset of winter, CENTCOM released $2 million from supplemental 
funds for 12 systems 9 months after the request was initiated. Four 
months later, the Air Force agreed to supply $2.5 million for the 
remaining 38 "Screamer" systems. However, technical complexity, 
including issues related to testing and final modifications, prevented 
the "Screamers" from being deployed as quickly as desired. 

In March 2007, the joint process awarded another contract for 
development and testing of "Firefly" JPADS systems. In July 2007, the 
Army's Rapid Equipping Force arranged for $5 million to fund the first 
Firefly order under the March 2007 contract. However, funds needed for 
the remaining 105 Firefly systems—-later taken from the fiscal year 
2008 supplemental appropriation—-were not received by the program 
manager until August 2008. As of June 2009, 200 Firefly systems had 
been delivered to Afghanistan. 

Source: U.S. Air Force (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 15: Discouraging Adversaries or Crowds by Using Electromagnetic 
Radiation (2 case studies): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Active Denial System 2] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 11/12/2006; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: Not fielded; 
Request rescinded: 01/24/2008. 

Case Study B: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 06/03/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: Not fielded; 
Request rescinded: 04/14/2008. 

Urgent Need: Capability to engage potential adversaries at distances 
in a safe, effective, and nonlethal manner and nonlethal capability to 
quell violence among detainees: 
The first requests arose from the desire of Marines to disperse crowds 
or repel attackers without using lethal force. The second need request 
originated from the Camp Bucca Detention Center in Iraq. 

Solution: Active Denial System 2: 
No commercial solution existed for these requests, but DOD was 
developing the Active Denial System (ADS). ADS is a nonlethal counter-
personnel, directed-energy weapon that causes an intense, temporary 
burning sensation on the skin. ADS can purportedly provide troops with 
the ability to compel potential adversaries to either cease 
threatening behavior or leave, from distances well beyond small arms 
range and in a safe, effective, and nonlethal manner. ADS was briefed 
to JRAC in February 2007 with ADS 2 presented as a viable alternative. 
ADS 2 was demonstrated in October 2007 and selected as the potential 
solution. 

Challenge(s), If Any: Technical complexity, requests withdrawn: 
The Marine Corps considered the components of Active Denial System 2—
including the system's gyrotron, waveguides, super-conducting magnets, 
antenna, and other major subsystems—too complex to allow extensive 
field repair, and combat damage to the antenna could create a 
logistics problem because storage and replacement of such large items 
is difficult. Further, Marine Corps officials stated that if the 
system were deployed, its mobility could be limited due to its weight 
and size. Therefore, the Marine Corps rescinded its request a little 
over a year after it was initiated. 

Although the U.S. Central Command Chief of Staff endorsed the urgent 
need for a nonlethal crowd control capability at the detention center, 
DOD did not want to use this system in a detention facility, until it 
had first been used and evaluated in an operational setting. U.S. 
Central Command rescinded its urgent need request in April 2008. 
However, the system is being maintained in a ready condition in the 
event an operational need arises. 

Source: U.S. Air Force (photo). 

[A] ADS-2 was being developed as part of an advanced concept 
technology demonstration. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 16: Providing Advanced Video Surveillance Technology to the 
Theater (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Rapidly Configured Camera Control 
Station for RDISS] 

Case study A: 
Process Used: Joint; 
Date of Theater Endorsement: 08/04/2007; 
Time Elapsed Until Initial Fielding: 375 days. 
	
Urgent Need: Video Surveillance Equipment for Forward Operating Bases: 
The Army's Rapid Equipping Force—a group within the Army that equips 
commanders with off-the-shelf technology to speed delivery of 
capabilities to the warfighter—created this capability. Army officials 
told us that urgent needs request are often based on equipment 
offerings proposed by the group. As a result, this request specified a 
material solution rather than simply describing a capability gap. 
Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82) initiated this joint urgent 
needs request. 

Solution: Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS): 
The Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS) is one 
part of the Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance System- 
Combined (BETSS-C) portfolio. The BETSS-C portfolio is intended to 
provide warfighters with the ability to maintain enhanced situational 
awareness on the battlefield. 

Challenge(s), If Any: Technical complexity, Funding: 
Program managers stated that requirement determination for the BETSS-C 
was the most complex aspect of developing the solution and that 
ascertaining CENTCOM requirements was an iterative, time consuming 
process. Once identified, the requirement specified the integration of 
a variety of systems into a single compatible "system of systems," 
which involved reconfiguring multiple software systems into compatible 
packages. The request also covered a vast number of locations and 
different mixes of system components for each location, which further 
complicated efforts to quickly develop a solution. 

In addition, multiple offices within DOD and the Army had to 
coordinate to develop a funding strategy and field the solution. The 
estimated cost for the BETSS-C portfolio was roughly $1.5 billion, of 
which $8 million was estimated for RDISS). The program managers told 
us that they attempted to obtain funding for the entire BETSS-C 
program from the Army in early 2007, but the Army declined. In 
February 2008, JIEDDO agreed to provide the $8 million needed to 
satisfy this urgent needs request. The first system was fielded to 
theater in August of 2008. 

Source: U.S. Army (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 17: Making Secure Satellite Communications Available from More 
Locations (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: SNAP VSAT satellite dish in use 
in Iraq] 

Case study A: 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 08/06/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 428 days. 

Urgent need: Portable satellite communications terminals for voice and 
data exchanges: 
The Commander, Multi-National Corps Iraq requested additional portable 
satellite communications terminals for classified voice and data 
exchanges at remote border crossing points, joint security stations, 
and combat outposts in remote locations. 

Solution: 
NIPR Access Point Portable Very Small Aperture Terminal (SNAP VSAT): 
SNAP VSATs use commercial off-the-shelf equipment to provide secure 
beyond line-of-sight communications. 

Challenge(s), if any: Funding, manufacturing delay: 
In October 2007, JRAC and the Army agreed to a funding strategy for 
the SNAP VSAT system in which JRAC would administer the transfer of 
approximately $3 million from the Iraq Freedom Fund to the Army, which 
in turn would use the funds to award a contract for the system. The 
Army would then place additional SNAP VSAT orders against the contract 
to satisfy the urgent need, once it received additional funding for 
the system in the Army's Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) supplemental. 
However, JRAC was unable to affect the Iraq Freedom Fund transfer to 
the Army until February 2008, due to changes in personnel and a lack 
of influence, according to JRAC officials. Moreover, after receiving 
the $3 million transfer from the Iraq Freedom Fund, the Army did not 
award a contract for the SNAP VSAT until July 2008, the same month 
that it received its GWOT supplemental funding. 

In addition, program officials stated that hardened travel cases for 
the systems purchased under this contract had to be custom made to 
protect the equipment amid harsh combat environments. This resulted in 
slight delays when compared to other off-the-shelf items. As a result, 
the SNAP VSAT systems purchased under the contract resulting from this 
request arrived in theater 14 months after the request was initiated. 

Source: GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 18: Improving Battlefield Communications Through Adaptive 
Satellite Technology (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Depiction of Distributed Tactical 
Communications System being used in the field] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 11/08/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 474 days. 

Urgent need: Over-the-horizon, on-the-move, beyond-line-of-sight 
communications: 
Warfighters in Afghanistan identified the need for improved 
communications because the current communication handset devices did 
not operate adequately in the mountainous terrain. 

Solution: Distributed Tactical Communication System (DCTS): 
To develop tactical commercial satellite communications for 
warfighters in any terrain and in any location on earth, in a cost-
effective manner, providing push-to-talk, one-to-many communications 
to facilitate tactical actions and command-and-control, the Navy 
planned to leverage commercial off-the-shelf technology. A 
collaborative agreement allowed DOD to participate in industry-funded 
development of the DCTS. One general officer referred to the result as 
"the most significant tactical communications improvement developed 
and fielded during the Global War on Terror." 

Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, funding: 
The solution to this urgent needs required developing a technology 
that was previously unavailable. The program manager told us that work 
would have taken longer without the urgent needs process. Limited 
testing of handsets in and out of the continental United States began 
in November 2008. 

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab began developing this capability in 
2001, but acquiring funding within DOD has been a challenge. JRAC 
delayed assigning a sponsor for a joint urgent need for communication 
equipment for 131 days because it was unable to resolve which service 
would fund the solution. After assigning a sponsor, JRAC administered 
the transfer of approximately $14.5 million from the Iraq Freedom Fund 
to rapidly acquire 20 prototype handsets and to expedite low-rate 
production. As the usefulness of the solution was recognized, the 
initial request for 20 handsets was increased to 500. The Army has 
since provided additional funds of about $15 million. Total funding to 
date has been about $30 million, but officials state additional 
funding will be needed beyond 2010. 

Source: U.S. Navy (photo). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 19: Ability to Provide Improved Force Protection from 
Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case study): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Parked "Razorback' Boom Mower 
with mower head stowed] 

Case study A; 
Process used: Joint; 
Date of theater endorsement: 11/26/2007; 
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 253 days. 

Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive 
devices: 
U.S. forces in Iraq identified dense vegetation along roadways as 
potentially concealing IEDs and insurgents. DOD officials stated other 
methods to address this threat, such as chemical defoliation, are no 
longer viable due to policies prohibiting the use of chemicals. 

Solution: "Razorback" Boom Mowers: 
The Razorback is a commercially available mower assembly that can be 
mounted to forklifts or front-end loaders. The configuration chosen by 
the military involves mounting the mower on a boom fitted to a 5-ton 
capacity cargo truck modified with an armor protection kit, suitable 
tires, anti-lock brakes, air conditioning, and chemical-resistant 
paint. The Razorback can cut vegetation alongside roads and on steep 
side slopes near canals. 

Challenge(s), if any: Solution did not fully meet the need: 
Multiple contract modifications were executed for the development, 
integration, and sustainment of Razorback systems, and testing 
revealed many safety concerns. However, the Army awarded the principal 
contract for 29 Razorback systems, for $2.35 million, in June 2008. 
The first Razorbacks were shipped to theater in August 2008. 

However, soldiers who operated the truck told us that they had 
performed two missions with the Razorback in the 2 months since 
delivery and completion of training. On one mission, the boom was not 
long enough to reach the area needing to be mowed without risking 
getting the heavy truck stuck in the soft ground. On the other 
mission, standing water prevented mowing because the truck could not 
be used in standing water. The soldiers were also uncomfortable with 
the slow speed—only 2 miles per hour—at which the Razorback must move 
while operating. Soldiers told us that they could easily and 
effectively perform their route clearance missions without the 
Razorback mower. 

Source: GAO (photo). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 	
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000 

April 6, 2010: 

Mr. William Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report 10-460, "Warfighter Support: Improvements to DoD's Urgent Needs 
Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts To Meet 
Critical Warfighter Needs," dated March 5, 2010 (GAO Code 351236). 
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department has initiated multiple actions to address the 
recommendations of the GAO. During the extended review by the GAO the 
Department completed other studies that, along with the dialogue with 
the GAO, directly contributed to actions to improve the Department's 
ability to respond to the Warfighter's Urgent Needs. Updated policy is 
expected to be issued that will address many of the specific 
recommendations of the GAO. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments were provided separately for your 
consideration. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. 
William Beasley, William.Beasley@osd.mil, 703-692-5722. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Thomas P. Dec: 
Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 5, 2010: 
GAO-10-460 (GAO Code 351236): 

"Warfighter Support: Improvements To DOD's Urgent Needs Processes 
Would Enhance Oversight And Expedite Efforts To Meet Critical 
Warfighter Needs" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in 
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, Military Services, and other DoD components, as necessary, 
clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense(OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services and 
other DoD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or 
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is 
accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all 
phases of the process — including applying the technological maturity 
criteria. (See page 45/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of 
Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of 
Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to 
clearly define roles and responsibilities of all DoD Components. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in 
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary, 
include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to officials 
responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests. (See page 45/GAO 
Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing additional DoD 
policy to facilitate the use of Rapid Acquisition Authority and has 
issued guidance to Service Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of 
Rapid Acquisition Authority is considered when necessary to address 
urgent needs. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in 
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary, 
develop and implement standards for accurately tracing and documenting 
key process milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and 
assessment, and for updating data management systems to create 
activity reports to facilitate management review and external 
oversight of the process. (See page 45/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman's Instruction to 
establish requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment 
of urgent needs from initiation through fielding and ultimate 
disposition. Visibility of actions of the DoD Components to fulfill 
urgent needs is expected to be incorporated into new DoD policy. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in 
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary, 
develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel, for the 
Military Services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met 
urgent needs. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
Of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing 
of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to 
establish requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment 
of urgent needs from initiation, operational assessment, fielding, and 
ultimate disposition. Visibility of actions of the DoD Components to 
fulfill urgent needs, is expected to be incorporated into new DoD 
policy. This is expected to improve the ability for OSD to provide 
oversight of the fulfillment of urgent needs and satisfaction of the 
urgent Warfighter's requirements. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
amend DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that 
officials responsible for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may 
need to consider using joint urgent processes, including rapid 
acquisition authority. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing new DoD 
policy to establish responsibilities for oversight and management of 
the fulfillment of urgent needs and the utilization of Rapid 
Acquisition Authority. This policy development is expected to result 
in a DoD Directive that will be separate from the DoD Directive 5000.1 
and DoD Instruction 5000.02. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to amend the urgent needs process 
guidance in Army Regulation 71-9 to include distinct performance 
standards that distinguish how different types of urgent needs, such 
as non-performance standard mission equipment shortages and new 
capabilities, should be processed, and to develop and implement 
standard operating procedures for headquarters officials to use when 
processing urgent needs requests. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department of the Army recently 
(December 2009) updated Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities 
Determination. This update partially addresses the GAO recommendation. 
Upon issuance of additional DoD policy and update to the Chairman's 
Instruction, additional changes to the Army Regulation and other DoD 
Component's polices may be required. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to update training procedures to 
include instruction for unit requirements officers regarding the 
development of joint and Army urgent need statements in order to 
ensure that these personnel are prepared to effectively draft urgent 
requirement documents upon arrival in theater. (See page 46/GAO Draft 
Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The proposed direction by the 
Secretary should be to all military department Secretaries as well as 
the heads of the other DoD Components. The findings of the GAO, based 
upon assessment of the Department of the Army urgent needs processes, 
are applicable across the Department. Training and improved 
instructions for all DoD Component personnel involved in the 
generation of urgent needs requirement and their fulfillment would 
improve the Department's ability to respond to the War-fighter's 
urgent needs. The Department is developing additional DoD policy that 
will direct DoD Components to develop procedures for urgent 
operational needs. Implementation steps of these procedures by DoD 
Components will be monitored by OSD to ensure the procedures, 
including the GAO recommended training, are accomplished. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
amend its implementing policy for the Department's rapid acquisition 
authority to designate an OSD entity, such as the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, with primary 
responsibility for recommending to the Secretary of Defense when to 
implement the Department's statutory rapid acquisition authority — as 
provided in Public Law Number 108-375 — as solutions are validated by 
the Joint Staff. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing 
additional DoD policy to facilitate the use of Rapid Acquisition 
Authority and has issued guidance to Service Acquisition Executives to 
ensure the use of Rapid Acquisition Authority is considered when 
necessary to address urgent needs. The Department is continuing to 
evaluate the need for legislative changes to enhance the Department's 
Rapid Acquisition Authority. We recommend that the GAO change "...as 
solutions are validated by the Joint Staff." to "...as needs are 
validated by the Joint Staff." The Joint Staff does not validate 
solutions. The Joint staff validates needs (the requirement). 

Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
create an executive council to include the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller), the Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition 
Cell, the Comptrollers of each of the Services, and other stakeholders 
as needed, and appoint a chair for the purpose of making timely 
funding decisions as solutions are validated by the Joint Staff. (See 
page 47/GAO Draft Report.) 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing 
additional DoD policy that is expected to clarify processes for 
funding urgent needs. The Department intends to use established senior 
governance councils to achieve the goal of the recommendation rather 
than establish a new council. We recommend that the GAO change "...as 
solutions are validated by the Joint Staff." to "...as needs are 
validated by the Joint Staff" The Joint Staff does not validate 
solutions. The Joint staff validates needs (the requirement). 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

For further information please contact William Solis, (202) 512-8365 
or solisw@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant 
Director), Susan Ditto, Larry Junek, Ron La Due Lake, Lonnie 
McAllister, Jason Pogacnik, Paulina T. Reaves, Matthew Tabbert, and 
John E. Trubey made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806 (2002). 

[2] Until November 2004, JRAC was known as the Joint Rapid Action Cell. 

[3] GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 
Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 29, 2009); and Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's 
Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive 
Devices Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009). 

[4] Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 801 (2008). 

[5] GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and 
Installation of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-160] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 22, 2006); and Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach 
between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and 
Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-274] (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 
2006). 

[6] GAO, Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
Vehicles, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-884R] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008). 

[7] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[8] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training (Feb. 5, 
2009). 

[9] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 17, 2008). 

[10] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 

[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009). 

[12] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-9, 
Warfighting Capabilities Determination (Dec. 28, 2009), in conjunction 
with several Army memoranda, collectively provide the guidance for the 
urgent needs process. 

[13] The most recent guidance for the process can be found in the 
Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps 
Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement 
(Urgent UNS) (Oct. 17, 2008). 

[14] Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806(a) (2002). 

[15] Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 811 (2004). 

[16] The senior official would be authorized to waive any provision of 
law, policy, directive, or regulation addressing (a) the establishment 
of the requirement for the equipment; (b) the research, development, 
test, and evaluation of the equipment; or (c) the solicitation and 
selection of sources, and the award of the contract for the 
procurement of the equipment. 

[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, Rapid 
Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) In 
The Year of Execution (July 15, 2005). 

[18] FAR Subpart 6.3. 

[19] The Iraq Freedom Fund was a Department of Defense account 
providing funds for "additional expenses for ongoing military 
operations in Iraq, and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-
40 (2001)." Pub. L. No. 108-11 (2003). 

[20] JRAC forwards to JIEDDO approved countering improvised explosive 
devices joint urgent needs that fall within JIEDDO's rule set for 
accepting joint urgent needs, as outlined in JIEDDOI 5000.1, Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and 
Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[21] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[22] CJCSI 3470.01 (July 15, 2005). 

[23] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August 
2001). 

[24] In a January 25, 2005, memo, the Secretary of Defense notified 
department components of the existence of rapid acquisition authority. 
The memo explains that requests for use of the authority should be 
submitted to JRAC and directs requestors to follow the process and 
format outlined in the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 2004 
"Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs" memo. Requestors are left to 
infer from such direction that they are to submit requests for the use 
of rapid acquisition authority using the format and following the 
process for requesting that an urgent operational need or an immediate 
warfighter need be validated. 

[25] CJCSI 3470.01 (July 15, 2005). 

[26] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[27] Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806 (2002); Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 
811 (2004). 

[28] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[29] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination 
Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 2008). 

[30] Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition 
System (Nov. 20, 2007). 

[31] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

[32] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Army's Operational Needs Statement 
Process: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Audit Report A- 
2008-0014-ALA (Alexandria, Va.: Nov. 13, 2007). 

[33] The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is required to 
review all urgent needs requests for implications of needed change to 
current or future Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) or 
policy, with a written response to headquarters staff coordinating the 
urgent needs request. The 120-day goal applies to headquarters' and 
TRADOC's review combined, not to providing a definitive response to an 
urgent needs request. 

[34] GAO, Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the 
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 30, 2008). 

[35] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training (Feb. 5, 
2009). 

[36] For purposes of this report, we have used the term "requirements 
officers" to denote officers at the tactical level who, in addition to 
their specialized training, are assigned the responsibility for 
locating equipment and other necessary items, and arranging logistical 
support for their own tactical-level units such as brigades and/or 
battalions. 

[37] For purposes of this report, we have used the term "force 
management officers" to denote officers at the operations level (as 
part of a division, task force, or command staff) assigned 
responsibility for reviewing requests from the tactical level 
(brigades or battalions) for equipment, other necessary items, and/or 
logistical support. Force management officers may also generate 
requests at the operations level and may or may not be officially 
designated as FA-50 Force Management Officers. 

[38] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address 
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors 
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 
2006). 

[39] As will be discussed later in this report, in 7 of these 11 
cases, technical complexity was also a challenge. Technical complexity 
was the major challenge to DOD's ability to field timely solutions in 
7 other cases. For details on all 23 case studies see appendix II. 

[40] Joint IED Defeat Organization Instruction, Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition 
Management Process (JCAAMP), JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Nov. 9, 2007). 

[41] For example, Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 109-289, 120 Stat. 1303 (2006); Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1868 (2009). 

[42] Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 811 (2004). 

[43] The authority may not be used to acquire equipment in an amount 
aggregating more than $100,000,000 in any fiscal year. 

[44] Rapid acquisition authority was twice used for the Sky Warrior 
urgent need request. 

[45] Beginning with the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request in April 
2009, the administration now refers to funds for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as Overseas Contingency Operations funds instead of Global 
War on Terrorism funds. 

[46] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 17, 2008); High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2009); Defense Acquisitions: Charting A Course for Lasting Reform, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009); and Defense Transformation: Sustaining Progress 
Requires Continuity of Leadership and an Integrated Approach, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-462T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2008). 

[47] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 17, 2008); Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help 
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October 
2005). 

[48] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2003). 

[49] Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, DOD 
Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts - 
Husky Mounted Detection System, D-2010-032 (Dec. 31, 2009). 

[50] The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program was 
started by DOD as a way to get new technologies that meet critical 
military needs into the hands of users faster and for less cost. The 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is currently known 
as the "Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration" program. 

[51] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-155T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 8, 2009). MRAP production began in February 2007 with one 
vendor producing 10 vehicles. By March 2008--a little more than a year 
after the contracts were awarded--6,935 vehicles had been produced. 

[52] The instruction states that "they [solutions] should not involve 
the development of a new technology or capability; however the 
acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) or 
minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar 
mission is within the scope of the JUON validation and resourcing 
process." CJCSI 3470.01, Encls. A, para. 3.e. (July 15, 2005). 

[53] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[54] For information on how we selected cases for our study, see 
appendix I. 

[55] In some cases, the same urgent need was submitted through more 
than one of the three urgent needs processes, or the same solution was 
proposed or provided to meet similar urgent needs. For the purposes of 
our analysis, and to eliminate redundancy, we have synthesized related 
case studies, as appropriate, in the figures below. As a result, the 
number of figures is less than 23. 

[End of section] 

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