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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2010:
Warfighter Support:
DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support
Future Military Operations:
GAO-10-472:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-472, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Contractors provide a broad range of support to U.S. forces deployed
to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contractors at times
exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has acknowledged shortcomings in how the
role of contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and
Afghanistan. In its report accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Senate Armed Services
Committee directed GAO to assess DOD’s development of contract support
plans. This report examines (1) what progress DOD has made in
developing operational contract support annexes for its operation
plans, (2) the extent to which contract requirements are included in
other sections of operation plans, and (3) DOD’s progress in
establishing a long-term capability to include operational contract
support requirements in operation plans. GAO reviewed DOD policies,
selected operation plans and annexes, and interviewed officials at the
combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
What GAO Found:
Although DOD guidance has called for combatant commanders to include
an operational contract support annex—Annex W—in their operation plans
since February 2006, we found only four operation plans with Annex Ws
have been approved and planners have drafted Annex Ws for an
additional 30 plans. According to combatant command officials, most of
the annexes drafted to date restated broad language from existing DOD
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces. Several
factors help explain the difficulties planners face in identifying
specific contract support requirements in Annex Ws. For example, most
operation plans contained limited information on matters such as the
size and capabilities of the military force involved, hindering the
ability of planners to identify detailed contract support
requirements. In addition, shortcomings in guidance on how and when to
develop contract support annexes complicate DOD’s efforts to
consistently address contract requirements in operation plans and
resulted in a mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership
and combatant command planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws
will contain specific information on contract support requirements.
Senior decision makers may incorrectly assume that operation plans
have adequately addressed contractor requirements. As a result, they
risk not fully understanding the extent to which the combatant command
will be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being
unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of
deployed contractor personnel.
According to combatant command officials, detailed information on
operational contract support requirements is generally not included in
other sections or annexes of the operation plans. Although DOD
guidance underscores the importance of addressing contractor
requirements throughout an operation plan, including the base plan and
other annexes as appropriate, GAO found that nonlogistics personnel
tend to assume that the logistics community will address the need to
incorporate operational contract support throughout operation plans.
For example, combatant command officials told GAO that they were not
aware of any assumptions specifically addressing the potential use or
role of operational contract support in their base plans. Similarly,
according to DOD planners, there is a lack of details on contract
support in other parts of most base plans or in the nonlogistics
(e.g., communication or intelligence) annexes of operation plans.
DOD has launched two initiatives to improve its capability to address
operational contract support requirements in its operation plans, but
these initiatives are being refined and their future is uncertain. DOD
has placed joint operational contract support planners at each
combatant command to assist with the drafting of Annex Ws. In
addition, the department has created the Joint Contingency Acquisition
Support Office to help ensure that contract support planning is
consistent across the department. For both initiatives, a lack of
institutionalization in guidance and funding and staffing
uncertainties have created challenges in how they execute their
responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making a number of recommendations aimed at improving the
ability of combatant command planners to identify contract support
requirements in their operation plans and ensuring the department
effectively institutionalizes its organizational approach to
addressing contractors in its plans. DOD agreed with GAO’s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472] or key
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Operational Contract
Support Annexes and Faces Challenges Identifying Detailed Contractor
Requirements in These Annexes:
Detailed Information on Operational Contract Support Generally Not
Included in Other Sections or Annexes of Operation Plans:
The Future of DOD's Initiatives to Improve Identification of
Operational Contract Support Requirements Is Uncertain Because of
Guidance and Funding Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Status of Annex W Development and Approval by Combatant
Commands as of February 2010:
Figure:
Figure 1: Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products:
Abbreviations:
ADUSD(PS): Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program
Support):
DOD: Department of Defense:
JCASO: Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 30, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long used contractors to provide
supplies and services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale and
scope of contract support the department relies on today in locations
such as Iraq and Afghanistan have increased considerably from previous
operations. According to DOD, in September 2009 the number of
contractor personnel working for the department in Iraq and
Afghanistan was about 218,000, with the number of contractors at times
exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. By way of
contrast, an estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military
operations in the 1991 Gulf War. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors
provide traditional logistical support, such as base operating support
(food and housing) and maintaining weapons systems, but also
nonlogistical support, such as providing intelligence analysts and
interpreters who accompany military patrols. DOD expects to continue
to rely heavily on contractors for future operations.
It is important to note that the increased use of contractors at
deployed locations, which DOD refers to as operational contract
support, is the result of thousands of individual decisions rather
than comprehensive planning across the department.[Footnote 1] The
department has acknowledged shortcomings in how the role of
contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and Afghanistan.
For example, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the growth of
contractor services in Iraq in many respects happened without a
coherent strategy.[Footnote 2]
Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the
oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces and
has identified the need to ensure that specific information on the use
and roles of contract support to deployed forces is integrated into
DOD's plans for future contingency operations.[Footnote 3] We also
suggested that DOD conduct a comprehensive reexamination of its use of
contractors to determine the appropriate balance of contractors and
military personnel and ensure that the role of contractors is
incorporated into its planning efforts.[Footnote 4] Congress has
expressed concerns regarding the department's use of contractors to
support deployed forces and has directed DOD to develop joint policies
for requirements definition, contingency program management, and
contingency contracting during combat operations and postconflict
operations.[Footnote 5]
DOD guidance has long recognized the need to include the role of
contractors in its operation plans. For example, joint guidance states
that military commanders must ensure that requisite contract planning
and guidance are in place for any operations where significant
reliance on contractors is anticipated, and planning for contractors
should be at a level of detail on par with that for military forces.
[Footnote 6] To provide greater details on contract services needed to
support an operation and the capabilities that contractors would
bring, DOD's guidance for contingency planning was revised in February
2006 to require planners to include an operational contract support
annex--known as Annex W--in the combatant commands' most detailed
operation plans.[Footnote 7] In addition, joint guidance gives the
combatant commanders the discretion to require Annex Ws for
additional, less detailed plans.
In its report accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 8] the Senate Armed
Services Committee directed us to conduct an assessment of the
implementation of DOD guidance on including contract support plans in
contingency operation plans.[Footnote 9] The committee also asked us
to look across DOD's plans and evaluate each plan's assumptions,
comprehensiveness, feasibility, adequacy of executable detail,
resources required and available, contracting-related operational risk
at each phase of the plan, and any other aspect of contracting support
planning. In designing and conducting our assessment, our objectives
were to determine (1) what progress DOD has made in developing
operational contract support annexes for its operation plans, (2) the
extent to which operational contract support requirements are included
in other sections of operation plans, and (3) what progress the
department has made in establishing a long-term capability to ensure
the inclusion of operational contract support requirements in
operation plans.
To address our objectives, we met with and obtained documentation from
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff to review key guidance on how contingency operation plans are
drafted and reviewed and obtain an understanding of how operational
contract support is addressed in this guidance. We visited all of the
geographic combatant commands as well as U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and some combatant command service
components to discuss their roles in drafting contingency operation
plans, how operational contract support was addressed in those plans,
and other related efforts to improve the preparation and planning for
working with contractors in future operations. We reviewed some base
plans and annexes at the combatant commands, comparing them to DOD's
guidance on plan development as well as its operational contract
support guidance in order to determine how well these documents
incorporated contract support. Specifically, we reviewed 7 of the 34
Annex Ws drafted or approved as of February 2010, 3 base plans, 4
Annex Ds (logistics), and contractor-related excerpts of a base plan
and Annex D. However, because DOD limited our access to its operation
plans, we were unable to provide a comprehensive assessment of each
plan's assumptions, comprehensiveness, feasibility, adequacy of
executable detail, and other aspects of operational contract support
as directed in the mandate. Nevertheless, we believe that the excerpts
of plans and annexes DOD allowed us to see, along with in-depth
conversations with planners and other officials responsible for
drafting or reviewing base plans and annexes, gave us adequate
information with which to assess DOD's progress in incorporating
operational contract support into its plans.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through February
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further
details on our scope and methodology are contained in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Although DOD guidance has called for the integration of an operational
contract support annex--Annex W--into combatant command operation
plans since February 2006, the department has made limited progress in
meeting this requirement. Planners identified 89 plans that may
require an Annex W. As of February 2010, only four operation plans
with Annex Ws have been approved by the Secretary of Defense or his
designee, and planners have drafted Annex Ws for an additional 30
plans. According to combatant command officials, most of the draft
Annex Ws developed to date restated broad language from existing DOD
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces but
included few details on the type of contractors needed to execute a
given plan, despite guidance requiring Annex Ws to list contracts
likely to be used in theater. Several factors help explain the
difficulties planners face in identifying specific contract support
requirements in Annex Ws. For example:
* According to combatant command planners, in order to identify the
details on contracted services and capabilities needed to support an
operation, planners need to know the size and capabilities of the
military force involved and how the plan envisions that force being
employed. However, most operation plans lack this level of detail,
hindering the ability of the planners to include details on contract
support requirements in Annex Ws.
* Current guidance complicates DOD's efforts to consistently address
contract support requirements in Annex Ws across the department.
According to planning officials, the current Annex W template was
created with DOD's most detailed plans in mind even though less than
10 percent of the combatant commands' operation plans are at this
level of detail. Some planners told us that the template's one-size-
fits-all approach makes it harder for them to meet the current Annex W
requirements. Further, while DOD's guidance requires Annex Ws for the
combatant commands' most detailed plans, the guidance leaves it to the
combatant commanders to determine which additional, less detailed
operation plans require an Annex W. However, there is no specific
guidance to guide the combatant commanders in determining which plans
should include an Annex W. As a result, we found that some combatant
commanders took a more expansive view than others regarding which
plans require the annex.
The one-size-fits-all approach to Annex Ws and the lack of specific
guidance regarding which plans require an Annex W has resulted in a
mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant
command planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws will contain
specific information on contract support requirements. Senior decision
makers may therefore assume that the combatant commands have
adequately addressed contractor requirements in a plan, even though
many plans do not contain Annex Ws or lack the expected details on the
anticipated contractor support needed to execute the mission. As a
result, they risk not fully understanding the extent to which they
will be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being
unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of
deployed contractor personnel.
In discussions with combatant command officials responsible for
developing operation plans, we found that detailed information on
operational contract support requirements is generally not included in
other sections or annexes of these plans. Although the Annex W is
intended to be the focal point within an operation plan for discussing
operational contract support, DOD guidance underscores the importance
of addressing contractor requirements throughout an operation plan,
including the base plan and other annexes as appropriate. However, we
found that nonlogistics personnel tend to assume that the logistics
community will address the need to incorporate operational contract
support throughout operation plans. We also found the following:
* Base plans generally lack information or assumptions on operational
contract support, according to DOD planners. Base plans are important
because most people reviewing an operation plan will look only at the
base plan and, in some cases, annexes for which they are responsible.
As a senior official responsible for logistics planning at one
combatant command remarked, if something is not in the base plan, it
might as well not be in the plan. If the base plan contains only
limited information on the use and role of contractors, this will
restrict the level of information available to senior DOD leadership
in assessing the potential risks associated with reliance on
contractors. For example, combatant command officials told us that
they were not aware of any assumptions specifically addressing the
potential use or role of operational contract support in their base
plans. Assumptions are used to focus attention of senior DOD
leadership on factors that could present risks to mission success.
* DOD has made limited progress in incorporating operational contract
support information in nonlogistics annexes of operation plans, such
as the intelligence annex and the communications annex, based on our
discussions with officials responsible for writing these annexes. DOD
guidance for these annexes directs planners to identify the means or
capabilities necessary for meeting mission requirements. Although this
guidance does not specifically mention contractors, contractors
provide significant support in these areas. The failure to include
contract support requirements in nonlogistics annexes makes it more
difficult for combatant commanders to understand their total reliance
on contractors to execute a mission.
Without better integration of operational contract support throughout
operation plans, it will be more difficult for combatant commanders to
understand the extent to which their plans rely on contractors.
DOD has launched two initiatives in response to congressional
direction to improve its capability to ensure that the operational
contract support requirements are addressed in its operation plans,
but these initiatives are still being refined and their future is
uncertain. First, each combatant command has been allocated joint
operational contract support planners to assist the combatant command
in drafting Annex Ws. However, the concept of the contract support
planners has not yet been institutionalized in DOD's operational
contract support guidance. Additionally, funding and staffing issues
remain, creating uncertainty regarding the long-term vision for the
program. According to officials responsible for the contract support
planners, the planners were expected to be provided by contractors
through September 2009, at which time the services were to provide a
mix of military and civilian personnel to serve as planners. However,
DOD declined to provide funding for these positions in the fiscal year
2010 budget, believing that the combatant commands could provide the
planners using existing personnel, but several combatant command
officials told us that the combatant commands would be unlikely to
dedicate their own resources to operational contract support planning.
As a result, the planners continue to be contractors who are funded
under supplemental appropriations. According to officials responsible
for the contract support planners, DOD has funded the planners in the
fiscal year 2011 budget. However, the budget does not provide
additional resources to fund the contract support planners and they
are working with the DOD Comptroller to find an alternative funding
source. Second, DOD has created the Joint Contingency Acquisition
Support Office (JCASO), among other things, to look across DOD's
operation plans to ensure that planning for the use of contractors in
future contingencies is consistent throughout the combatant commands.
However, guidance for this office, including its role in reviewing
plans, is still being developed. We found that the lack of specific
guidance has led to confusion regarding the JCASO's role in the
requirements definition process. In addition, according to JCASO
officials, the JCASO concept calls for a staff of about 30 people, but
as of December 2009, the JCASO consisted of only 5 individuals. As a
result of these staffing challenges, the JCASO has been limited in its
ability to execute its responsibilities.
We are making a number of recommendations aimed at better enabling
senior DOD leadership to determine the department's reliance on
contractors to execute future operations by improving the ability of
combatant command planners to effectively identify contract support
requirements in Annex Ws and throughout their operation plans and
ensuring that the department effectively institutionalizes its
organizational approach to addressing operational contract support in
its plans. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with our recommendations and identified additional actions
the department believes are needed to address our recommendations. We
agree that these actions are important steps toward addressing our
recommendations. The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted
in appendix II.
Background:
An operation plan describes how DOD will respond to a potential event
that might require the use of military force. It is a foundation for
an operation order, which entails the execution of an operation plan
by a combatant commander. An operation plan is used to deal with a
wide range of events, such as terrorism, hostile foreign nations, and
natural disasters. An operation plan consists of a base plan and
annexes. The base plan describes the concept of operations, major
forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing
the mission. Base plans are written following a five-paragraph
structure--Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and
Logistics, and Command and Control. Plans will include assumptions
that are relevant to the development or successful execution of the
plan and the concept of operation that the commander plans to use to
accomplish the mission, including the forces involved, the phasing of
operations, and the general nature and purpose of operations to be
conducted. In addition to the base plan, operation plans include
annexes that provide further details on areas such as intelligence
(Annex B), operations (Annex C), logistics (Annex D), personnel (Annex
E), communications (Annex K), and operational contract support (Annex
W).
Operation plans are broken into four levels of detail, ranging from
the least detailed, level 1, to the most detailed, level 4, as
described below:
* Level 1, the commander's estimate, has the least amount of detail
and is focused on developing the combatant commander's course of
action to meet a mission.
* Level 2, the base plan, describes the concept of operations, major
forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing
the mission.
* Level 3, the concept plan, is an operation plan in an abbreviated
format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to
convert it into a full operation plan or order. It includes a base
plan and some annexes, such as those for intelligence (Annex B),
logistics (Annex D), and communications (Annex K). It can also include
time-phased force and deployment data, which describe the military
forces and transportation assets required by phase of operation.
* Level 4, the fully prepared operation plan, contains the above
details as well as any remaining annexes and time-phased force and
deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional
support, and resources required to execute the plan and provides
closure estimates for their flow into the theater. It can be quickly
converted into an operations order.
DOD has an established a joint operation planning process to develop
plans in response to contingencies and crises, including the
contingency planning process for developing and reviewing operation
plans. The department uses contingency planning to develop its
operation plans, and Joint Publication 5-0 is DOD's keystone guidance
for joint operation planning.[Footnote 10] The Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System manuals provide more detailed guidance
on the format of plans, including templates for the base plan and
annexes.[Footnote 11] Contingency planning begins with broad strategic
guidance provided by the President of the United States, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
strategic guidance includes DOD documents, such as the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan and the Guidance for the Employment of the Force,
which tell combatant commanders what to plan for within their areas of
responsibility. Combatant commanders can also initiate contingency
planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered
necessary to discharge command responsibilities. Based on the
strategic guidance, combatant command planners write an operation
plan. During this stage, a combatant commander can also task and
provide guidance to the component commands to develop supporting plans
for an operation plan. As a plan is developed, DOD guidance calls for
frequent dialogue between planners and senior DOD leadership to ensure
that results are sufficient and feasible to meet mission objectives.
DOD guidance also identifies three distinct areas for in-progress
reviews with the Secretary of Defense or other senior DOD leadership
during plan development: (1) the commander's mission analysis of
strategic guidance, (2) the commander's concept of operations for the
mission, and (3) the combatant command's operation plan.[Footnote 12]
The Joint Planning and Execution Community, which is made up of a
broad range of military leadership and DOD agencies, reviews all level
3 and level 4 plans prior to the final in-progress reviews and when
requested to do so by a combatant commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, the J-
7, works with the combatant command to determine when an in-progress
review of a plan will take place. Based on a plan's priority, the
Secretary of Defense may delegate plan approval authority to other DOD
senior leadership. Plans that do not require in-progress reviews can
be approved by the combatant commanders. After a plan is approved, it
is supposed to go through periodic reviews that are initiated by the
Joint Staff J-7, which maintains the department's plan review
schedule. For top-priority plans, guidance calls for reviews every 9
months; other plans are to be reviewed every 12 months. When DOD
decides to execute a plan, the combatant commander issues an operation
order that has been sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for approval by the Secretary of Defense or the President. The joint
operation planning activities, functions, and products are illustrated
in figure 1.
Figure 1: Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Planning function: Strategic guidance;
IPR:
Products:
Approved Mission;
Warning order.
Planning function: Concept development;
IPR:
Products:
Approved concept;
Planning order.
Planning function: Plan development;
IPR:
Products:
Approved plan.
Planning function: Plan assessment (refine, adapt, terminate, execute);
Six month review cycle:
Approved plan:
- Base plan;
- Concept plan;
- Operations plan; Operations order;
Alert order;
Execute order;
Deployment order.
Source: Joint Publication 5-0.
Legend: IPR = in-progress review.
[End of figure]
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Operational Contract
Support Annexes and Faces Challenges Identifying Detailed Contractor
Requirements in These Annexes:
Few Approved Operation Plans Include an Operational Contract Support
Annex:
Although the requirement for the Annex W--the operational contract
support annex--has been in DOD's guidance since early 2006, we found
that few of the operation plans approved by the Secretary of Defense
or his designee as of February 2010 included an Annex W. Starting in
September 2007, each of the six geographic combatant commands has been
allocated joint operational contract support planners (hereafter
referred to as contract support planners) to assist them in drafting
these annexes. These contract support planners have been reviewing
existing operation plans to determine the extent to which they address
operational contract support. Based on their review, the planners have
identified 89 plans--varying from level 1 to level 4 plans--that may
require an Annex W. Specifically, the contract support planners found:
* two level 4 operation plans that require Annex Ws in accordance with
joint guidance;
* in some cases, combatant command officials determined that certain
level 2 and 3 operation plans should also have Annex Ws;
* in other cases, combatant command officials determined that
operational contract support issues should be addressed in the
logistics annexes (Annex D) of less-detailed plans rather than
developing stand-alone Annex Ws; and:
* two Annex Ws were developed and approved prior to the arrival of the
contract support planners, but were later determined insufficient to
meet the requirements for the Annex W.
According to combatant command planners, four operation plans with
Annex Ws have been approved by the Secretary of Defense or his
designee, although the contract support planners determined two of
these annexes were insufficient. In addition, the contract support
planners have drafted Annex Ws for 30 of these plans to date. Planning
officials at the combatant commands told us that several plans with
draft Annex Ws are currently in the plan review process and are
expected to be approved over the next year. Table 1 summarizes the
development of Annex Ws by combatant commands as of February 2010.
Table 1: Status of Annex W Development and Approval by Combatant
Commands as of February 2010:
Combatant command: U.S. Africa Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 6;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 5;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 0.
Combatant command: U.S. Central Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 6;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 1;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 2[A].
Combatant command: U.S. European Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 8;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 5;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 2.
Combatant command: U.S. Northern Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 4;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 2;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 0.
Combatant command: U.S. Pacific Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 2;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 1;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 0.
Combatant command: U.S. Southern Command;
Number of Annex Ws drafted by contract support planners: 4;
Number of Annex Ws currently in the plan review process: 1;
Number of Annex Ws in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense or
his designee: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of information from geographic combatant commands.
[A] Contract support planners at U.S. Central Command told us that two
Annex Ws had been completed prior to their arrival, but they
subsequently determined that these annexes were not sufficient. The
officials told us that these annexes will be revised when the plans
are updated in fiscal year 2010.
[End of table]
Most Annex Ws Developed to Date Lack Specific Information on Contract
Support Requirements:
Although contract support planners have been working to develop Annex
Ws, we found that those annexes provide little insight into the extent
to which DOD will need to rely on contractors to support contingency
operations. According to combatant command planning officials, most of
the draft Annex Ws restate broad language from existing operational
contract support guidance. Similarly, we reviewed two draft Annex Ws
at U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command and found that they
consisted largely of language drawn from DOD's high-level guidance on
operational contract support: Joint Publication 4-10, DOD's doctrine
for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support
in joint operations, and DOD Instruction 3020.41, the source of DOD's
policy and procedures concerning operational contract support.
[Footnote 13]
Although this reference to guidance is an improvement over how
contractors were previously addressed in the contingency planning
process, DOD's planning guidance includes an Annex W template that
requires the annex to include a list of contracts likely to be used in
theater and the capabilities they would provide. Moreover, Joint
Publication 4-10 states that in developing Annex Ws, planners should
identify military capability shortfalls that require contract
solutions and ensure that combatant commanders are aware of the
general scope and scale of contracted support to be utilized for an
operation. We reviewed seven draft Annex Ws at various combatant
commands and found that the annexes contained general information on
what should be done in contingency operations, such as considering the
use of external support contracts for logistics and selected
nonlogistics support. However, those Annex Ws did not generally
identify specific steps to be taken to determine when to use such
contracts or who is responsible for making those determinations. We
found that six of the seven Annex Ws we reviewed lacked details on
contract support requirements, such as the number and type of
contractors that would be needed to execute any given plan. For
example:
* One combatant command had a level 3 plan that provided details on
the military forces expected to be used to support various aspects of
the operation. However, the draft Annex W for this plan consisted
largely of information from other DOD guidance and did not clearly
spell out expected contract support for the operation or define
specific contractor-related responsibilities.
* The draft Annex W for a level 4 plan with time-phased force and
deployment data at another combatant command also consisted largely of
references to existing guidance and lacked specific information on
contract support needed to execute the mission.[Footnote 14] Planners
acknowledged that while the plan provides details regarding military
forces, they have not developed the same level of detail regarding
contractors.
With regard to the broader set of draft Annex Ws, including but not
limited to the annexes we were able to review, several planners told
us that there is not much variance across the annexes they have
developed or reviewed to date. Moreover, several combatant command
officials stated that for almost all of their plans, the level of
detail on operational contract support contained in an Annex W would
not enable a combatant commander to identify for senior DOD leadership
the extent to which an operation relied on contractors. As our
previous work has shown, DOD's lack of understanding of its reliance
on contractors can hinder its ability to effectively manage and
oversee contractors, raising the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse and
potentially resulting in negative impacts on military operations and
unit morale.[Footnote 15]
In contrast, a few draft Annex Ws contain a detailed discussion of
contract support. For example, we reviewed a detailed Annex W that
U.S. Southern Command had developed for one operation plan that lays
out expected contractor support by phase of operation and identifies
several existing contracts that could be used to support the
operation. According to officials at U.S. Southern Command, this
detailed Annex W is useful to them because it helps them identify
existing capabilities and shortfalls and to consider where contracts
should be augmented or added. In addition, U.S. Central Command
officials told us that they were identifying more detailed contract
support requirements in the draft Annex W of one of their operation
plans.
Limited Information Hinders DOD's Ability to Include Details on
Contract Support Requirements in Annex Ws:
Combatant command planners told us that they are unable to identify
specific contract support requirements as called for in Annex W
guidance because of the limited amount of information contained in
most operation plans. In order to identify the details on contracted
services and capabilities needed to support an operation, planners
need to know the size and capabilities of the military force involved
and how the plan envisions that force being employed. For example, in
order to make reasonable judgments on the contractor support required
for base operating support (e.g., food and housing), planners told us
that they would need to know the number of personnel to be supported
and the base operating support capabilities the military force would
provide. Engineers at U.S. Southern Command told us that the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has developed standards for housing, latrines,
dining facilities, and other structures used to construct a base camp,
and they look at the force structure and units coming in to build the
support structure. Similarly, planning officials at U.S. European
Command told us that if a plan has force packages in it, they would
identify what will be provided by the military and what will be
provided by contractors for things such as housing, food services, and
other support.
However, most operation plans address broad missions but do not
contain details on specific courses of action or identify the specific
military forces required to meet the mission. For example, combatant
commands have plans to evacuate U.S. citizens or provide humanitarian
assistance, but these plans do not provide details on the size of the
mission, such as the number of people to be evacuated or assisted.
Additionally, operation plans lay out key tasks for accomplishing the
mission, but these tasks may also lack specific details needed to
identify potential contract support requirements. For example, a key
task in one operation plan could be to provide precision strike
capability within 72 hours. Combatant command officials noted that
this is a description of a capability rather than a specific
description of the number or type of units required. Therefore, a
response to this task could involve 2 aircraft or 100 aircraft.
Planners told us that the lack of information on military forces and
the capabilities they bring makes it difficult for them to identify
specific contract support requirements as called for in Annex W
guidance.
There are a few operation plans that contained sufficient details on
the scale of effort involved and the size and capabilities of the
military force to enable contract support planners to develop more
detailed Annex Ws that identify capabilities that could reasonably be
expected to be provided by contractors. For example, we reviewed one
operation plan at U.S. Southern Command that contains significant
details regarding the size of the military operation and the
capabilities needed to execute the plan. As a result, as discussed
earlier, planners were able to develop a more detailed Annex W that
describes expected contractor support by phase of operation and
identifies existing contracts that could be used to support the
operation. The annex also outlines the staffing for a Joint Theater
Support Contracting Command to support theater contracting efforts.
However, this is a plan for a highly defined operation of limited
scope, which enabled planners to more readily develop a detailed Annex
W that identifies specific contract support requirements. Similarly,
U.S. Central Command officials told us that they were making progress
in identifying contractor support in one of the command's operation
plans. Contract support planners said that the plan identifies the
military forces coming in to execute the operation, which helps them
identify gaps in needed capabilities that contractors could
potentially fill. However, we found other cases where combatant
commands had developed detailed operation plans, including time-phased
force and deployment data, but lacked specific contract support
information in their draft Annex Ws. For example, the draft Annex W we
reviewed for one combatant command's level 4 plan with time-phased
force and deployment data lacked details on the expected contractor
support requirements needed to execute the mission. Similarly, we
found that one combatant command has developed an operation plan for
an ongoing operation. However, while considerable information is known
about the mission, time frames, and force structure, the plan's Annex
W focuses on contracting policies and lacks specific information on
contract support requirements needed to facilitate the operation.
In addition, several combatant command planning officials told us that
they expected to draw on contract support requirements identified in
the component commands' supporting plans to develop Annex Ws.[Footnote
16] Disagreements exist regarding the level of detail on contract
support that should be included at the combatant command versus the
component command level. For example, U.S. Pacific Command planners
told us that they view the Annex W as providing a broad discussion of
contract support and that detailed information on contract support
requirements would be found at the component level. Conversely, senior
DOD officials told us to expect to see specific information on
contractor support requirements in the combatant command Annex Ws.
Joint Publication 4-10 states that the service components must ensure
that operational contract support requirements are identified and
incorporated into operation plans. However, we found that few service
components had developed supporting plans that provide detailed
information on contract support requirements. We identified several
factors that hinder the ability of service components to identify
contract support requirements in the Annex Ws of their supporting
plans. For example:
* Combatant commands were still developing their Annex Ws for most
operation plans and had not yet shared them with their components. In
some cases, service components were in the process of developing
inputs that could be used to identify contractor support requirements
in their supporting plans.
* Annex W guidance does not identify how information at the service
component level should be integrated into the Annex W or how to
balance the levels of detail between a combatant command's and a
service component's plans.
Several combatant command planners told us that as a result of limited
information from the component commands, they were unable to provide
details in their combatant command plans on the specific roles of
contractors.
Shortcomings in Guidance Complicate DOD's Efforts to Consistently
Address Contract Support Requirements in Annex Ws across the
Department:
Shortcomings in guidance on how and when to develop Annex Ws have also
complicated the ability of contract support planners to consistently
address contract support requirements across DOD. According to
planning officials, the current Annex W template was created with
DOD's most detailed plans in mind--level 4 plans or level 3 plans with
time-phased force and deployment data. However, less than 10 percent
of the combatant commands' operation plans are at this level of
detail. We found that the one-size-fits-all approach of the Annex W
template makes it difficult for contract support planners to meet the
current Annex W requirements for operation plans that are less
detailed. This one-size-fits-all approach also contributes to a
mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant
command planners regarding the degree to which the Annex W should
contain specific information on contract support requirements. We
found that several senior DOD officials have the expectation that most
combatant command plans should at least identify the capabilities that
contractors may provide, regardless of the level of plan. For example:
* Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program
Support) (ADUSD(PS)) officials told us that the Annex W should provide
details on the numbers and roles of contractors required to support an
operation.
* Other senior DOD officials involved in reviewing plans for contract
support requirements told us that they expected that planners could
figure out the major force elements needed under a plan and then
determine the contractor support required.
However, the contract support planners and other officials responsible
for developing the Annex Ws disagreed, stating that given the limited
amount of information on military forces in most operation plans, the
expected level of detail was difficult if not impossible to achieve.
Senior DOD officials acknowledged these challenges but continue to
believe that regardless of the level of detail of a plan, there should
be some level of discussion on what capabilities contractors might
reasonably be expected to provide during an operation. Moreover, DOD
has acknowledged that the department is highly likely to continue to
rely on contractors to provide base operating support, maintenance for
certain pieces of equipment, and communications support, underscoring
the importance of a more detailed discussion of contract support in
all of the department's plans. ADUSD(PS) and Joint Staff J4
(Logistics) officials told us that as part of the ongoing revision of
the Annex W template, they are considering including additional
information in the guidance to determine the amount of information
required based on the level of detail of the plan. In addition, Joint
Staff J4 (Logistics) has created a task force to examine ways to
improve operational contract support planning. According to officials
responsible for this effort, the Annex W template is a good start, but
additional tools and guidance are needed to ensure that contract
support planners have the information they need to meet the
requirements established in the template. For example, officials noted
that planning factors might be developed to assist planners with
estimating the number of contractor personnel needed to provide base
support in a contingency. Until such actions are taken, senior DOD
officials may continue to assume that contractor requirements are
adequately addressed in a plan even though most Annex Ws lack this
level of detail.
Further, DOD's planning guidance leaves it to the combatant commanders
to determine if certain annexes are required for their operation
plans, including the Annex W.[Footnote 17] However, there is no
specific guidance to guide the combatant commanders in determining
which plans should include an Annex W. As a result, we found that some
combatant commanders took a more expansive view than others regarding
which plans require the annex. For example:
* U.S. European Command officials decided to develop Annex Ws for as
many plans as they could.
* U.S. Pacific Command officials are developing Annex Ws only for
their level 4 operation plans.
* U.S. Central Command officials are developing Annex Ws for their
operation plans on a case-by-case basis for their levels 2 and 3 plans.
In addition, DOD's guidance on Annex Ws and operational contract
support continues to evolve, resulting in inconsistencies in how
contract support requirements are addressed in Annex Ws, depending on
when an annex was written. Officials from ADUSD(PS) and the Joint
Staff J4 (Logistics) have been working with the contract support
planners over the past 2 years to develop a more detailed Annex W
template that provides more specific guidance for planners developing
these annexes. The current Annex W template requires planners to
detail the contracted services and capabilities desired in theater,
including a list of contracts likely to be used in theater, but it
provides no additional guidance on how this information should be
captured in the annex. The draft guidance, on the other hand, requires
planners, among other things, to outline how contracting will support
the operation, address how various contracts are integrated into each
phase of the operation, and address the contract management command
and control structure. However, DOD leadership has not yet finalized
the revisions, which are expected to be completed sometime in fiscal
year 2010, and therefore the current template remains in effect.
Contract support planners told us that they are using both the
existing template as well as different versions of the revised
template based on when an Annex W was being written. As a result, we
found that combatant command plans vary in how they present
information on the potential use of contractors in executing those
plans. For example, in describing two Annex Ws that they had prepared,
planning officials at U.S. Pacific Command told us that many changes
were made to the template after they drafted their first annex. As a
result, their second Annex W was substantially different from the
first and increased from about 7 to about 26 pages. In addition,
contract support planners at U.S. Central Command told us that they
considered the Annex Ws that were developed prior to their arrival to
be insufficient in providing information on operational contract
support. In DOD's July 2009 Strategic Management Plan, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense identified developing adequate Annex W guidance
as a key initiative to ensure effective logistics support for current
major contingency operations.[Footnote 18] Until the department
finalizes the Annex W template, these varying formats for developing
Annex Ws will continue to complicate efforts to ensure that
operational contract support is being addressed consistently across
the combatant commands. This will make it difficult for senior DOD
leadership to acquire an overall view of the extent to which
successful execution of DOD's plans rely on contractors, which could
also limit the department's ability to provide congressional decision
makers with information on DOD's reliance on contractors to support
future operations.
As with the one-size-fits-all approach to Annex Ws discussed above, a
lack of specific guidance regarding which plans require an Annex W has
resulted in a mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership
and combatant command planners regarding the level of detail the Annex
W will contain. In most cases, we found that Annex Ws did not contain
the level of detail expected by senior DOD leadership and envisioned
in current guidance, limiting the utility of the Annex W as a planning
tool to assess and address contract support requirements. Senior
decision makers may assume that the combatant commands have adequately
addressed contractor requirements in a plan, even though many plans do
not contain Annex Ws or lack the expected details on the anticipated
contractor support needed to execute the mission. As a result, they
risk not fully understanding the extent to which they will be relying
on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to
provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor
personnel.
Detailed Information on Operational Contract Support Generally Not
Included in Other Sections or Annexes of Operation Plans:
Nonlogistics Personnel Tend to Assume That Operational Contract
Support Planning Will Be Addressed by the Logistics Community:
We found that nonlogistics personnel tend to assume that the logistics
community will address the need to incorporate operational contract
support throughout operation plans. Although the Annex W is intended
to be the focal point within an operation plan for discussion of
operational contract support, DOD guidance underscores the importance
of addressing contractor requirements throughout an operation plan,
including the base plan and other annexes as appropriate. The
department's primary guidance for joint operation planning, Joint
Publication 5-0, states that for any operation in which significant
reliance on contract support is anticipated, commanders must ensure
that requisite planning is completed. This includes complying with
other DOD operational contract support guidance, such as requirements
to ensure continuation of essential contractor services and to
identify specific contractor policies and requirements in the
operation plan, such as contractor-related deployment and
accountability reporting, force protection, and medical support. In
addition, Joint Publication 5-0 includes specific references to
contract support. For example, in determining personnel requirements
for supporting a mission, planners are expected to identify and
address known or anticipated factors that may influence potential
courses of action, including the anticipated use of civilian, contract
support, or host nation personnel. The guidance also states that the
administration and logistics section of the base plan should address
contract support. Other DOD guidance also addresses the importance of
incorporating operational contract support throughout the combatant
commands' operation plans. For example, Joint Publication 4-10 states
that planning for contractor personnel integration should be addressed
in either a contractor management plan appendix or in appropriate
sections of operation plans. Similarly, Joint Publication 3-33
identifies contractor-related considerations, such as medical, legal,
and personnel considerations, for personnel outside of the logistics
community.[Footnote 19] Although the guidance above discusses the
importance of incorporating contract support throughout an operation
plan, it is generally at a high level and does not provide direction
on how to incorporate contractors into specific segments of plans.
In our discussions with planning officials outside of the logistics
community within the Joint Staff and at the combatant commands, we
found a tendency to assume that contractor-related matters will be
managed by logistics personnel. For example, officials responsible for
the overall plan writing process at one combatant command did not see
much value in placing contractor-related information in operation
plans because they believed contractor issues would be addressed by
the logistics community once a plan is being executed. However, DOD
has acknowledged that inadequate planning for contractors for Iraq
contributed to the significant challenges the department has
encountered there. In addition, our review of the operation order for
the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq found that planners failed to
identify the contract support required to facilitate drawdown.
According to ADUSD(PS) and Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) officials, the
Annex W contains the overarching operational contract support plan,
but contract support requirements should be discussed throughout the
plan. As Joint Publication 4-10 states, planners often develop a mind-
set that contracting is inherently a combat service support function.
However, contract support for military operations not only includes
logistics, but also may include combat support functions such as
engineering, intelligence, and signal/communications. Similarly,
several combatant command logistics officials voiced the opinion that
given the department's extensive reliance on contractors to provide a
broad range of both logistics and nonlogistics services, it is
important that operational contract support considerations be
discussed both within and outside of the logistics community.
ADUSD(PS) officials stated that taking the discussion of operational
contract support beyond the logistics community will require a
fundamental cultural change for DOD. They added that the department's
ongoing efforts to reform how it approaches operational contract
support are, for the logistics community, as complex as the Goldwater-
Nichols reforms were for training and other areas.[Footnote 20] As we
have previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have
identified regarding the oversight and management of contractor
support to deployed forces stem from DOD's reluctance to plan for
contractors as an integral part of the total force.[Footnote 21]
Base Plans Generally Lack Information on Operational Contract Support:
In discussions with combatant command officials responsible for
developing operation plans, we found that base plans generally lack
information on operational contract support, limiting DOD's ability to
identify contract support requirements for future operations. The base
plan establishes the combatant commander's concept for how an
operation will be executed and includes essential tasks to be
accomplished, assumptions, major forces, and a discussion of the
operation by phase. The base plan also serves as the foundation for
developing the annexes of an operation plan. According to several
combatant command planning officials, base plans are important because
most people reviewing an operation plan will look only at the base
plan and, in some cases, annexes for which they are responsible. If
the discussion of operational contract support is limited to the Annex
W, awareness of contractor-related issues will be limited to those
individuals who develop or review the annex. As a result, officials
responsible for operational contract support planning told us that it
is important that the base plan address the use and role of
contractors. As a senior official responsible for logistics planning
at one combatant command remarked, if something is not in the base
plan, it might as well not be in the plan.
According to officials responsible for developing operation plans at
the combatant commands, the base plans for their operation plans lack
assumptions regarding the potential use or role of contractors. Joint
Publication 5-0 states that plans are derived from the best available
information and rely heavily on assumptions regarding the
circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. Assumptions are
intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the
operation is based. They provide suppositions about the current
situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the
absence of facts, and are necessary to enable the commander to
complete an estimate of the situation and select the course of action.
Base plan assumptions are important because they are signed off on by
the combatant commander and are reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.
As a result, assumptions are used to focus attention of senior DOD
leadership on factors that could present risks to mission success.
DOD acknowledges that contractors will likely play a significant role
in support of future operations and has long recognized the risks
inherent in its use of and reliance on contractors. However, combatant
command officials responsible for writing operation plans told us that
they were not aware of any assumptions specifically addressing the
potential use or role of operational contract support in their base
plans. Moreover, of the three base plans we were able to review, we
found that there were base plan assumptions regarding critical factors
such as sustainment and support of military forces. For example, one
plan assumed sufficient strategic lift assets would be available to
execute the mission. Another base plan contained assumptions regarding
the availability of host nation or interagency support. However, none
of the base plans we reviewed addressed contractor support
requirements in their assumptions. Some combatant command officials
noted that DOD's planning guidance for base plans does not specify the
need to develop assumptions on the potential need for contract
support. According to these officials, modifying this guidance to
address the need to include such assumptions would be helpful in
developing contractor-related assumptions in base plans. Despite this
lack of guidance, planning officials at some combatant commands
acknowledged the value in having such assumptions and told us that
they were considering adding contractor-related assumptions to some of
their base plans. For example:
* A senior official at U.S. Southern Command endorsed the idea of
including contractor-related assumptions in base plans and stated that
the command would take steps to do this.
* Planning officials at U.S. Pacific Command told us that they were
considering adding a contractor-related assumption to the base plan of
one of their level 4 plans.
* U.S. Central Command contract support planners saw value in
including operational contract support assumptions in their base
plans. Moreover, the command included a contractor-related assumption
in its Iraq drawdown plan.
In discussions with combatant command planning officials, we also
found there is a lack of details on operational contract support in
other parts of most base plans, although a few plans did contain such
details. For example, planners at one combatant command told us that
base plan references to operational contract support were mostly
limited to designating component command responsibilities for command
and control of contracting efforts. Similarly, officials at another
combatant command told us that the extent to which operational
contract support is discussed in base plans sometimes does not go
beyond the word "contracting" in the section describing logistics and
administration responsibilities. In addition, we found a similar lack
of contractor-related details in the base plan section that describes
the friendly forces that the commander anticipates relying on to
execute the operation. DOD has long considered contractors part of the
total force and recognized the importance of planning for contractors
to the same level of detail it plans for military forces. However, the
friendly forces sections of the three base plans we were able to
review did not mention contractors, even though some of these plans
did include other non-U.S. military sources of support, such as
nongovernmental organizations.
As discussed above, the base plan establishes the combatant
commander's concept for how an operation will be executed and serves
as the foundation for developing the rest of the operation plan. As a
result, if the base plan contains only limited information on the use
and role of contractors, this will restrict the level of information
available to senior DOD leadership in assessing the potential risks
associated with reliance on contractors. Senior DOD officials,
including the Secretary of Defense, have acknowledged that the
department has not thought holistically or coherently about its use of
contractors in combat areas such as Iraq and that the failure to
anticipate or plan for the heavy reliance on contractors has led to
oversight and management challenges. Officials at some combatant
commands recognized the potential value in having more information on
contractors in their base plans. For example, U.S. Southern Command
officials told us that they have included a discussion of contractor
support in the concept of operations sections of three of their base
plans, and we found that contract support information had been
integrated throughout one of the base plans we reviewed. Planning
officials at several other combatant commands were also open to
expanding the discussion of operational contract support in their base
plans.
Limited or No Discussion of Operational Contract Support in
Nonlogistics Annexes:
We found that DOD has made limited progress in incorporating
operational contract support into annexes that cover nonlogistics
areas, based on our discussions with officials responsible for writing
these annexes. Our previous work has described how DOD's reliance on
contractors has moved beyond traditional logistics areas.[Footnote 22]
Similarly, DOD reported that as of September 2009, over 30 percent of
contractor personnel in Iraq were performing nonlogistics functions,
such as linguist support and security. This broader use of contractors
is reflected in DOD guidance, such as Joint Publication 4-10, which
highlights key contract management planning considerations, noting
that these considerations cross all lines of responsibility of
combatant command directorates. For example:
* The J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) and J-3 (Operations) directorates
are responsible for publishing operation-specific security screening
and badge issuance policies and procedures.
* The J-2 (Intelligence) directorate is responsible for assisting
other directorates in areas such as vetting and badging procedures and
force protection and security plans.
* The J-3 (Operations) directorate is responsible for ensuring that
contractor personnel who require access to military facilities are
incorporated into force protection and security plans.
* The J-5 (Plans) directorate is responsible for taking steps to
mitigate the risks associated with contractor support.
* The J-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems)
directorate is responsible for assisting the J-3 (Operations)
directorate in developing workable and reliable information-sharing
and communication mechanisms.
In addition, although DOD's planning guidance establishes Annex W as
the focal point for operational contract support within an operation
plan, this guidance requires other directorates to identify in their
annexes the capabilities required to perform the mission described in
the plan. For example, guidance for preparing the intelligence and
communications annexes directs planners to identify the means or
capabilities necessary for meeting mission requirements. Although this
guidance does not specifically mention contractors, contractors
provide significant capabilities in these areas in current operations.
However, several planning officials responsible for the intelligence
and communications annexes told us that they did not identify contract
support requirements in their annexes. For example:
* Officials responsible for the intelligence annexes at several
combatant commands told us that they assume contractors will be used
but do not identify them in the annex. At one combatant command,
intelligence planning officials noted they had not received any
training to direct them to include contractor-related issues or
requirements in their annexes, adding they thought such training would
be useful.
* One official responsible for writing communications annexes told us
that because he already knew which contractors would be needed for the
early phases of the operation, he did not include them in the annex.
He acknowledged that additional operational contract support may be
required in later phases of an operation, but that this was also not
included in the annex. Similarly, officials responsible for developing
the communications annexes at another combatant command told us that
they did not include contract support requirements in their annexes
and were not aware of any guidance requiring them to identify the use
and role of operational contract support in their annexes.
According to Joint Publication 4-10, a key contract management area of
concern is whether the combatant commanders and their staffs are aware
of the general scope and scale of contracted support to be utilized
for the operation. Although J4 (Logistics) is the lead directorate
responsible for assembling this information, the other directorates
are required to assist it. In our discussions with combatant command
logistics planners, they stressed that this information should be in
all appropriate annexes, not just the Annex W. As a result, the lack
of information on contract support requirements in nonlogistics
annexes could hinder the ability of combatant commanders to understand
the extent to which their plans rely on contractors.
The Future of DOD's Initiatives to Improve Identification of
Operational Contract Support Requirements Is Uncertain Because of
Guidance and Funding Challenges:
DOD Has Launched Two Initiatives to Address Contract Support
Requirements in Its Operation Plans:
In response to congressional direction, DOD has launched two
initiatives to improve its capability to ensure that operational
contract support requirements are addressed in its operation plans,
but these initiatives are still being refined and funding and guidance
challenges remain. In 2006, Congress mandated that DOD, among other
things, develop joint policies to provide for an organizational
approach to operational contract support requirements definition and
coordination during combat operations, postconflict operations, and
contingency operations.[Footnote 23] Congress defined requirements
definition as the process of translating policy objectives and mission
needs into specific requirements, the description of which will be the
basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be
accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered.
As we reported in 2008, DOD's organizational approach to requirements
definition and coordination is a two-step approach to identify
contract support requirements and integrate them into the combatant
commands' operation plans.[Footnote 24]
* First, DOD has allocated joint operational contract support planners
to each geographic combatant command as well as U.S. Special
Operations Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command. These contract
support planners are tasked with assisting the combatant command with
identifying military capability shortfalls and the contract
capabilities necessary to meet these shortfalls and defining these
requirements in the combatant commander's operation plans.
* Second, DOD has established the JCASO, which will be responsible
for, among other things, performing an independent review of the
combatant commanders' operation plans to ensure early identification
and inclusion of contract requirements. This office will also lead the
integration and synchronization of contract support in operation plans
across combatant commands and U.S. government agencies.
Joint Operational Contract Support Planners Face Challenges in
Executing Their Responsibilities and Their Future Is Uncertain:
DOD has deployed contract support planners to the combatant commands,
but a lack of institutionalization has created challenges in how the
planners execute their responsibilities. As discussed above, there
have been long-standing requirements to integrate contractor support
into operation plans, including the development of Annex Ws. In
determining how to meet these requirements, ADUSD(PS) and senior
leadership at the combatant commands recognized that there was a
significant shortfall in the combatant command planning processes
regarding the contractor-related portions of operation plans. As a
result, ADUSD(PS) agreed to initially fund contract support planners
to supplement the staffs of the combatant commands and give the
commands the ability to ensure that operational contract support
considerations are adequately factored into their plans.
In an October 2007 memo, ADUSD(PS) defined the broad responsibilities
of the planners to include:
* developing the contracting support plans and contractor integration
plans that constitute the Annex W;
* standardizing contract management business practices;
* ensuring that contracting requirement and capabilities are
synchronized;
* ensuring contracted unity of effort; and:
* avoiding contracting duplication and competition for limited
resources.
In addition to this memo, ADUSD(PS) has signed memorandums of
understanding with the combatant commands to define the general roles
and mission of the contract support planners. For example, the
contract support planners (except for the planner at U.S. Joint Forces
Command, who is primarily supporting training and exercises) are
assigned responsibility for developing Annex Ws and assisting
combatant commanders in identifying the requirements for contractor
services. We found that the contract support planners' roles had not
yet been institutionalized in DOD's higher-level operational contract
support guidance. We reported in November 2008 that the contract
support planners, as part of DOD's organizational approach to
requirements definition, had not been institutionalized in DOD joint
policies.[Footnote 25] We also reported that DOD, the Joint Staff, and
some combatant commands were unclear on who should be identifying and
defining requirements for contractor support and what level of detail
should be included in the combatant commanders' plans. The department
is in the process of revising joint policies to provide some
additional direction on planning operational contract support. For
example, the department is revising DOD Instruction 3020.41--DOD's
comprehensive policy document on the management of contractors
supporting deployed U.S. forces--to include a requirement that
military planners develop orchestrated, synchronized, detailed, and
fully developed contractor support and contractor integration plans as
components of feasible operation plans and operation orders. However,
the roles and responsibilities of the contract support planners are
not identified or described in the draft instruction. Similarly, the
roles and responsibilities of the contract support planners are not
discussed in Joint Publication 4-10. Several officials voiced concerns
that until the contract support planners' roles and responsibilities
are institutionalized in DOD guidance, their ability to influence
those outside of the logistics community will be limited, hindering
their ability to effectively integrate operational contract support
across operation plans.
We found uncertainty in how the contract support planners program will
be institutionalized with regard to funding and staffing. As stated
above, the contract support planners were allocated to the combatant
commands to address a significant shortfall in the commands' ability
to incorporate operational contract support into their planning
processes. According to ADUSD(PS) officials, when the contract support
planner concept was developed, the services were to provide a
combination of military and civilian personnel to serve as the
planners. It was anticipated that the services would be able to
provide these individuals by 2010. In order to jump-start the process
and get the planners in place earlier, ADUSD(PD) agreed to provide the
combatant commands with contractors to provide an immediate planning
capability. The planners came on contract in September 2007 and were
originally expected to stay through September 2009, at which time the
services were expected to institutionalize the program by providing
one military and one civilian billet to each combatant command to
become part of the command's staff.
DOD's April 2008 report to Congress stated that DOD's budget guidance
included the permanent resourcing of the contract support planners
with the goal of filling these positions by military personnel as soon
as possible.[Footnote 26] ADUSD(PS) officials told us that they
requested funding for one military and one civilian planner at each
combatant command in the fiscal year 2010 budget submission. However,
senior DOD leadership declined to provide this funding during the
budget review process within DOD. According to ADUSD(PS) officials,
DOD leadership believed that the combatant commands could meet this
requirement without additional resources. As a result, the expected
transition from contractors to a mix of military and civilian
personnel has been delayed. In the meantime, the contract support
planners currently at the combatant commands continue to be
contractors who are funded out of appropriations provided for overseas
contingency operations. We have previously reported the risks in
relying on supplemental appropriations to fund long-term capabilities.
[Footnote 27] According to ADUSD(PS) officials, DOD has funded the
contract support planners in the fiscal year 2011 budget. However, the
budget does not provide additional resources to fund the contract
support planners but requires the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to pay for the
program using existing funds. According to the officials, the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics lacks the funds to pay for this program, and the officials
are working with the DOD Comptroller to find an alternative funding
source. In addition, these funding uncertainties have also complicated
the ability of the contract support planners to carry out their
responsibilities. For example, although the contract support planner
memorandums of understanding call for ADUSD(PS) to fund travel to the
semiannual operational contract support conferences, a lack of funding
led to delaying the second 2009 conference to 2010.
Furthermore, we found concerns that changing who funds the contract
support planners in the future may erode the department's ability to
retain a long-term organizational approach for requirements
development. Currently, ADUSD(PS) provides the planners to the
combatant commands to supplement their staffs. As described above, the
expectation has been that the planners would become part of combatant
command staff. However, several combatant command planners and
officials responsible for the contract support planners told us that
the combatant commands would be unlikely to dedicate their own
resources to carry out the tasks currently being executed by these
planners. For example, J4 (Logistics) officials from U.S. Pacific
Command were concerned that if the funding for contract support
planners was forced to come out of the combatant command budget, there
was a danger that the planners would be redirected from the
operational contract support focus to deal with other issues because
of the manpower shortages the command faces. The officials added that
unless the combatant command staff is expanded to add the planners, it
is important that the planners retain their independent funding source
so they can remain focused on contractor-related issues. The officials
hoped ADUSD(PS) would continue to fund the planners through 2012.
Nevertheless, officials at several combatant commands stated that the
contract support planners provided valuable support and indicated that
losing this planning capability would reduce the commands' ability to
ensure that operational contract support requirements are sufficiently
incorporated into operation plans. According to ADUSD(PS) officials,
the current plan is for the contract support planners to transition to
military and civilian billets and become part of the JCASO while
continuing to be under the operational control of the combatant
commands as supplements to the commands' staffs. This will enable the
planners to retain their focus on operational contract support.
Uncertainty regarding the Roles and Responsibilities of the Joint
Contingency Acquisition Support Office:
Uncertainty also exists regarding the roles and responsibilities of
the JCASO--the second element of DOD's organizational approach to
requirements definition. The JCASO was established by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness in a July
2008 memo, among other things, to review the combatant commanders'
operation plans continually to ensure early identification of and
inclusion of contractor requirements. The JCASO will also lead the
integration and synchronization of contract support in operation plans
across the combatant commands. JCASO officials told us the JCASO is
expected to maintain situational awareness of all combatant command
operation plans, work closely with the contract support planners as
they conduct operational contract support planning, and collect
lessons learned from contingency operations to identify improvements.
The JCASO is also expected to play a role in exercises and ensuring
that operational contract support-related issues are incorporated in
those exercises.
However the department has made little progress in finalizing JCASO
guidance since we first reported on the JCASO's planning roles in
November 2008.[Footnote 28] Guidance for this office is still being
developed, and existing guidance contains few details on the JCASO's
planning roles. For example:
* The July 2008 memo establishing the JCASO did not discuss the
organization's planning responsibilities.
* The JCASO is only briefly identified as a future organizational
option in Joint Publication 4-10, which establishes DOD's doctrine for
planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support
integration and contract management functions in support of joint
operations.
* The JCASO is not mentioned at all in DOD Instruction 3020.41, the
source of DOD's policy and procedures concerning operational contract
support.
* The planning responsibilities of the JCASO are only briefly
mentioned in the draft concept of operations for operational contract
support, one of the documents intended to explain how the department
plans to implement the policies it is developing to meet congressional
intent for an organization approach to requirements development.
The lack of specific guidance regarding the JCASO's roles and
responsibilities has led to confusion regarding the JCASO's role in
requirements definition. We found significant confusion among the
combatant command planners regarding what the JCASO was intended to
do. For example:
* U.S. European Command planning officials stated that it was not
clear what the JCASO's role would be, how it would fit into the
broader plan development and review process, or how the contract
support planners would interact with the JCASO.
* U.S. Central Command logistics planners stated they do not have a
good understanding of what the JCASO concept is. They were familiar
with the draft concept of operations but remained unsure as to how the
JCASO would work with or for the combatant command and were waiting to
see how the concept evolves.
* U.S. Northern Command planning officials were unclear as to what the
JCASO's roles would be and how the JCASO would support their efforts.
The officials believed additional information was needed in the JCASO
concept of operations to define how the JCASO would fit into the
combatant command's efforts.
* U.S. Southern Command planners saw the JCASO more as a body to
coordinate contract support-related policy and doctrinal changes,
noting that the JCASO was still being developed and that more
coordination with the planners would be helpful in defining the
JCASO's role in plan development and review.
* U.S. Special Operations Command planners thought the JCASO could
deploy in support of the geographic combatant commands but were unsure
what support, if any, the JCASO could provide to U.S. Special
Operations Command.
JCASO officials acknowledged that they were still building processes
to validate the JCASO concept. According to these officials, the
contract support planners are their entrée to raise these questions in
the planning process. Further, the draft concept of operations states
that the JCASO and the contract support planners are key contributors
to integrating operational contract support in exercises and plans.
Although the draft concept of operations does not describe how the two
should work together, it does indicate that the contract support
planners are to become part of the JCASO. According to ADUSD(PS) and
JCASO officials, aligning the contract support planners within the
JCASO will enable contingency response and contract planning functions
to be under one operational management staff and to share lessons
learned. We found one case where the lack of management of the
contract support planner program led to the failure to share best
practices. Planners at U.S. Southern Command developed a detailed
checklist for reviewing plans to track progress and ensure that each
plan was reviewed in a consistent manner, but did not share this
checklist with contract support planners at the other combatant
commands.
In addition to challenges arising from the lack of detailed guidance,
the JCASO has not been fully staffed, further limiting its ability to
execute its responsibilities. The JCASO concept calls for a staff of
about 30 people drawn from disciplines such as finance, law, and
engineering as well as a liaison from the Defense Contract Management
Agency. According to the memo establishing the JCASO, the office was
to achieve an initial operational capability by fiscal year 2009.
However, as of December 2009, the JCASO consisted of only 5
individuals, primarily contractors. According to ADUSD(PS) officials,
DOD included funding for a 28-person JCASO as part of DOD's fiscal
year 2010 budget that was submitted to Congress. DOD now has the funds
in its approved budget, but the JCASO is not expected to be fully
staffed until late 2010.
As a result of these staffing challenges, the JCASO has been limited
in its ability to carry out the broad responsibilities described
above. We found that the JCASO's interactions with the combatant
commands thus far have not dealt with the JCASO's role in reviewing
and assessing the discussion of operational contract support in
operation plans. Rather, the focus of the JCASO has been on
integrating itself into combatant command exercises in order to
demonstrate and refine the JCASO concept. According to ADUSD(PS), a
U.S. European Command exercise in 2008 was used to conduct a pilot
implementation of the JCASO concept, with additional JCASO
participation in U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command
exercises in 2009. Similarly, JCASO officials stated that these
exercises have been helpful in developing a better concept for the
JCASO's potential role in providing or supporting contingency contract
management during an operation. However, JCASO and ADUSD(PS) officials
acknowledged that the JCASO has not yet reviewed any operation plans.
Conclusions:
While DOD has recognized its reliance on contractors to support
operations both now and in the future, the department continues to
face challenges in integrating the potential use and role of
contractors into its operation plans. The introduction of the Annex W
requirement and the deployment of contract support planners to the
combatant commands has raised awareness of the importance of
operational contract support and led to some improvement in planning
for contract support. Despite these actions, the combatant commands
have not fully identified for senior DOD leadership the extent to
which their plans rely on contractors. As operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have made clear, failure to adequately plan for the use
and role of contractors can impede the department's ability to
identify and mitigate the risks associated with relying on
contractors. In addition, as our previous work has shown, DOD's lack
of understanding of its reliance on contractors can hinder the
effective management and oversight of contractors, potentially
resulting in negative impacts on military operations and unit morale.
Further, the failure to fully identify contract support requirements
in operation plans limits DOD's ability to provide congressional
decision makers with information on the department's reliance on
contractors to support future operations.
DOD's challenges to integrating the potential use and role of
contractors into its operation plans are exacerbated by shortcomings
in guidance and a lack of institutionalization of the department's
organizational approach to requirements definition for contractors and
developing and funding personnel with clear roles and appropriate
expertise. A one-size-fits-all approach to defining Annex W
requirements has contributed to an expectations mismatch between
senior DOD leadership and combatant command planners regarding the
level of information the annexes should contain. Similarly, a lack of
specific guidance has enabled combatant commands to choose varying
approaches with regard to what plans require Annex Ws. As a result,
DOD senior leadership is unable to look across the combatant command
plans and assess or address the department's overall reliance on
contractors to execute future operations. Similarly, the limited
discussion of operational contract support in other sections of
operations plans, including the base plan, limits the ability of
combatant commanders and senior DOD leadership to evaluate and react
to the potential risks of reliance on contractors. With contractor
personnel equaling or at times outnumbering military personnel in
current operations, the failure to include the likely use of
contractors among base plan assumptions or the lack of discussion of
the role contractors may play in the various phases of an operation
could create significant risks in executing plans. In addition, with
over 30 percent of contractor personnel in Iraq performing
nonlogistics functions, the department must take steps to ensure that
contract support considerations are addressed across the combatant
command directorates. Furthermore, if the department fails to
institutionalize and fund its initiatives to address contract support
requirements in its operation plans, it will fail to meet the
congressional mandate to develop an organization approach to
requirements definition. Until such actions are taken, DOD will
continue to struggle to recognize the centrality of operational
contract support to the effective execution of its missions and will
therefore be at risk of repeating the contractor-related problems it
has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To better enable senior DOD leadership to assess the department's
reliance on contractors to execute future operations and to improve
the ability of combatant commanders to effectively identify contract
support requirements in their operation plans, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
take the following two actions:
* As part of the ongoing revision of the Annex W template, clarify and
specify the appropriate level of detail that should be included in an
Annex W based on the degree to which the plan provides details on the
size and capabilities of military forces and how the plan envisions
those forces being used. The revised template should be completed
consistent with the transition of the funding of the contract support
planners from appropriations provided for overseas contingency
operations to the defense budget.
* Update DOD's guidance for contingency planning to clarify and
specify the level of plans that require an Annex W or similarly
detailed discussion of operational contract support requirements.
To improve the integration of operational contract support
requirements throughout combatant command operation plans, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to take the following two actions:
* Require all base plans to include an assumption on the potential use
and role of contractors.
* Require the base plans and nonlogistics annexes of operation plans
to address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate
(e.g., intelligence and communications annexes).
To ensure that the department effectively institutionalizes the
required organizational approach to addressing operational contract
support in its operation plans, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics to
take the following three actions:
* Clarify the roles and missions of the joint operational contract
support planners and the JCASO and the relationship between both
functions.
* Take steps to ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and
funded to meet their missions.
* Incorporate both of these initiatives in DOD's operational contract
support guidance.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of our
recommendations. In agreeing with our recommendations, DOD identified
additional actions the department believes are needed to address our
recommendations. We agree these actions are important steps toward
addressing our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in
appendix II. DOD also provided several technical comments, which we
considered and incorporated where appropriate.
With regard to the Annex W, DOD agreed with our recommendation to
clarify and specify the appropriate level of detail that should be
included in an Annex W based on the degree to which the plan provides
details on the size and capabilities of military forces and how the
plan envisions those forces being used. In its comments, DOD described
the progress the department has made in developing an Annex W
template, but acknowledged that the level of operational contract
support detail should be tailored to match the degree to which the
plan provides details on the anticipated size of capabilities of
military forces to be used. DOD added that the operational contract
support community of interest is designing a contract support
estimator tool that will help planners determine operational contract
support requirements, particularly the contractor footprint
anticipated for an operation. We agree that such a tool will
facilitate the commander's ability to integrate operational contract
support in the overall operation. DOD also agreed with our
recommendation to update DOD's guidance for contingency planning to
clarify and specify the level of plans that require an Annex W or
similarly detailed discussion of operational contract support
requirements. In its comments, DOD stated that the Annex W is as
important as the logistics annex (Annex D) and that whenever an Annex
D is required by joint planning guidance, the Annex W should also be
required. The department added that joint planning guidance should
dictate that operational contract support be included in the base
plan. We agree that both of these actions would clarify the
requirement for where and how to include operational contract support
requirements in operation plans.
With regard to the need to improve the integration of operational
contract support requirements throughout combatant command operation
plans, DOD agreed with our recommendations to require all base plans
to include an assumption on the potential use and role of contractors
and to require the base plans and nonlogistics annexes of operation
plans to address the potential need for contractor support where
appropriate (e.g., intelligence and communications annexes). In its
comments, DOD stated that the base plan at the operational or
component level should also address the requisite assumptions and
roles of contractors and the use of contractor support in the
appropriate annexes where the plan determines a valid requirement for
support. The department added that major operational contract support
functions that will have a significant impact upon a mission should be
included in the base plan concept of operations. We agree with DOD's
comments as well as the department's observation that joint planning
guidance should be modified to incorporate these requirements.
Lastly, with regard to effectively institutionalizing the required
organizational approach to addressing operational contract support in
operation plans, DOD agreed with our recommendations to clarify the
roles and missions of the joint operational contract support planners
and the JCASO and the relationship between both functions, take steps
to ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and funded to
meet their missions, and incorporate both of these initiatives in
DOD's operational contract support guidance. In its comments, DOD
further stated that funding for these positions be centralized rather
than placed with each combatant command. As noted in the report, there
are concerns that funding the contract support planners out of the
combatant command budgets could cause the planners to be redirected to
focus on issues other than operational contract support. We agree that
it is important that the planners retain their operational contract
support focus and that their role needs to be institutionalized in
operational contract support guidance. We also agree with DOD's
comment that the department should consider contract support planners
at the service component and combat support agency levels.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. The report also is available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In designing and conducting our assessment, our objectives were to
determine (1) what progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made
in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation
plans, (2) the extent to which operational contract support
requirements are included in other sections of operation plans, and
(3) what progress the department has made in establishing a long-term
capability to ensure the inclusion of operational contract support
requirements in operation plans. To address our objectives, we met
with and obtained documentation from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff to review key guidance on how contingency
operation plans are drafted and reviewed and to obtain an
understanding of how operational contract support is addressed in this
guidance. We visited all of the geographic combatant commands as well
as U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and
some combatant command service components to discuss their roles in
drafting contingency operation plans, how operational contract support
was addressed in those plans, and other related efforts to improve the
preparation and planning for working with contractors in future
operations. We reviewed some base plans and annexes at the combatant
commands, comparing them to DOD's guidance on plan development as well
as its operational contract support guidance in order to determine how
well these documents incorporated contract support. Specifically, we
reviewed:
* 7 of the 34 Annex Ws drafted or approved as of February 2010,
* 3 base plans (1 base plan for a level 4 plan and 2 base plans for
level 3 plans),
* 4 Annex Ds (logistics), and,
* contractor-related excerpts of a base plan and an Annex D
(logistics).
However, because DOD limited our access to its operation plans, we
were unable to provide a comprehensive assessment of each plan's
assumptions, comprehensiveness, feasibility, adequacy of executable
detail, and other aspects of operational contract support as directed
in the mandate. Nevertheless, we believe that the excerpts of plans
and annexes DOD allowed us to see, along with in-depth conversations
with planners and other officials responsible for drafting or
reviewing base plans and annexes, gave us adequate information with
which to assess DOD's progress in incorporating operational contract
support into its plans.
Following our site visits to the combatant commands, we requested
updated information on each command's number of plans, by plan level,
to determine the total number of plans for which they were including
operational contract support in an Annex W or D or in other sections
of their plans. We also requested from the Joint Staff J-7 an updated
list of DOD plans required under the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan. We compared these two groups of information to ensure
consistency in the number of high-level plans that require the Annex
W. We also visited select DOD components with some responsibilities
for contract management, such as the Defense Contract Management
Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency, to discuss their roles in
contingency operations planning and efforts to improve the inclusion
of operational contract support in plans.
We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
Support), Washington, D.C.
* Defense Contract Management Agency, Springfield, Virginia.
* Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
* Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, McLean, Virginia.
* U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany.
* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida.
* U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and its following service
components:
- Special Operations Command Europe;
- U.S. Air Forces in Europe;
- U.S. Army Europe;
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe;
- U.S. Naval Forces Europe.
* U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia.
* U.S. Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
- U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, and its following service
components:
- Pacific Air Forces;
- Special Operations Command, Pacific;
- U.S. Army Pacific;
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific;
- U.S. Pacific Fleet.
* U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida.
* U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) Directorate, Washington, D.C.
* Joint Staff J7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Development)
Directorate, Washington, D.C.
Department of the Army:
* Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through February
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
March 19, 2010:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report. GA0-10-472, "Warfighter Support: DoD Needs to Improve Its
Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations,"
dated February 25, 2010, (GAO Code 351275). Detailed comments are
enclosed.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft
report and look forward to working with you.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gary J. Motsek:
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support):
Enclosure: As stated:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report — Dated February 25, 2010:
GAO Code 351275/GAO-10-472:
"Warfighter Support: DoD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using
Contractors to Support Future Military Operations"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as part of the ongoing
revision of the Annex W template, to clarify and specify the
appropriate level of detail that should be included in an Annex W
based on the degree to which the plan provides details on the size and
capabilities of military forces and how the plan envisions those
forces being used. The revised template should be completed consistent
with the transition of the funding of the contract support planners
from appropriations provided for overseas contingency operations to
the defense budget.
DoD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation. DoD agrees that
the level of operational contract support (OCS) details contained
within a plan should be scoped to the anticipated size and
capabilities of military forces to be used. Two years ago no Annex W
{Contract Support Integration Plan (CS1P)) template existed within DoD.
Since the inception of the Joint Operational Contract Support Planner
(JOCSP) initiative, the planners have made significant strides in
developing a template and integrating the Annex into plans, despite
the lack of institutionalization of the Annex W in the joint planning
process (e.g. JOPES). As GAO points out, this template is not a one
size fits all" tool. Military plans vary greatly in scope. Whereas
some plans may afford greater fidelity of details, such as the
inclusion of a Time-Phased Force Deployment Data {TPFDD) and known
operating locations/bases, other plans are very general due to
unknowns. The level of OCS details should be tailored accordingly. The
OCS community of interest is designing a contract support estimator
tool that will facilitate planners in determining OCS support,
particularly the contractor footprint anticipated for an operation.
Such data will greatly facilitate a commander's ability to integrate
OCS into the overall operation as it will allow them to anticipate
additional life support requirements for contractors authorized to
accompany the force (CAAF). DoD further concurs that the JOCSP program
is critical and should be institutionalized.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to update DoD's guidance
for contingency planning to clarify and specify the level of plans
that require an Annex W or similarly detailed discussion of
operational contract support requirements.
DoD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Annex W is on
the same level of importance as the Annex D (Logistics). Whenever an
Annex D is required in accordance with Joint Operational Planning and
Execution System (JOPES), so should the Annex W. If an Annex W is not
included in plans, JOPES should dictate that Operational Contract
Support must be included in base plan, most likely in paragraph 4.
Clarification of the level of plans and minimum requirements for
operational contract support requirements will assist with Command
emphasis to the component commands to enforce planning at the
appropriate level and inclusion of component command planning
directives.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to:
* Require all base plans to include an assumption on the potential use
and role of contractors.
* Require the base plans and non-logistics annexes of operation plans
to address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate
(e.g., intelligence and communications annexes).
DoD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation. However, the base
plan at the operational or component level should also address the
requisite assumptions and roles of contractors and the use of
contractor support in the appropriate annexes where the plan
determines a valid requirement for support. DoD agrees that all plans,
regardless of level, should include key Operational Contract Support
(OCS) assumptions in the base plan. Additionally, major OCS functions
that will have a significant impact upon a mission should be included
in base plan concept of operations (paragraph 3). The inclusion of OCS
language in the base plan does not negate the necessity for an Annex
W. DoD concurs that other functional annexes (e.g. intelligence,
communications, operations, etc.) in a plan should include OCS
factors. This should be enforced in the Joint Operational Planning and
Execution System and annex templates should be modified to include OCS
in the assumptions and concept of operations of each functional annex
at a minimum, which is currently being staffed and updated by the J-7.
As GAO described, this must be institutionalized and trained before it
"eventually migrates into the mindset of planners."
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics to:
* Clarify the roles and missions of the Joint Operational Contract
Support Planners (JOCSP) and the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support
Office (JCASO) and the relationship between both functions.
* Take steps to ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and
funded to meet their missions.
* Incorporate both of these initiatives in DoD's operational contract
support guidance.
DoD Response: DoD concurs and adds reference comment. Clarification of
the JCASO relationship with the lead service for logistics and
contracting (LCLC) may assist planners in support functions and
planning considerations provided by the two entities. DoD concurs that
the JOCSP program be fully staffed and resourced. DoD further
recommends that funding of these positions be centralized, under the
JCASO, vice with each combatant command. If each combatant command is
required to fund these positions, substantial risk will be assumed.
For instance, a combatant command may not fund the program due to
other higher priority requirements, or, available command funding may
not be sufficient to retain/obtain the planner expertise level
required. In order to maintain the vitality of both the JCASO and
JOCSP program it must be institutionalized and centrally funded. DoD
concurs that both programs are an important development and must be
incorporated in Operational Contract Support guidance. Furthermore,
DOD should consider Operational Contract Support planners at the
Service Component and Combat Support Agency levels.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made
contributions to this report: Carole Coffey, Assistant Director; Karyn
Angulo; Noah Bleicher; Gabrielle Carrington; Laura Czohara; Susan
Ditto; James Leonard; and James A. Reynolds.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for Operational
Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R]. Washington,
D.C.: November 20, 2008.
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2008.
Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and
Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1087].
Washington, D.C: September 26, 2008.
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further
Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on
Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective Management
and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in Kuwait.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-316R]. Washington,
D.C.: January 22, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to
Better Control DOD's Acquisition of Services. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-832T]. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007.
Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Longstanding Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145]. Washington, D.C.: December
18, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Continued Progress Requires Overcoming Contract
Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1130T]. Washington, D.C.: September
28, 2006.
Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees
Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S.
Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-999R]. Washington,
D.C.: September 22, 2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private
Security Providers. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-865T]. Washington, D.C.: June 13,
2006.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security
Providers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-737].
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-201]. Washington, D.C.: April 29,
2005.
Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further
Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-328]. Washington, D.C.: March 21,
2005.
Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on
Department of Defense Service Contracts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-274]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2005.
Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support
Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-854]. Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2004.
Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed
Forces but Are not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2003.
Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost
in the Balkans. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-225]. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 2000.
Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-63]. Washington, D.C.:
February 11, 1997.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD defines operational contract support as the process of
planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from
commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the
associated contractor management functions.
[2] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee (Jan. 27, 2009).
[3] See the related GAO products list at the end of this report.
[4] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Overcome Long-standing
Challenges with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-362T]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2009), and Defense Management: DOD Needs
to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to
Improve Management and Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11,
2008).
[5] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854 (2006).
[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics
(July 18, 2008).
[7] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03B, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning
Formats (Feb. 28, 2006). Superseded by Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume
II Planning Formats (Aug. 17, 2007).
[8] S. Rep. No. 110-335, at 317 (2008). See also S. Rep. No. 111-35,
at 116 (2009).
[9] Operation plan refers to any plan for the conduct of military
operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies.
It also refers to a complete and detailed joint plan with all annexes
and time-phased force and deployment data. We use the term to refer to
all plans developed through DOD’s contingency planning process.
[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Dec. 26, 2006).
[11] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01A, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning
Policies and Procedures (Sept. 29, 2006) and CJCSM 3122.03C.
[12] A fourth in-progress review is held within a year of a plan’s
review and approval. At this time, the plan will be refined, adapted,
terminated, or executed.
[13] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, Operational
Contract Support (Oct. 17, 2008), and DOD Instruction 3020.41,
Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces
(Oct. 3, 2005).
[14] The time-phased force and deployment data describes force
requirements, how and when those forces are to be deployed, and the
transportation assets needed to deploy them.
[15] GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and
Other Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Oversight and Management of
Contractors in Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24,
2008); Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006); and Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] (Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2003).
[16] According to Joint Publication 5-0, service components prepare
supporting plans for operation plans when tasked to do so by the
combatant commander.
[17] As discussed in the Background section, the most detailed
operation plans, level 4 plans, are required to have all annexes,
including the Annex W. For all other plans, DOD’s planning guidance
leaves it to the combatant commander to determine if a plan should
include an Annex W.
[18] Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Strategic
Management Plan (July 31, 2009).
[19] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force
Headquarters (Feb. 16, 2007).
[20] The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was, in part, to
reorganize DOD into a more unified military structure. Within that
act, Congress included several provisions that specifically address
the education of officers in joint matters, their assignment to joint
organizations, and the promotion of officers serving in joint
positions.
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T].
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-362T].
[23] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854.
[24] GAO, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for
Operational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative
Requirements, GAO-09-114R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2008).
[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R].
[26] Department of Defense, Report to the Congress of the United
States, Department of Defense Program for Planning, Managing, and
Accounting for Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel during
Contingency Operations (April 2008). This report was issued by DOD in
response to the congressional mandate in section 854(c) of the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-364.
[27] GAO, Supplemental Appropriations: Opportunities Exist to Increase
Transparency and Provide Additional Controls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-314] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2008).
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R].
[End of section]
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