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Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan' which was released on October 2, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

October 2009: 

Contingency Contracting: 

DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking 
Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

GAO-10-1: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-1, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on 
contractors to provide a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
as GAO has previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in 
obtaining sufficient information to plan and manage their use of 
contractors. 

As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data for Iraq and 
Afghanistan for FY 2008 and the first half of FY 2009 on the (1) status 
of agency efforts to track information on contracts and contractor 
personnel; (2) number of contractor personnel; (3) number of killed and 
wounded contractors; and (4) number and value of contracts and extent 
to which they were awarded competitively. GAO reviewed selected 
contracts and compared personnel data to other available sources to 
assess the reliability of agency-reported data. 

What GAO Found: 

In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor 
oversight, DOD, State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized 
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track 
information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in Afghanistan, the agencies 
are in the process of implementing the system and require contractor 
personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. However, the 
agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are entered, 
resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as 
required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track 
detailed information on all contractor personnel, particularly local 
nationals. Further, SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all 
required data elements, such as contract dollar value and the number of 
personnel killed and wounded. As a result, the agencies rely on other 
sources for contract and contractor personnel information, such as 
periodic surveys of contractors. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel, 
including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their 
limitations, the reported data should not be used to identify trends or 
draw conclusions about contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we 
found that the data reported by the three agencies were incomplete. For 
example, in one quarterly contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000 
personnel in Afghanistan, and USAID did not provide personnel data for 
a $91 million contract. The agencies depend on contractors to report 
personnel numbers and acknowledge that they cannot validate the 
reported information. 

USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed 
and 159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD 
officials told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track 
killed or wounded contractor personnel and referred us to the 
Department of Labor’s Defense Base Act (DBA) case data for this 
information. However, because DBA is a worker’s compensation program, 
Labor’s data include cases such as those resulting from occupational 
injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis for determining how 
many contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working on DOD, 
State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the 
data provide insights into contractor casualties. According to Labor, 
11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq 
and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based 
on our review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11 
percent of all FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from 
hostile actions. 

DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly 
85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD 
accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations. 
The agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during 
our review period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations, 
were competed. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends the agencies implement a plan to, among other matters, 
ensure consistent criteria for entering information into SPOT and 
improve its reporting capabilities to track statutorily required 
contracting data. DOD and State disagreed that a plan is needed, citing 
current coordination efforts. A plan with time frames would help to 
translate their coordination efforts into actions to address the issues 
GAO identified. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] or key 
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

SPOT Not Yet fully Implemented to Track Contractor Personnel and 
Contracts: 

DOD, State, and USAID Lack Reliable Data on Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Agencies' Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded in 
Iraq and Afghanistan Varies: 

DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on 
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of Contractor 
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half 
of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel in SPOT 
Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, as of March 31, 2009: 

Table 5: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel Killed 
and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First 
Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 9: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding 
Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 
2009: 

Table 10: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 11: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 13: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 14: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 17: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Table 18: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts for 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and Obligations 
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan 
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 
2009: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

DBA: Defense Base Act: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation: 

LOA: letter of authorization: 

MEJA: Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: 

MOU: memorandum of understanding: 

NDAA for FY2008: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008: 

SPOT: Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker: 

UCMJ: Uniform Code of Military Justice: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 1, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on 
contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and to oversee and 
carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the use 
of contractors to support military operations is not new, the extent to 
which the three agencies are relying on contractors in the two 
countries is unprecedented--both in terms of the number of contractors 
and the range of services they are providing. We and others have 
reported that the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining 
information on contracts and contractor personnel to plan and manage 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] Absent complete and 
accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations, 
the agencies are limited in their ability to develop a complete picture 
of their reliance on contractors, the tasks being performed, and their 
associated costs. The importance of such information is heightened by 
the evolving U.S. efforts in the two countries as the agencies reduce 
their presence in Iraq while expanding their presence in Afghanistan. 
Reliable and meaningful data on contractors and the services they 
provide are a starting point for agency decisions on when and how to 
effectively use contractors; support contractors in terms of housing, 
transportation, security, and other services; and ensure that 
contractors are properly managed and overseen. 

Congress has taken a number of actions to increase oversight of 
contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among these, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for 
FY2008) directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) regarding matters relating to contracting in the 
two countries, including maintaining common databases of information on 
contracts and contractor personnel.[Footnote 2] In their July 2008 MOU, 
the agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT) database as their system of record for information on 
contracts and contractor personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Congress directed us to annually review DOD, State, and USAID contracts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and report on these reviews through 2010. 
[Footnote 3] This is our second report issued pursuant to that mandate. 
[Footnote 4] We are providing the results of our analyses of agency-
reported data for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 
2009 regarding (1) the agencies' implementation of SPOT, (2) the number 
of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions, 
[Footnote 5] working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) the number of contractor 
personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the number and value of contracts 
[Footnote 6] that were active and awarded[Footnote 7] during our 18-
month review period and the extent of competition for new contract 
awards. 

We used the following methodologies to develop our findings: 

* To assess SPOT's implementation, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's 
MOU and interviewed officials responsible for implementing SPOT to 
determine the agencies' criteria and practices for entering information 
into SPOT and the system's current and planned capabilities. We 
reviewed agency guidance and policy documents regarding the use of SPOT 
and took training courses designed for personnel who expect to use the 
system. We then compared the uses and capabilities of SPOT to the MOU 
requirements to determine the extent to which SPOT fulfills the terms 
of the MOU. 

* For the number of contractor personnel, we obtained DOD, State, and 
USAID data on the number of U.S., third country, and local nationals 
working on contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, including those performing 
security functions, during our review period. The agencies provided 
data from surveys of their contractors as well as the SPOT database. We 
assessed the reported data by comparing them to other available 
sources. Based on comparisons of each source, we concluded that the 
agency-reported data should not be used to draw conclusions about the 
actual number of contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan or trends 
over time. However, we are presenting the reported data along with 
their limitations as they establish a minimum number of contractor 
personnel during our period of review. 

* For contractor personnel killed or wounded during our review period, 
we analyzed State and USAID data; DOD did not collect and could not 
provide these data. We could not independently verify the completeness 
of the data reported by USAID and State. However, we report State's and 
USAID's data as they provide insight into the number of contractor 
personnel who were killed or wounded during our review period. In 
addition, we analyzed Department of Labor data on Defense Base Act 
(DBA) cases for incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. We determined the DBA data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on our 
prior reliability assessments. We also reviewed a random sample of 150 
DBA case files, from a population of 2,500 cases, for incidents that 
occurred during fiscal year 2008 to determine, for example, whether the 
case was the result of a hostile incident and the severity of the 
contractor's injury. 

* For the contracts, we obtained data from DOD, State, and USAID on the 
number of active and awarded contracts with performance in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during our review period, the amount of funds obligated on 
those contracts, and the extent of competition for new contract awards. 
Data were provided from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next 
Generation (FPDS-NG), agency-specific databases, and manually compiled 
lists of contract actions. We determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and 
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the number of 
competed contracts, based on our prior reliability assessments, 
interviews with agency officials, and verification of some reported 
data. 

A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in 
appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 
through September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Section 861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU 
related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law specified a 
number of issues to be covered in the MOU, including the identification 
of each agency's roles and responsibilities for matters relating to 
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, responsibility for establishing 
procedures for the movement of contractor personnel in the two 
countries, responsibility for collecting and referring information 
related to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and 
identification of common databases to serve as repositories of 
information on contract and contractor personnel. The NDAA for FY2008 
requires the databases to track at a minimum: 

* for each contract, 

* a brief description of the contract, 

* its total value, and: 

* whether it was awarded competitively; and: 

* for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, 

* total number employed, 

* total number performing security functions, and: 

* total number who have been killed or wounded. 

DOD, State, and USAID signed the MOU in July 2008.[Footnote 8] The 
agencies agreed that SPOT, a Web-based system initially designed and 
used by DOD, would be the system of record for the statutorily-required 
contract and contractor personnel information. The MOU specified that 
SPOT would include information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with 
more than 14 days of performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or valued at 
more than the simplified acquisition threshold, which the MOU stated 
was $100,000, as well as information on the personnel working under 
those contracts. In contrast, the NDAA for FY2008 established a 14-day 
threshold for inclusion in the database but did not specify a minimum 
dollar value. 

As agreed in the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and 
upgrades to the SPOT database.[Footnote 9] The agencies further agreed 
to negotiate funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements 
and for specialized training requirements. Each agency is to ensure 
that data elements related to contractor personnel, such as the number 
of personnel employed on each contract in Iraq or Afghanistan, are 
entered into SPOT and to require its contractors to enter that 
information accurately. Information entered into SPOT is more detailed 
than the number of contractor personnel as it is designed to track 
individuals by name and record information such as the contracts they 
are working under, deployment dates, and next of kin. Data elements, 
such as contract value and whether it was awarded competitively, are to 
be imported into SPOT from FPDS-NG, the federal government's system for 
tracking information on contracting actions. 

SPOT Not Yet fully Implemented to Track Contractor Personnel and 
Contracts: 

While implementation of SPOT is still under way, DOD, State, and 
USAID's criteria for deciding which contractor personnel to enter into 
the system differed from what was agreed to in the MOU and varied by 
country. This has resulted in not all contractor personnel being 
entered into SPOT as agreed to in the MOU. Further, SPOT currently does 
not have the capability to track all of the required contract 
information or readily generate reports on the total number of killed 
or wounded contractor personnel. 

Agency Implementation and Criteria for Using SPOT Varied: 

For the majority of our review period, DOD, State, and USAID were 
phasing in the MOU requirement to use SPOT to track information on 
contracts and the personnel working on them in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
January 2007, DOD designated SPOT as its primary system for collecting 
data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces and directed 
contractor firms to enter personnel data for contracts performed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. State started systematically entering information 
for both Iraq and Afghanistan into SPOT in November 2008. In January 
2009, USAID began requiring contractors in Iraq to enter personnel data 
into SPOT. However, USAID has not yet imposed a similar requirement on 
its contractors in Afghanistan and has no time frame for doing so. 

In implementing SPOT, DOD's, State's, and USAID's criteria for 
determining which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT varied and 
were not consistent with those contained in the MOU, as the following 
illustrate. 

* Regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID 
officials stated that the primary factor for deciding to enter 
contractor personnel into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT- 
generated letter of authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel need SPOT-
generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military 
identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for 
security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons.[Footnote 10] 
However, not all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals, in 
Iraq need LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel 
were not being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials informed 
us that individuals needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their 
contracts did not meet the MOU's 14-day or $100,000 thresholds. 

* For Afghanistan, DOD offices varied in their treatment of which 
contractor personnel should be entered into SPOT. Officials with one 
contracting office stated that the need for an LOA determined whether 
someone was entered into SPOT. As in Iraq, since local nationals 
generally do not need LOAs, they are not being entered into SPOT. In 
contrast, DOD officials with another contracting office stated that 
they follow DOD's 2007 guidance on the use of SPOT.[Footnote 11] 
According to the guidance, contractor personnel working on contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan with more than 30 days of performance and valued 
over $25,000 are to be entered into SPOT--as opposed to the MOU 
threshold of 14 days of performance or valued over $100,000. 

Agency officials have raised questions about the need to enter detailed 
information into SPOT on all contractor personnel. Some DOD officials 
we spoke with questioned the need to individually track all contractor 
personnel as opposed to their total numbers given the cost of 
collecting these detailed data compared to the benefit of having this 
information. Similarly, USAID officials questioned the need to enter 
detailed information as agreed to because personnel working on its 
contracts in Afghanistan generally do not live or work in close 
proximity to U.S. government personnel and typically do not receive 
support services from the U.S. government. USAID officials also cited 
security concerns as one factor affecting their decision on who should 
be entered into SPOT. USAID officials explained that they have held off 
entering Iraqi or Afghan nationals into SPOT because identifying local 
nationals who work with the U.S. government by name could put those 
individuals in danger should the system be compromised. To help address 
this concern, DOD officials said that they have begun developing a 
classified version of SPOT. However, USAID officials told us the agency 
would most likely not be able to use a classified system due to limited 
access to classified computers. 

Because of the varying criteria on who should be entered into the 
system, the information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of 
the total number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. For 
example, officials from all three agencies expressed confidence that 
the SPOT data were relatively complete for contractor personnel who 
need an LOA in Iraq. Conversely, agency officials acknowledged that 
SPOT does not fully reflect the number of local nationals working on 
their contracts. Agency officials further explained that ensuring that 
information on local nationals is in SPOT is challenging because their 
numbers tend to fluctuate due to the use of day laborers and because 
local firms do not always keep track of the individuals working on 
their projects. DOD officials also explained that they have had to 
develop workarounds to deal with the fact that SPOT requires a first 
and last name to be entered for each individual along with a birth date 
and unique identification number. The officials noted that many Afghan 
laborers have only one name, do not know their birth dates, and lack 
identification numbers. 

SPOT Not Capable of Tracking All Required Information: 

SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all of the contract data 
elements as agreed to in the MOU. While the MOU specifies that contract 
values, competition information, and descriptions of the services being 
provided would be pulled into SPOT from FPDS-NG, this capability is not 
expected to be available until 2010. In the interim, the DOD officials 
overseeing SPOT's development told us that SPOT users can manually 
enter competition information and descriptions, but there is no 
requirement for them to do so. Since SPOT is not designed to let users 
enter contract dollar values, the DOD officials stated that SPOT and 
FPDS-NG are being periodically merged to identify contract values. 

Even when the direct link is established, pulling FPDS-NG data into 
SPOT may present challenges because of how data are entered into SPOT. 
First, information from the two systems can only be merged if the 
contract has been entered into SPOT. If no contractor personnel working 
on a particular contract have been entered, then the contract will not 
appear in SPOT and its information cannot be linked with the 
information in FPDS-NG. Second, while contract numbers are the unique 
identifiers that will be used to match records in SPOT to those in FPDS-
NG, SPOT users are not required to enter contract numbers in a 
standardized manner. In our review of SPOT data, we determined that at 
least 12 percent of the contracts had invalid contract numbers and, 
therefore, could not be matched to records in FPDS-NG.[Footnote 12] 
Additionally, contract numbers may not be sufficient to identify unique 
contracts. Specific orders placed on task order contracts are 
identified through a combination of the contract number and task order 
number. However, SPOT users are not required to enter task order 
numbers. For example, one SPOT entry only contained the contract number 
without an order number. In reviewing FPDS-NG data, we determined that 
DOD had placed 12 different orders--ranging from a few thousand dollars 
to over $129 million--against that contract. Based on the information 
in SPOT, DOD would not be able to determine which order's value and 
competition information should be imported from FPDS-NG. 

SPOT, as currently designed, also lacks the capability to readily 
generate reports on the number of killed or wounded contractor 
personnel. SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 to fulfill the NDAA for 
FY2008 requirement to track such information. Contractors can now 
update the status of their personnel in the system, including whether 
they have been killed or wounded, while agencies can run queries to 
identify the number of personnel with a current status of killed or 
wounded. However, the standard queries can only generate a list of 
personnel currently identified as killed or wounded and cannot be used 
to identify individuals who previously had the status of killed or 
wounded and whose records have become inactive or whose injured status 
changed when they returned to work. For example, if an individual has 
an injured status today and a query were run, that individual would be 
included in the report. If that individual then returned to work, the 
status would change and that individual would not appear on any 
subsequent injury reports, with the agencies having no means of 
determining whether the individual was ever injured. 

DOD, State, and USAID Lack Reliable Data on Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 

DOD, State, and USAID reported to us that there were 226,475 contractor 
personnel, including 27,603 performing security functions, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as of the second quarter in fiscal year 2009. Over the 
period of our review, DOD reported significantly more contractors than 
State and USAID, most of whom were working in Iraq. For example, as of 
the second quarter in fiscal year 2009, DOD reported over 200,000 
contractor personnel while State and USAID reported almost 9,000 and 
over 16,500, respectively. However, due to limitations with the 
reported data, we determined the data reported by the agencies should 
not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about the number of 
contractor personnel in either country. Specifically, we found that 
personnel information reported by the three agencies was incomplete 
and, for DOD, additional factors raise questions about the reported 
numbers' reliability. Further, the agencies could not verify whether 
the reported data were accurate or complete; although, they indicated 
that the data for certain types of contractors, such as those providing 
security functions, were more complete than other data, such as those 
for local nationals. 

DOD Contractor Personnel: 

According to DOD officials, the most comprehensive information on the 
number of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan comes from 
the U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) quarterly census.[Footnote 13] 
CENTCOM initiated its quarterly census of contractor personnel in June 
2007 as an interim measure until SPOT is fully implemented. The census 
relies on contractor firms to report their personnel data to DOD 
components, which then aggregate the data and report them to CENTCOM at 
the end of each quarter. As shown in table 1, DOD's reported number of 
contractor personnel for our review period ranged from 200,111 to 
231,698, with approximately 7 percent performing security functions 
over the entire period, on average. 

Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of Contractor 
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half 
of Fiscal Year 2009: 

Iraq: All contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 163,591; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 149,378; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 162,428; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 163,446; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 148,050; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 132,610. 

Iraq: Contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 9,952; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 7,259; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 7,704; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 10,446; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 9,218; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 12,942. 

Afghanistan: All contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 36,520; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 52,336; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 41,232; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 68,252; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 71,755; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 68,197. 

Afghanistan: Contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 2,998; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 6,982; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 3,537; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 3,847; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 3,689; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 4,373. 

Total all contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 200,111; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 201,714; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 203,660; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 231,698; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 219,805; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 200,807. 

Total contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 12,950; 
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 14,241; 
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 11,241; 
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 14,293; 
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 12,907; 
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 17,315. 

Source: GAO analysis of CENTCOM census data. 

[End of table] 

DOD officials acknowledge that the census numbers represent only a 
rough approximation of the actual number of contractor personnel that 
worked in either country. Specifically, these officials told us that 
because of how the data were collected and reported by the various DOD 
components, it was difficult to compile and obtain an accurate count of 
contractor personnel. We determined that over the course of our review 
period the following data issues existed. 

* Contractor personnel information was sometimes incomplete. Most 
notably, an Army-wide review of fiscal year 2008 third quarter census 
data determined that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not include 
approximately 26,000 Afghan nationals working on contracts. However, 
information on these contractors was included in subsequent censuses. 
As a result, comparing third quarter and fourth quarter data would 
incorrectly suggest that there was an increase in the number of 
contractors in Afghanistan, when in fact the increase is attributable 
to more accurate counting of personnel. 

* Contractor personnel were being double counted. For example, the 
system used to record contractor personnel numbers for the Joint 
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was found to have duplicates. As a 
result, DOD reported a 10 percent decrease in personnel in Iraq in the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2009 and a 5 percent decrease in 
contractor personnel in Afghanistan in the second quarter of fiscal 
year 2009 when duplicates were removed. 

* The process used to collect data changed. For example, a 3 percent 
decrease in personnel numbers reported in the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2009 compared to the previous quarter was attributed to the Joint 
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan's decision to begin using a 
monthly data call to contractors to collect personnel numbers. 

* Data submitted by the DOD components were often of poor quality or 
inaccurate, which created challenges for CENTCOM to compile quarterly 
totals. During our review of quarterly census data submissions, we 
identified a DOD component in Afghanistan that provided invalid 
contract numbers for about 30 percent of its contracts in the second 
quarter for fiscal year 2009. Also, it was not possible to determine 
for some submissions how many contractors were working in a specific 
country. In such cases, the CENTCOM official responsible for the census 
told us he would either seek clarification from the DOD component that 
provided the data or use his judgment to determine the correct 
personnel numbers. 

State Contractor Personnel: 

In response to our request for information on its contractor personnel 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, State officials informed us that prior to 
fiscal year 2009 the department did not systematically track contractor 
personnel. Instead, State bureaus conducted periodic surveys of their 
contractors; however, each bureau's survey covered different time 
periods. Based on these surveys, which at least one bureau supplemented 
with SPOT data, State reported that 8,971 contractor personnel, the 
majority of whom performed security functions, worked on contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of fiscal year 
2009.[Footnote 14] Only one bureau provided comparable information for 
fiscal year 2008, reporting 3,514 personnel working on its contracts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the year. 

Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Iraq: All contractors; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,376. 

Iraq: Contractors providing security; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 3,632. 

Afghanistan: All contractors; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 3,595. 

Afghanistan: Contractors providing security; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 1,559. 

Total all contractors; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 8,971. 

Total contractors providing security; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,191. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: If a bureau provided the results of more than one survey 
conducted in fiscal year 2009, the table includes the results of the 
most recent survey. Of the five bureaus that provided data, one 
provided data that covered the entire first half of fiscal year 2009 
and the other four provided data as of a specific date or month. 

[End of table] 

Even relying on a combination of periodic surveys and SPOT, which State 
implemented in fiscal year 2009, it appears that State underreported 
its contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, in our analysis of 
State contract and personnel data, we identified a number of contracts 
with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan for which contractor personnel 
numbers were not reported. For example, although State provided 
obligation data on a $3 million contract for operation and maintenance 
services in Iraq as well as a $5.6 million contract for support 
services in Afghanistan, information on the number of personnel working 
on these contracts was not contained in the agency's periodic surveys 
or the SPOT data we received. 

USAID Contractor Personnel: 

For the personnel numbers reported to us, USAID relied entirely on 
periodic surveys of its contractors. USAID provided contractor 
personnel numbers for both Iraq and Afghanistan for all of fiscal year 
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. The agency reported that 
16,697 personnel, including 5,097 performing security functions, worked 
on its contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of 
fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 15] 

Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

Iraq: All contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: 2,707; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,668. 

Iraq: Contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: 901; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 1,010. 

Afghanistan: All contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: 12,955; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 14,029. 

Afghanistan: Contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: 3,818; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 4,087. 

Total all contractors; 
Fiscal year 2008: 15,662; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 16,697. 

Total contractors providing security; 
Fiscal year 2008: 4,719; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,097. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

[End of table] 

USAID relied on the results of surveys sent to its contractors in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to respond to our request for contractor personnel 
information.[Footnote 16] However, this information appeared to be 
incomplete. Specifically, agency officials acknowledged the periodic 
surveys most likely underreported the total number of contractor 
personnel. For example, an official in Afghanistan informed us that if 
a USAID contractor firm did not respond to a survey for personnel 
information, which is sometimes the case since there is no contractual 
requirement to do so, then personnel working for that firm were not 
included in the reported numbers. Our analysis of USAID personnel and 
contract data also indicates that USAID's numbers are incomplete. 
Specifically, USAID provided us with personnel data for about 83 
percent of its contracts that were active during the period of our 
review and had performance in Iraq or Afghanistan. We identified a 
number of contracts for which contractor personnel information was not 
provided, including contracts to refurbish a hydroelectric power plant 
and to develop small and medium enterprises in Afghanistan worth at 
least $6 million and $91 million, respectively. 

Agency-Reported Data Not Verified but More Complete Than SPOT: 

DOD, State, and USAID could not verify the accuracy or completeness of 
the contractor personnel data they provided to us, and officials 
acknowledged that they are likely undercounting the actual number of 
contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials from the three 
agencies stated they lack the resources to verify the information being 
reported by their contractors, their primary source of data. Officials 
we met with indicated this is particularly true for contracts that 
involve work at remote sites, where security conditions make it 
difficult for U.S. government officials to regularly visit. However, 
the agency officials stated that personnel information on certain types 
of contractors is likely more reliable than others. In particular, 
officials from DOD, State, and USAID told us that the personnel numbers 
provided for their private security contractors are the most accurate 
and reliable. This is due in part to the increased scrutiny these 
contractors receive. Conversely, these same officials told us obtaining 
accurate information on local nationals is especially difficult. For 
example, one DOD official told us some local national contractors 
hesitate or simply refuse to submit information on their personnel 
because of safety concerns, among others. Further, the number of local 
nationals working on a particular contract on a daily basis can vary 
greatly depending on the type of work being performed. 

Despite the limitations we identified with the agencies' use of 
surveys, the survey data were more complete than the data in SPOT for 
our review period. For example, as shown in table 4, in the second 
quarter fiscal year 2009 census, DOD reported 83,506 more contractor 
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan than were entered into SPOT. An even 
smaller portion of USAID's contractor personnel were entered into SPOT 
because the agency did not enter any personnel for any contracts in 
Afghanistan and was generally not entering Iraqis into the system. 
While the difference between SPOT and the surveys was smaller for 
State, there still were a number of contracts for which personnel 
information was available from State's surveys but was not in SPOT. 

Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel in SPOT 
Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, as of March 31, 2009: 

DOD: 
Source of contractor personnel information: 
SPOT: 117,301; 
Surveys: 200,807; 
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 83,506. 

State[A]: 
Source of contractor personnel information: 
SPOT: 7,022; 
Surveys: 8,971[B]; 
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 1,949. 

USAID[B]: 
Source of contractor personnel information: 
SPOT: 445[A]; 
Surveys: 16,697; 
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 16,252. 

Total: 
Source of contractor personnel information: 
SPOT: 124,768; 
Surveys: 226,475; 
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 101,707. 

Source: GAO analysis of SPOT and agency-reported data. 

[A] State's survey number reflects the number of contractor personnel 
in SPOT and personnel identified through bureau surveys, as well as 
individuals working on personal services contracts. 

[B] USAID's numbers for SPOT are only for Iraq since the agency did not 
use SPOT in Afghanistan, while the survey numbers reflect personnel in 
both countries, including those working on personal services contracts. 

[End of table] 

Agencies' Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded in 
Iraq and Afghanistan Varies: 

Although USAID, State, and DOD are required to collect data on the 
total number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded 
while working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only USAID and 
State tracked this information during our review period. USAID reported 
59 contractor personnel were killed and 61 wounded during fiscal year 
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009, while State reported that 
5 of its contractors were killed and 98 more were wounded (see table 
5). These data were based on reports submitted by contractors and then 
tracked by the agencies. In tracking this information, USAID and State 
noted in some cases, but not all, whether the death or injury was the 
result of a hostile action or an accident. However, due to the lack of 
other available and reliable sources, we could not independently verify 
whether USAID's and State's data were accurate. 

Table 5: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel Killed 
and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First 
Half of Fiscal Year 2009: 

USAID: Killed; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 6; Iraq: 
First half of fiscal year 2009: 2; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 38; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 13; 
Total: 59. 

USAID: Wounded; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 0; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 35; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 19; 
Total: 61. 

USAID Total; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 13; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 73; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 32; 
Total: 120. 

State: Killed; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 3; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 1; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 0; Total: 5. 

State: Wounded; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 68; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 13; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 14; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 3; Total: 98. 

State Total: 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 71; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 14; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 15; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 3; Total: 103. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

Note: USAID reported that an additional 12 contractors were kidnapped 
in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period. 

[End of table] 

DOD officials informed us that their department continued to lack a 
system for tracking information in a manner that would allow the 
department to provide us with reliable data on killed or wounded 
contractor personnel. Although DOD did not maintain departmentwide 
data, some individual components within the department received reports 
on killed or wounded contractor personnel. However, the components did 
not consistently track these reports in a readily accessible or 
comprehensive manner. For example, officials with the Defense Contract 
Management Agency in Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/ 
Afghanistan explained that they received reports when contractor 
personnel were killed or wounded, but this information was not recorded 
in a manner that made it readily retrievable. In addition, an Army 
Corps of Engineers official in Afghanistan told us that he tracked data 
on contractor illnesses and injuries resulting from workplace accidents 
but did not track data on contractor personnel killed or wounded as a 
result of hostile incidents. Absent DOD-wide data and as was the case 
for our prior report,[Footnote 17] DOD officials referred us to Defense 
Base Act (DBA) case data, which are maintained by the Department of 
Labor, as a means of obtaining information on killed and wounded 
contractor personnel. 

Labor DBA Data Are Not a Good Proxy for Contractor Personnel Killed or 
Wounded: 

Labor's DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for 
determining the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in 
Iraq and Afghanistan while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts. 
Under the NDAA for FY2008, Labor--unlike DOD, State, and USAID--has no 
responsibilities for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel, 
and as such, its data were not designed to do so. Instead, Labor 
maintains data on DBA cases to fulfill its responsibilities for 
overseeing DBA claims by providing workers' compensation protection to 
contractor personnel killed or injured while working on U.S. government 
contracts overseas, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 
18] 

After analyzing Labor's DBA data and case files, we determined that DBA 
data are not a good proxy for determining the number of killed and 
wounded contractor personnel. This is, in part, because, as Labor 
officials explained, not all deaths and injuries reported under DBA 
would be regarded as contractors killed or wounded within the context 
of the NDAA for FY2008. Many nonhostile-related deaths and injuries, 
such as strains, sprains, and cases arising from auto accidents and 
other common occupational injuries, are compensable under DBA and are 
routinely reported to Labor. In addition, during our file reviews, we 
noted that many cases, particularly those submitted for injuries, were 
for medical conditions, such as pregnancy, cancer, and appendicitis, 
determined not to be related to the individual's employment in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, and compensation claims for many of these cases were 
denied because the conditions were not work-related. While employers 
must notify Labor of all work-related contractor deaths and injuries 
resulting in time lost from work, one Labor official told us that some 
employers report all medical-related conditions, regardless of their 
severity and the nature of the incidents that caused them. In addition, 
some contractor deaths and injuries may not be reported to Labor as 
required. In particular, Labor officials have indicated that deaths and 
injuries to local and third-country contractors may be underreported. 

Additionally, because Labor does not track cases by agency or contract, 
DBA data cannot be analyzed to determine how many cases involved 
contractor personnel working specifically on DOD, State, or USAID 
contracts. As a result, the data may include cases for contractor 
personnel working for agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. During 
our review of 150 DBA case files, we noted that the files did not 
always contain contract information and did not consistently identify 
the contracting agency. While we identified 103 case files for 
personnel working on DOD or State contracts, we did not identify any 
files for USAID contractor personnel. In addition, 1 case file 
specified an agency other than DOD, State, or USAID, while 46 files did 
not specify which agency the contractor worked for. 

Despite their limitations for determining the number of contractor 
personnel killed or wounded, Labor's DBA case data provide insight into 
contractor personnel deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
According to Labor, there were 11,804 DBA cases, including 218 cases 
reporting contractor deaths, which resulted from incidents that 
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first 
half of fiscal year 2009. As shown in table 6, overall both the total 
number of DBA cases and the number of death cases decreased from fiscal 
year 2007 to fiscal year 2008, though the number of death cases in 
Afghanistan increased. 

Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

Deaths: 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 337; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 122; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 31; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 40; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 47; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 18. 

Injuries: 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,148; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,735; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,306; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 1,962; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,100; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 445. 

Total: 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,485; 
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,857; 
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,337; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 2,002; 
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,147; 
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 463. 

Source: GAO analysis of Labor data. 

Note: Cases may be filed for contractor personnel working on contracts 
with U.S. government agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. 

[End of table] 

Based on our review of 150 randomly selected DBA case files, we 
estimated that about 11 percent of the deaths and injuries reported to 
Labor for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 resulted from 
hostile actions.[Footnote 19] Only 16 of the 150 files we reviewed were 
for cases related to hostile actions.[Footnote 20] Further, about one- 
third of the 11,586 DBA injury cases that occurred during our review 
period resulted in the affected contractor losing time from work. For 
example, we reviewed a case in which a contractor lost time from work 
after receiving multiple injuries when an ammunition pallet fell and 
wedged him against the side of a container, while another contractor 
suffered fractures and spinal injuries caused by an improvised 
explosive device and small arms fire. 

DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on 
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating nearly $39 billion on 84,719 
contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 (see figure 1 for 
obligation data). DOD accounted for the vast majority of both the 
contracts and obligations. Approximately two-thirds of the total number 
of contracts and obligations were for performance in Iraq. Task orders 
were the most common contract vehicle that the agencies used during our 
review period and accounted for most of the obligations. A relatively 
small number of task orders accounted for a large portion of each 
agency's obligations. For example, during our review period, DOD 
obligated more than $6.5 billion on two task orders that provide food, 
housing, and other services for U.S. military personnel, while more 
than a third of State's obligations were on three task orders for 
police training and criminal justice programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
See appendix II for detailed information on each agencies' Iraq and 
Afghanistan contracts and obligations during our review period. 

Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts for 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal 
Year 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Agency: DOD; 
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $25,322.1 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $8,464.1 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Other: $926.8 million. 

Agency: State; 
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $1,057 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $715 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Other: $70 million. 

Agency: USAID; 
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $706.7 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $1,347.2 million; 
Amount of Obligations, Other: $0 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Note: Some contracts included performance in countries other than Iraq 
and Afghanistan, such as the United States. It was not possible, based 
on the data reported for us, to isolate which portion of the 
obligations was specific to Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Therefore, if a 
contract had performance in Iraq and other countries (not including 
Afghanistan), we set the place of performance as Iraq. We set the place 
of performance as Afghanistan for contracts with performance in 
Afghanistan and other countries (not including Iraq). We set the place 
of performance as "other'" for contracts that were reported as having 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan or for which the country was not 
specified in the agency-reported data. 

[End of figure] 

The NDAA for FY2008 mandated that we identify the total number and 
value of all contracts, defined to include prime contracts, task or 
delivery orders, and subcontracts at any tier. While we obtained data 
on prime contracts and orders, DOD, State, and USAID were unable to 
provide data on the number or value of individual subcontracts. 
Contract files may contain information on subcontracts, but none of the 
agencies systematically tracked this information. The value of 
subcontracts is captured in the total value of the prime contract, but 
the agencies were unable to provide us with data on what portion of the 
total contract value went to subcontractors. 

Of the almost 85,000 contracts, including task and delivery orders, 
which were active during our review period, 97 percent were awarded 
during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. 
However, more than a third of the funds obligated during our review 
period were on contracts originally awarded before fiscal year 2008. 
There were some variations between the agencies, as shown in figure 2. 
For example, most of USAID's obligations were on contracts awarded 
prior to fiscal year 2008. In contrast, most of State's active 
contracts were awarded during our period of review, but more than half 
the obligations were on a small portion of previously awarded 
contracts. 

Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and Obligations 
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Agency: DOD; 
Contracts: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $97.7 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $2.3 million; 
Obligations: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $70 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $30 million. 

Agency: State; 		
Contracts: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $91.7 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $8.3 million; 
Obligations: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $46 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $54 million. 

Agency: USAID; 		
Contracts: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $46.1 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $53.9 million; 
Obligations: 
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year 
2009: $21.3 million; 
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $78.7 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

[End of figure] 

Majority of New Contract Awards Were Competed: 

DOD, State, and USAID reported that they used competitive procedures to 
award nearly all contracts awarded in our review period, with the 
exclusion of task and delivery orders. Generally, contracts should be 
awarded on the basis of full and open competition.[Footnote 21]The 
agencies reported that most of their new contracts were awarded using 
full and open competition, but in some cases the agencies reported a 
contract as competed without indicating whether full and open or 
limited competition occurred. The agencies reported that approximately 
3 percent of contracts awarded during our period of review, accounting 
for 29 percent of the obligations, were not competed (see figure 3). 

Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan 
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 
2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Extent of competition: Competed; 
Contracts: 96.6%; 
Obligations: 71.2%. 

Extent of competition: Not competed; 
Contracts: 3.1%; 
Obligations: 28.5%. 

Note: Excludes task and delivery orders. In addition, for less than 1 
percent of contracts and obligations the agencies did not report 
whether the contract was competed. 

[End of figure] 

Most of the 1,143 contracts reported to us as not competed had 
relatively small obligations during our review period.[Footnote 22] 
Approximately 90 percent of them had obligations of less than $100,000 
and 80 percent had obligations less than $25,000. In contrast, only 27 
of the 1,143 contracts reported as not competed had over $1 million in 
obligations.These 27 contracts accounted for 99 percent of obligations 
for contracts that were not competed. 

The law authorizes agencies to use limited competition in certain 
situations. There may be circumstances under which full and open 
competition would be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be 
awarded quickly to respond to urgent and compelling needs or when there 
is only one source for the required product or service. In such cases, 
agencies may award contracts without providing for full and open 
competition (e.g., using limited competition or on a sole-source basis) 
if the proposed approach is appropriately justified, approved, and 
documented. Similarly, simplified acquisition procedures allow for 
limited competition when awarding certain contracts, and the use of 
these procedures is determined based on dollar thresholds contained in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).[Footnote 23] These dollar 
thresholds vary depending on where and for what purpose the contract 
was awarded and performed, its dollar value, and the contracting method 
used. Additionally, contracts valued below the micropurchase threshold, 
which is $25,000 for contracts awarded and performed outside the United 
States in support of contingency operations, may be awarded without 
soliciting competitive quotations if the authorized purchase official 
considers the price to be reasonable. 

To determine the circumstances in which the agencies awarded contracts 
using other than full and open competition, we reviewed 79 DOD and 
State contracts[Footnote 24] awarded in fiscal year 2008 that had more 
than $100,000 in obligations during our review period and were reported 
as not competed or for which no competition information was provided. 
[Footnote 25] During our review, we discovered that 8 of these had 
actually been awarded after a full and open competition and 14 had been 
awarded after a limited competition (i.e., they were not sole-source 
awards). Of the 71 files we reviewed that were not awarded under full 
and open competition, the most common justification for limiting 
competition or awarding a sole-source contract was that only one source 
could provide the good or service being acquired. In some of these 
cases, the incumbent contractor was awarded the new contract. For 
example, State awarded a sole-source contract for communication 
equipment in Iraq because only one company offered radios that were 
compatible with State's existing communication network. The second most 
common reason for limiting competition was DOD's enhanced authority to 
acquire products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan[Footnote 26]. 
Congress granted DOD this authority, which allows DOD to limit 
competition or provide preferences for products and services from Iraq 
or Afghanistan, to provide a stable source of jobs and employment in 
the two countries. According to DOD contracting officials in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, they are increasing their use of this authority. However, 
officials in Afghanistan explained that in doing so they generally have 
some level of competition among local firms as opposed to doing a sole- 
source award. They explained that limited competitions are being 
conducted to not only ensure better prices and products but also to 
help instill Western business practices and develop local business 
capacity. 

Competition requirements generally do not apply to the process of 
issuing task and delivery orders.[Footnote 27] However, where there 
were multiple awardees under the underlying contract, the FAR requires 
the contracting officer in most instances to provide each awardee a 
fair opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000. The 
agencies reported that 99 percent of the orders issued during our 
review period were competed. 

Conclusions: 

Congress has directed DOD, State, and USAID to track specific 
information regarding contractor personnel and contracts with 
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such data are a starting point for 
providing decision makers with a clearer understanding of the extent to 
which they rely on contractors and for facilitating oversight to 
improve planning and better account for costs. Implementing SPOT, as 
agreed to in the MOU, has the potential of providing the agencies and 
Congress with data on contracts, contractor personnel, and those 
personnel who have been killed or wounded. However, the agencies' 
implementation of SPOT currently falls short of that potential. 
Specifically, there is a lack of consistency as to which contractor 
personnel are entered into SPOT. Not withstanding the MOU, some agency 
officials have questioned the need or feasibility of entering detailed 
information on individual contractor personnel into SPOT beyond the 
requirement of the NDAA for FY2008 or the MOU. Furthermore, SPOT does 
not currently have the capability to accurately import contract data 
and its report generating capabilities limit the agencies' access to 
information that has been entered, particularly with respect to killed 
or wounded contractor personnel. Until SPOT is fully implemented, the 
agencies will continue to rely on multiple alternative sources of data, 
which are also unreliable and incomplete, for information related to 
contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a 
result, the agencies and Congress will continue to be without reliable 
information on contracts and contractor personnel to help improve 
oversight and decision making at a critical juncture as agencies draw 
down their efforts in Iraq and expand them in Afghanistan. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable information on 
contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 
recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID 
Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated time 
frames for their continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 
requirements, specifically: 

* ensuring that the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and 
contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008 
and with the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing 
contracts and contractor personnel; 

* establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be 
entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled 
from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and: 

* revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill 
statutory requirements and agency information needs, such as those 
related to contractor personnel killed or wounded. 

In developing and executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit 
their MOU to ensure consistency between the plan and what has 
previously been agreed to in the MOU. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and 
USAID. In its written comments, DOD did not agree with our 
recommendation that the agencies jointly develop and execute a plan for 
continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008. According to DOD, the 
current MOU, existing regulations, and ongoing coordination among the 
agencies should be sufficient to meet legislative mandates. DOD noted 
that additional direction beyond the implementation of the MOU may 
require statutory action. DOD further explained that it is planning 
upgrades to SPOT that may address some of the issues we identified, 
particularly related to the entry of contract numbers and reporting 
features. State, in its written comments, also disagreed with the need 
for the agencies to develop and execute a plan to address the issues we 
identified. Nevertheless, State acknowledged that the agencies need to 
continue meeting to review their progress in complying with the NDAA 
for FY2008, revisit the MOU, address issues to ensure consistency in 
meeting the MOU criteria, and discuss SPOT's future reporting 
capability. Similarly, while USAID's written comments did not address 
our overarching recommendation for the agencies to develop and 
implement a plan or indicate whether it agreed with the specific issues 
to be included in their plan, it noted that it plans to continue 
regularly meeting with DOD and State officials concerning the NDAA for 
FY2008 and the existing MOU. 

We agree that coordination among the three agencies is critical, but 
given the findings in this report, coordination alone is not 
sufficient. Instead, the agencies need to take action to resolve the 
issues we identified in their implementation of SPOT. In their comments 
the agencies recognized the importance of having reliable information 
on contracts and contractor personnel and acknowledged that corrective 
measures are needed. However, the agencies did not explain in their 
comments how they plan to translate their coordination efforts and 
upgrades into actions to resolve the issues we identified. By jointly 
developing and executing a plan with time frames, the three agencies 
can identify the concrete steps they need to take and assess their 
progress in ensuring that the data in SPOT are sufficiently reliable to 
fulfill the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and their respective 
agency needs. Further, the extent to which the steps necessary to 
implement the MOU and the recommended plan are consistent with the NDAA 
for FY2008, no additional statutory action would be required. 

DOD's, State's and USAID's comments, along with our supplemental 
responses, are reprinted in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. 

Additionally, we provided a draft of this report to Labor for its 
review and comment. Labor provided technical comments that we 
incorporated into the final report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested 
congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at 
no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

John Hutton: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond: 
Vice Chairman: 
Select Committee on Intelligence: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Darrell Issa: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter Hoekstra: 
Ranking Member: 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 directs GAO to review and report on matters relating to Department 
of Defense (DOD), Department of State, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 
response to this mandate, we analyzed agency-reported data for fiscal 
year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 regarding (1) the 
status of the agencies' implementation of the Synchronized 
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database, (2) the number 
of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions, 
working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with performance in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, (3) the number of personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the 
number and value of contracts that were active and awarded during our 
period of review and the extent of competition for new contract awards. 

Implementation of SPOT: 

To address our first objective, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's 
July 2008 MOU relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
interviewed DOD, State, and USAID officials responsible for 
implementing SPOT regarding the current and planned capabilities of the 
system. We also interviewed agency officials who use SPOT, including 
officials in Iraq and Afghanistan, to determine the criteria the 
agencies use to determine what information is entered into SPOT. We 
reviewed agency guidance and policy documents regarding the use of SPOT 
and took training courses designed for government and contractor 
personnel who expect to use the system. We then compared the 
information we collected on the use and capabilities of SPOT to the 
requirements identified in the agencies' MOU to determine the extent to 
which SPOT fulfilled the terms of the MOU. 

Contractor Personnel: 

To address our second objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and 
USAID on the number of U.S. nationals, third-country nationals, and 
local nationals working on contracts with performance in Iraq or 
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 and/or the first half of fiscal year 
2009. These data included individuals reported to be performing 
security functions. 

* DOD reported data from the U.S. Central Command's quarterly census 
and SPOT for both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 
2009. Of the two sources, DOD officials said that the quarterly census 
was the most complete source of information on contractor personnel. 
Given that and the limitations we identified with SPOT, we used the 
quarterly census data to develop our DOD-related findings for this 
objective. 

* State reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors 
for fiscal year 2008. For the first half of fiscal year 2009, State 
reported contractor personnel information gathered from SPOT as well as 
through surveys. 

* USAID reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors 
for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. USAID also 
reported SPOT data for some contracts with performance in Iraq for the 
first half of fiscal year 2009. 

We compared these data to the list of contracts we compiled to address 
our objective on the number and value of agency contracts. Furthermore, 
we interviewed agency officials regarding their methods for collecting 
data to determine the number of contractor personnel, including those 
providing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also assessed 
the completeness of the SPOT data that we received from each agency by 
comparing them to data from other sources, such as the agency surveys. 
Based on our analyses and discussions with agency officials, we 
concluded that the agency reported data should not be used to draw 
conclusions about the actual number of contractor personnel in Iraq or 
Afghanistan for any given time period or trends in the number of 
contractor personnel over time. However, we are presenting the reported 
data along with their limitations as they establish a minimum number of 
contractor personnel during our period of review. 

Killed or Wounded Contractor Personnel: 

To address our third objective, we analyzed USAID and State data on the 
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during the period of our review. DOD did not collect and 
could not provide such data. USAID provided us with information on 
deaths and injuries it had compiled from its implementing partners, 
including contractors. Similarly, State provided data on contractors 
who were killed or wounded based on reports from its contractors, which 
were compiled by department personnel. Due to the lack of other 
available and reliable data sources, we could not independently verify 
whether USAID's and State's data were accurate. Nevertheless, we are 
providing them as they provide insight into the number of contractor 
personnel who were killed or wounded during our period of review. After 
informing us that they did not have a reliable system for tracking 
killed or wounded personnel, DOD officials referred us to use the 
Department of Labor's data on Defense Base Act (DBA) cases. 

We analyzed data from Labor on DBA cases arising from incidents that 
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 or the first half 
of fiscal year 2009. We obtained similar DBA data from Labor for our 
previous report, for which we determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable, when presented with appropriate caveats, for 
providing insight into the number of contractor personnel killed or 
wounded.[Footnote 28] As a result, we did not reassess the reliability 
of the data we received for this report. We also selected a random two- 
stage cluster sample of 150 DBA case files from a population of 2,500 
cases files submitted to Labor's 10 district offices for incidents that 
occurred during fiscal year 2008 and resulted in the affected 
contractor losing time from work. Labor provided us with DBA case data 
on all incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 through February 26, 
2009. Because there may be a lag between when an incident occurred and 
when Labor was notified, we limited our sample to cases arising from 
incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008. As a result, the findings 
from our file review are generalizable only to fiscal year 2008 cases. 
Labor provided us with a second data set for fiscal year 2008 and the 
first half of fiscal year 2009 as of July 9, 2009, which included cases 
that were in the first data set. The second data set included an 
additional 367 cases resulting from incidents that occurred in fiscal 
year 2008 that were not in the population from which we drew our sample 
due to a lag in when Labor was notified of the incidents. Because these 
additional cases were within the scope of our review, we included them 
in the total number of DBA cases presented in objective three; however, 
these cases were not included in the population of cases from which we 
drew our random sample. 

The first stage of our sample selection was comprised of 5 clusters, 
selected randomly with replacements, which came from 4 of the 10 Labor 
district offices. In the second stage, we randomly selected 30 files 
from each cluster. Thus, our final sample consisted of 150 DBA case 
files. We reviewed these files to determine the circumstances of the 
incident resulting in the death or injury, whether the incident was the 
result of a hostile or nonhostile incident, and the severity of the 
contractor's injury, where applicable. 

Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, 
our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 
drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we 
express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's 
results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 7 
percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual 
population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As 
a result, we are 95 percent confident that the confidence interval in 
this report will include the true value in the study population. 

Contracts: 

To address our fourth objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and 
USAID on the number of active and awarded contracts with performance in 
Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of 
fiscal year 2009, the amount of funds obligated on those contracts 
during our review period, and the extent to which new contracts were 
competitively awarded. We also interviewed agency officials to discuss 
the reported contract data. The agencies provided data from the Federal 
Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), agency specific- 
databases, and manually compiled lists of obligations and 
deobligations. We determined that the data each agency reported were 
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and 
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the extent of 
competition, based on prior reliability assessments, interviews with 
agency officials, and verification of some reported data compared to 
information in contract files. 

We took steps to standardize the agency-reported data and removed 
duplicates and contracts that did not have obligations or deobligations 
during our review period. DOD provided us with 32 separate data sets, 
State provided 7, and USAID provided 9. The reported data included 
multiple numbering conventions for each agency. We reformatted each 
data set and combined them to create a single, uniform list of 
contracts, orders, and modifications for each agency. We excluded the 
base contracts under which task and delivery orders were issued. This 
was done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations 
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance 
of each order. We also excluded grants, cooperative agreements, and 
other contract vehicles such as leases, sales contracts, and notices of 
intent to purchase as these instruments do not include performance by 
contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. For all contracts within 
our scope, we summed the reported obligations for each contract and 
order for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. Some 
contracts had obligations in both fiscal year 2008 and the first half 
of fiscal year 2009, so the number of active contracts for the entire 
18-month period was lower than the combined number of contracts that 
were active in each fiscal year. 

We reviewed contract files to identify the justification cited by the 
agencies for not awarding the contract using full and open competition 
for a subset of DOD and State contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 
that were reported as not competed and that had total obligations 
during our review period greater than $100,000. We did not review the 
files for all contracts that met our criteria, in part, due to the 
location of some of the files. For example, while we reviewed files 
located in Baghdad, Camp Victory, Kabul, and Bagram Air Base, we did 
not review files for contracts located in other areas of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In total, we reviewed information on 68 DOD contracts and 
11 State contracts. At the time of our contract file reviews, USAID had 
not reported any new contracts with obligations over $100,000 as not 
competed. After our file reviews were completed, USAID provided us with 
additional data, including data on two contracts with obligations over 
$100,000 that were not awarded competitively. Due to when we received 
these data, we did not review these two contracts. However, we reviewed 
12 other USAID contracts to verify the contract information reported to 
us. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through 
September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

DOD Contracts: 

Table 7 shows all DOD contracts, along with the associated obligations, 
reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both during fiscal 
year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last year's 
review, DOD reported obligating $18,996 million on 37,559 contracts in 
fiscal year 2007. 

Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 )Dollars in 
millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 16,154; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $6,646.6; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 14,354[B]; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,817.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 30,353[C]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$8,464.1. 

Iraq: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 30,219; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $19,536.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 22,268[B]; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $5,785.7; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 52,207[C]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$25,322.1. 

Other[A]: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 272; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $798.7; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 601[B]; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $128.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 870[C]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$926.8. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 46,645; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $26,981.6; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 37,223[B]; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $7,731.4; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 83,430[C]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$34,713.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and 
Afghanistan or contracts that DOD reported as having performance in 
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country: 

[B] One DOD component changed the way it reported its contracts in 
fiscal year 2009. Orders that had been previously combined were 
reported separately. A DOD official explained that what appeared to be 
an increase in contracts was due to the reporting change rather than an 
actual increase in the number of orders. 

[C] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first 
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active 
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the 
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are 
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period 
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

[End of table] 

Table 8 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by DOD 
and associated obligations made during our review period. The majority 
of DOD's active contracts were awarded during our review period and 70 
percent of DOD's obligations were made on the new contract awards. 

Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 
(Dollars in millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 15,724; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $5,051.6; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 14,137; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1,313.3. 

Iraq: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,941; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $15,305.3; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 21,869; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1,794.1. 

Other: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 245; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $614.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 596; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $110.0. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 44,910; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $20,971.0; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 36,602; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $3,217.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred so some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

Table 9 shows competition information for the DOD contracts (excluding 
task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our review period. 
DOD reported that 97 percent of its contracts were competed, including 
33,143 (93 percent) that were awarded using full and open competition. 
For 74 contracts, DOD either provided no competition information or 
what was provided was not sufficient to determine whether the contract 
was competed. 

Table 9: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding 
Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 
2009 (Dollars in millions): 

Competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,459; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $5,193.3; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 6,356; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $939.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 34,815; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$6,132.8. 

Not Competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 143; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $2,501.7; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 768; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.3; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 911; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$2,528.9. 

Not Reported: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 61; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $4.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 13; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 74; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$5.5. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,663; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $7,699.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 7,137; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $967.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 35,800; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$8,667.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each order. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 10, most of the DOD contracts reported as awarded 
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review 
period. 

Table 10: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Less than or equal to $25,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: 
Number of awarded contracts: 756; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $5.3. 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than 
or equal to 100,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 72; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $3.6. 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than 
or equal to $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 60; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $16.6. 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $1 million; Fiscal 
year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: 
Number of awarded contracts: 23; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $2,503.4. 

Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Total; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 911; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $2,528.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each order. 

[End of table] 

State Contracts: 

Table 11 shows all State contracts, along with the associated 
obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both 
during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For 
last year's review, State reported obligating $1,550.4 million on 773 
contracts in fiscal year 2007. 

Table 35: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 
(Dollars in millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 272; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $625.5; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 11; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $92.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 275[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$717.6. 

Iraq: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 469; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $781.8; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 102; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $279.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 544[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$1,061.3. 

Other[B]: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 105; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $68.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 8; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1.9; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 112[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$70.3. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 846; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,475.7; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 121; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $373.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 931[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$1,849.2. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first 
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active 
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the 
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are 
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period 
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and 
Afghanistan or contracts that State reported as having performance in 
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country. 

[End of table] 

Table 12 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by 
State and associated obligations made during our review period. The 
majority of State's active contracts were awarded during our review 
period and 46 percent of State's obligations were made on the new 
contract awards. 

Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 
(Dollars in millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 250; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $265.0; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 2; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.6. 

Iraq: Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 419; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $559.0; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 69; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $15.1. 

Other: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 98; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $11.7; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.8. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 767; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $835.8; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 75; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $16.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

Table 13 shows competition information for the State contracts 
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our 
review period. State reported that 70 percent of its contracts were 
competed, including 358 (47 percent) that were awarded using full and 
open competition. For 10 contracts, State either provided no 
competition information or what was provided was not sufficient to 
determine whether the contract was competed. 

Table 13: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009 (Dollars in millions): 

Competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 494; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $47.0; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 41; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 535; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$48.9. 

Not competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 199; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $21.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 20; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 219; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$22.4. 

Not reported: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 5; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $6.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 5; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 10; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$7.1. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 698; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $74.5; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 66; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $3.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 764; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$78.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
orders and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each order. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 14, most of the State contracts reported as awarded 
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review 
period. 

Table 14: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 149; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $1.2. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than 
or equal to 100,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 52; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $2.7. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than 
or equal to $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 14; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $4.6. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 4; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $13.9. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Total; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 219; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount 
(in millions): $22.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each order. 

[End of table] 

USAID Contracts: 

Table 15 shows all USAID contracts, along with the associated 
obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq or Afghanistan during 
fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last 
year's review, USAID reported obligating $1,194.8 million on 190 
contracts in fiscal year 2007. 

Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 
(Dollars in millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 149; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,018.6; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 71; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $328.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 191[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount: 
$1,347.2. 

Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 128; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $638.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 51; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $68.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 167[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount: 
$706.7. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 277; 
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,656.7; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 122; 
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $397.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active 
contracts: 358[A]; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount: 
$2,053.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first 
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active 
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the 
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are 
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period 
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year. 

[End of table] 

Table 16 provides information on the number of contracts awarded and 
associated obligations made during our review period. The majority of 
USAID active contracts were awarded prior to our review period and 
obligations on these previously awarded contracts accounted for nearly 
79 percent of USAID's obligations during fiscal year 2008 and the first 
half of fiscal year 2009. 

Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 
(Dollars in millions): 

Afghanistan: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 67; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $176.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 17; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $24.7. 

Iraq: Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 52; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $233.3; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 29; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $4.2. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 119; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $409.4; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 46; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $28.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

Table 17 shows competition information for the USAID contracts 
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our 
review period. USAID reported that 90 percent of its contracts were 
competed, including 126 (82 percent) that were awarded using full and 
open competition. For 3 contracts, USAID either provided no competition 
information or what was provided was not sufficient to determine 
whether the contract was competed. 

Table 17: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts 
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009 (Dollars in millions): 

Competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 102; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $163.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 35; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 137; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$190.3. 

Not Competed: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 4; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $0.3; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 9; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 13; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$0.6. 

Not Reported: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 3; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $12.1; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 0; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 3; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$12.1. 

Total: 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 109; 
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $175.5; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 44; 
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 153; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$203.0. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each order. 

[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded, 
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year 
2009. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 18, there were only 13 contracts that USAID reported 
as awarded without competition and none had obligations greater than $1 
million during our review period. 

Table 18: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of 
Fiscal Year 2009: 

Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 8; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$71,327. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than 
or equal to 100,000; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 3; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$196,146. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than 
or equal to $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$286,163. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$0. 

Contract value by obligated amount: Total; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded 
contracts: 13; 
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: 
$553,636. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task 
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same 
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we 
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were 
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have 
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with 
the issuance of each task order. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

September 28, 2009: 

Mr. John Hutton: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:	
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Hutton: 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO10-01, "Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID 
Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and 
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan," dated August 27, 2009 (GAO Code 
120790). 

Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: [Illegible], for: 

Shay D. Assad: 
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 27, 2009: 
GAO-10-01 (GAO CODE 120790): 

"Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, And USAID Continue To Face 
Challenges In Tracking Contractor Personnel And Contracts In Iraq And 
Afghanistan" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a 
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 requirements by 
ensuring that the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and 
contractor's personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for 
FY2008 and with the agencies' respective information needs for 
overseeing contracts and contractor personnel 

DOD Response: Non concur. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Program Support) (ADUSD (PS)) is the DOD lead on 
implementation of the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT) to meet the requirements of section 861 of the 2008 
NDAA. The DoD has made a concerted effort to meet the requirements 
outlined. We acknowledge the importance of having reliable information 
on contracts and contractors' personnel operating in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. DoD has successfully integrated SPOT with the contract 
writing system and registration module for all contracted companies of 
the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq /Afghanistan (JCC I/A), automating 
the upload of contract data directly into SPOT. 

Since DoD signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Department of State and the USAID, the registered contractor population 
in SPOT has grown from 68,000 to over 180,000 active contractor 
employees operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. [See comment 
1] CENTCOM published a fragmentary order (FRAGO) in August 2008, 
requiring all contractors meeting the minimum thresholds be registered 
in SPOT. Further, if contractors require government furnished services, 
they are required to have a SPOT-generated Letter of Authorization 
(LOA). [See comment 2] Today, approximately 93,000 active U.S., third 
country nationals, and local national contractor employees possess 
system-generated LOAs, and the remaining 87,000 have standard 
registrations in SPOT. DoD is requiring all U.S. contractor employees 
to be registered in SPOT if their contract meets the threshold of 30 
days and $25,000 in contract value. 

DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute 
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The 
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing 
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet 
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of 
the MOU may require further statutory action. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a 
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of 
the NDAA for FY 2008 requirements by establishing uniform requirements 
on how contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract 
information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the 
MOU 

DOD Response: [See comment 3] Non Concur. DoD, through the Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), is working to create 
standard contract number formats in contract writing systems, the 
Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDSNG), and SPOT. 
Currently, SPOT allows contract data not normally transmitted digitally 
to be entered using a free text field. This field in SPOT is free text 
to allow for the capture of grants data and contract data of other 
government agencies and organizations such as AAFES, using non-standard 
contract number formats. DoD is working to standardize the contract 
field in SPOT and add additional fields for non-standard contract 
numbers and grants. SPOT currently validates contract numbers against 
FPDS-NG on a scheduled daily basis. In 2010, SPOT will connect directly 
with FPDS-NG to enable contract information entered into SPOT to be 
validated immediately. Additionally, the SPOT unclassified reporting 
(NIPR) and the SPOT classified reporting (SIPR) systems will be able to 
report cumulative obligated dollar values at the prime contract level 
in November 2009. 

DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute 
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The 
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing 
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet 
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of 
the MOU may require further statutory action. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a 
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of 
the NDAA for FY 2008 requirements by revising SPOT's reporting 
capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and 
agency information needs, such as those related to contractor personnel 
killed or wounded. 

DOD Response: [See comment 4] Non Concur. The DoD implemented new 
functionality in the SPOT system in January 2009 to meet many of the 
requirements of section 861 of the NDAA for FY 2008. The SPOT program 
created the ability to track contractor employees who were killed, 
wounded or missing. This functionality began in January 2009, and it 
was not intended to report on information prior to upgrade in SPOT 
system software. The completeness of this information in the SPOT is 
reliant upon contractors' inputs of this information when closing out 
deployments. SPOT will provide the ability for government users to run 
query reports on contractors killed or wounded in November 2009. 
Further, the classified version of SPOT and the Total Operational 
Pictures Support System (TOPSS) business intelligence tool will have 
the ability to connect to other authoritative data systems via web-
services and generate additional desired reports. 

DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute 
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The 
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing 
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet 
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of 
the MOU may require further statutory action. 

The following are GAO's supplemental comments on the Department of 
Defense's letter dated September 28, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. DOD cites the number of contractor personnel in SPOT for the entire 
CENTCOM area of responsibility, which extends beyond Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Consistent with our mandate, we report 117,301 DOD 
contractor personnel identified in SPOT as being in Iraq or Afghanistan 
as of March 31, 2009. However, we did not use SPOT as our primary data 
source for contractor personnel data. We found that the quarterly 
census was a more comprehensive source--containing approximately 84,000 
personnel more than SPOT as of March 31, 2009 for Iraq and Afghanistan. 

2. In signing the MOU, DOD agreed to track contractor personnel in Iraq 
or Afghanistan if their contract is more than 14 days or over $100,000. 
As described in its comments, however, DOD's regulations contain 
different thresholds on which contractors should be entered into SPOT. 
In practice, we found that the need for an LOA--rather than the 
thresholds in the MOU or DOD's regulations--served as the primary 
determinate as to whether or not a contractor was entered in SPOT. 
These variations reinforce our finding and recommendation that the 
agencies ensure they have consistent criteria--both in policy and 
practice--on which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. 

3. DOD's comments recognize the need to develop a standardized contract 
field in SPOT. However, any effort to create a standardized field needs 
to involve DOD, State, and USAID to ensure consistency with their 
contract numbering systems and a common understanding of how data must 
be entered into the system. Further, each agency must ensure that the 
way contract and task order numbers are entered into SPOT are identical 
with how those numbers are entered into FPDS-NG. 

4. Our report recognizes that SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 to 
track contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. As 
discussed in the report, however, this upgrade does not provide 
agencies with the capability to readily generate reports on the total 
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded within a given 
timeframe; instead, the current capability is limited to generating a 
report of personnel identified as killed or wounded on the day the 
report is generated. DOD does not specify in its comments as to whether 
or how the planned November 2009 upgrade would address this reporting 
limitation. Also, it is not clear from DOD's comments as to whether 
this planned upgrade will apply to both the unclassified and classified 
versions of SPOT. State's comments suggest that based on information it 
received from DOD, the improved reporting features will be limited to 
the classified version. 

Additionally, while DOD notes that the completeness of data on killed 
or wounded personnel is reliant on contractor input, it is the 
responsibility of DOD and the other agencies to ensure that such 
information is tracked as required by the NDAA for FY2008: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, DC 20520: 

September 24, 2009: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Contingency 
Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in 
Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan," 
GAO Job Code 120790. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Cynthia Andreotta, Logistics Management Specialist, Bureau of 
Administration at (703) 875-5803. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: 
GAO - Johana Ayers: 
A - Steven Rodriguez: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face 
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (GAO-10-01, GAO Code 120790): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report titled, “
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to Face 
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.” 

Recommendation: To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable 
information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and 
the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a plan with 
associated timeframes for their continued implementation of the NDAA 
for FY2008 requirements, specifically: 

* Ensuring that the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and 
contractor personnel into the Synchronized Predeployment and 
Operational Tracker (SPOT) are consistent with the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 and with the agencies’ respective 
information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel; 

* Establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be 
entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled 
from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and; 

* Revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill 
statutory requirements and agency information needs, such as those 
related to contractor personnel killed or wounded. In developing and 
executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit their MOU to 
ensure consistency between the plan and what has previously been agreed 
to in the MOU. 

Response: The Bureau of Administration (A) has the lead on agency 
implementation of SPOT and the NDAA. We acknowledge the importance of 
reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan reported jointly with the Secretary of Defense (DOD) and 
the Administrator of USAID to implement NDAA FY2008 requirements. We 
agree that the agencies need to continue to meet to review progress and 
intent of the MOU to comply with NDAA FY2008, but do not agree with the 
recommendation that a new plan needs to be developed. We do agree that 
the current MOU needs to be revisited as well as some issues to ensure 
consistency meeting the criteria it already contains as specified in 
NDAA 2008, section 861. 

However, we are concerned with the interpretation of certain 
information in the GAO draft report on Contingency Contracting. For 
example, page 6 states: 

“regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID 
officials stated that the primary factor for deciding to enter 
contractor personnel into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-
generated letter of authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel need SPOT-
generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military 
identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for 
security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons. However, not 
all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals, in Iraq need 
LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel were not 
being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials informed us that 
individuals needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their contracts 
did not meet the MOU’s 14 day or $100,000 thresholds.” 

State personnel advised the GAO during an interview that company 
administrators were told verbally and in writing to enter all United 
States citizens, Third Country Nationals, and Locals Nationals into 
SPOT. Due to security concerns about entering data on Local Nationals, 
company administrators were given a blind identity scheme to aid with 
accountability of entering the information. We continue to urge that 
actual information be entered on all Local Nationals because SPOT would 
be used for NDAA 1248, repatriation requests. [See comment 1] 

Also, the MOU signed by the three agencies stipulate that contracts 
under the simplified acquisitions threshold of $100,000 and 14 working 
days would not be entered into SPOT (Section VII B). The GAO was 
advised by State personnel during the interview that it lacked 
resources to enter every acquisition into SPOT and support the higher 
threshold. However, there may be confusion because an earlier Section 
II A of the MOU only states “longer than 14 days”. We agree that the 
three agencies need to discuss this issue to determine one standard. 
[See comment 2] 

Another example is on page 8 of the report which states: 

“while contract numbers are the unique identifiers that will be used to 
match records in SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, SPOT users are not required 
to enter contract numbers in a standardized manner. In our review of 
SPOT data, we identified that at least 12 percent of the contracts had 
invalid contract numbers and, therefore, could not be matched to 
records in FPDS-NG.” 

When implementing SPOT, State used the configuration guidance which 
complies with FPDS-NG given by DOD to enter all contract numbers. The 
user guide posted on the Department’s intranet was shared with GAO; the 
business rules in it state the configuration to be used when entering a 
contract number into SPOT. We contacted DOD on September 9, 2009, and 
they informed us they are already working on a standardized 
configuration. [See comment 3] 

Recently, DOD conducted user acceptance testing for implementation of 
enhanced reporting in SPOT, but we were told it would only be on its 
secure network. However, all the information input to date into SPOT is 
in an unclassified network. The agencies need to discuss future 
reporting capability for non-classified SPOT. 

The following are GAO's supplemental comments on the Department of 
State's letter dated September 24, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. Notwithstanding State's guidance to contractors, we found that not 
all contractor personnel are being entered into SPOT as required. In 
practice, we found that the need for an LOA is the primary determinate 
for whether or not contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. For 
example, a State contracting officer informed us that Iraqis working on 
his contracts are not in SPOT because they do not need LOAs, which is 
not consistent with State's guidance, the MOU criteria, or the NDAA for 
FY2008. 

2. As reflected in our recommendation, we agree that the agencies need 
to determine a single standard on which contracts should be entered 
into SPOT. This is not only due to State's observation regarding 
inconsistencies in the MOU, but also due to the inconsistencies we 
found between the MOU and NDAA for FY 2008 and the varying criteria 
being used by the agencies. Until there is a single agreed upon 
standard--both in guidance and practice, the agencies will continue 
track data differently and, as a result, the data for all three 
agencies will be incomplete. 

3. Our finding pertained to how data are actually being entered into 
SPOT, which as we report allows users to enter invalid contract numbers 
and does not require the entry of task order numbers. For example, we 
found that none of State's task orders in SPOT provided both the 
contract and task order numbers. If such data entry issues are not 
resolved in the near future, then the planned connection with FPDS-NG 
may present challenges and prevent contract data from being accurately 
imported into SPOT. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

USAID: 
From The American People: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
[hyperlink: http://www.usiad.gov] 

September 22, 2009: 

Mr. John Hutton: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Hutton: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) written comments in response to the GAO draft report No. 10-01 
entitled "Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to 
Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan." 

We strongly support the goal to develop consistent and reliable 
information for contracts and assistance awards as well as maintain the 
numbers of contracting personnel supporting USAID programs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. During the period of GAO's review for this draft report, 
USAID diligently worked with our interagency partners, Department of 
Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) to address the practical 
implications, resource requirements, and technical challenges necessary 
to utilize the Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT). 
We have used lessons learned from our Iraq efforts to understand how we 
can best roll out this new system in Afghanistan. 

Originally designed to allow DOD to track pre-assignment 
qualifications, process logistics and security support personnel, and 
monitor physical locations and DOD-provided services used in-theater, 
SPOT and its implementation presented some challenges for USAID. [See 
comment 1] The program proves to be labor intensive when used as a 
daily administrative tool in the locations of operations. USAID 
officials must closely monitor the information entered into the SPOT 
database. However, the largest burden of the SPOT implementation effort 
falls upon our contracting and assistance partners. As a personnel 
management and tracking system, SPOT is strictly additive to our 
partners' existing human resources administration and project 
management systems. While we are pleased that they are cooperating with 
our efforts to introduce SPOT, we do understand that the impact of 
these resource requirements on overall development program 
administration will need to be re-evaluated in the future. 

In regards to the recommendations put forth in the draft report, we 
provide the below comments: 

Recommendation 1 relates to "ensuring that the agencies' criteria for 
entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent 
with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2008 and with 
the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing contracts and 
contractor personnel." As the GAO's draft report indicates, the primary 
output of SPOT is the Letter of Authorization (LOA), which has varying 
degrees of application depending upon DOD's on-the-ground support in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. SPOT, however, also provides for non-LOA 
deployments and-through these available database features personnel 
numbers can be rolled up and reporting products can be obtained and 
shared without invoking the relatively labor-intensive LOA process. 
USAID will further investigate this functionality of SPOT as a means 
for complying with the MOO terms within our available resources. [See 
comment 2] 

Recommendation 2 suggests "ensuring uniform requirements on how 
contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract 
information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the 
MOU." We are pleased to note that our existing USAID-specific contract 
numbering system is fully compatible with both SPOT and FPDS-NG. USAID 
already meets the uniform requirements described. [See comment 3] 

Recommendation 3. states "revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to 
ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information 
needs, such as those related to contractor personnel killed or 
wounded." USAID must rely upon DOD, as the system owner, to 
appropriately manage SPOT development. We will await the necessary 
enhancements to capabilities in order to meet our needs. [See comment 
4] 

In closing, allow me to emphasize the importance USAID places upon 
interagency cooperation. Both DOD and DOS have assisted USAID in moving 
forward with this new system, and we will continue to meet regularly 
with our interagency colleagues concerning NDAA FY 2008 and FY 2009 
requirements and our existing MOU. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO report and for the 
courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Drew W. Luten: 
Acting Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

cc: Peter Orszag, Director, OMB: 

The following are GAO's supplemental comments on USAID's letter dated 
September 22, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. While building off the lessons learned in Iraq has merit, we note 
that USAID does not provide a time frame for when it will begin 
requiring contractors in Afghanistan to use SPOT to fulfill the 
requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and what it agreed to in the MOU. 

2. Our report explains that the need for the LOA--as opposed to what 
was agreed to in the MOU or contained in the NDAA for FY2008--has 
become the primary factor for determining which contractor personnel 
are entered into SPOT. USAID's comment that it will explore SPOT's 
functionality to track personnel who do not need LOAs is consistent 
with our recommendation that the agencies work together to ensure that 
the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and their respective 
information needs are fulfilled. 

3. While USAID has a standard contract numbering system, the issue we 
identified pertains to how SPOT allows contract and task order numbers 
to be entered inconsistently. The agencies need to work together to 
ensure that contract and task orders numbers are entered into SPOT so 
that data can be accurately pulled from FPDS-NG. 

4. While DOD is responsible for maintaining and upgrading SPOT, the 
three agencies have a shared responsibility to ensure that the database 
they agreed to use in their MOU fulfills the requirements of the NDAA 
for FY2008. Rather than deferring to DOD as the system owner to manage 
SPOT's development, USAID should work with the other agencies to 
identify and agree on their information and reporting needs and ensure 
that the necessary upgrades are made to SPOT. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director; 
Noah Bleicher; E. Brandon Booth; Justin Fisher; Art James, Jr.; 
Christopher Kunitz; Jean McSween; Alise Nacson; Jason Pogacnik; Karen 
Thornton; Gabriele Tonsil; and Robert Swierczek made key contributions 
to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking 
Actions to Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-538T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 
854 (2008). 

[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863. While the mandate and our report 
address DOD, State, and USAID contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
other federal agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, 
and the Treasury have contracts with performance in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that are not included in the scope of the mandate or our 
report. 

[4] For our first report issued pursuant to the mandate, see GAO, 
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor 
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 
2008). 

[5] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854(d) amended section 864 of the 
NDAA for FY2008 to add a definition of "contractor personnel" as "any 
person performing work under contract for the Department of Defense, 
the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International 
Development, in Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and 
subcontractors at any tier." Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines 
private security functions as the "guarding of personnel, facilities or 
property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a 
third party" and "any other activity for which personnel are required 
to carry weapons in the performance of their duties." 

[6] Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY2008 defines a "contract in 
Iraq or Afghanistan" as "a contract with the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International 
Development, a subcontract at any tier issued under such a contract, or 
a task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a contract 
(including a contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order 
issued by another Government agency for the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International 
Development) if the contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery 
order involves worked [sic] performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a 
period longer than 14 days." The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
defines a subcontract as a contract entered into by a subcontractor to 
furnish supplies or services for performance of a prime contract or 
other subcontracts. The FAR defines a task order as an order for 
services placed against an established contract or government sources. 
For purposes of this report, when we use the term contract, we intend 
it to refer to a "contract in Iraq or Afghanistan" as defined in the 
NDAA for FY2008. 

[7] Since the NDAA for FY2008 did not define what constitutes an 
"active" contract, we considered a contract active if funds were 
obligated or deobligated on that contract in fiscal year 2008 and/or 
the first half of fiscal year 2009. There were other contracts that had 
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no 
obligations or deobligations; such contracts were not included in our 
analyses. Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 and the first half of 
fiscal year 2009 are a subset of the active contracts. Throughout the 
report, the term award refers to the issuance of a task or delivery 
order or the award of a new contract. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854 amended section 861 of the NDAA for 
FY2008 by specifying additional matters to be included in the MOU 
regarding UCMJ and MEJA offenses and requiring the agencies to modify 
their MOU to address these additional matters by February 11, 2009. 
However, according to DOD officials, the required modifications to the 
MOU are still pending final approval. 

[9] DOD, as the system owner, currently pays all development and 
maintenance costs for SPOT. However, DOD officials we spoke with said 
they are exploring options for having the agencies that use SPOT pay 
for some maintenance costs. 

[10] An LOA is a document issued by a government contracting officer or 
designee that authorizes contractor personnel to travel to, from, and 
within a designated area and to identify any additional authorizations, 
privileges, or government support the contractor is entitled to under 
the contract. 

[11] This guidance was implemented in DOD FAR Supplement section 
252.225-7040(g), which specified that contractors are to enter 
information into SPOT for all personnel authorized to accompany the 
U.S. Armed Forces. However, Class Deviation 2007-O0010 excluded 
contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command's area of 
responsibility that did not exceed $25,000 or had less than 30 days of 
performance. 

[12] Contract numbers consist of 13 alphanumeric characters. We 
considered a contract number invalid if the contract number entered 
into SPOT had a different number of characters. 

[13] CENTCOM is one of DOD's unified combatant commands. It is 
responsible for overseeing U.S. security interests in 20 countries-- 
including Iraq and Afghanistan--that stretch from the Arabian Gulf 
region into Central Asia. 

[14] In addition to the survey and SPOT numbers provided to us, we 
included individuals working on personal services contracts in State's 
totals. State is authorized under section 2 of the State Department 
Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended, to contract for personal 
services. 22 U.S.C. § 2669(c) and (n). The FAR defines "personal 
services contracts" as contracts that, by their express terms or as 
administered, make the contractor personnel appear to be, in effect, 
government employees. 

[15] In addition to the survey numbers provided to us, we included 
individuals working on personal services contracts in USAID's totals. 
USAID is authorized under section 636 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended, to contract for personal services. 22 U.S.C. § 
2396(a)(3). 

[16] USAID officials informed us that in March 2009 its mission in Iraq 
began requiring contractors to provide quarterly personnel updates. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]. 

[18] Congress enacted the DBA in 1941. The insurance required under the 
DBA provides employees with uniform levels of disability and medical 
benefits or, in the event of death, provides benefits to eligible 
dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors, are required to 
provide DBA insurance coverage for all of their employees, regardless 
of their nationality, working outside the United States on U.S. 
military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government for public 
works or national defense. Labor initiates a case when it receives a 
notice of death or injury. Notices include reports filed by employers 
and claims for benefits submitted by injured employees or their 
survivors. 

[19] This estimate based on our sample is subject to sampling error. We 
reviewed 150 DBA case files for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 
2008. The margin of error for the percentage of reported deaths and 
injuries resulting from hostile actions is no more than plus or minus 7 
percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. For more 
detailed information on this file review, see appendix I. 

[20] While the majority of the 16 case files in our sample that 
resulted from hostile actions were submitted for injuries, as opposed 
to deaths, we could not reliably estimate for all DBA cases the portion 
of hostile actions that occurred in fiscal year 2008 that resulted in 
injuries compared to the portion that resulted in deaths. 

[21] See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (applicable to DOD) and 41 U.S.C. § 253 
(applicable to other executive agencies discussed in this report). 
Section 403(6) of title 41, U.S. Code, defines "full and open 
competition" as when all responsible sources are permitted to submit 
sealed bids or competitive proposals on a procurement. The competition 
requirements are implemented in FAR Part 6 and corresponding agency 
acquisition regulation supplements. 

[22] We obtained obligation data for each contract with performance in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal 
year 2009. Obligations, however, may not be equivalent to the full 
contract value as contracts may be incrementally funded over multiple 
years. 

[23] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition 
threshold (SAT). For contracts in support of a contingency operation, 
the SAT during our review period was $1 million for contracts awarded 
and performed outside the United States and $250,000 for contracts 
awarded and performed in the United States. Contracts awarded and 
performed in the United States were not in the scope of our review. 
Additionally, FAR subpart 13.5 provides higher thresholds if the 
acquisition is for commercial items. For example, the SAT for 
commercial items in support of a contingency operation is $11 million. 
FAR § 13.500(e). 

[24] At the time of our contract file review, none of the contracts 
awarded in fiscal year 2008 that USAID reported as not competed had 
over $100,000 in obligations during our review period. USAID 
subsequently provided us with additional data in which two contracts 
met our review criteria; these contracts were not included in our file 
reviews due to when we received the data. 

[25] We did not evaluate whether the justifications that the agencies 
provided for awarding contracts without full and open competition were 
adequate. 

[26] Section 886 of the NDAA for FY2008 authorizes DOD, in certain 
circumstances, to limit competition to products and services from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, award a contract to a particular source or sources 
from Iraq or Afghanistan using other than competitive procedures, or 
give preference to products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 886. 

[27] FAR 16.505(b)(1)(ii). 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]. 

[End of section] 

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