This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-395 
entitled 'Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central 
American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement 
of Efforts' which was released on April 23, 2010. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2010: 

Combating Gangs: 

Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, 
but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts: 

GAO-10-395: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-395, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as 
MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American 
countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing 
Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC); 
the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State; 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was 
asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This 
report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has 
developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal 
agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat 
these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results. 
GAO examined federal agencies’ antigang plans, resources, and 
measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven 
localities representing varying population sizes and geographic 
regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and 
Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The 
results of these interviews are not generalizable. 

What GAO Found: 

The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a 
strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however, 
the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation 
and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously 
reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be 
addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy; 
describing agencies’ activities, roles, and responsibilities; 
providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing 
performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a 
strategy’s effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of 
these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks 
associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the 
strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies 
as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other 
characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and 
goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although 
agencies coordinate the strategy’s implementation through an 
interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force 
does not oversee the strategy’s implementation and that no entity 
exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy’s implementation. 
Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the 
outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass 
all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a 
whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the 
accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a 
means for assessing progress. 

To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal 
agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their 
actions and develop performance measures to assess results of 
individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an 
antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit 
currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups 
to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ’s Anti-gang Coordination 
Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated 
antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While 
the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE 
requests go to its country attaché, then to FBI agents at the unit who 
pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the 
unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate 
information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources. 
Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be 
improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing 
the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on 
ICE’s role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen 
coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established 
measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just 
starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the NSC revise the antigang strategy to include an 
approach for oversight and performance measures and that DOJ and DHS 
reach agreement on the composition of an antigang unit in El Salvador. 
The NSC did not comment. DOJ and DHS agreed with our recommendation to 
them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-395] or key 
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
8777 or larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency 
Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive 
Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts: 

U.S. Federal Agencies Have Implemented Programs to Combat 
Transnational Gangs, but Could Take Additional Action to Enhance 
Coordination Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Leadership Structure and Key Transnational Criminal 
Activities of MS-13 and 18th Street: 

Appendix II: Characteristics of Other Transnational Gangs: 

Appendix III: Federal Agencies' Programs to Address Transnational 
Gangs with Connections to Central America: 

Appendix IV: Federal Agencies' Entities and Mechanisms for 
Coordinating Transnational Antigang Efforts: 

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the United States Agency for 
International Development: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Categories Related to the Strategy to Combat the Threat of 
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico and Corresponding 
Implementing Agencies: 

Table 2: Examples of Measures USAID Tracks for Its Efforts to Combat 
Transnational Gangs from Central America: 

Table 3: Performance Measures and Reported Results for the FBI's 
Efforts to Combat Transnational Gangs: 

Table 4: Examples of Federal Efforts or Projects Implemented to Combat 
Central American Transnational Gangs, by Agency and Country Where 
Implemented: 

Table 5: Headquarters-Level Entities Focused on Coordination of 
Antigang Efforts: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Federal Departments and Agencies with Key Roles in Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

Figure 2: Youth Participating in Activities at USAID-sponsored Youth 
Centers in El Salvador: 

Figure 3: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009): 

Abbreviations: 

ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives: 

BOP: Federal Bureau of Prisons: 

CARSI: Central American Regional Security Initiative: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

EOUSA: Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

GangTECC: National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination 
Center: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization: 

IOCPCC: International Organized Crime Policy Coordinating Committee: 

MS-13: Mara Salvatrucha: 

NDIC: National Drug Intelligence Center: 

NGIC: National Gang Intelligence Center: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

OMG: outlaw motorcycle gang: 

SOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command: 

State: Department of State: 

the Strategy: Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from 
Central America and Mexico: 

TAG: Transnational Anti-Gang unit: 

Treasury: Department of the Treasury: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USAO: U.S. Attorneys' Offices: 

USMS: U.S. Marshals Service: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 23, 2010: 

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
United States Senate: 

According to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment by the National 
Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) and National Drug Intelligence Center 
(NDIC), as of September 2008, there were approximately 1 million gang 
members in the United States--a 25 percent increase over 2005 
membership levels.[Footnote 1] The assessment found that street gangs 
that operate throughout most of the United States are a significant 
threat that has become magnified as national-and regional-level street 
gangs migrate from urban areas to suburban and rural communities. 
According to the assessment, gang members engage in a host of criminal 
activities such as homicide, extortion, drug distribution, and other 
crimes. Gangs such as the Latin Kings, the Jamaican Posse, Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13), and 18th Street, as well as outlaw motorcycle 
gangs like the Hells Angels, have been identified by federal law 
enforcement officials as transnational gangs--gangs whose members are 
present in and criminally active in more than one country. Of these, 
gangs with ties to Central America such as MS-13 and 18th Street have 
been specifically identified as posing serious threats to the public 
safety of communities in the United States and in Central American 
countries due to their extremely violent nature, the breadth of their 
criminal activities, and their rapid expansion.[Footnote 2] Our report 
focuses primarily on U.S. federal agencies' efforts to combat these 
gangs with ties to Central America. 

A wide variety of federal departments and agencies have 
responsibilities for addressing the issue of gangs with ties to 
Central America, including the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland 
Security (DHS), State (State), and Defense (DOD), and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). Under the auspices of the 
National Security Council's (NSC) International Organized Crime Policy 
Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC),[Footnote 3] these departments and 
agencies have collaboratively developed an interagency strategy to 
combat the threat of criminal gangs with connections to Central 
America and Mexico. In addition, these departments and agencies work 
together and with Central American countries and nongovernmental 
organizations to, among other things, exchange information for use in 
investigating gang crime, remove gang members who are illegally 
residing in the United States, and support programs to help prevent 
young people from becoming gang members or to intervene to provide at-
risk youth with alternatives to being part of a gang. In July 2009 we 
reported on federal efforts to combat gang crime within the United 
States and coordination mechanisms among federal, state, and local 
agencies for domestic-based antigang efforts.[Footnote 4] We discuss 
the status of our July 2009 recommendations relevant to transnational 
gangs later in this report. 

You asked us to examine the extent to which U.S. federal agencies have 
taken steps to address the problem of transnational gangs. This report 
focuses on U.S. federal agencies' efforts to combat Central American 
gangs, addressing the following questions: (1) To what extent has the 
U.S. federal government developed a strategy to combat transnational 
gangs with connections to Central America? and (2) How have U.S. 
federal agencies implemented this strategy and related programs to 
combat transnational gangs with connections to Central America, and to 
what extent have federal agencies coordinated these programs and 
assessed their results? In addition, we provide information on the 
leadership structure and transnational criminal activities of MS-13 
and 18th Street (see appendix I) and other U.S. gangs that federal law 
enforcement agencies have identified as having transnational 
connections (see appendix II). We also provide additional details on 
federal programs for combating transnational gangs (see appendix III) 
and federal antigang coordinating mechanisms and entities (see 
appendix IV). 

To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed 
a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central 
America, we examined the interagency strategy developed by various 
federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC, called 
the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central 
America and Mexico (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the 
strategy to select criteria in our prior work on desirable 
characteristics of an effective national strategy, including (1) clear 
purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, 
and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; and (4) delineation of roles and 
responsibilities.[Footnote 5] We also examined the roles and 
activities of the various federal departments and agencies under the 
Strategy, including DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, the Department of the 
Treasury (Treasury), and USAID, and their component agencies, such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within DOJ and U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, that are 
responsible for carrying out efforts under the Strategy. In regard to 
the NSC, we discussed its role in developing and implementing the 
Strategy with a mix of the departments and agencies that participated 
in the NSC's IOCPCC such as State, DOJ, and USAID. 

To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to 
carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated 
these programs and assessed their results, we examined a mix of DOJ's, 
DHS's, State's, USAID's, and their component agencies' plans, 
performance data, reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006 
through 2009. We compared federal agencies' efforts to coordinate and 
share information on their transnational antigang programs to select 
criteria on effective interagency collaboration and results-oriented 
government.[Footnote 6] In addition, we reviewed federal agencies' 
budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2010; appropriations 
acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID and supplemental appropriations 
acts for those fiscal years; and expenditure plans for U.S. provision 
of antigang assistance to countries in Central America. To assess the 
reliability of statistical information, such as data on performance 
and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with agency 
officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of 
data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. To obtain information on federal efforts to 
combat the gangs as well as the extent to which agencies have 
coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we interviewed a mix of 
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in seven locations 
in the United States as well as a mix of officials from U.S. federal, 
foreign, and three nongovernmental agencies in El Salvador and 
Guatemala. The locations we selected were based on a mix of criteria 
that included locations (1) along the U.S. borders; (2) where U.S. 
federal agencies have implemented antigang programs; and (3) where 
federal law enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving 
gangs with connections to Central America. For our site visits to 
foreign locations, we consulted with officials of federal agencies to 
identify in which foreign locations their agencies had efforts 
underway. Of the countries in the region, agency officials suggested 
we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more antigang initiatives 
were underway and further along compared to efforts in other 
countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more 
information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on 
the gang problem. To obtain information on the process of how ICE 
handles and removes gang members who are in the United States 
illegally, we visited ICE's South Texas Detention Facility in 
Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE's Office of 
Detention and Removal Operations. We also observed activities related 
to gang prevention efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala, such as those 
at the youth centers, and interviewed participants, local government 
officials involved in the efforts, and members of the community about 
their views of the programs and the programs' effect. The information 
we obtained from interviewing officials in the U.S. and Central 
American locations cannot be generalized across all locations in the 
United States or Central America. However, because we selected these 
locations based on a variety of factors, they provided us with an 
overview of the agencies' antigang programs, examples of coordination 
and measurements to assess results, and any challenges with 
implementation of the programs. Additional details on our scope and 
methodology, including the locations we visited, are in appendix V. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Overview of Gangs with Connections to Central America: 

Both the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs were formed in Los Angeles, 
California. MS-13 was founded by Salvadoran immigrants, many of whom 
came to the United States to escape the civil war in their native 
country in the 1980s. The 18th Street gang was founded primarily by 
Mexican immigrants in the 1960s, though it currently accepts members 
from other backgrounds. MS-13's early membership is reported to have 
included former guerrillas and Salvadoran government soldiers whose 
combat experience during the Salvadoran civil war contributed to the 
growth of the gang's notoriety as one of the more violent Los Angeles 
street gangs. The end of the Central American civil wars and changes 
in U.S. immigration laws helped to facilitate the removal of tens of 
thousands of Central Americans illegally in the United States to their 
native countries in the 1990s, including MS-13 and 18th Street gang 
members who subsequently spread their gang culture and operations to 
those countries.[Footnote 7] MS-13 and 18th Street gang members 
removed from the United States to Central American countries 
established gangs in those countries. 

Within the United States, NGIC has reported that MS-13 has between 
8,000 and 10,000 members nationally. The FBI has reported that MS-13 
operates in at least 42 states and the District of Columbia. 
Traditionally, in the United States, MS-13 has consisted of loosely 
affiliated groups; however, law enforcement officials have reported 
the coordination of criminal activity among MS-13 gang members 
operating in the Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan areas. In the 2009 National Gang Threat 
Assessment, the NGIC and NDIC indicated that MS-13 members have been 
involved in a wide range of crimes within U.S. communities, including 
homicide, drive-by shootings, assault, robbery, weapons trafficking, 
the transportation and distribution of drugs, identity theft, and 
prostitution operations. The 18th Street gang is active in 28 states 
and has a membership estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000. According 
to the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, in California, for 
example, about 80 percent of 18th Street gang members are illegal 
aliens from Mexico and Central America. In the United States, 18th 
Street gang members have been involved in homicide, assault, robbery, 
street-level drug distribution, auto theft, and identification fraud. 

Although estimates vary, in the Central American countries of El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, USAID has estimated that 
there are approximately 63,000 gang members,[Footnote 8] while the 
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has estimated total gang membership 
in Central America to be approximately 70,000.[Footnote 9] According 
to USAID, the majority of these members belong to MS-13 and 18th 
Street. Within Central American countries, these gangs engage in a 
range of criminal and violent acts, including homicide, kidnapping, 
drug smuggling, and extortion, among other crimes. 

Overview of Federal Agencies' Missions and Roles in Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national 
security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security 
advisors and cabinet officials. The council also serves as the 
President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among 
various government agencies. As such, under its IOCPCC, the NSC 
coordinated with other federal departments and agencies to develop a 
strategy to combat the threat of criminal gangs from Central America. 

Various other federal departments and agencies play key roles in U.S. 
federal government efforts to address transnational gangs. As shown in 
figure 1, these departments include DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD. 

Figure 1: Federal Departments and Agencies with Key Roles in Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Department of Justice (DOJ): 
* Criminal Division: 
- Gang Unit; 
- International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program; 
- Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 
Training; 
* Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); 
* Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); 
* Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
* U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol; 
* Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); 
* U.S. Attorneys. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 
* U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); 
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

State Department: 
* Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; 
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE) 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection(CBP)
Department of Homeland Security(DHS) 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): 
* Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean; 
* Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. 

Department of Defense (DOD): 
* U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

DOJ Component Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

Within DOJ, seven components have key roles in law enforcement efforts 
to combat transnational gangs--the Criminal Division; the 93 U.S. 
Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that operate with 
administrative and operational support from the Executive Office for 
U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA); and four law enforcement agencies--the FBI; 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA); and U.S. National Central Bureau of 
Interpol.[Footnote 10] The Criminal Division, along with the U.S. 
Attorneys, is charged with enforcing most federal criminal laws and 
can prosecute a wide range of criminal matters, including those 
involving transnational gangs and gang members.[Footnote 11] The 
Criminal Division's International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program[Footnote 12] and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance and Training[Footnote 13] have been involved 
in providing antigang training for law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors from Central America. Also part of the Criminal Division 
is the Gang Unit, a specialized group of prosecutors charged with 
developing and implementing strategies to address gangs. In addition 
to prosecuting gang cases, the Gang Unit prosecutors assist U.S. 
Attorneys on legal issues and multidistrict cases, as well as work 
with domestic and foreign law enforcement to coordinate enforcement 
strategies. The 93 U.S. Attorneys prosecute the majority of criminal 
cases as well as civil litigation handled by DOJ. EOUSA provides 
general executive assistance and guidance to U.S. Attorneys' Offices 
(USAO) and has a national gang coordinator who acts as a liaison 
between the USAOs and other DOJ components involved in gang 
prosecution efforts.[Footnote 14] The FBI's transnational gang efforts 
target violent crime and criminal enterprises associated with 
transnational gangs. ATF's primary involvement with MS-13 and 18th 
Street is related to gang members' illegal possession of, or 
trafficking in, firearms. DEA targets gangs in connection with 
specific drug sources or large-scale suppliers who distribute illicit 
drugs to the gangs. The U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol is 
the point of contact for all International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL) matters in the United States, including secure 
communications with police authorities in INTERPOL member countries. 
[Footnote 15] As such, among other things, the National Central Bureau 
receives and sends out notices to INTERPOL bureaus in other countries 
concerning information or the location of gang members or suspects 
involved in gang activities. 

DHS Component Agencies' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

Within DHS, ICE's Office of Investigations has a National Gang Unit 
that manages and coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and 
proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who 
are involved in crimes with a nexus to the border, or are foreign-born 
and are in the United States illegally may be subject to ICE's dual 
criminal and administrative authorities that are used to disrupt and 
dismantle transnational gang activities with criminal prosecutions and 
removal from the United States. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), the DHS component that protects U.S. borders against 
terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling, among other 
threats, has a role in identifying gang members at the borders. Upon 
the arrest of a suspected gang member, CBP will contact ICE and 
determine if enforcement action is to be taken by CBP or ICE based 
upon whether the apprehension took place between the ports of entry or 
at a port of entry. CBP has developed an Anti-Gang Initiative to 
improve the agency's awareness of gangs through increased partnerships 
with other federal agencies and to provide gang awareness training for 
its personnel. 

