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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

February 2009: 

Veterinarian Workforce: 

Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public 
and Animal Health: 

GAO-09-178: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-178, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Veterinarians are essential for controlling zoonotic diseases—which 
spread between animals and humans—such as avian influenza. Most federal 
veterinarians work in the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense 
(DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). However, there is a growing 
national shortage of veterinarians. GAO determined the extent to which 
(1) the federal government has assessed the sufficiency of its 
veterinarian workforce for routine activities, (2) the federal 
government has identified the veterinarian workforce needed during a 
catastrophic event, and (3) federal and state agencies encountered 
veterinarian workforce challenges during four recent zoonotic 
outbreaks. GAO surveyed 24 federal entities about their veterinarian 
workforce; analyzed agency workforce, pandemic, and other plans; and 
interviewed federal and state officials that responded to four recent 
zoonotic outbreaks. 

What GAO Found: 

The federal government lacks a comprehensive understanding of the 
sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce. More specifically, four of 
five component agencies GAO reviewed have assessed the sufficiency of 
their veterinarian workforce to perform routine activities and have 
identified current or future concerns. This includes USDA’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS), Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS), and Agricultural Research Service (ARS); and DOD’s 
Army. Current and future shortages, as well as noncompetitive salaries, 
were among the concerns identified by these agencies. HHS’s Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) does not perform such assessments and did not 
identify any concerns. In addition, at the department level, USDA and 
HHS have not assessed their veterinarian workforces across their 
component agencies, but DOD has a process for doing so. Moreover, there 
is no governmentwide effort to search for shared solutions, even though 
16 of the 24 federal entities that employ veterinarians raised concerns 
about the sufficiency of this workforce. Further exacerbating these 
concerns is the number of veterinarians eligible to retire in the near 
future. GAO’s analysis revealed that 27 percent of the veterinarians at 
APHIS, FSIS, ARS, Army, and FDA will be eligible to retire within 3 
years. 

Efforts to identify the veterinarian workforce needed for a 
catastrophic event are insufficient. Specifically, agencies’ plans lack 
important elements necessary for continuing essential veterinarian 
functions during a pandemic, such as identifying which functions must 
be performed on-site and how they will be carried out if absenteeism 
reaches 40 percent—the rate predicted at the height of the pandemic and 
used for planning purposes. In addition, one federal effort to prepare 
for the intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease is based 
on the unrealistic assumption that all affected animals will be 
slaughtered, as the United States has done for smaller outbreaks, 
making the resulting veterinarian workforce estimates irrelevant. A 
second effort lacks crucial data, including data on how the disease 
would spread in wildlife. If wildlife became infected, as they have in 
the past, response would be greatly complicated and could require more 
veterinarians and different expertise. 

Officials from federal and state agencies involved in four recent 
zoonotic disease outbreaks commonly cited insufficient veterinarian 
capacity as a workforce challenge. However, 10 of the 17 agencies that 
GAO interviewed have not assessed their own veterinarian workforce’s 
response to individual outbreaks and are thus missing opportunities to 
improve future responses. Moreover, none of the entities GAO reviewed 
has looked across outbreaks to identify common workforce challenges and 
possible solutions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to help ensure sufficient veterinarian 
capacity to protect public and animal health. In commenting on a draft 
of this report USDA, DOD, OPM, DHS, and Interior generally agreed with 
our recommendations. HHS generally concurred with the report, but 
disagreed with a 2007 FDA Advisory Committee report GAO cited, which 
said that FDA’s Center of Veterinary Medicine is in a state of crisis. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-178]. For more 
information, contact Lisa Shames at (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Federal Government Lacks a Comprehensive Understanding of the 
Sufficiency of Its Veterinarian Workforce: 

Efforts to Identify the Veterinarian Workforce Needed during a Pandemic 
and Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak Are Insufficient: 

Federal and State Agencies Are Missing Important Opportunities to 
Ensure Efficient Use of Veterinarians During Disease Outbreaks: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Location and Responsibilities of Veterinarians in the 
Federal Government: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Agriculture: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Agency Concerns about Sufficiency of the Federal Veterinarian 
Workforce: 

Table 2: Four Recent Zoonotic Outbreaks We Analyzed: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Percentage of Veterinarian Grade Levels by Key USDA Agencies 
in Fiscal Year 2008: 

Figure 2: Mean Veterinarian Salaries by Key USDA Agencies, Fiscal Years 
2003-2007: 

Figure 3: Mean Veterinarian Base Salaries at 19 Component Agencies or 
Federal Entities in Fiscal Year 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

APHIS:Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: 

ARS: Agricultural Research Service: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

CSREES: Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service: 

CVM: Center for Veterinary Medicine: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FDA: Food and Drug Administration: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

FSIS: Food Safety and Inspection Service: 

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 

HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive: 

Interior: Department of the Interior: 

NADC: National Animal Disease Center: 

NAFV: National Association of Federal Veterinarians: 

NIH: National Institutes of Health: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 

SES: Senior Executive Service: 

USDA: Department of Agriculture: 

USGS: U.S. Geological Survey: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 4, 2009: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Veterinarians play a vital role in the defense against animal diseases-
-whether naturally or intentionally introduced--and these diseases can 
cause serious harm to human health and the economy. For example, 
veterinarians were at the forefront of the response to the 2001 United 
Kingdom outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, which resulted in the 
slaughter of more than 4 million animals to control the outbreak, 
losses of over $5 billion to the food and agriculture sectors, and 
comparable losses to the tourism industry. Veterinarians are also 
essential for controlling zoonotic diseases, which are diseases that 
spread between animals and humans. Zoonotic diseases are of particular 
concern because, in recent years, about 75 percent of the newly 
emerging infectious diseases affecting humans have originated in 
animals. For example, over the past few years, a highly pathogenic 
strain of avian influenza has killed millions of wild and domestic 
birds worldwide and infected over 400 people, more than half of whom 
have died. Health experts are concerned that this virus could cause a 
pandemic if it develops the ability to spread efficiently from human to 
human. Veterinarians also help prevent foodborne illness, which humans 
can acquire, for example, from meat contaminated with viruses or 
bacteria. Each year, about 76 million Americans contract foodborne 
illnesses, and about 5,000 die. 

However, there is a growing shortage of veterinarians nationwide, 
particularly of veterinarians who care for animals raised for food, 
serve in rural communities, and have training in public health, 
according to several professional associations. This shortage has, 
according to the American Veterinary Medical Association, placed the 
nation's food supply at risk and could hinder efforts to protect humans 
from zoonotic diseases. The veterinarian shortage is expected to 
worsen, partly as a result of space constraints at the country's 28 
veterinary colleges, which can graduate only about 2,500 students a 
year combined, according to the American Association of Veterinary 
Medical Colleges. The demand for veterinarians is expected to increase, 
however. For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that 
demand will increase by 35 percent from 2006 to 2016--from 62,000 full- 
time jobs to 84,000. Subsequently, the Congress enacted two pieces of 
legislation that address these concerns. In 2003, it enacted the 
National Veterinary Medical Services Act directing the Secretary of 
Agriculture to carry out a program to help repay school loans for 
veterinarians who agree to work in areas of need. In August 2008, the 
Congress passed the Higher Education Opportunity Act, which has 
provisions intended to increase the number of veterinarians in the 
workforce. 

The federal government employs more than 3,000 veterinarians. Although 
this number represents a small portion of the federal workforce, these 
veterinarians play a crucial role in helping to protect people and the 
economy from animal diseases. More than 2,900 federal veterinarians 
work for component agencies within the Departments of Agriculture 
(USDA), Defense (DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). The 1,771 
veterinarians at USDA have numerous functions, including the following: 

* Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) veterinarians help 
protect and maintain the health of American livestock and poultry 
during production, and monitor wildlife populations for critical 
endemic and foreign animal diseases; 

* Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) veterinarians inspect 
animals at slaughter plants to help ensure the safety of meat and 
poultry products, and they also oversee the humane treatment of 
livestock during slaughter; and: 

* Agricultural Research Service (ARS) veterinarians research critical 
endemic and foreign animal diseases. 

DOD employs 841 veterinarians, the majority of whom work for the Army 
as active duty veterinarians or as part of the Army's veterinary 
reserve corps. These veterinarians are responsible for caring for 
service and research animals, ensuring food safety at military 
installations, and conducting intelligence work related to 
bioterrorism, among other things. 

HHS employs 316 veterinarians, whose functions include the following: 

* Food and Drug Administration (FDA) veterinarians are responsible for 
ensuring that animal drugs are safe and effective, that animal feed is 
safe, and that food from medically treated animals is safe to eat. They 
also help ensure the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics, among other 
things; 

* Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) veterinarians help 
promote human health by conducting research and investigating human 
disease outbreaks of animal origin. They also oversee the welfare of 
animals used in such research, as required by federal regulation. 

Veterinarians work in other departments, such as the Department of the 
Interior (Interior), whose 24 veterinarians play a role in researching, 
diagnosing, and responding to wildlife diseases. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) also employs veterinarians to, among other 
things, help develop national policy for defending the nation's 
agriculture and food supply against terrorist attacks and other 
emergencies. See appendix I for a list of veterinarian roles and 
responsibilities within the federal government. 

As this list of responsibilities indicates, the federal veterinarian 
workforce plays a critical role in ensuring the safety of the U.S. food 
supply. However, we testified in 2008 that the staffing levels at FSIS-
-where veterinarians play an important role in helping to ensure the 
safety of our food supply and the humane treatment of animals during 
slaughter--have declined since 1995 despite an increasing budget, and 
some districts have experienced high vacancy rates among inspectors. 
This could impair enforcement of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 
1978 and of food safety regulations generally.[Footnote 1] In addition, 
we have designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk 
area of government operations because the current system is fragmented, 
causing inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and 
inefficient use of resources.[Footnote 2] 

As with all professions in the federal government, departments and 
their component agencies are responsible for hiring and maintaining a 
veterinarian workforce sufficient to meet their missions. High- 
performing public organizations have found that maintaining a quality 
workforce requires them to systematically assess current and future 
workforce needs and formulate a long-term strategy to attract, retain, 
develop, and motivate employees.[Footnote 3] The Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) provides guidance and leadership intended to help 
build a high-quality and diverse federal workforce. Our prior work has 
identified the need for OPM to use its leadership position to help 
departments and agencies recruit and retain a capable and committed 
workforce.[Footnote 4] 

In this context, you asked us to determine the extent to which (1) the 
federal government has assessed the sufficiency of its veterinarian 
workforce for routine program activities, (2) the federal government 
has identified the veterinarian workforce needed during a catastrophic 
event, and (3) federal and state agencies encountered veterinarian 
workforce challenges during four recent zoonotic outbreaks. 

To address the first objective, we identified and surveyed departments, 
component agencies, and other federal entities employing veterinarians 
to determine, among other things, the number, salaries, and roles and 
responsibilities of veterinarians, as well as the sufficiency of this 
workforce. We then selected component agencies within three departments 
for further analysis to determine the extent to which they assessed the 
sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce. We selected USDA, DOD, and 
HHS because these departments employ about 96 percent of federal 
veterinarians. Within these departments, we focused our veterinarian 
workforce assessment review on APHIS, FSIS, Army, and FDA, because 
these component agencies employ the most veterinarians. We also 
selected ARS for further review because it is USDA's chief scientific 
research agency and conducts research to solve agricultural problems of 
high national priority. We interviewed officials involved in workforce 
planning, as well as those that carry out program activities such as 
veterinarians working in slaughter plants. To address the second 
objective, we analyzed agency plans for continuing essential functions 
during a pandemic, and compared them with DHS national planning 
guidance, which identifies essential elements that federal departments 
and agencies should consider. We also reviewed veterinarian workforce 
outcomes from DHS's nationwide effort to assess the nation's 
preparedness for multiple, intentional introductions of foot-and-mouth 
disease. We selected a pandemic and intentional foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak because these are two potential catastrophic events the White 
House Homeland Security Council has deemed critical for planning 
purposes. To address the third objective, we conducted semistructured 
interviews with selected officials from 17 federal and state agencies 
involved in responding to the following four recent zoonotic outbreaks: 

* bovine tuberculosis in Michigan: a bacterial disease that spreads 
from deer to cattle; 

* exotic Newcastle disease in California: a highly infectious virus 
that spread rapidly throughout poultry; 

* monkeypox in Wisconsin: a virus not seen in the United States until 
2003, when there was an outbreak in exotic pets and humans; and: 

* West Nile virus in Colorado: a disease that spread rapidly across the 
United States, infecting numerous species. 

We focused our review on these outbreaks because they were most 
frequently recommended by federal officials as examples of zoonotic 
diseases, are still occurring or occurred since 2001, and affected 
various types of animals, among other things. Additional details about 
our scope and methodology are presented in appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to February 
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

Despite a growing shortage of veterinarians, the federal government 
does not have a comprehensive understanding of the sufficiency of its 
veterinarian workforce for routine program activities. Specifically, 
although four of five component agencies we reviewed have assessed 
their veterinarian workforces, little has been done to gain a broader, 
departmentwide perspective, and no assessment has been conducted 
governmentwide. 

* At the component agency level, APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and Army assessments 
have each identified actual or potential veterinarian shortages. First, 
APHIS reported it has filled all of its veterinary positions but has 
identified a potential future shortage of, for example, veterinary 
pathologists, who diagnose animal diseases. In addition, 30 percent of 
APHIS' veterinarians will be eligible to retire by the end of fiscal 
year 2011. Second, FSIS has not been fully staffed over the past 
decade, according to agency officials. In fiscal year 2008, it had a 
goal of employing 1,134 veterinarians to carry out its mission of 
ensuring the safety of meat and poultry products, but it had 968 as of 
the end of that fiscal year--a 15 percent shortage. FSIS veterinarians 
working in slaughter plants told us that a lack of veterinarians has 
impaired the agency's ability to meet its food safety responsibilities, 
but FSIS headquarters officials told us this was not the case. In 2004, 
we recommended that FSIS periodically assess whether the level of 
resources dedicated to humane handling and slaughter activities is 
sufficient, but the agency has yet to demonstrate that they have done 
so. Third, ARS reported a 12 percent shortage of veterinarians. 
Officials told us the agency needed 65 veterinarians--most of them with 
a Ph.D.--to conduct critical animal disease research, such as detecting 
avian influenza and developing vaccines against it. However, in fiscal 
year 2008, ARS had only 57. Fourth, while the Army has filled all of 
its active-duty veterinarian positions, officials reported that the 
veterinary reserve corps is 12 percent short of its goal and identified 
an increasing demand for veterinary pathologists and medical 
intelligence specialists. In contrast to these four agencies, FDA does 
not regularly assess the sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce. FDA 
officials told us the agency has enough veterinarians to meet its 
responsibilities, despite a 2007 internal review that found its 
scientific workforce, including veterinarians, is inadequate and that 
FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine is in a state of crisis. 

* At the department level, neither USDA nor HHS has assessed its 
veterinarian workforce to gain a departmentwide perspective on trends 
and shared issues, whereas DOD has a process for doing so. USDA does 
not perform such assessments because, according to department-level 
officials, workforce planning is the responsibility of the component 
agencies. As a result, USDA's agencies compete against one another for 
a limited number of veterinarians. According to FSIS officials, APHIS 
is attracting veterinarians away from FSIS because the work at APHIS is 
more appealing, there are more opportunities for advancement, and the 
salaries are higher. HHS officials told us they do not assess 
veterinarian workforce needs departmentwide because veterinarians are 
not deemed mission critical for the department, even though they are 
critical to the missions of its component agencies that employ 
veterinarians. 

* Governmentwide, no integrated approach exists for assessing the 
current and future sufficiency of the veterinarian workforce. Yet 
officials from 16 of the 24 component agencies and other federal 
entities that employ veterinarians told us they are concerned about the 
sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce. This includes four of the 
five key agencies where we focused our agency-level review. Further 
exacerbating these concerns is the number of veterinarians eligible to 
retire in the near future. Our analysis revealed that 27 percent of the 
veterinarians at APHIS, FSIS, ARS, Army, and FDA will be eligible to 
retire within 3 years. OPM officials told us they will initiate a 
governmentwide effort to address this issue if the departments 
demonstrate that a shortage exists. This could include allowing 
departments to expedite the hiring of veterinarians, as OPM has done in 
the past in the case of doctors and nurses. 

We are making several recommendations to improve the federal 
government's ability to meet its routine veterinary responsibilities. 

The federal government has undertaken efforts to identify the 
veterinarian workforce needed during two catastrophic events--a 
pandemic and multiple intentional introductions of foot-and-mouth 
disease. However, these efforts are insufficient because they are 
either incomplete, based on an infeasible planning assumption, or 
lacking in adequate data. 

* Four of the five agencies we reviewed--APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and FDA-- 
have developed pandemic plans that identify how they will continue 
essential functions, including those that veterinarians perform, during 
a pandemic that severely reduces the workforce. However, each plan 
lacks elements that DHS has deemed necessary. For example, FDA's plan 
does not identify which functions its veterinarians must perform on 
site, which can be performed remotely, or how the agency will conduct 
essential functions if a pandemic renders its leadership and essential 
staff unavailable. FDA officials told us they are updating their plan 
and will consider such gaps. The Army is still in the process of 
getting its pandemic plan approved and, therefore, we have not 
evaluated it. 

* DHS has two efforts under way that involve identifying the workforce 
needed during a catastrophic outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, which 
would require veterinarians to quickly diagnose and control the fast- 
moving disease in a large number of animals. The first effort is 
hindered by an infeasible planning assumption. Specifically, DHS is 
coordinating a long-term national effort that is based on the 
assumption, set forth by a White House Homeland Security Council 
working group, that the United States would slaughter all potentially 
exposed animals, as it has during smaller outbreaks of foreign animal 
diseases. However, DHS and USDA officials consider this approach 
infeasible for such a large outbreak and told us that although the 
planning effort is a valuable exercise for understanding the enormity 
of the resources needed to respond to such an event, any workforce 
estimates produced from this effort are not relevant. The second effort 
is hindered by a lack of information. Specifically, DHS is modeling 
various foot-and-mouth disease outbreak scenarios in order to estimate 
the number and type of personnel needed for responding to foot-and- 
mouth disease by using vaccines, among other things. Vaccinating 
animals instead of slaughtering them to control the outbreak is a new 
strategy, which DHS and USDA officials believe may play an important 
role in controlling a catastrophic outbreak. However, the details of 
how this vaccine-based strategy would be implemented are not yet 
formalized, reducing the likelihood that workforce estimates will be 
accurate. In addition, the models do not yet factor in the potential 
for the disease to spread between livestock and wildlife. If wildlife 
became infected, as they have in some past outbreaks, control and 
eradication strategies would be greatly complicated and could require 
more veterinarians and different expertise. Agency officials recognize 
the importance of including wildlife for controlling and eradicating 
foot-and-mouth disease but told us that the data on how wildlife and 
livestock interact are limited. 

We are making recommendations to improve the federal government's 
ability to identify the veterinarian workforce needed during a pandemic 
and to respond to a large-scale outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. 

The veterinarian workforce challenge most commonly cited by federal and 
state agencies involved in the four recent zoonotic outbreaks we 
reviewed was insufficient veterinarian capacity. Specifically, 
officials we interviewed at 12 of the 17 agencies involved in the 
recent outbreaks told us they did not have enough veterinarians to 
address these outbreaks while continuing to carry out their routine 
activities. Officials at numerous state agencies attribute this 
insufficient capacity to difficulty recruiting and retaining 
veterinarians because, among other things, the salaries they are able 
to offer are lower than those offered in the federal or private 
sectors. In addition, to control a demanding outbreak of exotic 
Newcastle disease in poultry in California in 2003, APHIS had to borrow 
more than 1,000 veterinarians from federal and state agencies around 
the country, as well as the private sector. This reduced the number of 
veterinarians available to respond to outbreaks of bovine tuberculosis 
in Michigan, monkeypox in Wisconsin, and West Nile virus in Colorado. 
Despite reports of insufficient veterinarian capacity during the four 
outbreaks, the agencies have not taken full advantage of two key 
opportunities to learn from past experience. First, 10 of the 17 
agencies have not assessed their own veterinarian workforce's response 
to individual outbreaks, which our prior work has identified as a 
useful tool for improving response.[Footnote 5] Second, none of the 
agencies have looked across outbreaks to identify common challenges. 
Consequently, the agencies are missing the opportunity to identify 
workforce challenges that have arisen during outbreaks and ways to 
address them in the future. Federal and state agency officials we spoke 
with generally agreed that it would be beneficial to conduct 
postoutbreak assessments. However, some agency officials told us that 
they are already having difficulty meeting their responsibilities and 
have not had time to do so. We are making recommendations to improve 
the ability of the federal government to help ensure the efficient and 
effective use of the veterinarian workforce during future zoonotic 
disease outbreaks. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA, DOD, OPM, DHS, and 
Interior generally concurred with the report's recommendations. 
However, DHS did not agree that veterinarian workforce estimates 
produced from one of its planning efforts are not relevant. HHS 
generally concurred with our report but disagreed with a 2007 FDA 
Advisory Committee report GAO cited, which said that FDA's Center of 
Veterinary Medicine is in a state of crisis. USDA, DOD, HHS, OPM, DHS, 
and Interior also provided additional information, comments, and 
clarifications on the report's findings that we have addressed, as 
appropriate, throughout the report. 

Background: 

High-performing public organizations have found that maintaining a 
quality workforce requires them to systematically assess current and 
future workforce needs and formulate a long-term strategy to attract, 
retain, develop, and motivate employees. While simple in theory, 
strategic planning can be difficult to carry out. Managers must, for 
example, acquire accurate information on the workforce, set goals for 
employee performance, and develop ways to measure that performance. 
According to our previous work, strategic workforce planning should 
involve certain key principles. Among these principles is the need to 
involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in 
developing, communicating, and implementing a strategic workforce plan. 
Other principles include determining the critical skills that will be 
needed, developing strategies to address any gaps in these skills, 
building the capability needed to address educational and other 
requirements important to support workforce planning strategies, and 
monitoring and evaluating progress toward workforce goals.[Footnote 6] 
However, federal agencies have for years lacked a strategic approach to 
workforce management. Consequently, since 2001, we have identified 
human capital management as a high-risk area needing urgent attention 
and transformation.[Footnote 7] 

OPM provides information and guidance on a wide range of strategies 
that departments and agencies can use to help strategically plan for 
and maintain a workforce sufficient to accomplish their missions. This 
includes standard retention and recruitment payments, such as 
recruitment incentives and student loan repayments. OPM can also 
authorize departments to use additional strategies to address workforce 
shortage situations should standard strategies prove insufficient. For 
example, OPM can approve higher salaries for individual positions in an 
occupation if the agency has difficulty staffing a position requiring 
an extremely high level of expertise that is critical to the agency's 
successful accomplishment of an important mission. 

In addition to maintaining a workforce sufficient for routine 
functions, departments and agencies are directed by the President to 
ensure they can carry out essential functions during a "catastrophic 
event." Such a catastrophic event is any natural or man-made incident, 
including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass 
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or 
government functions. To do so, agencies must develop continuity of 
operation plans for emergencies that disrupt normal operations. 
Continuity planning includes identifying and establishing procedures to 
ensure vital resources are safeguarded, available, and accessible to 
support continuity operations. Vital resources are personnel, 
equipment, systems, infrastructures, supplies, and other assets 
required to perform an agency's essential functions. DHS's Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides direction to the federal 
executive branch for developing continuity plans and programs, 
including pandemic plans. 

For one type of catastrophic event, a pandemic that severely reduces 
the workforce, DHS has developed guidance that identifies specific 
elements agencies should consider as they plan to maintain essential 
services and functions. FEMA concluded that planning for a pandemic 
requires a state of preparedness that goes beyond normal continuity of 
operations planning. On March 1, 2006, FEMA first issued guidance to 
assist departments and agencies in identifying special considerations 
for protecting the health and safety of employees and maintaining 
essential functions and services during a pandemic. The Implementation 
Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza recommends that 
organizations plan for a 40 percent absenteeism rate at the height of a 
pandemic. In addition, it called for department and agency pandemic 
plans to be completed by March 31, 2006. 

Departments and agencies must also plan for other events that could 
place extraordinary demands on their workforce, such as a catastrophic 
outbreak of a foreign animal disease. In December 2003, the President 
issued a Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8) to establish 
national policy to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies. As part of its efforts to meet HSPD-8, a White House 
Homeland Security Council working group developed National Planning 
Scenarios for 15 major events, including a biological attack with a 
foreign animal disease, foot-and-mouth disease. According to the 
scenario, terrorists introduce the disease in several locations and 
states simultaneously. The transportation of livestock spreads the 
contagious virus to surrounding states and, within 10 days of the 
attack, more than half of the states may be affected. Ultimately, 
almost half the nation's beef, dairy, and swine would be affected. 
These scenarios serve as the basis for assessing the nation's 
preparedness for such an event by defining tasks that may be required 
and the capabilities needed governmentwide to perform these tasks. 
Although not a prescription for the resources needed to achieve these 
capabilities, they are intended to help identify such resource needs 
and guide planning efforts. No single jurisdiction or agency will be 
expected to perform every task, so the response to a catastrophic event 
will require coordination among all levels of government. State and 
local agencies are typically the first to respond, but federal agencies 
become involved if state resources are overwhelmed. In certain 
catastrophic events, it becomes the responsibility of DHS to coordinate 
the federal response. 

The Federal Government Lacks a Comprehensive Understanding of the 
Sufficiency of Its Veterinarian Workforce: 

Four of the five key agencies that employ veterinarians--APHIS, FSIS, 
ARS, and Army--regularly assess the sufficiency of their veterinarian 
workforces for routine program activities, and all four identified 
existing or potential shortages. FDA does not perform such assessments. 
At the department level, USDA and HHS have not assessed their 
veterinarian workforces across their component agencies, whereas DOD 
has delegated this task to the Army. Finally, there is no 
governmentwide assessment of the veterinarian workforce. Specifically, 
OPM has not conducted a governmentwide effort to address current and 
future veterinarian shortages identified by component agencies, and 
efforts by the Congress to address the national shortage have thus far 
had minimal impact. 

Four of Five Agencies Have Identified Existing and Potential 
Veterinarian Shortages: 

APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and Army conduct regular workforce assessments. While 
APHIS reported it does not currently have a shortage, it identified a 
potential future shortage. FSIS, ARS, and Army have identified both 
existing and potential future shortages. FDA does not conduct such 
assessments, but officials there told us the veterinarian workforce is 
adequate to meet its responsibilities. Our work has shown that agencies 
should be held accountable for the ongoing monitoring and refinement of 
human capital approaches to recruit and hire a capable and committed 
federal workforce. 

APHIS: 

APHIS reported that none of its six units that employ veterinarians has 
identified a current shortage, but officials told us they are concerned 
about the future size and skills of the veterinarian workforce. First, 
the agency reported that 30 percent of its veterinarians will be 
eligible to retire by the end of fiscal year 2011, potentially creating 
a serious shortage. This is consistent with our previous work where we 
reported that one-third of federal career employees on board at the end 
of fiscal year 2007 are eligible to retire between spring 2008 and 
2012.[Footnote 8] In addition, APHIS is concerned that it will be 
unable to maintain an adequate workforce of veterinary pathologists. 
This is consistent with a report by the United States Animal Health 
Association, which found a shortage of over 40 percent nationwide. An 
APHIS laboratory director told us that veterinary pathologists are 
integral to work conducted in APHIS diagnostic laboratories, including 
work on diseases that threaten animal and human health. For example, 
APHIS veterinary pathologists work on bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 
a fatal degenerative disease--commonly known as mad cow disease--that 
has been linked to at least 165 human deaths worldwide. APHIS also 
identified a need to maintain a veterinarian workforce with sufficient 
expertise to help protect livestock and the nation's food supply from 
foreign animal diseases. We reported in 2005 that many U.S. 
veterinarians lack the training needed to identify such diseases, 
whether naturally or intentionally introduced.[Footnote 9] Finally, 
after the terrorist attacks of 2001, USDA's responsibilities were 
broadened to enhance the ability of the United States to manage 
domestic incidents. As such, in addition to being the lead for 
coordinating any response efforts to incidents involving an animal 
disease, APHIS will now also play a supporting role in incidents not 
directly related to animal diseases. For example, APHIS veterinarians 
may be called upon to assist in ensuring the safety and security of the 
commercial food supply or for caring for livestock stranded in 
hurricanes and floods. These increased responsibilities raise concerns 
about the ability of veterinarians to respond to multiple, simultaneous 
events, according to agency officials. 

APHIS has supported training opportunities to help overcome some of 
these projected skill gaps. The agency has also set a goal of 
recruiting at all veterinary colleges and working with universities to 
help them include relevant training in their course offerings. In 
addition, APHIS uses bonuses to attract and maintain its veterinarian 
workforce. During the first 9 months of fiscal year 2008, it provided 
one retention and one relocation bonus to veterinarians, totaling 
$41,654. 

FSIS: 

Over the past decade, FSIS has not had a sufficient number of 
veterinarians and remains unable to overcome this shortage, according 
to FSIS officials. The agency's goal was to have 1,134 veterinarians on 
staff in fiscal year 2008, but it fell short of that by 166 
veterinarians, or 15 percent. Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, the 
FSIS veterinarian workforce has decreased by nearly 10 percent--from 
1,073 to 968. The majority of these veterinarians work in slaughter 
plants. Federal law prohibits slaughtering livestock or poultry at a 
plant that prepares the livestock or poultry for human consumption for 
use in interstate commerce unless the animals have been examined by 
USDA inspectors and requires the humane slaughtering and handling of 
livestock at such plants. In implementing federal law, each slaughter 
plant is covered by one or more FSIS veterinarians to, among other 
things, ensure the safety and quality of meat and poultry products and 
the humane treatment of livestock during slaughter. Agency data from 
the past 5 years reveal that vacancy rates for veterinarian positions 
in slaughter plants vary by location and year, from no vacancy to as 
many as 35 percent of the positions vacant. 

FSIS headquarters officials and veterinarians working in slaughter 
plants differed on the impact of this shortage. Headquarters officials 
told us that, despite the shortage, the agency has been able to meet 
its food safety and other responsibilities by redistributing the 
workforce. For example, in some cases, FSIS has assigned one 
veterinarian to several slaughter plants or assigned only one to plants 
that previously had two. In contrast, several veterinarians working in 
slaughter plants told us that, because of inadequate staffing, they are 
not always able to meet their responsibilities and perform high-quality 
work. For example, veterinarians told us they cannot always verify 
crucial sanitation and security checks of the plant or promptly log 
data on animal diseases and welfare. 

In early 2008, veterinarians also told us they did not always have time 
to ensure the humane treatment of livestock. Inhumane treatment 
triggered an investigation that led to the largest beef recall in U.S. 
history. More specifically, in February 2008, the Humane Society of the 
United States released videos to the public that documented abuse of 
cattle awaiting slaughter at a plant in Chino, California. These 
alleged abuses, which took place in the fall of 2007, included 
electrically shocking nonambulatory "downer" cattle, spraying them with 
high-pressure water hoses, and ramming them with a forklift in an 
apparent attempt to force them to rise for slaughter. These acts are 
not only cruel, they pose a risk to the safety of the food supply, 
because downer animals are known to be at greater risk for bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy. FSIS regulations require that downer cattle 
be separated to await disposition by an inspector, even if they become 
nonambulatory after an inspector has approved the animal for slaughter 
during the preslaughter inspection. On February 1, 2008, the plant 
voluntarily ceased operations pending investigation by FSIS into the 
alleged abuses. On February 17, 2008, the plant announced that it was 
voluntarily recalling approximately 143 million pounds of raw and 
frozen beef products because of its failure to notify FSIS of the 
downer cows and the remote possibility that the beef being recalled 
could cause adverse health effects if consumed. The release of the 
videos by the Humane Society led congressional committees and USDA to 
question how such events could have occurred at a plant in which FSIS 
inspectors were assigned. At the request of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) is leading a 
criminal investigation that is ongoing at the time of this report. In 
addition, OIG conducted an audit of FSIS's controls over preslaughter 
activities and reported in November 2008 that controls to demonstrate 
the sufficiency and competency of FSIS' personnel resources could be 
strengthened to minimize the chance that such events could recur, among 
other things.[Footnote 10] 

Veterinarians and other FSIS officials we interviewed told us that, at 
the time of the incident, only one veterinarian was assigned to the 
plant that was the source of the recall, whereas two had been assigned 
in past years. Two veterinarians were needed, according to these 
officials, because the plant processed "cull" dairy cows, which are no 
longer used for milk production. These cows are generally older and in 
poorer condition than other livestock and thus require more frequent 
veterinary inspection. In the wake of this incident, FSIS required 
veterinarians to spend more time verifying the humane treatment of 
animals. However, veterinarians told us that this exacerbated the 
difficulty of completing their other work. In 2004, we made 
recommendations aimed at ensuring that FSIS can make well-informed 
estimates about the inspection resources--including veterinarians-- 
needed to enforce the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1978.[Footnote 
11] Specifically, we recommended that FSIS periodically assess whether 
the level of resources dedicated to humane handling and slaughter 
activities is sufficient, but the agency has yet to demonstrate that 
they have done so. 

FSIS officials told us that there are several reasons for the agency's 
ongoing shortage of veterinarians. For example, most veterinarians do 
not want to work in the unpleasant environment of a slaughterhouse. 
Furthermore, veterinarians are trained to heal animals, but FSIS 
veterinarians are hired to oversee the slaughter of animals. The job 
can also be physically and emotionally grueling, and many of the plants 
are in remote and sometimes undesirable locations. In addition, as a 
result of staff shortages, there is little opportunity to take time off 
for training that could lead to promotion. Finally, FSIS veterinarians 
told us that their salaries do not sufficiently compensate for the 
working conditions and are low relative to those of other 
veterinarians. According to OPM's Central Personnel Data File, the mean 
annual salary for FSIS veterinarians in 2007 was $77,678; in contrast, 
the mean salary for private-practice veterinarians was $115,447 in 
2007, according to the most recent data from the American Veterinary 
Medical Association. In commenting on a draft of this report, FSIS 
officials added that there is a lack of public health and food-safety 
emphasis in veterinary schools. 

FSIS has taken several steps to address the shortage. For example, it 
awarded 35 recruitment bonuses totaling more than $583,000 in the first 
9 months of fiscal year 2008. FSIS also has internship programs that 
have, according to agency officials, increased awareness and generated 
interest in veterinarian work at the agency. For example, over the past 
5 years, FSIS has established agreements with 16 veterinary schools to 
provide volunteer training opportunities to veterinary students with an 
interest in food safety and public health. In fiscal year 2008, there 
were 26 participants in the program, compared with only 1 when the 
program began in 2003. Two participants have thus far returned to FSIS 
for full-time employment after graduation. FSIS also has a paid 
veterinary student program that is designed to provide experience 
directly related to the student's educational program and career goals. 
Since 2002, when FSIS began tracking this program, 77 students have 
participated, and 6 have become full-time employees. In addition, FSIS 
has sought special hiring authorities from OPM. For example, in July 
2008, the agency was delegated authority to hire a limited number of 
retirees at full salary instead of at the reduced salary required for 
those with annuity income. Officials told us they hope this will 
encourage retired veterinarians to join FSIS, but, as of the date of 
this report, no retirees have been hired through this program. FSIS 
intends to track the effectiveness of this special hiring authority. 
Moreover, FSIS has proposed implementing a demonstration project that 
would allow the agency to test a pay system that offers more 
competitive salaries to veterinarians, among others. OPM requires that 
agencies undertaking such a project provide OPM with an analysis of the 
impact of the project results in relation to its objectives. OPM 
officials told us the project may be implemented in July 2009. Finally, 
OPM has in the past granted FSIS the ability to make immediate job 
offers to veterinarians without following prescribed competitive 
procedures, which can slow the hiring process. This "direct-hire 
authority" expired in 2007 and was not renewed at that time because, 
according to FSIS officials, USDA did not provide the expiration 
notification to FSIS. We were recently informed that USDA received 
approval from OPM on November 25, 2008, for direct hire for FSIS 
veterinarians lasting through December 31, 2009. However, FSIS 
officials raised concerns about the length of time of the authority, 
among other things, stating that it takes 5 to 6 months to renew this 
authority. 

ARS: 

ARS employed 57 veterinarians in fiscal year 2008, 12 percent short of 
its goal of 65. It has reported similar shortages throughout the last 5 
years. Although veterinarians represent a small share of the ARS 
workforce (about 1 percent of more than 4,300 scientists and research 
technicians), the agency considers them critical to its mission. 
According to ARS officials, a sufficient veterinarian workforce is 
important to the quality and breadth of research ARS is able to 
conduct. For example, ARS would not have been able to conduct its 
research on the detection of avian influenza and development of 
vaccines against it, or on the transmission of bovine tuberculosis, 
without its veterinarians' skills and experience. 

ARS officials told us it is difficult to attract and retain 
veterinarians because the agency requires its research veterinarians 
and senior program leaders who are veterinarians to have a Ph.D. in 
animal sciences or a related field, as well as a veterinary degree, and 
there is a limited pool of candidates for these positions. A recent 
report by the National Academy of Sciences identified a declining 
interest in veterinary research among veterinary students as a cause of 
a shortage of Ph.D. veterinarians. In addition, ARS officials told us 
the agency cannot compete with many of the salaries offered in the 
private sector. In 2007, the mean salary for ARS veterinarians was 
$102,081, according to OPM's Central Personnel Data File. This is about 
$28,000 less than the mean salary reported by the American Veterinary 
Medical Association for veterinarians with a Ph.D. working at 
universities and colleges and about $96,000 less than those working in 
industry with similar qualifications, such as at pharmaceutical 
companies. 

To address its shortage of Ph.D. veterinarians, ARS provided six 
recruitment or retention bonuses to its veterinarians totaling $48,313 
in the first 9 months of fiscal year 2008. The agency also created a 
tuition program in 2003, but participation has been limited. Only four 
individuals have been hired through the tuition program, and only two 
remained with the agency, according to officials. Under this program, 
ARS hires veterinarians without a Ph.D. and pays tuition and other 
educational costs while they earn this degree. Officials told us that 
the lack of success is most likely due to low salaries at ARS. In 
addition, the agency is reluctant to use this program because it 
diverts funding from the hiring of employees already qualified and 
ready to work. 

Army: 

The Army reported that it filled its 446 authorized active-duty 
veterinarian positions, but that its veterinary reserve corps is not at 
full strength. Specifically, the Army only filled 173 of its 197 
reserve positions in fiscal year 2008, a 12 percent shortage. According 
to the Army's analysis, the reserve corps has been at less than full 
strength since fiscal year 2005. These veterinarians commit to part- 
time training and to being deployed to full-time active duty when 
needed. The shortage means there is not a sufficient pool of 
veterinarians that can be called into active duty as the need arises. 
This is a concern, according to the official responsible for assessing 
Army veterinarian workforce needs, because the Army's need for 
veterinarian services is increasing due to growing concerns over 
bioterrorism, intentional contamination of the food supply, emerging 
zoonotic diseases, and due to operational requirements, such as 
agricultural reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, among other 
things. This official told us that recruitment into the reserves has 
been a problem because of the length, frequency, and uncertainty of 
deployments, which, in some cases has also resulted in veterinarians 
losing their jobs or suffering financial hardships. However, he told us 
that recent changes to the reserve corps program--such as decreasing 
the length of deployment from 1 year to 180 days, and making additional 
incentives available to veterinarians in the reserves--have helped 
strengthen the capacity of the veterinary reserve corps. 

Officials also told us they are concerned about a growing need for 
certain special veterinary skills. For example, there is an increasing 
demand for Army veterinary pathologists, who are essential for 
interpreting test results from animals used in drug and vaccine 
research. The official responsible for assessing Army veterinarian 
workforce needs told us the Army has yet to formally assess this need. 
Other Army veterinarians conduct medical intelligence work for DOD's 
Defense Intelligence Agency, where officials told us they are concerned 
about the difficulty of recruiting veterinarians with appropriate 
skills to meet a growing need to, among other things, collect and 
analyze data on animal diseases that could be used in a terrorist 
attack. Veterinarians are important to such work because, according to 
these officials, the majority of diseases considered to be potential 
bioterrorism agents are animal diseases that could also affect humans. 
They told us that while the agency is working to expand its workforce 
capabilities to address bioterrorism, there is a concern that the 
growing demand for veterinarian capabilities may outpace the growth of 
the Army's workforce. 

The primary reason for the Army's success in maintaining its active- 
duty veterinarian workforce is a scholarship program, according to the 
official responsible for assessing Army veterinarian workforce needs. 
This program targets veterinary students and pays their tuition and 
fees to veterinary school in exchange for a commitment to (1) serve as 
a veterinarian in the Army for 3 years and (2) serve an additional 5 
years either in active duty or in the Army reserve program. In fiscal 
year 2008, the Army reported it had 106 qualified applicants for 47 
scholarships. According to the official, the program is successful 
because it targets students before they accumulate school-related debt. 
Veterinary students graduate with more than $106,000 in debt, on 
average, according to the American Veterinary Medical Association. In 
addition, the funding for this program is directed specifically by 
congressional committees, separate from funds the Army uses to hire 
veterinarians. 

FDA: 

FDA officials reported that the agency has not assessed the sufficiency 
of its veterinarian workforce, but they told us that the workforce is 
sufficient to meet its responsibilities. However, a 2007 report by an 
FDA Advisory Committee found that FDA cannot fulfill its mission 
because of an insufficient scientific workforce.[Footnote 12] More 
specifically, the report states that FDA's scientific workforce has 
remained static while its workload has increased, and that FDA's Center 
for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) is in a state of crisis. This center 
employs nearly two-thirds of FDA's 152 veterinarians and is responsible 
for ensuring the safety of veterinary drugs and regulating animal feed, 
among other things. An author of the report told us that veterinarians 
enter FDA employment lacking necessary skills and experience to examine 
the wide variety of veterinary products that require FDA approval and 
that FDA needs to better train its veterinarians to review the many 
diverse products under its jurisdiction. FDA officials told us the 
agency is currently undertaking significant reforms to address 
fundamental concerns in the report. For example, FDA reported it hired 
more than 1,000 scientists in order to build a more robust workforce, 
and it created the position of Chief Scientist to improve coordination 
of science planning and execution across the agency. However, FDA did 
not tell us how these reforms address the identified veterinarian skill 
gaps. 

Although FDA officials said the veterinarian workforce is sufficient, 
CVM officials recently told us that as a result of new obligations, the 
center hired 26 veterinarians in 2008 to fill vacancies. This 
represents a 17 percent increase in FDA's overall veterinarian 
workforce in 2008, and it plans to hire more. The additional staff will 
enhance FDA's ability to review generic animal drug submissions, among 
other things, according to these officials. In addition, in commenting 
on a draft of this report, OPM informed us that it is currently 
reviewing a request for direct-hire authority from FDA to fill 
veterinary positions. According to OPM, this request is based on a 
severe shortage of candidates and it is projected that this authority 
may be granted through December 31, 2010. CVM also plans to develop an 
internship program for entry-level veterinarians and other scientists 
in order to develop a qualified talent pool from which to draw 
permanent employees. Further, these officials said that, as a result of 
recent participation in interagency efforts to protect the nation's 
food supply, CVM has begun to analyze the gap between its current 
resources and its needs. 

Departments Have Done Little to Assess the Sufficiency of Their 
Veterinarian Workforces across Their Component Agencies: 

Even though their component agencies identified concerns about their 
veterinarian workforces, officials from both USDA and HHS told us that 
they have not undertaken a departmentwide assessment of these 
workforces to gain a broader perspective on trends and shared issues. 
In contrast, DOD has a process for such an assessment. Our prior work 
has found that top-level management needs to be involved in order for 
strategic workforce planning to be effective.[Footnote 13] 

USDA: 

Although USDA regularly collects veterinarian workforce data from its 
component agencies that employ veterinarians, it does not use this 
information to assess the sufficiency of the veterinarian workforce 
departmentwide. Department officials told us that workforce assessment 
is the responsibility of the agencies. Because USDA delegates this 
responsibility, it appears to be unaware of the scope of the workforce 
problems facing its agencies. For example, in its fiscal year 2007 
human capital management report, USDA reported that its agencies had 
met or surpassed certain veterinarian workforce goals but made no 
mention of the shortages that FSIS and ARS identified in their 
workforce reports. USDA officials agreed that the report did not 
capture this critical information and that future reports should 
address the shortages. 

One result of this lack of department-level involvement is that USDA 
agencies compete against one another for veterinarians instead of 
following a departmentwide strategy to balance the needs of the 
agencies. According to FSIS officials, APHIS is attracting 
veterinarians away from FSIS because the work at APHIS is more 
appealing, there are more opportunities for advancement, and the 
salaries are higher. Indeed, our analysis shows that veterinarians are 
more concentrated in lower grade levels at FSIS than at APHIS (see 
figure 1). Moreover, according to OPM's Central Personnel Data File, 
the mean annual salary for veterinarians at FSIS in 2007 was about 
$78,000, the lowest among the three key USDA agencies (see figure 2). 
According to an APHIS human resources official, the agency hired 75 
veterinarians from FSIS between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, 17 percent 
of total new APHIS veterinarians hired. 

Figure 1: Percentage of Veterinarian Grade Levels by Key USDA Agencies 
in Fiscal Year 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Grade level: GS-9-10; 
APHIS: 0; 
ARS: 5.45%; 
FSIS: 0. 

Grade level: GS-11; 
APHIS: 2.44%; 
ARS: 7.27%; 
FSIS: 7.6%, 

Grade level: GS-12; 
APHIS: 41.16%; 
ARS: 25.45%; 
FSIS: 69.5%, 

Grade level: GS-13; 
APHIS: 21.95%; 
ARS: 20%; 
FSIS: 18.95%. 

Grade level: GS-14; 
APHIS: 28.35%; 
ARS: 12.73%; 
FSIS: 2.74%. 

Grade level: GS-15; 
APHIS: 5.18%; 
ARS: 16.36%; 
FSIS: 0.61%. 

Grade level: GS-16+; 
APHIS: 0.91%; 
ARS: 12.73%; 
FSIS: 0.61%. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses. 

Note: Federal agency grade levels represent ascending rates of basic 
pay, from GS-1 through GS-15, above which is the Senior Executive 
Service (SES). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Mean Veterinarian Salaries by Key USDA Agencies, Fiscal Years 
2003-2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
FSIS: $68,663; 
APHIS: $75,731; 
ARS: $88,024. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
FSIS: $70,661; 
APHIS: $80,126; 
ARS: $89,643. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
FSIS: $73,021; 
APHIS: $84,310; 
ARS: $95,450. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
FSIS: $75,830; 
APHIS: $88,137; 
ARS: $97,752. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
FSIS: $77,678; 
APHIS: $90,629; 
ARS: $102,081. 

Source: GAO analysis of Central Personnel Data File data. 

Note: Data in this figure contains locality pay. 

[End of figure] 

HHS: 

HHS neither assesses veterinarian workforce needs departmentwide nor 
has it instructed any of its component agencies that employ 
veterinarians--FDA, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)-- 
to assess their own workforces. HHS is thus not fully aware of the 
status of the veterinarian workforce at these component agencies and 
cannot strategically plan for future veterinarian needs. If it were 
able to provide such planning, it might be able to help FDA address 
workforce concerns raised in the 2007 FDA Science and Mission at Risk 
report. However, senior HHS strategic workforce planning officials we 
spoke with were unaware of the report. 

HHS officials told us that departmental leadership in workforce 
planning is important. In fact, they said the department is in the 
preliminary stages of developing a strategic departmentwide approach to 
workforce planning for certain professions. This effort will initially 
focus on workforce assessments for specific occupations, such as nurses 
and medical doctors. HHS officials told us they will not initially 
include veterinarians in this effort, because veterinarians are not 
deemed mission critical for the department, even though they are 
critical to the missions of FDA, CDC, and NIH. However, HHS officials 
said that this effort does not preclude agencies from assessing their 
own veterinarian workforce needs and sharing that information with the 
department. HHS officials also told us that because the department is 
expected to provide veterinary medical care and support during public 
health and medical disasters that warrant a coordinated federal 
response, it is critical that appropriate veterinary resources are 
identified and maintained. Furthermore, these officials told us that 
efforts are under way at the component agency level to address the 
national veterinary shortage. Specifically, CDC, in collaboration with 
Emory University, has developed a residency program designed to provide 
comprehensive training in laboratory animal medicine to better prepare 
veterinarians for working in laboratory research facilities at CDC and 
across the nation. In addition, in 2006 and 2008 CDC sponsored a 
"Veterinary Student Day" to promote public health careers for 
veterinarians. 

DOD: 

Unlike USDA and HHS, DOD has a process for assessing veterinarian 
workforce needs departmentwide. It has given this responsibility to the 
Army, which employs 89 percent of DOD veterinarians, with the remaining 
veterinarians working as public health officials for the Air Force. The 
Army assesses not only the number and type of veterinarians it will 
need but also what will be needed for the other services. For example, 
Army veterinarians are routinely assigned to care for working dogs and 
other animals at Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine bases. Army 
veterinarians also conduct medical intelligence activities at the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. As the executive agency charged with 
assessing veterinarian workforce requirements for DOD, the Army takes 
all of these needs into consideration, then forwards the assessment 
results to DOD, which integrates them with overall workforce planning. 

There Is No Governmentwide Assessment of the Veterinarian Workforce: 

No effort is being made to assess the sufficiency of the veterinarian 
workforce governmentwide. This is problematic because the majority (67 
percent) of the 24 component agencies and other federal entities that 
employ veterinarians told us they have concerns about their 
veterinarian capabilities. OPM has not conducted a governmentwide 
effort to address current and future veterinarian shortages identified 
by component agencies, as it has done for other professions, and 
efforts by the Congress to address the national shortage have thus far 
had minimal impact. 

Sixteen of the 24 component agencies and other entities employing 
veterinarians reported concerns about their veterinarian workforce (see 
table 1). For example, several agencies reported that they lack 
veterinarian expertise required to fully meet agency responsibilities, 
such as addressing wildlife disease outbreaks. 

Table 1: Agency Concerns about Sufficiency of the Federal Veterinarian 
Workforce: 

Department: Department of Agriculture; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Thirty percent of its veterinarians will be eligible to retire by the 
end of fiscal year 2011, and it may be difficult to maintain enough 
veterinarians with expertise in pathology and foreign animal disease in 
the future. Responsibilities have also increased in recent years, 
raising concerns that there will not be sufficient veterinarian 
capacity if multiple emergencies occur at once. 

Department: Department of Agriculture; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Food Safety and Inspection 
Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Veterinarian workforce falls short of agency goal by 15 percent due, in 
part, to unpleasant environment, grueling work, and low salary. 

Department: Department of Agriculture; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Agricultural Research Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Veterinarian workforce falls short of agency goal by 12 percent. There 
is a limited number of qualified veterinarians and agency salaries are 
not competitive with private sector. 

Department: Department of Agriculture; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Cooperative State Research, 
Education, and Extension Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
One of the four veterinarian positions is vacant, stressing the 
agency's ability to oversee funds for a national network of 
laboratories that diagnose and track animal diseases. 

Department: Department of Defense; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Army; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Veterinary reserve corps falls short by 12 percent. Also, the number of 
active-duty veterinarian positions has remained relatively static 
despite increasing demands across the Army's mission, including in 
medical intelligence, food safety and defense, agricultural 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and emerging zoonotic 
diseases. 

Department: Department of Defense; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Air Force; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Not enough veterinarians choose to join the Air Force because of the 
service commitment, and the salary is not competitive. Air Force 
officials are concerned they might not be able to fully meet the 
agency's public health mission, which includes ensuring food safety and 
tracking infectious diseases on Air Force bases. 

Department: Department of Health and Human Services; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Food and Drug Administration; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Department of Health and Human Services; 
Component agency/other federal entity: National Institutes of Health; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Agency faces challenges recruiting veterinarians that specialize in 
laboratory animal medicine and veterinary pathology, who make up the 
majority of veterinary positions at the agency. Both specialties are 
reporting significant shortages that are not forecast to improve for at 
least 10 years, which will hinder the agency's ability to recruit 
qualified veterinarians. 

Department: Department of Health and Human Services; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Veterinarian expertise in agriculture and animal health contribute 
significantly to human health programs and could be enhanced. 

Department: Department of Health and Human Services; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
The Office reported that more than two full-time veterinarians are 
needed to help develop effective response programs to public health 
emergencies. Department officials did not support this statement, but 
said that veterinarians are integral to its response strategy and their 
continued engagement is essential. 

Department: Department of Veterans Affairs; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Office of Research and 
Development; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Department of the Interior; 
Component agency/other federal entity: U.S. Geological Survey; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Salaries are not competitive with the private sector. The agency faces 
difficulty hiring veterinarians to address wildlife diseases, including 
those that kill many animals in a single local outbreak. 

Department: Department of the Interior; 
Component agency/other federal entity: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Agency has too few veterinarians to monitor diseases in wildlife, 
nationally and internationally. 

Department: Department of the Interior; 
Component agency/other federal entity: National Park Service; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Agency has too few veterinarians to address wildlife diseases and 
survey outbreaks in the vast park system of 84 million acres. 

Department: Department of Homeland Security; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Office of Health Affairs; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Agency has too few veterinarians to effectively develop the 
capabilities to respond to catastrophic food, agriculture, and 
veterinary events. 

Department: Department of Homeland Security; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Directorate for Science and 
Technology; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Department of Homeland Security; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Directorate for National 
Protection and Programs; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Smithsonian; 
Component agency/other federal entity: National Zoo; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Salaries are not competitive; American Veterinary Medical Association-
specialty boarded status is necessary to perform responsibilities, but 
compensation for this additional training is not available; too few 
veterinarians to fully conduct agency wildlife health and surveillance 
studies. 

Department: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Component agency/other federal entity: [Empty]; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: U.S. Agency for International Development; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Bureaus for Economic Growth, 
Agriculture and Trade; for Global Health; and for Africa; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Department of Commerce; 
Component agency/other federal entity: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
Too few veterinarians available to investigate major or multiple 
outbreaks, or single events that kill many animals, when they occur in 
marine animals. 

Department: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Office of the Chief Health and 
Medical Officer; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Department: Department of Energy; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
There is a limited number of veterinarians with the expertise to 
develop models and conduct analyses to identify the resources agencies 
will need to respond to animal disease outbreaks, among other things. 

Department: Department of Justice; 
Component agency/other federal entity: Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Examples of concerns reported by component agency/other federal entity: 
No concerns reported. 

Source: Agency survey responses and interviews. 

[End of table] 

These current challenges are likely to worsen because a large number of 
federal veterinarians are eligible to retire in the near future. These 
retirements would exacerbate the veterinarian shortage and possibly 
increase interagency competition. Our analysis found that 697 
veterinarians at FSIS, APHIS, ARS, Army, and FDA--27 percent of the 
combined veterinarian workforce of these agencies--are eligible to 
retire over the next 3 years. As the shortage grows, agencies across 
the federal government may experience a situation similar to the 
competition between FSIS and APHIS, and agencies with higher salaries 
for veterinarians are likely to gain an advantage. As figure 3 
illustrates, mean veterinarian base salaries vary widely across 
agencies, from just under $70,000 at Interior's National Park Service 
to just about $122,000 at DHS's Office of Health Affairs. Salaries for 
individual veterinarians range from $35,000 for those in the residency 
program at the National Zoo to $205,000 for the highest paid 
veterinarian at NIH. 

Figure 3: Mean Veterinarian Base Salaries at 19 Component Agencies or 
Federal Entities in Fiscal Year 2008: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Food Safety and Inspection 
Service[B] (USDA); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $70,354. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (USDA); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $81,195. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Agricultural Research Service (USDA); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $90,432. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Cooperative State Research, 
Education, and Extension Service (USDA); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $114,036. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Air Force (DOD); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $69,588. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Army (DOD); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $69,588. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Food and Drug Administration (HHS); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $83,028. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention[B] (HHS); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $90,736. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: National Institutes of Health (HHS); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $117,713. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: National Park Service (Interior); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $68,689. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Interior); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $75,522. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: U.S. Geological survey (Interior); 
Mean veterinarian salary: $85,229. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $80,579. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $84,194. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: National Zoo; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $89,694. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $93,730. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Department of Veterans Affairs; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $93,840. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: U.S. Agency for International 
Development; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $94,608. 

Component agency/federal entity[A]: Office of Health Affairs; 
Mean veterinarian salary: $121,588. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

Note: Salaries do not include locality pay and stipends. In addition, 
we do not display mean salary for those agencies with fewer than four 
veterinarians due to the small number of employees represented. This 
includes the Departments of Energy and Justice; HHS's Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; and DHS's 
Directorate for National Protection and Programs. In addition, DHS's 
Science and Technology was unable to provide base salary information in 
time for this report and, therefore, is not included. 

[A] We relied on officials from these federal entities to identify mean 
salaries of all veterinarians employed, including civil and military 
service employees, contractors, and other, regardless of job title. 
Because data are means reported by agencies, we could not assess the 
underlying distribution for outliers or skewness. 

[B] This does not include the salaries of the United States Public 
Health Service Commissioned Corps veterinarians stationed at these 
agencies. The Commissioned Corps is a uniformed service that belongs to 
HHS but fills public health leadership and service roles at several 
federal agencies. 

[End of figure] 

Some agencies, such as those within HHS and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, can augment base salaries for veterinarians using special 
statutory authorities.[Footnote 14] Agencies can use these authorities 
to hire veterinarians when standard hiring practices, including the use 
of recruitment incentives, are impracticable, less effective, or have 
been exhausted. In addition, DOD can provide all of its veterinarians 
with a $100 per month stipend, as well as up to an additional $5,000 
per year of special pay if they have met the education and training 
standards of an American Veterinary Medical Association-recognized 
specialty college.[Footnote 15] There is no similar authority for USDA 
veterinarians. 

OPM's mission is to ensure the federal government has an effective 
civilian workforce, but it has not conducted a governmentwide effort to 
address current and potential veterinarian shortages, as it has done 
for other professions. For certain professions, OPM has initiated 
governmentwide direct-hire authority, which allows expediting hiring 
during a time of critical need or a severe shortage of candidates. For 
example, in 2003, OPM authorized departments to immediately hire 
doctors, nurses, and other types of medical professionals without 
following prescribed competitive procedures. OPM officials told us 
their agency issued this authority based in part on department and 
agency concerns. OPM can also hold interagency forums to discuss 
workforce concerns but has not done so for veterinarians. According to 
OPM officials, interagency forums are open to all senior human capital 
representatives from all departments, including USDA and HHS. The 
forums provide an opportunity to discuss concerns, exchange ideas, and 
explore solutions to governmentwide staffing issues. OPM officials told 
us that no department has requested a discussion about veterinarian 
workforce concerns. Further, officials told us that the agency will 
facilitate a governmentwide solution, such as an interagency forum, if 
the departments demonstrate that a shortage exists. Our prior work has 
identified the need for OPM to use its leadership position to provide 
assistance to departments and agencies efforts to recruit and retain a 
capable and committed workforce.[Footnote 16] 

OPM officials told us the agency has taken some steps that could 
improve veterinarian recruitment and retention. During the course of 
our review, OPM created a Personnel Action Team to determine whether a 
governmentwide direct-hire authority should be granted for all 
veterinarians. OPM did not provide further details other than to state 
that a decision is expected in early 2009. In addition, OPM recently 
changed the federal classification of veterinarians. OPM raised the 
entry grade level for newly hired veterinarians from GS-9 to GS-11 and 
expanded the description of the federal veterinarian occupation to 
include areas of specialization, such as toxicology and pathology. OPM 
officials believe this will help attract more veterinarians into 
federal service. Agency officials also told us that they meet 
periodically with departments to ensure occupation classifications meet 
department needs. This was the first change of the veterinarian 
classification in over 20 years and was initiated at USDA's request. 

The Congress has taken steps that address the broader, national 
veterinarian shortage, but its efforts thus far have had minimal 
impact. The National Veterinary Medical Services Act enacted in 2003, 
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out a program to help 
veterinarians repay their school loans when they agree to work in areas 
of need. Although USDA is responsible for implementing the act, it has 
been delayed in doing so. USDA's Undersecretary for Research, 
Education, and Economics testified before the Congress that this was 
because the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension 
Service (CSREES)--the USDA agency in charge of implementation--does not 
have experience with complex loan repayment programs. The Congress 
provided initial funding for the act in fiscal year 2006. In August 
2008, CSREES began holding public hearings to solicit stakeholder 
input. Officials from USDA and veterinary associations told us that the 
$1.8 million allocated thus far for the program is insufficient and 
would have minimal impact on the shortage. With veterinary student debt 
averaging $106,000 upon graduation, $1.8 million would cover about 17 
students with loans. Moreover, the program targets veterinarians who 
already have their degree and may not have the skill set the federal 
government is seeking. To be effective, officials from professional 
veterinary associations told us, the program would have to provide 
guarantees and target students early in veterinary school. The Congress 
also enacted the Higher Education Opportunity Act in August 2008, which 
has provisions intended to increase the number of veterinarians in the 
workforce through a competitive grant program that can increase 
capacity at veterinary colleges. According to the American Veterinary 
Medical Association, however, these grants will be capped at $500,000 
per school, which will not be enough to increase capacity to meet 
veterinarian demands. 

Efforts to Identify the Veterinarian Workforce Needed during a Pandemic 
and Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak Are Insufficient: 

Four of the five key agencies we reviewed--APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and FDA-- 
have plans intended to detail how essential functions and services, 
including those that veterinarians perform, would continue during a 
pandemic that has the potential to severely reduce the workforce. 
However, each lacks elements that FEMA considers important for 
effective planning. The Army is still in the process of getting its 
plan approved and, therefore, we have not evaluated it. In addition, 
DHS's efforts to identify the veterinarian workforce needed to address 
a catastrophic nationwide outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease are based 
on an unrealistic assumption and limited information. 

Agency Planning to Ensure Continuity of Essential Veterinary Functions 
during a Pandemic Is Incomplete: 

FEMA's pandemic guidance assists agencies in identifying special 
considerations for maintaining essential functions and services during 
a pandemic outbreak that may cause absenteeism to reach 40 percent. For 
example, the guidance directs agencies to identify in their pandemic 
plans how operations will be sustained until normal business activity 
can be reconstituted, which may be longer than the 30 days usually 
planned for other types of emergencies. Agency plans are also to 
identify the essential functions that must be continued on-site and 
those that can be conducted from a remote location. They also should 
take into consideration the need for logistical support, services, and 
infrastructure that help an agency achieve and maintain essential 
functions and services. To account for the expected high rate of 
absenteeism at the peak of a pandemic, FEMA guidance also directs 
agencies to identify at least three people who can carry out each 
responsibility and identify how the agency will continue to operate if 
leadership and essential staff are unavailable. Finally, agencies are 
directed to test their pandemic plans, including the impacts of reduced 
staffing on facilities and essential functions and services. 

APHIS has developed pandemic plans for its headquarters, regional 
offices, and three laboratories that employ veterinarians, but these 
plans are missing elements in FEMA's guidance and are not well- 
organized. For example, they do not explain how animal care, disease 
investigation, and other essential functions and services would 
continue if leadership and essential staff are unavailable. Moreover, 
pieces of these pandemic plans are spread throughout a large number of 
documents and are not well linked. For example, APHIS officials 
provided us with an undated pandemic plan that they told us was an 
appendix to the headquarters continuity of operations plan. But this 
continuity of operations plan made no reference to such an appendix, 
and officials were never able to provide us with a document that made 
reference to such an appendix. USDA recently hired a new emergency 
preparedness director to revise APHIS's pandemic plans, among other 
things. The director told us that APHIS recognizes the importance of 
easily locating the plans and quickly implementing them in the event of 
a pandemic, and he acknowledged that the current documents are not an 
effective plan. APHIS is now combining its plans into one comprehensive 
document that will cover APHIS headquarters, regional offices, and 
laboratories. In addition, the director told us the new plan, to be 
completed by early 2009, will better adhere to FEMA guidance. 

FSIS has developed a pandemic plan that addresses many of the elements 
in FEMA's guidance, but it lacks some crucial details. Importantly, the 
plan takes into account the work that veterinarians do at private 
slaughter plants. However, it does not address the logistics of how 
FSIS will work with industry to ensure veterinarians and other 
employees are available in the event of a pandemic so that food 
production can continue. FSIS officials told us that they have 
discussed this logistic with industry and expect, based on these 
discussions, that some plants would not be able to operate during a 
pandemic, as a result of FSIS or plant personnel absenteeism. The 
agency would maintain close communication with industry during a 
pandemic in order to determine how best to allocate available 
veterinarians and other FSIS inspection personnel so that slaughter 
plants could continue to operate. Veterinarians would be allocated to 
plants based on considerations such as the location of the outbreak and 
the type of slaughter plant affected. For instance, poultry plants may 
receive priority consideration because birds can only be slaughtered at 
a very specific weight. That is, the equipment for processing birds is 
designed for birds of a very specific size, and industry would not be 
able to process them if they were permitted to grow too large. However, 
such logistics are absent from FSIS's plan, effectively postponing any 
decisions until the middle of a crisis. Similarly, the plan does not 
mention how FSIS would work with APHIS, even though the agencies have 
formally agreed to jointly plan for critical activities related to 
surveillance of animal diseases. In addition, the plan does not 
consider the impact of local quarantines on access to plants. 

ARS has developed pandemic plans for all of its 12 laboratories where 
veterinarians work. We reviewed plans for the two laboratories that 
employ the most veterinarians: the Southeast Poultry Research 
Laboratory and the National Animal Disease Center (NADC). These plans 
are important because they spell out the site-specific details needed 
to ensure that essential functions at each laboratory can continue. 
However, the plans lack crucial details, such as how the laboratories 
will continue operations if absenteeism reaches 40 percent. 
Specifically, neither of the plans take into account how the 
laboratories would continue to conduct essential functions and services 
if leadership and essential staff are unavailable. Agency officials 
told us they would temporarily suspend projects to account for 
increased absenteeism, but there is no mention of this in the plans; 
nor is there mention of how the agency will select projects for 
suspension or what would trigger suspension. Ensuring a sufficient 
veterinarian workforce at these laboratories during a pandemic is 
important because veterinarians carry out critical research and must be 
available to ensure the proper care of research animals. In addition, 
NADC is part of a USDA research complex that is transitioning to joint 
ARS and APHIS support services, including veterinary care for research 
animals. However, ARS and APHIS have yet to jointly plan for continuity 
of operations for any type of emergency. 

FDA has also developed a pandemic plan, but it is high-level plan that 
does not address several of FEMA's elements, leaving it unclear if 
consideration has been given to how veterinarians would carry out any 
essential functions and services during a pandemic. For example, it 
does not identify which essential functions--whether they be the 
responsibility of the veterinarian or others--must be performed on-site 
and which can be performed remotely. Nor does it explain how 
veterinarians, or others, will continue operations if absenteeism 
reaches 40 percent by, for example, delegating authority to three 
individuals capable of carrying out each of the agency's essential 
functions. The plan omits other important details, such as contact 
information for individuals who could assume authority should essential 
staff and leadership become unavailable. FDA officials told us they 
will take these gaps into consideration when they update their plan in 
2009. 

The Army is still in the process of getting its pandemic plan approved 
and, therefore, we have not evaluated it. According to Army officials, 
the agency has developed a pandemic plan that has been validated by the 
U.S. Army Northern Command, but it has not yet been formally referred 
for approval to the Army's senior leadership, and it does not contain 
details of how essential functions would continue. According to DOD 
officials, subordinate divisions within the Army intend to develop 
detailed plans, but the division responsible for veterinary services 
(Veterinary Command) has yet to do so. However, DOD officials told us 
that the Army has been instrumental in helping the United States plan 
for an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in birds. 
Controlling the outbreak in birds reduces the opportunity for the virus 
to mutate into a strain that could cause a pandemic in humans. 

FEMA guidance also directs agencies to test how well their pandemic 
plans might maintain essential functions and services given reduced 
staffing levels. FSIS and FDA are the only agencies we reviewed that 
have done so. In March 2007, FSIS conducted a "tabletop" pandemic 
exercise where key personnel discuss simulated scenarios in an informal 
setting in order to test their plans, policies, and procedures. In a 
summary report, FSIS officials noted that, among other things, 
additional exercises were needed to improve coordination with industry. 
FSIS subsequently conducted a similar tabletop exercise with industry 
in November 2008, but the summary report on lessons learned has yet to 
be published. FDA conducted an operational exercise in October 2008--a 
drill to test how well it could continue operations under a staffing 
shortage. As part of this exercise, FDA tested its ability to reassign 
tasks, but it is not clear if tasks performed by veterinarians were 
among those reassigned. FDA officials told us that they plan to issue a 
report with lessons learned from the exercise in early 2009 and will 
incorporate that information into FDA's pandemic plan. ARS and APHIS 
have not tested their plans to see how well their agencies might 
maintain essential functions and services in the event of reduced 
staffing levels, but officials told us they intend to do so. 

An Infeasible Assumption and Limited Information Hinder Veterinarian 
Workforce Planning Efforts for a Catastrophic Outbreak of Foot-and- 
Mouth Disease: 

DHS has two efforts under way that involve identifying the veterinarian 
workforce needed to quickly perform rapid diagnoses and other essential 
activities during a large-scale outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, but 
both efforts have shortcomings. The first is a long-term national 
effort that DHS is coordinating to assess the nation's preparedness for 
multiple, intentional introductions of foot-and-mouth disease. This 
effort includes identifying the veterinarian workforce and other 
capabilities that would be needed to best respond to such an outbreak. 
For example, it has identified the need for 750 veterinarians 
nationwide to conduct animal health epidemiological investigations and 
surveillance. It has also identified the need for teams of six 
livestock and six companion animal veterinarians in each affected state 
and local jurisdiction to implement disease containment measures, 
provide animal welfare, and euthanize and dispose of animals. 

However, this effort is based on a national planning scenario that USDA 
and DHS officials' say includes an infeasible assumption. The scenario, 
developed by a White House Homeland Security Council working group in 
2006, involves the mass slaughter of all potentially exposed animals. 
This "stamping out" method is the same one the United States has used 
in the past for eradicating smaller outbreaks of foreign animal 
diseases, but under this scenario, it would result in the slaughter of 
almost half the nation's beef, dairy, and swine. DHS and USDA 
officials, as well as state officials who have conducted large-scale 
foot-and-mouth disease exercises, consider this stamping out method 
infeasible because, among other things, it would lead to serious 
logistical and environmental concerns, would not be tolerated by the 
public, and could wipe out a viable livestock industry. As a result, 
DHS and USDA officials told us, any workforce estimates produced from 
this effort are not relevant. However, these officials told us it has 
helped them better understand the enormity of the workforce response 
and the coordination that would be required for such a catastrophic 
event. 

DHS and USDA officials told us that to arrive at more relevant 
workforce estimates, the United States would have to consider 
alternatives to stamping out for outbreaks as large as the one depicted 
in the national planning scenario. For example, some countries protect 
against and control foot-and-mouth disease using vaccines. There are 
numerous reasons the United States has not used this approach, 
including limitations to vaccine technology.[Footnote 17] However USDA, 
DHS, and state officials recognize that newer, more promising vaccines 
may play an important role in controlling a catastrophic outbreak. DHS 
officials also told us that they are looking into revising the Homeland 
Security Council's planning scenario to make it a more useful planning 
tool. 

For its second effort to identify the veterinarian workforce needed 
during a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, DHS has contracted with the 
Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to create 
a decision support system that models various foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak scenarios. This effort includes estimating the number and type 
of workforce needed for responding to outbreaks, both with and without 
vaccination. However, according to the project leader, modeling efforts 
could be improved if certain information were available. For example, 
in order to model workforce needs for a response that includes the use 
of vaccines without subsequent stamping out, known as "vaccinate to 
live," it is important to know what segments of the livestock industry 
might use such a strategy, and under what circumstances, and how 
animals and animal products would be identified and their movement 
tracked. Because the concept of vaccinate to live is new in the United 
States, USDA has yet to detail in contingency response plans how it 
would employ this concept, according to agency officials. In the 
absence of such plans, the project leader, a veterinarian who took part 
in the response to the 2001 United Kingdom foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak, told us that she is left to base her modeling assumptions on 
personal knowledge and experience, as well as conversations with agency 
subject matter experts. 

Moreover, data limitations make it difficult for any computer modeling 
effort to accurately predict the spread of the disease. Specifically, 
modelers must estimate the number and location of animals, as well as 
their interaction with other segments of industry, because the United 
States does not have a mandatory, national system that identifies the 
location and tracks the movement of livestock.[Footnote 18] Instead, 
modelers currently use outdated county-level data from USDA's National 
Agricultural Statistical Survey census, reducing the accuracy of 
predictions about the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Also, without 
knowing the exact location of livestock, it is difficult to understand 
the interaction between livestock and wildlife. Limited data and 
information on the number and movement of wildlife and the 
susceptibility of wildlife populations to the virus further complicates 
matters, according to agency officials. This is an important gap, since 
foot-and-mouth disease has been known to spread from livestock to 
wildlife in past outbreaks. In fact, the last time the United States 
had an outbreak was in California in the 1920s, when the virus spread 
from pigs to cattle and black-tailed deer. It took 2 years and the 
slaughter of 22,000 deer to eradicate the disease from a local deer 
population in one national park. In areas where livestock graze 
extensively, there is potential for interaction with susceptible 
species, such as deer and feral pigs. According to the project leader, 
as well as USDA and DHS officials, control and eradication strategies 
would be greatly complicated if wildlife became infected and could 
require more veterinarians and different expertise. Given the important 
role wildlife can play in disease outbreak, officials agree it is 
important to better understand the interaction between livestock and 
wildlife. In fact, new technologies, such as global positioning 
systems, have been developed that can, for example, help determine the 
number and movement of animals, making it possible to gather this type 
of data, according to a USDA Wildlife Services official. A DHS official 
told us that, as a first step, it would be important for those agencies 
with responsibility for overseeing the health of humans, wildlife, and 
livestock to discuss how wildlife data can be gathered to most 
accurately model the spread of disease in wildlife. 

Federal and State Agencies Are Missing Important Opportunities to 
Ensure Efficient Use of Veterinarians During Disease Outbreaks: 

During four recent zoonotic disease outbreaks, the veterinarian 
workforce challenge cited most often by federal and state officials was 
having too few veterinarians to control the outbreak while also 
adequately carrying out other routine activities. Specifically, 
officials from 3 of 4 federal agencies--APHIS, CDC, and Interior's U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS)--and 9 of 13 state agencies cited this 
challenge. See table 2 for the 17 agencies that were identified as 
playing an important role, those that cited insufficient veterinarian 
capacity as a challenge, and other details about these outbreaks. 

Table 2: Four Recent Zoonotic Outbreaks We Analyzed: 

Disease: Bovine tuberculosis; 
Location: Michigan; 
Date outbreak began: Fall 1994; 
Date outbreak ended: Outbreak is ongoing; 
Animals infected: Wildlife, cattle; 
Number of human cases in the identified location: 2[C]; 
Number of veterinarians involved in outbreak[A]: 218[D]; 
Total size of workforce involved in outbreak[A]: 412; 
Federal and state agencies involved in outbreak (agencies in bold cited 
insufficient veterinarian capacity as a challenge)[B]: 
APHIS; 
Michigan Department of Agriculture (bold); 
Michigan Department of Community Health; 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources; 
Michigan State University. 

Disease: Exotic Newcastle disease; 
Location: California; 
Date outbreak began: October 2002; 
Date outbreak ended: September 2003; 
Animals infected: Poultry and other susceptible avian species; 
Number of human cases in the identified location: 2[C]; 
Number of veterinarians involved in outbreak[A]: 1,250[D]; 
Total size of workforce involved in outbreak[A]: 6,039; 
Federal and state agencies involved in outbreak (agencies in bold cited 
insufficient veterinarian capacity as a challenge)[B]: 
APHIS (bold); 
California Animal Health and Food Safety Laboratory (bold); 
California Department of Food and Agriculture (bold); 
California Department of Public Health (bold). 

Disease: Monkeypox; 
Location: Wisconsin; 
Date outbreak began: May 2003; 
Date outbreak ended: August 2003; 
Animals infected: Prairie dogs, Gambian giant rats, dormice, rope 
squirrels; 
Number of human cases in the identified location: 27[C]; 
Number of veterinarians involved in outbreak[A]: 39; 
Total size of workforce involved in outbreak[A]: 560; 
Federal and state agencies involved in outbreak (agencies in bold cited 
insufficient veterinarian capacity as a challenge)[B]: 
APHIS; 
CDC; 
FDA; 
USGS; 
Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
(bold); 
Wisconsin Division of Public Health (bold). 

Disease: West Nile virus; 
Location: Colorado; 
Date outbreak began: June 2003; 
Date outbreak ended: November 2003[E]; 
Animals infected: Birds, horses; 
Number of human cases in the identified location: 2,947[F]; 
Number of veterinarians involved in outbreak[A]: 27; 
Total size of workforce involved in outbreak[A]: 150; 
Federal and state agencies involved in outbreak (agencies in bold cited 
insufficient veterinarian capacity as a challenge)[B]: 
APHIS (bold); 
CDC; 
Colorado Department of Agriculture (bold); 
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment (bold); 
Colorado Division of Wildlife; 
Colorado State University (bold). 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Estimates provided by agency officials. Includes veterinarians 
across agencies. 

[B] The agencies listed are those identified as playing an important 
role in the outbreak, although additional agencies were involved. 

[C] Number of confirmed human cases, as provided by state departments 
of public health. 

[D] These estimates include private-sector veterinarians who worked on 
the outbreaks as contractors or temporary employees. 

[E] West Nile virus is endemic to the United States. There have been 
seasonal outbreaks across the country every year since 1999. 

[F] Number of CDC confirmed human cases. CDC also reports that the 
number of confirmed nationwide human cases in 2003 for monkeypox and 
West Nile virus was 51 and 9,862, respectively. 

[End of table] 

Two primary reasons emerged for this insufficient capacity. First, 
according to federal and state officials, veterinarian capacity was 
insufficient because most of the agencies involved in the four 
outbreaks had difficulty recruiting and retaining veterinarians in 
general. For example, officials at many of the public health agencies 
and diagnostic laboratories we spoke with said that it has been 
challenging to hire or retain veterinarians with the specialized 
qualifications they need--public health and pathology skills, 
respectively. According to 2008 survey results from the American 
Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, it takes most 
diagnostic laboratories more than 6 months to fill vacancies for 
veterinary pathologists. In addition, numerous state agency officials 
told us that the salaries they offer are not competitive with those of 
the federal or private sectors. Moreover, officials told us that it has 
been particularly challenging recruiting veterinarians to work in 
remote areas or in areas with a high cost of living. 

Second, in 2002 and 2003 many veterinarians went to California to 
address a particularly demanding outbreak of exotic Newcastle disease, 
limiting the number of veterinarians available to respond to other 
outbreaks. The exotic Newcastle disease outbreak quickly exhausted 
California's supply of veterinarians, both at state agencies and APHIS, 
because so many backyard birds--which are kept as a hobby or for 
personal consumption--were affected. Responders had to spend valuable 
time going door-to-door trying to locate potentially infected birds in 
densely populated urban areas. APHIS called in over 1,000 federal, 
state, and private-sector veterinarians from outside California to help 
with the response. But, even with a task force of over 6,000, it took 
almost a year to control the outbreak. Moreover, because so many 
veterinarians converged on California, the number available to work on 
the other three outbreaks--located in Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Colorado--was insufficient, according to federal and state agency 
officials. In part because of the strain on veterinarian resources 
during the four outbreaks, officials from 16 federal and state agencies 
expressed concern that they will not have sufficient veterinarian 
capacity for multiple outbreaks in the future. FDA assisted in one of 
the four outbreaks and was the only agency not to express concerns 
about veterinarian capacity. Some federal officials said that the 
United States has never been tested with two major outbreaks occurring 
at once, such as simultaneous outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and 
highly pathogenic avian influenza--two highly infectious foreign animal 
diseases. They said that should this happen, the effects on animal and 
public health could be devastating. 

Federal and state agency officials reported several consequences of 
this insufficient veterinarian capacity. Examples are as follows: 

* Michigan state agency officials told us they had trouble testing 
enough cattle during the bovine tuberculosis outbreak. Over a 6-1/2 
year period, veterinarians struggled to test more than a million cows-
-an average of more than 3,500 a week--but the state has yet to 
eradicate the disease. 

* Some Michigan officials told us that APHIS and the Michigan 
Department of Agriculture did not have enough veterinarians to both 
respond to bovine tuberculosis and address other animal diseases, such 
as E. coli. In fact, during all four outbreaks, veterinarians at some 
point had to delay important work on other diseases, in part because 
there were not enough veterinarians.[Footnote 19] 

* During the 2003 West Nile virus outbreak in Colorado, a lack of 
sufficient veterinarians to track and control the disease, among other 
things, may have allowed the virus to infect more people and animals 
than it otherwise would have.[Footnote 20] 

* The volume of work required to control and eventually eradicate 
exotic Newcastle disease in California physically and emotionally 
exhausted veterinarians to the extent that, once the outbreak was over, 
they needed significant time off to recover, further delaying work on 
routine activities. 

* The demanding nature of the exotic Newcastle disease and bovine 
tuberculosis outbreaks may have caused some veterinarians to seek 
employment elsewhere. 

Despite reports of insufficient veterinarian capacity during these four 
outbreaks, the agencies have not taken full advantage of two important 
opportunities to learn from past experience. First, 10 of the 17 
agencies have not assessed how well their own veterinarian workforces 
responded to individual outbreaks. Our prior work has shown that 
agencies can improve response by conducting postoutbreak assessments 
[Footnote 21]. One outcome of such an assessment might be a better 
understanding of how to most efficiently use veterinarians. For 
example, APHIS--one of the agencies that has performed postoutbreak 
assessments--found that it had difficulty locating veterinarians with 
the specialized expertise needed for addressing the exotic Newcastle 
disease outbreak. As a result, APHIS is developing a national list 
identifying veterinarians and their credentials to call upon in the 
future. In addition, federal and state agencies working on bovine 
tuberculosis in Michigan meet periodically to assess what strategies 
are working and what they need to change in order to better control the 
disease. APHIS also conducts periodic reviews of its efforts and the 
state's efforts to address bovine tuberculosis. 

Moreover, none of the 17 agencies have come together to share their 
experiences across the outbreaks in order to identify workforce 
challenges that they may have had in common, including veterinarian 
workforce challenges. Consequently, the agencies are missing the 
opportunity to identify and address challenges they are likely to face 
in the future. The majority of the federal and state agency officials 
we spoke with agreed that it would be useful for agencies not only to 
conduct assessments of their own workforce response but also to 
periodically meet to identify common workforce challenges across 
multiple outbreaks and discuss strategies for overcoming these 
challenges. However, some agencies told us that their veterinarian 
workforce is already facing heavy workload demands that make it 
difficult for them to meet their existing responsibilities, and thus 
they have not had time to conduct postoutbreak assessments. 

Bovine tuberculosis: 

Figure: Photographs of a cow and a deer (Source: USDA). 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Bovine tuberculosis is a contagious disease that can be transmitted 
from livestock to humans and all other warm-blooded vertebrates. It is 
a chronic disease, and symptoms are often not apparent until it has 
reached an advanced stage. Inhalation is the most common route of 
infection for farm and ranch workers and veterinarians who work with 
diseased livestock. Calves, hogs, and humans can also contract bovine 
tuberculosis when they drink unpasteurized milk from infected cows. 
Livestock are more likely to infect each other when they share a common 
watering place. The disease’s presence in humans has been reduced as a 
result of a national eradication program, advances in sanitation and 
hygiene, the discovery of effective drugs, and pasteurization of milk. 

Exotic Newcastle disease: 

Figure: Photograph of a rooster (Source: USDA). 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Exotic Newcastle disease is caused by a highly contagious virus 
affecting birds of all species. The virus is spread primarily through 
direct contact with birds and their bodily discharges. It can also be 
transmitted through contact with certain objects contaminated with the 
disease such as vehicles, equipment, shoes, and clothing. It spreads 
rapidly among birds kept in confinement, such as commercially raised 
chickens. Many birds die without showing any signs of the disease; 
however, there are symptoms including, among other things, nasal 
discharge, coughing, depression, drop in egg production, and swelling 
around the eyes and neck. Exotic Newcastle disease is only mildly 
zoonotic in humans, with conjunctivitis being the most common symptom. 
Other human symptoms include headache, discomfort, and slight chills. 

Monkeypox: 

Figure: Photographs of a rodent (Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service), and a person with the virus (Source: CDC). 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Monkeypox is a rare viral disease that first appeared in the United 
States in 2003 when a shipment of exotic, wild animals from Ghana, 
including infected Gambian rats, dormice, and rope squirrels, entered 
the country. The infected animals then transmitted the virus to prairie 
dogs when they were collocated at an animal distributor. The prairie 
dogs were later sold as exotic pets and, in turn, transmitted the 
disease to humans. People can get monkeypox through a bite or direct 
contact with the infected animal’s blood, body fluids, or lesions. It 
is thought to be spread person-to-person through large respiratory 
droplets during direct and prolonged face-to-face contact. In addition, 
monkeypox can be spread by direct contact with body fluids of an 
infected person or with virus-contaminated objects, such as bedding or 
clothing. In humans, the signs and symptoms of monkeypox are similar to 
those of smallpox and include rash, fever, headache, muscle aches, 
backache, swollen lymph nodes, a general feeling of discomfort, and 
exhaustion. 

West Nile virus: 

Figure: Photographs of birds (Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

West Nile virus was recently introduced in wild birds and poses a 
potentially serious threat to people and horses. The virus spread 
quickly across the United States between 1999 and 2003. Experts believe 
it is now established as a seasonal epidemic in North America, flaring 
up in the summer and continuing into the fall. The virus is most often 
spread when mosquitoes bite infected birds (such as house sparrows or 
robins), acquire the virus, and then pass it on to other animals or to 
humans. However, West Nile virus is fatal to many species of wild birds,
such as crows, which are then only minimally involved in the spread of 
the infection. Many people infected with the virus do not become ill. 
Some experience mild symptoms, including fever, headache, body aches,
nausea, vomiting, swollen lymph nodes, or a skin rash. About 1 in 150 
develop severe illness and have symptoms that include high fever, 
headaches, neck stiffness, stupor, disorientation, coma, tremors, 
convulsions, muscle weakness, vision loss, numbness, and paralysis. 

Conclusions: 

Veterinarians are a small but vital part of the federal workforce, 
playing important roles in protecting people from zoonotic and 
foodborne diseases, ensuring the health and humane treatment of food 
animals, and helping to keep America's food system safe. The nation is 
facing a growing shortage of veterinarians, and component agencies and 
other federal entities have already identified insufficiencies in their 
veterinarian workforces. At FSIS, for example, the veterinarian 
workforce is finding it difficult to adequately carry out its 
responsibilities for ensuring food safety and the humane treatment of 
animals. In 2004, we recommended that FSIS periodically assess whether 
it has enough inspection resources, including veterinarians, dedicated 
to humane handling and slaughter activities, but the agency has yet to 
demonstrate that they have done so. Nor has the federal government 
conducted the broader assessments and planning activities necessary to 
address veterinarian workforce problems at FSIS and beyond. Unless USDA 
and HHS conduct departmentwide assessments of their veterinarian 
workforces, they will not fully understand the size and nature of the 
challenges they face in recruiting and retaining veterinarians with the 
appropriate skills. This will leave their component agencies without a 
high-level solution to problems they have so far been unable to solve 
on their own. Moreover, without a governmentwide effort to identify 
shortcomings in veterinarian capabilities, the federal government may 
be missing opportunities to find common solutions for attracting 
veterinarians into federal service. 

In addition, unless component agencies complete and test their pandemic 
plans in keeping with FEMA guidance, they will not be fully prepared to 
carry out essential veterinarian functions in the face of high rates of 
absenteeism. Until USDA details how responders would control a foot- 
and-mouth disease outbreak using vaccines, the nation will not have a 
complete understanding of the veterinarian workforce needed to control 
such an outbreak. Similarly, until more information is gathered on the 
spread of foot-and-mouth disease in wildlife, agencies will not be able 
to more accurately model the number and type of veterinarians that 
would be needed if the disease were to spread beyond livestock. Failure 
to understand the workforce needed during a catastrophic event--whether 
a pandemic or an attack on the food supply--could unnecessarily 
increase the scope and severity of the crisis. Finally, unless 
component agencies involved in responding to outbreaks of zoonotic 
disease regularly review their own performance and collectively assess 
opportunities for improvement, they cannot be assured they are using 
veterinarians as efficiently as possible. They are, therefore, more 
likely to face an insufficient veterinarian workforce capacity during 
future outbreaks, which may cause an unnecessary increase in the 
severity of the outbreaks and worsen the threat to public health. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making nine recommendations to improve the ability of the 
federal veterinarian workforce to carry out routine activities, prepare 
for a catastrophic event, and respond to zoonotic disease outbreaks. 

To help ensure the federal veterinarian workforce is sufficient to meet 
the critical responsibilities it carries out on a routine basis, we 
recommend that: 

1. The Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to periodically assess 
whether its level of inspection resources dedicated to food safety and 
humane slaughter activities is sufficient, and: 

2. The Secretary of Agriculture conduct a departmentwide assessment of 
USDA's veterinarian workforce--based, for example, on workforce 
assessments by its component agencies--to identify current and future 
workforce needs (including training and employee development) and 
departmentwide solutions to problems shared by its agencies. When the 
Secretary completes the assessment, the results should be forwarded to 
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. 

3. We also recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
direct the department's component agencies that employ veterinarians to 
conduct regular workforce assessments and that the Secretary then 
conduct a departmentwide assessment of HHS's veterinarian workforce to 
identify current and future workforce needs (including training and 
employee development) and solutions to problems shared by its agencies. 
When the Secretary completes the assessment, the results should be 
forwarded to the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. 

4. Finally, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management determine, based on USDA's and HHS's departmentwide 
veterinarian workforce evaluations, whether a governmentwide effort is 
needed to address shortcomings in the sufficiency of the current and 
future veterinarian workforce. 

To help the veterinarian workforce continue essential functions during 
a pandemic, we recommend that: 

5. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, and Health and Human 
Services ensure that their component agencies that employ veterinarians 
complete pandemic plans that contain the necessary elements put forth 
in DHS's continuity of operations pandemic guidance, including 
periodically testing, training, and exercising plans. 

To improve estimates of the veterinarian workforce needed to respond to 
a large-scale foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, we recommend that: 

6. The Secretary of Agriculture detail in a contingency response plan 
how a response using vaccines would be implemented, and: 

7. The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinate an interagency effort 
to identify the data necessary to model the spread of disease in 
wildlife and how best to gather these data. 

To improve the ability of the federal veterinarian workforce to respond 
to zoonotic outbreaks in the future while also effectively carrying out 
routine activities, we recommend that the Secretaries of those 
departments most likely to be involved in response efforts--such as 
USDA, HHS, and Interior--ensure that their agencies: 

8. Conduct postoutbreak assessments of workforce management; and: 

9. In coordination with relevant federal, state, and local agencies, 
periodically review the postoutbreak assessments to identify common 
workforce challenges and strategies for addressing them. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to USDA, DOD, HHS, OPM, DHS, and 
Interior for their review and comment. USDA, DOD, OPM, DHS, and 
Interior generally agreed with the recommendations. HHS generally 
concurred with the report but not with one finding we reported 
regarding FDA's veterinarian workforce. Also, all departments provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

USDA agreed that it should periodically assess whether its level of 
inspection resources dedicated to food safety and humane slaughter 
activities is sufficient and believes that FSIS is already doing this 
assessment as a part of its budget formulation process. However, we 
made this recommendation in 2004, and are repeating it now, because 
FSIS has yet to demonstrate that they have done this assessment. USDA 
also reported that because APHIS and FSIS employ the majority of 
veterinarians within the department, these component agencies will work 
together, with departmental consultation, as needed, to develop 
solutions to shared problems. We continue to believe that a 
departmentwide assessment is necessary. In addition, the department 
commented that it will track veterinarian workforce trends and devise 
strategies to train, recruit, and retain veterinarians in order to 
mitigate attrition and maintain progress toward the department's 
mission to protect the public health. Furthermore, USDA reported that 
APHIS and FSIS are already taking steps to revise their pandemic plans 
to overcome many of the gaps we identified to help ensure the USDA 
veterinarian workforce can carry out essential functions during a 
pandemic. USDA's written comments and our evaluation appear in appendix 
III. 

DOD stated that efforts are under way to finalize the Army's pandemic 
influenza plan and that the implementation date will be determined 
based on current mission priorities. DOD's written comments and our 
evaluation appear in appendix IV. 

HHS reported that veterinarians are essential to protecting the health 
of the American people. In addition, the department commented that 
veterinarians are a valuable resource at CDC and conducting workforce 
assessments, as recommended in our report, will ensure that HHS 
maintains a sufficient capacity for outbreak response. HHS further 
reported that all operating staff division heads are required to have 
workforce plans in place for their organizations by September 2009. 
Once the plans are completed, the HHS Office of Human Resources will 
look across the plans to identify opportunities for collaboration with 
regard to strategic recruitment, development, and retention. The 
department also plans to strengthen its oversight of the operating 
divisions to ensure that they are implementing their workforce plans, 
focusing on those occupations critical to the success of their 
missions. While veterinarians are not currently identified as a 
department-level Mission Critical Occupation, largely because they 
represent less than 1 percent of the HHS workforce, the department 
plans to review its Mission Critical Occupations in the coming year 
using criteria that are more risk-based. However, HHS did not agree 
with a statement in our report that references a 2007 FDA Advisory 
Committee report claiming that CVM is in a state of crisis. The 
department stated that, given the broad nature of the 2007 Advisory 
Committee report, it is not applicable to veterinarians. However, we 
reported information pertaining directly to veterinarians--information 
we obtained from an interview with an author of the Advisory Committee 
report. Furthermore, HHS stated that CVM has made great strides in the 
past few years assessing its workforce needs and that the 2007 report 
is outdated. Our report identifies many of the efforts CVM has recently 
undertaken, such as hiring additional veterinarians and beginning an 
effort to analyze the gap between current resources and needs. It also 
notes that, according to FDA officials, the agency is undertaking 
significant reforms to address fundamental concerns in the 2007 report. 
However, as our report also states, FDA did not tell us how these 
efforts address the identified veterinarian skill gap specifically. 
HHS's written comments and our evaluation appear in appendix V. 

OPM informed us that it has established a team to research and analyze 
data to determine the feasibility of issuing a governmentwide direct- 
hire authority for veterinarians under its statutory and regulatory 
authority. OPM did not provide further details except to say that a 
decision is expected early in 2009. Until this study is completed, OPM 
relies on individual agencies to make such requests when they have 
encountered a severe shortage of candidates or a critical hiring need 
for veterinarians. In addition, OPM informed us that on November 25, 
2008, it approved USDA's request for direct-hire authority. OPM also 
commented that, in 2003, the agency approved direct-hire authority for 
temporary and term positions, including veterinarians, to help protect 
the health or safety of the U.S. food supply during a pandemic or other 
declared emergency situation. OPM's written comments and our evaluation 
appear in appendix VI. 

DHS recommended that the federal government enhance efforts to identify 
the veterinarian workforce needed during catastrophic events. They 
stated that this could be achieved through an OPM pursuit of a 
multidepartment assessment of veterinary manpower requirements. They 
further recommended that agencies develop plans that identify how 
veterinarians will continue essential functions during additional 
catastrophic events, taking into consideration the potential for 
absenteeism that exceeds the level of 40 percent estimated for a 
pandemic. In addition, DHS stated that, once a governmentwide 
veterinarian workforce need is determined, effective recruitment and 
retention programs should be developed that are consistent across all 
agencies. However, DHS disagreed with our finding that the estimate 
produced from one of its efforts to identify the workforce needed 
during a catastrophic outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease is not 
relevant. We continue to believe, as does DHS, that this effort is 
based on an infeasible assumption. Therefore, we do not agree that this 
estimate is relevant to any response that could reasonably be 
implemented during such an outbreak. DHS's written comments and our 
evaluation appear in appendix VII. 

Interior commended GAO for conducting a well-researched examination of 
the federal veterinarian workforce. The department emphasized the 
importance of including wildlife disease expertise in a strategy for 
protecting human and animal health. The department also identified the 
importance of detecting and preventing non-native invasive infectious 
diseases from entering U.S. borders via imported wildlife as important 
to protecting human and animal health. Interior's written comments and 
our evaluation appear in appendix VIII. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 22 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human 
Services, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, Smithsonian 
Institution, and Veterans Affairs; the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management; the Administrators of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 
U.S. Agency for International Development; appropriate congressional 
committees; and other interested parties. The report also will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix IX. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Lisa Shames: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Location and Responsibilities of Veterinarians in the 
Federal Government: 

Table 3: 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Agriculture; 
1,771; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service; 667; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Protect American livestock 
and poultry health through diagnosis, control and eradication of animal 
diseases, and partnering with state officials to manage and eradicate 
disease outbreaks. Some are employed overseas. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Agriculture; 
1,771; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
1,043[B]; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Inspect livestock and 
poultry at slaughter plants to identify and examine diseased animals, 
and prevent their entry into the nation's food supply; determine the 
significance of disease conditions and their potential hazard to public 
health; and may oversee total inspection operations. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Agriculture; 
1,771; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Agricultural Research Service; 57; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Conduct critical research to 
develop solutions for high-priority agricultural problems, such as 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Agriculture; 
1,771; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service; 4; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Plan, develop, organize, and 
manage animal health related research, education, and extension 
programs in coordination with other federal agencies and national and 
international efforts. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Defense; 841; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Army[C]; 753; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Ensure food safety at 
Department of Defense locations; develop medical defenses against 
chemical and biological warfare threat agents; conduct intelligence 
work; and care for service animals. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Defense; 841; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Air 
Force; 88; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Track infectious diseases 
among Air Force personnel, oversee the health of Air Force personnel 
for deployment, and ensure food safety at Air Force bases. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Health and Human 
Services[D]; 316; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Food 
and Drug Administration; 152; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Ensure that animal food and 
drugs are safe and effective; that food from medically treated animals 
is safe to eat; and help ensure the safety of food, drugs, and 
cosmetics, among other things. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Health and Human 
Services[D]; 316; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
National Institutes of Health; 85; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Support all animal aspects 
of its intramural research program by providing regulatory oversight of 
research animals, providing disease surveillance and diagnostics, 
managing the agency compliance office, and conducting basic scientific 
and translational research. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Health and Human 
Services[D]; 316; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention; 77; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Work to identify, prevent, 
and control public health threats through applied epidemiology, 
laboratory animal medicine and toxicology, technical assistance and 
consultation, surveillance, field and clinical investigations, and 
human-animal interface research; support public health training and 
activities among state, local, tribal, and global health programs; 
provide expertise in public health emergency preparedness and provide 
surge capacity following public health disasters, global disease 
outbreaks, and terrorist attacks; and prevent importation at ports of 
entry of animals/animal products that pose human health risks. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Health and Human 
Services[D]; 316; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; 2; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Identifies, coordinates, and 
provides qualified veterinary medical personnel for events requiring 
emergency and disaster-related veterinary medical care services to 
impacted animal populations (including household pets and service 
animals) in or outside of shelter locations until local infrastructures 
are reestablished. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Veterans Affairs; 
37; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Office 
of Research and Development; 37; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Conduct research to improve 
the health of veterans and oversee the health and welfare of animals 
used in research. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of the Interior; 24; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: U.S. 
Geological Survey; 16; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Investigate, diagnose, 
develop control methods, and develop databases for wildlife diseases; 
provide training to wildlife biologists and resource managers in 
wildlife disease identification and control; conduct clinical 
veterinary research on wildlife diseases; and oversee the health and 
welfare of experimental and wild animals used in research, including 
research on wildlife diseases. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of the Interior; 24; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service; 4; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Perform fish health 
management and diagnostic activities; conduct wildlife disease 
surveillance, diagnostics, and outbreak investigations; provide 
technical expertise; and draft policy, regulation, and management 
action plans. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of the Interior; 24; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
National Park Service; 4; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Prepare surveillance and 
contingency response plans for addressing important wildlife diseases 
in the park system; formulate policies for management of wildlife 
diseases. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Homeland Security; 
16; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Office 
of Health Affairs; 8; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Provide professional 
veterinary expertise and leadership to defend human and animal health 
and the nation's agriculture and food supply against terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Homeland Security; 
16; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Directorate for Science and Technology; 6; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Utilize knowledge and skills 
of disease movement, risk, and economic impacts of diseases to oversee 
programs regarding the safety of U.S. agriculture and food supply. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Homeland Security; 
16; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Directorate for National Protection and Programs; 2; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Identify technologies and 
capabilities that can be used to help assure the protection of the 
nation's agriculture and food supply from a terrorist attack. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Smithsonian; 16; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
National Zoo; 16; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Protect the health of 
endangered species under the auspices of the National Zoo and oversee 
the health of animals housed at the National Zoo; study disease 
dynamics and pathology of disease in endangered species; conduct 
research in endangered species conservation and propagation, and 
surveillance and research in emerging diseases of nondomestic animals 
including wildlife; train veterinarians and advance veterinary medical 
knowledge regarding zoo and wild animal species in the United States 
and abroad; administer International Veterinary Training program. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Environmental Protection Agency; 
13; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 13; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Assess the risks of 
pesticide use to humans and domestic animals, research the cancer risk 
of environmental chemicals, and improve the process for managing 
potential environmental carcinogens. 

Number of veterinarians by department: U.S. Agency for International 
Development; 8; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Bureaus 
for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade; for Global Health; and for 
Africa; 8; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Provide guidance on issues 
related to management of highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks 
and recovery; identify opportunities to share and leverage resources 
for avian influenza response efforts with international and domestic 
health agencies and universities. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Commerce; 9; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; 9; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Conduct audits of seafood 
plants and products as part of the Seafood Inspection Program; provide 
guidelines and oversight of the Marine Mammal Health and Stranding 
Response Program, Aquatic Animal Health Program, disease surveillance, 
health monitoring, outbreak investigations, and 
contaminants/pathogen/toxin/health research. 

Number of veterinarians by department: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; 5; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Office 
of the Chief Health and Medical Officer; 5; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Provide and coordinate 
animal care at agency research facilities; one veterinarian is an 
astronaut. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Energy; 1; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; 1; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Oversees the laboratories' 
Food and Agricultural Security program, which includes the work on 
modeling animal disease to determine workforce resources that will be 
needed for response to outbreaks. 

Number of veterinarians by department: Department of Justice; 1; 
Number of veterinarians by component agency or other entity[A]: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; 1; 
Examples of veterinarian responsibilities: Provide veterinary expertise 
in the investigation of an intentional disease outbreak. 

Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses and interviews. 

[A] We relied on federal agency officials to identify all veterinarians 
employed--civil and military service employees, contractors, and other-
-regardless of job title. The number of veterinarians reported for all 
agencies are as of June 30, 2008, except for the following: The Food 
Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and the Army veterinary reserve corps 
are current as of the end of fiscal year 2008 and November 2008, 
respectively. 

[B] The number of veterinarians listed for FSIS include 968 veterinary 
medical officers, the majority of whom work at slaughter plants, as 
well as approximately 75 veterinarians who work in other occupations. 

[C] The Army veterinarian workforce consists of 446 active duty; 173 
reserve corps; and 134 other. 

[D] The number of veterinarians listed for the Department of Health and 
Human Services does not include those United States Public Health 
Service Commissioned Corps veterinarians working at the FSIS and the 
Environmental Protection Agency because they are counted as employees 
of those agencies. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the federal government has assessed 
the sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce for routine activities, 
we interviewed officials and collected documents from the American 
Veterinary Medical Association, the National Association of Federal 
Veterinarians (NAFV), and the Association of American Veterinary 
Medical Colleges to identify general concerns about the federal 
veterinarian workforce. NAFV also provided a review it had conducted in 
1996 that identified federal departments and agencies that employ 
veterinarians. We expanded this list of departments and component 
agencies based on referrals and experience from our past reports, 
resulting in a list of 24 component agencies and other federal 
entities. We then surveyed these 24 entities to obtain information on 
the federal veterinarian workforce--including the number of 
veterinarians employed, their grade level, salaries, roles and 
responsibilities, number of vacancies, and sufficiency of the 
workforce. We conducted this self-administered electronic survey in 
October 2007 and then requested an update of this survey information in 
July 2008. We achieved a 100 percent response rate both times. However, 
one entity was unable to provide some of the specific salary 
information we requested, and we noted this in our report. 

Because this was not a sample survey, but rather a survey of the 
universe of respondents, it has no sampling errors. However, the 
practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 
commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, respondents 
may have difficulty interpreting a particular question, the sources of 
information available to respondents may introduce errors or 
variability, and analysts may introduce errors when entering data into 
a database or analyzing these data. We took steps in developing the 
questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such 
nonsampling error. For example, we pretested the survey to ensure that 
the questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to understand. 

To obtain salary information for Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
agencies over the past 5 years, we used data from the Office of 
Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File. We did not 
independently verify these data for the years we reviewed; however, in 
a 1998 report, we found that governmentwide data from this file for the 
key variables in this study (agency, birth date, service computation 
date, occupation, and retirement plan) were 99 percent accurate or 
better.[Footnote 22] Therefore, we feel these data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this review. 

On the basis of information we received in our survey of these 
component agencies and other entities, we then analyzed the workforce 
assessment efforts of USDA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). We selected these 
departments because they employ the majority of federal veterinarians 
(96 percent) identified in our survey. Within these three departments, 
we further focused our review on five component agencies--the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), FSIS, Army, and the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA)--to determine the extent to which they 
assessed the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce. We also 
selected the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) for further review 
because it is USDA's chief scientific research agency and conducts 
research to solve agricultural problems of high national priority. We 
conducted our assessment by reviewing department and agency documents, 
such as workforce plans, human capital management reports, workforce 
models, and gap assessments. We then compared workforce assessment 
efforts of the three departments and five component agencies with GAO 
workforce planning guidance. We also conducted semistructured 
interviews with workforce planning and veterinarian program officials. 
In addition, we interviewed an author of the report FDA Science and 
Mission at Risk regarding the report's findings and their relation to 
FDA veterinarian skill gaps. Further, we visited one poultry and two 
beef slaughter plants of varying sizes to observe conditions and 
interview veterinarians and other FSIS officials. We also interviewed 
FSIS officials working at the slaughter plant that was the subject of 
the nation's largest beef recall. We selected these plants on the basis 
of proximity to the sites of the four recent zoonotic disease outbreaks 
we reviewed, and recommendations from FSIS officials. Moreover, other 
veterinarians contacted us to relay concerns about the sufficiency of 
the FSIS veterinarian workforce. We interviewed officials from the OPM 
to determine the agency's role in workforce planning for federal 
veterinarians and to identify recruitment and retention authorities 
available to agencies and departments. Finally, we interviewed experts 
from the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the National 
Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, the American College 
of Veterinary Pathologists, the American Association of Wildlife 
Veterinarians, the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory 
Diagnosticians, and the National Academy of Sciences to identify 
workforce needs for veterinary specialties including public health, 
wildlife veterinarians, veterinary laboratory diagnostics, and 
veterinary pathology. 

To determine the extent to which the federal government has identified 
the veterinarian workforce needed during a catastrophic event, we 
analyzed workforce planning efforts for two potential large-scale 
national incidents that the White House Homeland Security Council 
deemed critical for planning purposes: a pandemic and a foot-and-mouth 
disease outbreak. For the first, we compared pandemic plans from APHIS, 
FSIS, ARS, Army, and FDA to guidance the Department of Homeland 
Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency provided to 
departments and agencies for identifying special considerations for 
maintaining essential functions and services under such conditions. 
[Footnote 23],[Footnote 24] These agencies were selected for the 
reasons described above. We interviewed agency officials to discuss 
identified gaps and determine the extent to which the plans were being 
updated and tested. Furthermore, we interviewed HHS officials to 
understand their review of state pandemic plans, which are under 
development to ensure continuity of the food supply system and the 
ability to respond to agriculture emergencies. For the second, we 
reviewed veterinarian workforce outcomes from DHS's nationwide effort 
to assess the nation's preparedness for multiple, intentional 
introductions of foot-and-mouth disease. In addition to interviewing 
the DHS official responsible for coordinating the animal health 
emergency capability, we also interviewed state officials who have 
conducted large-scale exercises simulating a response to foot-and-mouth 
disease, as well as USDA officials with responsibility for such an 
event, to determine the feasibility of the response depicted in the 
scenario. Because vaccine use was suggested as an alternative strategy 
to the slaughter of animals infected with foot-and-mouth disease, we 
also interviewed USDA's Chief Veterinary Officer, and DHS and USDA 
officials at Plum Island Animal Disease Center to determine the status 
of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine development and the feasibility, as 
well as practicality, of their use. Finally, at the recommendation of 
DHS, we interviewed the Department of Energy official responsible for 
overseeing the development of a decision support system that models 
various foot-and-mouth disease outbreak scenarios in order to estimate 
the number and type of workforce needed for responding to outbreaks. 
The Department of Energy is performing this work under contract for 
DHS. We also interviewed USDA, DHS, and Department of the Interior 
(Interior) officials to determine the extent to which agencies are 
including the possible spread of foot-and-mouth disease in wildlife in 
their planning efforts. 

To determine the extent to which federal and state agencies encountered 
veterinarian workforce challenges during four recent zoonotic 
outbreaks, we conducted semistructured interviews with 17 federal and 
state agencies involved in these outbreaks. We relied on federal and 
state officials to identify those agencies that played an important 
role in outbreak response. Based on this information, we then 
interviewed officials from USDA, HHS, Interior, state public health 
departments, state agriculture and wildlife agencies, state diagnostic 
laboratories, and one county public health agency. We also interviewed 
other individuals involved in the outbreaks, including researchers from 
Northwestern University, the University of California at Davis, and 
Western University of Health Sciences. We selected the four outbreaks 
in our review--bovine tuberculosis in Michigan, exotic Newcastle 
disease in California, monkeypox in Wisconsin, and West Nile virus in 
Colorado--because these outbreaks were most frequently recommended by 
federal officials as examples of recent zoonotic diseases; are ongoing 
or have occurred since 2001; and have affected various types of 
animals, including livestock, wildlife, pets, and exotic animals. In 
addition, we chose these four outbreaks for review because of the 
unique nature of the outbreaks in these states. Specifically, we 
selected Michigan as the state for the bovine tuberculosis review 
because the ongoing outbreak is the longest outbreak of this disease in 
the United States in recent history. We chose California because it 
experienced the greatest number of animal infections for the exotic 
Newcastle disease outbreak. We selected Wisconsin because it 
experienced the most human monkeypox infections. We selected Colorado 
for West Nile virus because the number of human infections in Colorado 
in 2003 was the highest for a single state. In addition to the 
interviews, we also analyzed federal, state, and county documents, such 
as after action reports, in order to (1) understand the extent to which 
agencies formally assessed the management of their veterinarian 
workforces during these outbreaks and (2) identify any workforce- 
related challenges and steps agencies took to address these challenges. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Agriculture: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

USDA: 
United States Department of Agriculture: 
Office of the Secretary: 
Washington, D.C. 20250: 

January 16, 2009: 

Ms. Lisa Shames: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W. Mail Room 2T23A: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Shames: 

Thank you for allowing the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft report "Veterinarian 
Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for 
Protecting Public and Animal Health" (09-178). We are providing 
comments to the Recommendations for Executive Action for USDA. 

Recommendation #1: 

To help ensure the federal veterinarian workforce is sufficient to meet 
the critical responsibilities it carries out on a routine basis, GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to 
periodically assess whether its level of inspection resources dedicated 
to food safety and humane slaughter activities is sufficient. 

USDA agrees with the recommendation and already regularly assesses the 
level of inspection resources it needs. As part of the budget 
formulation process, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) 
annually assesses its needs for the inspection and veterinary resources 
sufficient to meet the statutory mandates for food safety and the 
humane handling of livestock. Also, as mentioned in the GAO report, 
FSIS is continually taking steps to enhance veterinary and inspection 
capacities and to better allocate its resources to protect the public 
health. [See comment 1] 

In addition, in the course of operations FSIS managers conduct regular 
assessments to determine the number of Public Health Veterinarians 
(PHV) positions needed in specific establishments, primarily by 
considering the geographic location or proximity of other federal 
establishments, the size of the establishment, the production volume of 
plant operations (which determines the number of on-line inspection 
personnel), and the number of approved operational shifts. Multiple 
slaughter plants located in close proximity can be assigned a single 
PHV on a patrol basis while slaughter establishments in more remote 
locations may require a PHV at each plant. In slaughter plants with 
extremely high production volume, FSIS may assign an additional PHV. 

In addition to the above response, we have further general comments 
pertaining to GAO's analysis of FSIS operations and activities for 
publication in the final report. These general comments are contained 
in the attached appendix. 

Recommendation #2: 

To help ensure the federal veterinarian workforce is sufficient to meet 
the critical responsibilities it carries out on a routine basis, GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Agriculture conduct a departmentwide 
assessment of USDA's veterinarian workforce-based, for example, on 
workforce assessments by its component agencies-to identify current and 
future workforce needs (including training and employee development) 
and departmentwide solutions to problems shared by its agencies. When 
USDA completes its assessment, it should forward the results to the 
Director of OPM. 

USDA agrees with this recommendation. However, given that the majority 
of USDA's veterinary workforce is located in two agencies--the Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and FSIS (40 percent and 57 
percent, respectively), and that each has both the staff as well as the 
expertise to conduct the assessments and analyze the data, APHIS and 
FSIS will conduct veterinary workforce analyses for their respective 
agencies and work together, with Departmental consultation, as needed, 
to develop solutions to problems shared by both agencies. Agency-
specific problems will be addressed separately within the respective 
agency. Veterinary workforce trends will be tracked, and training, 
recruitment and retention strategies devised to mitigate attrition and 
maintain progress toward the Department's mission to protect the public 
health. Assessment results will then be forwarded to the Director of 
OPM. [See comment 2] 

Recommendation #5: 

To help the veterinarian workforce continue essential functions during 
a pandemic, GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense 
and Health and Human Services ensure that their component agencies that 
employ veterinarians complete pandemic plans that contains the 
necessary elements put forth in DHS's continuity of operations pandemic 
guidance, including periodically testing, training, and exercising 
plans. 

USDA agrees with this recommendation. The active Pandemic Plan (Plan) 
was written in January 2007 by APHIS. However, that Plan is now 
currently being updated and modernized based upon the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) Pandemic Plan checklist that was published in 
July of 2008. The checklist was developed by DHS to assist Departments 
and Agencies in creating a complete and workable Pandemic Plan based on 
ensuring that the primary essential functions of an agency, in this 
case APHIS, will continue to be performed. Included among the 
provisions of that checklist is the requirement for periodic testing, 
training and exercising of the Plan. The revised Plan is expected to be 
ready for internal review, coordination, and collaboration with the 
regions, programs, and various stakeholders by the end of January 2009 
with a final document in place by March 2009. 

Recommendation #6: 

To improve estimates of the veterinarian workforce needed to respond to 
a large-scale foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, GAO recommends that the 
Secretary of Agriculture detail in a contingency response plan how a 
response using vaccines would be implemented. 

USDA agrees with this recommendation. USDA has issued contingency plans 
for use of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Specifically, APHIS has issued 
contingency plans for use of FMD vaccine as a sponsor of the North 
American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB). The NAFMDVB 
holds FMD concentrated antigens, which can be finished into vaccine in 
the event of a FMD outbreak in one of the member countries (United 
States, Canada and Mexico). In addition, APHIS' Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness and Response Plan includes a decision tree which outlines 
the decision-making process that would lead to the use of vaccine as an 
aid in the control and eradication of FMD in North America. [See 
comment 3] 

Policy decisions as to who may administer the vaccine will be made 
based upon the circumstances of the outbreak. If the outbreak is FMD 
and a vaccination strategy is chosen, multiple options exist. The 
considerations include activating the National Animal Health Emergency 
Response Corps; federalizing private veterinarians who have pre-
qualified; utilizing the federally accredited veterinarian workforce in 
addition to regulatory (federal and State) veterinarians; or allowing 
animal owners to vaccinate, under appropriate veterinary supervision 
with respect to State laws. 

Looking to the future, USDA and DHS are actively supporting the 
development and application of new vaccine technologies, like molecular 
based vaccines, that do not require expensive, high-containment 
production facilities and can be produced safely in the United States. 

Recommendation #8: 

To improve the ability of the federal veterinarian workforce to respond 
to zoonotic outbreaks in the future while also effectively carrying out 
routine activities, GAO recommends that the secretaries of those 
departments most likely to be involved in response efforts-such as 
USDA, HHS, and the Interior-ensure that their agencies conduct post-
outbreak assessments of workforce management. 

USDA agrees with this recommendation. USDA has conducted or 
commissioned assessments of the response workforce and used findings to 
direct its response planning. This has generated the development and 
utilization of a resource ordering and status system, based on the 
Forest Service tool that allows for real-time management of resources, 
including trained personnel, to either support the response or maintain 
regular functions. Internal evaluations of response team deployments 
and activities have led to a more integrated team approach which will 
be introduced in 2009. Another approach to adequately address surge 
needs in a response effort that has been highly successful and merits 
possible expansion is the utilization of 3D (depopulation, disposal and 
decontamination) contractors. Companies contracted by APHIS and trained 
in advance have arrived on-the-scene within 24 hours, freeing 
veterinarians to work on incident management, surveillance or 
epidemiological studies. 

Recommendation #9: 

To improve the ability of the federal veterinarian workforce to 
response to zoonotic outbreaks in the future while also effectively 
carrying out routine activities, GAO recommends that the secretaries of 
those departments most likely to be involved in response efforts-such 
as USDA, HHS and the Interior-ensure that their agencies in 
coordination with relevant federal, state, and local agencies, 
periodically review the post-outbreak assessments to identify common 
workforce challenges and strategies for addressing them. 

USDA agrees with this recommendation. Specifically, USDA agrees that 
commonalities exist among response agencies when faced with an animal 
or public health emergency that creates immediate needs for trained and 
ready personnel. We will continue to collaborate with the agencies 
listed in support of mutual goals, such as the requirements of Homeland 
Security Presidential Declarations and ensuring a workforce adequate to 
manage crises. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bruce I. Knight: 
Under Secretary: 
Marketing and Regulatory Programs: 

Appendix to USDA Response on "Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are 
Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal 
Health" (09-178): 

General Comments On GAO's Analysis Of FSIS Operations And Activities: 

Page 14, 1st sentence, last paragraph: It states that that "FSIS has 
never had a sufficient number of veterinarians..." 

USDA Comment: This is misleading. It would be more accurate to state 
that "Many FSIS veterinarian positions have gone unfilled due to a lack 
of candidates. In the past decade, FSIS has never been fully staffed 
with veterinarians..." On page 15, where it discusses vacancy rates, it 
would be more accurate and more in line with the information on page 14 
to state that vacancy rates "varied by location and year, ranging from 
a very small percentage to as high as 35 percent of the total 
positions." Also, as GAO notes on page 15, FSIS has been able to 
reallocate veterinary resources sufficient to meet its statutory 
mandates for food safety and humane handling of livestock. [See comment 
4] 

Page 15, 2nd sentence, last paragraph: This sentence states that 
"Inhumane treatment of livestock contributed to the largest beef recall 
in US history, in February 2008." 

USDA Comment: As written, this sentence is factually incorrect. FSIS 
obtained evidence that the establishment did not consistently contact 
the FSIS public health veterinarian in situations in which cattle 
became non-ambulatory after passing ante-mortem inspection, which is 
not compliant with FSIS regulations. Such circumstances require that an 
FSIS public health veterinarian reassess the non-ambulatory cattle, 
which are either condemned and prohibited from the food supply, or 
tagged as suspect. It was this evidence that directly led to the 
voluntary recall by the Chino firm on February 17, 2008. The inhumane 
treatment was not the basis for the recall, but, rather, resulted in a 
suspension of operations which occurred on February 4, 2008. The 
inhumane treatment allegations were what led to the investigation into 
plant practices by USDA. [See comment 5] 

Page 16, 2nd paragraph: This paragraph discusses instances of local 
veterinary shortages, and increased verification of humane handling. 

USDA Comment: Although FSIS has not been able to hire as many 
veterinarians in some locations as would be ideal, work is prioritized 
to ensure food safety tasks are performed. The full paragraph on p.16 
should not give the impression that food safety is compromised by 
intermittent local veterinarian shortages. Veterinarians in FSIS are 
instructed to prioritize their time with food safety (which includes 
ante-mortem activities such as humane handling), then food defense 
activities being the highest priority. In the last few years, FSIS has 
placed supervisory consumer safety inspectors in many large slaughter 
plants. These employees directly report to the veterinarian, and 
provide significant relief to the supervisory activities of the 
veterinarian. This enables the veterinarians to focus their time on 
food safety related activities. From 2003 until 2008, FSIS increased 
staffing for the number of SCSI's almost four fold, from 57 to 207. 
This paragraph also notes that "In the wake of this incident, FSIS 
required veterinarians to spend more tome verifying the humane 
treatment of animals". Although technically correct, as noted in FSIS 
Notice 17-08, this increased focus w for only a 60 day period between 
March 10 and May 6, 2008. During this brief period, it was important 
that humane handling activities took priority over other duties. 

There is also much emphasis on the incidents at a plant in Chino, CA. 
This is attributed to having only one veterinarian assigned to the 
plant. It should be noted, however, that the incidents at this plant 
are not representative of FSIS regulatory control at comparable plants. 
FSIS is similarly staffed at comparable plants, but these incidents 
have not been replicated. In their recent audit report, OIG found no 
evidence of systematic humane handling oversight problems. It is 
important to note, that the last time two veterinarians were assigned 
to the	facility was in the early 1990's. Simply because the plant 
slaughters cull cows is not a sufficiently justifiable reason to assign 
two veterinarians to a plant, especially following the ban on slaughter 
of downer cattle in late 2003 because the ante-mortem and post-mortem 
examination of downers was labor intensive. [See comment 6] 

Page 16, last two sentences, 2nd paragraph: These last two sentences 
reference a recommendation made in a 2004 GAO report "... that ISIS 
periodically assess whether the level of resources dedicated to humane 
handling and slaughter activities is sufficient but the agency has yet 
to demonstrate that they have done so." 

USDA Comment: This same recommendation is repeated in the first 
paragraph on page 47 and again on page 48. It is our understanding that 
the recommendation from the 2004 GAO report, "Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems but Still Faces 
Enforcement Challenges", has been closed. As stated in the response to 
the recommendation, FSIS already annually assesses its needs for the 
inspection and veterinary resources sufficient to meet its statutory 
mandates for food safety and the humane handling of livestock, as part 
of the budget formulation process. In addition, since the initial 2004 
GAO report, FSIS has taken a number of actions in regard to ensuring 
the verification of compliance with the humane handling requirements. 
FSIS implemented the HATS database which is used by FSIS Public Health 
Veterinarians and other in-plant program personnel to report their time 
and data for specific humane handling activities. District Veterinary 
Medical Specialists (DVMS) routinely verify the accuracy of the data 
entered. For FY2008, FSIS inplant personnel spent approximately 120 FTE 
staff years, or 250,000 person-hours, verifying humane handling 
activities at the 800 livestock slaughter plants under Federal 
Inspection. Approximately 47% of this humane handling verification time 
was conducted by PHVs. Eighty-six humane handling related suspensions 
were effected at 65 of these livestock slaughter plants. [See comment 
7] 

Page 17: The first and second paragraphs on this page provide a 
comparison between the mean annual salary for FSIS veterinarians as 
compared to the mean salary, for private practice veterinarians and 
discusses the steps FSIS has taken to address veterinary shortages. 

USDA Comment: We believe it should be noted that overtime work pushes 
the FSIS salaries closer to those in the private sector. We also 
believe, when discussing recruitment initiatives, the following should 
be included: "In April 2003 the FSIS and the Public Health Service 
(PHS) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement which significantly 
expanded the number of PHS Commissioned Corps Officers detailed to 
FSIS. The Commissioned Corps has a variety of occupations, including 
veterinarians, which help promote FSIS' public health mission. PHS 
Officers work as permanent staff members alongside their FSIS 
counterparts, and this has proven to be a valuable alternative method 
to fill vacant Veterinary Medical Officer positions." 

Page 18, last sentence, 1st paragraph: This sentence states that the 
"direct-hire authority" expired in 2007 and was not renewed. 

USDA Comment: On page 18, direct-hire information is outdated and 
incomplete. USDA submitted a request to resume using direct-hire 
authority, and the request was approved by OPM, on a limited basis, on 
November 25, 2008. FSIS will continue using this limited direct-hire 
authority for veterinarians at least through its December 31, 2009 
expiration date. If recruitment difficulties continue, FSIS plans to 
request an extension of its direct-hire authority, without the 
limitations currently imposed. Currently, FSIS is limited to a total of 
150 hires using this authority, and may only use it in locations where 
there are fewer than three eligible candidates. Given that it takes 5 
to 6 months to obtain OPM approval, we will need to reinitiate our 
direct-hire request in July or August 2009 in hopes to have it approved 
prior to the December 31, 2009 expiration date. It would be more 
advantageous to the Agency if OPM would approve Government-wide direct 
hire authority for veterinarians without limitations and for a longer 
period of time than just one year. [See comment 8] 

Page 26, Table 1: The table indicates that the veterinarian workforce 
falls short of Agency goals due to the unpleasant environment and 
grueling work. 

USDA Comment: The challenges faced by FSIS are not adequately 
highlighted. Recruitment difficulties result from more than the nature 
of the work and the work environment. In addition to what is already 
stated, it would be helpful to note that FSIS highlighted a wide 
variety of factors that have a negative impact on their recruitment 
efforts, including salary, lack of public health and food safety 
emphasis in Veterinary Colleges, and remote duty stations. [See comment 
9] 

Page 30, 1st paragraph: This paragraph discusses the change in the 
entry grade level for newly hired veterinarians and OPM 's review of 
veterinarian classification initiated at USDA 's request. 

USDA Comment: It should be noted that FSIS provided staff resources to 
expedite the development and implementation of the classification and 
qualification standards. The revised qualification standards were 
developed by an FSIS senior human resources specialist with input from 
all participating federal agencies. Additionally, during the 
development of the classification standard FSIS and APHIS veterinarians 
participated in focus groups, and both agencies reviewed the draft 
material in-depth at several stages. We recommend a minor change to the 
second sentence in the first paragraph: "This change paralleled the 
revised qualification standard for the veterinary occupation which 
raised the entry grade level for newly hired veterinarians from GS-9 to 
GS-11..." In addition, FSIS has been able to attract more veterinarians 
through the use of hiring flexibilities, such as superior 
qualifications, direct-hire authority and recruitment incentives." 

Page 30, 2nd paragraph: This paragraph discusses NVMSA authority. 

USDA Comment: USDA funding under the NVMSA was rescinded 6/19/08. FSIS 
absorbed the student loan repayment obligations to the five individuals 
hired while under the NVMSA. Over a three-year period, it will cost the 
Agency a total of $150,000. 

Page 31, 5th sentence, 2nd paragraph: This sentence states that FEMA 
guidance directs agencies to identify three people who can carry our 
each responsibility and identify how the agency will continue to 
operate if leadership and essential staff are unavailable. 

USDA Comment: FSIS Human Pandemic Operations Plan (HPOP), Annex D shows 
that all program areas have identified at least 3 people who can carry 
out program responsibilities and ensure delivery of essential functions 
to the maximum extent possible with available personnel during an 
expected high rate of absenteeism during a pandemic. Section 2.1 of the 
HPOP details the essential functions of the program areas and alternate 
personnel (by job titles) who can take over the functions. 

Page 32, 3rd sentence, 2nd paragraph: The sentence stales that FSIS' 
plan does not address the logistics on how FSIS will work with industry 
to ensure veterinarians and other employees are available in the event 
of a pandemic so that food production can continue. 

USDA Comment: FSIS is finalizing a Pandemic Resource Management 
Strategy developed in collaboration with the Food Sector Coordinating 
Council which outlines what the Agency and the Industry will do at the 
different stages of a pandemic to ensure food production is sustained 
to the maximum extent possible. FSIS actions include among other 
measures, the development of quick immersion training for veterinarians 
and other employees to ensure to the maximum extent possible that 
inspection services are provided that will allow the industry to 
produce food under continuous inspection. Priority allocation of 
resources to the slaughter inspection of certain species (poultry) may 
become necessary based on need identified through active communication 
with the industry. The Strategy will be added as an Annex to the HPOP. 

Page 33, 4th sentence, 1st paragraph: The sentence states that FSIS' 
plan does not mention how it would work with APHIS on activities 
related to surveillance of animal diseases. 

USDA Comment: In a pandemic, FSIS, as part of its essential inspection 
functions will continue to report foreign animal diseases, including 
BSE, that are of interest to APHIS as part of their surveillance 
program as per FSIS Directive 6000.1 (8/4/06) Responsibilities Related 
to Foreign Animal Diseases (FADS) and Reportable Conditions. Specific 
language will be added to the HPOP as part of its revision/update that 
is in progress. 

Page 33, last sentence, 1st paragraph: the sentence slates that FSIS' 
plan does not consider the impact of local quarantine on access to 
plants: 

USDA Comment: In a pandemic, FSIS does not intend to deploy inspection 
personnel from a non-pandemic area to a pandemic area. If quarantine is 
in effect however for a certain area, plant personnel will likewise be 
prevented from access to facilities therefore inspection services would 
not be needed. According to the Department guidance, FSIS inspection 
personnel may be granted special permission to enter local/State 
quarantine areas if deployment is deemed necessary, critical, and 
appropriate to provide inspection services. 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Agriculture's 
letter dated January 16, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. USDA commented that FSIS already regularly assesses the level of 
inspection resources it needs, as we recommended in 2004. However, as 
our report states, FSIS has yet to demonstrate that they have done so. 
We regularly follow up to request evidence that agencies have 
implemented our recommendations, and FSIS has not provided such 
evidence. 

2. USDA reported the majority of its veterinarian workforce is located 
within two agencies, APHIS and FSIS, and each has the staff and 
expertise to conduct veterinarian workforce analyses for their 
respective agencies. Therefore, these two agencies will work together, 
with departmental consultation, as needed, to develop solutions to 
problems shared by both agencies. We continue to believe that a 
departmental assessment, not a consultation, is necessary, particularly 
in light of the competition between the two agencies. As we reported, 
APHIS is attracting veterinarians away from FSIS because the work at 
APHIS is more appealing, there are more opportunities for advancement, 
and the salaries are higher. Furthermore, ARS continues to experience 
difficulties recruiting and retaining highly qualified veterinarians to 
carry out critical research of national importance, yet there is no 
mention of ARS in USDA's comments. 

3. USDA commented that it has contingency plans and a decision tree for 
use of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine from the North American Foot-and- 
Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank. We acknowledge that USDA has these plans. 
In fact, we reviewed a draft plan titled, Response to the Detection of 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States, dated October 2007, that 
USDA officials told us was their new response plan that considered 
alternative response strategies, including "vaccinate to live." 
However, this plan does not detail how a policy of this nature would be 
implemented. USDA further commented that policy decisions as to who may 
administer the vaccine will be made based on the circumstances of the 
outbreak. While we recognize that each outbreak is unique, this should 
not preclude USDA from identifying a plausible scenario or scenarios 
and detailing how a vaccinate to live strategy would be carried out in 
order to enhance preparation, response, and recovery in a time of 
crises. 

4. We modified our report to reflect that USDA would like to change 
their statement from FSIS has "never" had a sufficient number of 
veterinarians to "over the past decade." USDA also asserts that our 
report says that FSIS has been able to reallocate veterinary resources 
sufficient to meet its statutory mandates for food safety and humane 
handling of livestock. However, our report only presents this as the 
view of FSIS headquarters officials. We raise this point to illustrate 
that FSIS headquarters officials and veterinarians working in slaughter 
plants differ on the impact of this shortage. 

5. We modified our report to reflect more clearly the relationship 
between the events at a Chino, California, plant and the February 2008 
beef recall. 

6. USDA commented that that our report emphasizes the incident at a 
plant in Chino, California. We raise the point because some 
veterinarians told us they did not have time to ensure the humane 
treatment of livestock, and this example illustrates inhumane treatment 
occurred despite the presence of FSIS inspectors. USDA further 
commented that we attribute this incident to having only one 
veterinarian. We do not state this in our report. We use this and other 
statements about resources to illustrate the need for FSIS to 
periodically assess whether the level of resources dedicated to humane 
handling and slaughter activities is sufficient. They have yet to do 
so. In addition, USDA commented that the USDA Inspector General did not 
find systematic problems associated with oversight of humane handling 
at slaughter facilities that process cull cows. However, the Inspector 
General did conclude that there is inherent vulnerability at the other 
plants in the scope of its audit, and that inhumane handling could 
occur and not be detected by FSIS inspectors due to lack of continuous 
surveillance. 

7. USDA commented that GAO has closed the 2004 recommendation that FSIS 
periodically assess whether the level of resources dedicated to humane 
handling and slaughter activities is sufficient. We recognize that FSIS 
has taken actions in response to a number of recommendations made in 
the 2004 report and have documented implementation of these 
recommendations. However, with regard to periodic assessment, we closed 
this recommendation because enough time had passed that we considered 
it unlikely to be implemented. As our report states, FSIS has yet to 
demonstrate that it has been implemented. Based on our current work, we 
continue to believe that periodic assessment is needed, and we make a 
recommendation to that effect. 

8. We modified our report to include the recent approval of USDA's 
direct-hire authority and noted that USDA has raised some concerns. 

9. We modified our report to include the concern about veterinary 
schools and enhanced the chart to include the concern for salary. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Department Of The Army: 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Command: 
2050 Worth Road: 
Fort Sam Houston, Texas 78234-6000: 

Reply To Attention Of: 

January 6, 2009: 

Ms. Lisa Shames: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Ms Shames: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-09-178, "Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to 
Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health," 
dated December 16, 2008 (GAO Code 360855). 

We have enclosed comments regarding the report and recommendation five. 

My point of contact is COL Gary Vroegindewey, 703-681-3062, or email: 
gary.vroegindewey@us.army.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

William H. Thresher: 

GAO Draft Report Dated December 16, 2008: 
GAO-09-178 (GAO Code 360855): 

"Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed To Ensure Sufficient 
Capacity For Protecting Public And Animal Health" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation: In report recommendation number 5 the GAO recommends 
that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the component agencies that 
employ veterinarians complete pandemic plans that contain the necessary 
elements put forth in the Department of Homeland Security's continuity 
of operations pandemic guidance, including periodically testing, 
training, and exercising plans. 

DOD Response: Concur. As reflected in the draft report, DoD is 
currently working with component agencies that employ veterinarians to 
complete pandemic plans that contain the necessary elements of the 
Department of Homeland Security's continuity of operations pandemic 
guidance (including periodically testing, training, and exercising 
plans). Efforts are underway to finalize the Army Pandemic Influenza 
(PI) Plan. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch, 
Headquarters, US Army MEDCOM, plans to hold a 2nd Quarter, FY 2009 
conference/teleconference for all concerned parties to adjust the 
current Army plan to meet the NORTHCOM-directed PI response phases. The 
implementation date of the final PI plan will be determined based on 
current mission priorities. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Department Of Health & Human Services: 
Office Of The Secretary: 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 
Washington, DC 20201: 

January 14, 2009: 

Lisa Shames: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Shames: 

Enclosed are comments on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's 
(GAO) report entitled: "Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to 
Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health" 
(GAO-09-178). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review this report before 
its publication. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jennifer R. Luong, for: 
Craig Burton: 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 

Attachment: 

Comments Of The Department Of Health And Human Services (HHS) On The 
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Draft Report Entitled: 
Veterinarian Workforce Actions Are Needed To Ensure Sufficient Capacity 
For Protecting Public And Animal Health (GAO-09-178): 

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appreciates the 
opportunity to review and comment on the General Accountability 
Office's (GAO) Draft Report entitled, "Veterinarian Workforce Actions 
Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and 
Animal Health (GAO-09-178)." We recognize that veterinarians are 
essential to protecting the health of the American people. 

General Comments: 

While the veterinary series is not currently identified as a Department 
level Mission Critical Occupation (MCO) due largely to veterinarians 
representing less than one (1) percent of the HHS workforce, the 
Department plans to review its MCOs in the coming year according to a 
more risk based set of criteria. 

In an agency as decentralized and diverse as HHS, HHS has taken an 
operating-division-centric approach to workforce planning. All 
operating and staff division heads are required to have workforce plans 
in place for their organizations by September 2009. The Department also 
plans to strengthen its oversight of the operating divisions to ensure 
that they are implementing their workforce plans, focusing on those 
occupations critical to the success of their missions. 

The Department however, disagrees with GAO's premise that controlling 
zoonotic diseases is solely dependent on the capacity of the 
veterinarian workforce. [See comment 1] CDC's zoonotic outbreak 
response strategy is robust and is not limited to veterinarians 
(DVM/VMD), but also involves persons with other professional degrees 
(MPH, PhD, MD). Likewise, veterinarians as well as these professionals 
from other disciplines serve in various roles as epidemiologists, 
health communicators, laboratorians, animal care technicians, and 
public health advisors. In the Technical Comments, we provide 
clarification that insufficient veterinarian capacity was not a 
workforce challenge in the responses to the monkeypox and West Nile 
virus outbreaks. That being said, veterinarians are a valuable resource 
at CDC and conducting regular workforce assessments, as recommended in 
the GAO report, will ensure that we maintain a sufficient capacity for 
outbreak responses. [See comment 2] 

The same example holds true in the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). ASPR ensures a coordinated 
approach to public health emergencies and medical disaster preparedness 
and response capability by leading and coordinating the relevant 
activities of the HHS Operating Divisions on behalf of, and subject to 
the authority of, the Secretary. 

ASPR also leads the Department for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 
#8 - Public Health and Medical Services (ESF #8), in the event of a 
public health emergency or medical disaster, ASPR coordinates the 
provision of federal public health and medical assistance (via HHS 
assets and ESF#8 partner/supporting agencies, departments, 
organizations) to fulfill the requirements identified by the affected 
state and local authorities in several areas, including veterinary 
and/or animal health issues. 

Disaster and emergency response programs are developed by teams of 
subject matter experts with a variety of skills and technical 
backgrounds (not only veterinarians) including microbiologists, 
epidemiologists, physicians, etc., whose training and expertise may 
include areas overlapping with those of veterinarians. Veterinarians 
may bring additional expertise and should be sought for enhancing the 
overall perspective and depth of response planning. 

The mission of ASPR's Emergency System for Advance Registration of 
Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) program is to establish and 
maintain a national network of state-based systems for advance 
registration of health professionals for the purpose of verifying the 
credentials, licenses, accreditations, and hospital privileges of such 
professionals, when, during public health emergencies, the 
professionals volunteer to provide health services. This national 
network of systems allows for the management of volunteer health 
professionals at all tiers of response (local, state, regional, and 
federal). All state ESAR-VHP systems are required to have the ability 
to register and collect the credentials and qualifications of 
veterinarians. 

Successful recruitment of veterinarians at NIH poses an additional 
hurdle that the report did not identify - board specialization in 
laboratory animal medicine. Achieving specialty in laboratory animal 
medicine is very difficult (-40% pass rate). Also, very few 
veterinarians are interested in accruing additional debt immediately 
upon graduation from veterinary school in order to enter a residency 
program. [See comment 3] 

The Department does not agree with the statement cited on page 21, 
referencing the 2007 Science Board report, characterizing the FDA's 
Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) as being "in a state of crisis." 
Given the broad nature of the 2007 Science Board report (i.e., the 
report addressed, among other things, CVM's scientific workforce in 
general), the suggestion that these conclusions necessarily applied to 
CVM's veterinary workforce in particular is a misstatement. 
Furthermore, CVM has made great strides in the past few years in 
assessing its workforce needs and has implemented effective strategies 
for recruiting and retaining the finest workforce possible. The 
conclusions of the report are out of date in that they do not take into 
account the many workforce-related activities undertaken by CVM since 
2007. [See comment 4] 

As a participant in the comprehensive Agency Food Protection Plan and 
Import Strategy initiatives for protecting the nation's food supply, 
CVM has outlined its needs to close the resource gap in order to 
function at full potential. In addition, as part of the Animal Drug 
User Fee Act (ADUFA) and the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act (AGDUFA) 
analysis, CVM outlined the resources needed to meet statutory review 
timeframes and meet industry and public expectations. Finally, this 
past year CVM completed a gap analysis for all of its programs to 
measure the "gap" between current and optimal performance and the 
resources required to close the gap. This ensures CVM resources are 
appropriately aligned with current and future needs. 

Through an integrated and coordinated process, CVM has built alliances 
and partnerships with private and governmental groups and has developed 
a recruitment process, which includes attending job fairs at 
universities and trade shows. These activities have enabled CVM to 
exceed the Agency's Hiring Surge goals. 

With the enactment of AGDUFA, CVM is hiring staff to enhance the 
performance of the generic new animal drug review process. This will 
reduce the time required for safe and effective generic animal drugs to 
reach the marketplace, which provides consumers a lower cost 
alternative to pioneer drugs. Under AGDUFA, the new hires help FDA to 
meet specified performance goals over five (5) years for review of 
certain submissions. 

Over a five (5) year period (FY2004 - FY2008) CVM hired 56 Full Time 
Equivalent Employees, which helped CVM meet or exceed all of its ADUFA 
performance goals for applications and submissions each year. In 
FY2008, for the first time in over a decade, CVM met and surpassed all 
its statutory timeframes. 

Moreover, the Department does not agree with the statement in reference 
to (Page 21) the report that "veterinarians enter FDA employment 
lacking necessary skills and experience to examine the wide variety of 
veterinary products that require FDA approval and that FDA needs to 
better train its veterinarians to review the many diverse products 
under its jurisdiction." 

CVM has been very successful in attracting, hiring, and retaining 
highly qualified veterinarians. Veterinarians hired by CVM qualify 
under a variety of "occupational series" and many of them come to CVM 
with significant scientific and clinical experience as well as advanced 
educational backgrounds in addition to the Doctor of Veterinary 
Medicine degree (e.g., Ph.D., M.P.H., M.B.A., J.D.). 

CVM's Succession Plan offers a wide variety of programs for new and 
current employees to support them in their efforts to reach their 
maximum potential by strengthening and increasing their professional 
competencies. The CVM Succession Plan is embedded into a Competency 
Model, a tool that helps CVM determine what skills are required in 
particular job roles/functions to meet the present requirements of the 
organization, and most importantly, the needs of the future. 

Furthermore, all CVM employees have access to a robust training program 
made available through CVM's Staff College. The CVM Staff College 
directs the development and implementation of the competency-based 
management and leadership development programs. The extensive 
scientific and regulatory curricula that include veterinary drug law 
bring CVM veterinarians and scientists up to speed on applying the 
appropriate regulatory law to the drug review process of veterinary 
products. The Staff College collaborates with outside experts from 
industry and the academia such as the University of Maryland, 
Baltimore, who keep CVM scientists and veterinary reviewers informed on 
emerging science and technology. The Staff College continues to expand 
its training initiatives as seen with its collaboration with other FDA 
Centers and federal agencies requiring similar skill sets and sharing 
similar issues. The CVM Staff College also makes every effort to obtain 
accreditation for continuing education credits from the Maryland State 
Board for Veterinary Medicine for all scientific and emerging 
technology seminars offered. 

The Department would like to clarify the statements in reference to 
(Page 21) of the report indicating that "Although FDA officials said 
the veterinary workforce is sufficient, CVM officials recently told us 
that the Center hired 26 veterinarians in 2008 to fill vacancies" (17% 
increase in FDA's overall veterinarian workforce) "and it plans to hire 
more." 

In responding to survey questions provided as part of the GAO study 
that focused primarily on the adequacy of the veterinary workforce for 
responding to zoonotic disease outbreaks, CVM did indicate that it had 
a sufficient number of veterinarians to respond to such occurrences. As 
described in the survey question response, FDA's veterinary expertise 
resides primarily at FDA headquarters with the greatest concentration 
within CVM. If an issue regarding a zoonotic disease arises, the 
veterinary resources in the Agency are tapped as needed to address the 
issue. This approach has proven to be an effective means for utilizing 
this expertise when the need arises. Furthermore, the primary role of 
FDA veterinarians in responding to zoonotic disease outbreaks is to 
provide technical/scientific advice and to coordinate FDA's activities 
with those of other federal, state, and local agencies. In light of 
their role as coordinators and consultants in such situations, we 
believe FDA has a sufficient number of veterinarians on staff that 
could be temporarily reassigned as needed to respond to such an event. 

Subsequent to responding to the aforementioned survey question, CVM 
proceeded with its ongoing efforts to assess its resource needs to 
address changes in its current workforce (e.g., backfill 
vacancies/attrition) and to address new workforce demands associated 
with newly acquired responsibilities. In particular, during this 
timeframe CVM took on a number of new obligations including those 
associated with the agency's Food Protection Plan, the FDA Amendments 
Act, and the Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act. Therefore, the 
significant increase observed in CVM's veterinarian workforce was 
primarily in response to these new obligations. CVM plans to continue 
its workforce assessment and gap analysis to determine staffing that 
may be required to support workload related to other emerging issues 
and technologies (e.g., nanotechnology, biotechnology). [See comment 5] 

GAO made nine (9) Recommendations for Executive Action to improve the 
ability of the federal veterinarian workforce to carry out routine 
activities, prepare for a catastrophic event, and respond to zoonotic 
disease outbreaks. We offer general comment(s) regarding four (4) GAO 
recommendations, which specifically address the Department (pages 48 
and 49 of the draft report). 

Third, Eighth and Ninth GAO recommendation - that the Secretary of HHS 
direct the department's component agencies that employ veterinarians to 
conduct regular workforce assessments, and that the Secretary then 
conduct a department-wide assessment of HHS's veterinarian workforce to 
identify current and future workforce needs (including training and 
employee development) and solutions to problems shared by its agencies. 
When HHS completes its assessment, it should forward the results to the 
Director of OPM. 

In a department as decentralized and diverse as HHS, HHS has taken an 
operating division centric approach to workforce planning. All 
operating and staff division heads are required to have workforce plans 
in place for their organizations by September 2009. Once the plans are 
in completed, the HHS Office of Human Resources will look across the 
plans to identify opportunities for collaboration with regard to 
strategic recruitment, development and retention. The department also 
plans to strengthen its oversight of the operating divisions to ensure 
that they are implementing their workforce plans, focusing on those 
occupations critical to the success of their missions. 

Fifth GAO recommendation - The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, and 
Health and Human Services ensure that their component agencies that 
employ veterinarians complete pandemic plans that contain the necessary 
elements put forth in DHS's continuity of operations pandemic guidance, 
including periodically testing, training, and exercising plans. 

HHS concurs with this recommendation. Work currently underway at the 
HHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides an illustration of how 
HHS is addressing this recommendation through one of its component 
agencies. 

As part of FDA's follow-up and after actions to the October 2008 FDA 
Pandemic Influenza Functional Exercise, the agency will be updating its 
FDA Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response Plan. The update will include 
addressing the necessary elements put forth in DHS's continuity of 
operations pandemic guidance. The specific elements that will be 
addressed include: 

* identifying what essential functions performed by veterinarians must 
be performed on-site; 

* delegation of authority to three individuals capable of carrying out 
each essential function performed by veterinarians; 

* contact information for individuals who could assume authority should 
essential veterinarian staff and leadership become unavailable; and; 

* testing, training, and exercising of plans. Projected date for 
completion of updating the plan is September, 2009. 

As a side note, the FDA Pandemic Influenza Operational Annex to the HHS 
Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan provides extensive guidance to 
agency officials on ways to mitigate the impact of high absenteeism and 
to ensure continued operations and coverage for essential functions. 
Examples from the Annex include: 

* Re-employment of annuitants; 

* SES Limited Emergency Appointments; and; 

* One-year temporary emergency need appointments. 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Health and Human 
Services' letter dated January 14, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. HHS commented that a premise of our report is that the control of 
zoonotic diseases is solely dependent on the capacity of the 
veterinarian workforce. Our report does not state this. The scope of 
this report, as described in the introduction, was to review the 
sufficiency of the federal veterinarian workforce. 

2. Our report does not identify the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) as having too few veterinarians to control the 2003 
West Nile virus outbreak while also adequately carrying out other 
routine activities. However, CDC officials we interviewed who were 
involved with the 2003 monkeypox outbreak in Wisconsin told us there 
were too few veterinarians during this outbreak. 

3. We modified our report to reflect the new information about the 
difficulty the National Institutes of Health has recruiting 
veterinarians. 

4. Our report states conclusions from the FDA Advisory Committee 
report: that FDA "cannot fulfill its mission" because its scientific 
workforce has remained static while its workload has increased, and 
that FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) is "in a state of 
crisis." We discussed with an author of the Advisory Committee report 
how that report's findings specifically related to veterinarians. 
Consequently, our report also states that an author of the FDA Advisory 
Committee report told us that veterinarians enter FDA employment 
lacking necessary skills and experience to examine the wide variety of 
veterinary products that require FDA approval and that FDA needs to 
better train its veterinarians to review the many diverse products 
under its jurisdiction. HHS further stated that CVM has made great 
strides in the past few years in assessing its workforce needs and that 
the conclusions of the Advisory Committee report are out of date. Our 
report identifies several of the efforts CVM has recently undertaken, 
such as hiring additional veterinarians and beginning efforts to 
analyze the gap between current resources and needs. It also notes 
that, according to FDA officials, the agency is undertaking significant 
reforms to address fundamental concerns in the 2007 report. However, as 
our report states, FDA did not tell us how these efforts address the 
identified veterinarian skill gap specifically. 

5. We modified our report to add a statement that the increase observed 
in CVM's veterinarian workforce was primarily in response to new 
obligations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

The Director: 
United States Office Of Personnel Management: 
Washington, DC 20415: 
"Our mission is to ensure the Federal Government has an effective 
civilian workforce" 
[hyperlink, http://www.opm.gov] 
[hyperlink, http://www.usajobs.gov] 

January 15, 2009: 

Ms. Lisa Shames: 
Director, Agriculture and Food Safety Issues: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Shames: 

Thank you for providing the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
the opportunity to comment on the Government Accountability Office 
draft report, "Veterinarian Workforce, Actions are Needed to Ensure 
Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health." We 
appreciate the opportunity to update you about OPM's efforts since this 
draft report was prepared. 

In relation to statements on pages 6, 7, 13, 25, 29, and 47 concerning 
the lack of Governmentwide effort to address shortages in the 
veterinarian workforce, OPM has established a team to research and 
analyze data to determine the feasibility of issuing a Governmentwide 
Direct-Hire Authority (DHA) for veterinarians under our statutory and 
regulatory authority. We anticipate completing our study and making a 
determination early in 2009. [See comment 1] 

Until this study is completed, OPM relies on the individual agencies to 
request DHA when they have encountered a severe shortage of candidates 
or a critical hiring need for specific occupations. The criteria for 
issuing a DHA under 5 CFR 337, which implements the statute at 5 U.S.C. 
3304(a)(3), is purposefully stringent. While retaining the public 
notice requirement, a DHA bypasses the basic tenets of Federal 
competitive examinations, i.e., selections based on merit and veterans' 
preference. The data and justification must ensure that all other 
alternatives have been tried and proven inadequate to address the 
hiring problem, given the suspension of these basic tenets. 

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS), met this criteria in their DHA request to 
fill 150 Veterinary Medical Officer positions at the GS-11 and 12 grade 
levels. OPM approved a DHA on November 25, 2008, for these positions 
nationwide and in U.S. overseas territories, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Virgin Islands. This DHA is available in those locations for which a 
recruitment, retention, or relocation incentive is authorized and after 
public notice has been available for 21 calendar days. [See comment 2] 

In relation to filling USDA positions during a pandemic or other 
declared emergency situation, in 2003, OPM approved a DHA for positions 
necessary to protect the health or safety of the U.S. food supply. This 
DHA allows the USDA to fill temporary and term positions in a variety 
of occupational categories, including Veterinary Medical Officers at 
the GS-9 through 13 grade levels. This DHA is limited to non-permanent 
positions because these excess employees would no longer be needed upon 
recovery from the pandemic or termination of the emergency. 

We also note that under 5 CFR 213.3102(i)(3), OPM may allow agencies to 
temporarily appoint individuals in the excepted service during a 
pandemic or emergency situation. OPM permitted agencies to use this 
authority to immediately staff emergency positions in the aftermaths of 
September 11, 2001, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Technical comments to the draft report are enclosed. Unless otherwise 
noted, the suggested revisions are meant to provide technical accuracy 
and conform to terminology applicable to the Federal service. 

Please contact Mr. David Cushing on (202) 606-4660 should your office 
require additional information. 

Again, my thanks to your office for providing this opportunity to 
update and clarify information in the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael W. Hager: 
Acting Director: 

Enclosure: 

The following are GAO's comments on the Office of Personnel 
Management's letter dated January 15, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We modified our report to reflect OPM's establishment of a team to 
determine the feasibility of issuing a governmentwide direct-hire 
authority for veterinarians. 

2. We modified our report to include OPM's recent approval of USDA's 
direct-hire authority request. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20525: 
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov] 

January 14, 2009: 

Ms. Lisa Shames: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Shames: 

RE: Draft Report GAO-09-178, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed 
to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's (GAO's) Draft Report GAO-09-178 entitled 
Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient 
Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health. We concur with the 
recommendation that applies to the Department of Homeland Security. We 
have included comments and additional recommendations for your 
consideration. 

General Comments: 

GAO states that they are making several recommendations to improve the 
federal government's ability to meet its routine veterinary 
responsibilities. 

The report states: "The federal government has undertaken efforts to 
identify the veterinarian workforce needed during two catastrophic 
events-a pandemic and multiple intentional introductions of foot-and-
mouth disease. However, these efforts are limited in their usefulness 
because they are either incomplete, based on an infeasible planning 
assumption, or lacking adequate data." DHS concurs in part, and 
proposes the following additional language: 

"We recommend that the federal government enhance efforts to identify 
the veterinary workforce. This may be achieved through an OPM pursuit 
of a multi-department assessment of veterinary manpower requirements to 
include an all-hazards approach with regards to requirements for 
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery." 

In section, Pandemic: the report states, " Four of the five agencies we 
reviewed-APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and FDA - have developed plans that identify 
how they will continue essential functions, including those that 
veterinarians perform, during a pandemic that severely reduces the 
workforce. However, each plan lacks elements that DHS has deemed 
necessary." DHS concurs in part, and proposes the following additional 
language: 

"We recommend that agencies develop plans that identify how they will 
continue essential functions during additional catastrophic events, 
taking into consideration the potential for greater than the estimated 
40 percent absenteeism during a pandemic. We also recommend, that once 
an overall government-wide veterinary manpower needs determination is 
made, that the government directs its efforts to developing effective 
recruitment and retention programs." 

Under the section, Foot-and-mouth disease outbreak the report refers to 
an infeasible planning assumption that the United States would 
slaughter all potentially exposed animals as it has during smaller 
outbreaks of foreign animal diseases, and that the resultant workforce 
estimates (required to implement the infeasible planning assumption) 
are not relevant. DHS does not concur that the workforce estimates are 
not relevant; the current policy requires slaughter of all potentially 
exposed animals and therefore the projected manpower requirement is 
relevant. [See comment 1] 

DHS agrees that this approach may be infeasible for a large foot-and-
mouth outbreak. Procedures that accurately describe a catastrophic foot-
and-mouth disease incident and appropriate response would be 
beneficial. DHS proposes that the following language be deleted: 

"However, DHS and USDA officials consider this approach infeasible for 
such a large outbreak and told us that although the planning effort is 
a valuable exercise for understanding the enormity of the resources 
needed to respond to such an event, any workforce estimates produced 
from this effort are not relevant." 

DHS proposes that the following language is inserted: 

"Even though DHS and USDA officials consider this approach infeasible 
for a catastrophic foot-and-mouth disease incident, the planning effort 
is necessary because the slaughter of all potentially exposed animals 
remains the currently accepted response to a foot-and-mouth disease 
outbreak." 

In the chart on Homeland Security, column on Examples of Concerns, DHS 
proposes that the following language be deleted: [See comment 2] 

"Pool of candidates with the skills necessary to help plan for the 
defense of the nation's food supply is small; office lacks the 
resources to offer salaries sufficient to attract such veterinarians." 

DHS proposes that the following language is inserted: 

"Veterinary expertise contributes to agriculture, animal health and 
human health. The agency has too few veterinarians to effectively 
develop the capabilities to respond to catastrophic food, agriculture, 
and veterinary events." 

Following that chart, the report states that retirement within the next 
3 years would be approximately 27 percent which would exacerbate the 
shortage of veterinarians in the federal agencies. DHS concurs and 
proposes the following additional language: 

"Based on these figures, we recommend that the government direct its 
efforts to develop effective recruitment and retention programs." 

DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) submits the following background 
information. OHA stood up on March 31, 2007. The OHA mission includes 
developing a robust biological threat awareness capacity and 
information sharing with food and agriculture communities, enhancing 
local response capabilities for agro-defense and collaborating with 
other federal agencies to prevent introduction of foreign animal and 
plant pathogens into this country. In order to accomplish this mission, 
OHA, filled senior level veterinary positions first with the intention 
of filling entry level positions later. When this is accomplished, OHA 
average salaries will be within range of other agency veterinary 
positions in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. 

Referring to the paragraph after Figure 3 and Note: the report states: 
"Some agencies, such as those within HHS and the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, can augment base salaries for veterinarians using special 
statutory authorities." DHS concurs and proposes the following 
additional language: 

"OPM should consistently apply incentive programs across all agencies 
for recruitment and retention of veterinarians." 

Technical comments have been provided under separate cover. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jacqueline L. Lacasse, for: 
Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison: 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland 
Security's letter dated January 14, 2009. 

GAO Comments: 

1. DHS stated that current policy requires slaughter of all potentially 
exposed animals and, therefore, the projected manpower requirement is 
relevant. We agree that this estimate is relevant to this method. As 
our report notes, the United States has used this "stamping out" method 
in the past for eradicating smaller outbreaks of foreign animal 
diseases. However, DHS and USDA officials told us, and DHS reiterates 
in its comments, that stamping out is infeasible for a large-scale 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Therefore, we do not agree that 
this estimate is relevant to a catastrophic outbreak, which was the 
scope of this section of our report. Indeed, as we note, DHS and USDA 
officials we interviewed during the course of our review told us that 
the estimate was not relevant. 

2. We modified our report to clarify the Office of Health Affairs' 
concerns about the sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

United States Department of the Interior: 
Office Of The Secretary: 
Washington, DC 20240: 

January 15, 2009: 

Ms. Lisa Shames: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Shames: 

Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity 
to review and comment on the draft Government Accountability Office 
Report entitled, "Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure 
Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health" (GAO-09-
178). 

The GAO staff is to be commended for conducting a well-researched 
examination of the nation's veterinary workforce capacity. We agree 
with the recommendations and wish to emphasize the importance of 
including wildlife disease expertise and resources into the national 
strategy protecting human and animal health. We believe that additional 
emphasis needs to be placed on determining capacity, including 
expertise, training and resources in the area of wildlife disease that 
is needed at the Federal level to support emergency response and other 
needs. 

The enclosure provides comments from the Department of the Interior. We 
hope these comments will assist you in preparing the final report. If 
you have any questions, or need additional information, please contact 
Dr. Susan Haseltine (703) 648-4050 or Dr. Patricia Bright at (703) 648-
4058. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Kameran L. Onley: 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Water and Science: 

Enclosure: 

Comments from the Department of the Interior on the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled, "Veterinarian 
Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for 
Protecting Public and Animal Health" Report Number GAO-09-178: 

We agree with the recommendations and wish to emphasize the importance 
of including wildlife disease expertise and resources into the strategy 
for protecting human and animal health. 

DOI's veterinarians and disease experts bring to bear a diverse array 
of scientific expertise that compliment and enhance the work of other 
agencies. DOI leadership in wildlife health activities helps assure a 
truly integrated approach to protecting the health of human and wild 
and domestic animals. A comprehensive approach that includes wildlife 
is critical for facilitating early detection and timely intervention of 
emerging infectious diseases, which can impact humans. 

Emerging zoonotic diseases such as the West Nile Virus and Ebola 
appeared first in wildlife, gaining a foothold in wildlife populations 
before spilling over into humans. Interior wildlife disease 
surveillance and infrastructure proactively address wildlife disease. 
The Department of Homeland Security has expressed concern that wildlife 
could be used by terrorists as potential "delivery systems" for the 
introduction of pathogens into human and domestic animal populations. 
Current DOI wildlife disease activities and research such as DOI's 
Avian Influenza surveillance in migratory wild birds could also 
potentially detect intentionally introduced pathogens and/or help 
discern naturally occurring disease events from intentional 
introductions. 

A related topic that is not addressed in the GAO report but that we 
feel is key to protecting human, animal, and ecosystem health as well 
as economic interests within the U.S. borders is the detection and 
prevention of non-native invasive infectious agents from entering U.S. 
borders via imported wildlife. The recent Monkey Pox outbreak 
illustrates how quickly an infectious disease from imported animals can 
be disseminated around the country. Interior's FWS port inspection 
program is key to detecting and containing pathogens before an imported 
animal enters the country providing the best opportunity for preventing 
disease outbreaks. 

During the importation process a single sick animal has the potential 
to infect a large number of animals in the same shipment. In addition, 
the mixing of animals during the importation process also provides an 
ideal environment for "new" diseases to develop. Diseases such as 
Ebola, HIV/AIDS and Mad Cow disease all developed as a result of 
pathogen moving from its normal host species into a new species. 

To adequately address these areas Interior needs to evaluate workforce 
needs that could support: (1) Research - including identifying and 
developing alternative methods such as risk assessments for screening 
animals when diagnostic tests are not available or not feasible, (2) 
testing and/or necropsying suspect animals when appropriate, and (3) 
providing the U.S. Ports of Entry and Border Offices additional 
personnel and training to detect and sample for disease in wildlife 
species. 

At the Federal level we recommend that a part of the workforce planning 
be focused on capacity building including specialized, 
multidisciplinary training for wildlife veterinarians including 
clinical diseases of wildlife, ecology, wildlife epidemiology, and 
environmental health. We also recommend that predictive disease models, 
such as those developed for Foot and Mouth disease and plague, include 
wildlife species when appropriate. As the GAO report correctly points 
out, models that address only captive animals will be inadequate. 
Disease prevention and control methods developed for use in 
captive/controlled agriculture will likely be ineffective and not 
feasible if free ranging wildlife are involved in the outbreak. For 
that reason it is critical to have wildlife disease specialists 
including ecologists, and epidemiologists involved in the development 
of the disease models and the response plans. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Lisa Shames, (202) 512-3841, or shamesl@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Charles Adams, Assistant 
Director; Mary Denigan-Macauley; Jennifer Gregory; Terry Richardson; 
Benjamin Shouse; and Michelle K. Treistman made key contributions to 
this report. 

Other important contributors included Kevin Bray; Candace Carpenter; 
Nancy Crothers; William Doherty; Joyce Evans; Brian Friedman; Katheryn 
Hubbell; Judith Kordahl; Jena Sinkfield; and Gloria Sutton. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Humane Methods of Handling and Slaughter: Public Reporting on 
Violations Can Identify Enforcement Challenges and Enhance 
Transparency, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-686T] 
(Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008). 

[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2009). 

[3] GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic 
Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). 

[4] GAO, Human Capital: Transforming Federal Recruiting and Hiring 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-762T] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008). 

[5] GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and 
Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 
2006). 

[6] See GAO-04-39; GAO, Human Capital: Insights for U.S. Agencies from 
Other Countries' Succession Planning and Management Initiatives, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-914] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 15, 2003). 

[7] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. 

[8] See GAO, Older Workers: Federal Agencies Face Challenges, But Have 
Opportunities to Hire and Retain Experienced Employees, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-630T] (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2008). 

[9] GAO, Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture 
from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-214] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 
2005). 

[10] USDA, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region, Audit 
Report: Evaluation of FSIS Management Controls Over Pre-Slaughter 
Activities, 24601-0007-KC (Washington, D.C.: November 2008). 

[11] GAO, Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some 
Problems but Still Faces Enforcement Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-247] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 
2004). 

[12] FDA Science Board, Subcommittee on Science and Technology, FDA 
Science and Mission at Risk, a special report prepared at the request 
of the Food and Drug Administration (November 2007). 

[13] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]; 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-914]. 

[14] E.g. 38 U.S.C. § 7405; 42 U.S.C. § 209(f). 

[15] 37 U.S.C. § 303. 

[16] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-762T]. 

[17] For more information on why the United States has not used 
vaccines, see [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-214]. 

[18] To understand the issues and our recommendations for helping the 
United States implement an animal identification system, see GAO, 
National Animal Identification System: USDA Needs to Resolve Several 
Key Implementation Issues to Achieve Rapid and Effective Disease 
Traceback, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-592] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007). 

[19] Insufficient laboratory resources also affected veterinarians' and 
other responders' abilities to control outbreaks in a timely manner, 
according to numerous federal and state agency officials. 

[20] CDC officials told us that additional veterinarians may have been 
beneficial in getting more horses vaccinated. In addition, they said 
difficulties implementing effective mosquito control programs and 
getting residents to adopt effective personal protection could also 
have contributed to a higher number of animal and human infections. 

[21] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T]. 

[22] GAO, OPM's Central Personnel Data File: Data Appear Sufficiently 
Reliable to Meet Most Customer Needs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-98-199] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
30, 1998). 

[23] To learn more about federal guidance for pandemic planning, see 
[hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html]. 

[24] GAO has a separate review under way that is looking at federal 
agency plans for protecting the workforce while maintaining their 
essential functions during a pandemic. 

[End of section] 

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