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International Strategic Plan' which was released on April 21, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2009: 

Iraqi Refugee Assistance: 

Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking 
Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan: 

GAO-09-120: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-120, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been 
called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8 
million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million 
fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan. 

GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in 
achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing 
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for 
Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to 
address the Iraqi refugee situation. 

GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S. 
government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and 
Syria. 

What GAO Found: 

To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State 
primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing 
partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host 
country populations with education, vocational training, health care, 
food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link 
program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi 
refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and 
report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve 
program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor 
projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the 
lack of reliable data have challenged State’s efforts to ensure that 
projects help the intended beneficiaries. 

U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of 
reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the 
funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live 
interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily 
identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi 
refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to 
determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs 
because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and 
multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee 
programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related 
humanitarian assistance. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for 
Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the 
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for 
Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for 
Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and 
offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although 
another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria 
and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees “guests” who should return to Iraq 
once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made 
progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008. 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 
international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to 
address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated 
Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international 
community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the 
international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of 
the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host 
them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that 
addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the 
international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that 
involves all stakeholders. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, with relevant others, (1) 
develop performance measures to assess and report progress in achieving 
overall U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees; (2) track and 
report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi refugee 
programs in each host country; (3) assess the number and needs of Iraqi 
refugees and the related needs of countries hosting them; and (4) 
develop a comprehensive international strategy for assistance and 
solutions for Iraqi refugees. The Department of State generally 
concurred with our recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-120]. For more 
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 
christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured Progress in 
Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners Face Monitoring 
Challenges: 

Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and 
UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees: 

The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering Permanent 
Solutions for Iraqi Refugees: 

Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered 
Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs: 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq- 
Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, as of 
September 30, 2008: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for Iraq-Related 
Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, Calendar Years 
2003 through 2008: 

Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance 
in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring Host 
Government Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported by UNHCR, as of 
September 30, 2008: 

Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions under 
USRAP, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008: 

Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of 
Resettlement, Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of September 30, 
2008: 

Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan 
Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under Section 1059, as 
of September 30, 2008: 

Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans and 
Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of September 30, 2008: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees: 

Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and Vulnerable 
Host Country Populations: 

Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan: 

Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria: 

Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance Management 
Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance with Leading Results-Oriented 
Management Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

IDP: internally displaced person: 

IOM: International Organization for Migration: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: 

OPE: overseas processing entity: 

PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration: 

SARC: Syrian Arab Red Crescent: 

SIV: special immigrant visa: 

UN: United Nations: 

UNDP: United Nations Development Program: 

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

USRAP: United States Refugee Admissions Program: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 21, 2009: 

Congressional Committees: 

According to the United Nations (UN), Iraqi refugees represent one of 
the largest urban refugee populations the organization has been called 
upon to assist and pose an unprecedented burden on the countries 
hosting them. The UN reports that regional governments estimate that 
over the last 5 years about 4.8 million Iraqis have been displaced from 
their homes in search of safety, with about 2 million fleeing to 
neighboring countries, primarily Syria and Jordan. According to the 
Department of State (State), because of its unique role in Iraq, the 
United States has recognized the need to take the lead in mitigating 
the effects of this humanitarian crisis. 

GAO is assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist 
Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). In this report, 
we examine challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in 
achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing 
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for 
Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to 
address the Iraqi refugee situation.[Footnote 1] In addition, we 
reviewed the progress made in implementing special immigrant visa 
programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some refugees but are not 
designed specifically for them (see appendix I). We plan a subsequent 
review that will examine challenges faced in assisting internally 
displaced Iraqis. Because of broad congressional interest in the U.S. 
engagement in Iraq, we are completing this report under the Comptroller 
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed reports and data 
from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), other UN 
agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and 
research institutes. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C., we met 
with officials from State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, and special immigrant 
visa programs and the challenges they have encountered. We also met 
with research institutions and NGOs and held discussion groups with 
NGOs conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to discuss strategic 
planning and program implementation challenges. Through our fieldwork 
in Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; and Damascus, 
Syria, we met with officials from the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and 
Iraqi governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella agencies, including the 
World Food Program and IOM; international and local NGOs; and research 
institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we held discussion groups 
with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, 
needs, assistance received, and challenges encountered. We toured and 
observed assistance projects and activities in resettlement processing 
centers. We analyzed U.S. funding, refugee admissions, and visa data, 
and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. Appendix II contains a more detailed description of our scope 
and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State 
primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing 
partners, which include international organizations and NGOs.[Footnote 
2] These State-funded activities provided Iraqi refugees and the 
populations of the countries that host them with primary education, 
vocational training, health care, psychosocial services, distribution 
of food and household items, and financial support, among other 
efforts. However, based on our review of State's assessment of progress 
in fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to determine the extent to which 
State achieved its overall goal and objectives.[Footnote 3] For 
example, State reported on a number of individual projects but did not 
specifically measure these accomplishments against benchmarks or report 
how these project-level accomplishments helped State achieve its 
overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has 
limited information to judge progress in reaching its goal and 
objectives for Iraqi refugee programs and improve effectiveness. 
Assessing progress is complicated by difficulties State confronts in 
overseeing refugee projects that it funds in Jordan and Syria--the 
countries with the largest number of Iraqi refugees. Insufficient 
quantity of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to 
projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data on education and 
health needs have hindered State's efforts to ensure that projects are 
helping the intended beneficiaries. For example, in April 2008, State 
reported that UNHCR was able to effectively monitor approximately 40 to 
59 percent of its implementing partners in Jordan. In November 2008, 
State officials reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete 
annual reviews of UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of 
difficulties getting into each country as a result of visa and security 
restrictions. In Jordan and Syria, difficulty obtaining reliable data 
for the education and health sectors has hindered UN efforts to monitor 
progress. 

U.S. and international efforts to effectively provide humanitarian 
assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by 
two key factors--the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi 
refugees and data on the funding targeted toward Iraqi refugee 
programs. Iraqi refugees mostly live interspersed among the local urban 
populations which has made them difficult to identify. First, official 
government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country 
may be overstated. Jordan and Syria, with the largest reported numbers 
of Iraqi refugees, estimate 450,000 to 500,000 and 1,200,000 to 
1,500,000 Iraqi refugees, respectively, in their countries. In 
contrast, UNHCR reported officially registering 54,411 Iraqis in Jordan 
and 221,506 Iraqis in Syria, as of September 30, 2008. Neither country 
has enabled an independent and comprehensive survey of refugees to be 
undertaken, asserting that assistance should not be targeted toward 
Iraqi refugees while they have vulnerable populations that need help. 
As a result, both countries have based requests for international 
assistance primarily on the health and education needs of their 
citizens rather than on the numbers of Iraqi refugees residing there. 
Accordingly, the U.S. government and the UN have included the needs of 
both Iraqi refugees and host country populations in their Iraqi refugee 
programs. Second, it is difficult to determine the amount of funding 
provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and 
UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not 
report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided 
for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance.[Footnote 4] For fiscal 
years 2003 through 2008, the U.S. government made available about $1.6 
billion and spent about $1.2 billion for all Iraq-related humanitarian 
assistance. UNHCR funding appeals for calendar years 2003 through 2008 
totaled about $730 million and resulted in about $542 million in 
contributions for its Iraq Operation, which, in addition to Iraqi 
refugees, also included internally displaced Iraqis and other 
vulnerable populations in Iraq and host countries. The United States 
contributed about $316 million, or about 58 percent, of these UNHCR 
contributions. According to State, all multilateral and bilateral 
donations from other countries met only a fraction of the needs inside 
and out of Iraq. Representatives of donor countries raised concerns 
regarding the uncertain number of Iraqi refugees and the extent of 
their needs and noted that the lack of objective and complete 
information made it difficult to garner support for funding. Some also 
stated that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi humanitarian 
crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the refugees are 
its citizens, should bear most of the costs. Although in 2007 the Iraqi 
government pledged and later transferred $25 million to support the 
assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is 
unclear whether Iraq plans to provide additional funds to support Iraqi 
refugees. Iraqi officials stated that the government is reluctant to 
fund programs for Iraqi refugees because improving refugee conditions 
in neighboring countries may discourage refugees from returning to 
Iraq. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for 
Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the 
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for 
Iraqis to return. According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited 
improvements in security and offered financial incentives (about 1 
million Iraqi dinars) to returning refugee families. However, according 
to UNHCR, refugees fear leaving the safety of their host countries for 
the uncertain environment in Iraq, and there is no clear trend on the 
number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their country. According to 
the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be returning, but this may be 
due to increasing hardship in their host countries rather than 
improvements in Iraq. Although another solution is integration and 
settlement in host countries, both Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi 
refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation 
improves. In Syria and Jordan, difficulties in renewing visas, a lack 
of funds, and limited access to employment and public services affect 
Iraqi refugees' decisions to stay or return to Iraq. According to 
Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither government 
anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to UNHCR, Syria and 
Jordan are determined not to establish arrangements that might lead to 
permanent residence, such as officially allowing employment of Iraqi 
refugees. Resettlement to a third country is another option, but a 
limited number of countries resettle refugees, according to UNHCR, and 
less than 1 percent of registered refugees worldwide are resettled in 
third countries, according to State. The U.S. government has made 
progress in resettling Iraqi refugees to the United States under its 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, established in February 2007. In 2007, 
the U.S. government admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve 
State's own expectation of resettling 2,000 to 3,000 refugees under the 
program. However, the U.S. government surpassed its fiscal year 2008 
goal of 12,000 with the admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees. According 
to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other countries resettled a total 
of 5,852 refugees in calendar years 2007 and 2008. 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 
international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to 
address the Iraqi refugee situation.[Footnote 5] Although the 
international community has recognized the need to strategically plan 
for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has focused on the crisis within 
Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic planning for 
the refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for 
Iraq and the Region showed significant progress in strategic planning, 
the UN and the international community continue to lack a longer-term 
approach. According to NGOs, the lack of an international strategy has 
hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Syria and 
Jordan. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive 
independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and 
the economically vulnerable populations that host them. Host countries' 
unwillingness to enable these assessments impedes strategic planning 
efforts. Without these assessments, it is difficult to determine the 
scope of the problem and to appropriately prioritize and align 
resources to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Second, State, UNHCR, 
and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect 
assistance efforts. For example, according to NGOs, the annual budget 
focus of UNHCR and key donor countries, including the United States, 
makes it difficult for them to conduct longer-term planning because 
they do not know whether their efforts will be funded from one year to 
the next. Thus, they may focus on shorter-term efforts in lieu of more 
effective long-term efforts. Third, the international community has 
lacked a coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders--including 
the governments hosting refugees, international organizations, NGOs, 
and the donor community--that would help ensure effective delivery of 
assistance. For example, NGOs in Jordan cited duplication of efforts 
and competition for beneficiaries as impeding progress in helping Iraqi 
refugees. NGOs cited the need for international strategic planning to 
use resources efficiently and address coordination difficulties. 

In this report, we make several recommendations. First, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State develop performance measures to assess and 
report progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi 
refugees. Performance goals, objectives, and measures should clearly 
and transparently address the extent to which programs should target 
Iraqi refugees and host government populations. Second, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) Administrator develop systems to separately track 
and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi 
refugee programs in each host country, to the extent practicable. 
Third, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with UNHCR and the 
governments of Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to 
expedite efforts to conduct independent comprehensive assessments of 
the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and the related needs of the 
countries hosting them. Fourth, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies and in coordination 
with the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments, to build on the 
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and 
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance 
and solutions for Iraqi refugees. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, State generally agreed 
with each of our recommendations and noted aspects that the department 
believes might be difficult to implement. USAID commented that our 
recommendation regarding tracking and reporting USAID funding was 
resolved. However, we continue to believe that additional action is 
needed. State's and USAID's written comments and our evaluation of 
those comments are discussed in detail later in this report. State, 
DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which we incorporated where 
appropriate. 

Background: 

According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara in 
February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that increased the number of 
displaced Iraqis. Although military operations, crime, and general 
insecurity remained factors, sectarian violence became the primary 
driver for population displacement.[Footnote 6] As displayed in figure 
1, many Iraqis fled their country and immigrated to neighboring 
countries, particularly to Syria and Jordan. 

Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees: 

[Refer to PDF for image: map] 

Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees: 
Egypt; 
Europe; 
Gulf States; 
Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Jordan; 
Lebanon; 
Syrian Arab Republic; 
Turkey. 

[End of figure] 

According to UNHCR, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for modern 
refugee protection. According to the Convention, a refugee is someone 
who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country...." The 1951 Convention does not apply to 
persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity. UNHCR recognizes and registers as refugees both those 
persons who fall within the 1951 Convention criteria and those falling 
within the extended definition of persons fleeing generalized armed 
conflict or civil unrest. Registration allows UNHCR to identify Iraqis 
in need of protection, offer them assistance, and screen them for 
possible resettlement. According to the UN, of the countries hosting 
Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, only Turkey, Egypt, and Iran are 
parties to the 1951 Convention. Syria and Jordan, the two countries 
hosting the largest number of Iraqi refugees, have not signed the 1951 
Convention. As a result, according to the UN, although the refugees 
have been able to access public services, they have not been able to 
obtain legal employment and may face deportation if they do not comply 
with visa requirements, which have become more restrictive over the 
years.[Footnote 7] According to UNHCR, the identification, 
registration, intervention in detention and deportation, and monitoring 
of access to asylum are important UNHCR functions for refugees. 

UNHCR coordinates the provision and delivery of shelter, food, water, 
sanitation, and medical care to refugees throughout the world. UNHCR is 
also mandated to find solutions to the plight of refugees. According to 
UNHCR, three solutions are available:[Footnote 8] 

* First, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution for the 
majority of refugees. Most refugees prefer to return home as soon as 
circumstances permit (generally when a conflict has ended and a degree 
of stability has been restored). UNHCR promotes, supports, and 
facilitates voluntary repatriation as the best solution for displaced 
people, provided it is safe and reintegration is viable. 

* Second, UNHCR may help refugees integrate and settle in the "asylum," 
or host, country where they reside as refugees. Some refugees cannot or 
are unwilling to return because they would face persecution. According 
to UNHCR, relatively few countries allow refugees to settle. 

* Third, UNHCR may assist refugees in permanently resettling in third 
countries. According to UNHCR, only a small number of nations take part 
in UNHCR resettlement programs worldwide and accept annual quotas of 
refugees. According to State, historically, less than 1 percent of 
registered refugees are resettled in third countries. 

Within the U.S. government, the Department of State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has primary responsibility 
for formulating U.S. foreign policy on population issues, protection 
and assistance to refugees and conflict victims, and international 
migration. It also administers U.S. refugee assistance and admission 
programs. In this capacity, PRM has the lead role within the department 
in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies around the world and 
in working to resolve protracted refugee situations. According to 
State, to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, PRM works closely with 
regional bureaus, U.S. embassies, and U.S. missions to provide guidance 
to its international organization and NGO implementing partners and to 
engage with other donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees. 
PRM primarily implements its U.S. humanitarian assistance goals for 
Iraqi refugees by funding and monitoring international organization and 
nongovernmental organization projects. USAID also provides some 
humanitarian assistance that benefits Iraqi refugees, but according to 
State and USAID, most of its programs focus on efforts within Iraq. PRM 
is also responsible for managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP). Within this program, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) is responsible for interviewing refugees and 
adjudicating their applications for resettlement in the United States. 

Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured Progress in 
Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners Face Monitoring 
Challenges: 

The Department of State and its international partners, including UN 
agencies and NGOs, have funded and implemented a number of programs and 
projects that benefit Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. However, 
although State has established a broad goal and objectives for its 2008 
efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, it did not establish 
performance measures for assessing progress in achieving them. In 
addition, State and its implementing partners face challenges in 
monitoring their Iraqi refugee assistance projects. 

State Department and UN Fund Assistance to Support Iraqi Refugees: 

To implement its goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State 
primarily funds and monitors the activities of its implementing 
partners, which include international organizations and NGOs.[Footnote 
9] According to State, U.S. funding through these organizations has 
supported the most vulnerable refugees and host country populations. 
UNHCR, other international humanitarian organizations, and NGO partners 
provided education, health care, food, financial assistance, and other 
assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations 
(see figure 2). 

Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and Vulnerable 
Host Country Populations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

U.S. government and other international funding: 
* UNHCR, other international humanitarian organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations; 
* Nongovernmental organizations; 

Organizations provide assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host 
populations through direct implementation of projects or implementing 
partners: 

Types of assistance provided to beneficiaries: 
Legal protection; 
Food; 
Nonfood items; 
Vocational training; 
Financial assistance; 
Education; 
Shelter; 
Psychosocial services. 

Sources: GAO analysis of Department of State and UNHCR data; GAO 
(photo); Nova Development (clip art); Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

For example, in Syria, UNHCR and the World Food Program provided food 
rations and nonfood items such as mattresses, blankets, and household 
items to Iraqi refugees. Additionally, in Syria and Jordan, UNHCR 
provided monthly cash assistance primarily to vulnerable Iraqi 
refugees, including single female heads of households. In Syria, for 
example, the heads of households received approximately $100 per month, 
with an additional $10 for each dependent. Appendix V provides more 
details on the number of Iraqis who benefited from UNHCR assistance in 
2008. 

In terms of health care, we visited a clinic in Jordan, funded through 
the State Department's PRM bureau, which assisted Iraqi refugees, and 
met with outreach workers. According to the program manager, the 
project provided health care to Iraqis and stipends for some Iraqi 
women conducting community outreach. (See figure 3, showing an Iraqi 
volunteer conducting outreach.) 

Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: International Relief and Development. 

[End of figure] 

In Syria, we visited another PRM-funded project that provided medical 
assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations 
(see figure 4). According to the program manager, the clinic provided 
primary health care, child health screening, chronic noncommunicable 
disease care, maternal health care, and health education. We toured the 
pharmacy, the dental unit, and the laboratory where basic tests are 
performed. 

Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

At another NGO project site in Syria, we visited a summer school 
program for Iraqi refugee children. According to the program manager, 
in addition to the academic lessons provided in Arabic, English, math, 
and science, Iraqi students participate in summer camp activities. 
During our visit, we observed children participating in various camp 
activities, including arts and crafts and a musical production. 
According to the program manager, all of the participants were Iraqi 
children. He also stated that the children received meals while 
attending the activities. The program manager stated that these 
activities were designed to promote the Iraqi students' emotional and 
social well-being. 

The State Department Has Not Linked Progress to Overall Goals and 
Objectives: 

It is difficult to determine the progress of U.S. efforts to assist and 
protect Iraqi refugees because State's 2008 goal and regional 
objectives were broad and difficult to measure. In addition, State did 
not have corresponding performance measures that clearly linked the 
achievements of its Iraqi refugee activities to progress in meeting its 
overall 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Prior GAO work 
suggests that leading organizations promote accountability by 
establishing results-oriented goals and corresponding performance 
measures by which to gauge progress. Measuring performance allows 
organizations to track the progress they are making toward their goals 
and give managers crucial information on which to base their 
organizational and management decisions.[Footnote 10] Figure 5 provides 
more information on State's 2008 performance management efforts for 
Iraqi refugee assistance compared with leading results-oriented 
practices. 

Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance Management 
Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance with Leading Results-Oriented 
Management Practices: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Leading results-oriented management practices: 

Step 1: 
Establish program goals and objectives; 

Information flows to: 

Step 2: 
Establish performance measures to assess progress; 

Information flows to: 

Step 3: 
Collect data on performance; 

Information flows to: 

Step 4: 
Analyze data and report results; 

Information flows to: 

Step 5: 
Adjust program goals and objectives to improve program efficiency and 
effectiveness; 

Information flows to Step 1. 

State's 2008 procedures[A]: 

Step 1: 
Yes, State established program goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees 
and efforts within Iraq. 

Goals: 
* Maintain humanitarian assistance and protection for Iraqi refugees; 

* Within Iraq, support assistance and protection programs for non-Iraqi 
refugees; 

* Within Iraq, support international organization programs to assist 
and protect returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and 
conflict victims. 

Regional objectives: 

* Meet the assistance and protection needs of refugees and other 
conflict victims through expanded engagement and funding of 
international and nongovernmental organization partners; 

* Contribute to regional stability by channeling humanitarian 
assistance through primary international organization partners; 

* Promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for non-Iraqi and Iraqi refugees; 

* Ensure greater burden sharing among donors, including the Iraqi 
government. 

Information flow lacking to: 

Step 2: 
No, State did not develop performance measures to assess progress 
toward its goals and objectives for Iraqi refugee efforts. Instead, 
State measured global humanitarian assistance and protection efforts, 
but these global performance measures were not linked to Iraq-specific 
program goals and objectives. 

Information flow lacking to: 

Step 3: 
No, State did not collect and compare performance data against 
established performance measures for its goals and objectives. 

Information flow lacking to: 

Step 4: 
N0, State did not analyze performance data and report results. State 
prepared a descriptive report of partners' accomplishments but no 
assessment of how these accomplishments helped achieve State's goals 
and objectives for Iraqi refugees. 

Information flow lacking to: 

Step 5: 
No, Without linkage between partners’ accomplishments and State’s 
overall goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it was difficult to 
assess progress and identify ways to improve program efficiency and 
effectiveness. 

Information flow lacking to Step 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

[A] Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, 
Policy and Implementation Paper for Iraq Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) for FY 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2008). 

[End of figure] 

As shown in figure 5, State established a goal and objectives for its 
2008 efforts concerning Iraqi refugee efforts as part of its overall 
goals and objectives for its efforts to assist refugees, internally 
displaced persons, and other conflict victims.[Footnote 11] However, on 
the basis of our review of State's assessment of progress achieved in 
fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to determine the extent to which 
State achieved its overall goal and objectives.[Footnote 12] Although 
State reported progress achieved in 2008 by sector and at the country 
level,[Footnote 13] it did not aggregate these data to demonstrate how 
these activities that it funded helped State meet its overall goal of 
assisting and protecting Iraqi refugees. Similarly, State did not 
develop corresponding performance measures and milestones, nor did it 
compile and aggregate the data it needed to assess and report on its 
progress in achieving its objectives to expand engagement through 
funding of NGOs and international organizations, contribute to regional 
security by channeling humanitarian assistance through primary 
international organization partners, promote UNHCR to achieve solutions 
for Iraqi refugees, or ensure greater burden sharing. 

State measures PRM's bureauwide progress for humanitarian assistance at 
the global level, but this effort does not include specific performance 
measures for assessing progress toward its goal and objectives for 
Iraqi refugees. According to State officials, the goal and objectives 
for Iraqi refugees are in line with the PRM bureau's overall 
humanitarian response strategic goal for fiscal year 2008 and with its 
performance goals for global refugee protection, solutions, and 
assistance. State officials said that progress on its global efforts is 
measured through bureauwide indicators, including acute malnutrition 
and crude mortality rates. Similarly, progress on protection efforts by 
PRM partners is measured at the global level through performance 
relating to "non-refoulement," as reported in UNHCR's annual protection 
reports.[Footnote 14] However, these indicators are not generally 
applicable to specific programs targeting Iraqi refugees. According to 
State, global acute malnutrition, for example, is used as a proxy of 
the overall health and well-being of a population. PRM monitors 
situations where more than 10 percent of refugee children are suffering 
from wasting;[Footnote 15] where this occurs, high malnutrition levels 
indicate a serious humanitarian crisis. However, according to State 
officials, the absence of reports of acute malnutrition occurring among 
Iraqi refugee children makes this indicator a poor choice for assessing 
the effectiveness of State's Iraqi refugee programs. 

State's implementing partners reported progress against agreed-upon 
performance indicators for assessing Iraqi refugee-related activities. 
[Footnote 16] However, State did not aggregate individual project or 
program performance so that it could measure progress toward its 
overall goal and objectives. GAO previously reported that leading 
organizations seeking to become more results-oriented clearly define 
desired outcomes, measure performance to gauge progress, and use 
performance information as a basis for decision making.[Footnote 17] 
For example, in its 2008 and 2009 policy papers on Iraqi refugees, 
State reported on a number of individual projects but did not 
specifically report how these project-level accomplishments helped 
State achieve its overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. 
[Footnote 18] In addition, on the basis of our review of NGO monitoring 
reports,[Footnote 19] State received information on its partners' 
achievements but did not identify how it would use these data to 
measure and report on overall progress for its Iraqi refugee goal and 
objectives.[Footnote 20] For example, in its NGO guidelines, State 
generally requires that a project demonstrate that at least 50 percent 
of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees.[Footnote 21] According to State 
officials, NGO partners are required to submit beneficiary statistics 
by objectives and indicators. Our review of the 13 available final NGO 
reports showed that in 10 cases NGOs reported that 50 percent or more 
of beneficiaries were Iraqi refugees,[Footnote 22] while in 3 cases 
less than 50 percent were Iraqi refugees.[Footnote 23] However, these 
data were not aggregated or reported as a measure of progress in 
meeting the U.S. goal and objectives for assisting Iraqi refugees. 

For 2009, State has made progress in articulating more results-oriented 
goals and objectives; however, the elements that State identified as 
corresponding performance indicators are not clearly linked to the 
objectives and are not consistently measurable.[Footnote 24] State 
reported that, on the basis of discussions with GAO, it established 
more detailed objectives and indicators for fiscal year 2009 to measure 
progress in providing assistance and protection to Iraqi refugees, 
internally displaced persons, and conflict victims. According to State, 
it has developed a spreadsheet to track progress toward these 
objectives and indicators throughout the year. 

State Department and Its Partners Face Challenges in Project 
Monitoring: 

The Department of State and its implementing partners use a number of 
methods to monitor their refugee programs and activities; however, 
according to State and its implementing partners, a lack of resources, 
difficulty gaining physical access to projects and refugees, and a lack 
of reliable data create challenges to their monitoring and evaluation 
efforts. According to State officials, they monitor their partners' 
programs and projects by conducting site visits, reviewing progress and 
final reports, reviewing NGO project beneficiary statistics, meeting 
and conducting follow-up with program managers, and consulting other 
donors and humanitarian organizations. According to UNHCR officials, 
they have an extensive monitoring system that includes field 
monitoring, program evaluations, and financial account and document 
reviews. State is working with its partners to improve their monitoring 
and evaluation efforts. A Framework for Cooperation between State and 
UNHCR noted that enhancement of the quality of monitoring and 
evaluation activities that UNHCR undertakes deserved particular 
attention.[Footnote 25] Additionally, in State's Framework for 
Cooperation with IOM, both parties committed to strengthening 
monitoring and evaluation capacity and to quantify program results and 
impact more effectively.[Footnote 26] 

While there are challenges to monitoring and evaluation, State has 
taken steps to improve its oversight of NGO projects. For example, in 
the fiscal year 2007 NGO cooperative agreements, State required NGOs to 
provide two reports. The first report covered the first 4 months of the 
project, and the second report covered the last 8 months of the 
project. However, for NGOs funded in fiscal year 2008, State revised 
the formal reporting requirements included in the cooperative 
agreements. As a result, NGOs are required to provide quarterly reports 
on project progress, including progress against objectives and 
indicators. Additionally, State reported that it has expanded the 
template used to track the progress made by NGOs on a quarterly basis. 

However, according to State and implementing partner officials, 
monitoring continues to be impeded by the following challenges. 

* Insufficient monitoring resources: In April 2008, State reported that 
UNHCR effectively monitored approximately 40 to 59 percent of its 
implementing partners' program activity sites in Jordan.[Footnote 27] 
State noted that it faced the same challenges, given that program 
activities are conducted at more than 200 sites and that PRM's officer 
would be able to visit only a fraction of these activities over the 
course of a year. During our visit to a small project site in Jordan, 
the embassy official responsible for monitoring in Jordan noted that 
this was the first visit to the site, given that it was one of the 
smaller projects and embassy staff had limited time to make site 
visits. Moreover, State reported that it expected the problem to 
increase for UNHCR as it continued with plans to decentralize its 
services to Iraqi refugees to 18 locations throughout Jordan. In 
commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has taken 
steps to mitigate the lack of monitoring resources in Jordan.[Footnote 
28] In Syria, monitoring efforts are limited by a lack of PRM 
monitoring staff at the U.S. embassy. In August 2008, a senior U.S. 
embassy official in Syria stated that the U.S. embassy had limited 
staffing resources to monitor all Iraqi refugee program activities. 
According to State, monitoring efforts for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan 
are carried out by two PRM staff based at the U.S. embassy in Jordan 
and visiting PRM staff from Washington, D.C. 

* Difficulty gaining physical access to projects: In November 2008, 
State reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete annual 
reviews of UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of difficulties 
getting into each country because of visa and security restrictions. 
According to State officials, the United States is constrained in 
monitoring its assistance efforts in Syria because of its poor 
relationship with the government of Syria and resulting restrictions on 
the visas of U.S. government visitors. In addition, according to two 
interim program evaluations, State personnel were unable to monitor the 
two NGO projects in Lebanon because of security constraints. The U.S. 
embassy in Beirut operates under strict security protocols that limit 
the ability and flexibility of the mission to host visitors. State 
monitoring officials planned to travel to Beirut in May 2008, but this 
trip was canceled after violence escalated. 

* Lack of reliable data: According to the UN, in both Syria and Jordan, 
difficulty obtaining reliable data in the education and health sectors 
has hindered efforts to monitor progress. For example, according to the 
UN, student attendance data in Jordan are not disaggregated by gender 
and age. According to the UN, information management systems in the 
Syrian and Jordanian health sector need improvement to collect more 
reliable data on beneficiaries served. 

Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and 
UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees: 

U.S. and UNHCR efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to 
Iraqi refugees are challenged by the lack of reliable needs estimates 
and data on funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Without a 
comprehensive assessment of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to 
help ensure sufficient assistance and protection efforts. Donor 
countries are resistant to providing funds without further information 
on the needs. According to UN and donor representatives, they are also 
resistant because they believe the United States and Iraq should fund 
the majority of assistance efforts. 

The Number of Iraqi Refugees and the Extent of Their Needs Are Unknown: 

Efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees are 
hindered by the lack of reliable information on their number, the 
extent of their needs, and the needs of the countries hosting them. 
Iraqi refugees primarily live interspersed among the local urban 
populations, rather than concentrated in camps, and are not easily 
identified. According to the UN, statistics on the number of Iraqi 
refugees in neighboring countries vary and are difficult to verify. The 
UN further notes that efforts are needed to improve data collection on 
Iraqi refugees across the region.[Footnote 29] In contrast to official 
host government estimates of Iraqi refugees, a significantly smaller 
number of refugees have registered with UNHCR for protection and 
assistance (see table 1). However, UNHCR officials stated that the 
registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the number of Iraqi 
refugees in each country because an unknown number of refugees do not 
register or seek assistance.[Footnote 30] The actual number of Iraqi 
refugees in need may be somewhere in between these figures. 

Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring Host 
Government Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported by UNHCR, as of 
September 30, 2008: 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Syrian Arab Republic; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 221,506; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 1,200,000-
1,500,000[A]. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 54,411; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 450,000-500,000. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Lebanon; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 10,764; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 50,000. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Egypt; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 10,163; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: Not available. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Turkey; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 6,610; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: Not available. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 4,861; 
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 27,725. 

Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Gulf Cooperation Council countries[B]; 
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 2,112; Host government 
estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 200,000. 

Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN 2009 Consolidated 
Appeal for Iraq and the Region. 

[A] According to the UN, the total number of Iraqis in Syria remains 
unconfirmed, with estimates ranging from 700,000 to 1.5 million people. 
As of September 2008, the Syrian government reported that 1.2 million 
Iraqis currently hold residence permits. 

[B] Gulf Cooperation Council countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 

[End of table] 

Further, neither Jordan nor Syria, the countries reporting the largest 
number of Iraqi refugees, has enabled an independent, comprehensive 
survey of refugees to be undertaken. As shown in table 1, as of 
September 30, 2008, UNHCR reported that the estimated number of 
refugees, as provided by the governments of Syria and Jordan, was 1.2 
million to 1.5 million in Syria and 450,000 to 500,000 in Jordan. 
[Footnote 31] However, State, NGOs, and international organizations 
have questioned these high numbers.[Footnote 32] In 2007, the Jordanian 
government tasked Fafo, a Norwegian research institute, to estimate the 
number of Iraqi refugees living in the country.[Footnote 33] After Fafo 
estimated that 161,000 Iraqi refugees resided in Jordan, the Jordanian 
government disagreed with the institute's findings, citing conflicting 
estimates. Fafo conducted further work with the Jordanian government 
that resulted in an estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 Iraqi refugees as of 
May 2007.[Footnote 34] According to State, while some NGOs agree with 
this estimate, others believe the number may be as low as 200,000. 
State further reported that although the Jordanian government initially 
approved a UNHCR proposal for a joint study to assess Iraqi refugee 
needs in September 2008, it has yet to take any action to initiate the 
required work. In Syria, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
produced a preliminary study in January 2008 that was intended to 
analyze the Syrian economy since 2003 and assess the macroeconomic 
impact of Iraqi refugees. However, the report, which included estimates 
of the numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria, has not been released to the 
public.[Footnote 35] According to a UNDP official, the study was only a 
preliminary report pending the commissioning of a survey on the number, 
geographic location, and socioeconomic characteristics of Iraqis in 
Syria. UNDP received comments from the Syrian government and agreed to 
incorporate them into the final report. UNDP also found that some of 
the results were contradicted by other studies and agreed with the 
Syrian government on the need to further analyze and validate the 
preliminary results once a survey is conducted. 

Moreover, government officials in Jordan and Syria stress that their 
most vulnerable citizens as well as refugees need assistance. As a 
result, both countries prohibit parallel assistance systems that would 
provide refugees with increased aid and potentially create resentment 
within their respective populations. Both countries have primarily 
based their requests for international assistance on their countries' 
overall health and education needs rather than on the numbers of Iraqi 
refugees. In the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, 
the UN notes that host countries have drawn on their existing social 
services to assist Iraqi refugees. The UN concludes that, therefore, 
efforts should continue to reinforce basic needs such as health and 
education, among others, for all refugees and local populations. 
Although the figure has been debated,[Footnote 36] according to State, 
the Jordanian government contends that Iraqi migration into Jordan has 
cost it about $2 billion over the last 3 years because of increased 
stress on its health, education, and water infrastructure in Amman, 
Zarqa, and Irbid. 

However, the extent to which Iraqi refugees affect these sectors is not 
clear, government numbers are not clearly supported, and supporting 
government assessments are not publicly available. For example, 
according to State, the Jordanian government stated that a total of 
24,000 Iraqis enrolled in public and private schools during the 2007 to 
2008 school year, but some NGOs estimated that the public school 
attendance figure may have been as low as 9,000 students. Both State 
and the UN have reported that the Jordanian government has not made 
disaggregated figures available and has declined to allow independent 
confirmation of the number of students in the public school system. 
Further, NGOs reported that outreach efforts in Syria were discouraged 
by the Syrian government, limiting the ability to obtain information to 
better understand the needs of Iraqi refugees in Syria. Similarly, 
according to State, the Jordanian government has withheld permission 
from UNHCR to conduct mobile registration drives and public outreach 
campaigns. 

In the absence of a comprehensive survey of the needs of all Iraqi 
refugees and a transparent assessment of the impact of Iraqis on host 
countries, the UN relied on available information to identify refugee 
needs. In 2008, the UN expanded the efforts of its working groups and 
relied on the UNHCR central registration system as the most effective 
means for UN agencies to assess needs, estimate refugee movements, and 
understand the changing circumstances of the Iraqi refugee community. 
The UN also considered other information, such as public studies, 
limited surveys, and host government data. As a result of its working 
groups' assessments, in its 2009 Consolidated Appeal, the UN targeted 
assistance in areas such as protection, health, education, sexual and 
gender-based violence, food, psychosocial support and mental health, 
and skills development. The UN tailored programs for what was known at 
the time about the situation in each host country. According to UNHCR 
and NGO officials, to ensure that these programs reach Iraqi refugees, 
they target their assistance programs in Jordan and Syria in poor and 
underserved areas where Iraqi refugees are known to live. However, 
according to the UN, a growing number of Iraqi refugees are leaving 
costly urban areas, resulting in a more dispersed population and 
creating the need for further outreach.[Footnote 37] 

The United States, Donors, and Iraq Have Funded Programs Benefiting 
Iraqi Refugees, but the Total Amount of Funding Explicitly for Iraqi 
Refugee Programs Is Unavailable: 

The amount of U.S., UN, and other funding spent to assist Iraqi 
refugees is not readily available. The U.S. government and UNHCR, 
reportedly the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do 
not always designate and report funding solely for Iraqi refugee 
programs, which target refugees and the vulnerable populations of the 
countries that host them. Instead, the U.S. government reports funding 
for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance that may include 
assistance to Iraqi refugees, internally displaced Iraqis, and other 
vulnerable populations in Iraq and host countries. According to funding 
data provided by State and USAID, for fiscal years 2003 through 2008, 
the U.S. government has apportioned about $1.6 billion, obligated about 
$1.5 billion, and expended about $1.2 billion for all Iraq-related 
humanitarian assistance (see appendix III). 

Similarly, UNHCR includes Iraqi refugees in its Iraq Operation and 
obtains funding through a number of funding appeals made to the 
international community. Some appeals, such as the 2008 UN Iraq 
Consolidated Appeal, were for efforts inside Iraq; others, such as the 
2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal, were intended for 
programs that benefit Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons in 
Iraq, non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq (such as Palestinian refugees in 
Iraq), and Iraqi returnees. For calendar years 2003 through 2008, UNHCR 
appeals for its Iraq operation, including Iraqi refugees, totaled about 
$730 million and resulted in about $542 million in contributions (see 
appendix IV). The United States contributed about 58 percent of the 
donor contributions to these appeals. 

Moreover, in addition to providing UNHCR funding, donor countries also 
fund the appeals and efforts of other UN agencies and international 
organizations that assist Iraqis and other conflict victims in the 
region. Because of the number of overlapping appeals, it is difficult 
to track the amount requested and funded for all Iraq-related 
humanitarian assistance. To better coordinate efforts among UN 
agencies, humanitarian organizations, and donors, in December 2008, for 
the first time, the UN consolidated all of its Iraq-related appeals for 
UN agencies and over 15 NGOs. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq 
and the Region requests $547.3 million, of which $355 million is 
requested for efforts to assist Iraqi refugees and host country 
populations and $192.3 million is requested for efforts within Iraq. 

In addition to multilateral funding, an unknown amount of bilateral 
funding and private contributions is made to programs benefiting Iraqi 
refugees and others. The UN's Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs reports data on multilateral and bilateral 
contributions. However, it relies primarily on self-reporting, and the 
data may be incomplete. According to State, all donations from other 
countries meet a small fraction of the needs inside and out of Iraq. 
State officials also noted that the department demarched both the Gulf 
States and traditional donors in 2007 and 2008, asking for greater 
support. However, representatives of donor countries raised concerns 
regarding the uncertain numbers of Iraqi refugees and the extent of 
their needs, and they noted that the lack of objective and complete 
information made it difficult to garner support for funding. Some also 
noted that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi humanitarian 
crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the refugees are 
its citizens, should bear most of the funding costs. 

Although the Iraqi government pledged funds in 2007 to support the 
assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is 
unclear whether additional funds will be provided. The Iraqi government 
pledged $25 million to assist neighboring countries hosting Iraqi 
refugees. Of this amount, the government provided $15 million to Syria, 
$2 million to Lebanon, and $8 million to UNHCR in Jordan. For efforts 
within Iraq, the Iraqi government donated $40 million, left over from 
the Oil for Food Program, to the World Food Program through the UN's 
2008 Iraq Consolidated Appeal. In August 2008, Iraq's Council of 
Representatives passed a supplemental budget that included an 
additional $208 million primarily for IDPs and Iraqi returnees. It is 
unclear whether any of these funds are intended for or have been 
expended for Iraqi refugees. Iraqi officials noted that the government 
is reluctant to fund programs for Iraqi refugees because improving 
refugee conditions in neighboring countries may discourage refugees 
from returning to Iraq. Instead, the Iraqi government's position is to 
improve conditions in Iraq to encourage returns and focus government 
resources on those Iraqis who are displaced within the country. 
According to the UN, in 2009, the Iraqi government plans to direct more 
of its resources to the poorest Iraqi families in Iraq. 

The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering Permanent 
Solutions for Iraqi Refugees: 

The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering permanent 
solutions for Iraqi refugees. Conditions in Iraq are not suitable for 
their return, and host countries such as Jordan and Syria prefer that 
the refugees return to Iraq. Although the United States is making 
progress resettling Iraqi refugees in the United States, a limited 
number of Iraqi refugees are being resettled abroad. 

Conditions Are Not Suitable for Repatriation, and Neighboring Host 
Countries Resist Integrating Refugees: 

According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred permanent 
solution for the majority of refugees worldwide. However, in the case 
of Iraq, according to the UN and the IDP Working Group,[Footnote 38] 
the conditions for their return are not yet suitable.[Footnote 39] 
According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in 
security and offered financial incentives (about 1 million Iraqi 
dinars) to returning refugee families. However, while the UN notes that 
some improvements have been made, the UN cites major obstacles to large-
scale returns, including the uncertain security situation,[Footnote 40] 
lack of a mechanism for restoring ownership of property, lack of access 
to basic services, and the need for reconciliation among ethno-
religious groups and political solutions. According to the U.S. Senior 
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and IDP Affairs, the most critical 
challenge is the uncertain security environment. According to the UN, 
although voluntary return is the preferred solution, Iraqi refugees 
should not be encouraged to return until the security situation allows 
for large-scale return and sufficient monitoring. 

Nonetheless, according to the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be 
returning, but it may be more due to increasing hardship in the host 
country and some recent improvements in security rather than 
significant improvements in Iraq. According to UNHCR, there is no clear 
trend regarding the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their 
country. In Jordan and Syria, difficulties in renewing visas and a lack 
of funds, employment, and public services affect Iraqi refugees' 
decisions to stay or return to Iraq. Moreover, according to UNHCR, 
refugees may return to Iraq for religious holidays and school breaks or 
to visit family and property. Returning refugees may become internally 
displaced if their homes have been destroyed or occupied. In early 
August 2008, the Iraqi Chairman of the Committee for the Displaced 
noted the difficulties in removing the current occupants of homes owned 
by Iraqi refugees who want to return. According to UNHCR and the IDP 
Working Group, returnees primarily return to neighborhoods, districts, 
and governates under control of the sects to which they belong, and as 
of August 2008, few families had returned to areas under the control of 
another sect. Moreover, some refugees, including many with whom we met 
in Jordan and Syria, will not leave because they fear that they will be 
unable to return to their host country, if needed, because of the 
tightening of borders since they left Iraq. Others fear they cannot 
safely return to Iraq because of their ethnic or religious identity or 
employment by coalition forces. Although the Iraqi government, with the 
support of UNHCR and others in the international community, has 
initiated planning for the return of refugees, some international 
organizations reported that it is unknown whether the Iraqi government 
has the capacity to implement such plans.[Footnote 41] 

Meanwhile, according to the UN, the continued willingness of countries 
in the region to host Iraqi refugees is essential to ensuring refugee 
protection; however, opportunities for local integration in neighboring 
countries are limited for Iraqi refugees. The governments of Syria and 
Jordan consider Iraqi refugees to be "guests" and have stated their 
preference that the refugees return to Iraq once the security situation 
in Iraq improves rather than integrate and settle in their countries. 
On the one hand, a tradition of hosting and protecting Arab nationals 
provides a political and moral imperative to accept Iraqis in need of 
refuge, according to the UN and the international community. On the 
other hand, Syria and Jordan are determined not to establish 
arrangements that might lead to permanence, such as officially allowing 
employment of Iraqi refugees, according to UNHCR. According to 
Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither government 
anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to the UN, most 
countries in the region have provided Iraqi refugees with access to 
education and health care even though social services and 
infrastructure were already strained meeting the needs of the local 
population. 

Although the international community has commended both Syria and 
Jordan--Syria in particular--for initially opening their borders to 
refugees, both countries have now tightened their borders because of 
security and economic factors and their own capacity to address the 
situation. According to State, UNHCR, and host government officials, 
both governments are concerned that the past Palestinian refugee 
experience may repeat itself. According to State, UNHCR, and host 
government officials, parallel assistance systems or institutions, such 
as schools, camps, and social services that were created to serve the 
Palestinian population became an incentive for Palestinians to stay in 
Jordan or Syria. These parallel structures created resentment among the 
host population, which led to a strong desire for these governments not 
to do the same for the Iraqis.[Footnote 42] State reported that the 
Jordanian government wishes to avoid the perception that Iraqis, like 
Palestinians, intend to stay in Jordan and compete with Jordanians for 
jobs and resources. 

