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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2010: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs: 

GAO-10-388SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-388SP, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

This is GAO’s eighth annual assessment of selected Department of 
Defense (DOD) weapon programs. The report examines how well DOD is 
planning and executing its weapon acquisition programs, an area that 
has been on GAO’s high-risk list since 1990. 

This year’s report is in response to the mandate in the joint 
explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. The report 
includes (1) observations on DOD’s efforts to manage its portfolio of 
major defense acquisition programs; (2) an assessment of the knowledge 
attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 
42 weapon programs from the 2009 portfolio; (3) data on other factors 
that can affect program execution; and (4) examples of how DOD is 
implementing recent acquisition reforms. To conduct the assessment, 
GAO analyzed data on the composition of DOD’s portfolio of major 
defense acquisition programs. GAO did not analyze the cost and 
schedule performance of the portfolio because DOD did not issue timely 
or complete Selected Acquisition Reports for the second consecutive 
presidential transition. GAO expects to resume its portfolio analysis 
in next year’s assessment. GAO also collected data from program 
offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge, as well as 
on other factors that can affect program execution. GAO analyzed this 
data and compiled one- or two-page assessments of 70 weapon programs. 

What GAO Found: 

In 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed canceling or significantly 
curtailing weapon programs with a projected cost of at least $126 
billion. Congress supported several of the recommended terminations. 
DOD plans to develop new options to replace several of the canceled 
programs. The most significant of these will be the effort to 
restructure the Army’s terminated Future Combat System program. At the 
same time, DOD’s 2009 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs 
grew to 102 programs—a net increase of 6 since last year. DOD did not 
issue complete Selected Acquisition Reports for these programs in 
2009, which precluded an analysis of the overall cost and schedule 
performance of DOD’s portfolio in this year’s assessment. 

Table: Secretary of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Recommendations: 

Recommended termination: 

Weapon system: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter; Secretary’s comments: 
Plan to develop options for a new program. 

Weapon system: Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; Secretary’s 
comments: Plan to reexamine requirements. 

Weapon system: Next-Generation Bomber; Secretary’s comments: Will not 
initiate new development program without better understanding of the 
requirement and technology. 

Weapon system: Future Combat Systems–Manned Ground Vehicles; Secretary’
s comments: Plan to reevaluate requirements, technology, and approach 
before relaunching and recompeting program. 

Weapon system: Transformational Satellite; Secretary’s comments: Plan 
to buy two more AEHF satellites as alternative. 

Weapon system: Ballistic Missile Defense–Multiple Kill Vehicle; 
Secretary’s comments: Plan to reexamine requirements; no mention of 
new program. 

Recommended end of production: 

Weapon system: C-17; 
Secretary’s comments: Recommended ending production at 205 aircraft. 

Weapon system: DDG-1000; 
Secretary’s comments: Recommended ending production at 3 ships. 

Weapon system: F-22; 
Secretary’s comments: Recommended ending production at 187 aircraft. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

For 42 programs GAO assessed in depth, there has been continued 
improvement in the technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge 
programs had at key points in the acquisition process. However, most 
programs are still proceeding with less knowledge than best practices 
suggest, putting them at higher risk for cost growth and schedule 
delays. A majority of programs have also experienced requirements 
changes, software development challenges, or workforce issues, or a 
combination, which can affect program stability and execution. DOD has 
begun to implement a revised acquisition policy that addresses many of 
these areas. For example, seven programs we examined in technology 
development plan to test competitive prototypes before starting system 
development, and nine programs plan to hold early systems engineering 
reviews. If DOD consistently applies this policy, the number of 
programs adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition should increase and 
the outcomes for DOD programs should improve. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] or key 
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

Observations on DOD's 2009 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio: 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

Observations on Other Factors That Can Affect Program Execution: 

Observations about DOD's Implementation of Acquisition Reforms: 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM): 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload Baseline: 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability 
Increment 1: 

BMDS Airborne Laser (ABL): 

BMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: 

BMDS Flexible Target Family: 

BMDS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

BMDS Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System: 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program: 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier: 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

EA-18G Growler: 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System (ER/MP): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

Future Combat System Spin Out Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team: 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

H-1 Upgrades (4BW/4BN): 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System: 

Joint Strike Fighter: 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain: 

Mutifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio 
System (MIDS-JTRS): 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Littoral Combat Ship - Mission Modules 97: 

LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program: 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle: 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control: 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA: 

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program: 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

P-8A Poseidon (P-8A): 

PATRIOT MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

Standard Missile-6 Extended Range Active Missile: 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2: 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 3: 

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability 
Increment 2: 

BMDS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

C-27J: 

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM): 

F-22A Raptor: 

Future Combat System (FCS): 

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile: 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): 

Kiowa Warrior (KW): 

Next Generation GPS Control Segment (OCX): 

Ohio-Class Replacement/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD): 

Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS): 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Secretary of Defense's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Recommendations: 

Table 2: Programs Testing an Early System Prototype: 

Table 3: Program Office Composition for 50 DOD Programs: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Percentage of Technologies That Were Mature and Nearing 
Maturity When Selected Programs Entered System Development: 

Figure 2: Average Percent of Total Expected Design Drawings for 
Selected Programs That Are Releasable at Critical Design Review: 

Figure 3: Programs Testing Production-Representative Prototype before 
and after a Production Decision: 

Figure 4: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

B-2 EHF SATCOM: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SATCOM: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

CDR: critical design review: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FCS: Future Combat System: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GPS: Global Positioning Systems: 

LRIP: low-rate initial production: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

MDAP: major defense acquisition program: 

MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle: 

NA: not applicable: 

PDR: preliminary design review: 

RDT&E: research, development, test and evaluation: 

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 30, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

I am pleased to present GAO's eighth annual assessment of selected 
weapon programs. The report provides a snapshot of how well the 
Department of Defense (DOD) is planning and executing its major 
defense acquisition programs--an area that has been on GAO's high-risk 
list since its inception in 1990. The past 15 months have seen DOD and 
Congress take meaningful steps towards addressing long-standing weapon 
acquisition issues. Many of these actions are consistent with our past 
recommendations. DOD made major revisions to its acquisition policies 
to place more emphasis on acquiring knowledge about requirements, 
technology, and design before programs start--thus putting it in a 
better position to field capabilities on time and at the estimated 
cost. Congress strengthened DOD's acquisition policies and processes 
by passing the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which 
includes provisions to ensure programs are based on realistic cost 
estimates and to terminate programs that experience high levels of 
cost growth. The Secretary of Defense proposed a fiscal year 2010 
budget that ended or curtailed all or part of at least a half dozen 
major defense acquisition programs--such as the Air Force's F-22A 
Raptor, the Army's Future Combat System, the Navy's DDG 1000 
destroyer, and the Missile Defense Agency's Multiple Kill Vehicle--
that were over cost, behind schedule, or no longer suited to meet the 
warfighters' current needs. Congress's support for several of the 
recommended terminations signaled a willingness to make difficult 
choices on individual weapon systems and DOD's major defense 
acquisition program portfolio as a whole. 

While DOD's acquisition policies and process may be improving, fiscal 
pressures continue to build. Notwithstanding the federal government's 
long-term fiscal challenges, the Pentagon faces its own near-term and 
long-term fiscal pressures as it attempts to balance competing 
demands, including ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
initiatives to grow and modernize the force, and increasing personnel 
and health care costs. While DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget request 
started the process of reprioritizing acquisition dollars to meet 
warfighters' most pressing needs, the department must still address 
the overall affordability of its weapon system investments. Our report 
this year indicates the number of major defense acquisition programs 
has grown in the past year from 96 to 102, although DOD's efforts to 
reprioritize its acquisition investments are still ongoing. DOD should 
continue to work to balance its weapon system portfolio with available 
funding, which includes reducing the number or size of weapon system 
programs, or both, and assessing the affordability of new programs and 
capabilities in the context of overall defense spending. 

We believe that this report can provide insights that will help DOD 
place programs in a better position to succeed, and help the 
department maximize its investments. One of the surest ways that DOD 
can ensure it delivers the promised return on investment for its 
weapon system spending is to execute programs using a knowledge-based 
acquisition approach. Our review this year found continued improvement 
in the knowledge DOD officials had about programs' technologies, 
designs, and manufacturing processes at key points in the acquisition 
process. However, most programs are still proceeding with less 
knowledge than best practices suggest, putting them at higher risk for 
cost growth and schedule delays. If DOD consistently applies its 
revised acquisition policy, we expect to see the number of programs 
adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition increase, and at the same 
time, the outcomes for those programs improve. These policies must 
also be reinforced by DOD and Congress in their decisions on whether 
or not to fund individual programs. 

Our report this year does not include an analysis of the performance 
of DOD's major defense acquisition program portfolio. In recent years, 
this analysis showed that the cumulative cost growth on DOD programs 
had reached $300 billion (in fiscal year 2010 dollars). DOD did not 
issue timely or complete Selected Acquisition Reports for its major 
defense acquisition programs in fiscal year 2009 for the second 
consecutive presidential transition, which precluded an analysis of 
the overall cost and schedule performance of DOD's portfolio. GAO 
expects to resume its portfolio analysis in next year's assessment. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

[End of letter] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 30, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is GAO's eighth annual assessment of selected Department of 
Defense (DOD) weapon programs and the second in response to the 
mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations 
Act, 2009.[Footnote 1] This report provides a snapshot of how well DOD 
is planning and executing its weapon programs--an area that has been 
on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. Since last year's report, the 
executive and legislative branches have taken actions that altered the 
direction of individual major defense acquisition programs, as well as 
the way DOD must manage these acquisitions. In DOD's fiscal year 2010 
budget request, the Secretary of Defense proposed ending all or part 
of at least a half dozen major defense acquisition programs that were 
over cost, behind schedule, or no longer suited to meet the 
warfighters' current needs. Congress enacted the Weapon System 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,[Footnote 2] which built on previous 
congressional actions, our past recommendations, and DOD policy 
changes designed to put weapon programs on solid footing before they 
begin and maintain discipline throughout the acquisition process. 

This report includes (1) observations on DOD's efforts to manage its 
portfolio of major defense acquisition programs, (2) our assessment of 
the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for 
a subset of 42 weapon programs--primarily in development or the early 
stages of production--from the 2009 portfolio, (3) data on other 
factors that can affect program execution, and (4) examples of how DOD 
is implementing its revised acquisition policy for major defense 
acquisition program. 

To conduct our assessment of DOD's management of its major defense 
acquisition program portfolio, we collected and analyzed data on the 
composition of DOD's portfolio in 2009.[Footnote 3] Our ability to 
analyze the cost and schedule performance of the 2009 portfolio was 
limited this year because DOD did not prepare Selected Acquisition 
Reports that reflected the Secretary of Defense's proposed changes to 
weapon programs in the fiscal year 2010 budget. Instead, we made 
observations on programs entering and exiting DOD's portfolio of major 
defense acquisition programs using DOD budget documentation, fiscal 
year 2010 authorization and appropriation acts, December 2007 Selected 
Acquisition Reports, DOD's list of major defense acquisition programs, 
and other program data. 

To conduct our assessments of individual programs, we obtained 
information on the extent to which they followed knowledge-based 
practices for technology maturity, design stability, and production 
maturity, from a data collection instrument provided to each program 
office. We also collected information from program offices on other 
aspects of program management including systems engineering, 
requirements changes, software development, and program office 
staffing. Overall, we collected information on 70 weapon programs. We 
chose these programs based on their estimated cost, stage in the 
acquisition process, and congressional interest. Our assessment of how 
well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach 
includes a subset of 42 major defense acquisition programs from DOD's 
2009 portfolio.[Footnote 4] 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to March 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains detailed 
information on our scope and methodology. 

Observations on DOD's 2009 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio: 

We make four overall observations or points concerning DOD's 
management of its major defense acquisition portfolio this year. 
First, in DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget, the Secretary of Defense 
proposed canceling or significantly curtailing programs with projected 
total costs of at least $126 billion that he characterized as too 
costly or no longer relevant for current operations, while increasing 
funding for others that he assessed as higher priorities. Second, DOD 
plans to replace several of the canceled programs in fiscal years 2010 
and 2011, hopefully with new, knowledge-based acquisition strategies, 
because the warfighter need remains. The most significant of these new 
programs will be the effort to restructure the Army's terminated 
Future Combat System program into several smaller, integrated 
programs. Third, DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs 
grew to 102 programs in 2009--a net increase of 6 since December 2007. 
Eighteen programs with an estimated cost of over $72 billion entered 
the portfolio,[Footnote 5] while 12 programs with an estimated cost of 
$48 billion, including over $7 billion in cost growth, left the 
portfolio.[Footnote 6] When the Future Combat System is added to the 
programs leaving the portfolio, the total cost of these programs 
increases to $179 billion, including over $47 billion in cost growth. 
Finally, our analysis of this year's portfolio was limited by the lack 
of timely Selected Acquisition Reports that reflected the Secretary of 
Defense's proposed changes to the programs in the portfolio. 

Additional details about each of these four observations follow: 

* The Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2010 budget recommended the 
cancellation of several high-risk acquisition programs. In April 2009, 
the Secretary of Defense recommended canceling or curtailing all or 
part of at least a half dozen major defense acquisition programs-- 
including the Air Force's Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, the 
Army's Future Combat System, the Missile Defense Agency's Multiple 
Kill Vehicle, and the Navy's VH-71 Presidential Helicopter 
Replacement--that were over cost, behind schedule, no longer suited to 
meet the warfighters' current needs, or based on a single service, 
instead of a joint solution. In announcing these changes, the 
Secretary estimated that the total cost of three of the programs 
recommended for cancellation exceeded $126 billion.[Footnote 7] Table 
1 provides a summary of some of the Secretary of Defense's 
recommendations in DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

Table 1: Secretary of Defense's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Recommendations: 

Recommended termination: 

System: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): $13; 
Secretary's comments: Plan to develop options for a new program; 
Congressional action: Conferees recommended $100 million for 
technology capture that DOD has budgeted for the VH-71 program. 

System: Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Plan to reexamine requirements; 
Congressional action: Did not authorize appropriations for the program. 

System: Next-Generation Bomber; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Will not initiate new development program 
without better understanding of the requirement and technology; 
Congressional action: Supported development of a Next-Generation 
Bomber Aircraft, but did not authorize appropriations. 

System: Future Combat System-Manned Ground Vehicles; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): $87; 
Secretary's comments: Plan to reevaluate requirements, technology, and 
approach before relaunching and recompeting program; 
Congressional action: Directed Army to develop, test, and field an 
operationally effective and affordable next-generation ground combat 
vehicle. Conferees recommended rescission of $26 million in existing 
funding. 

System: Transformational Satellite; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): $26; 
Secretary's comments: Plan to buy two more AEHF satellites as 
alternative; 
Congressional action: Did not authorize appropriations for the program. 

System: Ballistic Missile Defense-Multiple Kill Vehicle; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Plan to reexamine requirements; 
no mention of new program; 
Congressional action: Did not authorize appropriations for the program. 

Recommended end of production: 

System: C-17; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Recommended ending production at 205 aircraft; 
Congressional action: Conferees recommended $2.5 billion for the 
procurement of 10 C-17 aircraft, associated spares, support equipment, 
and training equipment. 

System: DDG 1000; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Recommended ending production at 3 ships; 
Congressional action: Did not fund additional ships. Appropriated $1.4 
billion for completion of third DDG 1000. 

System: F-22; 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): Unspecified; 
Secretary's comments: Recommended ending production at 187 aircraft; 
Congressional action: Did not fund additional aircraft. Conferees 
recommended rescission of $383 million in existing funding. 

Total: 
Total estimated cost: (dollars in billions): $126. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO analysis of Secretary's April 2009 statement on fiscal 
year 2010 budget and fiscal year 2010 DOD authorization and 
appropriations acts. 

* DOD is currently developing options for new programs to replace the 
Future Combat System and VH-71 Presidential Helicopter that will begin 
in fiscal year 2010 or 2011. While DOD recommended canceling existing 
programs with high-risk acquisition strategies, such as the manned 
ground vehicle portion of the Future Combat System and the VH-71 
Presidential Helicopter, the capability needs these systems were 
supposed to fill still exist. In both cases, DOD is currently 
developing options for new programs that will begin in fiscal year 
2010 or 2011. The Army is planning the acquisition strategy to deliver 
residual capabilities from the Future Combat System program. While its 
plans are still preliminary, it has already made a decision to produce 
the first increment of equipment from the Future Combat System 
program; begin development of follow-on equipment; establish an 
approach to acquiring future increments of network capabilities; and 
plan for the development of a new ground combat vehicle. The Navy is 
currently conducting early systems engineering activities including 
analyzing requirements and alternative approaches to meeting those 
requirements to support the start of a new presidential helicopter 
replacement program. In both cases, DOD has an opportunity to develop 
lower-risk alternatives with requirements that are aligned with 
available technology and funding and better reflect warfighters' 
current needs. 

* DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs continues to 
grow. Between December 2007 and July 2009, DOD's portfolio of major 
defense acquisition programs grew from 96 to 102 programs.[Footnote 8] 
Overall, 18 percent of the portfolio or 18 programs are newly 
designated major defense acquisition programs. These programs have a 
total estimated cost of over $72 billion.[Footnote 9] Cost data were 
only available for 13 of these programs. Not all of these programs 
entering the portfolio are new starts. For instance, the Airborne 
Signals Intelligence Payload, the MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft 
System, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System, and 
the Predator Unmanned Aircraft System programs all began as 
acquisition category II programs, but their total research and 
development or procurement costs now exceed the threshold for major 
defense acquisition programs. Twelve programs with an estimated total 
cost of $48 billion as of December 2007, including over $7 billion in 
cost growth, left the portfolio.[Footnote 10] These programs left the 
portfolio for a variety of reasons, including program restructure, 
termination, or completion. Due to the methodology we used to identify 
the programs entering and exiting the portfolio, our analysis did not 
include the Future Combat System program, which is being significantly 
restructured as part of the Secretary of Defense's fiscal year 2010 
budget recommendations. As of December 2007, the estimated total 
acquisition cost of the Future Combat System program was over $131 
billion (fiscal year 2010 dollars), which includes over $40 billion in 
cost growth (fiscal year 2010 dollars) since the start of development. 
At the time of our review, DOD did not have a cost estimate for the 
new programs that will replace the Future Combat System. 

* The lack of complete Selected Acquisition Report data for 2009 
precludes an analysis of the overall cost and schedule performance of 
DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. DOD did not 
comply with statutory requirements when it did not issue Selected 
Acquisition Reports within 60 days of its fiscal year 2010 budget 
submission on May 7, 2009.[Footnote 11] DOD prepared limited Selected 
Acquisition Reports for 85 of 102 major defense acquisition programs 
by November 2009, 6 months after the budget was submitted.[Footnote 
12] The data in the limited Selected Acquisition Reports were not 
complete. Program costs were not updated from December 2007 Selected 
Acquisition Reports, except to reflect changes in the funding received 
in fiscal year 2009 and funding requested in fiscal year 2010. 
According to DOD, the rest of the cost data on programs could not be 
updated because the fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Defense Program 
was not complete. 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

For 42 individual weapon programs in DOD's 2009 portfolio, we assessed 
the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process. 
Our analysis allows us to make five observations about DOD's 
management of technology, design, and manufacturing risks and its use 
of testing and early systems engineering to reduce these risks. These 
observations present a mixed picture of DOD's adherence to a knowledge-
based acquisition approach. First, newer programs are beginning with 
higher levels of technology maturity, but they are not taking other 
steps, such as holding early systems engineering reviews, to ensure 
there is a match between requirements and resources. Second, programs 
that have held critical design reviews in recent years reported higher 
levels of design knowledge; however, few programs are demonstrating 
that the design is capable of meeting performance requirements by 
testing an integrated prototype. Third, some programs are taking steps 
to bring critical manufacturing processes into control; however, many 
programs still rely on "after the fact" metrics. Fourth, programs are 
still not regularly testing production representative prototypes 
before committing to production. Fifth, more programs are using 
reliability growth curves before beginning production. While program 
knowledge is increasing, as in the past, none of the 42 programs we 
assessed have attained or are on track to attain all of the requisite 
amounts of technology, design, and production knowledge by each of the 
key junctures in the acquisition process.[Footnote 13] However, if DOD 
consistently implements its December 2008 policy revisions on new and 
ongoing programs, then DOD's performance in these areas, as well as 
its cost and schedule outcomes, should improve. 

Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based 
approach to product development that demonstrates high levels of 
knowledge before significant commitments are made. Achieving the right 
knowledge at the right time enables leadership to make informed 
decisions about when and how best to move into various acquisition 
phases. In essence, knowledge supplants risk over time. This building 
of knowledge consists of information that should be gathered at three 
critical points over the course of a program. 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving a 
high level of technology maturity by the start of system development 
is an important indicator of whether this match has been made. 
[Footnote 14] This means that the technologies needed to meet 
essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work in their 
intended environment. In addition, the developer has completed a 
preliminary design of the product that shows the design is feasible. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when 
a program determines that a product's design will meet customer 
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A 
best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level 
critical design review, usually held midway through system 
development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings 
at this point or 100 percent of the 3D product models for ships at 
fabrication start provides tangible evidence that the product's design 
is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is 
capable of meeting performance requirements. 

* Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This point is 
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can 
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A 
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes 
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, 
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's 
quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 

A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in 
which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before 
proceeding. In other words, demonstrating technology maturity is a 
prerequisite for moving forward into system development, during which 
the focus should be on design and integration. 

Additional details about each of our five observations on DOD's 
adherence to these knowledge points follow. 

* Newer programs are beginning with higher levels of technology 
maturity, but they are not taking key steps to ensure there is a match 
between requirements and resources. Since 2006, there has been a 
significant increase in the percentage of technologies demonstrated in 
a relevant or realistic environment by the start of system 
development.[Footnote 15] This increase coincided with a change in 
statute. In 2006, the National Defense Authorization Act included a 
provision requiring all major defense acquisition programs seeking 
milestone B approval--entry into system development--to get a 
certification stating the program's technologies have been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment.[Footnote 16] While only one of 
the six programs that entered system development since 2006 and 
provided data had fully mature critical technologies--that is, 
demonstrated in a realistic environment, according to our criteria--
all the programs had critical technologies that had been at least 
demonstrated in a relevant environment (see figure 1). Overall, only 4 
of the 29 programs in our assessment that provided data on technical 
maturity at development start did so with fully mature critical 
technologies. 

Figure 1: Percentage of Technologies That Were Mature and Nearing 
Maturity When Selected Programs Entered System Development: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Year program entered system development: 2003 or prior (14); 
Mature: 32% (32); 
Nearing maturity: 14% (14). 

Year program entered system development: 2004-2005 (9); 
Mature: 40% (14); 
Nearing maturity: 14.29% (5); 

Year program entered system development: 2006-2009 (6); 
Mature: 21.74% (5); 
Nearing maturity: 78.26% (18). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The number of programs entering system development is in 
parentheses under the years. The number of critical technologies for 
those programs is in parentheses in the bars. 

[End of figure] 

While the technology levels of DOD programs entering system 
development have increased, these programs are still not regularly 
conducting early systems engineering reviews, which help ensure there 
is a match between requirements and resources. We have previously 
reported that before starting development, programs should hold 
systems engineering events, such as the preliminary design review, to 
ensure that requirements are defined and feasible and that the 
proposed design can meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and 
other system constraints. Our assessment last year found that programs 
conducting these events prior to development start experienced less 
research and development cost growth and shorter delays in the 
delivery of initial operational capabilities than programs that 
conducted these reviews after development start. Almost all nonship 
programs (37 of 40 that provided data) in our assessment have held at 
least one of three key systems engineering reviews (system 
requirements review, system functional review, and preliminary design 
review). However, only 1 of these 37 programs held a preliminary 
design review before the start of system development. The remaining 
programs held the review, on average, 30 months after development 
start. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 established a 
statutory requirement for programs to conduct a preliminary design 
review before milestone B, so we expect improvements in this area. 
[Footnote 17] 

* Programs that have held critical design reviews in recent years 
reported higher levels of design knowledge; however, few programs are 
demonstrating that the design is capable of meeting performance 
requirements by testing an integrated prototype. Knowing a product's 
design is stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of 
costly design changes occurring during the manufacturing of production-
representative prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become 
more significant. The overall design knowledge that programs have 
demonstrated at their critical design reviews has increased since 
2003. Programs in our assessment that held a critical design review 
between 2006 and 2009 had, on average, almost 70 percent of their 
design drawings releasable at the time of the review, which is a 
consistent upward trend since 2003 (see figure 2). 

Figure 2: Average Percent of Total Expected Design Drawings for 
Selected Programs That Are Releasable at Critical Design Review: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Stable design = 90%. 

Year of critical design review: 2003 or prior; 
Average percent: 51.24% (2). 

Year of critical design review: 2004-2005; 
Average percent: 57.42% (7). 

Year of critical design review: 2006-2009; 
Average percent: 69.86% (19). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Number of programs in parentheses. 

[End of figure] 

However, most designs are still not stable at this point. Of the 28 
programs in our assessment that have held a system-level critical 
design review, only 8 reported having a stable design. Only 2 of the 5 
programs that held a critical design review in 2009 had a stable 
design at that point. The 5 programs reported that, on average, 83 
percent of the total expected drawings were releasable. 

While the design knowledge of DOD programs at the system-level 
critical design review has increased since 2003, these programs are 
still not regularly demonstrating that these designs can meet 
performance requirements by testing integrated prototypes before the 
critical design review--a best practice. We have previously reported 
that early system prototypes are useful to demonstrate design 
stability and that the design will work and can be built. None of the 
5 programs that held their critical design review in 2009 and planned 
to test a prototype did so before the review. Of the 33 programs that 
reported that they either had tested or were going to test an early 
system prototype and provided a critical design review date, only 4 
did so before their critical design review.[Footnote 18] The remaining 
programs tested or will test their prototype, on average, 31 months 
after their critical design review. While few programs test integrated 
prototypes by the critical design review, DOD programs are testing 
prototypes earlier. As shown in table 2, programs that held or will 
hold their critical design reviews in 2004 or later are testing or 
plan to test an integrated prototype much sooner than programs with 
design reviews in 2003 or earlier. 

Table 2: Programs Testing an Early System Prototype: 

Number of programs testing before critical design review; 
Year of critical design review: 2003 or prior: 1; 
Year of critical design review: 2004-2005: 0; 
Year of critical design review: 2006-2009: 3; 
Year of critical design review: 2010 and later: 0; 
Year of critical design review: All programs: 4. 

Number of programs testing after critical design review; 
Year of critical design review: 2003 or prior: 3; 
Year of critical design review: 2004-2005: 6; 
Year of critical design review: 2006-2009: 15; 
Year of critical design review: 2010 and later: 5; 
Year of critical design review: All programs: 29. 

For programs testing after critical design review, average number of 
months from design review to prototype test; 
Year of critical design review: 2003 or prior: 74; 
Year of critical design review: 2004-2005: 29; 
Year of critical design review: 2006-2009: 27; 
Year of critical design review: 2010 and later: 18; 
Year of critical design review: All programs: 31. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that DOD 
policy ensure that the acquisition strategy for each major defense 
acquisition program provides for competitive prototypes before 
milestone B approval, unless a waiver is properly granted.[Footnote 
19] This requirement should increase the percentage of programs 
demonstrating that the system's design works as intended before the 
critical design review. 

* Some programs are taking steps to bring critical manufacturing 
processes into control; however, many programs still rely on "after 
the fact" metrics, such as defects and rework, to measure 
manufacturing process maturity. Capturing critical manufacturing 
knowledge before entering production helps ensure that a weapon system 
will work as intended and can be manufactured efficiently to meet 
cost, schedule, and quality targets. Identifying key product 
characteristics and the associated critical manufacturing processes is 
a key initial step to ensuring production elements are stable and in 
control. Seven programs in our assessment have identified their 
critical manufacturing processes, including four of the programs that 
entered production in 2009. Three of those seven programs reported 
that their critical manufacturing processes were in control.[Footnote 
20] Bringing processes under statistical control reduces variations in 
parts manufactured, thus reducing the potential for defects. It is 
generally less costly--in terms of time and money--to eliminate 
product variation by controlling manufacturing processes than to 
perform extensive inspection after a product is built. However, many 
DOD programs rely on inspecting produced components instead of using 
statistical process control data in order to assess the maturity of 
their production processes. For example, 12 programs in our assessment 
reported tracking defects in delivered units, nonconformances, or 
scrap/rework as a way to measure production process maturity. The use 
of "after the fact" metrics is a reactive approach towards managing 
manufacturing quality as opposed to a prevention-based approach. DOD 
is proposing the use of manufacturing readiness levels, which include 
process controls, as a common standard for identifying, communicating, 
and managing manufacturing risk and readiness. 

* Programs are still not regularly testing production-representative 
prototypes before committing to production. We have previously 
reported that in addition to demonstrating that the system can be 
built efficiently, production and postproduction costs are minimized 
when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to show 
that the system will work as intended and in a reliable manner. The 
benefits of testing are maximized when the tests are completed prior 
to a production decision because making design changes after 
production begins can be both costly and inefficient. However, of the 
32 programs in our assessment that could have tested a prototype 
before production, only 17 either tested or expect to test a fully 
configured, integrated, production-representative prototype before 
holding their production decision review. In December 2008, DOD 
changed its policy to require programs to test production-
representative articles before entering production. Three of the five 
programs that held their production decision in 2009 reported testing 
a production-representative prototype before their production 
decision. However, as figure 3 shows, only 9 of the 18 programs 
planning to hold their production decision review in 2010 and beyond 
plan to test a prototype before that decision. 

Figure 3: Programs Testing a Production-Representative Prototype 
before and after a Production Decision: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2003 or prior; 
Programs testing prototype before production decision: 0; 
Programs not testing prototype before production decision: 1. 

Year: 2004-2005; 
Programs testing prototype before production decision: 1; 
Programs not testing prototype before production decision: 0. 

Year: 2006-2009; 
Programs testing prototype before production decision: 7; 
Programs not testing prototype before production decision: 4. 

Year: 2010 and later; 
Programs testing prototype before production decision: 9; 
Programs not testing prototype before production decision: 9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

* More programs are using reliability growth curves before beginning 
production. Reliability growth testing provides visibility over how 
reliability is improving and uncovers design problems so fixes can be 
incorporated before production begins. According to DOD's acquisition 
policy, a major defense acquisition program may not proceed beyond low-
rate initial production until it has demonstrated acceptable 
reliability. Over half--22 of 40 programs that responded to our 
questionnaire--reported that they use a reliability growth curve, with 
18 of these programs reporting they are currently meeting their 
established goals. Programs that have held production decisions since 
2009 are more likely to use reliability growth curves compared to 
programs that held production decisions before 2009. Three of the five 
programs that held their production decision in 2009 reported using a 
reliability growth curve, with all three reporting that they are 
meeting their goals. In addition, 12 of 19 programs that expect to 
hold their production decision in 2010 and beyond use reliability 
growth curves and most are currently meeting their goals. This 
practice should help these programs begin production with a reliable 
product design. 

Observations on Other Factors That Can Affect Program Execution: 

In addition to collecting and analyzing data on the attainment of 
knowledge at key junctures in an acquisition program, we also 
collected and assessed data on other areas related to DOD's management 
of its weapons programs, including requirements, software management, 
and program office staffing. We have previously identified 
requirements changes and increases in software lines of code as 
sources of program instability that can contribute to cost growth and 
schedule delays. Our analysis of the data we collected in these areas 
allows us to make three observations. First, a majority of the 
programs in our current assessment reported experiencing requirements 
changes after starting development, resulting in major cost and 
schedule effects for eight programs. Second, a majority of programs 
have also either experienced growth in software lines of code or are 
at risk of doing so in the future. Third, program offices reported 
experiencing workforce challenges that hindered program execution and 
negatively affected program management and oversight. As a result of 
shortfalls in government personnel and capabilities, programs in our 
current assessment are relying heavily on support contractors to fill 
these gaps. Additional details about each of these three observations 
follow. 

* A majority of programs changed key systems requirements after 
development start. We reported in our last assessment that programs 
that changed key system requirements after starting development 
experienced greater cost increases and schedule delays than programs 
with no requirements changes. Of the 42 programs in our current 
assessment that reported tracking requirements changes, 23 programs 
reported having had at least one change (addition, reduction, 
enhancement, or deferment) to a key performance parameter--a top-level 
requirement--since development start--up from 22 programs in last 
year's assessment. Further, nine programs experienced at least one 
change to a key system attribute--a lower level, but still a crucial 
requirement of the system. Eight programs reported major effects on 
the program as a result of these requirements changes, such as not 
meeting acquisition program baseline cost, schedule, and performance 
thresholds. DOD's revised December 2008 acquisition policy attempts to 
reduce potentially disruptive requirements changes by requiring 
programs to hold annual configuration steering board meetings to 
ensure that significant technical changes are not approved without 
considering their effect on cost and schedule. 

* Many programs are at risk for cost growth and schedule delays 
because of software development issues. We reported in our last 
assessment that programs experiencing more than a 25 percent growth in 
software lines of code since development start had higher development 
cost growth and longer schedule delays than other programs. Seventeen 
of the 28 programs that reported data on software lines of code 
estimated that the number of lines of code required for the system to 
function has grown or will grow by 25 percent or more--up from 14 
programs in our last assessment. Overall, the average lines of code 
growth or planned growth for the 28 programs was about 92 percent. In 
addition to measuring growth in software lines of code, we have 
previously reported that collecting earned value management data for 
software development and tracking and containing software defects in 
phase are good management practices. Overall, 30 programs in our 
assessment reported collecting earned value management data to help 
manage software development. Thirty-two programs in our assessment 
reported collecting some type of software defect data. For the 22 
programs that responded to a more specific question about defect 
correction, on average, only 69 percent of the defects were corrected 
in the phase of software development in which they occurred. Capturing 
software defects in-phase is important because discovering defects out 
of phase can cause expensive rework later in programs. 

* Programs' reliance on nongovernment personnel continues to increase 
in order to make up for shortfalls in government personnel and 
capabilities. In recent years, Congress and DOD have taken steps to 
ensure the acquisition workforce has the capacity, personnel, and 
skills needed to properly perform its mission; however, programs 
continue to struggle to fill all staff positions authorized. Only 19 
of the 50 programs that responded to our questions on staffing were 
able to fill all the positions they had been authorized.[Footnote 21] 
A commonly cited reason for not being able to fill positions was 
difficulty finding qualified candidates. As a result of staff 
shortfalls, program offices reported that program management and 
oversight has been degraded, contracting activities have been delayed, 
and program management costs have increased as contractors are used to 
fill the gap. Overall, 43 programs or 86 percent of those providing 
data reported utilizing support contractors to make up for shortfalls 
in government personnel and capabilities. Program offices' reliance on 
contractors has continued to increase. For the first time since we 
began reporting on program office staffing in 2008, programs reported 
having more nongovernment than government staff working in program 
offices. As shown in table 3, for the 50 programs in our assessment 
that responded, nongovernment staff constituted approximately 51 
percent of the total program office workforce--up from 48 percent in 
2008. 

Table 3: Program Office Composition for 50 DOD Programs: 

Percentage of staff: 

Military: 
Program management: 28%; 
Engineering and technical: 7%; 
Contracting: 6%; 
Other business functions: 3%; 
Administrative support: 2%; 
Other: 5%; 
Total: 8%. 

Civilian government: 
Program management: 40%; 
Engineering and technical: 41%; 
Contracting: 74%; 
Other business functions: 45%; 
Administrative support: 18%; 
Other: 24%; 
Total: 40%. 

Total government: 
Program management: 67%; 
Engineering and technical: 47%; 
Contracting: 80%; 
Other business functions: 48%; 
Administrative support: 20%; 
Other: 29%; 
Total: 49%. 

Support contractors: 
Program management: 32%; 
Engineering and technical: 43%; 
Contracting: 20%; 
Other business functions: 50%; 
Administrative support: 78%; 
Other: 70%; 
Total: 45%. 

Other nongovernment[A]: 
Program management: 0; 
Engineering and technical: 9%; 
Contracting: 0; 
Other business functions: 3%; 
Administrative support: 2%; 
Other: 1%; 
Total: 6%. 

Total nongovernment: 
Program management: 33%; 
Engineering and technical: 53%; 
Contracting: 20%; 
Other business functions: 52%; 
Administrative support: 80%; 
Other: 71%; 
Total: 51%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Other nongovernment includes federally funded research and 
development centers, universities, and affiliates. 

[End of table] 

The increasing number of support contractors accounts for this steady 
growth. This year, support contractors made up about 45 percent of 
program office staff--up from 36 percent in 2008. The greatest numbers 
of support contractors are in engineering and technical positions, but 
their participation has increased in all areas, from program 
management and contracting to administrative support and other 
business functions. 

Observations about DOD's Implementation of Acquisition Reforms: 

DOD has begun to incorporate acquisition reforms into the acquisition 
strategies for new programs. Both DOD's December 2008 acquisition 
policy revisions and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
require programs to invest more time and resources in the front end of 
the acquisition process--refining concepts through early systems 
engineering, developing technologies, and building prototypes before 
starting system development. In addition, DOD policy requires 
establishment of configuration steering boards that meet annually to 
review all program requirements changes as well as to make 
recommendations on proposed descoping options that could help keep a 
program within its established cost and schedule targets. These steps 
could provide a foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based 
business cases for individual weapon programs and are consistent with 
many of our past recommendations; however, if reform is to succeed and 
weapon program outcomes are to improve, they must be reinforced in 
practice through decisions on individual programs. Our analysis of the 
programs in our assessment allows us to make two observations about 
the extent to which DOD is implementing recent acquisition reforms. 
First, ten programs in our assessment have not yet entered system 
development and most reported having acquisitions strategies 
consistent with both DOD's revised acquisition policy and the 
provisions of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 
Second, seven programs in our assessment reported holding 
configuration steering boards in 2009. Additional details about both 
of observations follow. 

* Almost all the pre-major defense acquisition programs in our 
assessment plan to develop competitive prototypes and conduct a 
preliminary design review before development start. Consistent with 
the new requirement in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, 8 of 10 pre-major defense acquisition programs in our assessment 
reported planning to develop competitive prototypes of the proposed 
weapon system or key system elements before milestone B.[Footnote 22] 
The programs include the 3rd Generation Infrared Surveillance, Air and 
Missile Defense Radar, Common Infrared Countermeasures, Joint Air-to- 
Ground Missile, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Next Generation GPS 
Control Segment, Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Mobile Landing 
Platform, and Small Diameter Bomb Increment II. The B-2 EHF SATCOM 
Increment 2 did not report that competitive prototypes were part of 
its acquisition strategy. In addition, 7 of 10 pre-major defense 
acquisition programs in our assessment have already scheduled a 
preliminary design review before milestone B, consistent with the new 
requirement in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. 
[Footnote 23] One program--the Navy's Sea Based Strategic Deterrent--
is not in the technology development phase and, therefore, has not put 
forth a technology development strategy that would include competitive 
prototypes or a scheduled preliminary design review. In addition to 
programs planning to develop competitive prototypes and conduct early 
systems engineering reviews, we have seen examples of programs 
focusing on developing realistic requirements. For example, the B-2 
EHF Increment 2 is currently reexamining its requirements after early 
reviews and trade studies found that they could not be met with 
existing technologies. 

* Only a few programs reported holding configuration steering boards 
to review requirements changes, significant technical changes, or de- 
scoping options in 2009. We have previously reported that requirements 
changes and the inability of the program manager to defer requirements 
that could not be completed under existing cost and schedule targets 
are factors in poor acquisition program outcomes. Under DOD's revised 
acquisition policy, ongoing programs are required to conduct annual 
configuration steering boards to review requirements changes and 
significant technical configuration changes that have the potential to 
result in cost and schedule effects on the program. In addition, the 
program manager is expected to present de-scoping options to the board 
that could reduce program costs or moderate requirements. Only seven 
programs in our assessment reported holding a configuration steering 
board meeting in 2009. None of the programs reported that the board 
approved requirements changes or significant technical changes. 
However, the P-8A program presented de-scoping options to decrease the 
cost and schedule risk on the program and reported that those options 
were approved. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

For our two-page assessments, we depict the extent of knowledge gained 
by key points in a program using a stacked bar graph and provide a 
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page of each assessment. 
As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is based on three 
knowledge points. The key indicators for the attainment of knowledge 
are technology maturity (in orange), design stability (in green), and 
production maturity (in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based 
on the ideal attainment of the three types of knowledge at the three 
knowledge points. The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the 
best practice line; the more likely the weapon will be delivered 
within estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge deficit at development 
start--indicated by a gap between the technology maturity attained and 
the best practice line--means the program proceeded with immature 
technologies and faces a greater likelihood of cost and schedule 
increases as risks are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 4: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start; 
DOD design review; 
GAO review; and: 
Production decision (which includes a projection). 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

An interpretation of this notional example would be that system 
development began with critical technologies that were partially 
immature, thereby missing knowledge point 1 indicated by the orange 
diamond. By the design review, technology knowledge had increased, but 
all critical technologies were not yet mature, and only 33 percent of 
the program's design drawings were releasable to the manufacturer. 
Therefore, knowledge point 2, as indicated by the green diamond, was 
not attained. At the time of GAO's review, this program had matured 
all of its critical technologies and released approximately 75 percent 
of its design drawings. When the program plans to make a production 
decision, it expects to have released all of its design drawings and 
have half of its critical manufacturing processes in statistical 
control. The expected knowledge at this future point is captured in 
the outlined region marked "projection." 

This program is not projected to reach knowledge point 3, indicated by 
the blue diamond, by the time it makes a production decision.[Footnote 
24] 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs. Each 
assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are following 
a knowledge-based approach to system development and other program 
information. In total, we present information on 70 weapon programs. 
For 57 programs, we produced two-page assessments discussing 
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained, as well as 
other program issues. Forty-seven of these assessments are of major 
defense acquisition programs, most of which are in development or 
early production; eight assessments are of components of major defense 
acquisition programs, including elements of MDA's Ballistic Missile 
Defense System; and three assessments are of programs that were 
projected to become major defense acquisition programs during our 
review. The other 13 programs, which include 8 pre-major defense 
acquisition programs, 2 major defense acquisition programs that were 
terminated or are ending, 1 major defense acquisition program that is 
a commercially-derived aircraft, 1 MDA element, and 1 acquisition 
category II program are covered in a one-page format that describes 
their current status. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2009 Lockheed Martin Corporation. All rights reserved. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and 
tactical warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission 
control segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications 
are acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

Concept: 
Program start (4/99). 

System development: 
Development start (9/01); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
Production decision (6/04); 
GAO review (1/10); 
First satellite launch (9/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,022.0 million:
Procurement: $2,171.3 million:
Total funding: $3,193.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,796.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $7,277.5; 
Percent change: 51.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,418.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,129.4; 
Percent change: 120.6%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,214.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $10,406.8; 
Percent change: 67.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,242.896; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,601.707; 
Percent change: 109.3%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 09/2008: 4; 
Percent change: -20.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest 09/2008: 170; 
Percent change: 53.2%. 

[End of table] 

The AEHF program has overcome the technical problems that have delayed 
the first satellite's launch by almost 2 years and increased the cost 
of the program. Defective satellite parts were replaced and the 
satellite successfully completed system-level environmental testing. 
The satellite is now proceeding to final testing before its scheduled 
September 2010 launch. The AEHF technologies are mature and the design 
appears stable. We could not assess production maturity because the 
program does not collect statistical process control data. Three 
satellites have been added to the program in recent years because of 
concerns about delays in and the subsequent recommended termination of 
the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program. Satellites four through 
six will cost significantly more than the third satellite because of 
parts obsolescence issues and a 4-year break in production. 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 9/01; 
DOD design review: 4/04; 
Production decision: 6/04; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

AEHF Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are 
mature, with all either flight-qualified through test and 
demonstration or flight-proven through successful mission operations. 
System-level environmental testing for the first satellite was 
completed in July 2009. The AEHF's design appears stable with all of 
its expected design drawings released. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the program office 
does not collect statistical process control data. However, during 
initial system level environmental testing for the first and second 
satellites, several flight boxes experienced failures due to defective 
components that required removal, repair, and reinstallation. Because 
of the number of components that had to be removed and reinstalled, 
the first satellite had to undergo an additional round of system-level 
environmental tests. These actions delayed the first launch almost 2 
years and increased program cost. According to the program office, the 
additional testing was successfully completed in July 2009. The second 
satellite also completed system level environmental testing in 2009, 
and no new problems or issues were discovered. The first satellite 
will now proceed to final testing, which includes verifying satellite 
interfaces and functions and that the space, ground control, and 
terminals segments perform together as expected. The satellite will 
then be prepared for its scheduled September 2010 launch. Launches for 
satellites 2 and 3 are scheduled for May 2011 and January 2012, 
respectively. 

Other Program Issues: 

The number of AEHF satellites to be procured has changed over time. 
The original AEHF program included the purchase of five satellites. In 
December 2002, satellites 4 and 5 were deleted from the program with 
the intention of using the first TSAT satellite to achieve full 
operational capability. However, because of concerns about TSAT 
development and a possible gap in capability, the conference report 
accompanying the fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act 
recommended funding for the advanced procurement of a fourth 
satellite, which the Air Force fully funded in the fiscal year 2010 
budget for about $1.5 billion (then-year dollars). This satellite is 
expected to launch in 2016. The cost of the fourth satellite is 
significantly more than the estimated $952 million (then-year dollars) 
cost of the third satellite because there is an estimated 4-year break 
in production and some electronics components are no longer 
manufactured. Program officials do not anticipate significant 
technical challenges, but integrating, testing, and requalifying the 
new components will require time and money. In addition, in April 
2009, DOD announced its intention to terminate the TSAT program and 
procure two additional AEHF satellites, bringing the total to six. The 
program has decided that the design specifications for the first three 
satellites will remain unchanged for satellites four through six, 
which will be clones except for obsolete parts. The program office 
estimates the cost of satellites five and six will be about $1.6 
billion and $1.7 billion (then-year dollars), respectively, with 
estimated launch dates in 2018 and 2020. 

Program Office Comments: 

The AEHF program office provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: AGM-88E AARGM Program Office (PMA). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's AARGM is an air-to-ground missile for carrier-based 
aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled surface-to-
air defenses. The AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed Anti- 
Radiation Missile (HARM). It will utilize the existing HARM propulsion 
and warhead sections, a modified control section, and a new guidance 
section with Global Positioning System and improved targeting 
capabilities. The program is following a phased approach for 
development. We assessed phase I and made observations on phases II 
and III. 

Concept: 
Development start (6/03); 

System development: 
Design readiness review (3/06); 
Low-rate decision (9/08). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full-rate decision (1/11); 
Initial capability (2/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: ATK Missile Systems Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3.5 million:
Procurement: $1,232.2 million:
Total funding: $1,235.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,841: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $621.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $665.7; 
Percent change: 7.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $940.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,292.7; 
Percent change: 37.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,561.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,958.4; 
Percent change: 25.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $.872; 
Latest 09/2008: $1.025; 
Percent change: 17.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1,790; 
Latest 09/2008: 1,911; 
Percent change: 6.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 85; 
Latest 09/2008: 92; 
Percent change: 8.2%. 

[End of table] 

The AARGM program awarded a contract for the first lot of low-rate 
initial production in December 2008. According to the program office, 
its critical technologies are mature and its design is stable. 
Software development is nearing completion. However, the contractor 
has not yet demonstrated that production processes are fully mature. 
The program office has identified the number of critical manufacturing 
processes and stated that the contractor was to begin collecting 
statistical process control data in December 2009. According to the 
program office, deficiencies related to the missile's capabilities 
were identified during developmental testing in the last year, which 
has delayed the start of operational evaluation by 4 months. The 
program also is in the process of coordinating approval from the Navy 
to defer demonstration of one aspect of a key performance parameter. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/03; 
DOD design review: 3/06; 
Production decision: 9/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

AGM-88E AARGM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AARGM program began system development in 2003 with its two 
critical technologies--the millimeter wave software and radome-- 
nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment. According 
to the program office, these technologies were mature and demonstrated 
in a realistic environment when the program received approval to enter 
production in September 2008. However, according to DOT&E, the 
missile's millimeter wave capabilities were not fully demonstrated 
during the program's operational assessment in order to avoid a delay 
in the program's production decision. According to the program office, 
these capabilities have been demonstrated during subsequent 
developmental tests. During these tests, the program identified 
deficiencies related to the missile's reliability and situational 
awareness. As a result, program officials stated that the start of 
operational evaluation will be delayed 4 months until February 2010. 
In addition, program officials said that the missile is not fully 
meeting its lethality requirement for a specific target in a specified 
scenario. The program is in the process of obtaining approval from the 
Navy to defer demonstration of this requirement to follow-on 
operational testing and evaluation. 

The AARGM program will incorporate additional capabilities in phase II 
and phase III of the program. The weapons impact assessment 
transmitter and integrated broadcast service receiver are key enablers 
of these capabilities. According to program officials, both 
technologies are mature and were demonstrated in a realistic 
environment during developmental testing. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the AARGM is currently stable and all of the drawings 
were released to manufacturing by the start of production. The program 
office reports that it is nearing completion of software development 
efforts and has tested, integrated, and released 100 percent of the 
total lines of code. 

Production Maturity: 

The AARGM program awarded a contract for the first lot of low-rate 
initial production in December 2008. However, the AARGM's production 
processes have not yet demonstrated their maturity because the 
contractor has not started collecting statistical process control 
data. The program has identified the number of critical manufacturing 
processes and expected the contractor to start collecting statistical 
process control data by the end of 2009. According to the Defense 
Contract Management Agency, the contractor is still finishing efforts 
under the system development and demonstration contract and has not 
yet fully moved into low-rate initial production. Delivery of the 
first unit is scheduled for January 2010. The contract provides 
incentives for on-time delivery of subsequent units. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program delayed entry into operational testing in September 2009 
to correct key deficiencies identified toward the end of developmental 
testing. Since that time, the program corrected those deficiencies and 
completed all developmental flight testing events to support entry 
into operational testing, which will begin in February 2010. The first 
production units will be delivered in January 2010. The program 
continues to focus on affordability and is reporting a 1.3 percent 
average procurement unit cost growth against the current acquisition 
program baseline estimate. 

[End of section] 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload Baseline: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2003 Northrop Grumman. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) is a 
common, scalable family of sensors designed for medium-and high- 
altitude aircraft. ASIP sensors are expected to provide automatic, 
real-time, battlefield surveillance, situational awareness and 
intelligence information. The Air Force is developing three different 
ASIP variants, a baseline variant for use on the U-2 and Global Hawk, 
and two scaled-down variants referred to as ASIP 1C and ASIP 2C for 
Predator and Reaper respectively. We assessed the baseline variant. 

Concept: 
Development start (12/02); 
Requirements review: (12/03). 

System development: 
Preliminary review (8/04); 
Design review (1/05); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Development test: (7/10); 
Operational test: 10/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $338.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $493.6; 
Percent change: 45.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0; 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $338.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $493.6; 
Percent change: 45.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $123.397; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The critical technologies for the baseline ASIP are mature and its 
design appears stable. However, ASIP has not been fully tested on 
Global Hawk and additional design work may be necessary. Operational 
testing of the sensor on Global Hawk will not begin until 2010 because 
of delays in the Global Hawk program. The ASIP program was granted 
approval to conduct operational test flights on a U-2. Program 
officials stated that U-2 test data will be used to help ensure that 
ASIP is ready to begin Global Hawk testing. We did not assess design 
stability using design drawing releases because the program does not 
track that data. Instead, officials noted that they track design 
stability by analyzing trends in the number of engineering changes. 
Trend data provided by the program office indicates a generally stable 
design. ASIP production will be funded and managed as part of the 
Global Hawk program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 12/02; 
DOD design review: 1/05; 
Production decision: NA; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

ASIP Baseline Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

At the beginning of system development in 2002, all four critical 
technologies for the ASIP baseline sensor--spray cooling, VME 
receiver, high-band antenna array, and data encryptor--were nearing 
maturity. Developmental testing of the ASIP sensor began in late 2006. 
The sensor is now nearing the end of development; and according to the 
program office, all four critical technologies are fully mature, 
having been successfully demonstrated on the intended host aircraft. 
Operational testing of the ASIP sensor on Global Hawk has been delayed 
because of continuing developmental problems with the Global Hawk 
aircraft. However, the ASIP program office sought and was granted 
approval to conduct additional sensor evaluations on U-2 aircraft. The 
evaluations began in 2009, and program officials noted that the test 
data from those flights will be used to help ensure that ASIP is ready 
to begin Global Hawk initial operation testing and evaluation in 2010. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the ASIP baseline sensor appears stable; however, it has 
not been fully tested on Global Hawk and additional design work could 
still be necessary. We did not assess design maturity using design 
drawing releases because the program does not track that data. 
Instead, ASIP program officials noted that they assess design 
stability by tracking trends in the number of engineering changes. 
This trend data provided by the program office indicates that the 
sensor's design is generally stable. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the ASIP program office 
is only responsible for developing and testing the sensor. The host 
aircraft program offices are responsible for managing and funding 
sensor production and integration. The ASIP program did produce four 
sensors for U-2 and Global Hawk testing. 

Other Program Issues: 

In January 2009, the ASIP program was designated a major defense 
acquisition program because its estimated eventual total expenditure 
for research, development, test, and evaluation is more than $365 
million (fiscal year 2000 dollars). According to the program office, 
the bulk of the cost growth experienced by the ASIP baseline sensor is 
primarily due to capability enhancements, Global Hawk schedule delays, 
and the need to purchase two more developmental sensors than 
originally planned. Program officials stated that although the 
baseline sensor's development is on schedule, testing of the sensor 
continues to be adversely affected by delays in Global Hawk 
development and testing. 

DOD has also noted that it wants to oversee all ASIP variants as part 
of a system of systems. However, officials stated that the Air Force 
will continue to manage the program as though it were three separate 
programs. ASIP 1C is being developed for possible integration onto the 
MQ-1 Predator. ASIP 2C is expected to be a larger variant of the ASIP 
1C. It will be used on the MQ-9 Reaper and potentially on the Army's 
Extended Range Multi-Purpose unmanned aircraft. The ASIP 2C has not 
yet officially begun development, but a study is ongoing to determine 
the potential of this sensor to meet the signals intelligence needs of 
both the Air Force and the Army. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with this assessment. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability 
Increment 1: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: B-2 Systems Group 1999, USAF photo. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite communication upgrade 
being developed in three increments. Increment 1 upgrades computing 
system speed and storage capacity of the current avionics 
infrastructure with new integrated processing units and disk drive 
units that will facilitate future B-2 upgrades. Increment 2 will 
ensure survivable strategic connectivity by adding low-observable 
antennas and radomes. Increment 3 will enable connectivity with the 
Global Information Grid. We assessed Increment 1. 

Concept: 
Program start (3/02). 

System development: 
Development start (2/07); 
Design review (10/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Low-rate decision (7/11). 

Production: 
Full-rate decision (10/11); 
Production decision (6/04); 

First satellite launch (9/10). 
Required assets available (3/14); 
Last procurement (2014). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $230.2 million:
Procurement: $123.8 million:
Total funding: $353.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 16: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $571.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $521.0; 
Percent change: -8.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $120.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $123.8; 
Percent change: 2.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $692.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $644.8; 
Percent change: -6.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $32.972; 
Latest 09/2008: $32.238; 
Percent change: -2.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 21; 
Latest 09/2008: 20; 
Percent change: -4.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 85; 
Latest 09/2008: 85; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 will 
have mature critical technologies and a stable design by its planned 
July 2011 production decision. The program office expects all critical 
technologies to be flight qualified through test and demonstration by 
the production start. The current software development plan is on 
track and progressing toward certification in April 2010. The program 
expects flight testing with certified software to begin in spring 
2010. As of September 2009, 8 of 10 software blocks had completed 
integration testing, with the core software increments having 
demonstrated full functionality in testing. The 10th software block is 
being used to correct any deficiencies identified in the overall 
software build. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 2/07; 
DOD design review: 10/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 7/11. 

[End of figure] 

B-2 EHF SATCOM Inc 1 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Increment 1 of the B-2 EHF SATCOM program entered system development 
in February 2007 with all six of its critical technologies near 
maturity. The program office expects all critical technologies to be 
mature and flight qualified by the program's planned July 2011 
production decision. According to program officials, development and 
successful integration of new disk drive units (DDU) and integrated 
processing units (IPU) is the primary objective for Increment 1. 
According to the Air Force, DDU qualification and design verification 
testing has been completed without discovering any significant issues. 
IPU durability testing and flight test airworthiness testing is also 
completed. 

Design Maturity: 

The B-2 EHF Increment 1 design appears stable. According to the 
program office, all of the expected drawings were releasable at the 
October 2008 design review. 

The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program has recovered from early 
software development issues that delayed the start of developmental 
test and evaluation by about 9 months. In 2008, the Increment 1 
software plan was revised because software requirements for each block 
were not defined upfront. The revised development plan stated the 
requirements for all software components must be defined before coding 
begins. It also added three preliminary software blocks, which have 
reduced the risk of late problem discovery and accelerated integration 
testing of key functionality. According to program officials, the 
software development has remained on schedule since the revision. As 
of September 2009, 8 of 10 software blocks had completed integration 
testing, with the core software increments having demonstrated full 
functionality in testing. The 10th software block is being used to 
correct any deficiencies identified in the overall software build. 
Software certification is scheduled for April 2010 and first flight 
test is expected in spring 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

Due to the limited availability of the one B-2 test aircraft, flight 
testing for EHF Increment 1 is scheduled to occur in tandem with 
another acquisition program. Program officials emphasized the B-2 EHF 
SATCOM Increment 1 will not be held up by any schedule delays that 
might occur with its test partner because the B-2 EHF SATCOM is not 
dependent on the other program to meet its test objectives. If the 
other program is not ready for testing, then the B-2 EHF SATCOM 
program will proceed with its scheduled flight tests without the other 
program. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with this assessment and provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Airborne Laser (ABL): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Airborne Laser Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's ABL element is being developed to negate enemy missiles during 
the boost phase of flight. The current program will not result in an 
operational system. Carried aboard a modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL 
employs a battle management subsystem to plan and execute engagements, 
a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy 
missiles, and a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the high- 
energy laser beam on the target. We assessed the prototype design that 
is expected to lead to a lethality demonstration in 2010. 

Technology/system development: 
Program start (11/96); 
Transition to MDA (10/01); 
GAO review (1/10); 
First lethality demonstration (2Q FY 10); 
Second lethality demonstration (3Q FY 10); 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Kirtland AFB, NM:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,789.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,789.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns only include costs from the program's inception through fiscal 
year 2010. 

[End of table] 

In 2009, long-standing technical problems, cost growth, and schedule 
delays prompted the Secretary of Defense to recommend decreasing the 
fiscal year 2010 budget request for ABL by more than $200 million, 
canceling the planned second aircraft, and focusing the program on 
technology development efforts. None of ABL's seven critical 
technologies are fully mature. Program officials plan to demonstrate 
the prototype's critical technologies during a flight test planned to 
occur during the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. The program has 
continued to experience cost increases and schedule delays as a result 
of technical problems such as system optics issues. The program 
currently estimates that the cost of the ABL through the first 
lethality demonstration is nearly $5.1 billion, almost five times the 
approximate $1 billion estimated for the original contract in 1996. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Production decision: NA; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of ABL's seven critical technologies are fully mature. Program 
officials assessed one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing 
the high-power beam--as fully mature, but the technology has not yet 
been demonstrated in a flight environment. The remaining six 
technologies--the six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric 
compensation, transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter 
control--were assessed as nearing maturity. The program plans to 
demonstrate all critical technologies in a lethality demonstration in 
fiscal year 2010. During the demonstration, the ABL will attempt to 
shoot down a ballistic missile. The program plans to conduct an 
additional lethality demonstration in 2010. According to program 
officials, the additional lethality attempt will be used to 
demonstrate the capability of the ABL prototype if the first attempt 
is unsuccessful or to prove that the demonstration can be repeated 
successfully and that the ABL capability is effective. 

The first lethality demonstration was delayed from the fourth quarter 
of fiscal year 2009 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2010 due to 
technical problems with the system's optics. In addition, in October 
2009, MDA announced that the combination of test dynamics, continued 
refinement and testing, target preparation, and test range 
availability would delay the demonstration even further--until the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2009, the program 
discovered problems with the system's optics during ground testing 
that caused the laser to shut down prematurely. In order to rectify 
this issue, the program replaced the optics using a new material and 
tested the system in November 2009 to validate the replacement 
material's performance. The new material allowed the program to 
successfully complete ground testing. 

Although program officials assessed jitter control as nearing 
maturity, this technology continues to be a risk for the ABL. This 
technology controls and stabilizes the high-energy laser beam so that 
aircraft vibration does not degrade the laser's aimpoint. Controlling 
jitter is critical to the system imparting sufficient energy on the 
target to rupture its fuel tank. If it is not controlled, the ABL may 
not be able to successfully demonstrate lethality. During fiscal year 
2009, program officials lowered the risk of jitter from high to medium 
because ground tests verified the alignment of the laser's beam and 
demonstrated the system's ability to control jitter. Program officials 
stated that jitter performance, as measured during testing, was 
sufficient to support a successful lethality demonstration. However, 
if Congress decides to proceed with the ABL beyond its technology 
demonstration, jitter would have to be substantially reduced for an 
operational system. 

Other Program Issues: 

In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed to cancel the 
purchase and development of a second ABL aircraft and focus the 
program's research and development efforts on resolving the technology 
problems with the ABL prototype. MDA had planned to begin developing a 
second aircraft in 2010 that would have provided the initial 
operational capability for the ABL. This aircraft was intended to be 
more robust, supportable, and producible than the testing prototype 
and suitable for operational testing. However, technological problems 
with the first prototype need to be resolved before proceeding with a 
more advanced version. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. The ABL Program Manager also stated that 
the program is developing, integrating, and testing unique 
capabilities to defend against ballistic missile threats by acquiring, 
tracking, and destroying adversary missiles with the only airborne 
megawatt-class laser in the world. He noted that the ABL has 
demonstrated precision tracking and atmospheric beam compensation 
during flight over two dozen times from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal 
year 2009--including successfully tracking two boosting missiles in 
June 2009 and engaging a low-power instrumented boosting missile test 
asset in August 2009. He further noted that the first high-powered 
lasing through the entire beam control system and external to the 
aircraft in flight was achieved in December 2009, significantly 
reducing program technical risk. The first shootdown against a short-
range, liquid fueled, foreign-acquired target is scheduled for early 
2010. He noted that after this demonstration, ABL will continue 
testing its capability against different missiles at greater ranges 
and varying geometries to characterize ABL's capabilities for missile 
defense and that further jitter reductions will be a focus of the 
follow-on development in order to improve capability. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Aegis BMD Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's Aegis BMD is a sea-based missile defense system being developed 
in incremental, capability-based blocks to defend against ballistic 
missiles of all ranges. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 
radar, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control 
systems. It will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for 
surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles. The SM-3 missile has 
multiple versions in development or production: Blocks IA, IB, and 
IIA. We assessed the SM-3 Block IB. 

Technology/system development: 
Program start (10/95); 
Transition to MDA (1/02); 
Design review (5/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Production start--SM-3 Block 1B (2/10); 
1st end-to-end test (2Q FY 11); 
Initial capability (3Q FT 12). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin (WS), Raytheon (SM-3):
Program office: Dahlgren, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,006.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $226.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,232.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Columns include costs for the entire Aegis BMD program only from it's 
inception through fiscal year 2010. Totals do not include sustainment 
funds. 

The Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block IB at risk for cost 
growth and schedule delays by planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 
before its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. Program officials assessed three critical technologies as 
nearing maturity and two others as fully mature; however, four of the 
five have not completed developmental testing. The first flight test 
with a target intercept will help demonstrate that the system will 
work as intended, but it has been delayed until fiscal year 2011. The 
program reported that 100 percent of drawings were released to 
manufacturing, indicating that the design is stable, although design 
changes may be needed if problems are discovered in testing. We could 
not assess production maturity because the program has not started to 
collect production data on the SM-3 Block IB. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 1/08; 
DOD design review: 5/09; 
GAO review: 1/10;
Production decision: 2/10. 

[End of figure] 

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block IB at risk for cost 
growth and schedule delays by planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 
before its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. This risk has been deemed acceptable by the MDA. While 
Aegis program officials consider two technologies to be fully mature 
and three to be nearing maturity, we assessed four of those five 
technologies as immature. Prototypes of these four critical 
technologies--the throttleable divert and attitude control system, all 
reflective optics, two-color seeker, and kinetic warhead advanced 
signal processor--have not completed developmental testing in a 
relevant environment. Aegis program officials told us that the 
integrated ground test would not be completed until late 2010. In 
addition, the first target intercept flight test will not occur until 
the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

Design Maturity: 

Program officials reported that 100 percent of SM-3 Block IB drawings 
were released to manufacturing. However, since most of the critical 
technologies have not completed developmental testing, additional 
design changes and costly rework could be necessary if problems are 
discovered. 

Production Maturity: 

The Aegis program intends to proceed with production of 18 
operationally configured Block IB rounds for testing or fielding in 
the second quarter of 2010 before flight testing a fully integrated 
prototype in an operational environment.This increases the risk of 
design changes and costly rework while production is underway. The 
first target intercept flight test will help demonstrate that the 
system will work as intended and in a reliable manner, but it has been 
delayed until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. Program 
officials consider moving forward with SM-3 Block IB production before 
a fully integrated prototype is tested to be an acceptable risk 
because of the SM-3 Block IB's success in developmental testing and 
the program office's confidence in the throttleable divert and 
attitude control system design. In addition, in order to avoid a break 
in the combined SM-3 IA/IB missile production, long lead items must be 
ordered about 30 months before delivery. We could not assess the 
maturity of the SM-3 Block IB's production processes because the 
program has not started to collect production data. The program has 
identified 26 critical manufacturing processes--an important first 
step for assessing maturity--and intends to conduct a detailed 
analysis of process control data before the manufacturing readiness 
review in December 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Aegis program is developing an SM-3 Block IIA missile under a 
cooperative agreement with the government of Japan. The Block IIA 
missile is intended to be faster and have an advanced discrimination 
seeker. The Aegis program completed the system design review for the 
Block IIA in fiscal year 2009 after a delay of over 5 months. The 
first operational test of the Block IIA is planned for the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2014. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Aegis BMD program 
officials disagreed with GAO's assertion that the SM-3 Block IB 
missile is at risk of cost growth and schedule delays by beginning 
production in 2010. Program officials stated that the SM-3 Block IB 
full rate production decision is scheduled for 2012--after several 
flight tests. The procurement that is mentioned in this report is for 
test rounds to conduct developmental and operational flight testing. 
These rounds may also be deployed if a security situation demands, and 
any remaining rounds will support fleet proficiency firings. 

GAO Response: 

The program office acknowledges that the initial 18 SM-3 Block IBs 
could be deployed if needed, indicating that they may be used as 
operational fleet assets. Furthermore, according to MDA's September 
2009 SM-3 Block IB utilization plan, 2 missiles are to be used for 
flight tests, 10 are to be used for fleet deployment and 6 are to be 
used for either fleet proficiency or deployment. The program office 
acknowledged that the technologies will not be fully mature until 
after the decision to produce these 18 SM-3s, which puts the program 
at risk for costly design changes and retrofits if testing reveals 
issues. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Flexible Target Family: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Strategic Targets and Countermeasures Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's Flexible Target Family (FTF) was originally designed to be a 
family of short, medium, and long-range targets designed with common 
components for ground, air, and sea launch capabilities. MDA canceled 
work on all FTF target vehicles except the 72-inch, long-range LV-2 
ground-launched target and is pursuing an alternative target 
acquisition strategy for other classes of missiles needed for 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) testing. The LV-2 has 12 
possible configurations that can be used to support different test 
events. 

Technology/system development: 
Program start/Design review (3/06). 
GAO review (1/10); 
First flight/initial capability (1/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal AL:
Funding FY10-FY12:
R&D: $174.4 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $174.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $630.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $630.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $105.150; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include cost from program inception through FY12. FY11-12 
funding is reflected from the 2009 President's Budget with adjustments. 

[End of table] 

LV-2 development issues have contributed to cost increases and 
schedule delays for the FTF program and flight test delays for the 
Aegis BMD and GMD programs. Five of the LV-2 target's six critical 
technologies are nearing maturity and one is immature. While most of 
the missile's components have been flown in legacy systems, many have 
been modified for the LV-2 and have not been flown together. MDA chose 
not to conduct a risk reduction flight of the LV-2. Instead, the 
program planned to mature LV-2 technologies through a BMDS flight test 
as early as 2008. However, qualification, safety, and modeling and 
simulation issues have delayed the first launch to fiscal year 2010. 
The LV-2's design appears stable, but ongoing technology maturation 
efforts and testing of new configurations could lead to design 
changes. Development and production costs of the first four LV-2s have 
grown 48 percent. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: 3/06; 
Production decision: 9/07; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

FTF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the LV-2's six critical technologies are fully mature, even 
through the missile is in production. Five of the LV-2's critical 
technologies--the reentry vehicle separation system and countermeasure 
integration, the avionics software, avionics suite, and C4 booster--
are nearing maturity but have not been flight tested in their current 
form, fit, and function on the LV-2. The program planned to mature 
technologies through a BMDS flight test as early as 2008, but the 
first launch has now been delayed until fiscal year 2010. In addition, 
the reentry vehicle shroud is still immature. Program officials 
discovered problems with the design of the shrouded configuration and 
considered developing a back-up technology as an alternative. In late 
2008, however, officials determined that problems with the original 
design were manageable and would not affect mission objectives. This 
technology will not be needed until the LV-2 target's third launch in 
a STSS program test now scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 
2011. Program officials expect it to be nearing maturity by that time. 
The LV-2 target began development in March 2006 with almost all of its 
technologies still being demonstrated in a lab or through analytical 
studies--a low level of maturity. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the LV-2 target configuration for the first two missions 
appears stable, and the program has released 100 percent of the 
engineering drawings to manufacturing. Program officials reported that 
drawings for portions of other configurations have been released, but 
they are not complete. The prime contractor plans to begin work on 
drawings for the third and fourth missions soon, but requirements for 
those missions have not been finalized. Ongoing efforts to flight test 
the new configurations may lead to additional modifications to the 
target's design. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the program does not 
have statistical process control data on the LV-2 target's critical 
manufacturing processes. Instead, the program assesses production 
maturity by tracking various metrics including schedule performance, 
number of test flags per specific procedure, number of software issues 
per mission test run, and others. The prime contractor has completed 
production of the first LV-2 vehicle and is finishing assembly and 
integration of the next three. The program has contracted to buy six 
LV-2 targets through fiscal year 2012. 

Other Program Issues: 

LV-2 development issues have contributed to cost increases and 
schedule delays for both the Aegis BMD and GMD programs. MDA 
originally planned to launch the first LV-2 target as early as July 
2008. Qualification issues, unmet safety requirements, and lack of 
system level modeling data have caused the first test date to move 
into fiscal year 2010. In addition, the development and production 
cost of the first four LV-2s has grown 48 percent, from $245 million 
to $362 million. MDA has also exercised integration and launch options 
on the contract bringing the total cost of the first four LV-2 targets 
to $435 million. 

Program Office Comments: 

Program officials stated that the LV-2 technologies are all nearing 
maturity. The drawings required to shoot the first LV-2 including 
Ground Support Equipment drawings are complete and the shrouded 
configuration design has been completed and is ready for demonstration 
in flight test. Officials stated that requirements for the first four 
missions are either complete or near completion. For those missions 
(numbers 2 and 3) with draft requirements, the documentation is of 
sufficient detail to allow the contractor to develop mission-specific 
simulations and target configuration alterations. They stated that the 
formal draft requirements documents were issued for these missions in 
the first quarter fiscal year 2010. Unit cost (recurring costs) for 
the six LV-2 targets averages approximately $30.3 million for the 
target and unique mission applications. 

GAO Response: 

In our review, we found that unit cost was estimated in several ways 
by different organizations. The Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA), for example, estimates that the recurring unit cost for the LV-
2 is $55 million--significantly higher than MDA's estimate. 
Regardless, the total program cost calculated by both MDA and DCMA is 
consistently around $630 million for 6 LV-2s, which brings the total 
unit cost of each target to $105 million. In addition, DCMA officials 
explained that these calculations were based on December 2008 data. 
Subsequently, launch delays occurred, so the cost could be higher. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range 
ballistic missile attacks during the midcourse phase of flight. GMD 
consists of an interceptor--a booster with an exoatmospheric kill 
vehicle (EKV) on top--and a fire control system that formulates battle 
plans and directs components that are integrated with BMDS radars. We 
assessed the maturity of all critical technologies and the design 
maturity of the EKV's upgraded configuration known as Capability 
Enhancement II (CE-II). 

Technology/system development: 
Program start (2/96); 
Directive to field initial capability (12/02); 
1st emplaced interceptor (7/04); 

Initial capability: 
Initial capability (10/04); 
1st CE-I end-to-end intercept (9/06); 
1st CE-II emplaced (10/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
1st CE-II intercept test (1/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Company:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL:
Funding FY10-FY13:
R&D: $1,882.8 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $1,882.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $32,934.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $33,129.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include cost from program inception through FY13. FY11-13 
funding is from the 2009 President's Budget with adjustments. Totals 
do not include the future cost of the European component. 

[End of table] 

MDA continues to put the GMD program at risk for cost growth and 
schedule delays by buying and emplacing enhanced interceptors before 
this configuration has been demonstrated in a realistic environment. 
MDA planned to test the CE-II EKV in fiscal year 2009, but this test 
has been delayed several times and is now scheduled for fiscal year 
2010. However, by the time this test is conducted, program officials 
state that almost 40 percent of the CE-II EKVs will have been 
delivered. Additionally, two components--the Inertial Measurement Unit 
and Electronics Unit--are experiencing problems during development. 
While all the drawings for the CE-II EKV have been released, costly 
design changes and rework could be necessary if issues are discovered 
during flight testing. MDA has also continued to produce hardware for 
operational use, yet it does not intend to make a formal production 
decision. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: 5/06; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: NA. 

[End of figure] 

GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

MDA continues to put the GMD program at risk for further cost growth 
and delays by buying and emplacing enhanced interceptors before the 
critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. While all nine technologies in the operational GMD 
configuration are mature, two technologies being developed for the CE- 
II EKV--an upgraded infrared seeker and onboard discrimination--are 
not fully mature. The GMD program expected to integrate these 
technologies and emplace enhanced interceptors in fiscal year 2008, 
but the program was not able to do so because of problems with the 
inertial measurement unit and electronics unit. These problems have 
slowed planned deliveries of the CE-II EKVs, and as a result, MDA was 
only able to emplace 28 of the 33 interceptors planned through fiscal 
year 2009. Work on these components has also been the primary driver 
of GMD cost growth in fiscal year 2009. 

Design Maturity: 

While all the drawings for the CE-II EKV have been released and the 
design appears stable, costly design changes and rework could still be 
necessary since this configuration has not been flight tested. Since 
the preliminary design review in August 2005 and critical design 
review in August 2006, problems discovered during EKV testing have 
already resulted in significant redesigns of the CE-II. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity. While the program is buying 
interceptors for operational use, officials do not plan to make an 
official production decision or collect statistical control data 
because the planned quantities are small. However, GMD continues to 
concurrently develop, manufacture, and field CE-II EKVs before they 
are fully demonstrated through testing. The GMD program office 
projects that the contractor will deliver about 40 percent of the CE-
II EKVs currently on contract before the first flight test 
demonstrates this configuration. 

Other Program Issues: 

GMD's flight test program continues to experience setbacks and delays, 
which impedes realistic evaluation of GMD's capability. Since 2005, 
GMD has only conducted three intercept tests. In fiscal year 2009, two 
intercept tests were planned; however, the program only partially 
completed one. The test, FTG-05 in December 2008, achieved a 
successful intercept, but the target did not deploy its 
countermeasures, reducing the complexity of the test. According to 
program officials, the target failure initially caused the GMD program 
to delay the second flight test until the fourth quarter of fiscal 
year 2009. However, problems with the target and sea-based X-band 
radar in pretest activities have further delayed the test until fiscal 
year 2010. This flight test will be the first one with the CE-II EKV, 
even though interceptors with this configuration are already emplaced. 

The GMD program is continuing a scheduled refurbishment effort for 
emplaced interceptors to address parts reliability issues in the 
booster and kill vehicle. The total expected cost of the refurbishment 
effort is still unknown because, according to program officials, the 
program is expanding to address longer-term sustainment activities, 
including determining what is required for mid-life maintenance of a 
GBI and increasing the refurbishment scope to include known Exo- 
atmospheric Kill Vehicle items previously not part of the initial 
limited refurbishment concept. In addition, as MDA continues to 
manufacture GBIs, they are discovering additional process and design 
concerns, and corrective actions are being incorporated into the 
refurbishment program as intended to increase the reliability of the 
fleet. Additionally, in cases that require extensive levels of 
refurbishment, MDA is expecting the work to cost between $14 million 
and $24 million per unit. GMD is also developing an interceptor 
rotation program. GMD will replace the oldest emplaced interceptors 
with newly manufactured ones to reduce the fleet's age. The removed 
interceptors will be modified into testing assets or utilized as 
operational spares. The projected cost of this effort is $24 million 
for each operational refurbishment and $30 million for each 
interceptor refurbished and modified for flight tests. 

Program Office Comments: 

GMD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: THAAD Project Office/MDA, Release. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's THAAD is being developed as a rapidly-deployable, ground-based 
missile defense system with the capability to defend against short-and 
medium-range ballistic missiles during their late midcourse and 
terminal phases. A THAAD battery includes interceptor missiles, a 
launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and communications 
system. We assessed the THAAD batteries that MDA plans to deliver to 
the Army in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for initial operational use. 

Technology/system development: 
Program start (1/92); 
Transition to MDA (10/01); 
First successful intercept (7/06); 
Contract award for Batteries #1 and #2 (12/06). 

Initial capability: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Battery #1 initial capability delivery (4Q FY 10); 
Battery #2 delivery (4Q FY 11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,955.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $526.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $14,481.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year 
2010. Totals do not include sustainment funds. 

[End of table] 

The THAAD program is producing assets for initial operational use. The 
program's critical technologies are mature and its design appears 
stable. However, it is still qualifying components and conducting 
flight tests, so additional design work may be necessary. Target 
issues continue to affect the program as it was unable to conduct two 
planned fiscal year 2009 flight tests or its first fiscal year 2010 
flight test because of target issues. Although one successful 
intercept test during fiscal year 2009 could not demonstrate a major 
knowledge point because of target availability, as THAAD's first 
developmental and operational test it demonstrated THAAD's ability to 
launch two interceptors against a single target. The program is on 
schedule to deliver two THAAD batteries to the Army in 2010 and 2011. 
DOD requested procurement funding for fiscal year 2010 to procure an 
additional battery. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/00; 
DOD design review: 12/03; 
Production decision: 12/06; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

THAAD Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The program's four major components--the fire control and 
communications component, the interceptor, the launcher, and radar--
are mature, and the system's design appears stable with 99 percent of 
its design drawings released. However, the number of drawings has 
increased in the past year after the program held design reviews for 
several components, including the prime power unit in the radar. 
Additional drawings or design work could still be required based on 
the results of remaining ground and flight testing. 

Production Maturity: 

MDA awarded a contract in December 2006 for two operational batteries 
without fully testing all the systems critical components, which could 
lead to costly design changes and rework. While we could not assess 
THAAD's production maturity because the program has not collected 
process control data on its key production processes, the THAAD 
program does monitor its manufacturing processes by tracking metrics 
related to production readiness, configuration changes, parts 
shortages, and product progression through final assembly. Based on 
the program's own assessment of these metrics, it has identified a 
number of risks, including beginning production before fully 
qualifying critical components. The first THAAD battery will be 
provided to the Army and fielded in fiscal year 2010 with the second 
battery to follow in fiscal year 2011. 

Other Program Issues: 

Target issues have continued to affect the THAAD program. The program 
was unable to conduct either of its planned tests (FTT-11 and FTT-12) 
in fiscal year 2009 due to target availability issues and an agency- 
wide restructuring of its testing schedule. As a result, both of the 
planned flight tests for fiscal year 2009 were delayed into fiscal 
year 2010. The first flight test to be conducted in fiscal year 2010, 
FTT-11, resulted in a "no test" due to target failure. This test was 
supposed to have demonstrated THAAD's ability to intercept a real, 
complex target from among multiple simulated targets. The second test 
plans to demonstrate THAAD's ability to engage two targets for the 
first time. The program did successfully conduct an intercept flight 
test in 2009 that had been rescheduled from fiscal year 2008 due to a 
target failure. This test was THAAD's first developmental and 
operational test event and demonstrated the system's ability to launch 
two interceptors against one target for the first time. This test was 
originally designed to be the first intercept of a medium range 
ballistic missile, a major knowledge point for the program, but 
because the medium-range target was not available, the program used a 
short-range target instead. The program will not attempt a medium-
range ballistic missile intercept until fiscal year 2011---nearly 3 
years later than planned. 

In its fiscal year 2010 budget, DOD requested procurement funding for 
THAAD for the first time. DOD requested $420 million in procurement 
funding to buy interceptors, launchers, and a fire control and 
communication system for a future THAAD battery, as well as to procure 
tooling and equipment to increase THAAD interceptor production 
capacity. Program officials told us that they plan to award a 
procurement contract for a future THAAD battery by the end of fiscal 
year 2010. These batteries will be fully funded using procurement 
funds. The first two THAAD batteries were incrementally funded using 
research, development, test and evaluation funds as authorized by 
Congress. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the THAAD program manager 
noted that THAAD has successfully demonstrated the element's ability 
to destroy ballistic missile threats in six successful flight tests 
including its most recent successful intercept attempt in March 2009. 
Additionally, he stated that THAAD is continuing to conduct ground 
testing and operational testing to further demonstrate the THAAD 
system's capability and reliability for missile defense. The THAAD 
program also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: PMA-262. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS UAS) is intended to provide a persistent maritime intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the P-8A 
Poseidon and the future EP-X electronic surveillance aircraft, BAMS 
UAS will be part of a maritime patrol and reconnaissance family of 
systems that recapitalizes the Navy's airborne ISR assets. Future 
increments are planned to upgrade communication relay capabilities and 
add signals intelligence capability. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (4/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review (1/11). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/13); 
Initial capability (12/15); 
Full capability (2019). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River MD Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,064.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,064.1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $9,094.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,094.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $12,531.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $12,531.2; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $179.017; 
Latest 09/2008: $179.017; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 70; 
Latest 09/2008: 70; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 92; 
Latest 09/2008: 92; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to DOD and the Navy, the BAMS UAS program began system 
development in August 2008 with all its technologies approaching 
maturity. However, that assessment may understate the program's 
technology and integration risks. The BAMS UAS program has identified 
six watch items that could affect cost, schedule, and performance. 
Several of these watch items, including the multi-spectral targeting 
system, are used on UAS platforms such as the Air Force's Reaper and 
are tracked as critical technologies. BAMS UAS has completed several 
systems engineering reviews including its system requirement and 
system functional reviews. A preliminary design review is scheduled 
for January 2010. An additional technology readiness assessment will 
be conducted after the preliminary design review. BAMS UAS is 
scheduled to reach initial operational capability in December 2015. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 4/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 1/11; 
Production decision: 5/13. 

[End of figure] 

BAMS UAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

DOD and the Navy have certified that all BAMS UAS technologies were 
approaching maturity and had been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment before the start of system development. While the program 
office does not currently identify any technologies as critical, the 
program is still managing various technology and integration risks. 
Specifically, the program is monitoring six watch items that may cause 
cost, schedule, and performance issues during development. These 
include radar software and the multi-spectral targeting system's large 
array and focus integration. The Air Force's Reaper UAS program also 
uses the multi-spectral targeting system, but tracks it as a critical 
technology. 

There are other technologies that are essential for meeting BAMS UAS 
key performance parameters that the Navy did not identify as critical. 
Several of these technologies have been tracked as mature critical 
technologies on Air Force UAS programs. For example, both the Global 
Hawk and BAMS UAS programs use electro-optical and infrared sensors, 
which must be operational to meet key performance parameters. While 
the Global Hawk program tracks its sensors as critical technologies, 
BAMS UAS does not. These decisions will be reviewed when the Navy 
conducts an additional independent technology readiness assessment and 
submits it to DOD for review after the program's January 2010 
preliminary design review. 

The BAMS UAS will utilize more than 5 million lines of software code, 
including the development of more than 600,000 lines of new code. 
According to the program, the software development effort is closely 
monitored and is being developed in three blocks of capability to 
decrease risks. 

Other Program Issues: 

BAMS UAS is intended to serve as an adjunct to the P-8A Poseidon. The 
Navy intends to position BAMS UAS mission crews with maritime patrol 
and reconnaissance forces personnel to allow operators to closely 
coordinate missions and utilize a common support infrastructure. 
According to program officials, BAMS UAS plans to achieve full 
operating capability in 2019, which aligns with the full operational 
capability for the P-8A. 

In 2009, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics issued an acquisition decision memorandum which called for 
ground station commonality between UAS platforms. According to BAMS 
UAS officials, the Navy is coordinating with the Air Force to identify 
common approaches and share planned capabilities for the BAMS UAS 
ground station. Program officials also indicated a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) has been put in place between the Navy and Air Force 
to formalize cooperation on all potential joint program areas. 

The BAMS UAS program is continuing to gain knowledge about the 
performance and capabilities from the BAMS Demonstrator program. The 
BAMS Demonstrator consists of two block 10 Global Hawk UASs and is 
being used to support BAMS UAS design activity and to develop a Navy 
doctrine and concept of operations for the system. 

Program Office Comments: 

The BAMS UAS program office did not agree with the depiction of the 
program's assignment and management of critical technologies in a 
draft of this assessment. The program office indicated that the 
program's technology readiness and maturity were assessed by an 
independent panel and validated by DOD prior to development start in 
accordance with DOD policies. In addition, the program noted that BAMS 
UAS does not currently have any critical technology elements, but the 
panel identified six technology readiness assessment watch items that 
are managed, tracked, and assessed for risk potential. The watch items 
are not at the subsystem level but assessed on particular attributes. 
The six identified watch items are the following: Multi-Spectral 
Targeting System (MTS-B) (Large array optics and auto-focus 
integration), Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) Rotary Joint, Due 
Regard Radar (Software), Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B) Contact Report to Track Assignment, On-Board Image Formatting, 
Compression and Reduction, and Smart Image bandwidth Management. 

[End of section] 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP will standardize the cockpit and avionics to 
increase the reliability, maintainability, and sustainability for 
three combat configurations of the C-130 fleet. The program is 
intended to ensure the C-130 global access and deployability by 
satisfying navigation and safety requirements, installing upgrades to 
the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems no longer supportable 
due to diminishing manufacturing resources. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (7/01); 
Critical design review (8/05); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (TBD); 
Full-rate decision (TBD); 
Last procurement (TBD). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $756.4; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,274.5; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,030.8; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $7.767; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 519; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Cost updates are pending the C-130 AMP program's production decision. 

[End of table] 

While the C-130 AMP program's technologies are mature and its design 
is stable, the program's production decision has been delayed several 
times since it was restructured in 2008 following a Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breach of the critical threshold. The reasons for the delays 
include concerns over the program's acquisition strategy and 
affordability, and software testing and documentation issues. These 
issues have been addressed, and program officials said that the 
program's production decision is tentatively planned for spring 2010. 
A proposed effort to provide avionics upgrades to additional C-130 
aircraft will also be evaluated as part of future budget cycles. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 7/01; 
DOD design review: 8/05; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: TBD. 

[End of figure] 

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-130 AMP program's three current critical technologies--global 
air traffic management, defensive systems, and combat delivery 
navigator removal--are mature. After a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach 
of the critical cost growth threshold, the program was restructured 
and the number of critical technologies was cut in half from six to 
three. The removed technologies were intended for Special Mission C-
130 aircraft configurations, which were eliminated from the program 
during the restructure. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable, 
with all of the expected drawings releasable to manufacturing. The 
program is currently completing flight testing of production 
representative aircraft, which it plans to finish by the end of 2009. 
The program also plans to complete configuration reviews by the end of 
2010 to ensure the modified system matches the design and meets its 
specifications. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the program does not 
collect statistical process control data on its critical manufacturing 
processes. However, according to program officials, the Air Force and 
the contractor will use detailed, proven work instructions to control 
installation quality and will conduct inspections to ensure 
installations are performed as planned. In addition, the contractor is 
currently meeting or exceeding its quality goals. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since its restructuring in 2008, the C-130 AMP program's production 
decision has been delayed several times. These delays have been 
primarily due to recent uncertainty over the future of the program due 
to affordability concerns, senior leadership concerns over the 
program's acquisition strategy, software testing issues, and 
completion of required documentation. These issues have been 
addressed, and program officials said that the program's production 
decision is tentatively planned for spring 2010. 

The Air Force had proposed a second phase for the C-130 AMP program to 
provide the avionics modernization to C-130 aircraft that are not part 
of the 221 aircraft included in the current program. The Air Force 
will evaluate the requirement to modernize these aircraft as part of 
future budget cycles. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments on this assessment, which 
were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Edwards AFB. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system; modifying 
the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear systems; 
and making other structural modifications. Together with the C-5 
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), these upgrades are intended to 
improve C-5 mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs. 
We assessed the C-5 RERP. 

Concept: 
Program start (2/00). 

System development: 
Development start (11/01); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (3/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full-rate decision B-model (9/10); 
Last procurement (2014). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $119.5 million:
Procurement: $4,939.5 million:
Total funding: $5,067.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 45: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,709.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,771.2; 
Percent change: 3.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $8,924.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,531.2; 
Percent change: -38.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $10,637.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $7,310.6; 
Percent change: -31.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $84.422; 
Latest 09/2008: $140.589; 
Percent change: 66.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 126; 
Latest 09/2008: 52; 
Percent change: -58.7%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 100; 
Latest 09/2008: 139; 
Percent change: 39.0%. 

[End of table] 

The C-5 RERP is currently in production. C-5 RERP critical 
technologies are mature and its design is stable. We did not assess 
production maturity because the Air Force is buying commercially 
available items. Three systems development and demonstration aircraft 
are currently flying missions as part of operational test and 
evaluation. Qualification testing is expected to end in January 2010. 
The program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over the 
critical cost growth threshold in 2007 and quantities were 
subsequently cut from 111 to 52 aircraft. Additional program changes 
could occur if the Air Force decides it cannot afford to fund 
production to the current cost estimate. The results of an ongoing 
mobility capabilities requirements study may also affect the number of 
C-5 aircraft receiving the RERP modification. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 11/01; 
DOD design review: 4/04; 
Production decision: 3/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

According to an independent technology readiness assessment conducted 
in October 2001, the C-5 RERP's technologies are mature. In addition, 
the C-5 RERP design is stable with 100 percent of the drawings 
released. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. According to program 
officials, the program office and prime contractor have expended 
considerable effort in preparing the RERP for production. For example, 
a production readiness review was conducted, three test aircraft were 
produced in the system development and demonstration phase, and the 
lessons learned from AMP are being applied to production plans. 

The C-5 RERP program experienced a 30-month delay between the first 
flight of the last system development and demonstration aircraft in 
February 2007 and the start of modifying the first production aircraft 
in August 2009. Increased costs contributed to this delay. For 
example, the Lot 1 production award was delayed because upward 
production cost pressures associated with the engines, pylons, 
reliability enhancement items, and labor resulted in the program being 
restructured. 

The Air Force did not provide a low-rate initial production aircraft 
for operational testing, as recommended by the Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation because one will not be available until September 
2010. Operational testing began in October 2009 and is expected to be 
completed in January 2010. Three systems development and demonstration 
aircraft are currently flying missions as part of operational test and 
evaluation. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2007, DOD notified Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase 
over the critical cost growth threshold. DOD considered 14 options to 
meet its strategic airlift requirements and concluded that the cost to 
upgrade all C-5 aircraft was unaffordable. DOD decided to limit RERP 
modifications to 52 aircraft--49 production aircraft (47 C-5Bs and 2 C-
5Cs) and 3 system development and demonstration aircraft (2 C-5Bs and 
1 C-5A)--rather than 111 aircraft planned. While the Air Force is 
expected to spend $3.4 billion less under the restructured program, 
ultimately, less than one-half of the aircraft will be modernized at a 
much higher unit cost. 

Further changes to the program are possible based on whether the 
program exercises future contract options and the mobility capability 
study. Program officials have indicated that if options for lots four 
through seven of the C-5 RERP production contract are not exercised by 
the dates required in the contract, the remaining lot four through 
seven negotiated not to exceed prices become invalid for all future 
options. Consequently, officials indicated that future work may need 
to be renegotiated and if so, it would lead to a substantial increase 
in the negotiated prices. In addition, DOD is currently studying its 
future mobility capabilities requirements with the results expected in 
December 2009. The study may or may not affect the number of C-5s that 
require the RERP modification. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2008 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform heavy-lift assault 
transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel to support 
distributed operations deep inland from a sea-based center of 
operations. The CH-53K program is expected to replace the current CH- 
53E helicopter with improved range and payload, survivability and 
force protection, reliability and maintainability, coordination with 
other assets, and total cost of ownership. 

Concept: 
Program start (11/03). 

System development: 
Development start (12/05); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review (3/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (3/13); 
Initial capability (2/16); 
Full-rate decision (5/16); 
Last procurement (2021). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,862.1 million:
Procurement: $15,474.7 million:
Total funding: $18,336.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 156: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,270.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,222.5; 
Percent change: -1.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $11,878.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $12,327.4; 
Percent change: 3.8%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $16,149.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $16,549.9; 
Percent change: 2.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $103.524; 
Latest 09/2008: $106.089; 
Percent change: 2.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 156; 
Latest 09/2008: 156; 
Percent change: 0.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 119; 
Latest 09/2008: 122; 
Percent change: 2.5%. 

[End of table] 

The CH-53K program is being restructured because of delays in the 
completion of key systems engineering tasks. The program began 
development without adequate knowledge of its requirements and 
critical technologies and underestimated the complexity of the system 
engineering. The CH-53K's two critical technologies, the main rotor 
blade and the main gearbox, were immature at development start and, 
according to program officials, are maturing as planned. The program 
expects the design to be stable with 90 percent of drawings released 
by March 2010. Due to attrition in the fleet of CH-53Es, the Marine 
Corps needs to field the CH-53Ks as soon as possible. While the 
program is experiencing schedule delays, the Navy still hopes to enter 
production in March 2013. As a result, the program will likely 
complete less testing before production begins. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 12/05; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 3/10; 
Production decision: 3/13 (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

CH-53K Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The CH-53K's two critical technologies, the main rotor blade and the 
main gearbox, were immature at development start and, according to 
program officials, are maturing as planned. The program office 
estimates that they will be fully mature by the start of low-rate 
initial production, currently planned for March 2013. The main rotor 
blade will be the same diameter (79 feet) as, and 11 percent wider 
than, the CH-53E design. A smaller-scale (1/7th) model of the main 
rotor blade has demonstrated improved performance in wind tunnel 
tests. The actual-sized rotor blade has not been tested because 
appropriately sized wind tunnels do not exist. According to program 
officials, full scale prototypes of main gearbox components have 
exceeded performance requirements in testing. 

Design Maturity: 

The CH-53K design is approaching stability. According to the program 
office, about 67 percent of the CH-53K's expected drawings--11,756 out 
of 17,622--are releasable to manufacturing. In addition, half of the 
required subsystem design reviews have been completed as of October 
2009. The program office expects 90 percent of the drawings to be 
releasable by its design review currently scheduled for March 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The CH-53K program is being restructured because of delays in the 
completion of key systems engineering tasks and uncertainty about the 
cost and schedule of the program. The program has made attempts to 
mitigate schedule risks, including eliminating noncritical tasks and 
postponing preliminary and critical design review, but continues to 
experience delays. For example, the critical design review has been 
delayed multiple times and will now take place in March 2010 at the 
earliest--over 1 year later than originally planned. According to 
program officials, the critical design review will be delayed until 
all subsystem design reviews are successfully completed. While the 
program continues to mitigate schedule delays, the Navy still hopes to 
enter production in March 2013. As a result, the program will likely 
complete less testing before production begins. While concurrent 
testing and production may help to field the system sooner, it could 
also result in greater retrofit costs if unexpected design changes are 
required. 

Delays in the CH-53K program may result in the extended use of and 
increased costs for legacy systems, such as the CH-53E and CH-53D 
helicopter. Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at three 
times the planned utilization rate. This operational pace is expected 
to result in higher airframe and component repair costs, including 
short-term fatigue repairs necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory 
reductions until CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. The number 
of operational CH-53Es is 24 aircraft fewer than required in the 
Marine Corps' fiscal year 2010 aviation plan. This shortfall will 
increase if the planned attrition rate of two aircraft per year holds. 
According to program officials, all available decommissioned CH-53E 
helicopters have been reclaimed and they are looking into extending 
the serviceable life of the CH-53D, a medium lift helicopter built in 
the 1960s, by an additional 2 years pending an analysis of the costs. 

Program Office Comments: 

In its comments on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
stated that in late 2009, the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, completed two independent assessments of the CH-53K 
program. These reviews, completed after GAO's assessment, verified 
that the program office has implemented effective corrections for 
previous program schedule issues and that critical technologies have 
matured according to plan. Budget and funding uncertainties at the 
time of GAO's assessment have also been corrected with finalization of 
the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request. These events will 
support a contract modification and revised acquisition program 
baseline in first quarter of fiscal year 2011. In its comments, the 
Navy also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

GAO Response: 

While the program's technologies may be maturing according to plan, 
the program still began without adequate knowledge of those 
technologies and the complexity of the systems engineering effort. 
According to the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request, the Navy 
has asked the contractor to revise the schedule to support an initial 
operating capability in fiscal year 2018--an almost 2-year delay. 

[End of section] 

CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: CVN-21 Program Office 050708-D-8455H-001 Washington, D.C. 
(July 8, 2005) U.S. Navy graphic (released). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered 
aircraft carriers. The new carriers are expected to include advanced 
technologies in propulsion, aircraft launch and recovery, and 
survivability designed to improve operational efficiency and enable 
higher sortie rates while reducing required manpower. The Navy awarded 
a construction preparation contract for the lead ship, CVN 78, in May 
2004. Construction began in September 2008 and the Navy expects 
delivery of this ship by September 2015. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/00). 

System development: 
Construction preparation contract award (5/04). 

Production: 
Production decision (7/07); 
Lead ship fabrication start (9/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Construction contract award--2nd ship (11/12); 
1st ship delivery (9/15); 
Initial capability (9/16). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News:
Program office: Washington, DC Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,200.0 million:
Procurement: $17,132.8 million:
Total funding: $18,332.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,685.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,458.9; 
Percent change: -4.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $30,015.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $26,630.7; 
Percent change: -11.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $34,701.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $31,089.6; 
Percent change: -10.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $11,567.001; 
Latest 09/2008: $10,363.201; 
Percent change: -10.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 3; 
Latest 09/2008: 3; 
Percent change: 0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 137; 
Latest 09/2008: 149; 
Percent change: 8.8%%. 

[End of table] 

The CVN 78 began construction in September 2008 without all its 
critical technologies mature or a complete product model for the 
entire ship. Eight of the program's 13 critical technologies are still 
not fully mature because the technologies have not been demonstrated 
in a realistic environment. Of these technologies, the electromagnetic 
aircraft launch system (EMALS), advanced arresting gear, and dual band 
radar continue to present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and 
schedule. While the contractor has completed the ship's detail phase 
in the 3D product model, the program could experience costly design 
changes because EMALS testing is proceeding concurrently with ship 
construction. Construction of a number of the units low on the ship is 
complete. According to program office officials, these units account 
for about 9 percent of the ship's total production hours. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Contract award: 5/04; 
Lead ship fabrication: 9/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

CVN 21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The CVN 21 program has consistently demonstrated the maturity of its 
critical technologies later than recommended by best practices. Only 4 
of the program's 19 critical technologies were mature when the 
construction preparation contract was awarded in 2004. Of the 
program's 13 current critical technologies, 8 have not been 
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Three of these technologies--
EMALS, advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar-present the 
greatest risk to the ship's cost and schedule. While CVN 21 program 
officials stated that the EMALS program is on schedule to deliver 
material to the shipyard when it is needed for construction, 
concurrent EMALS testing and ship construction continue to present 
cost and schedule risks to the program. The Navy completed a second 
phase of testing for the EMALS generator--an area of prior concern--
and the first phase of testing for the EMALS launch motor in 2009. As 
a result of the tests, the program identified design changes that are 
necessary to improve the performance of EMALS, but add cost and 
schedule risk to the program. The Navy plans to test EMALS with actual 
aircraft in summer 2010. The advanced arresting gear includes seven 
major subsystems. Programs officials expect that six of the subsystems 
will be mature after analyzing data from a recent reliability test. 
The remaining subsystem--control system software--will remain immature 
until integrated land-based testing with actual aircraft occurs in 
fiscal year 2012. This testing will overlap with the first arresting 
gear deliveries to the shipyard. Testing of carrier specific dual band 
radar functionality is scheduled to conclude in fiscal year 2012. Dual 
band radar equipment will be delivered incrementally from fiscal years 
2012 through 2014. 

Design Maturity: 

The CVN 78 began construction in September 2008 without a complete 
product model. The program began production with approximately 76 
percent of the 3D product model complete. In November 2009, the 
contractor completed the detail phase in the 3D product model. 
However, program officials reported that while the 3D product model is 
complete, some product model work will continue up to and after 
delivery of CVN 78. This additional work includes making design 
adjustments for planned just-in-time technology insertions or for 
unplanned delays in contractor or government furnished information. 

Production Maturity: 

The Navy awarded the contract for CVN 78 construction in September 
2008. Construction of approximately 50 percent of the ship's units are 
complete. According to program officials, these units are low on the 
ship and only account for 9 percent of the ship's production hours. 
The Navy awarded a not-to-exceed fixed-price production contract to 
General Atomics for EMALS and the advanced arresting gear in 2009. At 
the time of award, the contract price had not been finalized. The Navy 
expects to finalize the price of this contract in March 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy plans to use the dual band radar on both CVN 21 carriers and 
DDG 1000 destroyers. Given the recent decision to truncate the DDG 
1000 program, CVN 21 program officials stated that the dual band radar 
production line may be idle for up to 4 years before production begins 
for CVN 79. The cost of the CVN 79 dual band radar could increase due 
to the costs associated with restarting the production line. In 
addition, the fiscal year 2010 President's Budget recommends moving 
the carrier to a 5-year build cycle. If adopted, the fabrication start 
date for CVN 80 will be delayed by 2 years, which will increase the 
amount of shipyard overhead costs paid under the CVN 79 contract. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office generally concurs with the assessment that 
concurrent technology development, particularly regarding EMALS, the 
advanced arresting gear, and the dual-band radar system, presents the 
highest programmatic risk. Officials stated that all critical 
technologies are being aggressively managed through established 
processes to mitigate cost, schedule, and development risk and remain 
on track to meet required shipbuilder in-yard need dates. 

[End of section] 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed 
to provide advanced land-attack capability in support of forces ashore 
and contributes to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. 
Lead ship construction started in February 2009, and the Navy 
anticipates awarding construction contracts for two follow-on ships by 
June 2010. Bath Iron Works will build all three ships in this class 
with key segments built by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Gulf Coast. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/98). 

System development: 
Development start (3/04); 

Production: 
Production decision (11/05); 
Contract award--detail design (8/06); 
Lead ship construction start (2/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Follow-on ships construction award (6/10); 
Initial capability (9/15). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman 
Shipbuilding, Raytheon: 

Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,218.3; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $31,726.8; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $33,945.1; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,060.785; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 32; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 128; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The lead DDG 1000 began construction in February 2009 with 3 of its 12 
critical technologies mature and 88 percent of its design complete. 
The program expects to demonstrate the maturity of the deckhouse prior 
to its installation, but the remaining 8 technologies will not be 
demonstrated in a realistic environment until after installation on 
the ship due to testing limitations. Software development continues to 
be a challenge. The total ship computing environment will not be 
completed until after the lead ship's systems are activated. The 
Navy's truncation of this program from 7 to 3 ships will likely 
increase the cost per ship. Navy officials reported that this could 
lead to a critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. The Navy requested 
$310 million in fiscal year 2010 and will require additional funds 
through 2014 to cover costs that would have been distributed over the 
7-ship program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Contract award: 8/06; 
Lead ship fabrication: 2/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

DDG 1000 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are mature, and an 
additional 8 have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 
Practical limitations prevent the Navy from fully demonstrating all 
technologies in a realistic environment prior to installation. The 
Navy planned to fully demonstrate the integrated deckhouse prior to 
ship construction start in February 2009, but land-based testing was 
delayed. Testing is now scheduled to complete by March 2010--over a 
year after deckhouse construction began. The integrated power system 
will not be tested with the control system until 2011--nearly 3 years 
later than planned. As a result, the power system will not be 
demonstrated until after its installation on the first two ships. The 
volume search radar has progressed in maturity and began testing with 
the multifunction radar in January 2009. However, program officials 
report that the tests were conducted without the volume search radar's 
radome and at a lower voltage than required. The lead ship's volume 
search radar will be installed in April 2013--after the Navy has taken 
custody of the ship. The total ship computing environment (phased over 
six releases and one spiral) remains at a lower level of maturity and 
will not be completed until after the lead ship's systems are 
activated. Program officials report that problems identified in 
release 4 have been resolved in release 5, which is currently 
undergoing integration testing. However, the Defense Contract 
Management Agency expects that problems discovered in releases 4 and 5 
will cause release 6 to have higher defect rates than planned, and 
additional cost and schedule delays. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the DDG 1000 appears stable, although the continuing 
maturation of critical technologies could result in design changes. 
The design was 88 percent complete at the start of lead ship 
construction, and 100 percent complete shortly thereafter. 

Production Maturity: 

Lead ship construction began in February 2009 and 68 percent of the 
units that make up the ship are now in fabrication. The Navy reported 
that it contractually requires the shipbuilders to specify detailed 
structural attributes to be monitored during unit fabrication and 
integration in order to reduce the risk of rework. According to 
program officials, this contractual requirement is a first for large 
Navy shipbuilding programs. The program initially experienced higher 
than expected rejection rates on the peripheral vertical launch 
system, which program officials reported were resolved. The Navy 
anticipates awarding construction contracts for the second and third 
ships by June 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy reduced the number of ships in the DDG 1000 program from 7 to 
3 ships in fiscal year 2008. Program officials stated that truncating 
the program will likely cause an increase in the cost per ship. Navy 
officials reported that this could result in a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach of the critical cost growth threshold. In addition, some 
contractor costs that were previously distributed over the planned 7- 
ship program will now be allocated to the 3-ship program. In fiscal 
year 2010, the Navy requested $310 million to fund these costs. The 
Navy anticipates requesting additional funds for this purpose during 
fiscal years 2011-2014. 

The Navy is conducting a Future Surface Combatant study, which program 
officials say includes a review of hull options for this new ship 
program. One option being considered is the DDG 1000 hull form. The 
Navy expects to incorporate the final decision from this study in the 
fiscal year 2011 budget. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Navy stated that three critical technologies are mature and that 
all technologies have been demonstrated in at least a relevant 
environment, except for the total ship computing environment which 
will increase in maturity on the completion of release 5. The Navy 
noted that release 5 includes most combat systems-related 
functionality and release 6 focuses on engineering control, which is 
mostly independent of combat systems. The Navy noted that the software 
schedule has a margin available before software is needed for land-
based and ship testing. The Navy stated that the power system will be 
tested on land in 2011 using components of the third ship before lead 
ship testing begins. The Navy noted that the volume search radar 
prototype was built at a lower voltage to limit risk, and that 
prototype integration tests are not dependent on the voltage or 
radome. The Navy stated that full-voltage modules have been produced 
and tested, and that a lead-ship radar will be tested in 2012 with a 
radome. 

[End of section] 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PEO(T)). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. 
It is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The key objectives of 
the E-2D AHE are to improve battlespace target detection and 
situational awareness, especially in the littorals; support theater 
air and missile defense operations; and provide improved operational 
availability for the radar system. 

Concept: 
Program/development start (6/03). 

System development: 
Design review (10/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full-rate decision (12/12); 
Initial capability (10/14). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $606.9 million:
Procurement: $12,874.4 million:
Total funding: $13,516.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 68: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,746.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,181.4; 
Percent change: 11.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $10,643.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,414.7; 
Percent change: 26.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $14,390.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $17,643.3; 
Percent change: 22.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $191.878; 
Latest 09/2008: $235.244; 
Percent change: 22.6%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 75; 
Latest 09/2008: 75; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 95; 
Latest 09/2008: 136; 
Percent change: 43.2%. 

[End of table] 

The E-2D AHE was approved for entry into low-rate initial production 
in June 2009. All five of the E-2D AHE's critical technologies are 
considered mature. The E-2D AHE design is stable and the rate of 
design drawing growth has slowed. We did not assess production 
maturity, but program officials reported that three pilot production 
aircraft were on schedule to be completed by the end of fiscal year 
2010. The program has made progress in completing flight tests, but 40 
percent of the test points remain to be completed before initial 
operational test and evaluation can begin in October 2011. Prior to 
the approval to enter low-rate initial production, the program 
experienced a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach due to unit cost growth. 
The initial operating capability date changed from April 2011 to 
October 2014 when the program expects to have a squadron ready for 
operational deployment. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/03; 
DOD design review: 10/05; 
Production decision: 5/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

E-2D AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the Navy, all five of the E-2D AHE's critical 
technologies are mature. The Navy completed a technology readiness 
assessment in 2009 to support the low-rate initial production 
decision, and DOD concurred with that assessment. The assessment 
included one new critical technology--the high power UHF circulator. 
Although the assessment indicated the silicon carbide UHF transmitter 
was mature, DOD expressed concern about the transmitter's durability 
and its potential effect on life-cycle costs and operational 
availability. 

Design Maturity: 

The E-2D AHE design is stable and 100 percent of total estimated 
design drawings are releasable. The rate of design drawing growth has 
continued to slow, increasing only 4 percent since last year. The 
program office reported that the growth in design drawings was 
attributable to integrating new capabilities, such as the Cooperative 
Engagement Capability. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity. The program did not identify 
any critical manufacturing processes associated with the E-2D AHE, nor 
does the program require the contractor's major assembly site to use 
statistical process controls to ensure its critical processes are 
producing high-quality and reliable products. The E-2D AHE was 
approved for entry into low-rate initial production in June 2009. 
Program officials reported that three pilot production aircraft were 
on schedule to be delivered by the end of fiscal year 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

Prior to the approval to enter low-rate initial production, the 
program experienced a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach over the original 
acquisition program baseline due to unit cost growth. A root cause 
analysis indicated that the primary causes of this growth were 
inaccurate cost estimates for producing the radar and lower annual 
procurement quantities than planned. Secondary causes included 
increases in contractor overhead costs and added requirements. The 
Navy was directed to accelerate the production schedule, seek 
multiyear procurement authority, and investigate other initiatives to 
offset cost growth and improve affordability. A new acquisition 
program baseline was established in July 2009, and the program has 
been directed to report to DOD before reprogramming or budgeting 
additional funding if program costs exceed 10 percent of the new 
baseline. The initial operating capability for the E-2D AHE changed 
from April 2011 to October 2014 due to budget cuts in fiscal year 2009 
and a change in the program's definition of initial operating 
capability. The program changed initial capability from having a fleet 
squadron ready for testing to having a fleet squadron ready for 
operational deployment. 

The program has made progress in completing flight testing, 
particularly with respect to the radar system. Approximately 60 
percent of the planned test points have been completed, with the 
remaining 40 percent scheduled for completion before initial 
operational test and evaluation in October 2011. Program officials 
plan to utilize both development aircraft and the first pilot 
production aircraft for mission systems testing to ensure testing is 
completed on time. In addition, program officials said increased 
aircraft availability and radar system reliability have enabled the 
program to conduct more test flights per month. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

EA-18G Growler: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's EA-18G Growler will replace the carrier-based EA-6B and 
provide electronic warfare capability. The EA-18G is designed to 
support friendly air, ground, and sea operations by suppressing enemy 
radar and communications. The aircraft is a combination of the EA-6B's 
new, more capable Improved Capability (ICAP) III electronic suite, the 
F/A-18F airframe, and other EA-18G unique capabilities. The program 
completed operational testing in March 2009 and its first deployment 
is anticipated in 2010. 

Concept: 
Program start (8/02). 

System development: 
Development start (12/03); 
Design review (4/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (4/07); 
Initial capability (9/09); 
Full-rate decision (11/09);
GAO review (1/10); 
Last procurement (2012). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $121.3 million:
Procurement: $2,465.7 million:
Total funding: $2,587.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 32: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,864.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,929.7; 
Percent change: 3.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,890.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $6,678.6; 
Percent change: -3.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $8,755.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $8,632.8; 
Percent change: -1.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $97.281; 
Latest 09/2008: $101.562; 
Percent change: 4.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 90; 
Latest 09/2008: 85; 
Percent change: -5.6%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 70; 
Latest 09/2008: 69; 
Percent change: -1.4%. 

The 2008 data do not include three aircraft purchased with fiscal year 
2008 wartime supplemental funding. 

[End of table] 

The EA-18G was approved for full-rate production in November 2009, 
prior to deficiencies identified during operational testing being 
fully resolved. In operational tests, the Navy rated the EA-18G 
operationally effective and operationally suitable; however, the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) found the aircraft 
to be operationally effective for most missions and not operationally 
suitable. This difference can be primarily attributed to how the 
organizations accounted for the poor reliability of the ALQ-99 jamming 
pod. In addition, the simultaneous operation of the active 
electronically scanned array radar and the airborne electronic attack 
suite degraded the radar's performance in certain situations. Despite 
these shortcomings, most aircraft were either procured or funds were 
requested prior to a full-rate production decision. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 12/03; 
DOD design review: 4/05; 
Production decision: 4/07; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

EA-18G Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

All of the EA 18-G's technologies are mature and its design is stable. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the program does not 
collect statistical process control data. We have previously expressed 
concerns about the EA-18G's aggressive production schedule. The 
current EA-18G program of record includes 88 aircraft. A full-rate 
production decision was made in November 2009. The Navy has scheduled 
follow-on operational test and evaluation for spring of 2010 which 
will allow full evaluation of new software, as well as other actions 
to improve current suitability problems. Prior to the full-rate 
production decision, 56 aircraft were procured. Funding for an 
additional 22 aircraft was requested in the fiscal year 2010 budget 
even though the operational test reports by the DOT&E had not yet been 
published. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy test organization and DOT&E have reached different 
conclusions about the operational effectiveness and suitability of the 
EA-18G. 

The Navy assessed the EA-18G as operationally effective and identified 
one negative warfighting effect--poor ALQ-99 reliability. It also 
rated the EA-18G as operationally suitable but identified a total of 
seven major deficiencies. The Navy testers recommended fleet 
introduction of the EA-18G and noted that follow-on tests would be 
used to demonstrate that deficiencies had been corrected. 

DOT&E's independent assessment found the EA-18G to be operationally 
effective for most, but not all missions, due to the excessive time 
required to make reactive jamming assignments. In addition, during 
tests, electromagnetic interference in some frequency bands from the 
EA-18G's airborne electronic attack (AEA) suite degraded active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar performance. The Navy 
operational testers did not consider this a deficiency because the 
capability production document only required independent operations of 
the AESA and AEA systems. DOT&E noted this deficiency in their 
operational effectiveness assessment. Also, DOT&E found that the EA-
18G was not operationally suitable, due to significant problems with 
the built-in-test (BIT). A high rate of false BIT indications 
frequently led to a lack of aircrew confidence in the AEA system 
health, which can impact the decision on whether or not to take the 
aircraft on a given mission. At times, the aircrews flew missions with 
real faults because the high rate of false indications led them to 
disregard BIT. The EA-18G also exhibited low reliability, due 
primarily to the frequent failure of the legacy ALQ-99 jamming pods 
and their newly designed pod interface units. Tests also found that EA-
18G aircraft speed was reduced when carrying the ALQ-99 pods and 
external weapons, limiting its ability to keep up with the strike 
aircraft it was escorting. The legacy ALQ-99 pods were not considered 
in the Navy's assessment of the EA-18G. DOT&E further found that 
pilots in the two-person EA-18G have an increased workload versus the 
EA-6B four-person crew. In some missions the workload was acceptable, 
but the workload for performing radar and communications jamming for 
missions with modified escort profiles was close to exceeding 
aircrew's abilities to maintain required functionality or 
effectiveness. 

The Navy test organization and DOT&E recommended further tests to 
address deficiencies found in operational tests. In late September 
2009, the program started to determine if software upgrades were 
effective in correcting the EA-18G's major deficiencies. The DOT&E 
report contained recommendations to improve the EA-18G and make the 
aircraft fully effective and suitable and increase survivability. They 
include upgrading the pilot tactical situation display to minimize 
aircrew workload management comparable to the EA-6B, upgrading 
hardware and software diagnostics tools, assessing the benefits of a 
threat warning system, and assessing the safety and performance 
benefits of adding higher performance engines to the EA-18G. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office stated the fleet continues to transition to the EA- 
18G Growler aircraft. The verification of correction test period has 
ended and the program office is awaiting the report of test results. 
The verification of corrections will be available prior to the first 
deployment of the EA-18G. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs] 

Source: EFV Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships 
offshore to inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer 
distances than the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A--the system it is 
designed to replace. The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier 
for 17 combat-equipped Marines and 3 crew members, and a command 
vehicle to manage combat operations. DOD restructured the program in 
June 2007 and awarded a follow-on development contract in July 2008 
that focuses on redesigning key subsystems to improve reliability. 

Concept: 
Program start (3/95); 
Development start (12/00);
Nunn-McCurdy (6/07); 

System development: 
Development restart (7/08);
GAO review (1/10); 
Operational testing (7/11); 
Low-rate decision (12/11); 
Initial capability (8/15). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Woodbridge, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $866.7 million:
Procurement: $10,226.4 million:
Total funding: $11,163.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 573: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,609.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,743.7; 
Percent change: 132.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $7,228.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $10,445.3; 
Percent change: 44.5%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $8,930.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $14,286.7; 
Percent change: 60.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $8.713; 
Latest 09/2008: $24.092; 
Percent change: 176.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1,025; 
Latest 09/2008: 593; 
Percent change: -42.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 138; 
Latest 09/2008: 245; 
Percent change: 77.5%. 

[End of table] 

The EFV's critical technologies are mature, but its design will 
continue to evolve into low-rate production as part of the design for 
reliability effort. DOD restructured the program in 2007 and extended 
system development so that the program could implement a revised 
approach to meet its reliability requirements. The program will 
conduct an operational assessment in 2011, before its low-rate initial 
production decision, to see if the program is on track to meet its 
minimum reliability requirements. Delivery of new prototypes built 
using mostly production-representative tooling will begin in August 
2010, but the program does not intend to collect data on key 
manufacturing processes until low-rate production begins. In response 
to changing warfighter needs, the program is also planning to develop 
armor kits to improve protection from Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED) blasts. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 12/00; 
DOD design review: 12/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 12/11. 

[End of figure] 

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four of the EFV system's critical technologies are considered 
mature and have been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype under 
the initial development contract. 

Design Maturity: 

The EFV's design will continue to evolve into low-rate initial 
production. The Marine Corps has reported that 96 percent of the 
system's design models have been released; however, the program 
anticipates design changes will continue until 2014 as it executes its 
reliability growth and testing strategy. The program is addressing 180 
design actions raised during its critical design review in December 
2008 and plans to incorporate many of them into seven new prototypes 
currently under construction. The first of the new prototypes is 
scheduled to be delivered in August 2010. An operational assessment is 
scheduled for April 2011. At that time, the program expects to 
demonstrate on average at least 16 hours of operation between 
operational mission failures, which will keep the EFV on the 
reliability path needed to reach its minimum requirement of 43.5 
hours. Additional testing and design revisions are scheduled to 
continue through the fourth lot of low-rate production, and the 
program will commit to all four low-rate production lots before 
conducting initial operational test and evaluation to validate the 
performance and reliability of the EFV. 

Production Maturity: 

The EFV program plans to demonstrate its production processes during 
prototype fabrication and assess their maturity in low-rate initial 
production and full-rate production. According to the program office, 
the prototypes will be built using mostly production representative 
tooling and processes. However, the program will introduce new 
friction-welding processes during low-rate production that are 
expected to increase the strength of the hull and reduce weight. While 
the prototype vehicles will be built using production representative 
tooling and processes, the program does not intend to collect data on 
key manufacturing processes and use statistical process controls until 
low-rate production begins. However, the contractor does currently 
require that suppliers have their manufacturing processes in control 
for all parts associated with key system characteristics. 

Other Program Issues: 

The EFV program has examined multiple options to increase IED 
protection, including adding a v-shaped hull to the vehicle, and 
selected armor kits that provide two levels of protection. According 
to the program, one kit would provide comparable protection to the 
MRAP, while the other kit would provide a higher level of protection 
comparable to the M1A1 Abrams tank. The Marine Corps recently 
formalized the IED requirement for the EFV, but did not make it a key 
performance parameter for the program. In an effort to reduce vehicle 
cost and weight, the program office has considered different options, 
such as removing a system designed to protect EFV occupants from 
exposure to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. If the 
NBC system were removed, warfighters would still be protected using 
mission-oriented protective suits, which they currently use on the AAV-
7 legacy platform. No decision has been made on this proposal, but it 
is being held as an option for later in the program. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the design for reliability effort increased the reliability 
potential of the EFV design by utilizing overarching systems 
engineering processes to mature the design. This effort culminated in 
a design approved at Critical Design Review (CDR) that predicts a 
reliability of 56 hours Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure 
(MTBOMF) based on models and prediction processes. Production of the 
SDD-2 prototypes is on track at the Joint Services Manufacturing 
Center (JSMC), Lima, Ohio, with deliveries planned for August 2010. 
Testing is on track to support Reliability Growth and the Operational 
Assessment prior to Milestone C. 

[End of section] 

Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System (ER/MP): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. 

[End of figure] 

The Army expects its Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft 
System (ER/MP) to fill a capability gap for an unmanned aircraft 
system at the division level. Each system will include 12 aircraft, 
ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic 
takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The Army 
plans for ER/MP to operate alone or with other platforms such as the 
Longbow Apache helicopter and perform missions including 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition and attack. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (4/05); 
Design review (11/06); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (2/10); 
Full-rate decision (1/12); 
Initial capability (3/12). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $293.5 million:
Procurement: $2,197.9 million:
Total funding: $2,675.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 9: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $336.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $824.6; 
Percent change: 145.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $653.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,655.6; 
Percent change: 306.1%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $990.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,480.2; 
Percent change: 251.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $198.058; 
Latest 09/2008: $316.385; 
Percent change: 59.7%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 09/2008: 11; 
Percent change: 120.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 50; 
Latest 09/2008: 83; 
Percent change: 66.0%. 

Cost and quantities shown are from program inception through 2018. 

[End of table] 

According to the Army, the ER/MP will enter production in February 
2010 with its four critical technologies mature, design stable enough 
for low-rate production, and manufacturing processes demonstrated in a 
production representative environment. In 2009, the Army assessed the 
program's production readiness and concluded that design changes did 
not pose significant risk during low-rate production, and that, for 
critical/major suppliers, manufacturing readiness objectives had been 
met and manufacturing maturity was satisfactory. However, the first 
development test of a fully-integrated production representative unit 
will not occur until September 2011--a year and 7 months after the 
production decision. The program entered production over a year later 
than planned, due in part to direction from the Secretary of Defense 
to prioritize fielding a near-term capability. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 4/05; 
DOD design review: 11/06; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 2/10. 

[End of figure] 

ER MP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The ER/MP program began development in 2005 with two critical 
technologies the Army considered mature--the heavy-fuel engine and 
automatic take-off and landing system--but these technologies had not 
been integrated onto an unmanned aircraft using exactly the same 
configuration as planned for the ER/MP. The program's other two 
critical technologies--airborne ethernet and tactical common data link-
-were not mature at development start and only had been demonstrated 
in a laboratory environment. All four critical technologies are now 
mature and have been demonstrated on the final version of the unmanned 
air system. 

Design Maturity: 

The ER/MP design appears stable. In June 2009, the Army established a 
configuration change board in conjunction with the prime contractor to 
track engineering changes to the design. It plans to use the change 
rate as a measure of design stability and maturity. According to the 
program office, the change rate has been less than 1 percent per month. 

Production Maturity: 

The ER/MP is expected to enter low-rate initial production in early 
2010 with all its manufacturing processes demonstrated in a production 
representative environment. In 2009, the Army's Aviation and Missile 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center independently assessed 
the program's production readiness, including whether the system's 
design was stable, production planning was complete, and proper 
facilities were in place. The resulting November 2009 report concluded 
that the design of the system is mature and stable enough such that 
design change does not present a significant risk to the program 
during low-rate initial production. It also indicated that, for 
critical/major suppliers, manufacturing readiness objectives had been 
met, manufacturing process maturity was satisfactory, and 
manufacturing infrastructure met or exceeded requirement for low-rate 
initial production. However, the first development test of a fully-
integrated production representative unit will not occur until initial 
operational test and evaluation in September 2011--a year and 7 months 
after the production decision. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army anticipates DOD will approve a new acquisition program 
baseline for the program in February 2010. According to the Army, the 
new baseline will reflect the program approved at its production 
decision review as well as changes resulting from a Secretary of 
Defense memorandum to field the capability as soon as possible. The 
Secretary's direction affected the program in several ways. According 
to program officials, it extended system development and demonstration 
by about 2 years and delayed the award of the low-rate initial 
production contract by over 1 year. In accordance with the Secretary's 
direction, the Army fielded one "Quick Reaction Capability" system in 
2009 and plans to field another in 2010. These systems lack the full 
capabilities planned for the program of record. 

In 2007, DOD issued a memorandum directing that the Army's ER/MP and 
Air Force's MQ-1C Predator unmanned aircraft systems be combined into 
a single acquisition program. Since that time, the Air Force has 
determined it will no longer acquire the MQ-1C Predator. The Army now 
anticipates a DOD acquisition memorandum closing the direction to 
combine the programs. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. Program officials also stated that the 
program was approved in February 2010 for low-rate initial production, 
and they now anticipate changes in cost, quantity, and schedule. 
However, official, detailed information was not available in time for 
inclusion in this report. 

[End of section] 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Office of Product Manager Excalibur. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended 
to provide improved range and accuracy. The Excalibur's near-vertical 
angle of fall is expected to reduce collateral damage, making it more 
effective in urban environments. Although the original plans called 
for three variants, the unitary, smart, and discriminating munitions, 
only the unitary variant is currently being developed. We reviewed the 
unitary variant Increment Ia-1 and Ia-2. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (5/97); 
Design review (5/05); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (6/10); 
Initial capability (8/10); 
Last procurement (2020). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $74.3 million:
Procurement: $1,187.4 million:
Total funding: $1,261.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 28,035: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $746.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $931.9; 
Percent change: 24.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,912.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,543.5; 
Percent change: -60.6%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,659.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,475.3; 
Percent change: -46.9%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $.061; 
Latest 09/2008: $.081; 
Percent change: 33.4%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 76,677; 
Latest 09/2008: 30,544; 
Percent change: -60.2%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 136; 
Latest 09/2008: 159; 
Percent change: 16.9%. 

[End of table] 

Excalibur Increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 are in production. According to 
program officials, critical technologies are mature and designs are 
stable for both increments. Since development began in 1997, the 
program has encountered a number of significant changes, including 
four major restructures, reduced production quantities, and increased 
unit costs. The Excalibur program received approval to begin 
production of Increment Ia-1 in May 2005 to support an urgent 
requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that would reduce 
collateral damage and has delivered over 400 rounds to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, the contractor experienced a series of quality 
issues that delayed production and Increment Ia-2 qualification, and 
increased program cost. Increment Ib is in engineering and 
manufacturing development. The program plans to select from two 
competitors in March 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 5/97; 
DOD design review: 5/05; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 6/10. 

[End of figure] 

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Excalbur's three critical technologies for Increments Ia-1 and Ia- 
2, the airframe, guidance system and warhead, are mature. According to 
the program office, in both cases the technologies were demonstrated 
in a realistic environment at the time of their respective design 
reviews in May 2005 and March 2007. 

The Excalibur program office has identified two critical technologies 
for Increment Ib, the guidance system and electronic safe-and-arm 
fuze. According to the program office, these technologies are nearing 
maturity. Two contractors are currently developing prototypes of the 
Increment Ib round and the program plans to down-select in March 2010. 

Design Maturity: 

The Excalibur's design for Increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 appears to be 
stable. In May 2005, Excalibur held its design review and concurrently 
entered production to support an urgent fielding requirement for Iraq 
and Afghanistan. At the time of the design review, 750 of 790 design 
drawings were released. By August 2006, the number of drawings had 
increased by almost 20 percent to 943, all of which have been 
released. According to a program official, the increase in drawings 
was due to parts changes on the Increment Ia-1 as well as upgrades and 
changes for the Increment 1a-2. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity because 
statistical process controls have not been implemented at the system 
level. The program is taking steps to utilize statistical process 
control at the subsystem and component levels. To date, over 400 
complete rounds have been delivered and the program is baselining the 
system metrics. According to program documents, in the past year, the 
Excalibur contractor has experienced a quality issue that delayed 
production and increased program cost. The Army suspended Excalibur 
deliveries from November 2008 until August 2009 because of problems 
with the inertial measurement unit (IMU) that helps guide the 
projectile to the target. The IMU supplier was replaced and a new, 
more reliable IMU has been successfully tested and deliveries have 
resumed. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Excalibur acquisition plan currently focuses on developing its 
unitary version in three increments--Ia-1, Ia-2, and Ib. The Increment 
Ia-1 projectile, which has been made available for early fielding, 
meets the requirements for lethality and accuracy in a nonjammed 
environment. The Increment Ia-2 projectile is designed to meet 
requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment, with extended range 
and increased reliability. The Increment Ib projectile is planned to 
further increase reliability, lower unit costs, and will be available 
for fielding in fiscal year 2014. Of the total planned quantity of 
30,000 rounds, over 85 percent will be Increment Ib rounds. Increment 
Ia-1 Excalibur was fielded in Iraq with its first use in combat in 
2007. Since then, more than 400 rounds have been delivered to the 
Army, Marine Corps, and Canadian troops both in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The program office reported that over 85 percent of the rounds 
expended in combat operations functioned as expected. Increment Ia-2 
is currently in the final stages of development. Increment Ia-2 has 
been approved for production, but production deliveries are pending 
the completion of initial operational testing, scheduled for the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2010. The Excalibur program awarded 
fixed price incentive fee contracts to Allied Techsystems and Raytheon 
for a planned 18-month design maturation and demonstration period for 
the Increment Ib round in September 2008. This will lead to a 
contractor down-select in March 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office noted that the Excaliber is on track to meet the 
Army's performance, schedule, and cost requirements. The newly 
incorporated IMU has been successful and resulted in an improved 
reliability rate for rounds produced since July 2009. The Excaliber 
will enter into initial operational testing in January 2010 and a full-
rate production decision is expected in June 2010. The program is 
meeting or exceeding its key performance parameters. The current 
accuracy of the system exceeds its requirements, providing the 
Excaliber with the lowest collateral damage estimate of all precision 
guided munitions. The current Increment 1b development contract 
includes not-to-exceed production options and is on track to meet its 
program unit costs. 

The program office also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Boeing. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite 
communications terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T 
will address current and future communications capabilities and 
technologies, replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being 
developed incrementally; the first increment will provide voice and 
data military satellite communications for nuclear and conventional 
forces as well as airborne and ground command posts, including the B-
2, B-52, RC-135, E-6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed the first 
increment. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (9/02); 
Design review (1/09); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (TBD); 
Full-rate decision (TBD); 
Initial capability (TBD); 
Full capability (TBD). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Company:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $435.1 million:
Procurement: $2,213.1 million:
Total funding: $2,648.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 216: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,499.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,731.8; 
Percent change: 15.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,610.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,217.5; 
Percent change: 37.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,110.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,949.4; 
Percent change: 27.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $14.400; 
Latest 09/2008: $16.253; 
Percent change: 12.9%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 216; 
Latest 09/2008: 243; 
Percent change: 12.5%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 129; 
Latest 09/2008: 129; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The FAB-T program expected to enter production in February 2010 with 
its critical technologies mature and its design stable; however, the 
program now plans to extend its development phase. A new low-rate 
production decision date has not been approved and the program has not 
identified its critical manufacturing processes or started to collect 
statistical process control data to demonstrate their maturity. In the 
past year, the FAB-T program received the first engineering design 
model, completed developmental testing of the low-data rate system, 
and began testing of the high-data rate system. The program 
anticipates two significant engineering change proposals prior to the 
low-rate production decision. The FAB-T program office also continues 
to monitor two areas--certification by the National Security Agency 
and software development--that could cause cost increases and schedule 
delays. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 9/02; 
DOD design review: 1/09; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: TBD. 

[End of figure] 

FAB-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The FAB-T program expected to enter production with all six critical 
technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment. 
According to program officials, four critical technologies were mature 
as of August 2009. FAB-T's critical technologies were not assessed at 
development start in 2002 because it was not yet a major defense 
acquisition program. In December 2008, a technology readiness 
assessment concluded that all six critical technologies required 
additional testing to fully demonstrate their maturity. The assessment 
also deemed a seventh technology--radiation hardening--to be immature, 
but noncritical, and removed it as a critical technology. Since that 
review, the program office has assessed four of the critical 
technologies as mature based on the results of flight testing. 

Design Maturity: 

The FAB-T design appears stable based on the number of design drawings 
releasable to manufacturing. As of August 2009, 88 percent of the 
total expected drawings were releasable, and the program office 
expects that all drawings will be releasable by its production 
decision. In the last year, the number of total expected drawings has 
increased by 22 percent due, in part, to new drawings for the extended-
data rate (XDR) system variant, subassemblies, and the security 
module. Program officials anticipate that two additional engineering 
changes--one related to hardware obsolescence and another related to 
software changes for FAB-T's interface with AEHF--will increase the 
estimated cost of the FAB-T contract by approximately $50 million 
prior to the production decision. 

The FAB-T program office also continues to monitor two areas-- 
certification by the National Security Agency (NSA) and software 
development--that could cause cost increases and schedule delays. FAB- 
T needs to properly protect information at various classification 
levels and NSA will provide a certification of the cryptography in 
certain equipment. In June 2009, the NSA completed a review of the low-
date rate low data rate (LDR) version of system software and approved 
limited use of the FAB-T cryptographic element in program test events. 
While NSA is currently scheduled to complete final certification based 
on a production-like terminal in fiscal year 2011, program officials 
said that pending engineering changes will likely delay certification 
by 3 to 6 months. Since last year, the total lines of software code 
expected in the final FAB-T system have increased by over 8 percent, 
and software development costs have increased by almost 12 percent. 
These increased costs are primarily a result of engineering change 
proposals, internal requirements reallocations, and higher costs 
associated with LDR integration and XDR coding complexity. 

Production Maturity: 

The FAB-T low-rate production decision was scheduled for February 
2010, but the program now plans to extend its development phase and a 
new low-rate production decision date has not yet been approved. 
Program officials stated that the program has not yet identified its 
critical manufacturing processes. According to the program office, a 
production readiness assessment, previously planned for January 2010, 
will still be conducted to support the low-rate production decision 
but has not yet been rescheduled. 

In January 2009, the contractor delivered the first FAB-T engineering 
design model. According to program officials, FAB-T has completed all 
the objectives for developmental flight testing of the hardware for 
the LDR system. The XDR system will undergo most of its testing 
concurrently with low-rate production. Operational testing for the XDR 
system is not scheduled to begin until after the first AEHF satellite 
has launched, which is currently scheduled for September 2010. The FAB-
T program is planning to procure almost half of its units during low- 
rate production. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Air Force concurred with our assessment; however, they noted that 
they are currently replanning the program, which will affect the data 
presented. The Air Force provided additional technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Combat System Spin Out Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: PEO Integration approved Case 09-9146. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's E-IBCT will augment brigade-level capabilities through an 
incremental, expedited fielding of some systems to current forces. The 
first increment, scheduled for fielding in late 2011, includes 
unattended munitions and sensors, unmanned ground and air vehicles, 
and new radios and battle command software. Increment 1 content 
derives from Army efforts to "spin out" selected Future Combat System 
capabilities to current forces. The Army anticipates at least one 
follow-on increment. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (7/04); 
Limited user test (10/09). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Limited user test (9/10); 
Initial capability (9/11); 
Full-rate decision (12/11); 
Last procurement (unknown). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Despite recognized technology and design issues, DOD authorized E-IBCT 
Increment 1 to enter low-rate initial production in December 2009. The 
Army rated 9 of the E-IBCT's 10 critical technologies as mature, but 
testing has revealed reliability and performance issues with many 
Increment 1 systems. In addition, while the Army has held design 
reviews for the individual systems and the E-IBCT as a whole, system 
designs continue to change. The Army has not been able to test the 
full capabilities of E-IBCT systems and has been forced to use non- 
production-representative or surrogate systems in some tests. In March 
2010, DOD plans to review the Army's progress on addressing issues 
with network capabilities, system and sensor reliability, and the 
performance and cost effectiveness of the non-line-of-sight launch 
system. A decision on future E-IBCT production is planned for December 
2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: 10/09; 
Production decision: 12/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

FCS SO E-IBCT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the Army, 9 of the 10 E-IBCT critical technologies are 
fully mature. However, while the Army reported that the radio 
technologies were mature, its assessment was based on testing that 
used non-production representative systems. According to the Army, the 
cross-domain guard solution, which enables information sharing between 
classified, unclassified, and allied networks, is nearing maturity. 
The Army expects to demonstrate the technology's maturity in a 
realistic environment in a 2010 limited user test. When the E-IBCT 
Increment 1 was approved to enter production in December 2009, the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
raised concerns about the maturity of the systems' network capability 
and the performance of software-defined radios and their associated 
waveforms. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering will conduct 
a technology readiness assessment of the network capability to support 
a March 2010 DOD review of the E-IBCT program. 

Design Maturity: 

E-IBCT system designs are not yet stable. In 2009, Army test officials 
discovered performance issues that will result in design changes. For 
example, the small unmanned ground vehicle could not provide infrared 
imagery necessary to recognize a person at required distances, and 
thus the system will need design improvements. Similarly, the Army is 
considering a change to the unmanned air system's design because the 
air vehicle can be heard from a considerable distance. E-IBCT system 
designs may also change due to reliability issues. As indicated at the 
E-IBCT critical design review in October 2009, four of the E-IBCT's 
systems did not meet reliability goals established as criteria for 
entry into production. For example, the tactical unattended ground 
sensor is required to operate 127 hours between failures. The Army 
currently estimates that it can operate 5 hours. Also, the unmanned 
aerial system is required to operate 23 hours between system aborts, 
but testing has only proven the system can achieve 4 hours. As a 
result of these design issues, some E-IBCT systems have released few, 
and in some cases, no engineering drawings to manufacturing. For 
example, the redesigned tactical unattended ground sensor requires 13 
drawings, but none of them have been released. The range-extending 
relay, which was recently incorporated to address the insufficient 
range of tactical sensor radios, requires 8 drawings, but none have 
been released. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not collect production maturity data for the Increment 1 
systems. 

Other Program Issues: 

Despite recognized technical issues and evolving system designs, DOD 
authorized low-rate production of Increment 1 systems in December 
2009. The lack of systems' maturity adversely affected DOD's ability 
to assess the capabilities of E-IBCT Increment 1 systems prior to this 
decision. Specifically, an Army test report stated that this lack of 
maturity reduced the ability to assess and refine tactics, techniques, 
and procedures; test the full capabilities of some systems; and 
examine Increment 1 systems' contributions to mission success. The 
Army plans to continue to develop the systems' designs at least until 
the initial operational test and evaluation in 2011. This approach 
presents the risk that articles delivered for operational testing will 
not be representative of final production articles. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to program officials, Increment 1 provides the capability to 
significantly improve soldiers' battlefield knowledge and safety. It 
also provides enhanced tactical data across the brigade using current 
networks and provides the foundation for future capabilities. It uses 
an acquisition approach designed to rapidly develop, test, and field 
systems. There were 16 months between the decision to make infantry 
brigades the focus of fielding and the production decision, which 
included acceleration of unmanned systems. Test results from 2009 
enabled DOD officials to make the decision to produce enough items for 
a single brigade in support of initial operational testing in 2011. 
Limited user testing this summer will evaluate possible upgrades to 
these initial items. This testing will inform a future decision on 
whether to produce enough systems to equip two additional brigades. 
After initial operational testing, the Army will ask for production of 
six more brigade sets. 

[End of section] 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation, 94 ABW/PA #09306. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance 
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations 
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 
The Global Hawk will replace the U-2. After a successful technology 
demonstration, the system entered development and limited production 
in March 2001. In total, the program will procure 7 RQ-4A aircraft 
similar to the original demonstrators and 47 larger and more capable 
RQ-4Bs. RQ-4A production is complete. We assessed the RQ-4B. 

Concept: 
Demonstration/Program start (2/94). 

System development: 
Development start/low-rate decision (3/01). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Last procurement (2013). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,020.6 million:
Procurement: $2,823.7 million:
Total funding: $3,844.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 20: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,016.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,630.3; 
Percent change: 257.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,212.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $6,158.4; 
Percent change: 46.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,259.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,901.9; 
Percent change: 88.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $83.487; 
Latest 09/2008: $183.369; 
Percent change: 119.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 63; 
Latest 09/2008: 54; 
Percent change: -14.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 55; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

The Global Hawk RQ-4B aircraft is currently in production. The RQ-4B's 
critical technologies are mature, but integration and testing are not 
complete. The basic airframe design is stable, and the program office 
reports that the airframe production processes are mature. Development 
and operational tests to verify the design and ensure performance 
meets warfighter requirements have been delayed over 3 years due to 
hardware and software problems. The program expects to have procured 
more than 70 percent of the planned quantity by the time testing is 
completed. Further, operational testing on the advanced radar will not 
be complete until 2013, the last year of planned procurement. Problems 
found during testing could require costly redesigns and retrofits. The 
RQ-4B is expected to replace the U-2, but Global Hawk delays have kept 
the U-2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Development start/Production decision: 3/01; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The critical technologies for the RQ-4B are mature. These technologies 
include two key capabilities--the advanced signals intelligence 
payload and multiple platform--radar-that are required for the larger 
RQ-4B. However, the program must still successfully integrate and test 
these technologies to ensure they perform as expected. The first 
flight of a RQ-4B equipped with the signals intelligence payload 
occurred in September 2008. The completion of development and 
operational testing has been delayed until November 2010. Development 
of the advanced radar has also experienced delays. The radar has flown 
on an aircraft similar to the Global Hawk, however its operational 
testing has been delayed by more than 2 years. 

Design Maturity: 

The RQ-4B basic airframe design is stable with all of its engineering 
drawings released. During the first year of production, however, 
frequent substantive engineering changes increased development and 
airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing. Differences between 
the RQ-4A and the RQ-4B were much more extensive and complex than 
anticipated. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, the manufacturing processes for the 
RQ-4B airframe are fully mature and in statistical control. In 
addition, the program reports that it is meeting its quality goals on 
measures such as scrap and rework rates and number of nonconforming 
parts. The RQ-4B aircraft is being produced in three configurations. 
Block 20 aircraft are equipped with an enhanced imagery intelligence 
payload; block 30 aircraft have both imagery and signals intelligence 
payloads; and block 40 aircraft will have an advanced radar 
surveillance capability. All six block 20 aircraft have been produced. 
Production continues on block 30 and block 40 aircraft. Thirty-four 
total aircraft have been procured through fiscal year 2009. The first 
block 30 aircraft was delivered to the Air Force in November 2007 and 
delivery of the first block 40 aircraft is expected in September 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Global Hawk program has continued to experience delays in 
development and operational testing. First, the Air Force issued a 
Joint Urgent Operational Need to install the Battlefield Airborne 
Communications Node--an airborne communication system--on two block 20 
aircraft. According to program officials, the shift in focus and 
resources required for this effort has contributed to block 40 
operational test delays. In addition, the completion of operational 
tests to verify that the basic RQ-4B design works as intended has been 
delayed to November 2010--now more than 3 years later than originally 
planned. Program officials said a number of factors contributed to the 
most recent schedule slip, including developmental test problems, 
software deficiencies, and parts failures. The program expects to have 
procured more than 70 percent of the total program quantities by the 
time operational testing is completed. Further, follow-on block 40 
operational tests will not be completed until fiscal year 2013, the 
last planned year of procurement. Problems found during testing could 
require costly redesigns and retrofits and result in further delays in 
deliveries to the warfighter. The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 
with the RQ-4B, but Global Hawk delays have kept the U-2 in the 
inventory longer than anticipated. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Air Force stated that the Global Hawk program made significant 
strides in program execution while reducing program risk. Three 
deployed RQ-4A aircraft supported Overseas Contingency Operations 
amassing almost 8,000 combat hours in 2009 and over 37,000 total 
program flying hours to date. The larger and more capable RQ-4B 
aircraft continued development testing including flying all three 
blocks of RQ-4B aircraft and achieving Air Worthiness Certification. 
Two block 20 aircraft will be outfitted to support high-priority 
communications tasks. The new signals intelligence payload continued 
testing on the block 30 aircraft and will enter operational testing in 
2010. The advanced radar payload will be integrated into and begin 
testing on the block 40 aircraft in 2010. Operational testing of block 
20/30 aircraft are key 2010 events. Current program challenges 
include: software production, production acceptance, and normalization 
of sustainment and operations. 

[End of section] 

H-1 Upgrades (4BW/4BN): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: USMC Light/Attack Helicopter (H-1) Program Office, PMA276. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's H-1 Upgrades Program converts the AH-1W attack helicopter 
and the UH-1N utility helicopter to the AH-1Z and UH-1Y 
configurations, respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack 
helicopter is to provide rotary wing fire support and reconnaissance 
capabilities in day/night and adverse weather conditions. The mission 
of the UH-1Y utility helicopter is to provide command, control, and 
assault support under the same conditions. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (10/96); 
Design review (9/98). 

Production: 
Initial capability UH-1Y (9/08); 
Full-rate decision UH-1Y (9/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full-rate decision AZ-1H (10/10); 
Initial capability AZ-1H (3/11); 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $261.5 million:
Procurement: $7,112.8 million:
Total funding: $7,374.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 280: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $680.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,835.2; 
Percent change: 169.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,856.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,689.1; 
Percent change: 239.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,536.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $11,524.3; 
Percent change: 225.8v. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $12.453; 
Latest 09/2008: $32.647; 
Percent change: 162.2%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 284; 
Latest 09/2008: 353; 
Percent change: 24.3%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 105; 
Latest 09/2008: 142; 
Percent change: 35.2%. 

[End of table] 

The AH-1Z and UH-1Y configurations are in production. According to the 
program office, their technologies are mature and designs are stable. 
We did not assess production maturity because the program does not use 
statistical process controls. The program office tracks postproduction 
quality metrics and delivery performance and reported meeting its 
goals on the latest aircraft delivered. Over the course of the 
program, production has proceeded slower than expected, due in part to 
supplier base issues. Program officials believe these problems could 
be resolved if advanced procurement funding is made available. In 
December 2008, the Navy reported a unit cost breach of the significant 
cost growth threshold. According to the revised baseline, the 
completion of AH-1Z operational testing will be delayed 28 months to 
July 2010 with a full-rate production decision to follow in October 
2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 10/96; 
DOD design review: 9/98; 
Production decision: 9/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

H-1 Upgrades Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, all of the technologies in the AH-1Z 
and UH-1Y configurations are mature. In addition, their designs appear 
stable. Program officials reported that the helmet-mounted display 
issues which limited UH-1Y operational testing in 2008 have been 
resolved. In February 2009, DOD approved a plan to redesign the main 
rotor cuff and yoke to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost. 
The program's maneuverability requirement--a key performance 
parameter--was previously reduced because of the static strength 
limitations of the main rotor. The program does not plan to retrofit 
aircraft with the redesigned components, but will replace them during 
normal maintenance. 

Production Maturity: 

DOD approved full-rate production for the UH-1Y in September 2008 and 
low-rate initial production for the AH-1Z in October 2003. We did not 
assess production maturity because the program does not use 
statistical process controls. Instead, the program office tracks 
postproduction quality metrics and delivery performance and reported 
meeting its goals on the latest aircraft delivered. 

Overall, production has proceeded slower than expected, due in part to 
supplier base issues. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, the program will 
request advanced procurement funding to support fiscal year 2011 
production. Program officials state that this funding will help 
resolve prior supply issues. However, the contractor has not yet 
demonstrated that it can produce the aircraft at the rate--28 
aircraft--called for in the program's fiscal year 2010 budget request 
and revised acquisition program baseline. Although the program reports 
that its maximum annual production rate is 32 aircraft, to date it has 
not delivered more than 12 aircraft in a single year. In 2009, the 
program expects to accept delivery of six aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

In August 2009, a DOD report on the H-1 Upgrades Program cited 
improvements in operational performance, production deliveries, and 
cost containment. An initial deployment of three UH-1Ys was completed 
in July 2009, and a second deployment of nine UH-1Ys to Afghanistan 
began in October 2009. The program has also addressed performance 
issues with AH-1Z weapons components. Gun control corrections have 
been tested and verified and the target sight system has undergone 
risk reduction testing without experiencing hardware reliability 
failures. 

In December 2008, the Navy reported a unit cost increase of 19 percent 
over the program's then current baseline, breaching the significant 
cost growth threshold. Program officials stated this breach was due to 
growth in the cost of material, labor, government furnished equipment, 
and nonrecurring engineering. This breach followed four previous major 
restructuring efforts. The program's new acquisition program baseline 
delays completion of operational testing for the AH-1Z by 28 months 
from March 2008 to July 2010 and establishes a new full-rate 
production decision review for the AH-1Z, which is planned for October 
2010. The revised baseline also accounts for an almost 25 percent 
increase in planned procurement quantities from 280 to 349 aircraft 
(123 UH-1Ys and 226 AH-1Zs) to support the Marine Corps' growth plans. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the H-1 Upgrades Program 
Office stated it is currently taking delivery of low-rate initial 
production UH-1Y and AH-1Z aircraft in accordance with its production 
ramp plan. 52 UH-1Y and 21 AH-1Z aircraft are on contract and the last 
13 aircraft deliveries were ahead of contract schedule. AH-1Z risk 
reduction testing is complete and the AH-1Z Operational Evaluation 
(OPEVAL) begins in spring 2010. Previously noted deficiencies with 
Target Sight System, rocket gas ingestion, helmet mounted sight 
system, and mission software have been corrected and will be formally 
assessed in the spring 2010 OPEVAL. A subsequent full-rate production 
decision for the AH-1Z is planned for first quarter, fiscal year 2011. 
The UH-1Y is in full-rate production and is deployed in Operation 
Enduring Freedom, performing at three times normal aircraft operating 
rates. 

[End of section] 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Integrated Test 2 accomplished December 2006. 

[End of figure] 

JASSM is a long-range Air Force air-to-ground precision missile that 
will be able to strike targets from a variety of aircraft. The Air 
Force is producing a baseline JASSM and developing a JASSM-Extended 
Range (ER) variant, which will provide greater range. Each missile 
will have separate milestone decision reviews and budgets. The 
missile's hardware is 70 percent common and its software is 95 percent 
common. We assessed both variants. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/96). 

System development: 
Development start (11/98). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/01); 
Initial capability (9/03); 
Full-rate decision (7/04); 
GAO review (1/10); 
ER low-rate decision (2010); 
ER last procurement (2027). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $994.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,317.2; 
Percent change: 32.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,240.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,451.5; 
Percent change: 258.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,259.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,768.7; 
Percent change: 155.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $.915; 
Latest 09/2008: $1.152; 
Percent change: 26.0%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 2,469; 
Latest 09/2008: 5,006; 
Percent change: 102.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 75; 
Latest 09/2008: 87; 
Percent change: 16.0%. 

[End of table] 

The JASSM program has a history of cost growth, due primarily to 
reliability issues with the baseline JASSM and the addition of JASSM-
ER to the program. The program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach of the critical threshold in 2007 and was restructured in 2008. 
The baseline JASSM entered production in 2001 with mature technologies 
and a design that appeared stable. Since then, however, the missile 
has demonstrated inconsistent reliability. In 2009, the Air Force 
stopped accepting delivery of baseline missiles and delayed 
negotiations on the Lot 8 production contract after 4 out of 10 
missiles failed during flight tests conducted from November 2008 
through February 2009. Subsequent flight tests completed in October 
2009 exceeded reliability goals. A JASSM-ER production decision is 
expected in fiscal year 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 11/98; 
DOD design review: 9/01; 
Production decision: 12/01; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

JASSM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the JASSM program office, the three critical technologies 
for the baseline JASSM and JASSM-ER--global positioning system anti- 
spoofing receiver module, composite materials, and stealth/signature 
reduction--have been mature since the start of production in 2001. 
Consistent with DOD acquisition policy, JASSM-ER is undergoing a 
technology readiness assessment to support its planned fiscal year 
2010 production decision. 

Design Maturity: 

The JASSM program will not achieve design stability until it can 
consistently demonstrate that the missile can perform reliably. To 
address reliability issues, the program has made design changes and 
will retrofit about half of the baseline missiles already delivered. 
DOD has also made changes to the way the program oversees the prime 
contractor. JASSM was initiated as a Total System Performance 
Responsibility program, under which all drawings were developed and 
managed by the contractor. Following the program's Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breach of the critical threshold in 2007, DOD directed the 
program to improve its oversight and control over the missile's 
configuration management. 

Production Maturity: 

Since the full-rate production decision for the baseline JASSM in 
2004, missile lot to lot reliability rates have been inconsistent. 
Recent Lot 5 test results raised concerns about the maturity and 
quality of the program's manufacturing process. Independent reviews 
have found that JASSM's reliability issues are primarily driven by 
supplier quality control problems. The JASSM program stopped accepting 
deliveries of missiles in both 2007 and 2009 because of test failures 
and reliability concerns. Specifically, in 2009, the Air Force stopped 
accepting delivery of baseline missiles and delayed negotiations on 
the Lot 8 production contract after 4 out of the 10 missiles failed 
during flight tests conducted from November 2008 through February 
2009. Subsequent flight tests completed in October 2009 have achieved 
a 94 percent reliability rate. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Air Force has 1,053 JASSM baseline missiles on contract (Lots 1-7) 
and 800 have been delivered to date. The program plans to retrofit at 
least 389 missiles to improve their reliability. Even though the 
missiles are covered by a system performance warranty, under which the 
contractor guarantees their performance for 15 years, the retrofit 
process and various reliability improvements not covered by the 
warranty have the potential to cost the Air Force an estimated $18 
million to $23 million, according to the program office. In addition, 
the retrofit process itself could introduce new reliability issues. 
All four flight test failures from November 2008 through February 2009 
involved missiles that had been retrofitted. The program now plans to 
use Lot 6 reliability tests to validate improvements to the retrofit 
process. Air Force testing will determine if $18 million to $23 
million in additional retrofits is necessary. 

JASSM-ER development, which began in late 2003, is almost complete. 
The missile continues testing in fiscal year 2010. The program will 
undergo an operational assessment based on all test results to date, 
and it will complete a system-level production readiness review to 
support its low-rate initial production decision scheduled for late 
fiscal year 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Austal USA. 

[End of figure] 

The JHSV is a joint Army and Navy program to acquire a high-speed, 
shallow-draft vessel for rapid intratheater transport of combat-ready 
units. The ship will be capable of operating without reliance on shore 
based infrastructure. The program awarded a detail design and 
construction contract with options for nine additional ships to Austal 
USA in November 2008, and DOD authorized construction of the first 
ship in December 2009. 

Concept: 
Program start (4/06). 

System development: 
Contract award (11/08); 
Lead ship construction start (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
First ship delivery (11/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Austal, USA:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $24.1 million:
Procurement: $1,171.2 million:
Total funding: $1,195.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 7: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $119.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $1722.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,841.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $184.152; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 10; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 77; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

DOD authorized JHSV lead-ship construction in December 2009. While all 
18 critical technologies were mature, only 65 percent of the ship's 3D 
product model was complete. The program office believes that product 
model completion is less critical for the JHSV because it is not as 
complex as other Navy ships, such as the DDG 1000 or the T-AKE. Before 
production began, the shipbuilder also demonstrated its supplier base 
was stable and its manufacturing processes were in control as required 
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, program officials 
stated that the shipbuilder successfully built a pilot JHSV module in 
its new modular manufacturing facility, which demonstrated its 
production readiness. Workforce issues could negatively affect JHSV 
production. The shipbuilder will have to hire a significant number of 
skilled workers if its workload increases as anticipated. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Contract awarded: 11/08; 
Lead ship fabrication: 12/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

JHSV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JHSV program awarded its detailed design and construction contract 
in November 2008 with 17 of its 18 critical technologies mature and 
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Before production began in 
December 2009, the program was required to demonstrate that all JHSV 
critical technologies were mature. According to program officials, the 
final technology, the high expansion foam firefighting system, 
completed testing in an operational environment and demonstrated its 
maturity in November 2009. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

In December 2009, DOD authorized the shipbuilder to start JHSV lead 
ship construction with 65 percent of the ship's 3D product model 
complete. According to program officials, the product modeling is 
complete for some of the JHSV's most complex modules, including the 
machinery, water jet, and generator rooms. The decision to authorize 
construction is not consistent with GAO recommended shipbuilding best 
practices, which call for achieving a complete and stable 3D product 
model before construction begins. The program office believes that the 
completion of the model prior to construction start is less critical 
for its program because the JHSV is not as complex as other Navy 
ships, such as the DDG 1000 or the T-AKE. The Navy also demonstrated 
JHSV design maturity by tracking the number of critical drawings 
approved by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). As of December 
2009, ABS has approved 99 percent, or 319 out of 321, of JHSV's 
critical design drawings used to build the 3D product model. 

Program officials estimate that 70 percent of the JHSV design is the 
same as the commercial Hawaii Superferry produced by the JHSV 
shipbuilder. However, the differences, which include the firefighting 
system, hotel services, aviation accessibility, and the addition of a 
limited self-defense capability, affect a large area of the JHSV. The 
Navy is reviewing dynamic load analysis to ensure safety of the ship. 
In addition, the program fulfilled the requirement set by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense to demonstrate that all JHSV critical 
technologies were mature, its supplier base was stable, and its 
manufacturing processes were in control prior to the beginning of 
construction in December 2009. 

In order to achieve the necessary production rate, the shipbuilder 
built a modular manufacturing facility, which marks a change in 
production strategy for the yard. Prior to using this facility to 
build the JHSV, the shipbuilder built components of the Littoral 
Combat Ship in the facility. In addition, it built a pilot JHSV module 
in the facility prior to lead-ship construction start. While modular 
manufacturing decreases the number of workers needed, the contractor 
experienced hiring issues and program officials anticipate that the 
shipyard will be challenged to hire a sufficient number of workers 
with critical skills as its workload increases. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense chose the JHSV to participate 
in the Capital Budget Account Pilot Program, which was created to 
control cost growth by providing stable funding. Under this program, 
the program office must gain approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Office of Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller 
for changes in funding or requirements. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. Program officials also stated that in 
accordance with Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal year 2008 (Pub. L.No.110-181), the Secretary of the Navy 
certified that the results of the JHSV production readiness review 
support commencement of construction of Fortitude (JHSV 1), lead ship 
of the JHSV class. They stated that the program exceeded its exit 
criteria by completing greater than 85 percent of all production 
design efforts, which include preliminary design products, functional 
design products, 3D computer-aided modeling, ABS reviews of critical 
design products, and production information, prior to the start of 
construction in late 2009. 

[End of section] 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: JLENS Product Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and 
tracking of land-attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is 
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a 
test bed to demonstrate the initial concept. Spiral 2 consists of two 
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well 
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing 
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other 
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (8/05); 
Design review (12/08); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (1/12); 
Initial capability (9/13); 
Full-rate decision (1/12); 
Last procurement (2020). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $995.7 million:
Procurement: $4,680.7 million:
Total funding: $5,914.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 14: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,956.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,171.3; 
Percent change: 11.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,475.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,680.7; 
Percent change: 4.6%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,501.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $7,067.3; 
Percent change: 8.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $406.372; 
Latest 09/2008: $441.709; 
Percent change: 8.7%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 16; 
Latest 09/2008: 16; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 97; 
Latest 09/2008: 98; 
Percent change: 1.0%. 

[End of table] 

While the JLENS program began with less technology knowledge than 
suggested by best practices, it is projected to enter production in 
2012 with mature technologies, a stable design, and proven production 
processes. The program began development in 2005 with one of its five 
critical technologies mature. The program expects all four of its 
technologies to be mature, but additional design work could be 
necessary as a result of testing and the expected inclusion of a new 
armor requirement. Twelve of the program's 15 critical manufacturing 
processes are currently in control and the program expects all 15 to 
be mature and stable by the start of production. The JLENS program's 
cost and schedule could be negatively affected by Army efforts to 
synchronize it with the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) 
program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 8/05; 
DOD design review: 12/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 1/12. 

[End of figure] 

JLENS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its 
five critical technologies mature. The program subsequently combined 
two of the critical technologies--the communications payload and the 
processing group--into the communications processing group. Two of the 
program's four current critical technologies are mature and the 
program office expects to demonstrate the fire control radar and 
surveillance radar in a realistic environment by late 2010. Many of 
the JLENS radar technologies have legacy components. However, key 
hardware, such as the surveillance radar's element measurement system 
that provides data for signal processing, have not been demonstrated 
in the size and weight needed for integration on the JLENS aerostat. 
In addition, sensor software items related to signal processing, 
timing, and control, as well as element measurement, are not yet 
mature. The program office is currently conducting tests to 
characterize and integrate the fire control radar and surveillance 
radar components in the program's system integration laboratory. 

Design Maturity: 

The JLENS program completed its design review in December 2008. Since 
then, the number of design drawings has grown by over 20 percent. The 
program has released 100 percent of the 7,573 engineering drawings, 
and the program office does not expect further drawing increases 
before production begins in 2012. Although the JLENS design appears 
stable, the potential for design changes remains until the maturity of 
JLENS components have been demonstrated. For example, the JLENS 
program continues to define, develop, and design the mobile mooring 
station used to anchor the aerostat during operations. Although the 
mobile station is based on a fixed mooring station design, the program 
has yet to demonstrate its mobility. The mobile mooring transport 
vehicle is still being designed and the program office expects the 
survivability requirements for the vehicle to change. This may require 
the program to add armor to the vehicle. According to program 
officials, the combined weight of the mooring station and an up-
armored vehicle would exceed the maximum allowed for roads in the 
United States and in a operational theater. 

Production Maturity: 

The JLENS program projects that it will enter production in January 
2012 with all 15 of its critical manufacturing processes mature and 
stable. According to the program office, 12 of the program's critical 
manufacturing processes are currently in control. 

Other Program Issues: 

The cost and schedule of the JLENS program could be negatively 
affected by the Army's IAMD program. The IAMD program is tasked with 
developing a standard set of interfaces between systems such as JLENS 
and other sensors, weapons, and the battle management, command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence components to 
provide a common air picture. As part of the IAMD strategy, the Army 
plans to extend the system development and demonstration phase of the 
JLENS program by approximately 12 months and delay low-rate initial 
production until fiscal year 2012. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: PMA 213 Program Executive Office. 

[End of figure] 

JPALS is a Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System-based 
system that will provide a rapidly deployable, adverse weather, 
adverse terrain, day-night precision approach and landing capability 
for all DOD ground and airborne systems. It is a Navy-led joint 
program with the Air Force and Army. The sea-based JPALS will replace 
the obsolete SPN-46 and SPN-35 systems. We assessed Increment 1A, 
which includes the development, integration, installation, and testing 
of the sea-based JPALS. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (7/08); 
Initial review (11/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review (11/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (2/13); 
Initial capability (12/14); 
Last procurement (2017). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $438.8 million:
Procurement: $208.0 million:
Total funding: $646.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 25: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $772.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $772.6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $208.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $208.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $987.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $987.3; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $26.684; 
Latest 09/2008: $26.684; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 37; 
Latest 09/2008: 37; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 75; 
Latest 09/2008: 77; 
Percent change: 2.7%. 

[End of table] 

Both of the JPALS critical technologies were approaching maturity at 
the start of system development and are expected to be mature by the 
program's low-rate production decision in 2013. JPALS is primarily a 
software development effort and does not currently have design 
drawings. However, leading up to the November 2010 critical design 
review, the program office is tracking requirements and weapon system 
specification changes to monitor design stability. As of January 2009, 
there were 361 requirements in the system performance specification--
an increase of 7 since development start. A second increment of JPALS, 
Increment 1B, for the F/A18E/F, EA-18G, and MH-60 will begin 
development in fiscal year 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 7/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 11/10; 
Production decision: 2/13. 

[End of figure] 

JPALS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Both of the JPALS critical technologies were approaching maturity at 
the start of system development in July 2008. According to the program 
office, the Geometry Extra-Redundant Almost Fixed Solution addresses 
errors associated with the system's Global Positioning System. The 
program office stated that the Vertical Protection Level/Lateral 
Protection Level calculates the protection level of the navigation 
system to ensure accurate aircraft landings, and is an existing 
technology used on fixed locations that now will be applied to moving 
ships. Program officials expect both technologies to be mature by 
production in 2013. 

Design Maturity: 

JPALS is primarily a software development effort and does not 
currently have design drawings. Prior to its November 2010 critical 
design review, the program is tracking requirements and weapon system 
specification changes to monitor design stability. As of January 2009, 
there were 361 requirements in the system performance specification--
an increase of 7 since the start of development. The program has not 
yet released any software. Program officials stated that they are 
still defining software requirements and that software coding has yet 
to begin. 

Although the program reported that it is currently on track to meet 
all its key performance parameters, officials noted one design risk 
that it is still working to address. Specifically, the shipboard 
system currently requires maintenance every 224 hours--well short of 
the required 590 hours, although repair times are approximately 25 
percent lower than required. Minimizing corrective maintenance 
activity on the JPALS system is key to minimizing system operating and 
maintenance manpower--a key performance parameter of the system. 
Program officials said that design changes may be needed if the 
antenna is moved to accommodate needed maintenance activities. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials plan to employ various techniques to assess 
production maturity, including tool design and fabrication metrics, as 
well as quarterly production assessment reviews. The program also 
expects to assess six functional areas: program management, 
engineering production and design, production engineering and 
planning, materials and purchase parts, industrial resources, and 
quality assurance. The program expects to receive approval to enter 
production in February 2013. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, the system development phase of the 
JPALS program was initially delayed by three months due to a bid 
protest of the development contract award. However, the protest was 
subsequently withdrawn and officials maintain that the overall cost 
and schedule of the program was not affected. Officials also reported 
that the program completed preliminary design review in December 2009 
and the independent panel found the technical baseline meets program 
requirements and is at the proper maturity to begin detailed design 
with no significant changes anticipated. 

The acquisition strategy separates the JPALS program into two 
increments. The second increment of JPALS, Increment 1B, will 
integrate the system with the avionics of the F/A18E/F, EA-18G, and MH-
60R. Increment 1B will begin development in fiscal year 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with this assessment and provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Strike Fighter: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] 

The JSF program will develop and field a family of stealthy strike 
fighter aircraft for the Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and U.S. 
allies, with the goal of maximizing commonality to minimize costs. The 
carrier-suitable variant will complement the Navy's F/A-18E/F. The 
conventional takeoff and landing variant will primarily be an air-to- 
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and A-10 aircraft, and 
will complement the F-22A. The short takeoff and vertical landing 
variant will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

Concept: 
Program start (11/96). 

System development: 
Development start (10/01); 
Design review (6/08); 
Low-rate decision (6/07). 

Low-rate Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability USMC (3/12). 

Full Production: 
Initial capability USAF (3/13); 
Initial capability USN (3/15); 
Last procurement (2034). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7061.7 million:
Procurement: $192,093.9 million:
Total funding: $199,499.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,413: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $38,022.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $47,309.5; 
Percent change: 24.4%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $168,687.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $199,412.8; 
Percent change: 18.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $208,475.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $247,221.3; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $72.741; 
Latest 09/2008: $101.196; 
Percent change: 39.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 2,866; 
Latest 09/2008: 2,443; 
Percent change: -14.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 116; 
Latest 09/2008: 137; 
Percent change: 18.1%. 

[End of table] 

The JSF program has not demonstrated key knowledge by critical points 
in the acquisition process. Program officials report that all eight 
critical technologies are mature; however, development risks remain on 
two technologies. Officials also report that more than 99 percent of 
the expected engineering drawings have been released, but the number 
of drawings continues to grow and the design has not been proven. The 
program collects data to monitor its critical manufacturing processes, 
but only a small percentage of them are in control. In addition, a 
fully integrated, capable aircraft will not begin flight testing until 
2012, increasing the likelihood of costly redesign and retrofit. In 
October 2009, an independent cost estimating team reported that the 
program has made little progress over the past year and will need more 
time and money to finish development. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 10/01; 
DOD design review: 2/06 and 6/07; 
Production start: 6/07; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JSF program entered system development with none of its eight 
critical technologies fully mature. While the program office currently 
reports that all eight technologies are mature, significant 
development risks still remain on two technologies--mission systems 
integration and the prognostics and health management system. Full 
mission systems integration will not be demonstrated on an F-35 test 
aircraft until 2012. In addition, a 2009 operational assessment by the 
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center reported that the 
prognostics and health management technology was immature. With an 
immature prognostics and health management system, maintainers may not 
be able to correctly diagnose and repair aircraft faults in a timely 
manner resulting in reduced aircraft usage and higher support costs. 

Design Maturity: 

The JSF program did not have a stable design at its critical design 
review. Since then, it has released over 99 percent of the expected 
engineering drawings; however, the design is still not proven. The 
program continues to experience numerous design changes as system 
development and manufacturing progresses. Design changes to the 
turbine blades, electrical ice protection, and fuel pump systems on 
the F-135 engine have contributed to contract cost increases of more 
than $800 million. 

Production Maturity: 

Despite beginning production in 2006 and procuring 28 aircraft to 
date, the JSF program's manufacturing processes are still not mature. 
While the program collects information on the maturity of its 
manufacturing processes--a good practice--only 12.5 percent of its 
critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control. Ongoing 
design issues and subsequent supplier problems have led to late part 
deliveries and manufacturing inefficiencies from which the program is 
still recovering. The contractor has restructured the manufacturing 
schedule three times, significantly delaying deliveries to the test 
program and raising questions about its ability to meet planned 
production schedules. Projected labor hours still exceed early 
projections and out-of-station work, which is carried forward from its 
designated station and completed at a different station down the 
production line, continues. Officials do not expect inefficiencies to 
be corrected until 2010, during the third low rate production lot. 

Delays in delivering development test aircraft have led to worsening 
flight test delays. As of December 2009, only 4 out of a planned 13 
development test aircraft had flown and developmental flight testing 
is still only about 3 percent complete. In addition, a fully 
integrated, capable aircraft is not expected to enter flight testing 
until 2012, increasing the risk of late design and production changes 
and the likelihood that retrofits will be required. 

Other Program Issues: 

An updated independent cost estimate, completed in October 2009, 
reported that significantly more time and money would be needed to 
complete system development. Current contractor engineer staff levels 
are higher than predicted by the program office and the independent 
cost team last year. Manufacturing inefficiencies have seen little 
improvement and the late delivery of flight test aircraft continues. 
In addition, while the JSF program is producing software at higher 
rates than past programs, the overall software effort is behind 
schedule and some of the program's most challenging software 
integration efforts are yet to come. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program noted that the JSF's technical, software, production 
processes, and testing maturation are tracking to plan and 
substantially exceed standards set in past programs. While production 
of initial test jets has taken longer than planned, the manufacturing 
fit and quality are unprecedented and production processes are 
improving with each jet. The aircraft's design is 100 percent 
complete. By the completion of the fourth low-rate initial production 
lot, thousands of flight-test hours will be complete. Thus far, 
laboratory models have strongly correlated to actual flight test data. 
Software development is 80 percent complete (over 14 million lines) in 
accordance with the spiral development plan and with record-setting 
code-writing efficiencies. Systems integration testing continues on 
schedule through the use of flight tests, a flying lab, and over 
150,000 hours of ground lab testing. A fully integrated mission 
systems jet is scheduled to fly in 2010. The program is on track to 
start training operations at Eglin AFB, Florida, in late summer 2010. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: 2 illustrations] 

Source: JTRS AMF Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A joint program executive office provides a 
central acquisition authority that cuts across the military services. 
Program and product offices develop hardware and software for users 
with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios and 
associated equipment for integration into nearly 160 different types 
of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations. 

Technology/system development: 
Development start (3/08); 
Design review (10/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Production decision (11/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Corp.
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,319.5 million:
Procurement: $6,129.8 million:
Total funding: $7,449.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 26,878: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,968.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $6,129.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $8,098.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $.299; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 27,102; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The program office reported quantities in terms of channels rather 
than radios. The program is developing a 2-channel small airborne 
radio and a 4-channel maritime/fixed station radio. 

According to an independent technology readiness assessment, the JTRS 
AMF program began system development in March 2008 with all five 
critical technologies nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. The JTRS AMF design appears stable with nearly 94 percent 
of the total expected drawings releasable when the program began its 
design review process in October 2009. Each of the AMF variants will 
undergo initial operational test and evaluation after the program's 
low-rate initial production decision. Testing of the small airborne 
variant is scheduled from October 2012 to December 2013 and testing of 
the maritime/fixed-station variant is scheduled from May 2013 to March 
2014. JTRS AMF quantities could change depending on the Navy and 
Marine Corps' strategy for acquiring networking capabilities. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 3/08; 
DOD design review: 10/09; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 11/11. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS AMF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

DOD certified the JTRS AMF program for entry into system development 
in March 2008 with all five critical technologies nearing maturity and 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Prior to the start of system 
development, the JTRS AMF program took steps to develop key product 
knowledge. In 2004, the program awarded competitive system design 
contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin to 
help mitigate technical risks and address key integration challenges. 
Program officials noted that another independent assessment of 
critical technologies will be performed in preparation for the small 
airborne variant low-rate initial production milestone of November 
2011. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology has 
expressed concern about four waveforms and network management services 
technologies being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain 
program, on which JTRS AMF is dependent. To address this concern, the 
Under Secretary recommended that the JTRS joint program executive 
office conduct an independent technical assessment of the Network 
Enterprise Domain's waveforms, networking, and network management 
approaches. The Under Secretary also recommended that a similar 
assessment be conducted on the Mobile User Objective System waveforms 
and network management software to demonstrate their maturity before 
being inserted into the JTRS AMF program. According to program 
officials, these recommendations will be implemented by the JTRS 
Network Enterprise Domain program in future technical evaluations. 

Design Maturity: 

The JTRS AMF design appears stable. According to program officials, 
nearly 94 percent of the total expected drawings were releasable by 
the October 2009 design review. The results of the design review are 
scheduled for release in early 2010. While the design appears stable, 
JTRS AMF's ability to demonstrate that the system meets its 
performance requirements is dependent on waveforms and network 
management services from the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program. 
Each of the JTRS AMF variants will undergo initial operational test 
and evaluation after the program's low-rate initial production 
decision. Testing of the small airborne variant is scheduled from 
October 2012 to December 2013 and testing of the maritime/fixed-
station variant is scheduled from May 2013 to March 2014. 

Other Program Issues: 

Updated draft fielding plans are expected from the services in fiscal 
year 2010, and the updated fielding plans will require the preparation 
of updated Joint Programming Guidance from the Office of the Director, 
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to be finalized. JTRS AMF 
quantities could change depending on the Navy and Marine Corps' 
strategy for acquiring networking capabilities. The total planned 
procurement of small airborne radios is 8,641. The Army and Air Force 
plan to buy 5,664 and 2,977 small airborne radios, respectively. 
However, a March 2008 JTRS AMF acquisition decision memorandum stated 
that neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps have a requirement for the 
small airborne JTRS AMF radio. The lack of a requirement indicates 
that the Navy and Marine Corps plan to rely on the ARC-210 radio for 
their airborne communications needs. While the ARC-210 radio is being 
upgraded, it will not have the waveforms for air-to-air and air-to- 
ground data networking. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the JTRS joint 
program executive office, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Networks and Information Integration (NII), along with the 
Joint Staff and military services, to assess issues and options 
related to replacing currently fielded ARC-210 radios with JTRS AMF 
capabilities. According to an NII official, this assessment has not 
been initiated. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred 
with our findings and offered technical comments for our 
consideration. We incorporated the technical comments where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: JPEO JTRS. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with selected radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. The JTRS GMR program is developing radios for 
ground vehicles. JTRS GMR depends on waveforms being developed by the 
JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program, and shares interdependencies 
with the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit program as well as the 
JTRS Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station program. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/97). 

System development: 
Development start (6/02); 
Design review (12/07); 
New acquisition program baseline (1/08); 
Program rebaseline directed (9/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Production decision (2/11); 
Initial capability (11/12). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: The Boeing Company:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $994.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,693.0; 
Percent change: 70.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $16,000.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $14,449.0; 
Percent change: -9.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $16,994.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $16,142.0; 
Percent change: -5.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $.157; 
Latest 09/2008: $.186; 
Percent change: 18.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 108,388; 
Latest 09/2008: 86,643; 
Percent change: -20.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 55; 
Latest 09/2008: 114; 
Percent change: 107.3. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS GMR program began system development in 2002 with none of its 
20 critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. The program expects that all JTRS GMR critical 
technologies will be mature, its design will be stable, and most of 
its production processes will be in control by its expected February 
2011 production decision. The cost and quantities of the JTRS GMR 
program are in flux. In September 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the program to 
revise its acquisition program baseline and update its cost estimate. 
However, as of October 2009, a new baseline had not been approved. In 
addition, changes to the Army's Future Combat System could 
substantially affect the program, as over 99 percent of the program's 
anticipated 86,512 production units are expected to go to the Army. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/02; 
DOD design review: 12/07; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 2/11. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS GMR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of 
its 20 critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. Twelve of JTRS GMR's 20 critical technologies are now 
mature, 7 are nearing maturity, and 1 is still immature. The immature 
critical technology--bridging/retransmission software--is to be 
evaluated in a realistic environment during the second phase of 
production qualification testing (PQT), which began in December 2009. 
The program expects all JTRS GMR critical technologies to be mature 
before its February 2011 production decision. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the JTRS GMR appears stable. However, the potential for 
design changes remains because all of the program's critical 
technologies have not been demonstrated in a realistic environment. 
The program held its critical design review in December 2007 and 
reported that all its design drawings were releasable at that time. 
The JTRS GMR prime contractor also tracks requirements volatility for 
hardware and software items as a measure of design stability. Program 
officials stated that requirements volatility has not exceeded the 
program's 5 percent goal during the period it has been tracked. 

Production Maturity: 

The JTRS GMR program has reported that 27 of its 35 critical 
manufacturing processes will be in statistical control by the 
program's low-rate production decision in February 2011. The 
identification of critical manufacturing processes is a key initial 
step to ensuring production elements are stable. However, by not 
having all processes in statistical control at production start, there 
is a greater risk that the radio will not be produced within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets. The JTRS GMR program has delivered 32 
engineering development model (EDM) sets for use in PQT, and program 
officials consider these EDMs to be production representative. 

Other Program Issues: 

The cost and quantities of the JTRS GMR program are in flux. In April 
2009, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to significantly 
restructure the Future Combat System program. The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics terminated the 
existing manned ground combat vehicle development program and the Army 
is now proceeding with plans to assess potential materiel solutions 
for a new ground combat vehicle program. Changes to the Future Combat 
System program could substantially affect JTRS GMR, as over 99 percent 
of the JTRS GMR's anticipated 86,512 production units are expected to 
go to the Army. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics completed a review of the 
overall JTRS program and directed the JTRS GMR program manager to 
update the program's cost estimate and revise its acquisition program 
baseline. As of October 2009, a new baseline had not been approved. 
According to program officials, estimated JTRS GMR program costs have 
decreased overall due to lower than projected production costs. 
Program officials stated that expected quantities have not changed, 
nor has the expected mix of two-, three-, and four-channel radios to 
be procured. Current program office estimates of total research and 
development costs are $279 million higher than last year's estimates. 
However, the testing schedule has slipped 3 months and the program's 
production decision has been delayed until February 2011. The Army's 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) program used three GMR engineering 
development models and seven pre-engineering development models to 
support the Early IBCT LUT in August 2009. According to DOD's 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the LUT assessment 
indicated operational reliability issues and poor performance from the 
JTRS GMR subsystem. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2009 General Dynamics. 

[End of figure] 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. JTRS HMS is developing handheld, manpack, and 
small form fit radios. The program has two concurrent phases of 
development. Phase 1 includes handheld and small form fit radios for 
use in an unclassified security domain. Phase 2 consists of the 
manpack, handheld, and small form fit radios for use in a classified 
security domain. We assessed Phase 1 and made observations on Phase 2. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (4/04); 
Design review Phase I (3/08); 
Design review Phase II (9/09); 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Low-rate decision Rifleman Radio (8/10); 
Low-rate decision Manpack (2/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $167.8 million:
Procurement: $2,526.7 million:
Total funding: $2,694.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 215,551: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $531.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $844.4; 
Percent change: 58.9%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $9,259.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,526.7; 
Percent change: -72.7%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $9,790.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,371.1; 
Percent change: -65.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $.030; 
Latest 09/2008: $.016; 
Percent change: -47.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 329,574; 
Latest 09/2008: 215,961; 
Percent change: -34.5%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 85; 
Latest 09/2008: 99; 
Percent change: 16.5%. 

Total quantities include the Army's requirement for 120,000 Rifleman 
Radio units. 

[End of table] 

The two JTRS HMS Phase 1 critical technologies are nearing maturity 
and have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The program 
expects to formally identify critical technologies for Phase 2 by the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2010. The program has completed design 
reviews for both phases, although neither design is stable. Designing 
the Phase 2 two-channel handheld radio to meet size, weight, power, 
and thermal requirements continues to be a challenge. Development of 
this radio has been on hold since September 2008 pending an assessment 
of alternatives. The key networking waveform for the HMS program, the 
Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), recently completed a formal 
qualification test, and according to the program office, the full 
version of the waveform will be used in the Rifleman radio. According 
to the program office, the one JTRS HMS critical manufacturing process 
is in control. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 4/04; 
DOD design review: 3/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 8/10. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS HMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS HMS program started system development in 2004 with only one 
of its six critical technologies mature. In 2006, the program was 
restructured to include two concurrent phases of development. Phase 1, 
which intends to maximize the use of commercial off the shelf 
components and products, includes two critical technologies--logical 
partitioning and software power management. The program completed an 
independent technology assessment in September 2009, which determined 
these technologies were nearing maturity and had been demonstrated in 
a relevant environment. In addition, the program is developing the 
single channel Rifleman Radio in Phase 1 to meet operational 
requirements. This radio will utilize the SRW waveform, which was 
developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program office to 
support protected communications within fire teams and squads. 

The JTRS HMS program expects that critical technologies for Phase 2, 
which includes the security-enhanced handheld and manpack variants, 
will be formally identified by the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. 
The development of the Phase 2 two-channel handheld radio continues to 
pose a significant risk for the program. The risk stems from trying to 
meet size, weight, power, and thermal requirements with current 
technologies. In September 2008, DOD halted the development of the two-
channel handheld radio to assess the viability of the radio, as well 
as other alternatives. Development of the two-channel handheld radio 
remains on hold. 

Design Maturity: 

Neither Phase 1 nor Phase 2 designs were stable at their respective 
design reviews in March 2008 and September 2009. In the last year, the 
number of Phase I design drawings has increased by 169 due to the 
development of the Rifleman Radio. The number of Phase 2 design 
drawings has increased by over 750 due in part to the added 
requirement to utilize the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 
waveform with the manpack radio. The number of drawings for Phase 2 
will increase again to include the two-channel handheld radio, if its 
development is allowed to continue. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, the one JTRS HMS critical 
manufacturing process is mature and in control. Last year, the program 
identified 24 critical manufacturing processes. The program office 
explained that the reduction was due to changes in the content of the 
program and the elimination of key hardware that is no longer 
manufactured by the prime contractor. In addition, the program office 
stated that the maturity of JTRS HMS manufacturing processes has been 
steadily increasing, so processes once deemed critical are now 
considered either key or standard processes. The JTRS HMS program will 
utilize visual inspections and testing to assess the maturity of these 
processes. In addition, according to the program office, all JTRS HMS 
production processes are equivalent to processes already implemented 
successfully on other programs. 

Other Program Issues: 

JTRS HMS quantities have increased by 120,000 radios, due to the 
Army's new requirement for the Rifleman Radio. The addition of a 
significant number of Rifleman Radios to the program will make it 
appear as if the overall JTRS HMS unit cost has decreased. As we have 
previously reported, the unit cost for the HMS program varies 
significantly by radio from an estimated $4,500 for the Rifleman Radio 
including ancillaries to about $55,000 for the manpack radio. 

Program Office Comments: 

Program officials noted that the Rifleman radio's Low Rate Initial 
Decision was delayed by 9 months in order to demonstrate the 
correction of performance deficiencies identified in a Limited User 
Test that occurred in fiscal year 2009. In addition, the program 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Network Enterprise Domain Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides 
central acquisition authority. The Network Enterprise Domain (NED) is 
responsible for the development of products or software applications 
that will operate on the JTRS variants. We assessed the Wideband 
Networking Waveform (WNW) and Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), which 
provide key advanced networking capability. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/02). 

Formal qualification test: 
SRW (1/09); 
WNW (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
MUOS (2/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Various:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $557.0 million:
Procurement: NA:
Total funding: $557.0 million:
Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $956.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,018.7; 
Percent change: 111.0%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $956.9; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,018.7; 
Percent change: 111.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS NED program is responsible for the development of legacy and 
networking waveforms and Network Enterprise Services for JTRS radios. 
The one critical technology for both WNW and SRW--the Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networking--is expected to be fully mature by August 2010. Since NED 
is a software development effort, it does not have design drawings. 
Instead, program officials assess waveform design stability using 
software metrics. Officials reported low requirements and design 
volatility for both waveforms. In the past year, the program office 
reported progress in developing and testing both waveforms. SRW passed 
its formal qualification test in January 2009, and WNW's formal 
qualification test was completed in December 2009. However, the 
results of the 30-node test conducted in 2009 with the JTRS Ground 
Mobile Radios and WNW were mixed. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/02; 
DOD design review: 12/07; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 8/10. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS NED Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS NED program began development in 2002 with the one critical 
technology for both WNW and SRW--Mobile Ad Hoc Networking--immature. 
This technology is currently nearing maturity and is expected to be 
fully mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment by August 
2010. JTRS NED is a software development effort and the major 
milestones are formal qualification tests. SRW passed its formal 
qualification test (FQT) in January 2009. WNW formal qualification 
testing was successfully completed in December 2009--6 months later 
than planned. According to the program office, WNW formal 
qualification testing was delayed to allow for the correction of 
software deficiencies, as well as full integration testing with a 
suitable JTRS GMR engineering development model and operating 
environment. 

Design Maturity: 

We could not assess design stability because the JTRS NED is a 
software development effort and does not have design drawings. 
Instead, program officials indicated that waveform design stability 
and maturity are evaluated using metrics such as waveform requirements 
and design volatility, software lines of code, and software defect 
reports. The NED program office has reported that since December 2007, 
the waveforms show less than 5 percent requirements volatility and 
less than 1 percent design volatility. In addition, the program has 
reported maintaining a steady closure rate for software defects for 
the WNW. 

Other Program Issues: 

As directed in a September 2008 acquisition decision memorandum, the 
JTRS Joint Program Executive Office completed a 30-node field test of 
the WNW and JTRS Ground Mobile Radio in May 2009. DOD's Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation concluded that the initial assessment 
of the test indicates that the preproduction WNW hosted on a JTRS 
Ground Mobile Radio preliminary engineering development model (Pre-EDM 
GMR) could scale to a network of 30 nodes, yet performed poorly in the 
areas of throughput and message completion rate. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the program office, NED completed a 30-node field test of 
the WNW Network Manager and WNW using Pre-EDM GMRs in May 2009. The 
WNW network exhibited practical scalability to 30 nodes in an 
operationally relevant network topology and provided a tactically 
useful networking capability in an operationally relevant suburban 
environment. Convergence was achieved at all networking layers, 
transporting three different protocols of red-side user traffic. 
Several software updates were implemented to the WNW code, 
successfully demonstrating the ability to enhance networking 
capability while deployed. Performance data collected were analyzed to 
develop enhanced WNW networking algorithm updates, which were 
integrated into the final WNW software version that completed FQT in 
December 2009. This final WNW baseline software version improved 
performance on GMR Engineering Development Model hardware during the 
FQT. Program office technical comments were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Mutifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio 
System (MIDS-JTRS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: MIDS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

DOD's MIDS-JTRS program is intended to transform the existing MIDS Low 
Volume Terminal--a jam-resistant, secure voice and data information 
distribution system--into a 4-channel, programmable JTRS-compliant 
radio that will be used in aircraft, ships, and ground stations across 
the military services. We assessed the development of the MIDS-JTRS 
core terminal and made observations on the status of the planned JTRS 
platform capability package, which includes an airborne networking 
waveform being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start--core terminal (12/04); 
Design review--core terminal (4/06). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision--core terminal (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability--core terminal (12/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Data Link Solutions, ViaSat:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $18.2 million:
Procurement: $129.7 million:
Total funding: $147.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 179: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $304.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $491.3; 
Percent change: 61.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $216.2; 
Percent change: 100.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $304.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $707.5; 
Percent change: 132.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $9.500; 
Latest 09/2008: $2.033; 
Percent change: -78.6%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 32; 
Latest 09/2008: 348; 
Percent change: 987.5%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 50; 
Latest 09/2008: 69; 
Percent change: 38.0%. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the MIDS-JTRS core terminal had its 
critical technologies mature, its design stable, and its production 
processes in control when it entered limited production and fielding 
in December 2009. In the past year, the production decision was 
delayed 9 months due primarily to issues in meeting first article 
qualification testing requirements. Core terminal development models 
have been integrated into F/A-18E/F aircraft and are undergoing 
testing in an operational environment to support the limited 
production and fielding decision. MIDS-JTRS airborne networking 
waveform development remains on hold. In September 2007, the JTRS 
Board of Directors suspended the design, development, fabrication, and 
testing of the JTRS platform capability package pending a 
determination of whether there were enough potential users among the 
military services to support this effort. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 12/04; 
DOD design review: 4/06; 
Production decision: 12/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

MIDS JTRS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The MIDS-JTRS program entered system development with four critical 
technologies for the core terminal--Link-16 waveform software, Link-16 
architectural design, operating environment, and programmable crypto 
module--that were immature and had only been demonstrated in a lab 
environment. Unanticipated complexity in integrating these subsystems 
has caused program schedule delays. According to program officials, 
the program has been demonstrating the terminal's capabilities in an 
operational environment and was expected to demonstrate the maturity 
of the critical technologies by the limited production and fielding 
decision in December 2009. 

Design Maturity: 

According to program officials, the core terminal's design is stable. 
Design, integration, and testing challenges have caused delays at 
several points in the program. The core terminal faced challenges in 
meeting National Security Agency security requirements. Though it 
received National Security Agency design concurrence and over-the-air 
approval in an F/A-18E/F aircraft, understanding and implementing 
information security criteria caused changes in security design. The 
effects of the design changes were not adequately scoped into the 
integration schedule, which contributed to delays in the program's 
production decision. NSA has approved the security verification 
testing report for the latest build, but the final build will require 
additional testing. In the past year, the production decision was 
delayed another 9 months due primarily to issues with vendors' ability 
to meet first article qualification testing requirements. Production 
Verification terminals are on loan to the government to support 
developmental and operational testing until purchased terminals are 
delivered. 

Production Maturity: 

The MIDS-JTRS program has demonstrated that its two critical 
manufacturing processes are mature. Program officials stated that 
production maturity is high because the core terminal is a form, fit, 
and function replacement for the MIDS Low Volume Terminal (LVT) and 
the manufacturing processes are the same as those previously employed. 

Other Program Issues: 

In June 2008, after the MIDS-JTRS program experienced cost growth and 
continuous schedule delays, a cost cap agreement with incentives was 
negotiated between the government and MIDS contractors to reduce the 
government's cost risk to complete the core terminal program. 
According to DOD, the program's schedule and cost are holding within 
the agreed cost cap. A new acquisition program baseline will be 
approved with the MIDS-JTRS low-rate limited production decision. 
According to the program office, the MIDS Program, which includes MIDS-
LVT and MIDS-JTRS variants, will be tracked as a single program in the 
baseline, but the baseline will identify the MIDS-JTRS variant cost 
data independently from the MIDS-LVT variant in the unit cost memo 
section. Program officials estimated that the unit cost for a JTRS 
terminal during limited production and fielding will be $234,500 
higher than the LVT ($425,000 vs. $190,500), but they expect the cost 
to decrease during full rate production as a result of competition as 
was the case for the LVT terminal. 

MIDS-JTRS airborne networking waveform development has still not been 
authorized. In September 2007, the JTRS Board of Directors suspended 
the design, development, fabrication, and testing of the JTRS platform 
capability package, pending a determination from Joint Staff and 
Services on the requirements for the future advanced airborne tactical 
data link. This suspension remains in effect. Further, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and 
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, co-chaired a study of 
airborne networking waveforms for integration into the MIDS-JTRS. This 
study was completed in the fall of 2009. The program office indicates 
that studies are ongoing to recommend a waveform for integration into 
the MIDS JTRS terminal. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the MIDS-JTRS program 
office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Sources: Lockheed Martin (left); General Dynamics (right). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, 
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of 
the ship itself, or seaframe, and the mission package it deploys. The 
Navy plans to construct the first four seaframes in two unique 
designs, then select one design for the remainder of the class. The 
first seaframe (LCS 1) was delivered in September 2008 with the second 
seaframe (LCS 2) following in December 2009. We assessed both 
seaframes. See pages 97-98 for an assessment of LCS mission packages. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/02). 

System development: 
Development start (6/04); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
Production decision--1st design (12/04); 
Production decision--2nd design (10/05); 
First ship delivery (9/08); 
Second ship delivery (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability (7/12). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $865.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,329.2; 
Percent change: 169.2%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $460.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,784.3; 
Percent change: 505.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,325.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,113.4; 
Percent change: 285.9%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $331.296; 
Latest 09/2008: $730.489; 
Percent change: 120.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 4; 
Latest 09/2008: 7; 
Percent change: 75.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 41; 
Latest 09/2008: 98; 
Percent change: 139.0%. 

Baseline estimates above are for seaframe-related costs only. Research 
and development funding includes detail design and construction of two 
ships. 

[End of table] 

Seventeen of 19 critical technologies for the LCS seaframes are mature 
and have been demonstrated in a realistic environment. For LCS 2, the 
trimaran hull and aluminum structure are both nearing maturity. The 
Navy could not provide data on design completion for either LCS 1 or 
LCS 2. The Navy identified watercraft launch and recovery as a major 
risk for both designs. Acceptance trials for LCS 1 showed it may not 
meet stability requirements if critically damaged. To increase LCS 1 
buoyancy, the Navy added internal and external tanks. Challenges for 
LCS 2 include completing required endurance testing of the main 
propulsion diesel engines and addressing pitting and corrosion in the 
waterjets. The Navy modified its acquisition strategy for future 
seaframes. After selecting one design, the Navy plans to award 
contracts for the next 10 ships in fiscal year 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Contract award: 12/04; 
Lead ship fabrication: 2/05; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Seventeen of 19 critical technologies for both LCS designs are mature. 
For LCS 2, the trimaran hull and aluminum structure are nearing 
maturity. The Navy identified watercraft launch and recovery--
essential to complete the LCS antisubmarine warfare and mine 
countermeasures missions--as a major risk to both seaframe designs. 
Watercraft launch and recovery systems have not been fully 
demonstrated for either seaframe. On the LCS 1, the Navy is conducting 
dynamic load testing, but integration with the Remote Multi-Mission 
Vehicle--a physically stressing system to launch and recover--is not 
scheduled to occur until after the ship's shakedown cruise. For LCS 2, 
factory testing of the twin boom extensible crane revealed performance 
and reliability concerns that were not fully addressed prior to 
installation. In addition, program officials report the LCS 2 main 
propulsion diesel engines have not completed a required endurance 
test, in part due to corrosion in each engine's intake valves. As an 
interim solution, the Navy has installed new intake valves, which 
enabled the ship to complete acceptance trials. LCS 2 has also 
experienced pitting and corrosion in its waterjet tunnels. The Navy 
has temporarily fixed the issue and plans to make weld repairs to 
pitted areas during a future dry dock availability. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

The Navy could not provide data on completion of basic and functional 
drawings--a metric of design stability--at the start of LCS 1 and LCS 
2 construction. The Navy used a concurrent design-build strategy for 
the two seaframes, which proved unsuccessful. Implementation of new 
design guidelines, delays in major equipment deliveries, and strong 
focus on achieving schedule and performance goals resulted in 
increased construction costs. LCS 1 and LCS 2 still require design 
changes as a result of maturing key systems. At the same time, 
shipbuilders are constructing modules for the next two ships, LCS 3 
and LCS 4. At fabrication start for each ship, approximately 69 
percent (LCS 3) and 57 percent (LCS 4) of basic and functional 
drawings were complete. Starting construction before drawings are 
complete could result in costly out-of-sequence work and rework to 
incorporate new design attributes. Incomplete designs at construction 
also led to weight increases for LCS 1 and LCS 2. According to the 
Navy, this weight growth contributed to a higher than desired center 
of gravity on LCS 1 that degraded the stability of that seaframe. 
Acceptance trials showed LCS 1 may not meet Navy stability 
requirements in a damaged condition. In response, the Navy added 
internal and external buoyancy tanks. For LCS 3, the contractor has 
incorporated a design change to extend the transom by four meters to 
improve stability. 

Other Program Issues: 

In an effort to improve affordability in the LCS program, the Navy 
modified its acquisition strategy for future seaframes. The new 
strategy calls for selecting one seaframe design and awarding one 
prime contractor and shipyard a fixed-price incentive contract for 
construction of up to 10 ships between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal 
year 2014. Navy officials report that the earned value management 
systems (EVMS) in each of the LCS shipyards do not yet meet Defense 
Contract Management Agency requirements. Under the terms of the LCS 3 
and LCS 4 contracts, the shipyards must achieve EVMS certification 
within 28 months from the date of the award. Until those requirements 
are met, cost and schedule data reported by the prime contractors 
cannot be considered fully reliable. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the Navy, the LCS program continues to deliver vital 
capability with the recent commissioning of LCS 2. The Navy stated 
that LCS 1 now meets the damage stability requirement with the 
addition of external tanks on the rear of the ship. The shipbuilder 
incorporated additional stability improvements to the design for LCS 
3. In the continuing effort to ensure the delivery of affordable LCS 
capability, the Navy said it revised the acquisition strategy in 2009 
to down select to a single design in fiscal year 2010 and procure up 
to 10 ships in a block buy. The winner of this competition will also 
be responsible for developing a technical data package to support 
competition for a second shipbuilder to build up to 5 ships in fiscal 
year 2012-2014. Construction continues on LCS 3 and LCS 4. To address 
corrosion of the waterjet tunnels, the Navy stated that electrical 
isolation of propulsion shafts from the waterjets is being 
incorporated and a plan is in place to renew the corroded metal in the 
waterjet intake tunnels. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will perform mine 
countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare missions 
using modular mission packages. Packages include weapons and sensors 
that operate from MH-60 helicopters or unmanned underwater, aerial, or 
surface vehicles. Initial packages are partially capable. They include 
engineering development models and some, but not all, systems planned. 
Mission capability improves with each package delivered until it 
reaches a baseline capability of production-representative systems. 

Concept: 
LCS program start (5/04). 

System development: 
First MCM delivery (9/07); 
First SUW delivery (7/08); 
First ASW delivery (9/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Milestone B-LCS (5/10); 
Initial capability MCM (2013); 
Initial capability SUW (2013). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation, Integrated Systems:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $479.7; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,179.1; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,658.8; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $57.169; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 64; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The Navy has accepted delivery of partially capable Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Antisubmarine 
Warfare (ASW) mission packages. Overall, operation of the MCM, SUW, 
and ASW packages requires a total of 22 critical technologies, 
including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 5 weapons. Most of these 
technologies are mature; however, some mission systems have 
experienced test failures and have not demonstrated the ability to 
meet requirements or provide the capability needed. Individual mission 
systems in the MCM and ASW packages do not meet reliability 
requirements and the ASW package as configured does not provide 
sufficient capability to meet the range of threats. The mission 
package acquisition and testing strategies are also in flux due to 
changes in the LCS program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Production decision: NA; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

LCS Modules Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages on the LCS requires a 
total of 22 critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, 
and 5 weapons. Of these technologies, 16 are mature and have been 
demonstrated in a realistic environment. In the past year, the Navy 
removed three critical technologies from LCS mission modules due to 
changes in future ASW packages. 

The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially capable MCM mission 
packages; however, the program has delayed the procurement of the 
fiscal year 2009-funded package due to technical issues and the 
resulting operational test delays. Four MCM systems--the Unmanned 
Surface Vehicle (USV), Unmanned Sweep System (USS), Organic Airborne 
and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS), and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System (RAMICS)--have not yet been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment, and two others--the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 
(ALMDS) and Remote Minehunting System (RMS)--cannot meet system 
requirements. ALMDS has been unable to meet its mine detection 
requirements at its maximum depth or its mine detection and 
classification requirements at surface depths. RMS demonstrated poor 
system reliability, availability, and maintainability in a September 
2008 operational assessment, and program officials report the system 
is currently undergoing a series of tests to try to improve its 
reliability. Program officials also reported that the cable used to 
tow certain airborne MCM systems had to be redesigned following test 
failures with two systems. 

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable SUW mission 
package in July 2008. This package included two engineering 
development models for the 30 mm gun, but did not include the Non-Line-
of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) launcher or missiles. Integration of 
the gun with LCS 1 was completed in January 2009. The gun module 
design appears stable with 100 percent of its drawings released to 
manufacturing. According to program officials, NLOS-LS was tested in 
August 2009, but was unable to fire due to a malfunctioning sensor and 
battery connector. The program expects delivery of the second SUW 
mission package in March 2010. It will include the 30 mm gun module 
and the NLOS-LS launcher, but no missiles. 

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission 
package in September 2008, but plans to reconfigure the content of 
future packages before procuring additional quantities. According to 
Navy officials, recent warfighting analyses showed that the baseline 
ASW package did not provide sufficient capability to meet the range of 
threats. The current package will undergo developmental testing and 
the results will inform future configuration decisions. The first 
package underwent end-to-end testing in April 2009 and will undergo 
developmental testing in fiscal year 2010. During the 2009 end-to-end 
test, the Navy found that the USV and its associated sensors will 
require reliability and interface improvements to support sustained 
undersea warfare. 

Other Program Issues: 

Recent changes to the LCS seaframe acquisition strategy may 
necessitate changes to the LCS mission module acquisition strategy and 
testing plans. For example, the new seaframe strategy calls for the 
program to select a single design in fiscal year 2010. According to 
program officials, the first mission modules will still be tested on 
both seaframe designs, but future mission modules could be tested on 
one or both seaframe designs. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Navy stated that early packages will be delivered with partial 
capability, with systems added to the packages as they reach the level 
of maturity necessary for fielding. According to the Navy, the USV, 
USS, OASIS, and RAMICS have not entered production or been 
demonstrated in an operational environment. However, ALMDS and RMS 
have to date achieved a majority of their key performance 
requirements. The Navy stated these systems will be available in time 
to support planned retirement of legacy MCM forces. According to the 
Navy, it has initiated a program to address RMS reliability. The Navy 
noted that the program recently declared a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost 
breach and is under review by the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). Further, the Navy stated it has 
resolved technical issues related to the helicopter tow cable and the 
associated systems are ready to resume testing, while mission package 
acquisition and testing strategies have been updated to reflect 
seaframe acquisition strategy changes. 

[End of section] 

LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: LHA-6 Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's LHA 6 will replace the aging LHA 1 Tarawa-class amphibious 
assault ships. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the LHD 8 amphibious 
assault ship, which was commissioned in October 2009. The LHA 6 
features enhanced aviation capabilities and is designed to support all 
Marine aviation assets in the Expeditionary Strike Group, including 
the V-22 Osprey and the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. Construction of 
the LHA 6 began in December 2008 with delivery scheduled for April 
2013. 

Concept: 
Program start (7/01). 

System development: 
Contract award (6/07); 

Production: 
Construction start (12/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Ship delivery (4/13); 
Initial capability (10/14). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems:
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $215.5; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,886.5; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,102.0; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,101.960; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1; 
Latest 09/2008: 1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 146; 
Latest 09/2008: 159; 
Percent change: 8.9%. 

[End of table] 

The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with mature 
technologies, but an incomplete design. The LHA 6 began construction 
with 65 percent of its design complete. By November 2009, almost 95 
percent of detailed design drawings had been released. The Navy 
conducted two production readiness reviews to assess the shipbuilder's 
readiness to commence full construction. In addition, as of September 
2009, the program office had conducted unit readiness reviews for 141 
of the ship's 216 assembly units. The LHA 6 is likely to experience 
further cost growth because postdelivery rework of the ship's deck may 
be necessary to cope with the intense, hot downwash of the Joint 
Strike Fighter. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Contract award: 6/07; 
Lead ship fabrication: 12/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

LHA 6 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In 2005, DOD and the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and 
technologies were mature and will have been installed on other ships 
prior to LHA 6 delivery. Although not considered critical 
technologies, the program has identified six key subsystems needed to 
achieve the LHA 6's full capabilities. Five of these are mature, 
installed on numerous Navy ships, and do not require modification for 
installation on the LHA 6. The sixth, the Joint Precision Approach and 
Landing System (JPALS), a Global Positioning System-based aircraft 
landing system, is still in development. JPALS is not required to 
achieve the LHA 6's operating requirements nor is construction 
dependent on its availability. In addition, the program office has 
identified the machinery control system as a subsystem that may pose 
some risk. However, the LHA 6 control system will be largely based on 
the LHD 8 system, using 99 percent of the LHD 8 software code, and is 
expected to be less complex with fewer signals than the LHD 8 system. 

Design Stability: 

The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with only 65 percent of 
its design complete. As of November 2009, almost 95 percent of the 
ship's detailed design drawings had been released. Approximately 45 
percent of the LHA 6 design is based on the LHD 8. Changes from the 
LHD 8 to the LHA 6 include the expansion of the aviation hangar and 
removal of the well deck to accommodate more aircraft and create 
additional aviation fuel capacity. 

Production Maturity: 

The Secretary of the Navy certified that the LHA 6 program was ready 
to commence full shipbuilding construction activities in a report to 
Congress in July 2009. The Navy conducted two production readiness 
reviews to assess the shipbuilder's ability to commence and sustain 
production of the ship. In addition, as of September 2009, the program 
office had conducted unit-level readiness reviews for 141 of the 
ship's 216 assembly units. According to the program office, these unit-
level reviews are conducted prior to beginning production of each unit 
to ensure shipbuilder readiness and uninterrupted production. The Navy 
also requires the shipbuilder to track and report on various 
production metrics throughout construction. 

Other Program Issues: 

The LHA 6 is likely to experience further cost growth. Costly 
postdelivery rework of the ship's deck may be necessary to cope with 
the intense, hot downwash of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. The 
heat from these aircraft could warp the LHA 6 deck or damage deck 
equipment. The Navy is planning to conduct aircraft tests on the LHD 1 
during the fall of 2010, and will then determine whether the LHA 6 and 
other Joint Strike Fighter-capable ships need to modify their flight 
decks. The program office does not expect the Navy to finalize a 
solution for the LHA 6 prior to ship delivery, which could lead to 
expensive rework on the new ship if the deck surface has to be 
modified. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
LHA 6 has been designed from the outset to better integrate the Joint 
Strike Fighter. The Navy noted that improvements over other amphibious 
assault ships include a larger hangar, shops, and aviation parts 
stowage to better accommodate maintenance requirements and an 
increased aviation ordnance and fuel capacity to support the higher 
sortie rate of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Navy also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Army ATTC Office, Fort Rucker; Apache PMO. 

[End of figure] 

The Army is inserting Block III enhancements into the AH-64D Longbow 
Apache helicopter to modernize its capability to simultaneously 
conduct missions across the warfare spectrum. Apache Block III (AB3) 
upgrades are expected to amplify performance, improve situational 
awareness, enhance lethality, increase survivability, provide 
interoperability, and help prevent friendly fire incidents. Upgraded 
AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopters are scheduled to enter service 
starting in 2011. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (7/06); 
System design review (1/08); 
Production design review (3/09); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (4/10); 
Full-rate production (6/12); 
Initial operational capability (5/13). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $487.3 million:
Procurement: $8,497.5 million:
Total funding: $8,984.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 634: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,127.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,112.9; 
Percent change: -1.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,937.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $6,844.0; 
Percent change: 15.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $7,064.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $7,956.9; 
Percent change: 12.6%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $11.735; 
Latest 09/2008: $12.452; 
Percent change: 6.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 602; 
Latest 09/2008: 639; 
Percent change: 6.1%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 79; 
Latest 09/2008: 79; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, AB3 critical technologies will be 
mature and its design will be stable by its April 2010 production 
decision. The program entered system development in July 2006 with its 
one critical technology--an improved drive system--nearing maturity. A 
developmental test aircraft successfully completed its first flight in 
July 2008 and, according to the program office, recent flight tests 
demonstrated the maturity of the drive system in a realistic 
environment. The program plans to hold a series of design reviews that 
correspond to the three time-phased insertions of the program. 
According to the program office, over 85 percent of the design 
drawings for the first time-phased insertion were releasable at the 
March 2009 review. We did not assess production maturity because the 
program has not started collecting production data. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 7/06; 
DOD design review: 3/09; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 4/10. 

[End of figure] 

AB3 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AB3 program entered system development in July 2006 with one 
critical technology--an improved drive system--nearing maturity. This 
is the first time this technology will be used in a helicopter 
transmission, and it is expected to provide more available power and 
reliability than the existing transmission. According to program 
officials, the maturity of the improved drive system was demonstrated 
in a realistic environment during recent flight tests. 

The AB3 upgrade and modernization effort involves a time-phased series 
of technical insertions. There are three phases. First, each Apache 
aircraft will go to the factory for Block III modifications to 
complete most of the required hardware changes. The remaining two 
phases of modifications consist of software improvements that can be 
installed in the field, which eliminates the need to return the 
aircraft to the factory, reduces the time an aircraft is away from the 
unit, and increases the training time for soldiers in the field. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, the AB3 design for the first time- 
phased insertion is stable. Overall, the AB3 program plans to hold 
four critical design reviews, including one before the start of each 
time-phased insertion. The success of each review determines whether 
the program will move forward. According to program officials, a 
provision in the AB3 contract requires the contractor to complete 85-
90 percent of the estimated design drawings for the design review that 
corresponds to the time-phased insertion.The contractor met this goal 
for the January 2008 system-level design review and the March 2009 
design review that supports the program's production decision. The 
last two design reviews, which involve software insertions, should not 
significantly affect the total number of design drawings and are 
slated for fiscal years 2012 and 2014. 

Production Maturity: 

The low-rate production decision for the AB3 program is currently 
scheduled for April 2010. We did not assess production maturity 
because the program has not started collecting production data. 
According to the AB3 program, it plans to use engineering 
manufacturing readiness levels, a metric that takes into account 
technology and design maturity, as well as manufacturing readiness, to 
assess its production maturity. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2008, as part of DOD's new configuration steering board process, 
the AB3 program requested a number of changes that, if approved, could 
yield cost and schedule savings. First, due to concerns with armor on 
the Block I and II Apaches, the AB3 program will redesign and 
requalify the armor for Block III. Second, the program proposed 
focusing testing on new components and requested a waiver from full-up 
system level live fire testing from the Director of Operational Test 
and Evaluation. DOD has approved this request and the alternative live-
fire strategy has been developed. Third, the program requested to 
initially test aircraft survivability equipment on the Block II 
aircraft in order to help prevent schedule delays and reduce risk. DOD 
officials approved this request, but directed that testing on an AB3 
aircraft be completed prior to the full-rate production decision. 
Fourth, due to initial delays on the Joint Tactical Radio System, the 
AB3 program began using a Link-16 emulator to meet Phase II 
developmental test requirements and proposed moving full integration 
from Phase II to Phase III. However, the Joint Tactical Radio System 
development has proceeded on schedule allowing the Link-16 capability 
to be integrated into Phase II and the full Joint Tactical Radio 
System capability (Solider Radio Waveform, Wide Network Waveform) in 
Phase III. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Computer Science Corp. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is one of six classes of 
ships under consideration for the planned Maritime Prepositioning 
Force (Future)--MPF(F)--squadron that supports seabasing. The MLP 
would facilitate at-sea vehicle and cargo transfer, support the 
employment of combat-ready forces from over the horizon, and serve as 
a staging area for supplies that support activities on shore. The Navy 
plans to procure a total of three MLP ships. The MLP--a new ship 
design for the Navy--is currently in the technology development phase. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/08); 
GAO review (1/10). 

System development: 
Design/construction approval (12/10); 
Lead ship fabrication start (1/13); 
Lead ship delivery (3/16). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics/NASSCO:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 3: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $91.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,446.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,538.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,179.384; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: 171; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The MLP program plans to have its five critical technologies mature 
and demonstrated in a realistic environment before awarding a detail 
design and construction contract for the first ship in 2011. Of these 
five technologies, the skin-to-skin mooring and craft interface are 
currently mature and the crane is nearing maturity. The program plans 
to bring the remaining technologies, the vehicle transfer system and 
dynamic positioning system, to full maturity in January 2010 through 
at-sea testing with full-scale test articles and an MLP surrogate 
ship. The program's fiscal year 2010 budget request delayed full 
funding of the program, shifting the milestone review to authorize a 
production contract from fiscal year 2010 to 2011. According to 
program officials, the MPF(F) squadron concept is currently under 
review. The results of this review could affect the future of the MLP 
program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Contract award: 12/10; 
Lead ship fabrication (not assessed): 1/13. 

[End of figure] 

MPF F MLP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The MLP program has identified five technologies as critical to the 
functionality of the ship and plans to demonstrate their maturity in a 
realistic at-sea environment before DOD authorizes detail design and 
construction in 2010. Of the five technologies identified, the most 
mature are the skin-to-skin mooring and craft interface technologies, 
which allow connections between other surface ships for loading and 
unloading cargo. These technologies have been tested at sea through 
the use of surrogate platforms. According to the program office, the 
pendulation control system crane, which allows the transfer of 20-foot 
shipping containers in varying weather conditions, is nearing maturity 
and will demonstrate full maturity through demonstrations in a 
realistic environment in early fiscal year 2010. The vehicle transfer 
system and dynamic positioning system, the final two technologies for 
the MLP, are currently immature. The vehicle transfer system is a 
large ramp that allows equipment and personnel to be transferred from 
heavy lift ships to the MLP at sea before being loaded into landing 
craft for transfer to shore. The primary challenge for this technology 
is transferring cargo in different weather conditions while both ships 
are in motion. Together with the dynamic positioning system, which 
aligns the MLP with other ships using position sensors and the 
propulsion system, the vehicle transfer system will be tested in a 
realistic environment in January 2010. For this test the program 
office intends to outfit a surrogate MLP with full-scale test articles 
of both the vehicle transfer and dynamic positioning systems and test 
the ability to transfer cargo between ships in varying weather 
conditions. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the MLP is being developed by General Dynamics NASSCO 
and, according to program officials, is in the preliminary stages with 
many of the key decisions, such as the arrangement of the propulsion 
systems, yet to be finalized. While the Navy and General Dynamics 
NASSCO do plan to develop the design utilizing a three-dimensional 
model, according to program officials work on the model will only 
begin after a detail design and construction contract is awarded. 

Other Program Issues: 

DOD has delayed requesting full funding for the first ship until 
fiscal year 2011 with the intent of allowing more time for the program 
to develop its design. As a result, the milestone review for 
authorizing detail design and construction was rescheduled from the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2010 to the first quarter of fiscal year 
2011. However, DOD requested and Congress authorized $120 million in 
fiscal year 2010 funding for long-lead materials. According to program 
officials, a review of the MPF(F) concept is currently underway. The 
results of this review could result in further changes to the MLP 
program. 

Program Office Comments: 

Based on the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 30-year shipbuilding 
plan, a lower-cost variant of the MLP is being designed. It is based 
on an Alaska-class crude oil carrier modified to be a float-on/float-
off vessel. Using the parent design offers the Navy an opportunity to 
increase design maturity and reduce technological risk. These ships 
will provide concept validation, operational testing, and an 
incremental operational capability. The current test article for the 
vehicle transfer system is providing positive results that will inform 
the future design. 

[End of section] 

MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Taken in performance of official duties as a photographer/journalist. 
(U.S. Air Force Photo/Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca)
Source: http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/071110-F-1789V-
991.jpg. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole, 
medium to high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system 
capable of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its 
predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a 
ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each system consists of 
four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 
communications suite. We assessed Increment 1. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/02). 

System development: 
Development start (2/04); 
Low-rate decision (2/08); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability (TBD); 
Full-rate decision (3/13); 
Last procurement (2017). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $409.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $599.0; 
Percent change: 46.2%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,059.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $8,525.0; 
Percent change: 313.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,572.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,124.0; 
Percent change: 254.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $24.498; 
Latest 09/2008: $35.780; 
Percent change: 46.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 105; 
Latest 09/2008: 255; 
Percent change: 142.9%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

In the past year, the Reaper program has been designated a major 
defense acquisition program. All four of its original critical 
technologies are mature, but there are numerous technology 
improvements planned for the system. The program office has begun a 
block upgrade that includes system power increases and improvements to 
the primary data link. Planned aircraft quantities have more than 
doubled since fiscal year 2007 and the total is expected to increase 
again in the fiscal year 2011 budget due to user demands and the 
decision to terminate Predator procurement. Initial operational 
testing was completed in August 2008. The Reaper was effective in the 
killer role, but issues associated with the radar and network 
precluded the test team from evaluating the other two key performance 
parameters, the hunter and the net-ready capability. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 2/04; 
DOD design review: 2/09; 
Production decision: 2/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

MQ-9 Reaper Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Reaper's four original critical technologies--the synthetic 
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, the air vehicle, 
and the stores management subsystem--are mature. However, the Air 
Force has identified numerous technology enhancements that are 
expected to improve the capability of existing on-board subsystems and 
ground control stations. These enhancements include upgrades to the 
synthetic aperture radar, a more secure data link, heavyweight landing 
gear, an automatic takeoff and landing capability, and a modernized 
ground control station display. While the program office judged these 
improvements to be technologically mature, they still must be 
integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, the MQ-9 design is stable. Because 
the user required an early operational capability, the Air Force did 
not conduct a traditional system critical design review. Instead, it 
conducted a series of smaller incremental reviews of the early 
operational aircraft configurations. Program officials are also 
beginning a block upgrade that includes a more secure data link, 
improved cockpit controls/displays, and increased system power. Some 
subsystem upgrades will require significant engineering changes. To 
assess all system changes, the program office plans to conduct a 
preliminary design review and a critical design review in 2010 to 
evaluate the block upgrade design maturity. Development testing of the 
block upgrade is scheduled to be completed in July 2012. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the MQ-9 program does 
not use statistical process controls. The program uses other quality 
control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product 
quality. The Air Force has contracted for 77 aircraft, 30 percent of 
the currently planned total. Although the contractor has had problems 
in the past with late aircraft deliveries, its recent facilities 
expansion is now complete, enabling it to increase production from 2.5 
to 5 aircraft per month. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since inception, the program--designated an urgent operational need-- 
has followed a nontraditional acquisition path of concurrent 
development and production. Since fiscal year 2007, total aircraft 
quantities have more than doubled, largely due to significant 
increases in the wartime supplemental budgets and the Air Force's 
decision to curtail future procurement of the Predator in favor of the 
Reaper. Program officials noted that quantities may continue to grow 
because of user needs. The system's performance requirements have also 
continued to change. The program recently began a block upgrade with 
numerous performance enhancements and has received numerous urgent 
operational requirements from the warfighter, such as data link 
encryption, wide area/high resolution surveillance, and a capability 
to detect dismounted soldiers. 

