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Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee 
on Appropriations, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2010: 

Nuclear Weapons: 

Actions Needed to Address Scientific and Technical Challenges and 
Management Weaknesses at the National Ignition Facility: 

GAO-10-488: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-488, a report to the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In March 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, completed 
construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF). NNSA considers 
NIF critical to its stockpile stewardship program to ensure the safety 
and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, absent live nuclear 
testing. NIF is intended to simulate the extreme temperatures and 
pressures of “ignition”-—an atomic fusion event propagating a nuclear 
explosion—-for the first time in a laboratory. GAO was asked to 
examine (1) the extent to which NNSA has addressed key scientific and 
technical challenges that could prevent ignition at NIF; (2) whether 
NNSA has an effective approach for managing the cost, schedule, and 
scope of ignition-related activities; and (3) potential impacts to NNSA’
s stockpile stewardship program if ignition at NIF is not achieved, as 
planned, between fiscal years 2010 and 2012. To conduct this work, GAO 
analyzed relevant budgets, reports, and plans, and interviewed NNSA 
and national laboratory officials and independent experts. 

What GAO Found: 

Despite substantial progress, NNSA, its national laboratories, and the 
other organizations carrying out the NIF ignition effort face 
difficult scientific and technical challenges, which could limit the 
extreme temperatures and pressures that can be achieved using NIF’s 
192 lasers and, thus, delay or prevent ignition at NIF. As a result, 
successful ignition at NIF during the first attempt, scheduled for 
late 2010, remains unlikely, according to independent experts. In 
addition, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which operates NIF 
for NNSA, waited 4 years to implement a recommendation to form a 
standing external review committee of experts to advise on the 
challenges. Although a committee met for the first time in December 
2009, three factors could limit its effectiveness. First, the 
committee may not be able to give fully objective, candid advice, 
because the committee will take direction from, and report to, Livermore
’s Director, rather than to NNSA. Second, the committee will mainly 
review ignition activities after the fact, rather than advising on 
them sooner. Third, although its membership includes at least one 
scientist with significant nuclear weapons design experience, the 
committee may lack sufficient expertise to determine whether ignition-
related efforts will meet the future needs of scientists conducting 
stockpile stewardship research at NIF. 

Weak management by NNSA has allowed the cost, schedule, and scope of 
ignition-related activities to increase substantially, and further 
increases are possible. In 2005, NNSA established the National 
Ignition Campaign (NIC) to focus the management of ignition 
activities. Since then, however, NIC’s costs have increased by around 
25 percent—from $1.6 billion to over $2 billion—and the planned 
completion date has slipped by 1 year to the end of fiscal year 2012. 
Also, major new scope activities and milestones were added to NIC in 
2008 to prepare NIF for stockpile stewardship experiments by the 2012 
date. In addition, NNSA allowed tasks critical for the first ignition 
attempt—-such as constructing concrete doors to protect personnel from 
radiation—-to be removed from the NIF construction effort, which began 
in 1997, and deferred years later to NIC. Delays in completing the 
long-deferred tasks under NIC could delay, beyond 2012, ignition or 
other goals. 

There would be no immediate impact to NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship 
Program if ignition at NIF is not achieved by the end of fiscal year 
2012, according to NNSA and national laboratory officials. The 
consequences of not achieving ignition, however, would become more 
serious over time, possibly reducing NNSA’s confidence in the data it 
uses to certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. In September 2009, during the first stockpile stewardship 
experiments at NIF, Livermore scientists began using NIF to validate 
NNSA’s data and models on weapon performance under nonignition 
conditions. However, Livermore and NNSA officials said that only 
ignition experiments can help address some significant areas of 
uncertainty in predicting weapon performance, particularly as weapons 
in the stockpile age or are refurbished. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that NNSA take actions to improve its effectiveness in 
(1) using outside experts to advise on scientific and technical 
challenges—-by ensuring, for example, that the new committee reports 
to NNSA and advises on ignition activities early—-and (2) managing NIC’
s cost, schedule, and scope. NNSA agreed with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-488] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov or Tim Persons at 202-512-6412 or 
personst@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

NNSA Has Made Progress Toward Achieving Ignition at NIF, but Key 
Scientific and Technical Challenges Remain: 

Management Weakness Has Extended the Schedule and Increased the Cost 
of Achieving Ignition and Could Delay the Fiscal Year 2012 Ignition 
Goal: 

Failure to Achieve Ignition in Fiscal Year 2012 Would Not Immediately 
Impact NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, but Further Delays Could 
Limit NNSA's Options for Maintaining the Stockpile: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: National Ignition Campaign (NIC) Budget, by Major Scope 
Activity, for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2012: 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The National Ignition Facility: 

Figure 2: NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition: 

Figure 3: How Laser-Plasma Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF: 

Figure 4: How Hydrodynamic Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF: 

Abbreviations: 

EP: Extended Performance: 

MJ: megajoule: 

NIC: National Ignition Campaign: 

NIF: National Ignition Facility: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 8, 2010: 

The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Robert F. Bennett: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

In March 2009, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, completed 
construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a $3.5 billion 
research facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 
California.[Footnote 1] In this stadium-sized laser facility, NNSA's 
goal is to produce extremely intense pressures and temperatures that 
may, for the first time in a laboratory setting, simulate on a small 
scale the thermonuclear conditions created in nuclear explosions, 
known as "ignition." If successful, NIF may improve scientists' 
ability to evaluate the behavior of nuclear weapons without explosive 
testing. 

NNSA considers NIF a critical component of its multibillion-dollar 
stockpile stewardship program, which is responsible for ensuring the 
safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in 
the absence of underground nuclear testing.[Footnote 2] Stockpile 
stewardship involves refurbishing or dismantling aging weapons, 
conducting advanced nuclear weapons research, and maintaining the 
nation's nuclear production capabilities. In addition to NIF, NNSA has 
other experimental research facilities to support stockpile 
stewardship in all three of its national nuclear weapons laboratories: 
Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and 
Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and California. Although 
stockpile stewardship will be its primary mission, NNSA also plans to 
make NIF available to outside researchers for investigating basic and 
applied science issues, such as the physical properties of stars and 
planets and fusion energy production. 

Lawrence Livermore was responsible for carrying out the design and 
construction of NIF, with NNSA oversight, in a capital construction 
project that began in March 1997.[Footnote 3] At the same time, 
Lawrence Livermore and other institutions were conducting research and 
other activities--separate from the NIF construction project--to 
prepare for the first attempt at ignition that would take place 
sometime after NIF construction was completed. In 2004, Congress 
directed NNSA to develop a project management approach for controlling 
the cost, schedule, and scope of these separate activities.[Footnote 
4] In response, in 2005, NNSA established the National Ignition 
Campaign (NIC) to provide project management focus on the activities. 
The NIC participants, which include NNSA's national nuclear weapons 
laboratories and other research and industrial organizations, are 
responsible for planning and carrying out scientific experiments and 
related activities designed to set the stage for, and demonstrate, 
ignition at NIF, and for the completion of construction projects 
needed for the safe operation of NIF. In 2004, Congress also directed 
NNSA to enlist a group of outside experts, known as the JASON study 
group, to evaluate the NIC's initial plans and prospects for achieving 
ignition by the end of fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 5] In its 2005 
report, the JASON study group found that achieving ignition within 
this time frame would be unlikely and made a series of recommendations 
for addressing the many scientific and technical challenges that could 
delay or prevent ignition at NIF.[Footnote 6] 

As they focus on achieving ignition and preparing for NIF's role in 
supporting the stockpile stewardship program, NNSA and the NIC 
participants face scientific and technical challenges that have the 
potential to keep them from meeting their goals within the expected 
cost and time frame. In this context, you asked us to examine NNSA's 
progress toward its ignition-related goals for NIF. Specifically, we 
reviewed (1) the extent to which NNSA has addressed key scientific and 
technical challenges for achieving ignition at NIF; (2) the extent to 
which NNSA has an effective approach for managing the cost, schedule, 
and scope for achieving ignition at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and 
2012; and (3) the potential impact to NNSA's stockpile stewardship 
program if ignition is not achieved at NIF within that time frame. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed NIC project documents, relevant 
studies, and reports, and with assistance from GAO's Chief Scientist, 
analyzed scientific presentations and peer-reviewed articles by NIC or 
other scientists, as well as independent review reports by the JASON 
study group. We met with officials from the main organizations 
participating in the NIC, including Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, 
and Sandia National Laboratories; the University of Rochester's 
Laboratory for Laser Energetics in New York; and General Atomics in 
California. We toured NIF; facilities at the University of Rochester, 
Los Alamos, and Sandia for ignition-related stockpile stewardship 
research; and the target manufacturing facility at General Atomics. 
With assistance from GAO's Chief Scientist, we interviewed NIC 
participants to identify the key scientific and technical challenges 
for achieving ignition at NIF and their efforts to address those 
challenges. We also spoke with independent experts about the 
challenges of achieving ignition at NIF, including five members of the 
JASON study group, former NNSA laboratory scientists with expertise in 
fields related to ignition, and scientists from the Naval Research 
Laboratory's Laser Fusion Program. To assess the extent to which NNSA 
has an effective approach for managing NIC's cost, schedule, and 
scope, we examined NIC project execution plans, budget requests, 
progress reports, and other management documents. We also met with 
NNSA officials from the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and 
National Ignition Facility Project, responsible for formulating policy 
and budget guidance related to NIC and monitoring the NIC 
participants' efforts to adhere to NIC's cost, schedule, and scope 
requirements. To evaluate the potential impact of not achieving 
ignition at NIF by the end of fiscal year 2012 to NNSA's stockpile 
stewardship program, we analyzed briefings and studies of NIF's role 
in addressing aging and weapons performance issues and met with the 
lead weapons scientists at NNSA's three defense laboratories, who plan 
or carry out research in support of the stockpile stewardship program. 
We also discussed, with the independent experts, NIF's expected 
contributions to stockpile stewardship. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 to April 2010, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Nuclear fusion--the reaction that powers the sun--occurs when extreme 
temperatures and pressures force the nuclei of two or more atoms 
together. Scientists have previously achieved fusion during 
underground nuclear tests and in laboratory fusion experiments. 
Ignition--a fusion reaction resulting in a net gain of energy--has, 
however, only been recreated during nuclear tests. Scientists at NIF 
hope to use another man-made approach, laser-induced inertial 
confinement fusion, to recreate the intense temperatures and pressures 
under laboratory conditions necessary to fuse the nuclei of deuterium 
and tritium atoms (forms of hydrogen) and release helium atoms, 
neutrons, and a large quantity of energy. If ignition at NIF works as 
planned, the released energy would, in turn, fuse nearby atoms in a 
self-sustaining process known as thermonuclear burn. 

To achieve ignition, NIF will focus energy from its 192 laser beams 
simultaneously to deliver as much as 1.8 million joules (more commonly 
referred to by its acronym, MJ, which stands for "megajoules") of 
laser energy onto a target smaller than a dime. In a process that 
takes about one millionth of a second, the laser beams pass through a 
series of glass optics that amplify the energy and focus it onto a 
target located inside of a large spherical target chamber 10 meters, 
or over 3 stories, in height (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: The National Ignition Facility: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The illustration depicts the National Ignition Facility, with the 
following sections specifically identified: 

Optics assembly building: 
Control room: 
Laser beams with optics and amplifiers: 
Final optics system: 
Target chamber: 
Target chamber wall: 
Target positioner: 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

The target at the center of this chamber is a hollow gold cylinder, 
known as a hohlraum, which contains a tiny, peppercorn-sized fuel 
capsule consisting of a frozen deuterium-tritium layer surrounding 
cooled deuterium-tritium gas. As shown in figure 2, NIF's lasers 
rapidly heat the interior wall of this hohlraum, which converts the 
lasers' energy into X-rays. These X-rays then rapidly heat the outside 
surface of the fuel capsule. After sufficient heating, the capsule's 
outside surface blows off with rocket-like force, driving the 
remaining capsule wall and deuterium-tritium fuel layer within to 
implode. If this implosion occurs symmetrically, and at a sufficient 
velocity, it is expected that the deuterium and tritium atoms will be 
forced together in a fusion reaction, lasting about 10 trillionths of 
a second, and the fuel in the capsule will be ignited to temperatures 
greater than approximately 100 million degrees Celsius--hotter than 
the center of the sun. As the reaction is occurring, diagnostic 
instruments placed inside and around the target chamber are to take 
measurements and provide data on the reaction. 

Figure 2: NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The illustration depicts NIF's Approach to Achieving Ignition, with 
the following specifically identified: 

Fuel capsule (10 mm wide): 
Hohlraum wall: 
X-rays; 
Laser beams. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

To prepare for the first ignition attempt, NIC participants have been 
conducting experiments at various NNSA-funded facilities, including, 
very recently, NIF. The participants have also, among other 
activities, been developing many of the diagnostic instruments for 
NIF, including instruments to determine whether ignition has occurred. 
For purposes of NIC, ignition is being defined as a reaction in which 
the fusion energy output is greater than or equal to the laser energy 
used to create the fusion reaction. Currently, NIC's budget totals 
around $2 billion and covers activities from fiscal year 2006 through 
NIC's scheduled completion date at the end of fiscal year 2012 (see 
appendix I). 

NNSA's Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition 
Facility Project--which is part of the Office of Defense Programs, the 
organization responsible for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons 
stockpile--has oversight responsibility for NIF and NIC. Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory in California manages and operates NIF 
for NNSA and has the lead role in managing and coordinating NIC 
activities and receives most of NIC's annual funding. The other 
partners in the NIC campaign, listed in order, from highest to lowest, 
of the share of annual NIC funding they typically receive include the 
following: 

* University of Rochester's Laboratory for Laser Energetics (New 
York): This laboratory's OMEGA and OMEGA Extended Performance (EP) 
laser systems are considered to be NNSA's workhorse for ignition-
related research due to the high number of experiments conducted at 
the facility. Prior to the completion of NIF, OMEGA and OMEGA EP were 
capable of the world's most powerful laser pulse. For NIC, this 
laboratory performed target implosion experiments and developed 
diagnostic instruments. 

* General Atomics (California): A private company that manufactures 
NIF targets, including the hohlraum and fuel capsule, as well as 
targets for other NNSA research facilities. 

* Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico): Los Alamos scientists 
have developed nuclear diagnostics for NIC, conducted target design 
research, and worked on-site at NIF to lead or assist with experiments. 

* Sandia National Laboratories (New Mexico and California): Sandia's 
pulsed-power "Z Machine," which converts electromagnetic energy into X-
rays to create conditions of extreme temperature and pressure, 
supports NIC by conducting ignition-related stockpile stewardship 
research. Also, researchers at Sandia have developed diagnostic 
instruments for NIC experiments and worked at NIF during experiments. 

NNSA Has Made Progress Toward Achieving Ignition at NIF, but Key 
Scientific and Technical Challenges Remain: 

Despite progress, difficult scientific and technical challenges are 
likely to affect NIF's ability to achieve the temperatures and 
pressures needed for ignition. Furthermore, a newly established 
committee to evaluate NIC's progress toward achieving ignition may not 
be as effective as the JASON study group intended. 

Scientific and Technical Challenges Could Hinder Efforts at NIF to 
Achieve Extreme Temperatures and Pressures Needed for Ignition: 

While NNSA and the NIC participants have made substantial progress 
toward achieving ignition, two key scientific challenges, and a 
technical challenge, may affect NIF's ability to create the extreme 
temperatures and pressures needed for ignition. According to NIC 
scientists and independent experts such as the JASON study group, a 
key scientific challenge is to minimize the amount of laser energy 
that is reflected out of, or misdirected within, the hohlraum. 
Reflected laser light reduces the amount of energy available to heat 
and compress the fuel capsule, while misdirected light can negatively 
affect the symmetry of the resulting compression, thus risking the 
desired ignition reaction. As NIF's laser beams heat the inner walls 
of the hohlraum, a plasma, or ionized (electrically charged) gas, is 
created. While crucial for generating the X-ray energy needed for the 
implosion of the capsule, this plasma can also deflect incoming laser 
light out of the hohlraum, resulting in an important loss of energy. 
Scientists refer to the interaction between laser light and this 
plasma as laser-plasma instability. Alternatively, this instability 
can misdirect a portion of the laser energy from one beam into the 
pathway of another beam. If enough of this energy is misdirected to 
undesired locations on the hohlraum's inner wall, the fuel capsule 
might not implode symmetrically. Rather than maintaining its spherical 
shape as it compresses, the fuel capsule could instead flatten, 
lowering the probability of ignition (see figure 3). 

Figure 3: How Laser-Plasma Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 illustrations] 

1. NIF’s laser beams and the energy they provide enter the hohlraum, 
generating X-rays as they heat the hohlraum’s inner walls. The X-rays 
then heat the fuel capsule, helping it to implode and drive the 
ignition reaction. (For simplicity, only a few of NIF’s 192 beams are 
depicted.) 

2. As the beams contact the hohlraum’s inner walls, or as the X-rays 
contact the fuel capsule’s outside surface, ionized (electrically 
charged) gasses known as “plasmas” form at those locations. 

3. The plasmas can deflect the beams’ energy back out of the hohlraum, 
resulting in an important energy loss. Or, the plasmas can deflect the 
energy to undesired locations within the hohlraum, preventing a 
sufficiently symmetrical implosion of the fuel capsule. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

Another widely recognized key scientific challenge is achieving a fuel 
capsule implosion with sufficient velocity for ignition, according to 
NIC scientists and independent experts. For ignition to occur, NIC 
scientists believe that the fuel capsule has to shrink to a size that 
is about 40,000 times smaller than its original size. During this 
compression, the capsule must not only maintain its spherical shape, 
but it must implode at an extremely fast velocity in order to achieve 
the pressures needed for ignition. However, if the capsule's outside 
surface is not sufficiently smooth, or the X-rays produced in the 
hohlraum strike the capsule unevenly, the capsule's outside surface 
can protrude inward into the fuel capsule rather than blow away from 
the capsule with rocket-like force. The resulting protrusions are the 
result of "hydrodynamic instabilities," which occur when a material of 
lower density (i.e., the outside surface of the fuel capsule) makes 
contact with a material of higher density (i.e., the capsule's inner 
layer of frozen deuterium-tritium fuel). Having too many of these 
protrusions can prevent ignition, because they lower the temperature 
inside the fuel capsule, potentially reducing the compression velocity 
below that which is needed for ignition (see figure 4). 

Figure 4: How Hydrodynamic Instabilities Can Prevent Ignition at NIF: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

1. The fuel capsule must maintain its spherical shape as it compresses. 
Specifically identified are the following: 
Fuel capsule’s outside surface; 
Inner layer of frozen deuterium-tritium fuel; 
Deuterium-tritium gas. 

2. Hydrodynamic instabilities can cause the fuel capsule’s outside 
surface to protrude in finger-like patterns, into the frozen deuterium-
tritium fuel layer. These instabilities can prevent a fast, 
symmetrical compression. 

3. As a result, the fuel capsule may not compress spherically, 
reducing the likelihood of ignition. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to these two scientific challenges, NIC scientists face a 
technical challenge: controlling damage to NIF's glass optics-- 
particularly, the optics leading into the target chamber--caused by 
NIF's laser beams as they pass through the optics on their way to the 
target. Though the damaged areas on an optic initially may be few in 
number or very small in size--about the width of a human hair--they 
can increase in number or size the more the damaged optics are exposed 
to energy from NIF's lasers. According to the 2005 report by the JASON 
study group, if optical damage is beyond expected levels, the time and 
cost of repairing or replacing damaged optics could make it difficult 
or impractical to operate NIF at higher laser energy levels, including 
the 1.8 MJ-capability for which NIF was originally designed. 

Since NIF's construction, NIC scientists have taken steps to address 
these scientific and technical challenges, such as the following: 

* To minimize the amount of laser energy that is deflected out of, or 
misdirected within the hohlraum, NIC scientists have made several 
modifications to the hohlraum's original design and composition. For 
example, they removed the laser entrance hole liner, originally put in 
place to allow for more laser light to enter the hohlraum, after 
learning that it led to increased laser-plasma instabilities. NIC 
scientists also chose a new width for the laser entrance holes, 
allowing them to deliver less-intense laser energy into the hohlraum. 
Finally, they decided to fill the hohlraum with pure helium gas, 
rather than a mixture of hydrogen and helium, as originally designed. 
Following the completion of NIF's construction in March 2009, NIC 
scientists were able to test these modifications during the initial 
phase of their experimental campaign. As a result of these 
experiments, NIC scientists report that they are now able to limit 
laser-light deflection and misdirection due to laser-plasma 
instabilities to acceptable levels. 

* To improve their understanding of fuel capsule implosions, NIC 
scientists used two-and three-dimensional computer simulations to help 
predict how the fuel capsule's outside surface might mix with the 
frozen deuterium-tritium fuel layer during an implosion. They have 
also used other laser facilities, such as OMEGA, to study hydrodynamic 
instabilities, although, at lower velocities and pressures than are 
expected at NIF. 

* To address the challenge of optics damage caused by NIF's lasers, 
NIC scientists have developed a process to address routine damage by 
quickly repairing or replacing damaged optics so that the facility can 
seamlessly continue operations. During the first series of 
experiments, they have been slowly and methodically increasing the 
levels of laser energy delivered to the target, in part, to prevent 
optical damage. Laser energies during the first series of experiments, 
which were completed in December 2009, were gradually increased from 
laser pulses with 660 kilojoules (or less than a megajoule) of laser 
energy to pulses with laser energies as high as 1.2 MJ.[Footnote 7] 

While NIC scientists have made progress in addressing the scientific 
and technical challenges, independent scientific experts told us these 
challenges could still impede efforts to achieve the extreme 
temperatures and pressures needed for ignition. They also cautioned 
that, despite some early experimental successes, NIF will likely 
encounter unexpected or confounding scientific results or technical 
problems that are common in cutting-edge research and development. In 
2005, the JASON study group recognized the uncertainty of resolving 
these complex challenges and reported that achieving ignition at NIF 
in 2010, while possible, would be unlikely.[Footnote 8] In its 2009 
follow-up report, the JASON study group recognized the NIC 
participants' substantial progress since 2005 but cautioned that 
substantial scientific challenges remained.[Footnote 9] According to 
the 2009 JASON study group report, even after 4 years of additional 
research, the likelihood of achieving ignition at NIF in 2010 still 
remains unlikely. In particular, NIC scientists have not been able to 
fully resolve each scientific challenge because computer simulations, 
while important for developing an understanding of the science 
involved, are not sufficient by themselves to predict the results of 
actual ignition attempts or other experiments at NIF. And while the 
scientists have recently begun getting data from experiments conducted 
at NIF, questions remain that will require further investigation at 
NIF. For example, NIC scientists have not yet conducted any 
experiments at NIF testing the effects of hydrodynamic instabilities 
under ignition-like conditions. Until they begin using deuterium-
tritium capsules in experiments at NIF, instead of the plastic 
surrogate capsules currently being used, NIC scientists cannot be 
certain as to how well the deuterium-tritium capsules--planned for use 
during the first ignition attempt--will compress and whether a 
sufficiently symmetrical implosion will be possible. 

Additionally, independent experts are concerned that NIC scientists, 
for the first ignition attempt that is planned to take place at NIF at 
the end of fiscal year 2010, may not use enough of NIF's laser energy 
to compensate for inevitable energy losses out of the hohlraum. NIF 
was designed with the capability of delivering 1.8 MJ of laser energy 
to the target chamber. However, NIC scientists said they plan to 
conduct the first ignition attempt using laser energies between 1.2 
and 1.3 MJ. They predict that, at this level, there would still be 
enough energy left over for the capsule to reach ignition conditions, 
even after losses due to laser-plasma instabilities and other 
phenomena are taken into account. The scientists told us their 
innovations in target design, among other factors, will make it 
possible to achieve ignition with considerably less laser energy than 
NIF's 1.8 MJ designed capability. As a result, they do not plan to 
fire NIF's lasers at 1.8 MJ until the first half of fiscal year 2011, 
after the first ignition attempt. Moreover, during experiments in 
early fiscal year 2010 at NIF, months before the planned ignition 
attempt, energy losses due to laser-plasma instabilities were found to 
be within NIC's acceptable levels, according to NIC scientists. Even 
at laser energies of 1.2 MJ, the amount of total energy lost to laser-
plasma instabilities was 6 percent, meeting NIC's goal of keeping 
these energy losses below 15 percent. 

Furthermore, optical damage remains a concern. In March 2009, for 
example, NIC scientists noticed that some of the laser light moving 
toward the optics around the target chamber was being reflected back 
into the laser pathway, causing unexpected damage to the mirrors that 
direct NIF's laser light to the target chamber. Though the impact was 
limited, affecting only about 4 percent of NIF's mirrors, the damage 
occurred even at low laser energies. Additionally, according to NIC 
scientists, NIF's optics cannot, at present, adequately withstand 
routine exposure to higher laser energies, including the 1.8 MJ of 
energy for which NIF was designed. Despite major improvements in NIF's 
optics over the years, when NIF construction was completed in 2009, 
NIF's optics were incapable of withstanding repeated shots at 1.8 MJ 
without experiencing extensive damage. To improve the optics' 
performance under increasingly high energy levels, Lawrence Livermore 
recently began resurfacing certain optics with newly developed 
coatings, designed to provide better protection against high laser 
energy levels. Lawrence Livermore will take advantage of a 4-month 
pause in experiments at NIF, which began in December 2009, to continue 
resurfacing NIF's optics and complete other critical tasks. NIC 
scientists expect that NIF's optics will be prepared for 1.8 MJ 
operations in December 2010. 

Effectiveness of Committee Established to Evaluate NIC's Progress 
Toward Achieving Ignition May Be Limited: 

The committee formed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to 
review the NIC may not be structured in such a way that will allow it 
to be fully effective in evaluating NIC's progress toward achieving 
ignition. In 2005, the JASON study group recommended the formation of 
a standing review committee that would advise top NIF leadership on 
the allocation of scientific resources and provide peer reviews of 
critical scientific efforts, such as designing ignition targets. The 
JASON study group also suggested that the committee should hold 
regularly scheduled meetings and reviews, where proposals for 
scientific work, target designs, and the ignition shot plan could be 
discussed. Four years later, the NIC responded to this recommendation 
by stating that its activities had, in fact, been broadly examined 
during the intervening period, including semiannual reviews by a 
committee that reports to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Director, as well as occasional internal and external reviews of its 
target design and experimental plan. The JASON study group, however, 
determined that the narrow focus and ad hoc nature of these reviews 
made them insufficient to evaluate NIC's progress in addressing the 
complex scientific and technical challenges facing NIF. 

In February 2009, the JASON study group again recommended that NNSA 
and Lawrence Livermore establish a standing review committee of 
subject-matter experts to help manage technical and scientific risks 
and recommend the best course of action to achieve ignition. In 
response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory then established a 
NIC review committee that first met in December 2009. Chaired by a 
former national laboratory Director, the 13-member committee consists 
of scientists with recognized credentials and expertise in plasma 
physics, materials science, inertial confinement fusion, and other 
related fields. The laboratory's charter asked the committee to review 
scientific and technical issues, such as NIF laser performance, 
planned ignition experiments, and target designs. 

However, several issues could reduce the committee's effectiveness. 
First, the committee may not be structured in a way that will allow it 
to objectively analyze and render candid judgment on NIC's scientific 
progress. For example, Lawrence Livermore officials selected and 
appointed the committee's members. The committee will also report to, 
and take direction from, the laboratory Director. Reporting to the 
Lawrence Livermore Director, rather than to NNSA, may limit its 
members' ability to report honestly and frankly on any findings 
related to the scientific and technical progress of the NIC 
participants. In contrast, the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory 
Committee--a standing Department of Energy review committee 
established in the early 1990s--reports its findings to, and takes 
direction from, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, which 
has broad oversight responsibility over much of the department's 
nonweapons-related scientific research, or from NNSA's Administrator, 
if the findings are applicable to weapons scientists. This advisory 
committee is not limited to reporting to the organizations most 
closely tied to fusion energy research, such as the Office of Fusion 
Energy Sciences, which more directly manages fusion energy research 
for the Office of Science, or the national laboratories and other 
organizations that carry out the research. Second, the NIC review 
committee may not be as extensively involved in reviewing the NIC's 
scientific progress as the JASON study group intended. For example, 
officials at Lawrence Livermore told us they do not plan on asking the 
review committee to review experimental results until mid-2010, 
following the next series of experiments focusing on hydrodynamic 
instabilities. These plans do not meet the intent of the JASON study 
group recommendation or the general purpose of a standing review 
committee. According to the JASON study group, the review committee 
should be involved in making decisions on what experiments to conduct 
and what approach to take before experiments are completed. Further, 
the 2005 JASON study report called for the establishment of two 
separate subcommittees for the NIC: one to review laser-plasma 
instabilities and the other to review ignition fuel capsules. This 
recommendation signals the JASON study group's recognition that NIC's 
complicated ignition experiments should be reviewed with a high level 
of detail. Third, the committee may not have adequate representation 
from each of NIF's primary users, including those with significant 
experience in nuclear weapons design. For example, the committee has 
only one scientist with significant experience in nuclear weapons 
design. Since NIF's primary mission is stockpile stewardship, the 
committee might not have sufficient experience to determine whether 
NIC's approach is appropriate for creating a platform for future 
stockpile stewardship experiments. 

Management Weakness Has Extended the Schedule and Increased the Cost 
of Achieving Ignition and Could Delay the Fiscal Year 2012 Ignition 
Goal: 

The cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities at NIF 
and supporting facilities have expanded substantially because NNSA 
officials and NIC participants failed to follow required processes. In 
addition, weak oversight by NNSA has allowed the lead NIC participant, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to defer critical performance 
requirements, construction activities, and key equipment acquisitions 
needed for ignition experiments at NIF, which could delay ignition or 
other NIC goals beyond 2012. 

NNSA Officials and NIC Participants Did Not Always Follow Required 
Processes for Controlling Cost, Schedule, Scope Increases: 

The cost, schedule, and scope of ignition-related activities at NIF 
and supporting facilities have expanded substantially, in part, 
because NNSA and the NIC participants did not always follow the 
required procedures for controlling cost, schedule, and scope 
increases. To better manage NIC's cost, schedule, and scope, NNSA 
designated NIC as an "enhanced management program," requiring more 
rigorous standards and project-management practices than typical NNSA 
programs. In particular, NNSA's program management policies require 
that enhanced management programs follow an execution plan, which 
identifies the program's mission and establishes its cost, schedule, 
and scope. NNSA's policies also require that participants in enhanced 
management programs adhere to a formal process for approving any 
changes to the established cost, schedule, or scope.[Footnote 10] 

To meet these requirements, NNSA and the NIC participants adopted an 
execution plan in June 2005, formally establishing both NIC's total 
cost at $1.6 billion and its completion date at the end of fiscal year 
2011. The execution plan also defined NIC's mission and major scope 
elements for achieving ignition at NIF by the completion date. 
Furthermore, the plan outlined a process for controlling cost, 
schedule, and scope changes, which requires the NNSA Administrator's 
written approval for changes that would affect NIC's total cost, 
extend its completion date by more than 6 months, or change the scope 
in ways that would impact the overall mission. The plan requires 
approval from lower-ranking NNSA or NIC officials for less significant 
changes to cost, schedule, or scope. 

Despite NIC's enhanced management designation, the NIC participants 
did not consistently follow the more rigorous standards, and NNSA 
failed to ensure that the standards were being followed. Since NIC's 
cost, schedule, and scope were established in June 2005, its total 
costs have increased by around 25 percent--from $1.6 billion to over 
$2 billion--and its planned completion date has been extended by 1 
year to the end of fiscal year 2012. At the same time, NIC's mission 
and scope have expanded significantly. For example, in addition to 
achieving ignition once by NIC's planned 2012 completion date, the 
participants will need to achieve ignition repeatedly and reliably, as 
well as understand and control the results of ignition experiments. 
Moreover, within this same time frame, under the enhanced management 
program, the NIC participants must create a reliable "platform" for 
future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments at NIF. To 
create such a platform, the NIC participants plan to, among other 
things, develop and install special diagnostic instruments and optics 
for future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments, in addition 
to the ones for NIC experiments. 

NNSA officials and the NIC participants implemented these cost, 
schedule, and scope changes without following the required processes. 
Because the changes were extensive--affecting NIC's total costs, 
extending its completion date by more than 6 months, and changing its 
scope in ways that impacted the overall mission--the participants were 
required, under the provision of the enhanced management program, to 
obtain the NNSA Administrator's written approval before implementing 
the changes. On three separate occasions, however, the NIC 
participants revised the cost, schedule, or scope in the execution 
plan and implemented the revised plan without the NNSA Administrator's 
written approval as follows: 

* May 2006: The first revision to NIC's execution plan called for 
reducing NIC's total costs by around $14 million (1 percent) in 
response to a directive from an NNSA official in the Office of 
Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project, 
the office responsible for overseeing NIC. According to officials from 
that office, the revised plan was never submitted to the Administrator 
because Sandia National Laboratories, one of the NIC participants, did 
not agree with the changes. The NIC representative from Sandia told us 
the plan did not include detailed criteria for completing NIC's scope. 

* July 2007: In the second revision, NIC's costs were increased by $74 
million (4.5 percent) over the $1.6 billion total cost figure cited in 
the original June 2005 execution plan. Also, NIC's planned completion 
date was extended by one quarter through December 2011. NNSA officials 
from the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition 
Facility Project said they did not seek formal approval for the 
revisions because NNSA did not know, at the time, whether funding 
would be available to cover the cost increase. 

* August 2008: In the third and most recent revision, NIC's costs were 
increased by $404 million (24.8 percent) over the original costs, and 
the planned completion date was extended to the end of fiscal year 
2012. Furthermore, NIC's mission and scope were expanded to include 
the aforementioned effort to achieve ignition reliably, as well as the 
platform for future ignition and stockpile stewardship experiments at 
NIF. NNSA officials told us that achieving ignition reliably at NIF 
was always planned as a follow-on effort, but NNSA decided, instead, 
to include this work in the NIC. The officials said they did not seek 
the NNSA Administrator's approval for the changes because, at the 
time, the increased costs for NIC exceeded NNSA's overall budget for 
ignition-related activities in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, of which 
NIC is a major component. Similarly, the NIC representative from 
Sandia said he did not sign the revised plan because it was not budget 
compliant, and he felt it increased NIC's scope too far beyond the 
goal of achieving ignition at NIF. In the absence of a formally 
approved execution plan the NIC participants have been using the 
August 2008 revision to plan and prioritize their activities. 

In January 2010, officials from the Office of Inertial Confinement 
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project told us they were 
considering further changes to NIC's scope but that these changes 
would not impact the overall mission. They also said that efforts to 
revise the August 2008 NIC execution plan, which were previously under 
way, have been put on hold, until the fiscal year 2011 budget is in 
place. In addition, they said that NNSA plans to end the NIC enhanced 
management program at the end of fiscal year 2012, even if the NIC 
participants have not achieved ignition or a reliable platform for 
future experiments. Work on any remaining NIC scope, as well as 
routine operation of NIF, would continue beyond 2012 as a standard 
NNSA program, rather than an enhanced management one. 

Deferral of Key Activities Could Delay Ignition or Other NIC Goals 
Beyond 2012: 

Weak oversight by NNSA has allowed the lead NIC participant, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, to delay critical performance 
requirements, construction activities, and key equipment acquisitions 
needed for ignition experiments at NIF, increasing the risk that 
ignition or other NIC goals may not be completed by the end of fiscal 
year 2012. In particular, NNSA has allowed Lawrence Livermore to defer 
constructing major aspects of NIF's safety infrastructure, initially 
required under the NIF construction project.[Footnote 11] The 
infrastructure will be needed to protect personnel and the environment 
from exposure to radiation and hazardous materials during the first 
and subsequent ignition attempts. Without the infrastructure, the NIC 
participants would have to delay ignition experiments because they 
involve using tritium, a radioactive material that is key to an 
ignition reaction. Although NIF construction was officially completed 
in 2009, construction and installation of the safety infrastructure is 
currently under way as part of NIC.[Footnote 12] The work is expected 
to cost around $50 million, including: 

* $16 million for facilities and equipment to handle the radioactive 
tritium left inside of NIF's target chamber during ignition shots and 
other experiments with tritium-laced targets; 

* $13 million for concrete doors and other target-area shielding to 
contain radiation from neutrons generated during an ignition (or near- 
ignition) reaction; and: 

* $21 million for ventilation, filtration, detection, and 
decontamination systems and other safeguards. 

Deferring this work from NIF could delay completion of ignition or 
other NIC goals. As of September 2009--several months before the 
scheduled ignition attempt--construction of this safety infrastructure 
was considered to be behind schedule and over budget, in part because 
NIC's fiscal year 2009 funding was uncertain, according to NIC 
officials from Lawrence Livermore. According to NIC progress reports, 
by November 2009, satisfactory progress had been made, and the 
construction was no longer considered to be behind schedule and over 
budget. To speed progress, in December 2009, Lawrence Livermore halted 
all NIC experiments at NIF for an expected 4-month period, focusing 
instead on the safety construction and other critical tasks to prepare 
for ignition experiments. But, even if the safety construction is 
completed on time, the Lawrence Livermore officials told us that 
further delays are possible. Before ignition experiments can take 
place, the Department of Energy will need to inspect and approve the 
construction, and NIF staff will need to be trained and certified to 
work in exposed areas and handle dangerous materials. A delay in these 
or subsequent activities could threaten the NIC participants' schedule 
for the first ignition attempt or other NIC goals, thus increasing the 
risk of not completing NIC's goals by the fiscal year 2012 deadline. 

Similarly, NIC participants expressed concerns that a key diagnostic 
instrument would not be completed in time for the first ignition 
attempt. Known as the Advanced Radiographic Capability, the instrument 
would dramatically improve NIC researchers' ability to observe the 
fuel capsule as it implodes and reaches ignition-level temperatures 
and pressures. According to NIC officials from Lawrence Livermore, the 
need for such a capability had been identified long before NIC began, 
but NNSA instructed them to defer working on the instrument until 2009 
due to budget constraints. As a result, the NIC officials do not 
expect to complete the instrument--which is expected to cost nearly 
$42 million--until fiscal year 2011. Officials from NNSA's Office of 
Inertial Confinement Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project 
said they did not specifically instruct the NIC participants to defer 
the instrument, but given budget constraints, encouraged them to defer 
activities that were not absolutely necessary for the first ignition 
attempt in fiscal year 2010. Although the participants could attempt 
ignition in 2010 without the diagnostic instrument, the Lawrence 
Livermore officials said it will be more difficult to determine why 
ignition succeeded or failed without data from the instrument. 

Failure to Achieve Ignition in Fiscal Year 2012 Would Not Immediately 
Impact NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, but Further Delays Could 
Limit NNSA's Options for Maintaining the Stockpile: 

While there would be no immediate impact, the consequences to the 
stockpile stewardship program of not achieving ignition at NIF would 
become more serious over time--from delaying nuclear weapons research, 
to ultimately, reducing NNSA's confidence in its ability to certify 
the safety and reliability of the stockpile. NIF was designed to 
support nuclear weapons research and obtain additional data about 
nuclear weapon performance to increase confidence in the long-term 
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. As weapons 
age, cracks, corrosion, and the decaying of materials may affect 
weapon performance. Through the stockpile stewardship program, NNSA 
has assessed weapon performance by relying on data from past nuclear 
tests, sophisticated computer simulations, and routine surveillance of 
nuclear weapons in the stockpile to spot signs of deterioration as the 
weapons age.[Footnote 13] When the United States stopped underground 
nuclear testing in 1992, scientists did not fully understand all of 
the important details of how a nuclear weapon works. NNSA scientists 
told us that scientific knowledge and computational capabilities 
acquired in the meantime are still inadequate to understand all of the 
impacts on weapon performance and safety as nuclear weapons age. 
According to NNSA officials, when ignition has been achieved, and NIF 
is fully operational, scientists will be better positioned to address 
many significant gaps in their knowledge, as well as maintaining the 
skills of nuclear weapons designers. 

Despite the eventual importance of achieving ignition, there would be 
no immediate impact on the stockpile stewardship program if ignition 
is not achieved at NIF by the end of fiscal year 2012, according to 
NNSA and national laboratory officials. Most of the planned stockpile 
stewardship experiments at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and 2012 do 
not require ignition. According to NNSA officials, scientists will be 
able to obtain key weapons physics data by achieving temperatures and 
pressures just short of ignition, known as nonignition experiments. 
These nonignition experiments will, among other things, test the 
strength of materials inside nuclear weapons as they are exposed to 
intense radiation, temperatures, and pressures approaching those found 
in a nuclear weapons explosion. 

In September 2009, NNSA completed the first series of stockpile 
stewardship nonignition experiments at NIF. These experiments exposed 
materials to intense radiation, and scientists used the data to 
compare the predicted results with the actual results and make changes 
to computer models, as necessary, to predict weapon performance. To 
obtain these data, scientists used 700 kilojoules of laser energy--
less than half of NIF's full laser capability but more than 20 times 
the energy of OMEGA. According to NNSA scientists, understanding how 
these materials behave under extreme temperature and pressure, 
especially as the materials age, is crucial to understanding how a 
nuclear weapon will perform. Because models to accurately predict the 
behavior of materials in nuclear weapons are too complex for even the 
most state-of-the-art supercomputers, weapons scientists have long 
made predictions using less complete models that cannot precisely 
account for all performance factors. The inexact performance data 
provided by the current models raises uncertainties about the accuracy 
of predicting a weapon's performance as it ages or as changes are made 
to the weapon. Nonignition, as well as ignition, experiments at NIF 
are intended to allow scientists to improve these models and reduce 
some of this uncertainty. 

According to NNSA and Lawrence Livermore officials, however, some of 
the significant stockpile stewardship issues, and areas of 
uncertainty, can be addressed only with ignition experiments. 
According to NNSA officials, only NIF will be able to achieve the 
temperatures and pressures needed to study in a controlled laboratory 
setting the conditions that approach those found in a nuclear weapons 
explosion. The extreme temperatures and pressures that will be used to 
compress targets at NIF will help scientists simulate the conditions 
of actual nuclear explosions, providing them better data with which to 
predict the performance of similar implosions in actual weapons--
particularly in the presence of design irregularities that are 
sometimes found in those weapons as they age. New data from NIF on the 
nuclear reactions observed in imploding targets will be used in the 
annual assessment and certification of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. According to NNSA officials, the closer NNSA can get to 
nuclear weapons conditions, the less extrapolation is required, and 
the greater the confidence in its understanding of weapons physics. As 
a result, many of the stockpile stewardship experiments will require 
ignition reactions that, much like a nuclear detonation, produce 
significant energy gains--releasing 10 times the amount of energy, or 
more, than was used to initiate the reaction. According to NIC 
officials, achieving these high energy gains could require that NIF 
operate reliably at 1.8 MJ, although operation at lower laser energies 
may be sufficient. 

A long-term failure to achieve ignition, among other factors, could 
limit NNSA's options for refurbishing and making design changes to 
nuclear weapons to improve their safety and reliability. Although 
experts believe that current weapons refurbishment activities, which 
include replacing aging components, may be sufficient for extending 
the lives of deployed nuclear weapons for 20 to 30 years, doing so 
without ignition could constrain NNSA's options for ensuring a safe 
and reliable nuclear stockpile. An August 2009 review by the JASON 
study group found that life extension programs have not increased the 
risk of certifying the safety and reliability of currently deployed 
nuclear weapons. The JASON study group concluded that the lifetimes of 
currently deployed weapons could be extended for decades, with no 
anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those 
employed in life extension programs. However, NNSA officials told us 
that this approach necessarily requires manufacturing the same 
materials used in the original weapons and maintaining the same 
designs, because assessing a weapon's safety and reliability is 
partially tied to historical data from live nuclear tests. Changing 
the original design of the weapons increases the uncertainty about its 
potential performance, because the refurbished weapon cannot be tested 
using live detonations, and NNSA's ability to simulate similar 
conditions is limited. Furthermore, NNSA is finding it increasingly 
difficult to manufacture the same materials made 20 to 30 years ago 
and would, therefore, like to introduce some design changes to 
increase the safety and reliability of currently deployed weapons. If 
ignition is achieved, experiments at NIF could be used to study the 
potential effects of design changes, possibly giving NNSA greater 
confidence to make changes to weapons in the stockpile. But, without 
ignition at NIF or some other facility, NNSA's options for doing so 
would likely remain limited. 

In addition, according to NNSA in a March 2006 letter to Congress, a 
failure to achieve ignition may reduce NNSA's confidence in certifying 
the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, according 
to NNSA and national laboratory officials, depending on the reason for 
the failure. These officials told us that as weapons continue to age 
or are refurbished, the risk and uncertainty about predicting weapon 
performance increases, and only ignition experiments at NIF can fully 
address those uncertainties. A long-term failure to achieve ignition 
could signify problems with NNSA's models and computer simulations and 
call into question some aspects of NNSA's knowledge about weapon 
performance. However, these officials also told us that a failure to 
achieve ignition would not necessarily signal a need to return to 
underground nuclear testing. Nonignition experiments could continue to 
validate certain models for predicting weapon performance, and NNSA 
could continue to rely on other stockpile stewardship tools, such as 
supercomputing facilities, to maintain the safety and reliability of 
nuclear weapons. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified 
stockpile safety and reliability for the past 15 years without NIF or 
underground nuclear testing and could continue do so.[Footnote 14] 

Conclusions: 

Given the significant scientific and technical challenges that NNSA 
faces before it can achieve ignition at NIF, NNSA's ability to fully 
use NIF to generate new data in support of stockpile stewardship 
depends on achieving ignition. Although NNSA and the NIC participants 
have made significant progress toward ignition at NIF, it could take 
them longer than expected to reach this milestone, and any long-term 
failure to achieve ignition and produce significant energy gains could 
erode NNSA's confidence in its ability to certify the safety and 
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. In light of this, we are 
concerned that NNSA and the NIC participants have been slow to solicit 
help and ideas from outside experts with knowledge in inertial 
confinement fusion. In particular, we question NNSA's and the NIC 
participants' decision to wait 4 years--only months before the first 
ignition experiment is expected to take place--to implement the JASON 
study group's 2005 recommendation to form a standing external review 
committee of experts that could provide expert advice on the 
scientific and technical challenges. 

In addition, we are concerned that the committee currently in place 
falls short of meeting the intent of the JASON study group 
recommendation. In particular, we believe that the committee might not 
be as effective as it could be, given its reporting structure, its 
limited involvement in NIC's decision-making process, and the 
possibility that it may not have adequate representation from each of 
NIF's primary users. Committee activities, such as closely reviewing 
detailed experimental plans, could help create the needed level of 
committee involvement. Though the NIC has taken a positive step in 
forming the committee, we believe that an unprecedented, complex 
endeavor such as ignition requires a more effective external review 
component that can better evaluate whether NNSA and the NIC 
participants are in fact taking the correct approaches in their 
experimental campaign. Otherwise, NNSA and the NIC participants may be 
missing a valuable opportunity to draw on and implement the advice of 
recognized experts--and their contacts throughout the United States-- 
who may be able to provide fresh perspectives on such a challenging 
scientific experiment. 

Furthermore, because NNSA has not approved the most recent NIC 
execution plan, including its cost, schedule, and scope, as required 
by its own guidance, NNSA, in our view, has not been executing its 
oversight responsibilities as effectively as it should. Especially 
problematic is NNSA's failure to follow the processes required for 
making important changes to NIC's cost, schedule, or scope--as 
evidenced by the fact that NNSA's Administrator was never asked to 
formally approve major scope changes, which made the NIC participants 
responsible for achieving ignition repeatedly and reliably by the end 
of fiscal year 2012. Confidence in achieving ignition at NIF, and 
financial support for this expensive endeavor, could be jeopardized if 
the NIC participants do not achieve ignition at NIF by the end of 
fiscal year 2012 or complete these more ambitious goals within the 
proposed time frames and budget. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making six recommendations for addressing the scientific and 
technical challenges and management weaknesses. To enhance the NIC 
review committee's effectiveness, we recommend that the Administrator 
of NNSA direct the Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement 
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project to take the following 
three actions: 

* Have the NIC review committee report to, and receive direction from, 
NNSA's Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and 
National Ignition Facility Project on its review activities, instead 
of reporting to Lawrence Livermore's laboratory Director. 
Alternatively, the Director of NNSA's Office of Inertial Confinement 
Fusion and National Ignition Facility Project could appoint a separate 
review committee, serving a substantially similar function as the NIC 
review committee, to advise and report to that office's Director. 

* Involve the NIC review committee, or the separately appointed review 
committee, in NIC's critical decision-making, such as evaluating 
experiments planned on NIF, identifying potential weaknesses to the 
experimental plan, and recommending, if necessary, alternative 
approaches to address scientific and technical challenges. 

* Ensure that the review committee adequately involves nuclear weapons 
scientists that can help evaluate whether NIC's approach is 
appropriate for creating a platform for future stockpile stewardship 
experiments. This can involve increasing the number of nuclear weapons 
scientists on the NIC review committee or sharing information with 
weapons scientists at the national laboratories. 

To better manage NIC, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA 
direct the Director of the Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion and 
National Ignition Facility Project, with assistance from the NIC 
participants, to take the following three actions: 

* Develop an execution plan to establish NIC's cost, schedule, and 
scope. 

* Ensure that all NIC participants and appropriate NNSA officials have 
formally approved the execution plan. 

* Ensure that all changes to NIC's cost, schedule, and scope receive 
formal written approval from appropriate officials, as required. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided the National Nuclear Security Administration with a draft 
of this report for its review and comment. In commenting on the draft 
report, NNSA's Acting Associate Administrator for Management and 
Administration said that NNSA agreed with the recommendations and, 
overall, found that the report was fair and properly reflected the 
progress at NIF. NNSA's comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

NNSA also provided clarifying comments related to NNSA's oversight of 
NIC's cost, schedule, and scope, and the potential impact to NNSA's 
stockpile stewardship program if ignition is not achieved at NIF by 
the end of fiscal year 2012. We have incorporated these comments with 
one exception. We did not incorporate NNSA's proposed revision related 
to our statement on pages 22-23 of the report that scientific 
knowledge and computational capabilities, acquired since the United 
States stopped its underground nuclear testing, are inadequate to 
fully understanding the safety and performance impacts to nuclear 
weapons as they age. NNSA expressed concern that such statements would 
be misconstrued as meaning that NNSA's current stockpile certification 
methods are not adequate. We disagree since NNSA's own documents state 
that, as the stockpile continues to age and weapons are refurbished, 
existing stockpile assessment methods, without NIF--and, hence, 
without the capability to reliably and repeatedly demonstrate 
ignition--may become inadequate. Our report cites a 2006 NNSA letter 
to Congress, and NNSA has made similar statements to help justify NIF. 
For example, in its fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget request, 
NNSA stated, "Without the NIF, the nation's computational capabilities 
and scientific knowledge are inadequate to ascertain all of the 
performance and safety impacts from changes in the nuclear warhead 
physics packages due to aging, remanufacturing, or engineering and 
design alterations." 

In addition, NNSA provided detailed technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate Congressional 
Committees, the Secretary of Energy, the NNSA Administrator, and other 
interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or Tim Persons at (202) 
512-6412 or by email at aloisee@gao.gov or personst@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

Signed by: 

Dr. Timothy M. Persons: 
Chief Scientist: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: National Ignition Campaign (NIC) Budget, by Major Scope 
Activity, for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2012: 

Table: 

NIC scope activity[A]: Target development and manufacturing; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$195.9 million; 
Description: Design and fabrication of targets—including hohlraums, 
fuel capsules, and related components—for NIC target physics 
experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF). 

NIC scope activity[A]: Target physics experiments; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$504.0 million; 
Description: The experimental campaigns to be conducted under NIC, 
including the first ignition attempt, which is scheduled for the end 
of fiscal year 2010.[C] 

NIC scope activity[A]: Cryogenic target system; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$55.7 million; 
Description: Equipment and processes for positioning targets for 
ignition experiments and keeping cryogenic targets frozen at extremely 
low temperatures. 

NIC scope activity[A]: Target diagnostic instruments; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$216.7 million; 
Description: Design, fabrication, and operation of a suite of 
diagnostic instruments to detect and measure various physical 
phenomena during experiments, including ignition. 

NIC scope activity[A]: Personnel and environmental protection systems; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$49.5 million; 
Description: Equipment, infrastructure, and processes for protecting 
personnel from the effects of radioactive and hazardous materials that 
may be released during experiments, including the first ignition 
attempt. 

NIC scope activity[A]: NIF operation and maintenance; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$575.6 million; 
Description: Personnel, equipment, and other expenses for day-to-day 
operation and maintenance of NIF, as well as efforts to prepare for 
routine operation at peak laser energy (1.8 million joules) in fiscal 
year 2011. 

NIC scope activity[A]: All other activities; 
446.8 million; 
Description: Includes such activities as management and administration 
of NIC, development and acquisition of laser optics and systems for 
acquiring data from target diagnostic instruments. 

NIC scope activity[A]: Total; 
Total cost of NIC activities during fiscal years 2006 through 2012[B]: 
$2,044.2 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Ignition Campaign Execution Plan, 
Revision 3.1, August 2008, and other data provided by Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. 

[A] We grouped the scope activities in the table for purposes of the 
discussion in this report. The groupings do not necessarily reflect 
those that NNSA or the NIC participants use for budgeting, reporting, 
or other purposes. 

[B] Data on the total cost of NIC activities is current as of August 
2009. 

[C] NIC's budget for target physics experiments includes around $5.9 
million for experiments using "direct drive" ignition, in addition to 
the "indirect drive" approach for which NIF was primarily designed. 
Under direct drive, NIF's lasers would directly strike an ignition 
target rather than indirectly "driving" the target to ignition by 
striking a hohlraum to create X-rays. According to NIC participants, 
NIF will need significant facility modifications in order to field 
direct drive experiments. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 
Administration: 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

April 2, 2010: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20458: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
report, Nuclear Weapons Research: Actions Needed to Address Scientific 
and Technical Challenges and Management Weaknesses at the National 
Ignition Facility, GAO-I 0-488. In response to a request by the Senate 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on 
Appropriations, we understand that GAO performed this review to 
determine (1) to what extent has NNSA addressed key scientific and 
technical challenges for achieving ignition at the National Ignition 
Facility (NIF); (2) to what extent does NNSA have an effective 
approach for managing the cost, schedule, and scope of achieving 
ignition at NIF between fiscal years 2010 and 2012; and (3) what is 
the,potential impact to NNSA's stockpile stewardship program, if 
ignition is not achieved at NIF within that time frame? 

Overall, NNSA believes the report is fair and properly reflects the 
significant progress NIF has made. For the sake of clarity and 
correctness, below are some specific comments that, if accepted, would 
make a more balanced report. 

1. Page 17 — Second full paragraph: 

NNSA believes there might be a misimpression that "achieve ignition 
repeatedly and reliably" is a new assumed burden for the ICI, Program. 
This could be corrected by replacing sentence, "For example, 
...ignition experiments." with the following sentence: 

"Achievement of repeatable and reliable ignition was always planned as 
a follow on to NIC in order to prepare ignition for weapons program 
requirements. It was decided that it would be efficient to include 
this essential work in the body of the NIC effort." 

2. Page 19 — First paragraph: 

NNSA does not recall saying anything about an implicit action by the 
Administrator. We believe that it would be more accurate to replace 
the second sentence with the following: 

"The NNSA officials said they allowed the NIC participants to continue 
FY 2009 activities without a revised directed change because of the FY 
2009 budget being consistent with the proposed revised NIC Execution 
Plan." 

It was in the FY 2011 and FY 2012 budgets where we had concerns of 
major shortfalls. Also, NNSA officials did not move the proposed NIC 
Execution Plan Rev. 3.1 forward because it was not budget compliant. 
This is the reason it was not signed. 

3. Page 20 — First full paragraph: 

NNSA believes that adding the following sentence to the end of this 
paragraph will enhance both clarity and accuracy: 

"The NIF Project was completed according to the completion criteria of 
the rebaseline of 2000, as confirmed by reviews from the Laser 
Performance Review Committee in a letter to the NIF Project Manager 
signed on February 25, 2009." 

4. Page 23 — First paragraph: 

NNSA is concerned with the use of the terms like "inadequate" 
regarding nuclear weapons. An unequivocal term like "inadequate" might 
imply that our current weapons assessment methods are not adequate for 
certifying the stockpile when in fact they are. Our scientific 
advances will improve the assessment and certification process and 
meet the future needs of an aging stockpile. Replace "...mean time are 
still inadequate..." with "...mean time still need improvement...". 

5. Page 26 — First paragraph: [Now on p. 23] 

NNSA believes the sentence beginning with; "A long-term failure 
...weapons physics." is too strong and implies a broad lack of 
understanding of weapons performance. Thus, in a similar concern to 
the item above, NNSA suggests replacing this sentence with: "A long-
term failure to achieve ignition might limit the options that could be 
included for future weapons life extension programs. However 
officials...". 

6. Page 27 — Last paragraph: [Now on p. 24] 

NNSA believes it would be more accurate if the last sentence is 
deleted and replaced with: 

"If ignition is not achieved by the end of fiscal year 2012 then 
confidence in achieving ignition at all at NIF and financial support 
for this endeavor could be jeopardized." 

I am also enclosing general/technical comments for your consideration.
NNSA agrees with the recommendations. We recognize that even good 
programs can improve, and we are committed to quickly and effectively 
addressing GAO's recommendations for further improvement. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
JoAnne Parker, Acting Director, Policy and Internal Controls 
Management at 202-586-1913. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Talbot, Jr.
Acting Associate Administrator for Management and Administration: 

Enclosure: 

cc: Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs: 
NNSA Senior Procurement Executive: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov Tim Persons, (202) 512-
6412, or personst@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individuals named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant 
Director; Leland Cogliani; Kevin Craw; R. Scott Fletcher; Alison 
O'Neill; Cheryl Peterson; Kim Raheb; Jeff Rueckhaus; and John Smale 
made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The $3.5 billion cost includes $2.2 billion to design and 
construct the NIF facility and $1.3 billion to assemble and install 
NIF's 192 lasers and their associated components. 

[2] In 1992, the United States began a moratorium on testing nuclear 
weapons. Subsequently, the President extended this moratorium in 1993, 
and Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, 
directed the Department of Energy to establish a science-based 
stockpile stewardship program to maintain the nuclear weapons 
stockpile without nuclear testing (Pub. L. No. 103-160, sec. 3138 
(1994)). 

[3] In 2000, we found that poor management and oversight of the NIF 
construction project had increased NIF's cost by $1 billion and 
delayed its scheduled completion date by 6 years. Among the many 
causes for the cost overruns or schedule delays, the Department of 
Energy and Lawrence Livermore officials responsible for managing or 
overseeing NIF's construction failed to plan for the technically 
complex assembly and installation of NIF's 192 laser beams. They also 
failed to use independent review committees effectively to help them 
identify and correct issues before they turned into costly problems. 
For more information, see GAO, National Ignition Facility: Management 
and Oversight Failures Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-271] (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000). 

[4] Congress directed this in a report accompanying the Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005, H.R. 4614, H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 108-554 (2004). 

[5] JASON is an independent group of accomplished scientists that 
advises the U.S. government on matters of science and technology. The 
name "JASON" is not an acronym. Its sponsors include the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence 
community. Congress directed the JASON review of ignition-related 
activities at NIF in the Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4818 
(Pub. L. No. 108-447 [2004]), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2005 (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-792 (2004)). 

[6] JASON, NIF Ignition, JSR-05-340 (McLean, VA: June 29, 2005). 

[7] Although less than NIF's 1.8 MJ design capability, the 1.2 MJ of 
laser energy achieved during a December 2009 NIC-funded experiment, 
using all 192 lasers simultaneously, is the world's most powerful 
laser pulse to date. When operating at 1.8 MJ, NIF will be able to 
deliver 45 times more energy to a target than OMEGA. In addition, 
prior to producing the 1.2 MJ pulse using NIF's 192 laser beams, 
Lawrence Livermore produced a 78-kilojoule pulse using 8 of the beams, 
which Lawrence Livermore officials we spoke with said they considered 
to be equivalent to achieving nearly 1.9 MJ of laser energy, if the 78-
kilojoule value is applied to all 192 beams. 

[8] JSR-05-340. 

[9] JASON, Letter report addressed to the Office of Inertial 
Confinement Fusion, JSR-09-330 (McLean, VA: Feb. 13, 2009). 

[10] Standards for NNSA program management, including "enhanced 
management programs," are found in NNSA's NA-10 Defense Program-
Program Management Manual, November 2005. Enhanced management programs 
share many of the requirements of programs and projects carried out 
under Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project 
Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, including an 
execution plan and a formal process for approving changes. However, 
requirements under the Department of Energy order are generally more 
rigorous than for enhanced management programs. For example, 
independent peer review and formal departmental or NNSA approval is 
required before programs and projects managed under the department's 
order can proceed through various stages of planning, design, and 
implementation. 

[11] National Ignition Facility System Design Requirements, 
Conventional Facilities, April 1996; National Ignition Facility 
Subsystem Design Requirements, Laser and Target Area Building, August 
1996; and an addendum to the NIF project completion criteria dated 
Feb. 27, 1997. 

[12] According to NNSA, the NIF construction project, upon its 
completion in March 2009, complied with the project completion 
criteria, as revised by NNSA in 2000. Furthermore, in February 2009, a 
committee of outside experts verified that the project completion 
criteria related to the performance of NIF's lasers had been met or 
surpassed. 

[13] A key component of the stockpile stewardship program is annual 
surveillance testing, in which active stockpile weapons are randomly 
selected, disassembled, inspected, and portions tested--either in 
laboratory tests or in flight tests--to identify any problems that 
might affect a weapon's safety or reliability. Problems identified 
during surveillance testing can result in a "significant finding 
investigation" to determine the problems' cause, extent, and effect on 
the performance, safety, and reliability of the stockpile. 

[14] In 1995, the President established an annual stockpile assessment 
and reporting requirement to help ensure that the nation's nuclear 
weapons remain safe and reliable without underground nuclear testing. 
Subsequently, Congress enacted into law the requirement for an annual 
stockpile assessment process in section 3141 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. No. 107-314 (2002)). 
Specifically, section 3141 requires that the Secretaries of Energy and 
Defense submit reports to the President providing their assessment of 
the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon type in the 
nuclear stockpile. 

[End of section] 

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