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entitled 'Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could 
Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a 
Pandemic' which was released on June 16, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2009: 

Influenza Pandemic: 

Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees 
Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic: 

Influenza Pandemic: 

GAO-09-404: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-404, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the 
country’s critical operations will involve new challenges in the event 
of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This requested report discusses (1) 
the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect 
workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders, (2) the 
pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations 
performing essential functions other than first response, and (3) the 
opportunities to improve agencies’ workforce pandemic plans. GAO 
surveyed pandemic coordinators from 24 agencies and selected three case 
study occupations for review: federal correctional workers, staff 
disbursing Treasury checks, and air traffic controllers. 

What GAO Found: 

The HSC’s 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation 
Plan required federal agencies to develop operational pandemic plans, 
and responses from the pandemic coordinators of the 24 agencies GAO 
surveyed indicate that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are 
under way. However, the responses also showed that several agencies had 
yet to identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be 
performed remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies’ 
pandemic plans rely on telework to carry out their functions, several 
agencies reported testing their information technology capability to 
little or no extent. 

GAO’s three case study agencies also showed differences in the degree 
to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans. 
The Bureau of Prisons’ correctional workers had only recently been 
required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional facilities. 
Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable experience 
limiting the spread of infectious disease within its correctional 
facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral medications for 
a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of the Treasury’s 
Financial Management Service, which has production staff involved in 
disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks, had 
pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled 
personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand 
sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities, 
where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility 
pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards 
contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently 
completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of 
respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-
term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical. 

There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies’ 
workforce pandemic plans. Under the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza Implementation Plan, DHS was required to monitor and report 
on the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting 
their employees during an influenza pandemic. The HSC, however, 
informed DHS in late 2006 or early 2007 that no specific reports on 
this were required to be submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that 
agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their 
plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again 
in 2008. This process did not include any assessment or reporting on 
the status of agency plans. Given agencies’ uneven progress in 
developing their pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance 
agencies’ accountability to protect their employees in the event of a 
pandemic. GAO has previously reported on the importance of internal 
control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. 
Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, the President 
and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the agencies to 
continue their operations while protecting their federal employees in 
the event of a pandemic. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) request that 
the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive 
Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their 
operations while protecting their employees in the event of a pandemic. 
The Congress may want to consider requiring similar Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) reporting. The HSC noted that it will give 
serious consideration to the report findings and recommendations, and 
DHS said the report findings and recommendations will contribute to its 
efforts to ensure that government entities are well prepared for what 
may come next. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-404]. For more 
information, contact Bernice Steinhardt at (202) 512-6543 or 
steinhardtb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection 
of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic: 

Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff 
Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic 
Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development: 

Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies' Pandemic Workforce Protection 
Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a 
Pandemic: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies: 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Homeland Security Council: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Agencies' Examples of Non-First Response Essential Functions 
That Cannot Be Performed Remotely: 

Table 2: Agencies' Responses on the Extent to Which They Have Tested IT 
Infrastructure to Ensure That It Is Capable of Handling Telework or 
Work-at-Home Arrangements during a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Number of Agencies Reporting Taking Various Measures to 
Protect Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic: 

Figure 2: Number of Agencies Reporting Plans to Use Various Social 
Distancing Strategies: 

Figure 3: Federal Employees at Work in an Air Traffic Control Tower: 

Abbreviations: 

ATO: Air Traffic Organization: 

BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 

CFO: chief financial officer: 

COOP: continuity of operations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOC: Department of Commerce: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DOI: Department of the Interior: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DOL: Department of Labor: 

DOS: Department of State: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FEB: federal executive board: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FMS: Financial Management Service: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 

HSC: Homeland Security Council: 

HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development: 

IT: information technology: 

KFC: Kansas City Financial Center: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NSF: National Science Foundation: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration: 

PAPR: powered air purifying respirator: 

PFC: Philadelphia Financial Center: 

SBA: Small Business Administration: 

SEGS: sustain essential government services: 

SNS: Strategic National Stockpile: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USDA: Department of Agriculture: 

USP: United States Penitentiary: 

VA: Department of Veterans Affairs: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

June 12, 2009: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable George V. Voinovich: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the 
country's critical operations will involve new challenges in the event 
of an influenza pandemic. While a pandemic will not directly damage 
physical infrastructure, such as power lines or computer systems, it 
threatens the operation of vital systems by endangering and potentially 
removing the essential personnel needed to operate them from the 
workforce for weeks or months. Many federal employees will be able to 
perform their agencies' essential functions remotely through 
arrangements such as telework. Other federal employees, however, such 
as federal correctional workers, production staff involved in 
disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks,[Footnote 1] 
and air traffic controllers, will have to work at assigned locations 
where there will be an increased chance of infection due to proximity 
to others. While the roles and responsibilities of first responders 
[Footnote 2] in emergencies and the risks these employees face are well 
recognized, the risks to other federal employees unable to perform 
their essential functions remotely are not as apparent. 

Contingency planning for an event sometime in the future is often 
difficult to justify, particularly in the face of limited resources and 
more urgent problems and priorities. However, as we were recently 
reminded by the outbreak of an H1N1 virus, an influenza pandemic 
remains a real threat to our nation and to the world. Although the 
virus seems to have been relatively mild, it could return in a second 
wave this fall or winter in a more virulent form. Of the three 
pandemics of the 20th century, the most deadly was the influenza 
pandemic of 1918-1919 during which scientists estimate there were 50 
million to 100 million deaths worldwide, including at least 675,00 in 
the United States, making it among the most deadly events in human 
history. A pandemic is likely to come in waves, each lasting months, 
and pass through communities of all sizes across the nation and the 
world simultaneously. As a pandemic influenza outbreak spreads, federal 
employees may be infected and their ability to work may be limited. 

Many aspects of a pandemic and its consequences can be anticipated and 
mitigated through planning. The Homeland Security Council's (HSC) 
[Footnote 3] National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation 
Plan (Implementation Plan) requires federal agencies to develop 
operational plans[Footnote 4] addressing issues such as the protection 
of federal employees. This report responds to your request that we 
examine (1) the extent to which federal agencies have reported plans 
under way to protect their workforce should an influenza pandemic occur 
and have reported identifying essential functions, other than first 
response, that cannot be accomplished remotely in the event of a 
pandemic; (2) the plans selected agencies have established for certain 
occupations performing essential functions other than first response; 
and (3) opportunities to improve federal agencies' planning, enabling 
them to protect their workforce while maintaining their essential 
functions in the event of a pandemic. 

To address our objectives, we surveyed the pandemic coordinators 
[Footnote 5] from the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990,[Footnote 6] which we supplemented with a 
case study approach. We used the survey to get an overview of 
governmentwide pandemic influenza preparedness efforts regarding 
protection of the federal workforce. The survey questions asked about 
pandemic plans; essential functions that employees cannot perform 
remotely; protective measures, such as procuring pharmaceutical 
interventions;[Footnote 7] social distancing strategies;[Footnote 8] 
information technology (IT) testing; and communication of human capital 
pandemic policies. We received responses from all of the agencies. We 
also selected three federal occupations as case studies to provide a 
more in-depth examination of agencies' pandemic planning and because 
these occupations represent non-first response occupations involved in 
an essential function that federal employees need to provide on-site. 
The case study occupations were correctional workers employed by the 
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff 
responsible for disbursing federal payments, such as Social Security 
checks, in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Financial 
Management Service (FMS); and air traffic controllers employed by the 
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). 

We reviewed agency pandemic influenza plans, national pandemic plans, 
prior GAO work related to pandemic influenza planning, and additional 
relevant documents that assess pandemic influenza, public health, and 
other emergency preparedness and response issues. We interviewed agency 
officials and managers from the case study agencies and made site 
visits to case study facilities in the Kansas City metropolitan area, 
including the United States Penitentiary (USP) in Leavenworth, Kansas. 
In addition, we made a site visit to the Allenwood Federal Correctional 
Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and received written responses to 
interview questions from the FMS Philadelphia Financial Center. We also 
met with FAA representatives at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach 
Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air Route 
Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and Air Traffic Control 
Systems Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Our work included 
interviews with officials at the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM). In addition, we met with White House counsel representing the 
HSC from the past and current administrations to determine the role the 
HSC played in ensuring uniform pandemic preparedness across the U.S. 
government. We also interviewed representatives from the Kansas City 
Federal Executive Board (FEB), the Minnesota FEB, and the Oklahoma FEB 
[Footnote 9] and federal union representatives to gather their 
perspectives on the protection of federal workers during a pandemic. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Detailed information on our 
scope and methodology appears in appendix II. 

Background: 

Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United 
States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal 
government. Federal employees work in every state, with about 90 
percent outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Federal 
workers perform functions across a multitude of sectors, from those 
vital to the long-term well-being of the country--such as environmental 
protection, intelligence, social work, and financial services--to those 
directly charged with aspects of public safety--including corrections, 
airport and aviation safety, medical services, border protection, and 
agricultural safety. 

Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate 
workforce during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe 
influenza pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the 
workforce could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care 
for ill family members, or fear of infection. While the commitment of 
federal workers to carry out the missions of their agencies during 
natural and man-made disasters and emergencies is evident from past 
disasters, critical federal workers have sometimes been left to fend 
for themselves during such situations. For example, in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many essential federal personnel in New 
Orleans did not have housing and, therefore, were not able to return to 
work. Unlike oil and gas workers in New Orleans, whose companies sought 
to secure housing for them, local federal workers did not have an 
advocate that would ensure the speedy reconstitution of essential 
services. In many cases, essential federal employees queued up for 
temporary housing in long lines.[Footnote 10] 

The federal government has issued guidance to assist organizations of 
all types in developing plans for pandemic events, including a national 
strategy that discusses the threat and potential impact of a pandemic 
influenza event and an implementation plan for the national strategy 
that identifies roles and responsibilities for the federal government, 
the private sector, and others. HHS has also published a series of 
checklists intended to aid preparation for a pandemic across all 
segments of society. These include checklists for organizations such as 
state and local governments, U.S. businesses, individuals and families, 
schools, health care organizations, and community organizations. As 
pandemic influenza presents unique challenges to the coordination of 
the federal effort, joint and integrated planning across all levels of 
government and the private sector is essential to ensure that available 
national capabilities and authorities produce detailed plans and 
response actions that are complementary, compatible, and coordinated. 

All federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans 
that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will 
provide for the safety and health of its employees and support the 
federal government's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from a pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza 
requires that the scope of federal government continuity of operations 
(COOP) planning[Footnote 11] includes preparing for a catastrophic 
event that is not geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concluded that planning for a 
pandemic requires a state of preparedness that is beyond traditional 
federal government COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning 
purposes, essential functions may be broader than 30-day traditional 
COOP-essential functions. Federal agency pandemic planning guidance can 
be found at [hyperlink, 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html.[Footnote 12] 

Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection 
of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic: 

The Implementation Plan issued in May 2006 directs federal agencies to 
have operational pandemic plans. Agencies' responses to our survey 
questions indicate that the agencies' preparedness efforts are less 
than uniform. Although all of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported being 
engaged in planning for pandemic influenza to some degree, several 
agencies reported that they were still developing their pandemic plans. 
According to the survey responses, the development of practices for 
federal workforce protection in the event of a pandemic is also at the 
beginning stages for several agencies. 

The HSC Requested That Agencies Certify Their Pandemic Plans with the 
Council: 

In November of 2006, the HSC issued the Key Elements of Departmental 
Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan (Key Elements), which had a 
checklist for federal agencies to use in their pandemic preparedness. 
The Key Elements checklist covered subjects dealing with the safety and 
health of department employees, essential functions and services and 
how agencies will maintain them in the event of significant and 
sustained absenteeism, support of the federal response, and 
communication with stakeholders during a pandemic. The Key Elements 
stated that to ensure uniform preparedness across the U.S. government, 
the HSC was including a request that by December 2006 the agencies 
certify in writing to the HSC that they were addressing applicable 
elements of the checklist. A letter to the council stating that an 
agency was addressing the elements in the checklist in its planning was 
sufficient for certification. According to White House counsel from the 
prior administration, all of the 24 CFO Act agencies required to 
certify with the HSC did so, although not all of the agencies met the 
December 2006 deadline. 

Subsequently, in August 2008, the HSC revised the Key Elements to 
reflect current federal government guidance on pandemic planning. The 
HSC requested that all department and agency heads recertify that their 
pandemic plans were addressing all the applicable elements of pandemic 
planning stipulated in the updated checklist by October 15, 2008. The 
updated checklist provided revisions of some key elements and added new 
elements. Additionally, the revised checklist required that agencies 
plan for a severe pandemic, which requires planning for prolonged 
implementation of community mitigation measures that could affect 
workforce absenteeism, such as school closures, for up to 12 weeks. A 
new planning element also asked if the agency planned to purchase and 
stockpile antiviral medications and personal protective equipment for 
employees identified through risk assessments. 

Our survey questions for the pandemic coordinators of the 24 CFO Act 
agencies focused on areas similar to the elements from the HSC 
checklist dealing with the safety and health of agency employees and 
essential functions. In addition to asking agencies about their 
pandemic plans, we asked them whether they have identified essential 
functions other than first response that cannot be performed remotely 
in the event of a pandemic, planned measures to protect workers who 
will not be able to work remotely, established social distancing 
strategies, tested their IT capabilities, and communicated their human 
capital pandemic policies. Survey responses represent the main 
department or agency only unless components are specifically mentioned. 

Several Agencies Were Still Developing Their Pandemic Plans: 

In the introduction to the Key Elements, the HSC recognized that 
pandemic planning is not a static process and encouraged departments 
and agencies to revise their plans and procedures as new federal 
guidance is developed. However, several of the agencies we surveyed 
reported that they were still formulating their pandemic plans in May 
2008. For example, the Small Business Administration (SBA) stated that 
the agency had begun drafting its pandemic plan but had not completed 
or cleared it. In February 2009, SBA reported that it had begun to 
draft a more complete pandemic influenza annex to its COOP plan with an 
estimated completion date of spring 2009. The Department of Defense 
(DOD) had completed its overarching departmentwide plan, which tasked 
its components to develop COOP pandemic plans. The department was 
coordinating the plans among the combatant commands and military 
services. DOD officials commented that some DOD components have had 
pandemic influenza plans in place for several years. In addition, DOD 
installations have been required to have Force Health Protection Plans 
for years, and DOD reported that the installations are tailoring these 
plans to include pandemic influenza considerations. 

All of the 24 CFO Act agencies surveyed, with the exception of OPM, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), required their components[Footnote 13] to 
develop pandemic plans. OPM indicated that all of its essential 
functions are performed at the department level. NSF reported not 
having any essential functions as defined by Federal Continuity 
Directive 2[Footnote 14] but that it does have important government 
functions that the agency intends to continue during a pandemic. 
According to an NSF continuity manager, all of NSF's government 
functions are performed at the department level. HUD did not explain 
why it did not require its components to develop pandemic plans. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), SBA, the General Services 
Administration (GSA), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of 
Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required 
regional and program offices, in addition to components and bureaus, 
where applicable, to develop pandemic plans, and as mentioned 
previously, the DOD combatant commands and services were required to 
prepare and validate plans. Six of the agencies surveyed--the 
Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Education (Education), 
EPA, Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), and SBA--reported requiring their components to incorporate 
pandemic planning into or develop pandemic annexes or addenda to their 
COOP plans. DOC, for example, reported providing templates to each of 
its components to assist them in developing their own annexes or 
addenda to their COOP plans. 

Most, but Not All, of the Agencies Reported Identifying What Their On- 
site Essential Functions Would Be in the Event of Pandemic Influenza: 

The Implementation Plan instructs agencies that institutional planning 
efforts should address the question of the agency's essential functions 
and how they will be maintained in the event of significant and 
sustained absenteeism. Furthermore, the Key Elements asks for plans to 
include definitions and identification of essential functions needed to 
sustain agency mission and operation. This includes the determination 
of which, if any, essential functions, or nonessential operational 
support functions can be suspended and for what duration before 
adversely affecting agency mission. The Key Elements also calls on 
agencies to identify positions, skills, and personnel needed to 
continue essential functions and develop a plan to ensure and consider 
appropriate level of staffing to continue these functions. Identifying 
essential functions and enumerating the employees who would perform 
them is the first step in training those employees, communicating the 
risks and expectations of working during a pandemic, and budgeting and 
planning for measures that would mitigate those risks. 

Of the 24 agencies surveyed, 19 reported that they have identified 
essential functions at both the department and component levels that 
cannot be continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza 
or, in the case of OPM and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), determined that all of their essential functions 
could be performed remotely. NSF reported that all of its important 
government functions could be performed remotely. Of the 5 agencies 
reporting that they had not identified such functions, DOJ reported 
identifying essential functions at the component level but not at the 
departmental level, noting that the department's plan is being revised. 
DOJ stated that upon completion the plan will address department- 
essential functions that cannot be continued via telework. At the time 
of our survey, GSA reported not identifying its essential functions in 
the event of a pandemic while 3 agencies--DOD, SBA, and HUD--were still 
identifying essential functions or determining which essential 
functions could not be continued through telework. DOD reported that 
its classified work prohibits telework for approximately 26,200 
essential civilian personnel and its mission requirements preclude 
telework for approximately 89,500 positions. DOD has approximately 
700,000 civilian employees on its payroll. DOD stated that it is 
finalizing a list of essential functions at the department and 
component levels. SBA reported that it was expanding on its basic COOP 
planning to account for the circumstances of a pandemic, stating that 
the agency has identified its primary essential functions for COOP 
purposes, functions that could be performed for the most part remotely 
and through telework. HUD reported that it has identified its COOP- 
essential functions but has not confirmed that they could be continued 
through telework. Table 1 lists some examples agencies provided of 
their essential functions that cannot be performed remotely in the 
event of a pandemic. 

Table 1: Agencies' Examples of Non-First Response Essential Functions 
That Cannot Be Performed Remotely: 

Agency: DHS; 
Functions: 
* Transportation Security Administration functions; 
* Customs and Border Protection functions; 
* Immigration and Customs Enforcement functions; 
* U.S. Secret Service protection operations; 
* U.S. Coast Guard daily safety operations. 

Agency: DOC; 
Functions: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration weather 
forecasts, watches, warnings, and advisories; acquisition and 
distribution of hydrometeorological data; and interpretation of 
satellite data. 

Agency: DOJ; 
Functions: Correctional workers' functions. 

Agency: DOL; 
Functions: Mine inspections. 

Agency: DOS; 
Functions: Protection and assistance to overseas American citizens. 

Agency: DOT; 
Functions: 
* Air traffic control; 
* Aviation safety inspections; 
* Maintenance of National Aerospace System components; 
* Airport inspections; 
* Hazardous materials packaging and pipeline accident investigations; 
* Oversight of damaged pipeline service restoration; 
* Rail safety and truck safety inspections; 
* Intelligence analysis and staffing the 24-Hour Operations Center; 
* IT system maintenance. 

Agency: EPA; 
Functions: Lab sampling and analysis that supports emergency response 
personnel. 

Agency: HHS; 
Functions: Critical regulatory functions and systems Maintenance of 
unique biological stock. 

Agency: NASA; 
Functions: Command, control, and communications with spacecraft Imaging 
products provided by satellite systems. 

Agency: NRC; 
Functions: Regional reactor inspections. 

Agency: SSA; 
Functions: Assigning Social Security numbers. 

Agency: USDA; 
Functions: Food safety Animal and plant disease management. 

Legend: 
SSA = Social Security Administration, 
USDA = Department of Agriculture. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses. 

[End of table] 

DOL reported identifying essential functions in accordance with federal 
pandemic guidance. DOL stated that in recognition that an influenza 
pandemic will last much longer than a traditional 30-day or less COOP 
event, the DOL pandemic plan and component agency pandemic plans 
include functions beyond the essential functions in the DOL and agency 
COOP plans. The department expects that performance of its essential 
functions will ebb and flow based on the availability of personnel and 
telecommunications. DOL agencies identified which work would be 
accomplished through telework and which could be done safely in the 
office using social distancing methods. As part of its ongoing 
planning, DOL requires its agencies to continuously identify who would 
accomplish the essential functions and if the work could be done 
through telework, cross-train at least three employees for each 
function, and ensure that employees have the equipment needed to work 
at home and test their ability to do so. Some, but not all, DOL 
component agencies have identified which essential functions can only 
be performed within a DOL facility with notice to the affected 
employees. 

Identifying essential functions and the employees who perform them is 
the first step before informing these employees that they may be 
expected to continue operations in the event of a pandemic, as well as 
preparing them for the risks of performing such functions on-site. 
Eighteen agencies reported that they have notified some or all 
employees in department-level essential functions that they may be 
expected to continue operations during a pandemic and 16 reported doing 
so for employees in component-level essential functions. Three pandemic 
coordinators did not know whether their employees had been notified. A 
number of agencies reported having informed some employees who perform 
essential functions that they may be expected to continue operations, 
despite not having determined the number of such employees. 

Agencies Reported Taking Measures Such as Procuring Gloves and Masks to 
Protect Employees during a Pandemic: 

We asked the pandemic coordinators from the 24 CFO Act agencies whether 
they had planned or budgeted for any of seven potential measures to 
protect workers whose duties require their on-site presence during a 
pandemic. The measures included in our survey were among the 
recommendations for worker protection issued through the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), HHS, or FEMA guidance. They 
included procurement of personal protective equipment such as masks and 
gloves; supplemental cleaning programs for common areas; distribution 
of hygiene supplies (hand sanitizers, trash receptacles with hands-free 
lids, etc.); obtaining antiviral medications; arrangements to obtain 
pandemic vaccines to the extent available; prioritization of employees 
for vaccinations; and prioritization of employees for antiviral 
medications. The guidance recommends the measures according to risk 
assessments for employees, and therefore, based on the agencies' 
mission and activities, not all measures are equally appropriate for 
all agencies. 

Figure 1 details the agency responses to the measures they plan to 
protect their employees during a pandemic. As the figure shows, 
procurement of personal protective equipment and distribution of 
hygiene supplies had the highest number of positive responses. Sixteen 
agencies reported arranging for obtaining antiviral medication and 
supplemental office cleaning programs for common areas. Agencies 
reported arrangements to obtain vaccines, should they become available, 
less frequently. Eight agencies said that they had planned for all 
seven measures to some degree. 

Figure 1: Number of Agencies Reporting Taking Various Measures to 
Protect Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Procurement of personal protective equipment: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 19. 

Distribution of hygiene supplies: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18. 

Obtaining antiviral medications: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16. 

Supplemental office cleaning programs for common areas: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16. 

Prioritization of employees for antiviral medication: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 14. 

Arrangements to obtain pandemic vaccines to the extent available: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 13. 

Prioritization of employees for vaccinations: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses. 

[End of figure] 

Agency responses to this set of questions emphasized different 
approaches to planning for employee protective measures in the event of 
a pandemic. For example, DOD reported investing approximately $24 
million in antibiotics to treat bacterial infections secondary to 
pandemic influenza. DOD also noted that a pandemic influenza 
vaccination strategy for key civilian personnel within DOD is currently 
in development. DOJ said its planning and budgeting for the measures 
are limited to departmental first responders from its law enforcement 
components and leadership. However, DOJ also reported that it plans to 
advise all components to budget for emergency equipment and supplies in 
their future budget submissions, in accordance with Federal Continuity 
Directive 1 requirements. DHS reported that it had done fit testing of 
employees for N95 respirators[Footnote 15] and training on the proper 
use of other personal protective equipment and had pre-positioned 
stockpiles of the equipment for employees in 52 locations. DOS noted 
that it had provided pandemic influenza-specific training to janitorial 
staffing, with a focus on maintaining proper disinfection of restrooms, 
offices, and common areas as well as on their own protection. 

Agencies Reported That Social Distancing Strategies Were Part of Their 
Pandemic Plans: 

The Key Elements asks agencies if they have considered implementation 
of social distancing policies to prevent influenza pandemic spread at 
work. Influenza is thought to be primarily spread through large 
respiratory droplets that directly contact the nose, mouth, or eyes. 
These droplets are produced when infected people cough, sneeze, or 
talk, sending the infectious droplets into the air and into contact 
with other people. Large droplets can only travel a limited distance; 
therefore, people should limit close contact with others when possible. 
Examples of social distancing strategies include requiring six feet of 
separation between people or canceling events and closing or 
restricting access to certain buildings. Employees may decrease their 
risk of infection by practicing social distancing and minimizing their 
nonessential contacts and exposure to highly populated environments. In 
many instances, low-cost and sustainable social distancing practices 
can be adopted by employees at the workplace for the duration of a 
pandemic outbreak. 

The agencies reported considering a variety of social distancing 
strategies in the context of pandemic preparedness. For example, the 
survey revealed that the most frequently cited social distancing 
strategies involved using telework and flexible schedules for their 
workforce. Eighteen agencies were considering low-cost social 
distancing strategies, such as planning for restrictions on meetings 
and gatherings and canceling unnecessary travel. Only 8 agencies 
reported considering alternatives to public transportation for their 
employees. Figure 2 shows the number of agencies responding positively 
about their plans to use various social distancing strategies in the 
context of pandemic preparedness. 

Figure 2: Number of Agencies Reporting Plans to Use Various Social 
Distancing Strategies: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Flexible schedules: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 24. 

Telework: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 24. 

Restrictions on meetings and gatherings: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18. 

Avoiding all unnecessary travel: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18. 

Pandemic influenza-specific office protocols: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16. 

Closing office fitness centers or child care centers: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 13. 

Strategic work space configuration: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 11. 

Alternatives to public transportation: 
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 8. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses. 

[End of figure] 

The agencies reported some other examples of social distancing 
strategies. For instance, DOD's pandemic plan provides authority to 
installation commanders to implement Emergency Health Powers[Footnote 
16] to impose movement restriction and use of containment strategies, 
such as isolation and quarantine. As a result of pandemic exercises, 
DOD also plans to restructure cubicles and other work space during a 
pandemic. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) intends to break up 
workdays into shifts to minimize the number of people on-site 
performing essential functions, whereas the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) reported planning to stagger breaks and strategic 
reassignments. Although the planning process has not been completed, 
DOL noted that it plans to implement parking restrictions for essential 
employees who would need to be physically in the office and post 
signage for elevators and restrooms to limit use to one person at a 
time. In addition, NRC reported that it enhanced telephone conferencing 
capability so that it can locate and virtually assemble teams, 
managers, and staff as needed. 

Only One Agency Reported Testing Its Information Technology 
Capabilities to a Great Extent: 

Many of the agencies' pandemic influenza plans rely on social 
distancing strategies, primarily telework, to carry out the functions 
of the federal government in the event of a pandemic outbreak. 
Accordingly, the Key Elements asks if agencies have ensured that their 
telecommunications infrastructures are capable of handling telework 
arrangements. As part of their pandemic planning, agencies need to 
review their telework infrastructures and look for ways to expand their 
capacities, if necessary. 

In our survey, agencies reported testing their IT capabilities to 
varying degrees. Only one agency, NSF, stated that it tested its IT 
infrastructure to a great extent. NSF reported assessing its telework 
system formally several times each year and each day through various 
means. The agency noted that it has an annual COOP exercise that tests 
the IT infrastructure it would use in a pandemic situation. Twice a 
year, tests are done to ensure that the NSF computer service recovery 
site can provide a connection to the agency's IT infrastructure. NSF 
also stated that it has a majority of staff with telework agreements in 
place and who telework at least on an episodic basis. In contrast, five 
of the surveyed agencies acknowledged that they had tested their IT 
network capacity to little or no extent. Table 2 shows the agency 
responses to this question. 

Table 2: Agencies' Responses on the Extent to Which They Have Tested IT 
Infrastructure to Ensure That It Is Capable of Handling Telework or 
Work-at-Home Arrangements during a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak: 

Extent: To a great extent; 
Agencies: NSF. 

Extent: To a moderate extent; 
Agencies: DOC, DOE, DOI, DOL, DOS, DOT, Education, EPA, OPM, NRC, SSA. 

Extent: To some extent; 
Agencies: DOJ, HHS, HUD, DOD, Treasury, USAID, VA. 

Extent: To little or no extent; 
Agencies: DHS, GSA, NASA, SBA, USDA. 

Legend: 
DOI = Department of the Interior, 
VA = Department of Veterans Affairs. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency responses. 

[End of table] 

Several agencies provided more detail on their IT network testing 
efforts. For example, DOT stated that over the past 2 years, the 
department had a number of IT and telework exercises. One of these 
occurred on April 17, 2008, when the department tested its telework 
capacity for all headquarters operations during the visit of Pope 
Benedict XVI, who conducted a Mass at the Washington Nationals Stadium, 
1 block from DOT headquarters. Other examples of IT capacity testing 
included the Office of the Secretary of Defense's live 2-day pandemic 
influenza-based exercise, that included employees who teleworked from 
home or other alternative worksites. An HHS component, the Division of 
Payment Management, reported executing a business continuity exercise, 
which incorporated a scenario of responding to an outbreak of influenza 
in the Washington, D.C., area. The division directed 40 percent of its 
employees, 31 employees plus 3 contractors, to work from home. The goal 
of the exercise was to test employees' access to critical systems and 
determine IT gaps, the ability to continue transactions, and the 
ability to communicate during an emergency. DOL stated that it has 
established a committee to focus on increasing its telework testing and 
providing guidance for agency program managers to do more direct tests. 
On the other hand, SSA noted that while it has telework arrangements 
that can be used during a pandemic outbreak, the agency has elected not 
to develop a specific telework contingency because telework does not 
lend itself to the agency's primary mission. 

Three Agencies Reported Not Providing Employees with Information on 
Human Capital Policy Changes in the Event of a Pandemic: 

Federal Continuity Directive 1 requires that each agency implement a 
process to communicate its human capital guidance for emergencies--pay, 
leave, staffing, and other human resources flexibilities--to managers 
and make staff aware of that guidance to ensure that the agency 
continues essential functions during an emergency. Given the potential 
severity of pandemic influenza, it is important that employees 
understand the policies and requirements of their agencies and the 
alternatives, such as telework, that may be available to them. Many 
employees and their supervisors will have questions about their rights, 
entitlements, alternative work arrangements, benefits, leave and pay 
flexibilities, and hiring flexibilities available during the turmoil 
created by a pandemic. 

Twenty-one of the 24 pandemic coordinators surveyed reported making 
information available to their employees on how human capital policies 
and flexibilities will change in the event of a pandemic outbreak. 
Three agencies--DOC, GSA, and SSA--reported that they have not. Of the 
agencies that reported making information available, 2 had done so 
indirectly. HUD stated that it shared information with unions, and 
Treasury reported that it briefed its human capital officers on the 
human capital policies and flexibilities available to address pandemic 
issues. NRC reported that in September 2008 its pandemic plan was 
completed and made available to staff through the agencywide document 
management system. The plan reflected human capital policies and 
flexibilities. Many of the agencies that made information available did 
so through their internal Web sites, both by posting their own plans 
and guidance and by linking to OPM guidance on human capital policies. 
Of those agencies, several also held town hall meetings or all-staff 
briefings to share guidance with employees. A number of agencies 
reported distributing pamphlets or brochures that contained human 
capital information. 

Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff 
Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic 
Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development: 

BOP Has Taken Steps to Protect Correctional Workers in the Event of a 
Pandemic: 

BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by 
confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and 
community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and 
appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement 
opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. BOP 
has 114 correctional facilities with a central office located in 
Washington, D.C., and 6 regional offices. The central office provides 
administrative oversight of its facilities, and the 6 regional offices 
directly support operations of the facilities in their respective 
geographic areas of the country. As of January 8, 2009, the agency was 
responsible for the custody and care of 201,113 federal inmates. 
Approximately 35,000 federal employees ensure the security of federal 
prisons and provide inmates with programs and services. According to 
BOP officials, the warden is permitted to use all facility staff, 
including noncorrectional services staff, such as secretaries, nurses, 
or dentists, for correctional service assignments during emergencies 
and at other designated times. One of BOP's published core values is 
that all employees are "correctional workers first," regardless of the 
specific position to which an individual is hired, and both 
correctional services staff and noncorrectional services staff are 
responsible for the safety and security of the facility. 

BOP operates facilities at different security levels, and each facility 
is designated as either minimum, low, medium, or high security--with 
increasing security features, inmate to staff ratios, and control of 
inmate movement with each increasing security level--and administrative 
facilities that have special missions, such as the detention of 
pretrial offenders and the treatment of inmates with serious or chronic 
medical problems. Some BOP facilities are part of BOP's 13 federal 
correctional complexes, which consist of two or more colocated 
facilities. BOP facilities are given a security designation based on 
the level of security and staff supervision the facility is able to 
provide. 

Pandemic Planning for Correctional Workers: 

DOJ's pandemic influenza plan focuses on minimizing the effects of a 
pandemic on its workforce and operations via techniques such as social 
distancing, infection control, personal hygiene, personnel training, 
and telework. The department's plan is designed to supplement the 
traditional, all-hazards COOP plan. According to DOJ's plan, each DOJ 
component is required to identify its specific responsibilities for 
maintaining essential functions during a pandemic influenza outbreak, 
comply with Federal Continuity Directives 1 and 2 and FEMA guidelines, 
and certify compliance with DOJ's Security and Emergency Planning 
Department. DOJ's primary function with its components in pandemic 
planning is its periodic random assessments of component continuity 
programs. 

BOP's pandemic influenza plan was developed through its Office of 
Emergency Preparedness and was disseminated to its central office and 
six regional offices in May 2008. In conjunction with BOP's pandemic 
plan, BOP's Health Services Division developed four supplemental 
pandemic flu modules for facility-level planning--Surveillance and 
Infection Control, Antiviral Medications and Vaccines, Health Care 
Delivery, and Care of the Deceased--which provide detailed instructions 
for health-related aspects of pandemic flu emergency response. 
Specifically, the modules contain guidelines, standard operating 
procedures, checklists, and screening forms. The final modules became 
available to individual BOP facilities in August 2008, and the deadline 
to submit facility-specific pandemic plans was extended from September 
to November 2008. Prior to the plan's release, BOP held conferences 
with the Health Services Division and infection control officers to 
solicit feedback on the draft plan's feasibility and to encourage the 
facilities to start implementing elements of the plan, such as early 
coordination with local communities, surveillance of seasonal 
influenza, and promotion of good health habits among the correctional 
workers and the inmates. 

BOP's Antiviral Medications and Vaccines outlines guidance on 
stockpiling, distribution, and dispensation of antiviral medications. 
The module also requires the facilities to review HHS priority groups 
for receiving antiviral medication and pandemic vaccine; develop local 
procedures for dispensing antiviral medication and vaccine to employees 
and inmates according to the central regional office guidance issued by 
the medical director; and coordinate with local health departments to 
ensure the facility's inclusion in the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS),which is a national repository of medical supplies that is 
designed to supplement and resupply local public health agencies in the 
event of a national emergency. 

BOP headquarters provided funding to the central regional offices to 
stockpile Tamiflu, an antiviral medication, and a list of GSA-approved 
sources to procure additional supplies. Based on a historical review of 
the 1918 pandemic influenza and HHS planning assumptions, BOP intends 
to supply antiviral medication to 15 percent of the correctional 
workers and inmates in each facility if the influenza outbreak is 
geographically spread throughout the United States. BOP's pandemic plan 
anticipates that its supply of Tamiflu will come from two sources-- 
BOP's established stockpile and each BOP facility's coordinated effort 
with its local health department to ensure inclusion in the SNS for 
antiviral medication for treatment. According to a regional BOP 
official, antiviral medication is already stockpiled at designated 
storage sites in each region, and each storage site is responsible for 
plans to distribute the antiviral medication throughout its respective 
region. For example, the North Central Regional Office in Kansas City, 
Missouri, reported managing its stockpile through a GSA contract with 
McKesson Pharmaceuticals. Under the terms of the contract, the regional 
office can exchange the antiviral medication after 5 years if a 
pandemic does not occur. Upon expiration of the antiviral medication, 
the contract requires either recertification of the existing 
medications or a new shipment. 

At the time of our review, no BOP-wide pandemic or health care 
management exercise had been conducted; however, the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness was planning such exercises. At the same time, 
individual institutions and regional health services offices have 
conducted exercises on specific aspects of pandemic preparedness. For 
example, the North Central Regional Office in Kansas City reported 
participating in pandemic tabletop exercises and interagency tests 
coordinated by the Kansas City FEB. Regional directors have had basic 
pandemic training, but there have not been exercises on how to manage a 
pandemic or manage a local facility in the event of a pandemic. The 
regional managers have ongoing conferences and have been trained on 
overarching BOP pandemic plans and strategies, such as social 
distancing, hand hygiene, and stockpiling. 

BOP's pandemic plan addresses the need for infection control measures 
to mitigate influenza transmission and calls for education of 
correctional workers and the inmate population. Accordingly, all 
facilities are instructed that they should have readily available and 
ample supplies of bar soap and liquid soap in the restrooms, alcohol- 
based wipes throughout the facility, and hand sanitizers if approved by 
the warden. A BOP official noted that alcohol-based antibacterial hand 
sanitizers would not be available to the inmates because of the 
sanitizer's high alcohol content, which can be misused by the inmates. 
The Surveillance and Infection Control details recommendations for use 
of personal protective equipment such as surgical or procedure masks; 
N95 respirators, which BOP stipulates should only be used in the 
context of an OSHA-defined respiratory protection program; and gloves, 
when directly involved in caring for ill correctional workers and 
inmates. BOP's pandemic influenza plans also require training and 
education of correctional workers and inmates on pandemic influenza and 
aspects of facility management in case of an outbreak at the component 
and facility levels. 

Challenges in Protecting Correctional Workers: 

The use of social distancing measures to protect correctional workers 
in the event of a pandemic presents a challenge. Although BOP's 
Surveillance and Infection Control advocates social distancing during a 
pandemic outbreak, according to several BOP officials, social 
distancing measures are difficult to implement at the facility level. 
In older facilities, such as USP Leavenworth, there may be a greater 
need for correctional workers to be physically present and work in 
proximity to one another and the inmates to maintain facility security, 
address emergencies, and deal with the inmate population. On the other 
hand, recently constructed facilities such as the Allenwood Federal 
Correctional Complex have closed-circuit video monitoring systems 
throughout the facilities, which enable the correctional workers to 
better monitor the inmate population and minimize contact. However, BOP 
officials said that there are many situations in which close contact is 
inevitable between correctional workers and inmates and where personal 
protective equipment, such as gloves and masks, would not be feasible. 
In the event of a fight between inmates, for example, correctional 
workers would not have time to put on gloves or masks and any in-place 
masks would be likely to fall off. In addition, according to a medical 
officer at USP Leavenworth, gloves cannot be worn for a long period of 
time without compromising the health of the skin. Another BOP official 
said that various facilities have unique requirements that they need to 
factor into planning for the use of social distancing measures. 
Examples include prisons with different layouts; facilities where 
inmates have increased needs, for example, inmates with diabetes or 
those who need wheelchairs; and facilities where there are inmates who 
cannot be colocated for security reasons. 

A unique pandemic planning challenge facing federal correctional 
workers is the maintenance of an effective custodial relationship 
between them and the inmates in federal prisons. According to BOP 
officials, this relationship depends on communication and mutual trust, 
as correctional workers in federal prisons do not carry weapons or 
batons inside the cellblocks. Rather, they use verbal methods of 
communication to keep order. The BOP officials at USP Leavenworth said 
that they would not allow a situation where correctional workers wear 
N95 respirators or surgical masks but the inmates do not. Seeing a 
correctional worker wearing a mask may cause fear among inmates and 
could potentially contribute to an unstable situation. The BOP 
officials at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex said that they 
would provide personal protective equipment to both correctional 
workers and inmates and use antiviral medication combined with social 
distancing strategies to mitigate the spread of influenza. An Allenwood 
Federal Correctional Complex official noted that education of staff and 
the inmate population about pandemic influenza would be an important 
part of the facility's pandemic effort. 

The guidance provided by BOP's central office and regional offices does 
not clearly determine prioritization and allocation of pandemic 
pharmaceutical interventions to the facilities. For example, an 
official at USP Leavenworth said that the facilities do not know how 
much antiviral medication they can rely on from the SNS in addition to 
the 15 percent BOP allocation. The distribution of antiviral 
medications to Leavenworth correctional workers and inmates would take 
into account a variety of factors, such as age; health factors, 
including preexisting conditions; and severity of the pandemic event. 
Based on these factors, the numbers of antivirals needed would be 
difficult to calculate in advance. In addition, priority would always 
depend on the situation, and the warden working with the facility's 
medical director would make the final determinations. 

Despite the challenges BOP faces with pandemic influenza planning, the 
bureau has advantages, which are unique to its facilities. Every 
correctional facility is a closed and self-contained system, and each 
facility is somewhat self-sufficient, maintaining a 30-day supply of 
food, water, and other necessities for any type of contingency. 
Correctional facilities also have well-tested experience in emergency 
and health hazard planning and management and infection control, which 
provide them with a solid foundation to build on for pandemic influenza 
preparedness. Additionally, correctional facilities generally have 
strong ties with their local communities, important because pandemic 
influenza will be largely addressed by the resources available to each 
community it affects. For example, in addition to their own medical 
staff, BOP facilities rely on local hospitals and work with community 
first responders in emergencies. Having medical staff on board, an 
advantage some of the other agencies lack, also makes pandemic planning 
and decision making easier. 

FMS Has Operational Pandemic Plans for Production Staff Responsible for 
Disbursing Federal Payments: 

FMS, a component of Treasury, provides central payment services to 
federal agencies, operates the federal government's collections and 
deposit systems, provides governmentwide accounting and reporting 
services, and manages the collection of delinquent debt owed to the 
government. FMS is the primary disburser of payments to individuals and 
businesses on behalf of federal agencies, disbursing more than $1.6 
trillion in federal payments annually, including Social Security 
payments, veterans' benefits, and income tax refunds, to more than 100 
million people. FMS has about 2,100 employees, one-third of whom are 
located in four regional financial centers--Austin, Texas; Kansas City, 
Missouri; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco, California. 
The regional financial centers issue the majority of their payments by 
electronic fund transfers and the rest by wire transfers and paper 
checks. The centers are production facilities that rely heavily on 
integrated computer and telecommunications systems to perform their 
mission. However, they also rely on light manufacturing operations to 
print and enclose checks for releasing at specific times of the month. 

For the most part, the regional financial centers are planning that in 
the event of a pandemic, the nature of their business will be 
unchanged, but there will be issues with sickness, absenteeism, 
communication, and hygiene that they must address. Employees whose 
positions require, on a daily basis, direct handling of materials or on-
site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternative 
worksite are not eligible for telework. According to an FMS official, 
even with a minimum crew on-site to produce paper checks, there will 
still be instances when employees will need to be within 3 feet of 
other employees. For example, a certification process for the checks 
includes internal controls, which necessitates having more than one 
employee present in a confined space. The Kansas City Financial Center 
(KFC) estimated that it would need 13 essential employees to continue 
on-site operations in the event of a pandemic, including employees such 
as payment control technicians, mail processing clerks, and production 
machinery repairers. The Philadelphia Financial Center (PFC) explained 
that its peak production workload is toward the end of the month when 
it is preparing the monthly Social Security benefit payments. At this 
point in the month, the PFC will need the majority of the payment and 
mail operations branch employees present, approximately 25 employees. 

Pandemic Planning for FMS Production Workers: 

Treasury's pandemic plan is an annex to its COOP plan and describes how 
departmental offices and its bureaus will discharge their 
responsibilities in the event of a pandemic. The Treasury pandemic plan 
describes the department's operational approach to employee safety and 
COOP and the manner in which Treasury will communicate with its 
stakeholders. To facilitate consistent planning across Treasury, its 
Office of Emergency Preparedness provided all department offices and 
bureaus with guidance for departmental planning from the Implementation 
Plan. According to an FMS official, Treasury also directed its 
components to [hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov] for additional 
guidance. 

FMS officials said that they have a biweekly teleconference to discuss 
business continuity planning, including the pandemic plans for the 
regional financial centers. An FMS official commented that the primary 
guidance from FMS to the regional centers came from the Key Elements 
provided by the HSC. The KFC reported that the Kansas City FEB's 
Continuity Working Group held several workshops to discuss pandemic 
planning. At these workshops, and in conjunction with online guidance 
from the Office of Management and Budget, OPM, and FEMA, the KFC 
developed its own plan, striving for consistency in assimilating the 
guidance from all sources. FMS officials reported that the labor union 
representing FMS's bargaining unit employees, the National Treasury 
Employees Union, was involved in the pandemic planning process for FMS. 

The FMS Security Division is responsible for ensuring uniformity in 
pandemic planning across the regional financial centers. The four 
regional financial centers' pandemic plans follow the same basic 
template with an overview and center objectives followed by sections on 
succession planning, human resource issues, telework issues, 
communication, and hygiene. All of the regional financial centers' 
pandemic plans contain detailed guidance for employees on human capital 
policies in the event of a pandemic. All of the regional plans also 
have guidance to maintain links with their respective FEBs in order to 
be involved in local planning and communications. At the KFC, for 
example, through monthly meetings and special workshops sponsored by 
the Kansas City FEB, the regional financial center has had interactions 
with state and local entities, including representatives from the 
Missouri state emergency network and two local county health offices. 
PFC officials also reported participating in two tabletop exercises 
focused on emergency planning that were hosted by the Philadelphia FEB. 

As part of the center pandemic plans, officials researched the types of 
supplies they would need based on the risks faced in their facilities. 
For example, the janitorial staff now routinely wipes off door handles, 
tabletops, and other high-traffic areas. As part of the KFC's plan, the 
center stocks such items as N95 respirators, gloves, hand sanitizers, 
disinfectants, and fanny packs that include items such as ready to eat 
meals, hand-cranked flashlights, small first-aid kits, and emergency 
blankets. The KFC Deputy Director commented that in the event of a 
pandemic, the KFC would encourage the use of N95 respirators and gloves 
and that the facility had made a decision to pre-position these 
supplies. The KFC plans to stock enough for 15 to 20 employees per day 
for the first pandemic wave. Preceding the first wave, the KFC plans to 
order additional supplies from GSA at the onset of the first pandemic 
trigger. KFC officials believe that this will allow the center to have 
enough supplies to last during subsequent pandemic waves. The KFC has 
also discussed housing some employees on-site during a pandemic, but 
this will be a greater possibility once the exercise facility, 
including showers and lockers, is finished. The KFC Deputy Director 
said that the organization is aware that the basis of part of the U.S. 
economy rests on the regional financial centers and that they will need 
to issue payments even during a pandemic. PFC officials reporting 
having in stock approximately 1,200 N95 respirators, hand sanitizers, 
and gloves, and the PFC has pre-positioned masks and gloves in each 
branch. PFC officials noted that additional supplies are being 
procured. 

Although FMS said that continuing communication with employees is 
needed, training, education, and materials have been provided to 
managers concerning essential functions and employee safety and health 
in the event of a pandemic. Essential employees have been told in broad 
terms that operations will continue during a pandemic. For example, the 
KFC Director has asked that designated critical employees be approached 
to determine in the event of a pandemic crisis whether they would be 
receptive to sheltering in place. An FMS official reported that the 
agency presented a pandemic preparedness briefing in 2006, which shared 
with the regional facilities' employees pandemic-related subjects, such 
as cough etiquette. FMS also reported communicating the elements needed 
for a home pandemic preparedness kit as well as personal pandemic 
planning to all employees. The PFC stated that it plans to obtain 
informational materials on safety and health during a pandemic from 
local health care facilities for distribution to employees. The center 
incorporated training on pandemic awareness into its annual safety and 
health training. 

Challenges in Protecting FMS Production Staff: 

The FMS regional financial centers face some unique pandemic planning 
challenges. Since the regional financial centers are production 
facilities with large open spaces as well as enclosed office areas, 
pandemic planning requires different responses for different areas. For 
example, in the office and common areas, cleaning and disinfecting will 
be a key component. An FMS official said that the employees' response 
and diligence in following disease containment measures would be what 
determines the success of those measures. Scheduling of production 
personnel is also a challenge. Since the production of the checks must 
be done according to a deadline and internal controls must be 
maintained, schedules are not flexible. The KFC explained that its peak 
production workload is toward the end of the month when it is preparing 
the monthly Social Security benefit payments. PFC officials noted that 
although they could identify certain positions that could be performed 
remotely, there are issues surrounding personally identifiable 
information, which must be protected and which requires that special 
equipment needs be addressed. The PFC is exploring its telework options 
as part of its pandemic planning, but officials acknowledged that 
protecting sensitive data would be a significant consideration of any 
formal telework program. 

FMS officials had not made any arrangements for pandemic pharmaceutical 
interventions for the regional financial centers. According to an FMS 
official, Treasury asked its components to determine the number and 
courses of antiviral medications needed for very high-risk, high-risk, 
and medium-risk staff with critical professional responsibilities, 
consistent with HSC guidance documents. Aside from that action, FMS had 
not determined priorities for medical countermeasures in part because 
the relatively small number of essential employees required to be on- 
site, as well as the large open spaces in the regional facilities, 
makes social distancing measures more feasible. 

FAA Pandemic Plans to Protect Air Traffic Controllers Are Not Ready for 
Implementation: 

FAA, a component of DOT, expects the National Airspace System to 
function throughout an influenza pandemic, in accordance with the 
preparedness and response goal of sustaining infrastructure and 
mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society. FAA's 
Interim Plan for Sustaining Essential Government Services (SEGS) During 
a Pandemic states that since an influenza pandemic would not damage 
physical infrastructure, FAA facilities would remain operational and 
day-to-day operations would continue based on the number of available 
personnel. Maintaining the functioning of the National Airspace System 
will require that FAA's air traffic controllers, who ensure that 
aircraft remain safely separated from other aircraft, vehicles, and 
terrain, continue to work on-site. Under nonpandemic circumstances, 
FAA's over 15,000 air traffic controllers guide more than 7,000 
aircraft in the United States each hour during peak hours and about 
50,000 aircraft each day through the National Airspace System. While 
FAA expects the demand for air traffic control, which manages cargo as 
well as passenger travel, to be reduced in the event of a severe 
pandemic outbreak, its contingency plans assume full air traffic levels 
as a starting baseline. According to an FAA official, although 
passenger travel may be diminished, the shipping of cargo may increase. 

Pandemic Planning for Air Traffic Controllers: 

DOT and FAA pandemic plans and guidance provide the basis for the air 
traffic management facility pandemic plans. DOT's Guidance to the 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and Operating 
Administrations (OA) addresses the protection of employees and 
explicitly distinguishes pandemic plans from COOP plans, emphasizing a 
pandemic's duration and expected absenteeism rate and stating that 
plans must address workforce protective policies, equipment, and 
measures. The guidance requires that each component use an accompanying 
template to develop a plan to sustain essential government services 
(SEGS) during a pandemic. The guidance set deadlines of March 24, 2006, 
for the plans and July 31, 2006, for each operating administration 
office to conduct an exercise to validate its individual SEGS plan. 

FAA's SEGS plan defines essential services in the event of a pandemic 
outbreak more broadly than those of COOP, because of the longer 
duration of a pandemic. The essential services comprise all the 
services that FAA deems necessary to provide to the aviation sector and 
employees to keep the National Airspace System operational. The plan 
addresses sustaining such services amid high employee absenteeism at 
the peak of a pandemic wave. In broadening its categorization of 
essential services, FAA considered whether and for how long the 
functions can be deferred; whether the functions can be performed off- 
site; the interchangeability of the occupation, such as those with 
limited interchangeability because of certification requirements; as 
well as operational contingency measures such as devolution, functional 
backups, and system redundancies. FAA's SEGS plan also acknowledges 
employee protection measures, stating that FAA will ensure the ready 
availability of soap and water, tissues and waste receptacles, and 
environmental cleaning supplies throughout work facilities. 

The Air Traffic Organization (ATO), FAA's line of business responsible 
for the air traffic management services that air traffic controllers 
provide, had not yet directed facilities, such as its air route traffic 
control centers, to develop pandemic-specific plans or incorporate 
these pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. FAA 
officials said that all-hazards contingency and continuity plans are 
adapted to the facility level and are regularly implemented during 
natural disasters such as hurricanes. Although these plans are not 
specific to a pandemic, FAA officials reported that the all-hazards 
plans allow ATO to mitigate the impact of adverse events, including 
reduced staffing levels, on National Airspace Systems operations. FAA 
reported that ATO completed a national-level pandemic plan in 2006 as 
part of FAA's SEGS plan that addressed essential missions and services, 
as well as general direction on social distancing and workforce 
protection. FAA is incorporating detailed HHS antiviral stockpiling 
guidance, issued in December 2008, into an FAA workforce protection 
policy that it estimates will be completed by mid-2009. ATO will then 
update its national-level pandemic plan with detailed protective 
measures for its workforce, including air traffic controllers. ATO will 
also use the national-level updates to direct its facilities to develop 
pandemic-specific plans or enhance their preexisting all-hazards 
contingency plans to incorporate and implement workforce protection 
measures at the local field facility level. 

FAA was also expecting the results of a powered air purifying 
respirator (PAPR)[Footnote 17] feasibility study, completed in November 
2008, to help inform pandemic planning at the facility level. The 
objective of the study was to determine whether PAPRs are suitable for 
long-term use and whether air traffic controllers can communicate with 
aircraft and other controllers while wearing the PAPRs, as controllers 
cannot communicate adequately while wearing N95 respirators or surgical 
facemasks. At this time, FAA has provided PAPRs for short-term use by 
air traffic controllers so that they can transfer control of air 
traffic to other air traffic facilities, per existing contingency 
plans. This use was intended primarily for situations involving 
asbestos in air route traffic control centers. PAPRs cost approximately 
$1,000 each plus filter and battery expenses, and FAA estimates the 
total cost for PAPRs for its air traffic controller workforce would 
reach $15 million. In addition to the cost, the study findings 
suggested there are many potential problems, including noise, 
visibility, and comfort, with the PAPR approach that FAA would have to 
address. The study concluded that FAA would need to evaluate many 
concerns in a more operationally realistic environment before 
recommending PAPRs for use by air traffic controllers. Because of the 
nature of these concerns, FAA agency officials said that the long-term 
use of PAPRs in a pandemic appears to be impractical. 

FAA also plans to augment its agencywide pandemic plan with a workplace 
protection policy. Among the issues this policy would cover are the 
classification of employees' workplace exposure risk and the 
identification of categories of critical employees that should be given 
upgraded personal protective equipment beyond what would be indicated 
by their workplace exposure risk. Once the FAA-wide workforce 
protection policy is determined, ATO and other lines of business will 
be expected to incorporate it into their line of business-specific 
pandemic plans or revise and elaborate those policies where they exist 
and implement the policy. 

Both DOT and FAA's pandemic plans emphasize employee awareness training 
and both agencies already offer information and training to employees 
through their intranet sites; however, the air traffic controllers we 
interviewed did not generally access the intranet. DOT and FAA intranet 
sites provide checklists for personal and family preparedness; simple 
cleaning and decontamination guidance; hygiene reminders; social 
distancing practices, such as no handshake policies and the use of 
teleconferences in place of in-person meetings; and links to sites for 
pandemic influenza-related information from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, World Health Organization, and OPM. FAA's 
intranet also has pandemic influenza frequently asked questions and 
links to the latest Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance 
on public health measures to reduce the spread of influenza and other 
communicable diseases. FAA plans to publish its pandemic influenza plan 
on its intranet. However, FAA officials responsible for pandemic 
planning have acknowledged that disseminating information through 
agency e-mail or its intranet site is not effective for communicating 
with air traffic controllers, as they do not have ready access to 
either during their shifts. 

FAA has additional media through which to communicate pandemic 
awareness to its employees. For example, FAA has developed a "Pandemic 
Flu 101" training program, which is undergoing testing, and it has 
arrangements in place for managers to alert air traffic controllers of 
critical information and announcements when they are on duty. FAA also 
plans to provide copies of its pandemic plan to employees who do not 
have ready access to the intranet during duty hours. Managers will 
ensure that new hires review the FAA pandemic plan as well as other 
applicable documents and that employees undergo annual refresher 
training. 

Challenges in Protecting Air Traffic Controllers: 

Protecting air traffic controllers in the event of a pandemic outbreak 
is particularly challenging for several reasons. Air traffic 
controllers work in proximity to one another; the 6 feet of separation 
recommended for social distancing during a pandemic by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention and OSHA is not possible for them. 
Figure 3 shows federal employees working in an air traffic control 
tower. In addition, air traffic controllers cannot use personal 
protective equipment such as N95 respirators or surgical masks, as 
these impede the clear verbal communication necessary to maintain 
aviation safety. FAA officials and air traffic controllers we 
interviewed also reported that the common workstations that air traffic 
controllers share are not regularly sanitized between users. FAA must 
certify that any sanitizer, many of which are caustic chemicals, does 
not corrode sensitive equipment necessary to ensure flight safety. FAA 
is exploring this issue to determine if any sanitizer can be used 
safely. Moreover, cross-certification of air traffic controllers is 
problematic. Attaining full performance levels for the controllers 
takes up to 3 years, and air traffic controllers proficient in one area 
of airspace cannot replace controllers proficient in another airspace 
without training and certification. This could result in reduced air 
traffic management services. Finally, FAA regulations on medication for 
air traffic controllers are strict because certain medications may 
impair an air traffic controller's performance, and the Office of 
Aviation Medicine's policy on the use of Tamiflu for prophylactic use 
by on-duty controllers was still in draft as of March 2009. An FAA 
official said that FAA would make final the policy for this use when 
the workforce protection policy is approved. 

Figure 3: Federal Employees at Work in an Air Traffic Control Tower: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: FAA. 

Note: The employees shown are tower controllers at Fort Lauderdale- 
Hollywood International Airport in Florida. 

[End of figure] 

Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies' Pandemic Workforce Protection 
Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a 
Pandemic: 

Although the Implementation Plan includes action items aimed at 
developing and tracking progress relative to the national response for 
pandemic preparedness, there is no mechanism in place to track the 
progress of federal agencies' workforce preparedness efforts. Action 
items in the Implementation Plan specify roles and responsibilities as 
well as deadlines and performance measures, and the HSC has issued 
public progress reports on the status of the action items. 

The survey results from the 24 CFO Act agency pandemic coordinators, as 
well as information from the case study agencies, indicate that a wide 
range of pandemic planning activities are under way and that all of the 
agencies are taking steps to some degree to protect their workers in 
the event of a pandemic. However, agencies' progress is uneven, and 
while we recognize that the pandemic planning process is evolving and 
is characterized by uncertainty and constrained resources, some 
agencies are clearly in the earlier stages of developing their pandemic 
plans and being able to provide the health protection related to the 
risk of exposure their essential employees may experience. For example, 
our previous work showed that agencies' plans lack important elements, 
such as identifying which essential veterinarian functions must be 
performed on-site and how they will be carried out if absenteeism 
reaches 40 percent--the rate predicted at the height of the pandemic 
and used for planning purposes.[Footnote 18] An example of an essential 
veterinarian function is helping to ensure the safety of meat and 
poultry products. 

Under the HSC's Implementation Plan, DHS was charged with, among other 
things, monitoring and reporting to the Executive Office of the 
President on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue 
their operations while protecting their workers during an influenza 
pandemic. While directed by the plan, however, the report was not 
included as a specific action item. DHS officials reported that in late 
2006 or early 2007 they asked HSC representatives with direct 
responsibility for the Implementation Plan for clarification on the 
issue of reporting agencies' ability to continue their operations while 
protecting their workers during a pandemic. DHS officials said they 
were informed that they did not have to prepare a report. Instead, 
according to White House counsel representatives, the HSC planned to 
take on the monitoring role through its agency pandemic plan 
certification process. The HSC, as noted earlier, had requested that 
agencies certify that they were addressing the applicable elements of a 
pandemic checklist in their plans in late 2006 and again in late 2008. 

As originally envisioned in the Implementation Plan, the report was to 
be directed to the Executive Office of the President. There was no 
provision in the plan, however, for the report to be made available to 
the Congress. We have previously reported on the importance of internal 
control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. 
[Footnote 19] Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, 
the President and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the 
agencies to continue their operations while protecting federal 
employees in the event of a pandemic. 

The HSC's certification process, as implemented, did not provide for 
monitoring and reporting as envisioned in the Implementation Plan 
regarding agencies' abilities to continue operations in the event of a 
pandemic while protecting their employees. Although the council had 
asked agencies to certify that they were addressing the applicable 
elements of a pandemic planning checklist, the process did not include 
any assessment of, or reporting on, agencies' progress as was the case 
for the action items in the plan. Moreover, according to agency 
officials we interviewed, this certification process was the only 
effort to check on individual agencies' pandemic plans. 

Conclusions: 

Given the threat of pandemic influenza, heightened by recent events, it 
is imperative that agencies have pandemic plans that ensure their 
ability to continue operations while protecting their workers who serve 
the American public. The survey of the 24 CFO Act agencies showed that 
while some have progressed in their planning to address how their 
employees' safety and health will be protected and have identified the 
essential functions they will maintain in the face of significant and 
sustained absenteeism, several agencies have yet to complete such 
necessary initial steps. It is important to recognize that agency 
pandemic plans will continue to be revised and improved with additional 
time and information regarding pandemic preparedness and that some 
agencies face greater complexities in their planning than others. 
However, some agencies are not close to having operational pandemic 
plans, particularly at the facility level. Federal agencies must 
progress to establish operational plans to ensure the maintenance of 
essential services during times in which widespread disease will affect 
the health care system, the broader economy, and society as a whole. 

The three case study agencies illustrate that filtering pandemic plans 
down to individual facilities and making them operational present 
challenges for the agencies. Because the primary threat to continuity 
of operations during a pandemic is the threat to employee health, 
agencies' plans to protect their workforce need to progress to be 
operational at the facility level. However, unlike other action items 
in the Implementation Plan that address the federal response to 
pandemic influenza, there is no real monitoring mechanism in place to 
ensure that agencies' workforce pandemic plans are complete and ensure 
that the agencies can protect their workers in the event of a pandemic. 
The process of monitoring should ensure that federal agencies are 
making progress in developing their plans to protect their workforce in 
the event of a pandemic and have the information and guidance they need 
to develop operational pandemic plans. 

The HSC has been serving as the hub of federal preparedness activities 
for pandemic flu, coordinating activities across HHS, DHS, and other 
federal agencies. However, the council's certification process has not 
included any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans. 
Having DHS monitor and report on the status of agencies' pandemic plans 
to protect the safety and health of their employees while maintaining 
essential operations could enhance agencies' accountability for this 
responsibility and serve as an effective way of tracking agencies' 
progress in making their pandemic plans operational by planning for the 
protection of their workforce. Although the directive in the 
Implementation Plan required DHS to report to the Executive Office of 
the President, the Congress may want DHS to report to it on agencies' 
progress on their pandemic plans to allow it to carry out its oversight 
role. Given the important role that the federal government will play in 
responding to a pandemic, planning to ensure the safety and well-being 
of federal employees is vital to the success of government operations. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To help support its oversight responsibilities, the Congress may want 
to consider requiring DHS to report to it on agencies' progress in 
developing and implementing their pandemic plans, including any key 
challenges and gaps in the plans. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To ensure agencies' greater accountability in developing operational 
plans that will protect their workforce in the event of a pandemic, we 
recommend that the HSC request that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on the 
readiness of agencies to continue their operations while protecting 
their workers during an influenza pandemic. The reporting should 
include an assessment of the agencies' progress in developing their 
plans, including any key challenges and gaps in the plans. The request 
should also establish a specific time frame for reporting on these 
efforts. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided the Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security with a draft of this report for review and 
comment. The Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC commented that the 
report makes useful points regarding opportunities for enhanced 
monitoring and reporting within the executive branch concerning 
agencies' progress in developing plans to protect their workforce. She 
noted that the council will give serious and careful consideration to 
the report findings and recommendations in this regard. The Under 
Secretary for Management at DHS said that in the coming weeks and 
months, the department would be involved in efforts to ensure that 
government entities are well prepared for what may come next. She 
expressed her appreciation for the report's findings and 
recommendations, which she said would contribute to the department's 
efforts. The HSC's written comments are reprinted in appendix III, and 
DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix IV. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. We are sending copies of this report to the 
Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department 
of Transportation, relevant congressional committees, and other 
interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Bernice Steinhardt: 
Director, Strategic Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies: 

Department of Agriculture: 
Department of Commerce: 
Department of Defense: 
Department of Education: 
Department of Energy: 
Department of Health and Human Services: 
Department of Homeland Security: 
Department of Housing and Urban Development: 
Department of the Interior: 
Department of Justice: 
Department of Labor: 
Department of State: 
Department of Transportation: 
Department of the Treasury: 
Department of Veterans Affairs: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
Environmental Protection Agency: 
General Services Administration: 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
National Science Foundation: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Office of Personnel Management: 
Small Business Administration: 
Social Security Administration: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which federal 
agencies have reported plans under way to protect their workforce 
should an influenza pandemic occur and have reported identifying 
essential functions, other than first response, that cannot be 
accomplished remotely in the event of pandemic influenza; (2) the plans 
selected agencies have established for certain occupations performing 
essential functions other than first response; and (3) the 
opportunities to improve federal agencies' planning enabling them to 
protect their workforce while maintaining their essential functions in 
the event of a pandemic. 

To address the first objective, we developed and administered a Web- 
based survey. Our intent was to survey the pandemic coordinators from 
the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. We 
developed the survey questions based on guidelines for worker 
protection from the Homeland Security Council (HSC), Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency. We asked the 
pandemic coordinators questions about (1) their pandemic plans, (2) the 
department-and component-level functions the agencies consider 
essential in the event of a pandemic that are not first response and 
cannot be continued remotely, (3) measures planned to protect workers 
who will not be able to work remotely, (4) social distancing 
strategies, (5) information technology testing, and (6) communication 
of human capital pandemic policies. Furthermore, in addressing the 
first objective, we reviewed national pandemic plans, prior GAO work 
assessing influenza, and additional relevant documents that assess 
influenza, public health, and other emergency preparedness and response 
issues. We defined essential functions based on Federal Continuity 
Directive 1 as those functions that enable an organization to provide 
vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the 
public, and sustain the industrial and economic base during disruption 
of normal operations. We defined first responders as emergency 
personnel called to the scene of a crisis or responding to emergency 
calls for assistance and medical personnel. The scope of our work did 
not include an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
workforce protection measures recommended by federal lead pandemic 
planning agencies. 

From April 8 through April 17, 2008, we conducted a series of pretests 
with current and former federal pandemic coordinators and emergency 
managers to further refine our questions, clarify any ambiguous 
portions of the survey, and identify potentially biased questions. Upon 
completion of the pretests and the development of the final survey 
questions and format, we sent an announcement of the upcoming survey to 
the 24 pandemic coordinators on May 13, 2008. These pandemic 
coordinators were notified that the survey was available online on May 
15, 2008. We sent a reminder e-mail message to nonrespondents on May 
28, 2008, and conducted follow-up calls over the next few weeks. The 
survey was available online until July 25, 2008, and the results were 
confirmed or updated in early 2009. All 24 pandemic coordinators 
completed the survey for a response rate of 100 percent. 

To address the second and third objectives and to provide a more in- 
depth examination of agencies' pandemic planning, we reviewed agency- 
level pandemic planning for protection of employees for three case 
study occupations. Our case studies included correctional workers from 
the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff 
responsible for disbursing federal payments from the Department of the 
Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS); and air traffic 
controllers from the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). The primary criteria for selecting the case 
studies were that they represent non-first response occupations 
involved in an essential function that federal employees need to 
provide on-site. In addition, we excluded from our case study 
selections occupations in agencies that have a primary role in the 
federal response to pandemic influenza. 

To assess the extent to which the case study agencies, BOP, FMS, and 
FAA have operational plans to protect their workforce, we reviewed 
agency and component pandemic plans and conducted interviews with 
agency officials, employees in the case study occupations, and facility 
managers and emergency planners for the sites at which the employees 
work. We also met with union representatives from the American 
Federation of Government Employees, the National Treasury Employees 
Union, and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to get 
their perspective on plans to protect the federal workforce in the 
event of a pandemic. In addition, we conducted interviews with the 
executive directors of the Kansas City, Minnesota, and Oklahoma Federal 
Executive Boards (FEB) to better understand federal planning for 
workforce protection in the event of a pandemic at the regional level. 
Minnesota and Oklahoma were selected because we had identified them in 
a previous report[Footnote 20] as leaders in pandemic planning; Kansas 
City was selected because of the large population of federal workers in 
its jurisdiction, including many in our case study occupations. 

To better understand the challenges and assess the progress made in 
planning to protect employees, we visited several facilities where the 
employees in our case study occupations worked. Kansas City, Kansas; 
Kansas City, Missouri; and Leavenworth, Kansas, were selected as site 
visit locations because all of the case study agencies had facilities 
in the metropolitan statistical area that were also in the jurisdiction 
of an FEB, namely the Kansas City FEB. We selected as site visit 
facilities the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, and 
BOP's North Central Regional Office in Kansas City, Kansas, as the 
supporting regional office for that facility; the Kansas City Financial 
Center in Kansas City, Missouri; and FAA's Central Regional Office in 
Kansas City, Missouri. We also visited the Allenwood Federal 
Correctional Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania. We selected FAA air 
traffic facilities to cover the array of types of facilities in which 
air traffic controllers work. We visited the Ronald Reagan Washington 
National Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar 
Approach Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air 
Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and the Air Traffic 
Control Systems Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Although we did 
not conduct a site visit, the Philadelphia Financial Center provided us 
with written answers to our questions. 

We conducted interviews with officials from HHS, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and 
the Department of Labor (DOL). We met with HHS officials to get a 
better understanding of how access to antiviral medications and 
vaccines by federal agencies is envisioned in the event of a pandemic. 
HHS is responsible for the overall coordination of the public health 
and medical emergency response during a pandemic. DHS has 
responsibility for coordinating the overall domestic federal response 
during an influenza pandemic, including implementing policies that 
facilitate compliance with recommended social distancing measures, 
developing a common operating picture for all federal agencies, and 
ensuring the integrity of the nation's infrastructure. OPM has 
responsibility for providing direction to the FEBs and the Chief Human 
Capital Officers Council as well as responsibility for developing human 
capital policy guidance for federal employees in the event of a 
pandemic. DOL's Occupational Safety and Health Administration has 
responsibility for promoting the safety and health of workers. We also 
met with White House counsel from the past and current administrations 
representing the HSC to determine what role the council played in 
ensuring uniform pandemic preparedness across the U.S. government. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Homeland Security Council: 

The White House: 
Washington: 
June 1, 2009: 

Ms. Bernice Steinhardt: 
Director, Strategic Issues: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Steinhardt: 

Thank you for providing the Homeland Security Council staff the 
opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability 
Office's draft report entitled, "Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency 
Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public 
in the Event of a Pandemic" (GAO-09-404). We appreciate GAO's work in 
this engagement and in the area of pandemic influenza preparedness more 
generally. Recent events have underscored the importance of this issue. 

The report makes useful points regarding opportunities for enhanced 
monitoring and reporting within the executive branch concerning 
agencies' progress in developing plans to protect their workforce. We 
will give serious and careful consideration to GAO's findings and 
recommendations in this regard. 

Thank you again for your focus on this important issue. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Valerie S. Boyd: 
Acting Executive Secretary: 
Homeland Security Council: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

June 5, 2009: 

Ms. Bernice Steinhardt: 
Director: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-001: 

Dear Ms. Steinhardt: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability 
Office's (GAO) draft report; Influenza Pandemic. Increased Agency 
Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public 
in the Event of a Pandemic (GAO-09-404). This is, as you have noted, a 
serious situation that we are aggressively addressing. 

Our recent experience with the outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 flu reminds us 
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees have a 
critical role to play during public health emergencies - in this case 
the threat of a worldwide pandemic. In the coming weeks and months 
ahead, the Department will be involved in an ongoing series of actions 
to ensure government entities are well-prepared for what may come next. 
We appreciate the report's findings and recommendations, which will 
contribute to our efforts. We will continue to focus on our most valued 
assets, our people, and remind the DHS and federal workforce of the 
important roles they play in preventing the spread of influenza 
viruses, not only for their own health, but also for the health of the 
community-at-large. 

Thank you for your contributions to strengthen workforce pandemic 
plans. If there are any questions, please contact Michael Wetklow in 
the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, at (202) 447-5196. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Elaine C. Duke: 
Under Secretary for Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Bernice Steinhardt (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, William J. Doherty, Assistant 
Director, and Judith C. Kordahl, Analyst-in-Charge, supervised the 
development of this report. 

Alisa Beyninson, Ryan Little, Ulyana Panchishin, and Nicholas Petrovski 
made significant contributions to all aspects of this report. David 
Dornisch and Andrew Stavisky assisted with the design and methodology. 
Karin Fangman provided legal counsel. Mallory Barg Bulman verified the 
information in the report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) 
issues the majority of its payments by electronic fund transfers and 
the rest by wire transfers and paper checks. Nearly 206 million of 
FMS's payments were disbursed by check in fiscal year 2008. 

[2] For the purposes of this report, we are defining first responders 
as those called to the scene of a crisis or responding to emergency 
calls for assistance and medical personnel. 

[3] The HSC was established pursuant to Executive Order 13228, on 
October 8, 2001, for purposes of advising and assisting the President 
with respect to all aspects of homeland security and to serve as a 
mechanism for ensuring (1) coordination of homeland security-related 
activities of executive departments and agencies and (2) effective 
development and implementation of homeland security policies. The 
Congress subsequently established the HSC for the purpose of more 
effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the federal 
government relating to homeland security. See Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), 6 U.S.C. § 491 and § 494. On 
May 26, 2009, President Obama issued a statement outlining his decision 
to integrate White House staff supporting national security and 
homeland security. The HSC will be maintained as the principal venue 
for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the 
homeland, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, natural 
disasters, and pandemic influenza. 

[4] An operational pandemic influenza plan should articulate the manner 
in which the department, including its components, plans to discharge 
its responsibilities to support the federal efforts in fighting 
pandemic influenza; address the operational approach to employee safety 
and continuity of operations; and describe how the department plans to 
communicate with its stakeholders. 

[5] The pandemic coordinators are the individuals charged with 
coordinating and executing the department or agency pandemic plan. 

[6] 31 U.S.C. § 901. A list of the 24 CFO Act agencies appears in app. 
I. The CFO Act agencies employ nearly all federal employees. 

[7] The single most important pharmaceutical intervention during a 
pandemic--a pandemic vaccine that is well matched to the pandemic- 
causing strain--will not be available in large quantities in the 
initial stages of a pandemic. Other pharmaceutical interventions, such 
as antiviral medications and pre-pandemic vaccines are also expected to 
be in limited supply. Antiviral medications are drugs designed to 
prevent or reduce the severity of a viral infection, such as influenza, 
and vaccines are drugs used to stimulate the response of the human 
immune system to protect the body from disease. 

[8] Social distancing is a technique used to minimize close contact 
among persons in public places, such as work sites and public areas. 

[9] FEBs, located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large 
federal presence, are interagency coordinating groups composed of the 
federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their 
cities. They are designed to strengthen federal management practices, 
improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified 
federal force in local civic affairs. 

[10] GAO, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take 
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to 
Emergency Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-515] (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 
2007). 

[11] COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that 
the capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a 
wide range of potential emergencies. 

[12] The Web site, [hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov], provides 
access to U.S. government avian and pandemic influenza information and 
guidance. 

[13] Components refer to subordinate entities of departments, such as 
component agencies, field or regional offices, or other operating 
divisions. 

[14] In February 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security released two 
federal continuity directives. Federal Continuity Directive 1 provides 
direction for the development of continuity plans and programs for the 
federal executive branch. Federal Continuity Directive 2 provides 
additional guidance for agencies in identifying their mission-essential 
functions. 

[15] An N95 respirator is designed to protect an individual from 
breathing in very small particles, which might contain viruses. This 
type of respirator fits tightly to the face so that most air is inhaled 
through the filter material. To work most effectively, N95 respirators 
must be specially fitted for each person who wears one. 

[16] Emergency Health Powers establish DOD policy under applicable law 
to protect installations, facilities, and personnel in the event of a 
public health emergency because of biological warfare, terrorism, or 
any other public health emergency communicable disease epidemic. 

[17] PAPRs use a powered blower to force air through a filter. They 
typically have a hood connected by a flexible hose to a blower unit 
that is equipped with a filter and powered by a battery. 

[18] GAO, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure 
Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-178] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 4, 2009). 

[19] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August 
2001). 

[20] GAO, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take 
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to 
Emergency Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-515] (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 
2007). 

[End of section] 

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