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Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case Is Established' which was 
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

August 2009: 

NASA: 

Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a 
Sound Business Case Is Established: 

GAO-09-844: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-844, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Science and Technology, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

NASA’s Constellation program is developing the Ares I Crew Launch 
Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle as the agency’s first 
major efforts in a plan to return to the moon and eventually send 
humans to Mars. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on 
various aspects of this program, and made several recommendations. GAO 
was asked to assess NASA’s progress in implementing GAO’s 
recommendations for the Ares I and Orion projects, and identify risks 
the program faces. GAO analyzed NASA plans and schedules, risk 
mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to 
knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior GAO reports, 
and interviewed government officials and contractors. 

What GAO Found: 

NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case—including 
firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition 
strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time—
needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the 
implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include: 

* significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I 
vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the 
risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass 
of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be 
overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and; 

* a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls 
in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being 
completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has 
limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development 
and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental 
activities. 

In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-
flight and changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA 
acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency’s flexibility in 
resolving technical challenges. The program’s risk management system 
warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and 
milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the 
capability to service the International Space Station and has deferred 
the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes 
to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence 
level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions 
do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline. 
Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 
billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the 
Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already 
obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does 
not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not 
know until technical and design challenges have been addressed. 

Figure: Artist’s Rendition of Ares I and Orion: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The rendition includes a depicting of the following: 
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle; 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. 

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that as NASA addresses the findings and recommendations 
of an ongoing review of U.S. human space flight being conducted per 
direction from the President, the new NASA Administrator direct the 
Constellation program, or its successor, to develop a sound business 
case before proceeding into its next phase. NASA concurred with our 
recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-844] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 
512-4841 or ChaplainC@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

The Constellation Program Has Not Yet Developed the Sound Business Case 
Needed to Justify Entry into the Implementation Phase: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule: 

Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

August 26, 2009: 

The Honorable Bart Gordon: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) 
Constellation program is approaching a crossroads in development as it 
nears entry into the implementation phase. The Constellation program is 
developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle, the agency's first major efforts to support 
implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration.[Footnote 1] These 
efforts represent a substantial investment for NASA. Over $10 billion 
has already been obligated and NASA budget estimates indicate that over 
$97 billion is to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. 
[Footnote 2] NASA initiated the Constellation program in November 2005 
and expected the program to enter implementation in 2009. The program 
has delayed its entry into implementation, however, and is still 
modifying its overall architecture and specific requirements. Our 
previous work on best practices and NASA's own acquisition policies 
indicate that the program's architecture and requirements should be 
finalized and system designs expected to meet requirements in hand 
before a program enters the implementation phase.[Footnote 3] NASA 
recognized that the program faces challenges and in December 2008 
reported that the current program was high risk and unachievable within 
current budget and schedule constraints.[Footnote 4] Since then, NASA 
has taken steps to decrease risk, including delaying the first crewed 
flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and deferring work on lunar 
requirements. 

In May 2009, the Obama Administration announced an independent review 
of U.S. human space flight plans and activities with the stated goal of 
ensuring that the nation is pursuing the best course for the future of 
human space flight. This Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans 
Committee is composed of space industry experts, former astronauts, 
government officials, and academics. It is tasked with providing a 
range of options for U.S. human space flight activities and has been 
examining ongoing and planned NASA development activities and potential 
alternatives in order to present options for advancing a safe, 
innovative, affordable, and sustainable human space flight program 
following the space shuttle's retirement. Among alternatives that have 
received attention is the use of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
program, which already provides launch capability to the Department of 
Defense, the National Reconnaissance Office, and NASA, but has not been 
used to transport humans into space. The committee plans to complete 
this review by August 2009 and include any changes to current plans in 
an amended submission to its fiscal year 2010 budget request. NASA is 
continuing to execute the Constellation program as this review is 
conducted. 

We have issued a number of reports and testimonies that touch on 
various aspects of NASA's Constellation program and in particular the 
development efforts under way for the Orion and Ares I projects. These 
reports and testimonies have questioned the affordability and overall 
acquisition strategy for each project and have stressed repeatedly 
NASA's need to develop a sound business case --which includes firm 
requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition 
strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time -
-to support the Constellation program before making long-term 
commitments. In the past, we recommended that NASA modify the Orion 
Crew Vehicle acquisition strategy to ensure the agency did not commit 
itself to a long-term contractual obligation prior to establishing a 
sound business case.[Footnote 5] Although initially NASA disagreed with 
our recommendation, the agency subsequently revised its acquisition 
strategy to address some of the concerns we raised. We have also 
recommended that NASA ensure the business case for the Ares I project 
is established before proceeding beyond preliminary design review. 
[Footnote 6] NASA concurred with this recommendation and subsequently 
delayed the Ares I preliminary design review. In February 2009 NASA 
determined that the Orion project was not ready to begin the 
preliminary design review process and delayed initiation of the Orion 
review until August 2009 (see fig. 1). In response to your request that 
we review the Constellation program, this report assesses the extent to 
which NASA has implemented our prior recommendations, including 
establishing a sound business case for the Ares I and Orion projects, 
and identifies risks, if any, facing the program. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed Constellation 
plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract 
performance data relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices 
identified in prior reports. We also interviewed government and 
contractor officials at relevant NASA centers and NASA headquarters. 
For our full scope and methodology, see appendix I. We conducted this 
performance audit from December 2008 through August 2009, in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

NASA's Vision for Space Exploration calls for a return of humans to the 
Moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars. In September 2005, NASA 
outlined an initial architecture for implementing the Vision in its 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA is implementing 
this architecture under the Constellation program. Among the first 
major efforts of this program are the developments of new space flight 
systems--including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle. Ares I and Orion are currently targeted for 
operation no later than 2015 (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Constellation Program Schedule: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated schedule] 

Formulation (2008-May, 2010): 

Ares I: 
Current preliminary design review: July 2008[A]. 

Orion: 
Preliminary design review as of 2007: August 2008; 
Current preliminary design review: August 2009. 

Constellation: 
Preliminary design review as of 2007: June 2009; 
Current preliminary design review: March 2010; 
Current non-advocate review: May 2010. 

Implementation (May 2010-2015): 

Orion: 
First crewed flight as of 2007: September 2014; 
Current first crewed flight: March 2015. 

Source: GAO analysis of NASA data. 

Note: The non-advocate review is the analysis of a proposed program or 
project by a team composed of management, technical, and resources 
experts from outside the advocacy chain of the proposed program or 
project. It provides agency management with an independent assessment 
of the readiness of the program/project to proceed into implementation. 

[A] Ares I preliminary design review was completed in September 2008 
but significant technical issues were deferred until the Constellation 
program's preliminary design review. 

[End of figure] 

As illustrated by figure 1 above, the Constellation program, including 
the Ares I and Orion projects, is approaching the end of the 
formulation phase of NASA's acquisition life-cycle for spaceflight 
programs and projects. The purpose of the formulation phase is to 
establish a cost-effective program that is demonstrably capable of 
meeting the agency's objectives. The formulation phase concludes with 
the preliminary design review and a non-advocate review which marks the 
end of the formulation phase and the beginning of the implementation 
phase. During the implementation phase, the program will execute plans 
developed during the formulation phase. 

Under the ESAS architecture, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle would 
be an Apollo-like capsule capable of carrying six astronauts to the 
International Space Station (ISS) and four to the moon. It would 
include a launch abort system that would allow the crew to escape 
unharmed if a launch fails. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle would be a 
two-stage, vertically stacked vehicle with the first stage derived 
directly from the Space Shuttle solid rocket booster (see figure 2). 
Constellation would develop crew and cargo capabilities for missions to 
the lunar surface, no later than 2020. As currently planned, this 
system will include the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, Earth Departure 
Stage, Lunar Lander, and associated support capabilities. Further 
development will provide crew, cargo, and infrastructure to support 
human exploration of Mars and beyond. 

Figure 2: Artist Conception of Constellation Elements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

The following elements are depicted in the illustration: 

Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle: 
* Launch Abort System; 
* J-2X engine tucked inside; 
* Five segments. 

Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: 
* J-2X engine tucked inside; 
* Five segments. 

Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle. 

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of NASA photos and data. 

Note: The Earth Departure Stage and Lunar Lander are encapsulated in 
the Ares V. 

[End of figure] 

When it completed the ESAS study, NASA indicated it would maximize the 
use of heritage hardware and established technology in order to reduce 
cost and minimize risk. NASA also planned to retire the Space Shuttle 
in 2010 to make resources available for the Constellation program. NASA 
was confident this technical approach, in conjunction with a "go as you 
can afford to pay" funding approach, would support a first crewed 
flight no later than September 2014. Furthermore, NASA indicated that 
it would strive to bring that date as close as possible to 2010--the 
planned retirement date for the Shuttle--in order to minimize the gap 
between the Space Shuttle's retirement and deployment of new 
transportation vehicles. In fact, NASA was working to an internal date 
of 2013 for first crewed launch, with an initial flight to the Moon 
targeted for 2018 but no later than 2020. 

Human spaceflight development programs are complex and difficult by 
nature. Over the past decade, there have been a number of instances 
where NASA pursued costly efforts to build a second generation of 
reusable human spaceflight vehicles without attaining critical 
knowledge about requirements and resources. These programs experienced 
significant problems--including cost and schedule delays. They include 
the National Aero-Space Plane, the X-33 and X-34, and the Space Launch 
Initiative, which were eventually canceled. While these endeavors have 
helped to advance scientific and technical knowledge, none of these 
projects accomplished NASA's objective of fielding a new reusable space 
vehicle. By emphasizing heritage technology, the Constellation program 
was designed to avoid problems associated with the prior shuttle 
replacement efforts, which were largely rooted in the desire to 
introduce vehicles that significantly advanced technologies. Thus far, 
however, the Constellation program has encountered daunting challenges 
in terms of design, testing, manufacturing, and poorly phased funding 
that have led the program to slip its target for a first crewed flight 
to no later than March 2015. 

Our Work on Best Practices Support Business Case Establishment Prior to 
Product Development: 

Our work on best practices over the past decade has shown that success 
in large-scale development efforts like Constellation depends on 
establishing an executable business case before committing resources to 
a new product development effort. In its simplest form, a business case 
requires a balance between the concept selected to satisfy customer 
needs and the resources--technologies, design knowledge, funding, time, 
and management capacity--needed to transform the concept into a 
product. At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach 
that requires that managers demonstrate high levels of knowledge as the 
program proceeds from technology development to system development and, 
finally, production. Ideally, in such an approach, key technologies are 
demonstrated before development begins, the design is stabilized before 
prototypes are built or production begins, and testing is used to 
validate product maturity at each level. At each decision point, the 
balance among time, money, and capacity is confirmed. In essence, 
knowledge supplants risk over time. Having adequate knowledge about 
requirements and resources is particularly important for a program like 
Constellation because human spaceflight development projects are 
inherently complex, difficult, and costly. 

We have reported on several occasions that within NASA's acquisition 
framework, the preliminary design/non-advocate review--the hurdle 
marking transition from program formulation to program implementation--
is the point at which development projects should have a sound business 
case in hand.[Footnote 7] NASA's Systems Engineering Policy states that 
the preliminary design review demonstrates that the preliminary design 
meets all system requirements with acceptable risk and within the cost 
and schedule constraints. NASA realized that the Orion project was not 
ready to complete the preliminary design review process as planned and 
delayed its initiation from summer 2008 to summer 2009.[Footnote 8] 
Furthermore, although NASA officially closed the Ares I preliminary 
design review process in September 2008, it deferred resolution of the 
thrust oscillation issue until the Constellation program preliminary 
design review in March 2010. 

The business case is the essential first step in any acquisition 
program that sets the stage for the remaining stages of a program, 
namely the business or contracting strategy and actual execution or 
performance. If the business case is not sound, execution may be 
subpar. This does not mean that all potential problems can be 
eliminated and perfection achieved, but rather that sound business 
cases can help produce better outcomes and better return on investment. 
If any one element of the business case is weak, problems are more 
likely in implementation. Thus far in the Constellation program, the 
failure of NASA to establish a sound business case for both the Ares I 
and Orion projects early is manifesting itself in schedule delays and 
cost increases. 

The Constellation Program Has Not Yet Developed the Sound Business Case 
Needed to Justify Entry into the Implementation Phase: 

The Constellation program has not yet developed all of the elements of 
a sound business case needed to justify entry into implementation. 
Progress has been made; however, technical and design challenges are 
still significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to 
reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In 
addition, cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to 
hamper the program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition 
strategy for the Orion project as the agency attempts to increase 
confidence in its ability to meet a March 2015 first crewed launch. 
However, technical design and other challenges facing the program are 
not likely to be overcome in time to meet the 2015 date, even with 
changes to scope and requirements. 

Constellation Faces Significant Technical and Design Challenges: 

Technical and design challenges within the Constellation are proving 
difficult, costly, and time intensive to resolve. The Constellation 
program tracks technical challenges in its Integrated Risk Management 
Application (IRMA). NASA procedures recommend that programs identify 
and track risks as part of continuous risk management. As of June 9, 
2009, IRMA was tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion--207 high risks, 
206 medium risks, and 51 low risks.[Footnote 9] We have reported on 
some of these areas of technical challenge in the past, including 
thrust oscillation, thermal protection system, common bulkhead, and J- 
2X nozzle extension. In addition to these challenges, our recent work 
has highlighted other technical challenges, including Orion mass 
control, vibroacoustics, lift-off drift, launch abort system, and 
meeting safety requirements. While NASA has made progress in resolving 
each of these technical challenges, significant knowledge gaps remain 
in each of these areas. Descriptions of these technical challenges 
follow.[Footnote 10] 

Thrust Oscillation: 

Thrust oscillation, which causes shaking during launch and ascent, 
occurs in some form on every solid rocket engine. Last year, we 
reported that computer modeling indicated that there was a possibility 
that the thrust oscillation frequency and magnitude may be outside the 
limits of the Ares I design and could potentially cause excessive 
vibration in the Orion capsule. Agency officials stated that thrust 
oscillation is well understood and they are pursuing multiple 
solutions. These include incorporating a passive damping system inside 
the first stage solid rocket booster aft skirt that will act like a 
shock absorber during launch; adding a composite structure and springs 
between the first and second stages to isolate the upper stage and crew 
vehicle from the first stage; and could possibly use the upper stage 
propellant fuel tanks to offset thrust oscillation in the first stage. 
Officials said that NASA will be unable to verify the success of 
solutions until thrust oscillation occurs during an integrated flight. 
Officials noted that because thrust oscillation is not expected to 
occur in every flight, it is difficult to forecast when the solutions 
will be verified. 

Thermal Protection System: 

The Orion vehicle requires a large-scale ablative heat shield, at the 
base of the spacecraft, to survive reentry from earth orbit. These heat 
shields burn up, or ablate, in a controlled fashion, transporting heat 
away from the crew module during its descent through the atmosphere. 
NASA is using an ablative material derived from the substance used in 
the Apollo program. After some difficulties, NASA was successful in 
recreating the material. Because it uses a framework with many 
honeycomb-shaped cells, each of which must be individually filled 
without voids or imperfections, it may be difficult to repeatedly 
manufacture to consistent standards. According to program officials, 
during the Apollo program the cells were filled by hand. The contractor 
plans to automate the process for the Orion Thermal Protection System, 
but this capability is still being developed. 

Common Bulkhead: 

The common bulkhead separates the hydrogen and oxygen fuel within the 
Ares I upper stage fuel tank. The initial Ares I design employed a 
simpler two-tank configuration with lower manufacturing costs but did 
not meet mass requirements. According to project officials, the common 
bulkhead represents the critical path in both the development and 
manufacturing of the upper stage. Lessons learned from the Apollo 
program indicate that common bulkheads are complex and difficult to 
manufacture and recommend against their use. According to NASA 
officials, the difficulty of designing and manufacturing common 
bulkheads stems from the sheer size of components and the tight 
tolerances to which they must be manufactured. To accelerate the 
manufacturing process NASA is exploring using an oven with a vacuum bag 
instead of an autoclave[Footnote 11] to bond and cure the metallic and 
composite materials used in the manufacture of the common bulkhead. If 
this process proves unsuccessful, the program may encounter schedule 
delays. 

J-2X Nozzle Extension: 

We have reported in prior years that although the J-2X engine is based 
on the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the Saturn V and leverages 
knowledge from subsequent engine development efforts, the number of 
planned changes is such that, according to NASA review boards, the 
effort essentially represents a new engine development. A risk within 
this development is a requirement for a nozzle extension to meet 
performance requirements. NASA originally planned to pursue a composite 
nozzle. However, NASA eliminated the composite nozzle extension from 
the J-2X design because of cost and other considerations, and went with 
a unique aluminum alloy design, which, according to agency officials, 
should reduce costs, but has the potential to decrease engine 
performance and increase mass. Analysis indicates that the alloy nozzle 
is more likely to be affected by heat than a composite nozzle. In 
essence, while the alloy nozzle should withstand the heat environment, 
the composite nozzle allowed for improved performance margins. 
According to officials, to mitigate the potential problem, NASA is 
using a proven aluminum alloy with a honeycomb design, similar 
structurally to the Space Shuttle external tank, which will reduce 
weight. Contractor officials stated that they will continue to modify 
the nozzle design as test results are received and analyzed. 

Orion Mass Control: 

Controlling for mass has led to significant design changes to the Orion 
vehicle. Our previous work has shown that controlling for mass is a key 
factor in the development of space systems. As the mass of a particular 
system increases, the power or thrust required to launch that system 
will also increase. This could result in the need to develop additional 
power or thrust capability to lift the system, leading to additional 
costs, or to stripping down the vehicle to accommodate current power or 
thrust capability. For example, NASA went through the process in 2007 
to zero-base the design for the Orion to address mass concerns. In its 
efforts to reduce the mass of the Orion vehicle, NASA chose to move 
from land nominal landing to water nominal landing to reduce mass by 
eliminating air bags and, according to officials, by reducing the 
number of parachutes. NASA also incorporated jettisonable, load-bearing 
fairings[Footnote 12] into the Orion's service module design that, 
according to officials, saved 1,000 pounds. This change, however, 
increased development risk because the fairing design has no historical 
precedent and the fairing panels may not deploy properly and could 
recontact the Orion vehicle or the Ares I rocket after they are 
jettisoned. 

Vibroacoustics: 

Another issue related to vibration is vibroacoustics--the pressure of 
the acoustic waves--produced by the firing of the Ares I first stage 
and the rocket's acceleration through the atmosphere--which may cause 
unacceptable structural vibrations throughout Ares I and Orion. 
According to agency officials, NASA is still determining how these 
vibrations and acoustic environments may affect the vehicles. NASA is 
concerned that severe vibroacoustics could force NASA to qualify Ares I 
and Orion components to higher vibration tolerance thresholds than 
originally expected. For example, if current concerns are realized, key 
subsystems within the Upper Stage would be unable to meet requirements, 
would fail qualification testing, and would have to be redesigned. 

Lift-Off Drift: 

Analysis of the Ares I flight path as it lifts off from the launch pad 
indicates the rocket may drift during launch and could possibly hit the 
launch tower or damage the launch facilities with the rocket plume. 
Factors contributing to lift-off drift include wind speed and 
direction, misalignment of the rocket's thrust, and duration of lift- 
off. NASA plans to establish a clear, safe, and predicted lift-off 
drift curve by steering the vehicle away from the launch tower and not 
launching when southerly winds exceed 15 to 20 knots. 

Launch Abort System: 

NASA continues to address challenges designing the launch abort system, 
which pulls the Orion capsule away from the Ares I launch vehicle in 
the case of a catastrophic problem during launch. The Orion contractor 
had trouble finding a subcontractor who could design and build a 
working attitude control motor that steers the system during an abort. 
According to agency officials, previous attitude control motors have 
had 700 pounds of thrust, while the requirement for the attitude 
control motor is 7,000 pounds of thrust. Developing an attitude control 
motor with high levels of thrust and long burn durations that is 
steerable is proving to be a difficult technical challenge. A year 
after the initial contract was awarded, the first subcontractor did not 
have a viable design and had to be replaced. The current subcontractor, 
however, is making progress. For example, although the valves used by 
the complex steering system failed during high-thrust testing in April 
2008, redesigned valves have subsequently passed two high-thrust tests. 

Safety Requirements: 

Orion's safety requirements are no more than one loss of crew event in 
1,700 flights and one loss of mission event for every 250 flights for 
the ISS mission. According to Orion officials, these requirements are 
an order of magnitude higher than the Space Shuttle's safety 
requirements, were arbitrarily set by ESAS, and may be unattainable. 
According to the Constellation program manager, NASA has added 
robustness to current systems as well as redundant systems to increase 
safety margins. However, these added redundancies and system robustness 
have added mass to the system. 

The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the 
risks, technical or programmatic, which the Constellation program 
faces. As noted earlier, there are over 200 risks categorized as "high" 
for the Ares I/Orion programs, meaning that if not successfully 
mitigated, these risks (1) are either nearly certain, highly likely, or 
may occur, and (2) will have major effects on system cost, schedule, 
performance, or safety. These risks range in nature from highly complex 
technical risks, such as those noted above, to straightforward 
programmatic risks related to areas such as transitioning support work 
from the Marshall Space Flight Center to Michoud Assembly Facility for 
long-term vehicle production, compressing the software development 
cycle for the Orion vehicle, and creating a test program for Orion's 
communication and tracking system. 

Funding Issues and Cost Increases Continue to Hamper the Program: 

The Constellation program's poorly phased funding plan has affected the 
program's ability to deal with technical challenges. In our October 
2007 report, we noted that NASA initiated the Constellation program 
recognizing that the agency's total budget authority would be 
insufficient to fund all necessary activities in fiscal years 2009 and 
2010.[Footnote 13] NASA's funding strategy relied on the accumulation 
of a large rolling budget reserve in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to fund 
Constellation activities in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle 
program in 2010 would free funding for the Constellation program. In 
our October 2007 report, we noted that NASA's approach to funding was 
risky and that the approved budget profile at that time was 
insufficient to meet Constellation's estimated needs. The Constellation 
program's integrated risk management system also identified this 
strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in 
fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being 
completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project 
officials, these shortfalls limited NASA's ability to mitigate 
technical risks early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up 
of workforce and developmental activities. 

According to the Constellation program manager, these funding 
shortfalls are reducing his flexibility to resolve technical 
challenges. The Constellation program tracks unfunded risk mitigation--
engineering work identified as potentially needed but not currently 
funded--as cost threats in IRMA. The Constellation IRMA system 
currently tracks 192 cost threats for the Ares I and Orion projects 
totaling about $2.4 billion through fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 14] Of 
this $2.4 billion, NASA classifies 36 threats valued at $730 million as 
likely to be needed, 54 threats valued at $670 million as may or may 
not be needed, and 103 threats valued at $1.0 billion as not likely to 
be needed. Our analysis of the cost threats indicates these cost 
threats may be understated. For example, of the 157 threats classified 
as may or may not be needed or not likely to be needed, IRMA likelihood 
scores[Footnote 15] indicate that 68 cost threats worth $695 million 
are either highly likely or nearly certain to occur. Some examples of 
cost threats include $4.7 million to develop and mature Orion's data 
network technology and $12.5 million for an Upper Stage and First Stage 
separation test. 

The cost of the Constellation program's developmental contracts have 
increased as NASA added new effort to resolve technical and design 
challenges. Constellation program officials and contractor cost reports 
indicate that the new effort has increased the value of the 
Constellation program's developmental contracts from $7.2 billion in 
2007 to $10.2 billion in June 2009. Some of these modifications 
remained undefinitized for extended periods as NASA worked through 
design issues and matured program requirements in response to technical 
challenges.[Footnote 16] Undefinitized contract actions authorize 
contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract 
terms. By allowing undefinitized contract actions to continue for 
extended periods, NASA loses its ability to monitor contractor 
performance because the cost reports are not useful for evaluating the 
contractor's performance or for projecting the remaining cost of the 
work under contract. With a current, valid baseline, the reports would 
indicate when cost or schedule thresholds had been exceeded, and NASA 
could then require the contractor to explain the reasons for the 
variances and to identify and take appropriate corrective actions. Yet, 
NASA allowed high-value modifications to the Constellation contracts to 
remain undefinitized for extended periods, in one instance, more than 
13 months.[Footnote 17] 

Tradeoffs Made to Address Cost Increases and Funding Shortfalls Are 
Changing Constellation Program Test Strategy: 

In August 2008, when faced with cost increases and funding shortfalls, 
the Constellation program responded by reducing program reserves and 
deferring development effort and test activities. These changes 
resulted in a minimized flight test program that was so success 
oriented there was no room for test failures. During the course of our 
review, NASA test officials expressed multiple concerns about the test 
approach the program was then pursuing. NASA test officials also 
expressed concerns about the sufficiency of planned integrated system 
flight testing. NASA was planning only one integrated system flight 
test prior to the first crewed flight. Officials stated that while NASA 
would have been able to address each of the programs' specific test 
objectives during the planned flight tests, additional integrated 
system flight tests could have provided the agency increased confidence 
that the system performed as planned and allowed the agency the 
opportunity to design and implement solutions to performance problems 
without affecting the first crewed flight. According to agency 
officials, any problems encountered during integrated system flight 
testing could lead to significant delays in the first crewed flight. 

Test officials were also concerned that the highly concurrent test 
schedule had significant overlap between component qualification and 
fabrication of flight hardware. This concurrency could have resulted in 
schedule slips and increased costs if any component failed 
qualification tests. Our past work indicates that it is unlikely that 
the program will complete its test program without encountering 
developmental problems or test failures. The discovery of problems in 
complex products is a normal part of any development process, and 
testing is perhaps the most effective tool for discovering such 
problems. According to the Constellation program manager, the test plan 
strategy for the Constellation program is currently evolving as the 
program reshapes its acquisition strategy to defer all work on lunar 
content beyond the March 2015 first crewed flight. The test strategy is 
likely to continue to evolve until the Constellation program's Systems 
Integration Plan[Footnote 18] is finalized when the project enters the 
implementation phase. 

Changing Acquisition Strategy: 

In response to technical challenges and cost and funding issues, NASA 
is changing the Orion project acquisition strategy. In December 2008, 
NASA determined that the current Constellation program was high risk 
and unachievable within the current budget and schedule. To increase 
its level of confidence in the Constellation program baseline NASA 
delayed the first crewed flight from September 2014 to March 2015 and 
according to officials, adopted a two-phased approach to developing the 
Orion vehicle. NASA's original strategy for the Orion project was to 
develop one vehicle capable of supporting both ISS and lunar missions. 
According to the Constellation program manager, the Constellation 
program is currently deferring work on Orion lunar content beyond 2015 
to focus its efforts on developing a vehicle that can fly the ISS 
mission. This phased approach, however, could require two qualification 
programs for the Orion vehicle--one pre-2015 Orion qualification 
program for ISS mission requirements and a second post-2015 Orion 
qualification program for lunar mission requirements. 

According to the program manager, the knowledge gained from flying the 
initial Orion to the ISS will inform the design of the lunar vehicle. 
The Constellation program manager also told us that NASA is unwilling 
to further trade schedule in order to reduce risk. He asserted that 
delaying the schedule is an inefficient means of mitigating risk 
because of the high costs of maintaining fixed assets and contractor 
staff. 

Though these changes to overarching requirements are likely to increase 
the confidence level associated with the March 2015 first crewed 
flight, they do not guarantee that the program will conduct a 
successful first crewed flight in March 2015. For example, in May 2009 
the program announced its plan to reduce the number of crew for the ISS 
mission from six to four. According to project officials, NASA does not 
plan to finalize the preliminary design of the four-crew ISS 
configuration until after the Orion preliminary design review. Revising 
the ISS design for four crew and optimizing the area freed up by 
removing two crew for the ISS mission will entail additional effort on 
the part of the Orion design team. Furthermore, as noted above, both 
the Ares I and Orion projects continue to face technical and design 
challenges that will require significant time, money, and effort to 
resolve irrespective of the decision to defer lunar requirements. While 
deferring the lunar requirement is likely to relieve pressure on 
Orion's mass margins allowing increased flexibility to deal with some 
Orion-specific technical challenges, the lunar requirement has little 
bearing on many of the Ares I technical challenges discussed above. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how deferring the lunar requirement will 
affect the technical challenges faced in the development of the Orion 
launch abort system and in dealing with vibroacoustics. 

Conclusion: 

NASA's human spaceflight program is at a crossroads. Efforts to 
establish a sound business case for Constellation's Ares I and Orion 
projects are complicated by (1) an aggressive schedule, (2) significant 
technical and design challenges, (3) funding issues and cost increases, 
and (4) an evolving acquisition strategy that continues to change Orion 
project requirements. Human spaceflight development programs are 
complex and difficult by nature and NASA's previous attempts to build 
new transportation systems have failed in part because they were 
focused on advancing technologies and designs without resources-- 
primarily time and money--to adequately support those efforts. While 
the current program, Constellation, was originally structured to rely 
on heritage systems and thus avoid problems seen in previous programs, 
the failure to establish a sound business case has placed the program 
in a poor risk posture to proceed into implementation as planned in 
2010. In the past, NASA has recognized these shortfalls and has delayed 
design reviews for both the Ares I and Orion vehicles in an effort to 
gain the knowledge needed for a sound business case. NASA's current 
approach, however, is based on changing requirements to increase 
confidence in meeting the schedule. Nevertheless, the need to establish 
a sound business case, wherein resources match requirements and a 
knowledge-based acquisition strategy drives development efforts, is 
paramount to any successful program outcome. Until the Constellation 
program has a sound business case in hand, it remains doubtful that 
NASA will be able to reliably estimate cost and schedule to complete 
the program. 

Meanwhile, the new Administration is conducting an independent review 
of NASA's human spaceflight activities, with the potential for 
recommendations of broad changes to the agency's approach toward future 
efforts. While the fact that the review is taking place does not 
guarantee wholesale changes to the current approach, it does implicitly 
recognize the challenges facing the Constellation program. We believe 
this review is appropriate as it presents an opportunity to reassess 
both requirements and resources for Constellation as well as 
alternative ways for meeting requirements. 

Recommendations: 

Regardless of NASA's final plans for moving forward, the agency faces 
daunting challenges developing human rated spacecraft for use after the 
Space Shuttle is retired, and it is important that the agency lay out 
an acquisition strategy grounded in knowledge-based principles that is 
executable with acceptable levels of risk within the program's 
available budget. As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of 
the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend 
that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation program, or 
its successor, to develop a sound business case--supported by firm 
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic 
cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--before proceeding into 
implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review 
until a sound business case demonstrating the program's readiness to 
move forward into implementation is in hand. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix II), NASA 
concurred with our recommendation. NASA acknowledged that, while 
substantial work has been completed, the Constellation program faces 
knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies, funding, 
schedule, and other resources. NASA stated that it is working to close 
these gaps before committing to significant, long-term investments in 
the Constellation program. NASA stated that the Constellation program 
manager is required to demonstrate at the preliminary design review 
that the program and its projects meet all system requirements with 
acceptable risk and within cost and schedule constraints, and that the 
program has established a sound business case for proceeding into the 
implementation phase. At this point, the NASA Agency Program Management 
Council will review the Constellation program and determine the 
program's readiness to proceed into the implementation phase and begin 
detailed design. Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which 
have been addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, 
we will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. 
At that time, we will send copies to NASA's Administrator and 
interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or at 
ChaplainC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this report are listed 
in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess NASA's progress toward establishing a sound business case for 
the Ares I and Orion projects and identify key technical challenges 
NASA faces in developing the Ares I Crew Launch and the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicles, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans and 
schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data 
relative to the standards in our knowledge-based acquisition practices 
including program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk 
assessments, funding profile, budget documentation, earned value 
reports, and the results of NASA's assessments of the program. We 
interviewed and received briefings from officials associated with the 
Constellation program office, including Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate officials at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Orion 
project and Constellation program officials at the Johnson Space Center 
in Houston, Texas; and, Ares I and J-2X officials at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, regarding the program and 
projects' risk areas and test strategy, technical challenges, the 
status of requirements, acquisition strategy and the status of awarded 
contracts. 

We also conducted interviews and received briefings from NASA 
contractors on heritage hardware and design changes, and top risks and 
testing strategy, for the J-2X engine, Ares I First Stage, Ares I Upper 
Stage, Launch Abort System, and Orion vehicle. We analyzed risk 
documented through the Constellation program's Integrated Risk 
Management Application and followed up with project officials for 
clarification and updates to these risks. We also attended the 
Constellation Program's Quarterly Risk Review at the Johnson Space 
Center. 

In addition, we interviewed Constellation program officials from 
Johnson Space Center about program risks, requirements, and the impact 
of budget reductions. We also spoke with NASA headquarters officials 
from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate's Resources Management 
Office in Washington, D.C., to gain insight into the program's top 
risks and the basis for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 
budget requests as well as the funding strategy employed by the 
Constellation program. Furthermore, we reviewed NASA's program and 
project management directives and systems engineering directives. Our 
review and analysis of these documents focused on requirements and 
goals set for spaceflight systems. We compared examples of the centers' 
implementation of the directives and specific criteria included in 
these directives with our best practices work on system acquisition. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 through August 
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Office of the Administrator: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

August 10, 2009: 

Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates 
the opportunity to review and comment on your draft report entitled, 
"NASA: Constellation Program Lacks a Sound Business Case" (GAO-09-844). 

Recommendation: "As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of 
the Review of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend 
that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation Program, or 
its successor, to develop a sound business case--supported by firm 
requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic 
cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time-before proceeding into 
implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review 
until a sound business case demonstrating the project's readiness to 
move forward into implementation is in hand." 

Response: NASA concurs with this recommendation. NASA's acquisition 
approach is consistent with GAO's knowledge-based recommendation from 
previous audits and recognition that knowledge replaces risk over time. 
NASA fully recognizes the importance of investing its resources wisely 
and maintaining stakeholder confidence in its performance. NASA has the 
appropriate level of knowledge to proceed with its knowledge and 
performance-based acquisition plan and has executed all acquisitions 
using this knowledge base. NASA diligently continues to invest 
significant time and resources in the formulation phase of the 
Constellation Program in order to develop the confidence necessary to 
commit to a long-term design and development effort and enter into the 
implementation phase at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) milestone 
of the program life cycle. The PDR is the point when the formulation 
phase will have been completed and when a formal baseline is approved 
and authorization to enter the implementation phase is given. 

Many of the Constellation Program contracts are phased to contract 
first for the Design, Development Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) phase and 
later for the Production phase where the design is fully mature. This 
acquisition approach allows NASA to utilize the contractor's knowledge 
during the DDT&E contracting phase to develop a set of validated 
requirements, including component specifications and mature 
technologies by the project and program PDRs, thus enabling an informed 
firm cost, schedule, and risk assessment for the follow-on development 
activities. It is not until after the program PDR and the independent 
review of the program based on an integrated cost, schedule, and 
technical risk that the Agency will commit to any business case, at 
which point it will transition into the implementation phase. Until PDR 
is reached, refinement of requirements to achieve an optimal system 
solution will continue. These requirement enhancements and 
modifications are a natural result of the trade decisions in the 
formulation phase for any major spaceflight vehicle. Consequently, NASA 
had anticipated that it would need to modify the original Orion and 
Ares I contracts at several points to incorporate refined requirements 
and advanced technologies that would lead to an updated configuration. 
NASA had already budgeted for the anticipated cost of these contract 
changes within the Constellation Program. 

Human spaceflight is not an easy task nor is the process of building 
human spaceflight vehicles. Technical challenges will be experienced 
during development of a highly complex program such as the 
Constellation Program. That is why NASA has a rigorous risk-management 
process that identifies technical challenges early in the process and 
aggressively works solutions. All known technical risks have been 
identified and have active mitigation plans in place. NASA is executing 
a well-established plan to ensure that each project reaches the 
appropriate level of maturity for its milestones before proceeding 
further. The PDR is the final step of the initial design process 
(formulation phase), and thus it is a crucial milestone during which 
the overall program verifies that the preliminary design can meet all 
requirements within acceptable risk limits and within cost and schedule 
constraints. Following PDR, the Constellation Program Manager is 
required to demonstrate that the program and its projects meet all 
system requirements with acceptable risk and within cost and schedule 
constraints, and that it has established a sound business case to 
proceed into the implementation phase after PDR. The Agency Program 
Management Council will review the Constellation Program at this key 
juncture, Key Decision Point II (KDP-II), and determine readiness for 
the program to proceed into the implementation phase. As such, NASA 
will continue to ensure that each project within the Constellation 
Program reaches the appropriate level of maturity on each milestone 
before proceeding further along the design life cycle. 

NASA's aggressive internal goal for Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) of Orion and Ares I is often confused with NASA's commitment to 
achieve IOC no later than March 2015. NASA maintains the goal of 
meeting IOC by March 2015. NASA has consistently stated that the 
ability to meet internal schedule goals was contingent upon sufficient 
funding profiles and adequate time to achieve technical milestones. 
NASA had been working toward an aggressive internal goal to reach IOC 
by September 2013. The Agency had established this more aggressive goal 
in order to fly Orion/Ares I as soon as possible following the 
Shuttle's retirement in 2010. As such, NASA aligned Constellation 
contracts and internal milestones against this more aggressive date in 
order to incentivize an earlier IOC. In August 2008, NASA announced 
that, based on budget projections at that time, the Agency could no 
longer achieve its 2013 goal. The rephasing of internal goals is not 
unusual for a complex development program that is still in the 
formulation phase as work matures and schedules and resources are 
aligned. 

As part of the FY 2010 budget, and at the direction of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, NASA has initiated an independent review 
of human spaceflight activities to ensure that the Nation is pursuing 
the best solution for future human spaceflight - one that is safe, 
innovative, sustainable and affordable. The results of the committee 
review will support an Administration decision on how best to proceed 
with NASA's human spaceflight programs. NASA will fully support the 
review, and the Agency looks forward to working closely with the 
Administration during and after this process. 

In summary, NASA concurs with the GAO recommendation that the 
Constellation Program "...develop a sound business case - supported by 
firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a 
realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--before 
proceeding to implementation...." The Agency is working toward closing 
knowledge gaps about the Constellation Program requirements, 
technologies, funding, schedule, and other resources so that it can be 
positioned to succeed when decisions are made to commit to significant, 
long-term investments in the Constellation Program. Substantial work in 
defining the program and its projects' requirements, cost, and schedule 
estimates has been completed, and this work will continue as the 
program progresses through its formulation phase. The Constellation 
Program Manager is required to demonstrate that the program and its 
projects meet all system requirements with acceptable risk and within 
cost and schedule constraints and that it has established a sound 
business case to proceed into the implementation phase after PDR. The 
Agency Program Management Council will review the Constellation Program 
at this key juncture, Key Decision Point II (KDP-II), and determine 
readiness for the program to proceed into the implementation phase. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lori B. Garver: 
Deputy Administrator: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Cristina Chaplain (202)512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant 
Director; Jessica M. Berkholtz; Greg Campbell; Jennifer K. Echard; 
Nathaniel J. Taylor; John S. Warren Jr.; and Alyssa Weir made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 
2009. 

NASA: Agency Faces Challenges Defining Scope and Costs of Space Shuttle 
Transition and Retirement. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1096]. Washington, D.C.: September 
30, 2008. 

NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure 
Progress. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-186T]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 3, 2008. 

NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment Decisions 
for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51]. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 
2007. 

NASA: Issues Surrounding the Transition from the Space Shuttle to the 
Next Generation of Human Space Flight Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-595T]. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2007. 

NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration 
Program Requires More Knowledge. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R]. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 
2006. 

NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead 
to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218]. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 
2005. 

Defense Space Activities: Continuation of Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Program's Progress to Date Subject to Some Uncertainty. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-778R]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 24, 2004. 

Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon 
Acquisition. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-386SP]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 2004. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In 2004, President George W. Bush established a new space 
exploration policy--A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President's 
Vision for U.S. Space Exploration (Vision)--which calls for the 
retirement of the space shuttle and development of a new family of 
exploration systems to facilitate a return of humans to the moon and 
eventual human spaceflight to Mars. NASA estimates that implementing 
this policy will cost nearly $230 billion through 2025. This estimate 
includes programs such as the Commercial Crew and Cargo program that 
are separate from the Constellation program. 

[2] The estimate includes development of all Constellation projects 
including the Ares V and the Altair Lunar Lander. Up to $49 billion is 
estimated to be spent on the Ares I and Orion projects. 

[3] GAO, NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework 
Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 21, 2005) 

[4] NASA, Constellation Acceleration Study Report (Dec. 18, 2008). 

[5] GAO, NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space 
Exploration Program Requires More Knowledge. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R] (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 
2006). 

[6] GAO, NASA: Agency Has Taken Steps Toward Making Sound Investment 
Decisions for Ares I but Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 31, 2007). 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-218]; [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-817R]; and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51]. 

[8] NASA delayed the Orion preliminary design review in part to allow 
time for another design analysis cycle aimed primarily at improving 
performance against safety requirements for the International Space 
Station Mission. 

[9] NASA is currently using IRMA as a tool for implementing continuous 
risk management within the Constellation program. IRMA identifies and 
documents risks, categorizes risks--as high, medium, and low based on 
both the likelihood of an undesirable event as well as the consequences 
of that event to the project--and tracks performance against mitigation 
plans. 

[10] The technical challenges presented here do not capture all of the 
risks, technical or programmatic, facing the Constellation program. The 
technical challenges presented here represent our compiled summary of 
the challenges identified by, and discussed with, Ares I and Orion 
project management during the time frames of our review. 

[11] An autoclave uses a combination of heat and pressure to bond 
dissimilar materials. 

[12] The fairings are load-bearing in that they support the weight of 
the Orion capsule and service module. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-51]. 

[14] As of June 9, 2009. 

[15] Likelihood scores are assessments of the probability that a risk 
will actually occur. 

[16] We evaluated the contractor cost reporting data using best 
practice techniques found in the GAO Cost Assessment Guide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], Cost Estimating and Assessment 
Guide (March 2009). 

[17] The NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 1843.7005(a) 
states that NASA's goal is to definitize contract modifications within 
180 days from date of issuance. 

[18] The System Integration Plan will identify all testing and 
verification events needed to ensure the systems meet requirements. 

[End of section] 

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