This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-325 
entitled 'Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in 
Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities' which was released 
on May 7, 2009. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2009: 

Global Positioning System: 

Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used 
Capabilities: 

GAO-09-325: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-325, a report to the Subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides positioning, 
navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to 
U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public 
service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United 
States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is 
responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. 

In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and 
international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to 
undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in 
(1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user 
equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and 
evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other 
organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out 
this assessment, GAO’s efforts included reviewing and analyzing program 
documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, 
and interviewing key military and civilian officials. 

What GAO Found: 

It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new 
satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without 
interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users 
could be adversely affected. 

* In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build 
GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered 
significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery 
schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, 
the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost 
estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite 
has been delayed to November 2009—almost 3 years late. 

* Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program 
to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to 
deploy the next generation of GPS satellites 3 years faster than the 
IIF satellites. GAO’s analysis found that this schedule is optimistic, 
given the program’s late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and 
challenges facing the new contractor. Of particular concern is 
leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the 
lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent 
turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, 
funding stability, and resource allocation. 

* If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of 
GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 
2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation 
will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level 
of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in 
capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though 
there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and 
minimize these impacts. 

In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the 
Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the 
acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites 
with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the 
ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite 
capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given 
that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all 
procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted 
from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. 

DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond 
the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and 
coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO 
identified challenges to ensuring civilian requirements and ensuring 
GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-
based positioning, navigation, and timing systems. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO’s recommendations include that the Secretary of Defense appoint a 
single authority to oversee development of GPS space, ground control, 
and user equipment assets, to ensure they are synchronized, well 
executed, and potential disruptions are minimized. DOD concurred with 
our recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-325] or key 
components. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 
512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results In Brief: 

Background: 

Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites: 

New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed 
Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities: 

Prudent Steps Taken so GPS Can Meet Broader Needs but Challenges Exist 
in Coordinating Requirements and Ensuring Compatibility: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: International Global Satellite Navigation Systems: 

Appendix III: Cooperation Between U.S. and Foreign Entities: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: GPS Satellite and Ground Control Segment Modernization: 

Table 2: Key Differences in Program Framework for GPS IIF and GPS III: 

Table 3: Delays in Delivery of GPS Operational Functionality: 

Table 4: U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Entities on Satellite 
Navigation: 

Table 5: Non-U.S. Global Navigation Satellite Systems Currently in 
Development: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: GPS Operational System: 

Figure 2: National Space-Based PNT Organization Structure: 

Figure 3: Schedule Development from Start to Launch for Space Programs 
(in Months): 

Figure 4: Probability of Maintaining a Constellation of at Least 24 GPS 
Satellites Based on Reliability Data and Launch Schedule as of March 
2009: 

Figure 5: Probability of Maintaining a Constellation of at Least 18, 
21, and 24 GPS Satellites Based on Reliability Data as of March 2009 
and a 2-Year GPS III Launch Delay: 

Figure 6: Gap in the Ability of the Military to Use the Modernized 
Signal: 

Figure 7: Responsibilities Among the Military Services for Procurement 
of GPS User Equipment: 

Figure 8: Interagency Process for Submitting and Validating GPS 
Requirements: 

Abbreviations: 

AEP: Architecture Evolution Plan: 

DASS: Distress Alerting Satellite System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite Systems: 

GPS: Global Positioning System: 

IFOR: Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

L2C: second civil signal: 

L5: third civil signal: 

M-code: Military Code: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

OCS: Operational Control Segment: 

OCX: Next Generation Control Segment: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

PDOP: position dilution of precision: 

PNT: Positioning, Navigation, and Timing: 

SLR: Satellite Laser Ranging: 

TSPR: Total System Performance Responsibility: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2009: 

The Honorable John Tierney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jeff Flake: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Global Positioning System (GPS)--a space-based satellite system 
that provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users 
worldwide--has become essential to U.S. national security and a key 
component in economic growth, transportation safety, homeland security, 
and critical national infrastructure in the United States and abroad. 
GPS is integrated into nearly every facet of U.S. military operations, 
and the number of civil users is increasing. Other countries are now 
developing their own independent global navigation satellite systems 
that could offer capabilities that are comparable, if not superior to 
GPS. 

The U.S. government, which plans to invest more than $5.8 billion from 
2009 through 2013 in the GPS space and ground control segments 
currently under development, provides GPS service free of charge. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) develops and operates GPS, and an 
interdepartmental committee--co-chaired by DOD and the Department of 
Transportation--manages the U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, 
and timing infrastructure, which includes GPS. DOD also provides most 
of the funding for GPS. 

The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the 
process of modernizing GPS to enhance its performance, accuracy, and 
integrity. The modernization effort includes GPS IIF and IIIA, two 
satellite acquisition programs currently underway that are to provide 
new space-based capabilities and replenish the satellite constellation; 
the ground control segment hardware and software; and user equipment 
for processing modernized GPS capabilities. 

In light of the global economic and national security importance of 
GPS, the ongoing GPS modernization effort, and the international 
efforts to develop new systems, you asked us to undertake a broad 
review of the program and efforts to replenish and upgrade capability. 
Specifically, we assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) 
acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage 
GPS satellite capabilities, and (3) coordinating among federal agencies 
and other organizations to ensure broader GPS missions can be 
accomplished. 

To assess the acquisition of satellite, ground control, and user 
equipment, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
DOD officials from offices that manage and oversee the GPS program. We 
also reviewed and analyzed program plans and documentation related to 
cost, schedule, requirements, program direction, and satellite 
constellation sustainment, and compared programmatic data to GAO's 
criteria compiled over the last 12 years for best practices in system 
development.[Footnote 1] We also conducted our own analysis, based on 
data provided by the Air Force, to assess the implications of potential 
schedule delays we identified in our assessment of the satellite 
acquisition. To assess coordination among federal agencies and the 
broader GPS community, we interviewed OSD and DOD officials from 
offices that manage and oversee the GPS program, officials from the 
military services, officials from the Department of Transportation and 
other civil departments and agencies, and officials at the U.S. 
Department of State and at various European space organizations. We 
also analyzed how civil departments and agencies coordinate with DOD on 
GPS civil requirements, and how the U.S. government coordinates with 
foreign countries. Additional information on our scope and methodology 
is in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 
to April 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results In Brief: 

It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new 
satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without 
interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users 
could be adversely affected. 

* Under the IIF program, the Air Force had difficulty in successfully 
building GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered 
significant technical problems which still threaten its delivery 
schedule; and it faced challenges with a different contractor for the 
IIF program. These problems were compounded by an acquisition strategy 
that relaxed oversight and quality inspections as well as multiple 
contractor mergers and moves, and the addition of new requirements late 
in the development cycle. As a result, the IIF program has overrun its 
original cost estimate of $729 million by about $870 million and the 
launch of the first IIF satellite has been delayed to November 2009-- 
almost 3 years late. 

* Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program 
to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to 
deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. 
We believe the IIIA schedule is optimistic given the program's late 
start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new 
contractor. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as 
GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of 
authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers 
have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource 
allocation. 

* If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of 
GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 
2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation 
will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level 
of GPS service that the U.S. government is committed to providing. Such 
a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, 
though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for 
and minimize these impacts. 

Moreover, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing 
the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS 
satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying 
the ability of military users to utilize new GPS satellite 
capabilities. For example, a modernized military signal will be 
available for operations on GPS satellites over a decade before user 
equipment will be fielded that can take strategic advantage of it. The 
signal is designed to improve resistance to jamming of GPS. Also, 
because leadership for acquisitions across the space community is 
fragmented, there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing 
all procurements and fielding related to GPS. 

Lastly, DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities 
beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and 
coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, we 
identified challenges in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements 
can be met and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially 
competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing 
systems. 

Because of (1) the criticality of the GPS system to the military, 
various economic sectors, and the international community and (2) 
schedule risks in the current program, we are recommending that the 
Secretary of Defense appoint a single authority to oversee the 
development of the GPS system, including DOD space, ground control, and 
user equipment assets, to ensure that the program is well executed and 
resourced and that potential disruptions are minimized. The appointee 
should have authority to ensure DOD space, ground control, and user 
equipment are synchronized to the maximum extent practicable; and 
coordinate with the existing positioning, navigation, and timing 
infrastructure to assess and minimize potential service disruptions in 
the event that the satellite constellation was to decrease in size for 
an extended period of time. After a review of a draft of this report, 
DOD concurred with our recommendations and provided some additional 
comments. The full text of DOD's comments may be found in appendix IV. 

Background: 

GPS is a global positioning, navigation, and timing network consisting 
of space, ground control, and user equipment segments that support the 
broadcasts of military and civil GPS signals. These signals each 
include positioning and timing information, which enables users with 
GPS receivers to determine their position, velocity, and time, 24 hours 
a day, in all weather, worldwide. GPS is used by all branches of the 
military to guide troops' movements, integrated logistics support and 
battlespace situational awareness, and communications network 
synchronization. In addition, bombs and missiles are guided to their 
targets by GPS signals and GPS is used to locate military personnel in 
distress. Early in the development of GPS, the scope was expanded to 
include complementary civil capabilities. 

Over time, GPS has become a ubiquitous infrastructure underpinning 
major sections of the economy, including telecommunications, electrical 
power distribution, banking and finance, transportation, environmental 
and natural resources management, agriculture, and emergency services 
in addition to the array of military operations it services. For 
instance, civil agencies, commercial firms, and individuals use GPS to 
accurately navigate from one point to another. Commercial firms use GPS 
to route their vehicles, as do maritime industries and mass transit 
systems. In addition to navigation, civil departments and agencies and 
commercial firms use GPS and GPS augmentations[Footnote 2] to provide 
high-accuracy, three-dimensional positioning information in real time 
for use in surveying and mapping. The aviation community worldwide uses 
GPS and GPS augmentations to increase the safety and efficiency of 
flight. GPS is also used in the agricultural community for precision 
farming, including farm planning, field mapping, soil sampling, tractor 
guidance, and crop scouting. GPS helps companies and governments place 
satellites in precise orbits, and at correct altitudes, and helps 
monitor satellite constellation orbits. The precise time that GPS 
broadcasts is crucial to economic activities worldwide, including 
communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial networks. 

GPS System Description: 

GPS operations consist of three segments--the space segment, the ground 
control segment, and the user equipment segment. All segments are 
needed to take full advantage of GPS capabilities. 

Figure 1: GPS Operational System: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Space segment: 
satellites circling the globe; 

Ground control segment: 
Ground antenna; 
Monitor station; 
Master Control Station. 

User segment: 
Aviation; 
Hand held devices; 
Recreation; 
Ground navigation; 
Mapping and surveying; 
Maritime. 

Source: Copyright © Corel Corp. All rights reserved (map); Art 
Explosion; GAO. 

[End of figure] 

The GPS space segment consists of a constellation of satellites that 
move in six orbital planes approximately 20,200 kilometers above the 
earth. GPS satellites broadcast encrypted military signals and civil 
signals. In recent years, because numerous satellites have exceeded 
their design life, the constellation has grown to 31 active satellites 
of various generations. However, DOD predicts that over the next 
several years many of the older satellites in the constellation will 
reach the end of their operational life faster than they will be 
replenished, thus decreasing the size of the constellation from its 
current level and potentially reducing the accuracy of the GPS service. 

The GPS ground control segment is comprised of a Master Control Station 
at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; an Alternate Master Control 
Station at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; 6 Air Force and 11 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency monitoring stations; and four 
ground antennas with uplink capabilities. Information from the 
monitoring stations is processed at the Master Control Station to 
determine satellite clock and orbit status. The Master Control Station 
operates the satellites and regularly updates the navigation messages 
on the satellites. Information from the Master Control Station is 
transmitted to the satellites via the ground antennas. 

The GPS user equipment segment includes military and commercial GPS 
receivers. These receivers determine a user's position by calculating 
the distance from four or more satellites using the navigation message 
on the satellites to triangulate its location. Military GPS receivers 
are designed to utilize the encrypted military GPS signals that are 
only available to authorized users, including military and allied 
forces and some authorized civil agencies. Commercial receivers use the 
civil GPS signal, which is publicly available worldwide. 

GPS Modernization: 

In 2000, DOD began an effort to modernize the space, ground control, 
and user equipment segments of GPS to enhance the system's performance, 
accuracy, and integrity. Table 1 shows the modernization efforts for 
the space and ground control segment. 

Table 1: GPS Satellite and Ground Control Segment Modernization: 

Satellite evolution and capabilities: 

Legacy: (1989 - 2002): 

GPS IIA/IIR: 
* Broadcasts signals for military and civil users. 

Current: (2005 - 2012): 

GPS IIR-M: 
Includes IIA and IIR capabilities, plus: 
* 2nd civil signal; 
* 2nd military signal; 
* Ability to increase signal power to improve resistance to jamming. 

GPS IIF: 
Includes IIR-M capabilities, plus: 
* 3rd civil signal for transportation safety requirements. 

Future: (2014 - 2023): 

GPS III: 

Includes IIF capabilities, plus: 
* IIIA: stronger military signal to improve jamming resistance and 4th 
civil signal that is interoperable with foreign signals; 
* IIIB: near real-time command and control via cross links; 
* IIIC: improved antijam performance for military users. 

Ground control segment and capabilities: 

Legacy: (Various versions from 1979-2007): 

Legacy Operational Control System (OCS): 
* Centralized computer mainframe; 
* 1970s technology. 

Current: (Came online in 2007): 

Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP): 
* Distributed architecture; 
* Enables upgrades to the system; 
* Next upgrade will control GPS IIF. 

Future: (Planned to come online with initial capabilities in 2011): 

Next Generation Operational Control Segment (OCX): 
* Necessary for full operation of GPS IIR-M, IIF, and III satellites; 
* Service-oriented architecture; 
* Connects to the broader network. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD program information and discussions 
with DOD officials. 

[End of table] 

Full use of the military and civil GPS signals requires a ground 
control system that can manage these signals. Newer software will 
upgrade the ground control to a service oriented--or "plug and play"-- 
architecture that can connect to broader networks. In order to utilize 
the modernized military signal from the ground, military users require 
new user equipment with this capability, which will be provided by the 
military GPS user equipment program. 

Broader Management Structure: 

The 2004 U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 
policy established a management structure to bring civil and military 
departments and agencies together to form an interagency, multiuse 
approach to program planning, resource allocation, system development, 
and operations. The policy also encourages cooperation with foreign 
governments to promote the use of civil aspects of GPS and its 
augmentation services and standards with foreign governments and other 
international organizations. As part of the management structure, an 
executive committee advises and coordinates among U.S. government 
departments and agencies on maintaining and improving U.S. space-based 
PNT infrastructures, including GPS and related systems. The executive 
committee is co-chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Transportation, and includes members at 
the equivalent level from the Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland 
Security, Interior, Agriculture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Figure 2 
describes the National Space-Based PNT organization structure. 

Figure 2: National Space-Based PNT Organization Structure: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart] 

Top level: 
White House. 

Second level, reporting to the White House: 
National Executive Committee for Space-Based PNT, Executive Steering 
Group; Co-chairs: Defense and Transportation. 
Steering Group Members: 
Defense; 
Transportation; 
State; 
Interior; 
Agriculture; 
Commerce; 
Homeland Security; 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
NASA. 
Advisory Board; Sponsor: NASA. 

Third level, reporting to the National Executive Committee for Space-
Based PNT: 
National Coordination Office; Host: Commerce. 

Fourth level, reporting to National Coordination Office: 
GPS International Working Group; Chair: State; 
Engineering Forum; Co-chairs: Defense and Transportation; 
Ad Hoc Working Groups. 

Source: GAO presentation of National Executive Committee for Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Data. 

[End of figure] 

The departments and agencies have various assigned roles and 
responsibilities. For example, DOD is responsible for the overall 
development, acquisition, operation, security, and continued 
modernization of GPS. It has delegated acquisition responsibility to 
the Air Force, though other DOD components and military services are 
responsible for oversight, some aspects of user equipment development, 
and for funding some parts of the program. The Department of 
Transportation has the lead responsibility for the coordination of 
civil requirements from all civil department and agencies. The 
Department of State leads negotiations with foreign governments and 
international organizations on GPS positioning, navigation, and timing 
matters or regarding the planning, operations, management, and/or use 
of GPS. (See appendix III). 

Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites: 

The Air Force's GPS IIF acquisition initially was not well executed, 
and currently poses technical problems. The Air Force is implementing 
lessons learned from the GPS IIF effort as it starts the GPS IIIA 
program. However, based on our analysis, the GPS IIIA program faces a 
compressed schedule along with new challenges to deliver the satellites 
on time. A slip in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could increase 
the likelihood that the GPS constellation will fall below the number of 
satellites required to provide the level of GPS service the U.S. 
government has committed to provide. This would not only have 
implications for military users but also for the larger community of 
GPS users, who may be less aware and equipped to deal with gaps in 
coverage. However, the Air Force is evaluating different approaches 
that could potentially reduce the risk of degrading the GPS service. 

The IIF Program Was Not Well Executed, and Still Poses Technical 
Problems: 

The GPS IIF contract was awarded during an era of acquisition reform 
that centered on an approach called Total System Performance 
Responsibility (TSPR).[Footnote 3] TSPR gave a contractor total 
responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon system and for 
meeting DOD's requirements. This approach was intended to facilitate 
acquisition reform and enable DOD to streamline a cumbersome 
acquisition process and leverage innovation and management expertise 
from the private sector. However, DOD later found that TSPR magnified 
problems on a number of satellite acquisition programs because it was 
implemented in a manner that enabled requirements creep and poor 
contractor performance. For GPS IIF, the TSPR approach resulted in 
relaxed specifications and inspections of the contractor, loss of 
quality in the manufacturing process, and poor-quality parts that 
caused test failures, unexpected redesigns, and the late delivery of 
parts. The contractor did not provide data on design drawings and 
statistical process control techniques were not used to monitor 
production. 

According to GPS program officials, the GPS IIF program was also 
negatively impacted by multiple contractor mergers, acquisitions, and 
moves. In 1996, shortly after Rockwell won the IIF contract, the 
company's aerospace and defense units, including the Seal Beach, 
California, facility where the IIF satellites were to be manufactured, 
were acquired by Boeing. In December 1997, Boeing merged with McDonnell 
Douglas and took over its Delta launch vehicle unit in Huntington 
Beach, California, and subsequently GPS work was moved to that 
facility. In October 2000, Boeing acquired Hughes Electronics 
Corporation's space and communications business and related operations. 
Boeing took over the Hughes facility in El Segundo, California, and 
once again, GPS work was moved to another facility. As these events 
occurred, the prime contractor consolidated development facilities to 
remain competitive. In addition, the prime contractor lost valuable 
workers and knowledge, causing inefficiencies in the program. 

Shortly after the IIF contract was awarded in 1996, the Air Force also 
added requirements. For example, the government decided to accelerate 
the fielding of new civil and military GPS signals. Flexible power 
capabilities were added to IIF several years later. These new 
requirements drove design changes and resulted in technical issues and 
cost overruns that impacted the schedule. 

According to a GPS IIF program official, the combination of significant 
requirements additions, loss of engineering expertise, parts 
obsolescence, and fundamental design changes together caused the 
contractor to "lose the recipe" for the IIF space vehicle. In essence, 
by the completion of the design phase, the IIF space vehicle was to be 
built in a third location, by different people, in a way that was not 
initially anticipated. In addition, the program suffered from a lack of 
management continuity. Since the program's inception, the IIF program 
has had seven different program managers, the first five of whom only 
served 1 year each. 

According to a former deputy program director of the GPS program 
office, past GPS programs seemed to operate well for a number of 
reasons. The programs (1) never added major modifications to ongoing 
programs and (2) had no qualms in terminating contractors if work did 
not meet standards, business practices, or major milestones. 
Furthermore, the GPS program performed more on-site contract management 
to increase communications. This approach eliminated surprises like 
cost and schedule overruns and held the contractor to a high level of 
performance. Lastly, the former director noted that it was important to 
balance the responsibility assigned to the program managers with the 
authority they needed to properly implement the program. Prior GAO 
reviews have identified all of these practices as essential to program 
execution.[Footnote 4] 

Air Force Improves Oversight of IIF, but Technical Issues Lead to More 
Delays: 

The Air Force has since taken action to improve the IIF program. In 
2006, the program office[Footnote 5] increased its personnel at the 
contractor's facility to observe operations and to verify that 
corrective measures were being taken to address deficiencies in the 
contractor's cost and schedule reporting system (also known as earned 
value management[Footnote 6]). The Air Force increased the number of 
personnel to work on the contractor site, which included military and 
civilian personnel, as well as Defense Contract Management Agency 
[Footnote 7] personnel and system engineering contractors. Greater 
presence at the contractor's factory has enabled the government to find 
out about problems as they happen and work with the contractor to come 
up with solutions and resolve issues quicker, according to GPS program 
officials. 

Nonetheless, the program has experienced more technical problems. For 
example, last year, during the first phase of thermal vacuum testing (a 
critical test to determine space-worthiness that subjects the satellite 
to space-like operating conditions), one transmitter used to send the 
navigation message to the users failed. The program suspended testing 
in August 2008 to allow time for the contractor to identify the causes 
of the problem and take corrective actions. The program also had 
difficulty maintaining the proper propellant fuel-line temperature; 
this, in addition to power failures on the satellite, delayed final 
integration testing. In addition, the satellite's reaction wheels, used 
for pointing accuracy, were redesigned because on-orbit failures on 
similar reaction wheels were occurring on other satellite programs-- 
this added about $10 million to the program's cost. 

As a result of these problems, the IIF program experienced cost 
increases and schedule delays. The launch of the first IIF satellite 
has been delayed until November 2009--almost 3 years late. According to 
the program office, the cost to complete GPS IIF will be about $1.6 
billion--about $870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 
million. 

In addition, in 2006 we testified[Footnote 8] that diffuse leadership 
over military space acquisitions was another factor contributing to 
late delivery of capability and cost growth. We noted that the diverse 
array of officials and organizations involved with a space program has 
made it difficult to pare back and control requirements. GPS was one 
example we cited. According to the Air Force, in 1998 the government 
decided to accelerate the fielding of new civil and military GPS 
signals and added requirements for these signals to the IIR and IIF GPS 
satellites. These new requirements drove design changes and resulted in 
technical issues, cost overruns, and program delays. 

Problems Experienced in GPS IIF Seen in Other Space System 
Acquisitions: 

The problems experienced on the IIF program are not unlike those 
experienced in other DOD space system acquisitions. We have previously 
reported that the majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space 
portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades that 
have driven up costs, caused delays in schedules, and increased 
technical risk.[Footnote 9] DOD has restructured several programs in 
the face of delays and cost growth. At times, cost growth has come 
close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing DOD to nearly double its 
investment without realizing a better return on investment. Along with 
the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule 
delays--as much as 7 years--postponing delivery of promised 
capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in 
some cases that DOD has gone back to the drawing board to consider new 
ways to achieve the same, or less, capability. 

Our work has identified a variety of reasons for the cost growth, many 
of which surfaced in GPS IIF. Generally, we have found that DOD starts 
its space programs too early, that is before it has assurance that the 
capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within resources and time 
constraints. We have also tied acquisition problems in space to 
inadequate contracting strategies; contract and program management 
weaknesses; the loss of technical expertise; capability gaps in the 
industrial base; tensions between labs that develop technologies for 
the future and current acquisition programs; divergent needs in users 
of space systems; and other issues that have been well documented. 

We also noted that short tenures for top leadership and program 
managers within the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense have lessened the sense of accountability for acquisition 
problems and further encouraged a view of short-term success.[Footnote 
10] Several other studies have raised similar issues. In 2003, a study 
[Footnote 11] conducted for the Defense Science Board, for example, 
found that government capabilities to lead and manage the space 
acquisition process have seriously eroded, particularly within program 
management ranks. A 2005 Defense Science Board study[Footnote 12] 
focused specifically on the future of GPS found that the program was 
hampered by sometimes overlapping, sometimes disconnected roles of 
Office of the Secretary of Defense staff components, the Joint Staff, 
and the Air Force. More recently, a commission[Footnote 13] formed 
pursuant to the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007[Footnote 14], concluded in 2008 that there is 
currently no single authority responsible for national security space-
-which includes GPS--below the President and that within DOD 
authorities are spread among a variety of organizations, including the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force, the other military 
services, the Missile Defense Agency, and the National Reconnaissance 
Office with no effective mechanism to arrive at a unified budget and 
set priorities. A study[Footnote 15] chartered by the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence also recently found leadership for space 
acquisitions to be too diffused at higher levels and that there are 
critical shortages in skilled program managers. While recent studies 
have made recommendations for strengthening leadership for space 
acquisitions, no major changes to the leadership structure have been 
made in recent years. In fact, an "executive agent" position within the 
Air Force which was designated in 2001 to provide leadership has not 
been filled since the last executive resigned in 2005. 

GPS IIF acquisition problems have not been as extreme as those 
experienced on other efforts such as the Space Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS) and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite System (NPOESS). At the same time, however, the program was 
not as technically complex or ambitious as these efforts. 

DOD Is Implementing Lessons Learned from the GPS IIF Program as It 
Starts the GPS IIIA Program, but Schedule Is Optimistic: 

The Air Force is taking measures to prevent the problems experienced on 
the GPS IIF program from recurring on the GPS IIIA program. However, 
the Air Force will still be challenged to deliver IIIA on time because 
the satellite development schedule is compressed. The Air Force is 
taking the following measures: 

* using incremental or block development, where the program would 
follow an evolutionary path toward meeting needs rather than attempting 
to satisfy all needs in a single step; 

* using military standards for satellite quality; 

* conducting multiple design reviews, with the contractor being held to 
military standards and deliverables during each review; 

* exercising more government oversight and interaction with the 
contractor and spending more time at the contractor's site; and: 

* using an improved risk management process, where the government is an 
integral part of the process. 

In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics specified additional guidance for the GPS 
IIIA program. This includes: 

* reevaluating the contractor incentive/award fee approach; 

* providing a commitment from the Air Force to fully fund GPS IIIA in 
Program Objectives Memorandum[Footnote 16] 2010; 

* funding and executing recommended mitigation measures to address the 
next generation operational control segment and the GPS IIIA 
satellites; 

* combining the existing and new ground control segment levels of 
effort into a single level of effort, giving the Air Force greater 
flexibility to manage these efforts; 

* not allowing the program manager to adjust the GPS IIIA program scope 
to meet increased or accelerated technical specifications, system 
requirements, or system performance; and: 

* conducting an independent technology readiness assessment of the 
contractor design once the preliminary design review is complete. 

Table 2 below highlights the major differences in the framework between 
the GPS IIF and GPS III programs. 

Table 2: Key Differences in Program Framework for GPS IIF and GPS III: 

Requirements: 
GPS IIF: Addition of requirements after contract award; 
GPS III: Not allowing an adjustment to the program to meet increased or 
accelerated requirements. 

Development: 
GPS IIF: Immature technologies; 
GPS III: Incremental development, while ensuring technologies are 
mature. 

Oversight: 
GPS IIF: Limited oversight of contractor, relaxed specifications and 
inspections, and limited design reviews; 
GPS III: More contractor oversight with government presence at 
contractor facility; use of military standards; and multiple levels of 
preliminary design reviews, with the contractor being held to military 
standards and deliverables during each review. 

Source: GAO analysis based on discussion with the GPS program office 
and program documentation. 

[End of table] 

The Air Force's Schedule for GPS IIIA May Be Optimistic: 

While these measures should put the GPS IIIA program on sounder 
footing, the program is facing serious obstacles--primarily in terms of 
its ability to deliver satellites on schedule. At present, the GPS IIIA 
program is on schedule and program officials contend that there is no 
reason to assume that a delay is likely to occur. They point out that 
the Air Force is implementing an incremental development approach and 
GPS IIIA, the first increment of GPS III, is not expected to be as 
technically challenging as other space programs. In addition, program 
officials point out that the Air Force began risk reduction activities 
in 1998, and has made a concerted effort to exert more oversight over 
its contractors and ensure key decisions are backed by sufficient 
knowledge about technologies, design, and production. 

We recognize that these steps offer the best course for GPS to be 
completed on time. However, we believe there is still considerable risk 
that the schedule may not be met for the following reasons. 

* First, the GPS IIIA program got off to a late start. The program was 
originally scheduled to begin development in August 2007. However, 
according to GPS program officials, the Air Force shifted funds from 
GPS III to other commitments in its space portfolio and to address 
problems in other programs. The Defense Space Acquisition Board 
approved formal initiation of the GPS IIIA acquisition in May 2008. 

* Second, when compared to other DOD satellite programs, the GPS IIIA 
program schedule appears highly compressed. The Air Force is planning 
to launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014 to sustain the GPS 
constellation. To launch in 2014, the Air Force has scheduled 72 months 
from contract award to first satellite launch. This schedule is 3 years 
shorter than the schedule the Air Force has so far achieved under its 
IIF program. In fact, the time period between contract award and first 
launch for GPS IIIA is shorter than most other major space programs we 
have reviewed (see figure 3). Moreover, GPS IIIA is not simply a matter 
of replicating the IIF program. Though the contractor has had previous 
experience with GPS, it is likely that the knowledge base will need to 
be revitalized. The contractor is also being asked to develop a larger 
satellite bus to accommodate future GPS increments IIIB and IIIC. In 
addition, the contractor is being asked to increase the power of a new 
military signal by a factor of 10. In our opinion, there is little room 
in the schedule to accommodate difficulties the contractor may have in 
meeting either challenge. In addition, the GPS III program office still 
has not been able to fill critical contracting and engineering 
positions needed to assist in satellites design and contractor 
oversight--both of which functions are to receive more emphasis on this 
program than in the past. Consequently, the concerns that GPS IIIA 
could experience a delay are not unreasonable. However, according to 
DOD officials, the incremental approach to GPS acquisition should 
significantly lower the risk of schedule delays. Nonetheless, no major 
satellite program undertaken in the past decade has met its scheduled 
goals. 

Figure 3: Schedule Development from Start to Launch for Space Programs 
(in Months): 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Program: DSCS III; 
Start to launch: 52 months. 

Program: UHF Follow-On; 
Start to launch: 58 months. 

Program: MUOS (e); 
Start to launch: 62 months. 

Program: DMSP Block 5D-3; 
Start to launch: 65 months. 

Program: GPS III (e); 
Start to launch: 72 months. 

Program: STSS (e); 
Start to launch: 78 months. 

Program: Milstar II; 
Start to launch: 78 months. 

Program: WGS (e); 
Start to launch: 83 months. 

Program: AEHF(e)
Start to launch: 86 months. 

Program: TSAT (e); 
Start to launch: 89 months. 

Program: Navstar GPS IIF (e); 
Start to launch: 106 months. 

Program: NPOESS (e);
Start to launch: 125 months. 

Program: Milstar I; 
Start to launch: 128 months. 

Program: SBIRS High (e) 
Start to launch: 158 months. 

Source: GAO analysis based on program documentation. 

Note: 
DSCS - Defense Satellite Communications System. 
UHF - Ultra High Frequency. 
MUOS - Mobile User Objective System. 
DMSP - Defense Meteorological Satellites Program. 
GPS - Global Positioning System. 
STSS - Space Tracking and Surveillance System. 
WGS - Wideband Global Satellite Communications. 
AEHF - Advanced Extremely High Frequency. 
TSAT - Transformational Satellite Communications System. 
NPOESS - National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System. 
SBIRS - Space Based Infrared System. 

All programs with (e) denotation used current estimated dates for 
launch. 

[End of figure] 

* Third, we compared the Air Force's GPS IIIA schedule to best 
practices associated with effective schedule estimating. Past GAO work 
has identified nine practices associated with effective schedule 
estimating. We analyzed the Air Force's GPS IIIA schedule according to 
these practices and found that one was met, one was not met, and the 
other seven practices were only partially met. The practices deal with 
how well the schedule identifies key development activities, the times 
to complete these activities, as well as the amount of float time 
associated with each of these activities--float time is the amount of 
time a task can slip before affecting the critical path. Further, the 
practices assess how well activities have been integrated with other 
tasks and whether reserve times have been allocated to high-risk 
activities. The primary purpose of all scheduling activities is to 
establish a credible critical path. The best practices have been 
designed to support that goal. Because the GPS IIIA schedule does not 
follow all of the best practices, the reliability of the critical path 
identified in the schedule is diminished. 

A Delay in GPS III Could Severely Impact GPS Users: 

Delays in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites will increase the risk 
that the GPS constellation will decrease in size to a level where it 
will not meet some users' needs. If the GPS constellation falls below 
the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service 
that the U.S. government has committed to providing, some military and 
civilian operations could be affected. DOD is evaluating different 
approaches that could potentially mitigate the gap. However, 
procurement of additional GPS IIF satellites does not appear to be 
feasible. 

A Delay in GPS III Could Affect GPS Constellation Performance: 

The performance standards for both (1) the standard positioning service 
provided to civil and commercial GPS users and (2) the precise 
positioning service provided to military GPS users commit the U.S. 
government to at least a 95 percent probability of maintaining a 
constellation of 24 operational GPS satellites. Because there are 
currently 31 operational GPS satellites of various blocks, the near- 
term probability of maintaining a constellation of at least 24 
operational satellites remains well above 95 percent. However, DOD 
predicts that over the next several years many of the older satellites 
in the constellation will reach the end of their operational life 
faster than they will be replenished, and that the constellation will, 
in all likelihood, decrease in size. Based on the most recent satellite 
reliability and launch schedule data approved in March 2009, the 
estimated long-term probability of maintaining a constellation of at 
least 24 operational satellites falls below 95 percent during fiscal 
year 2010 and remains below 95 percent until the end of fiscal year 
2014, at times falling to about 80 percent. See figure 4 for details. 

Figure 4: Probability of Maintaining a Constellation of at Least 24 GPS 
Satellites Based on Reliability Data and Launch Schedule as of March 
2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2008: 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 100%. 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2009; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2010; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 98%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2011; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 92%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2012; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2013; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2014; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 86%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2015; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 77%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2016; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2017; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 86%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2018; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 91%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2019; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 89%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2020; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 97%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2021; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2022; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Fiscal year, beginning October 2023; 
Actual probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Committed probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 95%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

The probability curve in figure 4 was generated using unique 
reliability curves for each operational satellite in the current on- 
orbit GPS constellation, and block-specific reliability curves for each 
production (unlaunched) GPS satellite, including IIR-M, IIF, IIIA, 
IIIB, and IIIC satellites. (See appendix I for a more complete 
description of the approach used to generate this probability curve.) 
Because the reliability curves associated with new blocks of GPS 
satellites are based solely on engineering and design analysis instead 
of actual on-orbit performance, this estimated long-term probability of 
maintaining a 24-satellite constellation could change once actual on-
orbit performance data become available. For example, while the block 
IIA satellites were designed to last only 7.5 years on average, they 
have actually lasted about twice as long. If GPS IIF satellites were to 
last twice as long as their currently estimated mean life expectancy of 
11.5 years, the probability of maintaining a larger constellation would 
increase, but the long-term probability of maintaining the 24-satellite 
constellation would not improve significantly. Moreover, program 
officials provided no evidence to suggest that the current mean life 
expectancy for IIF satellites is overly conservative. 

A delay in the production and launch of GPS III satellites could 
severely impact the U.S. government's ability to meet its commitment to 
maintain a 24-satellite GPS constellation. The severity of the impact 
would depend upon the length of the delay. For example, a 2-year delay 
in the production and launch of the first and all subsequent GPS III 
satellites would reduce the probability of maintaining a 24-satellite 
constellation to about 10 percent by around fiscal year 2018. This 
significant gap in service would persist for about 2 years before the 
constellation began to recover. Moreover, this recovery--that is, the 
return to a high probability of maintaining a 24-satellite 
constellation--would take an additional 2 to 3 years. Consequently, a 2-
year delay in the production and launch of GPS III satellites would 
most likely result in a period of roughly 5 years when the U.S. 
government would be operating a GPS constellation of fewer than 24 
satellites, and a 12-year period during which the government would not 
meet its commitment to maintaining a constellation of 24 operational 
GPS satellites with a probability of 95 percent or better. For example, 
the delay in GPS III would reduce the probability of maintaining a 21- 
satellite constellation to between 50 and 80 percent for the period 
from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2020. Moreover, while the 
probability of maintaining an 18-satellite constellation would remain 
relatively high, it would still fall below 95 percent for about a year 
over this period. See figure 5 for details. 

Figure 5: Probability of Maintaining a Constellation of at Least 18, 
21, and 24 GPS Satellites Based on Reliability Data as of March 2009 
and a 2-Year GPS III Launch Delay: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Fiscal year: October 2008; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 100%. 

Fiscal year: October 2009; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 99%. 

Fiscal year: October 2010; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 98%. 

Fiscal year: October 2011; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 93%. 

Fiscal year: October 2012; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 86%. 

Fiscal year: October 2013; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 87%. 

Fiscal year: October 2014; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 97%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 74%. 

Fiscal year: October 2015; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 92%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 83%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 31%. 

Fiscal year: October 2016; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 83%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 40%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 1%. 

Fiscal year: October 2017; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 89%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 41%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 3%. 

Fiscal year: October 2018; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 86%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 56%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 7%. 

Fiscal year: October 2019; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 37%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 5%. 

Fiscal year: October 2020; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 81%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 24%. 

Fiscal year: October 2021; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 92%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 50%. 

Fiscal year: October 2022; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 97%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 76%. 

Fiscal year: October 2023; 
Probability of maintaining 18-satellite constellation: 100%; 
Probability of maintaining 21-satellite constellation: 99%; 
Probability of maintaining 24-satellite constellation: 89%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Both Military and Civilian GPS Users Would Be Affected by a Delay in 
GPS III: 

The impacts to both military and civil users of a smaller constellation 
are difficult to precisely predict. For example, a nominal 24-satellite 
constellation with 21 of its satellites broadcasting a healthy standard 
positioning service signal would continue to satisfy the availability 
standard for good user-to-constellation geometry articulated in the 
standard positioning service performance standard.[Footnote 17] 
However, because the GPS constellation has been operating above the 
committed performance standard for so long, military and civil users 
have come to expect a higher level of service, even though this service 
is not committed to them. Consequently, some users may sense an 
operational impact even if the constellation were to perform at or near 
its committed standards. In general, users with more demanding 
requirements for precise location solutions will likely be more 
impacted than other users.[Footnote 18] During our interviews with 
military, civil, and commercial representatives, several examples of 
possible impacts of a smaller GPS constellation were discussed. 

* The accuracy of precision-guided munitions that rely upon GPS to 
strike their targets could decrease. To accomplish their mission, 
military forces would either need to use larger munitions or use more 
munitions on the same target to achieve the same level of mission 
success. The risks of collateral damage could also increase. 

* Intercontinental commercial flights use predicted satellite geometry 
over their planned navigation route, and may have to delay, cancel or 
reroute flights. 

* Enhanced-911 services, which rely upon GPS to precisely locate 
callers, could lose accuracy, particularly when operating in "urban 
canyons" or mountainous terrain. 

Another important consideration is that both the standard positioning 
service and precise positioning service performance standards assume 
that users have unobstructed visibility to nearly the entire sky, 
[Footnote 19] an assumption that does not hold for the large number of 
users operating in moderately mountainous terrain, in the "urban 
canyons" of large cities, or under forest foliage. 

Different Approaches Are Being Evaluated that Could Potentially 
Mitigate the Gap: 

The Air Force is aware that there is some risk that the number of 
satellites in the GPS constellation could fall below its required 24 
satellites, and that this risk would grow significantly if the 
development and launch of GPS IIIA satellites were delayed. 
Consequently, an Air Force Space Command representative informed us 
that the command has established an independent review team to examine 
the risks and consequences of a smaller constellation on military and 
civil users. However, at this time, Air Force representatives believe 
that the best approach to mitigating the risk is to take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the current schedule for GPS IIF and III is 
maintained. Those steps include a commitment from the Air Force to 
fully fund GPS IIIA in the fiscal year 2010 Program Objectives 
Memorandum, and use of an incremental development approach toward 
meeting needs. This incremental approach would place a premium on 
controlling schedule risk by, among other things, deferring 
consideration of civil requirements for subsystems like the Distress 
Alerting Satellite System (DASS) and the Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) 
payloads to GPS IIIB or GPS IIIC satellite blocks. 

Options for developing lower-cost alternatives to current GPS 
satellites appear to be very limited. For example, in 2007 the Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board examined whether small satellites-- 
which can be developed more quickly and at relatively low cost--might 
help meet some PNT mission requirements. The board concluded that small 
satellites may eventually have operational utility in augmenting GPS 
III capabilities, with emphasis on enhancing the utility of the GPS M- 
code signal's capabilities against jamming. However, the need for an 
extensive control segment infrastructure to monitor and control these 
small satellite augmentations, combined with the need to develop, 
produce, and install user equipment, would make it very challenging to 
field a near-term small satellite augmentation for PNT. With respect to 
providing basic PNT services, the board noted that studies of PNT 
satellite constellations, performed at different times and by different 
organizations in the United States and elsewhere, demonstrate that a 
robust constellation of relatively powerful satellites operating at 
medium earth orbit is the best way to provide continuous worldwide PNT 
services; this is a performance set that small satellites currently 
cannot provide. 

According to Air Force representatives, the procurement of additional 
IIF satellites is not feasible, and initiating development of an 
alternative full-scale, satellite-based PNT system appears to be 
impractical. Such a system would likely be very expensive and would 
compete with GPS III development for funding, making it harder for the 
Air Force to meet its commitment to fully fund GPS IIIA development. 
Moreover, the GPS III system development contract was awarded in 
accordance with an approved GPS III acquisition strategy, which 
selected one alternative from two competing contractors' designs; an 
alternative system development would be, in effect, a significant 
deviation from that approved strategy. Finally, it seems unlikely that 
the award of a separate system development contract with another 
contractor would have any real impact on reducing the risk of 
delivering GPS IIIA requirements on the current schedule. 

In the event that this strategy proves unsuccessful and the schedule 
for GPS III slips, additional measures could be considered. For 
example, excluding random failures, the operational life of a GPS 
satellite tends to be limited by the amount of power that its solar 
arrays can produce. This power level declines over time as the solar 
arrays degrade in the space environment until eventually they cannot 
produce enough power to maintain all of the satellite's subsystems. 
However, according to Air Force representatives, the effects of this 
power loss can be mitigated somewhat by actively managing satellite 
subsystems--shutting them down when not needed--thereby reducing the 
satellite's overall consumption of power. It would also be possible to 
significantly reduce the satellite's consumption of power by shutting 
off a secondary GPS payload. This would buy additional time for the 
navigation mission of the satellite at the expense of the mission 
supported by the secondary payload. The 2004 U.S. Space-Based 
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) policy affirmed PNT as the 
primary mission for the GPS constellation, and stated that no secondary 
payload may adversely affect the performance, schedule, or cost of GPS, 
its signals, or services. Nevertheless, at this time the Air Force has 
no intention of shutting off the secondary GPS payload. Moreover, until 
there is a more immediate risk that the constellation will fall below 
its required size, there is no reason to take this step. 

Military and civil users might also take steps in response to a smaller 
GPS constellation. While a smaller GPS constellation could result in a 
significant reduction in positioning and navigation accuracy at certain 
times and locations, these times and locations are usually predictable 
in near-real time. Consequently for military users, who must rely upon 
GPS's precise positioning service, a smaller constellation could 
require changes in its approach to mission planning to ensure that 
operations are conducted at times when GPS accuracy is relatively high, 
or changes in tactics employed during a mission. For example, military 
users could utilize a larger number of (or more powerful) munitions to 
achieve an equivalent level of mission effectiveness. 

For civil and commercial users, one possible impact of a smaller GPS 
constellation could be an increased use of other positioning, 
navigation, and timing services, including those expected to be offered 
through Europe's Galileo system by the middle of the next decade. U.S. 
government officials at the various civil agencies and departments 
clearly understand what the government has committed to through GPS and 
they all have designed programs to function with this limit, with 
augmentations. 

New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed 
Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities: 

To maximize the benefit of GPS, the deployment of its space, ground 
control, and user equipment capabilities must be synchronized so that 
the full spectrum of military assets--weapons, aircraft, and ships, for 
example--and individual users can take advantage of new capabilities 
such as added protection from jamming. However, because of funding 
shifts and diffuse leadership, the Air Force has not been successful in 
synchronizing space, ground control, and user equipment segments. As a 
result of the poor synchronization, new GPS capabilities may be 
delivered in space for years before military users can take advantage 
of these capabilities. 

Air Force Has Deferred the Delivery of Ground Control Capabilities: 

The Air Force used funding set aside for the ground control segment to 
resolve GPS IIF development problems, causing a delay in the delivery 
of new ground control capabilities. The GPS ground control segment has 
evolved over time from the Operational Control Segment (OCS) to the 
current Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP). GPS IIIA satellites are to 
be controlled by a future ground control system called Next Generation 
Control Segment, or OCX. OCS was supposed to control and exploit GPS 
IIF space capabilities. However, because of the addition of new 
requirements and technical issues on the IIF program, funding was 
diverted from OCS to GPS IIF satellite development efforts. As a 
result, the delivery of new ground control capabilities will occur 
later than originally planned. 

Table 3 below illustrates satellite functions and capabilities that 
have yet to be made operational through the ground control segment. For 
example, in 2005 the Air Force began launching its GPS IIR-M satellites 
that broadcast a second civil signal (the L2C). Unfortunately, the 
ground control segment will not be able to make the second civil signal 
operational until late 2012 or 2013. 

Table 3: Delays in Delivery of GPS Operational Functionality: 

GPS IIR-M satellites (first launch in 2005 & currently being launched): 

Function or capability enabled: Command & telemetry for IIA & IIR and 
satellites, and use of additional signals; 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 5.0; September 
2005; 
Current or future ground control program/version: OCS Version 5.2.1; 
September 2007; 
Amount of delay (in months): 24. 

Function or capability enabled: Command & telemetry for IIRM & IIF 
satellites; 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 5.0; September 
2005; 
Current or future ground control program/version: AEP Version 5.2.2; 
March 2008; 
Amount of delay (in months): 30. 

Function or capability enabled: Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 
Module; 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 5.0; September 
2005; 
Current or future ground control program/version: AEP Version 5.5; 
September 2009; 
Amount of delay (in months): 48. 

Function or capability enabled: Second civil signal (L2C); 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 6; September 2007; 
Current or future ground control program/version: OCX Block I or II; 
September 2012/September 2013; 
Amount of delay (in months): 60-72. 

Function or capability enabled: Military code (M-code); 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 6; September 2007; 
Current or future ground control program/version: OCX Block I or II; 
September 2012/September 2013; 
Amount of delay (in months): 60-72. 

GPS IIF satellites (first launch planned for November 2009): 

Function or capability enabled: Third civil signal (L5); 
Original ground control program/version: OCS Version 6; September 2007; 
Current or future ground control program/version: OCX Block I or II; 
September 2012/September 2013; 
Amount of delay (in months): 60-72. 

Source: GPS program office. 

[End of table] 

By delaying the delivery of ground control capabilities, the Air Force 
has created an imbalance between the capabilities offered by GPS 
satellites and the ability to exploit and make operational these 
capabilities through the ground control segment. 

Synchronization Problems Will also Delay Fielding of Improved GPS 
Capabilities to Military Users: 

GPS satellites that will broadcast the modernized military signal 
require military user equipment capable of receiving and processing the 
signal so that military users can take advantage of the improved 
military capabilities. Before the modernized military signal can be 
considered initially operational, it must be broadcast from at least 18 
satellites, which is expected to occur in 2013. For full operational 
capability, it must be broadcast from 24 satellites, which is expected 
to occur in 2015. Consequently, the new military signal will be made 
operational by the GPS satellites and ground control system in about 
2013, but the warfighter will not be able to take full advantage of 
this new signal until about 2025--when the modernized user equipment is 
completely fielded. See figure 6 for our analysis of the gap between 
when the modernized military signal will be available on the GPS 
satellites and when the military services will be able to take 
advantage of it. 

Figure 6: Gap in the Ability of the Military to Use the Modernized 
Signal: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Timeline from 2010 to 2030. 

2013: Military signal capability from ground segment/18th military 
signal satellite launched; 

2015: 24th military signal satellite launched; 

2025: Army, Navy, and Marine Corps fully equipped with modernized GPS 
user equipment. 

12 years between military signal initial operational capability and 
fully equipped military services. 

10 years between military signal full operational capability and fully 
equipped military services. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and discussions with DOD 
officials. 

[End of figure] 

Funding and Technical Issues Have Delayed User Equipment Development, 
but the Air Force Is Seeking to Accelerate Development: 

The Air Force will spend the next several years developing prototype 
cards and production-ready receiver hardware for selected platforms 
within the space, air, ground, and maritime environments. Even after 
this is done, the services will still need to add the new user 
equipment to other platforms, which could take 10 or more years. This 
is due to the fact that the integration and installation of the new 
user equipment on the remaining platforms has to be coordinated with 
existing upgrade schedules for those platforms. As a result, the 
services' ability to achieve a joint military navigation warfare 
capability, an essential element in conducting future military 
operations, may not be realized until 2025 based on user equipment 
delivery schedules. 

Funding issues are a contributing factor in the delay in fielding new 
user equipment. According to Air Force officials, the GPS program 
office focused on developing the satellites, particularly when 
technical problems arose. Funding was diverted from the user equipment 
program to the GPS satellite program to fix problems, which resulted in 
delays in the development and acquisition of the user equipment. 

Diffused leadership has been particularly problematic in terms of DOD's 
ability to synchronize delivery of space, ground control, and user 
equipment assets. The responsibility for developing and acquiring GPS 
satellite and associated ground control segments and for acquiring and 
producing user equipment for selected platforms for space, air, ground, 
and maritime environments falls under the Air Force's Space and Missile 
Systems Center. On the other hand, responsibility for acquiring and 
producing user equipment for all other platforms falls on the military 
services. Figure 7 illustrates how the responsibilities for developing, 
acquiring, and producing GPS user equipment are divided among the 
services. 

Figure 7: Responsibilities Among the Military Services for Procurement 
of GPS User Equipment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: text box] 

Satellites and ground control: Single program executive officer; 
Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (reports to Air Force Space 
Command). 

User equipment: No single program executive officer; 

Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center develops common user 
equipment form factors, which can be used by all Services, to 
production ready status. This provides an industrial base, 
specifications, and standards required for the each of the Services to 
buy what they need. 

Separate Air Force components, which do not report to Space and Missile 
Systems Center, develop systems with embedded GPS capabilities on Air 
Force-owned aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, vehicles, 
hand-held devices, small diameter bomb, etc. For example, the Air Force 
Electronic Systems Center (which reports to the Air Force Materiel 
Command) develops GPS user equipment for command, control, and 
communications systems. 

Navy's GPS user equipment procurement is divided between three main 
activities. Procurement of surface ship, submarine and select aircraft 
is performed by the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence Program Executive Office through its navigation program 
office. Procurement of GPS user equipment for the majority of naval 
aircraft is done by the Naval Air Systems Command's Common Avionics 
program office. Due to their unique and limiting GPS user equipment 
form factors, Navy GPS-aided munitions are procured by each respective 
weapon's program office within the Naval Air Systems and Naval Sea 
Systems Commands. 

The Marine Corps Systems Command procures hand held and embedded GPS 
user equipment for Marine Air Ground Task Force employment in ground 
armored and unarmored vehicles, indirect fire weapons systems, radios, 
and other systems. Marine Corps aircraft GPS user equipment is procured 
by the Naval Air Systems Command. 

Army components, for example the Office for Intelligence, Electronic 
Warfare and Sensors, procure common GPS capabilities such as handheld 
devices and embedded cards for tanks, aircraft, and the High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. Platforms are responsible for developing 
unique GPS capabilities. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Because different military services are involved in developing user 
equipment for the weapon systems they own and operate, there are 
separate budget, management, oversight, and leadership structures over 
the space and ground control and the user equipment segments. As such, 
there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all the 
procurements and fielding related to GPS. A 2008 U.S. Strategic Command 
Functional Solutions Analysis, conducted to provide recommendations for 
solutions to positioning, navigation, and timing gaps, noted that the 
Air Force is responsible for developing and integrating military GPS 
user equipment for select platforms, and that integration and testing 
of these platforms is required to be complete so that the user 
equipment is available for procurement when the military signal becomes 
operational. However, this analysis showed no military service program 
office commitment of resources for procuring military GPS user 
equipment in service programming documents. Furthermore, DOD's 
management attention has been focused on delivering space capabilities. 
Only recently has DOD begun to shift its focus by recognizing that the 
user equipment segment needs to play an equal role in the overall GPS 
synchronization effort. 

Efforts to Speed up Delivery of User Equipment Face Obstacles: 

There have been various recommendations to accelerate the fielding of 
modernized military user equipment, though there are obstacles in the 
way of implementation. In October 2005, the Defense Science Board 
[Footnote 20] recommended that DOD initiate an aggressive program to 
introduce antijam enhancements as soon as possible. In August 2006, OSD 
issued a GPS User Equipment Development and Procurement Policy, which 
mandated that certain equipment categories have the modernized GPS user 
equipment by the time the 24th military code satellite is declared 
operational. In June 2007, representatives from the Combatant Commands, 
U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command requested that an 
aggressive schedule be established for all GPS segments to achieve 
military code initial operational capability by fiscal year 2013. In 
March 2008, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council recommended that 
the Air Force adjust the development and acquisition of the modernized 
GPS user equipment to ensure that warfighters can use space-based 
capabilities. Recommendations included amending programmatic schedules 
and funding profiles to incorporate military code capabilities at or 
before the initial operational capability date. 

To accelerate the delivery of the new user equipment, the Air Force 
increased the user equipment budget by $272 million for fiscal years 
2009 through 2011. In the conference reports accompanying the 
Department of Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, conferees 
recommended an additional $63.2 million in funding for GPS user 
equipment. However, the additional funds will not speed up development 
of the new user equipment to a large extent, because the program office 
is experiencing technical issues in developing the prototype cards. The 
major technical issue is with the difficulty in moving to a new 
security architecture, Protection of Navigation, which will provide 
information assurance. 

According to a GPS program office official, OSD, the Air Staff, U.S. 
Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and the GPS program office 
are looking at ways to get some of the modernized military user 
equipment to the field sooner. However, there are challenges with this 
approach, particularly because certain security requirements-- 
antispoof,[Footnote 21] antijam, and antitamper--should be met before 
user equipment can be fielded in conflict situations. According to an 
official at the GPS program office, meeting these security requirements 
is proving to be technically challenging, and attempting this at an 
accelerated rate is risky. 

Prudent Steps Taken so GPS Can Meet Broader Needs but Challenges Exist 
in Coordinating Requirements and Ensuring Compatibility: 

GPS has produced dramatic economic and security improvements both for 
the United States and globally. Ensuring that it can continue to do so 
is extremely challenging given competing interests, the span of 
government and commercial organizations involved with GPS, and the 
criticality of GPS to national and homeland security and the economy. 
On the one hand, DOD must ensure military requirements receive top 
priority and the program stays executable. In doing so, it must ensure 
that the program is not encumbered by requirements that could disrupt 
development, design, and production of satellites. On the other hand, 
there are clearly other enhancements that could be made to GPS 
satellites that could serve a variety of vital missions--particularly 
because of the coverage GPS satellites provide--and there is an 
expressed desire for GPS to serve as the world's preeminent 
positioning, navigation, and timing system. In addition, while the 
United States is challenged to deliver GPS on a tight schedule, other 
countries are designing and developing systems that provide the same or 
enhanced capabilities. Ensuring that these capabilities can be 
leveraged without compromising national security or the preeminence of 
GPS is also a delicate balancing act that requires close cooperation 
between DOD, the Department of State, and other institutions. 

Because of the scale and number of organizations involved in maximizing 
GPS, we did not undertake a full-scale review of requirements and 
coordination processes. However, we reviewed documents supporting these 
processes and interviewed a variety of officials to obtain views on its 
effectiveness. While there is a consensus that DOD and other federal 
organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to manage 
requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges in the 
areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring that 
GPS is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space- 
based positioning, navigation, and timing systems. 

The Process for Approving GPS Civil Requirements Is Rigorous but 
Untested: 

The 2004 U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 
policy provides guidance for civil involvement in the development of 
requirements for the modernization of GPS capabilities and the 
requirements process includes an entry point for civil requirements. 
This entry point is the Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements 
(IFOR), working groups consisting of a civil and a military panel. The 
IFOR receives proposed GPS requirements from civil agencies and assists 
in developing and validating them. From this point, the proposed 
requirement follows a DOD and civil path to validation with involvement 
from various interagency boards and councils. Figure 8 illustrates this 
formal process for submitting, considering, and validating civil GPS 
requirements. 

Figure 8: Interagency Process for Submitting and Validating GPS 
Requirements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Top level: 

* Civil Department/Agency Requirements Processes (civil panel): 

* Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements: 

* Service’s and Defense Agency Requirements Processes (military panel): 

Next levels, civil panel: 

From Civil Department/Agency Requirements Processes, there is a formal 
coordination path to: 

DOT Extended Positioning/Navigation Working Group: Coordinate and 
adjudicate civil requirements. Formal coordination path to: 

DOT Extended Positioning/Navigation Executive Committee: Approve civil 
requirements. Formal coordination path to: 
Validated civil requirements. 

An adjudication path for issues that cannot be resolved at a lower 
level has been established from the DOT Extended Positioning/Navigation 
Working Group to Interagency Requirements Board; 

An adjudication path for issues that cannot be resolved at a lower 
level has been established from the Interagency Requirements Board to 
the DOT Extended Positioning/Navigation Executive Committee, and from 
that committee to the Interagency Requirements Oversight Council. 

Interagency Requirements Oversight Council: Formal coordination path 
to: Validated interagency requirements. 

Next levels, military panel: 

From Service’s and Defense Agency Requirements Processes: Formal 
coordination path to: Net-centric Functional Capabilities Board: 
Coordinate and adjudicate military requirements. 

Net-centric Functional Capabilities Board: Formal coordination path to: 
Joint Capabilities Board: Coordinate and adjudicate military 
requirements. 

Joint Capabilities Board: Formal coordination path to: Joint 
Requirements Oversight council: Approve military requirements. 

Joint Requirements Oversight council: Formal coordination path to: 
Validated military requirements. 

An adjudication path for issues that cannot be resolved at a lower 
level has been established from the Joint Capabilities Board to 
Interagency Requirements Board; 

An adjudication path for issues that cannot be resolved at a lower 
level has been established from the Interagency Requirements Board to 
the Joint Requirements Oversight council, and from that committee to 
the Interagency Requirements Oversight Council. 

Interagency Requirements Oversight Council: Formal coordination path 
to: Validated interagency requirements. 

Source: GAO presentation of Department of Transportation and U.S. Air 
Force data. 

[End of figure] 

While the process for approving civil requirements on GPS has existed 
since 2001, DOD and civil agencies consider it rigorous but relatively 
untested because no civil unique requirements have completed the 
initial step in the process. Civil agencies have submitted two proposed 
requirements to the process; however, these requirements are not 
directly related to the GPS mission. Instead, they would add hardware 
to the GPS satellites and thus are considered secondary mission 
requirements. However, according to civil agencies, the analyses and 
documentation called for under the process are confusing and time- 
consuming. 

While GPS remains critical to national security and military 
operations, government policy calls for GPS planning to consider 
integration of civil requirements for the civilian infrastructure. The 
process for considering civil GPS requirements is intended to maintain 
fiscal discipline by ensuring only critical needs are funded and 
developed. Specifically, the process requires that civil agencies 
internally identify and validate their proposed requirements, and 
conduct cost, risk, and performance analyses. Our past work has shown 
that requirements add-ons are a major source of acquisition 
instability. In this case, the formal process also requires that the 
agency proposing the requirement pay the costs associated with adding 
it to the GPS III satellites, thereby forcing agencies to separate 
their wants from needs. 

Civil Agencies Find the GPS Requirements Process Confusing: 

According to the civil agencies that have proposed GPS requirements, 
the formal requirements approval process is confusing and time- 
consuming. Specifically, they stated that DOD's documentary and 
analysis standards are new to civil agencies and therefore difficult 
and time-consuming for them to manage. Some agencies have reported that 
it is costly for them to pay for the more detailed supporting analyses 
requested by DOD. For example, one civil agency had to withdraw and 
resubmit a proposal for new GPS requirements because it lacked 
necessary information, including a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, 
civil agencies' submitted requirements have necessitated that DOD 
perform further studies on compatibility and integration issues to 
ensure that the proposed requirements will not adversely affect the 
primary GPS mission. 

The two civil requirements that have entered the requirements process 
are the Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS) and the geodetic 
[Footnote 22] requirement implemented by Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR). 
Both are joint civil and military mission requirements and would be 
potential secondary payloads on GPS. DASS is an electronic unit that 
will receive beacon signals identifying a distressed individual's 
location and transmit this location data to emergency responders. The 
SLR laser retroreflector, which weighs less than 7 pounds, is being 
considered for inclusion starting with increment IIIB satellites. 
Scientists would aim a laser to the reflector to more precisely 
determine the satellite's position, ultimately allowing for more 
precise measurements on the ground. This SLR capability would support 
users who need to make very accurate measurements for scientific 
applications. 

* Distress Alerting Satellite System: The Coast Guard submitted the 
DASS requirement to the IFOR in 2003. Early in the review process, a 
debate on whether DASS was a civil or military requirement ensued. The 
IFOR decided to have military and civil panels review the requirement 
and resubmit it through the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) process. It took a total of 5 years to 
resolve the debate and prepare and resubmit the package. In July 2008, 
the civil agencies submitted DASS requirements and an analysis of 
alternatives to the IFOR for review. To date, a decision has not yet 
been made as to if and when the capability will be inserted on GPS 
satellites. 

* Satellite Laser Ranging: In April 2007, NASA submitted the SLR 
requirements package along with an analysis of alternatives to the 
IFOR. The IFOR officially accepted the SLR package into the IFOR 
process in August of that year. However, in June 2008, DOD opposed 
implementation of the SLR capability due to integration and 
compatibility concerns with the GPS satellites. A joint Air Force and 
NASA working group was established to resolve the integration and 
compatibility issues and report back to the IFOR by June 2009 prior to 
moving the requirement from the IFOR into the JCIDS process. 

DASS supporters have stated that the GPS constellation is the ideal 
platform for search and rescue capabilities. The current search and 
rescue capability is expected to degrade by 2017 and completely fail by 
2020. More urgently, supporters say that the Canadian government's 
offer to provide DASS hardware at a $90 million cost savings to the 
United States must be acted upon by August 2009 or Canada may provide 
this component to a developing foreign satellite navigation system. The 
SLR capability, until recently, existed on two GPS satellites. One 
satellite was decommissioned, and hence according to NASA does not meet 
its or other civil agencies' needs to perform scientific and geodetic 
applications. According to NASA, the SLR would need to be implemented 
on most of the GPS constellation to meet geodetic requirements for 
science and other user requirements. If the DOD does not include DASS 
and SLR on GPS satellites, U.S. users of these capabilities may be 
dependent on foreign systems which already include, or have plans to 
include, both DASS-like and SLR capabilities in their satellite 
navigation systems. 

Coordinating GPS Activities with the International Community also 
Presents Challenges: 

The U.S. government--specifically the State Department--is faced with 
challenges in ensuring GPS is compatible and interoperable with other 
new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, 
and timing systems. While the U.S. government has engaged a number of 
other countries and international organizations in cooperative 
discussions, only one legally binding agreement has been established. 
Furthermore, some U.S. manufacturers of GPS receivers stated that 
European Union manufacturers may have a competitive advantage over U.S. 
companies with respect to the manufacture and sale of Galileo-capable 
receivers, though officials with the European Commission disagree. In 
addition, Department of State officials have expressed concerns over 
the limited number of technical experts available to support activities 
under these cooperative arrangements. Without these resources, 
officials are concerned that it may be difficult to continue to ensure 
the compatibility and interoperability of foreign systems. 

Joint Statements of Cooperation Made and One Agreement Established: 

The United States has made joint statements of cooperation with 
Australia, India, Japan, and Russia to promote compatibility and 
interoperability and mutual interests regarding the civil use of GPS 
and its augmentations[Footnote 23] and established an executive 
agreement with the European Community (see table 4 for a list of types 
of cooperative arrangements with other countries).[Footnote 24] The 
joint statements and executive agreement were sought to avoid 
interference with each others' systems, and to facilitate the pursuit 
of common civil signals. Under the national space-based PNT policy, it 
is the Department of State's role to promote the civil aspects of GPS 
and its augmentation services and standards with foreign governments 
and other international organizations. The Department of State leads 
negotiations with foreign governments and international organizations 
regarding civil and, as appropriate, military space-based PNT matters 
including, but not limited to, coordinating interagency review of 
international agreements with foreign governments and international 
organizations regarding the planning, operation, management, and or use 
of the GPS and its augmentations. While most of the cooperative 
arrangements are joint statements that express the parties' intent to 
cooperate on GPS-related activities, the United States and the European 
Commission have established an executive agreement that is considered 
binding under international law. 

Table 4: U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Entities on Satellite 
Navigation: 

Country: Japan; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: 1998. 

Country: EU; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: 2004. 

Country: Russia; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: 2004. 

Country: Australia; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: 2007. 

Country: India; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: 2007. 

Country: China; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Executive agreement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Joint statement: [Empty]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: No agreement: [Check]; 
Cooperative arrangement/effective dates: Date signed: N/A. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of State data. 

[End of table] 

U.S. and European Commission Working to Address Concerns Regarding 
Access to Galileo Information: 

According to the executive agreement with the European Community, 
subject to applicable export controls, the United States and the 
European Commission are to make sufficient information concerning their 
respective civil satellite-based signals and augmentations publicly 
available on a nondiscriminatory basis, to ensure equal opportunity for 
persons who seek to use these signals, manufacture equipment to use 
these signals, or provide value-added services which use these signals. 

In 2006, the European Commission publicly released draft technical 
specifications for its open service. The draft document requests 
manufacturers to obtain a commercial license from the European 
Commission to sell and import products designed to work with the 
European satellite navigation system, Galileo. While this licensing 
requirement applies to all manufacturers, some U.S. companies stated 
that some foreign user equipment manufacturers who are members of the 
Galileo consortia may have an unfair advantage over U.S. companies. 
This is because the Galileo consortia currently have access to testing 
hardware and may be able to introduce their products more quickly into 
the marketplace once they are granted a commercial license. 

Officials with the European Commission told us that they do not believe 
the license restrictions or the knowledge gained from testing the 
Galileo systems are discriminatory. They further stated that the 
restrictions in obtaining a commercial license to sell user equipment 
apply to all companies, not just U.S. companies and they have not yet 
issued licenses to any company. In the meantime, a U.S. and European 
Commission working group on trade and civil applications is discussing 
the licensing issue. 

However, U.S. firms have raised concerns to the Department of Commerce 
(Commerce) on the lack of information from the European Commission 
relating to the process for obtaining a license to sell Galileo 
equipment. According to Commerce, U.S. firms have asserted that they 
are not aware of how, where, or when to apply for such a license, 
despite repeated inquiries to the U.S.-European Commission trade 
working group and direct contacts with European Commission officials-- 
and the timeline for the licensing process is unknown. Commerce further 
noted that U.S. manufacturers wanting to enter the Galileo market are 
hesitant to invest in technology that is not officially licensed and 
that could possibly be banned from sale. It takes industry 18 to 24 
months to develop a market-ready receiver, and the first operational 
Galileo satellite is scheduled for launch in 2010. U.S. firms are 
concerned they will not have their products ready by that time and will 
lose their market share to European companies with inside access to 
technology and/or licensing information. 

State Officials Believe International Efforts Lack Dedicated Resources: 

According to Department of State officials, the department lacks 
dedicated technical expertise to monitor international activities. The 
Department of State relies on a small pool of experts from DOD and the 
seven civil agencies represented on the National Executive Committee 
for Space-Based PNT. These experts are often in high demand because 
they work on other GPS-related activities and in some cases have other 
assigned duties that are unrelated to GPS. According to the Department 
of State, in many cases these experts and those in other agencies must 
continually justify to their managers that their attendance at 
international meetings is important. Given the progress made in working 
with foreign governments to establish arrangements, share information, 
and ensure compatibility and interoperability with GPS, Department of 
State officials would like DOD and civil agencies to dedicate funding 
and staff positions to international activities accompanied by a 
sustained level of senior management support and understanding of the 
importance of these activities. Without an expanded pool of technical 
expertise and related resources, Department of State officials stated 
they are concerned that ongoing international efforts to ensure 
compatibility of foreign systems with GPS could be jeopardized. 