The United States Has Made Recent Progress in Resettlement Efforts, but 
Limited Numbers of Refugees May Be Resettled Worldwide: 

The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees 
under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; however, only a limited 
number of other countries have admitted Iraqi refugees through 
resettlement programs.[Footnote 43] Once the program was announced, in 
February 2007, State estimated that if USRAP became fully operational, 
then the U.S. government would be able to admit 2,000 to 3,000 refugees 
in fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2008, the U.S. administration 
formally established an admission goal of 12,000 Iraqi refugees. 
Although the U.S. government did not meet State's fiscal year 2007 
goal, admitting 1,608 Iraqi refugees, it surpassed its fiscal year 2008 
goal, admitting 13,823 Iraqi refugees as of September 30, 2008 (see 
table 2 for processing steps and progress made). 

Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions under 
USRAP, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008: 

Key processing steps: Referrals and applications; received; 
Fiscal Year 2007: 11,646; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 28,886; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 40,532. 

Key processing steps: Prescreened by State Department's overseas 
processing entity (OPE); 
Fiscal Year 2007: 7,519; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 25,111; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 32,630. 

Key processing steps: Applicants interviewed and adjudicated for 
refugee status by DHS; 
Fiscal Year 2007: 4,422; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 24,845; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 29,267. 

Key processing steps: Applicant pending final DHS; decision; 
Fiscal Year 2007: 32; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 1,073; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 1,105. 

Key processing steps: Applicant denied by DHS; 
Fiscal Year 2007: 819; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 2,160; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 2,979. 

Key processing steps: Applicant approved by DHS for refugee status (and 
awaiting completion of outprocessing coordinated by OPE); 
Fiscal Year 2007: 2,378; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 21,812; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 24,190. 

Key processing steps: Admitted to the United States; 
Fiscal Year 2007: 1,608; 
Fiscal Year 2008: 13,823; 
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 15,431. 

Source: GAO analysis based on information from the Department of State, 
Refugee Processing Center, Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing 
System. 

[End of table] 

PRM is responsible for managing USRAP. PRM's regional refugee 
coordinator accepts referrals from UNHCR, embassies, and certain NGOs 
[Footnote 44] and provides them to an overseas processing entity (OPE). 
[Footnote 45] Certain categories of Iraqis with U.S. affiliations may 
apply directly for consideration under the USRAP program in Jordan, 
Egypt, and Iraq.[Footnote 46] The OPEs, working under a cooperative 
agreement with State, prescreen cases by collecting and verifying 
personal and family information, details of persecution or feared harm, 
and information for security name checks. State has cooperative 
agreements with IOM, which operates processing centers in Damascus, 
Amman, Cairo, and Baghdad, and the International Catholic Migration 
Commission, which operates centers in Istanbul and Beirut.[Footnote 47] 
Once the OPE prescreens the case, it is then provided to USCIS, of DHS, 
which makes periodic visits to the regions to interview refugees and 
adjudicate their applications for resettlement in the United States. 
[Footnote 48] Once USCIS approves or conditionally approves cases, they 
are returned to the OPE, which coordinates outprocessing, including 
security clearances, medical examinations, cultural orientation, and 
travel arrangements. Once the security background check and medical 
examination are completed with no adverse findings, then the refugee 
and eligible family members are cleared for departure to the United 
States. 

The U.S. government and UNHCR acknowledged that they initially faced 
challenges setting up and expanding their resettlement programs for 
Iraqi refugees. State's Office of Inspector General reported that State 
had little processing infrastructure in place in the region when the 
Iraqi resettlement program was announced in February 2007. According to 
the Inspector General, State had no permanent OPE presence in Damascus 
or Amman, UNHCR was not actively engaged in registering refugees, and 
USCIS had no permanent presence in the region. According to DHS and 
State, one reason for initial delays in processing resettlement 
referrals in Syria was the Syrian government's delays in approving 
visas for DHS officials and limitations set on IOM staffing and 
operations. However, according to UNHCR and State, a significant 
increase in the number of resettlement departures to the United States 
has occurred since June 2008.[Footnote 49] According to State and IOM 
officials, this has been due to increased processing capabilities after 
the initial expansion of the U.S. refugee-processing program. According 
to the Inspector General, on average, the total processing time from 
case creation to arrival in the United States for Iraqi refugee cases 
is 222 days. This is less than the average of 452 days for all other 
refugee cases worldwide.[Footnote 50] According to State officials, 
every case moves through USRAP at a different pace and can be delayed 
at any step along the way; however, if serious delays occur in any one 
case, they are generally due to the time it takes to complete security 
clearances.[Footnote 51] 

In contrast to U.S. efforts, only a small number of nations take part 
in resettlement programs and accept annual quotas of refugees from 
around the world, according to UNHCR. UNHCR refers cases to potential 
resettlement countries. According to State officials, most of its USRAP 
applicants come to the program through UNHCR referrals. According to 
UNHCR, the numbers referred to each country are negotiated based on the 
numbers each country is willing to consider for resettlement. In August 
2008, UNHCR reported that since the first quarter of calendar year 
2007, of the more than 40,000 Iraqis referred for resettlement, about 
30,000 were referred to the United States. According to UNHCR, for 
calendar years 2007 and 2008, the United States had resettled a total 
of 15,170 Iraqi refugees, while other countries had resettled 5,852 
Iraqi refugees, as of September 30, 2008 (see table 3). 

Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of 
Resettlement, Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of September 30, 
2008: 

Resettlement country: Canada; 
Calendar year 2007: 793; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 1,257; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 2,050. 

Resettlement country: Australia; 
Calendar year 2007: 464; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 954; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 1,418. 

Resettlement country: Sweden; 
Calendar year 2007: 856; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 427; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 1,283. 

Resettlement country: Netherlands; 
Calendar year 2007: 124; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 162; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 286. 

Resettlement country: Finland; 
Calendar year 2007: 23; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 113; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 136. 

Resettlement country: Norway; 
Calendar year 2007: 54; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 32; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 86. 

Resettlement country: Others; 
Calendar year 2007: 64; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 529; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 593. 

Resettlement country: Subtotal; 
Calendar year 2007: 2,378; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 3,474; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 5,852. 

Resettlement country: United States; 
Calendar year 2007: 2,615; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 12,555; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 15,170. 

Resettlement country: Total; 
Calendar year 2007: 4,993; 
Calendar year 2008 through September: 16,029; 
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 21,022. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data compiled by UNHCR from resettlement 
countries. 

Note: While the U.S. government generally reports its data on a fiscal 
year basis, the UN and many international organizations report their 
data on a calendar year basis. According to UNHCR, data received from 
resettlement countries has not been verified. 

[End of table] 

Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered 
Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees: 

According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the 
international community lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the 
Iraqi refugee situation. We previously reported that strategic planning 
is a key element in results-oriented management.[Footnote 52] A 
strategic plan should contain long-term goals that cover a period of 
not less than 5 years from the year it is submitted and should be 
updated and revised at least every 3 years.[Footnote 53] Although the 
international community has recognized the need to strategically plan 
for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has often focused on the crisis 
within Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic 
planning for the refugee situation. Specifically, the international 
community lacks a comprehensive international strategy that fully 
identifies and aligns the need with resources, identifies and addresses 
factors that may affect planning efforts, and ensures coordination 
among stakeholders. 

UN Continues to Recognize Need for Comprehensive Strategic Planning for 
Iraqi Refugees, but Focus Remains on Annual Country Operations Plans 
and Funding Appeals: 

Although the international community has recognized the need for 
international strategic planning to address the Iraqi refugee 
situation, its strategic planning efforts have focused on the situation 
in Iraq while calling for more to be done for Iraqi refugees. In 
January 2007, UNHCR stated that its operational and contingency plans 
must be revised and undertaken as part of a wider effort that involves 
other UN agencies and government and NGO stakeholders.[Footnote 54] 
UNHCR further noted that the security, political, social, and financial 
impact on Iraq, the region, and beyond would be felt for many years and 
that the response to Iraqi displacement must incorporate a long-term 
perspective to ensure protection for Iraqis and other displaced groups 
and overall stability in the region. According to the UN, beginning in 
January 2007, a series of high-level and technical consultations took 
place, involving key humanitarian agencies, UN headquarters, and UN 
member states, including the Iraqi government. These consultations 
resulted in the broad recognition that a humanitarian crisis was 
unfolding in Iraq and that a multisector interagency response was 
required. 

Accordingly, in April 2007, the UN Country Team for Iraq, under the 
leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, developed the Strategic 
Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq as a basis for a coordinated 
response by the international community.[Footnote 55] However, this 
framework solely focused on the immediate measures needed to expedite 
humanitarian assistance inside Iraq. It also called for a comprehensive 
approach to addressing the concerns of the Iraqi population displaced 
to neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Syria. Moreover, when 
governments in the region, donors, international organizations, and 
NGOs convened in April 2007 at a UNHCR-initiated international 
humanitarian conference on displaced Iraqis, the NGOs called for a 
multifaceted international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee 
situation.[Footnote 56] However, a comprehensive long term approach has 
yet to be developed. 

UNHCR and State have focused on UNHCR's annual planning efforts for 
UNHCR and its implementing partners and myriad funding appeals rather 
than on a comprehensive international strategic plan. State and UNHCR 
note that planning for Iraqi and other refugees is done through the 
annual UNHCR country operations plans. Each year, with donor input, 
UNHCR develops country operations plans that provide a summary of 
UNHCR's program goals and objectives for refugees in each country in 
which it operates. However, these plans, focusing on the efforts of 
UNHCR and its implementing partners, do not contain a mechanism to 
measure longer term progress in achieving strategic goals. Further, the 
complete plan has not always been made public.[Footnote 57] In January 
2008, UNHCR issued its Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal, which 
sought funds and support to address the immediate protection and 
assistance needs of Iraqi refugees, internally displaced Iraqis, 
refugees returning to Iraq, and refugees from other countries living in 
Iraq. Although the appeal provided information on activities, 
objectives, and targets, it did not prioritize efforts for funding and 
sets targets only for the immediate appeal. In February 2008, UNHCR 
stated that the international community needed to develop strategies 
and allocate resources that not only address immediate and medium-term 
needs, but also acknowledge that, over the long term, a significant 
portion of displaced Iraqis may never return.[Footnote 58] According to 
the 2007 study by Fafo, a Norwegian research institute, only one in 
five Iraqis in Jordan had concrete plans to immigrate to a third 
country.[Footnote 59] 

With the release of its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the 
Region in December 2008, the UN has shown progress in its strategic 
planning efforts for Iraqi refugees. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated 
Appeal is a 1-year funding request and plan and does not include or 
refer to strategic plans for the longer term. According to the UN, the 
2009 UN Consolidated Appeal's Pillar II, which focuses on Iraqi 
refugees, targets Iraqi refugee needs in accordance with priorities 
agreed to by all concerned humanitarian actors and, for the first time, 
presents a comprehensive statement of their planned response. Rather 
than have separate and sometimes overlapping appeals and strategies as 
in the past, UN agencies came together, and with NGO and donor input, 
developed one funding appeal and plan for the Iraqi refugee situation. 
Pillar II states the mission,[Footnote 60] and the objectives of the 
humanitarian action plans for each host country are clearly aligned 
with the strategic objectives for the year and with UNHCR's overall 
goals to protect and assist refugees.[Footnote 61] The UN expects its 
2009 Consolidated Appeal to serve as a framework for UN and NGO 
collaboration across the region. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal also 
includes a monitoring and evaluation plan and notes that there will be 
a midyear progress report in June 2009. However, the 2009 UN 
Consolidated Appeal lacks long term goals, and while it uses available 
information to assess needs, it is not based on a comprehensive needs 
assessment and is unclear on how efforts will be prioritized if the 
appeal is not fully funded. Further, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal 
relies on existing coordination mechanisms that the NGOs stated were 
problematic.[Footnote 62] 

Lack of International Strategic Planning Has Hindered Efforts to Assist 
Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Host Countries: 

According to NGOs, the lack of a comprehensive international strategy 
has hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and 
Syria. Specifically, the international community lacks a strategic 
planning effort for the assistance of Iraqi refugees that includes (1) 
a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Iraqi refugees and 
vulnerable host government populations and uses this assessment to 
prioritize activities for funding; (2) a discussion of the limitations 
of annual budget cycles and efforts to mitigate these limitations; and 
(3) a coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders, including host 
country governments, international organizations, international and 
local NGOs (including local churches), and donor countries. 

First, the international community lacks a comprehensive assessment of 
the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the economically vulnerable 
populations that host them that would establish a baseline for 
strategic planning. Without a comprehensive needs assessment in host 
countries such as Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to determine the 
scope of the problem and to appropriately prioritize and align 
resources to address the Iraqi refugee situation. This is particularly 
important given the limited amount of funding and resources, as well as 
the decision to avoid developing parallel systems. However, to date, 
host countries' unwillingness to enable completion of these assessments 
impedes strategic planning. 

Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses 
concerns raised about factors that may impact assistance efforts, such 
as the limitations of working with annual budget cycles and efforts to 
mitigate these limitations. According to State, UNHCR, and NGOs, the 
annual budget cycle of UNHCR and State's annual funding determinations 
for NGOs impede strategic planning efforts. According to State, 
planning is constrained by a reliance on donors whose contributions are 
inconsistent from year to year and whose annual budget cycles undermine 
multiyear planning on the part of UNHCR and other international 
humanitarian organizations. According to a UNHCR official, the 
organization is constrained by a supplementary budget process that has 
to be approved and renewed each year, thus forcing UNHCR to focus on 
annual objectives and targets. According to NGOs, the annual budget 
focus of UNHCR and key donor countries, including the United States, 
makes it difficult for them to conduct longer-term planning because 
they do not know whether their efforts will be funded from one year to 
the next. Thus, they may focus on shorter term efforts in lieu of more 
effective long term efforts. 

Third, NGOs noted that a comprehensive international strategy with long-
term goals is needed to improve coordination among all stakeholders to 
provide humanitarian assistance, effectively use the limited resources 
available, and prevent duplication of effort. On the basis of 
discussions with NGOs and UNHCR and a review of NGO progress reports 
and State's interim progress evaluations of its NGO implementing 
partners, we found that the lack of coordination among stakeholders has 
hindered progress. For example, according to interviews and reporting, 
the international community in Syria lacks an adequate coordination 
mechanism. UNHCR, to maintain a good working relationship with Syrian 
authorities, will officially meet and coordinate only with NGOs 
formally approved to work in the country by the Syrian Arab Red 
Crescent (SARC). According to U.S., UNHCR, and NGO officials, the SARC 
registration process is lengthy and nontransparent. Few NGOs have 
obtained formal SARC approval, although the number of approvals is 
increasing. According to NGOs, unapproved NGOs are not invited to UN 
coordination meetings and attempts to meet with UN agencies in Syria 
and develop formal beneficiary referral processes have been 
unsuccessful, even for those implementing U.S. programs. 

Moreover, NGOs in Syria further stated that there is limited 
information sharing between church and other humanitarian organizations 
and UNHCR and relevant UN organizations. The Syrian government has not 
required SARC approval for assistance provided by churches in Syria. 
Church officials stated that they were unaware of UNHCR coordination 
meetings. According to UNHCR, its religious organization partners are 
aware of coordination meetings but may not attend because they want to 
maintain a low profile. An NGO that was approved by SARC reported to 
State that the lack of full NGO participation, including that of 
churches, means that coordination meetings do not include all NGO 
activities assisting Iraqis in Syria. According to a State official, 
the department ensures coordination among its NGO implementing 
partners. NGOs noted that more needs to be done to coordinate efforts 
in Syria as the number of NGOs increases. 

In Jordan, UNHCR reported that implementing partners do not speak 
directly with each other to coordinate areas and types of coverage. For 
example, UNHCR reported in its Annual Program Interim Report for 2008 
that its effort to decentralize the delivery of essential services and 
humanitarian assistance in 17 geographical areas in Jordan was not 
fully implemented and was delayed because of operational constraints 
and lack of coordination among implementing partners. As a result, 
UNHCR decided to decentralize fewer services in fewer locations and 
conduct outreach to other locations. Also, according to NGOs in Jordan, 
coordination is made difficult by the large number of NGOs operating in 
Jordan on similar programs. NGO officials stated that at one point, the 
same beneficiaries were attending multiple programs offering the same 
services and that NGOs were competing for and taking beneficiaries from 
each other's programs. UNHCR commented that as soon as the organization 
became aware of the situation, it took immediate action. According to 
NGOs, they are now working by sector (health, education, etc.) in 
conjunction with UN agencies to prevent duplication that may have 
occurred among their programs. UNHCR is also developing a database of 
beneficiaries in Jordan--the Beneficiary Information System--that is 
intended to make enrollment in NGO programs more transparent. However, 
UNHCR encountered difficulties establishing the new system, including 
delays in data entry, inconsistent use of the system, and noncompliance 
with established procedures and guidelines on the part of implementing 
partners. According to UNHCR's 2008 annual interim program report, it 
has provided additional data entry staff and training for implementing 
partners to address these issues. 

According to international organization, NGO, and State officials, it 
may be difficult to engage countries hosting Iraqi refugees in 
international strategic planning efforts because these countries want 
the refugees to be repatriated as soon as feasible. According to 
Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi government officials, they did not 
initially expect the refugee situation to be a long term problem. 
However, Jordanian and Syrian government officials spoke of the long 
term needs of their education and health sectors, which they said were 
most affected by the refugee situation. In accordance with host country 
requirements that parallel assistance systems not be developed, refugee 
assistance programs have been targeted to both refugees and vulnerable 
populations in each country. Moreover, according to UNHCR, although 
repatriation is the primary goal, the return of refugees to Iraq will 
need to be phased in over time. While NGOs praise Syria and Jordan for 
hosting refugees, they also note that more needs to be done to 
coordinate efforts to register refugees and facilitate the work of 
relief and resettlement organizations. 

Conclusion: 

The global community is looking to the United States to address the 
Iraqi refugee situation. However, without a comprehensive assessment of 
the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, it is 
difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure assistance and 
protection for these refugees. Given that programs and funding 
currently target both refugees and vulnerable host country populations, 
the lack of transparent and complete assessments of the impact of the 
refugees on critical sectors, such as health and education, further 
exacerbates planning efforts. Similarly, the lack of transparent data 
on funding complicates efforts to make decisions regarding the 
assistance to be provided for neighboring countries. Further, without 
performance measures that assess overall progress in achieving U.S. 
goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it is not possible to show the 
full impact of U.S. assistance efforts. Moreover, without a 
comprehensive international strategy with long-term goals and the 
involvement of all stakeholders, it is difficult to effectively use the 
limited resources available. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance the ability of the Department of State to evaluate and 
report progress toward its stated goals and objectives to assist Iraqi 
refugees, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop performance 
measures to fully assess and report progress in achieving U.S. goals 
and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Performance measures and indicators 
should be clearly linked to progress in achieving stated goals and 
objectives. Performance goals, objectives, and measures should clearly 
and transparently address the extent to which programs should target 
refugees and host government populations, respectively, to the extent 
practicable. 

To provide more transparency in funding provided for Iraqi refugee 
programs and help Congress and the Administration consider funding 
requests for neighboring countries, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State and the USAID Administrator develop systems to separately track 
and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi 
refugee programs in each host country, to the extent practicable. 

To enhance the ability of the U.S. government and the international 
community to plan their assistance programs based on need and provide 
longer term solutions for Iraqi refugees, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State take the following two actions: 

1. Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other 
relevant host governments to expedite efforts to conduct independent 
comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and 
the related needs of the countries hosting them. 

2. In conjunction with relevant U. S. agencies and in coordination with 
the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the 
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and 
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance 
and solutions for Iraqi refugees. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Homeland Security, USAID, and UNHCR. State and USAID provided written 
comments, which are reprinted in appendixes VI and VII, respectively. 
State, DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated where appropriate. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally agreed with 
our recommendations regarding the need for improvements in measuring 
progress, assessing needs, tracking and reporting funding, and 
developing an international strategic plan for Iraqi refugees. However, 
State commented that it does not measure progress for specific refugee 
populations because such specificity runs counter to State's principles 
of universality and impartiality. We recognize throughout the report 
that State's refugee programs help both Iraqi refugees and vulnerable 
populations in the host countries. However, State's NGO guidelines 
generally require that its projects demonstrate that at least 50 
percent of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees. Given the importance of 
the Iraqi refugee situation to the United States, and the fact that 
State established goals and objectives specifically for Iraqi refugees 
and efforts within Iraq for 2008 and 2009, we believe that it is 
important that State establish performance measures and indicators that 
are clearly linked to its goals and objectives. 

Additionally, regarding our recommendation to track and report U.S. 
funding for Iraqi refugee programs, State noted that it is not 
practicable to track and report multilateral contributions for Iraqi 
refugees at the country level. We realize that State may not always be 
able to specifically track and report funding that is comingled by 
multilateral and international organizations before being apportioned 
to projects in each host country. However, State could provide Congress 
with information on the large percentage of U.S. contributions to UNHCR 
appeals and information from UNHCR on projects funded in each country. 
In addition, State should track and report bilateral funding for 
neighboring countries hosting Iraqi refugees, funding for its NGO 
implementing partners, and funding for specific multilateral and 
international organization projects. As a result, Congress and the 
Administration would be better able to assess funding requests from 
Iraq's neighboring countries and incorporate funding data into future 
planning efforts. 

In response to our recommendation that the USAID Administrator develop 
systems to separately track and report funding for Iraqi refugee 
programs, USAID noted that the issue was resolved because the agency no 
longer provides assistance to Iraqi refugees. We continue to believe 
that USAID needs improvement in tracking and reporting funding for 
Iraqi refugee assistance. First, based on data that USAID provided, it 
appears that the agency is still expending funds on Iraqi refugee 
programs. Second, the agency had considerable difficulty tracking, 
reporting, and verifying the accuracy of its funding data when GAO 
requested the information, resulting in a protracted effort that 
extended over a period of months. USAID had difficulty reconciling its 
funding data with amounts it previously reported to State as Iraq- 
related humanitarian assistance. USAID officials stated that the agency 
does not have a centralized system for tracking funding for Iraq- 
related humanitarian assistance. To help Congress and the 
Administration consider funding requests for neighboring countries and 
to better incorporate these requests into planning efforts, USAID 
should develop a system for tracking and reporting funding for Iraqi 
refugee assistance. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and the Administrator for USAID. We will also make copies 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chair:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chair:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
United States Senate: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs: 

Two U.S. special immigrant visa (SIV) programs afford qualified Iraqis 
with opportunities to immigrate to the United States. Some Iraqi 
refugees may qualify under these programs. The first SIV program, 
established in fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan translators 
and their dependents and resulted in 2,130 visas issued in fiscal years 
2007 and 2008.[Footnote 63] The second SIV program, established in 
fiscal year 2008, targeted certain Iraqis who had been U.S. government 
employees, contractors, or subcontractors and their dependents. 
[Footnote 64] This program resulted in a total of 705 visas issued in 
fiscal year 2008. 

Management and Processing of Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis: 

The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Consular Affairs 
administers laws, formulates regulations, and implements policies 
relating to consular services and immigration. Consular Affairs 
administers two SIV programs, in conjunction with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), to further assist Iraqis wanting to 
permanently immigrate to the United States. Principal applicants and 
their families who meet the conditions may file a petition (Form I-360) 
with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The 
petition is to include information about the petitioners and their 
immediate family members, proof of nationality, a favorable 
recommendation documenting their service, and other supporting 
documents. USCIS examiners evaluate the petition and, if it is 
approved, send it to State's National Visa Center. The center contacts 
the applicants and sets an embassy or consulate location for a visa 
interview, informs the applicant about the materials and documents 
required, verifies by e-mail that applicants have collected all 
required documents, and may request a security advisory opinion. The 
applicants and family members formally submit their application to a 
consular officer in person at the embassy or consulate. Consular 
officers interview applicants and review documents submitted and 
security and medical clearances and issue an immigrant visa if 
candidates satisfy all criteria. Iraqi SIV recipients are eligible for 
the same resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other 
benefits as Iraqi refugees admitted under the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program (USRAP).[Footnote 65] Finally, DHS officers verify the entire 
SIV package upon the applicants' arrival in the United States before 
granting individuals admission as lawful permanent resident aliens. 
Recipients of SIVs have lawful permanent residence status upon entry 
into the United States and are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship 
after residing for 5 years in the United States. 

State and DHS Implemented Two Special Immigrant Visa Programs That Were 
Available to Qualified Iraqi Refugees and Others: 

The Departments of State and Homeland Security have implemented two SIV 
programs, established by Congress, to further assist qualified Iraqis 
who worked for the U.S. government and want to immigrate to the United 
States.[Footnote 66] Qualifying Iraqi refugees may apply for these 
programs. However, the Departments of State and Defense have not 
maintained a complete record of Iraqis working for the U.S. government. 
In August 2008, the Congressional Budget Office reported that between 
2003 and 2007, an estimated 70,500 Iraqi nationals worked as 
contractors for the U.S. government. However, this number does not 
include Iraqi subcontractors because the Department of State and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development could not provide this 
information.[Footnote 67] 

The first SIV program, established under section 1059 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and 
Afghan translators and their dependents and resulted in a total of 
2,130 visas issued in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as of September 30, 
2008. In January 2006, Congress authorized that up to 50 Iraqi or 
Afghan translators who worked directly with U.S. armed forces and met 
other conditions as outlined in the law could receive SIVs during any 
fiscal year. Those who qualified are known as principal applicants. 
Spouses and children of principal applicants could also receive SIVs, 
but they were not counted against the authorized cap. In June 2007, 
Congress amended the program, authorizing an increase in the limit to 
500 SIVs for each fiscal year 2007 and 2008 and expanding it to cover 
both translators and interpreters who worked directly for the U.S. 
armed forces and those that worked under the chief of mission 
authority.[Footnote 68] According to State, given that Congress 
increased the limit late in the fiscal year, the department had little 
time to notify and process an additional 450 applicants. Therefore, 
according to State, it exercised its authority, under section 203(g) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, to estimate and 
anticipate the future number of visa approvals and thus scheduled far 
more applicants for interviews than the available number of SIVs. 
According to State, this was done on the assumptions that some would 
not appear for the interview, clearances would not be received, or some 
might not qualify. State officials said that while a cutoff date is 
usually imposed for other immigrant visa categories, it was not imposed 
for this program because these applicants faced imminent danger and 
State did not want to fall short of the cap. The result was that State 
exceeded its 500 limit in fiscal year 2007 by issuing 526 SIVs for 
principal applicants and in fiscal year 2008 by issuing 560 SIVs for 
principal applicants (see table 4). 

Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan 
Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under Section 1059, as 
of September 30, 2008: 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 500; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 429; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 92; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 5; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 526; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Iraqi: 383; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Afghan: 69; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Other: 10; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Total: 462; 
Total number of issued visas: 988. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 500; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 357; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 202; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 1; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 560; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Iraqi: 350; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Afghan: 221; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Other: 11; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Total: 582; 
Total number of issued visas: 1,142. 

Fiscal year: Totals; 
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 1,000; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 786; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 294; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 6; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 1,086; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Iraqi: 733; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Afghan: 290; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Other: 21; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Total: 1,044; 
Total number of issued visas: 2,130. 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Note: "Other" includes Iraqi and Afghani nationals who were born in a 
country other than Afghanistan or Iraq. The State Department tracks 
data by the applicant's country of birth. 

[End of table] 

The second SIV program, established under section 1244 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, targets certain Iraqis 
who have been U.S. government employees, contractors, or subcontractors 
and their dependents[Footnote 69]. This program had resulted in 705 
visas issued in fiscal year 2008. In January 2008, Congress authorized 
up to 5,000 Iraqis, per year for the next 5 fiscal years, who worked 
for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq and had experienced or 
are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of that 
employment and who meet other conditions outlined in the law, could 
receive SIVs. Further, the law allowed that if the 5,000 ceiling was 
not met in any given year, the unused authorized amounts could be 
carried over to the following year. Additionally, spouses and children 
of principal applicants are also eligible to receive SIVs, although 
these are not counted against the 5,000 cap. In June 2008, Congress 
amended section 1244 to allow processing to begin immediately and 
authorized State to convert approved section 1059 SIV petitions filed 
before October 1, 2008, for which a visa was not immediately available, 
to section 1244 SIV petition[Footnote 70]s. As of September 30, 2008, 
State had issued 371 visas to Iraqi and Afghan principal applicants 
under section 1244, all of which were converted from section 1059 
petitions (see table 5). 

Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans and 
Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of September 30, 2008: 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 5,000; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 169; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 198; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 4; 
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 371; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Iraqi: 125; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Afghan: 195; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Other: 14; 
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas: 
Total: 334; 
Total number of issued visas: 705. 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Notes: While petitions for these visas were approved under the section 
1059 program, since visas were not immediately available under this 
program, they were converted to the section 1244 program for issuance. 
Authority to convert these petitions was given to State and DHS in Pub. 
Law No. 110-242 in June 2008. 

"Other" includes Iraqi and Afghan nationals who were born in a country 
other than Afghanistan or Iraq. The State Department tracks data by the 
applicant's country of birth. 

[End of table] 

According to a May 2008 State Department Office of Inspector General 
report, several challenges may delay processing of Iraqi employees 
under the second SIV program.[Footnote 71] Officials we spoke with 
reiterated two key challenges: 

* Eligibility screening takes time because no central repository or 
database containing the names of the thousands of Iraqis that have been 
employed on behalf of the U.S. government since March 2003 is 
available. 

* Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus will require additional 
staff and physical changes to their workspaces to accommodate the 
increased workload, according to the Office of Inspector General and 
consular officers we spoke with in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus. 
According to State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, since the publication 
of the Office of Inspector General report, it has (1) added an officer 
in Amman and is working with the embassy to add additional interview 
space and an interviewing window, and (2) authorized an additional 
officer and two locally employed staff for the consular section in 
Baghdad. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, we assessed 
challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. 
goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian 
assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi 
refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address 
the Iraqi refugee situation. In addition, we reviewed the progress made 
in implementing special immigrant visa (SIV) programs for Iraqis, which 
may also benefit some refugees but are not designed specifically for 
them (see appendix I). We also conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; 
Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; Damascus, Syria; and, 
to a limited extent, Iraq. 

To assess progress in achieving U.S. goals for Iraqi refugees, we 
interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and their implementing 
partners and reviewed their policies, strategies, planning, 
programming, progress reporting, and monitoring documents. We also 
reviewed 13 Department of State interim program evaluation reports and 
13 final nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports to assess progress 
in meeting goals.[Footnote 72] In Washington, D.C., we met with 
officials within State's Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) 
bureau from the Office of Policy and Resource Planning and the Office 
of Assistance for Asia and the Near East. We obtained and assessed 
information on the general management of refugee assistance programs, 
coordination with international partners, and progress and program 
performance reporting. In Jordan and Syria, we interviewed U.S. embassy 
officials responsible for monitoring the programs and their 
implementing partners, including UNHCR and nongovernmental 
organizations. We also toured U.S. and UNHCR projects and met with 
project implementers. We discussed implementation and monitoring 
challenges with NGOs in Washington, D.C.; Jordan; and Syria. 

To assess U.S. government and international efforts to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and to assess international 
strategic planning efforts to address the Iraqi refugee situation, we 
interviewed officials of the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi 
governments; UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
and other United Nations (UN) agencies; nongovernmental organizations; 
and research institutes. We reviewed and analyzed relevant strategies, 
funding appeals, planning and reporting documentation, studies, and 
other related documents. We also held discussion groups with NGOs with 
a presence in Jordan, Syria, and/or Iraq to discuss program and 
overarching challenges and held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees 
in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, needs, assistance 
received, and challenges encountered. To further assess the numbers and 
needs of Iraqi refugees, we reviewed and assessed the reliability of 
available assessments and report data. To identify the nature and 
extent of U.S. and international funding, we reviewed funding data 
provided by State's PRM, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the UN, UNHCR, and the Iraqi government. According to PRM, its 
official data were obtained from its Global Financial Management 
System. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provided its 
official data from its Abacus and Phoenix systems, and USAID's Food for 
Peace program provided its data from its Food for Peace Information 
System, New Management System, and Phoenix system. UNHCR's Donor 
Relations & Resource Mobilization Service, the UN's Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and State's PRM bureau provided 
funding data for the UNHCR appeals and contributions received by the 
United States and other donors. To verify our summarization of the 
funding data, we sent out draft tables to agency and UN contributors 
and made supported changes. 

To assess the key challenges the U.S. government and UNHCR face in 
offering solutions for Iraqi refugees and the special immigrant visa 
program, we interviewed and assessed documentation from State's PRM; 
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs; State's Office of Inspector 
General; the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS); U.S. embassy officials in Jordan, Syria, 
and Iraq; UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
IOM, and other UN agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and research 
institutes. In the United States, we held discussion sessions with 
nongovernmental organizations with a presence in Iraq, Syria, and 
Jordan. In Jordan and Syria, we held discussion sessions with Iraqi 
refugees and visited U.S.-and UN-funded programs. To further assess the 
U.S. Refugee Admissions program, we obtained and assessed data from 
State's Worldwide Refugee Admissions Program System. We toured State's 
overseas processing entities managed by IOM and reviewed processing 
steps and data with IOM, USCIS, State, and U.S. embassy officials, 
including refugee coordinators. We analyzed U.S. admissions data and 
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. To further address the SIV programs, we reviewed the 
legislative requirements for the two SIV programs found in Section 1059 
of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and Section 
1244 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. We 
reviewed relevant documents from the Bureau of Consular Affairs 
concerning Iraqi interpreter/translator SIV program planning, 
processes, resources, and implementation. Also, we met with Consular 
Affairs officials in Washington, D.C.; Iraq; Syria; and Jordan, who 
provided information on general consular management and oversight, visa 
processing and procedures, staffing, and resource needs. We analyzed 
SIV data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq- 
Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, as of 
September 30, 2008: 

Dollars in millions: 

Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1)/P.L. 
108-11; 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)/P.L. 108-106; 
Agency/program: State/Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau (PRM); 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $160.5; Funding: Obligated: $160.4; Funding: 
Expended: $159.0; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons 
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[B]; In region: Iraqi refugees and host 
country populations[C]. 

Source of funds: [Empty]; 
Agency/program: USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA); 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $129.3; 
Funding: Obligated: $129.3; 
Funding: Expended: $126.8; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: none. 

Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 480 Title II; 108-7, P.L. 108- 
447, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161; Agency/program: USAID/Office of Food for 
Peace; Funding: Apportioned[A]: $218.2; 
Funding: Obligated: $218.2; 
Funding: Expended: $218.2; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: Iraqi 
refugees and host country populations. 

Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 108-7[D]; 
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Food for Peace; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $191.1; 
Funding: Obligated: $191.1; 
Funding: Expended: $191.1; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Iraqi population; In region: 
none. 

Source of funds: Migration and Refugee Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 109-
102, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding: 
Apportioned[A]: $170.9; 
Funding: Obligated: $170.8; 
Funding: Expended: $124.7; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

Source of funds: Supplemental for Migration and Refugee Assistance/ 
P.L. 110-28, P.L.110-252; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding: 
Apportioned[A]: $173.5; 
Funding: Obligated: $118.2; 
Funding: Expended: $48.0; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

Source of funds: International Disaster and Famine Assistance/P.L. 108-
7, P.L 107-115, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 109-102, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161, 
P.L. 110-252; Agency/program: USAID/OFDA; Funding: Apportioned[A]: 
$163.5; 
Funding: Obligated: $127.7; 
Funding: Expended: $59.4; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: none. 

Source of funds: 2003 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $12.0; 
Funding: Obligated: $12.0; 
Funding: Expended: $11.6; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: none. 

Source of funds: 2006 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 109-234; 
Agency/program: State/PRM; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $50.0; 
Funding: Obligated: $50.0; 
Funding: Expended: $31.8; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi 
refugees and host country populations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Egypt. 

Source of funds: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110- 
28; 
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $10.3; 
Funding: Obligated: $10.3; 
Funding: Expended: $1.2; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: government of 
Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country population. 

Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110- 
252; 
Agency/program: State/PRM; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $45.0; 
Funding: Obligated: $45.0; 
Funding: Expended: 0; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan and host country population. 

Source of funds: [Empty]; 
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $155.0; 
Funding: Obligated: $155.0; 
Funding: Expended: $110.0; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: government of 
Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country population. 

Source of funds: Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance[E]/ 
Presidential Determination (P.D.) 2003-17, P.D. 2003-13, and P.D. 2001- 
22, P.D. 2007-31; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding: Apportioned[A]: 
$51.9; 
Funding: Obligated: $51.6; 
Funding: Expended: $48.8; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

Source of funds: Development Assistance/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $28.5; 
Funding: Obligated: $28.5; 
Funding: Expended: $26.3; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: none. 

Source of funds: Child Survival and Health/P.L. 108-7; 
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA; 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $5.8; 
Funding: Obligated: $5.8; 
Funding: Expended: $5.7; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: none. 

Total: 
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $1,565.5; 
Funding: Obligated: $1,473.9; 
Funding: Expended: $1,162.6. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the Department 
of State and USAID. 

[A] USAID-apportioned funds also include funds recovered or unallocated 
in prior years. 

[B] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk; 
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from 
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims. 

[C] U.S. refugee programs benefit the host country population because 
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region, such as Jordan and 
Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi 
refugees. Host countries receiving assistance are identified when the 
information was made available. In instances where the host country is 
not identified, a portion of the funds was contributed to international 
organizations that may have spent the funds in one or a number of the 
countries hosting Iraqis in the region. 

[D] According to USAID, in 2003, USAID's Food for Peace Program 
received $191.1 million, which was reallocated from funds originally 
appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic Support 
Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine 
Assistance accounts. 

[E] The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund is 
drawn upon by the President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and 
migration needs whenever the President determines that it is in the 
U.S. national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to the 
ERMA fund and remain available until expended. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for Iraq-Related 
Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, Calendar Years 
2003 through 2008: 

Dollars in millions: 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2003 UNHCR Appeal for the Iraq 
Situation, and UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal--Ensuring Protection and 
Enabling Return[C]; Amount of appeal: $90.6; Amount of appeal funded: 
Carryover[A]: 0; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $77.4; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $31.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 40.1%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons 
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[D]; In region: Iraqi refugees and host 
country populations[E]. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2004 UNHCR Iraq Operation Appeal; 
Amount of appeal: $74.1; 
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $20.2; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $30.5; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $16.2; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 53.1%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2005 UNHCR Iraq Operation 
Supplementary Appeal; 
Amount of appeal: $42.0; 
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $18.9; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $21.7; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $19.2; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 88.6%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2006 UNHCR Iraq Operation 
Supplementary Appeal; 
Amount of appeal: $29.8; 
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $8.9; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $15.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $8.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 53.3%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response, 
and UNHCR Supplementary Appeal Iraq Situation Response[F]; Amount of 
appeal: $123.7; Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $3.5; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $112.2; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $36.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 32.1%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: UNHCR Portion of 2007 UNHCR and 
UNICEF Joint Appeal--Providing Education Opportunities to Iraqi 
Children in Host Countries: A Regional Perspective[G]; Amount of 
appeal: $99.0; Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: 0; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $39.9; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $30.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 75.2%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi 
refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation 
Supplementary Appeal[H]; 
Amount of appeal: $271.1; 
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $9.1; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $245.0; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $175.4; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 71.6%; 
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable 
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations. 

UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: Total; 
Amount of appeal: $730.3; 
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: Not applicable; 
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $541.7; 
U.S. portion of new contributions: $315.8; 
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 58.3%. 

Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.S. State Department. 

[A] Carryover includes funds contributed but not used from prior year. 

[B] New contributions include funds from donors for that year's appeal. 

[C] The 2003 UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal reduced the original appeal from 
$154.1 million to $90.6 million. 

[D] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk; 
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from 
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims. 

[E] Refugee programs benefit the host country population because 
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region, such as Jordan and 
Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi 
refugees. 

[F] The 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal increased the appeal 
from $59.7 million to $123.7 million. UNHCR's portion of a 2007 Joint 
Health Sector Appeal and contributions made were folded into the 2007 
UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal. 

[G] The UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal included 
additional funding requirements for $31.0 million. The amount of this 
portion of the appeal that was funded was $9.4 million, including $9.0 
million in contributions from the United States, representing 95.7 
percent of total contributions to the UNICEF portion of the Joint 
Education Appeal. 

[H] Contributions to the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal 
included here are as of December 10, 2008. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance 
in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008: 

Type of assistance provided: Food and nonfood items[A]; 
Syria (individuals): 144,900; 
Jordan (individuals): 13,909. 

Type of assistance provided: Cash assistance; 
Syria (individuals): 38,234; 
Jordan (individuals): 18,074. 

Type of assistance provided: Health care; 
Syria (individuals): 570,000; 
Jordan (individuals): 25,498. 

Type of assistance provided: Education support[B]; 
Syria (individuals): 35,224; 
Jordan (individuals): 10,631. 

Type of assistance provided: Students supported in public universities; 
Syria (individuals): 154; Jordan (individuals): Data not available. 

Type of assistance provided: Legal support; 
Syria (individuals): 12,930; 
Jordan (individuals): 1,380. 

Type of assistance provided: Psychosocial services; 
Syria (individuals): 13,861; 
Jordan (individuals): 6,152. 

Type of assistance provided: Outreach; 
Syria (individuals): 72,000; 
Jordan (individuals): 21,128. 

Type of assistance provided: People with disabilities assisted; 
Syria (individuals): 779; 
Jordan (individuals): 912. 

Source: UNHCR data. 

Note: We did not assess the reliability of the data provided by UNHCR. 

[A] Food (i.e., oil, rice, lentils, sugar, tea, tomato paste, pasta, 
and cracked wheat ) and nonfood items (i.e., mattresses, blankets, 
soap, detergent, and sanitary materials) provided to Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan included 5,087 hygiene kits, nonfood items for 602 individuals, 
and food for 8,220 persons. 

[B] Education support provided to Iraqi refugees in Syria included 
uniforms, shoes, and school materials. Education support provided to 
Iraqi refugees in Jordan included 2,615 school kits, 1,685 school fees, 
vocational training for 2,063 students, nonformal education for 2,493 
individuals, and formal education provided to 1,775 students. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

March 31, 2009: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed In Measuring Progress, 
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International 
Strategic Plan" GAO Job Code 320565. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Hilary Ingraham, Program Officer, Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration at (202) 663-3715. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: 
GAO - Audrey Solis: 
PRM - Sam Witten (Acting): 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report: 

Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, 
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International 
Strategic Plan: (GAO-09-120, GAO Code 320565): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. The 
Department of State appreciates that the GAO recognizes the multiple 
challenges inherent in identifying durable solutions and providing 
protection and humanitarian assistance for displaced Iraqis. The report 
acknowledges that many of the challenges require the active 
participation of non-U.S. government actors to achieve progress. The 
report also recognizes the progress that has been made to date, 
reflecting our efforts to continually look for ways to improve the 
delivery of assistance and provide protection to Iraqi refugees. 
However, the title of the GAO report only conveys the challenges 
identified and not the broader scope of the report's findings. The 
Department requests that the GAO change the title of the report in 
order to better capture the report's findings and acknowledge both the 
challenges and progress. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, with relevant others, 
take four actions: 

1. Develop performance measures to assess and report progress in 
achieving overall U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees. 
Performance measures and indicators should be clearly linked to 
progress in achieving stated goals and objectives. Performance goals, 
objectives, and measures should clearly and transparently address the 
extent to which programs should target refugees and host government 
populations, respectively, to the extent practicable. 

2. In conjunction with the USAID Administrator, develop systems to 
separately track and report funding apportioned, obligated, and 
expended for Iraqi refugee programs in each host country. 

3. Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other 
relevant host countries to expedite efforts to conduct independent 
comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and 
the related needs of the countries hosting them. 

4. In conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies and in coordination with 
the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the 
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and 
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance 
and solutions for Iraqi refugees. 

Develop Performance Measures: 

The Department of State concurs with the recommendation to strengthen 
the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration's (PRM) performance 
planning, monitoring, and reporting. As reflected in its Congressional 
Budget Justification, Congressional Presentation Document, and Bureau 
Strategic Plan, PRM has established global performance goals and 
measures, collects and analyzes performance results data on these 
measures, and adjusts targets based on past performance. Moreover, as 
noted in the GAO report, the Bureau has already developed more 
specific, measurable goals and objectives for its assistance and 
protection efforts for Iraqi refugees. The Bureau is working with both 
international organization partners as well as non-governmental 
organization (NGO) partners to continue strengthening program-level 
indicators. PRM is also refining a standardized list of key 
humanitarian indicators in an effort to collect information at the 
program level which could be aggregated to capture performance by 
sector at the program level, and, as appropriate, to inform the 
existing global-level performance measures of the Bureau. All of these 
activities and enhancements to our existing practices are fully 
consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen performance 
planning, monitoring, and reporting. 

However, the GAO recommendation goes further and suggests that PRM's 
performance planning, monitoring and reporting should focus on programs 
defined by "refugee population" (e.g., Iraqi refugees). The Department 
of State, and PRM in particular, does not define its programs in this 
way for several reasons: 

I) In many refugee situations - including the primarily urban 
displacements of the Iraqi situation - it is not desirable, and 
frequently not possible, to disentangle populations by nationality for 
purposes of program planning and performance monitoring. Moreover, we 
note that refugee populations vary significantly in terms of size, 
geographic distribution, relevant policy concerns, and humanitarian 
needs, and that international practice in assisting refugees does not 
rely on metrics that are firmly limited to a particular nationality in 
this kind of a complex situation. 

2) Universality and impartiality are cardinal principles of 
humanitarian assistance. PRM and its partners strive to meet the 
assistance and protection needs of refugees around the world 
(universality), regardless of nationality, ethnicity, religion or 
political opinion (impartiality). To require goals and objectives that 
are uniquely developed for a specific refugee population runs counter 
to these humanitarian principles, as the U.S. and other international 
donors have long maintained that assistance standards are universal. 

3) Most PRM contributions to multilateral humanitarian organizations, 
such as UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
are loosely earmarked at a regional level to maximize the flexibility 
these organizations need to respond to dynamic and sometimes mixed 
population movements, changing field conditions, and cross-border 
operations. Many UN appeals are regional. (e.g., UNHCR appeals for the 
Afghan or Sudanese repatriation operations, multiple relief operations 
in Africa) Contributing to regional appeals is longstanding practice of 
the United States in general and PRM in particular. Indeed, the 
Bureau's authorities under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 
I962, as amended, and its policy approach emphasize this multilateral 
support. 

Track and Report Funding in Each Host Country: 

The Department of State concurs with this recommendation, but notes 
that in most cases it is not practicable to track and report 
multilateral contributions at the country level. The Department takes 
its fiscal and programmatic accountability responsibilities very 
seriously. We agree that it is important to track and report funding 
apportioned, obligated and expended. The Department will continue to 
track and report funding for Iraqi refugee programs in each host 
country when possible. For example, the Department of State and USAID 
have tracked and reported on bilateral funding used specifically for 
programs to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan. The Department coordinates 
its oversight with the appropriate host governmental authorities. 

The Department affirms the GAO's understanding that programs assisting 
Iraqi refugees should include assistance to vulnerable members of the 
host population. Programs that only benefit refugees may lead to 
animosity and discrimination from local communities, cause protection 
concerns for refugees, and potentially destabilize what may be a 
strained domestic political situation. Inclusive programs are also more 
palatable to the host governments, which adamantly do not want to 
establish separate systems to assist Iraqis. 

The Department will continue to track funding contributed to NGO 
programs at the country level (e.g., programming by specific NGOs 
funded by PRM in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). We will make sure this 
information is available in the public domain through including it, as 
appropriate, in press releases on USG support for humanitarian 
assistance to Iraqis. We will also report on any multilateral 
contributions we make at the country level. In general, country-
specific multilateral contributions are made to an appeal which is for 
activities in a specific country. For example, in FY 2008 the U.S. 
contributed to the World Food Program's Emergency Operation in Syria. 

In most cases, it is not practicable to track multilateral funding at 
the country level. In order to do this, we would either need to (i) ask 
international organizations to issue country-specific appeals, or (ii) 
earmark all regional appeal contributions to specific countries. For 
the reasons that the GAO itself cites on page 28 of this report, we 
agree that the UN should continue to recognize the regional context in 
humanitarian situations and consolidate its appeals as it did in the 
2009 UN Consolidated Appeal, thereby not issuing individual appeals for 
each host country. Indeed, an integrated appeal framework helps to 
inform a regional strategy, another of GAO's specific recommendations. 
In this respect, as part of a collective effort to provide humanitarian 
assistance more efficiently, the U.S. government has joined thirty-five 
other donor governments in supporting the framework of principles and 
standards which comprises the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) 
initiative, co-chairing the group of governments in 2008. One of these 
principles calls for donors to provide flexible funding, vice earmarked 
funding, to multilateral organizations in order to give these 
organizations the ability to prioritize beneficiaries' most urgent 
needs and adapt to changing circumstances. The Department recognizes 
the importance of giving international organizations flexibility in 
responding to humanitarian needs of beneficiaries, and generally 
strives to minimize earmarking contributions at the country level or 
below (e.g., the sector or project level). 

The Department does not believe that the benefits of being able to 
track multilateral funding at the country level are outweighed by the 
negative repercussions these changes would have on USG partners' 
ability to effectively provide protection and assistance to Iraqi 
refugees. 

Independent and Comprehensive Assessments in Host Countries: 

The Department of State concurs with this recommendation but notes that 
our ability to take action on it requires the active concurrence of 
host country governments. It has long been clear to the Department of 
State, international organizations, and other donor countries that a 
comprehensive assessment of the numbers and needs of Iraqi refugees in 
host countries would greatly improve the international community's 
ability to plan and implement assistance activities for Iraqi refugees. 
The international humanitarian community has urged host countries to 
facilitate an accurate count of Iraqi refugees and assess their needs. 
Despite this, host countries have not permitted independent, 
comprehensive assessments of the needs and numbers of Iraqis living 
within their borders. We continue to look for ways to constructively 
raise these issues with host governments. 

The Department assesses needs for specific services and programs in 
coordination with its implementing partners. UNHCR, other international 
organizations, and NGOs analyze information they have gathered on the 
needs and number of vulnerable Iraqi refugees through and use it to 
develop assistance and protection programs. UNHCR relies primarily on 
information collected during the registration of Iraqi refugees and 
through other outreach mechanisms. The UN's Consolidated Appeals 
Process (CAP) also provides a coordinated overview of Iraqi needs based 
on input from UN agencies, other international organizations, and NGOs. 
NGOs routinely conduct smaller-scale needs assessments when the 
organizations are designing project proposals to compete for PRM or 
other donor funding. During program implementation, international 
organizations and NGOs assess their activities to ensure that project 
activities meet the needs of Iraqi refugees, measure the impact of the 
services provided and identify unmet needs. Taken collectively, these 
assessments provide insight into the needs of Iraqi refugees across 
sectors and geographic locations. Finally, PRM identifies gaps in the 
humanitarian assistance provided by multilateral organizations and 
responds by selecting and funding NGO projects to clearly respond to 
these identified needs and gaps. 

Comprehensive International Strategy: 

The Department of State concurs with this recommendation. As the GAO 
report notes on page one, the U.S. government has taken the lead in 
efforts to mitigate the humanitarian crisis facing displaced Iraqis. 
The Department of State continues to work in coordination with relevant 
U.S. agencies, UNHCR, other donor governments, and the Governments of 
Iraq, Jordan and Syria, to develop a strategy to provide needed 
protection and assistance to displaced Iraqis. Efforts to build a 
comprehensive strategy are hampered by the lack of comprehensive needs 
and numbers assessments of displaced Iraqis and the lack of agreement 
within the international community on the relative vulnerability of 
this displaced population in comparison to other refugee crises 
worldwide when donors apportion limited international humanitarian 
assistance funds. 

The Department continues to lead the way in international fora, urging 
international organizations to develop accurate needs-based budgets to 
assist displaced Iraqis. PRM continues to meet with other partners to 
discuss changing circumstances facing displaced Iraqis. For example, in 
mid-March 2009, PRM and USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) jointly hosted a meeting in Jordan to discuss ways 
the international community could support the return of Iraqi refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and prepare for future, large-
scale returns. PRM and OFDA met with UN agencies, other international 
organizations and NGOs active inside Iraq and identified sectors that 
need support. The group determined that the international community 
needed to support community based programs and development activities 
to enable Iraq to absorb its returning citizens. As follow up to the 
conference, PRM and OFDA are working together to coordinate U.S. 
government support for programs assisting current returns and to build 
the capacity of the Government of Iraq to be ready to meet the needs of 
Iraqi citizens when they start returning home in large numbers. 

President Obama made it clear in his February 27 speech on Iraq that 
the U.S. has a strategic interest and moral responsibility to assist 
displaced Iraqis. PRM is an active participant in the interagency 
discussions that are informing the development of a comprehensive Iraq 
strategy for the new administration. The U.S. recognizes that continued 
provision of protection and assistance to displaced Iraqis and the 
simultaneous development of programs to support sustainable returns are 
critical components of this much larger, interrelated policy strategy. 

Additional Comments on Text: 

PRM Engagement: 
Throughout the report, the GAO frequently refers to two primary ways 
PRM works to assist displaced Iraqis: PRM contributes funding to 
international organizations like UNHCR, other UN agencies and NGOs, and 
monitors the implementation of partners' program activities. [See, for 
example, page I0, "To implement its goals and objectives for Iraqi 
refugees, State's PRM bureau primarily funds and monitors the 
activities of its implementing partners."] However the GAO does not 
mention other important components of our work, particularly that of 
providing guidance to international organization and NGO partners and 
strong diplomatic engagement with host and donor governments on issues 
relating to protection and assistance for Iraqis. In these efforts, PRM 
works closely with Department colleagues in regional bureaus, U.S. 
Embassies, and U.S. Missions in New York, Brussels, and Geneva. [See 
comment 1] 

We are an active participant in UNHCR's Executive Committee (ExCom) 
which meets four times per year (once in the spring, once in the 
summer, and twice in the fall) to provide guidance on UNHCR operations, 
program standards, and policies. At ExCom meetings, the U.S. government 
joins other donor governments in reviewing and approving all UNHCR 
programs and budgets, giving the USG a significant voice in UNHCR's 
operations. Outside the Executive Committee meetings, PRM staff discuss 
the needs of displaced Iraqis and various program activities with a 
wide variety of UNHCR officials at minimum on a weekly basis. Our 
interlocutors range from the High Commissioner, Deputy High 
Commissioner, and the Middle East Regional Director to UNHCR Country 
Representatives in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq and other program 
staff within these country operations. 

With regard to NGO programs, PRM and its NGO partners establish the 
agreed upon parameters for the assistance programs NGOs are committing 
to undertake with PRM funding. PRM and NGOs agree on targets for 
program activities and ways to measure the organization's progress 
towards meeting those targets. PRM selects NGO programs to fill gaps 
the Bureau has identified in the assistance provided by international 
organizations. 

Monitoring: 
The Department agrees with monitoring challenges identified by the GAO 
in the report. We remain very concerned, however, that the data used on 
page 2I to validate this finding are largely drawn from a single 
element of an assessment PRM conducted in April 2008 to help the Bureau 
identify program performance areas within UNHCR's operations in Jordan 
that needed improvement. GAO quotes PRM's assessment that, at that 
time, UNHCR was able to effectively monitor approximately 40-59% of its 
implementing partners. The report misrepresents this percentage - 
taking it out of context in the full assessment - and represents it as 
a conclusion valid for the entire time period of the report. It is 
therefore misleading and understates the highly professional and 
systematic monitoring that is actually undertaken by UNHCR and PRM. 
[See comment 2] 

Specifically, at the time of the assessment, UNHCR's implementing 
partners conducted program activities at more than 200 program sites 
across Jordan. The monitoring statistic given in the PRM assessment 
primarily reflects the percentage of the sites UNHCR could physically 
visit as part of its monitoring plan. While site visits, including 
unannounced site visits, are an important component of monitoring, 
effective and complete monitoring includes many other components: 
review of progress and final program reports, review of financial 
reports, follow-up with program managers and other personnel, and 
consultations with other donors and humanitarian organizations active 
in the same geographic areas or sectors. Indeed, the GAO report fails 
to mention that, in the same element of the April 2008 assessment, PRM 
notes that UNHCR monitors the finances of its implementing partners on 
a quarterly basis and all implementing partners undergo a comprehensive 
audit. Finally, we note that the 200 sites mentioned in the GAO report 
are activity sites, not distinct implementing partner programs. We have 
full confidence in UNHCR's effective monitoring of its implementing 
partners during 2008. We continue to regularly discuss with UNHCR its 
program implementation and ongoing monitoring efforts in Iraq and the 
region in its efforts to assist displaced Iraqis. 

Individuals eligible for Special Immigrant Visas and the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program: 
On page 48, the report asserts that the State Department recommends 
that individuals not pursue the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program if 
they have a refugee interview date already scheduled under the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) because refugee processing is 
quicker than SIV processing. In actuality, processing under the SIV 
program is significantly faster than the in-country refugee program 
under USRAP. The SIV process requires one interview in contrast to the 
USRAP, which requires one interview with IOM and a second one with DHS. 
The State Department encourages otherwise qualified applicants to apply 
for the SIV program. [See comment 3] 

Chief of Mission approval process for SIV applicants: 
As the report states on page 50, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
program, established under section I244 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, provides 5,000 SIVs for certain 
Iraqis who have been U.S. government employees, contractors, 
subcontractors or their dependents. The report makes no mention of the 
I244 program's new requirement for Chief of Mission Approval (COM). The 
SIV COM approval process, as mandated in the legislation, has the Chief 
of Mission or the COM's designee at Embassy Baghdad review application 
requests, conduct verification of U.S. government employment and a risk 
assessment. The COM has delegated this responsibility to the Senior 
Coordinator for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). SIV 
applicants send their documents via email to refugee office staff for 
processing and then final review and approval by the Senior 
Coordinator. In an effort to reduce staffing and life-support needs in 
Baghdad, in April 2009 the majority of the SIV COM processing will be 
moved from Baghdad offices to the National Visa Center, which is part 
of the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of State. [See 
comment 4] 

The following are GAO's comments to the Department of State's letter 
dated March 31, 2009: 

GAO Comments: 

1. We added text in the background to describe other components of 
PRM's work. 

2. As stated in the draft of this report, in April 2008, State reported 
that UNHCR "effectively monitors 40 to 59 percent of its partners." In 
State's written and technical comments, the department notes that the 
statement in its document should have read "implementing partners' 
program activity sites." We have revised this report to correct State's 
reporting error. Further, despite our requests for an updated 
evaluation, State did not provide updated percentages of site visits. 
UNHCR, in its technical comments on the draft, provided evidence on the 
steps it has taken in 2009 to mitigate this challenge. We incorporated 
this information, as appropriate. 

3. This statement was deleted from the text. 

4. We added a footnote to provide information on the 1244 program's 
requirement for Chief of Mission approval and the approval process. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: From The American People: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20532: 
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov] 

April 1, 2009: 

Joseph A. Christoff, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Christoff: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled "Iraqi Refugee 
Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, 
Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan" (GAO-09-
120). 

Thank you for your recommendation to USAID regarding the tracking of 
funding for refugee assistance programs. In Iraq, USAID provides 
assistance for Internally Displaced People (IDP) through our office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). While refugee programs are overseen 
primarily by the State Department's bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration (PRM): USAID also does provide some assistance to Jordan to 
assist their efforts in supporting Iraqi refugees. 

While early on in our Iraq assistance we did provide limited refugee 
assistance, we no longer fund these types of activities under our 
humanitarian assistance program. The tracking of refugee assistance is 
no longer a concern for USAID's humanitarian assistance program. In 
addition, we have an established system of tracking and monitoring for 
our assistance in Jordan. Therefore, we feel this issue has been 
resolved. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Drew W. Luten: 
Acting Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Minty Abraham; Lynn 
Cothern; David Dornisch; Timothy Fairbanks; Kathleen Monahan; Mary 
Moutsos; Andrew Stavisky; and Heather Whitehead made key contributions 
to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Shirley Brothwell, 
Elizabeth Curda, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Etana Finkler, David Hancock, and 
Jeremy Sebest. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] As part of our methodology, we limited our fieldwork to Syria and 
Jordan, which reported hosting significantly more refugees than other 
neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the 
Gulf States. 

[2] According to State officials, its international organization 
partners include UNHCR, the World Health Organization, the World Food 
Program, IOM, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children's Fund. For fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, State officials said that they had 9 and 11 NGO 
partners implementing their program, respectively. 

[3] State's 2008 goal was to maintain basic humanitarian assistance and 
protection for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Its 
regional objectives were to meet the assistance and protection needs of 
refugees and other conflict victims through expanded engagement and 
funding of international and NGO partners; contribute to regional 
stability by channeling humanitarian assistance through primary 
international organization partners; promote UNHCR to achieve solutions 
for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; and ensure greater burden sharing 
among donors, including the Iraqi government. 

[4] Iraq-related humanitarian assistance funding includes that for 
Iraqi refugees and vulnerable populations of neighboring countries 
hosting them; internally displaced Iraqis; vulnerable populations in 
Iraq; refugees in Iraq, such as Palestinians; and other conflict 
victims. 

[5] A strategic plan should contain strategic or long-term goals that 
cover a period of not less than 5 years from the year it is submitted 
and should be updated and revised at least every 3 years. 

[6] IOM, Iraq Displacement & Return; 2008 Mid-year Review. 

[7] According to the UN, Syria has no domestic legislative framework 
securing the rights of Iraqi refugees and most Iraqis are issued 1-to 3-
month residence permits, with a minority being granted 1-to 2-year 
resident permits or permits covering a school year. According to the 
UN, in Jordan all Iraqis and others that are permitted to enter are 
allowed to stay for 3 months in accordance with the Law on the 
Residence of Foreigners. In May 2008, Jordan announced that all Iraqis 
must obtain a visa prior to arrival. 

[8] UNHCR, Protecting Refugees & the Role of UNHCR, 2007-2008 (Geneva). 

[9] According to State officials, its international organization 
partners include UNHCR, the World Health Organization, the World Food 
Program, IOM, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children's Fund. For fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008, State officials stated that they had 9 and 11 NGO 
partners implementing their program, respectively. 

[10] Government Performance and Results Act principles include setting 
strategic goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the degree to 
which goals were met. See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively 
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[11] In addition to its goal to maintain humanitarian assistance and 
protection for Iraqi refugees, State's PRM established two goals for 
its efforts within Iraq to (1) support assistance and protection 
programs for non-Iraqi refugees while pursuing opportunities to 
resettle or temporarily relocate these refugees to safe havens where 
they can be processed for resettlement or repatriation and (2) support 
UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross programs to assist 
and protect returning refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims and develop 
policy and assistance frameworks for refugee and IDP returns. PRM's 
objectives apply to all three goals. 

[12] The Fiscal Year 2009 Policy and Program Review Committee paper 
outlines State's goals and objectives for fiscal year 2009 and provides 
a review of performance in fiscal year 2008. 

[13] Sectors include humanitarian assistance, protection, education, 
water and sanitation, and health, among others. 

[14] According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "non- 
refoulement" is the principle protecting refugees from nonvoluntary 
repatriation to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened 
because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. 

[15] Wasting is a measure of acute malnutrition. 

[16] For international organizations, State officials noted that they 
provide input on objectives and performance measures through 
participation in board meetings, donor trips, and country operation 
planning meetings. Regarding NGOs, State officials noted that they work 
with each NGO partner to establish specific objectives and performance 
measures for projects in each country; these measures are documented in 
the partner agreements. 

[17] See GAO, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[18] State Department, Policy and Program Review Committee (PPRC): 
Policy and Implementation Paper for Iraq Refugees and IDPs for FY 2008, 
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2008. The 2009 paper is sensitive but 
unclassified. 

[19] We also reviewed 13 interim program evaluation reports prepared by 
State for 13 projects implemented by 8 NGO partners, the 13 final NGO 
reports available, and international organization partners' progress 
reports. We also interviewed State officials on their monitoring and 
evaluation efforts. (State Department officials prepare interim program 
evaluations for each NGO project from the information obtained from NGO 
reporting. These evaluations assess progress made and are used to make 
management decisions about an NGO's performance and future funding for 
Iraqi refugee programs.) We did not assess the reliability of the data 
in these reports. 

[20] For programs that were funded in fiscal year 2007, State officials 
stated that they required monitoring reports at 4 and 12 months, and 
for programs funded in fiscal year 2008, State required quarterly 
reports. 

[21] The 2007 Guidelines for Proposal Submissions for NGO Protection 
and Assistance Programs Benefiting Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon 
was issued as a part of the March 13, 2007, request for proposals. 

[22] We did not assess the reliability of the data provided in these 
reports. 

[23] As of the end of our fieldwork, the State Department had made 
available 13 of the 16 final NGO reports for our review. For one NGO 
for which State did not provide a final report, State reported that it 
did not meet the 50 percent requirement. 

[24] State considers the 2009 goals and objectives sensitive and not 
for public release. 

[25] Framework for Cooperation between the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, 
and Migration, U.S. Department of State, for the Year 2008 (Nov. 29, 
2007). 

[26] Framework for Cooperation between the IOM Administration and the 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of 
State, for the Year 2007 (Apr. 18, 2007). 

[27] Department of State, The Annual Review of UNHCR Country 
Achievements and Future Planning, April 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
17, 2008). According to State, it determined these percentages based on 
discussions with UNHCR in Jordan regarding current and past 
programming. State reported that site visits are determined by several 
criteria, including policy priorities, performance history, funding 
level, and security conditions. However, State did not provide any 
specifics on the percentage of partners' program activity sites that 
should be monitored. 

[28] According to UNHCR, in 2009, UNHCR monitoring of implementing 
partners and their respective programs has expanded beyond a financial 
audit into an evaluative mode with the extensive use of multifunctional 
teams visiting project sites, undertaking home visits, and conducting 
focus group sessions with Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, over the 
past quarter a Project Control Officer and Senior Oversight Officer 
have arrived in Jordan and physical verification of projects is now a 
requirement. UNHCR has also decided to reduce its intended 
decentralization of services from 18 to 16 locations. 

[29] According to the UN, government estimates largely rely on cross- 
border movements, which may result in counting persons more than once. 
See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York and Geneva). 

[30] According to the UN, Iraqi refugees may not register with UNHCR 
for a variety of reasons, including fear of being identified and 
deported, inability to reach a registration center, lack of 
understanding of the benefits of UNHCR registration, and lack of need 
for UNHCR protection or assistance. 

[31] According to UNHCR, the Iraqi embassy in Syria estimates that the 
total number of Iraqis in Syria is between 800,000 and 1,000,000. 

[32] According to State, in its interim program evaluations for NGOs, 
NGOs in Jordan set targets for numbers of Iraqi beneficiaries too high 
because they based them on faulty estimates of the total number of 
Iraqi refugees. 

[33] According to Fafo, it supplies decision makers and organizations, 
nationally and internationally, with research on working life and 
social policy. 

[34] Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics 
(Norway, 2007). We assessed Fafo's methodology and found that the 
number of 161,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan as of May 2007 is reliable, 
but we were unable to establish the reliability of the numbers beyond 
the initial 161,000. 

[35] United Nations Development Program, Macroeconomic Impact of Iraqi 
Refugees on the Syrian Economy (January 2008). 

[36] Center for Strategic Studies, The Iraq War's Impact on Growth and 
Inflation in Jordan, University of Jordan, 2007. 

[37] According to UNHCR, as of March 2009, UNHCR and its partners now 
have approximately 200 Iraqi outreach workers in the region. 

[38] The IDP Working Group members include UNHCR, IOM, other UN 
agencies, and NGOs. Its reporting is based on surveillance data 
gathered by IDP Working Group members and on information provided by 
the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 
other NGOs. 

[39] See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York and Geneva: Dec. 
2008); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Situation 
Update-August 2008 (Geneva: Aug. 2008); and IDP Working Group, 
Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq-Update June 2008 (Amman: 2008). 

[40] UNHCR reported in August 2008 that among the main dangers and 
concerns for returnees are detention and kidnappings, reported from all 
over the country but most frequently in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, 
Muthanna, Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Wassit governates. 

[41] See GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity 
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide 
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007). 

[42] As of July 2008, Jordan, with a total population estimated at 6.2 
million, hosted an estimated 1.8 million Palestinian refugees, and 
Syria, with a population of an estimated 19.7 million, hosted an 
estimated 522,100 Palestinian refugees (Central Intelligence Agency, 
World Fact Book, Aug. 21, 2008). 

[43] This report does not include information on the outcome of asylum 
procedures or the admission of refugees outside of resettlement 
programs. 

[44] The regional refugee coordinator was based in Cairo until the 
summer of 2008, when the new position was established in Amman. A 
refugee coordinator in Baghdad is responsible for in-country processing 
and embassy referrals from Iraq. 

[45] According to the U.S. government, the vast majority of submissions 
are UNHCR referrals. 

[46] With the passage of a provision in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, certain 
refugees of special humanitarian concern could apply directly to the 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Such refugees include Iraqis who were 
or are employed by the U.S. government, a U.S. contractor, or a U.S.- 
based media organization or NGO, and their family members. 

[47] The Departments of State and Homeland Security have recently 
initiated in-country processing of Iraqis employed by the U.S. 
government. According to State, IOM provides rotational coverage in 
Baghdad using a mobile office from Amman. 

[48] Under Section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
as amended, [8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42)] the term refugee includes "any 
person who is outside any country of such person's nationality…and who 
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion." Under this section, the term refugee also includes, 
in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate 
consultation [as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (e)] may specify, any 
person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which 
such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. 

[49] According to the State Department, on average about 70 percent of 
UNHCR referrals in the region receive U.S. refugee status. 

[50] The Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 
Office of Inspector General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of 
U.S. Refugee Resettlement Processing for Iraqi Nationals, MERO-IQO-08- 
02 (May 2008). 

[51] State officials noted that about 53 percent of the Iraqi refugees 
who were approved for resettlement but have not left for the United 
States have not done so because State is awaiting completion of 
security clearances, known as security advisory opinions, from the 
Central Intelligence Agency. According to State, the lack of personnel 
resources at the Central Intelligence Agency has become a significant 
issue for all immigrant and refugee applicants needing security 
advisory opinions, not just Iraqis. 

[52] GAO has found that three practices appear to be critical for 
effective strategic planning. Organizations must (1) involve their 
stakeholders; (2) assess their internal and external environments; and 
(3) align their activities, core processes, and resources to support 
mission-related outcomes. See GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under 
GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May 
1997, Version 1). 

[53] Government Performance and Results Act, Section 3 (a) and (b). 

[54] See UNHCR, Strategy for the Iraq Situation (Geneva: revised Jan. 
1, 2007); and UNHCR, Iraq Situation Response Supplementary Appeal 
(Geneva: Jan. 2007). 

[55] Strategic Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq, United 
Nations and Partners, April 2007. 

[56] NGO Statement on Regional Consequences of the Humanitarian Crisis 
in Iraq; International Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Needs 
of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons inside Iraq and in 
Neighboring Countries (Geneva: Apr.17-18, 2007). 

[57] UNHCR develops annual country operations plans that address its 
plans and performance measures for the refugee situation in each 
country. Country operations plans or summaries of plans for Syria and 
Jordan were made public from 2004 through 2006. Plans from 2007 through 
2009 were not made public until UNHCR responded to a draft of this 
report. Moreover, recent plans now cover a period of 2 years. 

[58] UNHCR, Estimating the Immediate Needs of Iraqi Refugees in the 
Middle East, February 2008. 

[59] Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007; Their Number and Characteristics 
(Norway: 2007). 

[60] Pillar II's mission is to "ensure host countries maintain 
welcoming environments in which Iraqi refugees can live their lives in 
safety and dignity while awaiting return or resettlement." It also 
notes that ultimately the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the 
Region must be measured by its impact on the lives of the Iraqi 
refugees. 

[61] Pillar II objectives within the UN's 2009 Consolidated Appeal for 
Iraq and the Region are to (1) ensure that Iraqis are able to seek 
asylum and continue to receive protection; (2) ensure that Iraqi 
refugees' basic needs are met, with special attention to the most 
vulnerable; (3) support targeted resettlement for vulnerable Iraqis; 
and (4) undertake contingency measures for potential voluntary returns. 

[62] In commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has 
appointed a senior regional coordinator that will be based in Amman 
beginning in mid-April 2009 to address coordination issues in the 
region. 

[63] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, Section 1059. 

[64] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-181, Section 1244. 

[65] After December 26, 2007, Iraqis and Afghans who receive special 
immigrant status are eligible for a period up to 6 months for 
resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits 
available to refugees admitted under section 207 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L. 
No.110-161). 

[66] Under these programs, Iraqi nationals who worked for the U.S. 
government, as defined in each program's authorizing legislation, and 
met other conditions are eligible to receive special immigrant visas. 

[67] Congressional Budget Office, Contractors' Support of U.S. 
Operations in Iraq, August 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2008). 

[68] In fiscal year 2009, however, the authorized number of SIVs for 
this program will revert to 50 annually. See An Act to Increase the 
Number of Iraqi and Afghani Translators and Interpreters Who May Be 
Admitted to the United States as Special Immigrants, and For Other 
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 110-36, June 15, 2007. 

[69] Under the 1244 program, the Chief of Mission or his or her 
designee is required to conduct a risk assessment of the principal 
applicant and an independent review of records maintained by the U.S. 
government or hiring organization to confirm employment and faithful 
and valuable service to the U.S. government prior to approval of a 
petition. According to State, the Chief of Mission has delegated this 
responsibility to the Senior Coordinator for Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons. 

[70] Pub. L. No. 110-181, as passed in January 2008, did not allow 
processing to begin until fiscal year 2009. However, Pub. L. No. 110- 
242, passed on June 3, 2008, amended the legislation to allow 
processing to begin in fiscal year 2008 and continue through 2012, and 
if any unused amounts remained, into 2013. 

[71] U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
Office of Inspector General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of 
Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs (May 2008). 

[72] We did not assess the reliability of the data in these reports. 

[End of section] 

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