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entitled 'Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past Disasters Offer 
Insights for Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events' which 
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Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2009: 

Disaster Recovery: 

Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for Effective 
Collaboration after Catastrophic Events: 

GAO-09-811: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-811, a report to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, coordination and 
collaboration challenges created obstacles during the government’s 
response and recovery efforts. Because of the many stakeholders 
involved in recovery, including all levels of government, it is 
critical to build collaborative relationships. Building on GAO’s 
September 2008 report which provided several key recovery practices 
from past catastrophic disasters, this report presents examples of how 
federal, state, and local governments have effectively collaborated in 
the past. 

GAO reviewed five catastrophic disasters—the Loma Prieta earthquake 
(California, 1989), Hurricane Andrew (Florida, 1992), the Northridge 
earthquake (California, 1994), the Kobe earthquake (Japan, 1995), and 
the Grand Forks/Red River flood (North Dakota and Minnesota, 1997)—to 
identify recovery lessons. GAO interviewed officials involved in the 
recovery from these disasters and experts on disaster recovery. GAO 
also reviewed relevant legislation, policies, and the disaster recovery 
literature. 

What GAO Found: 

Effective collaboration among stakeholders can play a key role in 
facilitating long-term recovery after a catastrophic event. Toward that 
end, GAO has identified four collaborative practices that may help 
communities rebuild from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future 
catastrophic events: 

* Develop and communicate common goals to guide recovery. Defining 
common recovery goals can enhance collaboration by helping stakeholders 
overcome differences in missions and cultures. After the Grand 
Forks/Red River flood, federally-funded consultants convened various 
stakeholders to develop recovery goals and priorities for the city of 
Grand Forks. The city used these goals as a basis to create a detailed 
recovery action plan that helped it to implement its recovery goals. 

* Leverage resources to facilitate recovery. Collaborating groups bring 
different resources and capacities to the task at hand. After the 
Northridge earthquake, officials from the Federal Highway 
Administration and California’s state transportation agency worked 
together to review highway rebuilding contracts, discuss changes, and 
then approve projects all in one location. This co-located, 
collaborative approach enabled the awarding of rebuilding contracts in 
3 to 5 days—instead of the 26 to 40 weeks it could take using normal 
contracting procedures. This helped to restore damaged highways within 
a few months of the earthquake. 

* Use recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities. 
Organizations can collectively agree on who will do what by identifying 
roles and responsibilities in recovery plans developed either before or 
after a disaster takes place. Learning from its experiences from the 
Loma Prieta earthquake, San Francisco Bay Area officials created a plan 
that clearly identifies roles for all participants in order to 
facilitate regional recovery in the event of a future disaster. 

* Monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made toward recovery. After 
the 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe and the surrounding region 
established processes to assess and report on recovery progress. These 
jurisdictions required periodic external reviews over 10 years on the 
progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result of one of 
these reviews, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended 
consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which 
subsequently led to a change in policy. 

Past recovery experiences—including practices that promote effective 
collaboration—offer potentially valuable lessons for future 
catastrophic events. FEMA has taken some steps to facilitate the 
sharing of such experiences among communities involved in disaster 
recovery. However, the agency can do more to build on and systematize 
the sharing of this information so that recovery lessons are better 
captured and disseminated for use in the future. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to create a mechanism focused on 
sharing information and lessons learned regarding disaster recovery, 
including good collaborative practices. The Department of Homeland 
Security concurred with our recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-811] or key 
components. For more information, contact Stanley J. Czerwinski at 
(202) 512-6808 or CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Effective Collaboration Has Facilitated Recovery in Past Disasters: 

FEMA Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Collaboration among Stakeholders, 
but Could Do More to Share Recovery Experiences: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Five Disasters Included in this Review (1989-1997): 

Figure 2: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake: 

Figure 3: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake: 

Figure 4: The Cypress Expressway Suffered Extensive Damage from the 
1989 Earthquake (top); Oakland Moved the Expressway to Reconnect a 
Neighborhood that Had Been Previously Divided (bottom): 

Figure 5: Selected Facts about the Impact of Hurricane Andrew: 

Figure 6: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from Hurricane 
Andrew: 

Figure 7: Florida City's Water Distribution System Was Heavily Damaged: 

Figure 8: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Northridge Earthquake: 

Figure 9: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the 
Northridge Earthquake: 

Figure 10: The Gavin Canyon Underpass, Part of Southern California's 
Interstate 5, Suffered Severe Damage but Was Restored Within a Few 
Months: 

Figure 11: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Kobe Earthquake: 

Figure 12: Examples of National Government Assistance for Recovery from 
the Kobe Earthquake: 

Figure 13: Although the City of Kobe Restored the Port of Kobe by March 
1997, the Port Never Fully Recovered: 

Figure 14: Japan Restored Damaged Railways and Highways Approximately 
20 Months after the Earthquake: 

Figure 15: Selected Facts about the Impact of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red 
River Flood: 

Figure 16: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Grand 
Forks/Red River Flood: 

Figure 17: After the Flood, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand 
Forks, Minnesota, Took Steps to Address Their Cities' Lack of an 
Adequate Flood-Control Infrastructure to Help Reduce Damage from Future 
Flooding: 

Abbreviations: 

CalTrans: California Department of Transportation: 

CDBG: Community Development Block Grant: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

EDA: Economic Development Administration: 

ESF #14: Emergency Support Function #14: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FHWA: Federal Highway Administration: 

HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development: 

LLIS: Lessons Learned Information Sharing Web Site: 

SBA: Small Business Administration: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 31, 2009: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

Successful recovery from catastrophic disasters requires a partnership 
involving federal, state, and local governments, as well as the 
nonprofit and private sectors. An extensive group of participants--both 
governmental and nongovernmental--were involved in recovery efforts 
after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.[Footnote 1] Stakeholders included 
virtually all cabinet-level federal agencies, several Gulf Coast 
states, almost 600 local jurisdictions in Louisiana and Mississippi 
including municipalities, parishes, school and utility districts, and 
housing authorities as well as community groups and other 
nongovernmental organizations. In the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast 
hurricanes, numerous reports have identified coordination and 
collaboration as a key challenge during the government's response. 
[Footnote 2] Our more recent work on Gulf Coast recovery efforts also 
identified collaboration and coordination as an obstacle to the 
recovery process as well.[Footnote 3] 

Experiences from past disasters can provide valuable insights to help 
communities overcome recovery challenges. At your request, last 
September we identified several key practices from past catastrophic 
disasters to help other communities when recovering from such 
events.[Footnote 4] In that report, we described actions taken by state 
and local governments during past disasters that facilitated recovery. 
Specifically, localities (1) created a clear, implementable, and timely 
recovery plan; (2) built state and local capacity for recovery; (3) 
implemented strategies for business recovery; and (4) adopted a 
comprehensive approach to combat fraud, waste, and abuse. Taken 
together, these actions provide state and local officials with a set of 
tools and approaches to consider when recovering from a catastrophic 
event. 

In this report, we focus on a key element involved in developing and 
carrying out many of these practices--collaboration. Because of the 
numerous partners and stakeholders involved after a disaster, effective 
collaboration is critical in order to accomplish many recovery-related 
tasks. As agreed with your offices, this report (1) presents examples 
of how federal, state, and local governments have collaborated in the 
past, identifying selected practices that may be helpful for 
communities recovering from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future 
catastrophic events and (2) describes ways in which the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports collaboration among 
recovery stakeholders and the extent to which it facilitates the 
sharing of lessons and experiences from past recovery efforts. 

To conduct our review, we selected five catastrophic disasters: the 
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California; Hurricane Andrew, 
which struck southern Florida in 1992; the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
in Los Angeles, California; the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan; and the 
1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East 
Grand Forks, Minnesota. We visited four of these communities to meet 
with federal, state, and local officials and make observations of the 
conditions today. Although we did not visit communities affected by the 
Grand Forks/Red River flood, we were able to gather the necessary 
information through telephone interviews with key officials involved in 
the recovery as well as experts knowledgeable about the disaster. 
Further, we also obtained and reviewed relevant legislation, 
ordinances, policies, and program documents that describe steps taken 
to facilitate long-term recovery following each of our selected 
disasters. 

We interviewed officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
FEMA, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Department 
of Commerce, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
nongovernmental organizations, as well as academic experts who were 
knowledgeable about the recovery following each of our selected 
disasters and issues relating to coordination. To understand how FEMA 
supports collaboration among recovery stakeholders and the extent to 
which it facilitates the sharing of experiences from past recovery 
efforts, we interviewed FEMA staff and gained access to some of its 
online systems. For more information on our scope and methodology see 
appendix I. For detailed descriptions of the impact of the five 
disasters we reviewed as well as selected recovery strategies taken in 
the wake of each of these events, see appendix II to VI. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through July 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

State and local governments generally have the primary responsibility 
for disaster recovery while the federal government provides support 
when requested. Because there are many parties involved in this 
process--including all levels of government as well as victims and 
businesses within the affected communities--effective collaboration is 
a key factor for successful recovery. In addition, collaboration among 
recovery stakeholders can continue for an extended period of time. 
Short-term recovery is immediate and an extension of the response phase 
in which basic services are restored.[Footnote 5] Long-term recovery 
can include some of these short-term activities, but typically 
continues them for a number of months or years, depending on the 
severity and extent of the damage sustained.[Footnote 6] It also 
involves restoration of both individuals and the community, including 
the redevelopment of damaged areas. 

To provide recovery assistance after a disaster, many federal agencies 
and program components are called upon to administer disaster 
supplemental programs and funding, re-program funds, or expedite normal 
procedures. For example, grants, loans, loan guarantees, temporary 
housing, and counseling are among the forms of disaster assistance 
available from federal agencies including FEMA; the departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, HUD, Treasury, and Transportation; and the Small 
Business Administration (SBA). 

Some of these federal programs provide financial resources to state and 
local governments following disasters, while others provide technical 
assistance. For example, FEMA's Public Assistance grant program 
provides funding to repair or replace public infrastructure; HUD's 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides formula 
grants for long-term recovery needs such as rehabilitating and building 
housing, EDA's economic adjustment grant responds to the short-and long-
term effects of severe economic dislocation events on communities; and 
DHS's Flood Insurance Program enables individuals to purchase insurance 
against losses from physical damage from floods. Other agencies 
directly carry out rebuilding or recovery projects such as the 
reconstruction of levees by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the 
repair of federal roads by the Federal Highway Administration. Federal 
recovery assistance is also provided directly to disaster victims. For 
example, FEMA's Individual Households Program provides housing, 
financial assistance, and other direct services while the Internal 
Revenue Service provides information about how to claim casualty loss 
deductions.[Footnote 7] 

The federal government also provides technical assistance for 
communities to engage in long-term community recovery activities, 
through the Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF #14), as part of the 
National Response Framework.[Footnote 8] ESF #14 coordinates federal 
and state long-term community recovery support and helps communities 
plan for and identify the necessary resources for recovery. Developed 
shortly before the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, ESF #14 was not in place 
at the time of the five past disasters we studied. ESF #14 and FEMA's 
Long-Term Community Recovery Branch in its Disaster Assistance 
Directorate, which supports this annex, provide assistance in 
coordinating federal, state, and local recovery efforts and developing 
community recovery plans. The Long-Term Community Recovery Branch also 
works with other federal agencies to help identify program gaps and the 
potential need for flexibilities and new authorities during the 
recovery process. 