State and USAID Bureaus' Roles and Responsibilities for Combating 
Transnational Gangs: 

Two State bureaus, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, are 
involved in efforts to address gang violence in Central America. The 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is responsible for managing and 
promoting U.S. interests in the region and fostering cooperation on 
issues such as drug trafficking and crime. The Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the U.S. government on 
the development of policies and programs to combat narcotics and 
crime, and works with host nations to strengthen their capabilities so 
that they can bolster their own effectiveness in fighting drug 
trafficking and crime including transnational gangs. 

USAID provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to 
other countries and, with respect to transnational gangs, is the 
primary agency responsible for managing gang intervention and 
prevention efforts in Central America.[Footnote 16] These efforts are 
carried out principally through the agency's Bureau for Latin America 
and the Caribbean and missions in Central America, with technical 
assistance and support from the Democracy and Governance Office of the 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The agency 
works with foreign governments and local communities in Central 
America to support and implement a broad range of programs focused on, 
among other things, creating employment opportunities and alternatives 
to participating in gangs. 

DOD Roles and Responsibilities for Combating Transnational Gangs: 

DOD, and specifically SOUTHCOM, has tracked the growth of the gangs in 
the Central American countries that are within its area of 
responsibility. Although SOUTHCOM does not have any specific programs 
in place in Central America to combat transnational gangs, it monitors 
information on gangs that either pose a threat to the sovereignty of 
governments in the region or are involved in drug trafficking. 

The Mérida Initiative: 

U.S.-sponsored antigang programs in Central America are being funded 
in part by the Mérida Initiative. This initiative was announced by the 
Bush Administration in October 2007 as a multinational effort to 
confront criminal organizations whose actions affect Mexico, Central 
America, and the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, and spill over into the United States.[Footnote 17] Through 
this initiative, the U.S. federal government is providing equipment, 
training, and other assistance to help these countries address drug 
and arms trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, and other crime issues such 
as gangs and organized crime.[Footnote 18] For Central America, 
funding under the Mérida Initiative is administered by State and has 
been allocated to various areas and efforts, including to combat 
transnational gangs, improve Central American countries' judicial 
systems, enhance airport and border security in the region, refurbish 
patrol boats used by Central American countries for intercepting drug 
traffickers in coastal waters, and a broad range of crime prevention 
programs, including programs directed at youth at-risk. In fiscal year 
2008, the Supplemental Appropriations Act appropriated $60 million for 
the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative.[Footnote 19] In 
fiscal year 2009, the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act appropriated 
$105 million for Mérida Initiative activities in Central America. 
[Footnote 20] Up to $83 million was appropriated for Mérida Initiative 
activities in Central America for fiscal year 2010 by the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2010.[Footnote 21] We recently completed work 
looking at the status of funds for the initiative and have work 
ongoing examining U.S. counternarcotics and anticrime assistance 
provided to Mexico under the initiative.[Footnote 22] We plan to issue 
a report on this work later this year. 

As of February 2010, federal agencies were developing a strategy for a 
regional security initiative in Central America, called the Central 
American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This new initiative is 
in accordance with direction in the conference report accompanying the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, which removed the Central 
American portion from the Mérida Initiative and placed funding for 
Central American programs into the new CARSI.[Footnote 23] Under this 
new initiative, Central American programs initially funded by the 
Mérida Initiative, including antigang programs under the Strategy, 
would be subsumed into CARSI. According to officials from State and 
USAID, the CARSI strategy is still under development and officials did 
not have an estimate as to when it would be completed. 

In addition to funding provided under the Mérida Initiative, federal 
agencies have used funding from their operating accounts to implement 
antigang programs in Central America and the United States. For 
example, in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 the FBI funded $200,000 and 
$965,000 from its operating account for establishment of the 
Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in El Salvador and the operations 
of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, an FBI task force that 
coordinates FBI-led investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, 
respectively. Further, ICE uses funding to conduct transnational gang 
investigations in the United States and abroad. According to ICE 
officials, $20.4 million that Congress directed to be used for ICE's 
antigang activities in fiscal year 2008 funded 119 positions to expand 
ICE's efforts to combat transnational street gangs.[Footnote 24] 
Additionally, USAID officials reported starting their gang prevention 
programs before Mérida Initiative funding became available and have 
used non-initiative resources to promote antigang and rule-of-law 
programs in Central America. 

The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency 
Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive 
Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts: 

Various federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC 
developed an interagency strategy for combating gangs with connections 
to Central America that defines the roles and responsibilities of 
federal agencies in carrying out the strategy, identifies the problems 
and risks associated with the gangs, defines its scope and purpose, 
and identifies specific activities to be taken to achieve results. 
However, it lacks other key characteristics, such as providing an 
approach or framework to include an entity for overseeing 
implementation, and goals and measures for assessing progress and 
performance in implementing the strategy. 

The Antigang Strategy Identifies Roles, Responsibilities, and 
Activities for Federal Agencies in Combating Transnational Gangs: 

To respond to the threats criminal gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street 
pose to the countries in which they operate, U.S. federal agencies 
developed the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from 
Central America and Mexico (the Strategy). Issued in July 2007, 
[Footnote 25] this interagency strategy was developed under the 
auspices of the NSC's IOCPCC, comprised of representatives from 
various federal agencies, including State, DOJ, DHS, USAID, and DOD. 
[Footnote 26] The Strategy is designed to combat the threat posed by 
gangs with links to Central America and Mexico by adopting an approach 
that integrates law enforcement with youth crime prevention and 
interventions that provide alternatives to gangs. The Strategy is also 
designed to be regional in scope, with the United States working with 
the other countries affected by the gangs to avoid transferring the 
gang problem to neighboring countries. To implement this approach, the 
Strategy includes five broad categories under which federal agencies 
are to take actions to combat transnational gangs--diplomacy, 
repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention-- 
and identifies the activities for agencies to implement under each of 
these categories. As shown in table 1, for each category, the Strategy 
identifies agencies that are to implement the individual activities 
and a lead agency to coordinate these activities. Specifically, the 
Strategy identifies State as the lead agency for the diplomacy 
category and, along with USAID, the lead agency for the capacity 
enhancement category; DHS as the lead agency for the repatriation 
category and, along with DOJ, the lead agency for the law enforcement 
category; and USAID as the lead agency for the prevention category. 

Table 1: Categories Related to the Strategy to Combat the Threat of 
Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico and Corresponding 
Implementing Agencies: 

Strategy category and description: Diplomacy: Carry out diplomatic 
efforts with affected countries to establish a coordinated and 
comprehensive approach to the gang problem; 
Lead agency for the category: State; 
Example of activities identified under each category: Work with 
multilateral organizations, including the Central American Integration 
System and the Organization of American States, to coordinate and 
support a regional strategy; 
Agency responsible for the activity: State and USAID. 

Example of activities identified under each category: Pursue a policy 
of engagement with target countries, working with them to identify the 
best initiatives to pursue at any given time; 
Agency responsible for the activity: State and USAID. 

Strategy category and description: Repatriation: Expedite the 
repatriation (removal) process of gang members and provide receiving 
countries with criminal history information of the gang members; 
Lead agency for the category: DHS; 
Example of activities identified under each category: Expand the 
Electronic Travel Document[A] system to countries in the region as 
conditions permit; 
Agency responsible for the activity: DHS. 

Example of activities identified under each category: Provide 
receiving countries with related information that could help 
facilitate the reintegration of individuals removed from the United 
States; 
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS. 

Strategy category and description: Law enforcement: Identify and 
exploit the gangs' vulnerabilities in order to disrupt their criminal 
activities and dismantle their criminal infrastructure; 
Lead agency for the category: DOJ and DHS; 
Example of activities identified under each category: Develop 
effective channels for sharing intelligence and operational 
enforcement information pertinent to antigang activities; 
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS. 

Example of activities identified under each category: Deter and deny, 
through bilateral and multilateral law enforcement activities, the 
ability of criminal gangs to engage in transnational criminal 
activities or recruit new members; 
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ and DHS. 

Strategy category and description: Capacity enhancement: Strengthen 
the capacity of criminal justice systems in Central America and Mexico 
to identify, prosecute, and incarcerate gang leaders and operatives, 
as well as seize and have them forfeit their assets; 
Lead agency for the category: State and USAID; 
Example of activities identified under each category: Provide training 
and technical assistance to selected elements within the justice 
system in each country and support the development of regular channels 
of communication and cooperation among them; 
Agency responsible for the activity: DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID. 

Example of activities identified under each category: Support 
community efforts to combat gang crime and violence in the region, 
including collaboration between law enforcement entities and 
communities; 
Agency responsible for the activity: State, USAID, and DOJ. 

Strategy category and description: Prevention: Strengthen the capacity 
of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and communities to 
reduce gang activity by discouraging youth from joining gangs and 
providing rehabilitation and integration options for youth who leave 
gangs; 
Lead agency for the category: USAID; 
Example of activities identified under each category: Support efforts 
to provide rehabilitation and reintegration programs and services to 
individuals removed from the United States to prevent them from 
joining a criminal gang or continuing involvement with criminal gangs 
upon return; 
Agency responsible for the activity: USAID, State, DOJ, and DHS. 

Example of activities identified under each category: Assist community-
based organizations and local authorities to provide youth with 
productive alternatives to criminal gang activity or encourage them to 
leave gangs (e.g., job placement, vocational skills 
training/alternative education, drug rehabilitation); 
Agency responsible for the activity: USAID and DOJ. 

Source: Department of State. 

Notes: Data are from the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal 
Gangs from Central America and Mexico. 

[A] Under the Electronic Travel Document system, ICE electronically 
sends travel document applications to the consular officials of these 
countries who can then electronically sign and certify the documents 
stating that the countries will receive the illegal aliens to be 
removed. These documents are also available to ICE electronically. 
This program eliminates the need for consular officials to visit in 
person the individual awaiting removal from the United States before 
issuing documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes for 
ICE to receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately 
remove illegal aliens. The system has been implemented in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras. 

[End of table] 

As part of our prior work on desirable characteristics of effective 
national strategies, we have reported that such strategies are the 
foundation for defining what agencies seek to accomplish.[Footnote 27] 
As such, we found that having characteristics like a description of 
agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities as part of a 
strategy helps to enhance the strategy's effectiveness. Strategies 
that include characteristics such as these provide policymakers and 
implementing agencies with a planning tool that can better help ensure 
accountability and more effective results.[Footnote 28] 

In addition to defining activities, roles, and responsibilities of 
participating agencies, the Strategy also defines its scope and 
purpose and identifies the problems, risks, and threats associated 
with transnational gangs. In our prior work, we found that desirable 
characteristics of effective national strategies also include a 
discussion of purpose, scope, problems, risks, and threats. For 
example, in defining its purpose and scope, the Strategy notes that 
effectively addressing the problem of these transnational gangs 
requires close coordination and information sharing among the affected 
countries in Central America and Mexico and a comprehensive approach 
that includes law enforcement, prevention, intervention, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration for gang members, which the five 
categories of the Strategy are intended to address. In regards to 
identifying the problem, the Strategy states that gangs such as MS-13 
and 18th Street threaten U.S. regional interests in fostering stable 
democracies and the U.S. domestic interest in protecting U.S. citizens 
from gang violence and crime. These characteristics help indicate why 
the Strategy was developed and identify the specific national issues 
and threats toward which the Strategy is directed. 

The Strategy's Lack of an Oversight Framework Hinders Efforts to 
Enhance Accountability: 

Even as the Strategy contains several characteristics of effective 
national strategies, it lacks other characteristics, such as providing 
an approach for overseeing implementation of programs and efforts 
across its different categories. Our prior work on effective national 
strategies found that they include an approach or framework for 
overseeing their implementation or describe the organizations that 
will provide oversight, which enhances the accountability of agencies 
and stakeholders to implement programs as planned.[Footnote 29] This 
is especially important for the U.S. antigang strategy given that (1) 
there are eight federal departments or agencies involved in 
implementing the Strategy; (2) these agencies have wide-ranging 
missions and programs--from USAID's mission to implement gang 
prevention and youth intervention programs to ICE's mission to remove 
foreign-born gang members from the United States; and (3) the Strategy 
specifies 35 different activities under the five categories that 
federal agencies are to implement. 

With regard to oversight, the Strategy itself does not identify an 
approach or framework for providing oversight across agencies' 
implementation of the Strategy's categories and activities and, 
according to DOJ, State, and USAID officials, one does not exist. 
Although the Strategy designates lead departments or agencies for each 
category, such as State leading the Diplomacy category and USAID 
leading the Prevention category, the Strategy does not designate an 
approach to provide oversight of the overall implementation of the 
Strategy across the Strategy's various categories. Further, while 
members of an interagency antigang task force have discussed agencies' 
efforts to implement the Strategy, this task force is not intended to 
provide this oversight. According to DOJ, State, and USAID officials, 
under the auspices of the NSC, the International Anti-Gang Task Force, 
which is chaired by DOJ's Criminal Division and includes 
representatives from DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID, has responsibility 
for sharing information on the implementation of the Strategy. 
However, this task force is not intended to, nor does it, provide 
oversight for holding agencies accountable for implementation of their 
activities under the Strategy. Additionally, State's regional gang 
advisor stated that no single department or entity has been identified 
as having oversight responsibility for the Strategy's implementation. 
DOJ officials did not know why an oversight mechanism was not included 
in the Strategy, noting that, as a result, there is no enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that agencies are implementing their respective 
parts of the Strategy. USAID officials told us that after the Strategy 
was developed, the individual within the NSC who had been responsible 
for coordinating development of the Strategy stated that the council's 
IOCPCC was to oversee the implementation of the Strategy; however this 
did not occur in part because the individual left the council. 
Additionally, although federal agencies are developing a strategy for 
the newly formed CARSI, participating agencies have not yet determined 
the oversight framework, if any, that is to be used for this broader 
initiative or whether the existing antigang Strategy will be 
incorporated into CARSI. Thus, it is too early to tell whether CARSI 
will provide an oversight approach for federal agencies' antigang 
programs. Regardless of whether the antigang Strategy is incorporated 
into the new CARSI, or whether the NSC or some other agency or entity 
is responsible for oversight, establishing an approach or framework 
for oversight across the Strategy's categories could help enhance the 
accountability of agencies to implement activities as laid out in the 
Strategy and provide visibility over the extent to which agencies' 
individual efforts are achieving their intended results under the 
Strategy. 

The Strategy's Lack of Performance Goals and Measures Hinders Efforts 
to Assess Progress: 

Our prior work found that effective national strategies set clear 
goals and related performance measures for assessing progress made in 
achieving intended results. The Strategy, however, does not identify 
the goals that are to be achieved through its implementation and the 
associated measures to track the progress made in achieving those 
goals, which could be established and monitored through an oversight 
approach or framework. We have reported that performance measurement 
is important because decision makers can use performance information 
to identify problems or weaknesses in programs, identify factors 
causing problems, and modify processes to address the 
problems.[Footnote 30] USAID officials told us that after the Strategy 
was initially developed, the NSC intended to establish performance 
measures for implementation of the Strategy, but this did not occur in 
part because the individual within the NSC who had been responsible 
for coordinating development of the Strategy left the council. 
Although the Strategy itself lacks goals and measures to gauge results 
and assess progress across the Strategy's categories and activities, 
State and USAID, for their parts of the Strategy, have begun to 
develop mechanisms to assess the results of their efforts being 
implemented under the Mérida Initiative, including the initiative's 
antigang programs. For example, for its part, State has drafted four 
gang-specific performance measures within the broader set of measures 
it is developing for the Mérida Initiative: (1) number of arrests of 
suspected gang members completed by police units trained/equipped 
through Mérida Initiative funding in countergang strategies, (2) 
number of arrests and prosecutions of gang leaders in the region, (3) 
number of gang-related crime occurrences and homicides in the region, 
and (4) number of instances where gang-related information is passed 
from the TAG to U.S. law enforcement for review/action. State 
officials noted that the department is working with its embassies to 
determine if Central American countries will be capable of providing 
the department with the requisite data needed to determine results and 
outcomes for these measures, as these countries control much of the 
data, often in disparate data sets and across various ministries. As 
of November 2009, State officials also reported that they were in the 
process of reviewing bids from contractors to develop performance 
measures for the department's Mérida Initiative programs, including 
its antigang programs, and to work directly with the host nations to 
obtain the necessary data to determine the results and outcomes of the 
efforts based on these measures.[Footnote 31] 

In addition to the measures State is developing to evaluate the 
results of Mérida Initiative-funded programs in Central America, USAID 
has developed a Mérida Initiative Central America Results Framework 
that includes an effect evaluation to be conducted by Vanderbilt 
University through a contractual arrangement with USAID. The agency 
intends for this evaluation to assess the long-term effect and measure 
the results of its programs in Central American communities that are 
the focus of USAID crime prevention efforts under the Mérida 
Initiative, including those related to gangs. The evaluation consists 
of five elements: (1) community surveys, (2) reviews of demographic 
data in the communities, (3) focus groups, (4) interviews with 
stakeholders such as community leaders, and (5) community observations 
such as physical infrastructure. Vanderbilt University officials are 
to conduct the evaluations every 18 months in communities where USAID-
sponsored crime prevention activities have been implemented and 
communities where no activities have been implemented, with these 
latter communities serving as control groups in order to establish a 
baseline. Specifically with respect to the surveys, USAID plans to use 
the results to gauge the effect of its crime prevention programs 
through community and citizen perceptions on safety and security. To 
minimize any duplication and take advantage of survey efforts already 
underway, USAID officials stated that they plan to incorporate the 
survey questions on community and citizen perceptions on safety and 
security as part of a broader survey Vanderbilt University will be 
conducting in the region in 2010. 

Although State and USAID have begun to develop mechanisms to help 
assess the outcomes of antigang programs implemented under the Mérida 
Initiative, these mechanisms do not encompass all of the Strategy's 
categories and activities, nor do they include the antigang programs 
of other federal agencies, such as those of DOJ and DHS. For example, 
while the measures State is developing, such as the numbers of arrests 
of gang members and leaders in the region, relate to the law 
enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention categories of the 
Strategy, these measures do not encompass the diplomacy or 
repatriation categories of the Strategy. According to State and USAID 
officials as well as officials from the FBI and ICE, State and USAID 
have not consulted or worked with DOJ and DHS agencies such as FBI and 
ICE in developing these performance measures because State's and 
USAID's measures are intended to encompass only their own programs and 
efforts. According to State, USAID, DOJ, and DHS officials, each 
agency focuses on developing performance-related goals and measures 
for its own programs as opposed to other agencies' antigang programs 
for which it is not responsible, and, therefore, less familiar. As a 
result, the performance measures State and USAID are developing cannot 
serve as overall indicators of the federal government's progress in 
implementing the Strategy as they do not take into account all of the 
federal agencies' antigang programs to be implemented under the 
Strategy's five categories, including those programs led by DOJ and 
DHS. In the absence of goals and performance measures or other 
mechanisms for monitoring and assessing the progress and performance 
of agencies' antigang programs across the categories of the Strategy, 
it will be difficult for the federal government to determine if the 
overall interagency antigang effort is achieving the intended results 
and to hold agencies accountable for implementing the Strategy. 

U.S. Federal Agencies Have Implemented Programs to Combat 
Transnational Gangs, but Could Take Additional Action to Enhance 
Coordination Efforts: 

Federal agencies have implemented a variety of programs to carry out 
the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to 
Central America. To coordinate their implementation of antigang 
programs, agencies use a variety of mechanisms such as interagency 
committees and task forces. However, for the antigang unit in El 
Salvador, coordination among the FBI, ICE, and Salvadoran law 
enforcement in sharing investigative information on gangs could be 
enhanced by reaching agreement on ICE's participation in the unit. 
Further, although agencies have taken steps to develop performance 
measures and obtain data on those measures to track the results of 
programs, agencies are just starting to collect performance data due 
to the early stage of implementation of most of these programs. 
Additionally, federal agencies have identified various factors that 
are largely outside their control and that can affect their 
implementation of programs, such as challenges facing Central American 
countries in sustaining antigang programs. 

Federal Agencies Have Developed a Variety of Programs to Implement the 
Interagency Strategy: 

To carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with 
connections to Central American countries, federal agencies have 
developed and implemented a variety of programs in the United States 
and in host countries in the region, such as El Salvador and 
Guatemala. This variety of programs reflects the different categories 
of the strategy and includes diplomatic efforts to establish a 
coordinated approach to the gang problem; efforts to facilitate the 
repatriation of gang members who are in the United States illegally; 
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of investigative information 
between U.S. law enforcement agencies and foreign law enforcement 
agencies; programs to provide training to Central American law 
enforcement officials; and programs to provide recreational and 
vocational opportunities for at-risk youth, among others. Additional 
details on federal agencies' antigang programs under each category of 
the Strategy are as follows:[Footnote 32] 

* Diplomacy: State has led efforts to engage diplomatically with 
Central American countries to discuss gang issues. The department has 
led discussions with member countries of the Central American 
Integration System. Under this initiative, the United States and 
Central American countries first held discussions regarding regional 
gang threats in July 2007, at which time the United States announced 
the Strategy. The countries held a second, and the most recent, 
dialogue in December 2008, which focused on discussing practical 
measures to combat the threats of criminal gangs, narcotics 
trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms in Central America. 
At the conclusion, all participating countries signed a communiqué 
pledging their continued support in the fight against transnational 
threats, including gangs. 

* Repatriation: ICE has implemented the Electronic Travel Document 
system to facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal 
of illegal aliens, including gang members, to El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras. Under this program, ICE electronically sends travel 
document applications to the consular officials of these countries; 
these officials can then electronically sign and certify the documents 
stating that the countries will receive the illegal aliens to be 
removed.[Footnote 33] These documents are available to ICE 
electronically through the Electronic Travel Document system. This 
program eliminates the need for consular officials to visit in person 
the individual awaiting removal from the United States before issuing 
documents, helping to reduce the amount of time it takes for ICE to 
receive travel documents from foreign countries and ultimately remove 
illegal aliens. According to ICE officials, the program can eliminate 
approximately 5 to 7 days that an alien would spend in detention, thus 
decreasing the cost incurred by the government. 

* Law Enforcement: In 2005, ICE implemented Operation Community 
Shield--a nationwide initiative to arrest and remove criminal alien 
gang members from the United States. ICE began the operation to target 
violent transnational street gangs through the use of ICE's broad law 
enforcement powers to identify, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang 
members from the United States. Although initially focused on MS-13, 
ICE expanded Operation Community Shield to target all transnational 
criminal street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. For 
its part, the FBI has implemented various programs to facilitate the 
exchange of information, such as criminal histories of suspected gang 
members, between law enforcement agencies in the United States and 
Central American countries. For example, in 2007, the FBI established 
a joint U.S.-Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang unit in El Salvador-- 
called TAG--to exchange information on gangs and gang members between 
the Salvadoran national police and U.S.-based law enforcement agencies 
for use in criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions in 
both countries. The unit includes investigators and analysts from the 
Salvadoran national police, prosecutors from El Salvador's Attorney 
General's Office, and two FBI agents. The TAG unit's exchange of 
information on gang members has aided U.S. gang investigations in 
locations such as Charlotte, North Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Los 
Angeles, California. The FBI plans to establish units like this in 
Guatemala and Honduras. Further, in 2006, the FBI began the Central 
American Fingerprint Exploitation program to collect and store 
existing criminal fingerprint records and other biometric information 
from the countries of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and 
Honduras in FBI databases and make them available to all U.S. local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies. These records are 
searched in the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System, with resulting matches shared with the contributing country 
for investigative purposes.[Footnote 34] The FBI has deployed the 
system in El Salvador, conducted assessments to determine how to 
deploy the system to Belize and Panama, and plans to conduct more 
assessments for deploying the system to Guatemala and Honduras. In 
addition, beginning in 2008, the FBI, with funding from State, has 
implemented the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange program 
wherein law enforcement personnel from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras have visited locations in the United States to receive 
antigang training and share investigative practices with U.S. law 
enforcement personnel. In exchange, law enforcement personnel from the 
United States have visited El Salvador to provide antigang training 
and share practices with Central American police.[Footnote 35] Also 
related to law enforcement, ICE, in conjunction with State, 
established an international gang task force in Honduras in January 
2010. Comprised of four Honduran police officers and one ICE agent, 
the task force is charged with developing intelligence to initiate and 
support gang investigations in the United States and Honduras. 

* Capacity Enhancement: To help enhance the capacity of Central 
American governments to address gangs, beginning in 2006, State, DOJ, 
DHS, and other agencies have provided antigang training courses to 
Central American law enforcement officials through the International 
Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador.[Footnote 36] The academy 
provides law enforcement training to officials from countries in 
Central and South America and the Caribbean. The training courses have 
focused on various aspects of gang enforcement efforts, such as police 
investigative techniques, prosecution, witness protection, and prison 
gang management, and participants have included police, prosecutors, 
judges, prison staff, border agents, and prevention and rehabilitation 
officials from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and 
Belize. As another example of capacity enhancement, USAID has provided 
technical assistance and training to police, prosecutors, and judges, 
among others, to reform justice-sector institutions in El Salvador to 
help improve the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes 
including those committed by gangs. 

* Prevention: USAID has implemented gang prevention, intervention, and 
rehabilitation programs in Central American countries to provide youth 
with alternatives to joining gangs and assist former gang members' 
reentry into society. For example, through partnerships with faith- 
based and nongovernmental organizations and local governments in 
Central America, USAID has started youth centers in specific 
communities to provide a safe environment for recreational and 
vocational opportunities for young people. Figure 2 shows individuals 
participating in activities at these youth centers in El Salvador. 

Figure 2: Youth Participating in Activities at USAID-sponsored Youth 
Centers in El Salvador: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Source: GAO. 

Note: The photographs have been altered to protect identities. 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, USAID has sponsored a community-based policing program 
in Guatemala to improve the relationship between the police and local 
citizens by establishing collaborative partnerships between law 
enforcement and the communities they serve to solve problems and 
increase trust. According to USAID, the agency plans to expand the 
community policing program to five new communities in Guatemala as 
well as five communities each in El Salvador and Panama. 

Federal Agencies Have Coordinated Their Antigang Programs through 
Various Mechanisms, but Could Strengthen Coordination by Examining the 
Establishment and Composition of a Salvadoran-Based Law Enforcement 
Unit: 

Federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their antigang 
programs and share information with each other through various 
interagency and coordinating groups. For example, DOJ has established 
several entities to coordinate and share information on gang 
enforcement efforts, including transnational gangs, among DOJ and DHS 
component agencies. These entities include the Anti-Gang Coordination 
Committee that is comprised of representatives from a variety of DOJ 
components and agencies, as well as representatives from DHS's ICE, 
and meets at least quarterly each year to report on the status of 
antigang efforts and disseminate information for coordination. Another 
entity used to coordinate, share information and intelligence on 
gangs, and serve as a deconfliction center for gang operations is the 
National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center 
(GangTECC).[Footnote 37] GangTECC is comprised of participants from 
the FBI, ATF, DEA, and ICE, among other DOJ and DHS components, and 
has responsibility for coordinating multijurisdictional investigations 
of all gangs except FBI-led investigations involving the MS-13 and 
18th Street gangs. In addition, the FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task 
Force has only FBI participants and is responsible for coordinating 
FBI's multijurisdictional investigations involving MS-13 and 18th 
Street gangs. Further, within Central American countries, federal 
agencies have mechanisms for coordinating and sharing information on 
antigang programs. For example, in El Salvador at the U.S. embassy, 
U.S. government agency officials who are involved in implementing 
antigang programs, such as officials from DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and 
DOD, hold regular meetings to discuss antigang activities and 
coordinate their implementation efforts. Appendix IV provides 
additional information on the roles and responsibilities of these and 
other headquarters-level coordinating entities as well as task forces 
that coordinate antigang efforts at the field level within the United 
States. 

In July 2009, we reported on the benefits and challenges associated 
with some of these various coordinating mechanisms. Specifically, we 
reported that entities such as the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, 
GangTECC, and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force provide DOJ and DHS 
with a means to operate across agency boundaries and facilitate 
communication among participating agencies at the headquarters level. 
[Footnote 38] However, we also reported that while some overlaps in 
mission may be appropriate, the entities had not clearly identified 
their roles and responsibilities, resulting in possible gaps or 
unnecessary overlaps in agencies' coordination and sharing of 
information on gang enforcement efforts, including those involving 
transnational gangs. Specifically, we reported that GangTECC and the 
MS-13 National Gang Task Force had overlapping missions and 
responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of 
multijurisdictional investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street 
gangs. The two entities had these overlaps in part because the MS-13 
National Gang Task Force already existed when GangTECC was established 
in 2006 and was not dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time. 
We reported that both entities risked unnecessary federal resource 
expenditures to fund two entities when a single group could be more 
efficient. We recommended that DOJ, in consultation with DHS, 
articulate and differentiate roles, responsibilities, and missions of 
headquarters-level entities, which would strengthen headquarters-level 
coordination efforts to help ensure that they are not expended on 
overlapping missions. DOJ agreed with our recommendation and as of 
February 2010, DHS and DOJ officials reported that they are discussing 
ways to streamline processes, modify policies, and establish cross- 
cutting performance measures for federal gang programs. 

At the field level, FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination 
and sharing of information on gang members and investigations 
specifically in El Salvador by reaching agreement on ICE's 
participation in the TAG.[Footnote 39] In El Salvador, both ICE and 
FBI contact the Salvadoran national police to request information and 
intelligence on gangs to assist in the agencies' gang investigations. 
The FBI makes its requests directly through its agents assigned to the 
TAG, while ICE's requests for Salvadoran national police information 
on gangs or gang members are sent through ICE's country attaché in El 
Salvador who forwards them to the FBI agents at the TAG. The FBI 
agents then pass the requests to Salvadoran national police officials 
if the FBI agents do not have the information needed to fulfill ICE's 
requests.[Footnote 40] FBI and ICE officials stated that this process 
for coordinating information requests for the Salvadoran national 
police through the TAG has worked well, but that the process could be 
further strengthened by ICE's participation in the TAG unit. Our work 
on effective interagency coordination has shown that collaborating 
agencies should organize joint and individual efforts and facilitate 
information sharing.[Footnote 41] Collaborating agencies also look for 
opportunities to leverage each others' resources, thus obtaining 
additional benefits that would not be available if they were working 
separately. Coordinating in this way could yield benefits in terms of 
leveraging efforts already underway and minimizing any potential 
unnecessary duplication in federal agencies' requests for information 
on gang members or gang investigations. Various U.S. and Salvadoran 
officials have cited potential benefits that could be gained from ICE 
and FBI both participating in the TAG. The director of El Salvador's 
national police stated that he would like to see federal law 
enforcement agencies other than the FBI involved in the TAG unit, 
particularly ICE, because of ICE's role in managing the removal of 
gang members from the United States to El Salvador. The unit chief of 
FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task Force stated that the FBI would also 
benefit from ICE participating in the TAG to assist in deconflicting 
enforcement operations between the FBI and ICE in El Salvador. ICE's 
El Salvador country attaché stated that having an ICE agent at the TAG 
would streamline the current process since an ICE agent would be 
working directly at the TAG and be able to better identify possible 
connections between FBI and ICE gang cases and requests for 
information, thereby expediting information sharing. 

The FBI and ICE have discussed signing a joint memorandum of 
understanding to provide parameters for ICE's participation in the 
TAG. According to the unit chief of the FBI's MS-13 National Gang Task 
Force, in 2008 the FBI presented ICE with a memorandum of 
understanding for ICE to participate in the TAG unit in which the FBI 
legal attaché would manage the TAG and coordinate TAG gang 
investigations with ICE. The FBI memorandum required ICE to coordinate 
all of its activities related to the TAG with the FBI legal attaché. 
However, according to the head of ICE's National Gang Unit, ICE would 
like to participate in the TAG more as an equal partner as opposed to 
being subordinate to the FBI. ICE officials stated that clarification 
is needed in regards to the administrative details on placing an ICE 
agent at the TAG such as housing and the location of the ICE agent's 
office, as well as agreement on the extent to which an ICE agent 
assigned to the TAG could focus on work for ICE-specific 
investigations as needed. 

To help obtain this clarification and try to reach consensus on ICE 
participation in TAG, ICE officials stated that as of February 2010 
they have not yet completed the process of drafting language to 
clarify their points of concern in the memorandum of understanding and 
plan to provide this draft language, once completed, to the FBI for 
its consideration. Further, the FBI and ICE have initiated discussions 
to conduct an assessment of ICE's possible participation in TAG by 
having an ICE agent who would conduct the assessment assigned to the 
unit on a temporary basis. However, as of February 2010, ICE and FBI 
have not yet reached agreement on this temporary assignment and ICE's 
plans to conduct the assessment because the two agencies disagree 
about the type and scope of the work that the agent would conduct for 
the assessment. The FBI and ICE could strengthen their coordination on 
gang investigations and enhance the efficiency of their existing 
process for exchanging information through the TAG by reaching 
consensus on ICE's participation in the unit. By reaching agreement on 
ICE's role, which the FBI and ICE have been considering since 2008, 
the two agencies would be in a better position to leverage their 
existing resources and information-sharing processes for gang 
investigations with a nexus to El Salvador. 

Federal Agencies Have Established Performance Measures for Their Own 
Antigang Programs, but Some Programs Are in the Early Stages of 
Collecting Performance Data: 

Earlier in this report, we discussed federal government efforts to 
measure the results achieved with the overall Strategy. Separately, 
federal agencies have established performance measures, such as 
numbers of arrests of gang members, for assessing their own individual 
antigang efforts. However, as most of these programs are in the early 
stages of implementation, agencies' data on their programs' 
performance cannot yet be used to assess the level of activity or 
program results across time. For example, USAID officials said that 
because most of the Mérida Initiative funding for its Central American 
programs was not released to USAID field missions until July and 
August 2009, programs funded by the Mérida Initiative have yet to have 
any appreciable results to measure. In addition, several antigang 
programs in Central America have yet to be fully implemented. For 
example, ICE and the FBI are seeking to establish the Criminal History 
Information Program in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras pending 
the hiring of needed analysts and completion of interagency 
agreements--expected to occur by the summer of 2010. 

Although federal agencies' performance data do not yet indicate the 
level of progress or results achieved over time, federal agencies have 
begun to report data on their levels of activity to date. For example, 
State has established measures for the antigang training courses 
offered through the International Law Enforcement Academy in El 
Salvador, including tracking data on the number of gang classes 
offered and the number of participants successfully completing them. 
According to State, the academy has offered 10 gang-related training 
courses since 2006 with a total of 416 participants from various 
countries including El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. In 
addition to these measures, State asks participants to complete course 
evaluations and uses these evaluations to make modifications to the 
antigang training courses, such as changes in curriculum. 

USAID has also established measures for its own antigang programs, as 
shown in table 2. For example, USAID has established measures for its 
community policing program, such as the number of communities that 
have implemented community policing programs. 

Table 2: Examples of Measures USAID Tracks for Its Efforts to Combat 
Transnational Gangs from Central America: 

Activity/program: Community Action Fund; 
Description of program: Provide employment-generating activities and 
education for youth at risk of gang involvement; 
Date began: 2008; 
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of people who have 
benefited from U.S. government-supported educational and socioeconomic 
opportunities. 

Activity/program: Community Policing Program; 
Description of program: Promotes collaboration between communities and 
police in prevention activities to undermine gang effectiveness and 
recruitment, resulting in successful arrests of gang members and 
greatly improved cooperation and trust between the police and citizens 
of the communities; 
Date began: 2008; 
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of communities with joint 
police-citizen groups (e.g., community committees, police/school 
liaison, police/citizen activities, etc.). 

Activity/program: Gang Prevention Program; 
Description of program: Increases security through community and 
private-sector partnerships that work with at-risk youth to reduce 
gang recruitment, crime, and violence by building the capacity of 
communities and governments and by enhancing law enforcement efforts; 
Date began: 2008; 
Examples of measures to be tracked: Number of communities assisted in 
crime prevention with U.S. government support. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Data sources include conversations with agency officials. 

[End of table] 

USAID also requires program contractors to develop performance indexes 
for their respective programs. For example, the private contractor 
conducting USAID's Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention 
Project plans to review local government records to measure the crime 
rate in project-targeted communities. For other efforts related to 
youth outreach centers, performance indicators tracked by program 
contractors include measures such as the number of youth who have 
received a job through the support of the outreach center or because 
of the skills acquired through the center. 

With regard to its gang enforcement efforts, ICE reports on the number 
of gang-related criminal and administrative arrests, among other 
measures.[Footnote 42] As shown in figure 3, the number of criminal 
and administrative gang-related arrests made by ICE has generally 
increased since fiscal year 2006, the first full year that it compiled 
this information. 

Figure 3: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009): 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Gang-related criminal arrests: 647; 
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,988. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,442; 
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,860. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,654; 
Gang-related administrative arrests: 2,211. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Gang-related criminal arrests: 1,718; 
Gang-related administrative arrests: 2,020. 

Source: ICE. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in table 3, the FBI has also established various measures for 
each of its primary programs to combat transnational gangs. Among 
others, these measures include the number of gang cases worked and the 
number of countries and officials participating in the Central 
American Law Enforcement Exchange Program. 

Table 3: Performance Measures and Reported Results for the FBI's 
Efforts to Combat Transnational Gangs: 

FBI program/activity: MS-13 National Gang Task Force; 
Performance measure: 
* Number of gang cases worked; 
* Number of coordination meetings with FBI Field Divisions and legal 
attaches; 
* Training provided to federal, state, local, and international law 
enforcement partners; 
Outputs reported: 
* According to the FBI, the task force conducted 19 investigations in 
fiscal year 2007, 29 investigations in fiscal year 2008, and 140 
investigations in fiscal year 2009; 
* The task force reported conducting 10 case-coordination meetings in 
fiscal year 2007, 15 meetings in fiscal year 2008, and 23 meetings in 
fiscal year 2009; 
* The task force reported conducting 12 trainings for law enforcement 
partners in fiscal year 2007, 10 trainings in fiscal year 2008, and 15 
trainings in fiscal year 2009. 

FBI program/activity: TAG unit; 
Performance measure: Number of requests for information received by 
the TAG to investigate leads on suspected gang members including 
whether a "hit" was made on the lead (i.e., a positive result); 
Outputs reported: During fiscal year 2008, the first year the FBI 
tracked performance metrics for the TAG, countries including El 
Salvador made 696 inquiries regarding transnational connections of 
suspected gang members. For fiscal year 2009, the FBI reported a total 
of 480 inquiries to the TAG. 

FBI program/activity: TAG unit; 
Performance measure: Number of contraband items recovered during TAG- 
assisted prison searches in El Salvador; 
Outputs reported: The FBI reported that 27 prison searches were 
conducted between September 2007 and November 2009. Over 1,000 items 
were seized during these prison searches. 

FBI program/activity: TAG unit; 
Performance measure: The number of arrests made by El Salvadoran law 
enforcement working in antigang operations who received coaching, 
advice, and instruction from the TAG unit; 
Outputs reported: According to the FBI, from the TAG's inception in 
September 2007 to July 2009, 16 gang members were arrested. 

FBI program/activity: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange 
Program; 
Performance measure: Number of countries and officials participating 
in the program; 
Outputs reported: FBI officials reported that in 2008, four officers 
from El Salvador and four officers from the United States (Los 
Angeles) participated in the first version of this program, which was 
referred to as the "Officer Exchange Program." 

FBI program/activity: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange 
Program; 
Performance measure: Number of countries and officials participating 
in the program; 
Outputs reported: According to the FBI's after-action report, 
"Exchange Class I" was conducted in March 2009 consisting of 27 
participants representing four countries and nine law enforcement 
organizations. In addition to the United States, the countries 
included El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In October 2009, 27 
officers from law enforcement agencies in the United States, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama participated in a third 
exchange. 

FBI program/activity: Central American Fingerprint Exploitation; 
Performance measure: Number of positive hits from foreign fingerprint 
data for subjects with U.S. criminal histories. The MS-13 National 
Gang Task Force maintains a record of all positive hits, warrants, and 
sexual offenders who are located; 
Outputs reported: According to FBI officials, approximately 3 million 
criminal fingerprint records from Central America and Mexico have been 
acquired. In particular, El Salvador, the only Central American 
country where the FBI has fully implemented the Central American 
Fingerprint Exploitation, has provided 75,000 fingerprint records in 
fiscal year 2009 to the FBI with 10,556 matches against U.S. criminal 
records for a match rate of approximately 15 percent. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data. 

[End of table] 

In addition to these measures, the FBI has prepared after-action 
reports for the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange Program that 
summarize the results of the exchanges, including feedback from 
program participants, and has used these reports to modify the 
program. For example, according to the FBI, future exchange classes 
will include more practical and operational experiences (such as ride-
alongs with local police officers and observation of police 
operations). Moreover, future classes will include more allowances for 
travel time and representation from more U.S. and foreign police 
departments. 

For the TAG, the FBI did not start to collect data for the unit's 
measures, such as the number of requests for assistance the unit 
receives, until April 2008, about 6 months after the unit was 
established. According to FBI officials, no systematic log or other 
mechanism was used to track and record data on the TAG's activities 
from September 2007 through April 2008, because, at the start-up of 
the unit, agents were assigned on a temporary basis and were primarily 
focused on establishing and initiating the operations of the unit. 
Thus, the FBI lacks information about the unit's activity levels for 
its first 6 months of operation. Since FBI agents have been stationed 
at the TAG for 2-year, long-term rotations, these agents have 
developed and maintained a log to track the unit's activities and 
assistance provided to FBI offices and other law enforcement agencies. 
This data maintained by the TAG is used by FBI, particularly the MS-13 
National Gang Task Force, to identify trends in where transnational 
gang members are located and traveling to and proactively target 
specific geographic areas for gang education or enforcement activities. 

Various Factors Affect U.S. Efforts to Implement Antigang Programs in 
Central American Countries: 

Even as agencies have worked to implement antigang programs in Central 
America, various factors in the region largely outside of the control 
of U.S. agencies pose challenges to the implementation of the 
programs. These factors include: the ability of host countries to 
sustain programs after U.S. support ends; Central American law 
enforcement personnel issues; and legal restrictions in Central 
American countries, such as El Salvador, that diminish the benefits of 
efforts. 

* Sustainability of programs by host countries: Federal agencies have 
identified challenges facing Central American countries in sustaining 
antigang programs currently being initiated and implemented in the 
region. Specifically, State officials identified several factors 
outside the control of U.S. agencies that contribute to the 
uncertainty as to whether Central American countries will be able to 
sustain antigang programs over the long term. These officials reported 
that the ability of partner countries to take responsibility for 
managing and supporting U.S.-funded antigang programs is hampered by 
the fact that these countries often do not have the financial 
resources to sustain the programs in the absence of U.S. funds. State 
officials said that the ability of foreign countries to sustain 
antigang programs is hindered by other factors as well, such as 
corruption throughout the countries' police and judiciary structures; 
a lack of investment in police training to make the countries' police 
forces more professional and accountable; the countries' inability to 
provide police forces with equipment such as communications gear and 
transportation assets; and the ability of the gangs to quickly adapt 
to law enforcement strategies. 

To help address these issues, federal agencies have taken steps prior 
to implementing these programs to plan for how the programs will be 
sustained, particularly after U.S. federal funding ends. For example, 
State officials said that when the department first developed and 
implemented these programs, it took into account the ability of 
foreign countries to take over and manage antigang programs initially 
funded and managed by the United States. Specifically, the officials 
noted that they worked directly with host country officials to gain an 
understanding of what programs or efforts the countries needed and 
what the countries might be able to support, both in terms of 
resources available and a supportive political climate, and then used 
that as a starting point to identify and shape the efforts that would 
receive U.S. support. According to USAID officials, USAID also took 
similar steps to work with host country officials to identify antigang 
efforts the countries had planned or were already underway for which 
USAID could provide additional support. Officials stated that they 
chose this approach because they sought to support local initiatives 
and programs whenever possible, as programs already planned or 
implemented by the host countries are more likely to be sustained by 
the countries themselves. Rather than setting up similar programs that 
would compete for resources, providing support for the host countries' 
programs helped to broaden the reach of the programs into additional 
areas that the host countries may not have had resources for 
otherwise. Further, USAID officials reported that they coordinated 
with the host countries and other donors to ensure that the host 
countries would assume responsibility for the activities when USAID 
funding expires. In regard to FBI-led efforts such as the TAG, FBI 
officials stated that they also considered the ability of the foreign 
government to support these efforts during negotiations between the 
foreign governments, such as El Salvador, and the FBI to establish the 
units. 

To help prepare for sustaining antigang programs over the long term, 
federal agencies have also taken action after these programs have been 
implemented. For example, at the country level, USAID officials work 
directly with host government partners and with other donors through 
regular donor coordination groups and meetings to identify best 
practices for sustaining efforts and incorporating those practices 
into programs. Further, FBI officials have discussed with the 
Salvadoran government ways for the government to provide the resources 
and commitment needed to help sustain the TAG unit over the long term. 
According to the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force who 
manages the TAG, other than what the FBI pays for in the salaries and 
living expenses of the FBI agents based at the TAG, the Salvadoran 
government provides the other resources necessary to sustain the TAG's 
operations. 

* Screening process for law enforcement personnel and transfer of 
personnel: Finding a sufficient number of Central American law 
enforcement personnel who can pass the screening process required to 
participate in U.S. investigative and information-sharing programs can 
complicate the implementation of those programs. For example, in order 
to become part of the FBI's TAG unit, police officers must receive a 
background screening before initially joining the unit and undergo a 
polygraph every 6 months thereafter. Under the rules of the TAG, if 
officers fail the polygraph, they must leave the unit. FBI officials 
stated that, as was the case in El Salvador when they set up the TAG 
in that country, they expect to face challenges in identifying and 
successfully screening a sufficient number of Guatemalan and Honduran 
police officers to participate in the units planned for those 
countries.[Footnote 43] To address this challenge, the FBI is planning 
to establish smaller TAG units in Guatemala and Honduras (10 officers 
each instead of the 20 stationed at the Salvadoran TAG) and set aside 
more time and resources for screening Guatemalan and Honduran police 
officers for the units. FBI officials also stated that one 
disadvantage of the first officer exchange with El Salvador was that 
of the four participating Salvadoran police officers, only two 
officers continued to work on gang investigations in El Salvador after 
the exchange was completed with the other two being transferred to 
different areas within the Salvadoran police force. Although the FBI 
has an agreement with participating countries that requires exchange 
participants to be involved in gang investigations for at least 2 
years after the exchange has concluded so they can put into practice 
the training they received and share it with their colleagues, FBI 
officials noted that there is little they can do to ensure 
participating countries abide by this requirement. 

* Legal restrictions: According to officials we interviewed from the 
FBI and DOJ's Criminal Division, Central American countries' laws can 
also pose challenges for conducting gang investigations in the region, 
or for federal agencies that may seek the extradition of individuals 
to face trial for crimes committed in the United States. According to 
an FBI official with the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, legal 
restrictions in countries such as El Salvador do not permit law 
enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance or wiretaps as part of 
their investigations. According to this official, while this 
restriction has not hindered the ability of the Salvadoran national 
police to conduct investigations, it takes more time and effort to 
develop and corroborate the evidence through the use of other 
investigative methods. According to an official from DOJ's Criminal 
Division, a recent amendment to the Salvadoran constitution now allows 
the use of electronic surveillance as a tool in criminal 
investigations and the Salvadoran National Assembly is currently 
considering implementing legislation. In regard to the extradition of 
gang members wanted in the United States, FBI officials noted that 
countries such as El Salvador have laws that prohibit the extradition 
of individuals to other countries where they could face a more severe 
punishment than would be given in El Salvador for the same crime. As 
an example, the unit chief of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force 
stated that the FBI had requested the extradition of a gang leader 
imprisoned in El Salvador for prosecution in Baltimore, Maryland, 
where the individual would have likely faced a longer prison sentence 
for the crime. However, the FBI's request for extradition was denied, 
preventing the gang leader from facing the charges against him in the 
United States. Nevertheless, DOJ's Criminal Division reported that on 
December 22, 2009, the Supreme Court of El Salvador voted to permit 
the first extradition of a Salvadoran national pursuant to the 
extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador.[Footnote 
44] Officials explained that future extraditions may still be limited 
by the penalties applicable to extradited individuals, such as the 
death penalty and life imprisonment. To help address these challenges, 
DOJ's Criminal Division continues to work with El Salvador under the 
existing treaty to facilitate extradition between the United States 
and El Salvador. 

Despite these challenges, officials from the agencies we interviewed 
stated that they continue to work to address or mitigate the effect of 
these challenges and to ensure their antigang programs are both 
sustainable and effective. 

Conclusions: 

Given the rapid growth of transnational gangs, their propensity for 
violence, and the public safety threats they pose, the response to 
these gangs requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach on the 
part of federal agencies that have different responsibilities and 
missions for combating transnational gangs. The Strategy to Combat the 
Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the 
Strategy) provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to 
follow in designing and implementing efforts to combat the gangs. 
However, while individual federal agencies may be familiar with the 
implementation of their own antigang programs, or those in the 
Strategy for which they are responsible, they do not necessarily have 
the visibility across the Strategy's categories to determine the 
extent to which the broader strategy is being implemented. Regardless 
as to whether it remains a separate effort or is incorporated into the 
broader CARSI being developed, incorporating an approach for 
overseeing the interagency effort to combat transnational gangs would 
help provide visibility by designating an agency or entity to ensure 
that the Strategy is being implemented as planned. In addition, as the 
Strategy and related antigang efforts are implemented, it will be 
important to be able to track the effect the Strategy as a whole is 
having against the transnational gang problem. By establishing 
performance goals and measures or other mechanisms to evaluate the 
progress made in implementing the Strategy, federal agencies, 
Congress, and other stakeholders could have more specific information 
relating to agencies' performance under the Strategy, thereby enabling 
them to make more informed decisions as to what adjustments to the 
Strategy might be necessary, if any, to achieve its desired effect. 
Relatedly, while federal agencies have taken various actions to 
collaborate on their transnational antigang efforts, agencies such as 
the FBI and ICE can take steps to further resolve their roles and 
participation in the TAG unit in El Salvador, especially given that 
the FBI and ICE have been discussing this participation since 2008. By 
reaching agreement on ICE's participation in the unit, both agencies 
could realize additional information-sharing benefits not only with 
each other, but with foreign counterparts, and help ensure that 
resources to combat gangs in El Salvador are used efficiently and 
effectively. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen oversight and accountability for implementation of the 
Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America 
and Mexico (the Strategy), we recommend that the Special Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with DOJ, 
DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, revise the Strategy to include, or include 
in the CARSI if the Strategy is incorporated into that initiative: 

* an approach or framework for overseeing implementation of the 
Strategy and antigang efforts in Central America, and: 

* performance goals and measures to assess progress made in achieving 
intended results under the Strategy. 

To strengthen federal agencies' coordination of antigang efforts and 
maximize use of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador, we 
recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security reach agreement on ICE's role and participation in the TAG 
unit. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State 
(State); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and 
the National Security Council (NSC). DHS, DOJ, and USAID provided 
written comments on the draft report. DOD, State, and the NSC did not 
provide comments. 

In their written comments, DHS and DOJ concurred with our 
recommendation that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security reach agreement on ICE's role and participation in the TAG 
unit in El Salvador, and outlined steps they have begun to take to 
address this recommendation. For example, DHS commented that ICE 
officials have reviewed the FBI's memorandum on the TAG to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of ICE and the FBI within the unit in El 
Salvador. DOJ also commented that any agreement on DHS's participation 
in the TAG unit in El Salvador should also address DHS's participation 
in future TAG units that the FBI expects to create in Guatemala and 
Honduras. 

In its written comments, USAID commented that it acknowledges the 
importance of increased interagency coordination to help bolster U.S. 
government efforts to address the threat of criminal gangs in Central 
America and the United States. 

DHS's, DOJ's, and USAID's written comments are contained in appendixes 
VI, VII, and VIII, respectively. We also incorporated technical 
comments provided by DHS, DOJ, and USAID as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs; the Attorney General; the 
Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense; the 
Administrator of USAID; selected congressional committees; and other 
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Please 
contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staff have any 
questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 
appendix IX. 

Signed by: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Leadership Structure and Key Transnational Criminal 
Activities of MS-13 and 18th Street: 

Federal agencies have specifically identified two primary gangs with 
connections to Central America--Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th 
Street--as posing the most significant public safety threats to the 
United States and Central American countries among transnational 
gangs. This appendix summarizes information federal agencies have on 
the leadership structure and transnational criminal activities of 
these two gangs. 

Leadership of the Gangs: 

Federal agencies have reported that these gangs generally do not have 
a centralized leadership structure. Rather, most gang cliques--or 
local gang groups--tend to operate in specific areas or communities in 
the United States and Central America and have autonomy to function 
independently without reporting to a central authority or leadership. 
However, law enforcement officials have reported that in some gang 
cliques activities are directed by gang leaders incarcerated in 
Salvadoran prisons. These leaders communicate by cell phones or coded 
written messages that are smuggled in and out of the prisons. Of the 
five U.S. locations[Footnote 45] we visited to discuss gang 
investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement, three 
reported instances in which gang leaders incarcerated in El Salvador 
directed gang members to organize new cliques, coordinate with cliques 
in other parts of the country, and carry out criminal activities, 
including murder. For example, an investigation in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, found that MS-13 clique leaders were sent to establish 
cliques at the behest of leaders in El Salvador. Further, according to 
the FBI, cliques convene periodically with gang leadership to 
determine future criminal activities and punishments for individual 
delinquent gang members. 

Transnational Criminal Activities of the Gangs: 

Transnational gangs engage in criminal activities that not only affect 
local communities in the United States and Central American countries, 
but that also stretch beyond U.S. and Central American borders. For 
example, in its 2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that gang 
activity has transcended the borders of Central America, Mexico, and 
the United States and evolved into a transnational concern.[Footnote 
46] USAID reported that while gang activity used to be territorially 
confined to local neighborhoods, globalization, sophisticated 
communications technologies, and travel patterns have facilitated the 
expansion of gang activity across neighborhoods, cities, and 
countries. Further, the 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment indicated 
that U.S. street gangs are expanding their influence in most regions 
and broadening their presence outside the United States to develop 
associations with criminal organizations in Mexico and Central 
America. According to federal agencies, major cross-border criminal 
activities in which transnational gangs engage include drug 
trafficking and distribution, human smuggling, and extortion, among 
others. 

With regard to drug trafficking and distribution, assessments 
conducted by the National Gang Intelligence Center, the National Drug 
Intelligence Center, the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicate that 
connections exist between drug trafficking organizations and MS-13 and 
18th Street gangs and these connections may be expanding. Several 
agencies also suggested that both gangs' connections with prison gangs 
such as the Mexican Mafia[Footnote 47] may provide a link to drug 
trafficking organizations, as one of the prison gangs' main sources of 
income is extorting money from drug distributors outside prison and 
distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison system. 
Further, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has reported that drug 
trafficking organizations have worked with MS-13 and 18th Street gangs 
to distribute their narcotics in Central America and the United 
States.[Footnote 48] MS-13 and 18th Street gangs have also been 
identified as engaging in retail street distribution of narcotics in 
the United States, for example. Although connections between gangs and 
drug trafficking organizations exist and may be growing, these 
connections may not yet reflect large-scale, organized cooperation 
between gangs and drug-trafficking organizations. For example, Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials stated that while 
individual gangs and gang members might work with drug trafficking 
organizations for their own personal gain, DEA has not observed or 
obtained evidence of high-level, organized cooperation between gangs 
and drug trafficking organizations. Likewise, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime has reported that because the Central 
American drug market is too small for gangs to develop into major 
distributors, the gangs lack the maritime capabilities required for 
the transport of drugs from Central America, and gangs have limited 
involvement in the U.S. narcotics market, the link between Central 
American gangs and drug trafficking organizations may not yet be well-
developed. 

In addition to their involvement in drug trafficking and distribution, 
transnational gangs have also been involved in other cross-border 
crime, including alien smuggling and extortion. For example, the 2009 
National Gang Threat Assessment indicated that U.S.-based gang members 
are increasingly involved in cross-border criminal activity that 
includes smuggling illegal aliens from Mexico into the United States. 
Moreover, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the FBI reported that 
MS-13 is known to smuggle persons from Central America into the United 
States from Mexico. The FBI has also reported that 18th Street may be 
involved in human trafficking and alien smuggling. However, the FBI 
stated that it is difficult to determine gang members' roles--whether 
they are organizing the border crossings, smuggling other aliens into 
the country, or being smuggled themselves. 

In addition, federal agencies have reported that extortion and retail 
drug distribution provide financial support for both MS-13 and 18th 
Street. Cliques have been reported to extort those who conduct illicit 
activities themselves, such as prostitution or drug distribution 
entities, within the gangs' territory. In the United States, 
transnational gang members are known also to extort money from 
businesses that operate within gang territory in exchange for not 
inflicting harm on the businesses or those businesses' owners, family 
members, or workers. Both MS-13 and 18th Street gangs also conduct 
extortion across international borders. For example, gang members in 
the United States may extort immigrants with threats that they will 
retaliate against family members in Central America if law enforcement 
is notified. In some instances, the gangs have coupled extortion with 
kidnapping. The FBI has reported that MS-13 has kidnapped illegal 
immigrants and then extorted money from their families for the 
immigrants' safe return. 

Finally, with regard to links to terrorists, federal agencies have 
found no indication that U.S. gangs with transnational ties have 
routine relationships. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Characteristics of Other Transnational Gangs: 

According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), three basic 
types of gangs have been identified by gang investigators: street 
gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The focus of this 
report has been on gangs with ties to Central America, such as Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street, which belong to the "street gang" 
category. However, all three categories contain gangs with members who 
are either present or criminally active (or both) in more than one 
country. This appendix provides examples of other gangs in these 
categories, including descriptions of their transnational activities. 
Most of the information presented in this appendix is from the April 
2008 Attorney General's Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent 
Street Gangs in Suburban Areas and supplemented by information 
obtained from interviews with agency officials. 

Street Gangs: 

According to federal law enforcement, street gangs are typically 
associated with a particular neighborhood, town, or city, which they 
may incorporate into the name of their gang. However, law enforcement 
officials report that several street gangs have attained regional or 
national status and operate in a number of states throughout the 
country. Two examples of these street gangs that also have 
transnational connections include the following: 

* Florencia 13: Florencia 13 originated in Los Angeles in the early 
1960s. Gang membership is estimated to be more than 3,000. This gang 
operates primarily in California, but is expanding to other states. 
Drug trafficking is a primary source of income for the gang whose 
members smuggle cocaine and methamphetamine from Mexico into the 
United States for distribution. Florencia members are also involved in 
other criminal activities including assault, drive-by shooting, and 
homicide. 

* Latin Kings: Latin Kings is a collection of over 160 structured 
gangs, referred to as chapters, operating in 158 cities in 34 states 
in the United States. The gang's membership is estimated to be 20,000 
to 35,000. Most members are Mexican-American or Puerto Rican males 
whose main source of income is street-level drug sales. The gang 
obtains drugs primarily from Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
that operate along the U.S.-Mexico border. Members also engage in 
other criminal activity such as assault, burglary, homicide, identity 
theft, and money laundering. 

Prison Gangs: 

According to federal law enforcement officials, prison gangs are 
criminal organizations that operate within federal and state prison 
systems as self-perpetuating criminal entities. These gangs also 
operate outside of prisons typically through the activities of members 
who have been released from prison into communities. Examples of 
prison gangs with transnational connections include the following: 

* Barrio Azteca: Barrio Azteca is one of the most violent prison gangs 
in the United States. The gang is highly structured and has an 
estimated membership of 2,000. Most members are either Mexican 
national or Mexican American males. Barrio Azteca is most active in 
the southwestern United States, primarily in federal, state, and local 
corrections facilities in Texas and outside of prison in southwestern 
Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The gang's main source of income is 
derived from smuggling illegal drugs from Mexico into the United 
States for distribution both inside and outside prisons. Gang members 
often transport illicit drugs across the border for drug trafficking 
organizations. Gang members are also involved in other crimes 
including alien smuggling, arson, assault, extortion, kidnapping, and 
weapons violations. 

* Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos: This is a Hispanic prison gang 
formed in Texas in the late 1980s. It operates in most prisons in the 
state and on the streets in many communities in Texas, particularly 
Laredo. The gang is also active in several cities in Mexico, and its 
largest contingent in that country is located in Nuevo Laredo. The 
gang is structured and is estimated to have 1,000 members. These 
members maintain close ties to several Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations and are involved in the trafficking of large quantities 
of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution. 

* Mexican Mafia: This gang was formed in the late 1950s within the 
California prison system. It is loosely structured and has strict 
rules that must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400 members. Most 
of these members are Mexican American males who previously belonged to 
a Southern California street gang. Mexican Mafia is active in 13 
states, but California remains the power base. The gang's main source 
of income is extorting drug distributors outside prison and 
distributing illegal drugs within the prison system and on the 
streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations. Other criminal activities include controlling gambling 
and homosexual prostitution in prison. 

* Mexikanemi: The Mexikanemi prison gang was formed in the early 1980s 
within the Texas prison system. The gang is highly structured and 
estimated to have 2,000 members, most of whom are Mexican national or 
Mexican American males who were living in Texas at the time of their 
incarceration. This gang poses a significant drug trafficking threat 
to communities in the southwest region of the United States, 
particularly Texas. Gang members reportedly traffic illegal drugs from 
Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and outside of 
prison. Gang members obtain these drugs from Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations. 

* Surenos: As some individual Hispanic street gang members enter the 
prison systems, they put aside rivalries with other Hispanic gangs and 
unite under the name Surenos. The original Mexican Mafia members, most 
of whom were from Southern California, considered Mexicans from the 
rural, agricultural areas of Northern California as weak and viewed 
them with contempt. To distinguish themselves from these northern 
agricultural workers, members of Mexican Mafia began to refer to the 
Hispanic gang members that worked for them as Surenos (Southerners). 
Surenos gang members' main source of income is retail-level 
distribution of illegal drugs both within prison systems and in the 
community, as well as the extortion of drug distributors on the 
streets. Some members have direct links to Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations and broker deals for Mexican Mafia as well as their own 
gang. Other criminal activities of Surenos members include assault, 
car jacking, home invasion, homicide, and robbery. 

* Texas Syndicate: Texas Syndicate is one of the largest and most 
violent prison gangs. It is active on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico 
border and poses a significant drug trafficking threat to communities 
in the southwest region. The gang is highly structured and is 
estimated to have 1,300 members, most of whom are Mexican American 
males between 20 and 40 years of age. Gang members smuggle illegal 
drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution inside and 
outside of prison. Gang members have direct working relationships with 
drug trafficking organizations. 

Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: 

According to federal law enforcement, outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG) 
have been in the United States longer than many other gangs and are 
most numerous in the United States. According to the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Gang Unit, there are more than 300 active OMGs in the 
United States, ranging in size from single chapters with five or six 
members to hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide. 
DOJ considers OMGs to be transnational criminal organizations because 
they typically maintain chapters in more than one country and engage 
in illicit cross-border activities. OMG chapters are found on every 
continent. 

OMGs are highly organized with well-defined hierarchies, defined rules 
in the form of either bylaws or constitutions, and clear recruitment, 
acceptance, and promotion processes for members. OMGs have a distinct 
chain of command, much like a corporation with positions such as 
president, vice-president, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms, and road 
captain at the chapter level. Generally, OMG organizational structure 
consists of individual chapters grouped by geographic region all being 
headed by a national president. While national and international 
presidents may exist, each regional chapter is run by its own 
president. The gang leadership requires loyalty and obedience from 
members. OMG members may be governed by a code of ethics, a 
constitution, or a strict set of bylaws. Descriptions of major OMGs 
present in the U.S. follows--including details on the gangs' 
transnational connections. 

* Hells Angels Motorcycle Club: According to U.S. law enforcement 
officials, the Hells Angels are the largest and the most criminally 
prominent of the "Big Five" OMGs.[Footnote 49] The gang includes 2,000 
to 2,500 members belonging to over 230 chapters in the United States 
and 26 foreign countries. In the United States, law enforcement 
officials estimate that Hells Angels has more than 92 chapters in 27 
states with over 800 members. Gang members produce, transport, and 
distribute marijuana and methamphetamine and transport and distribute 
cocaine, hashish, heroin, and other drugs. Other crimes perpetrated by 
Hells Angels members include assault, extortion, homicide, money 
laundering, and motorcycle theft. 

* Bandidos: U.S. law enforcement authorities consider the Bandidos and 
Hells Angels to be the two largest OMGs in the United States. This 
gang has approximately 900 members belonging to over 93 chapters in 
the United States, with a total of 2,000 to 2,500 members when the 
membership in 13 other countries is added to U.S. membership. Bandidos 
is involved in transporting and distributing cocaine and marijuana and 
producing, transporting, and distributing methamphetamine. The gang is 
most active in the Pacific, southeast, southwest, and west central 
regions of the United States and is expanding in these regions by 
forming new chapters and allowing members of support clubs[Footnote 
50] to form or join Bandidos chapters. 

* Mongols Motorcycle Club: According to law enforcement officials, the 
Mongols Motorcycle Club is an extremely violent OMG that poses a 
serious criminal threat to the Pacific and southwest regions of the 
United States. Mongols members transport and distribute cocaine, 
marijuana, and methamphetamine and frequently commit violent crimes 
including assault, intimidation, and murder to defend Mongols 
territory and uphold its reputation. Most of the club's 300 members 
are Hispanic males who live in the Los Angeles area, and many are 
former street gang members with a long history of using violence to 
settle grievances. The club also maintains ties to Hispanic street 
gangs in Los Angeles. In the 1980s, the Mongols OMG seized control of 
southern California's OMG activity from the Hells Angels and today is 
allied with the Bandidos, Outlaws, and Pagan's OMGs against the Hells 
Angels. 

* Outlaws: Outlaws has more than 1,700 members belonging to 176 
chapters in the United States and 12 foreign countries. U.S. law 
enforcement officials estimate that Outlaws has more than 86 chapters 
in 21 states with over 700 members in the United States. Outlaws are 
the dominant OMG in the Great Lakes Region of the United States. Gang 
members produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and 
transport and distribute cocaine and marijuana. Other criminal 
activities engaged in by Outlaws include arson, assault, explosives 
operations, extortion, fraud, homicide, intimidation, kidnapping, 
money laundering, prostitution, robbery, theft, and weapons 
violations. Outlaws compete with the Hells Angels for membership and 
territory. 

* Vagos Motorcycle Club: The Vagos OMG has hundreds of members in the 
United States and Mexico and poses a serious criminal threat to those 
areas in which chapters are located. Law enforcement reports that 
Vagos has approximately 300 members among 24 chapters in California, 
Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and three chapters in Mexico. Club members 
produce, transport, and distribute methamphetamine and distribute 
marijuana. Vagos members also have been implicated in other criminal 
activities including assault, extortion, insurance fraud, money 
laundering, murder, vehicle theft, weapons violations, and witness 
intimidation. 

* Black Pistons: This OMG is the official support club of the Outlaws 
Motorcycle Club. Established in 2002 with the backing of the Outlaws, 
Black Pistons has expanded rapidly throughout the United States and 
into Canada and Europe. The club has an estimated 70 domestic chapters 
in 20 states and an unknown number of foreign chapters in Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, and Poland. The exact number 
is unknown but is estimated to be more than 200 in the United States. 
The Outlaws OMG uses Black Pistons chapters as sources of prospective 
new members. The Outlaws also uses Black Pistons chapters to conduct 
criminal activity, especially transporting and distributing drugs. 
Black Piston members also engage in assault, extortion, fraud, 
intimidation, and theft. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Federal Agencies' Programs to Address Transnational 
Gangs with Connections to Central America: 

Federal agencies have developed and implemented a wide range of 
programs to combat transnational gangs in the United States that have 
links to Central America. As shown in table 4, some of these efforts 
directly combat the gangs while others seek to improve criminal 
justice systems to increase the ability of Central American countries 
to apprehend and prosecute criminals including gang members (such as 
Community Policing and Justice Sector Reform). As also shown in table 
4, other efforts are aimed at improving educational and employment 
opportunities of youth to reduce the motivation for joining gangs 
(such as Youth Centers). 

Table 4: Examples of Federal Efforts or Projects Implemented to Combat 
Central American Transnational Gangs, by Agency and Country Where 
Implemented: 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: Transnational Anti-Gang Unit (TAG); 
Description of effort/project: Through the TAG, information on MS-13 
and 18th Street gang members is shared between U.S. law enforcement 
agencies and El Salvador's Civilian National Police for use in 
criminal investigations and gang-member prosecutions. The TAG includes 
investigators from the Salvadoran police, Salvadoran prosecutors, and 
FBI agents. TAG funding is provided by the State Department. 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Central American Fingerprint Exploitation; 
Description of effort/project: This program collects biometric and 
fingerprint records maintained by Central American law enforcement 
agencies and makes them accessible to U.S. law enforcement agencies. 
The program helps countries acquire automated fingerprint technology 
along with technical and other support. The system has been deployed 
in El Salvador, and assessments have been conducted in Belize and 
Panama and are planned for Guatemala and Honduras. Funding is provided 
by the State Department. 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: MS-13 National Gang Task Force; 
Description of effort/project: To combat the transnational and 
national criminal activities of the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, the 
FBI established this task force in 2005. The task force coordinates 
local, state, federal, and international FBI-led investigations of 
those gangs. It also manages the operation of the TAG. 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Central American Law Enforcement Exchange; 
Description of effort/project: This is an exchange program for law 
enforcement personnel from Central America and the United States to 
share best practices, establish contacts, and receive antigang 
training. The first exchange occurred with four gang officers from El 
Salvador's national police traveling to Los Angeles where they spent 
30 days with gang officers of the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff's 
Departments. The Los Angeles officers subsequently visited El Salvador 
for 30 days. The FBI has modified the program to a 3-week session that 
includes training at the FBI Academy. In the second exchange, which 
occurred in March 2009, 28 officers from the United States, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala participated. 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Central American Intelligence Program; 
Description of effort/project: The objective of this program is to 
share intelligence, standardize reports and other intelligence 
products, and minimize the communication gaps between countries that 
allow gang members to operate across borders. The program is a joint 
initiative of the FBI and the State Department and consists of 
criminal-intelligence analysts from the United States, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Canada who work on gang-related 
matters. 

Lead implementing agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Criminal History Information Program; 
Description of effort/project: The FBI, in conjunction with U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is working to implement 
this project to transmit the criminal histories to law enforcement 
authorities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras of deportees being 
returned to those countries. Under this program, ICE is to provide the 
FBI with a list of the criminals from these countries detained by ICE 
with final orders of removal. Next, FBI analysts compile the criminal 
histories of these detainees and transmit the information to law 
enforcement officials in each country. As of November 2009, the FBI 
was still in the process of hiring analysts and negotiating with the 
El Salvadoran government--the first country where the program will be 
implemented. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE); 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Electronic Travel Document System; 
Description of effort/project: This is an internet-based system to 
facilitate the issuance of travel documents for the removal of illegal 
aliens, including gang members. ICE has implemented the system in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE); 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Operation Community Shield; 
Description of effort/project: This is an ICE initiative to combat 
transnational gangs by arresting and removing from the United States 
criminal aliens who are gang members. ICE works with state and local 
law enforcement agencies to investigate transnational gang members who 
are foreign-born and in the country illegally or have been involved in 
crimes. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE); 
Country: Honduras; 
Effort or project: Operation Community Shield--Honduras; 
Description of effort/project: ICE established Operation Community 
Shield-Honduras in January 2010 in conjunction with the Department of 
State. This specialized law enforcement unit in Honduras represents 
ICE's first international antigang task force and consists of four 
Honduran National Police gang enforcement officers and one ICE Special 
Agent. This specialized unit is charged with developing actionable 
gang intelligence to initiate and support current gang investigations 
in Honduras and the United States. 

Lead implementing agency: Department of State; 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: Security Threat Intelligence Unit Program; 
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this initiative is to 
collect, analyze, exploit and share gang intelligence within the 
prison system. According to the State Department, an effective 
intelligence program is essential in curtailing criminal activity both 
inside and outside the prisons since several thousand gang members, 
including much of the key leadership, are incarcerated throughout 
Central America. 

Lead implementing agency: Department of State; 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: U.S.-Central American Integration System[A] 
Dialogue; 
Description of effort/project: This initiative includes talks between 
the United States and countries participating in the Central American 
Integration System to promote regional coordination against 
transnational threats such as criminal gangs. 

Lead implementing agency: Department of State; 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Antigang Training; 
Description of effort/project: This initiative provides training to 
Central American law enforcement officials through the U.S.-sponsored 
International Law Enforcement Academy in El Salvador. Training 
includes investigative techniques, prosecution, witness protection, 
rehabilitation, and management of gang members in prison. Participants 
have included police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, border 
agents, and prevention and rehabilitation officials. 

Lead implementing agency: Department of State; 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Regional Corrections Advisor for Central America; 
Description of effort/project: The Regional Corrections Advisor serves 
as the regional corrections expert on the full range of corrections 
issues in Central America for the Department of State's Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The advisor coordinates 
corrections programs with the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement's Senior Corrections Advisor and the Regional Gangs 
Advisor for Central America. The advisor provides technical 
corrections expertise, policy guidance, technical assistance and 
training on behalf of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement for regional governments. 

Lead implementing agency: Department of State; 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Corrections Officer Exchange Program; 
Description of effort/project: Several state corrections departments 
have agreed to participate in this program for the identification and 
exchange of best practices with countries in the region. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: Justice Sector Reform; 
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this program is to 
provide technical assistance and training to strengthen justice- 
sector institutions in El Salvador that will allow them to improve the 
investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crimes including those 
committed by gangs. The recipients of USAID's assistance efforts 
include the El Salvadoran Attorney General and Public Defender's 
offices, the National Civilian Police, judges, and the courts. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: Dispute Mediation Centers Network; 
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program 
improves access to the justice system and promotes a culture of 
lawfulness and nonviolence by resolving conflicts through peer 
mediation. Through this program, USAID seeks to improve the 
reliability and effectiveness of the mediation centers through 
training, technical assistance, and public outreach. In implementing 
this program, USAID is working with the El Salvadoran Public 
Defender's Office, the Attorney General's Office, courts, schools, and 
selected municipalities. The program targets schools in areas with 
populations of students most at risk to be recruited to join gangs, in 
order to teach those youth how to resolve differences without 
resorting to violent practices or joining violent groups such as 
street gangs. USAID is also implementing a similar program in 
Nicaragua. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention 
Program; 
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with 
local-government officials, community leaders, and private groups to 
develop prevention plans in selected municipalities at high risk for 
gang activity. Specifically, 10 high-risk communities in five 
municipalities are participating in the development of crime 
prevention projects such as recreational infrastructure, sports 
activities, and vocational and arts centers. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: El Salvador; 
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy; 
Description of effort/project: USAID provides technical assistance and 
training to strengthen El Salvador's National Council for Public 
Security to formulate national-level policy on gang prevention and 
coordinate prevention activities throughout the country. USAID intends 
for this program to increase coordination between the national and 
local governments and bring together law enforcement officials, 
judges, and prosecutors to counter gangs and gang-related violence. 
Beneficiaries of this program are the government of El Salvador and 
selected municipalities throughout the country. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: Youth Centers; 
Description of effort/project: To reach at-risk youth, USAID started 
centers to provide a safe environment and access to sports activities 
and skills training. USAID is implementing this program through 
partnerships with faith-based organizations, the Rotary Club, 
nongovernmental organizations, and various municipalities. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: Youth Challenge Program; 
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program 
provides opportunities to develop new skills and offer free-time 
alternatives that reduce the vulnerability to gang recruitment for 
over 2,500 at-risk youth. This program builds on the results achieved 
under the Youth Alliance Program (responsible for "Youth Centers" 
above) and seeks to open additional centers and provide job placement 
to former gang members. This program partners faith-based 
organizations, the Rotary Club, small nongovernmental organizations, 
and municipalities. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: Community-Based Policing; 
Description of effort/project: USAID has sponsored this program in 
Villa Nueva, Guatemala, as part of an effort to reduce crime in the 
community--including crimes related to gang activity. According to 
USAID, the most important program activities include a diagnostic 
assessment to improve the effectiveness of the national police, police 
training, and youth crime prevention activities--including those 
related to involvement with gangs. For example, the program 
facilitated a number of interventions that targeted youth at risk of 
joining street gangs. Recipients of assistance under this program 
include police, prosecutors, and members of the judiciary in addition 
to the communities in which they all serve. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: 24-hour Courts; 
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, the purpose of the 
24-hour courts is to provide increased efficiency in processing 
criminal cases--including those involving criminal gangs over which 
these courts have jurisdiction. This program is a joint effort of four 
justice institutions in Guatemala--courts, prosecutors, public 
defenders, and police. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: United Nations Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala; 
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID supports the 
commission through direct funding and training of Guatemalan 
prosecutors and judges in the correct use of the law against organized 
criminal networks that have penetrated Guatemala. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: Crimes Against Life Unit; 
Description of effort/project: This program has provided for the 
reorganization of the Guatemala City Crimes Against Life Unit, 
procedural changes, and better case screening that has allowed the 
unit to increase prosecutions of homicides, including those related to 
gang violence. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: Desafio 100; 
Description of effort/project: According to USAID, this program is to 
help change public perception of reformed gang members. Desafio 100 
provides a partnership between USAID and the business community in 
Guatemala to provide 100 former gang members with jobs and special 
training. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Guatemala; 
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy; 
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID will promote 
and assist Guatemalan institutions to develop and implement a national 
policy to institutionalize and promote sustainability of crime 
prevention programs for youth at risk of joining gangs. Participants 
in this program include the government of Guatemala and the judiciary. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Honduras; 
Effort or project: Education for All; 
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with 
the Honduran Ministry of Education, schools, communities, and other 
donors to provide education and vocational training for at-risk youth 
that will result in alternatives to joining gangs. Volunteer 
facilitators with diverse backgrounds implement the program at 
learning centers situated in factories, businesses, schools, and 
community centers throughout the country. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Honduras; 
Effort or project: Civil Rights and Values for Youth; 
Description of effort/project: USAID intends for this program to 
provide civic education and problem-solving skills for 20,000 at-risk 
youth from disadvantaged populations in Honduras. According to USAID, 
students are less likely to engage in criminal activities if they are 
educated in values and reintegrated into society. Program participants 
receive training in the fundamentals of civil society, volunteerism, a 
free-market economy, and democratic participation. USAID's program 
partners include nongovernmental organizations, Regional Ministry of 
Education Coordinators, Peace Corps volunteers, and other local 
partners in order to target vulnerable youth subject to violence, 
migration, gang recruitment, and school desertion. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Honduras; 
Effort or project: Municipal Conciliation Centers; 
Description of effort/project: USAID intends for this program to 
promote crime and violence prevention through alternative dispute 
resolution. The program has set up seven centers throughout Honduras. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Honduras; 
Effort or project: National Gang Prevention Policy; 
Description of effort/project: Under this program, USAID partners with 
the Government of Honduras, local governments, the judiciary, and the 
private sector to develop a national policy framework for supporting 
municipal and community-led initiatives that address the root causes 
of gangs. These initiatives include job placement and infrastructure 
projects that support community efforts to address root problems and 
improve security such as educational facilities, street lighting, and 
safer community spaces. 

Lead implementing agency: U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID); 
Country: Multiple countries in Central America; 
Effort or project: Regional Gang Prevention Program, Central American 
Region; 
Description of effort/project: The purpose of this program is to 
support development of innovative gang prevention programs through 
small grants to various organizations. It will support public, 
private, and civil society organizations to implement gang prevention 
programs for at-risk youth and ex-gang members. This program address 
gang violence in three phases: (1) initiatives to prevent at-risk 
youth from joining gangs, (2) offer opportunities to entice youth to 
leave gangs, and (3) rehabilitation efforts for ex-gang members to 
prevent them from returning to crime. Recipients of assistance under 
this program include the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras along with the judiciaries in these countries. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by each applicable agency. 

[A] The Central American Integration System is a regional entity 
created by Central American countries to, among other things, promote 
regional coordination against transnational threats such as criminal 
gangs. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Federal Agencies' Entities and Mechanisms for 
Coordinating Transnational Antigang Efforts: 

Federal agencies have coordinated their programs to combat 
transnational gangs through working groups at the interagency level, 
coordinating groups within Central American countries, and federally 
led antigang task forces at the local level. For example, at the 
headquarters level, through the National Gang Intelligence Center 
(NGIC), representatives of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP), among other components, and the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) coordinate and 
share information on gangs that are a threat to U.S. communities. 
Table 5 provides additional information about headquarters-level 
entities' coordination of antigang efforts. These coordinating 
entities have different roles and responsibilities, but in general, 
they serve as mechanisms for deconflicting cases;[Footnote 51] 
providing law enforcement agencies with information on gangs and gang 
activities, including transnational gangs; and coordinating 
participating agencies' strategies and task forces. 

Table 5: Headquarters-Level Entities Focused on Coordination of 
Antigang Efforts: 

Entity: Anti-Gang Coordination Committee; 
Year established: 2006; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ Office of Deputy Attorney General; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals 
Service (USMS), DEA, BOP, Executive Office for United States Attorneys 
(EOUSA), Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
National Drug Intelligence Center, Civil Rights Division, Criminal 
Division, Office of Legal Policy, Budget Office, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Management Division, Office 
of Justice Programs, Attorney General's Advisory Committee, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, Tax Division, National Gang 
Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC), NGIC, and 
National Institute of Justice; 
DHS: ICE, CBP; 
Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service; 
Staff: None; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Organize DOJ's efforts to 
combat gangs, including to provide recommendations to Deputy Attorney 
General on all matters related to antigang activities, review 
applications for funds for gang-related task forces from U.S. 
Attorneys and approve creation of violent-crime task forces around the 
country. 

Entity: National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC); 
Year established: 2005; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, BOP, and 
National Drug Intelligence Center; 
DHS: ICE, CBP; 
Department of Defense: National Guard; 
Staff: About 22, including a director, two deputy directors, 13 FBI 
intelligence analysts, and at least one analyst detailed from each 
participating agency; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Provide law enforcement 
agencies with information and analysis of federal, state, and local 
law enforcement intelligence focusing on gangs that pose a significant 
threat to U.S. communities. 

Entity: National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center 
(GangTECC); 
Year established: 2006; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, BOP, USMS, and 
Criminal Division; 
DHS: ICE; 
Staff: About 14, including a director, deputy director, and agents 
detailed from participating agencies; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate and deconflict 
overlapping gang-related investigations and prosecutions and serve as 
a coordinating center for multijurisdictional gang investigations. 

Entity: MS-13 National Gang Task Force; 
Year established: 2004; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI; 
Staff: Supervisor, four FBI supervisory special agents, and six FBI 
analysts; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate the development of 
multijurisdictional FBI investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, 
including transnational investigations, into national-level 
investigations and prosecutions. 

Entity: Transnational Antigang unit (TAG); 
Year established: 2007; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ FBI; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ FBI, El Salvador's Civilian 
National Police; 
Staff: Two FBI agents; 
30 Salvadoran police officials and staff; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Provide information on MS-13 
and 18th Street gang members and their criminal activities in the 
United States and Central America. Information is shared between U.S. 
law enforcement agencies and the Salvadoran National Police. The TAG 
was created and implemented by the MS-13 National Gang Task Force to 
assist in combating the growing threat posed by transnational gangs 
and drug cartels in Central America. 

Entity: Gang Unit; 
Year established: 2006; 
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division; 
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ Criminal Division; 
Staff: 12 prosecutors; 
Coordination/information-sharing role: Coordinate with local U.S. 
Attorneys' Offices on legal issues and multidistrict gang cases and 
work with law enforcement agencies to achieve coordinated prevention 
and enforcement strategies. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ and DHS information. 

[End of table] 

In localities we contacted, law enforcement agencies obtained 
assistance from the antigang coordinating entities to support their 
investigations of MS-13 and 18th Street gangs and gang members. For 
example, in one location we visited, the National Gang Intelligence 
Center provided an analyst to an FBI antigang task force to help that 
task force analyze MS-13 gang data for an ongoing investigation. At 
another location, the FBI antigang task force obtained assistance from 
the TAG unit in El Salvador to help identify two MS-13 gang members 
who were in a Salvadoran prison and communicated with MS-13 gang 
members in the United States to direct the gang members' criminal 
activities. Additionally, DOJ's Gang Unit has assisted with the 
prosecution of MS-13 and 18th Street gang cases in the United States. 
For example, in one location we contacted, the Gang Unit assisted the 
local U.S. Attorney's Office with the prosecution of a gang case under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[Footnote 52] 
The Gang Unit provided this assistance because, according to the U.S. 
Attorney's Office, the office did not have enough experienced 
attorneys who were familiar with using the Act to prosecute gang 
members. 

At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies utilize task 
forces to coordinate their gang enforcement efforts. For example, the 
FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces coordinate with federal, 
state, and local law enforcement to investigate all active gang 
threats, but have conducted investigations on MS-13 and 18th Street 
gangs across the country. In locations we contacted, including Omaha, 
Nebraska; Los Angeles, California; and Charlotte, North Carolina, FBI 
task forces investigated MS-13 gangs and determined that gang members 
in those locations were communicating with gang members in El 
Salvador.[Footnote 53] Similar to the FBI's Violent Gang Safe Street 
Task Forces, ATF's Violent Crime Impact Teams, which partner ATF with 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to reduce firearms- 
related violent crime including gang crime, may investigate gangs with 
transnational connections in specific locations.[Footnote 54] For 
example, in 2007 ATF led an investigation in Baltimore, Maryland, 
involving MS-13 gang members who committed murder and robbery. Through 
its task force, ATF coordinated this investigation with other agencies 
including FBI, ICE, the United States Attorneys' Office, local police 
agencies, and the Salvadoran national police to investigate and 
prosecute these gang members. In addition, through Operation Community 
Shield, ICE works primarily with state and local law enforcement 
agencies to investigate gangs whose members are foreign-born or in the 
United States illegally, or both, or have been involved in crimes with 
a nexus to the U.S. borders.[Footnote 55] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed 
a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central 
America, we examined the interagency strategy, called the Strategy to 
Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico 
(the Strategy), and compared the contents of the Strategy to select 
criteria in our prior work on desirable characteristics of an 
effective national strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and 
methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3) 
desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and 
(4) delineation of roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 56] In regard 
to the National Security Council (NSC), we discussed its role in 
developing and implementing the Strategy with a mix of the departments 
and agencies that participated in the NSC's International Organized 
Crime Policy Coordinating Committee (IOCPCC) such as the Department of 
State (State), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID).[Footnote 57] We also examined 
the roles and activities of the various federal agencies under the 
Strategy including DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury), and USAID and their component agencies. To do this we 
reviewed antigang program documents and interviewed officials from 
DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, Treasury, and USAID in headquarters as well as 
component agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
within DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within 
DHS to obtain their views about the framework, including the different 
categories, of the Strategy. 

To determine how U.S. federal agencies have implemented programs to 
carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs, coordinated 
these programs, and assessed their results, we examined a mix of 
DOJ's, DHS's, State's, USAID's, and their component agencies' plans, 
performance data, reports, and assessments for fiscal years 2006 
through 2009. We compared federal agencies' efforts to coordinate and 
share information on their transnational antigang programs to criteria 
in our prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results- 
oriented government.[Footnote 58] To assess the reliability of 
statistical information we obtained, such as data on program 
performance and outcomes, we discussed the sources of the data with 
agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation 
of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this report. In addition, we examined federal 
agencies' funding allocated to transnational antigang programs. In 
particular, we reviewed agencies' budget requests for fiscal years 
2008 through 2010; appropriations acts for DOJ, DHS, State, and USAID 
for those fiscal years; and expenditure and other plans for the Mérida 
Initiative.[Footnote 59] To obtain information on federal efforts to 
combat the gangs as well as the extent to which the agencies 
coordinated their efforts with other agencies, we interviewed a mix of 
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in seven U.S. 
locations--Baltimore, Maryland; Charlotte, North Carolina; Laredo and 
McAllen, Texas; Los Angeles, California; Nashville, Tennessee; and 
Omaha, Nebraska--and U.S. federal, foreign, and three nongovernmental 
agencies' officials in El Salvador and Guatemala. To understand the 
process of how ICE handles and removes gang members who are in the 
United States illegally, we visited ICE's South Texas Detention 
Facility in Pearsall, Texas, and interviewed officials with ICE's 
Office of Detention and Removal Operations. We selected the U.S. 
locations and El Salvador and Guatemala based on a mix of criteria 
that included locations (1) along the U.S. borders, (2) where U.S. 
federal agencies have implemented antigang programs, and (3) where 
federal law enforcement agencies have conducted operations involving 
gangs with connections to Central America. For our site visits to 
foreign locations, we consulted with officials of federal agencies to 
identify in which foreign locations their agencies had efforts 
underway. Of the countries in the region, agency officials suggested 
we visit El Salvador and Guatemala because more antigang initiatives 
were underway and further along as compared to efforts in other 
countries. Given this, we selected these countries to obtain more 
information on these efforts and evaluate the effect they have had on 
the gang problem. We selected the South Texas Detention Facility 
because it was the facility identified by ICE officials for handling 
the most gang members awaiting removal. More specifically, in the U.S. 
locations we interviewed officials from some of the following federal 
agencies: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. 
Attorneys' Office; ICE; and in Laredo, Texas, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). We also interviewed a mix of state and local law 
enforcement officials in Charlotte, North Carolina; Los Angeles, 
California; Nashville, Tennessee; and Omaha, Nebraska. In Guatemala 
and El Salvador, we interviewed a mix of officials from the following 
federal agencies: DOJ's Office of International Affairs, FBI, DEA; 
ICE; State; USAID; the State-sponsored International Law Enforcement 
Academy; and DOD. We also interviewed a mix of officials from 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan government agencies, including the 
countries' national police and the Salvadoran prosecutors' office. We 
also observed some of the activities related to USAID-sponsored 
prevention efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala such as the youth 
centers and interviewed participants, local government officials 
involved in the efforts, and members of the community about their 
views and the effect of the programs. Additionally, we interviewed 
officials from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations 
such as the Organization of American States, Washington Office on 
Latin America, the Central American Coalition for Prevention of Youth 
Violence, the Centro de Formacion y Orientacion, and the Instituto 
Universitario de Opinion Publica to obtain their perspectives on the 
gang problem in Central America. We also interviewed officials from 
contractors and companies such as Creative Associates International, 
Inc., and Pepsi Co. that have partnered with USAID or participated in 
USAID efforts to establish gang prevention programs and provide 
employment opportunities for ex-gang members in countries such as El 
Salvador and Guatemala. The information we obtained from interviewing 
officials in the U.S. and Central American locations cannot be 
generalized across all locations in the United States or Central 
America. However, because we selected these locations based on a 
variety of factors, they provided us with an overview of the agencies' 
antigang programs, examples of coordination and measurements to assess 
results, and any challenges with implementation of the programs. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through April 2010 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

April 9, 2010: 

Ms. Eileen R. Larence: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

RE: Draft Report GAO-10-395, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have 
Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen 
Oversight and Measurement of Efforts (Engagement Code 440702): 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced 
above. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes two 
recommendations, one of which specifically is addressed to DHS. 

The draft report recommends that the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of DHS reach agreement on the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement's (ICE) role and participation in the joint U.S.-
Salvadoran Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in order to strengthen 
federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts and maximize use 
of federal law enforcement resources in El Salvador. We concur with 
the recommendation Officials within ICE's Office of International 
Affairs, Office of Investigations and Office of Principal Legal 
Advisor have reviewed and revised the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) TAG memo to clarify ICE/FBI roles and 
responsibilities within the TAG in El Salvador. Currently a memorandum 
of understanding is being drafted. 

The second recommendation is directed to the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs GAO recommends that the 
Special Assistant in conjunction with the Department of Justice, DHS, 
State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department 
of Defense revise the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs 
from Central America and Mexico. DHS officials defer to the Special 
Assistant to the President. DHS remains committed to assisting the 
Special Assistant and interagency partners in strengthening oversight 
and accountability for implementing the strategy and related 
revisions. This would include participating in a multi-agency 
oversight mechanism, which would use performance measures to report 
progress in implementation. 

Technical comments have been provided previously under separate cover. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael E. McPoland, for: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice: 
Office of the Deputy Attorney General: 
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General: 
Chair of the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee: 
Washington, D.C. 20530: 

April 13, 2010: 

Eileen R. Larence: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Team: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft Report on Combating Gangs (April 
2010) and for the opportunity to respond on behalf of the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ). In the report, GAO recommends DOJ and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reach an agreement on the 
composition of an anti-gang unit located in El Salvador, and the roles 
of its members. DOJ fully agrees with this recommendation and has 
already taken steps to facilitate such an agreement. 

As part of its gang strategy for the region, the FBI intends to create 
similar anti-gang units in Guatemala and Honduras. To strengthen 
federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts and maximize use 
of federal law enforcement resources in the region, DOJ strongly 
believes that any agreement to ensure DHS's participation in the 
current unit, located in El Salvador, should also address its 
participation in the forthcoming units. We are working to reach this 
broader agreement for our anti-gang activities in the region. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
Jennifer Shasky Calvery: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the United States Agency for 
International Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
www.usaid.gov: 

April 9, 2010: 

Ms. Eileen R. Larence: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Larence: 

I am pleased to provide the formal response of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to the GAO draft report "Combating 
Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang 
Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts" 
(GAO-10-395, engagement 440702). 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this 
letter as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely. 

Signed by: 

Drew W. Luten: 
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

Enclosure: a/s: 

[End of letter] 

USAID Comments On GAO Draft Report No. GA0-10-395: 

USAID appreciates the GAO's thorough investigation of the question of 
U.S. Government interagency coordination to address the problem of 
crime and violence related to gangs operating between the United 
States and Central America. USAID is committed to furthering the U.S. 
Government's anti-gang strategy and welcomes the GAO's attention to 
these critical issues; in addition to its targeted anti-gang 
programming, USAID has long been engaged in institutional capacity 
building of the justice sector and violence prevention in Central 
America. We also appreciate the GAO's recognition of our efforts 
toward monitoring and impact evaluation of our anti-gang program, and 
acknowledge the importance of increased inter-agency coordination to 
bolstering USG efforts against the threat of criminal gangs both in 
Central America and within the U.S. 

As the GAO noted, the gang problem is multifaceted, dynamic, and 
transnational in nature. As such, concerned actors continue to 
struggle with a dearth of reliable, accurate data on questions such as 
the numbers and demographics of gang members, or what percentage of 
crimes in Central America can truly be attributed to criminal gangs. 
This lack of reliable data presents a hurdle to measuring the overall 
impact of USG efforts to combat gang-related crime and violence. 
However, our progress has been significant. As noted in the report, 
USAID among others has helped to fill this information gap through 
activities such as the 2006 Central America and Mexico Gangs 
Assessment and our current efforts to measure impact of our Central 
American crime and violence prevention programs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant 
Director; Heather Dowey; Sally Gilley; Mike Harmond; Chris Hatscher; 
Michael Lenington; Amanda Miller; Janet Temko; and Adam Vogt made 
significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] National Gang Intelligence Center and National Drug Intelligence 
Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2009). The 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment is a 
collaborative effort between the NGIC and the NDIC to examine the 
threat posed to the United States by criminal gangs. The assessment is 
based on federal, state, and local law enforcement information and is 
supplemented by information retrieved from open sources. Information 
and data used for that report were collected through September 2008. 
The NGIC is a multiagency effort that integrates the gang intelligence 
assets of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities to serve 
as a centralized intelligence resource for gang information and 
analytical support. The NDIC was established by the Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-396, § 9078, 106 
Stat. 1876, 1919 (1992). Placed under the direction and control of the 
Attorney General, NDIC was established to "coordinate and consolidate 
drug intelligence from all national security and law enforcement 
agencies, and produce information regarding the structure, membership, 
finances, communications, and activities of drug trafficking 
organizations." Id. 

[2] MS-13 and 18th Street are Hispanic street gangs with members in 
both the United States and Central American countries. Throughout this 
report, we refer to "transnational gangs" as those gangs in the United 
States with connections to Central America. Appendix I provides 
additional information on MS-13 and 18th Street. 

[3] The IOCPCC is an interagency committee of the NSC made up of 
various departments and agencies of the federal government such as 
DOJ, DHS, State, DOD, and USAID. 

[4] GAO, Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance 
Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and 
Strengthen Assessment of Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708] (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 
2009). 

[5] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004), and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy 
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2006). 

[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[7] The changes to immigration laws were included in two major pieces 
of legislation passed in 1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 
Stat. 3009-546 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. These laws expanded the 
offenses that constitute an "aggravated felony" rendering a noncitizen 
removable, and contracted available avenues of relief from removal. 

[8] USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment (April 2006). 

[9] SOUTHCOM is 1 of 10 unified combatant commands in DOD. It is 
responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and 
security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean 
(except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), and Cuba as 
well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these 
locations. 

[10] The same U.S. Attorney serves the District of Guam and the 
District of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. 

[11] Only federal laws specifically assigned to other divisions within 
DOJ are outside the purview of the Criminal Division. For example, a 
National Security Division was established in September 2006 with 
specific responsibility for international and domestic terrorism and 
other national security threats. 

[12] The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program was established in 1986 to help train police officers in Latin 
America. Its mission is to work with foreign governments around the 
world to develop professional and transparent law enforcement 
institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce 
the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. 

[13] The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 
Training was established in 1991 to develop and administer technical 
assistance designed to enhance the capabilities of foreign justice- 
sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel to allow them 
to more effectively partner with DOJ in combating terrorism, 
trafficking in persons, organized crime, corruption, financial crimes, 
and other transnational crime. 

[14] EOUSA provides operational support for information technology, 
training, and other functions, and prepares an annual statistical 
report of U.S. Attorneys, among other functions. 

[15] INTERPOL is the world's largest international police 
organization, with 188 member countries. Created in 1923, it 
facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists 
all organizations, authorities, and services whose mission is to 
prevent or combat international crime. 

[16] Prevention refers to efforts to prevent, reduce, or minimize the 
incidence of gang activity and its negative consequences by dissuading 
at-risk youths from joining gangs. Intervention refers to efforts to 
support, encourage, and positively address the needs of individuals 
attempting to leave or who have left a gang, and may include efforts 
to persuade individuals to leave a gang. 

[17] The initiative was named for the location of a March 2007 meeting 
between Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderón of Mexico. The 
Mexican portion of the initiative is intended to complement U.S. and 
Mexican domestic efforts against drug, human, and weapons trafficking. 
Subsequently, Congress added funding for Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic to address concerns about increased drug trafficking in the 
Caribbean. 

[18] State has identified the following four strategic goals for the 
Mérida Initiative: (1) break the power and impunity of criminal 
organizations; (2) assist the governments of Mexico and Central 
America in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; (3) 
improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail 
gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish demand for 
drugs in the region. 

[19] Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1407(a), 122 Stat. 2323, 2340. Amounts 
appropriated for Mérida activities include those appropriated "to 
combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and 
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of 
law activities, and maritime security." The act appropriated $65 
million for assistance for the countries of Central America, Haiti, 
and the Dominican Republic, of which $2.5 million each was required to 
be made available for assistance to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 

[20] Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 7045(f), 123 Stat. 524, 887. Amounts 
appropriated for Mérida activities include those appropriated "to 
combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and 
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of 
law activities, and maritime security." 

[21] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 
7045(f), 123 Stat. 3934, 3374 (2009). Amounts appropriated for Mérida 
activities include those available "to combat drug trafficking and 
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform, 
institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities, and 
maritime security." As described above, funds requested for Mérida 
activities were directed to be made available for CARSI. H.R. Rep. No. 
111-366, at 1482 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 

[22] GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 
2009). 

[23] See H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 1482 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 

[24] See explanatory statement accompanying Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007), 
at 1041 (noting that additional funding had been provided in the act 
"to enhance the unique Federal role ICE plays in investigating and 
disrupting organized transnational criminal gangs"). 

[25] The Strategy was announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American 
Integration System summit on security issues. The Central American 
Integration System is a regional entity created by Central American 
countries to promote regional integration. Among other things, one of 
the objectives of the system is to set up a new model of regional 
security and eradicate violence. 

[26] According to State officials, U.S. embassies in Central America 
and Mexico and representatives from the Mexican and Central American 
governments also provided input to the development of the Strategy. 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788]. 

[28] In prior work, to develop these desirable characteristics of an 
effective national strategy, we reviewed several sources of 
information. First, we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to 
national strategies, as well as legislative and executive branch 
guidance. We also consulted the Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and 
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President's 
Management Agenda. In addition, among other things, we studied past 
reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to 
the desirable elements of a national strategy. Furthermore, we 
consulted widely within GAO to obtain updated information on strategic 
planning, integration across and between the government and its 
partners, implementation, and other related subjects. For more 
information on how these characteristics were developed, see 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T]. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788]. 

[30] GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other Actions 
Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport Perimeters 
and Access Controls, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-399] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2009). 

[31] In addition to establishing performance measures for Mérida-
funded programs in Central America, State plans to periodically 
discuss program results with countries in Central America. 
Specifically, under the terms of the agreements between the United 
States and the governments of each Central American country for 
implementing Mérida programs, representatives of each government will 
meet quarterly to evaluate the Mérida programs' progress toward 
achieving the performance measures described above. 

[32] Appendix III provides a complete list of federal agencies' 
programs and efforts to combat transnational gangs with connections to 
Central America. 

[33] When an alien is ordered removed from the Unites States, a 
consular official from the alien's country of origin must issue a 
travel document that allows the alien to return to his country. Once 
the alien's citizenship or nationality has been verified, the consular 
official issues a travel document to effect the alien's repatriation. 

[34] The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System is a 
national fingerprint and criminal history system maintained by the 
FBI. Incorporating gang members' criminal biometric data/fingerprint 
records from the Central American Fingerprint Exploitation should make 
the data/records accessible by all U.S. local, state, and federal 
agencies by means of this system. 

[35] The first round of exchanges occurred in May 2008 with four gang 
officers from El Salvador's national police traveling to Los Angeles 
where they spent 30 days with gang officers of the Los Angeles Police 
and Sheriff's Departments. The Los Angeles--based officers 
subsequently traveled to El Salvador for 30 days. The FBI then 
modified the program to a 3-week session that includes training at the 
FBI Academy and other learning opportunities in Washington, D.C.; Los 
Angeles; and El Salvador. In March 2009, 28 officers from 11 different 
law enforcement agencies across the United States, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala participated. In October 2009, 27 officers 
from law enforcement agencies in the United States, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama participated. 

[36] State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs funds the International Law Enforcement Academies. There are 
four academies, which are located in Europe (Budapest, Hungary), 
Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Thailand), Central America (San Salvador, El 
Salvador), and Southern Africa (Gaborone, Botswana); a regional 
training center in Lima, Peru; and a graduate-level academy (Roswell, 
New Mexico), in a cooperative effort with Treasury, DOJ, and DHS. 

[37] "Deconfliction" is the coordination and information sharing among 
law enforcement agencies on multijurisdictional investigations to help 
ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708]. 

[39] As of March 2010, El Salvador is the only Central American 
country to host a TAG. The FBI is in the process of establishing 
another TAG in Guatemala in 2010. Although one has also been planned 
for Honduras, it has been postponed indefinitely due to political 
unrest in the country. 

[40] According to ICE's country attaché, sometimes when special ICE 
enforcement operations ongoing in the United States result in a 
temporarily high volume of ICE requests for information, ICE has sent 
an agent on a temporary-duty basis to El Salvador to help the attaché 
process ICE requests and work with the TAG to fulfill the requests. 

[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[42] Criminal arrests include aliens subject to removal who are 
charged with criminal violations, whereas administrative arrests refer 
to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States but have not 
been charged with criminal violations. 

[43] As of August 2009, FBI officials stated that establishment of a 
transnational antigang unit in Honduras has been placed on hold 
because of the political instability in the country. 

[44] See Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America 
and El Salvador, April 18, 1911, 37 Stat. 1516. 

[45] We interviewed a mix of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
officials regarding MS-13 or 18th Street investigations in Los 
Angeles, California; Omaha, Nebraska; Nashville, Tennessee; Baltimore, 
Maryland; and Charlotte, North Carolina. 

[46] USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2006). This is the most recent regionwide assessment of 
gangs conducted by USAID. 

[47] The Mexican Mafia prison gang operates mainly within the 
California Department of Corrections. It is loosely structured and has 
strict rules that must be followed by the estimated 350 to 400 
members. Most members are Mexican American males who previously 
belonged to a Southern California street gang. The gang's main source 
of income is extorting drug distributors outside prison and 
distributing various narcotics within and outside the prison system. 
Some members of these prison gangs have direct links to Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations and broker deals for themselves and their 
associates. MS-13 and 18th Street are linked to numerous prison gangs, 
such as the Mexican Mafia, and these relationships are advantageous. 
Members must pay taxes to prison gangs in exchange for protection in 
prison. If members refuse, they risk being killed by the prison gangs. 

[48] SOUTHCOM, Intelligence Assessment: Criminal Gang and Drug 
Trafficking: A Relationship of Convenience (March 13, 2008). 

[49] The remaining four OMGs that make up the "Big Five" include the 
Bandidos Motorcycle Club (Bandidos), the Mongols Motorcycle Club 
(Mongols), the Outlaws Motorcycle Club (Outlaws), and the Pagans 
Motorcycle Club (Pagans). 

[50] "Support clubs" are members of subordinate clubs that swear 
allegiance to a mother club and whose purpose is to do the "dirty 
work" of the mother club. 

[51] "Deconfliction" is the coordination and information sharing among 
law enforcement agencies on multijurisdictional investigations to help 
ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources. 

[52] While the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was 
originally enacted to dismantle organized crime groups such as the 
Mafia, prosecutors have successfully used it to bring cases against 
members of organized gangs. The Act prohibits the commission of a 
pattern of racketeering activity to invest in, maintain an interest 
in, or participate in, directly or indirectly, an enterprise, the 
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; it also 
prohibits conspiracy to commit any of these activities. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§1961-68. 

[53] The FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces are part of the 
FBI's Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative which was designed to 
allow each field office to address violent street gangs and drug-
related violence through FBI-sponsored task forces. The task forces 
were established in 1992 to serve as long-term and coordinated teams 
of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and prosecutors. 
These task forces focus on disrupting and dismantling the most violent 
and criminally active gangs in the United States. According to the 
FBI, as of August 2009, 153 Safe Streets Task Forces are focused on 
violent gangs in 54 FBI field offices. 

[54] ATF's Violent Crime Impact Teams were established in 2004 through 
partnerships with state and local agencies to reduce firearms-related 
violent crime including violent gang crime in small geographic areas 
experiencing an increase in violent crime. According to ATF, as of 
April 2009, 31 Violent Crime Impact Teams were operating in locations 
across the country. 

[55] ICE's Operation Community Shield was established in 2005 through 
partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies as a 
national law enforcement initiative that targets violent transnational 
street gangs through the use of ICE's broad law enforcement powers to 
identify, locate, arrest, prosecute, and ultimately remove gang 
leaders, members, and associates from communities. Under this 
initiative, investigations focus on transnational street gangs whose 
members are subject to ICE's immigration and customs authorities 
because the members are foreign-born or in the country illegally, or 
both, or have been involved in crimes with a nexus to the U.S. borders 
(i.e., narcotics trafficking and human trafficking). 

[56] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004), and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy 
Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2006). In addition to these four characteristics, our prior work 
identified two other characteristics which were outside the scope of 
our review: identification of future costs and resources needed and 
discussion of the strategy's integration with other strategies, 
entities, or efforts. 

[57] During the course of our review, we attempted to meet with 
officials of the NSC to discuss the Strategy and its implementation, 
but were unsuccessful. 

[58] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[59] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-117, 123 
Stat. 3034 (2009); Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
8, 123 Stat. 524; Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-252, 122 Stat. 2323. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: