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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2009: 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: 

Key Issues for Congressional Oversight: 

GAO-09-679SP: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Enclosure I: Background: 

Enclosure II: Strategic and Operational Planning: 

Enclosure III: Performance Measurement: 

Enclosure IV: Coordination of U.S. Communications Efforts: 

Enclosure V: State's Public Diplomacy Workforce: 

Enclosure VI: Outreach Efforts in High-Threat Posts: 

Enclosure VII: Interagency Efforts to Adopt a New Approach to Public 
Diplomacy: 

Appendix I: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy Addresses 
GAO's Desirable Characteristics: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: June 2007 National Strategy's Conformance with GAO's Desirable 
Characteristics: 

Table 2: State Department's Linked Performance Indicators: 

Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National 
Strategy: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Strategic Communication Budget Resources for 
the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal 
Year 2008: 

Figure 2: Key Elements of the Campaign-Style Approach: 

Figure 3: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy for Public 
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Addresses the 27 Elements of the 
Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy: 

Abbreviations: 

BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors: 

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

ECA: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs: 

PCC: Policy Coordinating Committee: 

State: Department of State: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

VOA: Voice of America: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 27, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government 
has spent at least $10 billion on communication efforts designed to 
advance the strategic interests of the United States. However, foreign 
public opinion polling data shows that negative views towards the 
United States persist despite the collective efforts to counteract them 
by the State Department (State), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of 
Defense (DOD), and other U.S. government agencies. Based on the 
significant role U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy 
[Footnote 1] efforts can play in promoting U.S. national security 
objectives, such as countering ideological support for violent 
extremism, we highlighted these efforts as an urgent issue for the new 
administration and Congress.[Footnote 2] To assist Congress with its 
oversight agenda, we have enclosed a series of issue papers that 
discuss long-standing and emerging public diplomacy challenges 
identified by GAO and others.[Footnote 3] 

While the prior administration issued a national communication strategy 
in June 2007, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009 requires that the President issue a new comprehensive strategy by 
December 2009 to guide interagency efforts. The issues discussed in the 
enclosures to this report should be considered in the development of 
the new strategic plan, related agency and country-level plans, and 
other areas such as State's human capital and security policies. Key 
issues include the following: 

* Strategic and operational planning--The United States' current 
national communication strategy lacks a number of desirable 
characteristics identified by GAO, such as a clear definition of the 
problem, desired results, and a delineation of agency roles and 
responsibilities. We believe the inclusion of these and other key 
elements could have helped address several of the challenges and issues 
discussed below. Prior GAO reports have discussed the need for agency- 
specific and country-level plans that support national-level planning 
efforts. We found that such supporting plans have generally not been 
developed. In the absence of an improved strategy and supporting plans, 
it remains doubtful that agency programs are strategically designed and 
executed in support of common goals. 

* Performance measurement--While agencies have made some progress in 
developing performance measurement systems, limited data exist on the 
ultimate effect of U.S. outreach efforts relative to the top-level 
goals outlined in the national communication strategy. 

* Coordination of U.S. communications efforts--Although several 
mechanisms have been established to coordinate U.S. strategic 
communication policy and programs, concerns remain regarding the roles 
and responsibilities of State and DOD; the extent of outreach to the 
private sector; and whether new leadership mechanisms or organizational 
structures are needed. 

* State's public diplomacy workforce--State faces a number of human 
capital challenges that influence the effectiveness of its public 
diplomacy operations. Specific challenges include staffing shortages, a 
shortage of experienced public diplomacy officers to fill mid-career 
positions, administrative burdens and staffing policies that limit the 
time public diplomacy officers can devote to outreach efforts, and 
ongoing foreign language proficiency shortfalls. Collectively, these 
challenges and concerns raise the risk that U.S. interests are not 
being adequately addressed. 

* Outreach efforts in high-threat posts--Security concerns around the 
world have led to building practices and personnel policies that have 
limited the ability of local populations to interact with Americans 
inside and outside the embassy. For the past several years, State has 
experimented with alternative outreach mechanisms such as American 
Corners to alleviate this forced isolation. These efforts raise 
significant policy, funding, and operational questions, which remain to 
be fully addressed. 

* Interagency efforts to adopt a new approach to public diplomacy-- 
Dynamic shifts in how target audiences obtain and use information have 
led many public diplomacy practitioners to conclude that the United 
States must more fully engage emerging social networks and technologies 
(such as Facebook and Twitter) in order to remain relevant. Referred to 
as "Public Diplomacy 2.0," this new approach to strategic 
communications is exploring ways to operate in this evolving 
information environment. However, substantial questions exist regarding 
the challenges associated with this new approach. 

We reviewed current agency documents related to the issues discussed in 
the attached enclosures. We discussed these issues with State, BBG, 
USAID, and DOD officials in Washington, D.C. We reviewed reports 
related to public diplomacy by various research institutions. We also 
applied national planning criteria developed by GAO to the United 
States' current national communication strategy to highlight 
deficiencies that we believe should be addressed in the President's new 
interagency strategy. Further information on the scope and methodology 
for this particular analysis can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through May 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State, 
BBG, USAID, and DOD. Each agency declined to provide formal comments. 
State, BBG, and USAID provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated in the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the 
National Security Council and executive branch agencies. The report 
also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions, please contact Jess T. 
Ford at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last 
page of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Chuck Young at 
(202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report are included in 
appendix II. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

Enclosures: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Tierney:
Chair:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure I: Background: 

The overall goal of U.S. strategic communication efforts is to 
understand, engage, inform, and influence the attitudes and behaviors 
of global audiences in support of U.S. strategic interests. U.S. 
strategic communication efforts are distributed across several 
entities, including State, BBG, USAID, and DOD, and function under the 
broad guidance of the White House and National Security Council. Within 
the U.S. government, State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs has the lead for U.S. strategic communication efforts. 

Agency Programs: 

State's public diplomacy efforts are managed by the Under Secretary for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), International Information 
Programs, and Public Affairs. ECA aims to foster mutual understanding 
between the United States and other countries through International 
Visitor, Fulbright, and other academic and professional exchange 
programs. The Bureau of International Information Programs communicates 
with foreign publics about U.S. policy, society, and values through 
speaker programs, print and electronic publications, and Internet 
outreach. The Bureau of Public Affairs informs audiences about U.S. 
foreign policy through activities such as media outreach and news 
management. State's workforce of over 1,000 public diplomacy officers 
is divided between Washington and overseas posts, where public 
diplomacy staff report through the ambassador to their respective 
regional bureaus in Washington. State embassy officers engage in 
information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, and other 
efforts. 

The BBG, as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, 
aims to support U.S. strategic communication objectives by broadcasting 
fair and accurate information, while maintaining its journalistic 
independence as a news organization. The BBG operates 75 language 
services divided among its five broadcast entities--Voice of America 
(VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. 

USAID's communication mission is to inform host country audiences about 
U.S. assistance. To fulfill this role, USAID maintains a public affairs 
office in Washington, D.C., and a network of 111 communication 
specialists at USAID missions worldwide. The communications 
specialists' outreach functions include responding to inquiries about 
USAID programs, collaborating with the embassy public affairs office, 
speech writing for the USAID mission director and others, preparing 
press releases, and coordinating Web site updates. 

DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint 
Communication is responsible for overseeing DOD activities directed at 
shaping departmentwide communications doctrine, organization, and 
training for the joint force; but this office has not issued formal 
policy regarding its strategic communication operations. Among other 
efforts, DOD has developed a predoctrinal document called the 
"Commander's Handbook," which provides strategic communications 
principles, techniques, and procedures, and has launched some strategic 
communication education and training initiatives to help 
institutionalize strategic communication. DOD's strategic communication 
operations are divided among public affairs activities, information 
operations (which includes psychological operations), and defense 
support to public diplomacy offices. 

Agency Funding: 

As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG shared a total strategic 
communication budget of about $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2008, with 
$501 million going to State's exchange and cultural affairs programs, 
$378 million going to State's nonexchange programs, and the balance of 
$682 million going to the BBG to support its global broadcasting 
efforts. 

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Strategic Communication Budget Resources for 
the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal 
Year 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

State Department: $879 million total: 
* Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs exchange programs: $501 
million; 
* Public diplomacy activities in State's regional bureaus: $181 
million; 
* Domestic and overseas public diplomacy American salaries: $125 
million; 
* Public diplomacy activities in State's functional bureaus: $28 
million; 
* Bureau of International Information Programs: $23 million; 
* Related appropriations: $20 million. 

Broadcasting Board of Governors: $682 million total: 
* BBG management, engineering, capital improvement, and other costs: 
$252 million; 
* Voice of America: $188 million; 
* Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: $83 million; 
* Radio Free Asia: $34 million; 
* Office of Cuba Broadcasting: $33 million. 

Source: State Department and BBG. 

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

USAID funds all domestic and some foreign audience communications out 
of limited agency operating expenses. There is no stand-alone budget 
for agency communications other than the operational budget amount 
allotted to USAID's headquarters public affairs bureau through the 
annual budget process.[Footnote 4] USAID's main resource for 
communicating to foreign audiences is its worldwide network of 
communications specialists, most of whom are Foreign Service Nationals. 
USAID missions usually establish a program budget for mission or 
country communications based on amounts left over within the mission 
budget or through use of hard-to-utilize local currency accounts 
maintained by the embassy or mission, or both. 

DOD does not have a separate budget covering its strategic 
communication activities. DOD officials said that they consider 
strategic communication to be a process instead of a discrete set of 
programs, and as a result, cannot identify DOD's spending on its 
strategic communication efforts. Nonetheless, DOD officials acknowledge 
the department spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year to 
support its outreach efforts, and DOD has identified strategic 
communication as a critical capability it intends to develop and 
support with related policy and doctrinal guidance, training, and staff 
and program resources. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: Strategic and Operational Planning: 

Issue: 

A national strategy is a critical planning tool that provides 
policymakers and implementing agencies with direction and guidance on 
goals, resource allocations, program implementation, and evaluation and 
ensures effective oversight and accountability. Beginning in 2003, we 
reported on the importance of a national communication strategy to 
ensure agency efforts are properly coordinated, convey consistent 
messages to target audiences, focus on achieving concrete and 
measurable objectives, and lead to mutually reinforcing benefits 
overseas.[Footnote 5] In 2005, we specifically recommended such a 
strategy be developed.[Footnote 6] In June 2007, the previous 
administration released a national communication strategy, which 
established three objectives: (1) offer a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity, (2) nurture common interests and values, and (3) help 
isolate and marginalize violent extremists. The strategy also provided 
guidance on such topics as target audiences, public diplomacy 
priorities, and interagency coordination, and outlined implementation 
plans for each communication objective. However, the strategy failed to 
include a clear definition of the problem, desired results, and a 
delineation of agency roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the 
strategy is not adequately supported by agency-specific plans and 
country-level plans modeled on private-sector best practices that could 
help increase the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. communication 
efforts that are distributed across four major agencies, dozens of 
discrete programs, a diverse range of communication objectives, and 
assorted target audiences around the world. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires that the President 
issue a new comprehensive strategy by December 2009 to guide 
interagency strategic communication efforts.[Footnote 7] It is 
important that the President and Congress, in devising this new 
strategy, incorporate the need to (1) address key planning elements 
such as a desired end-state with clear outcome and subordinate goals, 
and (2) develop plans and policies regarding the need for supporting 
department and country-level planning efforts that incorporate private- 
sector best practices. Absent the development of such a detailed 
strategy, the U.S. government runs the risk that its communication 
efforts will lack coordination and focus, and fail to achieve strategic 
objectives. 

Key Findings: 

2007 National Strategy Only Partially Addressed Key Planning Elements: 

In 2004, GAO identified a set of desirable characteristics to aid in 
the development and implementation of national strategies, enhance 
their usefulness as tools to help make policy and program decisions, 
guide resource allocations, and assure better accountability for 
results.[Footnote 8] However, the June 2007 communication strategy did 
not address or only partially addressed such key characteristics as 
defining the purpose of the document, describing the nature and scope 
of the problem, developing a hierarchy of strategic goals and 
performance objectives, describing future costs and needed resources, 
and delineating U.S. government roles and responsibilities. Table 1 
lists all six characteristics identified by GAO and our assessment of 
whether the June 2007 strategy generally addresses, partially 
addresses, or does not address the key elements that support each 
characteristic. 

Table 1: June 2007 National Strategy's Conformance with GAO's Desirable 
Characteristics: 

Characteristics: Clear purpose, scope, and methodology; 
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Purpose; 
* Methodology. 

Characteristics: Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats; 
Extent of conformance: Does not address; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Problem definition; 
* Risk assessment. 

Characteristics: Desired goals, objectives, activities, and outcome- 
related performance measures; 
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Overall desired results, or "end-state"; 
* Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives; 
* Milestones and outcome-related performance measures. 

Characteristics: Resources, investments, and risk management; 
Extent of conformance: Does not address; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Resources and investments associated with the strategy; 
* Sources of resources; 
* Risk management principles. 

Characteristics: Delineation of U.S. government roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; 
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific 
federal agencies, departments, or offices; 
* Discussion of how conflicts will be resolved. 

Characteristics: Description of strategy's integration among and with 
other entities; 
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses; 
Examples of missing or incomplete elements: 
* Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies and 
subordinate levels. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table] 

The new administration needs to fully consider these characteristics in 
drafting the new strategy called for by the National Defense 
Authorization Act to ensure the strategy more extensively guides key 
planning, decision-making, and oversight processes in line with 
strategic communication objectives. 

Supporting Agency Plans Have Generally Not Been Developed: 

Beginning in 2003, GAO recommended that State develop an agency-level 
plan to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and direct 
them towards common objectives. We noted that the absence of a strategy 
may hinder the department's ability to guide its programs towards the 
achievement of concrete and measurable results. State responded to this 
recommendation with improvements to its strategic planning process; 
however, the department still lacks an agency-level plan that 
specifically supports the current national strategy. Significantly, the 
June 2007 national communication strategy calls for the development of 
such agency-level plans. The strategy indicates agency plans should 
identify key programs and policies that support the national strategy's 
objectives, identify key audiences, assign agency responsibility, 
outline specific implementation plans, and develop criteria to evaluate 
effectiveness. Among the four nonintelligence agencies (State, USAID, 
BBG, and DOD) involved in U.S. strategic communication efforts, only 
DOD responded to this call for an agency-specific plan. However, DOD's 
plan only lists programs and policies that support the national 
strategy's objectives, while omitting any details on target audiences, 
DOD's role in relation to other agencies, implementation plans, and 
performance measures. In the absence of supporting agency plans, no 
clear link can be established between national communication 
objectives, agency programs, and results, raising doubts about whether 
agency programs have been strategically designed to support a common 
purpose in the most efficient and effective manner possible. The new 
administration should require the development of supporting agency 
plans as it drafts the new strategy called for by the National Defense 
Authorization Act. 

State Department Lacks Country-Level Plans: 

We have recommended that State develop detailed country-level plans 
that incorporate strategic communication best practices--which we refer 
to as the "campaign-style approach."[Footnote 9] As shown in figure 2, 
the campaign-style approach includes defining a core message, 
identifying target audiences, developing detailed communication 
strategies and tactics, and using research and evaluation to inform and 
redirect efforts as needed. 

Figure 2: Key Elements of the Campaign-Style Approach: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Research and evaluation: 
1) Define core messages and themes based on program objectives; 
2) Define target audiences; 
3) Develop detail strategies and tactics to reach your target audiences 
with your intended messages and themes; 
4) Develop and implement a detailed communication plan that 
incorporates your program objectives,messages/themes, target audiences, 
strategies/tactics, and in-depth research and evaluation results; 
5) Monitor progress, adjust strategies and tactics, and report results; 
6) Return to step 4, refine as necessary. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Though we have reported that both USAID and DOD have sought to develop 
country-level communication plans that generally adhere to the campaign-
style approach, State has not yet developed such plans. Our 2006 review 
of public diplomacy operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt found 
that this approach and corresponding communication plans were absent, 
and that in-country public diplomacy planning efforts represented top-
level statements of intent with little detailed planning to support 
post communication goals. In 2007, we reported that State's attempt to 
improve country-level planning through a pilot effort at 18 posts 
served as a useful exercise, but the country plans lacked key elements 
of the campaign-style approach. State officials told us a new 
initiative will be launched this year requiring embassies to develop 
"public diplomacy implementation plans" that address post outreach 
efforts. State intends to pilot test these plans in 12 countries. It 
remains to be determined whether these new plans will fully incorporate 
the campaign-style approach to strategic communication. 

The new administration should require the development of supporting 
country-level plans as part of its new strategy. In the absence of such 
plans, program officials will likely fail to effectively harness 
available resources towards explicit communication goals and 
objectives. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What is the status of current agency efforts to meet the December 
2009 deadline for a new national communication strategy? 

2. To what extent will the President's new communication strategy 
incorporate key planning elements such as a clear definition of the 
problem, desired results, and a delineation of agency roles and 
responsibilities? 

3. What is the status of developing agency-level plans that support the 
national strategy's communication goals and objectives? 

4. To what extent does State plan to develop country-level 
communication plans that adhere to the campaign-style approach 
recommended by GAO? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure III: Performance Measurement: 

Issue: 

It is critical that agencies comprehensively measure the performance of 
their strategic communication efforts to understand which efforts are 
most effective and, in turn, determine how to make most efficient use 
of limited resources. However, U.S. agencies have not fully 
demonstrated the effect of their strategic communication efforts on the 
national communication goals, such as countering ideological support 
for violent extremism. Since 2003, GAO and other organizations have 
called on agencies to fully embrace a "culture of measurement" for 
their strategic communication efforts, beginning with a comprehensive 
communication strategy that would better enable agencies to direct 
their multifaceted efforts towards concrete and measurable progress. 
While agencies have made some progress in this area, including 
evaluating some programs, such as exchanges, the United States still 
lacks a national strategy that includes desired results, performance 
objectives, and outcome-related indicators. 

Key Findings: 

Limitations of Prior National-Level Performance Planning: 

The 2007 national communication strategy identifies three key strategic 
goals--(1) offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity, rooted in 
the most basic values of the American people; (2) nurture common 
interests and values; and (3) marginalize extremism. However, this 
strategy does not identify target "end-states," which are the desired 
results of such efforts, nor are the strategic goals supported by 
subordinate performance objectives and indicators that would allow 
agencies and others to gauge progress. In addition, agencies have 
adopted varying performance management systems that do not link back to 
the national communication strategy. 

* BBG's performance measurement system is not explicitly linked to the 
national strategy. According to BBG officials, the board's statutory 
mandate of broadcasting accurate and objective news and information 
sets it apart from other strategic communication efforts. BBG officials 
told us BBG supports the national strategic communications goals when 
they are consistent with BBG's mandate and strategic plan. BBG has a 
standard set of performance indicators it uses to measure progress 
towards its overarching strategic goal to "deliver accurate news and 
information to significant audiences in support of U.S. strategic 
interests." 

* USAID has not established a standard set of performance indicators 
for measuring progress towards the national strategic communications 
goals. USAID officials noted that their strategic communications do not 
constitute a separate program or budget line item; thus these efforts 
are generally not monitored or evaluated separately. However, USAID's 
field-based communications specialists are expected to develop 
communication strategies that include goals and objectives as well as 
performance monitoring plans for their outreach activities. 

* While DOD strategic communication has a substantial role in 
marginalizing extremism, DOD has not established standard performance 
indicators to assess its effectiveness in contributing to this key 
strategic goal. DOD officials said this is because the department 
considers strategic communications to be a process instead of a 
discrete program, thus they are not separately monitored. However, DOD 
has measured the effectiveness of its communications at the project 
level. 

* In contrast to the other three agencies, State's performance 
measurement system provides a set of outcome-oriented performance 
indicators linked to the national strategy's goals as shown in table 2. 
However, State has not established subordinate objectives in support of 
the national goals that could better illustrate the linkages between 
the broad strategic goals and its performance indicators. 

Table 2: State Department's Linked Performance Indicators: 

National strategic goals: Offer a positive vision of hope and 
opportunity, rooted in the most basic values of the American people; 
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Increased 
understanding of U.S. policy, society, and values. 

National strategic goals: Nurture common interests and values; 
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Percentage of exchange 
program participants who increased or changed their understanding of 
the United States immediately following their program. 

National strategic goals: Marginalize extremism; 
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Reduction in the level 
of anti-American sentiment among participants of State information 
programs. 

Source: State's Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Report. 

[End of table] 

Agencies' Ability to Measure Results Limited by Inherent Challenges and 
Varying Use of Research: 

Agencies cite three inherent challenges in measuring the effectiveness 
of their strategic communication efforts. First, strategic 
communications may only produce long-term, rather than immediate, 
effect. Second, it is difficult to isolate the effect of strategic 
communications from other influences, such as policy. Third, strategic 
communications often target audiences' perceptions, which are 
intangible and complex and thus difficult to measure. GAO and others 
have identified some potential best practices for assessing strategic 
communications programs that address some of the inherent difficulties 
in measuring these programs' effect on attitudes and behaviors. For 
example, in 2007, we reported that in-depth actionable research at 
every step of the communications process is critical to monitoring and 
evaluating progress.[Footnote 10] Common private-sector measurement 
techniques that are used to measure results include the use of surveys 
and polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and 
additional tracking polls to identify long-term changes over time. 

In addition, agencies' funding and use of research to measure 
performance varies. We reported in 2007 that State has generally not 
adopted a research-focused approach to evaluate the effect of its 
thematic communications efforts. State conducts and contracts for 
audience research, including broad public opinion polling and focus 
groups, in over 50 countries each year through its Office of Research, 
which has an annual research budget of about $5.5 million. However, 
such generic research is not used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
public diplomacy programs. By contrast, BBG uses research to help its 
broadcast services plan and evaluate their programs. BBG has a research 
budget of about $10 million per year, which funds audience surveys, 
focus groups, in-depth interviews, and listener and monitor panels to 
support its broadcasting activities throughout the world. In our prior 
work, we identified shortcomings with BBG's audience research 
methodology. In our August 2006 report on the Middle East Broadcasting 
Networks, we recommended that several steps be taken to correct 
methodological concerns that could affect the accuracy of its research 
data regarding Alhurra's viewing rates and Radio Sawa's listening 
rates.[Footnote 11] BBG has since taken steps to address some of these 
methodological concerns, including identifying significant 
methodological limitations. While USAID does not have a central 
research office that conducts audience research, staff at some missions 
contract for polling and focus groups to support specific, targeted 
public awareness campaigns. Finally, some of DOD's combatant commands 
have recently initiated their own polling and focus group efforts. 

Limited Evaluation of State Public Diplomacy Programs: 

State has evaluated its public diplomacy programs to varying degrees. 
The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) has its own 
staffed and resourced internal evaluation unit and has been a leader in 
performance measurement and evaluation for several years. While this 
bureau has extensively evaluated its programs using its annual 
evaluation budget of $1.8 million, State has sponsored limited 
evaluation of the rest of its public diplomacy programs. For example, 
the Bureau of International Information Programs' Speakers Program, 
which it describes as its "largest and single most powerful instrument 
for engaging foreign publics on a person-to-person basis," has not yet 
been evaluated, although State is planning an evaluation of the program 
later in 2009. Further, embassy public affairs officers generally do 
not conduct systematic program evaluations and receive only limited 
audience polling data to help measure progress. The lack of a 
comprehensive system for evaluating public diplomacy performance 
hinders State's ability to correct its course of action or direct 
resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success. 

In order to bring measurement and evaluation for the rest of public 
diplomacy up to the ECA bureau's high standard, State recently 
established an Evaluation and Measurement Unit within State's Office of 
Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 
The unit is charged with developing performance measurement instruments 
and conducting independent evaluations of the effectiveness of all 
State public diplomacy programs. This unit has established a core set 
of public diplomacy performance indicators and launched a global public 
diplomacy tracking system as well as a pilot study to attempt to 
quantify the aggregate effect of public diplomacy programs and 
products. 

State Department Country-Level Reporting on Results Is Inconsistent: 

State has inconsistent reporting requirements for its public diplomacy 
activities undertaken at the country-level and therefore does not 
ensure these efforts are measured by comparable standards, or at all. 
State mission performance planning guidance allows public diplomacy 
staff in the field to focus on public diplomacy as a stand-alone 
strategic goal aimed at promoting mutual understanding, to integrate 
public diplomacy into another strategic goal, such as counterterrorism, 
or do both. When treated as a stand-alone goal, posts are expected to 
generate related performance indicators and targets. When public 
diplomacy efforts are integrated with other strategic goals, posts are 
not required to develop related performance targets and indicators. In 
2003, we administered a survey to the heads of public affairs sections 
at U.S. embassies worldwide covering a range of issues.[Footnote 12] 
Survey results indicated that about 87 percent of respondents 
integrated public diplomacy into the missions' other strategic goals, 
which means that the majority of missions were not required to measure 
the performance of their public diplomacy programs. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. How do agencies track their contributions towards common 
communication goals such as marginalizing extremism? 

2. To what extent have agencies incorporated in-depth, actionable 
research into their performance evaluation efforts? 

3. To what extent do available resources meet agency needs for in- 
depth, actionable research? 

4. What effect do embassy communications efforts have beyond supporting 
the traditional goal of promoting mutual understanding, and how is this 
measured? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure IV: Coordination of U.S. Communications Efforts: 

Issue: 

When agencies conduct communications programs in a fragmented, 
uncoordinated way, it can result in a patchwork of programs that can 
waste funds, lead to inconsistent messaging, and limit the overall 
effectiveness of the effort. Interagency coordination of U.S. strategic 
communication efforts is limited by several challenges, including 
unclear agency roles and responsibilities, a lack of sustained 
leadership to direct agencies' efforts, minimal interagency sharing of 
research, and the lack of a strategy to engage the private sector. Due, 
in part, to concerns about the lack of effective interagency 
coordination, several reports have questioned whether new leadership 
mechanisms and organizational structures are needed to improve U.S. 
strategic communication efforts. Several reports have proposed creating 
an independent or semi-independent organization to support the 
government in achieving its communications goals, while other reports 
propose establishing a new government agency to consolidate U.S. 
government communications. 

Key Findings: 

Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Defined: 

The national communications strategy identifies the principal mechanism 
for the coordination of U.S. government strategic communication 
activities, namely the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public 
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication led by State's Under Secretary 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, but does not address which 
agencies, departments, and offices will implement the strategy and 
their roles and responsibilities. The lack of guidance on DOD's and 
State's respective roles and responsibilities is of particular concern. 
Both departments have made marginalizing extremism--one of the three 
national communication goals--their top communications priority and are 
undertaking activities in this area. While State has been formally 
designated as the lead for all U.S. government strategic 
communications, DOD has more resources than State to apply to the 
strategic communications goal of marginalizing extremism. In 2006, DOD 
established the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Support to Public Diplomacy to support and coordinate public diplomacy 
efforts, and serve as the lead for developing policy within DOD on 
countering ideological support for terrorism. DOD officials said this 
office was disbanded in early 2009 and it is unclear what existing or 
new mechanisms, if any, will conduct its functions. Further, despite 
internal planning initiatives that began in 2006, DOD has not defined 
the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of its internal military 
capabilities that support strategic communications, such as public 
affairs, information operations, and defense support for public 
diplomacy. 

Lack of Leadership: 

We reported in 2005 that a lack of leadership has contributed to 
agencies independently defining and coordinating strategic 
communications programs.[Footnote 13] Some reports note that a unifying 
vision of strategic communications starts with sustained senior 
leadership from the White House focusing exclusively on global 
communication. In January 2003, the then-President established an 
Office of Global Communications to facilitate the strategic direction 
and coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. However, this office 
was ineffectual in fulfilling its intended role and no longer exists. 
In addition, State officials told us the lack of sustained leadership 
at the under secretary level has also hindered interagency 
coordination. These officials estimate the position of the Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has been vacant about 
40 percent of the time since 2001, and said the PCC did not meet when 
the position was vacant. A recent report on this issue notes that 
neither a lead organization nor lead individual has the authority to 
command independent departments or agencies, and the PCC structure is 
incapable of fostering coordination and strategic planning.[Footnote 
14] The report recommends alternative options to integrate government 
efforts, such as the creation of decentralized interagency teams made 
up of a small full-time staff to formulate and implement policy and 
support collaboration. 

Minimal Interagency Sharing of Research: 

Several U.S. agencies conduct and sponsor audience research and media 
monitoring; however, they have not yet developed interagency protocols 
or a central clearinghouse for sharing such research as recommended by 
GAO in 2007.[Footnote 15] Agency officials told us that barriers to 
sharing research include classification of documents and concerns about 
the release of sensitive and proprietary information. A PCC 
subcommittee on "Metrics and Polling," the main interagency forum for 
research staff to discuss issues of concern, has recently taken steps 
to encourage greater sharing of research information, particularly 
through conducting two applied research seminars in which various U.S. 
government agencies shared and analyzed audience, market, and opinion 
data with the aim of informing communication strategies for Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. The BBG has also recently provided other U.S. agencies 
with access to its audience research. 

Lack of a Comprehensive Strategy to Engage the Private Sector: 

In 2003 and 2005, we recommended the Secretary of State develop a 
strategy to engage with the private sector in pursuit of common public 
diplomacy objectives to help ensure private-sector resources, talents, 
and ideas are effectively utilized in support of U.S. strategic 
communications. In 2005 we reported that State had engaged the private 
sector in the area of international exchange programs, but other 
efforts led by State's Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs had not yielded significant results. Since then, a 
former under secretary established an Office of Private Sector Outreach 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which has partnered with the 
private sector on various projects, hosted a Private Sector Summit on 
Public Diplomacy in January 2007, invited private-sector experts to 
assist U.S. government officials in marketing public diplomacy 
programs, and identified action steps the private sector can take to 
support and improve U.S. public diplomacy. However, the office has not 
worked with the private sector to implement those additional action 
steps. While State's efforts thus far have merit, their effect may be 
limited if not backed by the type of comprehensive strategy to engage 
the private sector we have recommended.[Footnote 16] 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What is the appropriate role of DOD in relation to State in 
strategic communication? What are DOD's and State's respective 
authorities, comparative advantages, and capabilities in conducting 
strategic communication? 

2. Given the disbanding of DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, what mechanisms, 
if any, will be instituted to carry out its functions? 

3. When will DOD issue policy guidance regarding its internal strategic 
communication structure? 

4. What are State's plans for future engagement with the private 
sector? When will State develop a strategy for engagement as 
recommended by GAO? 

5. What criteria can be used to evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of creating new organizational structures for conducting 
strategic communication? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure V: State's Public Diplomacy Workforce: 

Issue: 

Having the right people, with the right skills, in the right place is 
essential to the effective management of any government program. 
Beginning in 2003, GAO has reported that State's public diplomacy 
operations have been hampered by insufficient numbers and types of 
staff, administrative burdens and time constraints, and language 
proficiency shortfalls. These problems have compromised State's ability 
to fully execute its public diplomacy mission, led to minimal coverage 
at certain posts, placed a strain on more-junior staff filling 
positions above their pay grade, and diminished effectiveness where 
target language proficiency levels have not been met. The department 
has sought to respond to these challenges by instituting a number of 
initiatives including a requested increase of 2,400 in American and 
Foreign Service National staff over the next 2 years, various financial 
incentives to attract and motivate staff, and increased training 
opportunities. It remains to be determined whether these assorted 
initiatives will fully address the human capital challenges identified 
by GAO; a failure to do so by State will compromise the effectiveness 
of its public diplomacy operations for the foreseeable future. 

Key Findings: 

Staffing Shortages and Lack of Mid-Level Officers Hinder U.S. Outreach 
Efforts: 

State has experienced a shortage of public diplomacy staff since 1999 
when the United States Information Agency was merged into the 
department. In 2003, GAO reported that State experienced a 13 percent 
vacancy rate in its public diplomacy positions. Similar findings were 
reported by GAO in May 2006, and data from November 2007 show a vacancy 
rate of over 13 percent. In our 2003 report, we noted that more than 50 
percent of those responding to our survey of public diplomacy officers 
felt the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public 
diplomacy duties was inadequate. Our May 2006 report noted that while 
several recent reports on public diplomacy had recommended increased 
spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy officials 
told us that, given current staffing levels, they lacked the capacity 
to effectively utilize increased funds. 

In August 2006, we reported that State's consular and public diplomacy 
positions were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in 
these two tracks at the mid-level. We noted this staffing gap placed 
pressure on State to appoint junior officers to so-called "stretch 
positions"--whereby they serve in a position above their pay grade--to 
fill as many of these vacancies as possible. For example, at the time 
of our visit in 2006 the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria--which had the 
third largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees--told us the 
embassy had only three senior officers, and public affairs were handled 
entirely by first-tour junior officers. Ambassadors at posts GAO 
visited stated that junior officers, while generally highly qualified 
when entering the Foreign Service, lack sufficient training to handle 
some of the high-stress situations they encounter and therefore often 
end up making mistakes. A January 2008 analysis by State's Human 
Resources Bureau indicates that mid-level shortages continue. The 
report notes the public diplomacy cone has the highest mid-level 
deficit among the five generalist cones, and public diplomacy officers 
are being promoted through the mid-levels at higher rates than other 
cones. State officials expect it will take several years before the mid-
level deficit is erased. One senior State official noted accelerated 
rates of promotion have led to concern that some public diplomacy 
officers may not have the requisite experience and expertise to perform 
effectively at their current levels. 

Administrative Burden and Lack of Time Cited as Limiting Factors: 

In 2003, we reported public diplomacy officers at posts were burdened 
with administrative tasks, and thus had less time to conduct public 
diplomacy outreach activities than they did when the United States 
Information Agency was responsible for U.S. public diplomacy efforts. 
More than 40 percent of the 118 public affairs officers responding to 
our survey reported the amount of time they had to devote exclusively 
to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our 
overseas fieldwork, officers told us that, while they managed to attend 
U.S. and other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their 
host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time or 
staff resources to travel outside the capitals to interact with 
ordinary citizens. In May 2006, we noted one senior State official 
overseas told us administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and 
internal reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy 
responsibilities. Another official in Egypt told us she rarely had 
enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate programs. 

This challenge is compounded at posts with short tours of duty, 
including many posts of strategic importance in the Muslim world, as 
officials stated it is difficult to establish the type of close working 
relationships essential to effective public diplomacy when in the 
country for only a short time. In May 2006, we reported the average 
length of tour at posts with significant Muslim populations was 2.1 
years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-Muslim world. Noting the 
prevalence of 1-year tours at such posts, a senior official at State 
said public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to produce 
less effective work than officers with longer tours. 

Language Proficiency Shortfalls Remain: 

Beginning in July 2003, GAO reported that 21 percent of officers in 
public diplomacy language-designated positions did not meet the 
language requirements for their position. We reported similar findings 
in May 2006, and as of October 2008 this figure stood at 25 percent. 
Our May 2006 report noted this problem was particularly acute at posts 
where Arabic--classified as a "superhard" language by State-- 
predominates. In countries with significant Muslim populations, we 
reported 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions 
were filled by officers without the requisite proficiency in those 
languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language 
posts, about 36 percent of language-designated public diplomacy 
positions were filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the designated 
level. In addition, State officials said there are even fewer officers 
willing or able to speak on television or engage in public debate in 
Arabic. The information officer in Cairo stated his office does not 
have enough Arabic speakers to engage the Egyptian media effectively. 

Effect of Several Recent Initiatives Remains to Be Determined: 

State is seeking to increase its total staffing by over 2,400 
individuals over the next 2 years to, in part, create the "personnel 
float" needed to allow staff to take language and other forms of 
training, fill vacant positions, and ease the burden on existing staff. 
State has also repositioned several public diplomacy officers as part 
of its transformational diplomacy initiative, and is increasing its 
overall amount of language training and providing supplemental training 
for more difficult languages at overseas locations. The department has 
also increased its language proficiency and hardship-post service 
incentives and requirements. However, it remains to be determined 
whether these efforts will collectively resolve State's long-standing 
human capital challenges. 

Other groups have reported that additional human capital challenges 
help to explain State's long-standing difficulties filling open public 
diplomacy positions with fully qualified staff. For example, the United 
States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issued a report on the 
status of State's human capital operations since the integration of the 
United States Information Agency into the department in 1999.[Footnote 
17] This report addresses a range of topics that the commission 
believes have significantly contributed to State's human capital 
problems. Discussed topics include hiring, training, promotion 
practices, and the degree to which the 1999 merger of the United States 
Information Agency into State has resulted in better integration of the 
public diplomacy function into the work of State--in particular as 
measured by the presence of public diplomacy officers in the 
department's decision-making ranks. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. What is State's strategy to obtain a sufficient number of staff to 
create the desired training float needed to fill vacant public 
diplomacy positions and meet all required language training needs? 

2. What is State's strategy to address the deficit in mid-level 
management expertise? 

3. Are public affairs officers at posts overburdened with 
administrative duties? If so, what can be done to alleviate this 
situation? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure VI: Outreach Efforts in High-Threat Posts: 

Issue: 

Conditions in high-threat posts have led to security precautions that 
limit public access to U.S. embassies and reduce the number of external 
facilities open to local populations--thereby limiting the 
effectiveness of U.S. outreach efforts. Beginning in the late 1990s, 
security concerns led to the fortification of preexisting and new 
embassies, which in many cases entailed increased physical barriers 
around the embassies, as well as the location of embassy complexes to 
more remote locations. These measures have had the ancillary effect of 
making the United States seem unapproachable and distrustful, according 
to State officials, leading to increased anti-American sentiments 
amongst local populations. Compounding this problem, security and 
budgetary considerations brought about the closure of publicly 
accessible facilities outside the embassy compound, such as American 
Centers and Libraries. While little has been done to change the 
forbidding presence associated with many embassies, State has responded 
to the lack of external facilities by exploring a variety of outreach 
mechanisms such as American Corners, which are centers that provide 
information about the United States, hosted in local institutions and 
staffed by local employees. It is important that State determine the 
relative effectiveness of these alternative outreach mechanisms and, in 
turn, find the right balance between security and mission concerns. 

Key Findings: 

Enhanced Security Measures and the Closure of Public Facilities Have 
Limited Outreach Efforts: 

Since the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
Congress has provided State hundreds of millions of dollars annually 
for embassy construction to secure facilities around the world. Among 
the many embassy security-related construction requirements is that 
facilities be further offset from the street, leading to the building 
of many new embassies several miles from urban centers. Such sites tend 
to be in remote areas poorly served by public transportation, and these 
relocations have diminished the ability of local citizens and U.S. 
embassy personnel to interact. As we reported in May 2006, the new 
security architecture has created heavily-protected structures that 
make embassies seem less welcoming to local citizens. Congress has also 
mandated that sites selected for new U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad 
meet a colocation requirement designed to ensure all U.S. government 
agencies, except those under the command of a United States area 
military commander, be located on the same compound, complicating 
attempts to establish diplomatic venues outside the compound. 

In addition, due to security concerns and other factors, State closed 
or eliminated funding for many publicly accessible facilities that 
provided an opportunity for local populations to interact directly with 
Americans with the goal of promoting mutual understanding.[Footnote 18] 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States began to close its 
worldwide network of American Cultural Centers operated in downtown 
locations in capital cities around the world, which offered reading 
rooms; group lectures; film, music, and art series; and English 
language instruction.[Footnote 19] With the closure of these 
facilities, their operations were transferred to Information Resource 
Centers located within heavily fortified embassy compounds, many of 
which are now open by appointment only or have hours of operation and 
security policies limiting public access. In May 2006, we reported 
that, in Pakistan, for example, all American Centers closed for 
security reasons and selected operations moved to the embassy's 
Information Resource Center.[Footnote 20] Our report noted that 
concrete barriers and armed escorts outside the embassy compounds 
contribute to a perception that visitors are not welcome, as do 
requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones and pagers within 
the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, the number of 
visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center has declined to 
as few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the 
embassy's rigorous security procedures. We also reported the 
Information Resource Center in Abuja, Nigeria, is open only to students 
and other specific demographic groups, and access is granted by 
appointment only. The head of the center in Abuja said accessibility 
was one of his primary challenges. 

State Has Responded to Security Concerns and Actions by Establishing a 
Range of Alternate Outreach Mechanisms: 

Over the past two decades, State has experimented with a number of 
alternative outreach mechanisms designed to offset the increasingly 
isolated nature of U.S. diplomatic operations. These alternative 
mechanisms generally consist of small outposts with no or few U.S. 
staff, or virtual, internet-based efforts supported by in-person travel 
to a city or region. Specific alternate outreach mechanisms include the 
following: 

* American Presence Posts: Headed by an American officer, these posts 
provide citizen, commercial, and public diplomacy outreach services to 
a major city or region. There are currently nine such posts worldwide. 
While plans to create additional posts are on hold for budgetary and 
other reasons, State would like to add more American Presence Posts 
over the next few years. 

* American Corners: These provide the United States with a physical 
public diplomacy outpost, which includes internet access, a small 
reference collection, and a discussion forum. Sponsored by a host 
country's municipal or national government, the U.S. government is only 
required to fund the equipment and materials used. Staff are provided 
by the host institution. There are approximately 410 American Corners 
throughout the world, and State plans to develop up to 30 more corners 
over the next 2 years. 

* American Discovery Centers: These are small kiosks that provide 
information on America. The prime example of the use of these kiosks is 
Pakistan. In May 2006, we reported there were over 180 such kiosks, 
primarily in schools. State is considering the expanded use of such 
kiosks. 

* Virtual Presence Posts: Virtual Presence Posts are generally designed 
to combine virtual presence through an embassy-hosted Web site with 
coordinated outreach, programming, and travel targeted at a particular 
city or region. 

* Other outreach mechanisms: In our May 2006 report on outreach to the 
Muslim world, we noted that in Nigeria several embassy staff, including 
the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a permanent 
American presence; according to embassy officials, these "embassy on 
the road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve dozens of 
individuals. A variation on this theme are embassy "circuit riders," 
who are staff who travel from the embassy on a scheduled basis to cover 
an assigned city or territory. 

To date, only American Corners have been formally evaluated by State. 
State's evaluation was generally favorable; however, in May 2006, we 
reported that, while one State official told us American Corners are 
the best solution given the current security environment, others have 
described them as public diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner 
we visited in Nigeria was confined to a single small room housing a 
limited reference library and a small selection of donated books. At a 
meeting with a focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated 
in U.S.-sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the 
American Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding 
hosts for American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming 
terrorist targets. 

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has 
recommended that State systematically determine and coordinate how and 
where to locate alternative outreach mechanisms on a country by country 
basis.[Footnote 21] According to CSIS, each country mission should 
conduct this assessment, in coordination with the relevant State 
regional bureau, and integrate it into the post's strategic planning 
process. To support the effective development of these country-level 
strategies, CSIS recommended that State establish a federally-funded 
research center to assist with a number of related data analysis tasks. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent has State evaluated the effectiveness of alternative 
outreach mechanisms such as American Corners, American Presence Posts, 
and Virtual Presence Posts? 

2. What process guides post decisions on the need to establish outreach 
mechanisms and how are decisions made regarding the mix, number, and 
placement of these facilities? How is this process linked to post 
efforts to reach specific target audiences? 

3. How would reestablishing American Centers contribute to fulfilling 
U.S. strategic communication goals? 

[End of section] 

Enclosure VII: Interagency Efforts to Adopt a New Approach to Public 
Diplomacy: 

Issue: 

The United States needs to consider new approaches to conducting its 
strategic communication efforts in response to dynamic changes in the 
ways people around the world receive and use information. In 
particular, the rise of social networking, namely through Internet 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter, has transformed the nature of 
communications globally. State's prior Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs recently endorsed a new public diplomacy 
approach, referred to as Public Diplomacy 2.0, that could more fully 
engage these new and evolving communication trends. Key issues that 
remain to be addressed include the level of resources the United States 
should devote to this new approach, how agency operations will be 
guided when there is limited knowledge or agreement on how to operate 
in this new information environment, and how results will be measured 
when message control is partly or completely ceded to other groups that 
can distribute information through hundreds or thousands of diverse 
communication channels. These and other considerations should be 
incorporated in the President's new communication strategy, which could 
provide the best means for outlining a vision for Public Diplomacy 2.0 
efforts. While GAO has not previously assessed this issue, current 
information suggests a failure to adapt in this dynamic communications 
environment could significantly raise the risk that U.S. public 
diplomacy efforts could become increasingly irrelevant, particularly 
among younger audiences that represent a key focus of U.S. strategic 
communication efforts. 

Key Findings: 

Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiatives Are Underway: 

The most recent Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
noted in December 2008 that the United States should place a greater 
reliance on dialogue and collaboration, enabled by emerging social 
networks, in addition to the traditional model of public diplomacy that 
has focused on building a positive image of the United States, mainly 
through long-term programs like cultural and educational exchanges and 
efforts to tell America's story.[Footnote 22] State, the BBG, and DOD 
have begun to respond to this and earlier calls for change. State has 
been most active in this new approach, and the BBG's international 
broadcasting has the potential to help form social networks of like- 
minded people who listen to services such as the Voice of America (VOA) 
and Radio Free Asia and then pass along this information through word 
of mouth, blogs, Internet sites, and other means. DOD has chosen to 
engage in this new approach to a certain degree; however, DOD officials 
said it would represent a "sea change" in the department's culture to 
allow its staff to fully engage in Public Diplomacy 2.0-style 
activities. 

Specific examples of agency Public Diplomacy 2.0 initiatives include 
the following: 

* In December 2008, State joined with major new media companies and the 
Columbia University School of Law to bring together a number of youth 
movements from around the world to New York City to launch an Internet- 
based global network to mobilize people against violence and 
oppression. (See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-679sp] 
for an independently produced, State-endorsed video clip of the 
event that was edited by GAO.) 

* State has also held blogger-only press conferences, started its own 
blog, established a page on Facebook and a social networking site 
called Exchanges Connect, created a digital outreach team to 
participate in blogs and Web chat rooms with the goal of countering 
ideological support for terrorism, and hosted YouTube video contests on 
such topics as "what is democracy." 

* VOA maintains pages on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in multiple 
languages. According to BBG officials, there have been 4 million views 
of VOA-produced videos in the past year. VOA also distributes its 
content through podcasts, syndicated feeds to users' desktops, and 
mobile phones. For example, VOA has an agreement with Nokia to 
distribute English language content on mobile phones sold in China. 

* VOA created a special U.S. election Web site in 2008 that attracted 
traffic from more than 200 countries and resulted in thousands of users 
joining an online VOA community, where they were able to share photos, 
ask questions, and comment about the U.S. electoral process. 

* DOD plans to hold a conference on emerging Web technologies in July 
2009 to gain a better awareness and understanding of these tools, 
identify barriers to their adoption (such as restrictions due to 
policy, organizational culture, and other factors), and determine 
implementation strategies. Many DOD commands now have their own 
official blog sites and use tools such as Twitter and Facebook. The 
U.S. Army has also had success using online games and a variety of 
mechanisms to reach out to younger audiences. 

Challenges and Practical Considerations: 

Agencies seeking to implement this new approach to public diplomacy 
face several key challenges. First, there is a general lack of adequate 
research and understanding of how government entities can and should 
operate in a social network environment. Second, agencies will 
generally lose control over content since participants in a dialogue or 
collaborative project are free to voice their own opinions and 
distribute information as they choose. As noted by one senior State 
official, however, a difference in opinions is one of the core 
strengths of the approach and the underlying basis for its 
effectiveness. Third, views expressed by U.S. officials on, for 
example, social networking sites or blogs, become part of the permanent 
discussion record, which raises practical questions about how best to 
mitigate potential instances of miscommunication. Fourth, the level of 
available resources is small compared to the magnitude of the global 
communications environment. For example, State's Digital Outreach team 
consists of eight individuals seeking to provide a U.S. point of view 
into a communication environment consisting of millions of personal 
blogs and discussion forums on thousands of Web sites. Finally, this 
approach is likely to pose technical challenges, as agency efforts to 
plan, coordinate, fund, implement, and evaluate their Public Diplomacy 
2.0 efforts could strain systems and capabilities that have had 
difficulty operating smoothly in the less complex environment of 
traditional public diplomacy efforts. 

Oversight Questions: 

1. To what extent will the Public Diplomacy 2.0 approach be included in 
the President's December 2009 national communication strategy? 

2. What criteria should be used to guide strategic investment decisions 
regarding this new approach to public diplomacy? 

3. How do agencies intend to address the challenges identified by GAO 
such as the lack of in-depth research on social networking and resource 
constraint issues? 

4. Are there other challenges and practical considerations that should 
be considered in adopting this new approach? 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy Addresses 
GAO's Desirable Characteristics: 

In a 2004 GAO testimony, we identified six desirable characteristics of 
an effective national strategy that would enable its implementers to 
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, 
and standards that would enable federal departments and other 
stakeholders to achieve the identified results.[Footnote 23] We further 
determined in that testimony that national strategies with the six 
characteristics can provide policymakers and implementing agencies with 
a planning tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective 
results. To develop these six desirable characteristics of an effective 
national strategy, we reviewed several sources of information. First, 
we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to national strategies, 
as well as legislative and executive branch guidance. We also consulted 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature 
on strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of 
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda. In 
addition, among other things, we studied past reports and testimonies 
for findings and recommendations pertaining to the desirable elements 
of a national strategy. Furthermore, we consulted widely within GAO to 
obtain updated information on strategic planning, integration across 
and between the government and its partners, implementation, and other 
related subjects. We developed these six desirable characteristics 
based on their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance 
and the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We then 
grouped similar items together in a logical sequence, from conception 
to implementation. Table 3 provides these desirable characteristics and 
examples of their elements. 

Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National 
Strategy: 

Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology; 
Brief description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope 
of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. 

Desirable characteristic: Problems, risks, and threats; 
Brief description: Addresses the particular national problems and 
threats the strategy is directed toward. 

Desirable characteristic: Desired goals, objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; 
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve; 
steps to achieve those results; as well as the priorities, milestones, 
and performance measures to gauge results. 

Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management; 
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources 
and types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and 
investments should be targeted by balancing risk reductions and costs. 

Desirable characteristic: U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination mechanism; 
Brief description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, 
what their roles will be compared to those of others, and mechanisms 
for them to coordinate their efforts. 

Desirable characteristic: Integration among and with other entities; 
Brief description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other 
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities--and to subordinate 
levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

To assess U.S. strategic communication planning efforts, we examined 
the June 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication. To determine whether this national strategy contains all 
six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we 
developed and used in our prior work, we first developed a checklist of 
these characteristics, along with their 27 component elements. Two GAO 
staff members then independently assessed the national strategy for its 
inclusion of the 27 elements, recorded their findings on separate 
checklists, and met to reconcile any differences in their assessments. 
Once these assessments were reconciled, one additional GAO staff member 
reviewed this analysis for completeness and accuracy. To determine the 
extent to which the national strategy addressed GAO's six 
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we developed the 
following three categories: the strategy (1) generally addresses a 
characteristic when it explicitly cites all elements related to that 
characteristic; (2) partially addresses a characteristic when it 
explicitly cites at least one, but not all, of the elements related to 
that characteristic; and (3) does not address a characteristic when it 
does not explicitly cite any of the elements related to that 
characteristic. By applying these categories to our checklists of the 
27 elements, we developed a consolidated summary of the extent to which 
the strategy addressed the six characteristics of an effective national 
strategy. Figure 3 shows the results of our assessment of the national 
communication strategy. 

Figure 3: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy for Public 
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Addresses the 27 Elements of the 
Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy: 

[Refer to PDF for image: table] 

1. Clear purpose, scope, and methodology: Partially addresses. 

Purpose: 1a. Identifies the impetus that led to the strategy being 
written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event: Does 
not address. 

Purpose: 1b. Discusses the strategy’s purpose: Does not address. 

Scope: 1c. Defines or discusses key terms, major functions, mission 
areas, or activities the strategy covers: Generally addresses. 

Methodology: 1d. Discusses the process that produced the strategy 
(e.g., what organizations or offices drafted the document, whether it 
was the result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in 
its development): Does not address. 

Methodology: 1e. Discusses assumptions or the principles and theories 
that guided the strategy’s development: Partially addresses. 

2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats: Does not 
address. 

Problem definition: 2a. Includes a detailed discussion or definition of 
the problems the strategy intends to address: Does not address. 

Problem definition: 2b. Includes a detailed discussion of the causes of 
the problems: Does not address. 

Problem definition: 2c. Includes a detailed discussion of the operating 
environment: Does not address. 

Risk assessment: 2d. Addresses a detailed discussion of the threats at 
which the strategy is directed: Does not address. 

Risk assessment: 2e. Discusses the quality of data available (e.g., 
constraints, deficiencies, and "unknowns"): Partially addresses. 

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and outcome-related 
performance measures: Partially addresses. 

Goals and subordinate objectives: 3a. Addresses the overall results 
desired (i.e., an “end state”): Does not address. 

Goals and subordinate objectives: 3b. Identifies strategic goals and 
subordinate objectives: Partially addresses. 

Activities: 3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results: 
Generally addresses. 

Performance measures: 3d. Addresses priorities, milestones, and outcome-
related performance measures: Partially addresses. 

Performance measures: 3e. Identifies process to monitor and report on 
progress: Generally addresses. 

Performance measures: 3f. Identifies limitations on progress 
indicators: Generally addresses. 

4. Resources, investments, and risk management: Does not address. 

Resources and investments: 4a. Identifies what the strategy will cost: 
Does not address. 

Resources and investments: 4b. Identifies the sources (e.g., federal, 
international, and private, and types of resources or investments 
needed, e.g., budgetary, human capital,information technology, research 
and development, and contracts): Partially addresses. 

Risk management: 4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be 
targeted to balance risks and costs: Does not address. 

Risk management: 4d. Addresses resource allocation mechanisms: Does not 
address. 

Risk management: 4e. Identifies risk management principles and how they 
help implementing parties prioritize and allocate resources: Does not 
address. 

5. Delineation of U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination mechanism: Partially addresses. 

Organizational roles and responsibilities: 5a. Addresses who will 
implement the strategy: Partially addresses. 

Organizational roles and responsibilities: 5b. Addresses lead, support, 
and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, 
departments, or offices (e.g., who is in charge during all phases of 
the strategy’s implementation): Does not address. 

Coordination: 5c. Addresses mechanisms or processes for parties to 
coordinate efforts within agencies and with other agencies: Generally 
addresses. 

Coordination: 5d. Identifies process for resolving conflicts: Does not 
address. 

6. Description of strategy's integration among and with other entities: 
Partially addresses. 

6a. Addresses how the strategy relates to the strategies of other 
institutions and organizations and their goals, objectives, and 
activities (horizontal): Generally addresses. 

6b. Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies 
and subordinate levels (vertical): Partially addresses. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Audrey Solis (Assistant 
Director), Michael ten Kate, and Emily Gupta made key contributions to 
this report. Technical assistance was provided by Robert Alarapon, 
Martin de Alteriis, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph Carney, Marcus Corbin, 
and Leah DeWolf. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Broadcasting to Cuba: Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and 
Operations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-127]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2009. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and 
Coordination of Research. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904. Washington, D.C.: July 
18, 2007. 

Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of 
Agencies' Marking and Publicizing Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-277. Washington, D.C.: 
March 12, 2007. 

U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East Broadcasting 
Services Could Be Improved. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-762. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 
2006. 

Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist 
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894. Washington, D.C.: August 4, 
2006. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-535. 
Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the 
Lack of a National Communication Strategy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005. 

U.S. International Broadcasting: Enhanced Measure of Local Media 
Conditions Would Facilitate Decisions to Terminate Language Services. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-374. Washington, D.C.: 
February 26, 2004. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces 
Significant Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 
2003. 

U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on 
Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-772. Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] We use the terms "public diplomacy," "outreach," and "strategic 
communication" interchangeably in this report. 

[2] This report expands on issues discussed on GAO's transition Web 
site, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-679sp2]. 

[3] These papers are based on the continuing work of GAO, the 10 
related reports we have issued since July 2003 (see list of related GAO 
products), and select studies conducted by outside groups. 

[4] In 2008, this amounted to $1.7 million. 

[5] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but 
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 
2003). 

[6] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 
2005). 

[7] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 1055(a). 

[8] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004). 

[9] GAO has also discussed the use of a "program logic model" to 
further improve planning efforts at the interagency, department, and 
country level. A logic model systematically outlines program 
activities, inputs, outputs, outcomes, and program effect in a direct 
relational path. 

[10] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic 
Use and Coordination of Research, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904] (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2007). 

[11] GAO, U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East 
Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-762] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 
2006). 

[12] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but 
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 
2003). 

[13] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 
2005). 

[14] Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield 
(Arlington, Va., Nov. 26, 2008). 

[15] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic 
Use and Coordination of Research, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904] (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2007). 

[16] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but 
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 
2003); and GAO-05-323. 

[17] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Getting the 
People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. 
Public Diplomacy (Washington, D.C., June 25, 2008). 

[18] According to State, only about 30 American Cultural Centers remain 
open today. U.S. funding for binational outreach centers in Latin 
America was also eliminated; however, about 110 centers remain open 
with other revenue sources. Congress is now considering the option of 
reopening American Cultural Centers where security conditions permit 
and resuming some level of funding for binational centers where 
appropriate. See Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
U.S. Public Diplomacy--Time to Get Back in the Game, 2009. 

[19] As we noted in our May 2006 report, in 1990 the majority of posts 
had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. 

[20] We reported in May 2006, that State's Bureau of International 
Information Programs operates more than 170 such centers worldwide. 

[21] Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Embassy of the 
Future (Washington, D.C., Oct. 15, 2007). 

[22] In articulating his support for Public Diplomacy 2.0, State's most 
recent Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
highlighted the example of a social movement directed against rebel 
forces in Colombia, which illustrates the power of the collaborative, 
social networking approach in action. In this instance, according to 
the Under Secretary, an unemployed computer technician in Colombia 
started a Facebook page that grew quickly to more than 400,000 members. 
The group, called One Million Voices against the FARC, was able to 
mobilize 12 million people to engage in street protests on a single day 
in 190 cities around the world, just 2 months after it was set up. 

[23] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 
2004). 

[End of section] 

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