Our previous work defines collaboration broadly as any joint activity 
that is intended to provide more public value than could be produced 
when the organizations act alone. Because of the large number and wide 
variety of stakeholders involved in the recovery from a catastrophic 
event, collaboration is a critical element of this process. We have 
previously reported that agencies can enhance and sustain their 
collaborative efforts by engaging in eight practices: defining and 
articulating a common outcome; establishing mutually reinforcing or 
joint strategies; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging 
resources; agreeing on roles and responsibilities; establishing 
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 
agency boundaries; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and 
report on results; reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative 
efforts through agency plans and reports; and reinforcing individual 
accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management 
systems.[Footnote 9] 

Effective Collaboration Has Facilitated Recovery in Past Disasters: 

Effective collaboration among recovery stakeholders can play a key role 
in facilitating disaster recovery. Because the recovery process 
requires partnerships among representatives from all levels of 
government as well as nongovernmental groups, effective collaboration 
is critical. We have previously identified a number of practices that 
can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts, which would help to 
facilitate disaster recovery.[Footnote 10] We found four of these 
collaborative practices in the past disasters we reviewed. 
Specifically, governments (1) developed and communicated common 
recovery goals; (2) leveraged resources to facilitate recovery; (3) 
used recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities; and (4) 
evaluated and reported on progress made toward recovery. 

Develop and Communicate Common Recovery Goals: 

To overcome significant differences in missions, cultures, and 
established ways of doing business, collaborating groups must have a 
clear and compelling rationale for working together. We have previously 
reported that the compelling rationale for collaboration can be imposed 
externally such as through legislation or can come from the 
understanding that there are benefits to working together. In either 
case, collaborative efforts require staff working across organizational 
lines to define and articulate a common outcome or purpose they are 
seeking to achieve that is consistent with respective organizational 
goals and mission.[Footnote 11] In our September 2008 report on 
disaster recovery, we discussed the importance of recovery plans and 
how clearly identified goals in such plans can provide direction and 
specific objectives for communities to focus on.[Footnote 12] Building 
on this, we identify two approaches of how stakeholders involved in the 
recovery process following the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the Grand 
Forks/Red River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, worked collectively 
to define and articulate common outcomes. 

A month after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the national Japanese 
government formed a "reconstruction committee" to organize recovery 
efforts. The Japanese government created this body through national 
legislation that required the participation of numerous national, 
prefectural,[Footnote 13] and local agencies as well as nongovernmental 
organizations, such as the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The 
Prime Minister personally managed the committee, and the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary and Minister of the National Land Agency served as deputy 
managers. The reconstruction committee also included representation 
from other high-ranking government officials--including cabinet 
ministers, the governor of Hyogo prefecture, and the mayor of the city 
of Kobe--as well as participants from academia. According to an 
official who participated in this committee, the involvement of these 
prominent leaders not only encouraged stakeholders involved in the 
reconstruction committee to collaborate in order to come to agreement 
on recovery goals, it brought national attention to recovery issues. 

Working together through this committee, these officials and 
stakeholders collaborated to create a national plan of action for 
recovery. This plan included broad proposals that provided insight for 
how the national government would assist in recovery, such as 
recommending that a long-term recovery plan be developed quickly as 
well as making housing reconstruction, debris removal, port 
reconstruction, and job creation a national priority. It also included 
more specific details to guide Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe's 
recovery, such as promptly demolishing unsound structures and using 
excess concrete from the earthquake rubble for construction and repairs 
in the port area. 

In addition to providing an action plan, this committee also reviewed 
Hyogo prefecture's and the city of Kobe's recovery plans to help 
localities align their recovery proposals with the funding priorities 
of the national government. According to an evaluation of the recovery 
conducted by the city as well as outside recovery experts, the specific 
feedback provided by the reconstruction committee, along with the 
recovery goals previously clarified by the national government helped 
local officials to come to consensus on their recovery goals. Within 6 
months of the earthquake, Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe 
completed recovery plans, which included specific recovery goals for 
their regions, such as rebuilding damaged housing units in 3 years and 
completing physical recovery in 10 years. According to this evaluation, 
the delineation of these goals at a local level played a critical role 
in helping to coordinate the wide range of participants involved in 
implementing recovery projects. 

After the Grand Forks/Red River flood in 1997, federal, state, and 
local officials worked together to define common goals when planning 
for the recovery of Grand Forks, North Dakota. Technical consultants, 
funded by a HUD grant, brought together federal and city officials as 
well as members of the community to discuss Grand Forks's rebuilding 
priorities. According to a local official, because the city had no 
experience with the process of developing common goals for the city 
prior to the flood, this external facilitation helped the Grand Forks 
community and city officials come to agreement on a set of common 
recovery goals. The recovery goals resulting from these meetings were 
included in a comprehensive recovery plan for Grand Forks. A subsequent 
city evaluation found that the process of specifying goals within the 
recovery plan--which identified five broad goals and a number of 
supporting objectives and tasks to achieve those goals--helped the city 
to conceive and formulate projects in coordination with the city 
council and representatives from state and local governments. 

Leverage Resources to Facilitate Recovery: 

We have previously reported that to effectively collaborate requires 
the identification of the human and financial resources needed to 
initiate or sustain collaborative effort.[Footnote 14] In doing so, 
collaborating groups can bring different levels of resources and 
capacities to the task at hand. In our September 2008 report, we 
discussed the importance of helping state and local governments take 
advantage of all available disaster assistance by enhancing their 
financial and technical capacity when needed.[Footnote 15] Following 
the Kobe and Northridge earthquakes, we found examples of how 
governments leveraged the knowledge and expertise of diverse 
stakeholders to produce effective collaboration and, in turn, 
facilitate the recovery process. 

In the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese government 
created a formal organization through which human capital resources 
from all levels of the government were leveraged to plan for and 
implement recovery strategies. A committee comprised of high ranking 
officials--including members of the Japanese House of Representatives 
and leaders of affected jurisdictions and their staff--developed 
intergovernmental recovery strategies. In addition to those high- 
ranking officials, the committee also included working-level staff from 
national ministries to provide expertise for developing specific 
details to be included in the recovery plan. For example, staff from 
the Ministry of Transportation brought expertise on infrastructure 
replacement while those from the Kobe Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
contributed knowledge regarding economic recovery matters. According to 
a Japanese official involved in the recovery, this committee combined 
the political know-how from the top-level officials and 
interdisciplinary expertise from line-level bureaucrats to propose many 
recovery proposals which laid a foundation for the national 
government's approach to recovery. The Japanese government also 
leveraged human capital expertise through this committee to facilitate 
the implementation of recovery strategies. Upon the approval of certain 
recovery policies, working staff associated with the committee returned 
to their respective organizations to guide their home departments on 
how best to implement the strategies. A Japanese official involved in 
the committee said that this collaboration helped to ensure that 
disparate ministries understood and properly implemented the recovery 
strategies they helped to develop. 

After the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles, 
California, also leveraged human capital resources to accelerate the 
rebuilding of its freeway system. Using the technical expertise of 
staff from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the California 
Department of Transportation (CalTrans), the city of Los Angeles 
developed an expedited contracting process. To review construction 
proposals more efficiently, FHWA and CalTrans staff collaborated to 
review documents, discuss needed changes, and then approve projects 
together in one location. According to CalTrans officials, state and 
federal offices normally conduct separate reviews. This joint process 
helped to expedite the approval of projects while still meeting 
oversight requirements for both levels of government. Under standard 
contracting procedures, the contracting process could take 26 to 40 
weeks to complete. However, this collaborative, co-located process 
enabled state highway officials to advertise and award construction 
contracts in just 3 to 5 days. By leveraging the knowledge and 
resources of state and federal staff in this way, Los Angeles 
successfully restored its highways within a few months after the 
Northridge earthquake. 

In addition to leveraging human capital expertise, Los Angeles also 
found ways to take advantage of resources from different federal 
programs to facilitate housing recovery for certain disaster victims. 
The city faced challenges in helping owners of housing units that had 
suffered extensive damage in the earthquake. When Los Angeles learned 
that some of these dwellings were not eligible for SBA disaster 
assistance because they had negative cash flows, the city identified 
resources available from a HUD program to help these property owners. 
Using these funds, the city allocated $322 million to an Earthquake 
Supplemental Disaster Relief fund which assisted property owners who 
were declined by SBA. To obtain information on owners who might benefit 
from this program, the city entered into a cooperative agreement with 
SBA to obtain direct referrals of individuals who were denied loans so 
that the city could inform them of this additional source of 
assistance. A city evaluation of this program found that Los Angeles 
received over 5,000 referrals, which represented more than 22,000 
housing units. 

Use Recovery Plans to Identify Roles and Responsibilities: 

Collaborating organizations can work together to define and agree on 
their respective roles and responsibilities. In doing so, they can 
collectively agree on who will do what, organize joint and individual 
efforts, and facilitate decision making.[Footnote 16] One way to 
delineate roles and responsibilities for disasters is through planning. 
For the emergency response phase, the National Response Framework sets 
out the roles and responsibilities of key partners at the local, 
tribal, state, and federal levels. Responsibilities for recovery 
stakeholders are detailed in ESF #14, the Long-Term Recovery Annex. The 
annex mostly addresses the responsibilities of federal agencies 
involved in recovery. 

Because state and local governments play a lead role in disaster 
recovery, it is also important for their roles and responsibilities to 
be clearly delineated. After past disasters, this information has been 
delineated through long-term community recovery plans. Communities can 
develop such plans either before or after a disaster occurs. Post- 
disaster recovery plans typically include detailed projects and 
approaches to rebuild a community based on the damage and impacts of 
the specific disasters. Some communities have supplemented post- 
disaster plans by conducting planning efforts prior to a disaster. 

Pre-disaster planning does not involve actually developing rebuilding 
programs in advance of a disaster because the patterns of damage from 
natural disasters are impossible to predict with sufficient accuracy to 
support detailed pre-planning. However, these plans can be helpful in 
other ways that foster collaboration, specifically in defining the 
roles and responsibilities of recovery stakeholders prior to a 
disaster. We have previously reported how effective recovery plans 
identify specific roles and responsibilities among various 
stakeholders.[Footnote 17] While these plans are often developed after 
a disaster takes place, we have identified some instances where this 
information was clarified beforehand. 

Los Angeles's Recovery and Reconstruction Plan clearly identified the 
roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in recovery. In 
the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake in southern California, the 
city revised the plan for the purposes of recovery from that event. 
Specifically, the plan identified which city departments have 
responsibility for implementing pre-determined activities before and 
after a disaster in several functional categories, including 
residential, commercial, industrial rehabilitation, and economic 
recovery. An evaluation of the plan funded by the National Science 
Foundation found that the assignment of general responsibilities to the 
departments was useful because it helped the various components of city 
government to understand their post-disaster roles and 
responsibilities. Further, the process of developing the plan also 
improved collaboration among stakeholders. Specifically, 
representatives from many departments--including public safety, 
planning, public works, building, and community redevelopment--met 
several times to develop and revise the plan. 

A good plan is not simply a paper-driven exercise, but rather the 
result of a dynamic and inclusive process wherein key stakeholders are 
consulted and involved in the identification of priorities and the 
formation of strategies. Collaboration among recovery stakeholders was 
further enhanced through long-term recovery planning exercises held by 
the city of Los Angeles. In these exercises, police and fire officials 
engaged in role playing exercises in which they assumed the 
responsibilities of recovery officials. For example, a public safety 
officer played the role of a building inspector responsible for issuing 
building permits after an earthquake. A city official at the time of 
the earthquake told us that the process of developing the plan and 
conducting exercises was an important part of developing relationships 
among stakeholders which facilitated collaboration among city officials 
after the Northridge earthquake. According to a federally-funded 
evaluation of this plan, the contacts established during the planning 
process facilitated the recovery after the Northridge earthquake. 
Another city official stated a positive outcome of the planning effort 
was that participants knew of others who worked on similar issues with 
whom they can initiate conversations. In addition, the process of 
preparing and testing the plan educated city staff on their post- 
disaster roles and responsibilities. 

More recently, two other communities have taken action to develop 
recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and 
responsibilities for recovery. In the San Francisco Bay Area, state and 
local governments used pre-disaster planning to reinforce a regional 
approach to recovery as well as to assign regional roles and 
responsibilities for recovery. Learning from past experiences with 
natural disasters in California including the Loma Prieta earthquake, 
the Bay Area recognized the value of planning for recovery in 
anticipation of future disasters. Toward that end, Bay Area officials 
initiated a regional disaster response planning effort in 2004 
culminating with the Regional Emergency Coordination Plan in March 
2008, which included a subsidiary plan focused specifically on 
recovery.[Footnote 18] 

Specifically for recovery, the San Francisco Bay Area Regional 
Emergency Coordination Plan summarizes in a table organizations 
involved at each level of government and the primary role of each. 
[Footnote 19] For example, the table specifies that local governments 
will resume government functions and request state and federal 
assistance, that state agencies will implement state-funded recovery 
programs, and that regional infrastructure owners will initiate 
planning for and implementation of permanent repairs. We have 
previously reported on the challenges that state and local 
jurisdictions sometimes face with understanding the extent to which the 
federal government will pay for disaster-related costs.[Footnote 20] 
Pre-disaster recovery plans that clearly identify the roles and 
responsibilities of various stakeholders may prove useful in clarifying 
the specific types of costs federal programs are likely to cover as 
well as some of the requirements of these programs before a disaster 
strikes. 

Partly as a result of experiences following Hurricane Andrew, Florida's 
Palm Beach County developed the Palm Beach Countywide Post-Disaster 
Redevelopment Plan for guiding decision making and action during the 
disaster period as well as detailing actions that can be taken before a 
disaster strikes to speed the recovery process.[Footnote 21] Palm Beach 
County delineates roles and responsibilities for recovery by creating 
working groups who will be responsible for implementing different 
sections of the plan, including infrastructure, economic development, 
and government operations. Each working group is assigned several 
issues to cover along with a chairperson to spearhead those activities 
for the county. Additionally, city departments and agencies are 
represented in each of these working groups. 

As an outgrowth of this plan, a Business and Industry program was 
created that formally integrated business interests into the recovery 
process. Additionally, the program also created a private-public 
partnership comprising local, state, regional, and national businesses 
as well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations. According to 
a Palm Beach County official, partners in this program are fully 
engaged in the development and implementation of recovery initiatives. 
These collaboration efforts have resulted in improved relationships 
among the governmental, nongovernmental, and business entities involved 
in the program. 

Post-disaster recovery plans can also provide a vehicle to designate 
roles and responsibilities for recovery, among other things. We have 
previously reported that well-crafted post-disaster recovery plans can 
clarify roles and responsibilities and help jurisdictions make progress 
with recovery.[Footnote 22] For example, the city of Grand Forks's 
recovery plan developed in the wake of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River 
flood clearly identified which personnel--drawn from city, state, and 
federal agencies--would be needed to carry out each task. Specifically, 
the plan called for collaboration of staff from the city's urban 
development and engineering/building inspection departments, FEMA, and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to create an inventory of 
substantially damaged buildings in the downtown area. By clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities of those who would be involved in 
accomplishing specific tasks, the plan provided detailed information to 
facilitate its implementation. 

Monitor, Evaluate, and Report Progress Made toward Recovery: 

Organizations engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means 
to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas 
for improvement. Reporting on these activities can help decision 
makers, clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both 
policy and operational effectiveness.[Footnote 23] We have previously 
reported that effective recovery plans identify clear goals that can 
provide governments with a basis for subsequent evaluations of the 
recovery progress.[Footnote 24] As a next step, we identify how local 
jurisdictions impacted by the Kobe earthquake established a process 
through which government officials, community members, and recovery 
experts worked together to assess the recovery progress and recommend 
improvements. 

Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe established a system of periodic 
recovery assessments in the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan. 
Both governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the 
progress they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about 5 
years after the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. 
This design allowed for both a short-and long-term assessment of the 
recovery. Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these 
evaluations, neither prefecture nor city employees were directly 
involved in conducting these assessments; rather, they used external 
staff to perform the reviews. Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and 
international disaster recovery experts to serve on its evaluation 
panels, while the city of Kobe staffed its reviews with members of 
local community groups. 

These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery 
plans approved by the national government 6 months after the 
earthquake. They enabled policy makers to measure the progress made by 
various stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, and identify needed 
changes to existing policies, and learned lessons for future disasters. 
The panels examined six broad recovery topics--including health, 
industry, employment, and urban development--which resulted in many 
recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake. 

For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation Hyogo prefecture 
gained insight into the unintended consequences of how it relocated 
elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in 
policy. After the earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the 
relocation of elderly victims and grouped them together in special care 
residences located outside the city. While this policy ensured that 
this vulnerable population received housing quickly, it also had the 
unintended effect of isolating the relocated seniors, who were removed 
from their communities. In fact, the verification committee attributed 
this housing arrangement as leading to untimely deaths for some 
seniors. After learning of this finding, the prefecture built new types 
of residential housing that offer comprehensive lifestyle support for 
seniors. In addition, for future disasters the prefecture plans to 
develop a system to track displaced populations as they move from 
temporary to permanent housing to help maintain better contact with 
victims. 

FEMA Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Collaboration among Stakeholders, 
but Could Do More to Share Recovery Experiences: 

Recovery experiences from past catastrophes--including good 
collaboration practices--can offer lessons for such events in the 
future. FEMA has taken some actions to encourage recovery stakeholders 
to collaborate by sharing lessons and experiences related to recovery. 
However, in contrast to other phases of a disaster for which FEMA has a 
specific mechanism dedicated to sharing such information, this is not 
the case with the recovery phase. 

FEMA has taken steps to support collaboration through planning and 
sharing recovery lessons. FEMA has assisted state and local governments 
in developing post-disaster recovery plans in various ways, which in 
turn can help facilitate collaboration among stakeholders. First, FEMA, 
along with other federal agencies such as HUD and EDA, provided 
technical assistance for post-disaster recovery plans for several of 
the disasters we reviewed. Second, FEMA developed guidance for 
conducting the long-term recovery planning process. More specifically, 
the agency created a Long-Term Community Recovery Self Help Guide that 
offers communities step-by-step guidance for implementing a recovery 
program and planning process. Third, FEMA created the Long-Term 
Recovery Assessment Tool to help communities analyze the impacts of a 
disaster while taking into consideration the local government's 
capacity to assist in promoting its own long-term recovery. The 
assessment tool helps federal and other decision makers identity the 
type and level of supplemental long-term community recovery assistance 
that may be needed for full recovery from a disaster. The tool also 
includes processes and procedures for assessing long-term recovery 
needs, community evaluation protocols, standard planning templates, 
staffing strategies, and timetables for various levels of effort. 

FEMA has also taken actions to encourage collaboration among state and 
local officials to share experiences and expertise related to disaster 
recovery. For example, FEMA's Long-Term Community Recovery Branch, 
working through ESF #14, hosted a teleconference linking officials in 
Florida, Mississippi, Colorado, and Iowa with experience recovering 
from previous disasters to provide information to officials in Texas 
recovering from Hurricane Ike. In this way, officials with direct 
experience in the recovery process were able to share good practices 
related to recovery planning, disaster funds administration, and 
coordinating regional efforts with the participants from Texas. 
According to FEMA officials, this collaboration helped the Texas 
officials identify recovery projects and develop a community recovery 
plan. In addition, FEMA is considering ways to further facilitate the 
sharing of lessons learned for disaster recovery, including creating a 
peer-to-peer mentoring program where experienced local officials can 
provide technical assistance, advice, and support to communities 
impacted by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. However, these officials 
told us that this idea is still at an early stage and additional 
specifics are not yet available. 

FEMA's information sharing Web sites do not include a focus on 
recovery. FEMA has systematic approaches for sharing lessons regarding 
three of the four phases of a disaster--preparedness, response, and 
mitigation; however, as of June 2009, the agency does not have an 
information sharing system focused on recovery. Officials involved in 
the preparedness and response phases of a disaster can share lessons 
through FEMA's Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) Web site. 
LLIS is a national online network of lessons learned and best practices 
for the emergency preparedness, response, and homeland security 
communities. Online since April 2004, LLIS provides users access to 
over 12,000 documents including state and local plans, after-action 
reports, best practices, and lessons learned that are culled from real- 
world experiences and exercises. Because the Web site includes some 
sensitive information, its registration process is limited to domestic 
users with "a need to know."[Footnote 25] Information on LLIS is 
organized through a number of "featured topics," such as critical 
infrastructure, exercise planning and program management, and wild-land 
fires. Materials are also organized by numerous "disciplines" that have 
an emergency management focus such as emergency communications, mass 
care and human services, mortuary services, as well as search and 
rescue. 

While LLIS does contain materials relating to recovery, the issue is 
neither a featured topic nor a discipline, making it challenging to 
access recovery-related information in an easy or intuitive way. 
Additionally, the message boards that allow LLIS users to discuss a 
variety of homeland security topics are rarely used to exchange 
information about recovery. For example, while almost 600 messages have 
been exchanged on forums discussing preparedness and response issues as 
of June 2009, only two messages have been posted to the message board 
focused on disaster recovery (and they were both from the same 
individual). A FEMA official with responsibility for LLIS told us that 
there is an increasing recognition that recovery is an underserved area 
of disaster management, and the agency can see benefits of potentially 
including more information about recovery in LLIS. 

To share lessons related to the mitigation phase, FEMA has created a 
searchable online portfolio of case studies and best practices 
submitted by individuals and communities describing the measures they 
have taken to reduce the loss of life or property from future 
disasters. Communities that have taken creative steps in implementing 
good mitigation practices can submit those stories to FEMA where 
officials will review and possibly include them in the online best 
practices portfolio. 

Unlike the information sharing mechanisms it has in place for the 
preparedness, response, and mitigation phases of a disaster, FEMA does 
not have a similar approach for sharing lessons focused on recovery. 
Recovery lessons from specific disasters are sometimes available 
through the FEMA Web site under the listings for specific disasters, 
although the amount and nature of recovery information available this 
way varies greatly. In addition, the Long-Term Community Recovery and 
ESF #14 Web site contains considerable information on recovery, but 
this site is mostly dedicated to providing technical guidance for 
planning and does not permit recovery officials to share lessons or 
learn about recovery best practices. FEMA officials told us that they 
plan to develop a document compiling community-based best practices for 
disaster recovery, but they do not know when it will be available. 

Perhaps more useful than the sharing of reports and other written 
accounts of recovery lessons and experiences is the ability to directly 
network with other recovery officials who can answer questions and 
relate insights first-hand. In the course of our work, we learned of 
instances where this type of personal connection was particularly 
valuable. For example, a Watsonville, California, official told us of 
his efforts immediately after the Loma Prieta earthquake to contact a 
local official in southern California because he had read that the 
official had experienced an earthquake a few years earlier and he 
wanted to solicit his guidance. The official from southern California 
agreed to help and traveled to Watsonville the next day to share his 
experiences and provide insights on potential recovery strategies. In 
another example, when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, 
officials from Grand Forks, North Dakota, offered to help city leaders 
in Biloxi, Mississippi, based on their experiences with the 1997 Grand 
Forks/Red River flood. 

Through one-on-one exchanges like these, state and local officials 
involved in recovery can obtain tailored advice from individuals who 
have addressed similar challenges themselves. For emergency managers 
involved in the disaster preparedness and response phases, FEMA's LLIS 
Web site has a network-building feature that can be used to foster this 
type of exchange. LLIS provides its users with access to a directory of 
other registered users that can be searched for a number of variables 
including name, affiliation, and emergency management function 
(primarily disciplines such as mass care and human services or public 
health). The online directory mostly consists of officials and 
researchers involved in various aspects of emergency management. 
[Footnote 26] Such a directory, or one similar to it, might be very 
useful to recovery officials seeking to network with, and learn from, 
others with experiences or expertise in disaster recovery. 

Conclusions: 

Collaboration is essential for an effective partnership between the 
wide range of participants involved in the disaster recovery process. 
While effective collaboration has helped to facilitate recovery in past 
disasters, experiences from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes reveal that 
more can be done in this area. Specifically, we have identified a 
number of practices used during past disasters that can offer insights 
for effective collaboration: developing and communicating common goals 
to guide recovery; leveraging resources to facilitate recovery; using 
recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities; and monitoring, 
evaluating, and reporting on progress made toward recovery. While there 
is no one right way for how jurisdictions should manage recovery nor is 
there a recipe of techniques that fits all situations, the examples we 
describe in this report--which were tailored to the specific needs and 
conditions of those particular disasters--may provide insights into 
improving collaboration among the many stakeholders involved in the 
ongoing recovery efforts in the Gulf Coast as well as for future 
catastrophic events. 

Recovery stakeholders have a responsibility for fostering collaboration 
during disaster recovery. State and local governments have taken the 
lead in defining roles and responsibilities within pre-and post- 
disaster recovery plans, a step that has helped to facilitate the 
recovery process. The federal government has also played an important 
role in fostering collaboration for recovery. For example, FEMA has 
supported post-disaster planning efforts and hosted videoconferences 
between experienced officials and those currently in the recovery 
process. However, the agency can take additional steps to share 
information focused on recovery so that it is captured and preserved 
for the future. In the absence of a mechanism for compiling and 
disseminating recovery information, valuable expertise from officials 
who have first-hand recovery knowledge may be lost. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To improve the ability of the federal government to capture and 
disseminate recovery information, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a 
mechanism for sharing information and best practices focused on 
disaster recovery, including practices that promote effective 
collaboration such as those discussed in this report. Options for doing 
this could include (1) creating an approach, similar to the LLIS Web 
site or the mitigation best practices portfolio, through which disaster 
recovery lessons can be compiled and shared, and personal networks 
among interested recovery officials encouraged; and/or (2) modifying 
the LLIS Web site to add a focus on recovery by taking steps such as 
including more recovery documents, creating a recovery topic area 
within LLIS, and creating an online directory for recovery officials to 
encourage networking and facilitate further sharing of recovery 
experiences. 

Agency Comments: 

On June 19, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security for comment. We received written comments on July 
22, 2009. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix VII, 
DHS concurred with our recommendation. In addition, the department 
provided technical clarifications that we incorporated where 
appropriate. We also provided drafts of relevant sections to public 
officials, nongovernmental stakeholders, and recovery experts involved 
in or knowledgeable of the specific examples cited in this report and 
incorporated their comments as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report 
to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Housing and Urban 
Development, the FEMA Administrator, the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Economic Development, and the state and local officials we 
contacted for this review. In addition, the report will be available on 
our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6806 or by email at CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

Stanley J. Czerwinski: 
Director: 
Strategic Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To identify recovery lessons from past experiences, we selected 5 
catastrophic disasters: the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1995 Great Hanshin- 
Awaji (Kobe) earthquake, and the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood to 
review (see figure 1). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
defines a "catastrophic" event as one where the related federal costs 
reach or exceed $500 million. Under this definition, all the disasters 
selected for this review qualify as catastrophic. We chose these 
disasters because they had devastating communitywide or regional impact 
and occurred in urban areas of developed nations. Additionally, these 
disasters occurred far enough in the past that we could observe the 
long-term recovery process, occurred recently enough so that key 
officials and supporting documentation are still available, and 
represent different types of natural disasters. 

We interviewed officials from national, state, and local governments 
and nongovernmental organizations, as well as academic experts, 
involved in or knowledgeable of the recovery following each of our 
selected disasters. We also obtained and reviewed legislation, 
ordinances, policies, and program documents that described steps that 
were taken to facilitate long-term recovery following each of these 
disasters as well as the disaster recovery literature. In some 
instances, our review was limited by the availability of historic 
documents and the accessibility of key officials engaged in recovery 
from past disasters. To better understand the federal government's role 
in recovery from these disasters, we interviewed officials at the 
Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the Economic Development 
Administration in the Department of Commerce, and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. 

Figure 1: Five Disasters Included in this Review (1989-1997): 

[Refer to PDF for image: maps of the United States and Japan] 

The maps depict the location of the five disasters included in this 
review: 

In the United States: 
Loma Prieta Earthquake, 1989 (Northern California); 
Hurricane Andrew, 1992 (South Florida); 
Northridge Earthquake, 1994 (Southern California); 
Grand Forks Red River Flood, 1997 (Grand Forks, ND and East Grand 
Forks, MN). 

In Japan: 
Kobe Earthquake,1995 (Southeastern Japan). 

Source: GAO; Art Explosion (map). 

[End of figure] 

We visited the key communities impacted by four of the five disasters 
in our study to meet officials involved in the recovery effort and 
examine current conditions. Although we did not visit communities 
affected by the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood, we were able to 
gather the necessary information through telephone interviews with key 
officials involved in the recovery as well as recovery experts 
knowledgeable about the disaster. The scope of our work did not include 
independent evaluation or verification regarding the extent to which 
the communities' recovery efforts were successful and the practices we 
discuss in this report only represent a selection of the many recovery 
actions taken after these disasters. 

To identify examples of good collaboration among recovery stakeholders, 
we applied eight key practices we have reported on in prior work that 
enhance and sustain collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common 
outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) 
identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles 
and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, 
and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop 
mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce 
agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans 
and reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for 
collaborative efforts through performance management systems.[Footnote 
27] We used this framework to assess the ways in which recovery 
stakeholders collaborated in the five disasters included in our review. 
While we found examples related to four of these good collaborative 
practices, others that enhance coordination may also exist.[Footnote 
28] 

To understand how FEMA supports collaboration among recovery 
stakeholders and the extent to which it facilitates the sharing of 
lessons and experiences from past recovery efforts, we interviewed 
officials from FEMA's Long-Term Community Recovery Branch and staff 
responsible for managing the agency's Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) Web site. We also obtained access to LLIS and FEMA's 
online mitigation best practices portfolio, after which we reviewed the 
content and operations of those systems. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through July 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Loma Prieta Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

The Loma Prieta earthquake, which occurred in the Santa Cruz mountains 
in 1989, severely impacted four cities in northern California. San 
Francisco experienced damage to several areas, including its 
Embarcadero freeway, Marina district, and City Hall. In Oakland, the 
earthquake caused the collapse of the Cypress Expressway as well as 
damage to other infrastructure and low income housing. The cities of 
Santa Cruz and Watsonville, both located near the earthquake epicenter, 
suffered devastating destruction to their downtown districts (see 
figure 2). 

Figure 2: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and fact sheet] 

The map indicates the location of the epicenter of the earthquake near 
Santa Cruz and Watsonville, California, south of the San Francisco Bay 
area. 

Associated facts: 

Date: October 17, 1989. 

Location: Northern California. 

Disaster type: Magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the Richter scale[A]. 

Casualties: 63. 

Injuries: 3,757. 

Displacement: 12,000 people. 

Estimated overall cost: $10 billion property damage ($15 billion in 
2009 dollars). 

Residential impact: 24,000 properties damaged. 

Economic impact: 2,600 businesses damaged. 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the National Academy of 
Sciences, U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute, and GAO/RCED-96-136. 

[A] According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering 
magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale is considered to be "strong." 

[End of figure] 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected 
areas to facilitate its recovery from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. 
Some examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of data] 

Congressional supplemental appropriation: 

* $3.2 billion for 1989 domestic disasters($5 billion in 2009 dollars); 
Public Laws 101-130 (Oct. 26, 1989) and 103-211 (Feb. 12, 1994). 

Assistance from selected federal agencies: 

* Federal Emergency Management Agency Public Assistance grants: $514 
million for permanent work projects ($816 million in 2009 dollars); 

* Department of Housing Community Development Block Grants: none; 

* Commerce Economic Development Administration grants: $7 million for 8 
projects ($11 million in 2009 dollars). 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts, GAO/RCED-
92-141, and data from the Economic Development Administration. 

[End of figure] 

The areas most impacted by the earthquake were Oakland, San Francisco, 
and other cities in Santa Cruz county, including Santa Cruz,[Footnote 
29] and Watsonville.[Footnote 30] Key aspects of disaster recovery 
include planning, housing, economic development, and infrastructure. 
The following presents an overview of selected recovery efforts after 
the Loma Prieta earthquake in each of these areas. However, it does not 
provide a comprehensive account of recovery actions taken. 

Planning: 

Two months following the earthquake, the Santa Cruz City Council 
appointed a citizen group to develop an overall plan to rebuild the 
devastated downtown area. Santa Cruz faced the challenge of reaching 
consensus for decisions regarding recovery. The city facilitated 
decision making during the recovery from the Loma Prieta earthquake as 
a result of growing tension between citizens and local officials. To do 
so, the city devised a formal structure that incorporated time frames 
that helped different community groups reach consensus on a unified 
recovery plan. It created Vision Santa Cruz, a 36-member citizen 
advisory body that included wide representation from the neighborhood 
and community groups, business, finance, labor, and nonprofit 
organizations. To facilitate decision making among these groups, 
according to a former Santa Cruz official, time limits were instituted 
so that if Vision Santa Cruz did not agree on a plan by a certain date, 
city officials would finalize the plan without the group's consensus. 
Further, once a consensus was reached on an issue, it could not be 
opened for discussion again. Although faced with the challenge of 
uniting political groups with differing views in the community, Vision 
Santa Cruz succeeded in bringing the community together by forging a 
compromise among different stakeholders for recovery. Vision Santa Cruz 
completed the Downtown Recovery Plan in September 1991, which provided 
the policies, standards, and guidelines to direct the downtown 
rebuilding. 

The Downtown Recovery Plan provided guidance for building form, 
character, and height; housing; accessibility; open space and 
streetscape; circulation; and parking. According to a former Santa Cruz 
official, the Downtown Recovery Plan took into account the needs of the 
retail community by redesigning the business center. For example, the 
plan proposed new design guidelines that made buildings more suitable 
for retail purposes, such as requiring large ground floor windows to 
ensure that stores received more lighting. Specifically, the main 
street was designed to accommodate both pedestrians and low speed 
traffic (as opposed to being pedestrian-only), preserved on-street 
parking, and widened sidewalks. This plan is still in use today to 
guide development projects in downtown Santa Cruz. 

Watsonville relied on planning assistance offered by the Urban Land 
Institute to create a redevelopment plan. The city followed the plan it 
developed to rebuild and revitalize its downtown with a specific focus 
on implementation and an ancillary focus on development potential, 
planning, urban design, development goals, and marketing strategies. 
Watsonville took the opportunity to make improvements to address 
changing demographics of many blocks that became empty as a result of 
the earthquake. However, not all aspects of the plan were successfully 
implemented. For example, one of the plan's goals was to support and re-
open a department store. However, because the store's upscale retail 
marketing did not fit with the changing demographics, sales dropped, 
and the store closed within one year. 

The Urban Land Institute also offered planning assistance to the city 
of Santa Cruz; however, the final plan focused heavily on housing, 
which was not the direction in which the city was interested. 
Therefore, the city of Santa Cruz did not implement the plan. According 
to a former Santa Cruz official, a key finding of the Urban Land 
Institute was the need to establish a decision-making process to 
overcome the differing political and business interests in the 
community. Toward that end, the city established Vision Santa Cruz 
which helped to facilitate the planning process for the city's downtown 
recovery. 

Housing: 

Approximately 850 housing units in Watsonville (almost 10 percent of 
the city's housing stock) were severely damaged or destroyed after the 
Loma Prieta earthquake. According to a report funded by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Watsonville planners drafted a rebuilding 
ordinance within the first four days after the earthquake that 
suspended the limits on rebuilding nonconforming construction. The 
ordinance also streamlined the permitting process. Santa Cruz County, 
which includes the city of Watsonville, passed a temporary one-half- 
cent sales tax increase for 6 years, called Measure E. The proceeds 
were targeted to damaged areas within the county based on an allocation 
approved by voters. Watsonville received approximately $15 million 
through Measure E which helped to repair the damaged housing. Further, 
Watsonville also used portions of existing Department of Housing and 
Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant funds that it 
received prior to the earthquake (and not part of a supplemental or 
special disaster appropriation) to repair and replace damaged housing 
units. Within 1 year of the earthquake, almost 50 percent of the 
damaged housing units in Watsonville were repaired or replaced. 

The Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in the loss of many single-room 
occupancy units in the cities of Oakland and Santa Cruz. Oakland 
experienced destruction or severe damage of 1,300 single-room occupancy 
units, which provided housing to many minority and elderly residents. 
Oakland financed the replacement of single-room occupancy units through 
California's Disaster Assistance Program. In Santa Cruz, single-room 
occupancy units were built in several new buildings. According to a 
subsequent evaluation of the earthquake, these buildings represented an 
overall improvement in the housing stock. 

Economic Development: 

The cities of Watsonville and Santa Cruz adopted strategies for 
economic development after the Loma Prieta earthquake. Watsonville, 
which suffered about $60 million in damage (or equal to 350 percent of 
its general fund annual budget prior to the earthquake) had the highest 
per capita loss of any impacted city. To help restore its damaged 
downtown, Watsonville built a new parking garage with retail space on 
the first floor, improved the façades of rebuilt or refurbished 
buildings, helped to secure federal funding for restoration of a local 
department store, and constructed a performing arts center to replace a 
damaged high school auditorium. 

Santa Cruz, which lost approximately 20 percent of its sales tax due to 
earthquake damage, worked with community groups to construct seven 
large aluminum and fabric pavilions where local businesses that 
suffered physical damage temporarily relocated. Santa Cruz also 
constructed a parking garage with retail space on the first floor, and 
a nine-screen cinema complex that brings 750,000 people a year 
downtown, benefiting many other businesses because of the increased 
foot traffic. As a result of these strategies, a lively and youthful 
atmosphere in the downtown currently exists. 

Infrastructure: 

The Loma Prieta earthquake damaged several major transportation 
structures in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the Embarcadero 
Freeway and the Cypress Expressway. The California Department of 
Transportation (CalTrans) worked with the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) to finance the replacement of the Cypress 
Expressway with a cost sharing ratio of 90 percent of the funding from 
the federal government and 10 percent from the state. However, 
construction did not begin until 1994 partly because of community 
opposition to rebuilding the expressway in its original location, which 
divided a neighborhood in West Oakland. To address community concerns, 
CalTrans and FHWA moved the expressway so that it runs along the edge 
of the residential area. The space previously taken by the expressway 
is now occupied by new businesses, housing, and parks. See figure 4 for 
images of the Cypress Expressway before and after the replacement 
project. 

Figure 4: The Cypress Expressway Suffered Extensive Damage from the 
1989 Earthquake (top); Oakland Moved the Expressway to Reconnect a 
Neighborhood that Had Been Previously Divided (bottom): 

[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs] 

Two photographs from 1989 are indicated as "Before." 
One photograph from 2008 is indicated as "After." This photograph 
depicts the location of the replacement freeway, as well as pointing 
out the original location of the Cypress Viaduct. 

Sources: Photographs courtesy of the California Department of 
Transportation, District 4, Oakland, Calif. Photographer: Bob Colin (top
right and top left). Photographer: William R. Hall (bottom). 

[End of figure] 

In San Francisco, the controversial decision to demolish the 
Embarcadero Freeway caused business owners to worry that the lack of a 
freeway would negatively impact travel to the waterfront. Today, the 
Embarcadero Freeway has been replaced with an above-ground park that 
connects the city to the waterfront. Other affected jurisdictions in 
Northern California also experienced significant infrastructure damage. 
For example, Watsonville's sewer system was heavily damaged as a result 
of uneven ground settlement, which took more than 5 years to repair. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Hurricane Andrew: 

Disaster Impacts: 

Hurricane Andrew made landfall over southern Miami-Dade County in 
Florida as a category 5 hurricane, severely impacting several cities in 
southern Florida, including Homestead and Florida City (see figure 5). 
As a result of the hurricane, the city of Homestead suffered a 31 
percent decline to its population, 60 percent of the aggregated 
residential property value, and 29 percent of its average commercial 
real estate value. Additionally, the Department of Defense's decision 
to scale down the presence of the Homestead Air Force Base contributed 
to the loss of thousands of jobs. In Florida City, located near 
Homestead, Hurricane Andrew damaged every building, reducing 
residential property value by 78 percent, and the average commercial 
real estate value by 32 percent. 

Figure 5: Selected Facts about the Impact of Hurricane Andrew: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and fact sheet] 

The map indicates the location of the hurricane and its proximity to 
Florida City, Homestead, and Homestead Air Reserve Base. 

Associated facts: 

Date: August 24, 1992. 

Location: South Florida. 

Disaster type: Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale (which
ranges from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5). 

Casualties: 15 direct and 29 indirect in Florida. 

Displacement: More than 1 million ordered to evacuate; approximately 
160,000-180,000 homeless after the storm. 

Estimated overall cost: $25 billion in Florida ($36 billion in 2009 
dollars). 

Residential impact: Approximately 25,000 properties destroyed; 37,000 
suffered major damage; 51,000 suffered minor damage24,000 properties 
damaged. 

Economic impact: More than 100,000 jobs affected. 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the Economic Development Administration, 
the International Hurricane Center, and GAO/RCED-93-186. 

[End of figure] 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected 
area to facilitate its recovery from Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Some 
examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 6. 

Figure 6: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from Hurricane 
Andrew: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated data] 

Congressional supplemental appropriation: 

$6.2 billion for natural disasters including Hurricane Andrew ($9 
billion in 2009 dollars); 

Public Laws 102-368 (Sept. 23, 1992) and 103-50 (July 2, 1993). 

Assistance from selected federal agencies: 

* Federal Emergency Management Agency Public Assistance grants: $822 
($1.2 billion in 2009 dollars) with $245 million for permanent work 
projects ($355 billion in 2009 dollars); 

* Department of Housing Community Development Block Grants: $85 million 
($123 million in 2009 dollars); also includes funds for Hurricane Iniki 
and Typhoon Omar; 

* Commerce Economic Development Administration grants: $50.9 million 
for 28 projects ($73 million in 2009 dollars). 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts as well as 
data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of 
Commerce Office of Inspector General. 

[End of figure] 

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 
development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 
selected recovery efforts after Hurricane Andrew in each of these 
areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery 
actions taken. 

Planning: 

To help plan for the recovery from Hurricane Andrew, community leaders 
created a nonprofit organization called We Will Rebuild. The 
organization was led by the publisher of the Miami-Herald as well as 
other political, business, and civic leaders in Miami-Dade County. A 
key role that We Will Rebuild played was to coordinate the distribution 
of nearly $28 million of private and public funds. We Will Rebuild 
worked to devise recovery strategies through 29 committees that focused 
on different issue areas, including agriculture, business and economic 
development, housing, social services, as well as families and 
children. Committee members developed plans to achieve goals within 
those areas and in some instances implemented those strategies 
directly. For example, to achieve the goal of preventing the complete 
closure of the Homestead Air Force Base, one committee successfully 
advocated for the base to be changed into a combined civil and military 
facility. 

We Will Rebuild also funded planning meetings, coordinated through 
local universities, which brought together as many as 300 professionals 
over a 3 week period to create solutions for rebuilding Miami-Dade 
County. Teams comprised of architects, engineers, planners, and as well 
as others from the public and private sectors presented proposals for 
how to rebuild communities and neighborhoods. Eventually these meetings 
produced 16 projects focused on many issues such as site-specific 
neighborhood revitalization plans focused on urban planning, 
transportation, historic preservation, and natural resources for 28 
communities in the county. Many of these plans served as the basis for 
the redevelopment of neighborhoods and future regional developments 
related to water management, transportation development, and the 
preservation of buildings and open space. 

Housing: 

Hurricane Andrew caused devastating housing damage in Miami-Dade 
County, resulting in the destruction of over 25,000 homes and major 
damage to over 37,000 homes. According to a city official, Florida City 
worked with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create a 
program that provided second mortgages for homeowners to repair damaged 
housing. Today, the population of Florida City is approximately 10,000, 
a significant increase from the 3,000 still remaining in the wake of 
the hurricane. 

Over 8,000 Homestead residents, or 31 percent of its pre-hurricane 
population, left the city, leaving many abandoned properties that 
created challenges for the city to redevelop some areas. Some 
residential communities that suffered significant damage from the 
hurricane were eventually rebuilt. For example, the Naranja Lakes 
development, a private condominium community of thousands of residents, 
was razed and is being rebuilt with a mix of condominium and single 
family homes. 

Economic Development: 

To rebuild the economy in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, a number of 
economic development organizations in Miami-Dade County worked to 
revitalize affected communities. One of these groups, the Economic 
Development Council was founded by local business leaders in response 
to Hurricane Andrew to represent the economic development interests of 
the unincorporated portions of Miami-Dade County. The group led efforts 
to beautify a major roadway and commercial center through the area. The 
Economic Development Council hoped that such improvement projects would 
attract residents who had moved away after the hurricane to return to 
the county once more. 

The mission of the Vision Council, another organization that promoted 
economic redevelopment after Hurricane Andrew, was to attract new 
businesses to Miami-Dade County. The council serves Homestead, Florida 
City, and other parts of southern Miami-Dade County. The Vision Council 
experienced mixed success in its economic development efforts. For 
example, the Vision Council assisted Homestead's efforts to market and 
build a 270 acre commerce park, called Park of Commerce. The Vision 
Council also supported the creation of the Homestead-Miami Speedway, 
which sponsors professional car racing events year round. However, not 
all of its projects have been successful. For example, we observed that 
the Park of Commerce which the Vision Council supported was mostly 
vacant today. A Vision Council official explained that factors such as 
the perceived risk of another storm in the area, high insurance rates, 
and population decline has deterred some businesses from relocating to 
Miami-Dade County. 

Infrastructure: 

Hurricane Andrew destroyed much of the public and transportation 
infrastructure in southern Florida. For example, Florida City lost 
every public building to Hurricane Andrew, according to a city 
official. The city rebuilt the government center complex, which 
included the city hall, jail, and police station. Because the city's 
public funds were insufficient to rebuild the new government center 
complex, it used funding from the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA) in the Department of Commerce and the state to complete the 
center. 

Homestead and Florida City suffered sustained damage to their water 
systems. In Homestead, EDA provided $7.7 million partly for the 
construction of water and sewer lines, which extended these services to 
the Miami-Homestead Speedway and Park of Commerce facilities. Without 
those infrastructure enhancements, these projects could not have been 
developed. Florida City also sustained extensive damage to its water 
delivery system. EDA provided almost $5 million for the repair, 
replacement, and expansion the city's water system (see figure 7). As a 
result of the water system's expansion, the State Farmers Market was 
also restored, creating almost 400 jobs. 

Figure 7: Florida City's Water Distribution System Was Heavily Damaged: 

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Photograph from 1992; 
Photograph from 2002. 

Sources: Lou Toman, Sun Sentinel (left); Carl Seibert, Sun Sentinel 
(right). 

[End of figure] 

Miami-Dade County also used its recovery efforts from the hurricane to 
improve its transportation infrastructure. A local leader explained 
that the departure of some county residents following Hurricane Andrew 
resulted in the widespread dispersion of employees and employers. For 
example, the lack of transportation impacted the ability of the 
construction industry to find adequate labor, increasing both operating 
costs and stifling competition. To provide access to employment for 
individuals who work in the county, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency provided at least $38 million to increase transportation 
services to the county. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Northridge Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

The epicenter of the 1994 Northridge earthquake was located in western 
Los Angeles county, causing significant physical and economic damage 
(see figure 8). The earthquake devastated damaged southern California's 
freeway system, including the collapse of 11 overpasses on some of the 
busiest freeways in Los Angeles. The earthquake also caused widespread 
residential damage throughout many neighborhoods in the San Fernando 
Valley and other pockets in central and south central Los Angeles. 
Until the domestic terrorist attacks in 2001, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency spent more money on the response to, and recovery 
from, Northridge than any previous disaster. 

Figure 8: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Northridge Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and fact sheet] 

The map indicates the location of the epicenter of the earthquake and 
its proximity to Northridge, California. 

Associated facts: 

Date: January 17, 1994. 

Location: Southern California. 

Disaster type: Magnitude 6.8 earthquake on the Richter scale[A]. 

Casualties: 57. 

Injuries: More than 9,000. 

Displacement: More than 20,000 displaced from their homes. 

Estimated overall cost: $20 billion ($28 billion in 2009 dollars). 

Residential impact: Over 250,000 housing units damaged. 

Economic impact: $327 million in lost state and local taxes ($453 
million in 2009 dollars). 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the U.S. Geological 
Survey, the city of Los Angeles, and GAO/RCED-94-193. 

[A] According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering 
magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale is considered to be "strong." 

[End of figure] 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected 
area to facilitate its recovery from the 1994 Northridge earthquake. 
Some examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in figure 9. 

Figure 9: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the 
Northridge Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated data] 

Congressional supplemental appropriation: 

$8.7 billion for the Northridge earthquake and other disasters ($12 
billion in 2009 dollars); 

Public Laws 103-211 (Feb. 12, 1994), 103-317 (Aug. 26, 1994), and 103-
327 (Sept. 28, 1994). 

Assistance from selected federal agencies: 

* Federal Emergency Management Public Assistance grants: $4.4 billion 
($8 billion in 2009 dollars), of that amount, $3.9 billion was spent on 
permanent work projects; 

* Department of Housing Community Development Block Grants: $725 
million ($1 billion in 2009 dollars); 

* Commerce Economic Development Administration grants: $85 million for 
21 projects ($117 million in 2009 dollars). 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts, GAO 
summary of documents from the city of Grand Forks, N.D., and data from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Economic Development 
Administration. 

[End of figure] 

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 
development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 
selected recovery efforts after the Northridge earthquake in each of 
these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of 
recovery actions taken. 

Planning: 

In 1987, prior to the Northridge earthquake, the city of Los Angeles 
developed a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan in preparation for a 
future disaster. In the aftermath of the Northridge earthquake, the 
city adapted this plan to guide its recovery efforts. According to an 
evaluation funded by the National Science Foundation, the plan 
contributed to fostering good working relations between city officials 
and other stakeholders. The process of developing the plan itself 
strengthened relationships between city departments and agencies which 
in turn helped to facilitate collaboration during the recovery process. 
City departments also implemented several strategies outlined in the 
plan, such as developing loan programs for businesses unable to receive 
Small Business Administration loans, establishing an interdepartmental 
group to adapt the recovery plan for Northridge, streamlining permit 
processing, establishing mutual aid agreements, and forming 
reconstruction task forces. 

Housing: 

After the earthquake, the city of Los Angeles designated 17 areas that 
suffered extensive damage as "ghost towns," to received priority 
attention. The vacating of 7,500 housing units in those areas resulted 
in criminal trespassers such as drug dealers, prostitution rings, and 
squatters. In turn, those activities increased burglaries in 
surrounding neighborhoods and resulted in local businesses losing their 
customer base. The city's housing department collaborated with the 
police, public works, and building departments to create a special work 
unit to focus on security and offer refinancing to help property owners 
in the ghost towns rebuild. A subsequent evaluation of the housing 
reconstruction after Northridge found that this program contributed to 
the successful rebuilding of those areas and helped to stabilize 
surrounding neighborhoods. 

Economic Development: 

The city of Los Angeles implemented different strategies to assist 
businesses that were impacted by the earthquake. According to city 
officials, the Los Angeles used the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) to create 
a $24 million commercial recovery loan program that included a grace 
period for loan repayment so to provide businesses with a window of 
time to get reestablished after the disaster. The city also used grants 
from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Department of 
Commerce to develop projects that created new jobs. For example, an EDA 
grant funded the construction of a biomedical facility for research and 
development at California State University at Northridge that resulted 
in the creation of 1,600 new jobs. Further, the city helped to fund an 
outreach and counseling program developed by a local nonprofit to 
provide direct technical assistance to affected businesses in the San 
Fernando Valley. Specifically, the nonprofit provided guidance to 
businesses on obtaining federal and local governmental financial 
assistance, as well as strategies for adjusting to changes in the 
business environment. 

Infrastructure: 

According to Los Angeles officials, the city prioritized the 
replacement and restoration of its highway infrastructure to restore 
the region's transportation networks. To maintain partial traffic flows 
immediately after the earthquake, the city established alternative 
detour routing for the highways. The earthquake resulted in 480 damage 
locations to federal, state, and local roads throughout the Los Angeles 
area and forced the closure of four major highway corridors that, 
together, carried over 780,000 vehicles per day before the earthquake. 
This caused significant disruption to commuting patterns as well as the 
transportation of freight. 

To expedite the completion of highway rebuilding projects, the 
California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) included financial 
incentives in its contracts for each major restoration or repair 
contract. Under this approach, bonuses were available to each 
contractor who completed projects early. CalTrans calculated bonuses 
based on an analysis of the economic cost incurred to the region as a 
result of the disruption to traffic and associated delays. As a result 
of this approach, bonuses were awarded to 9 out of the 10 eligible 
contractors. According to a CalTrans official, these incentives allowed 
the city to restore these freeways within a few months after the 
earthquake (see figure 10). 

Figure 10: The Gavin Canyon Underpass, Part of Southern California's 
Interstate 5, Suffered Severe Damage but Was Restored Within a Few 
Months: 

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Photograph from January 1994; 
Photograph from June 1994. 

Sources: U.S. Department of Transportation (left), California 
Department of Transportation (right). 

[End of figure] 

The Federal Highway Administration also granted other measures of 
flexibility within its regulations to facilitate infrastructure 
recovery. For example, the agency granted exemptions from certain 
regulations, such as allowing the California Department of 
Transportation to proceed without conducting environmental impact 
statements as required under the National Environmental Policy Act. 
[Footnote 31] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Kobe Earthquake: 

Disaster Impacts: 

On January 17, 1995, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake caused significant 
damage to the Japanese city of Kobe in Hyogo prefecture.[Footnote 32] 
As a result of the earthquake, the affected areas sustained heavy 
damage and many casualties. For example, over 6,000 people were killed 
and 40,000 injured. In addition to destroying over 400,000 homes and 
buildings, the earthquake caused extensive damage to roads, railroads, 
highways, and subway stations (see figure 11). The port of Kobe, 
Japan's leading container shipping port at the time, also experienced 
heavy damage to almost all container berths. 

Figure 11: Selected Facts about the Impact of the Kobe Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and fact sheet] 

The map indicates the location of the epicenter of the earthquake and 
its proximity to Kobe City, Japan, as well as high damage areas and 
fault lines. 

Associated facts: 

Date: January 17, 1995. 

Location: Japan. 

Disaster type: Magnitude 7.3 earthquake on the Richter scale[A]. 

Casualties: 6,433. 

Injuries: 40,071. 

Displacement: 316,678 evacuees. 

Estimated overall cost: More than $150 billion in property loss ($204
billion in 2009 dollars). 

Residential impact: About 400,000 damaged houses and buildings. 

Economic impact: As much as $50 billion in direct economic disruption
($68 billion in 2009 dollars). Kobe’s port was shut down for 2 years 
and suffered an estimated $10 billion in damages ($14 billion in 2009 
dollars). As a result of the decrease in traffic volume during the port’
s closure, its ranking dropped from 6th in the world to 24th by 1995. 

Sources: GAO presentation of information from the Japanese central 
government; Stephanie Chang, Ph.D.; David Edgington, Ph.D.; and
Haruo Hayashi, Ph.D. 

[A] According to the U.S. Geological Survey, an earthquake registering 
magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale is considered to be "strong." 

[End of figure] 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

The Japanese government provided significant funding to facilitate 
recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Some examples of national 
government assistance for recovery are shown in figure 12. 

Figure 12: Examples of National Government Assistance for Recovery from 
the Kobe Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated data] 

* The central government allocated more than $58 billion ($79 billion 
in 2009 dollars) in first three years following earthquake to 
reconstruct basic infrastructure, housing, and other physical 
facilities. 

*The central government helped Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture establish 
a special loan fund of approximately $9 billion ($12 billion in 2009 
dollars) repayable in 10 years, to support reconstruction activities 
not covered by other national programs. 

* Special financial assistance legislation was created on March 1, 1995 
to provide indirect individual assistance to small businesses, 
homeowners, and local public authorities. 

Sources: GAO presentation of data from Laurie Johnson, Ph.D. and 
Professor Kenneth Topping. 

[End of figure] 

Recovery after the Kobe earthquake was generally a top-down process of 
post-disaster planning and financing. The government prioritized the 
rapid rebuilding of infrastructure and economic stabilization and later 
focused on housing and social recovery. The physical reconstruction 
process took less than 3 years to complete. Specifically, the city of 
Kobe designated 24 areas to prioritize for rebuilding, using national 
government funds to widen roads, add parks and open spaces, and 
construct other public facilities. For the first 3 to 4 years after the 
earthquake, the focus was mainly focused on physical reconstruction. In 
subsequent years, the government shifted it focus to community 
development, economic development, and the restoration of communities. 
Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 
development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 
selected recovery efforts after the Kobe earthquake in each of these 
areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of recovery 
actions taken. 

Planning: 

Immediately following the earthquake, Japan's national government 
implemented a 2-month moratorium where it did not approve any building 
permits so that the local governments could finalize planning before 
the rebuilding process began. Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe 
adopted complementary recovery plans within 2 months of the earthquake-
-in March 1995--which prioritized projects that replaced infrastructure 
as well as others that would help stabilize the economy and attract new 
businesses. 

After the earthquake, there was a relatively short amount of time to 
submit proposals for the national budget in order to be considered for 
the coming year. To ensure that they could take advantage of national 
government funding as soon as possible, the city of Kobe and Hyogo 
prefecture completed its recovery plans promptly. Facing this deadline, 
local officials devised a two-phase strategy to develop a plan that 
could quickly identify broad recovery goals to provide a basis for 
budget requests to meet the national budget deadline. After that 
initial planning phase, the governments then collaborated with 
residents to develop detailed plans for specific communities. 

Housing: 

The national government funded a 3-year emergency housing plan to build 
about 72,000 permanent new housing units throughout Kobe and Hyogo to 
replace an estimated 82,000 houses lost due to the earthquake. They 
planned to provide around 8,200 through the private rental market and 
more than half through public housing agencies. This overall target 
level was achieved by March 1998 when more than 120,000 new housing 
units were constructed. The accumulated number of new housing units 
built by 2005 was estimated to be over 222,000. Almost all the 
replacement housing was provided in multi-rise condominium structures, 
with approximately 56 percent of those available as public housing 
units. Both the public and private sector used a variety of strategies, 
aimed at many levels of the population, to ensure that replacement 
housing would be built. The result was that more housing was built than 
had been lost. According to an expert on Japan's recovery, the city of 
Kobe has recently experienced challenges in attracting new occupants-- 
especially younger families--to move into these units. 

Economic Development: 

The Kobe earthquake had lasting impacts on several industries, 
including the port and small businesses. The port of Kobe, Japan's 
leading container shipping port, sustained heavy damage to almost all 
container berths. Port repairs took almost 1 year to complete, during 
which time the port disruption was estimated to be an amount equivalent 
to the income of 40,000 workers. The city of Kobe completed its port 
restoration by March 1997 (see figure 13). However, port activity 
stalled at around 80 percent of pre-earthquake levels. In October 1998, 
exports from the port of Kobe to Asian countries declined by 24.3 
percent from the previous year. The negative impact of damage to the 
local economy and regional exports, in addition to the relocation of 
many container cargos to other ports during the port of Kobe's closure 
contributed to its decline. Further, changing trends in the 
international trade industry introduced increased competition from 
other Asian ports. As a result of these factors, the port of Kobe has 
not fully recovered. For example, while the port ranked 6th in the 
world for volume in 1994, it dropped to the 24th position in 1995 and 
the 33rd in 2006. 

Figure 13: Although the City of Kobe Restored the Port of Kobe by March 
1997, the Port Never Fully Recovered: 

[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs] 

Photograph from 1995. 
Photograph from 1997. 

Source: City of Kobe. 

[End of figure] 

Local industries, such as chemical and steel manufacturers as well as 
small businesses, were also affected by the earthquake. Chemical and 
steel manufacturers did not operate for several months after the event. 
Large companies, such as Kobe Steel and Mitsubishi Industries, were 
able to map out effective recovery strategies and were less affected by 
the earthquake. On the other hand, smaller industries, also severely 
damaged by the earthquake, were unable to recover as easily as the 
larger manufacturers. For example, smaller businesses such as shoe 
manufacturers, sake breweries, and roof-tile makers never fully 
recovered from the earthquake. 

The city of Kobe took several actions to stimulate the local economy 
with mixed success. For example, Kobe established support systems for 
affected businesses such as special no-interest loans and subsidies for 
the construction of temporary stores and factories. The city also 
created the "Luminaire," a festival of illuminated lights which began 
in the winter following the earthquake to boost morale of local 
residents and to attract tourists. In 2003, the event drew 28.1 million 
visitors, which increased the number of tourists by 115 percent from 
pre-earthquake levels. However, not all of its efforts were successful. 
For example, the city did not have enough funds to help all the small 
businesses that needed financial assistance. Some small businesses 
could not recover from the earthquake and closed. 

Recognizing the need to diversify Kobe's economy from its traditional 
port and manufacturing businesses, the city took steps to attract and 
develop several new industries. Kobe recognized that it could benefit 
from new infrastructure projects to change the industrial base of the 
city. Soon after the disaster occurred, the city conducted a study to 
assess economic conditions in Kobe. This study showed that although 
some of the economic challenges the city faced were a result of the 
earthquake, a more fundamental problem was Kobe's continued reliance on 
"old economy" industries, such as shipbuilding, steel, and shoe 
manufacturing. With this information, the city, in coordination with 
Hyogo prefecture, targeted new industries--such as medical, 
pharmaceutical, robotics, and information technology companies--to 
establish businesses in the region. 

To attract companies from these targeted industries, the city of Kobe 
and Hyogo prefecture offered loans, subsidies, tax incentives, and 
inexpensive office space. Further, these jurisdictions proposed 
reductions in existing government regulations for the medical and 
information technology sectors. These plans allowed foreign researchers 
to work in Kobe without overly rigorous visa regulations. Additionally, 
the city sought to remove regulations that prevented foreign firms from 
participating in the medical industry and thereby encourage the entry 
of foreign researchers and business persons. Overall, Kobe and Hyogo 
achieved success in diversifying its economy. About 10 years after the 
earthquake, over 285 new companies moved to the city, 40 of which were 
foreign firms. Additionally, six public facilities--including centers 
for business, developmental biology, and heath care--had relocated to 
the city as well. 

Infrastructure: 

The Kobe earthquake caused significant damage to the infrastructure and 
transportation network in affected areas. Extensive rail and roadway 
damage included the collapse of significant portions of three major 
freeway routes, damage to rail systems, and the collapse of Kobe's 
subway stations. There was also significant damage to the water, gas, 
and sewer systems. Over a million households lost access to water, gas, 
electricity, and sewage after the earthquake. The national government 
prioritized the replacement of the public infrastructure and set aside 
the largest portion of its financial support for the reconstruction of 
essential infrastructure (such as water and sewage systems) and 
transportation networks. 

The national Ministry of Construction was directly involved to assist 
the city and prefecture with the reconstruction. For example, the 
ministry provided resources for the replacement of electric power, 
water, and other utilities. Because of the government's prioritization 
of these issues, the damaged infrastructure was restored in a 
relatively short time. Reconstruction of rail lines, some of which are 
privately owned, was completed within 7 months. Collapsed freeways, 
including the Hanshin Expressway, were restored within 20 months of the 
earthquake. See figure 14 for images of restored rail lines and 
freeways after the earthquake. Similarly, utility services were also 
quickly repaired. Residents regained electricity in about 6 days and 
were able to access gas, water, and waste system services in less than 
3 months after the earthquake. 

Figure 14: Japan Restored Damaged Railways and Highways Approximately 
20 Months after the Earthquake: 

[Refer to PDF for image: four photographs] 

Above left and above right: Damaged railways were restored by August 
1995, seven months after the earthquake: 
Photograph from January 1995; 
Photograph from August 1995. 

Far left and near left: The Japanese government restored collapsed 
highways, including the Hanshin Expressway. The project was complete 20 
months after the earthquake: 
Photograph from January 1995; 
Photograph from September 1996. 

Source: City of Kobe. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Grand Forks/Red River Flood: 

Disaster Impacts: 

The 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood devastated Grand Forks, North 
Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. Following a season of record 
snowfall, the Red River flooded up to 2,200 square miles in these 
states, an area about twice the size of Rhode Island. The flood damaged 
83 percent of affected homes and impacted all downtown businesses. In 
East Grand Forks, 99 percent of homes and businesses were damaged (see 
figure 15). 

Figure 15: Selected Facts about the Impact of the 1997 Grand Forks/Red 
River Flood: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map and fact sheet] 

The map indicates the location of the Grand Forks/Red River Flood, 
including the area covered by the floodwater, the levee and floodwall 
system, and the State/city boundary. 

Associated facts: 

Date: April 1997. 

Location: East Grand Forks, Minnesota, and Grand Forks, North Dakota. 

Disaster type: Flood. 

Casualties: None. 

Displacement: 56,025 total for both Grand Forks, N.D., and East Grand
Forks, Minn. 

Estimated overall cost: $3.6 billion ($4.7 billion in 2009 dollars). 

Residential impact: More than 80 percent of homes damaged in Grand 
Forks and East Grand Forks. 

Economic impact: Every business in downtown Grand Forks and East Grand
Forks suffered damage. 

Sources: GAO presentation of data from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency. 

[End of figure] 

Long-term Recovery Snapshot: 

The federal government provided significant funding to the affected 
area to facilitate its recovery from the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River 
flood. Some examples of federal assistance for recovery are shown in 
figure 16. 

Figure 16: Examples of Federal Assistance for Recovery from the Grand 
Forks/Red River Flood: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated data] 

Congressional supplemental appropriation: 

$5.8 billion for flooding and other natural disasters ($7.6 billion in 
2009 dollars); 

Public Law 105-18 (June 12, 1997). 

Assistance from selected federal agencies: 

* Federal Emergency Management Agency Public Assistance grants: $357 
million ($466 million in 2009 dollars); 

* Department of Housing Community Development Block Grants: $142 
million ($186 million in 2009 dollars); 

* Commerce Economic Development Administration grants:$66 million for 
124 projects ($86 million in 2009 dollars). 

Sources: Presentation of GAO analysis of Appropriation Acts; GAO 
summary of documents from the city of Grand Forks, N.D.; and data from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Economic Development 
Administration. 

[End of figure] 

Key aspects of disaster recovery include planning, housing, economic 
development, and infrastructure. The following presents an overview of 
selected recovery efforts after the Grand Forks/Red River flood in each 
of these areas. However, it does not provide a comprehensive account of 
recovery actions taken. 

Planning: 

In the wake of the flood, the mayor of Grand Forks asked directors from 
the city's urban development, public works, and finance departments to 
collaborate in order to contribute their respective expertise to help 
the city create a recovery plan. The mayor delegated much of her 
authority to these civil servants, known as the Tri-Chairs, allowing 
them to set priorities for recovery, submit action steps for approval, 
and collectively manage the city's recovery resources. The Tri-Chairs, 
City Council, representatives from the federal Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), and other city staff collaborated to 
create a detailed flood recovery action plan for the city that 
identified (1) broad recovery goals, (2) roles and responsibilities 
associated with specific projects, and (3) potential sources for 
funding those activities. Specifically, the plan identified five broad 
recovery goals covering areas such as housing and community 
redevelopment, business redevelopment, and infrastructure 
rehabilitation. The plan details a number of supporting objectives and 
tasks to be implemented in order to achieve the stated goals. 
Additionally, the plan identified a target completion date for each 
task. 

Consultants that provided technical assistance on the planning process 
were hired using HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). A key 
role that these federally-funded consultants played was to maintain 
good communications and coordination between the city and HUD. The 
consultants facilitated communications through scheduling and 
publicizing meetings, providing workspace, and convening weekly 
conference calls. According to a subsequent evaluation of the 
consultants' efforts, these activities helped to build a team mentality 
among stakeholders by encouraging the sharing of information and common 
problem-solving. An important result of this communication was the 
completion of Grand Forks' recovery plan. A city evaluation of the 
recovery plan found that the process of specifying goals and 
identifying funding sources allowed the city to conceive and formulate 
projects in collaboration with the city council and representatives 
from state and local governments. This helped Grand Forks meet its 
recovery needs as well as adhere to federal and state disaster 
assistance funding laws and regulations. 

Housing: 

The cities of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks took measures to buy out 
housing located in the 100-year floodplain of the Red River. Grand 
Forks officials developed a buy-out program that purchased nearly 800 
homes, which was about 10 percent of the city's housing stock at the 
time. To determine the value of properties in the buy-out program, the 
city created teams to assess each home and based the value on pre-flood 
price of the home along with a deduction of insurance payments. 
According to a Grand Forks official, the city also changed existing 
land-use ordinances to prevent future building in the 100-year flood 
zone. 

In East Grand Forks, where nearly 99 percent of the homes were damaged 
by the flood, officials also established a buy-out program for 
approximately 400 homes located in the 100-year floodplain. The city 
used local realtors to determine property values, and the city provided 
a 7 to 10 percent premium above the house value to account for 
rebuilding costs. East Grand Forks used U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program funding to support its buy-out program. 

Economic Development: 

To focus on issues of economic recovery, the mayor of Grand Forks 
formed a task force on business redevelopment comprised of 15 prominent 
business leaders to address issues such as getting access to funding 
for business recovery and increasing opportunities for business 
development and growth. The business redevelopment task force comprised 
of seven committees that met regularly to discuss these issues. Grand 
Forks created several business redevelopment programs using federal 
funding. For example, using almost $2 million from HUD's CDBG program 
and over $5 million from the Economic Development Administration, the 
city constructed Noah's Ark, a large industrial building developed for 
the purpose of providing temporary office space to any displaced small 
business in the Grand Forks region. According to a Grand Forks 
official, the Noah's Ark building was converted into an Amazon.com call 
center in 1999. The city also developed several projects which 
incorporated mitigation techniques so those structures would be better 
prepared for a future flood. For example, the city changed the design 
of a convention center by raising the main event arena space of a 
convention center to ground level to mitigate against future flooding. 
The University of North Dakota also incorporated disaster resistant 
features into its construction of a new $100 million hockey arena to 
protect it from blizzards, floods, and wind. 

According to East Grand Forks officials, the city's business community 
relied upon the University of Minnesota's School of Architecture to 
development a strategy for economic recovery. As part of its economic 
redevelopment after the flood, East Grand Forks entered into an 
agreement with a major outdoor retailer to build a $7 million store if 
it were to employ local residents in the store. Since its opening, the 
retailer has thrived in East Grand Forks and is one of the fastest 
growing stores in this nationwide chain. 

Infrastructure: 

After the flooding, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks took steps to 
address their cities' lack of an adequate flood-control infrastructure 
to help reduce damage from future flooding of the Red River. The U.S. 
Army: 

Corps of Engineers assisted both cities in the construction of new 
flood protection consisting of levees and floodwall systems. The Grand 
Forks levees have a diversion channel to redirect water around to the 
west side of the city. Its flood walls were elevated an additional 3 
feet making it possible to add clay to levy to provide more protection 
in the event of severe flooding. In East Grand Forks, officials 
explained that the city built a nonpermanent floodwall that can be 
taken down and assembled when needed, because of concerns about keeping 
the city open to the view of the river. See figure 17 for images of the 
Red River before and after the infrastructure construction project. 

Figure 17: After the Flood, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand 
Forks, Minnesota, Took Steps to Address Their Cities' Lack of an 
Adequate Flood-Control Infrastructure to Help Reduce Damage from Future 
Flooding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs] 

Before: 

Photograph of 1st Avenue at North 3rd Street, Grand Forks, N.D. (1997). 

Photograph of East Grand Forks, Minn., side of Sorlie Bridge (1997). 

After: 

Photograph of both areas (2006). 

Sources: Photographs courtesy of Grand Forks Herald, Photographer: Eric 
Hylden (top left); North Dakota State Water Commission (top right); 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (bottom). 

[End of figure] 

In December 1998, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks jointly agreed to 
create a "greenway," which would manage the impact of rising river 
water as well as provide a natural space located between the levee 
system and river banks for recreational uses. For example, the greenway 
includes trails, golf courses, boat-ramps, campgrounds, athletic 
fields, and a wildflower garden. These infrastructure improvements, 
including the greenway and permanent river dikes, have successfully 
reduced property damage in subsequent floods. During a severe flood in 
2006, Grand Forks only incurred minor infrastructure and property 
damage, as compared to the damage suffered in the 1997 flooding. 

After the 1997 flood, Grand Forks' water treatment and distribution 
facilities were inundated with flood water and suffered heavy damage, 
resulting in no water service for 13 days and no drinkable water for 23 
days. Grand Forks' water system suffered significant damage and needed 
repairs to restore the water distribution and treatment facilities. The 
city used various federal and state funds for the restoration, 
including approximately $5.3 million from FEMA. The city experienced 
challenges during the sewer and water treatment system's closeout 
process (the last step of the program's process, during which FEMA 
certifies that the recovery work has been completed and eligible costs 
have been reimbursed). FEMA questioned whether certain damage was pre- 
existing or occurred as a result of the flood. The city and FEMA came 
to an agreement after the city provided over 40-hours worth of video 
documentation of the sewers, showing both previous damage and flood- 
related damage, which eventually resulted in the successful closeout of 
the projects. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

July 22, 2009: 

Stanley J. Czerwinski: 
Director: 
Strategic Issues Team: 
U.S. Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Czerwinski: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's (GAO's) Draft Report GAO-09-811 entitled, 
"Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for 
Effective Collaboration after Catastrophic Events." 

Recommendation: "To improve the ability of the federal government to 
capture and disseminate recovery information, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to 
establish a mechanism for sharing information and best practices 
focused on disaster recovery, including practices that promote 
effective collaboration such as those discussed in this report. Options 
for doing this could include (1) creating an approach, similar to the 
LLIS Web site or the mitigation best practices portfolio, through which 
disaster recovery lessons can be compiled and shared, and personal 
networks among interested recovery officials encouraged; and/or (2) 
modifying the LLIS Web site to add a focus on recovery by taking steps 
such as including more recovery documents, creating a recovery topic 
area within LLIS, and creating an online directory for recovery 
officials to encourage networking and facilitate further sharing of 
recovery experiences." 

Response: Concur. FEMA concurs with the recommendation outlined in the 
report and will continue to work with our partners to identify, and 
establish as needed, an appropriate information sharing mechanism that 
will improve the ability of the federal government to capture and 
disseminate recovery information. FEMA will evaluate all options that 
will promote and improve effective collaboration processes, including 
those suggested by GAO. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this Draft Report and 
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jacqueline L. Lacasse, for: 

Jerald F. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/0IG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues Team, (202) 512-6808 
or CzerwinskiS@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Peter Del Toro, Assistant 
Director, and Shirley Hwang were the major contributors to this report. 
Additionally, Patrick Breiding, Keya Chateauneuf, Christopher Harm, 
Donna Miller, and Diana Zinkl also made key contributions. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] "The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes" refers to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, which struck the Gulf Coast in August and September of 2005, 
respectively. For the purposes of this report, they are treated 
collectively as a single disaster event. When "the Gulf Coast 
hurricanes" is used, the term also includes Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, 
which struck the Gulf Coast in September 2008. 

[2] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, S. Rept. 109-322 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006); U.S. House of Representatives Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, (Washington, D.C.: February 
2006); White House Homeland Security Council, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C.: February 2006); 
and GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: September 
2006). 

[3] For example, see GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance 
Grant Program Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129] (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2008). 

[4] GAO, Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Insights for 
Recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural 
Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120] 
(Washington, D.C.: September 2008). The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency classifies an event where related federal costs reach or exceed 
$500 million as "catastrophic." Under this definition, all the past 
disasters we reviewed qualify as catastrophic. 

[5] Short-term recovery includes actions such as providing essential 
public health and safety services, restoring interrupted utility and 
other essential services, reestablishing transportation routes, and 
providing food and shelter for those displaced by the incident. 
Although called short-term, some of these activities may last for 
weeks. 

[6] Some examples of long-term recovery include providing permanent 
disaster-resistant housing units to replace those destroyed, initiating 
a low-interest façade loan program for the portion of the downtown area 
that sustained damage from the disaster, and initiating a buyout of 
flood-prone properties and designating them community open space. 

[7] Federal agencies and types of federal assistance differ from 
disaster to disaster. As such, not all the federal agencies we discuss 
are appropriated funds to provide assistance in all domestic disasters. 

[8] The Department of Homeland Security's National Response Framework, 
issued in final form in January 2008, is a guide for how the federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments, along with nongovernmental and 
private sector entities, will collectively respond to and recover from 
all disasters regardless of their cause. The framework recognized the 
need for collaboration among the myriad of entities and personnel 
involved in response efforts at all levels of government, nonprofit 
organizations, and the private sector. While the Emergency Support 
Function #14 is included in this guide, the National Response Framework 
indicates that long-term community recovery is outside its scope. 

[9] GAO, Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October 
2005). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. 

[13] In the Japanese governmental system, a prefecture is an 
administrative district about the size of a county. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. 

[18] Governor's Office of Emergency Services, San Francisco Bay Area 
Regional Emergency Coordination Plan RECP Recovery Subsidiary Plan, 
(San Francisco, Calif: March 2008), [hyperlink, 
http://www.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/Content/F39818FB706ECED6882
5743D00738C6A?OpenDocument], accessed on July 29, 2009. 

[19] According to an official involved in the development of the 
Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, Bay Area state and local 
governments used $2.5 million in funds from the Department of Homeland 
Security's Urban Area Security Initiative Grant (typically used for 
preparedness and response activities) to develop its pre-disaster 
recovery plan. 

[20] GAO, Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Observations on Federal Financial 
Implications, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1079T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2007) and GAO-09-129. 

[21] Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management, Countywide 
Post-Disaster Redevelopment Plan, Palm Beach County, Florida, (West 
Palm Beach, FL: August 2006), [hyperlink, 
http://www.pbcgov.com/publicsafety/emergencymanagement/resources/pdf/pdr
p_AUG_06.pdf], accessed on July 29, 2009. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]. 

[25] For example, according to the Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
(LLIS) system project manager, applications from individuals with a 
".gov" or ".us" Email address are approved immediately. However, 
applications from other types of Email addresses need to be affiliated 
with a recognized domestic organization and demonstrate a "need to 
know" in order to obtain access to LLIS. According to a FEMA official, 
the agency is working to provide limited LLIS access to international 
members. 

[26] As of July 2009, LLIS had over 51,000 active registered members. 

[27] GAO, Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October 
2005). 

[28] GAO has previously reported on regional coordination in the 
context of emergency preparedness, see GAO, Homeland Security: 
Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1009] (Washington, D.C.: 
September 2004). 

[29] The major industries in the city of Santa Cruz, located about 74 
miles south of San Francisco, include agriculture, tourism, 
manufacturing, food processing, and high-tech firms. The population in 
1990 was approximately 49,000. 

[30] Watsonville is located about 20 miles from Santa Cruz and close to 
the epicenter of the Loma Prieta earthquake. Agriculture and food 
processing are the main industries in Watsonville. The population in 
1990 was approximately 31,000. 

[31] GAO, Los Angeles Earthquake: Opinions of Officials on Federal 
Impediments to Rebuilding, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-94-193] (Washington, D.C.: June 
17, 1994). 

[32] In the Japanese governmental system, a prefecture is an 
administrative district about the size of a county. 

[End of section] 

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