The Reaper completed initial operational testing in August 2008. It 
was effective in the killer role, but problems associated with radar 
and the network prevented testers from evaluating the hunter and net-
ready capability. To enable testers to fully evaluate the hunter 
capability, the Air Force is upgrading the radar's ground moving 
target indicator and target recognition/classification capability, and 
integrating the radar into the crew station. Follow-on testing is 
planned for early 2012. 

In 2009, the Reaper program was designated a major defense acquisition 
program. The Air Force plans to begin development of Increment 2 of 
the MQ-9 Reaper under this program in fiscal year 2013. This increment 
will include the Small Diameter Bomb, automatic takeoff and land 
capability, and a de-icing system, along with national airspace 
certification. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: 9 photographs] 

Source: URS EG&G Division. 

[End of figure] 

MRAP is a joint program led by the Navy and Marine Corps to procure 
armored vehicles to protect personnel from mine blasts and fragmentary 
and direct-fire weapons. DOD acquired and fielded three categories of 
MRAP for combat and support missions for the Marine Corps, Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and Special Operations Command. DOD is also acquiring a 
lighter and more agile version--the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)-- 
for better off-road mobility but with the current level of protection. 
We assessed M-ATV and made observations on MRAP. 

Concept: 

System development: 

Production: 
MRAP production decision (1/07); 
M-ATV delivery award order (6/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
M-ATV IOC (4/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Various:
Program office: Quantico, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $189.6 million:
Procurement: $8,930.8 million:
Total funding: $9,682.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $233.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $609.9; 
Percent change: 161.1%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $21,359.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $35,513.1; 
Percent change: 66.3%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $22,566.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $37,781.6; 
Percent change: 67.4%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1.468; 
Latest 09/2008: $1.651; 
Percent change: 12.5%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 15,374; 
Latest 09/2008: 22,882; 
Percent change: 48.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 6; 
Latest 09/2008: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

To meet an urgent need, DOD is buying the M-ATV as a nondevelopmental 
item. The technologies for the vehicle are mature, but DOD plans to 
integrate two new technologies to increase protection. Both 
technologies are nearing maturity at this time. DOD also considers the 
design for the vehicle and the production processes to be mature. 
However, the M-ATV's highly concurrent production and testing schedule 
creates a risk for costly rework should testing anomalies occur. DOD 
has yet to make decisions on the role of MRAP and M-ATV in the 
tactical wheeled vehicle strategy, which will affect the total cost of 
ownership. For example, DOD has not decided how many of the fleet will 
remain on active service and how many will be stored or turned over to 
coalition forces. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Production decision: 6/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

MRAP Vehicle Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

DOD is buying M-ATV as a nondevelopmental item. Like its MRAP 
predecessor, the M-ATV vehicles technologies and design are considered 
mature. The government sought mature systems and offerors were 
required to submit two production-representative vehicles for 
inspection within about 6 weeks of submitting a proposal. However, DOD 
is proposing to integrate two new technologies onto the M-ATV--a Semi-
Active Rocket Propelled Grenade Protection System and a Hand-Thrown 
Threats Defense. According to program officials, prototypes of these 
technologies are being demonstrated on multiple variants of the MRAP 
vehicle. Program officials expect both technologies to be mature and 
demonstrated in a realistic environment by March 2010. 

Production Maturity: 

The production processes for M-ATV appear mature. The manufacturer 
began delivering vehicles in July 2009, one month after award of the 
first delivery order for production. As of the end of December, a 
cumulative 2,544 vehicles--300 more than the 2,244 planned--had been 
delivered. Program officials believe the contractor will deliver 1,000 
vehicles per month and complete deliveries as scheduled in fiscal year 
2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

In order to rapidly field the M-ATV vehicles, DOD substantially 
compressed both developmental and operational test and evaluation, 
resulting in highly concurrent production and testing schedules. This 
could lead to postproduction and postfielding fixes for the M-ATV if 
testing identifies any shortcomings, as was the case for the earlier 
versions of the MRAP vehicle. By the time operational tests were 
complete in December 2009, more than 2,500 had been delivered, and by 
the time the developmental automotive tests are scheduled to be 
complete in May 2010, all 6,644 vehicles will have been delivered. 

Upon completion of M-ATV production in fiscal year 2010, all MRAP 
variants will have been procured and delivered. At that time, the 
program will fully transition to operations and sustainment phase. The 
U.S. drawdown from Iraq and refocusing efforts in Afghanistan pose 
logistical challenges and uncertainty for refurbishing, retrofitting, 
and upgrading MRAP and M-ATV assets. Based on the urgency to rapidly 
field MRAP and M-ATV, the up-front sustainment and logistics planning 
that is normally part of the acquisition process was not conducted. 
This could negatively affect near-term reliability and 
maintainability. The normal planning and resource identification 
process for long-term sustainment has also been hindered. MRAP 
readiness has remained high in Operation Iraqi Freedom--95 percent--
but is lower in Operation Enduring Freedom--92 percent. Program 
officials attribute this lower rate to the rugged conditions in 
Afghanistan, which lead to more breakdowns and make it harder to 
supply deployed units with repair parts. 

DOD has not yet determined the role of MRAP and M-ATV in the tactical 
wheeled vehicle strategy, including how many of the fleet will remain 
on active service and how many will be stored or turned over to 
coalition forces. These decisions will ultimately affect the total 
cost of ownership. Other DOD decisions will also affect the future of 
the program, such as how DOD will integrate the outcome of multiple 
tactical wheeled vehicle studies into a unified, comprehensive 
strategy. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated 
that the government undertook multiple efforts to mitigate risk 
associated with the concurrent production and test schedule. The 
program office conducted source selection testing, which evaluated 
component and system-level survivability and crew protection of 
multiple candidate vehicles and consisted of multiple ballistic events 
against armor samples and vehicles. Automotive performance tests 
included human factors, mobility, braking, steering, electromagnetic 
interference, environmental factors, towing and recovery, and Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards compliance. Also, soldiers and marines 
participated in a limited user evaluation that included endurance 
drives, urban terrain and night operations, and maintenance and 
logistics inspections. 

[End of section] 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Lockheed Martin, © 2008 Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site 
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity 
and improved availability for small terminals. It is to replace the 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite system currently 
in operation and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS 
consists of a network of satellites and an integrated ground network. 
We assessed both the space and ground segments. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/02). 

System development: 
Development start (9/04); 
Design review (3/07). 

Production: 
Production decision (2/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
On-orbit capability (12/11); 
Full capability (9/15). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,558.0; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,960.5; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,556.2; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,092.697; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 6; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 91; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Latest cost data resulting from a late-2009 Defense Acquisition 
Executive review that established new program cost and schedule 
baselines were not available at the time of this assessment. 

[End of table] 

All MUOS critical technologies are mature and all design drawings have 
been released; however, the discovery of key design flaws late in 
production, and manufacturing process defects has resulted in cost 
growth and schedule delays. Additionally, ground segment development 
challenges have increased program costs. A recent Navy-initiated 
review of the MUOS program found that while the program is technically 
sound, its schedule was optimistic and its budget was inadequate. The 
current estimate for the first satellite to begin on-orbit operations 
is December 2011, representing an additional 10-month delay from last 
year's assessment. The delivery of MUOS capabilities is time-critical 
due to the operational failures of two UFO satellites. The MUOS 
program has taken several steps to address any potential capability 
gap prior to on-orbit operations of the first MUOS satellite. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 9/04; 
DOD design review: 3/07; 
Production decision: 2/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all MUOS critical technologies are 
mature. The number of critical technologies has varied over time, but 
all eight current critical technologies have been demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

While the program office has reported that the MUOS design was stable 
and indicated that the production maturity of the first satellite was 
high, the program has discovered key design flaws late in production, 
as well as manufacturing process defects. The design fixes and rework 
necessary to address issues with the MUOS satellite's diplexed feeds, 
legacy transmit antenna, and UHF reflectors have resulted in cost 
increases and schedule delays on the program. The MUOS program does 
not collect statistical process control data to assess production 
maturity, but the space segment does collect and track data on 
manufacturing process defects and analyze defect trends. While 
manufacturing defects have contributed to cost growth and schedule 
delays on the program, according to the program office, the number of 
defects has decreased slightly over time due to the increasing 
maturity of the manufacturing process. 

According to the program office, the program has also experienced 
software development challenges for the ground segment including poor 
contractor performance, code growth, greater-than-anticipated number 
of problem reports, and integration and testing issues. The estimated 
total lines of software for the ground segment increased about 94 
percent from the estimate at development start, and full qualification 
testing on one of the ground software build increments has been 
delayed by 1 year. The program manager's estimated cost at completion 
for the ground software development increased about 51 percent over 
the past year from about $251 million to about $378 million. According 
to program officials, software development delays have not yet 
affected major program milestones. 

Other Program Issues: 

The importance of the first MUOS launch increased due to the 
unexpected failures of two UFO satellites. Based on the current health 
of on-orbit satellites, UHF communication capabilities are predicted 
to fall below the required availability level in January 2011, and 
remain so until the first MUOS satellite is operational. However, 
because of MUOS satellite development issues, the current estimate for 
on-orbit operation of the first satellite is now December 2011--21 
months later than initially planned. The MUOS program office is 
addressing a potential capability gap by activating dual digital 
receiver unit operations on a UFO satellite, leasing commercial UHF 
satellite communications services, and examining the feasibility of 
expanded digital receiver unit operations on the legacy payloads of 
the MUOS satellites. 

In 2009, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisitions initiated a review to assess the 
technical, schedule, and cost aspects of the MUOS program. The review 
team found that while the program is technically sound, its schedule 
was optimistic and its budget was inadequate. Additionally, according 
to the MUOS program, the Defense Acquisition Executive reviewed the 
program in late 2009, which authorized the procurement of satellite 
four and long-lead items needed for satellite five, and established 
new cost and schedule baselines for the program. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Boeing. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) includes satellites, a 
ground control system, and user equipment. It conveys positioning, 
navigation, and timing information to users worldwide. In 2000, 
Congress began funding the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF 
satellites. GPS IIF is a new generation of GPS satellites that is 
intended to deliver all legacy signals plus new capabilities, such as 
a new civil signal and better accuracy. We assessed the Block IIF. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/99). 

System development: 
Development start (2/00). 

Production: 
Production decision (7/02); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full satellite launch (5/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing for IIF, Boeing for OCS, Lockheed Martin for 
IIR and IIR-M:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $154.9 million:
Procurement: $239.6 million:
Total funding: $394.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,147.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,636.6; 
Percent change: 22.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,916.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,645.5; 
Percent change: 18.6%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,064.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $7,282.1; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $183.760; 
Latest 09/2008: $220.669; 
Percent change: 20.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 33; 
Latest 09/2008: 33; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities include 13 IIR, 8 IIR-M, and 12 IIF satellites. 

[End of table] 

The first GPS IIF satellite launch is scheduled for May 2010, about 3- 
1/2 years later than originally planned. While development and 
production problems caused most of the delay, the GPS program 
attributes the latest delays to launch vehicle and facility 
availability. Recently identified technical issues could put the May 
2010 launch date at risk. By the time the first GPS IIF satellite is 
tested on orbit, five satellites are scheduled to have completed 
production. If problems are discovered, these satellites may need to 
be retrofitted. According to GPS officials, the GPS IIF program has 
discovered more issues late in development and production than should 
be expected. Many of these might have been caught earlier with better 
oversight. We have not been able to assess design stability and 
production maturity because the necessary data is not collected. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 1/00; 
DOD design review: 7/01; 
Production decision: 7/02; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

NAVSTAR GPS-Space & Control Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the GPS program, the one Block IIF critical technology-- 
space-qualified atomic frequency standards--is mature, meaning it has 
been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

We could not assess design stability or production maturity for the 
GPS Block IIF. According to officials, the Block IIF contract did not 
require design drawing data to be reported to the program office or 
for statistical process control data to be collected. According to GPS 
program officials, they assess design stability and production 
maturity through practices such as reviews of contractor testing, 
technical interchange meetings, and periodic program reviews. 

Other Program Issues: 

The first GPS IIF satellite launch is now scheduled for May 2010, 
about 3 and a half years later than originally planned. GPS officials 
attributed the latest delays to launch vehicle and facility 
availability. However, recently identified technical issues could put 
the May 2010 launch date at risk. GPS officials reported that the GPS 
IIF program has discovered more issues late in development and 
production than should be expected. 

According to the GPS program, many of these problems might have been 
identified earlier with sufficient oversight and more rigorous unit 
qualification efforts. Along with delays, the program has experienced 
substantial cost growth. The estimated cost to complete the program 
has more than doubled, from an original estimate of about $729 million 
to the current estimate of about $1.6 billion. 

Even after the first satellite is launched, there are other risks that 
could affect subsequent launches. For example, by the time on-orbit 
checkout and testing of the first satellite is complete, at least 5 of 
the 12 GPS IIF satellites are scheduled to have completed production. 
If problems are identified during on-orbit testing, the existing 
satellites may have to be retrofitted to correct these issues. In 
addition, the GPS IIF program may face further launch challenges 
because the main launch pad that the GPS IIF will utilize appears to 
be overscheduled in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. 

For the overall GPS, some new capabilities are not now available to 
the warfighter because the ground control system features needed to 
command and operate the capabilities have not been completely 
delivered. For example, updated user equipment possessing a capability 
to prevent spoofing of navigation information started being delivered 
to the warfighter in 2004. However, the current GPS ground control 
system is not capable of providing two important aspects of this 
capability and is not expected to do so until early fiscal year 2010. 
In addition, GPS will be providing a modernized military signal 
designed to be secure and jam-resistant. This signal is planned to 
reach its initial operating capability on the GPS satellites and 
ground control system by 2014, but the user equipment needed to 
utilize a the signal is not expected to be fully fielded and 
operational until 2025. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, GPS program officials stated 
that the GPS IIF program made significant strides toward delivery of 
its first satellite in February 2010 with an anticipated "Available 
for Launch" in March 2010 and launch in May 2010. In May 2009, GPS IIF 
Space Vehicle (SV)-2 was used as a Pathfinder vehicle at Cape 
Canaveral AFS to validate satellite processing procedures and verify 
end-to-end system performance prior to shipping SV-1 for launch. The 
Pathfinder mission recovered over 2 months of SV-1 launch schedule and 
significantly reduced schedule risk associated with first-time launch 
delivery and processing. While numerous technical challenges have been 
identified and resolved, the government and contractor teams have 
maintained mission success as the number-one priority for this 
nationally-critical program. This focus has created cost and schedule 
issues for the program, but strong and creative leadership has 
minimized those effects to the greatest extent possible. Program 
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) includes satellites, a 
ground control system, and user equipment. It conveys positioning, 
navigation, and timing information to users worldwide. GPS III, a 
future generation of GPS satellites, will provide capabilities in 
three increments: IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. We assessed GPS IIIA, which is 
intended to provide enhanced capabilities, such as a stronger military 
signal to improve jamming resistance and a new signal for civilian 
users that will be interoperable with foreign signals. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (5/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review and milestone C review (10/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (10/11); 
First satellite available for launch (5/14). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,401.4 million:
Procurement: $1,300.6 million:
Total funding: $2,702.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 6: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,462.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,380.4; 
Percent change: -3.3%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,382.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,300.6; 
Percent change: -5.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,844.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,680.9; 
Percent change: -4.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $480.580; 
Latest 09/2008: $460.117; 
Percent change: -4.3%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 8; 
Latest 09/2008: 8; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

We could not calculate acquisition cycle times for GPS IIIA because 
initial operational capability will not occur until GPS IIIC 
satellites are fielded. 

[End of table] 

In May 2008, the GPS IIIA program began system development and awarded 
a contract for the development and production of eight satellites. At 
that time, the program office reported that all five critical 
technologies were mature. A more recent assessment identified seven 
critical technologies, which are also mature, according to the GPS 
program. The program completed preliminary design review in May 2009, 
and the critical design review is planned for October 2010. Sixteen 
percent of the program's design drawings are releasable. The Air Force 
faces a number of challenges in delivering GPS IIIA satellites on 
schedule. The satellite's development schedule appears compressed; the 
satellites are being developed and built by a different contractor 
than the GPS IIF; and the GPS IIIA involves a larger satellite bus and 
more powerful military signal than its predecessor GPS satellites. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 5/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 10/10; 
Production decision: 10/11. 

[End of figure] 

GPS IIIA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to GPS program officials, in May 2008, the GPS IIIA program 
identified five critical technologies based on its preliminary 
baseline. All five critical technologies were determined mature and 
the program was approved to begin system development. A more recent 
technology readiness assessment based on the contractor's specific 
design identified seven critical technologies--the rubidium atomic 
clock; 28 percent-efficient solar cells; 50 watt field effect 
transistor; RTAX family of field programmable gate arrays; real time 
operating system integration with the satellite's processors; L1, L2, 
L5 triplexers; and a timekeeping system. According to the program 
office, these seven technologies are also mature and have been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. 

Design Maturity: 

The GPS IIIA program completed its preliminary design review in May 
2009. The critical design review is planned for October 2010. 
According to the program office, 16 percent of its total expected 
design drawings are releasable. Program officials reported that they 
are confident that at least 90 percent of design drawings will be 
released this year for critical design review. 

Other Program Issues: 

To prevent the problems experienced on the GPS IIF program from 
recurring on the GPS IIIA, the Air Force is implementing an 
incremental development strategy to meet capability needs; using 
military standards for satellite quality; and exercising more 
government oversight over the contractor. In addition, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has 
specified that the program manager is not allowed to adjust the GPS 
IIIA program scope to meet increased or accelerated technical 
specifications, system requirements, or system performance. 

However, the Air Force faces a number of challenges in delivering GPS 
IIIA satellites on schedule. First, we have previously reported that 
the program schedule appears highly compressed. The Air Force plans to 
launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014. This would require the 
program to go from contract award to first launch 3 1/2 years faster 
than the GPS IIF. The time between contract award and first launch is 
also less than most other major space programs we have reviewed. In 
addition, though the contractor has previous experience with GPS, some 
of its knowledge base will have to be revitalized since it was not the 
contractor for the GPS IIF. Finally, the contractor is planning to 
incorporate a previously developed larger satellite bus and increase 
the power of the military signal. 

The GPS IIIA satellites are to be controlled by a future ground 
control system called the Next Generation GPS Control Segment or OCX. 
However, OCX will not be fielded by the first planned GPS IIIA launch 
in May 2014. The Air Force is pursuing various options to increase the 
life of GPS satellites currently on orbit and provide command and 
control for the GPS IIIA satellites during launch and checkout to 
ensure the GPS constellation's performance is sustained. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, GPS program officials stated 
that they recognize past schedule delays and have purposely structured 
the GPS III program to mitigate these concerns. The GPS III 
contractor, Lockheed Martin (LM), has successfully built and flown 37 
other A2100 spacecraft bus-based systems. Additionally, LM built the 
highly successful GPS IIR and IIR-M satellites. LM's major 
subcontractor, ITT, delivered the complete navigation payload for GPS 
IIR and IIR-M programs and payload transmitter hardware for GPS IIF. 
To further enable the achievement of a 72-month schedule, the 
government invested in a competitive Phase A activity, prototyping 
numerous critical technologies. Additionally, GPS IIIA is utilizing a 
"pathfinder" vehicle to identify and resolve integration issues before 
the assembly of the first flight vehicle. Based on the successful 
history of LM and ITT, the A2100 bus platform, and the significant 
risk reduction efforts built into the program, the Air Force has high 
confidence that the 72-month schedule is an achievable target. Program 
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2008 Raytheon Company. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's NMT is the next-generation maritime military satellite 
communications terminal. Together with the Air Force's Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency satellite system, NMT is designed to enhance 
protected and survivable satellite communications to naval forces. NMT 
multiband capabilities will also enable communications over existing 
military satellite communication systems, such as Milstar, Wideband 
Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite Communications System. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (10/03); 
Design review (5/08). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Low-rate decision (7/10); 
Initial capability (9/12); 
Full capability (3/17). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $131.6 million:
Procurement: $1,311.1 million:
Total funding: $1,442.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 276: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $680.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $656.0; 
Percent change: -3.5%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,584.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,311.1; 
Percent change: -17.2%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,264.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,967.2; 
Percent change: -13.1%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6.799; 
Latest 09/2008: $6.471; 
Percent change: -4.8%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 333; 
Latest 09/2008: 304; 
Percent change: -8.7%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 107; 
Latest 09/2008: 107; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the NMT's critical technologies will 
be mature and its design stable by its July 2010 production decision. 
The two critical technologies are nearing maturity. Almost 100 percent 
of the program's design drawings are releasable. The NMT program has 
identified three critical manufacturing processes. According to the 
program office, the contractor has not yet demonstrated these 
processes are in control because production has not begun. The program 
began producing engineering development models in May 2008 and 
anticipates testing these models in February 2010. The NMT's full 
operational capability has been delayed 2 years to 2017 due to changes 
in the NMT's procurement and installation schedule that were made in 
2008 to align the program with the naval operations resources and 
objectives. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 10/03; 
DOD design review: 5/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 7/10. 

[End of figure] 

NMT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The NMT program's two critical technologies--a multi-band antenna feed 
and monolithic microwave integrated circuit power amplifiers for Q-
band and Ka-band communication frequencies--are nearing maturity. 
Design Verification Test is complete on the multi-band feeds, 
demonstrating their ability to communicate in the frequencies desired, 
and the program office expects these technologies to be fully mature 
before the production decision in Summer of 2010. According to the 
program office, the backup technologies are older versions of the same 
technologies, and if these older technologies are needed, the program 
could experience a challenge in repackaging them in a more efficient 
form. 

Design Maturity: 

The NMT's design is stable. As of August 2009, almost 100 percent of 
the program's total expected drawings were releasable. The program has 
also released all of the technical data packages necessary to build 
the NMT's engineering development models. The first development test 
of a fully configured, integrated engineering development model is 
expected to take place in February 2010. The NMT program held an 
earlier design review in May 2005 for NMT prototypes from two 
contractors, who were competing to build the engineering development 
models. DOD has stated that having competing contractors produce 
prototypes to demonstrate key systems elements is a good practice for 
lowering a program's technical risk, among other benefits. 

The NMT program's software lines of code have significantly increased 
since the start of development to accommodate software communications 
architecture requirements. Currently, software integration testing is 
over 80 percent complete and 95 percent of the defects discovered have 
been resolved. The NMT program is also containing most of the defects 
that it finds within the phase of software development in which they 
occurred. This is a good indicator because it is more efficient to 
correct problems within the phase in which they occur. 

Production Maturity: 

The NMT program office has identified three critical manufacturing 
processes--a first step in assessing production maturity--for the NMT 
program. However, the contractor has not yet demonstrated that these 
processes are in control. According to the program office, statistical 
process control data is not available for NMT since production has not 
begun. The three critical manufacturing processes were identified 
during the program's June 2008 technology readiness assessment and are 
related to the Q-band and Ka-band monolithic microwave integrated 
circuits and the Q/Ka radome. 

Other Program Issues: 

The NMT program may encounter challenges in developing and fielding 
the system. The full capability of the NMT program depends upon the 
successful launches of Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) 
satellites. The AEHF program anticipates launching its first satellite 
in 2010, 2 years later than originally projected, and it will not 
reach initial operational capability until 2013. While delays with 
AEHF capability directly affect the ability of the NMT program to test 
the new higher data rate communications capability, the NMT terminal 
can provide value to the fleet upon fielding by accessing existing 
satellite communication systems such as the Defense Satellite 
Communications System, Milstar, and Wideband Global SATCOM. The NMT 
program is still projecting a 2-year delay in realizing its full 
operational capability. NMT program officials stated that this delay 
is due to changes in NMT's procurement and installation schedule that 
were made to better align the program with naval operations resources 
and objectives. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
NMT program is successfully executing to provide deployed naval 
commanders with assured access to secure, protected, command and 
control, communication capabilities to support the exchange of 
warfighter critical information. It will support the Navy's Net-
Centric FORCEnet architecture and act as an enabler for transforming 
operational capability available to the warfighter. The Navy also 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Courtesy of Northrop Grumman. 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS is a tri-agency--Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration--satellite program to monitor the weather and 
environment through the year 2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites 
will be merged into a single national system. NOAA and DOD each 
provide 50 percent of the funding for NPOESS. The program consists of 
four segments: space; command, control, and communications; interface 
data processing; and the launch segment. We assessed the space segment. 

Concept: 
Program start (3/97). 

System development: 

Production: 
Development start/production decision (8/02); 
GAO review (1/10); 
First satellite launch (3/14). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology:
Program office: Silver Spring, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,382.7 million:
Procurement: $3,847.7 million:
Total funding: $7,230.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,181.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,313.8; 
Percent change: 79.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,337.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,847.7; 
Percent change: 187.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,519.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,161.5; 
Percent change: 101.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,086.521; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,290.377; 
Percent change: 202.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 6; 
Latest 09/2008: 4; 
Percent change: -33.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 113; 
Latest 09/2008: 193; 
Percent change: 70.8. 

[End of table] 

In August 2002, the program began development and production before 
achieving technology maturity, design stability, or production 
maturity. In July 2007, the NPOESS program was restructured in 
response to a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. 
As part of the restructure, 7 of the original 14 critical technologies 
were removed from the program. Of the remaining technologies, all 7 
are reported mature by program officials. While the restructure's goal 
was to lower future cost and schedule risks, it increased the risk of 
a satellite coverage gap and significantly reduced data collection 
capabilities. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Development start/production decision: 8/02; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

NPOESS's began development in August 2002 with 1 of 14 critical 
technologies mature. Seven technologies have been removed from the 
program. According to program officials, the 7 remaining technologies 
are mature. 

Three of the five sensors slated for the NPOESS demonstration 
satellite, NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), have been delivered and 
integrated on the spacecraft, but the launch of NPP continues to be 
delayed due to problems with a critical sensor. The launch of NPP, 
initially planned for May 2006, is not expected to occur until at 
least September 2011. The satellite is expected to demonstrate the 
performance in a realistic environment of three critical sensors that 
provide data for key weather products and two noncritical sensors. 

Design Maturity: 

The NPOESS program made a decision to begin production in 2002 before 
achieving design stability. At the latest design review in April 2009, 
the design was nearly stable with 86 percent of an estimated 6,488 
total drawings releaseable. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity. The program office does not 
collect statistical process control data due to the small number of 
satellites to be built. Program officials stated that contractors 
track various metrics for subcomponent production, such as rework 
percentages, defect containment, and schedule and cost performance, 
but the program has not set goals for these metrics. 

Contract Management: 

In June 2009, we reported that NPOESS's approved cost and schedule 
baseline was not achievable, due in part to continued problems with 
two critical sensors. Since the program's inception, the launch of the 
first satellite has slipped about 5 years--from April 2009 to about 
March 2014. The launch of the second satellite has been delayed from 
June 2011 to May 2016. We have previously reported that the delayed 
launches of fewer satellites could reduce satellite data collection 
and require dependence on a European satellite for coverage during 
midmorning hours. There is also an increased risk of a 3-to 5-year 
coverage gap for the existing constellation of satellites should there 
be premature satellite failures or unsuccessful launches of a Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), NPOESS, or NPP satellite. The 
restructured program deleted 4 of 13 instruments and reduced the 
functionality of four sensors. While the program has added one sensor 
back to the first satellite, the NPOESS system will have significantly 
less capability for providing global climate and space environment 
measures than originally planned. 

According to program officials, it is difficult for the NPOESS 
Executive Committee to steer three agencies' competing requirements 
and priorities. In July 2009, a task force within the Executive Office 
of the President was formed to monitor the program's progress and 
resolve obstacles. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010 requires the President to develop a strategy for the 
management and funding of NPOESS, and prohibits the Air Force from 
spending more than 50 percent of the funds available for NPOESS until 
the management and funding strategy is submitted to the relevant 
congressional committees. 

Program Office Comments: 

The NPOESS Integrated Program Office provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

P-8A Poseidon (P-8A): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: © 2008 Boeing. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's P-8A Posedon is a Boeing 737 commercial derivative that 
will replace the P-3C. Its primary roles are antisubmarine warfare; 
antisurface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The P-8A shares an integrated maritime patrol mission 
with the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aerial System and 
the EP-X (formerly the Aerial Common Sensor). These systems are 
intended to operate independently or in tandem to support the Navy's 
maritime warfighting capability. 

Concept: 
Program start (3/00). 

System development: 
Development start (5/04); 
Design review (6/07); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/10); 
Full-rate decision (4/13); 
Initial capability (7/13); 
Last procurement (2019). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: The Boeing Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $7,346.4; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $22,791.2; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $30,271.9; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $263.234; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 115; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 160; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

The program plans to purchase an additional nine aircraft but has not 
yet updated the total program cost and quantity. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the P-8A's critical technologies will 
be mature and its design will be stable by its planned May 2010 
production decision. The program will complete an operational 
assessment prior to the production decision and has begun testing to 
support that assessment. The P-8A's software development efforts are 
also nearing completion. The P-8A program has actively managed its 
technology risk. The program entered development with four immature 
critical technologies, but replaced two technologies with less 
capable, more mature backups. It also added a new critical technology, 
the Hydro-Carbon Sensor, which is considered mature in ground-based 
applications, but had not been demonstrated in an aircraft. According 
to program officials, the Navy now plans to buy nine additional 
aircraft for a total quantity of 122. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 5/04; 
DOD design review: 6/07; 
GAO review: 1/10;
Production decision: 5/10. 

[End of figure] 

P-8A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program entered development in 2004 with four immature critical 
technologies that had not been demonstrated in a relevant or realistic 
environment. Since then, it replaced two of those technologies with 
less capable, more mature backups that still meet P-8A requirements. 
The program currently considers two technologies--the Hydro-Carbon 
Sensor and the ESM Digital Receiver--to be critical. According to the 
program office, both technologies will be mature and demonstrated in a 
realistic environment by its planned May 2010 production decision. 
Both technologies were assessed during a September 2008 technology 
readiness assessment. The ESM Digital Receiver was considered mature, 
while the Hydro-Carbon Sensor was considered mature in ground-based 
applications, but had not been demonstrated in an aircraft. The 
program will conduct another technology readiness assessment prior to 
its low-rate initial production decision. 

The P-8A program is following an incremental approach. At present, the 
program has not identified any additional critical technologies for 
delivering the second increment of capability, which, according to the 
program office, involves accoustics and to communications, 
improvements, and upgrades to the tactical support center. 

Design Maturity: 

The P-8A's design is stable, with 99 percent of its design drawings 
released. Software development efforts are 97 percent complete, and 
program officials stated that the program has experienced a lower rate 
of software defects than anticipated. According to program officials, 
the program has also pursued a strategy of building, testing, and 
fixing software issues as they arise, rather than waiting until 
software development efforts are complete. 

Production Maturity: 

The P-8A program recently awarded a contract for long lead materials 
for low-rate initial production. While we did not assess production 
maturity, the program is tracking scrap/re-work rates for production. 
Currently, the scrap/rework rate is above the goal for the Boeing 
production facility, but program officials said that they expect to 
reach the target rate as production proceeds. The program has 
mitigated potential schedule effects from the 2008 labor strike at 
Boeing. 

Other Program Issues: 

The P-8A program will complete an operational assessment prior to its 
planned May 2010 production decision. However, the assessment will not 
include flight test results. In order to minimize on-aircraft testing, 
program officials stated that the program will be using a weapon 
system integration lab (WSIL) equipped with production representative 
hardware for the testing that supports the operational assessment. 
According to a Navy testing official, while it would be preferable to 
have flight test results for the operational assessment, the program 
planned from an early date to use data from the WSIL, as well as known 
information about the 737 aircraft. The program has begun testing the 
first flight test aircraft. 

According to program officials, the Navy now plans to purchase nine 
additional aircraft for a total of 122; a decision that was made as a 
result of a long term planning study conducted by the Navy. The 
procurement cost of the program will increase to account for the 
additional aircraft. Although development contract costs have already 
risen from $3.9 billion to $5.6 billion as a result of delays in 
design drawing release, additional costs to mitigate software 
development risks, strike recovery efforts, and funding for the second 
increment of capability, program officials have said that they have 
been able to stay within the cost estimates in the program's original 
baseline. 

Program Office Comments: 

In its comments, program officials said that the program continues to 
meticulously manage the critical technologies. The program has 
continually assessed the technologies constituting the P-8A in order 
to identify new candidate critical technologies that require 
additional management attention. The maturation of the P-8A 
technologies is on schedule to support the production decision. As an 
example, the Hydro-Carbon sensor is now assessed by the program as 
mature due to completion of developmental testing per the maturation 
plan. Although contract costs have grown since the original proposal, 
they still remain below the program's cost estimate at the start of 
development. The program continues to manage within the trade space 
for cost, schedule, and performance parameters as defined in the P-8A 
acquisition program baseline agreement. 

[End of section] 

PATRIOT MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: US MEADS National Product Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined 
Aggregate Program transitions the Patriot missile system to MEADS. 
MEADS is intended to provide low-to medium-altitude air and missile 
defense to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles, 
cruise missiles, or other air-breathing threats. MEADS is being 
developed by the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the 
MEADS fire unit, including launchers, radars, battle management 
component, and launcher reloaders. We did not assess the Patriot 
missile. 

Concept: 
Program/development start (8/04). 

System development: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review (8/10). 

Production: 
Full-rate production (11/12); 
Initial capability (9/17). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: MEADS International:
Program office: Huntsville, AL.
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,393.4 million:
Procurement: $13,101.2 million:
Total funding: $16,494.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,177.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,880.3; 
Percent change: -5.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $13,710.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,101.2; 
Percent change: -4.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $18,887.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $17,981.5; 
Percent change: -4.8%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $393.493; 
Latest 09/2008: $374.614; 
Percent change: -4.8%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 48; 
Latest 09/2008: 48; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 157; 
Latest 09/2008: 157; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

According to program officials, the program's cost and schedule will 
be rebaselined in 2010 to reflect changes in the program. 

[End of table] 

All five of the Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program fire unit's 
critical technologies are fully mature. The program held a preliminary 
design review in 2007 and is conducting an incremental critical design 
review that it expects to complete with a system-level review in 
August 2010. Program officials estimate they have released about 90 
percent of the total expected drawings for the system. The program has 
produced hardware prototypes. According to program officials, the 
program is expected to be extended by 18 months due, in part, to 
issues revealed during the preliminary design review period with 
requirements for the sensor and underestimation of the cost of the 
effort. Program officials stated that they expect to rebaseline the 
program once cost and schedule changes are final. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 8/04; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 8/10; 
Production decision (not assessed): 11/12. 

[End of figure] 

PATRIOT MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five of MEADS critical technologies are reported as fully mature. 
According to program officials, both the Launcher Electronics and the 
Tactical Exciter have made significant progress since program 
inception, especially the U.S.-developed and produced exciter. 
Officials also stated that the first Tactical Exciter was delivered in 
late fiscal year 2009 and has already started integration in Germany 
into the Multifunction Fire Control Radar system; the second Tactical 
Exciter is scheduled for delivery mid-fiscal year 2010. 

Design Maturity: 

The program office expects the system's design to be stable by its 
August 2010 system level design review. According to MEADS program 
officials, the program has released 92 percent of the total expected 
design drawings across five major end items (MEI). More than the 90 
percent of the drawings for two of the five MEIs--the launcher and the 
Multifunction Fire Control Radar--are releasable. For the remaining 
three MEIs--the Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, 
Computer, and Intelligence software and hardware, the reloader, and 
the Surveillance Radar--88 percent or more are releasable. The program 
is currently undergoing an incremental critical design review process 
and has completed 30 of 46 critical design review events. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the program will not 
enter production until 2012. Program officials noted that numerous 
hardware and software prototypes have been built, and much of the 
hardware is well beyond the prototype phase. For example, according to 
MEADS officials, over 16,000 X-band transmit/receive modules have been 
delivered. The program office does not collect statistical process 
control data at the MEI level, but, according to officials, 
contractors do collect statistical process control data for some 
component parts. 

Other Program Issues: 

MEADS officials expect the program's design and development phase to 
be extended by 18 months due in part to issues with Battle Management 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence and 
sensor requirements and an underestimation of the sensor development 
effort. This schedule extension includes an 11-month delay in the 
system level critical design review from October 2009 to August 2010. 
Due to the schedule extension, the program will need to be 
rebaselined. Program officials stated that the cost increase 
associated with the schedule extension is expected to be shared among 
the three member nations. However, part of the program extension 
includes breaking the program into two phases--a critical design 
review phase and a postcritical design review phase. According to 
program officials, this was done primarily to allow the member nations 
to minimize their liability if they decide not to continue with the 
program after the critical design review. Details regarding the 18-
month extension were not available as negotiations had not begun among 
the member nations, nor had they agreed to a memorandum of 
understanding. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the International MEADS program is over 5 years into development 
and has successfully completed System Requirements and Preliminary 
Design reviews. All five of the highlighted critical technologies are 
progressing satisfactorily. A contract amendment to mitigate program 
concerns and rebaseline the post-CDR phase is on track for national 
decisions in early fiscal year 2011. The planned schedule extension 
reduces program risk, facilitates added integration activities, and 
facilitates successful CDR completion. Cost growth continues to be a 
concern for the Army, when considered in today's limited resource 
environment. The program office also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: © 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to 
perform a range of missile warning, missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. A planned 
replacement for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High is a 
constellation of four satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), 
two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and 
fixed and mobile ground stations. In 2007, DOD authorized the Air 
Force to procure two additional HEO sensors. We assessed the space 
segment. 

Concept: 
Program start (2/95). 

System development: 
Development start (10/96); 
Design review/production decision (8/01). 

Production: 
First sensor delivery (8/04); 
Second sensor delivery (9/05); 
GAO review (1/10); 
First satellite delivery (9/10); 
Second satellite delivery (9/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,404.7 million:
Procurement: $1,392.0 million:
Total funding: $2,829.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,261.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $9,583.3; 
Percent change: 124.9%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,816.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,471.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,638.4; 
Percent change: 205.0%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $894.227; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,409.609; 
Percent change: 281.3%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 09/2008: 4; 
Percent change: -20.0%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: TBD; 
Latest 09/2008: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

The 1996 data show no procurement cost as the Air Force planned to use 
research and development funds to buy all five satellites. We could 
not calculate cycle time because the program stopped reporting an 
initial operational capability date in 2006. 

[End of table] 

The SBIRS High program continues to experience setbacks that could add 
to cost overruns and schedule delays. All three of the program's 
critical technologies are mature and 99 percent of the expected 
drawings are releasable. However, program costs continue to increase 
due to software development problems, hardware quality issues, and 
testing delays on the first GEO satellite. Unplanned work continues to 
be a challenge for the software development effort. The program also 
recently discovered hardware defects on the first GEO satellite. The 
Air Force's best-case estimate is that the first GEO satellite launch 
will be delayed an additional year from December 2009 to December 
2010. The HEO payloads continue to perform well on-orbit, and 
according to program officials, they were accepted for specific 
mission operations in 2009. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 10/96; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Design review/production decision: 8/01; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SBIRS High program began system development in 1996 with none of 
its three critical technologies mature. All three critical 
technologies--the infrared sensor, thermal management, and on-board 
processing--are now mature and have been demonstrated in at least a 
relevant environment. Furthermore, according to the program office, 
the HEO sensor's on-orbit performance instills confidence that the GEO 
infrared scanning sensor will work as intended. 

Design Maturity: 

The SBIRS High design was not stable when the program committed to 
production in 2001. According to program officials, 99 percent of the 
SBIRS High expected design drawings are now releasable. However, the 
program continues to experience design-related problems, and more 
could emerge. For example, flight software design problems have 
plagued the program for several years, causing cost increases and 
schedule delays, and the program may still be underestimating the 
amount of work that remains to resolve the issues. According to the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), unplanned work continues to 
be a challenge for the software development effort and its cost and 
schedule have been assessed as high risk. In addition, during 
functional testing of the payload and spacecraft in early 2009, the 
program found solder fractures on hardware components. The program 
conducted a root cause analysis and determined that these defects will 
not require design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does 
not collect statistical process control data. The program tracks and 
assesses production progress by reviewing monthly test data and 
updates. 

Other Program Issues: 

The SBIRS High program remains at high risk for cost and schedule 
growth. DCMA is currently projecting over $245 million in cost overrun 
from the current baseline at contract completion. This amount has more 
than doubled in the past year and continues to steadily grow. In 
December 2009, program officials began coordination to rebaseline the 
program to more realistic cost and schedule goals. Air Force officials 
expect the rebaselining effort to take about 9 months, and be 
completed in mid-to-late 2010. Additional contractor cost increases 
and schedule delays are expected due in part to hardware rework on the 
first satellite, continued difficulty with the flight software 
development, and delays in integration and test activities. The 
program's management reserve--funds set aside to address unanticipated 
problems--will likely be depleted before the first GEO satellite 
launches, and additional funding could be required if future problems 
occur. Additional schedule delays could also occur since meeting 
current launch estimates depends on the results of system-level 
integration tests. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the program office, the first GEO integrated payload and 
spacecraft successfully completed thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing in 
November 2009. Program officials say these testing results give them 
high confidence that the GEO satellite will perform similarly to the 
successful HEO sensors, noting that HEO TVAC test performance differed 
only slightly from its on-orbit performance. The program recently 
identified the root cause of the hardware solder defects and concluded 
that the units to be installed on the first GEO satellite are 
flightworthy. Program officials say that although technical issues 
discovered during testing have increased program cost, parallel 
activities have actually minimized program cost and schedule growth. 
They further stressed that mission assurance remains their top 
priority. 

[End of section] 

Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Boeing. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10 
satellite is intended to provide a follow-on capability to the 
Midcourse Space Experiment/Space Based Visible sensor satellite, which 
ended its mission in July 2008. SBSS will consist of a single 
satellite and associated command, control, communications, and ground 
processing equipment. The SBSS satellite is expected to operate 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, to collect positional and characterization 
data on earth-orbiting objects of potential interest to national 
security. 

Concept: 
Program start (2/02). 

System development: 
Development start (9/03); 
Design review (11/06). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Satellite launch (6/10). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Northrop Grumman Mission 
Systems:
Program office: Los Angeles, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $850.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $873.2; 
Percent change: 2.7%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $0.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $0.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $850.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $873.2; 
Percent change: 2.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $850.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $873.2; 
Percent change: 2.7%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1; 
Latest 09/2008: 1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The SBSS Block 10 satellite is fully assembled and completed testing 
in March 2009. However, it is not expected to launch until at least 
June 2010--3 years later than originally planned--due in part to 
launch vehicle issues unrelated to the SBSS satellite. The Air Force 
is currently assessing its launch vehicle options for SBSS. The SBSS 
program started development in 2003 with none of its five critical 
technologies mature. The technologies were tested in a relevant 
environment as a fully assembled satellite in March 2009. The program 
was restructured in 2006 after an independent review found that the 
program's requirements were overstated and its cost and schedule 
targets could not be met. The Air Force is currently planning for a 
full and open competition for the SBSS Follow-On program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 9/03; 
DOD design review: 11/06; 
Production decision: 4/08; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

SBSS Block 10 Program: 

Technology, Design, and Production Maturity: 

The SBSS Block 10 program's critical technologies are mature and its 
design is stable. The SBSS program began development in late 2003 with 
none of its five critical technologies mature. According to the 
program office, all five critical technologies have now been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The satellite completed 
testing in March 2009. According to the program office, the SBSS 
design is also stable with 100 percent of the space vehicle design 
drawings released to manufacturing. We could not assess production 
maturity because the program office did not collect statistical 
process control data. 

Other Program Issues: 

The SBSS satellite is fully assembled and completed testing in March 
2009. However, it is not expected to launch until at least June 2010-- 
3 years later than originally planned--due in part to launch vehicle 
issues unrelated to the SBSS satellite. The Air Force began an 
examination of the Minotaur IV launch vehicle in February 2009 after a 
launch failure involving a launch vehicle with commonalities. 
Subsequently, Air Force officials discovered an issue with the 
vehicle's third-stage gas generator which could affect the successful 
placement of the SBSS satellite in its operational orbit. According to 
the program office, an independent review team is assessing the risks 
associated with launching the SBSS satellite on the Minotaur IV. 
Additionally, program office officials and the SBSS contractors are 
studying the feasibility of launching the SBSS satellite on a Delta II 
rocket. Changing launch vehicles could require interface design 
changes to the SBSS satellite. Both reviews are expected to be 
completed in February 2010. 

The Air Force is currently planning a full and open competition for an 
SBSS Follow-On program. Parts obsolescence could be a factor in this 
decision. However, we have reported that existing spare parts could be 
used to help build a second SBSS Block 10 satellite. Relying on the 
existing Block 10 design could reduce the risk of the follow-on effort 
and, consequently, the risk of a gap in space surveillance 
capabilities. According to the program office, SBSS Block 10 lessons 
learned will serve as a critical foundation in follow-on SBSS 
acquisition efforts. However, the SBSS program plans to begin concept 
refinement activities for the follow-on effort before the SBSS Block 
10 satellite is launched. The Air Force is assessing statements of 
capability from industry and plans to issue a request for proposal in 
summer 2010 and award a contract in mid-2011 for the follow-on effort. 
The program is projecting a 2015 launch for a follow-on satellite. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the SBSS Block 10 system achieved launch readiness in October 
2009. The program office is focused on risk reduction efforts for 
launch, operations, and sustainment. The SBSS program office provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: SDB II Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II is planned to 
provide the capability to attack mobile targets from standoff range in 
adverse weather. It is planned to combine radar, infrared, and 
guidance sensors in a terminal seeker using GPS and an inertial 
navigation system to achieve precise guidance accuracy in all weather. 
SDB II will be integrated with the Air Force F-15E and the Navy and 
Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighters, and is designed to integrate with 
other aircraft, such as the F-22A. 

Concept: 
Competitive risk reduction start (5/06); 
GAO review (1/10). 

System development: 
Competitive down selection (4/10); 
Development start (6/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/12); 
Initial capability F-15E (5/15); 
Last procurement (TBD). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing, Raytheon:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: NA; 
Latest 09/2008: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The SDB II program is scheduled to enter engineering and manufacturing 
development in June 2010. The program has completed a 42-month risk 
reduction effort and is currently in source selection. An independent 
technology readiness assessment will be completed prior to the SDB II 
program's entry into engineering and manufacturing development. 
According to program officials, the critical technologies for one or 
both of the competing contractors are expected to be nearing maturity 
and demonstrated in relevant environment prior to development start. 
According to DOD's acquisition policy, if this does not occur, the 
program must use an alternative technology that has reached this level 
of maturity or modify the system's requirements. The program plans to 
award a fixed price contract for development in June 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Development start (not assessed): 6/10; 
DOD design review (not assessed): TBD; 
Production decision (not assessed): 12/12. 

[End of figure] 

SDB II Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SDB II program is scheduled to enter engineering and manufacturing 
development in June 2010. The program has completed a 42-month risk 
reduction effort and is currently in source selection. An independent 
technology readiness assessment will be completed prior to the SDB II 
program's entry into engineering and manufacturing development. 
According to program office officials, the critical technologies for 
one or both of the competing contractors are on track to be 
demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to development start. 

Other Program Issues: 

The SDB II program has completed its 42-month risk reduction effort. 
For this phase, the Air Force awarded separate risk-reduction 
contracts to Boeing and Raytheon. The contractors have proposed system 
performance specifications as part of this effort that will be 
evaluated as part of the source selection. A request for proposal was 
issued in October 2009 and the contractors will compete for a fixed 
price incentive contract for engineering and manufacturing development 
with options for production. The program plans to award the contract 
not later than June 2010. According to program officials, during 
development the contractor will be accountable for system performance, 
which includes designing the weapon system and planning the 
developmental test program to verify system performance. 

Integration with the Joint Strike Fighter carrier and short takeoff 
vertical landing variants is a requirement for the program. According 
to program officials, this is a risk for the SDB II development effort 
because of the concurrency between the two programs. The SDB II 
program office suggested breaking out SDB II integration on the Joint 
Strike Fighter into a separate development path at a November 2008 
configuration steering board to address this risk. However, program 
officials stated the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics kept the JSF integration requirement as part 
of the baseline program when it approved the SDB IIs acquisition 
strategy in September 2009. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials stated 
the original contracting strategy was to use a cost plus fixed fee 
with performance incentive for development. This strategy was changed 
after a DOD review and an Air Force acquisition strategy panel were 
held. In September 2009, DOD approved an acquisition strategy for the 
program that included a fixed price with incentive fee contract for 
development. According to the program office, the contract type 
provides a calculable incentive for the contractor to control costs, 
as well as a ceiling price to limit the government's liability for 
cost growth. The program office also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Standard Missile-6 Extended Range Active Missile: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Raytheon Missile Systems. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) is a surface-to-air missile 
launched from Aegis destroyers and cruisers. It is designed to provide 
anti-air warfare and anti-cruise missile ship self-defense, fleet area 
defense, and theater air defense. In addition to extended range, the 
initial SM-6 Block I will have an active missile seeker, 
countermeasures resistance, and "Engage-On-Remote" (EOR) intercept 
capability. The program is using an incremental approach to produce 
Block I, with additional blocks intended to meet future threats. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/04). 

System development: 
Design review (3/06). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (8/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability (3/11); 
Full-rate decision (6/11). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $182.0 million:
Procurement: $4,837.1 million:
Total funding: $5,019.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,181: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,047.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $954.8; 
Percent change: -8.8%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,512.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $4,958.4; 
Percent change: 9.9%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $5,560.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $5,913.2; 
Percent change: 6.3%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4.634; 
Latest 09/2008: $4.928; 
Percent change: 6.3%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1,200; 
Latest 09/2008: 1,200; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 75; 
Latest 09/2008: 81; 
Percent change: 8.0%. 

[End of table] 

The SM-6 program's concurrent testing and production strategy puts the 
program at increased risk for cost growth and schedule delays. 
According to the Navy program office, all SM-6 critical technologies 
were mature and its design was stable by the August 2009 low-rate 
initial production decision. However, the SM-6 has not been flight- 
tested at sea or tested some of its key capabilities, such as engage- 
on-remote. While the SM-6 program has identified its critical 
manufacturing processes, it has not started to collect the data to 
show those processes are in control. The program is using other 
measures to assess the production processes associated with selected 
key product characteristics. About 77 percent of the hardware 
components of the SM-6 are legacy Standard Missile and Advanced Medium 
Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) components. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 6/04; 
DOD design review: 3/06; 
Production decision: 7/09; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

SM-6 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SM-6 will combine existing SM-2 Block IV propulsion and warhead 
sections, and a modified seeker from the AMRAAM. According to the 
program office, the SM-6 program started development in 2004 with five 
of its seven critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. According to a Navy technology readiness 
assessment, all seven SM-6 critical technologies were mature by its 
August 2009 production decision. Land-based developmental flight tests 
against targets representing anti-ship cruise missiles were 
successful. However, during a developmental test in January 2009, the 
SM-6 missile failed to launch. Post-test failure investigation 
identified an issue with the tactical seeker batteries which caused 
mission computer failure. The contractor implemented corrective 
actions to missile circuitry to prevent this type of failure and in 
August 2009 it was retested successfully. The SM-6 has not yet been 
flight tested at sea. As of January 2010, the first operational flight 
test at sea is scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010, 
following a series of combined developmental-operational tests (DT/OT) 
scheduled to begin in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. Until 
these tests are conducted, the potential for future design changes and 
retrofits remain. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, all SM-6 drawings are releasable to 
manufacturing, indicating design stability. However, only about 22 
percent of the total design drawings were releasable when the program 
held its design review in March 2006. The primary metric that the 
program office uses to assess design stability is the number of 
changes that affect performance requirements per month. The program 
office measures these changes as a percentage of the total 
requirements in the missile's specifications, and set a goal of less 
than 5 percent. According to the program office, the SM-6 met this 
goal for design stability at both its design and low-rate initial 
production reviews. 

Production Maturity: 

Although the SM-6 program has identified its critical manufacturing 
processes, it has not started to collect the data to show those 
processes are in control. About 77 percent of the hardware components 
of the SM-6 are legacy Standard Missile and AMRAAM components. In the 
meantime, the program analytically assessed selected key product 
characteristics with higher risk for probability of noncompliance. In 
addition, prior to the low-rate initial production decision, the 
contractor conducted an assessment in December of 2008 to evaluate 
whether the overall SM-6 missile was mature enough to enter low-rate 
initial production using manufacturing readiness levels. The 
contractor concluded at the time that the manufacturing process was 
nearing maturity, and identified risks associated with several 
components and subsystems, as well as the capacity of test equipment. 

Other Program Issues: 

The SM-6 program is pursuing a concurrent testing and production 
strategy that could result in costly retrofits and schedule delays if 
unexpected design changes are required as a result of testing. The 
first lot of low-rate production missiles is expected to be produced 
concurrently with the completion of developmental testing. In 
addition, the program has not yet flight tested the SM-6 at sea or 
tested one key capability--receiving in-flight updates from another 
Aegis ship (engage-on-remote). 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the SM-6 program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps. 

[End of figure] 

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft developed for Marine Corps, 
Air Force, and Navy use. The Marine Corps completed four deployments 
with MV-22 Block B aircraft, including one at sea. Two deployments are 
ongoing; the aircraft is now being used in support of operations in 
Afghanistan and the humanitarian effort in Haiti. The Air Force 
Special Operations CV-22 has completed initial operational testing and 
begun its initial combat deployment. Our assessment focuses on the MV-
22 Block B. 

Concept: 
Program start (12/82). 

System development: 
Development start (4/86); 
Development restart (9/94); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
Full-rate decision (9/05); 
Initial capability (6/07); 
Operational deployment (9/07); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Last procurement (2018). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $320.1 million:
Procurement: $22,298.7 million:
Total funding: $22,719.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 282: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,135.6; 
Latest 09/2008: $12,805.5; 
Percent change: 209.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $34,745.8; 
Latest 09/2008: $43,089.8; 
Percent change: 24.0%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $39,112.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $56,141.2; 
Percent change: 43.5%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $42.839; 
Latest 09/2008: $122.579; 
Percent change: 186.1%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 913; 
Latest 09/2008: 458; 
Percent change: -49.8%. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 117; 
Latest 09/2008: 291; 
Percent change: 148.7%. 

[End of table] 

The MV-22 completed four combat deployments, including its first 
shipboard deployment on board the USS Bataan. Although the aircraft 
was approved for full-rate production in 2005, the program continues 
to identify and correct deficiencies. According to program officials, 
fixes for some key components including the engine air filtration and 
ice protection systems (IPS) have been identified. Incremental IPS 
upgrades are being fielded on some deployed aircraft, including the V- 
22s currently in use in Afghanistan. In addition, eight interim 
defensive weapon system mission kits have been purchased with five 
kits currently deployed. Program officials anticipate making further 
improvements to these systems. Although the V-22 availability rate has 
improved, it still falls short of its mission capable goal and a 
steering committee is examining options to increase operational 
availability. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: 4/86; 
DOD design review: 9/02; 
Production decision: 9/05; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

V-22 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Although the program office considers V-22 critical technologies to be 
mature and its design stable, the program continues to correct 
deficiencies and make improvements to the aircraft. For example, the 
engine air particle separator (EAPS), which keeps debris out of the 
engines, and has been tied to a number of engine fires caused by 
leaking hydraulic fluids contacting hot engine parts. Previous design 
changes did not fully correct this problem or other EAPS problems. 
According to program officials a root cause analysis is underway and 
they are exploring ways to improve reliability and safety of EAPS. 
Further, they believe that improved EAPS performance could reduce EAPS 
shutdowns and help to extend engine service life beyond its current 
average of 600 hours. 

According to program officials the program has purchased eight belly 
mounted all quadrant (360 degrees) interim defensive weapon system 
mission kits. Five kits are currently on deployed V-22 aircraft. The 
aircraft has a key performance parameter (KPP) requirement to carry 24 
combat equipped troops. The MV-22's shipboard pre-deployment exercise 
found that planning for fewer troops is needed to allow for additional 
space for equipment, including larger personal protective equipment. 
When retracted, the belly-mounted gun would reduce internal space and 
it will not meet the KPP of 24 combat equipped troops. 

According to program officials, incremental upgrades to the IPS are 
being fielded in concert with an overall strategy to improve IPS 
reliability. These incremental upgrades are now being fielded on some 
deployed aircraft, including the V-22s attached to the squadron 
deployed to Afghanistan, where icing conditions are more likely to be 
encountered. The program expects to make additional improvements to 
the IPS which could require retrofits to existing aircraft. 

Production Maturity: 

The V-22 is in the third year of a 5-year contract for 167 aircraft. 
According to the program office, the production rate will be 35 
aircraft per year for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. The program is 
planning and budgeting for cost savings that would result from a 
second multiyear procurement contract that would begin in fiscal year 
2013. 

Other Program Issues: 

The MV-22's shipboard pre-deployment training revealed challenges 
related to required aircraft maintenance and operations. Due to the 
aircraft's design, many components of the aircraft are inaccessible 
until the aircraft is towed from its parking spot. Shipboard 
operations were adjusted to provide 24 hour aircraft movement 
capability. Temporary work-arounds were also identified to mitigate 
competition for hangar deck space, as well as to address deck heating 
issues on smaller ships caused by the V-22's exhaust. Operational 
restrictions were also in place that required one open spot between an 
MV-22 when landing or taking off and smaller aircraft to avoid 
excessive buffeting of the lighter helicopters caused by the downwash 
of the Osprey. According to program officials, another restriction 
that limited takeoffs and landings from two spots on LHD-class ships 
has since been corrected with the installation of a new flight control 
software upgrade. Despite the restrictions, the amphibious assault 
mission was concluded with half the total number of aircraft, in less 
time, and over twice the distance compared to conducting the mission 
using traditional aircraft. However, the speed, altitude, and range 
advantages of the MV-22 will require the Marine Corps to reevaluate 
escort and close air support tactics and procedures. According to the 
program office, during the first sea deployment in 2009, the MV-22 
achieved a mission capable rate of 66.7 percent. This still falls 
short of the minimum acceptable (threshold) rate of 82 percent. The 
mission capable rate achieved during three Iraq deployments was 62 
percent average. The program is also taking various steps to improve 
the system's overall operational availability and cost to operate by 
addressing premature failure of selected components and establishing a 
steering committee to analyze factors that affect readiness and impact 
operations and support costs. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the V-22 program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Virginia-class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy 
submarines and surface ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide 
improved surveillance and special operations support to enhance 
littoral warfare. The Navy purchases the submarines in blocks and 
awarded its Block III construction contract in December 2008. The Navy 
is gradually introducing three new technologies to improve performance 
and lower construction costs. We assessed the status of the new 
technologies, cost reduction efforts, and quality assurance. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start - SSN 774 (6/95); 
Development start - AESR (12/08); 
GAO review (1/10). 

Production: 
Milestone III - full-rate production decision (4/10); 
Production decision - AESR (3/11); 
Development start - CAVES WAA (4/11); 
Production decision - CAVES WAA (10/14). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat Corporation:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $867.0 million:
Procurement: $44,065.4 million:
Total funding: $44,932.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 19: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,392.4; 
Latest 09/2008: $6,309.3; 
Percent change: 43.6%. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $54,565.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $76,073.1; 
Percent change: 39.4%. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $58,957.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $82,382.5; 
Percent change: 39.7%. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,965.258; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,746.083; 
Percent change: 39.7%. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 30; 
Latest 09/2008: 30; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 134; 
Latest 09/2008: 151; 
Percent change: 12.7%. 

[End of table] 

The Navy is gradually introducing three new technologies--advanced 
electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR), a conformal acoustic 
velocity sensor wide aperture array (CAVES WAA), and a flexible 
payload sail--on new or existing submarines as they mature. In the 
past year, the Navy has continued to develop AESR and CAVES WAA. 
However, due to changes in communications requirements, the Navy is 
reevaluating the design of the sail and is not certain when this 
technology will be ready for installation. The Navy has awarded a 
contract for construction of eight Block III submarines. In this 
contract, the Navy expects to realize its goal of reducing costs to 
$2.0 billion (in 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012. The Navy 
completed operational testing and evaluation of the Virginia-class 
submarine in March 2009 and plans to complete a full-rate production 
review in April 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Production decision: NA; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

Virginia-Class Submarine Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

There are three new technologies that the Navy plans to incorporate on 
current and future Virginia Class submarines once they mature--
advanced electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR), a conformal 
acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array (CAVES WAA), and a 
flexible payload sail. AESR is a software package comprised of two 
systems that use improved algorithms to continuously monitor and 
recalibrate the submarine's signature. The basic algorithms required 
to support this technology have been proven on other submarines. Navy 
officials stated they are now developing software and conducting 
laboratory tests in support of further algorithm development. The Navy 
has completed and released about 80 percent of the software code for 
this technology and plans to test it on board a submarine in February 
2010. The Navy will begin permanent AESR installations with SSN 782. 
It also plans to install the software on earlier ships when they are 
modernized. 

CAVES WAA is a sensor array that is designed to detect the vibrations 
and acoustic signatures of targets. The Navy has stated that CAVES WAA 
could save approximately $4 million per submarine. The Navy is 
analyzing two options for CAVES WAA production--ceramic 
accelerometers, a mature but more costly technology, or fiber-optic 
accelerometers, a less expensive but immature technology. According to 
program officials, the Navy completed testing panels incorporating 
both types of sensors in December 2008 and plans additional at sea 
testing in 2010. The Navy is also considering another option, using a 
more mature conformal array technology manufactured for the United 
Kingdom's Royal Navy. The Navy is evaluating whether or not this 
technology is a viable candidate for installation on Virginia-class 
submarines. 

The flexible payload sail would replace the sail atop the main body of 
the submarine. Due to recent changes in communications requirements, 
the Navy is reevaluating the design of the sail and is not certain 
when this technology will be ready for installation. 

Production Maturity: 

The Navy has identified extensive quality assurance problems at one of 
the Virginia-class shipyards. These problems include multiple 
contractor errors on Virginia-class submarines, the most recent of 
which involved the installation of weapons loading systems. Navy 
officials reported that the error in the weapons loading system 
installation does not affect deployed submarines. The Navy continues 
to investigate the extent of the quality assurance problems and the 
potential cost and schedule implications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy expects to achieve its goal of reducing costs to $2.0 billion 
(in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012. In 
December 2008, the Navy awarded a contract for construction of 8 Block 
III submarines bringing the total number of ships either delivered or 
under contract to 18. As part of this contract, the Navy plans to 
increase its procurement rate to two submarines per year beginning in 
fiscal year 2011 and anticipates this increase in procurement will 
generate savings of $200 million per submarine. This contract also 
reflects additional per-ship cost reductions. The Navy has also begun 
a total ownership cost reduction initiative for the program, under 
which the Navy will attempt to reduce the operations and support costs 
and other life cycle costs for future submarines. 

In March 2009, the Navy completed an operational test and evaluation 
of the Virginia-class program and found it to be operationally 
effective and suitable. The Navy plans to conduct a full-rate 
production review in April 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: © 2006 Northrop-Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's VTUAV will provide real-time imagery and data to support 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. A VTUAV 
system is composed of up to three air vehicles with associated 
sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery system, and spares 
and support equipment. The air vehicle launches and recovers 
vertically, and operates from ships and land. The VTUAV is being 
designed as a modular, reconfigurable system to support various 
operations that may include surface, antisubmarine, and mine warfare. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/00). 

System development: 
Design review (11/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/07); 
Initial capability (12/09); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Full-rate decision (3/10); 
Last Procurement (12/22). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $32.3 million:
Procurement: $1,272.0 million:
Total funding: $1,378.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 159: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $583.3; 
Latest 09/2008: $633.8; 
Percent change: 8.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,641.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $1,418.0; 
Percent change: -13.6. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,551.1; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,195.4; 
Percent change: -13.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $14.413; 
Latest 09/2008: $12.545; 
Percent change: -13.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 177; 
Latest 09/2008: 175; 
Percent change: -1.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 104; 
Latest 09/2008: 119; 
Percent change: 14.4. 

[End of table] 

The VTUAV program entered low-rate initial production in May 2007 with 
mature technologies and stable designs. The program uses common, 
mature technologies; for example, the air vehicles are based on a 
commercial manned helicopter that has been in service for over 20 
years. The VTUAV is currently undergoing developmental and operational 
testing and has landed successfully aboard a ship. The program plans 
to achieve initial operational capability in late 2009 and reach a 
full-rate production decision in March 2010. In February 2008, after 
being advised of at least a 2-year delay in the Littoral Combat Ship 
program, the Navy decided to continue VTUAV development using an 
alternate ship--a frigate. Navy officials estimated the move to the 
alternate ship would require $42.6 million of additional funding and 
result in a 9-month schedule delay for the VTUAV program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start (not assessed): 1/00; 
DOD design review (not assessed): 11/05; 
Production decision: 5/07; 
GAO review: 1/10. 

[End of figure] 

VTUAV Fire Scout Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, the VTUAV relies on common, mature 
technologies. In 2006, the program office completed a technology 
readiness assessment to support the VTUAV's entry in production and 
concluded that it had no critical technologies because it utilized 
existing commercial technologies. For example, the air vehicles are 
based on a commercial manned helicopter that has been in service for 
over 20 years. The VTUAV has landed successfully aboard a Navy frigate 
and has demonstrated operational capability. The operational test 
community's formal evaluation of the system's operational suitability 
and effectiveness is scheduled to be completed by December 2009. 
Operational evaluation was delayed to incorporate software changes 
that should reduce the number of erroneous warnings displayed to the 
operator and to improve system reliability. 

Design Maturity: 

The VTUAV's design is stable and the program has released over 99 
percent of the system's drawings. However, the program did not achieve 
design stability until it reached low-rate initial production in May 
2007--18 months after its November 2005 design review. According to 
the program office, the design changes that have been made since then 
involve final updates to the avionics and ground control station 
needed to field the system safely or to account for reconfiguration of 
the ground control station to deploy on a frigate versus the Littoral 
Combat Ship. 

Production Maturity: 

The VTUAV was originally designed as a modified commercial off-the- 
shelf item. We could not assess production maturity because the 
program did not require Northrop Grumman--the prime contractor--or its 
supplier base to identify key product characteristics, which is the 
first step to implementing production process controls. One VTUAV 
supplier does use statistical process controls to measure elements of 
blade manufacturing. The program has conducted numerous production 
readiness assessments of Northrop Grumman and its key suppliers and 
determined that the program needs to identify key product 
characteristics across the program. In addition, the program will 
collect statistical process control data as part of the production 
contract. The program plans to procure nine aircraft during low-rate 
initial production. 

Other Program Issues: 

In February 2008, after being advised of at least a 2-year delay in 
the LCS program, the Navy decided to continue VTUAV development using 
an alternate ship--a frigate. Navy officials estimated the move to the 
alternate ship would require $42.6 million of additional funding and 
result in a 9-month schedule delay for the VTUAV program. The 
additional funds were used to determine the system changes that would 
be needed to deploy the VTUAV off a frigate, including the mechanical 
integration of the system into the ship and changes in the ground 
control station. 

The VTUAV program is currently considering a variety of future 
capabilities that could be added to the system, including a surface 
search radar, a signals intelligence package, an enhanced data and 
communications relay, and weapons. The program office has funding and 
plans in place to integrate a surface search radar in fiscal year 
2010. Other capabilities are currently unfunded. Work on these 
capabilities will not begin until at least fiscal year 2012. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with the draft of this assessment. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Office of the Project Manager WIN-T. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels 
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in four 
increments. The second increment will provide the Army with an initial 
networking on-the-move capability. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (6/07); 
Design review (2/08). 

Production: 
GAO review (1/10); 
Low-rate decision (2/10); 
Full-rate decision (2/12); 
Initial capability (11/12). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $28.9 million:
Procurement: $3,093.2 million:
Total funding: $3,122.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,635: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $232.7; 
Latest 09/2008: $239.7; 
Percent change: 3.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,384.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,227.2; 
Percent change: -4.6. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $3,617.2; 
Latest 09/2008: $3,466.9; 
Percent change: -4.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1.911; 
Latest 09/2008: $1.984; 
Percent change: 3.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 1,893; 
Latest 09/2008: 1,747; 
Percent change: -7.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 50; 
Latest 09/2008: 65; 
Percent change: 30.0. 

[End of table] 

All 15 WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies were mature by its 
planned January 2010 production decision. In November 2009, the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, concurred with an Army 
assessment that found all WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies had 
been demonstrated in a realistic environment. When WIN-T Increment 2 
began development in June 2007, only seven critical technologies were 
mature or nearing maturity. The other eight technologies could not be 
assessed because the Army did not provide sufficient evidence of their 
maturity. We could not assess the design stability or production 
maturity of WIN-T Increment 2 because the program office does not 
track the number of releasable drawings or critical manufacturing 
processes in statistical control. According to the program office, 
these metrics are not meaningful because WIN-T is not a manufacturing 
effort. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start (not assessed): 6/07; 
DOD design review: 2/08; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
Production decision: 2/10. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Inc 2 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All 15 WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies were mature by its 
planned January 2010 production decision. In September 2009, the Army 
completed a technology readiness assessment to support a low-rate 
initial production decision. An independent review team reviewed this 
technology readiness assessment and the body of evidence used to 
support it and concluded that all 15 critical technologies were 
mature. In November 2009, the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, concurred with the independent review team's assessment, 
noting that tests conducted by the Army show that each of WIN-T 
Increment 2's critical technologies have been demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. 

The original WIN-T program entered system development in August 2003 
with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies nearing maturity; none 
were fully mature. Insufficient technical readiness was cited as one 
of the key factors leading to a March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach of the critical threshold for the original program. Following 
that cost breach, the WIN-T program was restructured to be fielded 
incrementally using more mature technologies. When WIN-T Increment 2 
began development in June 2007, only seven critical technologies were 
mature or nearing maturity. However, the maturity of the other eight 
WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies could not be assessed because 
the Army did not provided sufficient evidence to the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering. 

Design Maturity: 

According to program officials, WIN-T Increment 2 completed a 
successful critical design review in February 2008; however, we could 
not assess the design stability of the WIN-T Increment 2 because the 
program office does not track the number of releasable drawings. 
According to the program office, this metric is not meaningful because 
WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort. Instead, it measures performance 
through a series of component, subsystem, configuration item, and 
network level test events designed to demonstrate performance at 
increasing levels of system integration. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of the WIN-T Increment 2. 
According to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an information 
technology integration effort that relies on commercially available 
products. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that the 
program office completed a Limited User Test (LUT) in March 2009 to 
demonstrate that WIN-T Increment 2 will meet its operational 
requirements. The LUT is an operational test designed to verify and 
validate the suitability of the system for operational deployment. The 
event also provides an opportunity to track training, reliability, and 
supportability of WIN-T components and system. The test was conducted 
at Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Gordon, 
Georgia, and included a Brigade Combat Team and Division slice of 
Increment 2 equipment. The test also included a representative suite 
of WIN-T Increment 1 equipment to demonstrate interoperability across 
the increments. The Army Test and Evaluation Command completed an 
independent evaluation of the event and generated a report on its 
findings. The results of this test along with an earlier Developmental 
Test were used to support a successful Milestone C production decision 
on February 3, 2010. The Army also provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Increment 3: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Office of the Project Manager WIN-T. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels 
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in four 
increments. The third increment will provide the Army a full 
networking on-the-move capability. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (7/03); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Design review (2/14). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/16); 
Full-rate decision (12/18); 
Initial capability (6/19). 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,634.5 million:
Procurement: $13,344.5 million:
Total funding: $14,979.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,443: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2010 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $2,621.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $2,621.5; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $13,344.5; 
Latest 09/2008: $13,344.5; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $15,966.0; 
Latest 09/2008: $15,966.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4.585; 
Latest 09/2008: $4.585; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 3,482; 
Latest 09/2008: 3,482; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 165; 
Latest 09/2008: 191; 
Percent change: 15.8%. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, all 20 WIN-T Increment 3 critical 
technologies will not be mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment until its planned May 2013 production decision. Three 
technologies are currently mature and 15 are nearing maturity. The 
19th technology was also rated as nearing maturity by an independent 
review team; but, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), concluded that the technology, while robust, had ambiguous 
requirements that made it difficult to state whether the technology 
had been adequately demonstrated. The 20th technology--a cryptographic 
device whose development is being managed by the National Security 
Agency--is not yet available to be rated. The Army expects to have a 
revised WIN-T Increment 3 acquisition program baseline in place by 
March 2010 that accounts for changes to the Future Combat System 
program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Graph depicts the desired level of knowledge for three knowledge 
points, in relation to the stacked bars: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; and: 
Production, design and technology maturity. 

Stacked bars depicts the following: 
Development start (not assessed): 7/03; 
GAO review: 1/10; 
DOD design review: 2/14; 
Production decision: 5/16. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Inc 3 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all 20 WIN-T Increment 3 critical 
technologies will not be mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment until its planned May 2013 production decision. In April 
2009, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), reviewed 
an Army technology readiness assessment and concluded that 3 WIN-T 
Increment 3 critical technologies were mature and 15 were nearing 
maturity. 

The 19th technology--the Quality of Service Edge Device (QED)--was 
rated as nearing maturity in the Army assessment; however, DDR&E 
concluded that this technology had ambiguous requirements that made it 
difficult to state whether it had been adequately demonstrated. DDR&E 
noted that while the Army had demonstrated that the QED technology met 
requirements under most conditions, in one stressing scenario it did 
not. DDR&E representatives believe that it is unlikely that any 
network can meet this requirement in all environments. Since the QED 
technology was shown to be robust and capable of meeting its 
requirement in most scenarios, DDR&E recommended that the Army clarify 
the user's requirements for this technology by the next design review, 
currently scheduled for November 2011. 

The 20th technology--High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor 
(HAIPE) version 3.X--was not available to be rated. HAIPE is a device 
that encrypts and encapsulates Internet protocol packets so that they 
can be securely transported over a network of a different security 
classification. The current version of HAIPE (version 1.3.5) is 
mature; however its use in WIN-T Increment 3 would result in a less 
efficient network design. DDR&E has notified the Army that the 
maturity of the HAIPE version 3.X technology should be established to 
DDR&E's satisfaction before it is transitioned into WIN-T Increment 3. 
The National Security Agency (NSA) manages the HAIPE program and is 
responsible for certifying the maturity of HAIPE technology. According 
to an NSA representative, NSA has not yet been formally tasked with 
providing an assessment of HAIPE 3.X. However, the official believes 
that the latest version of HAIPE--version 3.1.2--is nearing maturity. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 restricted the WIN- 
T Increment 3 program's ability to obligate and expend research, 
development, test, and evaluation funding for fiscal year 2009 until 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics notified congressional defense committees that a new 
acquisition program baseline had been approved and an independent cost 
estimate and technology readiness assessment had been completed. In 
May 2009, the Under Secretary notified the congressional defense 
committees that these actions had been completed. However, the new 
baseline was developed prior to the Secretary of Defense's recommended 
cancellation of portions of the Future Combat System (FCS) program, 
which is closely related to WIN-T Increment 3. As a result, the Under 
Secretary restricted the Army from obligating or expending WIN-T 
Increment 3 funds associated directly with FCS and directed that a new 
cost estimate and acquisition program baseline be completed and 
approved. According to an Army representative, a new baseline will be 
in place by March 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army noted that the 
program office received notification of the cancellation of the manned 
ground vehicle component of the Future Combat System program. The 
Department of Defense Defense Acquisition Executive issued an 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum in May 2009 that directed WIN-T to 
refocus its efforts on Transmission Sub-System in supporting the 
airborne communications relay and WIN-T Increment 2. The Army also 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: PEO IWS. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) will be a next- 
generation radar system designed to provide ballistic missile defense, 
air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. The Navy plans to 
develop AMDR with technology that is scalable and adaptable to changes 
in future operational requirements. The Navy is designing AMDR to 
support multiple ship classes. 

Current Status: 

The AMDR program began concept development in 2009. In June 2009, the 
Navy awarded fixed-price concept development contracts to Northrop 
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. Each contractor completed 
concept studies and developed a plan for demonstrating the program's 
four key critical technologies in a relevant environment prior to 
engineering and manufacturing development. Program officials stated 
that these concept studies contracts were completed in December 2009. 
According to program officials, the digital beamforming--a critical 
technology necessary for AMDR's simultaneous air defense and ballistic 
missile defense mission--will likely take the longest time in 
development to mature. Program officials stated that this technology 
is currently in use on existing radars, but has not been demonstrated 
on a large-aperture radar. 

In December 2009, the Navy released a request for proposals for AMDR 
technology development pending the completion of a Navy-sponsored 
study of possible hulls and radar specifications for the Navy's future 
surface combatant. By the third quarter 2010, program officials expect 
to receive approval to enter technology development and award up to 
three technology development contracts. As required under the new 
acquisition policy, AMDR's technology development phase will include 
the development of competitive prototypes. 

While the Navy plans to install AMDR on future platforms, the Navy 
estimates that AMDR will not be available for delivery to a shipyard 
until fiscal year 2019. 

Funding, Fiscal Year 2010: RDT&E $189.1 million: 

Next Major Program Event: Technology development start, fiscal year 
2010: 

Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this 
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability 
Increment 2: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: B-2 Systems Group 1999, USAF photo. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite communication system 
designed to upgrade the current avionics infrastructure, replace the 
ultra high frequency system, and ensure a continued secure, survivable 
communication capability. The program includes three increments. 
Increment 2 provides survivable strategic connectivity by adding low- 
observable antennas and radomes, and includes nonintegrated Family of 
Advanced Beyond Line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) and related hardware. 

Current Status: 

In March 2008, the B-2 EHF Increment 2 program initiated a two-phase 
component advanced development effort to conduct detailed systems 
engineering, requirements analysis, technology maturation, and 
preliminary design activities prior to the start of engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD). During the first phase, the program 
identified risks that raised concerns about the viability of existing 
Increment 2 requirements. Specifically, the program determined that 
three out of four key performance parameters could not be met as 
written; no technology could meet all the requirements; requirements 
did not adequately reflect warfighter needs and available 
technologies; and the current need date for providing Increment 2 
capabilities could not be met. The program reconciled these problems 
with user requirements and technical capabilities in October 2009. The 
program expects to shift away from a mechanical array to an active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. According to program 
officials, this change should mitigate several program risks by 
removing limitations on where the array can be installed on the 
aircraft and enabling the aircraft to manage transmission power. 
However, the effect that radar integration will have on the low- 
observable characteristics, as well as antenna technology maturation 
and FAB-T integration, remain risk items for the program. 

The B-2 EHF program recently decided to delay the planned start of EMD 
for Increment 2 by over a year. This decision, as well as the one to 
conduct extensive technical studies and requirements analysis prior to 
preliminary design and EMD, should help mitigate future program risks 
and decrease the likelihood of late, and potentially more costly, 
changes to requirements. The program office is developing new cost and 
schedule estimates that will reflect revisions to the program's 
requirements and technical approach. The new cost estimate is expected 
in early 2010. 

Estimated Program Cost: $1,394.5 million. The program office cost 
estimate is from 2008. It is currently being revised and is expected 
to increase. 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, January 2012: 

Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this 
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman Space Technology. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's STSS is designed to acquire and track threat ballistic missiles 
in all stages of flight. The agency obtained the two demonstrator 
satellites in 2002 from the Air Force SBIRS Low program that halted in 
1999. The MDA refurbished and launched the two STSS demonstrations 
satellites on September 25, 2009. Over the next 2 years, the two 
satellites will take part in a series of tests to demonstrate their 
functionality and interoperability with the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System (BMDS). 

Current Status: 

In September 2009, two STSS demonstration satellites were successfully 
placed on-orbit. According to the program office, the 2 years of 
launch delays resulted in over $400 million in cost growth. 
Specifically, STSS officials reported that contract costs increased by 
40 percent or $385 million, including about $115 million to address 
the various hardware issues that drove the launch delays. In addition, 
they estimated that vehicle integration and launch support payments to 
NASA increased from $78 million to nearly $100 million. 

MDA expects to gain valuable information from the STSS demonstration. 
The program plans to test STSS capabilities, including missile 
detection and tracking throughout all phases of flight and intercept 
assessment in the context of the BMDS. According to the STSS program 
office, lessons learned from the STSS satellites will inform the 
design of a Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) experimental 
prototype, scheduled to launch in 2014. The PTSS will be a new 
technology development program, separate from STSS, which will apply 
lessons learned from the STSS demonstration and its own prototype to 
make decisions regarding a future satellite constellation. 

While the STSS program sustained personnel cuts, creating a knowledge 
and expertise gap, program officials reported they have filled most 
open positions and that the Air Force has committed to fully staffing 
the program. According to the program office, maintaining these 
personnel levels is important for ensuring that all the analysis and 
data collection functions are resourced. The STSS program also 
incurred significant funding cuts in fiscal year 2009 and anticipates 
additional cuts in fiscal year 2010. Although program officials 
explained that they were able to maintain continuous, around-the-clock 
satellite operations, they reduced STSS software upgrade development 
efforts and system engineering support, and terminated all technology 
risk-reduction efforts. According to the program office these cuts may 
delay the achievement of several STSS BMDS-level interoperability 
objectives. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2010-2013: RDT&E $472 million: 

Next Major Program Event: NA: 

Program Office Comments: The program office stated that STSS will 
provide risk-reduction data collection for future space-based sensor 
development, provide the necessary data to validate MDA space sensor 
models and simulations, and support functional demonstrations of the 
future operational integrated space architecture. The program also 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-27J: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: L-3 Communications. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-27J Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional 
aircraft. Its primary mission is to provide on-demand transport of 
time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and key personnel to forward-
deployed Army units, including those in remote and austere locations. 
Its mission also includes casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop 
transport, aerial sustainment, and homeland security. The aircraft is 
capable of carrying up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicles and heavy, dense loads such as aircraft engines and 
ammunition. 

Current Status: 

Initially designated the Joint Cargo Aircraft, the C-27J program began 
in late 2005 when the Under Secretary (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) directed the Army and Air Force to merge their intratheater 
airlift requirements. In June 2007, a joint Army/Air Force source 
selection team selected the commercial-off-the-shelf C-27J as the 
Joint Cargo Aircraft in a full and open competition, and awarded a 
firm-fixed price contract to L-3 Communications Integrated Systems. 
The program entered DOD's acquisition cycle at Milestone C (low-rate 
initial production) since it involved the procurement of a commercial 
aircraft. 

In fiscal year 2009, a DOD Resource Management Decision transferred 
responsibility for the program and the Army's time-sensitive/mission- 
critical resupply mission to the Air Force. As part of this 
restructuring, planned program quantities were reduced by 
approximately 51 percent, from 78 to 38 aircraft. Army orders 
constitute 13 of the 38 aircraft. These aircraft--2 of which have 
already been delivered--will be transferred to the Air Force. Air 
Force procurements under the program are expected to end in fiscal 
year 2012. The services have developed an event-driven plan to 
transition programmatic and functional responsibilities, such as 
contracting, engineering, and logistics, to the Air Force throughout 
fiscal year 2010. Additionally, the Army and Air Force have drafted a 
concept of employment describing how they will operate together 
providing tactical airlift for the Army to transport time-sensitive, 
mission-critical equipment, supplies, and personnel. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2006-2015: RDT&E: $118.5 million Procurement: 
$1,705.3 million Quantity: 38: 

Next Major Program Event: Initial operational capability, November 
2010: 

Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this 
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: BAE Systems. 

Note: Photo is of the ATIRCM/CMWS. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's CIRCM will be used with the Common Missile Warning System, 
and a countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing 
expendables, such as flares and chaff, to defend U.S. aircraft from 
advanced infrared-guided missiles. CIRCM is one of three subprograms 
that make up the Advanced Threat Infrared Counter Measures/Common 
Missile Warning System (ATIRCM/CMWS) major defense acquisition 
program. CIRCM will provide development of laser-based countermeasure 
systems for all rotary-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft across DOD. 

Current Status: 

In June 2009 the Army received approval to award contracts to five 
contractors to provide systems for testing. According to a program 
official, these tests are complete and are being used to determine the 
performance and maturity of the competing systems. The Army has 
conducted a system-level preliminary design review for the CIRCM 
program. According to DOD, these contracts will five satisfy the 
requirement for competitive prototyping prior to the planned start of 
engineering and manufacturing development. According to a program 
official, the results of the Army competitive testing will be 
presented to Army and OSD leadership in February 2010 to discuss the 
acquisition path forward. The EMD contract award date will be 
determined after the Army and OSD's overarching integrated product 
teams meet--scheduled for February 2010. 

The CIRCM program began when the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics supported the Army's decision to 
restructure the ATIRCM/CMWS program and directed the Army to establish 
subprograms in April 2009. The Under Secretary determined that 
aircraft survivability equipment development needed better 
coordination of service efforts, more emphasis on competitive 
prototyping, and a greater focus on reducing ownership cost by 
increasing reliability. The Under Secretary allowed CMWS to remain in 
full-rate production, but limited ATIRCM to fielding an interim laser 
jammer capability for CH-47 helicopters in use in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. This interim laser jammer capability will satisfy a Quick 
Reaction Capability need approved by the Army in September 2008. 
According to a program official, the ATIRCM first unit equipped was 
scheduled for September 2009; however, it was delayed until November 
2009 to allow for testing with representative units prior to fielding. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2010: RDT&E $238.820 million for ATIRCM, 
CMWS, and CIRCM: 

Next Major Program Event: Technology Development start, TBD: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
the Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

F-22A Raptor: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Air Force, 
http://www.af.mil/photos/index.asp?galleryID=40&page=5. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will have an expanded air-to-ground attack capability. It was 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics and 
supercruise, to make it less detectable and capable of higher speeds. 
The Air Force established the F-22A modernization and improvement 
program in 2003 to add enhanced air-to-ground, information warfare, 
reconnaissance, and other capabilities and to improve the reliability 
and maintainability of the aircraft. 

Current Status: 

In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that F-22A 
production would end at 187 aircraft. The Air Force has accepted 
delivery of 154 aircraft. The total cost to shutdown the F-22A 
production line has not been determined. 

As currently planned, the F-22A will be delivered in three 
configurations--global strike initial enhanced, global strike basic, 
and ground global strike enhanced. The Air Force originally planned to 
complete development of enhanced F-22A capabilities in 2010. Due to 
schedule delays, funding cuts, and requirement changes, the schedule 
has slipped 3 years. The Air Force has fielded and flight tested the 
first of four planned increments of the modernization program. The 
second major increment (3.1) is currently undergoing flight testing 
and is scheduled to start follow-on test and evaluation in 2010. One 
of the major capabilities included in increment 3.1 is the APG-77 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). The SAR radar is critical to giving 
the F-22A the ability to identify and target enemy ground defenses. 
The Air Force has only tested this radar on a flying test bed 
aircraft. The SAR radar will not be operationally tested on the F-22A 
aircraft until late 2010. The third increment of the modernization 
program (3.2) is currently in the requirements and analysis phase. 
During this phase, three new requirements were added to increment 3.2--
the multi-functional advanced data link, electronic protection, and 
combat identification. The critical technologies that support these 
requirements are not mature and prototypes have yet to be demonstrated 
in a relevant environment. In total, the program has obligated over $3 
billion for the F-22 modernization and reliability improvement program. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2010-2013: RDT&E $1,674.5 million; Procurement 
$1,051.1 million: 

Next Major Program Event: Initiation of follow-on test and evaluation 
for increment 3.1, 2010: 

Program Office Comments: The F-22A program office provided technical 
comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Combat System (FCS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

Until it was significantly restructured, the Army's FCS was the 
centerpiece of Army plans to transition to a lighter, more agile, and 
more capable combat force. The FCS program consisted of an integrated 
family of advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems; unmanned 
ground and air systems; and unattended sensors and munitions. FCS 
featured 14 major systems and other enabling systems along with an 
overarching network for information superiority and survivability. 

Current Status: 

In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to 
significantly restructure the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 
acquisition program. In the restructure, the Army terminated the 
manned ground vehicle development and abandoned its plans to field 
separate FCS BCTs. In a statement explaining his decision, the 
Secretary noted that the FCS vehicles did not adequately reflect the 
lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, he stated that he was troubled by the terms 
of the FCS contract, in particular its very unattractive fee structure 
that gave the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. 
At this time, the costs to terminate vehicle development are unknown. 
The Army is also negotiating the content and terms for the revised 
contract to develop the remaining items from the FCS program. The 
Office of Management and Budget estimates that net savings from 
terminating the ground vehicles, even after a replacement program has 
begun, could be $22.9 billion through fiscal year 2015. 

In June 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics signed an acquisition decision memorandum 
that instructed the Army to transition to a modernization plan 
consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs: one to 
produce and field the first seven infantry BCT unit sets; one or more 
acquisition programs to include, but not limited to, follow-on BCT 
modernization to develop, produce, and field required unmanned 
systems, sensors, and networking for the remaining combat brigades; 
one to continue development and fielding of incremental ground 
tactical network capability; and one to develop ground combat 
vehicles. The Army established a task force to carry out some of those 
instructions and that task force has generated, among other things, 
the preliminary requirements for the ground combat vehicle. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2009-2013: TBD: 

Next Major Program Event: In February 2010, DOD expected to make a 
materiel development decision for the ground combat vehicle program 
and the Army is proceeding with plans to conduct an analysis of 
alternatives. 

Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated into this product. 

[End of section] 

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile: 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: JAMS Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

JAGM is an Army-led joint program between the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps. The missile will be air-launched from helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft and is designed to target tanks; light armored vehicles; 
missile launchers; command, control, and communications vehicles; 
bunkers; and buildings. It is expected to provide line-of-sight and 
beyond line-of sight capabilities and be employed in a fire-and-forget 
mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will replace Hellfire, 
Maverick, and air-launched TOW missiles. 

Current Status: 

JAGM was approved to start a 27-month technology development phase in 
September 2008, and the program is implementing DOD's policy on 
competitive prototyping. The Army awarded fixed-price incentive 
contracts to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon for the technology 
development effort, which will culminate with flight tests of 
competing prototypes. The Army will select one of the contractors to 
proceed to engineering and manufacturing development. The JAGM program 
also plans to conduct a preliminary design review in the third quarter 
of fiscal year 2010. The program must also complete a postpreliminary 
design review assessment before it can be certified to enter 
engineering and manufacturing development. 

The JAGM program has identified three critical technologies--a 
multimode seeker for increased countermeasure resistance, boost- 
sustain propulsion for increased standoff range, and a multipurpose 
warhead for increased lethality. Program officials noted that many of 
the components of these technologies are being used on other missile 
systems, but they have not been fully integrated into a production 
missile. Program officials expect these technologies to be nearing 
maturity by the start of system development. To mitigate potential 
schedule and funding risks, the program has identified backup 
technologies for integration that are almost all mature. However, 
according to the program office, use of these backups could result in 
reduced capability, with the possibility of higher development and 
production costs, or an increased logistics burden or both. 

The Army will continue to extend the fielding of Hellfire missiles to 
meet the needs of the warfighter, while the Navy will rely on both 
Maverick and Hellfire missiles until JAGM becomes available. 

Estimated Total Program Cost, Fiscal Years 2008-2027: $6,385.8 million: 

RDT&E: $1,642.2 million: 

Procurement: $4,743.6 million: 

Quantities: 33,853: 

Next Major Program Event: Milestone B decision, November 2010. 
Engineering and Manufacturing development start, December 2010. 

Program Office Comments: The program office made technical 
corrections, which were incorporated as appropriate. It noted that 
funding numbers are program office estimates and will be updated by 
the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, at the Milestone 
B decision. 

[End of section] 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: PM JLTV/TD Phase Industry models as of 29 Oct 2009. 

[End of figure] 

The U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command's Joint 
Light Tactical Vehicle concept is a family of vehicles that is 
intended to supplement and potentially replace the High-Mobility Multi-
Purpose Wheeled Vehicle. The JLTV plans to provide defensive measures 
covering troops while in transport, increase payload, improve the 
logistics footprint, and reduce soldier workload associated with 
system operation and field maintenance activities. JLTV also expects 
to reduce life cycle costs through commonality at the subassembly and 
component level. 

Current Status: 

In December 2007, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics directed the Army to begin a 27-month 
technology development phase for the JLTV program with the goal of 
reducing risks prior to and shortening the length of system 
development. As part of the technology development phase, the JLTV 
program is implementing DOD's policy to develop competitive 
prototypes, demonstrate critical technologies in a relevant 
environment, and conduct a preliminary design review before entering 
into engineering and manufacturing development. In October 2008, the 
Army awarded technology development contracts to BAE Systems Land & 
Armaments, Ground Systems Division; General Tactical Vehicles, a joint 
venture of General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General; and Lockheed 
Martin Systems Integration. The Army plans to prototype and test 4 of 
the 10 configurations of JLTV during the technology development phase. 
In addition, each contractor will complete designs for the entire 
family of vehicles. The JLTV program completed preliminary design 
reviews during the summer of 2009. Critical design reviews are planned 
for early fiscal year 2010. 

At the conclusion of the technology development phase, the Army plans 
to hold a full and open competition and award two engineering and 
manufacturing development contracts. Following development, one of 
these two contractors will be selected for the production phase. If 
approved by the milestone decision authority, the program could begin 
low-rate initial production on selected JLTV configurations 
immediately following the technology development phase. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2008-2010: RDT&E $306.68 million (Army--$163.44 
million; USMC--$143.24 million): 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, fourth quarter fiscal year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
program officials stated that JLTV will restore transportability and 
overcome the current imbalance in protection, payload, and performance 
found in the existing tactical vehicle fleet. Modernizing the tactical 
vehicle fleet with JLTV is necessary to provide protected, sustained, 
and networked mobility for Army and Marine Corps personnel and 
equipment on the battlefield. 

[End of section] 

Kiowa Warrior (KW): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Kiowa Warrior ASH PMO. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's OH-58D Kiowa Warrior is a two-seat, single-engine, 
observation, scout/attack helicopter. The helicopter operates 
autonomously at standoff ranges providing armed reconnaissance, 
command and control, and target acquisition for other airborne weapons 
platforms in day, night, and adverse-weather conditions. We assessed 
the cockpit and sensor upgrade program that is part of a larger 
modification effort designed to extend the life of the Kiowa Warrior 
and address issues with interoperability, survivability, and 
sustainability. 

Current Status: 

The Kiowa Warrior Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade program is part of an 
ongoing Operational Service Extension Program designed to extend the 
life of the fleet through 2025. The Army approved the program's entry 
into the technology development phase in May 2009 in preparation for a 
development start decision in the fourth quarter of 2010. The program 
includes upgrades to improve the cockpit, performance, reliability, 
sustainability, survivability, communications, and lethality of the 
helicopter. For example, improvements to the cockpit include an 
improved master control processor, color displays, and independent 
mapping channels. The Army plans to upgrade the cockpit and sensors 
for the entire fleet of 368 Kiowa Warriors. 

The Kiowa Warrior Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade program has identified 10 
critical technologies and is working to mature these technologies 
prior to the start of system development in the fourth quarter of 
2010. Preliminary internal Army analysis indicate that all critical 
technologies may not be mature by the development decision, which puts 
the program at risk for cost growth and schedule delays. DOD 
regulations require that all critical technologies be demonstrated in 
a relevant environment prior to the start of system development. The 
Army has identified backup technologies for some but not all of the 
identified critical technologies and is addressing all critical 
technologies as part of its overall Technology Development Strategy. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2010-2014: RDT&E $732.3 million. 

Next Major Program Event: System development start, fourth quarter 
2010: 

Program Office Comments: A technology readiness assessment will be 
contained in the Acquisition Strategy Report not available until after 
Milestone B is completed (4Q10). A cursory, program-internal analysis 
did not adhere to strict guidelines expected by the DOD Technology 
Readiness Assessment Guidebook (May 2005) and did not include key 
inputs from industry and government sources. 

[End of section] 

Next Generation GPS Control Segment (OCX): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: GPSW OCS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's next generation GPS control segment (OCX) will provide 
command, control, and mission support for the GPS Block II and III 
satellites. OCX is expected to assure reliable and secure delivery of 
position and timing signals to serve the evolving needs of GPS 
military and civilian users. The Air Force plans to develop OCX in 
four blocks using an incremental approach to deliver upgrades as they 
become available. The first block will provide mission operations for 
GPS Block II and Block III satellites. 

Current Status: 

The GPS OCX program is in the technology development phase. In 
November 2007, the Air Force awarded contracts to Raytheon and 
Northrop Grumman for concept development, including prototyping 
activities. In February 2009, these contracts were modified to include 
further risk-reduction activities. DOD was originally scheduled to 
review the GPS OCX program for entry into the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase in April 2009; however, according to 
program officials, that review has been rescheduled for the fall of 
2010 to allow the program to hold a preliminary design review, which 
is now statutorily required to be held before a program enters the 
engineering and manufacturing development phase. According to the 
program office, the GPS OCX's 14 critical technologies are mature--
another requirement for entry into engineering and manufacturing 
development. 

To increase confidence in the schedule for delivering OCX, the GPS 
Wing added 16 months of development time to the effort, which means 
that OCX would not be fielded in time for the May 2014 launch of the 
first GPS IIIA satellite. As currently planned, OCX is scheduled to be 
delivered in August 2015. To address this issue, the GPS Wing is 
considering funding a parallel effort to command and control the GPS 
IIIA satellites in case OCX is delivered late. However, the GPS Wing 
currently predicts that the GPS IIIA satellite launches could begin as 
late as May 2016 without disrupting GPS service. 

There are several areas that pose risks for the program and could 
affect the schedule, including information assurance certification and 
space and ground segment integration. 

The Air Force's fiscal year 2010 OCX budget request totaled over 
$389.7 million for activities that include engineering studies and 
analyses, architecture engineering studies, trade studies, technology 
needs forecasting, systems engineering, systems development, and test 
and evaluation efforts. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2010-2015: RDT&E $1,526.3 million, Procurement 
$115.6 million: 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, fall 2010: 

Program Office Comments: According to the GPS Wing, OCX will also 
provide control of new modernized signals for civil users (including 
safety-of-life applications), secure military signals, and the ability 
to control signal power to counter enemy jamming threats. Risks 
associated with information assurance certification and space and 
ground segment integration are considered normal activities and are 
addressed as part of the GPS Wing's baseline process. 

[End of section] 

Ohio-Class Replacement/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Ohio-class Replacement will replace Ohio-class Ballistic 
Missile Submarines (SSBN) as they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy 
began research and development for the future submarine in order to 
avoid a gap in the provision of sea-based nuclear deterrence between 
Ohio-class retirement and production of a replacement. The Navy is 
working jointly with the United Kingdom to develop a common missile 
compartment for installation on both the Ohio-class Replacement and 
the United Kingdom's replacement for the Vanguard SSBN. 

Current Status: 

The Ohio-class Replacement program is conducting activities leading to 
entry into the technology development phase in the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2010. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved 
the Initial Capabilities Document for a Sea Based Strategic Deterrent 
(SBSD) in June 2008. The Navy recently completed an analysis of 
alternatives to study potential ship forms and configurations to 
inform how to best fulfill mission requirements. The Navy is planning 
for departmental approval of its proposed alternative by the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2010. According to program officials, the Navy 
began concept design in fiscal year 2010 to support construction 
beginning in fiscal year 2019. The Navy Fiscal Year 2009 Long Range 
Shipbuilding Plan includes 12 Ohio-class Replacement SSBNs. 

According to the Navy, in February 2008, the United States and United 
Kingdom began a joint effort to design a common missile compartment. 
This effort includes the participation of government officials from 
both countries, as well as industry officials from Electric Boat 
Corporation and BAE Systems. To date, the United Kingdom has provided 
a larger share of funding for this effort, totaling just over $200 
million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Navy officials told us that 
Congress approved $495 million for the program in fiscal year 2010. 
The majority of this funding will support the design of the missile 
compartment, while about $100 million supports design and feasibility 
studies for a new reactor plant. 

Funding: $13.2 million in fiscal year 2009, $495 million in fiscal 
year 2010: 

Next Major Program Event: Entry into the technology development phase 
in FY 2010: 

Program Office Comments: The Ohio-class Replacement Program Office 
generally concurs with the GAO assessment. Efforts to date have 
focused on development of a common missile compartment for use in the 
Ohio-class Replacement SSBN and the UK's successor to the existing 
Vanguard SSBNs. 

[End of section] 

Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS): 

[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: 3GIRS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS) is 
focusing on developing wide field of view (WFOV) earth staring 
capabilities, including WFOV infrared sensors and algorithms, for 
space-based infrared surveillance systems. The WFOV technology 
features a full-earth continuous staring sensor that is expected to 
enable the use of a smaller, lighter, and simpler payload and improve 
missile detection and warning times for future missile warning systems. 

Current Status: 

The 3GIRS program is currently developing technologies and has not 
identified a potential preliminary design start date. The program has 
taken steps to develop key product knowledge including contracting for 
competitive prototypes and conducting early subsystem testing. Two 
sensor prototypes have been delivered, a ground algorithm development 
laboratory has been established, and a quarter-earth staring sensor 
payload is scheduled to be delivered in April 2010. This payload--the 
commercially hosted infrared payload--is expected to be flown and 
tested on a commercial satellite in the second quarter of fiscal year 
2011. According to program officials, two of the program's four 
critical technologies are currently mature and two are immature having 
only been tested in a lab environment. 

3GIRS began in 2006 as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System. DOD 
expected the program to serve as a potential alternative to the third 
SBIRS geosynchronous earth orbit satellite. In August 2007, the 
milestone decision authority determined the SBIRS program had made 
substantial progress and directed the now 3GIRS program to refocus its 
efforts on technology maturation and risk reduction for the next 
generation of space-based infrared systems. The 3GIRS program had been 
on a path towards becoming a major defense acquisition program but the 
Air Force is now focusing 3GIRS on technology maturation for 
augmentation to the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and future 
missile warning systems. 3GIRS officials stated that the Air Force is 
currently working to identify critical issues, such as needed 
capabilities, and may conduct an analysis of alternatives this summer. 
Decisions in these areas can heavily influence total system life cycle 
costs. 

Funding, Fiscal Years 2010-2012: RDT&E $107.6 million: 

Next Major Program Event: Launch of commercially hosted infrared 
payload in 2011: 

Program office comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, the 
Air Force noted that fiscal year 2011 funding for 3GIRS as a stand 
alone effort was not requested. Instead, some work will continue under 
the SBIRS program. The Air Force also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 
are reprinted in appendix II. In those comments, DOD stated it was 
encouraged that the report cited the progress made by DOD in improving 
its acquisition programs and processes and agreed that factors we 
highlight, such as early systems engineering reviews and high 
technology readiness, are fundamental to containing cost growth. 
However, DOD continues to disagree with our long-established best 
practice standard for technology maturity. Our assessment notes the 
difference between our criteria and the standard for technology 
maturity contained in statute, while also acknowledging the 
significant increase in the technology maturity of newer programs 
entering system development. We also received technical comments from 
DOD, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be made 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

This report contains observations on the Department of Defense's (DOD) 
efforts to manage its fiscal year 2009 major defense acquisition 
program portfolio. To develop these observations, we obtained and 
analyzed documentation related to DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget 
request, focusing on the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to 
cancel or curtail a number of weapon programs. Using data and 
information obtained from individual programs, we evaluated the effect 
of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and identified future 
plans and requirements related to the canceled programs. 

We also collected and analyzed data on the composition of DOD's major 
defense acquisition program portfolio. To determine changes in that 
portfolio, we compared DOD's fiscal year 2009 major defense 
acquisition programs list, dated June 2009, with the list of programs 
that issued Selected Acquisition Reports in December 2007. To assess 
the cost effect of changes to the major defense acquisition portfolio, 
we first calculated the estimated total cost of the 18 programs 
entering the portfolio using data from program documents, specifically 
acquisition program baselines. We did not obtain cost data on 5 of the 
18 programs because they did not have an approved acquisition program 
baseline, so this amount is understated. To calculate the estimated 
total cost of the 12 programs exiting the portfolio, we used current 
cost estimates from December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports. We 
also calculated the total cost growth attributable to these programs 
by comparing their first full estimates to the current estimate in 
December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports. We excluded the Army's 
Future Combat System from our analysis of the portfolio changes since 
it appeared on DOD's fiscal year 2009 major defense acquisition 
program list, despite its June 2009 termination. However, because of 
its significance, we included its total estimated cost and cost growth 
since its first estimate in our discussion. The net cost effect of the 
Future Combat System termination is unknown since the Army plans to 
start several new programs to deliver some of the same or similar 
capabilities. 

Our ability to analyze the overall cost and schedule performance of 
DOD's fiscal year 2009 major defense acquisition program portfolio was 
limited because DOD did not prepare timely Selected Acquisition 
Reports that reflected the Secretary of Defense's proposed changes to 
weapon programs in the fiscal year 2010 budget. DOD did not provide 
another source of reliable data for us to use for this analysis. DOD 
prepared limited Selected Acquisition Reports for 85 of 102 major 
defense acquisition programs by November 2009, 6 months after the 
budget was submitted. Four programs prepared a baseline Selected 
Acquisition Report or a Selected Acquisition Report following a breach 
of the applicable statutory threshold--commonly referred to as a Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach;[Footnote 25] one program was designated a 
major acquisition information system program; and 12 programs that 
were either new major defense acquisition programs or programs that 
were being restructed did not prepare any Selected Acquisition 
Reports. The data in the limited Selected Acquisition Reports were not 
complete. Program costs were not updated from December 2007 Selected 
Acquisition Reports, except to reflect changes in the funding received 
in fiscal year 2009 and funding requested in fiscal year 2010. 
According to DOD, the rest of the cost data on programs could not be 
updated because the fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Defense Program 
was not complete. As a result, the limited Selected Acquisition 
Reports were not suitable for an overall analysis of the cost and 
schedule performance of DOD's fiscal year 2009 major defense 
acquisition program portfolio. 

With the exception of the budget dollars reported in table 1, all cost 
data in this report are in fiscal year 2010 dollars. We converted cost 
information to fiscal year 2010 dollars using conversion factors from 
the DOD Comptroller's National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal 
Year 2010 (Table 5-9). Through discussions with DOD officials 
responsible for this data and confirming selected data with program 
offices we determined that the data and information were sufficiently 
reliable for our purposes. 

Analysis of Selected DOD Programs Using Knowledge-Based Criteria: 

In total, this report presents information on 70 weapon programs. A 
table listing these programs is found in appendix IV. Out of these 
programs, 57 programs are captured in a two-page format discussing 
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained and other 
program issues. The remaining 13 programs are described in a one-page 
format that describes their current status. We chose these programs 
based on their estimated cost, stage in the acquisition process, and 
congressional interest. To obtain cost, schedule, technology, design, 
and manufacturing information from the programs, as well as 
information on other program factors such as requirements changes, 
configuration steering board activities, software development, and 
program office staffing, we asked 57 programs to complete two data 
collection instruments. We received responses from all 57 programs to 
the cost, schedule, and technology, design, and manufacturing 
instrument and responses from 56 programs to the data collection 
instrument related to other program factors. 

Our analysis of how well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based 
acquisition approach focuses on a subset of 42 nonshipbuilding major 
defense acquisition programs from DOD's fiscal year 2009 portfolio 
that are primarily in development or the early stages of production. 
The 28 programs that are not included in this analysis either do not 
have acquisition milestones that line up with development start, 
critical design review, and production start or lack key data on 
technology, design, and production necessary to assess them against 
our knowledge-based acquisition criteria at this point in time. 
[Footnote 26] 

To assess knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision points 
(system development start, critical design review, and production 
start), we collected data about their knowledge levels at each point. 
The data were collected from 42 program offices as of January 2010 
(additional information on product knowledge is found in the product 
knowledge assessment section of this appendix). Programs in our 
assessment were in various stages of the acquisition cycle, and not 
all of the programs provided knowledge information for each point. 
Programs were not included in our assessments if relevant decision or 
knowledge point data were not available. For each decision point, we 
summarized knowledge attainment as the number of programs with data 
that achieved that knowledge point. Twenty-nine programs provided data 
on technology maturity at development start, 28 programs provided data 
on design stability at their critical design review, and 7 programs 
provided data on production processes in control at production start. 
Our analysis of knowledge attained at each key point also includes 
other factors that we have previously identified as being key to a 
knowledge-based acquisition approach, including holding systems design 
reviews early in development, testing an integrated prototype prior to 
the design review, and testing a production representative prototype 
prior to making a production decision. 

We did not validate the data provided by the program offices, but 
reviewed the data and performed various checks to determine that they 
were reliable enough for our purposes. Where we discovered 
discrepancies, we clarified the data accordingly. In all but one of 
these areas, our potential group of respondents includes 46 major 
defense acquisition programs, including ships. The number of programs 
that responded to each of our questions varies. For our analysis of 
requirements changes, we obtained and analyzed information from 42 
programs about the number and effect of requirements changes since 
development start. For our analysis of software development, we 
obtained and analyzed information from 42 programs related to the 
number of software lines of code expected in the final system at 
development start and currently, and the percentages of software 
defects contained in-phase and in subsequent phases. Finally, we 
analyzed information related to program office staffing from 50 
programs, including 46 major defense acquisition programs and 4 
Missile Defense Agency elements, on the number of military personnel, 
civilian government employees, support contractors, and Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers and university-affiliated 
employees working in the following functions: program management, 
business related functions, contracting, engineering and technical 
support, administrative support, and other functions. 

To determine how DOD has begun to implement acquisition reform, we 
obtained and analyzed the revised DOD 5000.02 acquisition instruction 
and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. We also 
analyzed the pre-major defense acquisition programs in our assessment 
to determine how they were implementing requirements for competitive 
prototyping and preliminary design reviews. We also analyzed 
questionnaire responses from 45 programs on configuration steering 
boards. 

Finally, we relied on GAO's body of work examining DOD acquisition 
issues over the years. In recent years, we have issued reports that 
have identified systemic problems with major weapon systems 
acquisitions and we have made recommendations to DOD on ways to 
improve how it acquires major weapon systems. These reports cover 
contracting, program management, acquisition policy, cost estimating, 
budgeting, and requirements development. We have also issued many 
detailed reports evaluating specific weapon systems, such as aircraft 
programs, ships, communication systems, satellites, missile defense 
systems, and future combat systems. Finally, we used information from 
numerous GAO products that examine how commercial best practices can 
improve outcomes for DOD programs. This work has shown that valuable 
lessons can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied 
to the development of weapon systems. 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Over the past several years, DOD has revised policies governing weapon 
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major 
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more 
consistent across the 70 program assessments, we standardized the 
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in 
our assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an 
acquisition program as well as the start of engineering and 
manufacturing development. This coincides with DOD's Milestone B. A 
few programs in our assessment (mostly programs that began before 
2001) have a separate "program start" date, which begins a pre-system 
development phase for program definition and risk reduction 
activities. This "program start" date generally coincides with DOD's 
old terminology for Milestone I, followed by a "development start" 
date, either DOD's old Milestone II or new Milestone B depending on 
when the program began system development. The "production decision" 
generally refers to the decision to enter the production and 
deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial production. The 
"initial capability" refers to the initial operational capability--
sometimes called first unit equipped or required asset availability. 
For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of key program events in 
relation to acquisition milestones varies for each program. Our work 
on shipbuilding best practices has identified the detailed design and 
construction contract award and the start of lead ship fabrication as 
the points in the acquisition process roughly equivalent to 
development start and design review for other programs. For MDA 
programs that do not follow the standard DOD acquisition model but 
instead develop systems' capabilities incrementally, we identify the 
key technology development efforts that lead to an initial capability. 

For each program we assessed in a two-page format, we present cost, 
schedule and quantity data at the program's first full estimate, 
generally Milestone B, and an estimate from the program office 
reflecting 2009 data where it was available. Since DOD did not produce 
Selected Acquisition Reports for 2009, changes in cost, quantities, 
and cycle time are based on data obtained from program offices 
prepared in accordance with directions from DOD. According to those 
directions, program cost data are based on information contained in 
the December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports adjusted to reflect 
funding appropriated in fiscal year 2009 and funding requested in 
fiscal year 2010. Where necessary, we resolved discrepancies in this 
data with program offices to ensure its reliability. If current data 
were not available we show that the data were not assessed or are to 
be determined. For systems that have not yet started system 
development, we provided funding through the future years defense 
program. For MDA systems, for which a baseline was not available, we 
do not present a comparison. 

For each program we assessed, all cost information is presented in 
fiscal year 2010 dollars using Office of the Secretary of Defense- 
approved deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have 
depicted only the program's main elements of acquisition cost--
research and development and procurement. However, the total programs 
cost also include military construction and acquisition operation and 
maintenance costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in 
some situations, total cost may not match the exact sum of the 
research and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs 
are calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total 
quantities planned. In some instances, the data were not applicable, 
and we annotate this by using the term "NA." The quantities listed 
refer to total quantities, including both procurement and development 
quantities. 

The schedule assessment for each program is based on acquisition cycle 
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the 
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent 
fielding date. In some instances the data were not yet available, and 
we annotate this by using the term "TBD" or noting that the 
information is classified. 

The information presented on the "funding needed to complete" is from 
fiscal year 2010 through completion and, unless otherwise noted, draws 
on information from the program office. In some instances, the data 
were not available, and we annotate this by the term "to be 
determined" (TBD) or "not applicable" (NA). The quantities listed 
refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in 
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operations units 
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity 
figure. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate, or 
overall, picture of a program's history. These assessments represent 
the sum of the federal government's actions on a program not just 
those of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes 
with triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to 
make such detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Data on Individual Two-Page Assessments: 

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 57 
program offices. We received responses from all 57 programs; however, 
not every program had responses to each element of the data collection 
instrument. The results are graphically depicted in each two-page 
assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation and 
discussed the information presented on the data collection instrument 
with program officials as necessary. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), for our 
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally 
developed TRLs, and the Army and Air Force science and technology 
research organizations use them to determine when technologies are 
ready to be handed off from science and technology managers to product 
developers. TRLs are measured on a scale from 1 to 9, beginning with 
paper studies of a technology's feasibility and culminating with a 
technology fully integrated into a completed product. (See appendix 
III for TRL definitions.) Our best practices work has shown that a 
technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a 
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that 
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. For 
shipbuilding programs, we have recommended that this level of maturity 
be achieved by the contract award for detailed design and 
construction. In our assessment, the technologies that have reached 
TRL 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are 
referred to as mature or fully mature. Those technologies that have 
reached TRL 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment, are 
referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are assessed at 
attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge. Satellite 
technologies that have achieved TRL 6 are assessed as fully mature due 
to the difficulty of demonstrating maturity in a realistic 
environment--space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level 
of maturity. We sought to clarify the TRLs in those cases where 
information existed that raised concerns. If we were to conduct a 
detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies assessed, 
their readiness levels demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. Where 
practicable, we compared technology assessments provided by the 
program office to assessments conducted by officials from the Office 
of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of 
our current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate 
the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. 
We clarified the percentage of drawings completed in those cases where 
information that raised concerns existed. Completed drawings were 
defined as the number of drawings released or deemed releasable to 
manufacturing that can be considered the "build to" drawings. For 
shipbuilding programs, we asked programs officials to provide the 
percentage of the 3D product model that had been completed by the 
start of lead ship fabrication, and as of our current assessment. 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, 
to quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the 
information provided by the program office. We clarified the number of 
critical manufacturing processes and the percentage of statistical 
process control where information existed that raised concerns. We 
used a standard called the Process Capability Index, a process 
performance measurement that quantifies how closely a process is 
running to its specification limits. The index can be translated into 
an expected product defect rate, and we have found it to be a best 
practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework trends, in 
those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. We do not assess production maturity for shipbuilding 
programs. 

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of 
potential risks, by themselves they do not cover all elements of risk 
that a program encounters during development, such as funding 
instability. Our detailed reviews on individual systems normally 
provide a more comprehensive assessment of risk elements. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to March 2010 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this 
report. 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-10-388SP, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Programs," dated February 17, 2010 (GAO Code 120830). 

The Department is encouraged that the draft report cites the progress 
that we have made over the past several years in our efforts to 
improve acquisition processes and reduce cost growth. We have 
instituted several major changes that are beginning to show results. 
As noted in the draft report, recent acquisition policy revisions and 
the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 are aimed at 
starting programs out right by using early systems engineering, 
competitive prototyping, and configuration steering boards. The draft 
report acknowledges that there has been continued improvement in the 
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge that programs had at 
key points in the acquisition process. We agree that early systems 
engineering reviews and increasing technology readiness levels for new 
programs will be fundamental to restraining cost growth across the 
major defense acquisition programs. The Department is moving forward 
to implement WSARA and we expect to see even more improvement in the 
years to come. The draft report also acknowledges that recent changes 
in DoD acquisition policies are having beneficial impacts with respect 
to requirements changes, software development challenges, and 
workforce issues. In addition, we will be growing and improving the 
acquisition workforce to increase our capacity and capability to 
manage program cost, schedule, and performance. 

DoD and GAO, however, continue to disagree on the meaning of "mature
technology' before launching into system development. For GAO, that 
term means Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7. For DoD, it means TRL 
6. Thus, throughout the draft report, there are frequent references to 
immature technology being used in Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) system development, which is often true if a threshold of TRL 7 
is applied. On page 15, for example, GAO says that only one of six
MDAPs that entered system development since 2006 had mature critical 
technologies. That may be true when using GAO's definition, but DoD 
has taken the position that TRL 6 is adequate at Milestone B (which is 
considered the start of system development). Therefore, it's 
misleading for GAO to say repeatedly that MDAPs are not using mature 
technology. It would be more fair and accurate to say that MDAPs are 
sometimes using TRL 6, but not TRL 7, critical technologies when 
starting system development. 

I thank you and your staff for working with the Department to improve 
the information flow between our organizations and to develop more 
meaningful metrics in this area. I hope the new metrics that our 
staffs developed together last year will be included in future 
reports. These metrics will allow for a more accurate assessment of 
current portfolio performance and policies. We must continue to 
improve the acquisition process to more effectively and efficiently 
deliver products to our customers, and we need to continue to develop 
better metrics. The Department looks forward to working with the GAO 
in both important endeavors. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments are provided as an enclosure to this 
letter. My point of contact for this effort is Ms. Anne Twist, 703-614-
5420. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Dr. Nancy L. Spruill: 
Director: 
Acquisition Resources & Analysis: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. 
Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic 
properties; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard; 
Integration of nonscale components to show pieces will work together. 
Not fully functional or form or fit but representative of technically 
feasible approach suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" 
laboratory integration of components; 
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not 
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/ 
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft. 
Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications; 
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form 
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last 
"bug fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include 
using the system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or s [Hyperlink, 
sullivanm@gao.gov] ullivanm@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

Principal contributors to this report were Ronald E. Schwenn, 
Assistant Director; Raj Chitikila; Carol T. Mebane; Wendy P. Smythe; 
and Barbara J. Williams. Other key contributors included David B. 
Best, Maricela Cherveny, Thomas J. Denomme, Bruce D. Fairbairn, Arthur 
Gallegos, William R. Graveline, Kristine R. Hassinger, Michael J. 
Hesse, Arthur L. James, Jr., Meredith A. Kimmett, Jean L. McSween, 
John E. Oppenheim, Kenneth E. Patton, Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Rae Ann 
H. Sapp, Robert S. Swierczek, Bruce H. Thomas, Molly W. Traci, and 
Karen S. Zuckerstein. 

The following were responsible for individual programs: 

System: Advanced Extreme High Frequency Satellites (AEHF); 
Primary staff: Bradley Terry. 

System: AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM); 
Primary staff: Kathryn M. Edelman, Shea Bader. 

System: Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR); 
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci, Matthew C. Butler. 

System: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload Baseline (ASIP); 
Primary staff: Laura Jezewski, Travis J. Masters. 

System: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SatCom Capability 
(B-2 EHF SATCOM) Increment 1; 
Primary staff: Sean D. Merrill, Don M. Springman. 

System: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SatCom Capability 
(B-2 EHF SATCOM) Increment 2; 
Primary staff: Sean D. Merrill, Don M. Springman. 

System: BMDS: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Primary staff: Wiktor Niewiadomski, Thomas A. Mahalek. 

System: BMDS: Airborne Laser (ABL); 
Primary staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF); 
Primary staff: Ivy G. Hubler, Steven B. Stern. 

System: BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary staff: Steven B. Stern. 

System: BMDS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); 
Primary staff: Wiktor Niewiadomski, Sigrid L. McGinty. 

System: BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary staff: Meredith A. Kimmett. 

System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS UAS); 
Primary staff: W. William Russell, Jennifer A. Dougherty. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary staff: Lauren M. Heft, Dayna L. Foster. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary staff: Cheryl K. Andrew, Marvin E. Bonner. 

System: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR); 
Primary staff: Kevin J Heinz, Laurier R. Fish. 

System: Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM); 
Primary staff: Danny G. Owens. 

System: CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier; 
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci, Thomas P. Twambly, W. Kendal Roberts. 

System: DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Primary staff: Michelle M. Liberatore, Raj Chitikila. 

System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE); 
Primary staff: Jeffrey L. Hartnett, David Messman. 

System: EA-18G Growler; 
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark, Bonita P. Oden. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary staff: Nicholas C. Alexander, Jenny Hwang. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary staff: Beverly A. Breen. 

System: Extended Range/Multiple Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System 
(ER/MP); 
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: F-22A Raptor; 
Primary staff: Marvin E. Bonner, Robert K. Miller. 

System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T); 
Primary staff: Alexandra K. Dew, Scott Purdy. 

System: Future Combat System (FCS); 
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson, William C. Allbritton. 

System: Future Combat System Spin Out Early-Infantry Brigade Combat 
Team (FCS SO E-IBCT); 
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson, Tana M. Davis. 

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft system; 
Primary staff: Charlie Shivers, J. Andrew Walker. 

System: Global Positioning Systems Block IIIA; 
Primary staff: Laura T. Holliday, Josie H. Sigl. 

System: Global Positioning Systems III Next Generation Ground Control 
Segment (GPS III OCX); 
Primary staff: Arturo Holguin, Jr. 

System: H-1 Upgrades; 
Primary staff: Stephen V. Marchesani, Brenna Guarneros. 

System: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM); 
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis, Carrie W. Rogers. 

System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); 
Primary staff: Willliam C. Allbritton, Michael J. Hesse. 

System: C-27J Spartan; 
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd, Brian T. Smith. 

System: Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV); 
Primary staff: Michelle M. Liberatore, J. Kristopher Keener. 

System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted 
Sensor System (JLENS); 
Primary staff: John M. Ortiz. 

System: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV); 
Primary staff: Carrie W. Rogers, Dayna L. Foster. 

System: Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS); 
Primary staff: Lindsay Taylor, Ridge C. Bowman. 

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); 
Primary staff: David M. Adams, Ridge C. Bowman. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station 
(JTRS AMF); 
Primary staff: Paul G. Williams, Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR); 
Primary staff: Ann Marie Udale. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit 
(JTRS HMS); 
Primary staff: Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Ann Marie Udale. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain (JTRS 
NED); 
Primary staff: James S. Kim, James P. Tallon. 

System: Kiowa Warrior Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (KW CASUP); 
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe, Michael J. Hesse. 

System: LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6); 
Primary staff: Barbara J. Williams, Raj Chitikila. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary staff: Julia P. Jebo, Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship: Mission Modules (LCS Modules); 
Primary staff: Jeremy Hawk, Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Longbow Apache Block III (AB3); 
Primary staff: Helena Brink, Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform 
(MPF(F)/MLP); 
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener, Kelly Bradley. 

System: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP); 
Primary staff: Dayna L. Foster, Erin L. Stockdale. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Primary staff: Rae Ann Sapp. 

System: Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical 
Radio System (MIDS JTRS); 
Primary staff: Raffaele Roffo, Leigh Ann Nally. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary staff: Suzanne Sterling, Angela M. Pleasants. 

System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Space and Control; 
Primary staff: Laura T. Holliday, Josie H. Sigl. 

System: Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT); 
Primary staff: Lisa P. Gardner. 

System: Ohio-Class Replacement/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD); 
Primary staff: C. James Madar, Matthew C. Butler. 

System: P-8A Poseidon (P-8A); 
Primary staff: Kathryn M. Edelman. 

System: Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Primary staff: Ryan D. Stott, Carol T. Mebane. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II); 
Primary staff: Michael J. Hesse. 

System: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High; 
Primary staff: Claire Buck. 

System: Space-Based Surveillance Block 10 (SBSS); 
Primary staff: Maricela Cherveny. 

System: Standard Missile-6 Extended Range Active Missile (SM-6); 
Primary staff: Wiktor Neiwiadomski, Thomas A. Mahalek. 

System: Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS); 
Primary staff: Laura T. Holliday. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft; 
Primary staff: Bonita P. Oden, Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(VTUAV Fire Scout); 
Primary staff: Leigh Ann Nally, Raffaele Roffo. 

System: Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774); 
Primary staff: C. James Madar, Matthew C. Butler. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2; 
Primary staff: James P. Tallon. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3; 
Primary staff: James P. Tallon. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided 
a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-665]. Washington, D.C.: September 
24, 2009. 

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 
Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322]. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 30, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs 
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available 
Resources and Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon 
Systems. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-431T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2009. 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department 
of Defense Acquisition Management Framework. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-295R]. Washington, D.C.: February 
27, 2009. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not 
Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve 
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2008. 

Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed 
to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 1, 2008. 

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 30, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost 
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-368]. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 
2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers 
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 
2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-393]. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 
2004. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 
2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 24, 1998. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.: 
August 26, 1996. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Explanatory Statement, 154 Cong. Rec. H 9427, 9526 (daily ed. 
Sept. 24, 2008), to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
Fiscal Year 2009, contained in Division C of the Consolidated 
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 111-23. 

[3] Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD 
that require eventual total research, development, test and evaluation 
(RDT&E) expenditures, including all planned increments, of more than 
$365 million or procurement expenditures, including all planned 
increments, of more than $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant 
dollars. 

[4] The 28 programs in our assessment that are not covered in this 
analysis include: 10 pre-major defense acquisition programs, 6 Missile 
Defense Agency elements, 5 Navy shipbuilding programs, 3 components or 
subprograms within major defense acquisition programs, 2 programs that 
are been terminated or are ending, 1 major defense acquisition program 
that is based on a commercially-derived aircraft, and 1 acquisition 
category II program. An acquisition category II program is defined as 
a program that does not meet the criteria for an acquisition category 
I program and is estimated to require eventual total RDT&E 
expenditures of more than $140 million or procurement expenditures of 
more than $660 million in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

[5] Cost data were only available for 13 of the 18 newly designated 
major defense acquisition programs. 

[6] The estimated cost for these 12 programs is based on DOD's 
December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports. Cost growth was calculated 
from the programs' first cost estimate. 

[7] Data used to compute value of deletions and curtailments are based 
entirely on information provided by the Secretary of Defense when 
announcing budgetary recommendations. As shown in table 1, DOD did not 
specify a value to those programs that plan to end production. 

[8] We compared the number of major defense acquisition programs with 
Selected Acquisition Reports in December 2007 to the number of 
programs on DOD's June 2009 major defense acquisition program list. 

[9] The programs that entered the portfolio between December 2007 and 
July 2009 include: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aerial 
System, KC-X, Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed- 
Station, Joint High Speed Vessel, Global Positioning System IIIA, C- 
27J, Extended Range/Multipurpose Unmanned Aircraft System, Reaper 
Unmanned Aircraft System, Global Command Support System-Army, Joint 
Precision Aircraft Landing System, Airborne Signals Intelligence 
Payload, Navy Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures, Airborne 
Warning and Control System Upgrade, EA-6B, Integrated Defensive 
Electronic Countermeasures, Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System, 
Predator Unmanned Aerial System, and WIN-T Increment 3. 

[10] The programs that left the portfolio between December 2007 and 
July 2009 include: Mission Planning System Increments I-III, Armed 
Reconnaissance Helicopter, CVN 68 Nimitz Class Nuclear Powered 
Aircraft Carrier, Extended Range Munition, Minuteman III Guidance 
Replacement Program, Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program, VH-
71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement, Javelin, SSGN-Ohio Class 
Submarine Conversion, Advanced Deployable System (AN/WQR-3), Ship Self 
Defense System Program, and T-45TS GOSHAWK Undergraduate Jet Pilot 
Training System. 

[11] DOD is required to submit Selected Acquisition Reports to 
Congress at the end of each fiscal year quarter on current major 
defense acquisition programs, although certain exceptions apply. 
Selected Acquisition Reports for the first quarter of a fiscal year 
are known as comprehensive annual Selected Acquisition Reports. Each 
comprehensive annual Selected Acquisition Report is required to be 
submitted within 60 days after the date on which the President 
transmits the Budget to Congress for the following fiscal year. 10 
U.S.C. § 2432(b)(1), (c)(4), (f). 

[12] Four programs prepared a baseline Selected Acquisition Report or 
a Selected Acquisition Report following a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach; one program was designated a Major Acquisition Information 
System Program; and twelve programs that were new major defense 
acquisition programs or were being restructured did not prepare any 
Selected Acquisition Reports. 

[13] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point 
or had reached all of the knowledge points--development start, design 
review, and production start. 

[14] The start of system development, as used here, indicates the 
point at which significant financial commitment is made to design, 
integrate, and demonstrate that the product will meet the user's 
requirements and can be manufactured on time, with high quality, and 
at a cost that provides an acceptable return on investment. Under the 
revised Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), system development is now 
called engineering and manufacturing development. Engineering and 
manufacturing development follows materiel solution analysis and 
technology development. For shipbuilding programs, this point occurs 
when a program awards a detailed design and construction contract. 

[15] Demonstration in a relevant environment is Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) 6. Demonstration in a realistic environment is TRL 7. See 
appendix III for a detailed description of TRLs. 

[16] A major defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B 
approval until the milestone decision authority certifies that the 
technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 801 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(3)(D)). 

[17] Under the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, a major 
defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B approval until 
the program has held a preliminary design review and the milestone 
decision authority has conducted a formal postpreliminary design 
review assessment and certified on the basis of such assessment that 
the program demonstrates a high likelihood of accomplishing its 
intended mission. Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 205(a)(3) (codified as amended 
at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(2)). 

[18] One program that held a critical design review in 2009 did not 
plan to test an early systems prototype. 

[19] Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 203(a). 

[20] DOD policy states that the knowledge required for a major defense 
acquisition program to proceed beyond low-rate initial production 
shall include demonstrated control of the manufacturing process and 
acceptable reliability, the collection of statistical process control 
data, and demonstrated control and capability of critical processes. 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, enclosure 2, paragraph 7.c.(2) (Dec. 8, 2008). We 
did not specifically assess compliance with this requirement. 

[21] In addition to data from 46 major defense acquisition programs, 
our analysis of program staffing includes data from four Missile 
Defense Agency programs. 

[22] The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that 
DOD policy ensure that the acquisition strategy for each major defense 
acquisition program provides for competitive prototypes before 
milestone B approval, unless a waiver is properly granted. Pub. L. No. 
111-23, § 203(a). 

[23] The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 establishes a 
statutory requirement that a major defense acquisition program may not 
receive milestone B approval until the milestone decision authority 
has received a preliminary design review, conducted a formal 
postpreliminary design review assessment, and certified on the basis 
of such assessment that the program demonstrates a high likelihood of 
accomplishing its intended mission. Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 205(a)(3) 
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(2)). 

[24] For shipbuilding programs, knowledge point 1 occurs when a 
program awards a detailed design and construction contract, and 
knowledge point 2 occurs when the lead ship starts fabrication. We do 
not assess production maturity at knowledge point 3 for shipbuilding 
programs. 

[25] 10 U.S.C. § 2433. 

[26] The 28 programs in our assessment that are not covered in this 
analysis include: 10 pre-major defense acquisition programs, 6 Missile 
Defense Agency elements, 5 shipbuilding major defense acquisition 
programs, 3 components or subprograms within major defense acquisition 
programs, 2 programs that have been terminated or are ending, 1 major 
defense acquisition program that is based on a commercially-derived 
aircraft, and 1 acquisition category II program. An acquisition 
category II program is defined as a program that does not meet the 
criteria for an acquisition category I program and is estimated to 
require eventual total RDT&E expenditures of more than $140 million or 
procurement expenditures of more than $660 million in fiscal year 2000 
constant dollars. 

[End of section] 

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