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entitled 'Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent 
Progress to Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan' 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

February 2009: 

Human Capital: 

Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD's 
Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan: 

GAO-09-235: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-235, a report to Congressional Requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Having the right number of civilian personnel with the right skills is 
critical to achieving the Department of Defense’s (DOD) mission. With 
more than 50 percent of its civilian workforce (about 700,000 
civilians) eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD may be faced 
with deciding how to fill numerous mission-critical positions—some 
involving senior leadership. The National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 requires DOD to develop a strategic 
human capital plan, update it annually through 2010, and address eight 
requirements. GAO previously found that DOD’s 2007 plan did not meet 
most requirements. The 2007 NDAA added nine requirements to the annual 
update to shape DOD’s senior leader workforce. GAO was asked to assess 
the extent to which DOD’s 2008 update addressed (1) the 2006 human 
capital planning requirements, (2) the 2007 senior leader requirements, 
and (3) key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. GAO 
analyzed the update, compared it with the requirements, and reviewed 
factors identified in the update and prior GAO work. 

What GAO Found: 

While DOD’s 2008 update to its strategic human capital plan, when 
compared with the first plan, shows progress in addressing the FY 2006 
NDAA requirements, the update only partially addresses each of the 
act’s requirements. For example, DOD identified 25 critical skills and 
competencies—referred to as enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations, which included logistics management and medical 
occupations. The update, however, does not contain assessments for over 
half of the 25 occupations, and the completed assessments of future 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations do not cover the required 
10-year period. Also, DOD’s update included analyses of “gaps,” or 
differences between the existing and future workforce for about half of 
the 25 occupations. Finally, DOD’s update partially addressed the act’s 
requirements for a plan of action for closing the gaps in DOD’s 
civilian workforce. Although DOD recently established a program 
management office whose responsibility is to monitor DOD’s updates to 
the strategic human capital plan, the office does not have and does not 
plan to have a performance plan—a road map—that articulates how the 
NDAA requirements will be met. Until such a plan is developed, DOD may 
not be able to design the best strategies to address the legislative 
requirements and meet its civilian workforce needs. 

DOD’s 2008 update and related documentation address four of the nine 
requirements in the FY 2007 NDAA for DOD’s senior leader workforce and 
partially address the remaining five. For example, the update 
identifies a plan of action to address, among other things, changes in 
the number of authorized senior leaders. However, the update noted that 
DOD had conducted only initial leadership assessments as a first step 
in identifying some of its needs, capabilities, and gaps in the 
existing or projected senior leader workforce and stated that the final 
assessments would not be completed until the summer of 2009. Although 
DOD recently established an executive management office to manage the 
career life cycle of DOD senior leaders, as well as the FY 2007 NDAA 
requirements, this office has not and does not plan to develop a 
performance plan to address the NDAA-related requirements. 

While DOD’s 2008 update identified some key factors that could affect 
civilian workforce plans, such as base closures and legislation 
requiring the use of government employees for certain functions, it 
does not include strategies for addressing these factors. For example, 
the update noted that DOD may consider using government employees to 
perform, among other things, an activity performed by a contractor when 
an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost 
providers, but DOD does not provide a strategy for doing so. Further, 
GAO’s body of work has noted a similar factor not discussed in DOD’s 
update—DOD’s extensive reliance on contractors and its long-standing 
challenges in developing a civilian workforce strategy to address the 
use of contractors and the appropriate mix of contractors and 
civilians. Without strategies that address key factors like the use of 
contractors, DOD may not have the right number of people, in the right 
place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its 
mission in the future. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop performance plans for the new 
management offices that monitor its human capital updates and senior 
leader workforce and (2) include, in its next update, strategies to 
address factors that may affect its workforce plan. DOD partially 
concurred with GAO’s recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-235]. For more 
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604, 
farrellb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

While DOD's 2008 Update Shows Progress, It Only Partially Addresses 
Each of the Fiscal Year 2006 Legislative Requirements: 

DOD's 2008 Update of Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 
Generally Addresses 2007 Legislative Requirements for DOD's Senior 
Leader Workforce: 

Although DOD Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Plan, the 
Update Does Not Include Strategies to Address These Factors: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Examples of DOD's and the Component's Senior Leader 
Development and Training Programs: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of Extent to Which DOD's 2008 Update to Its Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Plan Satisfies FY 2006 NDAA Legislative 
Requirements: 

Table 2: Information on Assessments and Projected Trends for DOD's 
Enterprisewide Mission-Critical Occupations: 

Table 3: Summary of Extent to Which DOD's 2008 Update Satisfies FY 2007 
NDAA Legislative Requirements: 

Table 4: Defense Leadership and Management Program and Defense Senior 
Leader Development Program: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Pay Overlap of DOD's Senior Executive Service and General 
Schedule (GS) with and without D.C. Locality Pay, 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure: 

CIVFORS: Civilian Forecasting System: 

CPP: Civilian Personnel Policy: 

CSLP: Civilian Strategic Leader Program: 

DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency: 

DLA: Defense Logistics Agency: 

DLAMP: Defense Leadership and Management Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DSLDP: Defense Senior Leader Development Program: 

ECQ: Executive Core Qualifications: 

ELDP: Executive Leadership Development Program: 

FY: Fiscal Year: 

GS: General Schedule: 

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

OUSD(P&R): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness: 

PME: Professional Military Education: 

QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review: 

TRADOC: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command: 

WASS: Workforce Analysis Support System: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 10, 2009: 

The Honorable E. Benjamin Nelson: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Lindsey Graham: 
United States Senate: 

Having the right number of federal civilian personnel with the right 
skills is critical to achieving the Department of Defense's (DOD) 
mission. With more than 50 percent of its total civilian workforce 
(about 700,000 civilians) becoming eligible to retire in the next few 
years,[Footnote 1] DOD may be faced with deciding how to fill numerous 
mission-critical positions--positions that involve developing policy, 
providing intelligence, and acquiring weapon systems. Some of these 
positions also involve leadership roles that require hiring or 
promoting individuals to serve as senior leaders. However, in a 2006 
report on civil service governmentwide, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) reported that 90 percent of all federal executives in 
the civil service would be eligible for retirement over the next 10 
years. The report further noted that, if a significant number of these 
civil servants were to retire, it could result in a loss of leadership 
continuity, institutional knowledge, and expertise in the federal 
government.[Footnote 2] DOD has also stressed the need for leadership 
in human capital management and the need for an up-to-date human 
capital strategy to address these workforce changes in its 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).[Footnote 3] Since 2001, we have 
listed federal human capital management as a high-risk area, and in our 
2009 High-Risk Series we stated that ample opportunities remained for 
improving strategic human capital management to respond to 21st century 
challenges.[Footnote 4] 

In recent years, Congress has passed legislation requiring DOD to 
conduct human capital planning efforts for the department's overall 
civilian workforce and its senior leaders. For example, in section 1122 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (FY 2006 
NDAA), Congress directed DOD to develop and submit to the Senate and 
House Armed Services Committees a strategic plan to shape and improve 
the department's civilian employee workforce. The act stipulated eight 
requirements for the plan.[Footnote 5] This plan was to, among other 
things, include assessments of (1) existing critical skills and 
competencies in DOD's civilian workforce, (2) future critical skills 
and competencies needed over the next decade, and (3) any gaps in the 
existing or future critical skills and competencies identified. In 
addition, DOD was to submit a plan of action for developing and 
reshaping the civilian employee workforce to address any identified 
gaps, as well as specific recruiting and retention goals and strategies 
on how to train, compensate, and motivate civilian employees. The act 
required DOD to submit its original plan to Congress by January 6, 
2007, and to provide updates to its civilian human capital strategic 
plan no later than March 1 for each year from 2007 through 2010. We 
assessed DOD's original plan (which DOD submitted to Congress on 
November 6, 2007) and noted that it partially addressed two of the 
eight statutory requirements.[Footnote 6] For example, while DOD's plan 
listed current critical skills that DOD called enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations,[Footnote 7] it lacked a "gap analysis"--an 
assessment of the difference between the existing and future critical 
skills and competencies of the civilian workforce. We recommended that 
DOD provide Congress a plan that addresses all of the legislative 
requirements. DOD disagreed, noting that its response to the 
congressional reporting requirements reflected a centralized 
enterprisewide strategic perspective---as opposed to providing the 
information specified by law such as recruiting and retention goals. 

In October 2006, section 1102 of the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (FY 2007 NDAA) was enacted. This 
act required DOD to include in its March 1, 2008, update to the 
civilian human capital strategic plan, an assessment of the senior 
management, functional, and technical personnel, and a plan of action 
for improving them.[Footnote 8] The act stipulates nine requirements 
for the update. The update was to include assessments of (1) the needs 
of DOD for senior leaders, (2) the capability of DOD's existing senior 
leader workforce to meet DOD mission requirements, and (3) the gaps in 
DOD's existing or projected civilian workforce that should be addressed 
to ensure continued access to the senior leader workforce that DOD 
needs. DOD was to also submit a plan of action to address the gaps 
identified in its assessment. This plan was to include, among other 
things, (1) any legislative or administrative action that may be needed 
to adjust the requirements applicable to DOD's senior leader workforce, 
(2) any changes in the number of personnel authorized, (3) any changes 
in the rates or methods of pay, and (4) specific strategies for 
developing, training, deploying, compensating, motivating, and 
designing career paths and career opportunities for its senior 
leadership. DOD officials stated that the latter would encompass some 
parts of talent management[Footnote 9] and succession planning. 
[Footnote 10] On June 24, 2008, DOD submitted its update to the 
original human capital strategic plan.[Footnote 11] 

In response to your request, we reviewed DOD's first update to the 2007 
civilian human capital strategic plan. As agreed with your staff, we 
are reporting on the extent to which DOD's 2008 update addressed (1) 
the FY 2006 NDAA's human capital planning requirements, (2) the FY 2007 
NDAA's senior management-related human capital and succession planning 
requirements, and (3) other factors that may affect human capital 
planning for its civilian workforce. 

To examine the extent to which DOD's 2008 update addresses civilian 
human capital planning requirements in the 2006 and 2007 acts, we 
obtained and analyzed the update and compared it with the legislative 
requirements. We considered a requirement to be "addressed" if DOD 
demonstrated, through verifiable evidence, that it met all aspects of a 
stipulated requirement in the legislation and considered a requirement 
to be "partially addressed" if DOD provided evidence that showed some 
aspects of the legislation had been met. While we did not assess the 
reliability of the data in DOD's workforce assessments and gap 
analyses, we have previously reviewed information on the workforce 
forecasting system used by DOD[Footnote 12] and, during this review, we 
interviewed officials at OPM and DOD to obtain updated information on 
this system. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of our review. Additionally, we interviewed officials in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness' (OUSD [P&R]) Civilian Personnel Policy and the Civilian 
Personnel Management Service, along with officials from the individual 
services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Information 
Systems Agency, about the update and ongoing human capital efforts 
within DOD. The latter include the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 
(OSD) ongoing efforts to establish a program management office that is 
responsible for, among other things, developing and monitoring overall 
civilian workforce trends, competency assessments, and gap analyses, 
particularly for the DOD enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. 

To determine DOD's succession planning efforts for its senior 
management workforce, we analyzed applicable documents related to DOD's 
current efforts, along with our prior work on DOD's human capital 
planning efforts for senior leaders. To corroborate our understanding 
of DOD's efforts related to succession planning, we interviewed 
officials in DOD's office for Civilian Personnel Policy and the 
components[Footnote 13] about these matters. Among other things, we 
discussed DOD's efforts to establish an executive management office for 
talent management and succession planning at the OSD level. Finally, 
for our last objective, we identified and reviewed factors that would 
affect DOD's civilian workforce planning such as those that DOD 
identified in its update, and a factor previously identified in GAO's 
prior work--the department's reliance on contractors. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to February 
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives. We 
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more 
information about our scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

While DOD has made progress in addressing the legislative requirements 
when compared to the first plan, the department's 2008 update to its 
civilian human capital strategic plan partially addresses each of the 
requirements in the FY 2006 NDAA. For example, DOD identified 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations,[Footnote 14] which include 
logistics management, information technology management, and medical 
occupations such as physicians, nurses, and pharmacists. The update 
does not, however, contain an assessment of future enterprisewide 
mission-critical occupations that covers a 10-year period, as required 
in the law. DOD officials noted that its workforce assessments covered 
a 7-year period--which is in line with the department's budget. At the 
time of this review, DOD was just starting its assessment of future 
needs and had developed projected trends for its enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations to determine, among other things, overall 
workforce needs and retention goals for 11 of its 25 enterprisewide 
mission-critical occupations over a 7-year period. According to DOD, 
the department planned to complete its assessments of all 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations by the end of calendar year 
2008; however, DOD did not provide additional information on these 
assessments before completion of this review. Additionally, DOD's 2008 
update included information related to gap analyses for about half of 
its 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Further, DOD's 
update partially addressed the legislative requirements for a plan of 
action to develop and reshape the civilian employee workforce. OSD 
officials stated that they are working to more fully address all of the 
legislative requirements, and in November 2008, OUSD (P&R) officially 
established a program management office--whose responsibility is to, 
among other things, specifically monitor and review DOD's 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupation assessments, workforce 
trends, and gap analyses. While it is notable that the office has been 
established, at the time of our review, DOD officials stated that they 
did not have and did not plan to have a performance plan or "road map" 
to articulate how the department will fully address requirements of the 
FY 2006 NDAA. Our prior work has shown that key elements of a sound 
management approach contain performance plans that include establishing 
implementation goals and time frames, measuring performance, and 
aligning activities with resources.[Footnote 15] Without such a plan, 
DOD and its components may not be able to design and fund the best 
strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet their 
workforce needs. To continue the progress the department has made and 
better focus DOD's civilian human capital strategic planning efforts, 
we are recommending that the Under Secretary of Defense direct the 
newly established program management office to develop a performance 
plan to articulate how it will fully address all of the requirements of 
the FY 2006 NDAA--to include developing assessments and gap analyses 
for each of its identified enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. 
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our recommendation and we address those comments in detail later 
in this report. 

DOD's 2008 update and related documentation address four of the nine 
requirements in the FY 2007 NDAA for DOD's senior leader workforce and 
only partially address the remaining five. For example, as required by 
legislation, the update and supporting documentation identify a plan of 
action for developing or reshaping the senior leader workforce that 
addresses, among other things, certain legislative actions and changes 
in the number of personnel authorized. Nevertheless, the plan partially 
addresses some of the remaining legislative requirements. For example, 
DOD has conducted initial leadership assessments as a first step in 
identifying some of its needs, capabilities, and gaps in the existing 
or projected senior leader workforce. DOD's update noted, however, that 
final assessments to identify specific needs, capabilities, and gaps 
will not be complete until the summer of 2009. Further, the update's 
plan of action partially addresses some legislative requirements 
related to specific strategies for developing, training, and designing 
career paths and opportunities--which, per DOD, are components of 
talent management and succession planning. [Footnote 16] For example, 
DOD developed programs that are intended to provide senior leaders with 
targeted individual development and defense-focused leadership 
seminars, as well as a departmentwide effort to coordinate the 
management of its overall Senior Executive Service workforce.[Footnote 
17] With regard to succession planning, officials within DOD told us 
that their organization does not conduct departmentwide succession 
planning for its senior management workforce. DOD officials 
acknowledged that, while some work on the legislative requirements and 
succession planning for its senior management workforce had started, it 
was not complete, primarily because the newly formed executive 
management office for talent management and succession planning at the 
OSD level was not established until October 2008. At the time of our 
review, these officials stated that this new office, like the 
previously mentioned program management office, did not have and did 
not plan to have a performance plan that includes implementation goals 
and time frames, performance measures, and activities that are aligned 
with resources. As noted before, without such a plan, DOD and its 
components may not be able to design and fund the best strategies to 
address the legislative requirements and meet their workforce needs. We 
are therefore recommending that the Under Secretary of Defense task the 
newly established executive management office, which is responsible for 
addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to develop a 
performance plan that includes establishing implementation goals and 
time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with 
resources. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, and we 
address those comments in detail later in this report. 

While DOD's update identified some factors that could affect civilian 
workforce planning, such as decisions made during its Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) process,[Footnote 18] the update did not incorporate 
strategies for addressing these factors. For example, although DOD's 
update noted that BRAC has the potential to affect how, when, and where 
civilian positions are ultimately realigned relative to their original 
location, the update does not offer specific strategies for addressing 
how BRAC may affect projected trends and assessments for the civilian 
workforce. At the time of our review, OSD was developing strategies to 
address these factors. In addition, we have previously reported that 
DOD has experienced challenges in developing a civilian workforce 
strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate 
mix of contractors and government personnel.[Footnote 19] For example, 
in 2003, we recommended that DOD consider the roles and mix of civilian 
and contractor employees in its civilian human capital strategic plans. 
DOD did not concur with this recommendation, noting that the use of 
contractors was just another tool to accomplish the department's 
mission and was not a separate workforce with separate needs to manage. 
[Footnote 20] The 2006 QDR and DOD's 2008 update, however, recognize 
contractors as part of DOD's total force. We continue to believe that 
without strategies that address significant factors like the use of 
federal civilian personnel and contractors, DOD may not have the right 
people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost 
to achieve its mission in the future. We are, therefore, recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense incorporate, in future updates to DOD's 
civilian human capital strategic plan, strategies for addressing 
factors that could affect DOD's civilian workforce planning--
specifically, contractor roles and the effect contractors have on DOD's 
requirements for a civilian workforce. DOD partially concurred with 
this recommendation, and we addressed those comments in detail later in 
this report. 

Background: 

DOD stressed the importance of strategic human capital management in 
its 2006 QDR. For example, it noted the importance of involving senior 
leadership in this area and stated that DOD must (1) compete 
effectively with the civilian sector for highly qualified personnel, 
(2) possess an up-to-date human capital strategy, and (3) have the 
authorities to recruit, shape, and sustain the force it needs.[Footnote 
21] Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness, who serves as the Chief Human Capital Officer for DOD, 
has overall responsibility for the development of DOD's civilian human 
capital strategic plan and competency-based workforce planning. The 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy has the 
lead role in developing and overseeing the implementation of the 
civilian human capital strategic plan. 

In January 2006, section 1122 of the FY 2006 NDAA was enacted. It 
directed DOD to develop and submit to the Senate and House Armed 
Services Committees a strategic plan to shape and improve the DOD 
civilian employee workforce. The plan was to include eight 
requirements. These requirements included an assessment of: 

* the critical skills that will be needed in the future DOD civilian 
employee workforce to support national security requirements and 
effectively manage the department over the next decade, 

* the critical competencies that will be needed in the future DOD 
civilian employee workforce to support national security requirements 
and effectively manage the department over the next decade, 

* the skills of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce, 

* the competencies of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce, 

* the projected trends in that workforce based on expected losses due 
to retirement and other attrition, and: 

* gaps in the existing or projected DOD civilian employee workforce 
that should be addressed to ensure that the department has continued 
access to the critical skills and competencies needed to support 
national security requirements and effectively manage the department 
over the next decade. 

Also, as part of its civilian human capital strategic plan, the act 
directed DOD to include a plan of action for developing and reshaping 
the DOD civilian employee workforce to address identified gaps in 
critical skills and competencies, including specific: 

* recruiting and retention goals, including the program objectives of 
the department to be achieved through such goals; and: 

* strategies for developing, training, deploying, compensating, and 
motivating the DOD civilian employee workforce and the program 
objectives to be achieved through such strategies. 

In October 2006, the FY 2007 NDAA was enacted. Section 1102 of this act 
required DOD to include in its March 1, 2007, update a strategic plan 
to shape and improve its senior leader workforce.[Footnote 22] 

The plan was to include nine requirements. These nine requirements 
included an assessment of: 

* the needs of DOD for senior leaders in light of recent trends and 
projected changes in the mission and organization of the department and 
in light of staff support needed to accomplish that mission, 

* the capability of the existing civilian employee workforce to meet 
requirements relating to the mission of the department, and: 

* gaps in the existing or projected civilian employee workforce of the 
department that should be addressed to ensure continued access to the 
senior leader workforce DOD needs. 

Also, as part of its civilian human capital strategic plan, the act 
directed DOD to include a plan of action for developing and reshaping 
the senior leader workforce to ensure the department has continued 
access to the senior executives it needs. The plan of action is to 
include: 

* any legislative or administrative action that may be needed to adjust 
the requirements applicable to any category of civilian personnel 
identified or to establish a new category of senior management or 
technical personnel, 

* any changes in the number of personnel authorized in any category of 
personnel identified that may be needed to address such gaps and 
effectively meet the needs of the department, 

* any changes in the rates or methods of pay for any category of 
personnel identified that may be needed to address inequities and 
ensure that the department has full access to appropriately qualified 
personnel to address such gaps, 

* specific recruiting and retention goals, including the program 
objectives of the department to be achieved through such goals, 

* specific strategies for developing, training, deploying, 
compensating, motivating, and designing career paths and career 
opportunities for the senior leader workforce of the department, 
including the program objectives to be achieved through such 
strategies; and: 

* specific steps that the department has taken or plans to take to 
ensure that the senior leader workforce is managed in compliance with 
the requirements of section 129 of title 10, United States Code. 
[Footnote 23] 

To conduct the assessments of end strength[Footnote 24] and projected 
trends in the civilian workforce based on expected losses due to 
retirement and other attrition as required in the legislation, the 
department used OPM's workforce forecasting software Workforce Analysis 
Support System (WASS) and Civilian Forecasting System (CIVFORS). WASS 
is used to evaluate workforce trends and can perform simple to complex 
analyses from counts and averages to trend analyses, using such 
characteristics as employee age, retirement plan participation, and 
historical retirement data. CIVFORS was adapted from an Army military 
forecasting model for civilian use in 1987 and uses data from DOD's 
Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS).[Footnote 25] CIVFORS is 
a life-cycle modeling and projection tool, which models most 
significant events, including personnel actions such as promotions, 
reassignments, and retirements. Officials can use a default projection 
model or create their own, which can be tailored to examine issues such 
as projected vacancies of hard-to-fill occupations or turnover in 
specific regions by occupation. The workforce forecasts are generated 
over a 7-year projection period, using the most recent 5 years of 
historical data. While CIVFORS is used at the DOD enterprisewide level, 
the department has not directed the components to use the system. As a 
result, components use various systems and approaches for their 
forecasts and trend analyses. For example, when we met with officials 
from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) they noted that while they had 
received training on WASS/CIVFORS, the agency was not currently using 
the program, though they were having discussions to determine if they 
wanted to use the system in the future. Currently, DLA conducts 
workforce analysis by reviewing past information to determine future 
needs and uses a commercial off-the-shelf business software package to 
assist in the analysis. 

While DOD's 2008 Update Shows Progress, It Only Partially Addresses 
Each of the Fiscal Year 2006 Legislative Requirements: 

DOD has made progress in implementing the eight requirements in the FY 
2006 NDAA as compared to its first plan; however, as seen in table 1, 
the 2008 update only partially addresses each of the eight 
requirements. For example, DOD--through the department's functional and 
human resource leadership--identified 25 enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations but did not provide an assessment that covered a 
10-year period as required by the FY 2006 NDAA. Additionally, DOD 
provided projected trend data related, for example, to expected losses 
due to retirement on 11 of the 25 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations. Furthermore, DOD's 2008 update only included gap analyses 
for about half of the 25 identified enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations. DOD's update also partially addresses the legislative 
requirements for a plan of action to develop and reshape the civilian 
employee workforce. More importantly, the recently established program 
management office does not have a performance plan to articulate how it 
will address the legislative requirements. 

Table 1: Summary of Extent to Which DOD's 2008 Update to Its Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Plan Satisfies FY 2006 NDAA Legislative 
Requirements: 

Legislative requirement: 1; 
Description: An assessment of the critical skills that will be needed 
in the future DOD civilian employee workforce to support national 
security requirements and effectively manage the department over the 
next decade; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 2; 
Description: An assessment of the competencies that will be needed in 
the future DOD civilian employee workforce to support national security 
requirements and effectively manage the department over the next 
decade; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Partially addresses; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 3; 
Description: An assessment of the skills of the existing civilian 
employee workforce; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 4; 
Description: An assessment of the competencies of the existing DOD 
civilian employee workforce; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 2008 
Update: Addresses: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 5; 
Description: An assessment of the projected trends in that workforce 
based on expected losses due to retirement and other attrition; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 2008 
Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 6; 
Description: An assessment of gaps in the existing or projected DOD 
civilian employee workforce that should be addressed to ensure that the 
department has continued access to the critical skills and competencies 
to support national security requirements and effectively manage the 
department over the next decade; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 7; 
Description: A plan of action for developing and shaping the DOD 
civilian employee workforce to address identified gaps in critical 
skills and competencies of the existing or projected civilian 
workforce, including specific recruiting and retention goals and the 
program objectives to be achieved through such goals; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: 8; 
Description: A plan of action for developing and shaping the DOD 
civilian employee workforce to address identified gaps in critical 
skills and competencies of the existing or projected civilian 
workforce, including specific strategies for developing, training, 
deploying, compensating, and motivating the DOD civilian employee 
workforce and the program objectives to be achieved through such 
strategies; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Partially addresses; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses. 

Legislative requirement: Total; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Addresses: 0; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Partially addresses: 2; 
2007 Civilian human capital strategic plan[A]: Does not address: 6; 
2008 Update: Addresses: 0; 
2008 Update: Partially addresses: 8; 
2008 Update: Does not address: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: "Addresses" indicates that the agency has demonstrated, through 
verifiable evidence, that all aspects of the legislative requirement 
were covered. "Partially addresses" indicates that such evidence shows 
that some, but not all, aspects of the legislative requirement have 
been covered. 

[A] The 2007 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan was analyzed and 
reported on in GAO report GAO-08-439R. 

[End of table] 

DOD's Update Partially Addresses the Legislative Requirements to Assess 
Existing and Future Critical Skills and Competencies and Projected 
Trends: 

DOD's 2008 update partially addresses the legislative requirements of 
the FY 2006 NDAA to assess existing and future critical skills and 
competencies over the next decade and projected trends of the DOD 
civilian employee workforce. For example, DOD identified--through the 
department's functional and human resource leadership--25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations but did not provide an 
assessment of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that 
covered a 10-year period. As shown in table 2, DOD provided assessments 
of current and future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations and 
projected trend data in separate sections of its update. Specifically, 
the update had separate explanatory appendixes that addressed 
assessments for 12 of the 25 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations. These appendixes included assessment information compiled 
by OSD and the components. 

The update also had two separate appendixes with OSD-identified 
workforce assessments for the department and the components, along with 
projected trends data related to expected losses from retirements and 
attrition for 11 of the 25 DOD enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations. These data were obtained from the WASS/CIVFORS analyses 
and are also presented in table 2. 

Table 2: Information on Assessments and Projected Trends for DOD's 
Enterprisewide Mission-Critical Occupations: 

1; 
Occupation title: Information technology management; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

2; 
Occupation title: Computer scientist; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

3; 
Occupation title: Computer engineer; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

4; 
Occupation title: Electronics engineer; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

5; 
Occupation title: Contracting; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

6; 
Occupation title: Logistics management; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

7; 
Occupation title: Quality assurance; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

8; 
Occupation title: Human resources management; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

9; 
Occupation title: General engineering; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

10; 
Occupation title: Civil engineering; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

11; 
Occupation title: Physical science; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

12; 
Occupation title: Mathematician; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

13; 
Occupation title: Physician; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

14; 
Occupation title: Nurse; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

15; 
Occupation title: Pharmacist; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check]. 

16; 
Occupation title: Security administration; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

17; 
Occupation title: Intelligence; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Check]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

18; 
Occupation title: Police officer; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

19; 
Occupation title: Financial management; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

20; 
Occupation title: Accounting; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Check][A]. 

21; 
Occupation title: Auditing; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

22; 
Occupation title: Budget analysis; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

23; 
Occupation title: Foreign affairs; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

24; 
Occupation title: International relations; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

25; 
Occupation title: Language specialist; 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
[Empty]; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: [Empty]. 

Total addressed: 
Explanatory appendixes for enterprisewide mission-critical occupations: 
12; 
Assessments and projected trends information for enterprisewide mission-
critical occupations: 11. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

Notes: The data are from DOD's 2008 Update to the 2007 Civilian Human 
Capital Strategic Plan. 

[A] For the accounting enterprisewide mission-critical occupation, OSD 
only provided projected trends for the fourth estate. 

[End of table] 

Assessment of Existing and Future Critical Skills and Competencies: 

DOD's update provided assessments for 12 of the 25 existing and future 
critical skills and competencies, which OSD refers to as enterprisewide 
mission-critical occupations. As shown in table 2, DOD included 
explanatory appendixes on some of the enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations, including information technology management, computer 
science, and logistics management. Specifically, these appendixes 
discussed various issues, including end strength[Footnote 26] of the 
existing workforce for these 12 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations during fiscal year 2007. The update also contained two 
separate appendixes with OSD-identified workforce assessments for the 
department and the components, along with projected trends data related 
to expected losses from retirements and attrition for 11 of the 25 DOD 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations.[Footnote 27] The update 
noted that the department had just begun its assessments of the 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. It further noted that, to 
establish a baseline for its civilian workforce, the department decided 
to hold future workforce levels for the majority of the enterprisewide 
mission-critical occupations[Footnote 28] at the then 2007 level of 
employment--"steady state"--through 2014. This "steady state" would be 
maintained by controlling gains like "new hires." For example, in the 
appendix that contained the contracting enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupation, DOD noted that the 2007 end strength level was 
19,090 and that this steady state could be maintained at the fiscal 
year 2007 end strength levels of 19,090 through 2014, by controlling 
gains like new hires.[Footnote 29] 

However, DOD's update does not include an assessment of its future 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that cover a 10-year 
period, as required by the FY 2006 NDAA. DOD officials told us that the 
modeling tool it used to assess its workforce, WASS/CIVFORS, only 
generates forecasts for a 7-year period, in line with the department's 
budget--the Future Years Defense Program.[Footnote 30] DOD officials 
have noted that it is difficult to conduct workforce planning out to 10 
years, especially in light of factors that cannot be predicted, like 
the Global War on Terror and economic factors. On the other hand, some 
factors that could affect human capital planning are known well in 
advance, such as eligibility for retirement and the development of 
weapons systems that could take more than 10 years. 

Assessment of Projected Trends in the Critical Skills and Competencies 
of the Civilian Workforce Based on Expected Losses from Retirements and 
Other Attrition: 

As seen in table 2, DOD's update contained projected trend data on 
expected losses from retirement and other attrition for 11 of DOD's 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations and thus partially 
addressed the legislative requirement. Again, OSD used OPM's WASS/ 
CIVFORS projection tool to fulfill the legislative requirement for DOD 
to assess the projected trends in the civilian workforce. WASS/CIVFORS 
was used to develop charts on workforce demographics for the 11 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations identified. For the medical 
occupations of physician, nurse, and pharmacist, as an example, the 
projected trends data show that the majority of the department's 
projected losses in the medical community were due to transfers to 
other federal agencies, movement to the private sector, or internal 
transfers within DOD components. 

Assessment of Gaps in the Existing or Projected Critical Skills and 
Competencies of the Civilian Workforce: 

As seen in table 1, DOD has made progress in assessing the gaps in its 
civilian workforce since the publication of its 2007 civilian human 
capital strategic plan. Specifically, DOD's 2008 update notes that its 
approach to gap analysis has been both centralized at the OSD level-- 
with focus on the enterprisewide mission-critical occupations--and 
decentralized within the components. While not clearly identified as a 
gap assessment in the update, DOD provided data, at the OSD centralized 
level, from WASS/CIVFORS that showed end strength being maintained at 
the 2007 level--steady state--through 2014 for 10 of the previously 
mentioned 11 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. As stated 
before, the update noted that this steady state would be maintained by 
controlling gains[Footnote 31] in its workforce. Specifically, of the 
11 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations[Footnote 32] for which 
OSD projected trends, OSD forecasted that 10 could be maintained at a 
steady state--for a baseline, as previously noted. We also note that, 
for the civil engineering enterprisewide mission-critical occupation, 
DOD did not project a steady state for this occupation but rather 
identified a gap, stating that the projected gains would not meet 
projected losses. With this steady state assumption, OSD assumes that 
its goals for projected total gains will be achieved. We note however, 
that if these gains--that is, new hires or transfers from other 
government agencies--are not attained, then a potential gap exists. 
Furthermore DOD officials told us these steady state projections do not 
incorporate changes in workforce requirements resulting from 
initiatives like the "Gansler report"--which identified a need for 
additional contracting officials.[Footnote 33] We were told that the 
department would incorporate such changes in future updates. These 
changes could affect the size of the workforce. 

At the time of our review, the department had asked the components and 
functional community managers[Footnote 34] to validate the projected 
trends, which was originally expected to be completed by July 1, 2008. 
However, DOD officials stated that the functional community managers 
had not yet validated OSD's projections because they had to be trained 
on WASS/CIVFORS first. DOD officials said this training occurred in 
September 2008. At the time of our review, the revised completion date 
to validate the projected trends was January 2009. 

As previously stated, the update contained explanatory appendixes that 
specifically identified gap assessments for 6 enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations: civil engineering, human resource management, 
information technology management, computer engineering, computer 
scientist, and logistics management. Various methods and tools were 
used for these assessments--from discussions about the gaps to use of 
tools other than WASS/CIVFORS. For example, OPM's Federal Competency 
Assessment Tool for Human Resources was used to conduct a competency 
gap assessment for the human resource management enterprisewide mission-
critical occupation. Additionally, the assessment indicated that there 
were gaps in the employee relations and compensation competencies, 
among others. On the other hand, in the information technology 
appendix--which includes the enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations information technology management, computer engineering, 
and computer scientist--a federal survey was used and administered to 
the information technology community. The assessment identified gaps 
in, among other areas, information systems security certification and 
network security. 

DOD's update also included some competency gap analyses at the 
component level, in addition to the enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupation gap analyses. For example, DOD's update noted that the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) conducts gap analyses by 
having its employees do self-assessments to determine their proficiency 
level in the skills needed for their competency or career field. The 
update noted that all DISA employees are required to complete the 
competency gap assessment process and have a completed individual 
development plan. The update also stated that the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency has completed the first competency gap assessment for 
250 of its research and development workforce personnel. 

DOD officials acknowledge that work on the gap analyses for its 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations is not complete and efforts 
at the component level are ongoing. In addition, the update notes that 
the department has developed a proposed plan to identify and address 
future gaps. As mentioned previously, the functional community managers 
were tasked to validate and provide information for the projected 
trends; however, at the time of our review, some of the functional 
community managers were just established, and OSD officials said, as a 
result, the department published what it had. 

As we previously reported, the absence of fact-based gap analyses can 
undermine an agency's efforts to identify and respond to current and 
emerging challenges.[Footnote 35] Without including gap analyses for 
each of the areas DOD has identified as mission-critical, DOD and the 
components may not be able to design and fund the best strategies to 
fill their talent needs or to make the appropriate investments to 
develop and retain the best possible workforce. 

DOD's Update Partially Addresses the Legislative Requirements for a 
Plan of Action: 

Plan of Action, Including Specific Recruiting and Retention Goals and 
the Program Objectives to Be Achieved through Such Goals: 

As seen in rows 7 and 8 of table 1, we found that DOD partially 
addressed the legislative requirements for a plan of action for 
developing and reshaping the civilian employee workforce to address the 
gaps in critical skills and competencies identified. 

DOD's update contains recruiting and retention goals for 11 of the 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, which were developed with 
the WASS/CIVFORS projection tool; however, as stated previously, these 
forecasts cover 7 years, not 10 years as required by the FY 2006 NDAA. 
At the time of this review, DOD was just starting the process for 
developing projected trends for its enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations to determine, among other things, overall workforce needs 
and retention goals for 11 of its 25 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations over a 7-year period. DOD's update states that the 
department is in the process of identifying 10-year recruiting and 
retention goals for all of the enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations and expects to complete this effort by the end of calendar 
year 2008; however, DOD did not provide additional information on these 
assessments before completion of this review. Furthermore, DOD's update 
does not link specific recruiting and retention goals to program 
objectives. 

Additionally, DOD's update contains strategies for recruiting and 
retaining civilian employees in the appendixes that discuss the 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. For example, for the 
medical occupations, DOD formed the Tri-Service Medical Recruitment 
Workgroup in 2007 to, among other things, analyze current recruitment, 
hiring, and retention strategies for civilian health care positions. 
Some accomplishments of the workgroup include creation of a DOD medical 
recruitment sub-Web on the DOD Civilian Personnel Management Service 
Web site, guidance on the use of referral bonuses as a recruitment 
tool, and development of a handbook for recruiters and managers on 
compensation and hiring flexibilities. 

Plan of Action Including Specific Strategies for Developing, Training, 
Deploying, Compensating, and Motivating the DOD Civilian Workforce and 
Program Objectives: 

DOD's update does contain some strategies for developing, training, 
deploying, compensating, and motivating the civilian workforce. 
Specifically, DOD's update discusses strategies to address workforce 
requirements in the explanatory appendixes, which cover 12 of the 25 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations identified. For example, 
the FY 2008 NDAA granted DOD the authority to implement a modified 
version of the Information Technology Exchange Program, which would 
allow DOD civilians in the IT community to conduct job details in the 
private sector.[Footnote 36] However, because DOD has not completed its 
assessment of all 25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, any 
plan of action the department develops will not address gaps that have 
yet to be identified. While DOD's update contains an extensive list of 
strategies, it does not address the requirements of the law--that the 
strategies be specifically related to gaps in the enterprisewide 
mission-critical occupations. Furthermore, DOD's update does not link 
specific strategies for developing, training, deploying, compensating, 
and motivating the civilian workforce to program objectives. 

DOD's Recently Established Program Management Office Does Not Have a 
Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be 
Addressed: 

OSD officials stated that they are working to more fully address all of 
the legislative requirements, and in November 2008 OUSD (P&R) 
officially established a program management office[Footnote 37]--whose 
responsibility is to, among other things, specifically monitor and 
review DOD's enterprisewide mission-critical occupation assessments, 
workforce trends, and gap analyses. According to DOD, the budget for 
this office included salary and benefits for 20 people and training for 
human resource consultants on strategic human capital management. 

While it is notable the office has been established, at the time of our 
review, DOD officials stated that they did not have and did not plan to 
have a performance plan or "road map" to articulate how the department 
will fully address requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA. Additionally, we 
note that, prior to the establishment of this new office, the Program 
Executive Office for Strategic Human Capital Planning, per DOD 
officials, had responsibility to develop DOD's civilian human capital 
plan. It appears DOD has never had a performance plan to help manage 
this area. Our prior work has shown that key elements of a sound 
management approach contain performance plans that include establishing 
implementation goals and time frames, performance measures, and 
activities that are aligned with resources.[Footnote 38] Without such a 
plan, DOD and its components may not be able to design and fund the 
best strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet their 
workforce needs. 

DOD's 2008 Update of Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 
Generally Addresses 2007 Legislative Requirements for DOD's Senior 
Leader Workforce: 

Of the nine requirements stipulated in the FY 2007 NDAA, DOD's update 
and related documentation addresses four and partially addresses the 
remaining five. Table 3 summarizes the legislative requirements and 
identifies the extent to which the civilian human capital strategic 
plan update addresses the requirements. Although DOD recently 
established, in October 2008, an executive management office 
responsible for talent management, succession planning, and other 
issues, this office is operating without a performance plan that 
establishes implementation goals and time frames, measures performance, 
and aligns activities with resources. 

Table 3: Summary of Extent to Which DOD's 2008 Update Satisfies FY 2007 
NDAA Legislative Requirements: 

Legislative requirement: 1; 
Description: An assessment of DOD's needs for senior management, 
functional, and technical personnel in light of recent trends and 
projected changes in the mission and organization of DOD and in light 
of staff support needed to accomplish that mission; 
Partially addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 2; 
Description: An assessment of the capability of DOD's existing civilian 
employee workforce to meet requirements relating to DOD's mission; 
Partially addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 3; 
Description: An assessment of gaps in DOD's existing or projected 
civilian employee workforce that should be addressed to ensure 
continued access to senior management, functional, and technical 
personnel; 
Partially addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 4; 
Description: A plan of action including any legislative or 
administrative action that may be needed to adjust the requirements 
applicable to any category of civilian personnel identified or to 
establish a new category of senior leaders; 
Addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 5; 
Description: A plan of action including any changes in the number of 
personnel authorized in any category of personnel identified that may 
be needed to address such gaps and effectively meet DOD's needs; 
Addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 6; 
Description: A plan of action including any changes in the rates or 
methods of pay for any category of personnel identified that may be 
needed to address inequities and ensure that DOD has full access to 
appropriately qualified personnel to address such gaps and meet DOD's 
needs; 
Addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 7; 
Description: A plan of action including specific recruiting and 
retention goals, including the program objectives of DOD to be achieved 
through such goals; 
Partially addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 8; 
Description: A plan of action including specific strategies for 
developing, training, deploying, compensating, motivating, and 
designing career paths and career opportunities for DOD's senior 
management, functional, and technical workforce, including the program 
objectives to be achieved through such strategies; 
Partially addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: 9; 
Description: A plan of action including specific steps that DOD has 
taken or plans to take to ensure that DOD's senior management, 
functional, and technical workforce is managed in compliance with the 
requirements of section 129 of title 10, United States Code; 
Addresses: [Check]. 

Legislative requirement: Total; 
Addresses: 4; 
Partially addresses: 5; 
Does not address: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] See footnote 8 for details of positions covered by section 1102. 

[End of table] 

DOD's Update Addresses Four of Nine Legislative Requirements: 

DOD's 2008 update addresses four requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA-- 
specifically, a plan of action that identifies (1) legislative or 
administrative actions needed, (2) changes in the number of personnel 
authorized, (3) changes in the rates or methods of pay, and (4) 
specific steps DOD has identified to ensure compliance with section 129 
of title 10, United States Code.[Footnote 39] 

A Plan of Action Including Any Legislative or Administrative Action: 

At the time of our report, DOD officials said that the department has 
not determined whether additional legislative actions are needed. DOD's 
update, however, identifies the issuance of DOD Directive 1403.03, 
which established the policy for competency requirements and other 
requirements for the management of the career life cycle of senior 
executives. In addition, DOD Instruction 1400.25, issued in November 
2008, established a competency-based approach to manage the life cycle 
of senior executive personnel from accession through separation. 

A Plan of Action Including Any Changes in the Number of Personnel 
Authorized: 

DOD's update notes that the department has requested an increase in the 
number of Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service personnel 
allowed under section 1606a of title 10. Specifically, the update noted 
that the department required an additional 100 allocations for Defense 
Intelligence Senior Executive Service personnel in the following 
agencies: Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Defense 
Security Service, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence. Although the update states that this change will allow 
critical mission requirements to be met, we did not conduct a review of 
the department's analysis to determine its validity. 

A Plan of Action Including Any Changes in the Rates or Methods of Pay: 

DOD's update describes the finalization of a common Senior Executive 
Service position tier structure,[Footnote 40] which creates a framework 
for determining comparability in the management and compensation of 
executive positions. The update also includes new sourcing methods to 
fill positions within each tier using component talent management 
processes, which includes identifying candidates across the department 
who, based on annual talent reviews, have been identified as ready for 
an enterprise senior executive position.[Footnote 41] 

A Plan of Action Including Specific Steps DOD Has Taken or Plans to 
Take to Ensure Compliance with Section 129 of Title 10, United States 
Code: 

DOD's update describes a DOD Instruction that is being developed that 
is intended to address how DOD manages and allocates resources based on 
mission requirements, workload, and prescribed performance objectives, 
as prescribed by 10 U.S.C. §129. Specifically, section 129 of title 10 
states that the civilian personnel of DOD will be managed each fiscal 
year solely on the basis of and consistent with (1) the workload 
required to carry out the functions and activities of the department 
and (2) the funds made available to the department for such fiscal 
year. 

According to DOD's update, the new instruction will explain the 
manpower and resources that are allocated and managed to support the 
strategic objectives, daily operation, and effective and economical 
administration of the department. Further, where possible, measures of 
performance will be established as indicators of mission accomplishment 
and will be regularly monitored by management officials to ensure that 
budgeted manpower reflects the minimum necessary to achieve program 
objectives consistent with defense priorities. In addition, the 
instruction will cover the flexibilities to manage to a requirement and 
the budget. The update and DOD officials did not, however, give any 
indication as to when this instruction will be completed. 

DOD's Update Partially Addresses Five of Nine Legislative Requirements: 

DOD's 2008 update partially addresses the remaining five requirements 
of the FY 2007 NDAA. As seen in table 3, these include an assessment of 
the needs for, the capabilities of, and the gaps in the existing senior 
leader workforce; and a plan of action that includes specific 
recruiting and retention goals, along with specific strategies for 
developing, training, deploying, compensating, motivating, and 
designing career paths and career opportunities for the senior leader 
workforce. 

Assessment of DOD's Needs for Senior Leaders: 

DOD's 2008 update notes that the department has not completely 
addressed this requirement and has ongoing work to do so through a 
baseline review of senior leadership positions. DOD officials said that 
the latter will include an assessment of the needs for senior leaders. 
DOD's update does, however, identify leadership capabilities needed as 
part of an overall assessment of the senior leader workforce and 
includes some competencies developed to address the changing 
environment in which DOD operates. Specifically, the update identifies 
the need for senior leaders to assimilate quickly, possess language 
skills and cultural awareness, understand interagency roles and 
responsibilities, and have an enterprise-spanning perspective, 
including knowledge of joint matters and network-centric concepts as 
new leadership capabilities. 

Assessment of the Capability of the Senior Leader Workforce: 

The update acknowledges that work on this requirement is ongoing, and a 
DOD Instruction has been drafted that will clarify, when completed, 
DOD's official policy on the development and sustainment of its senior 
leader workforce. In addition, DOD officials have told us that the 
department began conducting a baseline review of its senior leader 
workforce in April 2008, and this review is expected to provide an 
assessment of the capability of existing executive talent. While work 
is ongoing, however, DOD's update provides projected trend data for the 
senior leader workforce, including retirements and other attrition, 
projecting that approximately 60 percent of DOD's senior leader 
workforce will be eligible to retire within the next 3 years. 

Assessment of Gaps in the Existing or Projected Workforce: 

DOD's update partially addresses this requirement, and the update 
acknowledges that work on this requirement will be ongoing until the 
summer of 2009. Specifically, the update states that DOD conducted 
initial leadership competency assessments at the Senior Executive 
Service, manager, and supervisor levels, in 2007, using OPM's Web-based 
Federal Competency Assessment Tool for Managers. The update noted that 
the department identified competency gaps against DOD's Executive Core 
Qualifications in areas including: creativity, flexibility, strategic 
thinking, vision, conflict management, and oral and written 
communications. In addition, DOD's subject-matter experts and senior 
leaders, through qualitative assessments, identified the following 
gaps: (1) lack of critical transformational leadership skills, (2) lack 
of enterprisewide approach to managing the talent pipeline for DOD 
leaders, and (3) the shortfall of excepted-service senior intelligence 
executives. 

A Plan of Action Including Specific Recruiting and Retention Goals: 

DOD's update partially addresses this requirement. For example, the 
update identifies a 5-year goal for the number of employees in 
leadership positions and contains projected trends in senior leader 
workforce gains, accessions, total losses, and retirement over a 7-year 
period. In addition, DOD is reviewing federal travel entitlements, 
benefits, and allowances to promulgate policies that attract and retain 
senior leaders. For example, DOD is reviewing Overseas Benefits 
Allowances to ensure the allowances are attractive incentives for 
senior leaders. The update, however, does not identify specific program 
goals to be achieved through such efforts. In addition, although the 
update suggests that DOD has tracking measures that relate to 
recruitment and retention, it does not link specific recruiting and 
retention goals to program objectives. 

A Plan of Action Including Specific Strategies for Developing, 
Training, Deploying, Compensating, Motivating, and Designing Career 
Paths and Career Opportunities: 

DOD's update and the implementation of DOD Directive 1403.03 partially 
address specific strategies for developing, training, deploying, 
compensating, motivating, and designing career paths and opportunities, 
which DOD officials stated are components of talent management and 
succession planning. The update does not, however, address specific 
strategies for deploying senior leaders. 

* Developing and Training. DOD has developed the Defense Senior Leader 
Development Program (DSLDP), which is intended to provide senior 
leaders with, among other things, targeted individual development, 
professional military education, and defense-focused leadership 
seminars. This program is available to a small percentage of the DOD 
workforce and will replace the Defense Leadership and Management 
Program (DLAMP). According to DOD officials, DLAMP faced a number of 
problems, such as lack of involvement of senior leadership in the 
career path or progression of potential SES candidates, lack of 
interaction and camaraderie among participants, and no plan for use of 
employees or progression after graduation. These shortcomings were 
identified through participant feedback and studies conducted by DOD. 

Although the development of DSLDP seeks to address some of the 
challenges that faced DLAMP, some components and defense agencies have 
indicated they will not use DSLDP because they prefer using their own 
component or agency programs, which they said are more focused on the 
unique needs for their specific senior leaders. 

In addition to DSLDP and other OSD-level leadership programs, the 
components and defense agencies have other leadership development 
programs, including but not limited to the Air Force's Civilian 
Strategic Leader Program, the Defense Information Systems Agency's 
Enterprise Leadership Development Program, and the Army Civilian 
University. For more information on selected leadership development 
programs throughout DOD, see appendix II. 

* Designing Career Path and Career Opportunities (Talent Management and 
Succession Planning). With regard to talent management and succession 
planning efforts, DOD officials stated that OSD does not conduct 
departmentwide succession planning for DOD's senior leader workforce. 
Nevertheless, DOD issued Directive 1403.03 in October 2007 establishing 
DOD policy to more effectively manage the career life cycle of DOD's 
Senior Executive Service leaders, which specifically covers succession 
planning for senior executives in the service components and defense 
agencies. DOD's 2008 update to its civilian human capital strategic 
plan states that succession planning efforts are currently being 
developed. 

Additionally, according to DOD officials, the executive management 
office for talent management and succession planning, which was not 
established until October 2008, will address these issues.[Footnote 42] 
This office will provide guidance and tools for the departmentwide 
talent management programs. For example, OSD is exploring the use of a 
talent management system that will allow OSD and the components to 
centralize their talent management efforts in accordance with DOD 
guidance. Specifically, this guidance requires DOD and the components 
to coordinate such efforts for the Senior Executive Service workforce. 
DOD officials noted that until this office is fully operational they 
will be unable to completely address the legislative requirements and 
this guidance. 

* Compensating and Motivating Senior Executives. In an effort to 
address compensation for and motivation of its Senior Executive Service 
workforce, DOD's update notes that the department issued a directive- 
type memorandum on April 28, 2008, establishing a common Tier Policy to 
help ensure transparency and comparability in the management and 
compensation of executive positions. Specifically, the DOD tier 
structure is built upon the principle that DOD senior executive 
positions vary in terms of effect on mission, level of complexity, span 
of control, inherent authority, scope and breadth of responsibility, 
and influence in joint, national security matters. Under the three-tier 
structure, DOD senior executive positions will be sorted into three 
tiers based upon position characteristics, with Tier 1 positions 
generally having less complexity and effect on mission outcomes and 
Tier 3 positions having significant complexity, effect on mission 
outcomes, or influence on joint, national security matters. Responsible 
DOD officials told us that compensation levels within the tier system 
are common throughout the department. 

According to DOD officials, however, while the common Tier Policy 
addresses compensation, the pay overlap of some General Schedule (GS) 
15 employees and Senior Executive Service personnel could pose a 
challenge to recruiting for the Senior Executive Service workforce. 
Specifically, this overlap of pay, which involved DOD's Senior 
Executive Service, some GS-15 federal compensation, and some GS-15 
compensation with Washington, D.C., locality, is shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Pay Overlap of DOD's Senior Executive Service and General 
Schedule (GS) with and without D.C. Locality Pay, 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

DOD SES Salaries by Tier: 
Tier 1: $114,468-$158,500 (Tier 1 GS 15 salary); 
Tier 2: $158,500-$166,000; 
Tier 3: $166,000-$172,200. 

GS 15 With DC Locality Pay: 
Step 6: $126,850; 
Step 7: $130,694; 
Step 8: $134,538; 
Step 9: $138,383; 
Step 10: $142,227. 

GS 15 Salary Differences Without Locality Pay: 
Step 8: $114,470; 
Step 9: $117,650; 
Step 10: $120,830. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and OPM data. 

[End of figure] 

Additionally, we have previously reported on other challenges related 
to Senior Executive Service compensation regarding pay compression-- 
which occurred when their pay reached the statutory cap.[Footnote 43] 

DOD's Recently Established Executive Management Office Does Not Have a 
Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be 
Addressed: 

OSD officials acknowledged that, while some work on the legislative 
requirements and succession planning for its senior management 
workforce had started, it was not complete, primarily because the newly 
formed executive management office responsible for talent management, 
succession planning, and other issues at the OSD level was not 
established until October 2008. At the time of our review, these 
officials stated that this new office, like the program management 
office, did not have and did not plan to have a performance plan that 
included implementation goals and time frames, performance measures, 
and activities that are aligned with resources. As noted before, 
without such a plan, DOD and its components may not be able to design 
and fund the best strategies to address the legislative requirements 
and meet their workforce needs. 

Although DOD Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Plan, the 
Update Does Not Include Strategies to Address These Factors: 

While DOD's update identified a number of factors that could affect 
civilian workforce plans, such as the effect of decisions made during 
BRAC[Footnote 44] and the conversion of military positions to civilian 
positions,[Footnote 45] it did not specifically incorporate strategies 
to address these factors. Importantly, the department did not consider 
a factor we previously identified--specifically, the department's 
reliance on contractors and the related human capital challenges 
associated with this reliance. For example, we previously identified 
the need to develop a civilian workforce strategy to address the extent 
of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractors. The greater 
reliance on contractors requires a critical mass of civilian personnel 
with the expertise necessary to protect the government's interest and 
ensure effective oversight of contractor work.[Footnote 46] Without 
considering contractors as a factor in strategic human capital 
planning, DOD may not have the right number and appropriate mix of 
federal civilian employees and contractors it needs to accomplish its 
mission. 

DOD's Update Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Plan: 

The update identified a number of factors[Footnote 47] that could 
affect the department's civilian human capital strategic plan. These 
included the execution of 2005 BRAC-round activities; military-to- 
civilian position conversions; and the "in-sourcing" requirement in the 
FY 2008 NDAA--that is, the requirement that certain positions be filled 
by federal civilian employees rather than contractors. The update, 
however, did not provide strategies for addressing these factors but 
stated that strategies were being developed. 

Specifically regarding BRAC, the update noted that the process has the 
potential to affect how, when, and where positions are ultimately 
realigned relative to their original location. It further noted that if 
employees do not move, open positions and attrition could result, thus 
increasing the recruiting needs of the department. We have previously 
reported that implementing hundreds of BRAC actions by the statutory 
deadline of September 15, 2011, will present a challenge for DOD to 
realign about 123,000 military and civilian personnel to various 
installations across the country.[Footnote 48] 

The update also noted that the conversions of military positions to 
civilian positions could also affect the department's workforce 
projections. For example, it stated that a key aspect of maintaining 
the nation's "All-Volunteer" force was the use of DOD's military 
members in only those positions that are military-essential. It stated 
that since 2004, more than 55,000 military positions have been selected 
for conversion to civilian status in areas such as healthcare 
administrators. It further noted that the department needs to consider 
this potential increase in civilians as it plans and implements its 
human capital strategies for future years. 

Additionally, the update noted that the management of the civilian 
workforce would also be affected by a new in-sourcing law--section 324 
of the FY 2008 NDAA.[Footnote 49] The update mentioned that the 
department may consider using government employees to perform, among 
other things, a new mission requirement or an activity performed by a 
contractor when an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are 
the low-cost providers. The department further noted that the increased 
use of civilians to accomplish such critical work will put greater 
demands on its civilian human resources, policies, and practices. 

We have previously reported a similar factor that has been a primary 
challenge for DOD--the department's increasing reliance on contractors. 
GAO's body of work has shown that DOD faces long-standing challenges 
with increased reliance on contractors to perform core missions. These 
challenges are accentuated in operations such as Iraq, where DOD has 
lacked adequate numbers of personnel to provide oversight and 
management of contractors.[Footnote 50] 

Key to meeting this primary challenge is developing workforce 
strategies that consider the extent to which contractors should be used 
and the appropriate mix of contractor and federal personnel. In 2003, 
we recommended that DOD develop a human capital strategic plan that 
considers contractor roles and the mix of federal civilian and 
contractor employees in these plans. DOD did not concur with this 
recommendation, at the time, noting that the use of contractors was 
just another tool to accomplish the department's mission and was not a 
separate workforce with separate needs to manage.[Footnote 51] However, 
we noted that strategic planning for the civilian workforce should be 
undertaken in the context of the "total force," including contractors. 
The 2006 QDR and DOD's 2008 update recognize contractors as part of 
DOD's total workforce. We continue to believe that, without strategies 
that address DOD's reliance on contractors--a key part of DOD's 
workforce--the department may not have the right people, in the right 
place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its 
mission in the future. 

Conclusions: 

According to DOD's projections, it is possible that the department 
could be faced, within the next few years, with replacing over 300,000 
civilian employees. With the change in administration, the roles of 
these civilians are of particular importance because of the 
institutional knowledge they possess, as the military rotates, and as 
political appointees change. Also, it becomes imperative that DOD 
strategically manage this workforce to ensure resources are used 
effectively. While DOD has made good progress in developing its 
civilian human capital strategic plan, the recent update remains 
incomplete. For example, the update does not assess gaps in all of the 
enterprisewide mission-critical occupations identified by DOD. Also not 
included are strategies for addressing factors like BRAC and DOD's 
reliance on contractors. DOD's human capital strategic plan may not be 
as useful as it could be to ensure that DOD has the right number of 
people with the right skills to accomplish the department's mission. 
DOD is moving forward in making operational the two management offices 
it established in the fall of 2008--one to shape and monitor DOD's 
updated plans and the other to address, among other things, talent 
management and succession planning for the senior leader workforce. 
However, this progress comes without performance plans to help guide 
and gauge how the department is achieving its objective, which we have 
previously reported is a key element of a sound management approach. 
[Footnote 52] 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To continue the progress DOD has made with its human capital strategic 
planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
take the following three actions: 

* task the newly established program management office, which is 
responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, to 
develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation 
goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities 
with resources; 

* task the newly established executive management office, which is 
responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to 
develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation 
goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities 
with resources; and: 

* incorporate, in future updates to its strategic human capital plan, 
strategies for addressing factors that could significantly affect DOD's 
civilian workforce plans--including contractor roles and the effect 
contractors have on requirements for DOD's civilian workforce. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of our report, the Acting Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially concurred with our three 
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also 
provided technical comments on our draft report, which we incorporated, 
as appropriate into the report. 

In written comments, DOD stated that the department had made great 
progress in its strategic human capital plan implementation--from its 
institutionalization in the department's philosophy to the actual 
conduct of workforce forecasting and competency assessments. The 
comments further stated that the department was disappointed that the 
complexity of its undertaking and accomplishments were not fully 
acknowledged in our report and trusted that this could be corrected in 
the final report. Our review was structured to assess the extent to 
which DOD's update addressed the FY 2006 and FY 2007 NDAA requirements 
and key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. We note 
that our report acknowledges that DOD has made progress in addressing 
the FY 2006 NDAA requirements when compared with its first strategic 
human capital plan. Specifically, our report shows that the initial 
plan did not meet most of the statutory requirements, while the update 
partially addressed each requirement. We also noted some of DOD's 
accomplishments--including issuance of a DOD Instruction on strategic 
human capital management and training of component representatives on 
the OPM forecasting tool. However, our report also identified those 
areas where DOD has further work to do to enhance its civilian human 
capital strategic plan. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the newly 
established program management office, which is responsible for 
addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, develop a performance 
plan that includes establishing implementation goals and time frames, 
measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The 
department noted that our report said DOD does not have and does not 
plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly formed 
civilian workforce readiness program office and that this statement was 
not correct. It further noted that, at the time of our review, the 
newly formed program office was only a couple of months old and that 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy had 
required the new office to develop both a performance plan and a road 
map--and that these efforts were in progress. We disagree. To the 
contrary, DOD officials did not provide any specific documentation from 
OUSD(P&R) or Civilian Personnel Policy requiring the new office to 
develop such plans, when asked about this plan. In fact, we were told 
that the department did not have a performance plan and that the 
Civilian Personnel Policy office, which had responsibility for the new 
program management office, normally does not produce such documents. We 
were further told that, essentially, any overall plan for the new 
office was scattered through several documents--including position 
descriptions, budget requests, and briefings to senior leadership. DOD 
also stated that, at the time of our review, the establishment of the 
civilian readiness office was only a couple of months old and its 
staffing was ongoing. We note however, that another office,[Footnote 
53] per DOD officials, had been addressing the FY 2006 NDAA 
requirements and that DOD did not provide us with a performance plan 
for that office either. After reviewing DOD's comments, we asked for 
additional documentation to support its statement that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy had required the 
development of a performance plan. DOD officials told us that while 
they have drafted a performance plan, they were unable to provide a 
copy because it is currently under review. In light of these 
circumstances, we believe it is imperative that DOD have a performance 
plan that provides additional guidance and measures to assess the 
extent to which the program management office is addressing the 
requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA. 

DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to task the newly 
established executive management office, which is responsible for 
addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to develop a 
performance plan that includes establishing implementation goals and 
timeframes, measuring performance, and aligning activities with 
resources. The department stated that, at the time of our review, the 
executive management office was only a couple of months old. It further 
noted that OUSD(P&R) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Civilian Personnel Policy) had required the new office to develop both 
a performance plan (which measures performance and aligns activities to 
resources) and a road map (with implementation goals and timeframes). 
The department also noted that development of these documents was in 
progress. Again, DOD officials did not mention or provide GAO with any 
specific documentation from OUSD(P&R) or Civilian Personnel Policy 
requiring the new office to develop such plans. These actions, if 
performed, appear consistent with the intent of our recommendation to 
develop a performance plan that provides additional guidance and 
measures to assess the extent to which the executive management office 
is addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to incorporate in 
future updates to its strategic human capital plan, strategies for 
addressing factors that could significantly affect DOD's civilian 
workforce plans--including contractor roles and responsibilities and 
the effect the use of contractors has on requirements for DOD's 
civilian workforce. The department stated that it has strategies in 
place to address recruitment and retention needs arising from factors 
affecting the DOD workforce, and that it will more closely align these 
strategies to the causal factors so the linkage is clearly evident. We 
believe these actions, once implemented, may meet the intent of our 
recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2008 
update to its civilian human capital strategic plan addresses the 
statutory requirements established in section 1122 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (FY 2006 NDAA) and 
section 1102 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007 (FY 2007 NDAA), we obtained and reviewed DOD's May 2008 update. 
This document was approximately 400 pages and was titled 
"Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan." We developed a checklist based on the FY 2006 NDAA and FY 2007 
NDAA legislative requirements, which enabled us to compare the 
requirements to DOD's updated plan. Two analysts independently assessed 
the DOD update using the checklist and assigned a rating to each of the 
elements from one of three potential ratings: "addresses," "partially 
addresses," or "does not address." According to our methodology, a 
rating of "addresses" was assigned if all elements of a legislative 
requirement were cited, even if specificity and details could be 
improved upon. Within our designation of "partially addresses," there 
was a wide variation between an assessment or plan of action that 
includes most of the elements of a legislative requirement and an 
assessment or plan of action that includes few of the elements of a 
legislative requirement. A rating of "does not address" was assigned 
when elements of a characteristic were not explicitly cited or 
discussed or any implicit references were either too vague or too 
general to be useful. Independent assessments between the two analysts 
were in agreement in the majority of the cases. When different initial 
ratings were given by the two analysts, they met to discuss and resolve 
differences in their respective checklist analyses and a senior analyst 
validated the results. On the basis of those discussions a consolidated 
final checklist was developed for both of the NDAAs. 

We did not assess the reliability of the data in DOD's workforce 
assessments and gap analyses; however, we have previously reported 
information on the workforce forecasting system used by DOD. In 
addition, we interviewed officials at the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) to obtain updated information on the workforce 
forecasting systems DOD used to assess its civilian workforce and 
ascertained that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. We also interviewed officials in DOD offices for 
Civilian Personnel Policy (CPP), the Civilian Personnel Management 
Service, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Defense Information 
Systems Agency, and the Defense Logistics Agency about the update and 
ongoing human capital efforts within DOD. We also discussed DOD's 
ongoing efforts to establish a program management office that is 
responsible for, among other things, monitoring and reviewing overall 
civilian workforce trends, competency assessments, and gap analyses. 
Additionally, we talked with officials responsible for standing up the 
separate talent management offices within the components and defense 
agencies. These offices will coordinate talent management efforts with 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To determine DOD's succession 
planning efforts for its Senior Executive Service workforce, we 
analyzed applicable documents related to DOD's current efforts, along 
with our prior work on DOD's human capital planning efforts for senior 
executives. We also interviewed officials in DOD's offices for CPP, the 
individual services, and the components about these matters. Among 
other things, we discussed the department's efforts to establish an 
executive management office for talent management and succession 
planning at the OSD level. 

Finally, we identified and reviewed factors that may affect DOD's 
civilian workforce planning such as those that DOD identified in its 
update. We also analyzed prior GAO reports examining other human 
capital challenges within DOD related to the department's reliance on 
contractors and discussed these matters with DOD and service officials. 
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to February 
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives. We 
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Examples of DOD's and the Components' Senior Leader 
Development and Training Programs: 

DOD Programs: 

In 1997, in response to recommendations from the Commission on Roles 
and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
created its Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP). This is 
a program aimed at preparing civilian employees for key leadership 
positions throughout the department.[Footnote 54] DOD refers to DLAMP 
as a systematic program of "joint" civilian leader training, education, 
and development that provides the framework for developing civilians 
with a DOD-wide capability, substantive knowledge of the national 
security mission, and strong leadership and management skills. 

Between 1997 and 2006, 1,894 participants were admitted to DLAMP, of 
which 1,132 completed senior-level professional military education, 480 
graduated, 470 remained in the program, and 187 were selected for 
Senior Executive Service positions. Based on feedback from the 
components and program participants, DOD made modifications to the 
program and decided to end DLAMP in its current form in 2010. The 
modifications to DLAMP resulted in it being transitioned into a new 
program called Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP). 

The modified approach in DSLDP focuses on developing senior civilian 
leaders to excel in the 21st century's joint, interagency, and 
multinational environment. DSLDP supports the governmentwide effort to 
foster interagency cooperation and information sharing by providing 
opportunities to understand and experience, first-hand, the issues and 
challenges facing leaders across DOD and the broader national security 
arena. 

Table 4 shows the differences between DOD's DLAMP and DSLDP programs. 
For example, DLAMP was a self-paced program and DSLDP uses a cohort- 
based approach. 

Table 4: Defense Leadership and Management Program and Defense Senior 
Leader Development Program: 

Program duration: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): Self-paced (2 to 5 
years); 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Cohort-based (2 
years); 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DSLDP 
utilizes cohorts. 

Professional military education (PME): 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): Complete: a 
foundation course in national security policy, strategy, and decision 
making; a senior-level course in PME from one of the senior service 
schools or the National Defense University; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Prepares candidates 
to take on additional responsibility, expands their knowledge of 
national security, complex policy, and operational challenges; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: None. 

Leadership courses: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): Two courses in 
executive leadership; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Cohort-based 
seminars (3-5 days in length) with classroom learning and practical 
application; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DSLDP 
provides cohort-based seminars and seeks to build camaraderie among 
candidates. 

Professional development: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): Encourages a joint 
or cross-component assignment as part of the program; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Requires the 
candidate to have an Individual Development Plan; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DSLDP 
requires a long-range plan for the candidate to address competency 
gaps. 

Allocations: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): Fiscal year 2006--
Army 108, Navy 112, Air Force 58, fourth estate 42, and intelligence 
30; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Fiscal year 2008--
Army 18, Navy 15, Air Force 12, fourth estate 10, and intelligence 5; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DLAMP is 
scheduled to sunset in 2010; until then, the programs will coexist. 

Eligibility: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): GS-13 or above, 
baccalaureate degree or higher; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): GS-14 or above, 
baccalaureate degree or higher, and 1 year of significant leadership 
experience; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DSLDP 
requires 1 year of significant leadership and is limited to GS-14 or 
above. 

Selection criteria: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): DOD components 
select candidates; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): Components nominate 
candidates. Nominees participate in an Executive Core Qualifications-
based (ECQ) assessment center activity and a DOD selection board 
recommends selections to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: DSLDP 
requires nominees to participate in an ECQ-based assessment center 
activity and a selection board reviews nominations for selection. 

Application process: 
Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP): DLAMP Applicant 
Information Sheet, resume, qualification statement describing how the 
applicant meets each of the ECQs, a supervisor's recommendation, 
transcripts; 
Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP): DSLDP Information 
Sheet, resume, latest performance appraisal, current SF-50, statement 
of achievements, statement of interest, supervisor's assessment, 
transcripts; 
Observed differences based on program solicitation memos: The DSLDP 
application process requires the latest performance appraisal and a 
statement of interest. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

In addition to DLAMP, DOD has revamped its Executive Leadership 
Development Program (ELDP), another program at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense level designed to develop a pipeline of high- 
potential future leaders. The ELDP is a 10-month program for GS-12-to 
GS-14-equivalent civilian personnel. According to DOD, ELDP provides 
participants with exposure to roles and missions of the entire 
department and fosters an increasing understanding of today's 
warfighter. 

Component-Specific Programs: 

Some of the individual components and fourth estate agencies have their 
own senior leader development programs, which are comparable to DLAMP 
and DSLDP. Below is a sample of the additional programs available to 
DOD civilians: 

* The Air Force's Civilian Strategic Leader Program (CSLP), which is 
designed to provide senior civilian leaders the career management and 
development necessary to put them on par with similar general officers 
in the Air Force. The intent of the CSLP process is to build a corps of 
civilian personnel within the Air Force that have the potential to 
progress into the Senior Executive Service. 

* The Defense Information Security Agency's (DISA) Enterprise 
Leadership Development Program provides leadership development and 
training to its senior executives. The program focuses on its GS-13 to 
GS-15 civilian employees with leadership potential. DISA also has a 
program called the Emerging Leaders Program, which focuses on GS-9 
through GS-12 civilian employees. 

* The Army Civilian University has been established to oversee and 
fully integrate an enterprise approach to education for civilians in 
support of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The 
university uses an integrated and TRADOC-complementary curriculum with 
a more standardized, competency-based approach to civilian education, 
training and leader development initiatives. The Army has also 
established the Army Senior Fellows Program to build a bench of future 
Army senior executives who are innovative, adaptive, interchangeable 
civilian leaders. This program is designed to (1) identify high- 
potential GS-14 and GS-15 employees through an Army Secretariat Board 
selection and (2) provide the employees with executive experience 
assignments and educational opportunities. 

* The Defense Logistics Agency launched a new Enterprise Leader 
Development Program in fiscal year 2007 for supervisors and managers 
who hold critical leadership positions. The objective of this program 
is to increase participants' proficiency in six critical leadership 
competencies: integrity/honesty, leading people, external awareness, 
strategic thinking, executive-level communication, and human capital 
management. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this 
report. 

Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel And Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-09-235, "Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on 
Recent Progress to Strengthen DOD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan," dated December 19, 2008. Enclosed are our specific comments and 
concerns. 

With an institution of the size and complexity of the Department of 
Defense, which employs over 760,000 civilian employees in hundreds of 
decentralized commands/activities and in most career fields, it is 
unreasonable to expect that implementation of a comprehensive Strategic 
Human Capital Management (SHCM) plan could be completed in two years. 
Rather, such a large-scale implementation is an on-going journey, which 
the Department is traveling in a planned, collaborative manner with its 
Defense Components. 

Nevertheless, the Department has made great progress in its SHCM plan 
implementation, from its institutionalization in the Department's 
management philosophy, to the actual conduct of workforce forecasting 
and competency assessment. I am disappointed that the complexity of the 
undertaking and the accomplishments achieved thus far are not more 
fully acknowledged in your report, and trust that this can be corrected 
in the final report. 

Ms. Patricia Bradshaw, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Civilian Personnel Policy can answer any questions you may have on the 
Department's response. She can be reached at (703) 614-9487. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael L. Donminguez: 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated December 19, 2008: 
GAO Code 351173/GAO-09-235: 

"Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Build on Recent Progress to 
Strengthen DoD's Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to task the newly established program management office, 
which is responsible for addressing the requirements of the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2006, to develop a performance plan that includes 
establishing implementation goals and timeframes, measuring 
performance, and aligning activities with resources. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The GAO report indicates the Department 
does not have, and does not plan to have, a performance plan or road 
map for its newly formed civilian workforce readiness program office, 
which will be working the Department's Strategic Human Capital 
Management (SHCM) plan. This is incorrect. At the time of the GAO 
engagement, the establishment of the civilian readiness office was only 
a couple of months old and its staffing was ongoing The Under Secretary 
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) have required for the newly-formed 
office, the development of both a performance plan, which measures 
performance and aligns activities to resources, and a road map, with 
implementation goals and timeframes; development of these documents is 
in progress. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to task the newly established executive management office, 
which is responsible for addressing the requirements of the Fiscal Year 
2007 NDAA, to develop a performance plan that includes establishing 
implementation goals and timeframes, measuring performance, and 
aligning activities with resources. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. At the time of the GAO engagement, the 
establishment of the executive management office was only a couple of 
months old. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 
and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) 
have required for the newly-formed office, the development of both a 
performance plan, which measures performance and aligns activities to 
resources, and a road map, with implementation goals and timeframes; 
development of these documents is in progress. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness to incorporate, in future updates to its strategic human 
capital plan, strategies for addressing factors that could 
significantly impact DoD's civilian workforce plans-including 
contractor roles and the effect contractors have on requirements for 
DoD's civilian workforce. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. The Department has strategies in place 
to address the recruitment and retention needs arising from factors 
impacting the DoD workforce. In future updates, however, the Department 
will more closely align these strategies to the causal factors, so the 
linkage is clearly evident. 

The following additional comments are provided regarding the GAO 
report. 

1. The report mentions several times the need for the Department to 
address contractor/civilian mix. However, this issue was not included 
as part of the GAO interviews or fact-finding. The Department has in 
place several initiatives, outside of Civilian Personnel Policy, that 
address this issue and requests the opportunity to present information 
in its regard. [See comment 1] 

2. The report also mentions several times the need for increased 
contract oversight. Again, this issue was not included as part of the 
GAO interviews or fact-finding. The Department also has ongoing 
initiatives relevant to this issue and requests the opportunity to 
present information in its regard. [See comment 2] 

3. The GAO engagement on the Department's Strategic Human Capital 
Management (SHCM) plan was bifurcated between an independent GAO review 
of the acquisition SHCM plan and an independent GAO review of the 
remaining part of the plan. This bifurcation, unfortunately, has led to 
a report that does not fully address the entirety of the Department's 
SHCM efforts. [See comment 3] 

4. The Department's efforts to institutionalize Strategic Human Capital 
Management Planning are not addressed in the report. 
Institutionalization of the effort is foundational to successful 
implementation, and efforts in this regard should be noted in the 
report. These efforts have been planned and undertaken by Department 
leadership to ensure Strategic Human Capital remains in the forefront 
of all Departmental mission planning, both current and future. [See 
comment 4] As discussed and presented to the GAO representatives, these 
institutionalization efforts include: 

i. Issuance of a DoD instruction, signed by the USD(P&R) on Strategic 
Human Capital Management (SHCM), which outlines roles and 
responsibilities, articulates SHCM requirements, both by Component and 
by Functional Communities, and establishes an assessment and 
accountability mechanism to ensure SHCM responsibilities are properly 
executed. [See comment 5] 

ii. Negotiation with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on 
licensing costs for DoD enterprise-wide use of the WASSCIVFORE 
forecasting tool; final licensing costs were received on 12 January 
2009. 

iii. Training of Component representatives on the Office of Civilian 
Personnel Management Forecasting Tool. [See comment 6] 

iv. Formulation, submission and authorization of a budget for a SHCM 
Program Office, known as the Civilian Readiness Cell, which included 
salary and benefits for 20 personnel, and training for HR Consultants 
on SHCM. [See comment 7] 

v. Development of mission and function statements, and organization 
charts for a Civilian Readiness (SHCM) Program Office. 

vi. Recruitment for, and selection of, SHCM staff. 

vii. Development of a training curriculum for HR consultants on SHCM. 

viii. Issuance of a Memorandum from the USD(P&R) to the USDs, tasking 
them to appoint Functional Community Managers (FCM). 

ix. Initiation of a Community of Practice for FCMs and conduct of
periodic meetings with them. 

x. Development of a seven-step SHCM model and a pilot of the model 
within the Information Technology, Financial Management and Logistics 
communities. Pilot is gearing up to start 3rd Quarter FY 09. 

Department Of Defense General Comments: 

1. Highlights Section, Summary Page. The statistic that more than 50 
percent of the DoD Civilian workforce is eligible to retire in the next 
few years is correct. However, it is somewhat misleading, as that 
figure includes both those eligible for optional and early retirement. 
By 2012, 26% of the DOD workforce will be eligible for optional 
retirement, and 20% will be age 59.9, which is the average age of a DoD 
optional retiree. [See comment 8] 

2. Summary Page. GAO's assertion that the Department's forecasting was 
for a seven year vice 10 year period is correct. However, the 
Department believes that a seven year forecast is valid and should be 
acceptable for Human Capital Planning purposes, especially since it 
mirrors DoD's budget planning cycle. [See comment 9] 

3. Summary Page/Page 6, Para 1/Page 21, Last Para. The GAO report 
indicates the Department does not have, and does not plan to have, a 
performance plan or road map for its newly formed civilian workforce 
readiness program office, which will be working the Department's SHCM 
plan. This is incorrect. The formation of the civilian readiness office 
is only a couple of months old and its staffing is still ongoing. There 
will definitely be both a performance plan and a road map for the 
office; they were just not complete at the time of the GAO engagement. 
[See comment 10] 

4. Summary Page. The GAO report discusses at length the Departments mix 
of contractors and civilians. This issue, however, was net discussed 
during the GAO interviews and, thus, GAO was not privy to the 
Department's ongoing efforts to ensure the contractor/civilian mix is 
appropriate. If this issue is included as part of the report, the 
Department would like the opportunity to provide GAO an overview of its 
ongoing initiatives in this area. [See comment 11] 

5. Page 5, Para 1 GAO report discusses the, "Department's reliance on 
contractors'. This issue was not raised by GAO representatives in their 
discussions with DoD staff and thus was not addressed by DoD. A meeting 
with appropriate DoD and GAO staff should be arranged to discuss this 
issue so that GAO can be provided salient information in its regard. 
[See comment 12] 

6. Page 6, Para 1. The GAO report indicates forecasting was only done 
for the eleven mission critical occupations (MCOs). This is incorrect. 
The Department conducted workforce forecasting for: 1) the entire DoD 
workforce; 2) the entirety of the Department of the Army. Air Force and 
Navy; and 3) for eleven of its mission critical occupations In 
addition, forecasting was completed by the Acquisition Community for 
seven mission critical acquisition career fields representing 86% (over 
100,000 members) of the DoD acquisition workforce. [See comment 13] 

7. Page 6, Para 1, Line 7/Page 19, Para 2. The GAO report indicates the 
Department did a gap analyses for about half of its 25 enterprise-wide 
mission occupations. It is not clear to what gap analyses this is 
referring If the report is referring to a competency gap analysis, the 
report is misleading. As indicated in DoD's response to Congress, on 
pages 2-15 through 2-25 of the DoD report, competency assessments were 
done on many occupational series, covering thousands of personnel. [See 
comment 14] 

8. Page 6. Para 1, Line O. The GAO report indicates that the DoD report 
partially addressed a plan of action to develop and reshape the 
civilian workforce. Chapter 3 of DoD's response to Congress. which is 
aligned by the Department's Human Capital Goals, comprehensively 
outlines the current and future strategies DoD is deploying to develop 
and reshape its workforce. Under each Human Capital goal, the report 
dearly delineates recruitment programs and initiatives, including 
innovative pipeline activities; retention programs and initiatives: and 
development opportunities. The Departments recruitment, retention and 
development activities do not focus solely on the MCOs: rather, they 
are widespread and cover most of the Department's occupations. [See 
comment 15] 

9. Page 14. Para 2. It is correct the DoD report to Congress had 
appendices on 12 of the MCOs. However. as was discussed during the GAO 
interviews. this does not reflect the fatality of the Department's 
efforts. The Department's acquisition community has strategic plans in 
place for seven of its mission critical acquisition career fields, 
covering 112.000 civilian personnel. These plans address the FY08 
implementation of Section 852 of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Development Fund, and discuss, in detail, recruitment and retention 
strategies and goals Although the acquisition strategic human capital 
management report is being submitted to Congress separate from the main
report, it is part of the Department's overall SHCM plan and should be 
considered in the GAO assessment. [See comment 16] 

10. Page 16, Footnote 28/Page 33, Para 3. The acquisition community has 
conducted a human capital analysis of the acquisition program 
management, contract management, and quality assurance career fields, 
and has undertaken initiatives to strengthen those workforces. 
Information on these initiatives, the DoD Panel on Contracting 
Integrity 2007 Report to Congress (submitted January 2008) (Section 
813), and the DoD Task Force on Contracting and Contract Management in 
Expeditionary Operations 2008 Report to Congress, should be included 
in, or referenced to, the GAO report to provide a complete picture of 
the Department's SHCM initiatives related to contract oversight. [See 
comment 17] 

11. Page 31, Last Para. Chapter 3 of DoD's report to Congress addressed 
recruitment and development strategies to meet DoD Civilian Workforce 
needs Recruitment strategies are key to ensuring the successful 
conversion of military positions to civilian, refreshing position 
pipelines incident to projected retirements, and readying a supply of 
candidates to meet in-sourcing requirements; thus, the Department 
believes it indeed has strategies in place to address emergent 
recruitment needs. [See comment 18] 

GAO Comments: 

The following are GAO's comments on specific sections in the Department 
of Defense's (DOD) letter sent on January 23, 2009. The specific 
sections are entitled, "The following additional comments are provided 
regarding the GAO report" and "Department Of Defense General Comments." 

1. DOD states that contractor issues were not a part of our interviews 
and fact finding for this review. However, as identified in the DOD 
notification letter, other challenges and emerging issues facing DOD's 
Senior Executive Service (SES) workforce in the human capital area was 
a key question included in this review. Our approach included reviewing 
our prior work, analyzing DOD's update, interviewing OSD and component 
officials about these issues, and discussing our potential findings 
with them. These officials noted that contractor reliance was a major 
challenge for the department, and we noted that the DOD 2008 update did 
not mention this as one of the challenges and, thus, did not provide a 
strategy. As noted in our report we assessed the extent to which the 
update addressed key factors like the reliance on contractors. 

2. DOD states that our report mentions the need for increased contract 
oversight and that this issue, again, was not part of our interviews or 
fact-finding. See comment 1. 

3. DOD stated that our review was bifurcated between an independent GAO 
review of the defense acquisition workforce section and a review of the 
remaining part of the update to DOD's plan. This is not correct. This 
review focused on how DOD's 2008 update submitted to Congress addressed 
the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and 2007 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) and key factors that could affect civilian human capital 
planning. According to section 851 of the FY 2008 NDAA, DOD was 
required to include a section on the defense acquisition workforce 
planning efforts in its 2008 update, but it did not. This review 
focused on DOD's 2008 update. A separate GAO review is looking at, 
among other things, the defense acquisition workforce requirements in 
the FY 2008 NDAA. 

4. DOD stated that we did not address the department's efforts to 
institutionalize strategic human capital management planning. We 
disagree. As we state in the report, the objectives for our review were 
to assess the extent to which DOD's update addressed the FY 2006 and FY 
2007 NDAA requirements and key factors that may affect civilian 
workforce planning and our report was, therefore, structured 
accordingly. Our report did, however, note some of DOD's efforts-- 
including issuance of a DOD Instruction on Strategic Human Capital 
Management and training for component representatives on the Office of 
Personnel Management's forecasting tool. 

5. DOD's comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that 
included issuance of a DOD Strategic Human Capital Management 
instruction. This information is referenced in our report. 

6. DOD's comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that 
mentioned training of component representatives on the Office of 
Personnel Management forecasting tool. This information is referenced 
in our report. 

7. DOD's comments provided a list of institutionalized efforts that 
mentioned formulation, submission, and authorization of a budget for 
the strategic human capital management program office. We added some of 
this information to our report. 

8. DOD's comments noted that our report said that more than 50 percent 
of the DOD civilian workforce is eligible to retire in the next few 
years and noted that this statement was correct but misleading because 
the figure included optional and early retirement. We have revised our 
report accordingly. 

9. DOD's comments said that our assertion that the department's 
forecasting was for a 7-year period and not a 10-year period is 
correct; however, the department believes that a 7-year forecast is 
valid and should be acceptable because it mirrors DOD's budget planning 
cycle. We provided DOD's perspective in our report but note that the FY 
2006 NDAA requires a 10-year forecast. 

10. The department noted that our report said DOD does not have and 
does not plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly 
formed civilian workforce readiness program office and that this 
statement was not correct. It further noted that, at the time of our 
review, the newly formed program office was only a couple of months 
old, its staffing was still in progress, and there would definitely be 
both a performance plan and a road map for the office. The department 
stated that these were just not complete at the time of the GAO 
engagement. We disagree. To the contrary, DOD did not provide us with 
any specific documentation that a performance plan was in progress 
during our review. In fact, we were told that the department did not 
have a performance plan and the Civilian Personnel Policy office, which 
has responsibility for the new program management office, normally does 
not produce such documents. We were further told that, essentially, any 
overall plan for the new office was scattered through several 
documents--including position descriptions, budget requests, and 
briefings to senior leadership. 

11. DOD stated that our report discussed DOD's mix of contractors and 
civilians and this was not discussed during our interviews. We 
disagree. See comment 1. 

12. DOD's comments state that our report discussed the department's 
reliance on contractors and this was not raised in discussions with 
DOD. We disagree. See comment 1. 

13. DOD's comments assert that our report incorrectly states that the 
department did forecasting only for eleven mission-critical occupations 
and this was not correct. We have revised the report accordingly. 

14. DOD states that our report indicates that the department did a gap 
analysis for about half of its 25 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations, but it was not clear to what gap analyses this was 
referring. It further noted that, if the report was referring to a 
competency gap assessment, it was misleading and noted that the update 
had discussed competency assessments on pages 2-15 through 2-25 of its 
update. We note that our report states that 11 gap assessments were 
done with the forecasting tool---10 of which DOD identified as "steady 
state" and one with an actual gap. We further noted that the update 
also discussed other gap assessments for six enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations. We note that only one of these was not previously 
identified as one of the 11 mission-critical occupations with gap 
assessments--this was the computer science mission-critical occupation. 
We also clarified that competency gap assessments were done at the 
component levels and provided examples in the body of our report. 

15. DOD states that our report indicates DOD's update partially 
addressed a plan of action to develop and reshape the civilian 
workforce and note that while its recruitment, retention and 
development activities did not focus solely on its mission-critical 
occupations, the strategies are widespread and cover most of the 
department's occupations. We note, however, that the law required the 
plan to address identified gaps in its "critical" skills and 
competencies or what DOD has identified as enterprisewide mission- 
critical occupations. 

16. While DOD acknowledged our report correctly stated that its update 
contained appendixes on 12 mission-critical occupations, it believed 
that we did not reflect the totality of the Departments efforts because 
the acquisition workforce section was not considered in the GAO 
assessment. As stated in comment 3, information from the section on 
defense acquisition workforce planning was not included in our report 
because it was not completed during the course of our review. 

17. DOD's comments stated that the acquisition community had conducted 
a human capital analysis and undertaken initiatives to strengthen this 
workforce and these should be included in the GAO report. We disagree. 
See comment 3. 

18. DOD stated that chapter 3 of its update addressed recruitment and 
development strategies to meet DOD civilian workforce needs--noting 
that strategies were key to ensuring the successful conversion of 
military positions to civilians and readying a supply of candidates to 
meet in-sourcing requirements. Accordingly, the department noted that 
it believed it indeed had strategies in place to address emergent 
recruitment needs. We note however that the introduction and executive 
summary of the update noted several factors we discussed as challenges 
and stated that strategies, at the time of our review, were being 
developed--and, as stated previously, contractor reliance was not 
identified as a challenge in the update. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact name above, Marion Gatling, Assistant 
Director; Andrew Curry; Michael Hanson; Mae Jones; Amber Lopez; Lonnie 
McAllister; Brian Pegram; Charlie Perdue; Terry Richardson; and Nicole 
Volchko made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

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Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008. 

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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-582]. Washington, D.C.: 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-762T]. Washington, D.C. 
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-630T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-609T]. Washington, D.C.: 
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[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOD officials noted that this figure includes various types of 
retirement eligibilities for its civilians, including early retirement. 

[2] U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Results From the 2006 Federal 
Human Capital Survey (2006). 

[3] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Feb. 6, 
2006). 

[4] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (January 2009). 

[5] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1122 (2006). 

[6] GAO, The Department of Defense's Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-439R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 
2008). 

[7] According to DOD officials, enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations are used in DOD's updated strategic plan to refer to both 
critical skills and competencies. 

[8] For the purposes of this report, senior management, functional, and 
technical personnel will be referred to as the senior leader workforce. 
Section 1102 covered senior management, functional, and technical 
personnel (including scientists and engineers) and includes the 
following categories of DOD civilian personnel: (1) appointees in the 
Senior Executive Service under section 3131 of title 5, United States 
Code; (2) persons serving in positions described in section 5376(a) of 
title 5, United States Code; (3) highly qualified experts appointed 
pursuant to section 9903 of title 5, United States Code; (4) scientists 
and engineers appointed pursuant to section 342(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Pub. L. No. 103-337 
(1994)), as amended by section 1114 of the Floyd D. Spence National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by 
Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000)); (5) scientists and engineers appointed 
pursuant to section 1101 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (5 U.S.C. 3104 note); (6) 
persons serving in the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service 
under section 1606 of title 10, United States Code; (7) persons serving 
in Intelligence Senior-Level positions under section 1607 of title 10, 
United States Code. 

[9] DOD defines talent management as the deliberate management of the 
career life cycle (recruitment, selection, development, performance 
management, succession and sustainment of talent, and separation). 

[10] DOD officials state that talent management and succession planning 
are components of designing career paths and career opportunities for 
its senior leadership. 

[11] Implementation Report for the DOD Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan 2006-2010 (May 2008). 

[12] GAO, DOD Personnel: Documentation of the Army's Civilian Workforce-
Planning Model Needed to Enhance Credibility, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1046] (Washington D.C.: August 2003) 
and GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce 
Plans Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-753] 
(Washington D.C.: June 2004). 

[13] Components refer to the military services and fourth-estate 
agencies. "Fourth-estate" agencies are all organizational entities in 
DOD that are not in the military departments or the combatant commands. 
These include OSD, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Inspector General 
of DOD, the defense agencies, and DOD field activities. 

[14] As stated previously, DOD refers to critical skills and 
competencies as enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. These 
include information technology management, computer scientist, computer 
engineer, electronics engineer, contracting, logistics management, 
quality assurance, human resources management, general engineering, 
physical science, civil engineering, mathematician, physician, nurse, 
pharmacist, security administration, intelligence, police officer, 
financial management, accounting, auditing, budget analysis, foreign 
affairs, international relations, and language specialist. 

[15] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[16] Department of Defense Directive 1403.03, The Career Lifecycle of 
the Senior Executive Service Leaders Within the Department of Defense 
(Oct. 25, 2007). 

[17] According to DOD officials, this includes one talent management 
system for all of DOD and the defense agencies instead of the many 
systems that are currently used. 

[18] To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress 
passed BRAC legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 
1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. 

[19] GAO, DOD Needs to Reexamine its Extensive Reliance on Contractors 
and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 
2008). 

[20] GAO, DOD Personnel: DOD Comments on GAO's Report on DOD's Civilian 
Human Capital Strategic Planning, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-690R] (Washington D.C.: Apr. 18, 
2003). 

[21] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

[22] See footnote 8 for details of positions covered by section 1102. 

[23] Section 129 states that the civilian personnel of DOD will be 
managed each fiscal year solely on the basis of and consistent with (1) 
the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of the 
department and (2) the funds made available to the department for such 
fiscal year. 

[24] For the purpose of its update, DOD defined end strength as the 
level of employment necessary to meet mission requirements. 

[25] DCPDS is a human resources information system that supports 
civilian personnel operations in DOD. It allows DOD to use a single 
management information system for DOD civilian employees. 

[26] As previously stated, for the purposes of the update, DOD defined 
end strength as the level of employment necessary to meet mission 
requirements. 

[27] As seen in table 2, assessments in the various appendixes did not 
cover the same enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Also, DOD's 
update contained workforce forecasts with projected trends for the 
entire DOD workforce and separate forecasts for the civilian workforce 
in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and fourth estate. These were not 
specific to any enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. 

[28] OSD forecasted that 10 of the 11 enterprisewide mission-critical 
occupations would be maintained at a steady state, while the civil 
engineering mission-critical occupation was identified as having a gap 
in its workforce. 

[29] We have previously reported that inadequate numbers of trained 
personnel to oversee and manage contracts is a long-standing problem 
that continues to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors 
in deployed locations. GAO, Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address 
Contract Oversight and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to 
Support Contingency Operations, GAO-08-1087 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
26, 2008). 

[30] The Future Years Defense Program summarizes resources associated, 
by fiscal year, with DOD programs, as approved by the Secretary or the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. For individual programs, this means that 
decision makers have visibility over planned funding for 4 or 5 years 
beyond the current budget year. 

[31] DOD defined total gains as the number of new hires and gains from 
inactive status and transfers from government agencies. 

[32] As noted in table 2, information for one of the 11 mission- 
critical occupations was specific to the fourth estate--accounting. 

[33] Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required: Army 
Expeditionary Contracting (Oct. 31, 2007). 

[34] Functional community managers are responsible for, among other 
things, analysis of functional community workload requirements, 
environmental factors, attrition and retirement trends, staffing needs, 
and identifying skill gaps. They are also responsible for the 
development and implementation of strategies to address identified 
gaps. 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-753]. 

[36] Section 1109, Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). Section 209 of the E- 
Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-347) initially authorized the 
establishment of an Information Technology Exchange Program. 

[37] Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, DOD Civilian Personnel 
Management System: Volume 250, Civilian Strategic Human Capital 
Planning (Nov. 18, 2008). This instruction assigns responsibilities 
regarding civilian personnel management in DOD, articulates strategic 
human capital management requirements (both for component and 
functional communities), and establishes assessments and accountability 
mechanisms to ensure strategic human capital management 
responsibilities are properly executed. 

[38] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[39] 10 U.S.C. § 129 (2008). 

[40] Per a DOD directive-type-memorandum issued on April 28, 2008, 
DOD's tier structure sorts senior executive positions into three tiers 
based upon position characteristics, with Tier 1 positions generally 
having less complexity and effect on mission outcomes and Tier 3 
positions having significant complexity, effect on mission outcomes, or 
influence on joint, national security matters. 

[41] According to DOD, enterprise senior executives will have diverse 
experiences to provide expert-level perspective and understanding of 
national security matters. 

[42] DOD Directive 1403.03 calls for a talent management process to 
include competency assessments, diagnostics of individual executive 
talent, a longitudinal study of the senior leadership cadre, 
identification of additional resources needed to fill gaps, and other 
assessments. 

[43] GAO, Results-Oriented Management: Opportunities Exist for Refining 
the Oversight and Implementation of the Senior Executive Performance- 
Based Pay System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-82] 
(Washington D.C.: Nov. 21, 2008). 

[44] To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress 
enacted BRAC legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 
1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. 

[45] DOD reported that tens of thousands of military personnel were 
performing tasks that were not military-essential and these tasks could 
be performed more cost-effectively by civilian or private-sector 
contract employees. 

[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-690R]. 

[47] DOD called these factors environmental/mission influences. 

[48] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 
Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-159] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 
2007). 

[49] This section amended chapter 146 of title 10 of the United States 
Code, by adding section 2463. 

[50] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1087]. 

[51] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-690R]. 

[52] GAO, Military Personnel: Improvements Needed to Increase 
Effectiveness of DOD's Programs to Promote Positive Working 
Relationships between Reservists and Their Employers, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-981R] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2008); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669]; and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[53] This office was the Program Executive Office for Strategic Human 
Capital Planning under OUSD(P&R). 

[54] GAO, Human Capital: Taking Steps to Meet Current and Emerging 
Human Capital Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-965T] (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 
2001). 

[End of section] 

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