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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and
the Internet, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, United
States Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
Emergency Communications:
Vulnerabilities Remain and Limited Collaboration and Monitoring Hamper
Federal Efforts:
GAO-09-604:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-604, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Communications, Technology, and the Internet, Committee on Commerce,
Science & Transportation, United States Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Emergency communications breakdowns undermined response efforts during
terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In response,
federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have increased efforts to
enhance emergency communications. This requested report identifies (1)
vulnerabilities, if any, to emergency communications systems; (2)
federal assistance available or planned to first responders for
addressing vulnerabilities or enhancing emergency communications; and
(3) challenges, if any, with federal emergency communications efforts.
GAO developed six catastrophic disaster case studies, reviewed agency
documents, and interviewed public and private sector officials at the
national, state, and local levels.
What GAO Found:
Continuity of communications, capacity, and interoperability are
primary areas of vulnerability in first responder emergency
communications in communities across the country. The destructive
nature of catastrophic disasters can disrupt continuity of
communications—the ability to maintain communications during and
following a disaster. A volcanic mudflow at Mount Rainier, Washington,
could destroy infrastructure supporting communications systems.
Capacity—a communication system’s ability to handle demand, provide
coverage, and send different types of information—is also vulnerable in
a catastrophic disaster. For example, blind spots, areas outside the
range of communications systems, could inhibit response. Lastly,
vulnerabilities involving interoperability—the ability to communicate
across different organizations and jurisdictions as needed and
authorized—remain due to technological and human factors.
Federal agencies provide a wide range of assistance intended to help
first responders mitigate emergency communications vulnerabilities. GAO
grouped available federal assistance into three categories: (1) new
guidance and other significant federal efforts; (2) grants and funding;
and (3) technical support and federal assets. DHS and other federal
agencies have taken strategic steps to enhance emergency communications
by issuing key documents like the National Emergency Communications
Plan—the first strategic document for improving emergency
communications nationwide. Numerous grants are available and are
increasingly aligned with recently developed national and state plans.
Federal agencies like DHS also offer technical support intended to help
mitigate vulnerabilities through planning and on-the-scene assistance.
Limited collaboration and monitoring jeopardize federal emergency
communications efforts, even as the federal government has taken
strategic steps to assist first responders. Federal agencies have
demonstrated limited use of some best practices that GAO previously
reported as helpful for addressing issues like emergency
communications. Delays in establishing the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center, which would help define common goals and mutually
reinforcing strategies—two collaboration best practices—undermine the
National Emergency Communications Plan’s implementation. DHS and FCC
have also not applied these practices in FCC’s effort to promote a
public safety network for emergency communications. Agency officials
reported it was either too early or not the agency’s responsibility to
use these best practices in developing this network. DHS did not submit
formal comments to FCC and FCC officials described its proposed network
as separate from DHS emergency communications efforts. However, GAO
found potential opportunities to align these agencies’ efforts. Another
collaboration best practice is leveraging resources, which DHS has done
in providing emergency communications technical assistance and planning
guidance. But efforts have focused on state and local jurisdictions and
less on federal agencies, some of which lack formal emergency
communications plans. Monitoring is also crucial in helping agencies
meet goals.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS complete efforts to help implement the National
Emergency Communications Plan; DHS and FCC establish a forum or other
mechanism to collaborate on significant agency emergency communications
efforts; and DHS leverage its expertise to help federal agencies
develop emergency communications plans. DHS and FCC generally agreed
with the recommendations. FCC raised concerns about the report’s depth
and scope. GAO clarified the scope and made other changes, as
appropriate.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-604] or key
components. For more information, contact David J. Wise at (202) 512-
2834 or wised@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Continuity of Communications, Capacity, and Interoperability Are
Primary Areas Where Emergency Communications Remain Vulnerable:
Catastrophic Disasters Threaten Continuity of Communications:
Limited System Capacity Hinders First Responders' Communications:
Interoperability Vulnerabilities Persist:
A Wide Range of Federal Assistance Aimed at Helping First Responders
Mitigate Emergency Communications Vulnerabilities:
New Strategic Guidance among Significant Federal Efforts to Enhance
Emergency Communications:
A Variety of Federal Funding Available:
Technical Support and Federal Assets Are Intended to Help Mitigate
Emergency Communications Vulnerabilities:
Limited Collaboration and Monitoring Jeopardize Significant Federal
Efforts and Impede Progress:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Case Study Disaster Scenarios:
Sacramento Flooding:
Miami Hurricane:
Honolulu/Hilo Tsunami:
Boston Terrorist Attack:
Memphis Earthquake:
Mount Rainier Volcanic Mudflow:
Appendix III: Descriptions of Communications Systems and Technologies
Used by First Responders:
Appendix IV: Stakeholder Group and Advisory Committee Descriptions:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Best Practices in Collaboration:
Table 2: 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership Proceeding:
Table 3: DHS Command, Control and Interoperability Division -identified
Challenges to FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership:
Table 4: DHS Stakeholder Groups and Tracking Activities:
Figures:
Figure 1: Emergency Communications Case Study Locations and Disaster
Type:
Figure 2: Examples of Natural Disaster Hazards in the United States:
Figure 3: Upper 700 MHz D Block and Public Safety Broadband Allocation:
Figure 4: Vulnerabilities Involving Continuity of Communications in an
Earthquake Scenario:
Figure 5: Exposed, Hanging Cable at Mount Rainier National Park:
Figure 6: Vulnerable Fuel Tank in the New Madrid Seismic Zone:
Figure 7: Vulnerabilities Involving Capacity Limitations in a Lahar--
Volcanic Mudflow--Scenario:
Figure 8: Jurisdictions' Emergency Response Vehicles:
Figure 9: Vulnerabilities Involving Interoperability in a Hurricane
Scenario:
Figure 10: National Emergency Communications Plan Framework:
Figure 11: Status of Regional Emergency Communications Coordination
Working Groups:
Figure 12: Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grants and
Efforts to Align Targeted Investments for First Responders with the
SCIP:
Figure 13: FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support Vehicle:
Figure 14: Analysis of FCC's Third Further Notice and DHS Efforts:
Figure 15: Analysis of Advisory Group Recommendations 2004-2008:
Figure 16: Number of Major Flood Declarations by County, 1980 - 2005:
Figure 17: Number of Hurricane Strikes by County, 1980 - 2007:
Figure 18: Tsunami Hazard Based on Frequency:
Figure 19: Urban Areas Security Initiative Regions, 2008:
Figure 20: High, Medium, and Low Seismic Hazards:
Figure 21: Location of High Threat and Very High Threat Volcanoes in
the United States:
Figure 22: Depiction of Land Mobile Radio System:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FCC: Federal Communications Commission:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NCS: National Communications System:
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration:
SCIP: Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan:
USGS: United States Geological Survey:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 26, 2009:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet:
Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and response to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 exposed the severe consequences of breakdowns in
emergency communications used by first responders. Failures in
emergency communications resulted in numerous lost lives and
exacerbated already challenging situations. These past events have
increased focus on the need to enhance emergency communications to
respond more effectively to future catastrophic disasters. Effective
response to catastrophic disasters will require that first responders--
law enforcement personnel, firefighters, and others first on the scene--
have reliable communication systems, including supporting
infrastructure, facilities, and staff. Such communication systems would
enable first responders to communicate through voice, video, and other
information seamlessly among themselves, various organizations, and
different levels of government. Unless otherwise noted, when we refer
to emergency communications systems, we mean those systems used by
first responders. Since September 11, 2001, state and local
jurisdictions, as well as the private sector, have invested billions of
dollars to build and enhance existing communications systems.
Federal agencies have played and will continue to play an important
role in supporting the further enhancement of emergency communications.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has led the development of
guidance and equipment standards, as well as technological innovation.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS has
distributed grant funding, maintained and provided emergency
communications assets, and developed assessment and planning tools for
state and local jurisdictions. Other federal agency efforts are also
underway. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent
regulatory agency that oversees use of radio spectrum for non-federal
entities, is currently pursuing the development of a nationwide,
interoperable broadband network for public safety. Because catastrophic
disasters can almost immediately overwhelm the response capabilities of
state and local first responders, effective federal support before,
during, and after such a disaster will be critical. That support may
include providing communication assets, personnel, and support directly
to state and local first responders. We have previously reported that
best practices in collaboration and monitoring can aid federal agencies
in addressing national, cross-cutting issues such as emergency
communications.[Footnote 1] In particular, we have found that given the
importance of emergency communications and limited resources, it is
critical that agencies find ways to work together to achieve effective
and efficient outcomes.
In response to your request, this report focuses on issues related to
emergency communications systems used by first responders in the
aftermath of catastrophic disasters. Specifically, we identified and
examined (1) vulnerabilities, if any, to emergency communications
systems, (2) federal assistance available or planned to first
responders for addressing any vulnerabilities or enhancing emergency
communications, and (3) challenges, if any, with federal emergency
communications efforts.
To identify and examine vulnerabilities, if any, to existing emergency
communications systems, we developed six case studies and subsequent
analyses of varying catastrophic disaster scenarios both natural and
man-made (see figure 1). These case studies included a flood in
northern California, a hurricane in southern Florida, a tsunami in
Hawaii, a terrorist attack in Massachusetts, an earthquake in
Tennessee, and a volcanic mudflow in the state of Washington. In
selecting our case studies involving natural disasters, we conferred
with subject matter experts from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), United States Geological Survey (USGS), and
other nongovernmental entities, as well as reviewed data on each
respective location's natural hazards. We also considered factors such
as the likelihood of occurrence, economic impacts, potential fatalities
and injuries, and geographic diversity. For our case study involving a
terrorist attack, we used scenario information produced by the Homeland
Security Council[Footnote 2] and selected a New England location to
provide geographic diversity among our six case studies. We visited
site locations for each of our six case studies and interviewed local
and state emergency managers; police officers, firefighters, and other
first responders; and regional federal officials to help identify
emergency communications vulnerabilities. We also conducted a
literature review of our prior products and other federal agency
reports on emergency communications to analyze and ascertain common
vulnerabilities.
Figure 1: Emergency Communications Case Study Locations and Disaster
Type:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the following case study locations:
Location: Boston;
Disaster type: Terrorist attack.
Location: Honolulu;
Disaster type: Tsunami.
Location: Memphis;
Disaster type: Earthquake.
Location: Miami;
Disaster type: Hurricane.
Location: Mt. Ranier;
Disaster type: Volcanic mudflow.
Location: Sacramento;
Disaster type: Flooding.
Sources: GAO and MapArt.
[End of figure]
To identify and examine federal assistance available to first
responders for emergency communications, we interviewed officials and
reviewed program documents from a variety of federal agencies with
responsibility for emergency communications efforts available or
planned, such as DHS, FCC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ). During
our case study work, state and local first responders, as well as
federal officials, also provided information on federal efforts that we
report on. To identify and examine any challenges in the federal
approach to supporting emergency communications, we consulted our
related past work on emergency communications, interagency
collaboration, and federal government program management and
performance. We analyzed key federal agency documents, such as DHS's
National Emergency Communications Plan and FCC's notices for proposed
rulemaking for an interoperable nationwide broadband public safety
network to determine the extent of interagency collaboration and
monitoring in some significant federal efforts. We interviewed federal
agency officials to determine what steps had been taken by their
respective agencies to collaborate and monitor these efforts. We also
interviewed state and local first responders, professional and trade
group representatives, and officials in the telecommunications industry
to obtain their perspectives on significant federal efforts.
We conducted this performance audit work from February 2008 to May 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Continuity of communications, capacity, and interoperability are the
primary areas of vulnerability in emergency communications that persist
in communities across the country, based on interviews with state and
local first responders in our six case studies and others, as well as a
literature review, including our prior work. DHS and FCC have described
similar vulnerabilities. First responders also noted that
communications vulnerabilities extend beyond our case study locations
and disaster scenarios.
* Through powerful effects, such as high winds and ground shaking,
potential catastrophic disasters can disrupt continuity of
communications--the ability to maintain communications during and
following a disaster--by destroying infrastructure supporting
communications systems. For example, a volcanic mudflow at Mount
Rainier National Park in Washington state could destroy cable
supporting phone communications. In addition, disasters may limit
continuity of communications by damaging communications facilities and
stranding first responders. For example, a major earthquake in
Tennessee could damage roads and bridges, stranding Memphis first
responders across the Mississippi River.
* Limitations in system capacity--a communication system's ability to
handle demand, provide coverage, and send different types of
information--could inhibit response. Spikes in demand following a
disaster can cause communications systems to crash and system outages
place additional demands on remaining systems. In addition, areas
outside of the range of local communications systems can limit response
efforts by creating "blind spots" in coverage, such as those found in
Hawaii's mountainous terrain. Furthermore, some equipment may lack the
capacity to send photographs and video, reducing first responders'
situational awareness.
* We have previously reported on vulnerabilities involving
interoperability--the ability to communicate across different
organizations and jurisdictions as needed and authorized--and first
responders we interviewed identified technological and human factors
that continue to limit interoperability. Jurisdictions use various, and
at times incompatible, communications systems. For example, some fire
departments have hesitated to use digital radio systems, which could
create incompatibility with other first responder systems, such as law
enforcement. The fast-changing nature of technology compounds the
difficulty of fostering and maintaining interoperability. Human factors
can also limit interoperability, such as the increasingly critical need
to have staff trained to coordinate with a growing number of
jurisdictions.
Federal agencies provide a wide range of assistance intended to help
first responders mitigate emergency communications vulnerabilities,
which we grouped in three categories: (1) new guidance and other
significant federal efforts, (2) grants and funding, and (3) technical
support and federal assets. Recently, DHS and other federal agencies
have taken significant and strategic steps to enhance emergency
communications by issuing the National Emergency Communications Plan in
July 2008, the first strategic document focused exclusively on
improving emergency communications nationwide. Other recent federal
efforts underway include completing a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
to establish the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center--to be
jointly operated by a number of federal agencies such as DHS, FCC, and
the Department of Commerce, as the focal point and clearinghouse for
implementing federal interoperability efforts--and establishing
multiple DHS and FCC stakeholder groups to formulate recommendations
for improving emergency communications based on lessons learned from
previous disasters. The second category of assistance includes a wide
range of grants and funding, some of which are increasingly aligned
with recently developed national and state plans. Finally, federal
agencies such as DHS offer technical support and assets intended to
help mitigate emergency communications vulnerabilities, both through
advanced planning and on-the-scene assistance. For example, DHS has
developed programs such as the Interoperable Communications Technical
Assistance Program, providing support to first responders for planning
and technical issues to be considered when developing interoperable
communications.
Limited collaboration and monitoring jeopardize progress in emergency
communications, even as the federal government has taken significant
and strategic steps to assist first responders. Federal agencies have
demonstrated limited application of some collaboration best practices
that we have previously reported as helping address issues like
emergency communications, which are national in scope and cross agency
jurisdictions. For example, delays in establishing the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center, which would help define common
goals and mutually reinforcing strategies--two collaboration best
practices--undermine the implementation of the National Emergency
Communications Plan, which relies heavily on participation from
multiple agencies. Additionally, DHS and FCC have not established a
common vision or mutually reinforcing strategies for a nationwide
broadband public safety policy, although both agencies play key roles
in such a development--DHS as the agency responsible for developing and
overseeing the National Emergency Communications Plan and FCC as the
agency charged with overseeing spectrum for non-federal entities.
Although FCC has for the last several years been engaged in an effort
to promote a nationwide interoperable broadband network for public
safety ("700 MHz Public/Private Partnership"), there has been limited
coordination with DHS. According to officials from DHS and FCC, it was
either too early or not the agency's responsibility to undertake these
best practices for this effort. DHS did not submit formal comments to
FCC during its most recent 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership comment
period. FCC officials described the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
and the National Emergency Communications Plan as two separate, but
parallel efforts. However, based on our analysis, we found potential
opportunities to align DHS and FCC emergency communications efforts.
Another collaboration best practice is leveraging resources. While DHS
has leveraged its expertise in emergency communications planning to
provide technical assistance and guidance, these efforts have focused
on state and local jurisdictions, and less so on other federal
agencies, some of which do not have formal emergency communications
plans. We have also previously reported that monitoring and evaluating
efforts are crucial elements to achieving agency goals. Although DHS
and FCC have various ways of examining stakeholder group
recommendations, neither agency systematically monitors or evaluates
recommendations from agency-assembled stakeholder groups or the
agency's response either, potentially limiting the groups' relevance
and value in addressing vulnerabilities.
We make four recommendations in this report to improve federal
agencies' collaboration and monitoring in efforts related to emergency
communications. To help foster implementation of the National Emergency
Communications Plan, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland
Security work to complete a memorandum to establish the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center. To help ensure that significant
federal efforts are collaborative, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Chair of FCC establish a forum,
or other mechanism, to better collaborate to identify and discuss
challenges, opportunities, and potential ways to better align their
emergency communications efforts, such as the National Emergency
Communications Plan and the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. To help
ensure that federal agencies are well-positioned to support state and
local first responders in a disaster, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Homeland Security provide guidance and technical
assistance to federal agencies in developing formal emergency
communications plans. Finally, to enhance the value of DHS and FCC
stakeholder group recommendations, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Chair of FCC systematically
track, assess, and respond to stakeholder groups' recommendations.
We provided a draft of this report, for official review and comment, to
DHS, FCC, Commerce, Interior, and DOJ. DHS generally agreed with our
recommendations and provided comments that are discussed near the end
of this letter. DHS's comments are contained in appendix V. FCC
provided comments via e-mail and agreed with our recommendations, but
raised concerns that related to the depth and scope of our analysis,
such as stating that the report relies heavily on anecdotes and
opinion. We made changes to clarify the scope of our work, but remain
confident about our findings and conclusions. We discuss FCC's comments
in detail near the end of this letter. The comments from Commerce and
Interior are discussed near the end of this letter and contained in
appendixes VI and VII, respectively. Interior commented that the report
could have been improved by incorporating Interior or federal
interoperability collaboration efforts in regards to emergency response
capabilities. DOJ did not comment on the report. DHS, FCC, Commerce,
and Interior also provided technical comments that we incorporated,
where appropriate.
Background:
Many regions of the country face hazards from natural and man-made
disasters, some of which could prove catastrophic (see figure 2).
Unlike most typical disasters, catastrophic incidents can yield
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption,
immediately overwhelming the response capacities of state and local
resources, and requiring outside action and support from the federal
government and other entities.[Footnote 3] Some catastrophic disasters,
such as large-scale hurricanes, may be detected or forecast well before
they impact population centers, though their intensity and path can
change significantly and quickly. Other catastrophic incidents, such as
earthquakes and terrorist attacks, can occur with little or no notice.
DHS has encouraged an all-hazards approach to disaster planning, to
ensure that communities consider all threats faced, both natural and
man-made, in the planning process. An all-hazards approach accounts for
vulnerabilities, such as damage to infrastructure, that occur in
various types of disasters in locations across the country. Some types
of disasters, such as hurricanes, are more likely to occur in certain
areas of the country, but many regions face hazards from one or
multiple types of disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and
response is to prevent where possible, prepare for, or mitigate, and
respond to disasters of any size or cause with effective actions at all
levels of government that minimize the loss of life and property and
set the stage for a quick recovery.[Footnote 4]
Figure 2: Examples of Natural Disaster Hazards in the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the locations of the following natural disaster hazards
in the United States:
Seismic hazard;
Flood hazard;
Tsunami hazard;
Hurricane hazard.
Also indicated on the map are the locations of high threat or very high
threat volcano hazards.
Sources: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and United
States Geological Survey (USGS) data; Map Resources (map).
Note: Figure 2 depicts only those natural disasters included as part of
our case study work and omits other disaster types, such as tornadoes.
We derived hurricane hazards in the figure from hurricane strike data
from 1980 through 2007. NOAA officials noted that the impact of
hurricanes can be felt along the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic Coasts from
Texas to Maine and extend inland for hundreds of miles.
[End of figure]
First responders play a critical role in disaster preparedness and
recovery, assisting in the response to emergency events, including
catastrophic disasters. Typically, first responders include law
enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and others who
are among the first on the scene of an emergency. However, since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the definition of first
responder has grown to include other organizations, such as public
health and hospital personnel, which may not be on the scene, but are
essential in supporting effective response and recovery operations.
Depending on the nature and location of a catastrophic event,
responders on the scene may also include federal agencies directing all
or a portion of the federal disaster response or assisting state and
local first responders in their response efforts. For example, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would participate in the response
to a terrorist attack, based on its mission to protect and defend the
United States against terrorist threats.
Communications systems serve as the backbone for first responders in
gathering and sharing information, coordinating response, and
requesting additional resources and assistance from neighboring
jurisdictions and/or the federal government. Effective communications
are vital to first responders' ability to respond and ensure the safety
of both their personnel and the public. First responders cooperate to
rescue victims, oftentimes relying on several different communications
systems to do so. Voice, data, and video technology, if available, can
be used to share information seamlessly between first responders, other
various organizations, and different levels of government.
Recent catastrophic events have underscored the importance of emergency
communications. For example, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the
large number of deaths among firefighters during the collapse of the
World Trade Center was partly attributable to a communications failure.
[Footnote 5] Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress expanded a number of federal
agencies' roles and responsibilities related to emergency
communications. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and
required the agency, among other things, to build a comprehensive
national incident management system comprising all levels of government
and to consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans
into a single, coordinated national response plan.[Footnote 6]
Hurricane Katrina highlighted additional communications challenges and
demonstrated the need to improve emergency communications leadership at
all levels of government in order to better respond to a catastrophic
disaster.
More recent legislation has directed DHS and FEMA to take on certain
roles and actions related to emergency response and emergency
communications. To address many of the challenges highlighted by the
Hurricane Katrina response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of October 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) was enacted, and
established within DHS, the Office of Emergency Communications to help
develop, implement, and coordinate interoperable and operable
communications for the emergency response community at all levels of
government.[Footnote 7] The Office of Emergency Communications also
oversees other DHS efforts, including elements of the SAFECOM program,
[Footnote 8] and the development of the National Emergency
Communications Plan and other key documents intended to create an
overarching strategy to address emergency communications shortfalls.
The Post-Katrina Act also charged FEMA with the primary responsibility
for coordinating and implementing key aspects of federal emergency
preparedness and response, including grants management. As required by
the act, FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based,
comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation. FEMA leads the integration of
tactical federal emergency communications during disasters and often
deploys personnel or equipment to the scene of a disaster to manage the
federal response.
Other federal agencies also have a role in emergency communications and
disaster response. For example, in September 2006, FCC established its
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, which is responsible for
developing, recommending, and administering the agency's policies
pertaining to public safety communications issues.[Footnote 9] The
bureau submits annual reports to the FCC Chairman and Commissioners and
hosts quarterly summits on various topics relevant to the public safety
community. In addition, the bureau has established a clearinghouse to
collect, evaluate, and disseminate public safety information. FCC also
manages the use of the radio-frequency spectrum by non-federal
entities, such as commercial enterprises, state and local governments,
and public safety organizations. Radio spectrum is a fixed, limited
resource, which government and nongovernmental entities share for
commercial and public safety communications.[Footnote 10] In 1993,
legislation authorized FCC to use competitive bidding--or auctions--to
assign spectrum licenses to commercial users.[Footnote 11] For the last
several years, FCC has pursued a new Public/Private Partnership (the
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership) in a proceeding involving
commercial and public safety spectrum in the 700 MHz Band, which was
occupied by television broadcasters.[Footnote 12] As part of the
digital television transition, this spectrum was to be cleared and made
available for public safety and commercial services in June 2009.
[Footnote 13] See figure 3.[Footnote 14]
Figure 3: Upper 700 MHz D Block and Public Safety Broadband Allocation:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following broadband allocation is depicted:
Commercial allocation:
746 MHz to 763 MHz;
Channels 60, 61, 62.
Public/Private Partnership:
758 MHz to 768 MHz;
Channels 62, 63.
758 MHz to 763 MHz is considered D Block;
763 MHz to 768 MHz is considered Broadband;
768 MHz to 775 MHz is considered Narrowband.
Public Safety allocation:
763 MHz to 775 MHz;
Channels 63, 64.
Commercial allocation:
775 MHz to 788 MHz;
Channels 65, 66.
Public/Private Partnership:
788 MHz to 798 MHz;
Channels 67, 68.
Public Safety allocation:
793 MHz to 805 MHz;
Channels 68, 69.
788 MHz to 793 MHz is considered D Block;
793 MHz to 798 MHz is considered Broadband;
798 MHz to 805 MHz is considered Narrowband.
Television broadcasters must vacate channels 60-69, clearing the
frequencies for reallocation.
Source: NTIA and GAO.
[End of figure]
Another agency with a role in emergency communications is the
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), which is responsible for managing spectrum used
by the federal government.[Footnote 15] Officials from NTIA and other
agencies also serve on a number of interagency committees to coordinate
their activities on a standing and disaster-activated basis. DHS's
National Communications System (NCS) coordinates the emergency support
function for communications, which involves, among other things,
oversight of communications within the federal incident management and
response structures. Interior has also been an active joint federal
partner through the National Interagency Fire Center, which has
provided search and rescue capabilities, as well as deploying,
operating, and managing communications systems during recent disasters.
With a mission to ensure public safety against foreign and domestic
threats, DOJ has also worked with other federal agencies, such as DHS
and the Department of the Treasury, to improve disaster response. For
example, in 2001, DOJ initiated an effort to provide secure, seamless,
and interoperable wireless communications for federal agents and
officers engaged in law enforcement, homeland defense, and disaster
response.[Footnote 16]
Multiple federal agencies have a role in disaster preparedness and
response, and there are several best practices agencies can employ to
help overcome the barriers to successful inter-agency collaboration. We
have previously reported on collaboration best practices, which are
useful in addressing issues that are national in scope and cross agency
jurisdictions, such as emergency communications.[Footnote 17] For the
purposes of our report, we focus on the three best practices described
in table 1. Prior GAO work has also shown that monitoring and
evaluating agency actions and progress can help key decision-makers
obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational
effectiveness.[Footnote 18]
Table 1: Best Practices in Collaboration:
Collaboration practice: Define and articulate a common outcome;
Description: Collaboration requires agency staff working across agency
lines to define and articulate the common federal outcome or purpose
they are seeking to achieve that is consistent with their respective
agency goals and mission.
Collaboration practice: Establish mutually reinforcing or joint
strategies;
Description: To achieve a common outcome, collaborating agencies need
to establish strategies that work in concert with those of their
partners or are joint in nature. Such strategies help in aligning the
partner agencies' activities, core processes, and resources to
accomplish the common outcome.
Collaboration practice: Identify and address needs by leveraging
resources;
Description: Collaborating agencies bring different levels of resources
to the effort. Collaborating agencies can look for opportunities to
address resource needs by leveraging each other's resources, thus
obtaining additional benefits that would not be available if they were
working separately.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To improve emergency preparedness, states, regions, and local
jurisdictions have also invested billions to build dedicated networks
and acquire technology, lease or subscribe to private carrier services
for primary or backup systems, and to maintain and test existing
communications systems. Similarly, private stakeholders, such as
telecommunications companies and equipment manufacturers, have invested
heavily to develop innovative technological solutions and expand or
strengthen their networks for emergency responders and commercial use.
Private stakeholders develop proprietary technology and networks that
first responder agencies may buy, lease, or subscribe to by paying
service charges (see appendix III for an overview of some of the
various technologies that first responders use).
Continuity of Communications, Capacity, and Interoperability Are
Primary Areas Where Emergency Communications Remain Vulnerable:
Continuity of communications, capacity, and interoperability are the
primary areas of vulnerability in emergency communications that persist
in communities across the country. We identified these vulnerabilities
in interviews with state and local first responders in each of our six
case studies and others, as well as a review of emergency
communications literature, which include our prior work. DHS and FCC
have identified similar vulnerabilities in recent work, including
continuity of communications and interoperability.[Footnote 19] First
responders also noted that identified communications vulnerabilities
extend beyond the communities in our case study locations and that
other disaster scenarios pose similar hazards.
Catastrophic Disasters Threaten Continuity of Communications:
Destructive forces, such as high winds and ground shaking, during
catastrophic disasters can disrupt first responders' continuity of
communications--the ability to maintain communications during and
following a disaster--in a number of ways. Using the scenario of a
major earthquake in a city, figure 4 depicts how damage to supporting
infrastructure and communications facilities, as well as stranding
first responders, may threaten continuity of communications.[Footnote
20]
Figure 4: Vulnerabilities Involving Continuity of Communications in an
Earthquake Scenario:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Pre-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following structures:
Communications facility;
Backup communications facility;
First responder;
Residential neighborhood;
Bridge with attached telecommunications infrastructure.
Post-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following challenges:
(1) Damage to supporting infrastructure: Infrastructure supporting
communications may be damaged by collapsed bridges and buildings;
(2) Damage to communications facilities: Facilities serve as rallying
points and damage can render them useless. Backup facilities may be
available.
(3) First responders stranded: Disaster damage may strand first
responders or otherwise make it impossible for them to participate in
response.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Damage to Supporting Infrastructure. Communications systems used by
first responders, such as landline phone systems and certain radio
systems, cannot function without phone cables, radio towers, and other
supporting infrastructure. For example, Hurricane Katrina's high winds
and flooding destroyed emergency communications infrastructure in
Louisiana and Mississippi, disrupting continuity of communications in
several states and inhibiting the response. Potential, future
catastrophic disasters pose similar hazards, such as a lahar--a
volcanic mudflow--in Mount Rainier National Park in Washington state.
[Footnote 21] National Park Service officials stationed in the park
said that the park's telephone system relies on a privately-owned phone
cable, which is old and exposed in many locations (see figure 5).
According to park officials, keeping the cable operational is a
constant challenge even under normal circumstances. In the event of a
lahar at Mount Rainier, fast-moving mud and debris could destroy the
cable and disrupt the park's phone system (see appendix II for more
information on the hazards associated with our six case studies).
Figure 5: Exposed, Hanging Cable at Mount Rainier National Park:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Damage to Communications Facilities. Emergency operations centers
[Footnote 22] and other facilities serve as command posts from which
first responders coordinate and launch a response. Yet a disaster may
damage or destroy these facilities, rendering them useless. First
responders in Jackson, Tennessee, described intense tornadoes hitting
and damaging two emergency operations centers in 2003, which then
inhibited the response. Responders in Jackson and Memphis, Tennessee,
also said that some of their facilities were vulnerable to future
earthquakes generated in the New Madrid seismic zone.[Footnote 23]
Local facilities were not constructed to withstand seismic shaking, and
some are located on thick sediment, which can amplify seismic shaking.
Even if a facility experiences little direct damage, the disaster may
down power lines to the facility, which some communications systems
need to function. Officials at the National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council described maintaining power as the most
basic vulnerability facing emergency communications after a disaster.
Officials at the Central United States Earthquake Consortium[Footnote
24] noted that facilities in Tennessee and neighboring states have
backup power generators. However, some fuel tanks powering the
generators are not properly secured and may otherwise be vulnerable to
seismic shaking (see figure 6).
Figure 6: Vulnerable Fuel Tank in the New Madrid Seismic Zone:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph are the following items:
* Unreinforced cinder-block building;
* Inflexible copper pipe buried just below the ground;
* Fuel tank resting unanchored on concrete block feet.
Sources: The Central United States Earthquake Consortium (photograph);
and GAO.
[End of figure]
To help maintain continuity of communications, some jurisdictions have
designed facilities to withstand damages expected from future
disasters. For example, Miami-Dade County officials described
mitigating potential hurricane wind damage at a county communications
facility by adding a sloped roof. First responders in Memphis,
Tennessee reported that some newer facilities had been built to
supposedly resist seismic shaking. Tennessee and California first
responders identified backup locations that they would move to if their
facilities were damaged, but this move would take time before they
would regain full communications capabilities.
Stranded First Responders. Disasters may strand first responders or
otherwise make it impossible for them to participate in a response.
Following Hurricane Katrina, many state and local first responders were
incapacitated and flooding blocked access. This inhibited response by
preventing the establishment of a command structure for the response,
reducing communications and awareness of the situation following
Hurricane Katrina's landfall. Memphis first responders expressed
concerns that a future, major earthquake in the New Madrid seismic zone
will damage bridges and strand some first responders across the
Mississippi River in Arkansas. With the Mississippi river bisecting the
region, bridges are some of the most important and seismically
vulnerable piece of the transportation network. A majority of the
bridges were designed with little or no seismic consideration. Law
enforcement and fire department officials in Tennessee, Florida, and
Washington state conveyed concerns about the ability of their staff to
report after a major disaster. Damage to first responders' property, as
well as personal injury to themselves or family, can also prevent
participation in response. To address such difficulties and maintain
continuity of communications, Miami-Dade County has taken steps to
enable responders' families to shelter in local facilities and to help
repair first responder property damage.
Limited System Capacity Hinders First Responders' Communications:
A number of capacity issues can hamper emergency communications systems
used in disaster response. For our work, we use the term "capacity" to
refer to a communication system's ability to handle demand, provide
coverage, and send different types of information (i.e., voice and
data). Using the scenario of a lahar hitting a small town, figure 7
depicts how capacity may be threatened by system crashes due to demand,
the existence of blind spots, and an inability to use non-voice
communications.
Figure 7: Vulnerabilities Involving Capacity Limitations in a Lahar--
Volcanic Mudflow--Scenario:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Pre-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following:
Communications tower;
Area of coverage;
Area of no coverage;
Post-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following challenges:
(1) System crashes due to demand: Spikes in demand following a disaster
may lead to system crashes;
(2) Existence of blind spots: Finite infrastructure and local geography
can limit communications coverage;
(3) Inability to use non-voice communications: Some systems cannot send
photographs and video, which can increase awareness of the situation.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
System Crashes due to Demand. Some communications systems used by first
responders may lack the capacity to prevent system crashes due to
spikes in demand, which can follow disasters. Telecommunications
company officials reported that their systems are not designed to
handle everyone in a region calling simultaneously. Past disasters,
such as the terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
created excessive demand, which caused communications system to crash.
System outages can also place additional demands on remaining systems.
More recently, officials in the California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services reported that over 5 million calls followed a
moderate earthquake and disrupted communications for a short time. FCC
has reported that first responders enjoy communications capabilities
that are more robust than those provided by the private sector; yet,
communications also rely on the functioning of the 85 percent of the
nation's critical communications infrastructure that the private sector
controls. Boston Fire Department officials told us that they anticipate
reduced communications capabilities following a disaster due to system
crashes. Jurisdictions are working to increase capacity on public and
private sector communications systems and related infrastructure. For
example, some jurisdictions are building new fiber optic networks. In
addition, some telecommunications companies offer jurisdictions
services for additional system capacity in a disaster, such as "cell on
wheels" and "cell phone on light trucks," to restore communications.
[Footnote 25]
Existence of Blind Spots. Communications system "blind spots"--that is,
areas that lie outside the range of local communications systems--exist
for a number of reasons. Some communications systems have finite
infrastructure, such as radio systems with a limited number of towers
and effective transmission range. In addition, local geography can
create blind spots as elevation changes or high-rise buildings
interfere with radio signals. We observed instances of system blind
spots in our case studies. According to Hawaii first responders,
mountainous terrain has created blind spots for some communities near
the water, which could inhibit emergency communications and response
during a tsunami.[Footnote 26] Law enforcement officials in one of our
other case study locations also reported that some local tunnels are
blind spots for certain emergency communications systems in the area.
Jurisdictions are addressing blind spots by investing in mobile
communications vehicles. In the event of an existing blind spot, or
damage from a disaster creating new ones, these vehicles can plug gaps
in emergency communications coverage by establishing a mobile
communications network at or near the scene of an incident. Vehicles
are equipped with cellular and satellite phone and fax capabilities, an
on-board computer network, printers and satellite, internet access,
video teleconferencing, recording, and broadcast/satellite television
(see figure 8). However, such assets are not a cure all for blind spots
and may not be able to support all organizations responding to a
disaster.
Figure 8: Jurisdictions' Emergency Response Vehicles:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
* Jackson Police Department communications vehicle;
* Interior of the Jackson Police communications vehicle, showing a work
desk with two computer monitors and wireless Internet;
* Boston Fire Department communications vehicle;
* Pierce County communications vehicle.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Inability to Send Non-Voice Communications. Some current systems are
not designed to send non-voice communications, such as photographs and
video. First responders in several of our case study areas described
additional capabilities that developing non-voice communications would
provide. For example, photographs and video can quickly convey an
emergency situation, saving time in response. Related capabilities,
such as geospatial mapping, can accurately identify the location of
first responders relative to a disaster. Hawaii first responders
described an instance battling brush fires when air reconnaissance had
to roughly convey its location using voice descriptions compared with a
paper map. Some jurisdictions we interviewed are expanding, or planning
to expand, their systems' capacity to transmit photographs and videos.
For example, first responders in Sacramento, California, have planned
to install a digital radio system in their emergency operations center,
which would enable both voice and data transmissions.
Interoperability Vulnerabilities Persist:
We have previously reported on vulnerabilities involving
interoperability, which is the ability of first responders to
communicate with whomever they need to (including personnel from a
variety of agencies and jurisdictions), when they need to, and when
they are authorized to do so. Facilitating interoperability has been a
concern for many years, and we have cited a variety of obstacles to
effective interoperable communications among first responders.[Footnote
27] While we have reported on progress in improving interoperability
among first responders, our case study work shows that technological
and human factors continue to impair interoperability. Using the
scenario of a hurricane hitting a coastal city, figure 9 depicts how
interoperability may be threatened by jurisdictions using different
technologies, fast-changing technologies, the critical nature of
training, and jurisdictional tensions.
Figure 9: Vulnerabilities Involving Interoperability in a Hurricane
Scenario:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Pre-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following:
Jurisdiction 1;
Jurisdiction 1 technology (radar/communications tower);
Jurisdiction 2;
Jurisdiction 2 technology (radar/communications tower).
Post-disaster:
Drawing depicts the following technology challenges:
(1) Jurisdictions use different technology: Various and sometimes
incompatible technology is in use;
(2) Fast-changing technology: Replacements and upgrades make it
difficult to foster interoperability.
Drawing also depicts the following human factors:
(3) Training increasingly critical: Staff require training to operate
complex technology and to work with other jurisdictions;
(4) Jurisdictional tensions: Frustration and uncertainty on
communications.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Jurisdictions Use Different and Fast-Changing Technology. First
responders continue to use various, and at times, incompatible
communications technology, making it difficult to communicate with
neighboring jurisdictions or other first responders to carry out
response. For example, some fire departments have hesitated to use
digital radio systems due to safety concerns, which could create
incompatibility with other responders' equipment, such as law
enforcement (see appendix III for more information on communications
systems used by first responders).[Footnote 28] According to first
responders in Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Washington state, 800 MHz
radio systems perform poorly in buildings. Difficult radio
communications in high-rise buildings contributed to firefighter deaths
during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City as
some firefighters did not receive the transmission to evacuate the
World Trade Center. In another example, Hawaii's geographic isolation
has contributed to island jurisdictions independently designing their
communications systems, resulting in disparate systems statewide. This
can prove problematic for interoperability, particularly if a major
disaster required responder assistance from neighboring islands.
Given the fast-changing nature of communications technology, upgrade
needs and replacement cycles compound interoperability vulnerabilities.
Officials at the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
reported that keeping up with technology is difficult for jurisdictions
due to funding constraints. Yet some jurisdictions must upgrade when
manufacturers eliminate technical support for older systems. Other
legacy systems still in use are aging or obsolete. For example, some
communications systems currently used by California's first responders
have reached or exceeded their life expectancy, while other components
need replacement. Not all jurisdictions, however, maintain the same
upgrade schedule. For example, first responders in Pierce County,
Washington, described coordinated efforts by them and other
jurisdictions to help ensure that different technological upgrades and
other system changes increase rather than reduce existing
interoperability.
To account for different and sometimes incompatible communications
systems, some jurisdictions have used technologies to facilitate
interoperability by "patching" together different systems into a common
network. For example, first responders in Florida, Massachusetts, and
Washington state described using equipment to create a local area
network that can patch in different communications systems. This
patched network can create local interoperability among different
jurisdictions' communications systems. However, first responders noted
instances where patching technology failed to establish
interoperability.[Footnote 29] Also, some patching equipment cannot
provide blanket interoperability for an entire city or county and thus
may be insufficient to meet communications needs in a catastrophic
incident.
Human Factors. Several jurisdictions emphasized that training was
increasingly critical to operate complicated equipment and coordinate
with multiple jurisdictions to improve interoperability. The
Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security reported
that achieving interoperability not only requires equipment, but staff
must be regularly trained to work effectively with a number of
jurisdictions. According to the 9-11 Commission Report,[Footnote 30]
the New York City Police and Fire Departments were not prepared to
comprehensively coordinate with one another on the day of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This led to communications breakdowns
where responding agencies lacked knowledge of what other agencies were
doing. For example, firefighters did not receive information from
police helicopters regarding damage to the World Trade Center. There
were also jurisdictional tensions as some reports indicated that
firefighters refused to evacuate when asked by police officers,
contributing to deaths. We observed jurisdictional tension in several
of our case studies, which could inhibit cooperation and achieving
interoperability. First responders in Florida, Massachusetts, and
Washington state noted frustration with neighboring jurisdictions and
uncertainty over how jurisdictions would communicate in the event of a
disaster. Working well with others and reducing tensions has taken on
increasing importance as more jurisdictions, such as public works, are
regarded as first responders and participate in emergency
communications. Memphis first responders said that achieving
interoperability requires not only compatible technology, but also
jurisdictions building relationships among personnel.
A Wide Range of Federal Assistance Aimed at Helping First Responders
Mitigate Emergency Communications Vulnerabilities:
Federal agencies such as DHS and FCC have a wide range of assistance
intended to help first responders mitigate emergency communications
vulnerabilities. Available assistance includes federal agency guidance,
grants, and technical support. We have identified several examples of
key federal assistance used by first responders.[Footnote 31]
New Strategic Guidance among Significant Federal Efforts to Enhance
Emergency Communications:
DHS and other federal agencies have recently developed strategic
guidance and pursued significant efforts to enhance emergency
communications. Efforts such as the National Emergency Communications
Plan, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, and various
stakeholder and advisory groups reflect an emphasis on developing a
more strategic approach to federal government efforts to mitigate
emergency communications vulnerabilities. Other recent efforts underway
include FCC's new approach to establishing a 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership.
National Emergency Communications Plan. DHS's Office of Emergency
Communications released the National Emergency Communications Plan in
July 2008, providing a framework for emergency communications users
across all levels of government.[Footnote 32] The plan is the first
strategic document focused exclusively on improving emergency
communications nationwide, and outlines an overarching strategy to
address emergency communications shortfalls for federal, state, and
local first responders. The plan includes strategic emergency
communications goals and objectives, and recommends numerous
initiatives and milestones to guide emergency response providers and
government officials in making measurable improvements to emergency
communications (see figure 10). Congress required this plan--developed
with federal, state, local, and private sector stakeholder involvement
and multiple policy and planning documents--to be subject to periodic
review and updates. An important foundation for the plan, the National
Communications Capabilities Report--also released in July 2008--
provides a framework for evaluating the emergency communications
capabilities of federal, state, and local agencies and organizations,
which, according to the report, vary.[Footnote 33] Both of these
reports build on the groundwork set by the 2004 DHS SAFECOM
Interoperability Continuum, which recognizes the importance of a formal
governance structure to ensure the success of interoperability
planning, including improving the policies and procedures of major
projects by enhancing stakeholder coordination and establishing
guidelines and principles.
Figure 10: National Emergency Communications Plan Framework:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Emergency communications vision:
Emergency communications goals;
Emergency communications objectives;
Short/long-term initiatives and milestones;
* Examples of key plan inputs:
- 56 Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans[A];
- National Communications Capabilities Report, SAFECOM Interoperability
Baseline Survey and Interoperability Continuum;
- National Response Framework;
- Target Capabilities List;
- Industry reports and national after-action reports;
- Federal, state and local first responder participation.
National Emergency Communications Plan:
Establishes operational targets to achieve:
* A minimum level of interoperable communications;
* Dates by which federal, state, and tribal agencies are to achieve
these goals.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[A] The 56 Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans include the
District of Columbia and 5 territories.
[End of figure]
Emergency Communications Preparedness Center. The Post-Katrina Act
requires federal agencies including DHS, FCC, DOJ, and the Department
of Commerce to establish and jointly operate the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center.[Footnote 34] Under the act, the
center is intended to serve as the focal point and clearinghouse for
intergovernmental emergency communications information sharing, and is
required to submit to Congress an annual strategic assessment on
federal coordination to advance emergency communications. The Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center is to provide a governance and
decision-making structure for strategic interagency coordination of
emergency communications at the federal level. The center will not be
officially established until a MOU has been finalized and approved by
the signatory agencies.[Footnote 35] DHS's Office of Emergency
Communications chairs the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center
working group. The working group drafted a charter, which defines the
mission and roles of its members. Once approved, the charter will serve
as the MOU governing the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center.
As of June 2009, the agencies were working on completing the MOU.
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. The FCC is pursuing a 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership to promote a nationwide interoperable
broadband network for public safety that would increase the bandwidth
capacity available for first responders in both day-to-day operations
and during an emergency response. This has been a key FCC effort with
regards to emergency communications and is a significant departure from
prior FCC public safety spectrum allocations, which assigned spectrum
licenses on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. However, after the
first attempt to auction the nationwide D Block license did not result
in a winning bidder, FCC issued two further notices of proposed
rulemakings, and a final order has not been adopted.[Footnote 36]
According to statements in FCC's Third Further Notice, a public/private
partnership remains the best option to achieve nationwide build-out of
an interoperable broadband network for public safety, given the current
absence of federal appropriations for this purpose and the limited
funding available to the public-safety sector. In April 2009, FCC
officials reported that they were exploring ideas and options for
future use of the spectrum. While the ultimate outcome of the 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership is currently unknown, the proceeding has
involved significant FCC action over the course of several years (see
table 2).
Table 2: 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership Proceeding:
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership: Major Actions:
August 1997;
Congress allocated 24 megahertz of spectrum in the Upper 700 MHz Band
for public safety services[A].
December 2006;
FCC proposed a centralized and national approach to maximize public
safety access to interoperable, broadband spectrum in the 700 MHz band,
and to foster and promote the development and deployment of advanced
applications (e.g., data and video), technologies, and systems[B].
July 2007;
FCC created a nationwide license in the D Block and required the
winning commercial bidder to work with the Public Safety Broadband
Licensee in a Public/Private Partnership--governed by FCC rules and a
network sharing agreement--to construct and operate a nationwide
network shared by commercial and public safety users[C].
November 2007;
The Public Safety Spectrum Trust was granted the license for the Public
Safety Broadband Licensee[D].
March 2008;
FCC's Auction 73 failed to attract a winning commercial bidder for the
D Block of spectrum[E].
September 2008;
FCC proposed a modified set of rules and a revised auction plan in the
Third Further Notice, which includes a proposal to use the bidding
process to determine whether the D Block spectrum would be licensed on
a nationwide or regional basis[F].
November 2008;
The Third Further Notice public comment period closed, and FCC was
continuing to review comments as of June 2009.
Source: GAO analysis of FCC information.
[A] See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251
§ 3004 (1997) (adding § 337 of the Communications Act); Reallocation of
Television Channels 60-69, the 745-806 MHz Band, Report and Order, 12
FCC Rcd 22953 (1998), recon. 13 FCC Rcd 21578 (1998).
[B] See Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public
Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, Development of Operational,
Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and
Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010,
Ninth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd 14837 (2006) (700 MHz
Public Safety Ninth Notice).
[C] 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 15289 (2007).
[D] Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety
Network in the 700 MHz Band, Order, 22 FCC Rcd 20453 (2007).
[E] See Auction 73, 700 MHz Band, at [hyperlink,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=73].
[F] 700 MHz Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd
14301 (2008). See, also 700 MHz Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd 8047 (2008).
[End of table]
Stakeholder Groups and Advisory Committees. DHS and FCC have
established stakeholder groups and advisory committees to help leverage
existing knowledge and provide strategic recommendations to improve
emergency communications. The purpose of these groups is to contribute
expertise, recommendations, and lessons learned from recent disasters
to help improve emergency communications. For example, the FCC's
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks studied the effect of Hurricane Katrina on all
sectors of the telecommunications and media industries, including
public safety communications.[Footnote 37] The panel then reviewed the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort and made
recommendations to FCC regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness,
network reliability, and communications. More detailed information on
these emergency communications related groups and committees--
including missions and activities--can be found in appendix IV.
Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups. As
required by the Post-Katrina Act, and in an effort to develop a new
regional governance structure, FEMA has recently established 10
Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups (see
figure 11), intended to work closely with federal, state and local
officials to improve emergency communications.[Footnote 38]
Specifically, the working groups are to assess local emergency
communications systems' ability to meet the goals of the National
Emergency Communications Plan; facilitate disaster preparedness by
promoting multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency emergency
communications networks; and ensure activities are coordinated with
regional emergency communications stakeholders. FEMA has proposed that
the working groups be the single federal emergency communications
coordination point for disaster response and interaction with state and
local governments. Many of the established working groups are in early
stages of development. For example, the Region X working group--
covering Mount Rainier in Washington state--has held one stakeholder
meeting. As of June 2009, all 10 of the FEMA Regions had established
working groups. In addition, FEMA has hired 1 national and 10 regional
positions to coordinate these working groups.
Figure 11: Status of Regional Emergency Communications Coordination
Working Groups:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the following:
Regions that have established working groups (8 regions):
Region 1;
region 3;
Region 4;
Region 5;
Region 6;
Region 7;
Region 8;
Region 10.
Regions that established working groups after May 1, 2009 (2 regions):
Region 2;
Region 9.
Also depicted on the map are the regional office locations.
Source: FEMA (data); MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
A Variety of Federal Funding Available:
Federal agencies have several grants available for states, territories,
and local and tribal governments that are used for emergency
communications. In 2008, interoperable emergency communications
represented the largest investment category of DHS grants, including
more than a dozen grant programs such as the Urban Areas Security
Initiative,[Footnote 39] the State Homeland Security Initiative,
[Footnote 40] the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program
[Footnote 41], and the Emergency Operations Center Grant Program.
[Footnote 42] FEMA, which is responsible for allocating and
administering DHS grants, awarded over $3.85 billion in federal funding
to improve interoperable emergency communications to state and local
agencies from 2004 to 2007. FEMA manages the majority of federal grants
for disaster preparedness and response; however, other federal agencies
have contributed to this effort. The total amount of federal funds
directed to emergency communications interoperability in the last 8
years is difficult to determine because after the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, multiple federal agencies offered funding to state
and local governments in preparation for natural and man-made
disasters. Interoperability was among several grant criteria for broad
preparedness funds that could be used for a number of things, including
interoperable emergency communications.
Historically, DOJ has also contributed to emergency communications
efforts. Many first responders in our case study locations reported
that they received funding to improve emergency communications from DOJ
grant programs. For example, Boston, Honolulu, and Miami participated
in DOJ's 25 Cities Project,[Footnote 43] which funded initiatives to
address communication networks between key state and local authorities
in major metropolitan areas that were determined to be at a higher risk
for terrorist attack. Boston, Memphis, and Sacramento also received
funding from DOJ's Interoperable Communications Technology
Program,[Footnote 44] which funds local and regional voice and data
interoperability projects. Between 2003 and 2006, the Community
Oriented Policing Program invested over $250 million in 65 agencies to
improve jurisdictions ability to talk across disciplines such as fire
and police departments using radio communications networks. In 2007,
DOJ awarded $5.7 million to the Sacramento Police Department to support
technology projects facilitating voice and data information sharing.
More recent federal funding has largely come from DHS and been focused
on addressing specific gaps and identified needs, such as interoperable
emergency communications. In 2007, all 56 states and territories
received a portion of the approximately $1 billion, one-time Public
Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program funding to purchase
hardware and update technology for interoperable communications
systems. These funds were provided to assist public safety agencies in
the planning and coordination associated with the acquisition of,
deployment of, or the training for the use of interoperable
communication equipment, software, or systems. The Public Safety
Interoperable Communications Grant Program is an NTIA program. NTIA and
DHS signed a joint collaboration agreement to have FEMA administer the
grant program. This funding assists public safety agencies in improving
communications through investments identified by each state or
territory's Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP),
which FEMA required prior to release of grant funds.
The Post-Katrina Act required DHS to ensure consistency between grant
guidelines and the goals and recommendations of the National Emergency
Communications Plan. Requiring states to develop SCIPs was one step in
an overall effort to align DHS-administered funding with the National
Emergency Communications Plan. In developing the SCIPs, states involved
local agencies and stakeholders to help identify communication and
interoperability gaps to better address vulnerabilities (see figure
12). The plans were developed using a methodology, which identified and
developed working groups or governance councils to assure state-level
accountability. For example, to ensure that local, regional, tribal,
and state needs would be addressed and coordinated, California combined
efforts of its existing Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee
with other strategic planning groups. The Office of Emergency
Communications, FEMA, and NTIA jointly oversaw a peer review of the
SCIPs and the investment justifications, using panels to review both
documents, in order to ensure that Public Safety Interoperable
Communications investment justifications addressed gaps that had been
identified in the SCIPs. The Office of Emergency Communications used
the recommendations from the peer review to approve the SCIPs in
February 2008, and FEMA and NTIA used the information from the peer
review to approve the investment justifications. All states where our
case studies were located developed plans and received funding through
the 2007 Public Safety Interoperable Communications grant[Footnote 45]
ranging from $8.1 million for Hawaii to $94 million for California.
California is using some of these funds to pursue 16 statewide
communications initiatives, including enhancing and implementing
interoperability in the Sacramento area.
Beginning in 2008, FEMA and the Office of Emergency Communications
worked together to develop the Interoperable Emergency Communications
Grant Program. Whereas the Public Safety Interoperable Communications
Grant was a one-time investment, this new grant program is ongoing and
is intended to help enable state, territorial, and local governments to
implement their SCIPs. The program funds initiatives in governance,
planning, equipment, training, and exercises that are consistent with
the strategic initiatives and milestones outlined in the National
Emergency Communications Plan. The Interoperable Emergency
Communications Grant Program awarded $48.6 million in both fiscal years
2008 and 2009.
Figure 12: Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grants and
Efforts to Align Targeted Investments for First Responders with the
SCIP:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Identify gaps:
States identify communication gaps and needs with first responder
input.
States draft plans and apply for grants:
States draft SCIPs and submit to DHS. States apply for emergency
communications grants, such as Public Safety Interoperable
Communications grants.
Conduct joint peer review:
Joint peer review of SCIPs by DHS (FEMA and the Office of Emergency
Communications) and Department of Commerce (NTIA).
Award grants:
FEMA awards emergency communications grant funds to states, based on
alignment with SCIPs and investment justifications. Future emergency
communications grants align with the National Emergency Communications
Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[End of figure]
Technical Support and Federal Assets Are Intended to Help Mitigate
Emergency Communications Vulnerabilities:
Several federal agencies with a role in disaster response offer
technical support and initiatives in advance of an incident, or some
can provide federal assets at the scene of a disaster to help mitigate
emergency communications vulnerabilities. Federal agencies such as DHS
and DOJ have developed technical support offerings intended to assist
first responders in advanced planning and emergency preparedness.
Similarly, in response to a real-time incident, DHS and FEMA can
establish a physical presence at the disaster site, deploying personnel
and assets to assist first responders. Technical support and planning
provide assistance to address individual state and local jurisdictions'
emergency communications needs. The following programs and efforts are
examples of technical assistance and training available to assist first
responders in improving continuity of communications, capacity, or
interoperability, among other vulnerabilities.
* Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program. DHS's
Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program provides
support to first responders for planning and technical issues that need
to be considered when first responders develop interoperable
communications. The program supplies a site management team and support
to each area requesting assistance, providing technical assistance and
analysis tailored to meet site-specific requirements. All of our case
study scenario states have received technical assistance and services
through this program. For example, Hawaii received assistance on 17
work requests, including communications unit leader training, a
tabletop exercise,[Footnote 46] and engineering support. Many states
also used this technical assistance to aid in the development of their
SCIPs. As previously discussed, DHS and FEMA also provided feedback to
assist states in completing these plans, as well as input to assure
alignment with the National Emergency Communications Plan.
* Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning Initiative. In 2006, FEMA
began a Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning Initiative combining
planning and exercises to produce functional plans for areas at risk of
a catastrophic disaster. In this ongoing effort, communications is one
of several functional areas FEMA is addressing with state and local
first responders. This involves planning for disaster scenarios--
including a catastrophic earthquake in the New Madrid seismic zone and
a hurricane in Florida--two of our case study locations. In the
earthquake-planning scenario, for example, FEMA officials are focused
on a bottom-up approach (i.e., beginning at the local level across all
disciplines, then rolling up to the state level to identify gaps and
craft the regional plan to mitigate those gaps) and completed 14 local
workshops and 18 state-level workshops in 2008, which included
approximately 3,800 stakeholders at all levels of government.
* Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and Wireless Priority
Service. NCS's Government Emergency Telecommunications Service provides
subscribers with access cards for priority service over wireline
telephone networks in an emergency.[Footnote 47] The FCC and NCS's
Wireless Priority Service offers a similar service for cellular
networks, and both of these services can be useful in mitigating
capacity vulnerabilities when demand overwhelms communications systems
immediately following an incident. State and local first responders in
many of our case study locations participated in the Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service program. NCS also manages the
Telecommunications Service Priority Program, which provides national
security and emergency preparedness users priority authorization of
telecommunications services.
* Integrated Wireless Network. In 2001, DHS, DOJ, and the Department of
the Treasury began a collaborative effort to develop the Integrated
Wireless Network and provide secure, seamless, and interoperable
wireless communications for federal agents and officers engaged in law
enforcement, homeland defense, and disaster response. Initially
conceived as a joint radio communications solution to improve
communication among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies,
the Seattle/Blaine area in Washington state began a pilot network in
2004. While the pilot continues to provide service to multiple
agencies, the departments have determined that this specific system
design cannot be implemented on a nationwide scale. Consequently, the
formal governance structure that was initially established among the
three departments has been disbanded, and the contract for developing a
new design is not currently being used jointly by the departments for
this purpose.
* Project 25. The Association of Public Safety Communications
Officials' Project 25 is a long-standing effort to select common system
standards for digital public safety radio communications.[Footnote 48]
These standards are intended to allow radios to be interoperable
regardless of manufacturer. We have previously reported that
implementation of systems based on incomplete Project 25 standards has
been problematic.[Footnote 49] With no process in place to confirm that
equipment advertised as compliant actually met the standards, Congress
called for the creation of the Project 25 Compliance Assessment
Program.[Footnote 50] This voluntary program establishes a process for
equipment suppliers to submit their equipment to certain testing labs
to receive a certification of Project 25 compliance.[Footnote 51]
In response to a disaster, federal assets are also available on the
ground to help mitigate one or more emergency communications
vulnerabilities, including continuity of communications, capacity, and
interoperability. Some emergency response personnel and equipment may
be deployed to the scene, such as DHS and FEMA officials, while other
federal agencies may have personnel at the scene based on the nature
and/or location of the incident. For example, at Mount Rainier National
Park in Washington state, National Park Service personnel physically
located on site would be directly involved in any response effort
taking place within the park. Some federal agencies have assets
available that can be deployed during or immediately following an
incident and can help mitigate continuity of communications
vulnerabilities. For example, FEMA maintains 6 deployable Mobile
Emergency Response Support detachments across the country. These
detachments provide personnel, vehicles, and technology on the scene
and can help other federal agencies, state, or local first responders
establish communications. Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments
can be activated at the request of state authorities to provide
communications on the scene when existing state and local
communications infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed. For
example, some of the vehicles in the detachment have the communications
equipment necessary to facilitate full voice, data, and video multi-
agency interoperability and can operate as a stand-alone communications
center. The Maynard, Massachusetts, detachment was deployed 41 times in
2007, 34 times in 2008. Based on its proximity to one of our case study
locations, the Bothell, Washington, detachment could be an effective
tool for restoring communications after a catastrophic disaster at
Mount Rainier, as equipment and personnel could arrive on scene within
12 hours after an incident (see figure 13).
Figure 13: FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support Vehicle:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Limited Collaboration and Monitoring Jeopardize Significant Federal
Efforts and Impede Progress:
Limited collaboration and monitoring impedes the progress of some
significant efforts being undertaken by federal agencies to
strategically enhance emergency communications. Our past work has
shown, and the National Emergency Communications Plan articulates, that
collaboration and monitoring are important elements to advancing
emergency communications.[Footnote 52] We found that federal agencies
have demonstrated limited application of collaboration best practices,
as well as lack mechanisms for fully monitoring efforts.
Collaboration Key to Advancing Emergency Communications:
Defining a common goal and mutually reinforcing strategies are
collaboration best practices that can help federal agencies deal with
issues that are national in scope and cross agency jurisdictions.
[Footnote 53] In particular, establishing a governance structure that
includes defined leadership, roles, and responsibilities can be an
effective step for establishing goals and aligning strategies so that
they are mutually reinforcing.[Footnote 54] Addressing goals by
leveraging resources is another collaboration best practice that can be
employed across agencies to maximize resources. The National Emergency
Communications Plan acknowledges the importance of collaboration,
including at the federal level, for enhancing emergency communications.
Among the plan's seven objectives is that federal emergency
communications programs and initiatives be collaborative and aligned to
achieve national goals. Additionally, the plan speaks to the importance
of federal programs and initiatives related to emergency communications
being coordinated so as to minimize duplication, maximize federal
investments, and ensure interoperability.
Strong collaboration is especially important since DHS has limited
authority to compel other federal agencies to participate or align
their emergency communications activities despite DHS's leadership role
in compiling and overseeing the National Emergency Communications Plan.
DHS officials noted that the agency cannot unilaterally achieve the
strategic goals, initiatives, and milestones of the National Emergency
Communications Plan and will rely on the voluntary commitment of
federal, state, local, and tribal government officials and the private
sector.[Footnote 55] DHS's tools to encourage the participation of
stakeholders include the technical assistance that DHS's Office of
Emergency Communications provides to state, regional, local, and tribal
government officials and the development of grant policies that align
with the National Emergency Communications Plan. The agency has fewer
instruments to encourage federal agencies' participation. For example,
the National Communications Capabilities Report notes that federal
agencies are not eligible to receive grants, and therefore, grant
guidance is an ineffective means for encouraging and coordinating
federal participation.
Establishing Common Goals and Mutually Reinforcing Strategies Can
Enhance Some Significant Emergency Communications Efforts:
In our past and current work, we found that federal agencies have
demonstrated limited application of certain collaboration best
practices with respect to some significant federal efforts.[Footnote
56] Limited collaboration has contributed to the failure of past
federal emergency communications efforts and puts ongoing efforts at
risk.
Integrated Wireless Network. In December 2008, we reported that federal
efforts to provide a joint agency solution for federal emergency
communications through the Integrated Wireless Network had not been
successful, because federal agencies did not effectively identify a
common goal and design mutually reinforcing strategies.[Footnote 57] We
found that success depended on a means to overcome differences in
agency missions and cultures and a joint strategy to align activities
and resources to achieve a joint solution. More specifically, DHS, DOJ,
and the Department of the Treasury did not establish an effective
governance structure. In abandoning collaboration as a joint solution,
DHS, DOJ, and the Department of the Treasury risk duplication of effort
and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest significant
resources on independent solutions. Further, the efforts being pursued
by these three agencies will not ensure that vulnerabilities involving
interoperability are addressed. We have previously reported that
interoperability with federal first responders remains an important
element in achieving nationwide interoperability, and until a federal
coordinating entity makes a concerted effort to promote federal
interoperability with other governmental entities, overall progress in
improving communications interoperability will remain limited.[Footnote
58]
Emergency Communications Preparedness Center. Delays in establishing
the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center undermine
implementation of the National Emergency Communications Plan's wide
array of strategic goals, initiatives, and milestones scheduled to
occur concurrently--most of which within the first year from the plan's
July 2008 issuance--and depend on cooperation from multiple agencies to
achieve. The National Emergency Communications Plan describes that
milestones detail the timelines and outcomes of each of the 29
initiatives to serve as the "key checkpoints" to monitor the plan's
implementation. To that end, the plan includes 11 January 2009
milestones, 2 April 2009 milestones, and 41 July 2009 milestones. These
milestones scheduled to occur within the first year of the plan's
issuance comprise more than half of the plan's total 91 milestones. As
previously discussed, the Post-Katrina Act envisions the center will
serve as a focal point for federal interagency coordination, and the
National Emergency Communications Plan articulates that the center will
help ensure that the strategic goals, initiatives, and milestones of
the plan are agreed upon and that federal agencies work collaboratively
to pursue mutually reinforcing strategies. The Office of Emergency
Communications within DHS chairs the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center working group, which has drafted a MOU currently
under review. As we have previously reported, an important element of
establishing effective collaborative relationships is to reach formal
agreements with each partner organization on a clear purpose, expected
outputs, and realistic performance measures, which the center's MOU
could supply.[Footnote 59] In September 2008, DHS officials reported to
Congress that the center's MOU was going to be completed by December
2008.[Footnote 60] To date, the MOU has not yet been finalized. DHS
officials reported to us that they are taking steps to establish the
Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, but noted that the
complexity of obtaining agreement from multiple agencies was a
challenge. In the absence of the Emergency Communications Preparedness
Center's finalized MOU, according to DHS officials, staff-level working
groups are working to help implement the plan. With the final nature of
the center as yet undetermined, however, FEMA officials expressed that
many federal agencies and components are still functioning in an
independent manner, which can be confusing to state and local first
responders. Moreover, these officials' understanding of the center was
that it would largely serve as a Web site clearinghouse for
information. Other DHS officials reported that the center would serve a
range of functions for emergency communications.
DHS Efforts and FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. Collaboration
between DHS and FCC on the 700 MHz D Block spectrum has been limited.
Spectrum is a valuable resource for public safety wireless
communications, and the 700 MHz spectrum that is becoming available as
the result of the digital television transition represents a
significant increase for public safety purposes. Limited collaboration
jeopardizes the viability and usefulness of this spectrum for public
safety and its relation to other federal efforts. By employing
collaboration best practices, DHS and FCC could enhance what is
ultimately done with the 700 MHz broadband spectrum and help accomplish
the goals of the National Emergency Communications Plan.[Footnote 61]
DHS and FCC officials do not have a common vision for the 700 MHz
spectrum and have expressed varying views on the relationship between
the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership--FCC's current proposal for how
the 700 MHz should be allocated and assigned--and the National
Emergency Communications Plan.[Footnote 62] According to DHS officials,
FCC's proceeding to establish the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
directly supports the goals of the National Emergency Communications
Plan and FCC officials said that they believed their effort is
compatible with the National Emergency Communications Plan. However,
FCC officials also reported that they believed the National Emergency
Communications Plan applied to only existing emergency communications
systems and, therefore, was not directly relevant to allocating and
assigning the spectrum, which they believed to be the main purpose of
the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership proceeding.[Footnote 63] FCC
officials described the plan and the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
proceeding as two separate and parallel efforts.[Footnote 64] These
officials reported that, accordingly, it was reasonable that the
proceeding's notices and other documents did not reflect or reference
the National Emergency Communications Plan.
DHS's Office of Emergency Communications Director reported that it was
too early for the office to have any significant role in developing the
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, because the auction had not been
completed.[Footnote 65] DHS did not submit formal comments in this
proceeding.[Footnote 66] FCC officials stated that the lack of formal
comments and critique from DHS suggested that the agency had no
objections to the proposed rulemaking, and that it reflected the
separate nature between the proceeding and DHS's efforts. FCC officials
could not recollect nor provide us with a record of substantive
conversations with DHS officials on this proceeding. However, the
Director of DHS's Command, Control and Interoperability Division
reported conveying to FCC officials several challenges regarding its
700 MHz Public/Private Partnership network before FCC's most recently
issued document describing the proposed network, the Third Further
Notice, was released. We recognize that FCC considers input from
stakeholders, but also acknowledge DHS's important role in federal
efforts regarding emergency communications. We compared the challenges
this official expressed to any treatment in the Third Further Notice.
Our analysis shows that on these issues that DHS and FCC do not share a
common view in support of a 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to build
a nationwide, interoperable broadband network.[Footnote 67] (See table
3.) We recognize that FCC's efforts are ongoing and that no final
decision relative to the future of the 700 MHz public safety broadband
spectrum has yet been made.
Table 3: DHS Command, Control and Interoperability Division -identified
Challenges to FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership:
Challenges identified by DHS Command, Control and Interoperability
Division: Pursuing a business model that requires subscriptions would
be problematic for jurisdictions that lack funds;
FCC Third Further Notice: FCC proposed a standard charge of $7.50 per
month per user (meaning per public safety officer/individual) for
gateway-based access to the shared network(s).
Challenges identified by DHS Command, Control and Interoperability
Division: Local jurisdictions hesitate to spend more money to buy
additional equipment, since they have already spent billions in newer
communications equipment and infrastructure that must be maintained for
mission-critical voice communications;
FCC Third Further Notice: FCC recognized that "multi-band radios could
be developed, although at some cost…that are capable of operating on
both the shared wireless broadband network and other public safety
frequency bands." Additionally, FCC "tentatively concluded to require
the Upper 700 MHz D Block licensee to offer gateway-based access..."
but proposed that "public safety users themselves bear the costs of the
bridges and gateways, including installation and maintenance costs..."
Challenges identified by DHS Command, Control and Interoperability
Division: Distributing any associated equipment in a disaster situation
would pose a logistical challenge, if not be impossible;
FCC Third Further Notice: FCC did not address this issue of how
associated equipment needed in a disaster area would be dispersed, but
sought comment on whether "it should require use or availability of
multi-band radios that could be available to public safety first
responders that may need to come into these areas in times of
emergency..."
Challenges identified by DHS Command, Control and Interoperability
Division: Training and maintaining skills in using the network would be
challenging, as first responders would need to use and exercise with
this network often to maintain their familiarity with it;
FCC Third Further Notice: FCC did not address or seek comment on if or
how the proposed system would be made available for training and
exercises[A].
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and FCC information.
[A] According to FCC officials, mandating training requirements for
state and local entities is outside FCC's jurisdiction. However, FCC
officials also reported that it was possible for FCC to set conditions
for the licensees operating the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to
address such issues through its rulemaking process.
[End of table]
According to FCC officials, it would be the responsibility of the
Public Safety Broadband Licensee to ensure that the network aligns with
and furthers the goals of the National Emergency Communications Plan
when it negotiates the details of the network sharing agreement with
the winning commercial bidder. According to FCC officials, the Public
Safety Broadband Licensee must ultimately meet the provisions outlined
in the final rules adopted by FCC. It is unclear, however, how the
Public Safety Broadband Licensee would do so or if it would have the
authority to require such an alignment between the proposed network and
DHS efforts. FCC did not suggest or specify in the Third Further Notice
that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee consider the strategic goals
and milestones of the National Emergency Communications Plan. Also, FCC
did not in the Third Further Notice solicit comments on the
relationship between the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership and other
DHS efforts. For example, FCC outlined no role for Regional Emergency
Communications Coordination Working Groups, despite potential overlap
with the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership.[Footnote 68] Specifically,
the Public Safety Broadband Licensee is responsible for representing
public safety interest in negotiating the network sharing agreement. In
comparison, as legislatively defined and described within the National
Emergency Communications Plan, the working groups are comprised of
public safety officials who will assess emergency communications
capabilities within their respective regions, facilitate disaster
preparedness through the promotion of multijurisdictional and
multiagency emergency communications networks, and serve as a primary
link in coordinating multistate operable and interoperable emergency
response initiatives and plans among federal, state, local, and tribal
agencies. These working groups could provide a valuable means for
representing public safety interests regionally and coordinating the
use of a nationwide, interoperable, public safety broadband network
envisioned by FCC.
Based on further analysis of the Third Further Notice and interviews
with FCC and DHS officials, we found potential opportunities to align
the proposed 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership network with the
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts to
reinforce one another.[Footnote 69]
* Given the National Emergency Communications Plan's focus on Urban
Area Security Initiative regions and the national planning scenarios
and their continued use by DHS and FEMA, FCC could align the
performance benchmarks to prioritize Urban Areas Security Initiative
regions or reference in their definition of "emergency," DHS and FEMA's
national planning scenarios.[Footnote 70] FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership currently has no relationship to these efforts.
* FCC's Third Further Notice does not propose a specific role for state
government in coordinating their public safety providers' participation
in the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership or the network, but state
governments have played a key role in emergency communications by
coordinating and completing SCIPs, which have been reviewed by DHS and
were required to be eligible for federal funding.[Footnote 71] FCC
could consider ways to involve state government or integrate the use of
SCIPs--particularly if regional licenses are awarded, because the
majority of Public Safety Regions that FCC has proposed as the
geographic regions are delineated along state lines.
* To help facilitate interoperability among federal agencies, the
National Emergency Communications Plan outlines an initiative to
implement the Advanced Encryption Standard for federal responders. FCC
proposed no requirement that federal government agencies be provided
access to the network and outlined no technical specification for the
Advanced Encryption Standard.[Footnote 72] Given that federal agencies
play a key role during catastrophic events, if the 700 MHz network does
not incorporate this standard,[Footnote 73] it could pose a challenge
for federal responders working with state and local responders on this
network. The encryption of the network once built may not adhere to the
Advanced Encryption Standard. Thus, if federal responders needed to
share sensitive or classified information with one another or with
local responders, this network might not be an option for them, since
it may not meet their encryption standard. FCC could consider including
this standard in the specifications for the network or ask the
licensees to examine the consequences for not adhering to this standard
and any potential remedies.
* FCC proposed that the network be based on a modern Internet Protocol
platform and that interconnectivity through gateways and bridges be
allowed. FCC officials told us that one of the key benefits of the
network would be nationwide interoperability facilitated through this
common technological architecture. According to DHS's Interoperability
Continuum, though, interoperability is not the result of solely
technological solutions. In order to achieve interoperability, other
elements such as standard operating procedures, usage, governance, and
training and exercises, must be addressed. FCC has not addressed these
other elements. According to FCC officials, these facets of emergency
communications fall under the purview of DHS and FCC has not
contemplated requiring the licensee(s) to take any actions that would
associate or connect the proposed network with DHS efforts. FCC
officials also reported that historically, FCC has not taken such
action within its rulemaking process. FCC could require that the
licensees adopt use of DHS's Interoperability Continuum as a framework
for negotiating the terms of the network sharing agreement (see figure
14).
Figure 14: Analysis of FCC's Third Further Notice and DHS Efforts:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Opportunities for alignment: Performance benchmarks and strategic
goals;
FCC 700 MHz Third Further Notice: FCC requires the D Block licensee(s)
to provide signal coverage and offer service to at least:
* 40 percent of the population in each Public Safety Region by the end
of the fourth year;
* 75 percent by the end of the tenth year, and;
* D Block licensee(s) will be required to meet other benchmarks after
15 years;
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts: The
National Emergency Communications Plan has strategic goals that
include:
* 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban
Area Security Initiative are able to demonstrate response-level
emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving
multiple jurisdictions by 2010, and;
* 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-
level emergency communications within 3 hours, in the event of a
significant incident as outlined in national planning scenarios by
2013.
Opportunities for alignment: Regional organization;
FCC 700 MHz Third Further Notice: 58 Regional licenses designated by
Public Safety Regions and one nationwide licensee (Public Safety
Broadband Licensee) that would represent public safety in negotiating
the network sharing agreement among other responsibilities;
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts: 10
DHS/FEMA Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups.
Opportunities for alignment: Role of state government;
FCC 700 MHz Third Further Notice: FCC proposed no specific role for
state governments in coordinating their public safety providers’
participation in the interoperable shared broadband network;
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts: States
have been instrumental in developing SCIPs, which are reviewed by DHS
and NTIA and required by Congress to be eligible for federal emergency
communications funding.
Opportunities for alignment: Federal agency access and encryption
standard;
FCC 700 MHz Third Further Notice: FCC leaves access for federal
agencies to the discretion of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and
outlines no technical specifications for the Advanced Encryption
Standard;
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts: Federal
agencies will implement the Advanced Encryption Standard.
Opportunities for alignment: Interoperability;
FCC 700 MHz Third Further Notice: FCC interoperability through an
Internet Protocol-based architecture;
National Emergency Communications Plan and other DHS efforts: DHS's
SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum describes 5 elements for achieving
interoperability: Governance, Standard Operating Procedures,
Technology, Training and Exercises, and Usage.
Source: GAO analysis of FCC and DHS data.
[End of figure]
The lack of commonly defined goals for the 700 MHz spectrum and
mutually reinforcing strategies with DHS efforts threatens the
usefulness and viability of the network for public safety. There is
some support for a 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to build a
nationwide, interoperable broadband network from entities such as the
Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, but officials
from major metropolitan areas, such as New York City, reported concerns
with how the network will be governed, as proposed in the Third Further
Notice. Specifically, the Deputy Chief from the New York City Police
Department expressed concern to FCC Commissioners in a July 2008 public
hearing regarding a commercial vendor managing the network and said
that his agency would likely not participate, because the network would
not meet all their mission requirements.[Footnote 74] First responders
we met with in Boston, Seattle, and Sacramento expressed similar
concerns about the proposed network. For example, Boston Police
Department officials told us that based on their experience with
commercial telecommunications providers and the proposed fees for using
the network, they preferred to directly manage and control the
spectrum's use in their jurisdiction. Should these and other
jurisdictions not participate in the 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership's network, first responders in those areas would be left
without access to a potentially vital resource during a catastrophic
event, which is contrary to FCC's stated goals for the network.
DHS Could Leverage Emergency Communications Planning Expertise for
Federal Agencies:
As the federal government's lead agency on emergency communications,
DHS has provided technical assistance and guidance on how to develop
emergency communications plans, but these resources have primarily
focused on state and local jurisdictions and less so on federal
agencies. As previously discussed, DHS has provided extensive
assistance to state and local jurisdictions in developing emergency
communications plans, which have been valuable to state and local first
responders in understanding their communications capabilities and
limitations and working toward further enhancements. DHS has also
issued guidance on emergency communications planning directed at all
levels of government. For example, the National Preparedness
Guidelines/Targeted Capabilities List, issued in September 2007,
included 13 critical tasks for how to "Develop and Maintain Plans,
Procedures, Programs, and Systems." DHS guidance outlines the
importance and some key elements of emergency planning for preparedness
and response, such as consideration of the systems that will be used,
personnel (those who can use these systems), and other relevant
considerations.
Not all federal agencies have developed communications plans or
conducted communication infrastructure threat and vulnerability
assessments, making their preparedness to assist state and local first
responders uncertain.[Footnote 75] According to the National Emergency
Communications Plan, few agencies conduct communications infrastructure
threat and vulnerability assessments as part of emergency
communications planning on critical communications assets. As
previously discussed, the National Communications Capabilities Report
notes that some federal agencies currently have no formal plans in
place to identify communications vulnerabilities or map a way forward
to mitigate such vulnerabilities.
DHS has begun efforts that could assist other federal agencies, but it
is unclear whether these will result in formal emergency communications
plans. The National Emergency Communications Plan observes that some
agencies do not view emergency communications planning as a priority
and includes a milestone that by July 2009 DHS will develop "a
standardized framework for identifying and assessing emergency
communications capabilities nationwide." The plan also includes a
milestone for DHS providing "best practices and methodologies that
promote the incorporation of vulnerability assessments as part of
emergency communications planning." Each federal agency and department
should also assess its existing communications capabilities and compare
them to the capabilities needed to complete each agency's missions.
According to DHS officials, they are taking steps to help meet these
milestones and to outreach and assist other federal agencies. However,
it is too early to tell what direction these new efforts will take.
A formal emergency communications plan can help federal agencies
respond in a catastrophic disaster by enhancing agencies' understanding
of their emergency communications capabilities. Without such planning
and understanding, federal agencies' fundamental readiness and response
declines, including their ability to support state and local first
responders in disaster. For example, FEMA Region IX officials reported
that planning activities with various California jurisdictions have
helped increase understanding on how FEMA will work and support
California first responders, as well as achieving a common
understanding of communications operations and assets. We have
previously reported that limited emergency communications planning has
reduced the federal government's readiness to support state and local
first responders and contributes to poor response. The Hurricane
Katrina Lessons Learned Report highlighted that communications problems
due to limited planning had a debilitating effect on response efforts
in the Gulf Coast region.[Footnote 76] Specifically, many available
communications assets were not utilized fully because there was no
national, statewide, or regional communications plan that incorporated
them. According to a senior DHS official, agencies may find themselves
at the center of response in certain disasters or other events, at
which time communications weaknesses are revealed. Officials from
federal agencies in our case studies, such as National Park Service
officials at Mount Rainier and FBI officials, also reported the
importance of emergency communications planning in preparedness and
response to a catastrophic event. For example, FBI officials and local
first responders in our Boston terrorism case study would be required
to work closely together. According to a senior FBI official, a number
of issues could interfere with the ability of FBI agents to carry out
their duties, such as a lack of interoperability with local radio
systems, inadequate encryption, and insufficient coverage.
Limited Monitoring May Impede Progress in Emergency Communications:
We found that DHS and FCC had only limited processes in place to
monitor and evaluate recommendations from stakeholder groups. We have
previously reported that monitoring and evaluating efforts are crucial
elements to achieving agency goals. Following up on stakeholder group
recommendations could help key decision makers within the agencies to
obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational
effectiveness.[Footnote 77] Instituting some of the recommendations
these groups have made may improve emergency communications. For
example, the National Coordination Committee, an advisory group set up
by FCC, recommended that FCC require standard channel nomenclature for
all interoperability channels in 2003.[Footnote 78] During disaster
response, it is crucial that all responding public safety agencies are
able to tune their radios to the frequency or frequencies that the
incident commander directs. However, there is little uniformity in the
naming of radio channels--some responders designate their channels by
colors, others by numbers. Standardized channel nomenclature could
enhance interoperability, since responders across different
jurisdictions and disciplines would use identical terminology for
identifying radio frequencies, thereby minimizing confusion and delay.
Standard channel nomenclature could prove particularly useful in
catastrophic disaster response, because of the large numbers of
responders from different jurisdictions and disciplines. According to
the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council, FCC has not
adopted this recommendation made in 2003. FCC officials reported that
FCC made reference to this stakeholder group recommendation in a 2006
proceeding. FCC officials indicated that the recommendation was raised
again in the ongoing 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership proceeding and
that the recommendation would be addressed therein.
Without monitoring and evaluation, it is unclear how DHS and FCC have
incorporated or kept pace with the work of their stakeholder groups. As
previously discussed, the constantly evolving nature of emergency
communications can create opportunities and challenges, some of which
advisory groups have addressed. According to the National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council, significant progress has been made in
implementing recommendations that contribute to improved emergency
communications, but meeting the demand for public safety communications
is a dynamic process requiring ever-additional work. Our analysis
revealed that stakeholder groups assembled by DHS and FCC have made
some recommendations repeatedly that could address identified
vulnerabilities (see figure 15).[Footnote 79]
Figure 15: Analysis of Advisory Group Recommendations 2004-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Vulnerability addressed: Continuity of communications;
Recommendation: Multiple access methods and alternative communication
technologies, so that emergency communications are not disrupted;
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: FCC, DHS;
Year of recommendation: 2007: DHS, FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2008: [Empty].
Vulnerability addressed: Continuity of communications;
Recommendation: Emergency Responder Classification/Credentialing for
Telecommunications Provider;
Year of recommendation: 2004: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: DHS, FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2007: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2008: [Empty].
Vulnerability addressed: Continuity of communications;
Recommendation: Pre-positioned or deployable communication assets, such
as mobile radios and mobile cell towers for both public safety and
commercial communications providers; related planning, training, and
exercises;
Year of recommendation: 2004: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2005: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2006: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2007: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2008: [Empty].
Vulnerability addressed: Capacity;
Recommendation: Communication platforms capable of integrating
different data types (voice, photos, etc.);
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2007: DHS;
Year of recommendation: 2008: FCC.
Vulnerability addressed: Capacity;
Recommendation: Increased bandwidth to enable transmission of video and
large format files such as blueprints and video files;
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2007: DHS;
Year of recommendation: 2008: FCC.
Vulnerability addressed: Interoperability;
Recommendation: Internet Protocol for an interoperable network of
networks such as LMR, cellular, and wireline, which can also handle
multiple services and applications;
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2006: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2007: DHS;
Year of recommendation: 2008: FCC.
Vulnerability addressed: Interoperability;
Recommendation: Migration path from legacy systems to the Internet
Protocol internetwork;
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2007: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2008: FCC.
Vulnerability addressed: Interoperability;
Recommendation: Develop Interoperability Rules to handle issues such as
governance and prioritization;
Year of recommendation: 2004: FCC;
Year of recommendation: 2005: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2006: [Empty];
Year of recommendation: 2007: DHS;
Year of recommendation: 2008: [Empty].
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS and FCC stakeholder recommendations made
in the following reports: Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council VII reports #1 and #3; and Focus Group 1B National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee Issue Review; FCC Hurricane Panel
Order--Report Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks; National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Report to the President
on Emergency Communications and Interoperability; and Joint Advisory
Committee on Communications Capabilities of Emergency Medical and
Public Health Care Facilities Report to Congress.
[End of figure]
Both agencies have various ways of examining some stakeholder group
recommendations, but neither includes a mechanism to systematically
monitor and evaluate all recommendations from stakeholder groups, or
the agencies' response. As previously discussed, DHS's approach has
been practitioner-driven. According to DHS officials, the agency tracks
recommendations and input provided by its stakeholder groups in varying
ways (see table 4).
Table 4: DHS Stakeholder Groups and Tracking Activities:
DHS stakeholder group: SAFECOM Executive Committee and Emergency
Response Council;
Tracking activity:
DHS tracks the recommendations and input provided by the SAFECOM
Executive Committee (EC) and Emergency Response Council (ERC):
* Formally through meeting reports;
* Informally through detailed minutes taken during biannual ERC
meetings, monthly and quarterly EC conference calls, and face-to-face
meetings, as well as during ad hoc working group meetings;
* For biannual ERC meetings, DHS develops a formal meeting report,
which documents the key content, input, and recommendations from the
working sessions.
DHS stakeholder group: National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee;
Tracking activity: The National Communications System (NCS), within
DHS, tracks recommendations made by the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). Once a recommendation is
approved by the NSTAC, which is typically on a quarterly basis, DHS/NCS
convenes a team of NCS managers and subject matter experts to determine
what priority area the recommendations fall under and provides a
quarterly; status report to the NSTAC Chairperson on whether the
recommendation will be:
* Taken for NCS action; or;
* Closed because:
- There are insufficient resources;
- The recommendation is overcome by events;
- The recommendation is being addressed by another organization; or;
- The NCS has completed its activities.
DHS stakeholder group: Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications;
Tracking activity: Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications
(FPIC) standing committees (Interoperability, Security, Spectrum, and
Standards) conducts the following activities:
* Identify potential recommendations;
* FPIC committee members draft recommendations and submit to the FPIC
general membership for review and formal acceptance, if needed; and;
* Any member agency or advisory member that disagrees with a decision
or vote of the FPIC may submit a Minority Report.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information on a selection of stakeholder
groups and tracking activities.
[End of table]
Not all these activities, however, result in the agency monitoring
recommendations or evaluating its response. DHS's activities to monitor
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee recommendations
appear the most robust, as these mechanisms can account for which
recommendations were acted upon and, if not, why. In contrast, though
DHS tracking activities for its other stakeholder groups document
recommendations and other information produced, DHS does not collect or
record the agency's response.
FCC has not systematically monitored or evaluated recommendations of
its advisory committees[Footnote 80] and the agency's response,
limiting the relevance of these groups' work. In December 2004, we
reported that FCC did not have a process for tracking all its advisory
committee recommendations. At the time, the deputy committee management
officer told us that as a result of our review, FCC planned on
improving the accountability of the advisory committee process by
requiring committee recommendations be tracked.[Footnote 81] To date,
FCC has not established and instituted any such tracking mechanism. FCC
officials reported that many of the recommendations from its advisory
groups are not directed at FCC, and consequently, tracking or
monitoring is less necessary. We note, in January 2009, the FCC Acting
Chairman said that the agency could more fully take advantage of the
work of advisory committees to increase agency transparency. FCC has
tools at its disposal that it could use for monitoring and evaluating
recommendations. For example, for its Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, FCC issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (notice) in June 2006 inviting comment on
what actions the Commission should take to address the Katrina Panel's
recommendations.[Footnote 82] FCC received over 100 comments and reply
comments in response to the notice. On June 8, 2007, FCC released an
order directing its Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to
implement and track several of the recommendations that included FCC's
rationale and conclusions behind selecting these particular
recommendations (FCC Hurricane Panel Order).[Footnote 83] The Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau fulfilled the order by taking
actions to implement the recommendations and reported to the
commissioners after 3 and 9 months, as directed, on its actions.
Both DHS and FCC are forming new stakeholder groups, but no mechanisms
to monitor or evaluate these groups' work, or the agencies' response,
are currently in place. Without such mechanisms, it will remain unclear
how and to what extent federal agencies have considered, or
incorporated, the information provided by these groups. For example, as
previously discussed, FEMA has formed Regional Emergency Communications
Coordination Working Groups across the country. However, while there
are defined roles and responsibilities for these working groups in both
the legislation and the National Emergency Communications Plan, there
are no legislative requirements for DHS, FEMA, or any other agencies to
monitor or evaluate information provided by working groups, such as
recommendations or the agencies' responses. FCC is also supporting the
development of a new advisory committee, the Communications Security,
Reliability, and Interoperability Council. FCC filed the charter for
the council with the appropriate House and Senate committees in April
2007.[Footnote 84] The charter did not state if or how FCC will
monitor, evaluate, or respond to the recommendations made by the
council.[Footnote 85]
Conclusions:
For the first time, the National Emergency Communications Plan provides
an overarching strategy for emergency communications at all levels of
government. This plan and other significant federal efforts represent
an increasingly strategic approach by the federal government to enhance
emergency communications and address existing vulnerabilities.
Collaboration and monitoring remain critical components for success
given the complex nature of emergency communications, the number of
stakeholders involved, and the numerous efforts underway. Those federal
agencies that do not use collaboration best practices jeopardize the
success of not only their own efforts, but those of other agencies who
have a role in supporting and enhancing emergency communications.
Identified emergency communications vulnerabilities may not only
persist, but deteriorate further as supporting infrastructure ages and
technology continues to change. Establishing an effective governance
structure by completing a MOU and establishing the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center would improve the implementation of
efforts that depend on the participation of multiple agencies, such as
the National Emergency Communications Plan. Other federal efforts, such
as FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership proceeding would also
benefit from DHS and FCC establishing a common vision and mutually
reinforcing strategies. This would help the agencies speak with one
voice as they work with state, local, tribal, and private stakeholders.
Given DHS's past experience and expertise in leveraging resources to
assist states with emergency communications planning, it is well suited
to offer similar assistance to federal agencies. Such assistance would
help ensure that agencies plan for an emergency response, including
evaluating how their communications assets and capabilities could best
assist state and local first responders in disaster. Like
collaboration, monitoring is crucial for ensuring advancement of
federal efforts to enhance emergency communication. Improved monitoring
and accountability of stakeholder and advisory committees
recommendations--including agencies considering, deciding, and acting
on such recommendations--would boost the value of these groups by
monitoring agency responses, avoiding duplication of efforts, and
identifying opportunities to work with other agencies.
Ultimately, the success or failure of federal efforts to enhance
emergency communications will have the greatest effect on state and
local first responders. Vulnerabilities involving continuity of
communications, capacity, and interoperability can all cause
communications failures during catastrophic disasters. As in the past,
when future catastrophic disasters cause similar failures, the federal
government will play a vital role in response. Addressing
vulnerabilities through successful collaboration and monitoring of the
wide variety of ongoing federal efforts will be essential in
determining the quality of this future federal assistance to
overwhelmed state and local first responders.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We make four recommendations in this report to improve federal
agencies' collaboration and monitoring in efforts related to emergency
communications.
To help foster implementation of the National Emergency Communications
Plan, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in DHS's
role as chair of the agency working group to establish the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center, work to complete the MOU to
establish the center. The MOU should include a clear purpose, expected
outputs, and realistic performance measures from participating
agencies.
To help ensure that DHS and FCC's significant emergency communications
efforts, such as the National Emergency Communications Plan and the 700
MHz Public/Private Partnership, have a common vision and mutually
reinforcing strategies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission
establish a forum, or other mechanism, to better collaborate on each
agency's emergency communications efforts. Such collaboration could
identify opportunities for aligning agency activities to ensure that
they are mutually reinforcing, as well as developing an action plan or
other working document to develop a common vision for implementation of
the National Emergency Communications Plan and its relationship to the
future 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership.
To help ensure that federal agencies and their communications assets
are well-positioned to support state and local first responders in
catastrophic disasters, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security provide guidance and technical assistance to federal agencies
in developing formal emergency communications plans. These plans could
include identifying how federal agencies' communications resources and
assets will support state and local first responders in a disaster.
To help DHS and FCC enhance the value of stakeholder groups'
recommendations, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission systematically
track, assess, and respond to stakeholder groups' recommendations,
including identifying actions taken by the agencies in response to
recommendations, whether recommendations are duplicative with past
recommendations, and opportunities to work with other agencies, as
appropriate, to advance recommendations.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FCC, Commerce, Interior, and
DOJ for official review and comment. In its comments, DHS generally
agreed with our recommendations and noted that steps were already
underway to implement some recommendations. Regarding our
recommendation that DHS work to complete the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center's MOU, DHS stated that the agency had signed the
MOU and that it had been circulated to the other interagency partners.
While this represents progress, more work remains to complete the MOU
and reach consensus among agencies on its purpose, expected outputs,
and performance measures. Regarding our recommendation that DHS and FCC
establish a mechanism for better collaboration on emergency
communication efforts, DHS stated that its Office of Emergency
Communications had begun regular coordination meetings with FCC's
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to identify areas for
collaboration and to work jointly on common solutions as appropriate.
Regarding our recommendation on DHS providing guidance and technical
assistance to federal agencies in developing formal emergency
communications plans, DHS noted that the Homeland Security Act focuses
on assistance to "state, regional, local, and tribal governments,"
providing limited authority for DHS to provide assistance to other
federal agencies. We agree that DHS cannot compel agencies to work to
develop formal emergency communications plans, but this recommendation
would include DHS offering such assistance through guidance and making
available its expertise to other agencies. Regarding our recommendation
that DHS systematically track, assess, and respond to stakeholder
groups' recommendations, DHS noted that its Office of Emergency
Communications has worked closely with numerous stakeholder groups to
track and use the information from these groups within its other
emergency communications efforts, such as the development of the
National Emergency Communications Plan. We agree that DHS has some
measures in place to track, assess, and respond to some stakeholder
groups, but our recommendation calls for such a process to be applied
systematically to all stakeholder group recommendations.
FCC generally agreed with our recommendations and provided comments via
e-mail that we summarize here. FCC said that most aspects of the
recommendations are already being actively pursued by the FCC, DHS and
other federal agencies. In addition, FCC said that it was engaged in a
large amount of work that goes beyond the report's recommendations
aimed at improving federal responses and eliminating vulnerabilities
not addressed in the report. In its comments, FCC said that the report
relies heavily on anecdotal information and opinion, which are often
uncritically presented as representing objective truth. For example,
FCC questioned the use of several interviews with state and local
officials about communications vulnerabilities forming the basis for
much of the discussion of vulnerabilities in the report. As presented
in our objectives, scope, and methodology, our case study work and
related interviews were one component of identifying vulnerabilities.
We also conducted a literature review of prior GAO products and other
agency reports on emergency communications to ascertain and analyze
common vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the three primary vulnerabilities
that we identified are similar to vulnerabilities identified by DHS,
FCC, and other stakeholder groups.
FCC said that the report also lacks a sufficient number of facts about
vulnerabilities, meaning that there will be no adequate way to judge
whether the adoption of the recommendations actually improves emergency
communications. Furthermore, FCC said that the report identifies
vulnerabilities, but does not place them in context or suggest
priorities in terms of how they should be addressed. As stated in our
report, our recommendations will help federal efforts in addressing
challenges to improve emergency communications by helping foster
implementation of the National Emergency Communications Plan, helping
ensure that significant emergency communications efforts share a common
vision and have mutually reinforcing strategies, helping ensure that
federal agencies and their communications assets are well-positioned to
support state and local first responders, and by helping DHS and FCC
enhance the value of stakeholder groups' recommendations. In addition,
ranking, prioritizing, or suggesting how to address the
vulnerabilities, was outside the scope of our work. We collected
information from local and state emergency managers, law enforcement,
firefighters, and other first responders, as well as federal officials
and telecommunications industry officials, on efforts to address some
of these vulnerabilities. We include this information on what
jurisdictions are doing to address vulnerabilities throughout our
report. Furthermore, our identification of vulnerabilities does not
preclude FCC or another organization from exploring metrics or other
benchmarks to track progress in addressing these vulnerabilities.
FCC also said that it was unclear whether the report is intended to
address only first responder communications or all types of emergency
communications, including commercial communications. We have clarified
in our report that unless otherwise noted, when we refer to emergency
communications systems, we mean those systems used by first responders.
FCC also said that the report overlooks many vital issues, such as all
the collaborative work done by federal agencies and communications
companies to prepare and respond to communications disasters. We
disagree that we omitted all collaborative work done by federal
agencies and communications companies. We acknowledge in the report
that DHS and other federal agencies have recently taken significant and
strategic steps to enhance emergency communications and that a range of
other federal efforts are underway. Additionally, we interviewed
telecommunications industry officials as part of our audit work, and
reported on the communications assets that companies can provide.
Furthermore, we reported that private stakeholders, such as
telecommunications companies and equipment manufacturers, have invested
heavily to develop innovative technological solutions and expand or
strengthen their networks for emergency responders and commercial use.
We did not intend our report to include or highlight all technological
capabilities present in certain emergency communications systems. We
made changes to clarify the scope of our work, but remain confident
about our findings and conclusions.
In its comments, Commerce provided information on two of its agencies'--
NOAA and NTIA--roles in emergency communications. Commerce commented
that emergency communications are important and that federal agencies
must effectively coordinate to mitigate vulnerabilities. In its
comments, Interior said that the report could have been improved if it
incorporated Interior or federal interoperability collaboration efforts
in regards to emergency response capabilities based on the following.
First, we could have expanded the report's geographic scope such as
including a case study involving fire. We do not intend to understate
fire hazards by not including a fire scenario. However, our case
studies represent a variety of different disaster scenarios
representing different regions of the United States and we do not imply
that these are the only possible catastrophic disaster scenarios.
Interior said that we also could have conducted interviews with
Interior's Emergency Management Offices. While we report on several
federal efforts involving emergency communications, our examples do not
constitute a complete list, or evaluation of the effectiveness of
federal assistance currently available to first responders. Interior
also said that the team could have reviewed existing emergency
deployment systems capabilities and nationally recognized emergency and
day-to-day interoperability efforts throughout the United States. Our
work included conducting interviews with first responders and federal
officials across the country and receiving information on
communications capabilities and efforts to improve interoperability,
among other things. DOJ did not provide comments on our draft report.
DHS, FCC, Commerce, and Interior also provided technical comments that
we then incorporated, where appropriate. DHS's, Commerce's, and
Interior's letters are contained in appendices V, VI, and VII
respectively.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chair of FCC, the Secretary
of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, and
appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on
(202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VIII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
David J. Wise:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objective of this report is to provide information on the status of
emergency communications used by first responders. In particular, we
sought to identify (1) vulnerabilities, if any, to emergency
communication systems; (2) federal assistance available or planned to
first responders for addressing any vulnerabilities or enhancing
emergency communications; and (3) challenges, if any, with federal
emergency communications efforts.
To identify vulnerabilities, if any, to emergency communication
systems, we developed six case studies and subsequent analyses of
varying catastrophic disaster scenarios both natural and man-made. In
its National Response Framework, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) defines catastrophic disasters as any natural or man-made
incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage, or disruption severely affecting the population,
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or
government functions.[Footnote 86] Further, GAO has defined
catastrophic disasters as a disaster whose effects almost immediately
overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local first
responders and require outside action and support from the federal
government and other entities.[Footnote 87] The scenarios captured by
our case studies contain elements from both of these definitions of
catastrophic disasters.
Our case studies included a flood in northern California, a hurricane
in southern Florida, a tsunami in Hawaii, a terrorist attack in
Massachusetts, an earthquake in Tennessee, and a volcanic mudflow in
the state of Washington. With this selection, we do not mean to imply
that these are the only possible catastrophic disaster scenarios. The
first step in selecting our particular case studies was to identify an
exhaustive list of disaster scenarios facing communities across the
United States. We limited this search to states, including Alaska and
Hawaii. We conferred with subject matter experts, and reviewed data and
documents from sources such as National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), United States Geological Survey (USGS), and
nongovernmental entities to produce a preliminary list of potential
case studies. After producing our initial list of over 60 potential
scenarios, we compared this list to available Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) data, which ranked metropolitan areas by the types of
hazards they face (i.e., seismic hazards, historic hurricane strikes,
etc.). This GIS data included historical disasters from 1980 to
2006.[Footnote 88] We also consulted USGS, NOAA, and other documents on
historically less frequent disasters that could occur in our lifetimes.
We identified overlap with our initial list and formulated several
criteria to help select our final set of case studies. Our criteria
included:
* National level impact--We selected scenarios that would have far-
reaching impacts beyond the immediate location of the disaster.
Responding to such disasters would be beyond the capacity of state and
local officials, requiring assistance from the federal government.
* Likelihood of occurrence--We selected scenarios that had a higher
likelihood of occurrence within our lifetime.
* Potential fatalities and injuries--We considered the population of
scenario areas, as well as related casualty forecasts, models, and
expert opinions to select scenarios that were more likely to cause
higher numbers of fatalities and injuries.
* Economic impact--We considered potential economic losses, including
damage to public and private infrastructure and the loss of public and
private revenue.
* Diversity of catastrophic disaster--We selected a variety of scenario
types to show how different disasters (i.e., earthquakes, hurricanes,
tsunamis, and volcanic mudflows) may pose similar and/or different
challenges to emergency communications systems.
* Diversity of geography--We selected scenarios to represent different
regions of the United States.
Data were not available to fully evaluate all scenarios under our
criteria. Previous research has not calculated estimated economic or
other financial losses for all of our scenarios beyond a broad range
(i.e., in the tens of billions). Also, we included one of our case
studies, a terrorist attack in Boston, given continued high interest in
terrorism by Congress and first responders. This case study did not
directly follow our selection method for the other five, although some
of the same criteria--such as potential fatalities and injuries,
economic impact, and diversity of geography--still apply. Other
criteria, such as likelihood of occurrence, have less application
regarding the location of another terrorist attack. We selected Boston,
Massachusetts, as the location of our terrorism scenario because it is
among the top 20 population centers in the United States and is located
in the Northeast, a region not represented by any of our other case
studies. Furthermore, two of the planes involved in the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks flew out of Boston's Logan International
Airport. To provide context for a catastrophic terrorist attack, we
used the Homeland Security Council's Planning Scenario Document.
[Footnote 89] This document provides 15 all-hazards planning scenarios
for use in national, federal, state, and local homeland security
preparedness activities. These scenarios are designed to be the
foundational structure for the development of national preparedness
standards. Because our criteria included physical damage to
communications systems, we used the Council's scenario involving a
nuclear detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised device. When meeting with
state and local stakeholders for this scenario, we described details of
this catastrophic disaster.
In developing our case studies, we visited site locations and
interviewed local and state emergency managers; law enforcement,
firefighters, and other first responders; and regional federal
officials to help identify emergency communications vulnerabilities. We
discussed catastrophic scenarios particular to each case study location
and toured federal, state, and local emergency facilities. First
responders also demonstrated available emergency communications
equipment. We provide additional information on the hazards associated
with each case study in appendix II. We conducted summary analyses of
interviews and other information that we collected on these site
visits. In addition to our case studies, we also conducted a literature
review of prior GAO products and other agency reports on emergency
communications to ascertain and analyze common vulnerabilities. The
three primary vulnerabilities to emergency communications that we
identified are similar to vulnerabilities identified by DHS, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and other stakeholder groups.
To identify federal assistance available to first responders for
emergency communications, we interviewed officials and reviewed program
documents from a variety of federal agencies with communications
responsibilities and efforts underway or planned. Our work focused on
the availability of federal assistance, but did not include a
comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of this assistance. We
reviewed recent emergency communications strategic guidance and
documents from agencies such as DHS, FCC, and DOJ. We also reviewed
FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership proceeding. Our work included
a review of key planning documents such as the National Emergency
Communications Plan. We also reviewed provisions of the Post-Katrina
Act to identify new efforts underway to meet the act's emergency
communications requirements. To obtain information regarding emergency
communications grants and funding available to state and local first
responders, we interviewed FEMA officials in the Grant Programs
Directorate, as well as DOJ officials involved with law enforcement
grants involving funding for emergency communications. To identify
technical support, initiatives, and assets available to first
responders in advance of or during a catastrophic disaster, we
interviewed DHS and DOJ officials, and reviewed our recent work on
several agency efforts. We also gathered information on available
federal assistance during our case study work, collecting examples of
state and local first responders' experiences and perceptions of
federal guidance, grants, and other efforts.
To identify and examine any challenges with federal efforts to enhance
emergency communications, we consulted our past work on emergency
communications, interagency collaboration, and federal government
program management and performance. Based on this review, we selected
several best practices in collaboration--including establishing a
common goal, developing mutually reinforcing strategies, and leveraging
resources--and for government accountability and program performance
relevant to emergency communications. We collected and analyzed key
federal agency documents, such as DHS's National Emergency
Communications Plan, National Communications Capabilities Report,
National Preparedness Guidelines, FCC's notices for proposed rulemaking
in the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership proceeding, and other
publicly available documents, such as comments filed to FCC from public
safety entities. We determined the extent of interagency collaboration
with regard to some significant federal efforts by comparing these
efforts as described within these key agency documents, interviews with
federal officials, state and local responders, and others against our
selected best practices in collaboration. To determine the extent of
monitoring being conducted by federal agencies of stakeholder groups'
recommendations, we analyzed recommendations issued over the past 5
years to identify those which were repeatedly made and relevant to the
vulnerabilities we identified. Additionally, we interviewed federal
agency officials on what steps their respective agencies had taken to
collaborate and monitor federal efforts, such as the Emergency
Communications Preparedness Center and the National Emergency
Communications Plan. We also interviewed state and local first
responders, professional and trade group representatives, and
telecommunications industry officials and reviewed testimony provided
by these groups before Congress and FCC to obtain their perspectives on
challenges to federal efforts.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to May 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Case Study Disaster Scenarios:
The following provides additional background information and context on
the hazards associated with each of our case study locations. These
case studies included a flood in northern California, a hurricane in
southern Florida, a tsunami in Hawaii, a terrorist attack in
Massachusetts, an earthquake in Tennessee, and a volcanic mudflow in
the state of Washington. The scenarios are hypothetical and we include
descriptions of potential impacts, including the geographic area and
populations affected, event frequency, hazards descriptions, and maps
depicting a particular hazard on a national scale.
Sacramento Flooding:
Disaster Type:
A large flood in the city of Sacramento, California, and the
surrounding Central Valley.
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
The city of Sacramento, the California state capital, is located in the
Central Valley, which encompasses the floodplains of two major rivers--
the Sacramento and the San Joaquin--as well as additional rivers and
tributaries that drain from the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The
approximately 1.8 million residents of Sacramento and the surrounding
Central Valley would feel the most significant and direct effects of
flooding. However, widespread flooding would likely have effects on the
entire state of California by disrupting the state government
(Sacramento's Capitol Building is below the flood water level),
utilities, and drinking water. The Sacramento area provides two-thirds
of the drinking water to Southern California.
Event Frequency:
* The actual number of years between floods of any given size varies
greatly. Severe floods can occur in successive or nearly successive
years. Scientists observe how frequently different sizes of floods
occur, and the average number of years between them, to determine the
probability that a flood of any given size will be equaled or exceeded
during any year.
* A 100-year flood has water levels high enough that there is a 1
percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year.
* A 500-year flood has water levels high enough that there is a 0.2
percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any given year. Since
1951, the Sacramento area has experienced five major floods (see figure
16 for a national map of flood declarations since 1980).
Hazards Description:
* Extensive flood zones: There are three different types of flood
events in the Sacramento area: flash, riverine, and urban storm
water.[Footnote 90] Flash floods are localized and the result of
extensive rainfall. Riverine floods occur when riverbeds overflow into
the flood zone. Existing flood zones in Sacramento County are
extensive. Urban storm water floods result when urban drainage systems
cannot handle the quantity of runoff from rainfall.
* Aging infrastructure might fail: The Central Valley's aging flood-
control system provides only limited protection as many of the system's
levees were poorly built or placed on top of older foundations up to
150 years old. Several areas of the county are subject to flooding by
the overtopping of rivers and creeks, levee failures, and the failure
of urban drainage systems to accommodate large volumes of water during
severe rainstorms.
* Other natural disasters can cause flooding: While heavy rains are a
major factor contributing to flooding, a major earthquake in the Bay
Area could also destroy levies, which would result in massive flooding
in the Sacramento area.
Figure 16: Number of Major Flood Declarations by County, 1980 - 2005:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the following major flood declarations by county:
1 to 5 flood declarations;
6 to 10 flood declarations;
11 to 15 flood declarations.
Sources: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Miami Hurricane:
Disaster Type:
Major hurricane striking southern Florida near the City of Miami.
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
A hurricane is a tropical cyclone storm system, which generally forms
in waters with temperatures at or above 80 degrees Fahrenheit, such as
those off of the U.S. coastlines in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic
Ocean. A major hurricane striking the coast of Florida near the City of
Miami and surrounding Miami-Dade County would bring high winds, heavy
rains, and ecological damage to an area with approximately 2.4 million
people. The effects of a major hurricane can include power and water
outages, damage to buildings and roads, and restricted communication
and rescue operations in the 24 hours following the storm.
Event Frequency:
* "Hurricane season" is from June 1 through November 30. According to a
NOAA official at the Tropical Prediction Center, August to October is
the time of highest risk for hurricanes for southern Florida.
* Hurricane intensity is measured on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane
scale, which classifies hurricanes on a scale of 1 to 5, based on the
sustained wind speed. A category 1 hurricane has sustained winds of 74
to 95 miles per hour, while a category 5 has sustained winds greater
than 155 miles per hour. A category 4 hurricane (storms with sustained
winds of 131 to 155 miles per hour) or stronger hurricane hits southern
Florida every 16 years. (See figure 17 for a national map showing the
location and number of hurricane strikes, including southern Florida,
since 1980.)
Hazards Description:
* High Winds: Hurricane-force winds can destroy constructed buildings
and mobile homes. Debris such as signs, roofing material, and items
left outside can become airborne in hurricanes. Downed trees and other
debris, such as occurred when Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida
in 1992, would largely restrict movement, including aid, for the first
few days. Local building codes account for and are designed to
withstand high winds from moderately strong hurricanes, however,
buildings are likely to suffer power and water outages, as well as have
windows destroyed, potentially making them uninhabitable. A category 5
hurricane would test even these building codes, the most stringent in
the nation for hurricanes.
* Storm surge: Water that is pushed toward the shore by the force of
the winds swirling around the storm (the storm surge) combines with
wave action and the normal tides to push water onshore to depths of as
much as 15 feet or more. According to NOAA officials, these waters
would penetrate inland at decreasing depths over eastern sections of
Miami near the waterfront. They could extend even further inland up
rivers.
* Inland flooding: According to NOAA officials, for the 35 years
preceding Hurricane Katrina's landfall along the Gulf Coast, inland
flooding was responsible for more than half the deaths associated with
domestic hurricanes. While the City of Miami is less vulnerable than
New Orleans (it is not situated below sea level), sections of the city
have been flooded by rainfall associated with major hurricanes and
weaker tropical cyclones.
* Associated Tornadoes: Hurricanes can also produce tornadoes, adding
to the potential for destruction.
Figure 17: Number of Hurricane Strikes by County, 1980 - 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. Map]
The map depicts the location of the following:
Counties with 5 or more strikes;
Counties with 4 strikes;
Counties with 3 strikes;
Counties with 2 strikes;
Counties with 1 strike.
Locations are concentrated on the southcentral and southeastern
coastlines.
Sources: GAO analysis of National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Honolulu/Hilo Tsunami:
Disaster Type:
A tsunami striking coastal communities in the state of Hawaii,
including Hilo on the island of Hawaii and Honolulu on the island of
Oahu.
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
Coastal communities in Hawaii are at high risk for tsunamis. Tsunamis
potentially destructive to Hawaiian communities, including the cities
of Hilo and Honolulu, may originate at distant locations around the
perimeter of the Pacific Ocean, or may be locally generated by
earthquakes on or near Hawaii. A tsunami originating in Alaska's
Aleutian Islands would reach the Hawaiian Islands in 4.5 to 5.5 hours.
Event Frequency:
* About 50 tsunamis have occurred in Hawaii since the early 1800s.
Seven of these tsunamis caused major damage to Hawaii, and two of these
tsunamis were locally generated near Hawaii. One of the most severe
occurred in 1946 when a tsunami originating in the Aleutian Islands
struck Hawaii without warning and killed over 170 people.[Footnote 91]
* According to NOAA officials, Hawaii has a high risk for future
tsunamis given its location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, where
about 80 percent of all recorded tsunamis have occurred.
* NOAA officials also reported that tsunamis hit Hawaii several times
per century. It has been 34 years since the last tsunami struck Hawaii
in 1975. (See figure 18 for a map of high and very high hazard coastal
areas based on tsunami frequency.)
Hazards Description:
* Different triggers: Tsunamis are large, rapidly moving ocean waves
triggered by a major disturbance of the ocean floor--typically an
earthquake--but sometimes by a sub-marine landslide or volcanic
eruption. A tsunami wave can travel at speeds of 600 miles per hour.
* Little to no warning: Locally generated tsunamis are potentially the
most dangerous, because the time between their generation and when the
waves arrive on shorelines may be too brief to warn and evacuate
people. After an earthquake near Hawaii in 1975, the first wave reached
Hilo 20 minutes later. Distant tsunamis generally take hours to arrive,
which would allow more time for evacuation.
* Wave Damage: As the tsunami approaches the coast, the wave speed
slows as the wave height grows in the shallower waters, sometimes
cresting at heights of 100 feet and striking the land at speeds of 30
mph or above. A series of waves may strike a coastline at intervals of
every 5 to 40 minutes, and the first wave is often not the
largest.[Footnote 92] The size and destructiveness of the waves are
largely determined by the local topography, both onshore and offshore,
and the direction from which the wave approaches. A tsunami wave may be
very small in the deep ocean, but can become a fast-moving wall of
turbulent water as it approaches land.
Figure 18: Tsunami Hazard Based on Frequency:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. Map]
The map depicts the location of the following:
Very high tsunami hazard based on frequency (Hawaii and Alaskan
coastline);
High tsunami hazard based on frequency (west coastline of continental
U.S.).
Sources: GAO analysis of National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Boston Terrorist Attack:
Disaster Type:
Terrorist incident involving the detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised
nuclear device in Boston, Massachusetts.[Footnote 93]
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
A nuclear bomb blast in a major metropolitan area such as Boston would
cause widespread casualties, damage, and economic disruption.
Approximately 600,000 people reside in the city of Boston, and over 3
million people live in the greater metropolitan area. The most severe
effect of a 10-kiloton nuclear device would be felt within a few miles
of the detonation point. Flying debris may damage areas within
approximately 3.5 miles of the detonation point. Severe radiation
fallout can cause acute health hazards up to 150 miles from point of
detonation, and less severe radiation can cause contamination up to
3,000 miles from point of detonation.
Event Frequency:
The likelihood of a terrorist attack is unknown; however, DHS has
determined the Boston area to be at risk of attack and has designated
it as an Urban Areas Security Initiative region. The criteria to
determine the risk to urban areas includes and considers threats,
vulnerabilities and consequences, such as threats from international
terrorist networks and their affiliates (see figure 19 for a national
map of these regions).[Footnote 94]
Hazards Description:
* Detonation zone: The intense heat of a nuclear explosion produces
fires located throughout the immediate blast zone. Human casualties,
damaged buildings, downed power and phone lines, leaking gas lines,
broken water mains, and weakened bridges and tunnels are just some of
the hazardous conditions that could result. If industrial storage
facilities and manufacturing operations are located near the detonation
site, additional hazardous materials could also be released.
* Electro-magnetic pulse: A nuclear explosion could also produce a high-
voltage spike called an electro-magnetic pulse. This pulse radiates
outwards from the detonation site and has the potential to disrupt the
communications network, other electronic equipment, and associated
systems within an approximately 3-mile range from the detonation point.
* Damage to infrastructure: There could be significant damage to
general infrastructure, including transportation systems, power
generation and distribution systems, communications systems, food
distribution, and fuel storage and distribution. There could also be
concerns about the safety and reliability of structures such as dams
and hazardous material storage facilities. Structures that provide
essential services, such as hospitals and schools, may also be damaged.
* Radiation fallout: The effects of the damage from the blast,
radiation, and fallout could be significant within an approximately 3-
mile range of the detonation point, with lesser effects on populations
up to 3,000 miles away.
Figure 19: Urban Areas Security Initiative Regions, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the following throughout the country:
Metropolitan statistical areas;
10-mile buffer around cities.
Sources: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Administration
(FEMA) data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Memphis Earthquake:
Disaster Type:
Major earthquake in the New Madrid seismic zone near Memphis,
Tennessee.
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
The New Madrid Seismic Zone is a collection of fault lines in the
central United States. An earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone
earthquake could shake the entire Mississippi Valley, including the
states of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Illinois,
Kentucky, and Ohio. This area is home to millions of people and
includes the cities of St. Louis, Missouri; and Memphis, Tennessee.
Event Frequency:
* The zone has produced several major earthquakes since 1800 and
geologists expect similar earthquakes in the future.[Footnote 95]
Geologists have dated evidence of past earthquakes at or exceeding 7 in
magnitude to the years 900 and 1450.[Footnote 96] This suggests that
magnitude 7 or greater earthquakes reoccur in the region approximately
every 500 years. The last series of 7 or greater earthquakes was in
1811-1812 (see figure 20 for a national map of earthquake hazards). The
last earthquake over magnitude 6 in the New Madrid seismic zone was a
6.6 tremor in 1895.
* USGS has calculated the probability of a damaging earthquake of
magnitude 6 or greater in the region to be between 25 to 40 percent in
the next 50 years.
Hazards Description:
* Seismic waves: Seismic wave energy decreases much more slowly in
soils in the central and eastern United States than in western portions
of the country. Consequently, there could be shaking over a larger
area.
* Unstable soil: Muddy, sandy deposits found near rivers tend to
liquefy during an earthquake, which causes buildings to sink, tip over,
and otherwise destabilize.
* Damage to infrastructure: Potential losses from a major earthquake
are expected to be significant due to buildings not designed and
constructed to withstand strong shaking. A quake will most likely
damage businesses, transportation, communication, oil and natural gas
pipelines, and housing.
* Economic losses: Estimated building damage costs could run as high as
$70 billion from one major earthquake alone. Economic costs from
disruptions in commerce through the center of the country could cost
additional billions.
Figure 20: High, Medium, and Low Seismic Hazards:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the locations of high, medium, and low seismic hazards
throughout the country.
Sources: GAO analysis of United States Geological Survey (USGS) data;
Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Mount Rainier Volcanic Mudflow:
Disaster Type:
A volcanic mudflow, also called a "lahar", descending from Mount
Rainier and inundating communities in Washington state.
Geographic Area and Populations Affected:
A major lahar originating from Mount Rainier in Washington state could
inundate portions of the Puget Sound lowlands, including the towns of
Orting, Puyallup, as well as portions of the city of Tacoma over 40
miles from the mountain's summit. Research indicates that Mount Rainier
has been the source of many lahars that buried areas that are now
densely populated.[Footnote 97]
Event Frequency:
* During the past few thousand years, lahars reaching the Puget Sound
lowlands have occurred every 500 to 1,000 years. The last lahar to
reach the Puget Sound lowlands occurred approximately 500 years ago.
Past lahars have struck different areas in the vicinity of Mount
Rainier. For example, during the last lahar to reach the Puget Sound
lowlands approximately 500 years ago, the lahar did not inundate the
present location of the city of Tacoma.
* Smaller flows not extending as far as the Puget Sound lowlands occur
more frequently. USGS estimates at least a one in seven chance of a
lahar reaching the Puget Sound lowlands during an average human
lifespan.
* USGS ranked Mount Rainier as a "very high threat volcano" among those
volcanoes in the United States and its territories. (See figure 21 for
a national map of the location of USGS's high threat and very high
threat volcanoes.) Of the 169 active volcanoes in the United States,
USGS ranked 18 as very high threat volcanoes.
Hazards Description:
* Occur suddenly: Lahars can occur with little or no warning. Most
lahars large enough to flow beyond the boundaries of Mount Rainier
National Park would occur during periods of volcanic unrest or
eruption. For these large lahars, the estimated time between detection
of a lahar on Mount Rainier and its arrival in the town of Orting,
Washington, is about 40 minutes. Orting is over 10 miles from the
boundary of Mount Rainier National Park and about 20 miles from the
summit of Mount Rainier. Dispersed populations closer to Mount Rainier
would be affected sooner.
* Dangerous debris flow: Lahars are fast-moving slurries of volcanic
rock, mud, and water that look and behave like flowing concrete. Mount
Rainier supports more than 1 cubic mile of glacial ice--as much as all
other Cascade Range volcanoes combined. Thus, there is the potential to
unleash large volumes of water that could combine with loose debris to
generate a large lahar.
* Different potential triggers: Triggers for lahars do not have to be
associated with volcanic eruptions. For example, a large flank collapse
of the mountainside could also trigger a lahar at Mount Rainier.
Although many flank collapses occur during eruptive periods, it is also
possible for them to be triggered by earthquakes or result from the
progressive weakening of rock, saturation by groundwater, and the
continuing pull of gravity.
Figure 21: Location of High Threat and Very High Threat Volcanoes in
the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: U.S. map]
The map depicts the locations of high threat and very high threat
volcanoes in the United States. Highest concentration is near the west
coast and on the Alaskan coastline.
Sources: GAO analysis of United States Geological Survey (USGS) data;
Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Descriptions of Communications Systems and Technologies
Used by First Responders:
Land Mobile Radio System. Land mobile radio systems are the primary
means of communications among first responders. These systems typically
consist of handheld portable radios, mobile radios, base stations, and
repeaters. Land mobile radio networks operate on different spectrum
frequencies, such as very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency
(UHF), 700 MHz, and 800 MHz. FCC has reported that radio handsets must
operate on the same frequencies to communicate. For example, a handset
operating on a specific frequency in the UHF band will not be able to
directly communicate with a handset operating on a different UHF
frequency or on a VHF, 700 MHz, or 800 MHz frequency. Generally, first
responders must carry multiple radios to allow direct communication
with radio systems operating on different frequencies.
Handheld portable radios are typically carried by first responders and
tend to have a limited transmission range. Mobile radios are often
located in vehicles and use the vehicle's power supply and a larger
antenna, providing a greater transmission range than handheld portable
radios. Base station[Footnote 98] radios are located in fixed
positions, such as public service access points or dispatch centers,
and tend to have the most powerful transmitters. A network is required
to connect the different base stations to the same communications
system. Repeaters are used to increase the effective communications
range of handheld portable radios, mobile radios, and base station
radios by retransmitting received radio signals. Figure 22 illustrates
the basic components of a land mobile radio system.[Footnote 99]
Figure 22: Depiction of Land Mobile Radio System:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The illustration depicts the following connections:
Portable radio user, connects to:
Repeater towers, which connects to:
Transmitter tower attached to Base Station, which connect to:
Mobile Radio user.
Source: GAO and DHS.
[End of figure]
Satellite systems. Satellite systems, such as phones, radio, and e-
mail, can provide service in areas where there is no terrestrial
infrastructure. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
reported that satellite communications, which can cover large portions
of the Earth's surface, can provide an immediate backup emergency
communications capability to restore emergency responder command and
control communications when terrestrial infrastructure is severely
damaged or destroyed.[Footnote 100] Like other communications systems,
orbiting satellites and their corresponding terrestrial infrastructure
are not immune from threats. For example, satellites face unique space-
based vulnerabilities. Typically, the terrestrial infrastructure, such
as hub and gateway earth stations, is well protected, reliable, and
redundant. Thus, satellite communications networks can weather
terrestrial disasters if their associated earth stations survive, and
can generally be restored to operation more quickly than terrestrial
communications networks that rely on wireline infrastructure (see later
discussion).
Cellular Systems. First responders can use systems supported by
cellular technologies, including cell phones. FCC has reported that
cellular technologies, which offer "anytime, anywhere" mobility, could
be an important tool for responders when their primary communications
systems become unavailable. For example, first responders use cellular
phones for non-critical primary communications or for backup
communications when primary systems fail. The existence of multiple
cellular service providers with national footprints greatly increases
dependability and coverage even if individual commercial networks are
suffering disruptions or do not necessarily meet all public safety
requirements. If a cellular tower or its associated power is lost
during a disaster, they could be temporarily replaced with a portable
tower, backup generators, and other backup equipment.
Wireline Systems. FCC has reported that first responders depend on
wireline (landline) communications for operation of critical systems.
Wireline service providers design networks to minimize single points of
failure that could disrupt the network. However, the strategy of no
single point of failure is not applied uniformly across the network.
For reasons of economy, some systems' vulnerabilities may remain. In
addition, facilities connecting first responders to central facilities
may use copper cable, making them vulnerable to flooding, or they may
use aerial cable, which subjects them to storm and fire damage. Loss of
wireline facilities was well documented during Hurricane Katrina.
Technologies to Improve Interoperability:
When different jurisdictions utilize different and incompatible
systems, technologies such as audio switches, crossband repeaters, and
others allow different systems to interoperate. These technologies to
improve interoperability are described below.
Audio Switch. An audio switch provides interoperability by sending an
audio signal from one radio system to all other connected systems. An
audio switch can be either stationary or mobile. One popular audio
switch consists of a frame with slots, into which different hardware
modules can be installed to control and interconnect different
communications systems, such as VHF and UHF radios, as well as
telephones. The audio switch can hold up to 12 interface modules, each
capable of connecting a radio system. Audio switches are useful where
multiple agencies temporarily come together to respond to an event
because they are easily transportable and can be used to create
temporary interoperability.
Crossband Repeater. A crossband repeater provides interoperability
between systems operating on different radio frequency bands by
changing frequencies between two radio systems. Crossband repeaters can
connect base stations or handheld or mobile radios. The repeater is
also useful for extending the communications coverage beyond the range
of a single radio. Crossband repeaters can also be linked together to
overcome distances or geographical features blocking communication
among users utilizing one repeater.
Console-to-console patch. A console-to-console patch achieves
interoperability by making an audio connection between the dispatch
consoles of two different radio systems. Console-to-console patches
connect consoles located at the dispatch centers where personnel
receive incoming calls. These patches can connect personnel from an
agency using one radio system to personnel from an agency using a
different radio system. Connections between dispatch consoles can be
made temporarily, as needed, through a public telephone line or
permanently over a dedicated leased line or a dedicated microwave or
fiber link.[Footnote 101]
Software-defined radios. These radios use software to determine
operating parameters such as the frequency band (such as VHF or UHF)
and modulation type (such as AM or FM), and can be programmed to
transmit and receive on any frequency within the limits of its hardware
design. Software-defined radios will allow interoperability between
agencies using different frequency bands, different operational modes
(digital or analog), proprietary systems from different manufacturers,
or different modulation (AM or FM). For example, a software-defined
radio can be programmed to work as a conventional UHF radio but in
another operating mode can function as an 800 MHz radio. Some software-
defined radios could be used to identify unused frequencies and
automatically make use of them, which is important in making efficient
use of limited radio spectrum. The software-defined radio technology
may also provide integrated voice and data over the same channel.
Voice over Internet Protocol. Voice over Internet Protocol can connect
different radio systems by using an Internet Protocol network as the
connecting mechanism. Voice over Internet Protocol converts analog
voice signals from a radio into digital data packets that travel over
an Internet Protocol network.[Footnote 102] At their destination, the
digital information is converted back to analog audio and can be heard
on the recipient's radio. Voice over Internet Protocol enables
interoperability between agencies using different frequency bands,
different operational modes (digital or analog), or proprietary systems
from different manufacturers. Voice over Internet Protocol holds
promise as a relatively low-cost solution to communications
interoperability.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Stakeholder Group and Advisory Committee Descriptions:
DHS Stakeholder Groups:
Name: National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC);
Type of group: Stakeholder Group;
Mission: To provide industry advice regarding national security and
emergency preparedness and the availability and reliability of
telecommunication services. Its goal is to develop recommendations to
the President to assure vital telecommunications links through any
event or crisis, and to help maintain a reliable, secure, and resilient
national communications;
Year established: 1982.
Name: SAFECOM Emergency Response Council;
Type of group: Stakeholder Group;
Mission: To provide broad based input from the public safety community
on its user needs to the SAFECOM program. A mechanism to share best
practices, lessons learned, and guidance so that interested parties at
all levels of government can learn from one another's experience,
perspective, and expertise;
Year established: SAFECOM founded in 2001.
Name: Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications;
Type of group: Stakeholder Group;
Mission: To address federal wireless communications interoperability by
fostering intergovernmental cooperation. Coordinating body that focuses
on technical and operational matters within the federal wireless
communications community, representing more than 40 federal entities;
Year established: 1994.
FCC Advisory Committees:
Name: Network Reliability and Interoperability Council-VII;
Type of group: Advisory Committee;
Mission: To partner with the FCC, the communications industry, and
public safety to facilitate enhancement of emergency communications
networks, homeland security, and best practices across the
telecommunications industry;
Year established: 2004.
Name: Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks;
Type of group: Advisory Committee;
Mission: To review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
telecommunications and media infrastructure. The panel studied the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and media
infrastructure, and made recommendations for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability, and communications among first
responders;
Year established: 2006.
Name: Joint Advisory Committee on Communications Capabilities of
Emergency Medical and Public Health Care Facilities;
Type of group: Advisory Committee;
Mission: To assess specific communications capabilities and needs of
emergency medical and public health care facilities; options to
accommodate growth of basic and emerging communications services; and
options to improve integration of communications systems used by
emergency medical and public health care facilities with existing or
future emergency communications networks;
Year established: 2007.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and FCC information.
Note: The FCC committees on this list no longer exist due to either
termination or charter expiration. For example, the Network Reliability
and Interoperability Council will be subsumed by the new Communications
Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Security:
Washington, DC 20525:
June 9, 2009:
Mr. Dave J. Wise:
Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Wise:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report: Emergency
Communications: Vulnerabilities Remain and Limited Collaboration and
Monitoring Hamper Federal Efforts (GAO-09604). The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates GAO's work in planning, conducting,
and issuing this report.
The following represents the DHS response to the recommendations
contained in the draft report.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in DHS's role as chair of the
agency working group to establish the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center (ECPC), work to complete the memorandum of
understanding to establish the center.
Response: Concur. Office of Emergency Communication (OEC) concurs that
finalizing the ECPC through the adoption of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) is an important step in formalizing the ECPC's role in
coordinating emergency communications across member federal agencies
and facilitating implementation of the NECP. While the final Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) has not yet been approved by all member
agencies, it has been signed by DHS and circulated to interagency
partners for final concurrence. Throughout the Charter development
process, the ECPC has been actively working on a number of key
coordination and NECP implementation issues by means of staff level
working groups, including the Grants Focus Group and the Technical
Assistance Focus Group. The Grants Focus Group provides a forum for
Federal grant issuers to convene to share lessons learned, best
practices, and information on their specific grant programs further
fostering alignment among the Federal communications grant programs.
The Technical Assistance Focus Group aims to identify commonalities for
Technical Assistance across the federal government.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Chair of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) establish a forum, or other mechanism,
to better collaborate on each agency's emergency communications
efforts.
Concur: OEC agrees that regular, senior-level meetings between DHS,
NTIA and the FCC would be beneficial. OEC notes that OEC and the FCC's
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau have begun regular
coordination meetings to identify areas for collaboration and to work
jointly on common solutions as appropriate. Additional
coordination will occur via the ECPC.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Homeland Security provide guidance and technical
assistance to federal agencies in developing formal emergency
communications plans.
Concur: However, it should be noted that Title 18 of the Homeland
Security Act focuses on assistance to "State, regional, local, and
tribal governments," and provides limited authority for OEC to provide
assistance to other federal agencies.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Chair of FCC systematically
track, assess, and respond to stakeholder groups' recommendations.
Concur: Though OEC concurs with this recommendation, it is important to
note that OEC currently works closely with numerous stakeholder groups,
including the SAFECOM Executive Committee (EC) and SAFECOM Emergency
Response Council (ERC), as well as relevant critical infrastructure
coordinating councils. EC/ERC meetings occur on a regular basis, and
include the compilation and circulation of meeting notes and minutes.
The Federal Partnership for Interoperability Coordination (FPIC) is
another example of a stakeholder body that OEC has tracked and for
which it has assessed recommendations. Indeed, in developing the NECP,
OEC utilized these and other coordination forums to engage more than
150 stakeholders at all levels of government and the private sector.
OEC also relied upon findings from the FCC's Hurricane Katrina Task
Force, the FCC's Joint Advisory Committee on Public Health and the
NSTAC Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Report in
developing the NECP.
Again, thank you and your staff for producing a thorough report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
United States Department Of Commerce:
The Secretary of Commerce:
Washington, DC 20230:
June 4, 2009:
Mr. David J. Wise:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2700:
Seattle, WA 98104:
Dear Mr. Wise:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled Emergency
Communications: Vulnerabilities Remain and Limited Collaboration and
Monitoring Hamper Federal Efforts (GAO-09-604). Technical and editorial
comments to the draft report were provided to GAO staff earlier.
As part of this engagement, GAO met with officials from two of the
Department of Commerce's agencies: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA). Among other things, NOAA provides
daily weather forecasts, severe storm warnings, and climate monitoring.
Its dedicated scientists provide research and use high-tech
instrumentation to provide citizens, planners, emergency managers, and
other decisionmakers with reliable information that may be needed
during a catastrophic or other emergency event. NTIA is responsible for
managing the Federal Government's use of the radio frequency spectrum.
NTIA also manages the Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC)
grant program, which awarded $968,385,000 to fund interoperable
communications projects in 56 States and Territories.
In the draft report, GAO made recommendations to improve Federal
agencies' collaboration and monitoring in efforts related to emergency
communications. I agree that emergency communications among first
responders are of the utmost importance and that Federal agencies must
be able to effectively coordinate activities to mitigate
vulnerabilities. Although none of the recommendations were directed at
or required specific action on the part of NOAA or NTIA, I assure you
that these agencies will continue to collaborate with and support other
Federal agencies in reducing vulnerabilities related to emergency
communications.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share the Department's comments
on this draft report. The Obama Administration is committed to
strengthening this country's preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gary Locke:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
Office Of The Secretary:
Washington, DC 20240:
June 3, 2009:
David Wise:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C 20548:
Dear Mr. Wise:
Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft Government Accountability Office
Report entitled "Emergency Communications: Vulnerabilities Remain and
Limited Collaboration and Monitoring Hamper Federal Efforts," (GAO-09-
604).
We appreciate the diligent work of the team that prepared the report
and the data collected. In general, we believe that this report is
somewhat informative but could have been improved if it incorporated
DOI or Federal interoperability collaboration efforts in regards to
Emergency Response capabilities based upon the following:
* a perspective that was expanded geographically;
* interviews with DOI Emergency Management Offices;
* review of existing emergency deployment systems capabilities; and;
* review of nationally recognized emergency and day-to-day
interoperability efforts throughout the United States.
In addition, we suggest further interviews with the National
Interagency Fire Center for a firsthand view of Emergency
Communications support, capabilities and established federal practices.
The enclosure includes information regarding national policy and
technical comments on the draft report.
If you have any questions, or need additional information, please
contact Christopher Lewis at Christopher Lewist@ios.doi.gov or phone,
703-648-5550.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Pamela K. Haze:
Deputy Assistant Secretary - Budget and Business Management:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Wise (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Other key contributors to this report were David Sausville (Assistant
Director), Matt Cail (Analyst-in-Charge), Eli Albagli, Delwen Jones,
John Mingus, Monica McCallum, Andrew Stavisky, Friendly Vang-Johnson,
Maria Wallace, and Mindi Weisenbloom.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October
2005); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[2] Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios - Executive
Summaries, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
[3] DHS's National Response Framework defines a catastrophic incident
as any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism that results
in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption
severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,
economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic
incident could result in sustained nationwide impacts over a prolonged
period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available
to state, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities in the impacted
area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and
emergency services to such an extent that national security could be
threatened. Department of Homeland Security, National Response
Framework, 2008.
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Improved Its Risk-Based Grant Programs'
Allocation and Management Methods, but Measuring Programs' Impact on
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-488T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11,
2008).
[5] 9-11 Commission, The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
[6] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
[7] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of the Post-Katrina Act became
effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the exception of
certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took
effect on March 31, 2007.
[8] SAFECOM is a DHS communications program that provides research,
development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, and templates on
interoperable communications-related issues to local, tribal, state,
and federal emergency response agencies.
[9] These policies include 9-1-1 and E9-1-1; operability and
interoperability of public safety communications; communications
infrastructure protection, and disaster response; and network security
and reliability.
[10] Spectrum is divided into frequency bands, each having technical
characteristics that affect electronic transmission in different ways.
"Bandwidth" is related to the transmission capacity of a frequency
band. If voice calls and low-rate data are involved, narrowband systems
are adequate; but, to transmit video and images, broadband is needed.
[11] Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002,
107 Stat. 312, 387-392 (1993), codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
309(j).
[12] In September 2008, FCC issued its Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in this proceeding. See, Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-
762 and 777-792 Bands; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband,
Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, Third Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd 14301 (2008) (700 MHz).
[13] DTV Delay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat. 112. The act also
extends the Commission's auction authority through September 2012.
[14] In the Public/Private Partnership, the winning bidder of the
commercial license in the Upper 700 MHz D Block (758-763/788-793 MHz)
("D Block") is to partner with the nationwide licensee of the public
safety broadband spectrum (763-768/793-798 MHz) ("Public Safety
Broadband Licensee") to enable construction of an interoperable
broadband network that would serve both commercial and public safety
users.
[15] NTIA is the President's principal adviser on telecommunications
and information policy issues, and in this role frequently works with
other Executive Branch agencies to develop and present the
Administration's position on these issues.
[16] GAO, Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure
Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-133] (Washington, D.C.: December
2008).
[17] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October
2005); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[19] FCC, however, would not necessarily characterize "continuity of
communications" as a vulnerability; rather, FCC views this as a goal
for emergency communications systems.
[20] While based on our case studies, we do not intend figure 4 or
other figures depicting disaster scenarios and their effects on
emergency communications to represent effects at any particular
location that we visited. An actual catastrophic disaster could have
much larger and more complicated impacts. The figure is meant to
provide examples of just some of the ways in which communications may
be disrupted.
[21] A lahar is a volcanic mudflow that originates from the slopes of a
volcano. These flows contain rock and other debris that exert high
impact force against objects in their path, such as buildings and
trees. Sizes vary, but lahars can travel over 50 miles from a volcano.
Triggers for lahars include volcanic eruptions and massive landslides,
such as the one that occurred at Mount St. Helens in the state of
Washington in 1980.
[22] An emergency operations center is the physical location where
multiagency coordination occurs. The core functions of such a center
include coordination, communications, resource allocation and tracking,
and information collection, analysis, and dissemination for disaster
response.
[23] The New Madrid seismic zone is a collection of fault lines that
runs through several states, including Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois,
Kentucky, and Tennessee. The zone has produced several major
earthquakes since 1800. Geologists expect similar earthquakes in the
future.
[24] Established in 1983, the consortium's primary mission is to reduce
deaths, injuries, property damage, and economic losses from earthquakes
in the central United States. The organization's primary objective is
to support multi-state response and recovery planning, resource
acquisition; public education and awareness; promotion; mitigation, and
research associated with earthquake preparedness in the central United
States. Members include Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee.
[25] These assets are mobile, self-contained cell sites to boost
coverage for first responders. They are designed for short-term
response and can process thousands of calls per hour.
[26] Underwater earthquakes typically generate tsunamis--landslides,
volcanic activity, and meteor strikes are less common sources. Tsunami
generating earthquakes usually occur in subduction zones, such as those
found in the Pacific Ocean off the U.S. western and Alaskan coasts.
Subduction zones are formed where one of the earth's outer shell of
tectonic plates plunges underneath another. A tsunami's size depends on
the earthquake's size, its depth below the ocean floor, the type and
amount of seafloor movement and the energy released among other
factors. Some tsunami waves can travel up to 600 miles-per-hour,
hitting nearby coasts within minutes and other distant shorelines hours
later. We have previously reported on communications challenges related
to tsunamis. See GAO, U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State
Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but
Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-06-519 (Washington, D.C.: June 5,
2006).
[27] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2007).
[28] Spectrum allocations for state and local public safety are
fragmented into many distinct slices of the radio spectrum. Bands of
interest to public safety include VHF (very high frequency), and UHF
(ultra high frequency). Radio systems used by law enforcement and other
first responders operating in the 806-824 MHz and 851-869 MHz portion
of the UHF bands are often referred to as "800 MHz" systems. The 800
MHz band is also home to commercial wireless carriers and private radio
systems. In July 2004, the FCC adopted a comprehensive plan to
reconfigure the 800 MHz band to separate public safety systems in the
band from commercial wireless systems using cellular architecture.
[29] FCC officials noted limitations with patched networks. For
example, handsets programmed to operate on frequencies not supported by
base stations in the same area will still not be able to communicate
with each other unless there is a compatible base station with which
the handset can communicate.
[30] The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
[31] Our examples do not constitute a complete list, or evaluation of
the effectiveness of, this federal assistance currently available to
first responders. We have previously reported on a number of issues/
challenges in past disaster preparedness efforts. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-133]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301]; GAO, Homeland Security:
Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation Required to
Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-740] (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
[32] Department of Homeland Security, National Emergency Communications
Plan (Washington, D.C.: July 2008).
[33] Department of Homeland Security, National Communications
Capabilities Report (Washington, D.C.: July 2008).
[34] The Emergency Communications Preparedness Center membership has
since been broadened to include other federal agencies beyond those
specified in the Post-Katrina Act.
[35] Interior is also a charter member of the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center, and the agency has participated in the Charter
writing and review process.
[36] The D Block refers to the portion of commercially allocated
spectrum that is adjacent to the public safety broadband spectrum. The
March 2008 auction received only a single bid that did not meet the
reserve price of $1.33 billion and thus did not become a winning bid.
[37] The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. appendix 2, governed
the operations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks with guiding principles of
openness in government; diversity in membership and advice; and public
accountability.
[38] The Post-Katrina Act directs these working groups to be
established in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and to include DHS,
FCC, and other federal agencies with responsibility for coordinating
interoperable emergency communications or providing emergency support
services. 6 U.S.C. § 575.
[39] The Urban Areas Security Initiative is intended to enhance
regional preparedness for prevention, protection, response, and
recovery in 62 major metropolitan areas determined to be "highest
risk."
[40] The State Homeland Security Initiative provides funds to states
and territories to implement the goals and objectives of state homeland
security strategies and initiatives included in the State Preparedness
Report.
[41] The Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program provides
governance, planning, training and exercise, and equipment funding to
state, territories, and local and tribal governments to carry out
initiatives to improve interoperable emergency communications. We
provide more details on this program later in our report.
[42] The Emergency Operations Center Grant Program supports Emergency
Operations Centers with a focus on addressing identified deficiencies
and needs.
[43] The 25 Cities Project refers to the High-Risk Metropolitan Area
Interoperability Assistance Project, a DOJ Wireless Management Office
grant program that identified the top 25 metropolitan areas that were
considered likely targets for terrorist attack and provided
communication solutions to federal and local authorities such as fire,
police, and emergency medical services. Projects differed from city to
city.
[44] The Community Oriented Policing Interoperable Communications
Technology Program funded projects that used equipment and technologies
to increase interoperability among the law enforcement, fire service,
and emergency medical service communities from fiscal years 2003
through 2006.
[45] While we did not evaluate the effectiveness or quality of the
Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grant Program as a part of
our work, a recent Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General
report identified an issue regarding Public Safety Interoperable
Communications grant effectiveness. The report found that most grantees
have made little progress in implementing their projects, and much
remains to be done for the grantees to finish their projects by the
September 30, 2010, deadline. See Public Safety Interoperable
Communications Grant Program: Grantees Appear Unlikely to Finish
Projects Within Short Funding Time Frame, Final Audit Report No. DEN-
19003 (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[46] A tabletop exercise is a discussion-based exercise that focuses on
existing plans, policies, mutual aid agreements, and procedures used
among multiple agencies. Typically, a tabletop exercise involves
representatives from the entire range of agencies and jurisdictions
that would take action in all-hazards or terrorist response incidents.
[47] The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service uses a calling
card that provides access authorization and priority treatment to first
responders in the public switched telephone network through a unique
dialing plan and personal identification number, and is designed to
maximize all available telephone resources should outages occur during
a disaster or other emergency.
[48] Project 25 was initiated in 1989.
[49] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301]. Project
25 radios were marketed to and purchased by federal, state, and local
agencies without any formal compliance testing to validate vendors'
compliance with the standards.
[50] See S. Rep. No. 109-88, at 45 (2005); H.R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 81
(2005).
[51] The initial Compliance Assessment Program process began in
December 2008, and after a 6-month grace period, equipment covered by
the program that is purchased with federal grant dollars will be
accompanied by declarations of compliance and test reports.
[52] The mission of FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau is
to collaborate with others, including other federal agencies.
Specifically, the mission is "To collaborate with the public safety
community, industry, and other government entities to license,
facilitate, restore and recover communications services used by the
citizens of the United States, including first responders, before,
during and after emergencies by disseminating critical information to
the public and by implementing the Commission's policy initiatives."
[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] and GAO,
Electronic Government: Potential Exists for Enhancing Collaboration on
Four Initiatives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6]
(Washington, D.C.: October 2003).
[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-133]. See also,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118], and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6].
[55] Similarly in 2004, GAO reported that SAFECOM's authority and
ability to oversee and coordinate federal and state efforts for
increased interoperability was limited by its dependence upon other
agencies for funding and their willingness to cooperate. GAO, Project
SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort Requires
Stronger Collaboration, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-494] (Washington, D.C.: April 2004).
[56] Collaboration can be broadly defined as any joint activity that is
intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the
organizations act alone.
[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-133].
[58] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301].
[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6].
[60] Interoperability in the Next Administration: Assessing the
Derailed 700 MHz D Block Public Safety Spectrum Auction: Hearing Before
the House Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and
Response, 110th Cong. (Sept. 16, 2008).
[61] Congressional members have expressed interest in the relationship
between DHS, the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, the
National Emergency Communications, and the 700 MHz Public/Private
partnership proceeding.
[62] FCC has taken steps to leverage DHS expertise on other efforts
such as the 700 MHz narrowband requirement for mandatory
interoperability through the use of Project 25 standards, as well as
designated interoperability channels.
[63] FCC officials strongly assert that FCC must take into account
input from all stakeholders, not just the views of DHS.
[64] According to DHS officials, while the National Emergency
Communications Plan does not reflect the FCC's final policies for the
700 MHz Public/Private partnership, one of the key objectives of the
plan (Objective 4: Standards and Emerging Communications Technologies)
identifies a number of initiatives to ensure that emerging
technologies, such as the wireless broadband technologies in the 700
MHz spectrum, are fully integrated with current emergency
communications capabilities and work to improve interoperability on a
nationwide basis.
[65] At a congressional hearing, members expressed interest in DHS
officials providing their opinion on how FCC's 700 MHz proceeding
should be structured.
[66] NTIA, acting on behalf of interested federal agencies, did submit
formal comments on this proceeding. As previously discussed, NTIA has a
role in managing spectrum used by federal agencies. Accordingly,
discussions on the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership that deal
specifically with spectrum issues and access for federal agencies would
include NTIA.
[67] The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has also highlighted the
separate paths that DHS and FCC are pursuing in developing a national
capabilities approach. Specifically, CRS stated that according to
testimony "neither agency has undertaken to incorporate each other's
goals in their specific planning." U. S. Congressional Research
Service, Public-Private Partnership for a Public Safety Network:
Governance and Policy (RL 34054, Oct. 16, 2008) by Linda K. Moore.
[68] At a congressional hearing, members expressed interest in the
relationship between FCC's 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership and the
Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working Groups.
[69] This is not intended to be an exhaustive list or proposal for how
the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership network could or should be
aligned with the National Emergency Communications Plan or other DHS
efforts. We also recognize that FCC has sought comment on aspects of
its proposal and that a final order has not been issued. However, we
believe that steps could be taken, as appropriate, to ensure that FCC's
700 MHZ Public Private Partnership plan, as adopted and implemented, is
supportive of the National Emergency Communications Plan
[70] FCC officials noted that it was ineffectual to compare the
strategic goals of the National Emergency Communications Plan to the
performance benchmarks and build out requirements in the 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership proceeding. According to these officials,
the plan is focused on improving the interoperability of current
systems, while FCC's initiative would create a 100 percent
interoperable network once built. Although we recognize the different
emphasis, we continue to believe that FCC build out requirements could
be leveraged to help meet the goals articulated in the National
Emergency Communications Plan.
[71] According to FCC, it sought comments on a state role in
coordinating participation in the network and received conflicting
comments on these proposals.
[72] In the Third Further Notice, FCC tentatively concluded that it
would reaffirm its prior decision that it was the "sole discretion" of
the public safety broadband licensee whether to permit federal public
safety agency use of the public safety broadband spectrum. This
decision was supported by NTIA in its comments filed to FCC.
[73] FCC mandated that the security and encryption be consistent with
state of-the-art technology. However, because FCC did not expressly
reference the Advanced Encryption Standard, it is unclear whether FCC's
mandated encryption will adhere to the standard called for in the
National Emergency Communications Plan.
[74] Public Hearing on Public Safety Interoperable Communications - The
700 MHz Band Proceeding: Hearing Before the Federal Communications
Commission (July 30, 2008). [hyperlink,
http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/mt073008.ram], accessed April 2009.
[75] It was beyond the scope of work for this engagement to assess the
full extent of emergency communications planning completed by federal
agencies. Not all federal agencies have communications infrastructure
or the role/responsibility to assist state and local first responders
with communications.
[76] U.S. Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006).
[77] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118].
[78] We have previously reported on the need for standard channel
nomenclature to facilitate interoperability. GAO, Homeland Security;
Federal Leadership Needed to Facilitate Interoperable Communications
among First Responders, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1057T] (Washington, D.C.: September
2004).
[79] According to FCC officials, the agency is under no obligation to
adopt any particular stakeholder group recommendation. Under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, the function of an advisory committee
is to provide advice; a federal agency may implement or not implement
an advisory committee's recommendation at its discretion.
[80] We have previously reported on the composition and transparency of
federal advisory committee selection processes. GAO, Issues Related to
the Independence and Balance of Advisory Committees, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-611T] (Washington, D.C.: April
2008).
[81] GAO, Federal Advisory Committees Follow Requirements, but FCC
Should Improve Its Process for Appointing Committee Members,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-36] (Washington, D.C.:
December 2004).
[82] Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd 7320 (2006).
[83] Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane on Communications Networks, Order, 22 FCC Rcd 10541 (2007).
[84] Although the Communications Security, Reliability, and
Interoperability Council became technically operational the date the
charter was filed, members were never determined and no meetings have
been held. The charter was renewed on March 19, 2009, and the FCC
recently issued a Public Notice seeking nominations for membership on
the committee. According to FCC officials, the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council will be subsumed by the new Communications
Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council.
[85] The purpose of an advisory committee charter is to describe the
mission, goals, and objectives of the advisory committee (41 CFR 102-
3.75), and according to the FCC, the Communications Security,
Reliability, and Interoperability Council charter fulfilled the
relevant legal requirements.
[86] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
(Washington, D.C.: January 2008).
[87] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006).
[88] The GIS data did not include tsunami hazards. We consulted other
data and included Honolulu, Hawaii (as well as other population centers
in Hawaii) for several reasons. These included the example of the
catastrophic tsunami that hit Indonesia in 2005, tsunamis repeatedly
striking Hawaii over the past century, and the unique challenge of
Hawaii's relative geographic isolation to the U.S. mainland.
[89] Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios - Executive
Summaries, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). We also used this
document to provide context for some of our other scenarios, such as
the effects of major hurricanes and earthquakes.
[90] Sacramento County Hazard Identification, Multi-Hazard Mitigation
Plan (December 2004).
[91] Following the 1946 tsunami, a tsunami warning system for the
Pacific basin was developed. Presently, the Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center System, which has its headquarters in Honolulu, is administered
by the National Weather Service under NOAA.
[92] U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate
to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant
Challenges Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-519]
(Washington D.C.: June 2006).
[93] Homeland Security Council, Planning Scenarios - Executive
Summaries, Version 2.0 (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
[94] Homeland Security: DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology Is Reasonable,
But Current Version's Measure of Vulnerability Is Limited, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-852] (Washington D.C.: June 2008).
[95] U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet FS-131-02 (October 2002).
[96] Earthquake magnitude is a measure of the size of an earthquake and
is based on ground motions recorded on seismographs.
[97] U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Fact
Sheet-034-02, Mt. Rainier - Learning to Live with Volcanic Risk (2002).
[98] A base station contains the equipment for transmitting and
receiving the radio signals that allow portable radios to communicate
with each other.
[99] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301], p. 11.
[100] Federal Communications Commission, FCC Report to Congress:
Vulnerability Assessment and Feasibility of Creating a Back-Up
Emergency Communications System, Submitted Pursuant to Public Law No.
110-53 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2008).
[101] A leased line refers to a permanent telephone connection set up
by a telecommunications provider between two geographic locations. A
fiber link uses light sent over a glass or plastic fiber to carry
communication signals. A microwave link uses radio beams of extremely
high frequencies to send information between two fixed geographic
sites.
[102] In some cases, this is the Internet; in others, it is a private
data network.
[End of section]
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