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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

November 2009: 

International Space Station: 

Significant Challenges May Limit Onboard Research: 

GAO-10-9: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-9, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2010, after about 25 years of work and the expenditure of billions 
of dollars, the International Space Station (ISS) will be completed. 
According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
the ISS crew will then be able to redirect its efforts from assembling 
the station to conducting research. 

In 2005, Congress designated the ISS as a national laboratory; in 
addition, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to provide a 
research management plan for the ISS National Laboratory. In light of 
these developments, GAO was asked to review the research use of the 
ISS. Specifically, GAO (1) identified how the ISS is being used for 
research and how it is expected to be used once completed, (2) 
identified challenges to maximizing ISS research; and (3) identified 
common management practices at other national laboratories and large 
science programs that could be applicable to the management of the ISS. 
To accomplish this, GAO interviewed NASA officials and reviewed key 
documents related to the ISS. GAO also studied two ground-based 
national laboratories and several large science institutions. 

What GAO Found: 

The ISS has been continuously staffed since 2000 and now has a six-
member crew. The primary objective for the ISS through 2010 is 
construction, so research utilization has not been the priority. Some 
research has been and is being conducted as time and resources permit 
while the crew on board performs assembly tasks, but research will is 
expected to begin in earnest in 2010. NASA projects that it will 
utilize approximately 50 percent of the U.S. ISS research facilities 
for its own research, including the Human Research Program, opening the 
remaining facilities to U.S. ISS National Laboratory researchers. 

NASA faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to 
maximize utilization of all ISS research facilities, including: 

* the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and reduced 
launch capabilities for transporting ISS research cargo once the 
shuttle retires, 

* high costs for launches and no dedicated funding to support research, 

* limited time available for research due to the fixed size of crew and 
competing demands for the crew’s time, and, 

* an uncertain future for the ISS beyond 2015. 

NASA is researching the possibility of developing a management body? 
including internal and external elements?to manage ISS research, which 
would make the ISS National Laboratory similar to other national 
laboratories. Though there is no existing direct analogue to the ISS, 
GAO studied two national laboratories and several other large science 
institutions and identified three common practices that these 
institutions employ that could benefit the management of ISS research. 

* Centralized management body: At each of the institutions GAO studied, 
there is a central body responsible for prioritizing and selecting 
research, even if there are different funding agencies. NASA’s ISS 
managers are currently not responsible for evaluating and selecting all 
research that will be conducted on the ISS, leaving this to the 
research sponsor. 

* In-house scientific and technical expertise: The institutions GAO 
studied have large staffs of in-house experts that can provide 
technical and engineering support to users. NASA’s staff members in ISS 
fundamental science research areas have been decentralized or 
reassigned, limiting its capability to provide user support. 

* Robust user outreach: The laboratories and institutes GAO studied 
place a high priority on user outreach and are actively involved in 
educating and recruiting users. NASA has conducted outreach to 
potential users in the public and private sectors, but its outreach is 
limited in comparison. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the NASA Administrator implement actions, such as 
increasing user outreach and centralizing decision making to enhance 
use of the ISS. NASA concurred with the recommendations. 

View GAO-10-9 or key components. For more information, contact Cristina 
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The ISS Will Have Excess Research Facilities Available for Other Users 
by Construction Completion: 

Several Significant Challenges May Impede Full Use of ISS Research 
Facilities: 

NASA Is Considering Engaging an Outside Partner for ISS Management, a 
Key Practice Found at Other National Laboratories: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Difference in ESMD Flight Experiment Research Areas (Not 
Including the Human Research Program), 2002 and 2008: 

Table 2: Projected NASA Occupancy of ISS ExPRESS Racks and Cold Stowage 
Racks Research Resources: 

Table 3: Capability of Launch Vehicles in Operation and under 
Development: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Weekly Crew Time Allocations among Russia and the 
International Partners: 

Abbreviations: 

COTS: Commercial Orbital Transportation Services: 

CSA: Canadian Space Agency: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

ESA: European Space Agency: 

ESMD: Exploration Systems Mission Directorate: 

FFRDC: federally funded research and development center: 

GOCO: Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated: 

GOGO: Government-Owned, Government-Operated: 

ISS: International Space Station: 

JAXA: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NIH: National Institutes of Health: 

NSBRI: National Space Biomedical Research Institute: 

NSF: National Science Foundation: 

SOMD: Space Operations Mission Directorate: 

UNOLS: University National Oceanographic Laboratory System: 

USOS: U.S. Operating Segment: 

WHOI: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 25, 2009: 

The Honorable Bart Gordon: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bill Nelson: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Science and Space:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

After about 25 years of design, development, and construction, the 
International Space Station (ISS) will be completed in 2010. According 
to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), once 
construction is completed the ISS crew will be able to focus its 
efforts on dedicated utilization of the onboard research capabilities. 
Building the ISS has been a long and costly effort; construction has 
been under way for over 10 years, and NASA estimates total direct ISS 
costs to NASA from 1994 to 2010 to be $48.5 billion.[Footnote 1] Though 
it has budgeted funds to allow for extension of the ISS, NASA is 
currently following the direction of the previous administration and 
budgeted to end its participation in the ISS at the end of 2015; if 
this does not change, there will be only a 5-year window during which 
the ISS will be available for dedicated research utilization. Congress 
has directed NASA to take all necessary steps to ensure that the ISS 
remains a viable and productive facility capable of potential 
utilization through at least 2020, but no decisions on any extensions 
have been made to date.[Footnote 2] 

Originally, the ISS was to be used for conducting a broad range of NASA-
funded experiments in many disciplines, including the life sciences, 
combustion science, fluid physics, and materials science as well as 
technology demonstration. In 2004, NASA changed its focus to studying 
the effects of long-duration space travel on humans and developing 
countermeasures for these effects and tests of exploration-related 
technology, and as a result the focus of its research on board the ISS 
has changed as well. In 2005, Congress designated the ISS as a national 
laboratory and asked NASA to seek to increase station research 
utilization by including other federal entities and the private sector 
through partnerships, cost sharing, and other arrangements that would 
supplement NASA funding of ISS research, and noted that NASA may enter 
into a contract with a nongovernmental agency to operate the ISS 
national laboratory, subject to all applicable federal laws and 
regulations. In addition, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 required 
NASA to develop a Research Management Plan to be used to prioritize 
research activities and resources. The Research Management Plan was to 
identify the organization to be responsible for managing United States' 
research on the ISS. The act noted that the management institution 
could be an internal NASA office or an external relationship arranged 
via contract, cooperative agreement or grant. This plan was delivered 
to Congress in August 2009. 

In light of these developments, you asked us to review the use of the 
ISS for research. Specifically, we (1) identified how the ISS is being 
used at present and how much it is expected to be used once assembly is 
complete, (2) identified challenges to fully maximizing research use of 
ISS, and (3) identified management principles of other national 
laboratories and other large science programs that could be applicable 
to management of the ISS. 

To identify how ISS research facilities are being used at present, we 
reviewed NASA documentation pertaining to available on-station hardware 
and scientific investigations that utilize this hardware. We also 
interviewed officials from the NASA Space Operations Mission 
Directorate (SOMD) and Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD), 
the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the European 
Space Agency (ESA). To identify how the ISS will be used once assembly 
is completed, we analyzed NASA documentation identifying available on- 
station hardware planned for the ISS and NASA projections for future 
requirements, and we compared available research resources to planned 
requirements. 

To identify the challenges to maximizing ISS research, we met with NASA 
officials in the ISS program office as well as in NASA's SOMD. We also 
met with and spoke to former, current, and prospective researchers who 
have conducted research onboard the ISS or who were interested in 
conducting future research. We interviewed officials from the National 
Research Council, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Space Biomedical Research 
Institute (NSBRI), and the Universities Space Research Association 
(USRA). To determine how NASA is managing the ISS, we interviewed NASA 
officials and reviewed NASA plans and documentation. 

To identify management principles of other national laboratories and 
large science programs that could be applicable to management of the 
ISS, we interviewed officials at the Department of Energy (DOE) who are 
responsible for the DOE national laboratories and spoke with officials 
at the National Energy Technology Laboratory. We also met with 
officials from the National Science Foundation (NSF) who are 
responsible for managing the Office of Polar Programs. Further, we 
visited Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) in Illinois and 
Brookhaven National Laboratory (Brookhaven) in New York, and we 
interviewed officials from the National User Facility Organization, the 
National Academies, NSBRI, the Space Telescope Science Institute, and 
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (WHOI). 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through October 
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The ISS--the largest orbiting man-made object--is being constructed to 
support three activities: scientific research, technology development, 
and development of industrial applications. Its facilities allow for 
ongoing research in microgravity,[Footnote 3] studies of other aspects 
of the space environment, tests of new technology, and long-term space 
operations. Its facilities enable astronauts to conduct many different 
types of research, including experiments in biotechnology, combustion 
science, fluid physics, and materials science, on behalf of ground- 
based researchers. The ISS also has capability to support research on 
materials and other technologies to see how they react in the space 
environment. In general, conducting research in a microgravity 
environment allows scientists to eliminate the influence of Earth's 
gravity and can result in discoveries of properties and reactions that 
would be masked on Earth. Some researchers believe that conducting 
scientific experiments in microgravity can yield potentially 
groundbreaking results in areas as diverse as stem-cell culturing, 
vaccine research, plant and seed research, and targeting drug-resistant 
microbes. Testing materials and technologies in space allows 
researchers to determine the impact of the harsh space environment on 
these items for potential future use in space vehicles or satellites. 

There are five main partners involved in supporting the development and 
manning of the ISS: the United States, Russia, Japan, ESA (which 
includes a number of participating countries), and Canada.[Footnote 4] 
The ISS consists of two separately administered (though conjoined) 
parts: (1) the U.S. operating segment (USOS), with contributions from 
its international partners (ESA, JAXA, and the Canadian Space Agency 
(CSA)), and (2) the Russian segment. Russian research is separate from 
the USOS operations: Russia has no utilization rights to U.S., 
European, or Japanese modules and NASA has no utilization rights to 
Russian modules, though NASA told us there are mechanisms for 
scientific collaboration and hardware sharing among all 
agencies.[Footnote 5] According to NASA, it provides a portion of ISS 
resources (including crew time, facilities, and launch capabilities) to 
the partners based on international agreements with each partner in 
exchange for its contributions to the ISS. Each partner facility has 
research accommodations that can be used and shared among the partners 
as stipulated in the agreements. 

Scientific research facilities currently available inside the ISS are 
generally mounted in modular, refrigerator-sized mounts called racks or 
ExPRESS racks, which provide the utilities necessary for conducting 
research, including electricity. Each rack contains lockers, drawers, 
or other inserts that can be used to install research payloads and are 
changed as necessary. The racks may also contain semipermanent 
equipment, such as freezers, incubators, or glove boxes. Research 
payloads are sent to the ISS in a flight-certified piece of hardware 
that may be small in size. This hardware is generally then installed in 
one of these racks, and the experiment is operated until the research 
is completed. Once completed, the payload may be returned to Earth for 
analysis or research data are transmitted back to Earth for analysis. 
Research can also be conducted on the exterior of the station in 
unpressurized facilities; for example, the Materials International 
Space Station Experiment is conducted in such facilities. 

Facilities on board the ISS and NASA's plans for its own utilization of 
the ISS have changed over time. When NASA adopted The Vision for Space 
Exploration (Vision) in 2004, it set forth a plan to explore space and 
extend a human presence across our solar system with dual goals of 
returning humans to the moon by 2020 and later sending humans to Mars 
and other destinations.[Footnote 6] It also dictated that NASA focus 
its research efforts on board the ISS on its Human Research Program 
supporting future human space exploration, including studying the 
effects of the space environment on humans; on technology development 
and test for exploration; and on developing operational protocols for 
successful long-duration space operations. Though ISS had originally 
been intended to be a broad-based research facility, the Vision 
required NASA to focus its ISS research on supporting space exploration 
goals with an emphasis on understanding the impacts of the space 
environment on astronauts and developing countermeasures to these 
effects. As a result, NASA reduced the scope of its ISS research; the 
agency conducted a zero-based review in the fall of 2005 and determined 
that some fundamental life and physical sciences tasks were not "highly 
relevant" to achieving the goals of the Vision. The agency canceled 
some existing grants in this area and stopped soliciting any new 
research, which caused affected ISS scientific research communities to 
shrink or turn to other research areas. NASA also reassigned its 
personnel involved with the fundamental sciences, including space 
biology (such as animal, plant, and microbial research), and reduced 
its portfolio of research on fluid physics, combustion, materials 
science, biotechnology, and fundamental physics. Table 1 depicts some 
changes in ESMD flight research conducted in 2002 and 2008 that 
illustrate the redirection of focus. 

Table 1: Difference in ESMD Flight Experiment Research Areas (Not 
Including the Human Research Program), 2002 and 2008: 

Research area: Fundamental space biology (including animal, plant, and 
microbial research); 
2002 flight experiments: 26; 
2008 flight experiments: 13. 

Research area: Biotechnology; 
2002 flight experiments: 11; 
2008 flight experiments: 0. 

Research area: Fundamental physics; 
2002 flight experiments: 13; 
2008 flight experiments: 0. 

Research area: Materials science; 
2002 flight experiments: 23; 
2008 flight experiments: 5. 

Source: NASA. 

[End of table] 

Hardware needed for research projects was also canceled or delayed by 
NASA or commercial developers, either because of the change in research 
priorities or other constraints, such as the pause in shuttle flights 
after the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. This included animal 
research facilities, the Life Sciences Glovebox, the Centrifuge 
Accommodation Module, and the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS). 
[Footnote 7] In 2003, the National Research Council and the National 
Academy of Public Administration reported that NASA drastically reduced 
the overall ability of the ISS to support science, and that this 
reduction limited or foreclosed the scientific community's ability to 
maximize the research potential of the ISS.[Footnote 8] NASA's Plan to 
Support the Operations and Utilization of the International Space 
Station Beyond 2015 states that it would cost several billion dollars 
to reinstate the full scope of planned ISS facilities. 

Though the Vision changed and reduced the scope of NASA's goals for its 
own research on board the ISS, Congress designated the ISS as a 
national laboratory in 2005 in an effort to increase utilization of the 
ISS for research. Congress also asked NASA to seek to increase 
utilization of the ISS by other federal entities and the private sector 
through partnerships, cost-sharing agreements, and other arrangements 
that would also supplement NASA funding of ISS research.[Footnote 9] 
According to NASA officials, this designation does not guarantee an 
appropriation specifically for ISS National Laboratory research. The 
ISS National Laboratory operates in conjunction with the ISS research 
programs of NASA and the international partners, and utilizes a portion 
of the USOS resource allocation, including crew time, facilities, and 
cargo launched to the station. As such, NASA conducts the research it 
sees as relevant to its mission, and the ISS can also accommodate users 
from outside of NASA who are not necessarily conducting research 
relevant to NASA's Human Research Program or other NASA-sponsored 
research. NASA established the ISS National Laboratory Office in the 
spring of 2009; this office is part of the existing Space Station 
Payloads Office and as of April 2009 had five staff members. 

In May 2009, President Obama established the Review of U.S. Human Space 
Flight Plans Committee. Its stated goal is to provide an independent 
assessment of the nation's planned human spaceflight activities and to 
ensure that the country is on "a vigorous and sustainable path to 
achieving its boldest aspirations in space." The committee conducted an 
assessment of NASA's plans, including plans for the ISS, and developed 
a number of possible options for the future of the U.S. space 
activities. In its summary report released in September 2009, the 
committee developed five options for NASA's human spaceflight program, 
and of these options, three recommend extending the lifespan of the ISS 
until 2020. The committee wrote that it would be unwise to de-orbit the 
ISS after 25 years of design, development, and assembly and only 5 
years of operations, and that the return on investment to both the 
United States and the international partners would be significantly 
enhanced by an extension of the ISS's life. It is unknown at present 
which option will ultimately be selected, but the future utilization of 
the ISS depends on this decision. 

The ISS Will Have Excess Research Facilities Available for Other Users 
by Construction Completion: 

The ISS has been continuously manned since 2000, and in March 2009 the 
crew expanded from three to six. NASA's primary objective for the ISS 
through 2010 is construction, so research has not been the main 
priority. Specifically, though the ISS facilities have been used for 
some research to date, new research capabilities are still being added 
and are awaiting launch and installation, and resources such as crew 
time, transportation, and facilities planned for the utilization phase 
have not been fully available. As such, research is being conducted at 
the margins of assembly and operations activities as time permits, 
while the crew on board performs assembly and operations tasks. NASA 
has identified 197 U.S.-integrated investigations that have been 
conducted on orbit as of April 2009, though 55 of these investigations 
were conducted on the Space Shuttle missions to the ISS instead of on 
the ISS itself (called sortie research). According to NASA, as of 
February 2009, U.S. ISS and sortie research have resulted in over 160 
publications, including articles on topics such as protein 
crystallization, plant growth, and human research. According to NASA, 
there have also been approximately 25 technology demonstration 
experiments flown on the ISS during the assembly phase. 

Once construction is completed, NASA projects that its share of the 
ExPRESS racks will be less than 50 percent occupied by planned NASA 
research related to the Human Research Program and other NASA-initiated 
research, with the remainder available for other use. Any facilities 
that NASA does not plan to utilize are available to the ISS National 
Laboratory, and the system is flexible so that future rack space can be 
made available either to NASA-funded or ISS National Laboratory users 
up to the total capacity. These projections are based on NASA's current 
ISS research budget and determinations of available resources based on 
the percentage of ISS resources that are allocated to NASA and the 
international partners according to established international 
agreements.[Footnote 10] Table 2 depicts the NASA projected occupancy 
of rack space for September 2010. 

Table 2: Projected NASA Occupancy of ISS ExPRESS Racks and Cold Stowage 
Racks Research Resources: 

ISS resource: ExPRESS racks; 
Projected NASA occupation of racks at assembly completion: 48 percent 
utilized; 
Details: Of NASA's seven ExPRESS racks, 25 of 59 lockers and 7 of 13 
drawers will be utilized after assembly is completed. 

ISS resource: Cold stowage racks; 
Projected NASA occupation of racks at assembly completion: 66 percent 
utilized; 
Details: NASA projects a need for 66 percent of the cold stowage racks. 
There will be three cold stowage racks on board the ISS; 
one rack will be utilized by NASA after assembly is completed, a second 
rack will be maintained as a spare, and the third may be available for 
the National Laboratory. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Notes: NASA's three racks for human research are not included in this 
table. One of NASA's human research racks, called the Muscle Atrophy 
Research and Exercise System, is a joint venture with ESA and will be 
used by European researchers or National Laboratory customers rather 
than NASA's Human Research Program. 

[End of table] 

Inside the ISS, there are many available interior, or pressurized, 
sites for research racks and other facilities, though not all available 
sites will ultimately accommodate a facility. NASA projects that 79 
percent (19 of 24) of the available NASA internal payload sites that 
can accommodate research facilities ultimately will, and that less than 
50 percent of these facilities will be occupied by planned NASA 
research after the ISS is completed, making them available for other 
users. The ISS also has external, or unpressurized, sites exposed to 
the vacuum of space on its exterior structure that can accommodate 
research facilities. NASA projects that these sites will be 33 percent 
(7 of 21) filled with research facilities when assembly is completed 
and 62 percent filled (13 of 21) by the end of 2015. NASA's 
international partners are fully utilizing their ISS allocations; ESA 
needs more resources than it has been allocated by the international 
agreements. NASA officials told us that their intention was to build 
the ISS with sufficient research facility capacity so that they could 
invite the broader scientific community to use the ISS; they added that 
had NASA intended to use the ISS to support only its own research, the 
agency could have truncated construction and utilized 100 percent of 
its facilities. NASA officials told us that they expect to be able to 
fill the surplus ISS capacity with research by National Laboratory 
users. 

Several Significant Challenges May Impede Full Use of ISS Research 
Facilities: 

NASA faces several significant challenges that may impede efforts to 
maximize research utilization of the ISS, including (1) the impending 
retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010, reduced launch capabilities 
once the shuttle retires, and the potential for a gap between 
retirement and follow-on U.S. vehicles; (2) high costs for launches and 
developing research hardware and a lack of dedicated funding streams 
for ISS research; (3) limited crew time available for research due to a 
fixed crew size and other requirements for crew time; and (4) an 
uncertain future for the ISS beyond 2015. 

Impending Space Shuttle Retirement Will Limit Launch Capabilities: 

The Space Shuttle is currently slated to retire in 2010, and as of 
November 2009 only five launch opportunities remain. We have previously 
reported that the ISS will face a significant cargo supply shortfall 
without the Space Shuttle.[Footnote 11] Further, since NASA has the few 
remaining Space Shuttle flights scheduled to carry equipment required 
for assembly, operations, and maintenance, there may be limited cargo 
capacity for research payloads. Potential researchers and others have 
told us that they have faced difficulty in getting payloads scheduled 
on board the Space Shuttle in a reasonable amount of time. 

Following the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010, NASA will rely 
on an assortment of vehicles in order to provide the necessary 
logistical support and crew rotation capabilities required for the ISS, 
but none will offer the same cargo capabilities as the Space Shuttle in 
upmass (delivering cargo to the ISS) and downmass (delivering cargo to 
Earth). NASA will rely heavily on Roscosmos--the Russian Federal Space 
Agency--and its launch vehicles to provide crew transport to the ISS 
once the Space Shuttle retires, and has signed agreements for future 
service. Some of the other vehicles are already supporting the ISS, 
while the international partners, the commercial sector, and NASA are 
developing others. As we have previously reported, NASA expects Russia 
to launch six Progress flights each year from 2009 through 2011, and 
that NASA cargo will be spread across the equivalent of four Progress 
flights in 2009, two in 2010, and one in 2011. NASA currently does not 
plan to utilize the Progress vehicle beyond 2011.[Footnote 12] 

International partners' vehicles alone cannot fully satisfy ISS cargo 
needs. Existing and planned international partner vehicles have much 
less upmass capability than the Space Shuttle and no downmass 
capability for research payloads. Overall, NASA now faces a 40-metric 
ton (approximately 88,000 pound) usable cargo shortfall from 2010 
through 2015. To mitigate this shortfall, NASA has turned to commercial 
developers to provide launch vehicles. These vehicles are known as 
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles, and two 
companies, Orbital Science Corporation (Orbital) and Space Exploration 
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are each developing future vehicles. 
The Russian Soyuz vehicle can transport downmass (though minimal) and 
return crew from the ISS after the Space Shuttle is retired, and the 
new commercial SpaceX vehicle is also expected to be able to return 
downmass. Delay of downmass capability will make it difficult to 
transport research back to Earth for analysis. Table 3 provides 
specifics on the available and planned vehicles. 

Table 3: Capability of Launch Vehicles in Operation and under 
Development: 

Vehicle (ownership): Space Shuttle (NASA); 
Upmass capability[A]: Maximum capability is 37,864 pounds (17,175 
kilograms); Can be configured for pressurized, unpressurized, and 
powered cargo; 
Downmass capability[A]: Maximum capability is 37,864 pounds (17,175 
kilograms); 
Crew transport: Seven crew members; 
Status: Operational until 2010; 
Challenges: Additional funding required for the Constellation program 
is not available while the Space Shuttle is in operation; Safety 
concerns. 

Vehicle (ownership): Soyuz (Roscosmos); 
Upmass capability[A]: 66 pounds (30 kilograms), pressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: 132 pounds (60 kilograms); 
Crew transport: Three crew members; 
Status: Completed missions to the ISS; Two Soyuz spacecraft 
continuously docked to the ISS as lifeboats for crew; 
Challenges: Limited cargo capacity. 

Vehicle (ownership): Progress (Roscosmos); 
Upmass capability[A]: Average capability of 5,732 pounds (2,600 
kilograms), pressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: None; 
Crew transport: None; 
Status: Completed missions to the ISS; NASA planned missions to the 
ISS, 2009-2011; 
Challenges: No downmass capability. 

Vehicle (ownership): Automated Transfer Vehicle (ESA); 
Upmass capability[A]: Maximum capability is 16,535 pounds (7,500 
kilograms), pressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: None; 
Crew transport: None; 
Status: One completed demonstration mission to the ISS to date; 
NASA planned missions to the ISS, 2010-2013; 
Challenges: No external capability. 

Vehicle (ownership): H-II Transfer Vehicle (JAXA); 
Upmass capability[A]: Maximum capability is 13,228 pounds (6,000 
kilograms), pressurized and unpressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: None; 
Crew transport: None; 
Status: One completed demonstration mission to the ISS to date; 
NASA planned missions to the ISS, 2010-2015; 
Challenges: Limited unpressurized external cargo. 

Vehicle (ownership): Commercial vehicle (SpaceX); 
Upmass capability[A]: Up to 7,300 pounds (3,300 kilograms), pressurized 
and unpressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: 3,748 pounds (1,700 kilograms); 
Crew transport: Dragon space vehicle is designed to transport crew, but 
COTS representatives stated that they have not yet received funding for 
this capability; 
Status: Under development; First mission to the ISS expected in 2010; 
Challenges: A delay in availability would lead to a significant scaling 
back of NASA's use of the ISS for scientific research. 

Vehicle (ownership): Commercial vehicle (Orbital); 
Upmass capability[A]: 4,400 pounds (2,000 kilograms), pressurized; 
Downmass capability[A]: None; 
Crew transport: None; 
Status: Under development; First mission to the ISS scheduled for 2011; 
Challenges: A delay in availability would lead to a significant scaling 
back of NASA's use of the ISS for scientific research. 

Vehicle (ownership): Ares I and Orion (NASA)[B]; 
Upmass capability[A]: To be determined; 
Downmass capability[A]: To be determined; 
Crew transport: Six crew members; 
Status: Under development; First crewed mission to the ISS scheduled 
for March 2015; 
Challenges: First crewed mission not likely to be launched by the March 
2015 scheduled execution date. 

Source: NASA and GAO documentation. 

[A] These figures depict total cargo capabilities of the various 
vehicles, not upmass or downmass available for utilization of the ISS. 

[B] Ares I and Orion are components of the Constellation program, 
NASA's effort to develop a replacement for the Space Shuttle. This 
program currently includes development of the Ares I and V rockets, the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, and eventually will include the Altair 
Lunar Lander. 

[End of table] 

As we have previously reported, the contractors responsible for the 
COTS vehicles have experienced delays in demonstration milestones and 
are at risk for further delays. Both SpaceX and Orbital have had 
schedule slippage in the development of their launch vehicles. For 
SpaceX, this has contributed to anticipated delays of 2 to 4 months in 
most of its remaining milestones.[Footnote 13] Orbital has recently 
revised its agreement with NASA to demonstrate a different cargo 
transport capability than it had originally planned, and delayed its 
demonstration mission date from December 2010 until March 2011. We have 
also previously reported that there have been delays with the 
development of the Constellation program, and that there were likely to 
be further delays that would make achieving NASA's 2015 first crewed 
launch date difficult.[Footnote 14] We have noted that a delay in the 
availability of commercial partners' vehicles in 2010 would lead to a 
significant scaling back of NASA's use of the ISS for scientific 
research;[Footnote 15] however, NASA officials told us that they 
believe recent developments (for example, the addition of a Space 
Shuttle flight) have shifted the horizon for serious impacts from COTS 
delays into 2011. 

NASA officials said that the impact of COTS failures or significant 
delays would be similar to the post-Columbia disaster scenario, 
[Footnote 16] where NASA operated the ISS in a "survival mode" and 
moved to a two-person crew, paused assembly activities, and operated 
the ISS at a lower altitude to relieve propellant burden. NASA 
officials stated that if the COTS vehicles are delayed, they would 
pursue a course of "graceful degradation" of the ISS until conditions 
improve or until NASA's commitment to operate the ISS expires at the 
end of 2015. In such conditions, the ISS would only conduct minimal 
science experiments. 

NASA officials told us that they are basing logistics requirements for 
the ISS on engineering estimates for component reliability, but will 
not know the full accuracy of these estimates until further operating 
experience is gained. NASA has current plans to use 50 percent of the 
United States' allocated launch capacity to transport research cargo to 
the ISS and 47 percent of the United States' allocation to transport 
research cargo returning to Earth for postflight analysis (not 
including operational cargo). However, these projections may change, 
and are based on the assumption that all follow-on and replacement 
launch vehicles will begin operations as scheduled; significant delays 
or new NASA requirements to provide logistics and resupply cargo have 
the potential to alter this projection and, as noted, may result in 
cargo shortfalls and potentially the scaling back of ISS research. ESA 
already wants to launch more research cargo to the ISS than it is 
allotted under international agreements. NASA's planning document 
states that ESA will have a demand of 1.8 metric tons of cargo beyond 
its allotment that it wants to send to the ISS. 

High Costs and No Dedicated Funds for Developing and Launching 
Research: 

NASA officials have stated that it is significantly more expensive to 
conduct research on board the ISS than on Earth and the agency now 
views lack of funding for research as the major challenge to full 
research utilization of the ISS. According to NASA, one of the major 
cost drivers is the cost to launch payloads to the ISS. When the Space 
Shuttle retires, Roscosmos and later the commercial launch partners 
will be able to set the launch costs. Costs to the user of the ISS 
vary: NASA signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with NIH as an 
ISS National Laboratory user to launch biomedical experiments to the 
ISS, and NASA officials have stated that the agency will work with NIH 
to determine the demand for launch services and accommodate NIH 
payloads on the margins of NASA operations and maintenance flights as 
space allows. However, NASA officials told us that the agency has set 
no money aside for ISS National Laboratory payload development or 
transportation, and it may be unable to provide complimentary launch 
opportunities to National Laboratory users. We asked NASA for launch 
cost estimates; officials gave an estimate of $44,000 per kilogram 
(about 2.2 pounds), along with the caveat that the costs to develop and 
launch experiments vary widely depending on the experiment. Researchers 
we spoke with gave higher estimates for payload costs. USDA reported 
that the average payload cost for its experiments, which were 
individually contained in a compartment the size of a shoe box, was 
about $250,000. Though specific figures will vary depending on the 
nature of the payload, these types of costs may be prohibitive to 
researchers who are responsible for seeking their own funding. 

According to NASA officials, the National Laboratory designation does 
not guarantee an appropriation specifically for ISS National 
Laboratory, and it is unclear if NASA or other federal agencies will be 
able to provide any funding support to facilitate ISS utilization. NASA 
regards this lack of dedicated funding as the current main limiting 
factor for utilization of the ISS. One positive indication came from 
NIH, which issued a funding announcement indicating that it may make 
funding available for selected applicants.[Footnote 17] Researchers we 
spoke with agreed that funding opportunities or grants are irregular 
and limited, and that regular funding opportunities are essential for 
attracting researchers to any science program. NASA officials told us 
that funding for ISS research had been $700 million in 2002 and is now 
approximately $150 million annually. According to NASA this reflects a 
shift in budget priorities from funding research on the ISS to 
developing the Constellation program. 

Limited Crew Time to Conduct Research: 

NASA also ranks limited crew time as a significant constraint for 
science on board the ISS. The size of the crew on board the station is 
constrained at six by the number of spaces available in the 
"lifeboats," or docked spacecraft that can transport the crew in case 
of an emergency. As such, at present crew time cannot be increased to 
meet increased demand. Further, crew time is shared between NASA and 
its international partners (JAXA, ESA, CSA, and Russia). According to 
NASA, the ISS crew members work 8.5 hours a day, and during this time 
they conduct maintenance, vehicle traffic operations, training, medical 
operations, human research experiments, and the experiments of NASA and 
the international partners. NASA documentation shows that the remaining 
crew time will be spent eating, sleeping, and exercising. Figure 1 
depicts the crew time allocations among NASA and its international 
partners; it also depicts the percentages of crew time available to 
NASA and its international partners as negotiated in agreements. 
According to NASA, the USOS is allocated half of the crew time 
available on the ISS, with the other half going to the Russian segment. 
NASA told us that it and the international partners (excluding Russia) 
will have 35 hours per week of scheduled crew time to share in 
conducting research. 

Figure 1: Weekly Crew Time Allocations among Russia and the 
International Partners: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 pie-charts] 

Allocation of available crew time among NASA and international 
partners’ six-person crew: 
Russia: 50%; 
NASA: 38%; 
JAXA: 6%; 
ESA: 4%; 
CSA: 1%. 

International partner hours available for research (excluding Russia): 
NASA: 27; 
JAXA: 4; 
ESA: 3; 
CSA: 1. 

NASA’s plans for use of its allocated crew time: 
Human Research Program: 56%; 
Other/National Laboratory research: 44%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in figure 1, NASA's share of crew time will be approximately 
27 hours per week to devote to research; of this time, NASA plans to 
use 56 percent for its own Human Research Program studies. The 
remaining 44 percent (or approximately 12 hours per week) will be 
available for other NASA research and National Laboratory 
investigations. 

Though available crew time may increase as the six-person crew becomes 
more experienced with operating the ISS efficiently or if the crew 
volunteers its free time for research utilization, crew time for U.S. 
research remains a limiting factor in that it cannot be scaled up to 
meet demand. According to NASA officials, potential National Laboratory 
researchers should design their experiments to be as automated as 
possible or minimize crew involvement required for their experiments to 
ensure that they are accepted for flight. For example, NASA told 
potential NIH grant applicants that an experiment requiring 75 hours or 
more of crew time over one 6-month period would be too intensive and 
would likely be rejected, though according to NASA no investigation to 
date has required that much crew time.[Footnote 18] Not all ISS 
research will require much crew intervention or be constrained by 
available crew time. Areas such as technology development may require 
less crew intervention; for example, the Materials International Space 
Station Experiment mounts samples on the exterior of the ISS and once 
set up requires little crew intervention. 

Uncertain Future for the ISS beyond 2015: 

NASA's budget currently reflects plans for retirement of the ISS at the 
end of 2015. The Review of Human Space Flight Plans Committee has 
proposed extension of the ISS until 2020 in three of its five possible 
scenarios and Congress has directed NASA to take steps to ensure that 
it remains capable of remaining a viable and productive facility for 
the United States through at least 2020, but there has not been a 
commitment yet to continue operations. If not extended, there will be 
only 5 years between the end of construction in 2010 and ISS retirement 
in 2015 to utilize the ISS research facilities. Under this deadline, 
the potential for long-term science and for building a robust ISS user 
community is limited. 

The uncertainty of the ISS program beyond its 2015 retirement date has 
deterred members of the scientific community from considering the 
station as a platform for fundamental research. According to 
researchers, they require sufficient time (months to years) to develop 
and conduct an experiment and then to replicate their research so they 
can seek publication in peer-reviewed journals. Officials from each of 
the other science programs we studied and many researchers we spoke 
with commented on the importance of having a program with a reasonable 
and definitive window of available time for scientists and graduate 
students to fully develop and implement their experiments. They added 
that having longevity in a research program ensures that prospective 
and current users, whether academic or commercial, will have an 
opportunity to work in a viable laboratory where they can invest in 
their research. Researchers have told us that they may be unlikely to 
get involved with ISS research if they do not have assurances that the 
ISS will be around for long enough for them to get their research 
developed and executed. They emphasized that by knowing they have 
plenty of time to conduct their experiments, they have not only the 
time to teach the next generation of scientists--that is, graduate 
students whose dissertations rely on the completion of research 
projects--but also the opportunity to reproduce their experiments. 
Publishing research results, a requirement for many academic 
scientists, often requires that results can be duplicated, which may 
not be possible on board ISS if the research utilization window is only 
5 years. 

NASA's international partners are using their research facility 
allotments and two have recently expressed interest in extending the 
operation of the ISS beyond 2015. The Director General of ESA told the 
Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee that he believed that 
the decision about the future of the ISS should be a joint decision of 
all the partner nations, and that if ISS research utilization is not 
successful, the program would be a failure. Similarly, the head of 
Roscosmos advised the United States to prolong operation of the ISS 
beyond 2020.[Footnote 19] Retirement of the ISS is in part predicated 
on the life of its components. NASA's plan for operating and using the 
ISS for research through 2020ærequired by the NASA Authorization Act of 
2008æstates that while some of the ISS's hardware was originally 
designed for a 30-year life, most was tested to the 15-year life 
requirement, meaning that there are unknowns that prevent providing an 
absolute definition of the lifetime capability of the ISS, and that 
additional testing and analysis is required. We did not assess the 
technical issues surrounding an extension of ISS operations. 

NASA Is Considering Engaging an Outside Partner for ISS Management, a 
Key Practice Found at Other National Laboratories: 

In addition to the transportation issues, high costs and limited 
funding, and limited crew time--challenges exacerbated by the 
possibility of retirement of the ISS in 2015--NASA may face challenges 
in the management and operation of ISS National Laboratory research. 
There is currently no direct analogue to the ISS National Laboratory, 
and though NASA currently manages research programs at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory and its other centers that it believes possess 
similar characteristics to other national laboratories, NASA has 
limited experience managing the type of diverse scientific research and 
technology demonstration portfolio that the ISS could eventually 
represent. If utilized to its full capabilities, the ISS research 
program could cross multiple research disciplines and involve 
researchers from the academic, governmental, and commercial sectors, 
management of which may be outside of NASA's core competencies. We 
studied other national laboratories and large, multidisciplinary 
science programs to learn how they are managed and to identify possible 
lessons learned that could be applicable to management of the ISS. We 
visited Brookhaven and Argonne National Laboratories and spoke with 
officials from several other large science programs, including the 
National Energy Technology Laboratory, DOE's only government-owned, 
government-operated (GOGO) national laboratory; the Space Telescope 
Sciences Institute, which is a nonprofit science center that works for 
NASA to coordinate research for the Hubble Space Telescope and 
forthcoming James Webb Space Telescope; the NSF Office of Polar 
Programs, which manages research conducted in the Arctic and 
Antarctica; and WHOI, a private, nonprofit institute that conducts, 
coordinates, and supports a range of oceanographic research onboard 
three large research ships, one coastal vessel, and submersible 
vessels. We identified three common practices that may be applicable to 
whatever management structure NASA decides on for managing all U.S.- 
sponsored ISS research: central management of research, robust in-house 
technical expertise, and significant user outreach. NASA has recognized 
the potential value of national lab practices--particularly engaging an 
outside partner for laboratory management. 

Central Management of Research: 

At the research institutions we studied, we found that each has a 
management structure that typically entailed a contractor or nonprofit 
consortium of universities that oversee the operation of the laboratory 
and that researchers deal directly with that management body to 
initiate and develop their research. For example, Brookhaven and 
Argonne[Footnote 20] are federally funded research and development 
centers (FFRDC) and operate as government-owned, contractor-operated 
(GOCO) facilities.[Footnote 21] According to officials at DOE and the 
national laboratories, the role of the government in a GOCO arrangement 
is to oversee the contract and the contractor, as well as to provide 
direction to the management of the laboratory.[Footnote 22] They added 
that the contractor manages the science conducted, and can expand and 
contract easily to bring in needed expertise to support operations as 
research priorities and user needs evolve, and since the contractor is 
not constrained by federal General Schedule pay scales, it can offer 
high salaries to secure world-class scientific talent. 

WHOI has a central management body, but was the only facility we 
studied that does not manage its own peer-review process or select the 
research conducted in its facilities. Instead, WHOI has the agency 
sponsoring the research manage this process, in part because most of 
WHOI's research ships are owned by NSF and the Office of Naval 
Research, and the agency that owns a ship gets priority for use of the 
research facilities. NASA officials told us they think that the ISS 
falls into a similar model as WHOI because its National Laboratory 
facilities are open for use by any interested party that can provide 
its own funding, and while NASA evaluates and selects its own ISS 
research, it leaves the selection of ISS National Laboratory research 
to the sponsors of the research. However, WHOI is a member of 
University National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS), a central 
organization that is involved in monitoring, prioritizing, and 
scheduling research that will be conducted on various ocean laboratory 
vessels. According to UNOLS documentation, it has an elected UNOLS 
Council with broad representation--more than 61 academic institutions 
and national laboratories are part of UNOLS--and it provides some 
strategic research selection and prioritization functions to make 
efficient use of finite resources. 

According to NASA, ISS National Laboratory research is managed through 
the Assistant Associate Administrator for the ISS in SOMD, working in 
cooperation with the ISS National Laboratory Office, which is within 
the ISS Payloads Office. NASA officials told us that the role of these 
offices is to optimize and maximize available ISS resources, but that 
the ISS National Laboratory Office does not determine the content of 
the science flown to the ISS, but relies on the sponsor to evaluate the 
research. Instead, NASA prioritizes payloads based on operational or 
tactical needs, such as if there is a need for parts or spares to be 
flown to the ISS and if NASA can accommodate the research. 

Because of the congressional designation of the ISS as a national 
laboratory, NASA has opened the ISS up to several additional 
organizations other than NASA to select and fund science on the ISS. 
Some existing sponsors include (1) NASA, through either ESMD or SOMD; 
(2) other government agencies that have signed MOUs with NASA, 
including NIH, USDA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and DOE; (3) 
commercial or nonprofit organizations[Footnote 23] that have signed 
Space Act agreements with NASA;[Footnote 24] (4) organizations that 
have other formal partnerships with NASA, for example, NSBRI, which has 
a cooperative agreement with NASA; and (5) the international partners. 
According to NASA, as with WHOI, content of the ISS research selected 
is decentralized and conducted by the sponsor, and each sponsor has its 
own priorities for the research it supports. Additionally, NASA 
officials told us that though most research--including NASA, DOD, and 
NIH research is subjected to a peer-review process to ensure that the 
investigation has scientific merit, other (especially commercial) 
research is not necessarily peer reviewed. Thus, the ISS currently 
lacks one central body that oversees the selection and prioritization 
of all U.S. ISS research and that can strategically decide what 
research should be conducted and at what time. This may become more 
problematic if there is future overlapping demand for ISS facilities 
from various users, including NASA, other federal agencies, and the 
academic and corporate sectors. 

NASA has considered management alternatives to coordinate ISS research, 
including FFRDC or GOCO arrangements, as well as cooperative 
agreements, a government corporation, and hybrid structures. NASA has 
also reported several times on this issue, including in its 1998 plan 
for the ISS where making a special non-governmental organization (NGO) 
responsible for selecting and planning research onboard the ISS was 
discussed, and more generally in its 2005 Organizational Model 
Evaluation Team report. Other entities have also recommended that NASA 
establish such a management structure. For example, the National 
Research Council recommended that NASA establish an NGO to manage the 
ISS under the direction of institutions representing the research 
community; in 2000, the Computer Sciences Corporation recommended the 
creation of a space station utilization and research institute to 
manage ISS utilization. Congress has also directed NASA to develop 
plans involving an external management body: in the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2000, 
Congress instructed the agency to submit an implementation plan to 
incorporate the use of an NGO to conduct research utilization and 
commercialization management activities of the ISS, and the NASA 
Authorization Act of 2008 required NASA to develop a plan to support 
operations and utilization of the ISS beyond 2015, including a research 
management plan that identified who would manage United States 
research. Potential management structures noted by the act included an 
internal NASA office or an external relationship governed by a 
contract, cooperative agreement, or a grant arrangement. NASA's plan 
submitted in response to this requirement did not mention management by 
any outside agency. 

NASA officials told us that they are currently evaluating options for a 
future management structure for the ISS that may include an external 
entity, but that they have concerns. For example, they stated that they 
are concerned that adding a layer of bureaucracy between NASA 
operations and researchers could further complicate the process of 
getting investigations onto the ISS. Additionally, they do not think it 
is wise to establish such a management structure too early, for 
example, before the transportation challenge is addressed. Further, 
NASA officials told us that they are concerned that such a structure 
has an appropriate mix of internal and external expertise, and that 
having the appropriate personnel is ultimately more important than the 
type of structure (such as a GOCO versus another structure) selected. 
[Footnote 25] 

NASA officials also told us that they cannot select all U.S. ISS 
research because there is funding coming from numerous sponsors with 
various missions; however, the national laboratories we studied do not 
have only one funding agency either. For example, Argonne officials 
told us that they receive more than half of their funding from DOE but 
that the laboratory accommodates research sponsored by others. 
According to NASA officials, though it does not centrally select and 
prioritize all U.S. ISS research, it uses central tracking of research 
accomplishments and discipline-based working groups to prevent research 
duplication. 

In-house Expertise: 

The national laboratories and science programs we studied have capable 
in-house scientific and technical experts (generally provided by the 
management body) who can consult with and provide guidance to users. 
These institutions make a concerted effort to hire scientists with 
expertise relevant to the research conducted at that institute or 
laboratory. For instance, in addition to conducting their own research, 
the scientists and engineers who work for the management body are also 
available to assist visiting researchers in developing their research, 
drafting their proposals, and ultimately conducting their experiments. 
In some cases, staff scientists are available to provide user support 
24 hours a day and 7 days a week. The national laboratories we studied 
consider use of in-house scientists and engineers to conduct research 
and to serve as advisors to lab users as a core competency. 

Because of internal restructuring in the recent past, NASA has 
decentralized its expertise in key scientific disciplines germane to 
ISS research, and a small number of personnel ultimately left the 
agency. According to congressional testimony given by an ISS researcher 
and according to others we spoke with, NASA has reassigned a number of 
experts within the agency whose experience would have been helpful for 
biological and microgravity research on board the ISS. Specifically, in 
the mid-1990s, NASA began making cuts to its gravitational biology 
program, and in 2004, it merged its Office of Biological and Physical 
Research, including the Physical Sciences Division, into ESMD. NASA 
ultimately eliminated research in these areas that was not deemed 
essential to achieving the Vision. 

Though NASA may have decided that these experts were not necessary 
based on its new internal direction in research goals, lack of these 
personnel complicates supporting other researchers using the available 
ISS research facilities and conducting research separate from NASA's 
goals. For example, according to a senior official from the nonprofit 
USRA, NASA has a contract with USRA at Glenn Space Center to assist 
researchers conducting studies at the National Center for Microgravity 
Research because NASA no longer has the broad base of scientific 
experts available to provide this service to potential microgravity 
researchers. NASA directs other users to implementation partners, or 
companies that have scientific and technical expertise that can assist 
users in developing hardware and experiments. With NASA having lost 
scientific expertise in certain areas, there is a shortage of experts 
able to assist ISS researchers who are not conducting research 
pertinent to NASA's goals in developing and conducting their 
experiments. 

Significant User Outreach: 

The national laboratories and other large, user-based science 
institutes we studied place a high priority on conducting outreach to 
current and potential users and hold conferences and workshops on a 
regular basis for this purpose. For example, NSF hosts the New 
Investigator Workshop to recruit scientists who want to know more about 
the polar programs, and uses this opportunity to tell them how to draft 
a research proposal to conduct experiments in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
The national laboratories reserve portions of their budgets to pay for 
speakers to attend lectures and workshops, and they will also host 
"schools" where scientists can come together and stay at the laboratory 
to study the basic and advanced research techniques applicable to 
specific laboratory facilities. One facility at Brookhaven has 
developed a piggybacking concept in which new investigators are paired 
with an experienced user to learn how the science is conducted at the 
facility. Educational outreach is a tool used by the national 
laboratories and science institutes to lure not only scientists and 
companies but also to generate public interest. The national 
laboratories also participate in the National User Facility 
Organization, which consists of representatives from 30 user 
facilities, attracts about 25,000 users, and provides a unified voice 
for the scientific community and a forum for them to share their work. 
Officials we spoke with from several of these facilities told us that 
managing their user community and ensuring that their facilities were 
responsive to user needs was critical to ensuring continuing interest 
in using their facilities. 

NASA's ability to do large-scale outreach initiatives on its own has 
been limited by existing resources and other factors. NASA's ISS 
National Laboratory Office has a small staff (recently increased to 
five employees and not exclusively dedicated to outreach; NASA 
officials expect to eventually have as many as 10 staff), for outreach 
activities, and NASA conducts outreach with funding from its budget for 
space operations. NASA has reached out to researchers and other 
interested parties in an effort to attract users to the ISS National 
Laboratory. For example, the agency has established National Lab 
Pathfinders, where designated companies and other entities were 
identified by NASA for their ability to engage in early utilization of 
the ISS with the aim of inaugurating the ISS National Laboratory 
research program. According to NASA, this program has resulted in six 
flight experiments from commercial partners and two flight experiments 
from USDA. NASA has also teamed with NIH, which has made a recent 
program announcement for ISS research. NASA has conducted outreach to 
potential NIH grant applicants and participated in a meeting in June 
2009 where NASA and NIH officials met with potential researchers to 
discuss ISS research capabilities. This meeting brought potential 
researchers together with NASA, NIH, and "implementation partners" that 
are able to supply researchers with specialized hardware for their 
research, and information about hardware and research capabilities was 
discussed. 

Based on our analysis, observations of outreach practices at other 
national laboratories and science institutions, and comments from 
researchers we spoke with, we believe that NASA needs to conduct more 
outreach and education. We were told that some potential researchers in 
industry were only informed about the ISS because they already had past 
employment or business ties with NASA or because they heard about ISS 
research opportunities via a third party advocating for ISS 
utilization. Others told us that they knew nothing of the value of ISS 
research until they had it explained to them on a one-on-one basis and 
that a broader education campaign might be a good way to interest more 
users. In addition to their other outreach efforts, the national 
laboratories we studied both have robust Web sites with considerable 
information that would be helpful in educating potential users. Though 
NASA has information on its ISS-related Web sites about the ISS and 
research conducted, the focus appears to be presenting successes rather 
than making user educational information--such as complete information 
on available hardware, available implementation partners, opportunities 
of microgravity research, and details about research results (including 
failures and the causes for any failures)--easy to find. 

Conclusions: 

Unless the decision is made to extend ISS operations, NASA has only 5 
years to execute a robust research program before the station is 
deorbited, which is little time to establish a strong utilization 
program. A viable user base will not develop without sufficient launch 
opportunities to permit recurring access, consistent funding 
opportunities, sufficient crew time to conduct research, and longevity 
of the ISS. However, despite these challenges, the on-orbit laboratory 
offers the potential for scientific breakthroughs, a unique test bed 
for new technologies and applications, and a platform for increased 
international collaboration in research. Having a central body that is 
able to: represent all the ISS user communities (including NASA, other 
federal agencies, the commercial sector, and academia); oversee the 
selection of all ISS research; and ensure that the research being 
conducted is meritorious, peer-reviewed where appropriate, and not 
duplicative may assist in achieving full utilization of the ISS and its 
unique capabilities and maximize the possibility of achieving research 
successes on board the ISS. There is no direct analogue to how 
something like the ISS National Laboratory should or could be managed, 
so the specific structure that should be developed will require further 
consideration. 

If the decision is made to cease ISS operations in 2015 and to not 
provide additional resources for research, there are management actions 
focused on education and outreach that could be easily and quickly 
implemented to allow NASA to better support and inform users. If the 
decision is made to extend the ISS past its current retirement date of 
2015 and to try to fully utilize all ISS research resources, then there 
are several major actions that NASA can take to build a robust user 
base and ensure that high-caliber science is being conducted. These 
actions will take more time--potentially years--and additional 
resources to implement. Though it may not be possible to establish a 
management structure similar to those found at other national 
laboratories that have been in existence for much longer than the ISS 
in the limited time remaining, NASA may be able to leverage existing 
agreements with management bodies to provide for a faster solution, or 
leverage the scientific and technical expertise of other sponsoring 
federal agencies (such as NIH) that have experience in conducting peer-
reviewed research in areas pertinent to their missions. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

If the Administration and NASA decide to retire the station in 2015 and 
to continue utilizing the ISS without increasing resources, we 
recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following four steps: 

* Develop and implement a plan to broaden and enhance ongoing outreach 
to potential users, including those in the commercial sector, with 
consideration given to the tight time frames for the ISS. 

* Further develop online ISS information materials to provide easy 
access to details about laboratory facilities, opportunities presented 
by microgravity, available research hardware, resource constraints, and 
the results of all past ISS research, including successes and failures. 

* As information develops, inform users on how launch capabilities will 
be provided to users of the ISS, including how regular these launches 
will be and what the cost will be (if any) to the users. 

* If full utilization of available USOS facilities on board the ISS is 
not possible, consider sharing excess research capacity with the 
international partners on a quid pro quo basis. 

If the administration and NASA decide to extend ISS operations beyond 
2015 and to provide the resources required for enhanced utilization of 
the ISS research facilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator 
take the following three steps: 

* Implement the first three steps recommended above. 

* Establish a body that centrally oversees U.S. ISS research decision 
making, including the selection of all U.S. research to be conducted on 
board and ensuring that all U.S. ISS research is meritorious and valid. 
This body should also be able to strategically prioritize research 
proposed by many potential sponsors. 

* Ensure that potential and actual ISS users have access to scientific 
or technical expertise, either in-house or external, in the areas of 
research relevant to the ISS that can provide assistance to users as 
required. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with all seven 
recommendations. NASA's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 
NASA also provided technical comments which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to NASA's Administrator and 
interested congressional committees. The report also is available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
provided in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To identify how the International Space Station (ISS) is being utilized 
at present, we reviewed National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) documentation pertaining to available on-station hardware and 
current scientific investigations that are using this hardware, 
including the Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan 2008-2015; 
the Reference Guide to the International Space Station; and NASA's ISS 
Science Prioritization Desk Instruction. We also interviewed NASA 
officials at headquarters and Johnson Space Center, including officials 
from the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), and the 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). We also spoke with 
officials from the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the 
European Space Agency (ESA). We also met with an official from The 
Boeing Company, which is the contractor responsible for the design, 
development, testing, and operation of the ISS. 

To identify how the ISS will be utilized once assembly is completed, we 
analyzed NASA documentation identifying available on-station hardware 
once assembly is complete and NASA projections for future NASA 
requirements. We also met with officials from NASA SOMD and NASA ESMD, 
and we spoke with researchers from academia, specifically researchers 
from North Carolina State University, Arizona State University, Case 
Western University, the University of Colorado-Boulder, Medical College 
of Wisconsin, Georgia Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, 
and Pennsylvania State University. These researchers were largely 
selected because they provided congressional testimony about conducting 
ISS research or because they were recommended as contacts by NASA or 
the National Academies of Science. We interviewed implementation 
partners for NASA, including BioServe Space Technologies and the 
Universities Space Research Association. We also attended NASA 
presentations to the National Academies of Science Decadal Survey on 
Biological and Physical Sciences in Space Committee regarding the ISS 
and its capabilities and utilization. It is important to note that no 
good metric exists for precisely quantifying the output of scientific 
research facilities, including the ISS. For example, number of 
experiments conducted is not a good metric for measuring utilization 
because it is unclear what baseline should be used for comparison, and 
the number of publications is not ideal since not all research is 
ultimately published. We also considered analyzing the use of 
electrical power on each utilization rack to determine how frequently 
they were powered up, but the racks do not have power meters and thus 
these data cannot be collected. 

To identify the challenges to fully maximizing the ISS, we interviewed 
NASA officials in the ISS Program Office as well as in NASA's ESMD and 
SOMD and a former NASA official. We reviewed reports from the National 
Research Council--an organization consulted by NASA on its ISS research 
program--including Factors Affecting the Utilization of the 
International Space Station for Research in the Biological and Physical 
Sciences (2003), Institutional Arrangements for Space Station Research 
(1999), Review of Goals and Plans for NASA's Space and Earth Sciences 
(2006), and Review of NASA Plans for the International Space Station 
(2006). We also met with officials from the National Academies of 
Science--whom NASA consulted on several occasions to review ISS 
research goals and management--and reviewed their report Elements of a 
Science Plan for the North Pacific Research Board. We reviewed the 
Computer Sciences Corporation's International Space Station Operations 
Architecture Study (2000) that was prepared for NASA. We also 
interviewed former, current, and prospective scientists and researchers 
who have had experience conducting research onboard the ISS or who were 
interested in conducting future research, including the academic 
researchers listed above as well as officials from WiCell Research 
Institute, Zero Gravity Inc, and Ad Astra Rocket Company. We also spoke 
with officials from the Department of Agriculture, the National Space 
Biomedical Research Institute, and the National Institutes of Health 
and the National Space Biomedical Research Institute, which have 
existing agreements or memorandums of understanding with NASA to 
conduct ISS research. Further, we interviewed officials from the 
Universities Space Research Association and BioServe Space 
Technologies, both of which assist scientists in conducting space 
research with NASA. 

To determine how NASA is managing the ISS, we interviewed NASA 
officials and reviewed NASA plans and documentation, including its 
Consolidated Operations and Utilization Plan 2008; ISS Utilization 
Management Concept Development Study; Research and Utilization Plan for 
the International Space Station; Commercial Development Plan for the 
International Space Station; Reference Guide to the International Space 
Station; NASA ISS Prioritization Desk Instruction; Human Research 
Program: Integrated Research Plan; Advanced Capabilities Division: 
International Space Station (ISS) Science Portfolio, Determination and 
Management; NASA Report to Congress: Regarding a Plan for the 
International Space Station's National Laboratory; Plan to Support 
Operations and Utilization of the International Space Station Beyond FY 
2015; and NASA's Organizational Model Evaluation Team Process, 
Analysis, and Recommendations. We also we reviewed NASA's international 
partner agreements. We also reviewed various National Research Council 
reports, including Factors Affecting the Utilization of the 
International Space Station for Research in the Biological and Physical 
Sciences (2003), Institutional Arrangements for Space Station Research 
(1999), Review of Goals and Plans for NASA's Space and Earth Sciences 
(2006), and Review of NASA Plans for the International Space Station 
(2006). We also reviewed the Computer Sciences Corporation's ISS 
Operations Architecture Study (2000) and prior GAO reports. 

To determine how NASA's management of the ISS compares to the 
management of other national laboratories and large science institutes, 
we spoke with officials at the Department of Energy (DOE) who are 
responsible for the DOE national laboratories. We also spoke with 
officials from the National Energy Technology Laboratory, which is 
DOE's only government-owned, government-operated laboratory. Further, 
we visited Argonne National Laboratory (Illinois) and Brookhaven 
National Laboratory (New York), and spoke with officials at these 
laboratories representing the National User Facility Organization. We 
also spoke with officials from the Space Telescope Science Institute, 
which is the body that manages NASA's Hubble Space Telescope. We 
selected these facilities in part because of NASA's suggestions, and in 
part because they are all multidisciplinary facilities conducting a 
wide range of research tasks. To understand the challenges posed by 
conducting research in remote, hostile environments with high logistics 
costs, we spoke with officials at the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institute, which operates oceangoing research ships and submersibles in 
remote and potentially hazardous environments, and we met with 
officials from the National Science Foundation who are responsible for 
managing the Office of Polar Programs, which manages research conducted 
in the Arctic and Antarctic. These two programs offer some analogue to 
conducting research in space. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through October 
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 	
Office of the Administrator: 	
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

November 18, 2009: 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

NASA appreciates the opportunity to comment on your draft report 
entitled, "International Space Station: Significant Challenges May 
Limit Onboard Research," (GA0-10-9). 

In the draft report, GAO makes a total of seven recommendations 
relating to utilization of the International Space Station (ISS). The 
recommendations are distributed across two potential scenarios of ISS 
utilization, specifically: 

A. If the Administration and NASA decide to retire the station in 2015 
and to continue utilizing the ISS without increasing resources, we 
recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following four steps: 

Recommendation 1: Develop and implement a plan to broaden and enhance 
ongoing outreach to potential users, including those in the commercial 
sector, with consideration given to the tight time frames for the ISS. 

Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 2: Further develop online ISS information materials to 
provide easy access to detail about laboratory facilities, 
opportunities presented by microgravity, available research hardware, 
resource constraints, and the results of all past ISS research, 
including both successes and failures. 

Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 3: As it develops, inform users on how launch 
capabilities will be provided to users of the ISS, including how 
regular these launches will be and what the cost will be (if any) to 
the user. 

Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 4: If full utilization of available United States 
operating segment facilities on board the ISS is not possible, consider 
sharing excess research capacity with the international partners on a 
quid pro quo basis. 

Response: Concur. 

B. If the Administration and NASA decide to extend ISS operations 
beyond 2015 and to provide the resources required for enhanced 
utilization of the ISS research facilities, we recommend that the NASA 
Administrator take the following steps: 

Recommendation 5: Implement the first three steps recommended above. 

Response: Concur. 

Recommendation 6: Establish a body that centrally oversees U.S. ISS 
research decision making, including the selection of all U.S. research 
to be conducted on board and ensuring that all U.S. ISS research is 
meritorious and valid. This body should also be able to strategically 
prioritize research proposed by many potential sponsors. 

Response: Concur with comment. NASA agrees with the recommendation. 
However, as noted by GAO in the draft report's conclusions (p. 27), 
"NASA may be able to leverage existing agreements with management 
bodies to provide for a faster solution, or leverage the scientific and 
technical expertise of other sponsoring federal agencies (such as NIH) 
that have experience in conducting peer-reviewed research in areas 
pertinent to their missions." Therefore, NASA will first look to 
meeting this recommendation by establishing a "centralized management 
body" internal to the Agency. This is essential to ensuring an 
effective interface with an external organization(s). 

Recommendation 7: Ensure that potential and actual ISS users have 
access to scientific or technical expertise, either in-house or 
external, in the areas of research relevant to the ISS that can provide 
assistance to users as required. 

Response: Concur. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to review this draft report. We are 
looking forward to your final report to Congress. If you have any 
questions or require additional information, please contact Mark Uhran 
at 202-358-2233. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lori B. Garver: 
Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, James L. Morrison, Assistant 
Director; Greg Campbell; Cheryl M. Harris; C. James Madar; Diana L. 
Moldafsky; Kenneth E. Patton; Timothy M. Persons; Leah L. Probst; and 
Alyssa B. Weir made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain 
Until a Sound Business Case Is Established. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844]. Washington, D.C.: August. 26, 
2009. 

NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Aggressive 
Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo Transport 
Capabilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2009. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to NASA documentation, this estimate includes 
development, operations, cargo and crew transportation, Space Shuttle 
costs, and costs to other NASA programs, but does not include Freedom 
program costs of approximately $10 billion or international partner 
costs. 

[2] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-422 § 601. This act is herein called the NASA 
Authorization Act of 2008. 

[3] A microgravity environment is one in which the apparent weight of 
an object is small compared to its actual weight; on board the ISS, 
objects are in a microgravity environment because the ISS is in a 
continual state of free fall toward the Earth. This state can be 
achieved for short periods of time through free fall drop towers, 
aircraft flying parabolic paths, and rockets flying suborbital, 
parabolic paths, and for longer periods in orbiting spacecraft. 

[4] ESA partners include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 

[5] According to NASA, to date every partner agency has implemented 
research throughout both the USOS and the Russian segment. 

[6] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, The Vision for Space 
Exploration (Washington, D.C., February 2004). 

[7] After the delay, AMS is scheduled to be transported to the ISS on 
one of the last Space Shuttle flights. 

[8] National Research Council and the National Academy of Public 
Administration, Factors Affecting the Utilization of the International 
Space Station for Research in the Biological and Physical Sciences 
(Washington, D.C., 2003). 

[9] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-155 § 507 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16767) (herein 
referred to as the NASA Authorization Act of 2005). 

[10] The ISS partners use a document called the Consolidated Operations 
and Utilization Plan to project resources for strategic planning 
purposes. 

[11] GAO, NASA: Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face 
Aggressive Schedules to Demonstrate Critical Space Station Cargo 
Transport Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618] (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 
2009). 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618]. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618]. 

[14] GAO, NASA: Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain 
Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26, 
2009). 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-618]. 

[16] This refers to the 2003 loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, which 
resulted in NASA suspending shuttle flights until 2005 while 
investigations were under way. 

[17] President Obama recently announced that $5 billion in American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds will be made available to support 
NIH research; this may provide funding for NIH-sponsored ISS research. 

[18] Six months is the standard ISS expedition duration. 

[19] Recent news articles have indicated that Russia may be interested 
in detaching from USOS and continuing operations if NASA decides to 
cease its involvement in 2015. NASA does not believe that this is 
technically feasible. 

[20] Brookhaven's contractor is Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC, and 
is in the ninth year of a 10-year contract; the contractor for Argonne 
is UChicago Argonne, LLC, which has a 5-year contract renewable for 20 
years. 

[21] For more on the management of FFRDCs, see GAO, Federal Research: 
Opportunities Exist to Improve the Management and Oversight of 
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 
2008). 

[22] The alternative structure is a GOGO facility. DOE has only one 
GOGO laboratory, the National Energy Technology Laboratory. 

[23] This currently includes Ad Astra Rocket Company; Spacehab Inc.; 
BioServe Space Technologies; Nanoracks, LLC.; and Zero Gravity Inc. 

[24] National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 
203 (1958). This act is commonly referred to as the Space Act and 
agreements signed utilizing NASA's other transaction authority are 
known as Space Act agreements. 

[25] We did not assess the cost implications to NASA of establishing an 
institute or other management structure. However, in NASA's 2002 
International Space Station Utilization Management Concept Development 
Study, NASA evaluators estimated a budget of about $90 million if a 
national laboratory nonprofit institute were established with a 
workforce of approximately 350; for a workforce of 1,000, the estimated 
cost was about $200 million. 

[End of section] 

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