Conclusions: 

GPS has enabled transformations in military, civil, other government, 
and commercial operations and has become part of the critical 
infrastructure serving national and international communities. Clearly, 
the United States cannot afford to see its GPS capabilities decrease 
below its requirement, and optimally, it would stay preeminent. Over 
the past decade, however, the program has experienced cost increases 
and schedule delays. While the Air Force is making a concerted effort 
to address acquisition problems, there is still considerable risk that 
satellites will not be delivered on time, leading to gaps in 
capability. Focused attention and oversight are needed to ensure the 
program stays on track and is adequately resourced, that unanticipated 
problems are quickly discovered and resolved, and that all communities 
involved with GPS are aware of and positioned to address potential gaps 
in service. But this is difficult to achieve given diffuse 
responsibility over various aspects of the GPS acquisition program. 
Moreover, disconnects between the space, ground control, and user 
equipment components have significantly lessened the military's ability 
to take advantage of enhancements, particularly as they relate to 
assuring the continuity of service during military engagements. Without 
more concentrated leadership attention, such disconnects could worsen, 
particularly since (1) both the ground control and user equipment 
programs have been subject to funding shifts to pay for problems 
affecting the satellite segment, and (2) user equipment programs are 
executed by separate entities over which no one single person has 
authority. Lastly, ensuring that GPS can continue to produce dramatic 
improvements to civil agencies' applications, calls for any weaknesses 
that are identified in the civil agency GPS requirements process to be 
addressed. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Because of the criticality of the GPS system and potential delays, and 
given the importance of GPS to the civil community, we are making the 
following recommendations. 

* We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a single authority 
to oversee the development of the GPS system, including DOD space, 
ground control, and user equipment assets, to ensure that the program 
is well executed and resourced and that potential disruptions are 
minimized. The appointee should have authority to ensure DOD space, 
ground control, and user equipment are synchronized to the maximum 
extent practicable; and coordinate with the existing positioning, 
navigation, and timing infrastructure to assess and minimize potential 
service disruptions should the satellite constellation decrease in size 
for an extended period of time. 

* We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation, as 
the co-chairs of the National Executive Committee for Space-Based 
Positioning, Navigation and Timing, address, if weaknesses are found, 
civil agency concerns for developing requirements, and determine 
mechanisms for improving collaboration and decision making and 
strengthening civil agency participation. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD concurred with our first recommendation to appoint a single 
authority to oversee the development of the GPS system, including 
space, ground control, and user equipment assets, to ensure that the 
program is well executed, resourced, and that potential disruptions are 
minimized. DOD stated that it has recognized the importance of 
centralizing authority to oversee the continuing synchronized evolution 
of the GPS. According to DOD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has 
reaffirmed that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration (ASD NII)) is designated with authority and 
responsibility for all aspects of the GPS. DOD further stated that the 
U.S. Air Force is the single acquisition agent with responsibility for 
synchronized modernization of GPS space, ground control, and military 
user equipment. 

In concurring with our recommendation on appointing a single authority 
to oversee the development of the GPS system, DOD asserts that ASD NII 
is designated with authority and responsibility for all aspects of GPS, 
and that the Air Force is the single acquisition agent responsible for 
synchronizing GPS segments. In addition, responsibility for acquiring 
GPS military user equipment acquisitions falls under various officials 
within the military services. We agree that given the diversity of 
platforms and equipment variations involved, it would not be realistic 
for the Air Force to unilaterally produce a "one-size-fits-all" 
solution. However, this does not obviate the need for a single 
authority to oversee the development of all GPS military user equipment 
to better ensure greater coordination with deployed satellite 
capabilities. Without an approach that enables a single individual to 
make resource decisions and maintain visibility over progress, DOD is 
at risk of facing the same issues in synchronizing the delivery of GPS 
assets and wasting capability that will be available in space but not 
on the ground. In addition, DOD may still want to consider establishing 
a means by which progress in developing the satellites and ground 
equipment receives attention from the highest levels of leadership that 
is the Secretary and perhaps the National Security Council, given the 
criticality of GPS to the warfighter and the nation, and the risks 
associated with not meeting schedule goals. 

DOD concurred with our second recommendation to address, if weaknesses 
are found, civil agency concerns for developing requirements and 
determine mechanisms for improving collaboration and decision making, 
and strengthening civil agency participation. DOD acknowledged that it 
employs a rigorous requirements process and is aware of the frustration 
civil agencies face when using this process. DOD further indicated that 
it worked to put in place an interagency requirements plan, and is 
currently in the process of jointly coordinating the Charter for an 
Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements to provide venues to 
identify, discuss, and validate civil or dual-use GPS requirements. 
Finally, DOD noted that it will continue to seek ways to improve civil 
agency understanding of the DOD requirements process and work to 
strengthen civil agency participation. We support DOD's efforts to 
inform and educate other civil agencies on the requirements process. As 
it undertakes these efforts, DOD should ensure that it is taking a more 
active role in directly communicating with civil agencies to more 
precisely identify concerns or weaknesses in the requirements process. 

The full text of DOD's comments may be found in appendix IV. We also 
received technical comments from the other departments and NASA, which 
we incorporated where appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 8 
days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland 
Security, Interior, State, and Transportation; the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration; and interested congressional committees. The 
report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional 
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. The major 
contributors are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite, ground 
control, and user equipment acquisition programs and determine whether 
GPS capabilities are being synchronized, we reviewed and analyzed 
program plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, 
requirements, program direction, and satellite constellation 
sustainment, and compared programmatic data to GAO's criteria compiled 
over the last 12 years for best practices in system development. We 
also interviewed officials from Air Force Space and Missile Systems 
Center GPS program office; Air Force Space Command; Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Office of Networks and Information Integration; United States Strategic 
Command; 2nd Space Operations Squadron; and the services. 

To determine the extent to which the Air Force had effectively 
developed and maintained the GPS IIIA integrated master schedule, we 
reviewed the program's schedule estimates and compared them with 
relevant best practices to determine the extent to which they reflects 
key estimating practices that are fundamental to having a reliable 
schedule. In doing so, we interviewed GPS program officials to discuss 
their use of best practices in creating the program's current schedule. 

To assess the status of the GPS constellation, we interviewed officials 
from the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center GPS program office, 
Air Force Space Command, and the 2nd Space Operations Squadron. To 
assess the risks that a delay in the acquisition and fielding of GPS 
III satellites could result in the GPS constellation falling below the 
24 satellites required by the standard positioning service and precise 
positioning service performance standards, we obtained information from 
the Air Force predicting the reliability for 77 GPS satellites--each of 
the 31 current (on-orbit) and 46 future GPS satellites--as a function 
of time. Each satellite's total reliability curve defines the 
probability that the satellite will still be operational at a given 
time in the future. It is generated from the product of two reliability 
curves--a wear-out reliability curve defined by the cumulative normal 
distribution, and a random reliability curve defined by the cumulative 
Weibull distribution. For each of the 77 satellites, we obtained the 
two parameters defining the cumulative normal distribution, and the two 
parameters defining the cumulative Weibull distribution. For each of 
the 46 unlaunched satellites, we also obtained a parameter defining its 
probability of successful launch, and its current scheduled launch 
date. The 46 unlaunched satellites include 2 IIR-M satellites,[Footnote 
25] 12 IIF satellites, 8 IIIA satellites, 8 IIIB satellites, and 16 
IIIC satellites; launch of the final IIIC satellite is scheduled for 
March 2023. Using this information, we generated overall reliability 
curves for each of the 77 GPS satellites. We discussed with Air Force 
and Aerospace Corporation representatives, in general terms, how each 
satellite's normal and Weibull parameters were calculated. However, we 
did not analyze any of the data used to calculate these parameters. 

Using the reliability curves for each of the 77 GPS satellites, we 
developed a Monte Carlo simulation[Footnote 26] to predict the 
probability that at least a given number of satellites would be 
operational as a function of time, based on the GPS launch schedule 
approved in March 2009. We conducted several runs of our simulation-- 
each run consisting of 10,000 trials--and generated "sawtoothed" curves 
depicting the probability that at least 21, 24, 27, and 30 satellites 
would still be operational as a function of time. We compared the 
results for a 24-satellite constellation with a similar Monte Carlo 
simulation that the Aerospace Corporation performed for the Air Force. 
We confirmed that our simulation produces results that are within about 
2 percent of the Aerospace Corporation's results for all times between 
October 2008 and April 2024. Using 10,000 trials per run, the results 
of different runs of the same Monte Carlo simulation can vary by about 
1 to 2 percent; consequently we concluded that we had successfully 
replicated the Aerospace Corporation's results. We then used our Monte 
Carlo simulation model to examine the impact of a 2-year delay in the 
launch of all GPS III satellites. We moved each GPS III launch date 
back by 2 years. We then reran the model and calculated new 
probabilities that at least 18, 21, and 24 satellites would still be 
operational as a function of time. 

To assess impacts of a potential GPS service disruption on particular 
types of military and civil GPS users, we interviewed numerous military 
and civil GPS representatives and reviewed studies provided by civil 
agencies. 

To assess the coordination and collaboration among federal agencies and 
the broader GPS community, and to determine the organization of the PNT 
community, we analyzed documents from and conducted interviews with 
officials in Washington, D.C. at the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; SAF/USA (Air Force 
Directorate of Space Acquisitions); National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; the Departments of Transportation, State, Commerce, and 
Homeland Security; the Space-Based National PNT Coordination Office; 
and the U.S. GPS Industry Council. We also interviewed a private sector 
GPS expert at Stanford University, and GPS industry representatives. To 
analyze how the U.S. government coordinates with foreign countries on 
GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems), we met with representatives 
of and reviewed documents from the U.S. Department of State and 
European Space Agency (ESA) in Washington, D.C. To obtain information 
on efforts by Australia, China, Japan, and Russia to develop GNSS, we 
met with Department of State officials, reviewed materials provided by 
these countries' representatives at GNSS conferences, and consulted the 
official government space agency Web sites. We also traveled to Europe 
to meet with experts in satellite navigation at the European Space 
Agency, French Space Agency (CNES), European Commission Directorate- 
General for Energy and Transport Satellite Navigation Unit, and 
European GNSS industry experts. In addition, we attended a conference 
in Berlin, Germany to learn about international coordination on PNT 
systems and applications. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to April 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: International Global Satellite Navigation Systems: 

In addition to the Global Positioning System (GPS), there are other 
space-based global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) in operation and 
in development. Russia has a system, GLONASS (Global Navigation 
Satellite System). There are currently 20 GLONASS satellites in orbit, 
and the Russians expect to have a full constellation of 24 satellites 
in orbit by 2010 and ultimately to expand to a 30-satellite 
constellation. The European Union (EU) is developing its own GNSS 
program, Galileo. Originally started as a public-private partnership, 
the program now is completely funded by the public sector. The EU has 2 
test satellites in orbit now, and plans to have a 27-satellite 
constellation with 3 spares by 2013. China also is in the process of 
developing its own GNSS, Compass (also called Beidou). China currently 
has 3 satellites in orbit, and plans to increase the constellation for 
coverage of the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 and for worldwide coverage 
by 2015. Table 5 lists the non-U.S. global navigation satellite systems 
currently in development. 

Table 5: Non-U.S. Global Navigation Satellite Systems Currently in 
Development: 

System name: Galileo; 
Country: European Union; 
Number of active satellites: 2 test satellites; 
Number of planned satellites: 27; [Empty]; 
Planned date of full operation: 2013; 
Interoperable signals: Interoperable L1C signal. 

System name: GLONASS; 
Country: Russia; 
Number of active satellites: 20; 
Number of planned satellites: 30; [Empty]; 
Planned date of full operation: 2011; 
Interoperable signals: Interoperable L1C signal. 

System name: Compass/Beidou; 
Country: China; 
Number of active satellites: 3; 
Number of planned satellites: 35; 
Planned date of full operation: Regional coverage in 2010; 
Interoperable signals: Compatible and interoperable with GPS, no 
broadcast on L1C at this time. 

Source: GAO analysis based on information from foreign program 
presentations. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Cooperation Between U.S. and Foreign Entities: 

During 2007, the Department of State signed joint statements of 
cooperation in the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) with 
Australia and India. The Australia joint statement expresses the 
parties' intention to promote interoperability between GPS and 
Australia's Ground-based Regional Augmentation System and Ground Based 
Augmentation System. The India joint statement expressed the parties' 
intention to promote GPS and India's GPS and GEO-Augmented Navigation 
system. An executive agreement with the European Community and its 
member states has been in effect since 2004 that expresses the 
intention that GPS and Galileo will be interoperable at the user level 
for the benefit of civil users around the world. This cooperation has 
resulted in working groups that are reviewing technical, trade, and 
security issues. The technical issues described in the executive 
agreement involve GPS-Galileo radio frequency compatibility and 
interoperability and the design and development of the next generation 
of systems. For trade, a working group is determining how to maintain 
nondiscriminatory trade practices in the global market for goods and 
services related to space-based PNT, and a group was appointed to 
review the security issues concerning GPS and Galileo. 

The United States and Russia initiated cooperation in 2004, with the 
parties expressing their intent to work together to maintain and 
promote civil interoperability at the user level between GPS and 
Russia's GLONASS system. Two working groups have been established to 
address: (1) radio frequency compatibility and interoperability for 
enhanced PNT and (2) technical interoperability between the search-and- 
rescue capabilities planned for GPS and GLONASS. 

The United States and Japan have had a relationship since signing a 
joint statement in 1998. In the joint statement, the parties expressed 
their intent to promote and facilitate civilian uses of GPS. Japan is 
developing MTSAT-based Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), a 
geostationary satellite system similar to the U.S. Wide Area 
Augmentation System. The United States and Japan most recently met in 
November 2008 to discuss the civil use of GPS and Japan's MSAS and 
Quasi-Zenith Satellite System. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Networks And Information Integration: 
6000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-6000: 

April 24, 2009: 

Ms. Christina Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-09-325, The Global Positioning System: Significant 
Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, dated 
March 12, 2009 (GAO Code 120696). 

The Department fundamentally concurs with the findings and 
recommendations expressed in the GAO report. However, factors relating 
to the longevity of the Global Positioning System (GPS) program and the 
complexity of its implementation across the range of military and 
civilian users require that our concurrence be augmented by clarifying 
comments, which have been provided separately. 

GPS developmental satellites were initially launched over thirty years 
ago. The system has evolved successfully through at least three 
generations of spacecraft, ground control systems, and military user 
equipment. During that time, GPS has become one of the most widely used 
systems in the world for military and civilian positioning, navigation 
and timing (PNT) purposes and sets the example for other nations 
seeking to provide similar services. 

In the United States, GPS is a fundamental enabler of national security 
and economic infrastructures, enhancing efficiency and improving safety 
and effectiveness of virtually all operations. As the cornerstone of 
our National PNT Architecture, it is the centerpiece around which 
future PNT services will evolve. The Department is fully aware of our 
responsibility with respect to GPS and is committed to maintaining and 
improving the services it provides. In that regard, DoD seeks the 
support of the Congress in maintaining stability of GPS funding to 
enable synchronized modernization of the next generation of GPS space, 
ground control, and user equipment that is now underway. 

We have determined that the report is unclassified and has been cleared 
for open publication. Our point of contact for this review is Mr. 
Raymond Swider, (703) 607-1122, raymond.swider@osd.mil. 

Signed by: illegible, for: 

Ronald C. Jost: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
(C3, Space & Spectrum): 

Enclosure: 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 12, 2009: 
GAO-09-325 (GAO CODE 120696): 

“The Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges In Sustaining 
And Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities” 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
appoint a single authority to oversee the development of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) system, including space, ground, and user 
assets, to ensure that the program is well executed and resourced and 
that potential disruptions are minimized. (p. 43/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur with comment. The Department has recognized the 
importance of centralizing authority to oversee the continuing 
synchronized evolution of the GPS. To that end, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense has reaffirmed that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) is the Department’s 
Principal Staff Assistant to oversee Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing, and, specifically, is designated with authority and 
responsibility for all aspects of the Global Position System (GPS). 
This designation is contained in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 
4650.05, issued on February 19, 2008. A formal Department of Defense 
Instruction is now in final coordination to further define the 
oversight processes to be employed in executing DoDD 4650.05, and 
completion is expected by May 2009. Further, under oversight of the 
ASD(NII), the U.S. Air Force is the single acquisition agent with 
responsibility for synchronized modernization of GPS space, ground 
control, and military user equipment. The Air Force acquires and 
operates the GPS space and control segments and provides the 
fundamental system design and security requirements necessary for 
acquisition of GPS user equipment and applications in support of 
diverse missions across the Department. Given the diversity of 
platforms, and equipment form factors involved, it is impossible for 
the Air Force to unilaterally produce a “one-size-fits-all” solution 
applicable to all DoD missions. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that Secretary of Defense, as one 
of the Position Navigation and Timing executive committee co-chairs, 
address, if weaknesses are found, civil agency concerns for developing 
requirements and determine mechanisms for improving collaboration and 
decision making and strengthening civil agency participation. (p. 
43/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response: Concur with comment. The Department is aware that we 
employ a rigorous requirements process in support of our extensive 
operational and acquisition responsibilities and that the process is a 
source of frustration for civil agencies without similar processes in 
place. In an effort to address the issue, we have worked with the civil 
agencies to put in place a GPS Interagency Requirements Plan, jointly 
approved by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is in 
charge of our process, and the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
acting on behalf of all civil agencies. Further, we are now in the 
process of jointly coordinating the Charter for an Interagency Forum 
for Operational Requirements (IFOR) to provide meeting venues to 
identify, discuss, and validate civil or dual use GPS requirements for 
inclusion in the DoD GPS acquisition process. Finally, we sponsor 
educational outreach opportunities for civil agencies to become more 
fully acquainted with the DoD requirements process, including a day-
long “Requirements Process Summit” jointly conducted by the Joint Staff 
and DOT on April 29, 2008. We will continue to seek ways to improve 
civil agency understanding of the DoD requirements process and work to 
strengthen civil agency participation. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 
were Art Gallegos (Assistant Director), Greg Campbell, Jennifer Echard, 
Maria Durant, Anne Hobson, Laura Hook, Sigrid McGinty, Angela 
Pleasants, Jay Tallon, Hai Tran, and Alyssa Weir. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to 
Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 1, 2008. 

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 30, 2007. 

Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology 
Transition Processes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883]. Washington, D.C.: September 
14, 2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed 
to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 
2005. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 
2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs 
Implement Best Practices. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-206]. Washington, D.C.: August 
16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 24, 1998. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.: August 
26, 1996. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For a list of reports on best practices, see Related GAO Products 
at the end of this report. 

[2] GPS is augmented by ground-based or space-based navigation aids 
that are maintained by individual departments and agencies to provide 
users with improvements to the GPS navigation signal in terms of 
accuracy, availability, and/or integrity needs. 

[3] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use 
of Best Practices, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007). 

[4] GAO, Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to 
Weapon System Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-87] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
17, 1998); Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for 
Cost and Schedule Increases, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-552T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 
2008); and, Defense Acquisitions: Results of Annual Assessment of DOD 
Weapon Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-674T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2008). 

[5] On July 31, 2004, the GPS program office became the GPS Wing, when 
the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center reorganized and 
renamed its organizations to mirror the traditional Air Force 
structure. 

[6] Earned value management (EVM) is a program management tool that 
integrates the technical, cost, and schedule parameters of a contract. 
During the planning phase, an integrated baseline is developed by time- 
phasing budget resources for defined work. As work is performed and 
measured against the baseline, the corresponding budget value is 
"earned." Using this earned value metric, cost and schedule variances 
can be determined and analyzed. EVM provides significant benefits to 
both the government and the contractor. An EVM system is required on 
all DOD space-program-related contracts meeting certain thresholds 
unless waived by the DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority. 

[7] The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is the DOD component 
that works directly with defense suppliers to help ensure that DOD, 
federal, and allied government supplies and services are delivered on 
time, at projected cost, and meet all performance requirements. 

[8] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems 
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-626T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 
2006). 

[9] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Major Space Programs Still at Risk for 
Cost and Schedule Increases, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-552T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 
2008). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-626T]. 

[11] Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Task 
Force, Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

[12] Defense Science Board Task Force, The Future of the Global 
Positioning System, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 
2005). 

[13] Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of 
National Security Space, Leadership, Management, and Organization for 
National Security Space, Institute for Defense Analysis (Alexandria, 
Va.: Jul. 15, 2008). 

[14] Pub. L. No. 109-364 § 914. 

[15] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on 
Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture, 
United States House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 3, 
2008). 

[16] The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is an annual memorandum 
submitted to the Secretary of Defense by the DOD component heads, which 
recommends the total resource requirements and programs within the 
parameters of the Secretary of Defense's fiscal guidance. The POM is a 
major document in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
process, and the basis for the component budget estimates. The POM is 
the principle programming document that details how a component 
proposes to respond to assignments in the Strategic Planning Guidance 
and Joint Programming Guidance and satisfy its assigned functions over 
the Future Years Defense Program. The POM shows programmed needs 6 
years hence (i.e., in fiscal year 2004, POM 2006-2011 was submitted). 

[17] This availability standard establishes thresholds for both global 
average and worst-case position dilution of precision (PDOP), a figure 
of merit commonly used to quantify the "goodness" of user-to-GPS- 
constellation geometry. 

[18] Some users with more demanding requirements employ GPS 
augmentation systems that mitigate this impact. For example, many 
applications using augmentations such as Satellite-Based Augmentation 
Systems (SBAS), which in the United States is the Wide Area 
Augmentation System (WAAS), have increased tolerance to degraded 
accuracy and availability when the constellation may be operating at 
minimum committed levels of availability. 

[19] Both performance standards assume an unobstructed view of the 
entire sky except for 5 degrees above the local horizon. 

[20] Defense Science Board Task Force, The Future of the Global 
Positioning System, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 
2005). 

[21] Antispoofing is a process of encrypting one of the codes broadcast 
by the satellites. This prevents an enemy from predicting the code 
sequence and using that prediction to generate a code that could be 
used to deceive a GPS set. The set would believe the deception code to 
be real and could falsely calculate its position. 

[22] Geodetic refers to the use of geodesy for measurements. Geodesy is 
the science of measuring and monitoring the size and shape of the 
Earth. 

[23] Augmentation systems are U.S. government global and regional 
systems that are maintained by individual departments and agencies to 
provide users with improvements to the GPS navigation signal in terms 
of accuracy, availability, and/or integrity needs. 

[24] Although China is developing a space-based positioning, 
navigation, and timing system, the United States has not established a 
formal bilateral relationship with China. For the purposes of this 
report, "cooperative arrangements" is used to mean joint statements of 
cooperation and executive agreements. 

[25] We completed our analysis prior to the successful launch of the 
first of these two IIR-M satellites on March 24, 2009. 

[26] Monte Carlo simulation refers to a computer-based analysis that 
uses probability distributions for key variables, selects random values 
from each of the distributions simultaneously, and repeats the random 
selection over and over. Rather than presenting a single outcome--such 
as the mostly likely or average scenario--Monte Carlo simulations 
produce a distribution of outcomes that reflect the probability 
distributions of modeled uncertain variables. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: