GAO-09-856, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities


This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-856 
entitled 'Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements 
and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities' which 
was released on September 16, 2009. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2009: 

Missile Defense: 

DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational 
Units before Fielding New Capabilities: 

GAO-09-856: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-856, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly 
fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of 
elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control 
systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend 
against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began 
a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended 
to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to 
congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations, 
GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and 
quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established 
the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed 
key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint 
Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully 
informed decisions about the types and quantities of elements and 
interceptors it needs. Such an analytic basis would include a 
comprehensive examination of the optimal mix of elements and 
interceptors needed to meet all of DOD’s ballistic missile defense 
requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed for specific 
purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of the 
studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full 
range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example, 
to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain 
ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-
intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have 
analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their 
specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for 
specific elements. Without a full assessment of its overall 
requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to make the best 
possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic 
missile defense. 

DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of 
eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into 
operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be 
fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To 
rapidly field missile defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put 
ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first 
ensuring that the military services had created units and trained 
servicemembers to operate them. Three of the eight elements were 
modifications to existing systems, like the Navy’s Aegis ships, so 
units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five 
remaining elements—the midcourse defense system designed to defend the 
United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater 
missile defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable 
platform; ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel; 
and the command and control system designed to link the BMDS together—
were put into use before operational units were fully established. As a 
result, DOD has faced a number of challenges. For example, the Army 
faced personnel shortfalls to operate the midcourse defense system. 
These shortages affected the Army units’ ability to support ongoing 
research and development activities and ultimately resulted in 
operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are 
taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take years 
for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting 
elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that 
operational units be in place before new elements are made available 
for use. Looking ahead, several new elements are in development, like 
the radars and interceptors currently being considered for deployment 
in Europe, and emerging threats could again cause DOD to press those 
capabilities into use. Unless fully trained units are in place to 
support missile defense elements when they are made operational, DOD 
will continue to face uncertainties and operational risks associated 
with the elements. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that DOD perform a comprehensive analysis 
identifying its requirements for BMDS elements and interceptors and 
require, in the absence of an immediate threat, the establishment of 
operational units before making elements available for use. In comments 
on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with GAO’s 
recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856] or key 
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not 
Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements: 

Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic 
Missile Defense Elements: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has Delivered to 
the Combatant Commands for Operational Use as of July 2009: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Benefits of Integration: 

Abbreviations: 

Aegis BMD: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

C2BMC: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

THAAD: Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 16, 2009: 

The Honorable Jim Langevin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Michael Turner: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the 
development and fielding of a globally integrated, interconnected, and 
layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of "elements" 
that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems, 
[Footnote 1] which together are to be capable of addressing all ranges 
of threatening ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.[Footnote 2] 
With the submission of the fiscal year 2010 defense budget to Congress, 
DOD announced its intention to strike a new balance between developing 
new ballistic missile defense capabilities and fielding what it 
believes to be proven and effective weapon systems. The Missile Defense 
Agency's (MDA) $7.8 billion budget request for fiscal year 2010 
emphasized the fielding of specific BMDS elements to defend against 
near-term threats from rogue states and threats to U.S. forces and 
population centers abroad. For example, the Secretary of Defense 
announced that DOD's budget request added $900 million to more rapidly 
acquire and field the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) elements and their 
associated interceptors, while reducing investments in some 
developmental programs designed to address longer-term threats. As the 
military services increasingly take responsibility from MDA for these 
and other elements as they transition from research and development to 
operations, the cost to the services for operating and maintaining 
ballistic missile defense elements is likely to grow; typically, such 
costs account for 70 percent of a weapon system's life-cycle costs. 

To assist the subcommittee in its review of DOD's approach to 
acquiring, fielding, and operating ballistic missile defenses, you 
asked us to review DOD's overall requirements to perform worldwide 
ballistic missile defense missions. We focused on the types and 
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements (including inventories 
of interceptors) and the organizations, personnel, and training needed 
to operate these elements. Specifically, in addressing its overall 
force structure requirements, we reviewed the extent to which DOD has 
(1) identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense 
elements and interceptors that it needs for performing ballistic 
missile defense missions and (2) established the units to operate 
elements that have been put into use. To determine the extent to which 
DOD has identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile 
defense elements and interceptors that it requires, we identified, 
obtained, and reviewed key MDA and Joint Staff studies identifying 
ballistic missile defense requirements. We performed our analysis by 
comparing DOD's analytical and funding approaches for ballistic missile 
defense against criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to 
acquiring major weapon systems, which provides evidence that 
warfighting requirements are valid and can be met with chosen concepts 
that are developed and produced within existing resources.[Footnote 3] 
The documentation we reviewed also included direction and guidance from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and MDA; MDA 
plans for developing ballistic missile defenses; and direction from the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense outlining the BMDS Life Cycle Management 
Process. To determine the extent to which DOD has established the units 
needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements that have been put 
into use, we identified, reviewed, and assessed MDA development plans 
and fielding schedules, Joint Staff orders, and U.S. Strategic Command 
processes and plans for evaluating the operational performance of 
ballistic missile defense capabilities. The scope of our analysis 
included those ballistic missile defense elements that have been 
delivered to the combatant commands for operational use as of July 
2009.[Footnote 4] For both objectives, we interviewed officials from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA, Army, Navy, 
and Air Force. We also obtained documentation from key geographic 
combatant commands to understand their operational requirements for 
ballistic missile defense elements and service forces, the processes 
for establishing these requirements, and any challenges they have had 
or expect to encounter in obtaining the capabilities and forces that 
they need for operations. The combatant commands we visited were U.S. 
Strategic Command and the four geographic combatant commands--U.S. 
Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. 
Pacific Command--that have participated in U.S. Strategic Command's 
advocacy efforts to identify desirable characteristics and capabilities 
for the BMDS. We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to 
September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

In 2002, the President reinforced ballistic missile defense as a 
national priority and directed DOD to proceed with plans to develop and 
put in place an initial capability beginning in 2004.[Footnote 5] To 
expedite the delivery of an operationally capable BMDS, in 2002 the 
Secretary of Defense established MDA, granted the agency expanded 
responsibility and authority to develop globally integrated 
capabilities, directed it to manage all ballistic missile defense 
systems then under development, and transferred those systems 
controlled by the military services to the agency. The systems 
transferred from the services and the new systems whose development MDA 
initiates are all considered to be ballistic missile defense elements. 

Since its creation in 2002, MDA has developed, fielded, and declared 
ready for operations an increasingly complex set of ballistic missile 
defenses designed to defend the United States, deployed forces, allies, 
and friends from limited ballistic missile attacks. By leveraging 
existing service weapon systems and developmental concepts, MDA fielded 
an initial defensive capability beginning in 2004 to defend the United 
States from a limited, long-range ballistic missile attack. This 
initial defensive capability included the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense system of interceptors and fire control systems, Upgraded Early 
Warning Radars, sea-based radars installed aboard Aegis cruisers and 
destroyers, and an early version of the Command, Control, Battle 
Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. MDA first made these 
elements available for operations in April 2005 by establishing the 
initial BMDS operational baseline.[Footnote 6] DOD first put these 
elements to operational use by activating them in 2006 in response to 
North Korean ballistic missile activity. Since that time, DOD has added 
some elements to the operational baseline while declaring others ready 
for contingencies. Table 1 identifies the fielding locations and dates 
that MDA first delivered operational elements to the combatant commands 
as of July 2009. 

Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has Delivered to 
the Combatant Commands for Operational Use as of July 2009: 

BMDS element/lead service: Ground-based Midcourse Defense/Army; 
Element description: A ground-based system based on a developmental 
program transferred to MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect the U.S. 
homeland from intermediate-and intercontinental-range ballistic missile 
attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. The element employs 
ground-based interceptors to strike at threatening warheads as they 
travel through space toward their target(s); 
Fielding location(s): Ground-based interceptors located in Alaska and 
California; fire control operations centers located in Alaska and 
Colorado; 
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in 
April 2005. 

BMDS element/lead service: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense/Navy; 
Element description: A system that (1) provides a forward-deployed 
capability to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all 
ranges and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs sensors and 
interceptors to protect deployed forces and population centers. The 
element is based on a modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to 
provide these capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard 
Missile-3, designed to defend against short-to medium-range missile 
threats in the midcourse phase, and a modified Standard Missile-2 
interceptor designed to defend against short-range threats in the 
terminal phase; 
Fielding location(s): Aegis-class Navy destroyers and cruisers 
homeported in Japan, Hawaii, California, and Virginia; 
Delivery date: Sensor capabilities to support the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense element were included in the first operational 
baseline, published in April 2005. Midcourse intercept capabilities 
were added to the baseline in November 2006. In September 2008 terminal 
defense capabilities were first made available for contingency 
operations. 

BMDS element/lead service: Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade/Air Force; 
Element description: Radar element that provides missile tracking data 
to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, in addition to legacy 
missions; 
Fielding location(s): Alaska; 
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in 
April 2005. 

BMDS element/lead service: Upgraded Early Warning Radar/Air Force; 
Element description: Radar element that provides missile tracking data 
to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, in addition to legacy 
Air Force missions; 
Fielding location(s): California and United Kingdom; 
Delivery date: First radar included in the first operational baseline, 
published in April 2005; second radar added to the operational baseline 
in December 2007. 

BMDS element/lead service: Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications/none designated; 
Element description: A networked computer and communications element 
developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing deliberate 
planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle 
management capabilities; 
Fielding location(s): Multiple combatant commands, the National 
Military Command Center, and other regional locations; 
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in 
April 2005. 

BMDS element/lead service: AN/TPY-2 Forward-based Radar[A]/Army; 
Element description: A transportable, land-based radar, similar in 
design to the THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic 
missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based locations; 
Fielding location(s): Japan and Israel; 
Delivery date: First radar, fielded in Japan, added to the operational 
baseline in September 2006; second radar, fielded in Israel, first made 
available for contingency operations in November 2008. 

BMDS element/lead service: Sea-based X-Band Radar/Navy; 
Element description: An MDA-designed element, consisting of a radar 
built on a movable sea platform, which is to provide an improved 
ability to acquire, track, and discriminate threatening warheads from 
decoys, thereby improving the chances of a successful intercept by the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense element; 
Fielding location(s): Pacific Ocean (based in Hawaii); 
Delivery date: First made available for contingency operations in July 
2008. 

BMDS element/lead service: Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense/Army; 
Element description: A ground-based system based on a developmental 
program transferred to MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect deployed 
U.S. forces and population centers from short-and medium-range 
ballistic missile attacks. The system employs interceptors designed to 
strike at threatening missiles both inside and just outside of the 
earth's atmosphere; 
Fielding location(s): Texas; 
Delivery date: First made available for contingency operations in 
September 2008. 
Source: GAO summary of DOD information. 

Note: Does not include the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element, which 
the Secretary of Defense assigned to the Army in 2003 as an operational 
system. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element is designed to 
protect deployed U.S. forces from short-range and medium-range 
ballistic missile threats. 

[A] AN/TPY stands for "Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance." 

[End of table] 

As table 1 indicates, DOD has designated lead services for seven of the 
eight elements that have been delivered to the combatant commands for 
operational use; MDA currently plans to retain control of the eighth 
element delivered to date--C2BMC--and not transition it to a single 
lead service.[Footnote 7] Lead military services are expected to 
provide the rest of the military force structure--the organizations, 
personnel, and training--required for operations as the elements become 
more technically mature.[Footnote 8] Lead military services are also 
expected to begin funding operational and support costs as elements 
transition from MDA to the services.[Footnote 9] 

To develop ballistic missile defense capabilities, MDA both modified 
existing service weapon systems to perform ballistic missile defense 
missions and developed new elements, many based on previously existing 
concepts, expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes. For 
example, MDA developed the Upgraded Early Warning Radar and Aegis BMD 
elements as modifications to existing service weapon systems, whereas 
MDA developed the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and THAAD elements 
based on developmental programs transferred to MDA in 2002. MDA has 
spent about $56 billion since 2002 to develop these assets. 
Additionally, MDA's fiscal year 2010 budget request proposes to develop 
more advanced Aegis BMD interceptors capable of addressing intermediate-
range ballistic missile threats, enhance the C2BMC element's 
capabilities, and undertake other developmental initiatives, including 
research into ascent phase technologies.[Footnote 10] These 
developments are likely to affect both element quantities and service 
force structure requirements as MDA begins to field these capabilities. 

MDA, under the direction and oversight of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is responsible for 
evaluating ballistic missile defense capabilities to determine which 
elements are ready to perform military operations, giving the Secretary 
of Defense the option of activating elements for operational use. 
[Footnote 11] Under MDA's approach, an element is first available for 
crisis and contingency operations when it has achieved Early Capability 
Delivery, based upon MDA's assessment of element-level tests and its 
determination that the element's employment will not degrade other 
operational ballistic missile defenses. According to MDA's current 
approach, an Early Capability Delivery declaration is the first point 
at which an element is made available for operational employment in 
defense of the United States and U.S. allies. Subsequently, MDA 
declares when an element is added to the operational baseline by 
declaring that it has achieved Partial Capability Delivery, and is 
capable of day-to-day operations, or Full Capability Delivery meaning 
that the element is able to sustain operations over longer periods. 
[Footnote 12] In May 2009, MDA updated its approach to making 
capability declarations so that it considers not only the agency's own 
developmental assessments, but also a U.S. Strategic Command-led 
assessment of the element's capabilities and limitations under 
operational conditions. MDA's first capability review under this new 
approach is expected to occur later in 2009. 

Oversight of MDA is executed by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because MDA is not subject to 
DOD's traditional joint requirements determination processes and 
because it utilizes flexible acquisition practices, DOD developed 
alternative oversight mechanisms. For example, in 2007 the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense established the Missile Defense Executive Board, 
[Footnote 13] which is to provide the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
as necessary, with a recommended ballistic missile defense strategic 
program plan and feasible funding strategy for approval. In September 
2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also established the BMDS Life 
Cycle Management Process, and directed the board to use the process to 
oversee the annual preparation of a required capabilities portfolio and 
develop a program plan to meet the requirements with Research, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation; procurement; operations and 
maintenance; and military construction in defensewide accounts. 

DOD is currently undertaking a review of its approach and requirements 
for ballistic missile defenses. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 14] Congress required 
DOD to prepare a review of the ballistic missile defense policy and 
strategy of the United States. Among other matters, the congressionally 
mandated review is to address the full range of ballistic missile 
threats to the United States, deployed forces, friends, and allies; the 
organization, discharge, and oversight of acquisition for ballistic 
missile defense programs; roles and responsibilities of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, combatant commands, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments in such programs; DOD's 
process for determining the force structure and inventory objectives 
for ballistic missile defense programs; the near-term and long-term 
affordability and cost-effectiveness of such programs; and the role of 
international cooperation on missile defense in the ballistic missile 
defense policy and strategy of the United States. Congress required DOD 
to provide a report on its review by January 31, 2010. 

This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic 
missile defense that have identified key acquisition, management, and 
operational challenges associated with the development of the BMDS. In 
August 2009 we published a report identifying actions that DOD needs to 
take to improve planning and to increase the transparency of total 
costs for the proposed European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse 
Radar elements.[Footnote 15] In March 2009, we issued our sixth annual 
assessment of DOD's progress in developing the BMDS; this report 
concluded that although MDA had shown the benefits of its flexible 
acquisition practices by fielding and improving upon an initial 
ballistic missile defense capability since 2005, this approach also has 
limited the ability of DOD and congressional decision makers to measure 
MDA's progress on cost, schedule, testing, and performance.[Footnote 
16] In September 2008, we found that although DOD had begun preparing 
for BMDS operations and support, difficulties in transitioning these 
responsibilities from MDA to lead services had complicated long-term 
planning to operate and support the elements over their life cycle. 
[Footnote 17] In July 2008, we reported that DOD had taken some steps 
to address the combatant commands' ballistic missile defense needs, but 
had yet to establish an effective process for identifying and 
addressing the overall priorities of the combatant commands when 
developing ballistic missile defense capabilities.[Footnote 18] We 
reported in May 2006 that DOD had begun preparations to operate 
ballistic missile defenses, such as identifying lead services, but had 
not established the criteria that must be met before the BMDS can be 
declared operational.[Footnote 19] 

DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not 
Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements: 

DOD has identified its needs for establishing an initial and evolving 
ballistic missile defense capability, but lacks the comprehensive 
analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the 
overall mix of elements and interceptors that it requires. A knowledge- 
based decision-making approach can help to provide the comprehensive 
analytic basis needed to establish missile defense policies and 
strategies and determine funding priorities. For ballistic missile 
defense, such an approach would require full examination of the optimal 
type and quantity of various ballistic missile defense elements and 
interceptors needed to meet all of DOD's requirements--a complex task 
due to the many factors that should be considered, including the 
evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies. For example, 
the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries provides different 
defensive coverage depending on whether the elements are acting 
autonomously or are integrated with another X-band radar. However, 
DOD's assessments of missile defense requirements prepared to date were 
limited in scope primarily because they were prepared for specific 
purposes. The Joint Staff, for example, conducted studies to identify 
the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile 
defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediate- 
range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their 
ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and 
the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a 
comprehensive analytic basis that identifies the full range of 
operational type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile 
defense elements, DOD may not be acquiring the optimized mix of 
elements and interceptors that would provide the most effective missile 
defense. 

DOD Has Identified the Types and Quantities of Ballistic Missile 
Defense Elements Needed for an Initial and Evolving Defensive 
Capability: 

MDA identified how many and what type of ballistic missile defense 
elements were needed to begin fielding an initial set of capabilities 
in 2004 and to evolve the BMDS over time. Directed by the President in 
2002 to begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities 
in 2004, MDA undertook the major early assessments that established 
DOD's initial and evolving ballistic missile defensive capability, 
which formed the foundation of the current BMDS. According to a 
February 2004 MDA briefing, the initial defensive capability prepared 
in response to the President's policy direction included the Cobra Dane 
Radar Upgrade, the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, up to 20 ground- 
based interceptors located in Alaska and California, command and 
control in Colorado, and sea-based radars deployed aboard Aegis ships. 
Additionally, based on the President's policy direction and direction 
from the Secretary of Defense, also issued in 2002, MDA planned to 
expand the initial capability over time. To do so, MDA conducted 
internal studies and developed plans in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that 
identified the quantities of elements and interceptors it needed for 
research and development purposes and to defeat long-range ballistic 
missiles from rogue states. As of February 2005, these studies resulted 
in plans for fielding 48 ground-based interceptors to address the long- 
range ballistic missile threat, with 36 of the interceptors planned for 
fielding in Alaska, 2 in California, and 10 in Europe.[Footnote 20] The 
studies also resulted in plans to establish a network of sensors-- 
including radars aboard Aegis ships and land-based radars in North 
America, Asia, and Europe. Additionally, MDA planned to build up to 48 
THAAD interceptors and 101 Aegis BMD interceptors by the end of 
calendar year 2011 as part of its efforts to develop and field 
capabilities to defeat short-, medium-, and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles. However, these initial plans did not define DOD's 
overall requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and 
interceptors. In particular, MDA's analyses were primarily focused on 
addressing the requirements of an initial and evolving ballistic 
missile defense capability and were not intended to address all of 
DOD's operational requirements for performing ballistic missile defense 
missions worldwide. 

Determining the Quantity of Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and 
Interceptors Required for All Missions Involves Many Factors: 

Establishing requirements for ballistic missile defense involves 
balancing several interrelated factors. A comprehensive analytic basis 
would include determining the optimum types and numbers of ballistic 
missile defense elements and interceptors for performing missile 
defense missions worldwide. However, optimizing the quantities of each 
element and interceptor involves many factors, including the 
integration of various types of ballistic missile defense elements, 
various risk assessments, the potential contributions of friends and 
allies, optimizing elements that can address multiple threats, and the 
evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies. Our prior work 
shows that a knowledge-based decision-making process can help to 
provide the comprehensive analytic basis needed for establishing 
funding priorities, including determining the affordability of DOD's 
missile defense policies and strategies.[Footnote 21] A knowledge-based 
decision-making process includes providing decision makers with 
evidence that warfighting requirements are valid, that they can be met 
with the chosen weapon system designs, and that the chosen designs can 
be developed and produced within existing resources. 

Integrated Elements Are More Effective Than Elements Operating 
Independently: 

Optimizing the numbers and types of each element and interceptor needed 
involves looking across the BMDS to see how the different elements can 
best work together as an integrated system. According to the Director 
of MDA, the integration of the many ballistic missile defense elements 
into a system makes the BMDS more effective than would the individual 
elements operating independently. Integration may include improving 
systems integration among elements, adding a different type of 
interceptor, adding a sensor, or a combination of these and other 
options in order to increase a defended area. For example, figure 1 
illustrates how the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries 
provides vastly different defensive coverage depending on whether the 
elements are acting autonomously (smaller coverage) or are integrated 
with a radar (larger coverage).[Footnote 22] Increased integration 
could therefore affect requirements, perhaps lessening the quantity of 
elements needed to defend an area. However, Air Force officials told us 
that the cost of integrating elements could be high enough in some 
circumstances that it may be more efficient to purchase additional 
elements and interceptors. 

Figure 1: Benefits of Integration: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Defended area with elements operating individually: 
Depicted on the illustration: 
THAAD defended area; 
Aegis BMD defended area; 
THAAD element; 
Aegis BMD element. 

Defended area with elements integrated together with a radar: 
Depicted on the illustration: 
THAAD defended area; 
Aegis BMD defended area (much larger than area previously covered); 
THAAD element; 
Aegis BMD element; 
X-Band radar. 

Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data. 

Note: The same number of elements acting individually provides a 
smaller defended area than when those elements are integrated together 
with a radar. 

[End of figure] 

Risk Assessments Factor into Overall Requirements: 

Assessments of the threat and other risk assessments are also factors 
affecting overall requirements for the types and quantities of missile 
defense elements and interceptors. According to the Director of MDA, 
optimizing the size and type of the ballistic missile defense force 
requires an operational risk assessment of the adversary's ballistic 
missile arsenal that would have to be engaged. It also requires 
understanding the capabilities and limitations of BMDS elements needed 
to counter these threats, an understanding that continues to improve 
with additional testing. For example, the required number of ground- 
based interceptors needed to defend the United States from long-range 
threats would be affected if additional testing were to reveal an 
increase or decrease in the expected capability of that type of 
interceptor. Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic 
Command officials told us that risk assessments should also consider 
the extent to which different kinds of elements and interceptors 
provide redundant coverage. Air Force officials added that redundant 
capabilities should be considered when optimizing force structure, 
stating that even if there were a single element that could provide 
defensive coverage for an entire region, an optimized force structure 
may include additional elements so that the area would still be 
defended if the original element were incapacitated. 

Allied Contributions Can Affect Quantity Requirements: 

The extent to which the United States can depend upon contributions 
from friends and allies also can affect the determination of DOD's 
optimized ballistic missile defense force structure. For example, U.S. 
Central Command officials told us that coordination with friends and 
allies on ballistic missile defenses and their purchase of ballistic 
missile defense elements and interceptors may allow the command to 
reorient its forces to fill other gaps. Similarly, U.S. Pacific Command 
told us that close ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan has 
improved overall ballistic missile defense protection in the command's 
area of responsibility, allowing the command to expand protection of 
critical assets. The Director of MDA testified before Congress in June 
2009 that if cooperative efforts with Russia were successful in 
integrating some radar facilities, it could enhance the ability of 
ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. Finally, in regard 
to the proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, DOD and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been exploring ways to 
link U.S. missile defense assets with NATO's missile defense efforts. 
In April 2008, NATO declared its intention to develop options for a 
comprehensive missile defense architecture to extend coverage to all 
allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the proposed 
U.S. system. 

Some Elements Are Designed to Defend against Multiple Threats or 
Perform Different Missions: 

A key factor affecting the requirements for some elements is that they 
are designed to address multiple types of ballistic missile threats. 
For example, potential choices about whether to use the interceptors 
based in Europe as a reserve to defend the United States or to use them 
to intercept all incoming long-range threats regardless of the intended 
target could significantly affect how many ground-based interceptors 
would be needed overall. Similarly, the Aegis BMD element was designed 
to provide search and track capabilities to help the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense element defend the United States, and as a stand- 
alone element capable of defending deployed U.S. forces and population 
centers abroad from shorter-range threats. In addition, Navy and U.S. 
Pacific Command officials told us that Aegis ships are also in high 
demand to perform other maritime missions, such as antisubmarine 
warfare. As a result, the use of Aegis ships as ballistic missile 
defense weapon systems may constrain the ability of combatant 
commanders to use those ships for other purposes without increasing the 
size of the available force structure. In coming years, as the Aegis 
BMD element takes on new roles to intercept longer-range missiles that 
are targeting the United States,[Footnote 23] regional combatant 
commanders who rely on the Aegis ships for multiple missions may be 
further constrained in how they deploy those assets. Consequently, even 
as the Aegis BMD element becomes more capable, requirements for Aegis 
force structure may increase in order to satisfy the multiple missions. 

Changes in Threat and Evolving Missile Defense Technology Will Likely 
Affect Future Requirements: 

The evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies also have 
implications for the quantity requirements for ballistic missile 
defense elements and interceptors. For example, MDA reported to 
Congress in July 2009 that the requirement for emplaced ground-based 
interceptors was reduced, in part, because the original intelligence 
estimate of the number of missiles that the ground-based interceptors 
were intended to counter was later assessed to be off by 10 to 20 
missiles. Similarly, improvements in BMDS capabilities affect 
requirements. For example, the Director of MDA testified before 
Congress in May 2009 that new ascent phase capabilities will eliminate 
the need for the Multiple Kill Vehicle program and would reduce overall 
the number of ballistic missile defense interceptors needed to defeat 
an attack. 

DOD's Analyses to Date Have Been Limited in Scope: 

Our review of DOD's analyses of its type and quantity requirements for 
ballistic missile defenses show that the studies prepared to date have 
been limited in scope and did not create the comprehensive analytic 
basis for making programwide decisions about policies, strategies, and 
investments. MDA's initial analyses were completed for the purpose of 
establishing an initial and evolving set of ballistic missile defense 
capabilities, not to determine DOD's overall operational requirements. 
Similarly, we found that the assessments of ballistic missile defense 
quantity requirements conducted by other DOD organizations were 
prepared for specific purposes: 

* The Joint Staff conducted two analyses beginning in 2006 that 
identified a minimum baseline need to double the number of THAAD and 
Aegis BMD interceptors planned in the fiscal year 2008 budget as well 
as a need for an additional THAAD battery and an upgraded AN/TPY-2 
forward-based radar with self-defense capability. The Joint Staff 
focused on THAAD and Aegis BMD interceptor inventory requirements 
because production decisions for additional interceptors needed to be 
made in DOD's fiscal year 2010 future years' funding plan in order to 
avoid the possibility of closing down production. Combatant commands 
were also voicing a demand for these capabilities in order to protect 
deployed U.S. forces and population centers abroad. The Joint Staff 
characterized the studies as an "initial mark on the wall" because the 
studies made assumptions that tended to drive down the identified 
quantities in the baseline. For example, the studies did not factor in 
quantities needed for spares, training, testing, or in transit; assumed 
the lack of enemy countermeasures; and assumed that ballistic missile 
defense command and control systems would work perfectly under 
operational conditions. Acknowledging these limitations, Members of 
Congress and DOD officials nevertheless have cited the Joint Staff 
studies as identifying the requirement for boosting THAAD and Aegis BMD 
quantities and affecting DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

* The geographic combatant commands regularly assess their individual 
requirements for ballistic missile defense forces, but these analyses 
are limited in scope to each command's unique area of responsibility, 
as assigned by the President. For example, U.S. Central Command 
officials told us that their requirements for ballistic missile 
defenses are driven by the need to protect against short-to medium- 
range threats from within the command's own theater. U.S. Northern 
Command officials told us that their requirements for ballistic missile 
defense forces are driven primarily by the command's need to protect 
against long-range strikes from states outside of their area of 
responsibility. U.S. Northern Command conducted an independent three- 
phase study on where to field ground-based interceptors that included 
looking at the operational benefits of an interceptor site located in 
the eastern United States in order to augment the planned European 
Interceptor Site. However, this study did not address whether MDA's 
budgeted requirement of ground-based interceptors--which at the time of 
the study included 44 interceptors in the United States and 10 in 
Europe--was sufficient to meet the command's requirement. 

* The military services have also started to perform assessments on 
ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, but these assessments 
have been limited in scope and do not attempt to optimize the number of 
ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors worldwide. For 
example, in 2007, the Navy completed a study assessing its requirement 
for making Aegis ships capable of performing the ballistic missile 
defense mission. Based on the study's findings, the Navy concluded that 
the entire Aegis fleet should have this capability and that ballistic 
missile defense was a core Navy mission. However, the Navy neither 
attempted to assess the requirements for the number and type of 
interceptors to be used aboard these ships, nor scoped the assessment 
to try to vary the mix of other elements and interceptors in order to 
optimize the number of Aegis BMD ships. For example, the Navy did not 
vary the number of THAAD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, AN/TPY-2 
forward-based radar, or other elements in order to see if that affected 
the requirement for Aegis BMD ships. The Army also recently undertook a 
short-turnaround study to identify whether it is a better option to 
maintain the THAAD battery procurement plan outlined in the fiscal year 
2010 budget or to buy fewer batteries and instead develop and field a 
more capable THAAD interceptor. The Army study intends to explore 
different options for gaining the same capability that a new 
interceptor could provide, including placing THAAD interceptors forward 
of the battery and operating them remotely, as well as the use of sea- 
and land-based Aegis BMD interceptors. However, Army officials told us 
that while the study is looking at several combat scenarios, it is not 
intended to establish the global quantity requirements for THAAD or 
establish a global optimum mix of joint BMDS elements and interceptors. 

DOD Has Opportunities to Establish What Type and How Many Elements and 
Interceptors Are Needed for All Missions and to Refine Ballistic 
Missile Defense Policy: 

Having prepared various but limited assessments of ballistic missile 
defense quantity requirements to support an initial and evolving 
ballistic missile defense capability, DOD now has the opportunity to 
build upon these studies to better define its overall requirements for 
ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. The newly 
established BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, which DOD has started 
using to prepare an annual capabilities portfolio and program plan to 
meet requirements, has broadened the participation of stakeholders from 
across DOD in developing the annual budget proposal for ballistic 
missile defense capabilities development, operations, and support. 
[Footnote 24] The Life Cycle Management Process is designed to allow 
DOD to balance long-term and near-term needs by reviewing ballistic 
missile defense capability developments as a portfolio. However, to 
date the Missile Defense Executive Board, which oversees the process, 
has not commissioned a broad-based analysis of DOD's overall 
requirements, and instead has depended on more limited analyses of 
quantity requirements to inform its deliberations over the missile 
defense budget. For example, in preparing DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget 
proposal, and again in beginning to prepare for the fiscal year 2011 
proposal, the board relied on the Joint Staff's limited analysis of 
THAAD and Aegis BMD requirements. The Joint Staff is completing 
additional studies focused on the impact of countermeasures on 
ballistic missile defenses and plans on studying how ballistic missile 
defense and air defense can be integrated. However, according to Joint 
Staff officials, these studies do not assess ballistic missile defense 
requirements in their entirety. As part of the congressionally mandated 
review of ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, DOD expects to 
examine, among other things, the appropriate balance among elements to 
defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges; the role of allied 
contributions; and options for defending Europe from Iranian ballistic 
missile defense attack. The review is required to be completed by 
January 2010 and is expected to inform future budget requests. Given 
its broad charter and short time frame, the review is not expected to 
include an underpinning, comprehensive analysis of all requirements. 
However, the policy and strategy review could potentially lead to 
revised ballistic missile defense requirements. 

Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic 
Missile Defense Elements: 

DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of 
the eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into 
operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be 
fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To 
defend against potentially catastrophic threats posed by rogue states 
armed with ballistic missiles, however, DOD has in some cases put 
ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first 
ensuring that the military services had created units and trained 
servicemembers to operate them. DOD had in place operational units to 
operate the three elements that were based on existing service weapon 
systems, such as Aegis ships and Air Force early warning radars that 
were upgraded to take on ballistic missile defense capabilities. 
However, the five remaining elements that have been put into 
operational use represent new capabilities designed expressly for 
ballistic missile defense purposes and for which new operational units 
had to be created. As a result, early fielding meant that units were 
not fully in place and required, in some cases, that personnel be 
temporarily assigned or borrowed from other organizations when the 
elements are put into operational use to address these potential 
threats. For example, the Army has faced personnel shortfalls to 
operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, which necessitated 
augmentation with personnel from the Army National Guard to overcome 
operational readiness concerns. These personnel shortages primarily 
resulted from the need for Army units to participate in MDA research 
and development activities, which are important to improving the 
element's capabilities. MDA and the military services are taking steps 
to establish the forces needed for operations, but this may take years 
for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting 
elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that 
operational units be in place before new elements are made available 
for use. In the future, emerging threats or crises could again require 
DOD to press developmental capabilities into use. However, until DOD 
reconsiders its approach to making elements available for operational 
use before the units are fully organized, manned, and trained to 
perform all of the missions they will be expected to execute, the 
combatant commanders will lack certainty that the forces can operate 
the elements as expected. 

DOD's Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense Has Focused on Early 
Fielding of Capabilities: 

DOD's approach to ballistic missile defense development differs from 
its standard weapons development process in order to stress the early 
fielding of new capabilities. DOD practices for developing military 
capabilities typically require that major weapon systems complete 
developmental activities and then be fielded with a full complement of 
organized and trained personnel so that servicemembers are capable of 
operating the systems on behalf of the combatant commands.[Footnote 25] 
DOD customarily prepares planning documents that identify 
organizational, personnel, and training requirements that must be 
established before a new weapon system can be declared operational for 
the first time. These requirements typically include an assessment of 
the military specialties needed; identification of personnel 
requirements; and the development of individual, unit, and joint 
training programs. The individual services also typically require the 
establishment of an operational unit that is manned with trained 
servicemembers before new weapon systems are used operationally. 
According to Army officials, the Army declares new weapon systems to be 
initially operational only after units have been activated and soldiers 
have completed collective training requirements for operating the 
systems. Navy and Air Force practices also emphasize establishing the 
organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate a weapon 
system before it is declared operational. 

DOD adopted a unique acquisition approach for ballistic missile defense 
capabilities in order to meet the President's direction to begin 
fielding in 2004 an initial capability to defend against ballistic 
missiles that may carry weapons of mass destruction. In establishing 
MDA, the Secretary of Defense directed it to use prototype and test 
assets to provide early capability, if necessary, and improve the 
effectiveness of deployed capabilities by continuing research and 
development activities and inserting new technologies as they become 
available. Further, the Secretary gave MDA the flexibility to field 
ballistic missile defense systems in limited numbers when available, 
and to base production decisions on test performance. Although the 
Secretary directed that the services provide forces to support 
ballistic missile defense operations, he also canceled the services' 
requirements documentation prepared for then-developmental programs-- 
such as THAAD and Ground-based Midcourse Defense--because the service- 
generated requirements were not consistent with the BMDS developmental 
objectives. Additionally, the Secretary directed that BMDS development 
would not be subject to DOD's traditional joint requirements 
determination processes and would utilize certain flexible acquisition 
practices until a mature ballistic missile defense capability had been 
developed and was ready to be handed over to a military service for 
production and operation. Consequently, the services initially had 
little basis on which to determine force structure requirements for 
some ballistic missile defense elements, even as MDA began to develop 
elements and add them to the BMDS operational baseline. 

Units Are in Place to Operate Existing Systems That Were Modified for 
Ballistic Missile Defense: 

Our analysis determined that the units operating the existing service 
systems that were modified for ballistic missile defense have been 
organized, manned, and trained to execute their ballistic missile 
defense capabilities. Such systems make up three of the ballistic 
missile defense elements that DOD first put into operational use by 
activating them in 2006 in response to North Korea's ballistic missile 
threat: 

* Upgraded Early Warning Radars. Air Force early warning radars, such 
as those at Beale Air Force Base and Royal Air Force Base Fylingdales, 
United Kingdom, were first developed and operated in the Cold War. As 
these radars have been modified for ballistic missile defense missions, 
the Air Force assigned responsibility to the 21st Space Wing for 
operating the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, while the United 
Kingdom has agreed to provide forces to operate and maintain the 
Fylingdales radar. The Air Force has provided stand-alone training 
equipment to train and qualify site personnel at the two Upgraded Early 
Warning Radars that DOD has already declared operational, and has 
certified that operational crews are fully trained at these radar 
sites. The Air Force has made similar preparations to begin operating a 
third Upgraded Early Warning Radar, located at Thule, Greenland, later 
in 2009. 

* Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade. In accepting the transfer of the Cobra Dane 
Radar Upgrade from MDA, which was approved by the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in February 2009, the 
Air Force agreed to continue to manage the radar on behalf of its 
multiple missions and stakeholders, while MDA agreed to fund missile 
defense mission-specific operations and maintenance training and to 
assist the Air Force in identifying mission-specific operations costs. 
MDA also is providing maintenance support through fiscal year 2013, 
when maintenance support becomes an Air Force-funded responsibility. 

* Aegis BMD. Aegis BMD-capable ships are operated by the Navy, and the 
Navy supports those ships through existing service-based infrastructure 
and processes. Servicemembers have been initially qualified on the 
ballistic missile defense mission through existing Navy commands and 
according to Navy practices. The Navy updated its training and 
personnel requirements and relied on established procedures to certify 
the performance of Aegis crews to perform the full range of Aegis BMD 
missions. 

Units Operating Newly Developed Ballistic Missile Defense Elements Have 
Not Been Fully Organized, Manned, and Trained for All Tasks: 

Our analysis determined that DOD has not yet put into place operational 
units that are fully organized, manned, and trained to execute all of 
their ballistic missile defense responsibilities for the remaining five 
ballistic missile defense elements, which were designed expressly for 
ballistic missile defense and thus required DOD to create new units. In 
order to address existing and emerging threats, DOD used flexible 
acquisition practices to make these elements available for operational 
use before the services were fully ready to operate them. However, 
without fully established organizations, personnel, and training, these 
units faced challenges in dealing with the rapid fielding of elements, 
the ongoing research and development activities involving fielded 
elements, and the lack of an established force structure for operating 
the BMDS command and control system. 

Rapid Fielding of Elements Has Challenged Operational Units: 

Operational units have faced challenges resulting from the rapid 
fielding of elements before the units have had all of the necessary 
organizations, personnel, and training in place. For example, the Army 
had only a few months after being named lead service to organize and 
train a detachment for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which 
MDA fielded in Japan and added to the BMDS operational baseline in 
September 2006.[Footnote 26] In contrast, the Army generally requires 
years to organize an operational unit, establish personnel 
requirements, and train servicemembers for operating a new weapon 
system. The rapid fielding required the Army to deploy soldiers without 
a complete and approved force structure for sensor management 
operations when MDA added the radar to the baseline. For example, the 
Army did not yet have a program to train Army soldiers; to mitigate 
this shortfall, MDA provided the first group of Army sensor managers 
with an orientation of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar and of the 
radar management software then in use. A U.S. Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command official told us that the initial servicemembers' 
orientation lacked the requirements, curriculum, training devices, 
standards, and evaluations that are generally expected to be in place 
as part of an initial qualification training course when the Army 
fields a new weapon system. As a result of the Army's initiative, the 
initial sensor managers developed their own tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for managing the radar before the Army had in place a 
training course to qualify servicemembers in sensor management. Since 
that time, the Army has established a training course, which has 
graduated a sufficient number of servicemembers projected to meet 
combatant command needs. 

Despite the Army's successes in training servicemembers, DOD still 
faces interrelated organizational and personnel challenges for the 
sensor management of the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA 
fielded in Israel and made available for contingency operations in 
November 2008. At the time DOD fielded the radar, the Europe-based Army 
unit responsible for sensor management operations lacked both the 
organizational structure and sufficient personnel to perform these 
functions on a continual basis.[Footnote 27] Rather, the unit was 
organized and manned to perform air and missile defense operations on 
behalf of U.S. European Command, including command and control 
operations of Patriot air and missile defense forces, and air and 
missile defense operational and exercise planning. To minimize the 
potential risk to the unit's primary missions as it performed the newly 
assigned sensor management operations, the Air Force has deployed 
servicemembers, at U.S. European Command's request, and will deploy 
them throughout 2009 to augment the unit. However, these deployments 
have not fully addressed the stress to the unit. In March 2009, the 
Commander, U.S. European Command, testified that the unit's increasing 
requirements were "a moving target" and would demand considerable 
flexibility to identify and resource them in the near-to mid-term. U.S. 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command officials told us that the Army 
has established an operational unit in its force structure planning 
system to provide sensor management for the second AN/TPY-2 forward- 
based radar; however, the officials added that the Army has not 
activated the unit because DOD has not determined whether the radar 
will be permanently fielded in Israel. 

The Sea-based X-Band Radar was first declared available for 
contingencies in 2008, and has been made operational for brief periods, 
without the full Navy force structure in place. Unlike Aegis BMD, which 
is based on existing Navy ships and support systems, the Sea-based X- 
Band Radar is a new system. In March 2007 the Navy agreed in principle 
to become the lead service for the Sea-based X-Band Radar, which could 
transfer to the Navy as early as 2011. However, to transfer to the 
Navy, the Sea-based X-Band radar element must pass a Navy inspection; 
and the combatant commands must determine not only that the element can 
perform all of its assigned missions, but also that the operator crew 
understands its current capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the 
Navy has agreed to the transfer of the element as long as funds for 
operating it are also transferred to the Navy; however, as we testified 
in March 2009,[Footnote 28] the transfer agreement does not specify how 
these funds will be transferred to the Navy in the long term. Further, 
the Navy had yet to determine personnel requirements for the radar. To 
mitigate the potential risk of an incomplete force structure before the 
radar transfers, MDA has provided contractor personnel to support day- 
to-day operations, as needed. 

MDA also declared the THAAD element to be available for contingencies 
in September 2008, and the Secretary of Defense activated the element 
in the Pacific region twice during 2009, before the Army had the 
opportunity to fully establish the unit that will operate the first 
THAAD battery.[Footnote 29] The Army activated a unit of 99 soldiers in 
2008 to operate the first THAAD battery, but does not expect to 
complete the training and organizational activities needed to fully 
establish the unit and declare an initial operational capability until 
late in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 30] As a result, U.S. Pacific 
Command and other combatant commands are operating the element during 
contingencies with a unit composed of a mix of MDA personnel, 
contractors, and Army soldiers. According to MDA's August 2008 
assessment of the element's capabilities and limitations at the time it 
was declared available for contingencies, the nonstandard unit lacks 
experience in tactical operations, has not completed collective 
training, and requires significant external support. Despite these 
force structure limitations, a U.S. Pacific Command official told us 
that the command requires THAAD in the event of a crisis. Further, Army 
and MDA officials told us that Army's approach to prepare forces to 
operate THAAD has been closely coordinated with MDA's schedule to 
acquire the element. Army officials added that the Army modified its 
approach from standard Army practices to more rapidly achieve an 
initial operational capability. However, Army officials told us that 
until the Army fully establishes the force structure to operate THAAD, 
the combatant commands may overestimate the Army's preparedness to 
deploy an operational unit to defend U.S. forces and population centers 
during a drawn out contingency. As a result, the benefit of rapidly 
fielding THAAD could be offset by the risks associated with depending 
on a unit that does not have the full complement of organized and 
trained personnel. 

Operational Units Have Faced Challenges Caused by Ongoing Research and 
Development Activities: 

Operational units have also faced challenges resulting from ongoing 
research and development activities for which the units have not been 
organized, manned, and trained. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 
Command officials told us that involving operational units in BMDS 
research and development activities can be beneficial because it allows 
the lead service and operational personnel to directly affect an 
element's development. Like other BMDS elements, the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense element was put into operational use to address 
existing threats, but is also simultaneously being tested and refined 
by MDA. Consequently, the Army units responsible for operating the 
element are also responsible for sending operational crews to 
participate in MDA-sponsored tests of new capabilities,[Footnote 31] 
such as upgraded versions of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
element's fire control software. However, like most other Army units, 
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense units are not organized, manned, and 
trained for tasks such as the testing associated with research and 
development activities. As a result, the Commanding General, U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command, concluded in May 2009 that the 
units' mismatch between the available crews and mission responsibility 
was creating an adverse impact on their operational readiness and 
performance of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense mission. Lacking 
additional crews and funding, the Commanding General determined that 
the units' operational requirements would preclude them from fully 
contributing to MDA's developmental efforts, which in turn would have a 
negative impact on both the operational crews' readiness and the 
efforts to rapidly develop the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element. 
To address this mismatch, the Army has agreed to temporarily activate 
Army National Guard soldiers to augment the units' personnel. However, 
the Army has not solved the long-term mismatch between operational 
requirements and available personnel, and has requested that U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command evaluate and present alternatives for 
meeting the long-term requirements that the mission entails. 

Ongoing research and development, as well as upgrades to elements, also 
create uncertainty about the preparedness of some operational units to 
operate elements under realistic conditions. For example, as new 
versions of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element's fire control 
software are installed, Army soldiers operating the software typically 
complete their initial qualification training, and crews are certified, 
according to standard Army practices. However, in August 2008, 
following the Army's participation in an MDA test using high-fidelity 
modeling and simulation capabilities, U.S. Northern Command determined 
that the existing training equipment provided by MDA did not adequately 
simulate how other ballistic missile defense elements interact with the 
fire control system.[Footnote 32] As a result, the Deputy Commander, 
U.S. Northern Command, stated that the Army's operational crews would 
no longer be certified on the fire control software until the crews had 
access to training systems that better reflected the operational 
behavior of BMDS elements. Since that time, MDA has installed an 
upgraded training system for Army operators to use. U.S. Northern 
Command officials stated to us that the upgraded training system is an 
improvement over the prior capability, and the Army units were using 
the upgraded system to train servicemembers on the next version of the 
fire control software. Officials from the 100th Brigade, U.S. Strategic 
Command, and MDA told us that MDA delayed declaring the upgraded fire 
control capability to be operational until the units had an opportunity 
to train on the upgraded operational system. However, as of July 2009 
the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, had not determined whether the 
upgraded training capabilities were sufficient to certify the crews for 
operations. 

DOD Plans for Establishing the Force Structure for the BMDS Command and 
Control Element Are Unclear: 

MDA retains lead responsibility for the command and control element, or 
C2BMC, unlike the other ballistic missile defense elements, which are 
being made part of the military services' force structure. According to 
MDA, retaining responsibility of C2BMC helps the agency control the 
configuration of the element as it is upgraded to more capable 
versions. Therefore, none of the services have been required to create 
units, train personnel, or provide servicemembers to the combatant 
commands to operate the C2BMC element. However, unlike the services, 
MDA lacks the responsibility for providing forces to support military 
operations. As a result, the combatant commands have had to identify 
and organize C2BMC operators from within their existing resources by 
drawing upon servicemembers who are already deployed to the commands 
for other warfighting responsibilities. 

MDA has provided personnel and training to support the combatant 
commands' C2BMC operational requirements, but additional steps are 
needed to ensure that the combatant commands' needs are met. The C2BMC 
element is the integrating element that makes the BMDS a global system 
by providing combatant commanders with communications links, real-time 
battle information to make decisions, and a planning capability to 
optimize the fielding of ballistic missile defense forces on a global 
scale. It is also used to perform sensor management of the AN/TPY-2 
forward-based radar, and future C2BMC versions are expected to have the 
capability to control additional sensors. To help meet the combatant 
commands' operational needs, MDA has trained hundreds of servicemembers 
who were already assigned to the combatant commands;[Footnote 33] 
through the end of 2008, MDA trained more than 200 personnel at U.S. 
Pacific Command and the Navy Pacific Fleet, 250 personnel at U.S. 
Northern Command, and more than 175 personnel at U.S. Strategic 
Command. MDA also deploys its own personnel to 26 locations around the 
world to help the combatant commands and other users operate the 
element. However, according to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 
Command officials, the inability to identify and request additional 
personnel from the services to operate the C2BMC element creates a 
potential personnel shortfall in combatant commanders' operations 
centers, which may become acute during a crisis when there are not 
enough personnel to effectively perform all required activities. 
Officials from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the U.S. 
Pacific Command-based Army unit using the C2BMC element also told us 
that the detachment responsible for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based 
radar can become overtaxed by the responsibility to operate the C2BMC 
element for other functions and purposes. 

Though none has been designated the lead service for the C2BMC element, 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force have started preparing to support the 
organizational, training, and personnel requirements to operate 
ballistic missile defense command and control and battle management 
systems. Such requirements could grow as MDA continues to add functions 
to the C2BMC element. Although the services have not established 
personnel requirements for operating the C2BMC system, DOD officials 
told us that future versions of the software may require crews of up to 
five personnel per shift. Moreover, at present MDA trains only 
individual servicemembers, not crews, to operate the C2BMC system. 
Furthermore, as of July 2009, the services' effort to establish 
requirements for the C2BMC element is in its very early stages. Until 
the services determine their respective requirements for manning and 
training for the C2BMC element, operational risks and impacts will 
persist. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Evaluate Operational Capabilities and 
Limitations, but Potential Risks Remain When Elements Are First 
Declared Operational: 

DOD has taken steps to evaluate the operational capabilities and 
limitations of ballistic missile defenses when they are first made 
available for operations. DOD recognized the potential operational risk 
of using developmental ballistic missile defense elements for military 
operations following the fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar 
to Japan in 2006. In 2006, we also recommended that DOD develop 
operational criteria for evaluating ballistic missile defense elements 
before the Secretary of Defense declares the elements operational. 
[Footnote 34] We found that without such criteria, the Secretary of 
Defense lacked a baseline against which to objectively assess the 
combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct ballistic 
missile defense operations. Moreover, we found that lacking clear 
criteria, DOD may have difficulty determining whether the return on its 
significant development investment in the BMDS can be realized. Since 
our report was issued, U.S. Strategic Command's functional component 
for integrated missile defense has developed and begun evaluating 
ballistic missile defense elements against operational criteria to help 
the combatant commands and element operators understand the 
capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense elements as 
they are added to the BMDS operational baseline. However, these 
criteria were not designed to evaluate the extent to which the services 
had fully established the organizations, training, and personnel needed 
to operate ballistic missile defense elements. 

In May 2009, MDA updated its BMDS Master Plan to more fully consider 
the extent to which the services are developing the organizations, 
personnel, and training needed for operations when declaring that an 
element has achieved Early Capability Delivery,[Footnote 35] which is 
the first point where the element is made available for operational 
employment in defense of the United States or U.S. allies. MDA's plan 
incorporates reviews of the elements' performance under the commands' 
operational criteria before the MDA Director makes capability delivery 
declarations. The updated plan also states that MDA will support 
service and combatant command requirements for new equipment training, 
unit training, and certification, and that MDA will provide appropriate 
training facilities and support. These steps could help coordinate the 
services' force structure development with MDA's capability delivery 
schedule in the future. However, MDA's updated plan does not require 
that organizations, personnel, and training of the operational unit be 
in place before MDA makes an Early Capability Delivery declaration, or 
before the Secretary of Defense subsequently activates the element. 

The tension between the early fielding of ballistic missile defense 
capabilities and the desirability of preparing units to operate these 
capabilities was reflected in the views expressed by officials from 
across DOD during our review. Officials from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense told us that MDA's flexibility to shift resources 
when developing and fielding ballistic missile defenses has allowed DOD 
to employ ballistic missile defense capabilities more quickly than if 
the services had been responsible for their development. Such 
flexibilities continue to reflect the urgency and national priority of 
the ballistic missile defense mission. However, they stated that it was 
appropriate to consider a ballistic missile defense element to be part 
of the respective service's force structure when MDA declared that the 
element had achieved Early Capability Delivery. Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Army officials emphasized the 
need to establish a lead service early in development and to provide 
adequate lead time to establish an operational force structure before 
operating elements. For example, Army officials told us that the Army 
has established the operational units needed to perform ballistic 
missile defense missions, but agreed that the previous lack of 
coordination with MDA on the timing of fielding missile defense 
elements and declaring them operational has been problematic. Navy 
officials told us that the Navy does not recognize distinctions among 
MDA's capability delivery declarations; the Navy does not consider a 
ballistic missile defense element to be operational until the element 
has been fully incorporated into the Navy force structure. A U.S. 
Pacific Command official told us that some crises could require DOD to 
put developmental capabilities to operational use, adding that shifting 
emphasis to the establishment of the services' force structure could 
delay the availability of ballistic missile defense capabilities to the 
combatant commanders. However, the official agreed that it was 
reasonable for DOD to ensure that the services had fully established 
the units' organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate 
ballistic missile defenses before the elements were declared available 
for operations, provided that such assurances reflected a broader shift 
in DOD's policy goals from fielding systems quickly to the more 
deliberate development of capabilities that can be readily operated 
over sustained periods. 

Better linkage between force structure development and element fielding 
plans is important because the currently configured BMDS is the 
starting point for additional capabilities and elements that await 
future deployment. For example, MDA plans to field and declare 
operational additional AN/TPY-2 forward-based radars; although the Army 
now has in place the units to operate these radars in its force 
structure plans, the Army requires time to activate these units and 
prepare them for operations. Similarly, although both the Army and the 
Air Force have started planning to operate the proposed European 
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar elements, which would be 
fielded in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles launched from 
the Middle East, both services will require time to prepare the 
operational units in order to be ready when MDA completes the 
development and fielding of these systems. Additionally, DOD's fiscal 
year 2010 missile defense budget proposal shifts emphasis toward 
developing new ascent phase capabilities, which are expected to 
intercept ballistic missiles before they can release countermeasures to 
defeat U.S. defenses. As DOD makes this shift, MDA and the services 
will need to closely coordinate their efforts in order to avoid the 
challenges that affected the operations of elements that have been 
previously fielded. 

Conclusions: 

Ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors of various types 
are in demand from the geographic combatant commands, but DOD faces a 
high price tag to develop, acquire, operate, and support ballistic 
missile defense capabilities over the long term. Thus far, decisions 
regarding the shape and structure of the BMDS have been made based on 
policy first established in 2002 and on limited analyses of force 
structure options. DOD's analyses to date have helped the department 
understand some of its requirements and inform its policies, but these 
analyses are incomplete and have not covered the full range of 
ballistic missile defense missions. DOD's ongoing review of its 
ballistic missile defense policy and strategy provides a good 
opportunity for DOD to reassess its ballistic missile defense 
priorities and needs. However, the review is moving forward without the 
benefits that a comprehensive assessment of DOD's quantity requirements 
would provide. Lacking the solid foundation of a knowledge-based, 
comprehensive analytic basis for making decisions, which includes 
careful assessments of DOD's overall ballistic missile defense quantity 
requirements, DOD will continue to lack crucial data it needs to make 
the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for 
ballistic missile defense. 

Making BMDS elements available for operational use before units were 
fully established reflected DOD's sense of urgency to rapidly field 
defenses against potentially catastrophic threats. However, now that 
some ballistic missile defenses are in place, the risk of putting 
additional elements in use before operational units are fully 
established must be weighed against the marginal benefits, absent an 
imminent threat. Looking forward, reassessing this approach is 
important because DOD has several elements in development that may be 
fielded in coming years, including additional forward-based radars, the 
interceptors and radars that are planned for fielding in Europe, and 
new elements associated with ascent phase intercept. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy, 
budgetary, and acquisition decisions, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Defense take the following two actions: 

* Direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive 
analysis of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense 
elements and interceptors that are required for performing ballistic 
missile defense missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the 
integration of elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities 
and limitations of the BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied 
contributions; the employment of elements that can perform multiple 
types of ballistic missile defense missions and other missions; and any 
other relevant factors identified by the department. 

* Use this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DOD's ballistic 
missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future 
budget requests as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy 
and strategy direction. 

To reduce the potential risks associated with operating ballistic 
missile defense elements with insufficient force structure, we further 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense require, in the absence of an 
immediate threat or crisis, that operational units be established with 
the organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform all of 
their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first making 
elements available for operational use. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with one and concurred with two of our recommendations. DOD's comments 
are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments that 
we incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to prepare and 
periodically update a comprehensive analysis of the types and 
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that 
are required for performing ballistic missile defense missions 
worldwide. In its comments, DOD validated the need for a comprehensive 
and recurring analysis. DOD indicated that the ongoing ballistic 
missile defense review will develop the strategic themes and analytic 
bases to be used in future analyses. DOD also noted the 
interrelationships between ballistic missile defense and air defense, 
and that a comprehensive assessment must include these defenses. 
Moreover, DOD stated that decisions related to ballistic missile 
defenses must factor in the priorities of other government agencies, 
like the State Department. In our recommendation, we stated that DOD 
should consider any other relevant factors it identifies, and the 
inclusion of air defense and priorities of other government agencies 
can reasonably be seen as such relevant factors. DOD intends to perform 
a detailed assessment for ballistic missile defense requirements during 
each Quadrennial Defense Review cycle and once in the intervening 
years.[Footnote 36] Overall, we generally agree with DOD's suggested 
approach to implement our first recommendation; such steps, if taken, 
would meet its intent. 

In its response to our second recommendation that DOD use the 
comprehensive analysis as a foundation for future ballistic missile 
defense budget requests as well as setting policy and strategy 
direction, DOD concurred and indicated that this analysis would be used 
to shape ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition 
priorities in future budget requests, and to shape overall ballistic 
missile defense policy, strategy, and future deployment options. 
However, until DOD conducts this detailed assessment of its overall 
ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, it will continue to 
lack crucial data needed to make policy, strategy, and budgetary 
decisions. 

DOD concurred without comment with our third recommendation to require, 
in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational units 
be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed 
to perform all of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities 
before first making elements available for operational use. Our 
recommendation recognizes that facing an immediate threat or crisis, 
DOD may need to field elements without first fully establishing 
operational units. However, now that some ballistic missile defenses 
are in place, we continue to believe that DOD must carefully weigh the 
risk of putting additional elements in use before operational units are 
fully established against the marginal benefits of rapid fielding. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, this report 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

During this review, we evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) 
assessments, prepared since 2002, of the types and quantities of 
ballistic missile defense elements required for ballistic missile 
defense missions, and DOD's efforts to establish the units to operate 
elements that have been put into use through July 2009.[Footnote 37] To 
determine the extent to which DOD has identified the types and 
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements that it requires, we 
identified, obtained, and reviewed key guidance, studies, and analyses 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, other combatant 
commands, and the military services. These documents included 
memorandums from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD 
Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), dated October 9, 2004, 
which established MDA and directed the development of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS); Office of the Secretary of Defense 
budget guidance establishing the goals and objectives of the BMDS; and 
direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense establishing the Missile 
Defense Executive Board and BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. We 
obtained and reviewed classified briefings summarizing MDA studies, 
including the September 26, 2002, Missile Defense Agency Response to 
Defense Planning Guidance Tasking; the October 26, 2004, briefing 
titled Missile Defense Capability; and the March 23, 2007, European 
Site Technical Rationale. We confirmed with MDA officials that these 
studies constituted the key initial MDA analyses outlining the types 
and quantities of elements and interceptors constituting the BMDS. We 
also obtained and reviewed unclassified briefings summarizing MDA's 
2002-2004 plans to establish an initial and evolving defensive 
capability against ballistic missile threats. To understand the Joint 
Staff's roles and contributions to determining DOD's quantity 
requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors, 
we obtained and reviewed briefings summarizing the Joint Staff's 
studies of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) and Terminal 
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) quantity requirements, including the 
2006 Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Capability Mix Study and the 
subsequent Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix II and 
Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix Sensitivity Analysis 
studies. To understand how these studies were used to develop MDA's 
fiscal year 2010 budget request, we obtained and reviewed key 
memorandums from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. We also obtained and reviewed guidance approved by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense establishing the Joint Staff's and U.S. Strategic 
Command's roles to develop analytical studies that are to be used as 
the basis for developing annual BMDS budget proposals. From U.S. 
Strategic Command, we obtained and reviewed Strategic Command 
Instruction 538.3, Warfighter Involvement Process, dated June 2008, and 
the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List to help us to understand the 
command's role in identifying and advocating for BMDS quantity 
requirements. We also used the U.S. Strategic Command documentation to 
identify key geographic combatant commands with ballistic missile 
defense requirements. These commands are U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We 
then obtained and reviewed briefings and other documents to understand 
the extent to which these commands had identified quantity requirements 
for ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. We also 
identified and reviewed Army and Navy analyses to identify the 
quantities of key elements. We analyzed DOD's various studies by 
comparing them with criteria for establishing a knowledge-based 
approach to acquiring major weapon systems, which we established based 
on our prior work on knowledge-based acquisition[Footnote 38] and on 
DOD documentation. We also met with officials from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA headquarters and element program 
offices, key geographic combatant commands, U.S. Strategic Command, and 
each of the military services to discuss DOD's efforts to establish 
type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense force 
structure, their respective roles and responsibilities in preparing 
such analyses, and the challenges of doing so. 

To determine the extent to which the military services have established 
the units needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements, we 
performed our work at each of the military services, MDA, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, and key combatant commands. During our work 
at each of the services, we adopted an element-by-element approach to 
review the progress made by each service: 

* To review the extent to which the Air Force has established units for 
operating the Upgraded Early Warning Radars and the Cobra Dane Radar 
Upgrade, we obtained and reviewed Air Force plans for declaring the 
Beale and Fylingdales radars operational. We obtained Air Force 
memorandums declaring whether the radars had met Air Force operational 
criteria for being considered initially operational. We also met with 
officials from the Air Force Air Staff and Air Force Space Command, and 
submitted questions to Air Force Space Command, which provided us with 
written responses. We also reviewed an agreement between the Air Force 
and MDA describing each organization's roles and responsibilities upon 
the transfer of the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade from MDA to the Air Force. 

* To review the extent to which the Navy has established the force 
structure for Aegis BMD and Sea-based X-Band Radar elements, we 
obtained and reviewed Navy certifications of the Aegis BMD capability 
and the Pacific Fleet's December 2008 draft Sea-based X-Band Radar 
Concept of Operations. We also reviewed an agreement between MDA and 
the Navy describing each organization's roles and responsibilities for 
providing operational forces for the Sea-based X-Band Radar until the 
radar transfers to the Navy. We also met with Navy officials from the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and from the Office of the 
Commander, Pacific Fleet. 

* To review the extent to which the Army has established units with the 
required organizations, training, and personnel for the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar elements, we 
reviewed documentation establishing each of the Army units covered by 
our review. We obtained and reviewed Army doctrine for THAAD and Ground-
based Midcourse Defense operations and the Army's 2009-2013 and 2010-
2015 force structure plans. We obtained and reviewed key U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command documentation regarding a command 
initiative to review and update the force structure for Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense. We met with officials from the Army staff, U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command, 100th Missile Defense Brigade, 49th 
Missile Defense Battalion, Forward-based X-Band Radar Detachment, 94th 
Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and 357th Air Defense Artillery 
Detachment. 

In addition to our work at the services, we also met with officials 
from MDA to discuss the agency's perspectives and contributions to the 
ballistic missile defense force structure, particularly for the 
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element. We 
submitted questions to each element program office and received written 
responses. We also obtained and reviewed key documents from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, including the BMDS 2007 Transition and 
Transfer Plan, which was published in February 2008. We established 
criteria for assessing the services' efforts to establish units with 
the required organizations, personnel, and training by reviewing our 
prior work on planning for ballistic missile defense operations, 
[Footnote 39] and by obtaining and reviewing key DOD and service 
documents. These included Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 
3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; Army 
Regulation 71-11, Total Army Analysis; Army Regulation 71-32, Force 
Development and Documentation--Consolidated Policies; and Air Force 
Instruction 10-601, Capabilities-Based Requirements Development. We 
obtained and reviewed documents outlining MDA's process and criteria 
for declaring elements to be available for operational use; these 
included MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMDS) Master Plan, version 
9.1, which was signed in May 2009, and prior versions of this plan; 
integrated master schedules; and other MDA guidance. We determined when 
MDA had first delivered capabilities to the combatant commands for 
operational use by reviewing MDA's initial operational baseline, dated 
April 2005, and subsequent memorandums issued by the MDA Director to 
update this baseline or declare elements to be available for 
contingency operations. We met with officials from U.S. Strategic 
Command and from the four geographic combatant commands that have 
identified ballistic missile defense priorities: U.S. Central Command, 
U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. 
We also met with officials from U.S. Strategic Command's Joint 
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, who 
provided us with the component's most recently completed Force 
Preparation Campaign Plan that outlines the command's approach and 
operational criteria for assessing ballistic missile defense element 
performance. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

September 9, 2009: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-09-856, "Missile Defense: DoD Needs to More Fully Assess 
Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New 
Capabilities," dated August 14, 2009 (GAO Code 351260). 

The DoD concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations and 
partially concurs with one. The rationale for our position is included 
in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical and 
factual errors for your consideration. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point 
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, 703-697-5385, 
david.crim@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report - Dated August 14, 2009: 
GAO Code 351260/GAO-09-856: 

"Missile Defense: DoD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and 
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive 
analysis of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense 
elements and interceptors that are required for performing ballistic 
missile defense missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the 
integration of elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities 
and limitations of the BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied 
contributions; the employment of elements that can perform multiple 
types of ballistic missile defense missions and other missions; and any 
other relevant factors identified by the Department. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. While as the GAO notes, the DoD 
currently conducts a number of analyses to determine the appropriate 
set of ballistic missile defense capabilities, the recommendation for 
DoD to prepare and update a comprehensive analysis of types and 
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements (to include 
interceptors) required for performing worldwide ballistic missile 
defense missions is valid. In addition, given the interrelationships 
between ballistic missile defense and air defense both operationally 
and technically, analyzing ballistic missile defenses must include a 
comprehensive assessment of global capabilities. In addition, decisions 
related to ballistic missile defenses must factor in the priorities not 
only of the broader DoD enterprise, but of other government agencies 
(e.g. the Department of State). 

The ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review will develop the strategic 
themes and analytic bases to be used in this periodic review. This 
analysis can then be incorporated into the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), which includes all principal stakeholders and meets the 
criterion for periodic update. The DoD will conduct a more detailed 
assessment of needs and capabilities during each QDR cycle and once in 
the intervening four years between QDRs the DoD will update the 
assessment. Because of the large number of factors GAO recommends for 
inclusion in the review (degree of integration, threat risk 
assessments, Ballistic Missile Defense System capabilities and 
limitations, redundancy requirements, allied contributions, employment 
of multi-mission assets, and other relevant factors) and the biennial 
budget planning process, it would be impractical to conduct such a 
comprehensive review on a more frequent basis. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense use 
this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DoD's ballistic missile 
defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget 
requests as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy and 
strategy direction. 

DoD Response: Concur. If undertaken as part of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, this analysis would serve the GAO-recommended purposes of 
shaping ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition 
priorities in future budget requests, and shaping overall ballistic 
missile defense policy, strategy, and future deployment options. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
require, in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that 
operational units be established with the organizations, personnel, and 
training needed to perform of their ballistic missile defense 
responsibilities before first making elements available for operational 
use. 

DoD Response: Concur. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director; 
David Best; Colin Chambers; Tara Copp Connolly; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse; 
Susan Ditto; and Kevin L. O'Neill, Analyst-in-Charge, made significant 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Ballistic missile defense elements include Airborne Laser; Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense; AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar; Cobra Dane 
Radar Upgrade; Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications; 
European Interceptor Site; European Midcourse Radar; Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense; Patriot Advanced Capability-3; Sea-based X-Band 
Radar; Space Tracking and Surveillance System; Terminal High-Altitude 
Area Defense; and Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a 
component of some ballistic missile defense elements that is used to 
destroy an adversary's ballistic missile. For example, the Missile 
Defense Agency is building the Standard Missile-3 to be used as a 
ballistic missile defense interceptor as part of the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense element. 

[2] A missile attack involves four phases from launch to impact: (1) 
the boost phase is the period immediately after launch when the 
missile's booster stages are still thrusting and typically lasts 3 to 5 
minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) the ascent phase 
is when the booster stages have stopped thrusting and dropped away, 
leaving a warhead and possible decoys; (3) the midcourse phase, lasting 
for about 20 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles, begins 
after the missile has stopped accelerating and the warhead travels 
through space; and (4) the terminal phase begins when the warhead 
reenters the atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute or less. 

[3] For example, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based 
Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 2, 2008), and Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008). 

[4] Our scope did not include an evaluation of the Army's efforts to 
establish the units needed to operate the Patriot Advanced Capability- 
3 element, which is the most mature ballistic missile defense element. 
Although MDA and the Army continue to work together to integrate the 
system's capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 transferred to the Army in 2003 and has been fully 
integrated into the Army's existing force structure for the Patriot air 
and missile defense system. 

[5] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive-23 
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002). 

[6] Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System 
Operational Baseline, version 1.0 (April 2005). The BMDS operational 
baseline is a management tool that MDA uses to determine the 
composition of the operational BMDS at any given point in time. 

[7] Three other elements--Airborne Laser, European Midcourse Radar, and 
Space Surveillance and Tracking System--have been assigned to the Air 
Force as lead service, and the Army is taking responsibility for 
operating the European Interceptor Site. MDA has not made these 
elements available for operational use. 

[8] In contrast, under standard DOD practices the services are 
generally responsible for declaring weapon systems to be operational 
and for developing both the weapon systems and the force structure 
needed for operations. 

[9] In developing an integrated BMDS, DOD's intention was for MDA to 
develop BMDS elements and then "transition" the elements to the 
services that would operate and support them. The transition process 
may, for some elements, end at a point that DOD calls transfer--with 
MDA and the lead service sharing development, operations, and 
sustainment responsibilities as defined by agreement. 

[10] Since the release of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, MDA has 
changed the name of the ascent phase concept to "early intercept." 
However, we continue to refer to the concept as ascent phase throughout 
this report. 

[11] According to DOD Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), 
October 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics is responsible for recommending to the 
Secretary of Defense when Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
assets are available for emergency or contingency use. According to 
MDA's May 2009 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Master Plan, MDA 
supports such decisions by determining which assets are suitable for 
emergency activation. 

[12] We have previously reported that MDA's effort to conform to a 
schedule of Early, Partial, and Full Capability Deliveries has resulted 
in making such declarations based on a more limited understanding of 
system effectiveness than planned. See GAO, Defense Management: Key 
Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering Changes to Missile 
Defense Agency's Roles and Missions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 
2009), and Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile 
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than 
Planned, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009). 

[13] The Missile Defense Executive Board is chaired by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The 
board's members are the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, 
and Technology; Deputy Under Secretary of Air Force Space Programs; 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command; Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and 
Nonproliferation; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Vice Chief 
for Naval Operations; Director, Missile Defense Agency; and Vice 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

[14] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234 (2008). 

[15] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning 
and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009). 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. 

[17] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost 
Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 25, 2008). 

[18] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process 
for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 31, 2008). 

[19] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational 
Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 31, 2006). 

[20] The total number of planned deployed ground-based interceptors 
remained 48 until the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request when 
the total number increased to 54--40 in Alaska, 4 in California, and 10 
in Europe. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request did not 
alter the total number of ground-based interceptors but changed the 
number of emplaced interceptors in Alaska and California from 44 to 30. 
In explaining this change, MDA reported to Congress in July 2009 that 
the 2002 projection of threat missiles was reassessed to be off by 10 
to 20 missiles. Additionally, the report explains that the number of 
long-range missiles the interceptors would have to engage at any one 
time was limited because of the low number of launch complexes for 
these missiles. The report concludes that 30 emplaced interceptors is 
sufficient to defend the United States and that the number could be 
expanded if the threat grows. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. 

[22] Areas on the figure do not signal current or intended deployment 
locations of the assets. 

[23] MDA is developing the Standard Missile-3 Block II interceptor, 
which is expected to be able to intercept intermediate-range missiles 
during the midcourse phase of flight. These interceptors are expected 
to be deployable on Aegis ships by 2015. 

[24] For a discussion of GAO's perspective on DOD's progress and 
challenges to improving oversight of the BMDS through the Life Cycle 
Management Process, see [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. 

[25] DOD's traditional requirements process is described in Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (Mar. 1, 2009). DOD's acquisition 
process is described in DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition 
System (May 12, 2003), and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

[26] Sensor management operations include integration and management of 
the sensor with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element and are 
executed from a remote location. Sensor management of the radar fielded 
to Japan in 2006 is executed by an Army unit located in Hawaii, and 
sensor management of the radar fielded to Israel in 2008 is executed by 
an Army unit located in Germany. 

[27] Israel is located within the U.S. European Command area of 
responsibility and sensor management operations are performed remotely 
from Germany by the 357th Air Defense Artillery Detachment. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. 

[29] This unit is the A Battery (THAAD), 4th Air Defense Artillery 
Regiment, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 32nd Area Air and Missile 
Defense Command. The Army also plans to activate the A Battery, 2nd 
Regiment, in fiscal year 2010; the D Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal 
year 2012; and the B Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal year 2013. 

[30] DOD defines an Initial Operational Capability as the first 
attainment of the capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of 
equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics that is 
manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported 
military unit or force. 

[31] The Army established the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
Brigade, based in Colorado, and the 49th Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
Battalion, based in Alaska, to operate the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense element. 

[32] The operational crews of the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
Brigade are certified by U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command in 
support of U.S. Northern Command. 

[33] The MDA-provided training does not include training for sensor 
management of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which the Army has 
provided to servicemembers since 2008. 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. 

[35] Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
Master Plan, version 9.1 (April 2009). The plan was signed by the MDA 
Director on May 18, 2009. 

[36] Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 118, 
directed DOD to conduct comprehensive Quadrennial Defense Reviews every 
4 years to examine elements of the defense program and policies of the 
United States, including the national defense strategy, force 
structure, modernization, infrastructure, and budget plan. 

[37] Because Patriot Advanced Capability-3 is not among the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements that the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) has declared ready for operations, we did not evaluate the Army's 
efforts to establish the units needed to operate the element. Although 
MDA and the Army continue to work together to integrate the system's 
capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
transferred to the Army in 2003 and has been fully integrated into the 
Army's existing force structure for the Patriot air and missile defense 
system. 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]. 

[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: