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Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for 
Reducing Assistance' which was released on November 5, 2009.

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Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

October 2008: 

Plan Colombia: 

Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; 
U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 

GAO-09-71: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-71, a report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, 
Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

n September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy, 
known as “Plan Colombia,” to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs 
(primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security 
in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed 
groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 
billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense, 
and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan 
Colombia’s drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the 
results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of 
U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to 
“nationalize” or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for 
U.S.-supported programs to Colombia. 

What GAO Found: 

Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and 
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not 
fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and 
cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent, 
respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures 
taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication 
efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic 
military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by 
degrading these groups’ finances. U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials 
cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until 
illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the 
government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring 
only police attention. 

Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion 
to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, U.S.–funded 
helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move 
Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors, 
training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped 
professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have 
recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual 
eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure 
of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal 
armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts 
face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca 
farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. 

Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly 
$1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector 
programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including 
aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia’s justice 
sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives 
while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of 
U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development, 
which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic 
alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is 
not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not 
assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the 
production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results. 

In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in 
fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies 
have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on 
Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation 
program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the 
largest—the Army Aviation Brigade—slated for turnover by 2012. Two 
National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established. 
State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to 
nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not 
been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that State, in conjunction with the other departments, 
USAID, and Colombia, develop an integrated nationalization plan that 
defines U.S. and Colombian roles and responsibilities, future funding 
requirements, and timelines. We also recommend that USAID develop 
measures to better assess its alternative development program. In 
commenting on the recommendations, State said it will continue to 
improve coordination of nationalization efforts, and USAID/Colombia 
noted that it is working to identify new indicators to better measure 
progress. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-71]. For more 
information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Plan Colombia Did Not Fully Meet Its Drug Reduction Goals, but Major 
Security Advances Have Been Achieved: 

U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics 
and Security Objectives: 

U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and 
the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug 
Production: 

U.S. Efforts to Transfer Program Operations and Funding 
Responsibilities to Colombia Have Had Mixed Results: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Support Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade and 
Police Air Service: 

Appendix III: Estimated Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-2007: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comment: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Assistance under Plan Colombia and the PCCP by Program 
Objective--Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008: 

Table 2: U.S. Assistance Provided to the Colombian Military and 
National Police, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008: 

Table 3: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 
through 2008: 

Table 4: Aviation Program Nationalization Efforts Supported by State: 

Table 5: U.S. Support Services Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade: 

Table 6: U.S. Support Services Provided to National Police Air Service: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Colombia: 

Figure 2: Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013: 

Figure 3: Colombia's Clear, Hold, and Consolidate Strategy: 

Figure 4: Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin 
Production, 2000-2007: 

Figure 5: Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

Figure 6: Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

Figure 7: Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards 
the United States, 2000-2007: 

Figure 8: Homicides in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

Figure 9: Kidnappings in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

Figure 10: Ridership on Colombian Roads, 2000-2006: 

Figure 11: State and Defense Support to the Army Aviation Brigade: 

Figure 12: Coca Growing Regions in 2004: 

Figure 13: Coca Growing Regions in 2006: 

Figure 14: Alternative Development Projects and Coca Cultivation in 
Colombia: 

Figure 15: Displaced Persons Receive Job Training: 

Figure 16: Colombian Government Worker Processes Paramilitary Soldier: 

Figure 17: Justice Training on Mass Grave Exhumation at Fiscalia 
Headquarters: 

Figure 18: State's Contractor Reduction Plan for the Army Aviation 
Brigade, 2004-2010: 

Figure 19: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007: 

Figure 20: Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000- 
2007: 

Abbreviations: 

ABD: Air Bridge Denial: 

ACI: Andean Counterdrug Initiative: 

ADAM: Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development: 

ARAVI: Police Air Service: 

AUC: United Self Defense Forces of Colombia: 

CCAI: Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action: 

CNC: Crime and Narcotics Center: 

CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

ELN: National Liberation Army: 

ESF: Economic Support Funds: 

FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia: 

FMF: Foreign Military Financing: 

FMS: Foreign Military Sales: 

IACM: Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement: 

IDP: internally displaced person: 

IMET: International Military Education and Training: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

ISS: Infrastructure Security Strategy: 

MIDAS: More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development: 

NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section: 

ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

PCCP: Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase: 

PCHP: Plan Colombia Helicopter Program: 

PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration: 

UNODC: United Nations Office of Drug Control: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 6, 2008: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the 
early 1970s to help the Colombian military, the National Police and 
other law enforcement agencies, and civilian agencies in their efforts 
to reduce illicit drug production and trafficking activities. Despite 
this assistance, in the late 1990s, Colombia was the world's leading 
producer of cocaine and had become a major source of heroin used in the 
United States. In October 1999, the Colombian government announced a 6- 
year strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to (1) reduce the cultivation, 
processing, and distribution of illicit narcotics in Colombia by 50 
percent over a 6-year period,[Footnote 1] and (2) improve the security 
climate in Colombia by reclaiming control of areas held by a number of 
illegal armed groups, which in the last decade had financed their 
activities largely through drug trade profits.[Footnote 2] 

Plan Colombia's counternarcotics strategy centered on illicit crop 
eradication and interdiction activities and alternative development 
projects designed to offer farmers an alternative to growing coca and 
opium poppy. Plan Colombia sought to reclaim control of territory 
dominated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its 
Spanish acronym, FARC) and other illegal armed groups through a variety 
of means, including the growth and professionalism of the Colombian 
military and National Police,[Footnote 3] systematic military 
engagement with insurgent groups, and an expanded police presence 
throughout the country. Plan Colombia also included a number of social, 
economic, and judicial reform programs designed to broadly support its 
drug reduction and security objectives. In January 2007, the Colombians 
issued a 6-year (2007-2013) follow-on strategy, referred to as the Plan 
Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP),[Footnote 4] which includes many of 
the same strategies and programs initiated under Plan Colombia. 
[Footnote 5] 

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than $6 
billion[Footnote 6] in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. 
Under the general guidance and direction of the White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),[Footnote 7] the Departments of 
State (State) and Defense (Defense) have overseen assistance provided 
to the Colombian military and National Police for Plan Colombia's 
counternarcotics and improved security objectives. State has provided 
most of this assistance, focusing on five major aviation 
programs[Footnote 8] for the Colombian Army, Air Force, and National 
Police. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Department of Justice (Justice), and State have overseen nonmilitary 
assistance for programs that support alternative development, aid to 
internally displaced persons and the demobilization of illegal armed 
groups, and judicial reform efforts. 

Beginning in 2005, Congress called on the Secretary of State to develop 
a multiyear strategy to guide anticipated follow-on assistance to Plan 
Colombia.[Footnote 9] Congress directed that this strategy include a 
detailed explanation of how State (and the other U.S. departments and 
agencies involved) planned to "nationalize" or transfer program 
operations and funding responsibilities to the government of Colombia. 
In response, State issued a report to Congress in March 2006 that noted 
the need for continued and sustained support for military and 
nonmilitary assistance programs in Colombia for the short-and mid-term, 
followed by reductions as nationalization efforts take hold.[Footnote 
10] State updated this strategy in two reports to Congress dated April 
2007 and April 2008.[Footnote 11] The April 2007 report included a 
proposed funding plan illustrating the administration's intent to 
provide an additional $4 billion in assistance under PCCP. The plan 
called for a gradual reduction in assistance to the Colombian military 
and National Police, an initial increase in funding for nonmilitary 
assistance programs, followed by relatively constant funding levels for 
nonmilitary assistance through fiscal year 2013. According to State, in 
fiscal year 2008, Congress accelerated these plans by reducing 
appropriations for Colombian military and police programs (in 
particular, aviation programs) by nearly $170 million, while increasing 
appropriations for nonmilitary programs (in particular, alternative 
development projects) by over $85 million with the expectation that 
this funding shift will lead to major reductions in coca growth. 

At your request, we examined U.S. assistance efforts since fiscal year 
2000 when funding for Plan Colombia was first approved. Specifically, 
we examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction 
and enhanced security objectives; (2) program support provided to the 
Colombian military and National Police, including specific results and 
related challenges; (3) nonmilitary program support provided to 
Colombia, including specific results and related challenges; and (4) 
the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance 
and the challenges, if any, these efforts face. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed planning, implementation, and 
other documentation related to U.S. counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism assistance to the government of Colombia since 2000, 
including our prior reports on various Plan Colombia related programs. 
(See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.) We met with 
officials at Defense, Justice, State, ONDCP, and USAID in Washington, 
D.C.; U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; the Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida; State's Office of 
Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in 
Bogotá, Colombia. In Colombia, we discussed U.S. assistance efforts 
with U.S. embassy officials and cognizant Colombian military, police, 
and civilian agency officials. We also met with U.S.-funded contractors 
assisting with the U.S. programs for the Colombian Army and National 
Police, and USAID implementing partners primarily involved in 
alternative development programs. We visited several Colombian military 
and police bases, including La Macarena, Larandia, Tolemaida, and 
Tumaco, and numerous nonmilitary program sites, including alternative 
development project sites, throughout Colombia. We also observed an 
aerial eradication operation. (See app. I for a more complete 
description of our scope and methodology.) 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to October 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and 
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years (through 
2006) was not fully achieved, however, major security advances have 
been made. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
production declined about 50 percent. Estimated coca cultivation was 
about 15 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000 as coca farmers took 
countermeasures such as moving to more remote portions of Colombia to 
avoid U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts.[Footnote 12] Estimated 
cocaine production was about 4 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000. 
ONDCP officials noted that cocaine production rates did not keep pace 
with rising levels of coca cultivation due to the impact of aerial and 
manual eradication on coca field yield rates.[Footnote 13] According to 
U.S. officials, Colombia improved its security climate through its 
counternarcotics strategy, military and police actions, and other 
efforts (such as its demobilization and deserter programs), which have 
weakened the operational capabilities of FARC and other illegal armed 
groups. As a result of these efforts, several indicators of security 
have shown marked improvement since 2000. For example, between 2000 and 
2007, the Colombian government reports that the number of murders and 
kidnappings were reduced by at least one-third and oil pipeline attacks 
were reduced to almost zero. Nonetheless, U.S. and Colombian officials 
cautioned that the progress made is not irreversible. U.S. embassy 
officials told us that security gains will become irreversible only 
when FARC and other illegal armed groups can no longer directly 
threaten the central government and, instead, become a local law 
enforcement problem requiring only police attention. 

U.S. assistance totaling nearly $4.9 billion since 2000 has provided 
the Colombian military and National Police with a range of 
capabilities, primarily air mobility, needed to pursue Plan Colombia's 
counternarcotics and security objectives. 

* U.S. support to the Colombian military included providing 72 
helicopters and related support services to the Army's Aviation 
Brigade; equipment and training for the Army's Counternarcotics Brigade 
and other Army mobile units dedicated to counternarcotics and 
counterinsurgency operations; aviation and ground support assistance to 
help protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline from insurgent 
attacks; aviation assets and support for the Colombian Air Force's Air 
Bridge Denial program; and support for Navy and Marine interdiction 
programs designed to seize drugs as they transit Colombia's coastal 
waters and rivers. Since 2000, U.S. assistance has increased the 
Colombian military's overall operational capability, in particular, its 
air mobility. These enhanced capabilities have contributed to a number 
of achievements including the Colombian military's seizure of hundreds 
of tons of illicit drugs, an estimated 50 percent reduction in FARC 
combatants since the outset of Plan Colombia, and the extension of the 
government's presence. 

* U.S. assistance to the National Police included support for its 
Aerial Eradication Program and Air Service, funding for a police 
commando unit dedicated to counternarcotics and counterterrorism 
objectives, seaport and airport interdiction programs, and the creation 
of mobile rural police squadrons that have helped establish a police 
presence in 169 municipalities, which lacked a presence in 2000. Since 
2000, the National Police have utilized U.S. assistance to aerially or 
manually eradicate over a million hectares of coca and opium poppy; 
destroy several hundred cocaine hydrochloride laboratories;[Footnote 
14] and seize thousands of metric tons of cocaine and heroin. 

However, both the military and the National Police face a number of 
challenges. For example, current coca cultivation levels have increased 
since Plan Colombia's inception, in part, because countermeasures taken 
by coca farmers, including replanting and moving to more remote parts 
of the country, have mitigated extensive aerial and manual eradication 
operations. 

Since fiscal year 2000, U.S.-supported nonmilitary programs totaling 
nearly $1.3 billion have had a range of accomplishments, but some of 
these efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others 
are difficult to assess. The largest share of U.S. nonmilitary 
assistance has gone toward alternative development, which has benefited 
hundreds of thousands of Colombians through the creation and expansion 
of legal economic opportunities. However, alternative development 
programs currently lack measures to gauge whether they contribute to 
USAID's stated strategic goal of reducing the production of illicit 
narcotics by creating sustainable projects that can function without 
additional U.S. support after the start-up phase is implemented. 
According to USAID, support to individuals displaced by violence in 
Colombia has benefited millions of people; however, by some accounts, 
many other displaced persons cannot access this assistance. According 
to USAID and Colombian officials, U.S. support for the demobilization 
and reintegration of former illegal armed combatants has likely 
improved security, but the reintegration of the former combatants into 
society and reparations to their victims has been slow. USAID democracy 
and human rights programs have expanded access to the democratic 
process for Colombian citizens, and are supporting a new Colombian 
initiative to coordinate military and civilian strategies in some 
areas. Finally, Justice and USAID assistance has helped improve the 
rule of law in Colombia, though progress has been hampered by Colombian 
judicial authorities' limited capacity to address the large number of 
criminal cases in Colombia and the lack of transportation needed to 
investigate crimes in remote and insecure locations. 

In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts mandated 
by Congress for fiscal year 2008, State and other agencies accelerated 
their efforts to transfer program and funding responsibilities for U.S. 
supported programs to Colombia beginning with the Colombian military 
and National Police aviation programs, which form the core of State's 
assistance. Undertaken as a series of separate initiatives, progress 
has been mixed with one aviation program nationalized, two programs in 
transition, and two programs with no definite transfer dates 
established. In addition, State has taken action to nationalize a 
portion of its non-aviation program support. Defense, Justice, and 
USAID each have their own approach to nationalization and differing 
time lines. The U.S. Military Group in Bogotá and State's Bureau for 
Political and Military Affairs are developing a strategy for Congress 
outlining their plans to reduce the level of Foreign Military Financing 
and Defense counternarcotics funding provided to Colombia over the next 
several years.[Footnote 15] Justice and USAID expect that it will take 
years to create the conditions and partnerships needed to ensure the 
long-term sustainability of programs and projects initiated with U.S. 
funding, however, both agencies have begun the process of nationalizing 
some of their project activities. Key nationalization challenges 
include uncertain future U.S. funding levels and the Colombian 
government's uncertain ability to rapidly assume program costs despite 
improvements in its economy. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Administrator of USAID, 
and the government of Colombia, develop a joint plan for turning over 
operational and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to 
Colombia. This plan should include clearly defined U.S. roles and 
responsibilities for all U.S. departments and agencies involved; 
funding requirements, including a detailed assessment of Colombia's 
fiscal situation, spending priorities, and ability to provide 
additional funding; and milestones for completing the transition. 

We also recommend that the Administrator of USAID develop performance 
measures to help USAID (1) assess whether alternative development 
assistance is reducing the production of illicit narcotics and (2) 
determine to what extent the agency's alternative development projects 
are self-sustaining. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed that it should 
continue to improve the coordination of nationalization efforts among 
Defense, other executive branch agencies, and the government of 
Colombia. However, State did not further address how it intends to 
develop an integrated plan involving these agencies and the government 
of Colombia. We continue to believe such an effort is needed to fully 
integrate and coordinate U.S. goals, timetables, and funding needs in 
Colombia. In its comments, USAID stated that the measures it has are 
sufficient to gauge progress towards its strategic goals. However, 
USAID went on to say that better measures and indicators to assess 
alternative development projects could be developed, and that the 
USAID/Colombia mission is working with the USAID missions in Bolivia 
and Peru, which also manage alternative development programs, to 
identify new indicators to help assess progress. 

Background: 

For decades, Colombia was one of Latin America's more stable 
democracies and successful economies. However, by the late 1990s it had 
entered a period of sustained crisis due to the emerging strength of 
the FARC, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and paramilitary 
groups (primarily, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC) 
who were increasingly financing their activities through profits from 
illicit narcotics.[Footnote 16] These groups were assuming increasing 
control of the coca and opium poppy growing areas of the country 
through wide scale violence and human rights abuses, which affected to 
varying degrees each of Colombia's 32 departments (see fig. 1). 
Colombia suffered a severe economic downturn in the late 1990s as its 
armed forces and police were unable to respond to the growing strength 
of these illegal armed groups, and levels of murder, kidnapping, 
extortion, economic sabotage, and illicit drug trafficking spiraled 
upward.[Footnote 17] According to State, in the 7 years prior to Plan 
Colombia, coca cultivation had increased by over 300 percent and opium 
poppy cultivation had increased by 75 percent. 

Figure 1: Map of Colombia: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: Map Resources. 

[End of figure] 

Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts to counter the drug-trafficking 
activities of these illegal armed groups, State reports that Colombia 
remains the source for about 90 percent of the cocaine entering the 
United States, and the primary source of heroin east of the Mississippi 
River. According to State officials, FARC and other illegal groups 
remain active in areas where coca and opium poppy are grown and are 
involved in every facet of the narcotics business from cultivation to 
transporting drugs to points outside Colombia. 

Plan Colombia Provided a Focus for Counternarcotics and 
Counterterrorism Efforts: 

Announced by Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 1999, Plan Colombia 
was designed to counter the country's drug and security crisis through 
a comprehensive 6-year, $7.5 billion plan linked to three objectives: 
(1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, (2) 
promote social and economic justice, and (3) promote the rule of law. 
While the latter two objectives were not specifically designed to 
reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, they broadly 
facilitate these goals by addressing some of the underlying social and 
economic realities that drive individuals toward the illicit drug trade 
and by providing a legal framework for bringing drug traffickers and 
terrorists to justice. 

As shown in figure 2, State and Defense assistance for the Colombian 
military and National Police has supported a counternarcotics strategy 
focused on reducing illicit narcotics and improving security. Central 
to this support have been State-led efforts to provide the Colombians 
with air mobility, which supports the full range of military programs 
and many nonmilitary programs by providing access and security in 
remote areas. Nonmilitary assistance efforts are implemented by USAID, 
Justice, and, State, which oversee a diverse range of social, economic, 
and justice initiatives. 

Figure 2: Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013: 

[See PDF for image] 

The following information is illustrated in the figure: 

State and Defense: 
Reduce Illicit Narcotics and Improve Security: 
* Support to the Colombian Military: 
- Army Aviation; 
- Army Ground Forces; 
- Infrastructure Security; 
- Air Interdiction; 
- Coastal and River Interdiction; 
* Support to the National Police: 
- Eradication; 
- Air Service; 
- Interdiction; 
- Police Presence in Conflict Zones. 

USAID and State: 
Promote Social and Economic Justice: 
* Alternative Development; 
* Internally Displaced Persons; 
* Demobilization and Reintegration; 
* Democracy and Human Rights; 
* Civilian Government Capacity Building. 

Justice: 
Promote Rule of Law: 
* Judicial Reform and Capacity Building. 

Source: GAO, based on State, Defense, USAID, and Justice. 

[End of figure] 

In January 2007, the government of Colombia announced a 6-year follow- 
on strategy, the PCCP. This new strategy includes the same three broad 
objectives as Plan Colombia. The government of Colombia has pledged to 
provide approximately $44 billion for PCCP. The strategy notes that a 
certain level of support from the international community is still 
essential. At the time, the United States developed a proposed funding 
plan of approximately $4 billion in U.S. support for PCCP for fiscal 
years 2007 through 2013. 

Security Component of Plan Colombia Expanded: 

The government of Colombia significantly expanded the security 
component of Plan Colombia with its Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy in June 2003, which outlined a "clear, hold, and consolidate" 
strategy. The strategy's main objective was to assert state control 
over the majority of Colombia's national territory, particularly in 
areas affected by the activities of illegal armed groups and drug 
traffickers. Colombian officials said this new strategy will take years 
to fully implement. (See fig. 3.) Expanded authority approved by the 
U.S. Congress at about the same time allowed agencies to support this 
security strategy. 

Figure 3: Colombia's Clear, Hold, and Consolidate Strategy: 

[See PDF for image] 

The following information is illustrated in the figure: 

Clear: Areas with active presence of IAGs; 
Objective: Disrupt and drive out IAG and assume territorial
control; Military Intensive Effort. 

Hold: Controlled areas in process of institutional recovery; 
Objective: Maintain order and security within the community.
Attract other institutions of the State; Police And Military
Intensive Effort. 

Consolidate: Stabilized areas; 
Objective: Consolidation of State authority and establishment
of all State institutions and public services; Social And Political
Intensive Effort. 

Source: Colombian Ministry o5 Defense. 

[End of figure] 

The government of Colombia has taken a number of steps to implement 
this strategy, including: 

* Increasing the size of its military and police from 279,000 in 2000 
to 415,000 in 2007. 

* Conducting a series of offensive actions against FARC under a 
military strategy called Plan Patriota, which began in June 2003 with 
efforts to clear FARC from areas surrounding Colombia's capital, 
Bogotá. In mid-2004, the military implemented a second, more ambitious 
phase of Plan Patriota aimed at attacking key FARC fronts encompassing 
the southern Colombian departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta. 
Based in Larandia, Joint Task Force-Omega was established in 2004 to 
coordinate the efforts of the Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marines in 
this area. 

* Creating the Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action 
(CCAI) in 2004 to coordinate the delivery of military and civilian 
assistance in 58 targeted municipalities emerging from conflict in 11 
regions throughout Colombia. 

An updated version of the Colombian defense strategy was released in 
coordination with the PCCP strategy in January 2007. Incorporating 
lessons learned from the 2003 strategy, this latest strategy focuses on 
clearing one region at a time and places a greater emphasis on 
consolidating military gains through coordinated civil-military 
assistance designed to solidify the government's presence in previously 
conflictive areas by providing a range of government services to local 
populations. 

To implement this strategy, the government of Colombia has taken 
several actions, including focusing Joint Task Force-Omega's efforts in 
La Macarena--a traditional FARC stronghold--through a new military 
offensive called Plan Consolidacíon. The government also developed a 
coordinated military and civilian plan of action called the 
Consolidation Plan for La Macarena, which has been in place since 
October 2007. As part of this plan, CCAI established a joint civil- 
military fusion center to coordinate military, police, economic 
development, and judicial activities. If successful, the approach in La 
Macarena is intended to serve as a model for similar CCAI efforts in 10 
other regions of the country. It represents a key test of the 
government's enhanced state presence strategy and a potential indicator 
of the long-term prospects for reducing Colombia's drug trade by 
systematically re-establishing government control throughout the 
country. 

U.S. Funding for Plan Colombia: 

Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, the United States has provided over 
$6 billion in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. (See 
table 1.) 

Table 1: U.S. Assistance under Plan Colombia and the PCCP by Program 
Objective--Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008 (Dollars in 
millions): 

Program objective: Reduce Illicit Narcotics and Improve Security; 
Fiscal year 2000: $817.8; 
Fiscal year 2001: $232.8; 
Fiscal year 2002: $395.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $607.9; 
Fiscal year 2004: $617.7; 
Fiscal year 2005: $585.6; 
Fiscal year 2006: $587.3; 
Fiscal year 2007: $591.1; 
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $423.4; 
Total: $4,859.5. 

Program objective: Promote Social and Economic Justice; 
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5; 
Fiscal year 2002: $109.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $125.7; 
Fiscal year 2004: $126.5; 
Fiscal year 2005: $124.7; 
Fiscal year 2006: $130.4; 
Fiscal year 2007: $139.7; 
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $194.4; 
Total: $1,031.8. 

Program objective: Promote Rule of Law; 
Fiscal year 2000: $121.1; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.9; 
Fiscal year 2002: $15.8; 
Fiscal year 2003: $27.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: 9.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $7.3; 
Fiscal year 2006: $10.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $7.8; 
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $39.4; 
Total: $238.7. 

Program objective: Total; 
Fiscal year 2000: $1,018.9; 
Fiscal year 2001: $234.2; 
Fiscal year 2002: $521.6; 
Fiscal year 2003: $760.6; 
Fiscal year 2004: $753.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $717.6; 
Fiscal year 2006: $728.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $738.6; 
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $657.2; 
Total: $6,130.0. 

[End of table] 

Sources: State and Defense. 

Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the 
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance 
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though 
all of it may not have been obligated or expended. State appropriations 
accounts include the Plan Colombia emergency supplemental; the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which became the Andean Counterdrug 
Program (ACP) in fiscal year 2008; International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement (INCLE); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); 
International Military Education and Training (IMET); and Non-
proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). 
USAID and Justice received the bulk of their funding through the ACI 
account until fiscal year 2008. Beginning in 2008, funding for Justice 
and USAID rule of law programs was provided through INCLE, with other 
USAID programs funded through the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Defense 
receives the bulk of its funding through its own counternarcotics 
budget for Colombia and state-controlled FMF and IMET funds. 

[End of table] 

Most State assistance for Colombia is overseen by its Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/ INL), 
though the Bureau for Political and Military Affairs is responsible for 
FMF and IMET funds. State/INL's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the 
U.S. Embassy Bogotá oversees daily program operations. State's Office 
of Aviation supports the NAS with advisors and contract personnel who 
are involved with the implementation of U.S. assistance provided to the 
Colombian Army's Plan Colombia Helicopter Program (PCHP) and the 
National Police's Aerial Eradication Program. The Military Group in the 
U.S. Embassy Bogotá manages both Defense counternarcotics support and 
State FMF and IMET funding. USAID and Justice have full-time staff 
based in Bogotá to oversee and manage their nonmilitary assistance 
programs. U.S. agencies are supported in their efforts by an extensive 
U.S.-funded contract workforce, which provides a range of services from 
aviation program support to alternative development project 
implementation.[Footnote 18] 

U.S. Nationalization Efforts: 

From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress has stated that U.S. 
assistance efforts should be nationalized over time and has followed 
through with a number of specific reporting requirements and budget 
decisions to help ensure this objective is achieved. Beginning in 2004, 
Congress signaled that U.S. program administrators should begin the 
process of drawing down support for U.S. financed aviation programs in 
Colombia, which it noted accounted for a significant portion of U.S. 
assistance to Colombia. 

In 2005, House appropriators requested that the administration develop 
a multiyear strategy defining U.S. program and nationalization plans 
going forward under the PCCP. The administration responded in March 
2006 with a report to Congress that outlined program achievements under 
Plan Colombia and a broad outline of planned nationalization efforts 
beginning with U.S. financed aviation programs.[Footnote 19] Follow-on 
reports issued in April 2007 and April 2008 further refined the 
administration's plans by providing a proposed funding plan 
illustrating how U.S. assistance efforts would be reduced from 2007 
through 2013 as the Colombians assume greater responsibility for 
programs funded and managed by the United States.[Footnote 20] 

Plan Colombia Did Not Fully Meet Its Drug Reduction Goals, but Major 
Security Advances Have Been Achieved: 

Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and 
distribution of illegal narcotics by targeting coca cultivation was not 
achieved. Although estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
production were reduced by about 50 percent, coca cultivation and 
cocaine production increased, though data from 2007 indicate that 
cocaine production slightly declined. Colombia's security climate has 
improved as a result of progress in a number of areas, but U.S. and 
Colombian officials cautioned that current programs must be maintained 
for several years before security gains can be considered irreversible. 

Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Fully Achieved: 

From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine 
production increased over the period. To put Colombia's 6-year drug 
reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for 
Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs 
to increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate 
drug crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and 
cocaine did not become operational until 2001 and later. Meanwhile, 
estimated illicit drug cultivation and production in Colombia continued 
to rise through 2001, with estimated cultivation and production 
declining in 2002 through 2004. However, the declines for coca 
cultivation and cocaine production were not sustained. In addition, the 
estimated flow of cocaine towards the United States from South America 
rose over the period. 

Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production Reduced by About 50 Percent 
Since 2000: 

As illustrated in figure 4, estimated opium poppy cultivation and 
heroin production levels in 2006 were about half of what they had been 
in 2000. 

Figure 4: Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin 
Production, 2000-2007[A]: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production, 2000-
2007[A]: 

Year: 2000; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 5; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 8.7. 

Year: 2001; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 6.5; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 11.4. 

Year: 2002; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.9; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 8.5. 

Year: 2003; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.4; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 7.8. 

Year: 2004; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 2.1; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 3.8. 

Year: 2005; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data. 

Year: 2006; 
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 2; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.6. 

Year: 2007; 		
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data; 
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data. 

[A] Estimates for 2005 and 2007 were not completed due to adverse 
weather conditions. 

Sources: 2008 International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report 
(INCSR) and ONDCP. 

[End of figure] 

Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production Reduction Goals Were Not Met: 

As illustrated in figure 5, coca cultivation was about 15 percent 
greater in 2006 than in 2000, with an estimated 157,000 hectares 
cultivated in 2006 compared to 136,200 hectares in 2000. State 
officials noted that extensive aerial and manual eradication efforts 
during this period were not sufficient to overcome countermeasures 
taken by coca farmers as discussed later in this report. U.S. officials 
also noted the increase in estimated coca cultivation levels from 2005 
through 2007, may have been due, at least in part, to the Crime and 
Narcotics Centers' decision to increase the size of the coca 
cultivation survey areas in Colombia beginning in 2004 and subsequent 
years. 

Figure 5: Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

Year: 2000; 
Thousands of hectares: 136. 

Year: 2001; 
Thousands of hectares: 170. 

Year: 2002; 
Thousands of hectares: 144. 

Year: 2003; 
Thousands of hectares: 114. 

Year: 2004; 
Thousands of hectares: 114. 

Year: 2005; 
Thousands of hectares: 144. 

Year: 2006; 
Thousands of hectares: 157. 

Year: 2007; 
Thousands of hectares: 167. 

Sources: 2006 and 2007 (interim) Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 
Movement (IACM) and ONDCP. 

Note: Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central 
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). CNC 
significantly expanded the number of hectares surveyed for coca growth 
beginning in 2005 in an effort to improve the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of the estimate. Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey 
area rose from 10.9 million hectares to 23.6 million hectares. The 
United Nations produces its own annual estimates of coca cultivation in 
Colombia. U.S. and U.N. estimates of coca cultivation vary widely due 
to technical and methodological differences. 

[End of figure] 

As illustrated in figure 6, estimated cocaine production was about 4 
percent greater in 2006 than in 2000, with 550 metric tons produced in 
2006 compared to 530 metric tons in 2000. However, in September 2008, 
ONDCP officials noted that cocaine production did not keep pace with 
rising coca cultivation levels because eradication efforts had degraded 
coca fields so less cocaine was being produced per hectare of 
cultivated coca. ONDCP also announced that estimated cocaine production 
rates in Colombia for 2003 through 2007 had been revised downward based 
on the results of recent research showing diminished coca field yield 
rates. On the basis of these revised estimates, ONDCP estimated cocaine 
production decreased by almost 25 percent from a high of 700 metric 
tons in 2001 to 535 metric tons in 2007. 

Figure 6: Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-
2007[A,B]: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-2007[A,B]: 

Year: 2000; 
Production in metric tons: 530. 

Year: 2001; 
Production in metric tons: 700. 

Year: 2002; 
Production in metric tons: 585. 

Year: 2003; 
Production in metric tons: 445. 

Year: 2004; 
Production in metric tons: 415. 

Year: 2005; 
Production in metric tons: 525. 

Year: 2006; 
Production in metric tons: 550. 

Year: 2007; 
Production in metric tons: 535. 

Sources: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP. 

[A] According to ONDCP officials, cocaine production estimates are 
given in "100 percent pure" metric tons to facilitate year-to-year 
comparisons. 

[B] Production estimates for 2003 to 2007 were recently revised 
downward based on analysis of coca leaf yield rates. 

[End of figure] 

As illustrated in figure 7, in 2000, the interagency counternarcotics 
community estimated that 460 metric tons of cocaine was flowing towards 
the United States from South America.[Footnote 21] In 2004, the 
interagency began reporting low and high ranges of estimated flow. 
Using the midpoints of these ranges, the estimated flow of cocaine to 
the United States in 2004 was about 500 metric tons; in 2005 it rose to 
over 625 metric tons; in 2006 and 2007, it was about 620 metric tons. 
[Footnote 22] 

Figure 7: Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards 
the United States, 2000-2007[A]: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards the United 
States, 2000-2007[A]: 

Year: 2000; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 461. 

Year: 2001; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 521. 

Year: 2002; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 532. 

Year: 2003; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 422. 

Year: 2004; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 325; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 675. 

Year: 2005; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 518; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 733. 

Year: 2006; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 530; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 710. 

Year: 2007; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 545; 
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 700. 

[A] Flow estimates use export quality cocaine (that is, less than 100 
percent pure) to reflect the fact that shipped cocaine is almost always 
diluted. Export quality purity levels can vary from year to year, 
depending on a number of variables. 

[B] Because of methodological concerns, beginning in 2004, the 
Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, which represents the 
principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone, 
began providing its cocaine flow estimates in the form of a range. 

[End of figure] 

Reductions in Colombia's estimated cocaine production have been largely 
offset by increases in cocaine production in Peru and to a lesser 
extent Bolivia. Although U.S. government estimates suggest that South 
American cocaine production levels have fluctuated since 2000, 
production in 2007 was 12 percent higher than in 2000. See appendix III 
for more detail about the interagency counternarcotics community's 
estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru. 

Plan Colombia Achieved Important Security Advances: 

Since 2000, U.S. assistance has enabled the Colombians to achieve 
significant security advances in two key areas. First, the government 
has expanded its presence throughout the country, particularly in many 
areas formerly dominated by illegal armed groups. Second, the 
government, through its counternarcotics strategy, military and police 
actions, and other efforts (such as its demobilization and deserter 
programs) has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and 
weakened their operational capabilities. These advances have 
contributed to an improved security environment as shown by key 
indicators (see figs. 8 through 10) reported by the government of 
Colombia. 

Figure 8: Homicides in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2000; 
Number of homicides: 26,540. 

Year: 2001; 
Number of homicides: 27,840. 

Year: 2002; 
Number of homicides: 28,837. 

Year: 2003; 
Number of homicides: 23,523. 

Year: 2004; 
Number of homicides: 20,208. 

Year: 2005; 
Number of homicides: 18,111. 

Year: 2006; 
Number of homicides: 17,479. 

Year: 2007; 
Number of homicides: 17,198. 

Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 9: Kidnappings in Colombia, 2000-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2000; 
Number of kidnappings: 2,889. 

Year: 2001; 
Number of kidnappings: 1,210. 

Year: 2002; 
Number of kidnappings: 1,709. 

Year: 2003; 
Number of kidnappings: 1,257. 

Year: 2004; 
Number of kidnappings: 758. 

Year: 2005; 
Number of kidnappings: 377. 

Year: 2006; 
Number of kidnappings: 292. 

Year: 2007; 
Number of kidnappings: 226. 

Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Ridership on Colombian Roads, 2000-2006: 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2000; 
Millions of riders: 2,889. 

Year: 2001; 
Millions of riders: 1,210. 

Year: 2002; 
Millions of riders: 1,709. 

Year: 2003; 
Millions of riders: 1,257. 

Year: 2004; 
Millions of riders: 758. 

Year: 2005; 
Millions of riders: 377. 

Year: 2006; 
Millions of riders: 292. 

Year: 2007; 
Millions of riders: 226. 

Source: Colombian Ministry of Transportation. 

[End of figure] 

Colombian Government Controls More of the Country: 

One central tenet of Plan Colombia and follow-on security plans is that 
Colombian government must reassert and consolidate its control in 
contested areas dominated or partially controlled by illegal armed 
groups. According to an analysis provided by the Colombian Ministry of 
Defense in February 2008, the government was in full or partial control 
of about 90 percent of the country in 2007 compared with about 70 
percent in 2003.[Footnote 23] U.S. officials we spoke to generally 
agreed that the government of Colombia had made major progress 
reasserting its control over large parts of the country and that 
Colombia's estimates of enhanced state presence were reasonably 
accurate. 

Illegal Armed Group Finances and Operating Capabilities Have Been 
Degraded: 

U.S. and Colombian officials and some observers agree that Plan 
Colombia's counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts have degraded 
the finances and operating capacity of illegal armed groups, including 
FARC, paramilitaries, ELN, and other drug-trafficking organizations. 
However, these officials also cautioned that FARC, while severely 
weakened, remains a threat to Colombia's national security. 

FARC's Capabilities and Finances Have Been Significantly Reduced, but 
It Remains a National Security Threat: 

According to U.S. and Colombian officials and some reports, FARC's 
capabilities and finances have been substantially diminished as a 
result of U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics efforts and continued 
pressure from the Colombian military. According to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, since 2000, FARC has been Colombia's principal drug- 
trafficking organization, accounting for approximately 60 percent of 
the cocaine exported from Colombia to the United States.[Footnote 24] 
According to ONDCP, FARC membership has declined from an estimated high 
of 17,000 in 2001 to an estimated force of 8,000 or less today. In June 
2007, ONDCP reported that Colombia's antidrug efforts reduced FARC's 
overall profits per kilogram of cocaine from a range of $320 to $460 in 
2003 to between $195 and $320 in 2005. 

According to State and embassy officials, and nongovernmental 
observers, the number of FARC combatants and its capabilities have been 
dramatically reduced by continuous assaults on its top leadership, 
[Footnote 25] the capture or killing of FARC members in conflictive 
zones, and a large number of desertions. In 2007, the Colombian 
Ministry of Defense reported that it had captured or killed 
approximately 4,600 FARC combatants and about 2,500 had demobilized. 
According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, as of July 2008, over 
1,700 FARC have demobilized this year--over two-thirds of the total for 
all of 2007. U.S. Military Group officials told us FARC now avoids 
direct combat with Colombian security forces and is limited to hit and 
run terrorist attacks. 

Nonetheless, Defense and Colombian officials caution that FARC remains 
a national security threat, exercising control over important parts of 
the country, such as Meta, which serves as a key transport corridor 
linking many of the coca cultivation areas in the eastern part of the 
country with the Pacific ports used to transport cocaine out of the 
country. According to U.S. military group officials, the government of 
Colombia's goal is to reduce FARC's members, finances, and operating 
capabilities so it no longer poses a national security threat. To 
achieve this goal, Colombian President Uribe has accelerated the pace 
of all activities to help ensure this happens by 2010 when his current 
term ends. However, according to U.S. Military Group officials, FARC 
will not reach the point where it can no longer pose a significant 
threat to Colombia's government until the number of combatants is 
reduced to less than 4,000. In February 2008, U.S. Military Group 
officials told us that they estimated that this point could be reached 
in 18 months, but not without continued U.S. support. 

AUC Has Demobilized, but Remnants Remain a Threat: 

Beginning in late 2003, AUC entered into a peace accord with the 
government of Colombia to demobilize and lay down its arms. From 2003 
to 2006, AUC paramilitary members reported to demobilization centers 
around the country. According to USAID officials, approximately 32,000 
paramilitary soldiers and support staff entered the demobilization 
process. 

However, according to Defense officials, former midlevel officers of 
AUC have taken advantage of the vacuum created by the demobilization of 
AUC to form or join regional criminal bands engaged in drug 
trafficking, which threaten to destabilize the political system and 
civilian security. According to a May 2007 report by the International 
Crisis Group,[Footnote 26] estimates of the total number of individuals 
involved in these criminal bands range from 3,000 to 9,000, with many 
of the members former AUC. These include the "Aguilas Negras," (Black 
Eagles), which operates in northeastern Colombia along the border with 
Venezuela, and the "Nueva Generacíon Organizacíon" (New Generation 
Organization), which operates in the department of Nariño. According to 
Defense officials, while homicides and kidnappings throughout Colombia 
have decreased, fighting among illegal armed groups has resulted in an 
increase in violence and internal displacement in certain regions of 
the country, such as the southern Colombian department of Nariño. 

ELN Has Been Weakened and Drug-Trafficking Organizations Have Been 
Fragmented: 

According to U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials, a number of 
factors, including Colombian counternarcotics efforts, military 
pressure, and competition with FARC, have combined to weaken ELN. 
According to U.S. military group officials, in 2000, ELN was estimated 
to number approximately 5,000 combatants; it is currently estimated to 
number between 2,200 and 3,000. 

According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, in addition to the 
insurgent and paramilitary groups that engage in drug trafficking, 
other major drug trafficking groups operate in Colombia. These include 
the North Valle de Cauca group based in the southwestern Colombian 
department of Valle de Cauca and the North Coast group based in the 
Caribbean cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. According 
to Drug Enforcement Administration officials and reports, Colombian law 
enforcement successes, including the arrest and extradition of major 
traffickers, have helped fragment these groups, forcing them to become 
"niche" organizations, specializing in limited aspects of the drug 
trade in order to avoid being identified, arrested, and prosecuted. 
Nevertheless, according to a 2006 Drug Enforcement Administration 
report, these organizations are increasingly self-sufficient in cocaine 
base production, have a firm grip on Caribbean and Pacific smuggling 
routes, and dominate the wholesale cocaine markets in the eastern 
United States and Europe. 

U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics 
and Security Objectives: 

State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2000 
to 2008 to the Colombian military and police to support Plan Colombia's 
counternarcotics and security objectives (see table 2). U.S. assistance 
to the Colombian military has focused on developing the capabilities of 
the Colombian Army's Aviation Brigade and the creation of an Army 
Counternarcotics Brigade and mobile units that focus on 
counternarcotics, infrastructure protection, and counterinsurgency 
missions. State and Defense also provided extensive support for the Air 
Force's Air Bridge Denial Program; and Navy and Marine interdiction 
efforts.[Footnote 27] U.S. support for the National Police has focused 
on its Aerial Eradication Program and Air Service. Other U.S. 
assistance supported the creation of mobile squadrons of rural police 
(referred to as "Carabineros"), which have helped establish (1) a 
police presence in 169 Colombian municipalities that had no police 
presence in 2002, and (2) specialized interdiction programs that attack 
cocaine labs and narcotrafficking in the ports. 

Table 2: U.S. Assistance Provided to the Colombian Military and 
National Police, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008 (Dollars 
in millions): 

Service: Colombian Military; 
Fiscal year 2000: $683.5; 
Fiscal year 2001: $192.8; 
Fiscal year 2002: $257.1; 
Fiscal year 2003: $443.4; 
Fiscal year 2004: $445.5; 
Fiscal year 2005: $394.7; 
Fiscal year 2006: $382.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $373.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $268.4; 
Total[E]: $3,441.7. 

Service: Colombian Military: Army Aviation; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $78.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: $140.8; 
Fiscal year 2004: $155.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $127.5; 
Fiscal year 2006: $143.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $129.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $69.7; 
Total[E]: $844.1. 

Service: Colombian Military: Army Ground Forces; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $9.7; 
Fiscal year 2003: $6.3; 
Fiscal year 2004: $18.1; 
Fiscal year 2005: $13.4; 
Fiscal year 2006: $22.2; 
Fiscal year 2007: $17.7; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $16.4; 
Total[E]: $103.7. 

Service: Colombian Military: Infrastructure Security; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $6.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: $93.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $4.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $4.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $4.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $4.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $0.0; 
Total[E]: $115.0. 

Service: Colombian Military: Air Interdiction[B]; 
Fiscal year 2000: No Program; 
Fiscal year 2001: No Program; 
Fiscal year 2002: $14.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: $8.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $7.1; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $4.6; 
Fiscal year 2007: $18.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $10.0; 
Total[E]: $62.5. 

Service: Colombian Military: Coastal and River Interdiction; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $26.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $11.8; 
Fiscal year 2006: $19.1; 
Fiscal year 2007: $19.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $13.0; 
Total[E]: $89.3. 

Service: Colombian Military: Other[C]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $134.9; 
Fiscal year 2001: $190.9; 
Fiscal year 2002: $149.4; 
Fiscal year 2003: $195.4; 
Fiscal year 2004: $234.8; 
Fiscal year 2005: $238.1; 
Fiscal year 2006: $189.7; 
Fiscal year 2007: $184.4; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $159.2; 
Total[E]: $1,676.8. 

Service: Colombian Military: Not allocated[A]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $548.6; 
Fiscal year 2001: $1.9; 
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0; 
Total[E]: $550.5. 

Service: Colombian National Police; 
Fiscal year 2000: $134.3; 
Fiscal year 2001: $40.0; 
Fiscal year 2002: $138.8; 
Fiscal year 2003: $164.5; 
Fiscal year 2004: $172.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $190.9; 
Fiscal year 2006: $204.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $217.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $155.0; 
Total[E]: $1,417.8. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Eradication; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $37.4; 
Fiscal year 2003: $63.7; 
Fiscal year 2004: $44.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $82.5; 
Fiscal year 2006: $81.7; 
Fiscal year 2007: $82.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $66.5; 
Total[E]: $457.9. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Air Service; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $67.5; 
Fiscal year 2003: $62.3; 
Fiscal year 2004: $71.2; 
Fiscal year 2005: $70.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $70.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $69.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $52.5; 
Total[E]: $463.0. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Interdiction; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $24.3; 
Fiscal year 2003: $21.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $41.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $16.9; 
Fiscal year 2006: $16.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $16.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $16.5; 
Total[E]: $152.7. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Police Presence in Conflict Zones; 
Fiscal year 2000: No program; 
Fiscal year 2001: No program; 
Fiscal year 2002: $4.8; 
Fiscal year 2003: $15.5; 
Fiscal year 2004: $13.8; 
Fiscal year 2005: $20.1; 
Fiscal year 2006: $19.4; 
Fiscal year 2007: $18.7; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $0.0; 
Total[E]: $92.1. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Other[D]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $18.7; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2002: $4.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $2.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $2.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $1.4; 
Fiscal year 2006: $16.4; 
Fiscal year 2007: $31.5; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $19.5; 
Total[E]: $96.4. 

Service: Colombian National Police: Not allocated[A]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $115.6; 
Fiscal year 2001: $40.0; 
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0; 
Total[E]: $155.6. 

Service: Total; 
Fiscal year 2000: $817.8; 
Fiscal year 2001: $232.8; 
Fiscal year 2002: $395.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $607.9; 
Fiscal year 2004: $617.7; 
Fiscal year 2005: $585.6; 
Fiscal year 2006: $587.3; 
Fiscal year 2007: $591.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $423.4; 
Total[E]: $4,859.5. 

Sources: State and Defense. 

Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the 
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance 
throughout this report. We refer to funding as "provided," though all 
of it may not have been obligated or expended. Funding sources include 
State funded ACI, INCLE, FMF, IMET, NADR, and Defense counternarcotics 
funding. State officials noted funding data represents allocated 
amounts, which do not reflect any subsequent budget reprogramming that 
might have occurred or restrictions placed on funds by Congress due to 
certification requirements relating to human rights or environmental 
concerns over the aerial spray program. 

[A] State could not allocate appropriations by program category in 
fiscal years 2000 and 2001. 

[B] This category addresses State's Air Bridge Denial program. 

[C] Includes Defense counternarcotics funding (which averaged $147 
million between fiscal years 2000-2008), which it could not allocate by 
program category; a portion of State's Critical Flight Safety Program; 
and Defense supplied aviation support for battlefield medical 
evacuations. 

[D] Includes other major expenses such as a portion of State's Critical 
Flight Safety Program. 

[E] Numbers may not add up due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

This support has led to a range of accomplishments since 2000 including 
increasing the cost of doing business for both coca farmers and drug 
traffickers by eradicating illicit drug crops and seizing finished 
product; destroying hydrochloride laboratories; demobilizing, 
capturing, and killing thousands of combatants; and the capture or 
killing of several high-profile leaders of FARC and other illegal armed 
groups. Program officials noted, however, that a number of challenges 
have diminished the effect U.S. assistance has had on reducing the flow 
of cocaine to the United States, including the countermeasures taken by 
coca farmers to mitigate the effect of U.S. and Colombian eradication 
programs. 

Army Aviation Brigade: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $844 
million to help expand and maintain an Army Aviation Brigade that has 
seen almost a threefold increase in the number of aircraft it manages 
and a near doubling in its total personnel since 2000. Increased air 
mobility has been described by the Colombian Ministry of Defense as a 
key outcome of U.S. support for Plan Colombia. Air mobility is needed 
to conduct spray operations and move Army Counternarcotics Brigade 
personnel to eradication sites to provide needed security. Air mobility 
is also needed to transport different Colombian army units waging 
security operations against FARC and other illegal armed groups where 
rapid deployment is essential for delivering combat troops to the point 
of attack. 

The brigade consists of three fleets of helicopters. The first, 
referred to as the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program or PCHP, consists 
of 52 U.S. aircraft--17 UH-1Ns, 22 UH-IIs, and 13 UH-60L Blackhawks-- 
that State provided to the Colombians under a no-cost lease.[Footnote 
28] The second fleet, commonly referred to as the FMS fleet, consists 
of 20 UH-60Ls, which Colombia acquired through the Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program. The third fleet consists primarily of Russian and 
U.S. aircraft leased by the Army Aviation Brigade, along with aircraft 
that have been nationalized.[Footnote 29] 

State, with assistance from Defense, has provided the PCHP fleet with 
the essential support components needed to manage a modern combat 
aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance support; 
contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and 
mechanics; flight planning, safety, and quality standards and 
procedures; and a logistics system. Defense provides a Technical 
Assistance Field Team to support the brigade's FMS fleet. The team is 
contracted to provide oversight of FMS fleet maintenance activities and 
to help train brigade mechanics working on these helicopters. Defense 
also is providing the Ministry of Defense with a logistics system and a 
limited aviation depot to enable the Colombians to perform certain 
depot-level repairs on their helicopters. Appendix II describes these 
support services in more detail. Figure 11 illustrates some examples. 

Figure 11: State and Defense Support to the Army Aviation Brigade: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains the following four photographs: 

* State-funded Hangar at Tolemaida; 
* Defense-funded flight simulator at Melgar Facility; 
* PCHP helicopter repair at Tolemaida (source: GAO); 
* Defense-funded engine test bed for Limited Aviation Depot. 

[End of figure] 

According to U.S. and Colombian officials, a key challenge facing the 
brigade is to train and retain enough pilots and mechanics to manage 
the brigade without continued U.S. support--a challenge we have noted 
previously. In June 2003, we reported that the Colombian Army could not 
maintain the PCHP helicopters because it did not have sufficient 
numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics.[Footnote 30] At that time, 
U.S. officials expected they would have enough trained entry level 
pilots by December 2004. They also told us that 54 maintenance 
personnel required basic training, but noted that it would be 3 to 5 
years before these mechanics would be qualified to repair helicopters. 

We found that the Army Aviation Brigade is still understaffed. 
According to State, as of June 2008, a total of 43 contract pilots and 
87 contract mechanics were needed to operate the PCHP program.[Footnote 
31] U.S. officials expect that almost all of these contract personnel 
will be replaced with Colombian Army personnel by 2012, at which time 
U.S. program officials said all program support to the Army Aviation 
Brigade would consist of technical support. According to the Commander 
of the Army Aviation Brigade, however, the Colombians are buying 15 
additional UH-60 Blackhawks through the FMS system for delivery 
starting in October 2008 and, in July 2008, the United States loaned 18 
UH-1Ns from PCHP's inventory to Colombia.[Footnote 32] These additional 
helicopters will strain U.S. efforts to help the Colombians ensure they 
have enough trained pilots and mechanics to meet their needs. Military 
Group and NAS officials told us that current U.S. funding and training 
plans can accommodate Colombia's planned FMS purchase and the 18 loaned 
UH-1Ns.[Footnote 33] These officials cautioned, however, that any 
additional Colombian aircraft purchases will have a significant impact 
on future funding and training requirements. 

While the Colombian Army has not had difficulty retaining pilots, the 
lack of a dedicated career path that provides an incentive for pilots 
to remain with the brigade could adversely affect retention. According 
to a U.S. Embassy Bogotá report, the lack of a warrant officer program 
means that, to earn promotion, Army Aviation Brigade officers must 
command ground troops, taking them away from being helicopter pilots. 
This lack of a dedicated career path may be a problem as more junior 
staff progress in their careers. According to the Commander of the Army 
Aviation Brigade, the Colombian Army has approved plans to establish a 
career path for military and police aviators by creating a warrant 
officer program. However, the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian 
legislature must approve this before the program can begin. 

Army Ground Forces: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $104 
million to advise, train, and equip Colombian ground forces, which grew 
by almost 50 percent during this period. This assistance supported the 
creation of an Army Counternarcotics Brigade, Army mobile units, and a 
Joint Special Operations Command. Each pursues various counternarcotics 
and counterinsurgency missions under a national joint command 
structure. 

Counternarcotics Brigade: 

The Army's Counternarcotics Brigade was originally established in 1999 
to plan and conduct interdiction operations against drug traffickers in 
southern Colombia.[Footnote 34] U.S. and Colombian officials credit the 
brigade with providing the security needed to conduct aerial and manual 
eradication operations, along with drug and precursor seizures and the 
destruction of base and hydrochloride laboratories. 

The brigade's initial focus was on the departments of Putumayo and 
Caquetá where, at the time, much of Colombia's coca cultivation was 
located. Subsequently, the brigade was designated a national asset 
capable of operating anywhere in Colombia. The brigade's mission was 
also extended to include counterinsurgency operations in line with 
expanded program authority passed by Congress in 2002 that allowed U.S. 
assistance to be used for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism 
purposes. Defense provided the brigade with training, equipment, and 
infrastructure support including the construction of facilities at Tres 
Esquinas and Larandia, while State assistance provided the brigade with 
weapons, ammunition, and training. The brigade carries out ground 
interdiction operations and provides ground security for the National 
Police's aerial and manual eradication efforts. The brigade is 
supported by the Army Aviation Brigade, which provides air mobility. 
According to State and U.S. military group officials, the brigade now 
provides its own training and most of its equipment. Beginning in 
fiscal year 2004, State reduced the amount of funding for the brigade 
from approximately $5 million to $2.2 million in fiscal year 2007. It 
is scheduled to remain at this level in fiscal year 2008. 

Mobile Army Brigades and Special Forces Units: 

Defense provided support has helped equip mobile Army brigades and 
joint special forces units which, according to Defense officials, seek 
to establish "irreversible" security gains against FARC and other 
illegal armed groups.[Footnote 35] In particular, this assistance (1) 
enabled the Army to form mobile brigades for counterinsurgency efforts, 
such as Joint Task Force-Omega[Footnote 36] in central Colombia, and 
(2) facilitated the establishment of a Joint Special Forces Command 
made up of a commando unit, an urban hostage rescue unit, and a 
Colombian Marine special forces unit. 

According to Defense officials, U.S. assistance to the mobile brigades 
consisted primarily of intelligence and logistics support,[Footnote 37] 
training, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and infrastructure support 
including a fortified base in La Macarena, which is the home base for 
Joint Task Force-Omega's mobile units.[Footnote 38] This assistance has 
helped the Colombian Army conduct mobile operations throughout 
Colombia, a capacity that Defense officials said generally did not 
exist at the outset of Plan Colombia. According to a senior U.S. 
Military Group official, the mobile brigades' effectiveness can be seen 
in the number of combatants from illegal armed groups captured and 
killed or who have surrendered. For example, Joint Task Force-Omega 
documentation provided by the Colombians show that, as of February 
2008, the task force had captured over 1,000 combatants, killed almost 
100, and persuaded about 400 to surrender. The United States continues 
to provide support for the Army's mobile brigades, but U.S. officials 
expect this support to be reduced as the brigades become increasingly 
self-sufficient. 

U.S. support has helped the Colombian military establish a Joint 
Special Forces Command that also operates under the direction of the 
General Command of the Armed Forces. The support consisted of training, 
weapons, ammunition, and infrastructure support, including for the 
command's principal compound near Bogotá. According to Defense 
officials, the command includes approximately 2,000 soldiers from five 
units made up of Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marine components. It 
is tasked with pursuing high-value targets and rescuing hostages in 
urban and rural environments. U.S. officials described this command as 
similar to the U.S. Special Operations Command and said that, prior to 
2004, the Colombian military did not have the capability to conduct 
joint special forces operations. According to U.S. officials, the 
command has been involved in a number of high-profile operations, 
including the recent rescue of 15 hostages that included three U.S. 
citizens. 

Infrastructure Security Strategy: 

In fiscal years 2000-2008, Congress provided over $115 million to help 
Colombia implement phase one of its infrastructure security strategy, 
designed to protect the first 110 miles of the nearly 500 mile-long 
Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline from terrorist attacks[Footnote 39]. In 
prior years, insurgent attacks on the pipeline resulted in major 
economic losses for both the Colombian government and oil companies 
operating in the country. For instance, in 2001, the pipeline was 
attacked 170 times and forced to shut down for over 200 days, resulting 
in approximately $500 million in lost revenues, as well as considerable 
environmental damage. According to State, there was only one attack 
made on the entire length of the pipeline in 2007. 

U.S. support provided for both an aviation component and a ground 
combat support element and included two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, 
eight UH-II helicopters,[Footnote 40] and related logistics support and 
ground facilities. Nearly $30 million was used for U.S. Special Forces 
training and equipment provided to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers 
assigned to protect this portion of the pipeline.[Footnote 41] 

In December 2007, the United States transferred operating and funding 
responsibility for the infrastructure security strategy to Colombia-- 
including nine helicopters. 

Air Interdiction: 

Beginning in fiscal year 2003, State has provided over $62 million in 
assistance[Footnote 42] to enable the Colombian Air Force to implement 
the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program, which is designed to improve the 
Colombian government's capacity to stop drug trafficking in Colombian 
airspace by identifying, tracking, and forcing suspicious aircraft to 
land so that law enforcement authorities can take control of the 
aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs.[Footnote 43] The program 
was expanded in 2007 to include surveillance of Colombia's coastal 
waters to strengthen the Colombian government's capacity to address the 
emerging threat posed by semisubmersible vessels. 

To support the program, State and Defense have provided the Colombian 
Air Force with seven surveillance aircraft,[Footnote 44] which monitor 
Colombian airspace for suspicious traffic, infrastructure support at 
four ABD bases located across Colombia, contract aviation maintenance 
support, training, ground and air safety monitors, and funding for 
spare parts and fuel. The program also utilizes a network of U.S. 
detection resources including five in-country radars, over-the-horizon 
radars located outside Colombia, and airborne radar systems. In June 
2007, the United States began nationalizing the ABD program, including 
transferring the title of surveillance aircraft and responsibility for 
operating and maintaining the five radars located in Colombia. 
According to NAS officials, the United States is training Colombian Air 
Force ground and air safety monitors and maintenance personnel and 
expects to nationalize the program by 2010, with only limited U.S. 
funding in subsequent years. 

According to NAS officials, suspicious aircraft tracks dropped from 637 
in 2003 to 84 in 2007. In 2007, the Colombian Air Force forced three 
suspected drug-trafficking aircraft to land and each aircraft was 
seized; however, according to a senior NAS official, the crews escaped, 
and no cocaine was found. In the same year, the ABD program was 
expanded to include a maritime patrol mission. While conducting a 
maritime patrol, ABD aircraft assisted in the sinking of two self- 
propelled semisubmersibles, which resulted in the arrest of seven 
individuals and the seizure or destruction of approximately 11 metric 
tons of cocaine. In our September 2005 report,[Footnote 45] we noted 
that the stated purpose of the program (the seizure of aircraft, 
personnel, and drugs) was rarely achieved, though the program did 
succeed in reducing the number of suspicious flights over Colombia--a 
valuable program outcome, according to U.S. and Colombian officials. 

Coastal and River Interdiction: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided over $89 million to 
help sustain and expand Colombian Navy and Marine interdiction efforts. 
According to Defense, from January to June 2007, an estimated 70 
percent of Colombia's cocaine was smuggled out of the country using go- 
fast vessels, fishing boats, and other forms of maritime transport. 
State and Defense support for the Colombian Navy is designed to help 
improve their capacity to stop drug traffickers from using Colombia's 
Caribbean and Pacific coasts to conduct drug-trafficking activities. 
[Footnote 46] State and Defense support for the Colombian Marines is 
designed to help gain control of Colombia's network of navigable 
rivers, which traffickers use to transport precursor chemicals and 
finished products. According to Colombian Ministry of Defense 
officials, the number of metric tons of cocaine seized by the Navy and 
Marines represented over half of all cocaine seized by Colombia in 
2007. 

State and Defense assistance to the Colombian Navy provided for 
infrastructure development (such as new storage refueling equipment for 
the Navy station in Tumaco), the transfer of two vessels to Colombia, 
eight "Midnight Express" interceptor boats, two Cessna Grand Caravan 
transport aircraft, weapons, fuel, communications equipment, and 
training. State assistance also helped the Colombian Navy establish a 
special intelligence unit in the northern city of Cartagena to collect 
and distribute time-sensitive intelligence on suspect vessels in the 
Caribbean. In 2007, the unit coordinated 35 interdiction operations, 
which resulted in the arrests of 40 traffickers, the seizure of over 9 
metric tons of cocaine, and the seizure of 21 trafficker vessels 
including one semisubmersible vessel. The U.S. Embassy Bogotá credits 
this unit for over 95 percent of all Colombian Navy seizures in the 
Caribbean, forcing traffickers to rely more on departure sites along 
the Pacific Coast and areas near Venezuela and Panama. 

The Colombian Navy faces certain challenges. First, it generally lacks 
the resources needed to provide comprehensive coverage over Colombia's 
Pacific coastline. For example, according to Colombian Navy officials, 
the Navy has only three stations to cover all of Colombia's Pacific 
coastline. Second, according to U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials, these 
services lack adequate intelligence information to guide interdiction 
efforts along the Pacific coast. According to embassy officials, the 
United States is working with the Colombians to expand intelligence 
gathering and dissemination efforts to the Pacific coast, in part by 
providing support to expand the Navy's intelligence unit in Cartagena 
to cover this area. Third, traffickers have increasingly diversified 
their routes and methods, including using semisubmersibles to avoid 
detection. 

For the Colombian Marines, State and Defense provided support for 
infrastructure development (such as docks and hangars), 95 patrol 
boats, weapons, ammunition, fuel, communications equipment, night 
vision goggles, and engines. Colombia's rivers serve as a vital 
transport network and are used to transport the precursor chemicals 
used to make cocaine and heroin, as well as to deliver the final 
product to ports on Colombia's Caribbean and Pacific coasts. According 
to State, up to 40 percent of the cocaine transported in Colombia moves 
through the complex river network in Colombia's south-central region to 
the southwestern coastal shore. 

According to U.S. Southern Command officials, the key challenge facing 
the riverine program is a general lack of resources given the scope of 
the problem. The Colombian marines maintain a permanent presence on 
only about one-third of Colombia's nearly 8,000 miles of navigable 
rivers. U.S. embassy planning documents have set a goal of helping the 
Colombian Marines achieve a coverage rate of at least 60 percent by 
2010. 

National Police Eradication Program: 

Since the early 1990s, State/INL has supported the Colombian National 
Police Aerial Eradication Program, which is designed to spray coca and 
opium poppy. Since fiscal year 2000, State has provided over $458 
million to support the program, which increased its spray operations 
about threefold. The Aerial Eradication Program consists of U.S.-owned 
spray aircraft and helicopters, as well as contractor support to help 
fly, maintain, and operate these assets at forward operating locations 
throughout Colombia. As of August 2008, these aircraft included 13 
armored AT-802 spray aircraft; 13 UH-1N helicopters[Footnote 47] used 
as gunships or search and rescue aircraft; four C-27 transport aircraft 
used to ferry supplies and personnel to and from the various spray 
bases; and two reconnaissance aircraft used to find and identify coca 
cultivation, and plan and verify the results of spray missions. A 
typical spray mission consists of four spray aircraft supported by 
helicopter gunships to protect the spray aircraft along with a search 
and rescue helicopter to rescue downed pilots and crew. In addition, 
ground security is provided as needed by the Army Counternarcotics 
Brigade. 

U.S. funded counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying, 
did not achieve Plan Colombia's overarching goal of reducing the 
cultivation, production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in 
part because coca farmers responded with a series of effective 
countermeasures. These countermeasures included (1) pruning coca plants 
after spraying; (2) re-planting with younger coca plants or plant 
grafts;[Footnote 48] (3) decreasing the size of coca plots; (4) 
interspersing coca with legitimate crops to avoid detection; (5) moving 
coca cultivation to areas of the country off-limits to spray aircraft, 
such as the national parks and a 10 kilometer area along Colombia's 
border with Ecuador;[Footnote 49] and (6) moving coca crops to more 
remote parts of the country--a development that has created a 
"dispersal effect" (see figures 12 and 13). While these measures 
allowed coca farmers to continue cultivation, they have increased the 
coca farmers and traffickers' cost of doing business. 

Figure 12: Coca Growing Regions in 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Colombia depicting coca growing regions in 
2004, as well as department boundaries. The regions are indicated as 
having one of the following cultivation densities, in hectares per 
square kilometer: 
0.0; 
0.0-1.0; 
1.0-4.0; 
4.0-8.0; 
More than 8.0. 

Source: Crime and Narcotics Center. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Coca Growing Regions in 2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Colombia depicting coca growing regions in 
2006, as well as department boundaries. The regions are indicated as 
having one of the following cultivation densities, in hectares per 
square kilometer: 
0.0; 
0.0-2.0; 
2.0-8.0; 
Over 8.0. 

Source: Crime and Narcotics Center. 

[End of figure] 

NAS officials said Colombia and the United States have taken several 
actions to address this issue. For instance, the government of Colombia 
initiated a program in 2004 to manually eradicate coca. Since 2004, the 
amount of coca manually eradicated increased from about 11,000 hectares 
to about 66,000 hectares in 2007. According to NAS officials, in 
response to congressional budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, the embassy 
reduced its aerial eradication goal to 130,000, compared with 160,000 
in 2007. This reduction may be offset by a planned increase in manual 
eradication efforts from 66,000 hectares in 2007 to 100,000 hectares in 
2008. However, manual eradication efforts require significant 
personnel, security, and transportation, including air mobility 
resources. Through the end of May 2008, Colombia reported that about 
28,000 hectares had been manually eradicated. In addition, manual 
eradication often takes place in conflictive areas against a backdrop 
of violence, which makes full implementation of this strategy even more 
problematic. According to State, despite protection measures taken, 
manual eradicators were attacked numerous times--by sniper fire, 
minefields, and improvised explosive devices--and through August 2008, 
23 eradicators were killed, bringing to 118 the total number of 
eradicators killed since 2005. 

National Police Air Service: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $463 million to help expand 
and sustain the Police Air Service (known by its Spanish acronym, 
ARAVI). Similar to the role played by the Army Aviation Brigade, ARAVI 
provides air mobility support for a range of National Police functions 
including aerial and manual eradication efforts that require gunship 
and search and rescue support for the spray planes, as well as airlift 
support for the manual eradication teams and associated security 
personnel. In addition, ARAVI provides airlift for the National 
Police's commandos unit, known as Junglas. According to NAS officials, 
ARAVI consists of 61 NAS-supported aircraft and 30 National Police- 
supported aircraft. Key program support elements include hanger and 
taxiway construction upgrades to the Air Service's operating base 
outside of Bogotá; the provision of contract mechanics; training; and 
funding for spare parts, fuel, and other expenses.[Footnote 50] 
Appendix II describes these support services in more detail. 

According to NAS officials, in addition to enabling ARAVI to better 
manage its aviation assets, ARAVI has become self-sufficient in some 
areas.[Footnote 51] For instance, it provides its own entry-level pilot 
and mechanic training and can plan and execute its own operations. 
However, U.S. and contractor officials said that ARAVI still continues 
to suffer from major limitations. According to NAS and contractor 
officials, ARAVI: 

* Receives approximately 70 percent of its total maintenance and 
operating funding from State. According to Embassy Bogotá officials, 
the Colombian Ministry of Defense often underfunds the service on the 
assumption that State will make up the difference. 

* Lacks some specialized maintenance personnel. For instance, according 
to State-funded U.S. contractor personnel, in February 2008, the 
service only had about half of the required number of quality control 
inspectors. To make up the shortfall, the service relies on quality 
control inspectors provided by the contractor. 

* Has high absentee rates. This is a problem that we have reported on 
in the past.[Footnote 52] For example, according to data supplied by 
the contractor, during the second week of February 2008, only 25 
percent of the technicians and 40 percent of the assigned inspectors 
were present to service ARAVI's UH-60s. 

National Police Interdiction Efforts: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $153 million to strengthen 
the National Police's efforts to interdict illicit drug trafficking. 
According to State, in fiscal year 2007, it focused most of its 
assistance on equipping and training the Junglas, but also provided 
assistance for maritime, airport, and road interdiction programs. 

The Junglas consist of 500 specially selected police divided into three 
companies based at Bogotá, Santa Marta, and Tulua, as well as a 60-man 
instructor group based at the National Police rural training center. 
Described by U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials as being widely considered 
as one of the best trained and equipped commando units in Latin 
America, they are often the unit of choice in operations to destroy 
drug production laboratories and other narcoterrorist high value 
targets, many of which are located in remote, hard-to-find locations. 
State support for the Junglas consisted of specialized equipment 
typically provided to U.S. Army Special Forces teams, such as M-4 
carbines, mortars, helmets, and vests, as well as specialized training 
provided in Colombia and the United States. According to State, in 2006 
and 2007, the Junglas were responsible for more than half of all the 
hydrochloric and coca base laboratories destroyed by the National 
Police, and seized over 64 metric tons of cocaine during the same 
period. 

State also supported the National Police's maritime and airport 
security programs to strengthen the National Police's capability to 
protect against illicit cargo--primarily narcotics--smuggled through 
Colombia's principal seaports and airports. State assistance included 
funding for training, technical assistance, and limited logistical 
support (including K-9 support) for port security units at eight 
Colombian seaports and six airports. According to State, units based at 
Colombia's principal seaports and airports seized more than 13 metric 
tons of illicit drugs in 2006; a figure that rose to over 22 metric 
tons in 2007. 

Reestablishing a Police Presence in Conflictive Zones: 

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States provided over $92 
million[Footnote 53] to help the Colombians establish Carabineros 
squadrons. The Carabineros were initially created to provide an 
immediate State presence in conflictive areas reclaimed by the 
Colombian military.[Footnote 54] According to State, the Colombians 
currently have 68 Carabineros squadrons, each staffed with 120 
personnel. The squadrons provide temporary support as other government 
services and a permanent police presence are established in reclaimed 
areas. State support consisted of training, weapons, ammunition, night 
vision goggles, metal detectors, radios, vehicles, and other items 
including some limited support for permanent police stations: 

The Carabineros supported President Uribe's goal of re-establishing a 
State presence in each of the country's 1,099 municipalities (169 
municipalities had no police presence prior to 2002). Though a July 
2007 U.S. Embassy Bogotá report noted there are now police stations in 
every municipality throughout Colombia, these often consist of a small 
number of police who are responsible for areas covering hundreds of 
square miles of territory. Despite these limitations, State noted that 
in contrast to earlier years, no police stations were overrun in 2007. 
NAS officials attributed this development to improved based defense 
training, defensive upgrades, and the increased police presence that 
Carabinero squadrons provide in rural areas. 

U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and 
the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug 
Production: 

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided nearly $1.3 
billion for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, focusing on the 
promotion of (1) economic and social progress and (2) the rule of law, 
including judicial reform. To support social and economic progress, the 
largest share of U.S. nonmilitary assistance has gone toward 
alternative development, which has been a key element of U.S. 
counternarcotics assistance and has bettered the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of Colombians. Other social programs have assisted thousands 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 30,000 former 
combatants. Assistance for the rule of law and judicial reform have 
expanded access to the democratic process for Colombian citizens, 
including the consolidation of state authority and the established 
government institutions and public services in many areas reclaimed 
from illegal armed groups. (See table 3.) 

Table 3: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 
through 2008 (Dollars in millions): 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice; 
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5; 
Fiscal year 2002: $109.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $125.7; 
Fiscal year 2004: $126.5; 
Fiscal year 2005: $124.7; 
Fiscal year 2006: $130.4; 
Fiscal year 2007: $139.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $194.4; 
Total: $1,031.9. 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Alternative 
Development; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $49.9; 
Fiscal year 2003: $60.2; 
Fiscal year 2004: $59.8; 
Fiscal year 2005: $70.7; 
Fiscal year 2006: $72.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $68.2; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $119.7; 
Total: $500.5. 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Internally 
Displaced Persons; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $34.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: $41.5; 
Fiscal year 2004: $42.6; 
Fiscal year 2005: $32.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $30.7; 
Fiscal year 2007: $31.1; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $35.3; 
Total: $247.2. 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Demobilization 
and Reintegration; 
Fiscal year 2000: No Program; 
Fiscal year 2001: No Program; 
Fiscal year 2002: $2.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $8.9; 
Fiscal year 2007: $15.7; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $18.3; 
Total: $44.9. 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Democracy and 
Human Rights; 
Fiscal year 2000: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2001: [A]; 
Fiscal year 2002: $24.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: $24.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $24.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $22.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $18.8; 
Fiscal year 2007: $24.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $21.1; 
Total: $158.7. 

Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Not 
allocated[A]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5; 
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0; 
Total: $80.5. 

Program category: Promote the Rule of Law-Judicial Reform and Capacity 
Building[B]; 
Fiscal year 2000: $121.1; 
Fiscal year 2001: $0.9; 
Fiscal year 2002: $15.8; 
Fiscal year 2003: $27.0; 
Fiscal year 2004: $9.0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $7.3; 
Fiscal year 2006: $10.5; 
Fiscal year 2007: $7.8; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $39.4; 
Total: $238.9. 

Program category: Total; 
Fiscal year 2000: $201.1; 
Fiscal year 2001: $1.4; 
Fiscal year 2002: $125.7; 
Fiscal year 2003: $152.7; 
Fiscal year 2004: $135.5; 
Fiscal year 2005: $132.0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $140.9; 
Fiscal year 2007: $147.6; 
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $233.8; 
Total: $1,270.7. 

Source: State. 

Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the 
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance 
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though 
all of it may not have been obligated or expended. Funding sources 
include the State controlled Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Economic 
Support Funds, and Defense controlled counternarcotics funding. State 
officials noted funding data represents the amount allocated for the 
categories and does not reflect any budget reprogramming that occurred 
after allocations were made or holds placed by Congress on funds due to 
certification requirements relating to human rights or environmental 
concerns over the aerial spray program. 

[A] State could not allocate appropriations by program category in 
fiscal years 2000 and 2001. 

[B] "Promote the Rule of Law" also includes other programs such as 
Demand Reduction and Culture of Lawfulness. 

[End of table] 

Nevertheless, these programs face several limitations and challenges. 
For example, the geographic areas where alternative development 
programs operate are limited by security concerns, and programs have 
not demonstrated a clear link to reductions in illicit drug cultivation 
and production. In addition, many displaced persons may not have access 
to IDP assistance, the reintegration of former combatants into society 
and reparations to their victims has been slow, and funding to continue 
these programs is a concern. Finally, Colombia's justice system has 
limited capacity to address the magnitude of criminal activity in 
Colombia. 

Alternative Development Has Benefited Many Colombians, but USAID Does 
Not Track Progress in Drug Reduction and Sustainability: 

USAID provided more than $500 million in assistance between fiscal 
years 2000 and 2008 to implement alternative development projects, 
which are a key component of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in 
Colombia. USAID's goal for alternative development focuses on reducing 
the production of illicit narcotics by creating sustainable projects 
that can function without additional U.S. support after the start-up 
phase is implemented. In recent years, USAID modified its alternative 
development strategy to emphasize sustainability. With regard to its 
strategic goal, alternative development projects face two key 
challenges--USAID currently has almost no alternative development 
projects in areas where the majority of coca is grown, and a government 
of Colombia policy prohibits alternative development assistance 
projects in communities where any illicit crops are being cultivated. 

USAID Modified Its Alternative Development Approach to Emphasize 
Sustainability: 

USAID's original alternative development strategy in 2000 focused on 
encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops and providing 
assistance to those who did through licit, short-term, income-producing 
opportunities. These efforts were concentrated in the departments of 
Caquetá and Putumayo, where, at the time, most of Colombia's coca was 
cultivated and where U.S. eradication efforts were focused. However, 
USAID and its implementing partners found it difficult to implement 
projects in the largely undeveloped south where the Colombian 
government exercised minimal control. As a result, in February 2002, 
USAID revised its approach to support long-term, income-generating 
activities, focus more attention and resources outside southern 
Colombia, and encourage private-sector participation. In 2004, we 
reported that the revised alternative development program had made 
progress but was limited in scope and may not be sustainable.[Footnote 
55] 

USAID revised its alternative development strategy beginning in 2006 to 
focus on specific geographic corridors, improve coordination, and 
increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable projects. The 
geographic corridors are in six regions in the western part of Colombia 
where the government has greater control and markets and transportation 
routes are more developed. However, the corridors are not in primary 
coca cultivation areas. USAID officials told us that the alternative 
development corridors are intended to act as a magnet, providing legal 
economic opportunities to attract individuals from regions that 
cultivate illicit crops, while also preventing people within the 
corridors from cultivating coca. 

USAID's current strategy is carried out through two major projects-- 
Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development (ADAM) and More 
Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS). ADAM works 
with individuals, communities, and the private sector to develop licit 
crops with long-term income potential, such as cacao and specialty 
coffee. ADAM also supports social infrastructure activities such as 
schools and water treatment plants, providing training, technical 
assistance, and financing of community projects. It emphasizes 
engagement with communities and individual beneficiaries to get their 
support and focuses on smaller scale agricultural development with long-
term earning potential. For example, under ADAM, USAID provided 
infrastructure improvements to a facility that processes blackberries 
in order to increase capacity and continues to provide technical 
assistance to farmers who grow blackberries for the facility. 

MIDAS promotes private-sector led business initiatives and works with 
the Colombian government to make economic and policy reforms intended 
to maximize employment and income growth. USAID encourages public and 
private-sector investment in activities that raise rural incomes and 
create jobs, and it provides training and technical assistance to the 
Colombian government at the local and national levels to expand 
financial services into rural areas, build capacity of municipal 
governments, and encourage the Colombian government's investment in 
programs. For example, MIDAS worked with the Colombian government to 
lower microfinance fees and provided technical assistance to private 
lenders, which led to increased availability of small loans in rural 
areas that can be used to start up small-and medium-sized businesses. 

Overall, alternative development beneficiaries we talked with told us 
their quality of life has improved because they faced less intimidation 
by FARC and had better access to schools and social services, even 
though they generally earned less money compared with cultivating and 
trafficking in illicit drugs. 

Alternative Development Challenges: 

One challenge facing alternative development programs is their limited 
geographic scope. Alternative development programs are largely focused 
in economic corridors in the western part of Colombia, where, according 
to USAID officials, a greater potential exists for success due to 
access to markets, existing infrastructure, and state presence and 
security. Currently, USAID has almost no alternative development 
projects in eastern Colombia, where the majority of coca is grown. (See 
fig. 14.) While the majority of the Colombian population lives within 
the USAID economic corridors, the lack of programs in eastern Colombia 
nonetheless poses a challenge for linking alternative development to 
reducing the production of illicit drugs. The USAID Mission Director 
told us that the mission intends to expand the geographic scope of 
alternative development programs as the government of Colombia gains 
control over conflictive areas. However, the lack of transportation 
infrastructure in most coca growing areas limits the chances of program 
success and future expansion. USAID and other U.S. Embassy Bogotá 
officials emphasized that alternative development programs have 
benefited from security gains made possible through the Colombian 
military's enhanced air mobility, but large areas of Colombia are still 
not secure. 

According to USAID officials, another challenge is the government of 
Colombia's "Zero Illicit" policy, which prohibits alternative 
development assistance projects in communities where any illicit crops 
are being cultivated. Acción Social[Footnote 56] officials said the 
policy is intended to foster a culture of lawfulness and encourage 
communities to exert peer pressure on families growing illicit crops so 
that the community at large may become eligible for assistance. 
[Footnote 57] However, USAID officials expressed concern that the 
policy limits their ability to operate in areas where coca is grown. 
The policy also complicates USAID's current strategy of working in 
conflictive areas like Meta, where coca is cultivated in high 
concentrations. One nongovernmental organization official told us the 
policy is a major problem because if one farmer grows coca in a 
community otherwise fully engaged in and committed to growing licit 
crops, then all aid is supposed to be suspended to that community. 
However, USAID officials told us programs have only been suspended a 
few times due to this requirement. 

Figure 14: Alternative Development Projects and Coca Cultivation in 
Colombia: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Colombia with the following indicated: 
* USAID corridors; 
* Alternative development municipalities; 
* Areas of Coca cultivation in 2006. 

Source: GAO based on USAID map from September 2007. 

[End of figure] 

USAID Measures of Progress Do Not Assess Reductions in Illicit Drug 
Cultivation or Project Sustainability: 

USAID collects data on 15 indicators that measure progress on 
alternative development; however, none of these indicators measures 
progress toward USAID's goal of reducing illicit narcotics production 
through the creation of sustainable economic projects.[Footnote 58] 
Rather, USAID collects data on program indicators such as the number of 
families benefited and hectares of legal crops planted. While this 
information helps USAID track the progress of projects, it does not 
help with assessing USAID's progress in reducing illicit crop 
production or its ability to create sustainable projects. 

In 2004, USAID officials said a new strategy was being developed that 
would allow for the creation of new performance measures. But, USAID 
did not develop indicators that are useful in determining whether 
alternative development reduces drug production. For example, while 
USAID intends for coca farmers in eastern Colombia to move to areas 
with alternative development projects, USAID does not track the number 
of beneficiaries who moved out of areas prone to coca cultivation. 

In addition, while the current alternative development strategy is 
designed to produce sustainable results, USAID does not collect 
tracking data on beneficiaries who have received assistance to 
determine whether they remain in licit productive activities or which 
projects have resulted in sustainable businesses without government 
subsidies. The contractor responsible for implementing USAID's 
alternative development programs told us USAID does not monitor the 
necessary indicators and, therefore, cannot determine the extent to 
which projects are contributing to reducing coca cultivation or 
increasing stability. 

Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons Is Limited: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State's Population Refugee and Migration (PRM) 
bureau reports it has provided $88 million in short-term, humanitarian 
assistance to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups (such as Afro- 
Colombians and indigenous peoples).[Footnote 59] PRM provides 
humanitarian assistance for up to 3 months after a person is displaced, 
providing emergency supplies as well as technical assistance and 
guidance to the government of Colombia and local humanitarian groups to 
build their capacity to serve IDPs. 

In addition, from fiscal years 2000 to 2007, USAID has provided over 
$200 million for longer term economic and social assistance to support 
IDPs and vulnerable groups. USAID assistance has focused on housing 
needs and generating employment through job training and business 
development and has also included institutional strengthening of 
Colombian government entities and nongovernmental organizations through 
technical assistance and training in areas such as delivery of housing 
improvements and subsidies and the provision of health care. According 
to USAID, more than 3 million people have benefited from this 
assistance. 

Figure 15: Displaced Persons Receive Job Training: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of displaced persons receive job training. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

However, according to State and USAID officials, the number of newly 
displaced persons in Colombia continues to rise, and it can be 
difficult to register as an IDP. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Colombia has up to 3 million IDPs--the most 
of any country in the world. Acción Social reports it has registered 
over 2.5 million IDPs.[Footnote 60] But State PRM officials report that 
international and non-governmental organizations estimate that between 
25 and 40 percent of IDPs are not registered. Acción Social officials 
disagreed and estimated under-registration to be 10 percent. In any 
case, Acción Social officials said that the agency's budget is not 
sufficient to provide assistance to all the IDPs registered. 

AUC Combatants Have Demobilized, but Reintegration and Reparations Have 
Been Slow: 

In 2003, the Colombian government and AUC entered into a peace accord 
to demobilize. State data indicate the United States has provided over 
$44 million for USAID programs for monitoring and processing 
demobilized AUC combatants, the verification mission of the 
Organization of the American States, reparations and reconciliation for 
victims of paramilitary violence, and the reintegration of adult and 
child ex-combatants into Colombian society. USAID also supports the 
National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation, which was created 
to deliver reparations and assistance to victims. 

From 2003 to 2006, according to USAID, approximately 32,000 AUC members 
demobilized. Most were offered pardons for the crime of raising arms 
against the Colombian state and were enrolled in a government of 
Colombia reintegration program. AUC leaders and soldiers who had been 
charged, arrested, or convicted of any major crime against humanity 
(such as murder and kidnapping) were offered alternative sentencing in 
exchange for providing details of crimes in depositions to Colombian 
officials.[Footnote 61] USAID assisted the government of Colombia in 
the creation of 37 service centers, mostly in large cities, at which ex-
combatants could register for health services, job training, and 
education and career opportunities, and has assisted the service 
centers in tracking the demobilized soldiers' participation in the 
reintegration process. USAID also assisted with AUC identity 
verification, criminal record checks, initial legal processing, 
documentation of biometric data (such as pictures, thumbprints, and DNA 
samples), and issuance of a registration card. 

U.S. and Colombian officials report that the AUC demobilization has 
enhanced security through reductions in murders, displacements, and 
human rights abuses. Depositions have uncovered thousands of crimes, 
hundreds of former combatants are serving jail sentences for their 
crimes, and victims of paramilitary violence are beginning to see 
resolution to crimes committed against them and their families. 

In April 2008, the government of Colombia began allowing some FARC 
deserters to receive benefits similar to those received by AUC. 
[Footnote 62] FARC ex-combatants who cooperate with Colombian 
authorities may receive pardons; enter a reintegration program; and 
have access to training, medical benefits, and counseling.[Footnote 63] 

Figure 16: Colombian Government Worker Processes Paramilitary Soldier: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of Colombian Government Worker Processing Paramilitary 
Soldier. 

Source: USAID. 

[End of figure] 

Despite the progress made, Colombian and USAID officials told us the 
reintegration of demobilized combatants has been slow, and many may 
have returned to a life of crime. The reintegration program is the 
primary system to prevent the demobilized from joining the ranks of 
criminal gangs. However, USAID officials estimate that approximately 
6,000 of the demobilized have not accessed the service centers. 
Moreover, Colombian officials told us many businesses have been 
reluctant to hire the ex-combatants, and the majority has not found 
employment in the formal economy. Criminal gangs recruit heavily from 
the ranks of the demobilized, and Colombian officials estimate about 10 
percent (or 3,000) have joined these illegal groups. 

In addition, a senior Colombian official reported that reparations to 
the victims of paramilitary violence have been slow. Ex-combatants have 
not been forthcoming about illegally obtained assets--which can be used 
to pay for reparations--and often hide them under the names of family 
or acquaintances. Victims of paramilitary violence have criticized the 
reparations process as slow and expressed resentment of the benefits 
paid to demobilized paramilitaries under the reintegration program. 
Initially, victims could not receive reparations unless there was a 
conviction, which required a lengthy judicial process. But, in April 
2008, Colombia began to provide compensation to over 120,000 
paramilitary victims without the requirement for a conviction. 

USAID Support for Democracy: 

Since fiscal year 2000, State data indicates that USAID has provided 
over $150 million to support the rule of law in Colombia through human 
rights protection, the creation of conflict resolution centers, and 
training of public defenders, among other activities. [Footnote 64] 

* USAID has provided more than 4,500 human rights workers protection 
assistance such as communications equipment and bullet proof vests, as 
well as technical assistance, training, equipment, and funding to 
programs that protect union leaders, journalists, mayors, and leaders 
of civil society organizations. USAID also created and provides 
assistance to Colombia's Early Warning System, to alert authorities of 
violent acts committed by illegally armed groups. According to USAID, 
since its inception in 2001, the Early Warning System has prevented 
over 200 situations that may have caused massacres or forced 
displacements. 

* By the end of 2007, USAID achieved its goal of creating 45 justice 
sector institutions known as Justice Houses, and has trained over 2,000 
conciliators who help to resolve cases at Justice Houses; these 
conciliators have handled over 7 million cases, relieving pressure on 
the Colombian court system. USAID has also refurbished or constructed 
45 court rooms to ensure they are adequate for oral hearings under the 
new criminal justice system, and is developing 16 "virtual" court 
rooms, by which the defendant, judges, prosecutors, and public 
defenders can all participate via closed circuit television. 

* USAID has trained 1,600 public defenders since 2003, including 
training in a new criminal procedure code, and the Colombian government 
now pays all of the defenders' salaries.[Footnote 65] 

However, these programs face challenges in receiving commitments from 
the Colombian government and addressing shortfalls in equal access to 
justice for all Colombians. USAID officials expressed concern about the 
Colombian government's ability to fund the Early Warning System--USAID 
currently pays 95 to 98 percent of the salaries. According to USAID 
officials, a letter of understanding between USAID and the Colombian 
government calls for Colombia to pay 100 percent in 2011. In addition, 
the 45 Justice Houses in Colombia are located in large cities primarily 
in the western half of the country, with almost no Justice Houses in 
the less populated eastern half of the country where high rates of 
violence and crime occur. However, USAID plans to assist the Colombian 
government in strengthening state presence in rural areas of Colombia 
through the construction of 10 new regional Justice Houses in rural, 
post conflict areas. 

Since the beginning of 2007, USAID and Defense have committed $28.5 
million for two programs that support Colombia's "Clear, Hold and 
Consolidate" strategy: (1) the Regional Governance Consolidation 
Program [Footnote 66] and (2) the Initial Governance Response Program. 
[Footnote 67] Both programs directly support the Coordination Center 
for Integrated Government Action (CCAI), which was created in 2004 to 
integrate several military, police, and civil agencies and to 
coordinate national-level efforts to reestablish governance in areas 
that previously had little or no government presence. USAID works to 
increase the operational capacity of CCAI by providing direct planning 
and strategic assistance; for example, USAID hired a consulting firm to 
develop a detailed operational plan for CCAI's activities in Meta. 
[Footnote 68] USAID also assists CCAI with projects designed to 
reinforce stability in areas formerly controlled by insurgents and 
quickly build trust between the government and local communities in 
Meta--such as La Macarena. 

USAID officials said Colombia's consolidation strategy may serve as a 
model for future program activities throughout Colombia; however, CCAI 
faces challenges that could limit its success. CCAI does not have its 
own budget and relies on support, funding, and personnel from other 
agencies within the Colombian government. While Defense officials 
estimate that CCAI spent over $100 million from Colombian government 
agencies in 2007, it often faced delays in receiving the funding. Also, 
security remains a primary concern for CCAI because it operates in 
areas where illegal armed groups are present. For example, CCAI 
representatives in La Macarena do not travel outside of a 5-kilometer 
radius of the city center due to security concerns. 

Justice Support for Rule of Law: 

Justice has provided over $114 million in fiscal years 2000 through 
2007 for programs intended to improve the rule of law in Colombia, 
primarily for the transition to a new criminal justice system and 
training and related assistance for investigating human rights crimes 
and crimes confessed to by former combatants during the AUC 
demobilization. 

About $42 million was for training, technical assistance, and equipment 
to support the implementation of a new accusatory criminal justice 
system. In 2004, Colombia enacted a new Criminal Procedure Code, which 
began the implementation[Footnote 69] of an oral accusatory system 
involving the presentation and confrontation of evidence at oral public 
trials, similar to the system used in the United States. Justice 
training has included simulated crime scenes and court proceedings to 
develop the necessary legal and practical understanding of the oral 
accusatory system. Justice reports it has trained over 40,000 judges, 
prosecutors, police investigators, and forensic experts in preparation 
for their new roles. 

According to Justice, the new accusatory system has improved the 
resolution of criminal cases in Colombia. Under the old system, trials 
took an average of 5 years; this has been reduced to 1 year under the 
current system. According to Justice, the new system has led to an 
increase in the conviction rate of 60 to 80 percent, with Colombia 
reporting 48,000 convictions in the first 2 years of implementation. 
Furthermore, the number of complainants and witnesses increased since 
implementation, which suggests a greater public confidence in the new 
system. 

Justice also provided about $10 million for fiscal years 2005 to 2007 
to both the Fiscalia's Justice and Peace Unit and Human Rights Unit to 
support the AUC demobilization under the Justice and Peace Process. The 
Justice and Peace Unit oversees the process through which demobilized 
paramilitaries give depositions that detail their knowledge of the 
paramilitary structure and of crimes such as mass killings or human 
rights abuses. Justice has provided more than $2 million in equipment, 
including video recording technology, to aid in the processing of 
approximately 5,000 depositions at the Justice and Peace offices in 
Bogotá, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The unit also collects and 
processes complaints filed by victims of paramilitary violence. The 
Human Rights Unit is tasked with the investigation and prosecution of 
human rights violations, such as attacks on union leaders, forced 
disappearances, and mass graves, as well as the investigation and 
prosecution of demobilized paramilitary members suspected of human 
rights violations. 

According to Colombian officials, depositions have led to the 
confession of over 1,400 crimes that the government had no prior 
knowledge of, as well as the locations of an estimated 10,000 murder 
victims in 3,500 grave sites. Over 1,200 victims' remains have been 
recovered through exhumations, and the human identification labs 
continue to work on the identification of the remains using DNA 
testing. According to Justice, the depositions of 25 paramilitary 
leaders have been initiated and, in May 2008, 15 leaders were 
extradited to the United States. The Justice and Peace Unit has 
received over 130,000 victims' claims. 

Justice also provided about $10 million from fiscal years 2005 to 2007 
to increase the capacity for the Colombian government to investigate 
criminal cases. Justice provided vehicles and funds for investigators 
to travel to crime scenes and collect evidence; specialized forensic 
training and equipment for Colombian exhumation teams that unearth 
victims' remains based on information uncovered in depositions; and 
training, technical assistance, and DNA processing kits to Colombian 
human identification labs to streamline and improve DNA identification 
efficiency. Justice is also funding a project to collect DNA samples 
from 10,000 demobilized AUC members and enter the data into a DNA 
identification database, which could later be compared with DNA found 
at crime scenes. Additionally, funds were allocated to contract 30 
attorneys to assist with the analysis and processing of thousands of 
complaints from paramilitary victims. Finally, Justice provided 
specialized criminal training in the areas of money laundering and 
anticorruption. 

Figure 17: Justice Training on Mass Grave Exhumation at Fiscalia 
Headquarters: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of Justice training on mass grave exhumation at Fiscalia 
Headquarters. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Despite U.S. assistance toward improving Colombian investigative and 
prosecutorial capabilities, Colombian officials expressed concern that 
they lack the capacity to pursue criminal cases due to a lack of 
personnel, air mobility, and security, particularly given that most of 
the paramilitary killings and other AUC crimes occurred in rural areas 
too dangerous or too difficult to reach by road. In particular: 

* Fiscalia and Justice officials said neither the Justice and Peace 
Unit nor the Human Rights Unit have enough investigators and 
prosecutors to fully execute their missions. For example, 45 
prosecutors from the Human Rights Unit have to cover more than 4,000 
assigned cases. From 2002 to 2007, the unit produced less than 400 
convictions. Further, thousands of depositions and victim complaints, 
which Colombian officials say are likely to reveal additional crimes, 
have yet to be processed by the Fiscalia. As of October 2007, over 
3,000 known grave sites had not been exhumed and less than half of the 
recovered human remains had been identified. Justice has provided 
assistance to expand the unit, including regional units in 7 cities 
outside of Bogotá. Moreover, Justice reported in September 2008 that 
the Human Rights Unit has received an additional 72 prosecutors and 110 
investigators, but noted that more investigators are needed. 

* According to Colombian and U.S. officials, criminal and human rights 
investigations and exhumation of graves often require hours and 
sometimes days to complete. The investigators often have to go to 
conflictive areas that are impossible to access without sufficient 
transportation resources. For example, in remote areas investigators 
often need army or police helicopters. The Colombian National Police 
have programmed over 15,600 flying hours for their helicopters for 
2008; however, police officials stated that none of these hours were 
allocated for Fiscalia investigations. U.S. officials confirmed 
Fiscalia's need for additional transportation resources, including 
funding for commercial transportation as well as assets provided by 
Colombian security forces. 

U.S. Efforts to Transfer Program Operations and Funding 
Responsibilities to Colombia Have Had Mixed Results: 

From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress made clear that it expects 
all U.S. support programs would eventually transition to Colombia. With 
the completion of Plan Colombia and the start-up of its second phase, 
Congress reiterated this guidance and called on State and other 
affected agencies to increase the pace of nationalization with a focus 
on the major aviation programs under Plan Colombia that are largely 
funded by State.[Footnote 70] In response to this guidance and budget 
cuts to fiscal year 2008 military assistance to Colombia instituted by 
Congress, State and Defense have accelerated efforts to nationalize or 
partly nationalize the five major Colombian military and National 
Police aviation programs supported by the United States.[Footnote 71] 
Apart from these efforts, State has taken action to nationalize 
portions of its nonaviation program support, and State and Defense are 
seeking to transfer a portion of the assistance Defense manages in 
other program areas to the Colombians by 2010. Justice and USAID view 
their efforts as extending over a longer period than U.S. support to 
the Colombian military and have not yet developed specific 
nationalization plans; however, each agency is seeking to provide its 
Colombian counterparts with the technical capabilities needed to manage 
program operations on their own. U.S. nationalization efforts 
collectively face the challenges of uncertain funding levels and 
questions pertaining to Colombia's near-term ability to assume 
additional funding responsibilities. 

State Has Defined Nationalization Plans for the Army Aviation Brigade 
and Plans to Provide Ongoing Support for National Police Aviation 
Programs: 

State has initiated the transfer of program funding and operations for 
the Army Aviation Brigade to the Colombians--by far the largest 
aviation program funded by State. Nationalization efforts have centered 
on a contractor reduction plan created by State in 2004 to eliminate 
the Colombians' reliance on U.S. contract pilots and mechanics (see 
fig. 18).[Footnote 72] This process, however, will not be completed 
until at least 2012 when State expects the Colombians will have enough 
trained pilots and mechanics to operate the brigade on their own. 
Contract pilot and mechanic totals provided by State indicate that the 
plan is on track.[Footnote 73] U.S. officials added that the transfer 
of U.S. titled aircraft and the termination of U.S. support for other 
costs, such as parts and supplies, will occur by 2012 as part of this 
plan. 

Figure 18: State's Contractor Reduction Plan for the Army Aviation 
Brigade, 2004-2010: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Year: 2004; 
Number of pilots: 82; 
Number of mechanics: 312. 

Year: 2005; 
Number of pilots: 100; 
Number of mechanics: 266. 

Year: 2006; 
Number of pilots: 70; 
Number of mechanics: 213. 

Year: 2007; 
Number of pilots: 38; 
Number of mechanics: 173. 

Year: 2008; 
Number of pilots: 28; 
Number of mechanics: 120. 

Year: 2009; 
Number of pilots: 6; 
Number of mechanics: 63. 

Year: 2010; 
Number of pilots: 6; 
Number of mechanics: 24. 

Source: State Department. 

Note: State officials noted that targets for 2011 and 2012 will be 
negotiated in connection with renewal up the PCHP support contract in 
2010. 

[End of figure] 

In contrast to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has not developed 
contractor reduction plans for the National Police's Air Service or 
Aerial Eradication Program--the second and third largest aviation 
programs supported by State, which work together to address U.S. and 
Colombian counternarcotics objectives. U.S. Embassy and State program 
officials explained that State's assistance to the police is expected 
to continue for the indefinite future, subject to congressional funding 
decisions, to sustain a partnership with the police which predates Plan 
Colombia. However, State has taken certain steps, such as training 
Colombian mechanics to replace contract personnel, to reduce the 
Colombian's dependence on U.S. assistance. As of June 2008, only 3 of 
the Colombian National Police's Air Service 233 pilots were contract 
personnel, while 61 out of 422 mechanics were contractors. For the 
Colombian National Police's Aerial Eradication Program, as of June 
2008, 61 out of 76 pilots were contract personnel, while 166 out of 172 
mechanics were contract staff. NAS plans to institute a series of 
efforts, including the training of spray plane mechanics, to increase 
the ability of the Colombians to assume a greater share of total 
program costs. 

Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Cuts Accelerated Nationalization Efforts: 

U.S. nationalization efforts were accelerated in the wake of the fiscal 
year 2008 budget cuts instituted by Congress but remain focused on 
State funded aviation programs. Based on discussions with the 
Colombians beginning in 2007, the United States identified six key 
elements of NAS aviation programs as a starting point for accelerated 
nationalization efforts, which supplement the steps described above. As 
show in table 4, these six areas cut across U.S. supported aviation 
programs in Colombia. U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials estimated that 
these actions could result in nearly $70 million in annual program 
savings. NAS is currently seeking to identify additional budget savings 
by reducing its aerial spray program and through a wide assortment of 
"efficiencies" they expect to implement. State officials noted that 
these reductions and efficiencies will lead to diminished eradication 
and interdiction results. 

Table 4: Aviation Program Nationalization Efforts Supported by State 
(Dollars in millions): 

Assets/program: Infrastructure Security Strategy; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): November 2007; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $3 million; 
Description: Nine helicopters devoted to the ISS project were 
transferred to Colombia in November 2007. All related support costs 
were also transferred at that time. 

Assets/program: K-Max; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): February 2008; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $5 million; 
Description: These helicopters were not highly valued by the Colombians 
given their limited utility to support drug eradication or interdiction 
efforts. The helicopters were removed from the country. 

Assets/program: Colombian National Police titled aircraft; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): March 2008; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $2 million; 
Description: Transition of support responsibility for 13 ARAVI aircraft 
took place in March 2008. 

Assets/program: 18 UH1Ns; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): July 2008; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $29 
million; 
Description: The Colombian Army Aviation Brigade has assumed operating 
responsibility for these aircraft under a loan agreement with the 
United States, which runs through December 2009. 

Assets/program: Fuel costs; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): October 2008; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $14-18 
million; 
Description: The transfer of fuel costs to the Colombians took place on 
October 1, 2008. 

Assets/program: Air Bridge Denial; 
Nationalization date (actual or expected): January 2010; 
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $10 
million; 
Description: Transition of the Air Bridge Denial program is under way, 
with a signed letter of agreement and aircraft titles transferred to 
the Colombians. The next step will be a 2-year transition of 
maintenance responsibilities to the Colombian Air Force. 

Source: NAS Bogotá. 

[A] All savings are estimates. Actual savings will not be known until 
all contracts are renegotiated to reflect changes due to 
nationalization. 

[End of table] 

State has made significant progress in nationalizing nonaviation 
programs, including support for interdiction efforts (seaport, airport 
security, base security and roads, and Junglas operations) and programs 
designed to extend the Colombian government's presence throughout the 
country (mainly, reestablishing a National Police presence in all 
municipalities); and an individual deserter program, which supplements 
the formal demobilization and re-integration programs managed by USAID. 
NAS largely describes all of these programs, with regards to U.S. 
funded employee or contractor involvement, as being fully nationalized 
or nearly nationalized with only limited U.S. oversight or technical 
assistance being provided. 

Defense and State are Working on a Transition Strategy: 

Defense nationalization efforts are managed by the U.S. military group 
in Bogotá. A senior military group official noted that Defense's 
nationalization efforts are based on limited draw downs in Defense 
managed funds which include both State FMF funds and Defense's 
counternarcotics budget. The U.S. government is seeking to establish a 
strategic partnership with Colombia by 2010 whereby the Colombian 
Ministry of Defense will accelerate its efforts to assume increased 
funding and management responsibilities for programs currently 
supported with U.S. military assistance. The same official noted that 
the Military Group has closely coordinated this nationalization 
strategy with the Colombian military at all levels since November 2007. 

According to Defense officials, the 2008 cuts in FMF and Defense 
funding led to a reexamination of plans to transition some program 
funding and implementation responsibilities to the Colombians.[Footnote 
74] In line with this reexamination, the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá 
and State's Bureau for Political and Military Affairs are developing a 
report to Congress which will detail their strategy to reduce FMF and 
Defense counternarcotics support over the next several years with an 
initial focus on 2010 when it is hoped the Colombians will reach a 
point of "irreversibility" with regards to security advances against 
the FARC and other illegal armed groups. 

USAID and Justice Efforts Focus on Sustainability and Will Take Years 
to Implement: 

USAID and Justice are focusing on the sustainability of projects and 
providing the Colombians with the technical capabilities to manage 
their own programs; however, neither agency has developed comprehensive 
transition plans.[Footnote 75] USAID and Justice efforts to transfer 
program and funding responsibilities differ significantly from State 
and Defense since, with limited exceptions, they do not have physical 
assets to turn over to the Colombians. Rather, their efforts center on 
training and capacity building to allow the Colombians to ultimately 
manage their own programs. 

USAID efforts focus on developing sustainable nonmilitary assistance 
programs, increasing the capacity of the government of Colombia to 
design and manage similar projects, and transferring any support 
activities, as warranted. USAID is seeking to create sustainable 
projects, in part, by increasing financial participation by the 
Colombian government, private sector, and project beneficiaries. For 
example, USAID alternative development projects are funded 70 percent 
to 90 percent by outside groups, on average, and have over $500 million 
in public and private funds. 

USAID is also seeking to increase the Colombians' ability to design and 
manage their own assistance programs by involving relevant government 
of Colombia staff in project design and implementation activities. For 
example, USAID provides technical assistance to the government of 
Colombia on financial policy reforms that seek to expand financial 
services to underserved groups and isolated regions. USAID also 
provides training to Colombian banks, credit unions, and 
nongovernmental organizations to establish and expand financial 
services for these groups. USAID has made efforts to transfer specific 
program operations and funding responsibilities for several projects. 
For example, USAID is transferring the Human Rights Early Warning 
System, which was originally funded entirely by USAID. Under an 
agreement, the government of Colombia currently funds 30 percent of 
this program and is supposed to assume full operational and financial 
responsibilities of this program in 2011. In addition, USAID will now 
contribute no more than 50 percent toward the construction of Justice 
Houses, which were initially constructed entirely with USAID funds. 

Justice efforts focus on building the capacity of the Colombian 
government in several areas, such as increasing the ability of the 
government to investigate and prosecute crimes, as well as provide 
protection to witnesses and legal personnel. Justice officials describe 
the process as one of creating an enduring partnership with the 
Colombian government through the provision of training and technical 
assistance. Justice conducts many "train the trainers" programs 
designed to enhance the ability of the Colombian government to 
continuously build institutional knowledge in certain program areas. 

Uncertain U.S. Assistance Levels and Government of Colombia Funding 
Complicate Nationalization Efforts: 

Both U.S. and Colombian officials said the congressionally mandated 
cuts to military assistance in 2008 and uncertainty over future years' 
funding complicate the process of planning and implementing 
nationalization efforts. In addition, while Colombia's economic outlook 
has improved in recent years, its ability to appropriate funds quickly 
or reallocate funds already approved is limited. 

U.S. Congressionally Mandated Spending Cuts Altered Nationalization 
Plans: 

State noted in its April 2008 multiyear strategy report to Congress 
that the fiscal year 2008 budget significantly changed the mix of U.S. 
assistance to Colombia by reducing eradication, interdiction, and FMF 
programs and increasing support for economic development, rule of law, 
human rights, and humanitarian assistance. The report notes agreement 
with Congress on the importance of increasing support for nonmilitary 
programs, but State expressed concern regarding Colombia's ability to 
use this assistance without the security that air mobility assets 
provide. The report also notes State's concern about the need to 
"ensure a smooth and coordinated transition of financial and 
operational responsibilities to the government of Colombia for 
interdiction, eradication, and counterterrorism programs." 

The Colombian Vice Minister of Defense stressed that the budget cuts 
mandated by Congress could not be fully absorbed within Colombia's 
current budget cycle and added that the Ministry of Defense is severely 
restricted in its ability to reprogram funds or request emergency 
spending from the central government. He also said that unplanned cuts 
of this magnitude put major programs at risk, in particular programs 
aimed at providing the Colombians with air mobility capabilities needed 
to support drug reduction, enhanced state presence, and a range of 
social and economic programs. 

Both U.S. and Colombian officials are working on a detailed 
nationalization agreement that would outline next steps, transition 
plans, key players and responsibilities, and potential funding sources. 
[Footnote 76] In line with this objective, the Colombians have formed 
an Office of Special Projects to head up all nationalization efforts 
involving the Ministry of Defense. The office Director told us that, 
while all prior attempts at nationalization planning have not been 
implemented, the government of Colombia has begun a serious effort to 
plan for nationalization. According to the Director, this effort 
includes (1) developing an inventory of all U.S. assistance provided to 
Colombia in order to identify potential candidates for nationalization, 
(2) prioritizing the list and working with the Ministry of Financing 
and the National Planning Department to ensure that adequate funds will 
be made available to finance these priority items, and (3) discussing 
the prioritized list with U.S. representatives. 

Colombia's Ability to Assume Program Costs Has Improved: 

Despite an improving economy and growth in public-sector resources, the 
Colombians have issued a call for international assistance to help fund 
a portion of PCCP from 2007 through 2013 noting that even a "single 
year without international support would force a retreat on the 
important advances that have been made so far." The call for assistance 
is similar to that issued by the Colombians at the outset of Plan 
Colombia, when internal security concerns and poor economic conditions 
limited the Colombian government's ability to fund its counternarcotics 
and counterterrorism objectives. The PCCP plan calls for spending by 
Colombia to total almost $44 billion from 2007 through 2013, with $6 
billion of this total devoted to counternarcotics and counterterrorism 
operations and the balance devoted to social, economic, and rule of law 
efforts.[Footnote 77] 

When Plan Colombia was first announced in 1999, a combination of 
domestic and foreign events limited Colombia's economic growth and its 
ability to fully fund the costs of its plan. As noted in a November 
2007 assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS),[Footnote 78] Colombia's financial system experienced a period 
of stress, during the late 1990s, characterized by the failure of 
several banks and other financial institutions, as well as by the 
severe deterioration of the system's financial health. The situation 
was exacerbated by violent conflict and, in 1999, the country's gross 
domestic product fell by 4.2 percent, the first contraction in output 
since the 1930s. In 2003, we reported that Colombia's ability to 
provide additional funding to sustain the counternarcotics programs 
without a greatly improved economy was limited.[Footnote 79] 

Improvements in Colombia's security environment and economy have 
allowed the government to significantly increase spending levels in a 
number of areas. Colombia's $130 billion economy grew at 6.8 percent in 
2006, the highest rate in 28 years and two points faster than the Latin 
American average. Colombia has reduced its inflation rate from 16.7 
percent in 1998 to 4.5 percent in 2006. According to the CSIS report, 
Colombia has improved its economy through a combination of fiscal 
reforms, public debt management, reduction of inflation, and 
strengthening of the financial system--policies that, along with three 
successive International Monetary Fund arrangements, have placed the 
country on a path of sustainable growth while reducing poverty and 
unemployment. 

Conclusions: 

While Plan Colombia's drug reduction goals were not fully met, U.S. 
assistance has helped stabilize Colombia's internal security situation 
by weakening the power of illegal armed groups to hold disputed areas 
that largely correlate to the major coca growing regions in the 
country. State anticipates that billions of dollars in additional aid 
will need to be provided to Colombia through at least 2013 to help 
achieve a desired end-state where drug, security, social and economic 
welfare, and civil society problems reach manageable levels. 

One principal challenge is determining which combination of military 
and nonmilitary programs will have the greatest affect on combating the 
drug trade in Colombia. Program activities in the past have relied 
heavily on the use of aerial spraying as a key tool for driving down 
coca cultivation levels, and the vast bulk of U.S. counternarcotics 
assistance has gone to eradication and interdiction efforts. However, 
coca cultivation reduction goals were not met. As a result, Congress 
directed a decreased emphasis on aerial eradication, while directing 
that more be spent on alternative development and in other nonmilitary 
program areas. However, USAID does not currently measure the effect 
alternative development has on this goal or the extent to which its 
programs are self-sustaining. 

Congress has renewed its call for accelerated nationalization efforts 
on the part of State and other U.S. agencies operating in Colombia. 
Both State and Defense are engaged in reducing assistance for military 
and police programs. USAID and Justice officials agree that sustainable 
nonmilitary programs will take years to develop, however, both agencies 
have begun to nationalize some portions of their assistance. While high-
level planning for nationalization has taken place and several discrete 
planning efforts are in place or are under development, U.S. 
nationalization efforts are not guided by an integrated plan that fully 
addresses the complex mix of agency programs, differing agency goals, 
and varying timetables for nationalization. Such a plan should include 
key milestones and future funding requirements that take into account 
the government of Colombia's ability to assume program costs supported 
by the United States. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Administrator of USAID, and 
in coordination with the government of Colombia, develop an integrated 
nationalization plan that details plans for turning over operational 
and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia. 
This plan should define U.S. roles and responsibilities for all U.S.- 
supported military and non-military programs. Other key plan elements 
should include future funding requirements; a detailed assessment of 
Colombia's fiscal situation, spending priorities, and ability to assume 
additional funding responsibilities; and specific milestones for 
completing the transition to the Colombians. 

We also recommend that the Director of Foreign Assistance and 
Administrator of USAID develop performance measurements that will help 
USAID (1) assess whether alternative development assistance is reducing 
the production of illicit narcotics, and (2) determine to what extent 
the agency's alternative development projects are self-sustaining. 

Agency Comments and Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Justice, and State; ONDCP; and USAID for their 
comments. Defense, State, ONDCP, and USAID provided written comments, 
which are reproduced in appendixes IV through VII. All except Homeland 
Security provided technical comments and updates, which we incorporated 
in the report, as appropriate.[Footnote 80] 

In commenting on our recommendation to the Secretary of State, State 
agreed that it should continue to improve the coordination of 
nationalization efforts among Defense, other executive branch agencies, 
and the government of Colombia. State noted that its annual multiyear 
strategy report (which it first provided to Congress in 2006) offers 
the most useful format to address our recommendation. While State's 
annual report is useful, it does not incorporate and rationalize the 
complex mix of agency programs, funding plans and schedules, differing 
agency goals, and varying timetables for nationalization as we 
recommend. State did not address how it intends to address these more 
detailed elements with Defense, Justice, and USAID. We continue to 
believe that an integrated plan addressing these elements would benefit 
the interagency and the Congress alike, as future assistance for 
Colombia is considered. 

In commenting on our recommendation to the Administrator of USAID, 
USAID stated that the measures it has are sufficient to gauge progress 
towards its strategic goals. However, USAID went on to say that better 
measures/indicators to assess alternative development projects could be 
developed. The USAID mission in Colombia noted that it is working with 
the USAID missions in Bolivia and Peru, which also manage alternative 
development programs, to identify new indicators to help measure 
progress. The USAID/Colombia mission also stated that USAID/Washington 
should lead an effort, in conjunction with the field and other 
interested agencies, to develop common indicators that would enhance 
USAID's ability to measure alternative development performance. We 
concur. In making our recommendation, we concluded that USAID's 
measures were largely output indicators that did not directly address 
reducing illicit drug activities or the long-term sustainability of 
USAID's efforts. An overall review such as USAID/Colombia suggests may 
help address this shortcoming. 

ONDCP and State commented that our draft report left the impression 
that little or no progress had been made with regards to Plan 
Colombia's counternarcotics goal. In response, we modified the report 
title and specific references in the report to better reflect that some 
progress was made; primarily, opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
production were reduced by about 50 percent. However, coca cultivation 
and cocaine production have been the focus of Colombian and U.S. drug 
reduction efforts since 2000. Neither was reduced; rather, both coca 
cultivation and cocaine production rose from 2000 to 2006. However, at 
ONDCP's suggestion, we added current information that suggests cocaine 
productivity (cocaine yield per hectare of coca) in Colombia has 
declined in recent years. 

Finally, ONDCP also commented that the report did not adequately 
address the full range of program goals associated with Plan Colombia 
and the progress made towards achieving these goals. We disagree. In 
characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia's goals and U.S. programs, 
we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as our prior reports, and 
discussed the goals and associated programs with U.S. officials both in 
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, and with numerous 
government of Colombia officials. We addressed U.S. assistance provided 
for nine specific Colombian military and National Police programs to 
increase their operational capacity, as well as numerous State, 
Justice, and USAID efforts to promote social and economic justice, 
including alternative development, and to promote the rule of law, 
including judicial reform and capacity building. We also note that 
State, USAID, and Defense did not raise similar concerns. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense and 
State; the Attorney General; the Director of Foreign Assistance and 
USAID Administrator; and the Director of ONDCP. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

We examined U.S. assistance efforts since 2000 when funding for Plan 
Colombia was first approved. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress 
made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security 
objectives; (2) program support provided to the Colombian military and 
National Police, including specific results and related challenges; (3) 
nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia, including specific 
results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S. and 
Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if 
any, these efforts face. 

Drug Reduction and Enhanced Security: 

To address the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and 
enhanced security objectives, we reviewed various U.S. and Colombian 
government reports and met with cognizant officials to discuss trends 
and the nature of the data. For trends in drug cultivation, production, 
and flow we relied primarily on U.S. agencies' information and 
officials. For trends in security data on government territorial 
control, homicides, kidnappings, and ridership on Colombian roads, we 
relied on data reported by the Colombian Ministry of Defense and other 
Colombian government ministries. 

Drug Reduction: 

To evaluate trends in Colombian drug cultivation and trafficking since 
calendar year 2000, we reviewed various studies, such as the National 
Drug Threat Assessment produced each year by the National Drug 
Intelligence Center. We reviewed various strategy documents produced by 
the United States that are the basis for overall drug control efforts, 
such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) annual 
National Drug Control Strategy, and the Department of State's (State) 
annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). 

* To track changes in coca cultivation and cocaine production trends in 
Colombia we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement 
(IACM), an annual interagency study designed to advise policymakers and 
resource analysts whose responsibilities include detection, monitoring, 
and interdicting illegal drug shipments. 

* To track changes in the combined amount of cocaine flowing towards 
the United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, we relied on IACM. 

* Because no similar interagency flow assessments are done for heroin, 
we obtained estimates of production and seizures from State's INCSR and 
the National Drug Threat Assessments. 

To understand how these estimates were developed, we discussed the 
studies and overall trends in the illicit drug threat from Colombia 
with officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency in Arlington, 
Virginia; the Drug Enforcement Administration in Arlington, Virginia; 
the Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), 
Langley, Virginia; the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, 
Florida; and the Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Military Group, 
U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia. We also met with and discussed these 
overall trends with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense, 
including the Deputy Minister of Defense. In addition, we compared the 
patterns and trends for the cultivation, production, and movement of 
cocaine and the cultivation and production of opium and noted that they 
were broadly consistent. 

We determined cultivation, production, and illicit narcotics flow data 
have some limitations, due in part to the illegal nature of the drug 
trade and the time lag inherent in collecting meaningful data. With 
regard to estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production levels 
in Colombia, we noted that CNC expanded the number of hectares surveyed 
for coca cultivation beginning in 2005 in response to concerns that 
coca farmers were moving their operations to avoid aerial spray 
operations. Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey area rose from 10.9 
million hectares to 23.6 million hectares. This change complicates the 
process of comparing pre-2005 cultivation levels with later year 
estimates. In addition, because of methodological concerns, the IACM 
began reporting in 2004 its estimated flow of cocaine as a range rather 
than a point estimate. Notwithstanding these limitations, we determined 
that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall 
indication of the relative magnitude of, and general trends in, 
Colombia's illicit drug trade since 2000. 

Security: 

To evaluate security trends, we used data provided primarily by the 
government of Colombia. To assess its reliability, we interviewed 
knowledgeable officials at the U.S. Embassy Bogotá and compared general 
patterns across data sets. We met with and discussed these overall 
trends with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense (including 
the Deputy Minister of Defense) and Justice (including the Colombian 
Attorney General). Some civil society representatives expressed concern 
that Colombian officials may be pressured to present favorable 
statistics, and that some information may be exaggerated. Nonetheless, 
U.S. officials, both in Washington, D.C., and Bogotá expressed 
confidence that the data illustrate overall trends that are widely 
accepted as accurate. U.S. officials added that while specific checks 
on the validity of these data are not conducted, data provided by 
Colombia are consistent with independent U.S. Embassy Bogotá reporting 
on Colombia's political, military, and economic environment. As a 
result, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to 
indicate general trends in government territorial control, homicides, 
kidnappings, and ridership between 2000 and 2006. 

U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Military and National Police: 

To assess program support provided to the Colombian military and 
National Police since 2000, including results and related challenges, 
we reviewed and analyzed congressional budget presentations, program 
and project status reports, our prior reports, and related information. 
We also reviewed program and budgetary data from the various 
departments and agencies in Washington, D.C., that manage these 
programs and met with officials responsible for these programs, 
including officials from State and Defense, as well as the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy. We met with cognizant U.S. officials at 
the U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; State's Office 
of Aviation Programs headquarters, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and 
the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida. At the U.S. 
Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, we met with U.S. officials with the 
Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, as well as U.S.-funded contractor 
representatives assisting with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, the 
National Police Air Service, and the police aerial eradication program. 
In Bogotá, we also met with Colombian Ministry of Defense military and 
police commanders and other officials, including the Deputy Minister of 
Defense. We visited facilities and met with Colombian Army commanders 
at the Army's Aviation Brigade headquarters in Tolemaida, the 
Counternarcotics Brigade headquarters in Larandia, and Task Force- 
Omega's operating base in La Macarena; and Colombian Marine commanders 
at their operating base in Tumaco. We also visited facilities and met 
with Colombian National Police commanders and other officials at its 
main base in Guaymaral (near Bogotá) and a police operating base in 
Tumaco, where we observed an aerial eradication mission in southern 
Nariño. 

To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data (beyond the 
drug cultivation, production, and flow, as well as security indicators 
discussed above) provided by U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed 
relevant U.S. and Colombian data sources and interviewed cognizant 
officials to determine the basis for reported information. We performed 
cross-checks of the data by comparing internal and external budget 
reports (such as State and Defense Congressional Budget 
Justifications), agency performance reports, and classified information 
sources. We determined that the cost and performance data provided were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. 

U.S. Assistance for Nonmilitary Programs: 

To assess nonmilitary program support provided since 2000, including 
results and related challenges, we reviewed our prior reports along 
with pertinent planning, implementation, strategic, and related 
documents and met with cognizant U.S. officials at State and Justice 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. To review 
the progress of alternative development programs, we met USAID 
officials and contractors in Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We 
reviewed pertinent planning documentation including USAID strategic 
plans for 2000-2005 and 2006-2007, as well as progress reports produced 
by USAID's prime contractor. We observed alternative development 
programs in the departments of Bolivar, Huila, Popayán, and Santander. 
To review efforts on internally displaced persons and demobilization, 
we met with officials from USAID, Justice, and State's Population 
Refugee and Migration Bureau in Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We 
interviewed government of Colombia officials from Acción Social, the 
National Commission on Reconciliation and Reparations, the Ministry of 
Interior and Justice, the Fiscalia, the Superior Council for the 
Judiciary, Inspector General's Office, the Public Defenders 
Directorate, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection. We also met with the High Commissioner for 
Reconciliation and Reintegration in Colombia, and with civil society 
and private-sector representatives both in Washington, D.C., and 
Colombia regarding human rights issues. We observed programs in the 
cities of Bogotá, Cartagena, and Medellin. 

To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data provided by 
U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed relevant U.S. and Colombian 
data sources and interviewed cognizant officials to determine the basis 
for reported information. We performed cross-checks of provided data 
against internal agency budget documents and external U.S. budget 
reports (such as State, USAID, and Justice Congressional Budget 
Justifications), agency performance reports, and Colombian reports and 
studies. We determined that the cost data provided by U.S. agencies was 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We did note certain limitations with regard to the performance data we 
received from U.S. agencies. Because of the difficult security 
situation in Colombia, U.S. agencies must often rely on third parties 
to document performance data. In particular, the USAID Office of 
Inspector General raised some concerns in May 2007 regarding the 
consistency with which alternative development performance goals had 
been defined, but was nevertheless able to use the data to determine 
whether overall goals had been met. Consequently, we determined that 
the data on families that have benefited from alternative development 
assistance, infrastructure projects completed, hectares of licit 
agricultural crops developed, and private-sector funds leveraged by 
USAID activities were sufficiently reliable to allow for broad 
comparisons of actual performance in 2007 against the goals that had 
been set, but that these data could not be used for very precise 
comparisons. 

Efforts to Nationalize: 

To determine the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize 
U.S. assistance, we reviewed planning and strategic documents related 
to nationalization, including a memorandum of understanding between the 
United States and Colombia regarding the transfer of programs. We met 
with State and Defense officials in Washington, D.C.; State's Office of 
Aviation Programs at Patrick Air Force Base; and U.S. Southern Command 
in Florida. We met with a special consultant to State who was 
conducting a strategic review of State programs in Colombia. In 
Colombia, we met with designated U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials 
responsible for managing U.S. nationalization efforts, along with an 
ambassador appointed by State to lead negotiations with Colombia 
regarding current and planned steps in the nationalization process. We 
discussed the implications of nationalization with Colombian government 
officials from the National Planning Department, the Ministry of 
Defense (in particular, the Office of Special Projects charged with 
leading the ministry's nationalization efforts), the Colombian Army and 
National Police, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, and AcciÓn 
Social. 

Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report 
do not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on 
interviews with cognizant officials and secondary sources. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Support Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade and 
Police Air Service: 

State and Defense officials told us that the Army Aviation Brigade has 
been provided with essential support services needed to manage a modern 
combat aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance 
support; contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and 
mechanics; flight planning, safety, and quality control standards and 
procedures; and a logistics system. Table 5 describes these support 
services in more detail. 

Table 5: U.S. Support Services Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade: 

Agency: State and Defense; 
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating locations throughout Colombia; 
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: State funded 
construction of helipads, hangars, warehouses, offices, training 
facilities, and other infrastructure. Defense funded the construction 
of a new aviation brigade headquarters, base operations offices, and 
hanger facilities. Defense also funded a Technical Assistance Field 
Team, based at Tolemaida, to support the Aviation Brigade's maintenance 
and logistics requirements and oversee contractor-provided maintenance 
support for Colombia's FMS UH-60s. Tolemaida serves as the Aviation 
Brigade's principal headquarters and maintenance center and is where 
most of the maintenance on PCHP and FMS helicopters is performed. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating locations; 
Description: Contract pilots and mechanics: A State contractor provides 
pilots and mechanics to ensure that the brigade has adequate personnel 
to fly and maintain PCHP aircraft. 

Agency: State and Defense; 
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating bases; 
Description: Logistics support: A State contractor provides an array of 
logistics services for the PCHP, including the provision of parts and 
supplies. The Colombians make their own arrangements for FMS fleet 
logistics requirements. 

Agency: State and Defense; 
Location: Tolemaida, Melgar, and U.S. locations; 
Description: Pilot training: State and Defense fund entry-level and 
advanced pilot training (classroom, simulated flight, hands-on, and on-
the-job) to Colombian Army personnel through a combination of training 
offered at the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School in Melgar, 
Colombia; Tolemaida; and at U.S.-based training facilities including 
Fort Rucker in Alabama. Defense assistance helped establish and support 
the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School within the Colombian Air 
Force in 2001. The school trains entry-level pilots from all three 
Colombian military services, including pilots flying the Army Aviation 
Brigade's PCHP and FMS helicopters. Defense assistance to the school 
included the provision of training helicopters, two helicopter 
simulators, spare parts, fuel, computers, and other equipment. Entry- 
level training provides the basis for pilots to become, with additional 
training and experience, co-pilots and, eventually, pilots-in-command. 
Pilot training is geared for the specific aircraft they intend to fly 
and normally takes 2 to 3 years to complete; The police can also send 
trainees to the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School, but have relied 
almost entirely on their own initial entry rotary wing flight school 
located in Mariquita to train their own pilots. U.S. officials have 
encouraged the Ministry of Defense to combine the two schools into a 
single operation located at either Melgar or Mariquita to save 
expenses. Ministry officials told us they will determine which of the 
two schools to close by the end of 2008. 

Agency: State and Defense; 
Location: Tolemaida; 
Description: Mechanics training: State and Defense provide training 
through a combination of in-country and U.S.-based training resources. 
This training combines both classroom and intensive on-the-job training 
provided by State and Defense contractors. Mechanics progress through 
three separate training phases--rising from journeyman to master 
mechanics--a process that can take as long as 5 years. 

Agency: State and Defense; 
Location: Tolemaida and 10 operating bases; 
Description: Flight safety and operating standards: U.S. assistance has 
helped the Colombians incorporate U.S. aviation flight planning, 
safety, and quality procedures into their own standards. For instance, 
the Colombian Army's flying regulations are based on the U.S. Army 
standards, which require a formal flight hour program, safety 
procedures and checklists, and a host of other requirements. 

Agency: Defense; 
Location: Madrid Air Base outside Bogotá; 
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: Defense is 
supporting a limited aviation depot to conduct major repairs in-
country. At present, the Colombian military and police do not have the 
capacity to perform major, depot-level repairs of helicopters, 
requiring the Colombians to send engines, rotor blades, and other major 
parts to the United States for costly repairs. When completed in 2009, 
this facility will increase the capacity of the military and police to 
perform major engine and rotor blade repairs for both the UH-IIs and 
Blackhawks. According to an analysis of cost data prepared by the U.S. 
Southern Command, a limited aviation depot should allow the Colombians 
to save over $10 million each year in repair costs once the facility 
becomes fully operational. 

Agency: Defense; 
Location: Bogotá; 
Description: Logistics support: Defense is funding the establishment of 
a Logistics Command and Control System. The three services and the 
police all operate and maintain U.S.-built helicopters, but they have 
no easy way to identify what spare parts each service has available and 
where the parts are located. They also do not have a means of 
exchanging funding information to pay for these parts. When completed 
in 2010, the system will provide the military and police with an 
integrated, software-based logistics network to manage five critical 
functions: maintenance, warehouse, supply, finance, and human 
resources. For instance, the system will enable each service to 
determine inventory levels in real time, track service and supply 
requisitions, and exchange funding data. 

Source: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, Narcotics Affairs Section and U.S. 
Military Group. 

[End of table] 

Similar to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has provided key program 
support elements to the Colombian National Police's Air Service. These 
elements include contract mechanics; mechanics training; the 
construction of helipads and hangers; and funding for spare parts, 
fuel, and other expenses. Table 6 describes these support services in 
more detail. 

Table 6: U.S. Support Services Provided to National Police Air Service: 

Agency: State; 
Location: Guaymaral and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia; 
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: State funds, 
hangars, warehouses, offices, training facilities and other 
infrastructure. Guaymaral serves as the Police Air Service's (ARAVI) 
principal headquarters and maintenance center and is where most of the 
maintenance on U.S. and ARAVI-owned helicopters is performed. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Guayamaral and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia; 
Description: Contract mechanics: State funds contract mechanics to 
ensure ARAVI has adequate support to maintain NAS-supported aircraft. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Guaymaral, and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia; 
Description: Logistics support: A State contractor provides an array of 
logistics services for the NAS-supported ARAVI fleet, including the 
provision of parts and supplies. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Mariquita and U.S. locations; 
Description: Pilot training: State provides funding for entry level 
rotary wing training at Mariquita as well as for UH-60 training in the 
United States. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Guaymaral and other operating locations; 
Description: Mechanics training: A State contractor provides intensive 
on-the job training provided. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Bogotá and other locations; 
Description: Search and rescue: NAS funded training to enable 13 ARAVI 
personnel to become search and rescue paramedics, enabling them to 
substitute in part for contract paramedics. 

Agency: State; 
Location: Guaymaral and other locations; 
Description: Flight safety and operating procedures: State assistance 
has helped the Colombians incorporate U.S. aviation flight planning, 
safety and quality procedures into their own standards. In June 2003, 
we reported on the results of a 2002 Aviation Resource Management 
Survey conducted by State's Office of Aviation. The survey found 
numerous deficiencies. For instance, ARAVI did not have a formal flying 
hour program, and its safety program did not have formal risk 
management practices. According to State officials, a more recent 
Aviation Resource Management Survey, conducted in January 2008, found 
that ARAVI had essentially resolved most of these problems and was 
incorporating U.S. standards into its operating procedures. 

Source: U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Narcotics Affairs Section. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Estimated Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-2007: 

As illustrated in figure 19, the estimated number of hectares of coca 
under cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has varied since 2000 
from an estimated 187,500 hectares to 233,000 hectares in 2007, and 
averaged about 200,000 hectares since 2000. As noted in our report, 
these changes were due, at least in part, to the Crime and Narcotics 
Center's decision to increase the size of the coca cultivation survey 
areas in Colombia from 2004 to 2006. 

Figure 19: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007 (in thousands 
of hectares): 

Year: 2000; 
Colombia: 136; 
Peru: 31.7; 
Bolivia: 19.6; 
Total: 187.3. 

Year: 2001; 
Colombia: 170; 
Peru: 32.1; 
Bolivia: 19.9; 
Total: 222. 

Year: 2002; 
Colombia: 144; 
Peru: 34.7; 
Bolivia: 21.6; 
Total: 200.3. 

Year: 2003; 
Colombia: 114; 
Peru: 29.3; 
Bolivia: 23.2; 
Total: 166.5. 

Year: 2004; 
Colombia: 114; 
Peru: 27.5; 
Bolivia: 24.6; 
Total: 166.1. 

Year: 2005; 
Colombia: 144; 
Peru: 34; 
Bolivia: 26.5; 
Total: 204.5. 

Year: 2006; 
Colombia: 157; 
Peru: 37; 
Bolivia: 25.8; 
Total: 219.8. 

Year: 2007; 
Colombia: 167; 
Peru: 36; 
Bolivia: 29.5; 
Total: 232.5. 

Source: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP. 

Note: Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central 
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). 

[End of figure] 

The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community uses the number of 
hectares of coca under cultivation to help estimate the amount of 100 
percent pure cocaine that can be produced in each country. Essentially, 
the community calculates production efficiency rates for turning coca 
leaf into cocaine and applies it to the total number of hectares under 
cultivation. As illustrated in figure 20, the total amount of estimated 
pure cocaine produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has fluctuated 
since 2000 but has risen from 770 metric tons in 2000 to 865 metric 
tons in 2007, and averaged about 860 metric tons per year since 2000. 

Figure 20: Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000- 
2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007 (in metric 
tons of pure cocaine): 

Year: 2000; 
Colombia: 530; 
Peru: 160; 
Bolivia: 80; 
Total: 770. 

Year: 2001; 
Colombia: 700; 
Peru: 160; 
Bolivia: 65; 
Total: 925. 

Year: 2002; 
Colombia: 585; 
Peru: 280; 
Bolivia: 110; 
Total: 975. 

Year: 2003; 
Colombia: 445; 
Peru: 245; 
Bolivia: 100; 
Total: 790. 

Year: 2004; 
Colombia: 415; 
Peru: 230; 
Bolivia: 115; 
Total: 760. 

Year: 2005; 
Colombia: 525; 
Peru: 250; 
Bolivia: 115; 
Total: 890. 

Year: 2006; 
Colombia: 550; 
Peru: 245; 
Bolivia: 115; 
Total: 910. 

Year: 2007; 
Colombia: 535; 
Peru: 210; 
Bolivia: 120; 
Total: 865. 

Source: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP. 

[End of figure] 

In 2008, the interagency counternarcotics community reduced Colombia's 
estimated cocaine production efficiency rate for the years 2003 through 
2007. The community attributed the reduced efficiency to Colombia's 
efforts to eradicate coca. However, according to Drug Enforcement 
Administration officials, the interagency had also raised the 
production efficiency rate in Peru for 2002 through 2005 due to better 
processing techniques, which offset much of the reduction in Colombia. 
The Drug Enforcement Administration also noted that it has not 
reassessed the cocaine production efficiency rate in Bolivia since 
1993, but expects that Bolivia has improved its processing techniques 
and is producing more pure cocaine than the interagency has estimated. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Global Security Affairs: 
2900 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900: 

September 17, 2008: 

Mr. Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Ford: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-08-1077, "Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, 
but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for 
Reducing Assistance," dated August 15, 2008 (GAO Code 320521). 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft 
report, which represents a generally accurate assessment of DoD support 
to Colombia. The enclosed DoD comments are provided for incorporation, 
along with this letter, as an appendix to the final report. 

Should you have any questions concerning this response, please do not 
hesitate to contact Mr. Edward Frothingham, Principal Director for 
Transnational Threats, in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counter-proliferation and Global 
Threats, at (703) 697-7202. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Benkert: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 15, 2008: 
GAO-08-1077 (GAO Code 320521): 

"Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has 
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing 
Assistance" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Report: 

Colombia's Security Improvements: 

DoD agrees that Colombia has made dramatic security gains since 2000. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that it is vital to continue to 
help Colombia consolidate gains made against narcoterrorists and other 
criminals until security improvements become irreversible. 

DoD Efforts to Transfer Program Responsibility 

DoD partially agrees that efforts to transfer program responsibility 
have had mixed results. The report however, fails to note progress made 
in DoD's model nationalization program - Ground Based Radars. Since 
March 31, 2008, the Colombian Air Force has operated and maintained 
five U.S. Air Force radars. DoD has initiated the Excess Defense 
Articles process for the transfer of this property, currently scheduled 
for 2010. [See comment 1] 

DoD disagrees with a statement on page 64 of the draft report, which 
states that "Defense officials noted that a comparable strategy to 
guide an anticipated drawdown in Defense's counternarcotics support to 
Colombia has not been developed." In fact, the U.S. Military Group in 
Colombia briefed GAO on DoD's Strategic Partner Transition Plan, which 
specifically addresses lower levels of DoD Counternarcotics funding 
over the next several years. [See comment 2] 

Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's comment 
letter dated September 17, 2008. 

GAO Comments: 

1. The transfer of these assets was not highlighted as a significant 
example of nationalization during the course of our review when we met 
with Defense officials in Washington, D.C., or the U.S. Military Group 
in Bogotá. Nonetheless, we added a statement to report progress in this 
area. 

2. We incorporated Defense's observation that the Strategic Partner 
Transition Plan addresses both Foreign Military Financing and Defense 
counternarcotics funding. As noted in our report, however, State's 
Political-Military Bureau declined to provide us a copy of the plan 
until it is formally released to Congress. As a result, we were not 
able to independently assess the plan's content and scope. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

September 17, 2008: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Plan 
Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved; 
U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance," GAO 
Job Code 320521. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Stuart Lippe, Senior Analyst, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at 
(202) 647-4208. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 

cc: GAO - Al Huntington: 
WHA - Thomas Shannon: 
INL - David Johnson: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has 
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance
(GAO-08-1077, GAO Code 320521): 

The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to review GAO's draft 
report "Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security 
Has Improved; U S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing 
Assistance." Separately, the Department of State has provided a number 
of technical comments for the factual content in the report, as you had 
requested. 

The Department further appreciates the wide consultations your staff 
undertook in Washington and Bogota during the preparation of this 
assessment. In particular, the report's finding that the security 
climate has improved and resulted in significant public safety progress 
is very welcome as this was a key result in our support to Plan 
Colombia and its follow-on programs. 

The Department acknowledges the accuracy of the GAO's finding that one 
of the original goals for Plan Colombia - the reduction of coca 
cultivation by 50 percent -- has not been reached. However, we believe 
the report could have been strengthened by emphasizing that there had 
been a rapid, more than three-fold increase in the area of coca under 
cultivation during the late 1990's, and that this was brought to a halt 
under Plan Colombia. Cultivation went from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 
169,000 hectares in 2001. By 2003, it had decreased to 113,000 hectares 
after intensive aerial spraying began, but grew to 157,000 in 2006. 

Cultivation of coca is, of course, only one measure for evaluating 
progress in achieving counternarcotics objectives. The report did 
include the eradication and interdiction programs that keep cocaine 
from reaching the U.S. market, and alternative development programs 
that provide new crop opportunities for farmers, but we believe that it 
would have been strengthened had these programs been highlighted. 
Moreover, declines in production potential because there is a reduced 
yield for new plantings merited being taken into account. 

One of our most important counternarcotics goals is to reduce the 
supply of cocaine reaching the United States. In 2007, the Colombian 
government reported that it had interdicted more than 190 metric tons 
of cocaine and coca base and nearly 1,000 metric tons since 2000. At 
the same time, aerial and manual eradication has removed additional 
hundreds of tons of coca from production each year. Production 
potential has been reduced as growers migrated from Putumayo, Guaviare 
and Caqueta to more marginal areas, planting less productive coca. Pure 
cocaine potential production because of reduced yields dropped from an 
estimated 700 metric tons in 2001 to 610 metric tons in 2006. 

Information that was announced by the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) on September 10, 2008, and which we regret was not 
available when the report was being drafted, indicates that new 
productivity data shows that in 2007 Colombia's maximum production 
potential dropped to about 535 metric tons of pure cocaine. Applying 
this productivity information against cultivation data from previous 
years, the past year estimates of cocaine production are also being 
revised downward. Thus, ONDCP's 2006 estimate falls from 610 metric 
tons to 550 metric tons. While ONDCP estimates that there were 167,000 
hectares of coca fields in 2007, the actual production potential of 
cocaine has declined by a significant 24 percent since 2001. [See 
comment 1] 

Reduction in coca cultivation and potential production, improved 
eradication and interdiction capacity, and alternative development 
growth were among a number of Plan Colombia goals sought by the U.S. 
and Colombia. In fact, there are a wide range of additional 
measurements that also demonstrate significant successes for U.S. 
assistance, including Colombia's transition to a new accusatorial 
system of justice and the extension of a police and other government 
agencies' presence throughout the country. These Plan Colombia programs 
and the increased security they have brought about, as the report 
accurately noted, have helped reduce kidnapping and homicide rates, and 
strengthened the capacity of the Colombian military and police to 
address long-standing threats from narcotics trafficking and terrorist 
organizations. Increased security also aided the Colombian government's 
efforts to strengthen its economy, reduce poverty, improve human rights 
and deliver humanitarian and social assistance. While the report 
describes these achievements, we believe their significance warrants 
this additional stressing. 

In many ways, Colombian programs and U.S. support have evolved from our 
original, more narrow focus into a comprehensive strategy that can now 
serve as a model to inform efforts in other challenged or failing 
states. The Department believes the report could have noted how this 
evolution in the approach to Plan Colombia's goals and objectives 
reflected an important flexibility as implementation progressed and the 
new opportunities that were presented. 

As World Bank President Robert Zoellick noted in his August 22 
Washington Post op-ed, "Colombia's experience has shown that a 
legitimate state cannot coexist with a thriving narcotics industry, 
which will corrode the government, businesses and legal systems as well 
as fund enemies." The broad strengthening of the Colombian state and 
the re-energized vigor of its democracy will allow for continued 
progress. 

Demand for illegal drugs in the United States and Europe is by 
definition beyond the scope of the report, but we find that it cannot 
be overlooked in any consideration of the results of counternarcotics 
programs, even if only mentioned here as a cautionary note for further 
attention. 

In turning to the report's recommendation that U.S. agencies develop an 
integrated nationalization plan, we note "Plan Colombia" and its follow-
on "Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development," 
both represent comprehensive Colombian strategy statements. The United 
States, as well as others in the international community, support 
separate elements of that strategy. The Colombian government's plans 
for its future funding and programs are far larger than the envisioned 
U.S. contributions, and one of Colombia's goals is to reduce the need 
for international support over time. This Colombian strategy, as 
described in our April 2007 and April 2008 reports to Congress, 
represents a well thought-out plan that the United States supports in 
cooperation with the Colombian government. 

We agree that the Departments of State and Defense should continue to 
improve coordination of nationalization plans between themselves and 
with the Colombian government in managing the transition of our 
military support programs. As the report states, significant steps are 
already underway, and we appreciate this recognition. 

The report also describes U.S. intentions to maintain support, albeit 
at lesser levels, for the Colombian National Police's Aerial 
Eradication Program and Aviation Service in order to address continuing 
U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics objectives. Assistance for these 
police programs was in place before the beginning of Plan Colombia and 
will remain necessary in the future as we work with Colombian partners 
to strengthen police eradication programs and rural police forces, and 
maritime interdiction capabilities. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has developed 
sector-specific nationalization plans that involve the transfer of 
program responsibilities to Colombia. As the report noted, these 
programs do not have substantial physical assets to transfer. Instead, 
nationalization plans have focused on the Colombian government assuming 
responsibility for the leadership of Plan Colombia and follow-on 
programs initiatives that are also a high priority for the United 
States. 

The Department of Justice does not have a nationalization plan, as 
such. Its programs provide support, technical training and capacity 
building for justice sector and law enforcement programs that are 
managed by Colombia. Justice is, however, increasingly focused on 
"training the trainers" and, as the report also described in the case 
of USAID, its programs do not involve the "turn over" of substantial 
physical assets. 

While there is presently strong Congressional funding support for these 
social, economic development and rule of law programs, State, Justice 
and USAID also agree on the need to improve coordination and promote 
potential efficiencies to better transfer operations and funding 
responsibilities to Colombia. 

Finally, because so many of the "moving parts" of our assistance to 
Colombia are quite different, the Department will consult with 
Congressional Members and staff to keep them informed of the plans to 
achieve U.S. policy goals and our efforts to incorporate and address 
Congressional concerns in those plans. Improved coordination within the 
Executive Branch as well as with the Congress is desirable. In 
particular, the report on our multiyear strategy for assistance to 
Colombia, which the Department of State has provided to Congress 
annually since 2006, offers the most useful planning format through 
which to further address the recommendations and concerns GAO has 
described. This report can be expected soon after approval of the FY 
2009 budget and will include more detailed information on the 
transition of our assistance, in particular our military support 
programs. 

We appreciate your consideration of these comments, which have been 
coordinated with the appropriate officials at the U.S. Departments of 
State, Defense and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. 

Following are GAO's comments on the State Department's comment letter 
dated September 17, 2008. 

GAO Comment: 

1. We included additional information on coca cultivation and cocaine 
production patterns in the final report. We also note that 2007 coca 
cultivation and cocaine production data did not become available until 
after this report was released for agency comments, and we have added 
it, as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

Executive Office Of The President: 
Office Of National Drug Control Policy: 
Washington, D.C. 20503: 

September 17, 2008: 

Mr. Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548-0001: 

Dear Mr. Ford: 

We welcome the opportunity to review GAO's draft report "Plan Colombia: 
Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. 
Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance" (GAO 08-
1077). We also request incorporation of the following response as an 
appendix. In a separate document, as per your request, we have provided 
comments on some of the factual content in the report. 

ONDCP acknowledges your finding that one of the ten original goals for 
the Colombian Government's Plan Colombia-a 50 percent reduction in the 
growth, production, and distribution of illicit drugs within six years-
was not completely met. However, the report title gives the false 
impression GAO addressed all ten goals of Plan Colombia, and that there 
was limited or no success in drug reduction. [See comment 1] We submit 
that Colombia's achievement in reducing, with U.S. support, illicit 
drug production in heroin and cocaine should be acknowledged at the 
very least as a partial success. Cocaine potential production decreased 
by 24 percent, while heroin-reduction efforts actually exceeded the 50 
percent goal. We would also underscore the fact that the other nine 
goals for Plan Colombia were substantially met and/or exceeded. [See 
comment 2] 

Your report accurately demonstrates that maintaining security is 
crucial to achieving all ten goals. In this regard, Plan Colombia has 
fully succeeded. Nowhere is this more evident than on the drug-
reduction front. As you indicate, funding for Plan Colombia from 2000 
through 2007 allowed for the development and implementation of programs 
sufficiently robust to advance security and reduce the production of 
illicit drugs. But the report does not take into account the dramatic 
shift in funding that occurred in 2008 just as drug control programs 
were beginning to bear fruit. Reduced, current-year funding has 
adversely affected the employment of eradication assets. Eradication 
goals slipped from 160,000 hectares in 2007 to 130,000 hectares in 2008 
(nearly 20 percent) and will drop further to 100,000 hectares in 2009. 
Spray aircraft have been reduced from 23 in 2007 to just 13 in 2008, 
and the number of spray bases will decrease by 33 percent. 

Today, we are seeing historic changes in the U.S. drug market. Heroin 
purity continues on a downward trajectory. Between January 2007 and 
June 2008, the price per pure gram of cocaine increased 27 percent and 
cocaine retail purity fell nearly 16 percent. These supply reduction 
indicators are complemented by signs of reduced demand that together 
give evidence of a sustained, historic decrease in drug availability. 
Without adequate funding, however, future success is in jeopardy. 

We appreciate the opportunity to review the report and ask that you 
consider placing greater emphasis on recent successes in combating 
illicit drug production. We also propose altering the report's title to 
suggest a broader view of Plan Colombia objectives - "Plan Colombia 
Yields Substantially Improved Security; Drug Reduction Goals Partially 
Achieved," for example - and adding a section that articulates the 
challenges created by changes in the funding stream. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John P. Walters: 
Director: 

Following are GAO's comments on the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy's comment letter dated September 17, 2008. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We disagree. In characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia's goals 
and U.S. programs, we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as our 
prior reports, and discussed the goals and associated programs with 
U.S. officials both in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in 
Bogotá, and with numerous government of Colombia officials. We 
addressed U.S. assistance provided for nine specific Colombian military 
and National Police programs to increase their operational capacity, as 
well as, numerous State, Justice, and USAID efforts to promote social 
and economic justice, including alternative development, and to promote 
the rule of law, including judicial reform and capacity building. We 
also note that State, USAID, and Defense did not raise similar 
concerns. 

2. The drop in potential cocaine production that ONDCP cites compares 
2001 (when coca cultivation and production peaked) to 2007. Our report 
compares 2000 (when U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was first approved) 
to 2006 (Plan Colombia's drug reduction goal was tied to 6-year time 
period). We also note that 2007 coca cultivation and cocaine production 
data did not become available until after this report was released for 
agency comments, and we have added it, as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USIAD: 
From The American People: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]: 

September 11, 2008: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) response on the draft GAO report entitled "PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug 
Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies 
Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance" (GAO-08-1077). 
Separately, we have provided a number of technical comments on the 
factual content of the report, as you requested. 

We find the report's analysis of USAID assistance to be less thorough 
than the State and Military sections, with several generalizations 
requiring more analysis, which we have attempted to outline. There are 
a few areas of clarification which we have detailed in the enclosed 
commentary for your consideration. The report outlines several 
constraints affecting our development efforts in Colombia. USAID agrees 
with other USG agencies that we can improve coordination within the 
Executive Branch as well as with the Congress. However, we continue to 
rely on the Colombian government's strategies for its own development 
as outlined in "Plan Colombia" and its follow-on "Strategy to 
Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development," to serve as the 
overarching framework for our support. In Colombia, USAID works very 
closely with State Department offices involved in the assistance effort 
and in close partnership with the Government of Colombia. As you will 
see in the attached, USAID is working hard to promote nationalization 
of the programs it is supporting. Regarding the report's recommendation 
on developing better indicators, we believe it would be helpful for 
USAID/Washington, in coordination with its field missions and the 
interagency group, to develop common indicators that would enhance 
USAID's ability to measure AD performance. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft GAO report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Sean R. Mulvaney: 
Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

Enclosure: a/s: 

USAID Response to GAO Report: 

"Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has 
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing 
Assistance" 

(GAO-08-1077) August 2008: 

Recommendation #1: 

Joint Nationalization Plan: The GAO recommends that Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General and the USAID Administrator, in 
coordination with the government of Colombia, develop an integrated 
nationalization plan that details plans for turning over operational 
and funding responsibilities for U.S. supported programs to Colombia. 

Response: In the draft report, the GAO team concludes that "Justice and 
USAID have not yet developed detailed strategies and plans to guide 
their nationalization efforts..." As discussed and presented to the GAO 
team, USAID has developed nationalization or "Colombianization" 
strategies for each of our programs. [See comment 1] These strategies 
differ depending upon the sector, but they focus on increasing 
Government of Colombia (GOC) or private sector support and investment 
in activities concurrent with decreasing USAID resources, particularly 
budget support for salaries. An equally important component of 
nationalization is expanding Colombian operational control and 
management of programs, and USAID has been very successful in achieving 
this objective. 

For example, with USAID/Colombia's Democracy and Governance (DG) 
program, USAID has signed four agreements with key GOC partner 
ministries to document political and financial commitments from GOC 
stakeholders on actions they will take to achieve short and long term 
program goals. For example, in USAID's Justice Program, USAID has 
decreased its financial commitment from funding 100 percent of the cost 
of a justice house to 40 percent. This is a direct result of USAID's 
nationalization strategy and the agreement signed with the Ministry of 
Interior and Justice. The GOC is picking up a large share of this 
burden; of the 10 new regional justice houses that are being 
constructed in rural post-conflict areas, USAID investments total $4 
million, compared to $6 million invested by the GOC. Thus, the GOC is 
clearly moving to fund the majority of investments in this program. 
This trend is also reflected through USAID's support to Colombian 
public defenders. Whereas USAID's justice program previously funded the 
salaries of 35 defenders at a cost of approximately $361,000, the GOC 
is now paying 100 percent of the salaries of more than 1,600 public 
defenders with a GOC investment of more than $31 million. 

A detailed nationalization strategy also guides USAID's Human Rights 
Program. As mentioned above, USAID signed "Letters of Understanding" 
with key GOC counterparts clearly outlining the GOC's financial and 
political commitments. These efforts have already resulted in notable 
progress toward nationalization; the GOC now assumes 100 percent of the 
costs of the Communities at Risk Program and the Human Rights 
Observatory. There have been similar results with the GOC's Protection 
Program and Early Warning System; USAID now only supports 1.5 percent 
of Protection Program's total costs ($676,000), compared to 18 percent 
six years ago. Similar accomplishments are underway under the Early 
Warning System. In 2003 USAID funded 100 percent of Early Warning 
System annual costs ($532,000) and by 2009 USAID will be funding only 
50 percent. 

Under the Alternative Development (AD) program, private as well as 
public sector resources are fundamental to nationalization. USAID-
supported AD projects are funded between 70 to 90 percent by outside 
groups on average, and have leveraged over $700 million in 18 months to 
support AD initiatives. USAID is currently assisting the GOC to 
establish a government-wide policy, definition and budget for 
alternative development and how it should be implemented and managed by 
the GOC and other stakeholders. In anticipation of this new policy, 
USAID made a formal request to the GOC to create an "Alternative 
Development budget" across all implementing ministries and agencies in 
the government. Currently, the GOC does not have such a budget, and 
many ministries'/agencies' policies and programs are not coordinated 
with each other. The creation of a government-wide AD budget is a 
critical step to ensuring that the USG has a coordinated set of 
entities with financial resources to which the AD program can be turned 
over during the next several years. 

USAID's nationalization strategy for the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) program has led to the leveraging of significant amounts of 
funding from the GOC. Since 2000 USAID investments have remained 
relatively static while GOC resources have skyrocketed. In 2003 the 
GOC's budget for IDP assistance was approximately $67 million, while 
USAID's was $41.5 million. In 2008, the GOC's budget is approximately 
$528 million and USAID's budget was reduced to $35 million. The GOC has 
entered into separate agreements with USAID partners with its own 
financing, demonstrating the catalytic role our assistance plays. 

With regards to the Demobilization and Reintegration (DR) program, 
during the GAO team's visit, they heard first-hand how USAID was a 
catalyst during the initial years of 2004-05 when the GOC was just 
developing the DR program. Over the past several years GOC funding 
significantly increased and USG funding has been less than 25 percent 
of GOC resources. The GOC's projected budget for 2009-2011 is between 
$130-145 million per year compared to USAID's projected levels of 
approximately $16 million. USG assistance has always been complementary 
to the GOC work, providing specific technical assistance in critical 
areas. A new High Commissioner for Reintegration is now in place 
providing the leadership needed to sustain this effort. 

USAID is playing an important role in supporting the growth of the 
Colombian economy to allow the GOC to increase spending levels and 
decrease reliance on U.S. assistance. Colombia's economic takeoff after 
2003 did not happen by chance. In the Trade Capacity Building Group of 
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations that started in 2004, the 
U.S. and Colombian governments agreed on an ambitious agenda including 
52 areas of economic reform needed for Colombia to better participate 
in and benefit from the FTA. USAID provided technical assistance to the 
GOC to help it design and implement policies ranging from fiscal reform 
to financial sector strengthening to improving the environment for 
small business, and many others. This effort has paid off, and should 
be noted in the report. The World Bank's 2008 Doing Business report 
ranked Colombia among the top ten reformers worldwide, citing Colombian 
efforts supported by USAID. This reform agenda jump-started the 
business environment: Colombia's $130 billion economy grew at 6.8 
percent in 2006, the highest rate in 28 years and two points faster 
than the Latin American average. Colombia has reduced its inflation 
rate from 16.7 percent in 1998 to 4.5 percent in 2006. 

In addition, regarding microfinance, USAID doesn't just advise on 
existing policies or "involve relevant Colombian staff in project 
design activities" (p. 65, last paragraph), but is supporting the GOC's 
leadership in its efforts to reform the financial system and develop 
the microfinance industry. 

Another element of USAID's nationalization strategy has been the 
initiation of consultative group meetings with its primary GOC 
counterpart, Accion Social. Thematic consultative groups, made up of 
USAID, GOC and USAID contractor personnel, meet on a regular basis, 
reviewing implementation and progress towards agreed upon goals. A high 
level consultative group made up of Accion Social and USAID senior 
officers also meets regularly, fostering GOC ownership and voice in 
management of programs. 

Finally, USAID developed and presented a "Colombianization" strategy in 
2006 as part of an inter-agency effort. While USAID's nationalization 
effort is different than the Department of State's International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) and the Department of 
Defense (DOD), which are responsible for the transfer of assets, 
USAID's focus is on reducing the dependence of the national government 
on salary support and transferring of leadership to Colombian entities 
in the four key sectors that are priorities for the U.S. government. As 
demonstrated above in numbers, USAID has already been very successful 
in "nationalizing" many of its programs. 

Recommendation #2: 

Performance Measurement: The GAO recommends that the Administrator of 
USAID develop performance measurements to help USAID (1) assess whether 
alternative development assistance is reducing the production of 
illegal narcotics and (2) determine to what extent the agency's 
alternative development projects are self-sustaining. 

1) Reducing the production of illegal narcotics: Alternative 
development (AD) assistance is one part of the USG's three prong 
counternarcotics strategy, (the others being eradication and 
interdiction and security assistance), which is not reflected in the 
report. In this sense, AD programs are not social programs as labeled 
in the draft report. [See comment 2] Four criteria guide AD 
programming: economic development potential, existence of illicit 
crops, existence of violence/conflict, and local government buy-in. The 
report states that the "majority" of coca is grown outside of areas 
where AD programs are in place. It is important to highlight that USAID 
programs are active in difficult areas as characterized by coca 
cultivation such as Norte Santander, Bolivar, Putumayo, parts of 
Antioquia, Meta and other areas. AD is also a medium- to long-term 
initiative. Preliminary results may be seen with one growing season, 
but initiatives to achieve sustainable eradication of illicit crops may 
take years to realize, as we have seen in areas such as Tibu, Norte de 
Santander; Magdalena Medio, and Sur de Bolivar. Reducing or redeploying 
scarce resources prematurely in order to relocate to other areas - 
"chasing the coca" - could destabilize these fragile areas still 
vulnerable to coca cultivation. 

USAID supported AD programs are designed to have the greatest impact in 
places where there are people, which is why programs cover half of the 
geographic territory of the country where 80-85 percent of Colombians 
live. [See comment 3] Further, USAID is working in areas directly 
affected by the drug industry. In the 75 municipalities covered under 
the ADAM program, there was presence of coca or poppy in 2001-07 in 73 
percent of them, with the remaining municipalities directly bordering 
those with presence. In the case of the 545 MIDAS supported 
municipalities, coca or poppy is present in 31 percent, and 21 percent 
of municipalities are bordering areas with growth. Another 12 percent 
are "at risk" areas and the remainder is in zones "vulnerable" to the 
illicit economy. It is also worth noting that the United Nation (UN)'s 
verification of the coca free status [Footnote 1] of the townships in 
which USAID's AD programs are located indicate that the United States 
Government has helped establish coca-free bulwarks in 688 well-defined 
areas where coca was either present or threatening. This is impressive 
because it contributes to the sustainable eradication of illicit crops. 
These municipalities are in departments of: Narifo, Putumayo, Cauca, 
Antioquia, Bolivar, Santander, and Norte de Santander. Another 
independent source indicates that, as a reflection of families affected 
by the Colombian drug trade, USAID programs are positively impacting 
social and economic development of 94 percent of families (361,000 out 
of 382,600 families total) involved in the drug industry in those 
communities. Primary coca cultivation areas do in fact lie within the 
MIDAS/ADAM corridors. 

Indicators: We believe USAID's AD efforts do not lack formal 
measures/indicators to gauge whether AD initiatives contribute to our 
stated strategic goals. However, it is true that these indicators are 
not reported to Washington (Andean Counternarcotics Initiative (ACI) 
indicators). A common complaint from field Missions regarding AD 
programs is that Washington stakeholders prefer output oriented 
indicators, which is why the mandatory indicators under AD projects are 
focused on the output-based ACI indicators. Also, since AD is but one 
part of the three-legged counternarcotics programming stool, the issue 
of appropriate measures/indicators is not related solely to alternative 
development. That said, USAID's MIDAS and ADAM programs include 
indicators that assess impact at the community level, i.e., changes in 
coca cultivation in municipalities where programs are in place, 
political and social stabilization, among others. 

To improve it's monitoring and evaluation system, USAID/Colombia is 
working with the USAID/Peru and Bolivia missions to identify new 
indicators to help measure progress toward strategic goals. We believe, 
however, that USAID Washington should lead an effort, in conjunction 
with the field and the interagency group, to develop common indicators 
that would enhance USAID's ability to measure AD performance. [See 
comment 4] 

The report fails to link key indicators such as organizations 
strengthened, increased gross market value and families benefited (from 
technical assistance in productive activities) to sustainable impact at 
the family and farm level. Thus, there appears to be no recognition of 
the link between a permanent increase in productive capacity leading to 
a permanent increase in income generating capacity, complemented by 
strengthened associations more capable of advocating for members in the 
marketplace, and sustainability. [See comment 5] 

Self-sustaining: As noted in the previous section, all of USAID's 
alternative development projects receive at a minimum 70 percent 
support from outside sources. As a result, all of these activities will 
continue after USAID support ends. [See comment 6] 

Footnote: 

During the UN's 734 verification missions since November of 2007, only 
28 townships (4 percent) did not pass because of the presence of 
illicit crops and eight verification missions (1 percent) could not be 
undertaken because of security issues. 

Following are GAO's comments on the U. S. Agency for International 
Development's comment letter dated September 11, 2008. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We modified the report to note USAID has initiated nationalization 
efforts for each of its major program areas and several major projects. 
However, we note that USAID's nationalization efforts are program and 
project specific and are not integrated with the range of other U.S. 
government efforts, as we recommend should be done. 

2. We believe we fairly characterized USAID's assistance role in the 
counternarcotics strategy for Colombia. However, we did not intend to 
imply that USAID alternative development programs are social programs. 
We intended to note that USAID's assistance supports social 
infrastructure, such as schools and other community projects. We 
clarified the text where appropriate. 

3. We only intended to note that most coca growing areas do not receive 
USAID assistance for various reasons, including restrictions by the 
government of Colombia. USAID resources are scarce and must be deployed 
to the areas most likely to achieve sustainable results. We added text 
to note that the majority of the Colombian population lives within the 
geographic areas where USAID operates. However, the fact that the 
majority of coca is cultivated outside of USAID's economic corridors 
poses challenges for USAID's strategic goal of reducing the production 
of illegal drugs. 

4. We endorse and commend USAID/Colombia's attempt to work at both the 
mission level and with USAID/Washington to develop common indicators 
which would enhance USAID's ability to assess the performance of 
alternative development projects. 

5. We recognize key indicators such as increased gross market value and 
number of families benefited are useful in determining the impact of 
USAID programs at a family or farm level. However, these indicators do 
not measure the sustainability of the projects, such as whether 
families or businesses have continued in legal productive activities 
after USAID assistance has ended. 

6. We agree that outside support for USAID alternative development 
projects is a key component of creating self-sustaining projects. 
However, this point does not address the fact that USAID does not 
currently collect and report data on whether USAID supported activities 
continue after its involvement ends. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment: 

GAO Contact: 

Jess Ford, (202) 512-4268, or FordJ@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the above named individual, A.H. Huntington, III, 
Assistant Director; Joseph Carney, Jonathan Fremont, Emily Gupta, Jose 
Peña, and Michael ten Kate made key contributions to this report. 
Technical assistance was provided by Joyce Evans, Jena Sinkfield, and 
Cynthia Taylor. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has 
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are 
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-784]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008. 

Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics 
Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains 
High. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-215T]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2007. 

Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics 
Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United 
States, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018]. 
Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007. 

State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for 
Managing Its Aviation Fleet. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-264]. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2007. 

Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug 
Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200]. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005. 

Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón-Coveñas 
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2005. 

Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New 
Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to 
Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2004. 

Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being 
Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-918]. Washington, 
D.C.: July 29, 2004. 

Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for 
U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783]. Washington, D.C.: June 
16, 2003. 

Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to 
Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-820T]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 3, 2003. 

Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-319R]. Washington, 
D.C.: January 8, 2003. 

Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit 
Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-291]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 8, 2002. 

Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit 
Zone Interdiction Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-13]. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2002. 

Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program 
Support, but Safety and Security Should Be Enhanced. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1021] Washington, D.C.: 
September 14, 2001. 

Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce 
Results. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-26]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2000. 

Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-76T]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 12, 2000. 

Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-90R]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2000. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in 
1999, U.S. funding for counternarcotics purposes was not approved until 
July 2000, leading to some uncertainty about when the 6-year goal was 
to be achieved. However, the Colombian government announced that it 
intended to eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006. For the purposes 
of this report, we use 2000 as the beginning of Plan Colombia and 2006 
to mark its end. We also focus on the cultivation and processing of 
illicit narcotics because only combined "distribution" or "flow" data 
for South America is developed for cocaine and no flow data is 
developed for heroin. 

[2] The drug trade in Colombia is dominated by the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC); the National 
Liberation Army (ELN); criminal gangs which include former members of 
the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which demobilized 
under a peace agreement with the government; and several drug cartels. 

[3] The National Police are part of the Ministry of Defense. 

[4] Formally titled the Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote 
Social Development. 

[5] Plan Colombia's security component is supplemented by government of 
Colombia security strategies and military plans of operations issued 
between 2003 and 2007. These strategies and plans are included in all 
references to "Plan Colombia" and PCCP in this report. 

[6] To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the 
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance 
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though 
all of it may not have been obligated or expended. 

[7] ONDCP establishes policies, priorities, and objectives for the 
nation's drug control program. The Director of ONDCP evaluates, 
coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug 
efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts 
sustain and complement state and local anti-drug activities. 

[8] These are the Army's Aviation Brigade and Infrastructure Security 
Strategy, the Air Force's Air Bridge Denial Program, and the National 
Police's Air Service and Aerial Eradication Program. 

[9] See H. Report 109-152 (p. 63) accompanying H.R. 3057, the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act for fiscal 
year 2006 and H. Report 109-486 (p. 40) accompanying H.R. 5522, the 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act 
for fiscal year 2007. 

[10] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans 
to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia, March 2006. 

[11] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, April 
2007, and Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, 
April 2008. 

[12] Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central 
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). CNC expanded 
the number of hectares surveyed for coca growth beginning in 2004 in an 
effort to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the estimate. 
Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey area rose from 10.9 million 
hectares to 23.6 million hectares. 

[13] ONDCP announced in September 2008 that estimated cocaine 
production rates for 2003 through 2007 had been revised downward based 
on the results of recent research showing diminished coca field yield 
rates in Colombia. On the basis of these revised estimates, ONDCP noted 
that cocaine production decreased by almost 25 percent from a high of 
700 metric tons in 2001 to 535 metric tons in 2007. 

[14] Hydrochloride laboratories are used in the final stages of 
processing coca into cocaine and are considered high-value targets. 

[15] Foreign Military Financing funds are appropriated to State but are 
managed by the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá. 

[16] FARC and ELN remain active. AUC was demobilized under the Justice 
and Peace process instituted in 2003. 

[17] FARC, ELN, and AUC are on State's list of terrorist organizations. 
Recognizing that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are 
inextricably linked, Congress provided "expanded authority" in 2002, 
which enabled the government of Colombia to use U.S.-provided equipment 
to fight groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to 
fight drug trafficking. 

[18] The Secretary of State is required to file an annual report to 
Congress on the activities of U.S. businesses that have entered into 
agreements in the previous 12-month period with State or Defense to 
carry out counternarcotics activities in Colombia. For example, see 
Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, 
Apr. 21, 2008. 

[19] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans 
to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia, March 2006. 

[20] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, March 
2007; and Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, 
April 2008. 

[21] According to ONDCP officials, a similar assessment is not done for 
heroin. 

[22] Not all of this cocaine reaches the United States. The United 
States and other countries in the "transit zone" between South America 
and the United States interdict hundreds of tons of cocaine a year. See 
GAO, Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries 
Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans 
Are Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-784] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008); GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance 
Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs 
Continue to Flow into the United States, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
17, 2007); and GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely 
Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance 
Measures for Transit Zone Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
15, 2005). 

[23] The analysis also suggested that while the government increased 
its presence in most areas of the country, some became more contested, 
including the southern department of Putumayo--a critical region of 
coca cultivation--and the eastern department of Vichada, which borders 
Venezuela. 

[24] According to Defense officials, FARC derives about 80 percent of 
its total revenue from drug trafficking. 

[25] For example, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (alias "Raul Reyes"), a member 
of FARC's central command, was killed in a raid over the border with 
Ecuador in March 2008. 

[26] International Crisis Group, Colombia's New Armed Groups, Latin 
America Report Number 20, May 10, 2007. 

[27] Pursuant to the "Leahy Amendment," U.S. assistance to the 
Colombian military may only be provided to units that have been vetted 
for human rights abuses as certified by the Secretary of State. 

[28] The United States originally provided the brigade with a total of 
72 helicopters (33 UH-1N, 25 UH-II, and 14 UH-60). According to State 
officials, several aircraft were transferred to the police, some were 
nationalized, and others have crashed. 

[29] For example, this fleet includes seven UH-IIs and two Blackhawks 
transferred to the Army Aviation Brigade as part of Colombia's 
infrastructure security strategy. 

[30] See GAO, Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term 
Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 16, 2003). 

[310] State officials noted that these levels represent nearly a 50 and 
75 percent reduction, respectively, in on-hand contract pilots and 
mechanics since 2004 when the contractor reduction plan was put in 
place. 

[32] This loan agreement runs through December 2009. During this 
period, the Colombians have agreed to assume all operating and 
maintenance costs. 

[33] In August 2008, one of these helicopters crashed. 

[34] The United States originally agreed to provide training and 
equipment for a brigade made up of three battalions (which became 
operational in December 1999, December 2000, and May 2001, 
respectively) and a headquarters staff that initially totaled about 
2,285 professional and conscripted soldiers. 

[35] This support refers to the counternarcotics funding directly 
appropriated to Defense, as well as FMF funds provided through State's 
Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. 

[36] According to Colombian officials, Joint Task Force-Omega was 
established in 2004 to coordinate the efforts of the Colombian Army, 
Air Force, and Marines against FARC in its traditional stronghold in 
central Colombia, which incorporates portions of the departments of 
Meta, Guaviare, and Caquetá. 

[37] Defense Planning Assistance Training Teams provide military 
planning and training to Colombian military units, including the mobile 
brigades. 

[38] Joint Task Force-Omega is supported by five mobile Army brigades. 
According to Colombian officials, Joint Task Force-Omega, which is 
comprised of about 10,000 soldiers, is tasked with clearing FARC from 
central Colombia and holding reclaimed areas with a focus on the pilot 
project for re-asserting government control in La Macarena in Meta. 

[39] This strategy consisted of three phases. Phase one focused on 
protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline. Phase two was designed 
to protect the rest of the pipeline, and phase three was to secure 
other infrastructure throughout Colombia. However, phases two and three 
of the strategy were later broadly incorporated into Colombia's Defense 
Policy and Security Strategy in 2003. 

[40] According to NAS officials, one of the UH-II helicopters crashed 
in 2006. 

[41] See GAO, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño 
Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005). 

[42] State provided an additional $35 million in fiscal year 2001 to 
the Colombian Air Force to upgrade interceptor aircraft. These are used 
to the support the ABD program and other air force missions. 

[43] The ABD program operated in both Colombia and Peru during the 
1990s. The program was suspended in both countries in April 2001 when a 
legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S. 
citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in August 
2003 after additional safeguards were established. 

[44] One of these aircraft crashed and is unrepairable. 

[45] See GAO, Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has 
Implemented New Safeguards, But Its Effect on Drug Trafficking is Not 
Clear,[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005). 

[46] Colombia's efforts are supplemented by U.S. interdiction resources 
as described in our November 2005 report on transit zone operations. 
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200]. 

[47] State officials told us that a total of 17 UH-1Ns are dedicated to 
the eradication program. As of August 2008, 4 of these aircraft were 
undergoing conversion to UH-1STs at Patrick Air Force Base as part of a 
service life extension program. The cost of upgrading each aircraft is 
approximately $3 million and the total estimated cost of upgrading all 
17 aircraft is about $50 million. 

[48] According to NAS officials, on average, an estimated 40 percent of 
the coca eradicated is replanted, although in some cases, NAS officials 
have validated that up to about 80 percent of the coca sprayed appears 
to have been replanted or pruned. 

[49] Ecuador has expressed concern that spray drifting across the 
border into its territory has caused damage. In December 2005, Colombia 
agreed to stop spraying within a 10-kilometer strip along its border 
with Ecuador. However, due to concerns about the growth of coca in this 
area, in late 2006, the Colombian government resumed spray operations 
for 2 months, provoking a diplomatic dispute that has not been 
resolved. 

[50] All ARAVI pilots are Colombian National Police personnel. 

[51] Defense is providing the Colombian Air Force with a Limited 
Aviation Depot that will also service ARAVI helicopters, enabling the 
military and police to perform some major depot-level repairs in 
Colombia. Defense is also funding a Logistics Command and Control 
System that will reduce the need for each service to maintain a full 
complement of spare parts by allowing them to share parts. 

[52] See GAO, State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic 
Approach for Managing Its Aviation Fleet, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-264] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
2, 2007). 

[53] State officials told us that legislation eliminated funding for 
this program in fiscal year 2008, but the Department has requested $19 
million in funding for fiscal year 2009. 

[54] According to NAS officials, the Carabineros' mission was later 
expanded to include providing security for manual eradication efforts 
and targeting the new criminal gangs formed in the wake of AUC's 
demobilization. 

[55] GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is 
Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily 
Sustainable, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004). 

[56] Acción Social is USAID's government of Colombia counterpart for 
alternative development and other social programs. 

[57] Acción Social partners with the United Nations Office of Drug 
Control (UNODC) to monitor areas that receive alternative development 
assistance and verify they are coca and poppy free. According to USAID, 
if illicit crops are found, all alternative development projects in the 
community where the coca is found are to be suspended. The community 
has up to 38 days to manually eradicate the crops, and UNODC will 
return to verify if the illicit crops have been eradicated. If so, the 
alternative development projects may resume. 

[58] USAID tracked eradication of coca and poppy through the end of 
2006. In 2007, USAID stopped tracking eradication of illicit crops 
because alternative development program communities cannot cultivate 
illicit drugs to participate. 

[59] According to State, PRM also provided un-earmarked funding to the 
United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, a 
portion of which may have been used to assist IDPs. 

[60] The government of Colombia has a lengthy IDP registration process 
and only registers people as IDPs if they have been displaced by 
violence committed by a recognized illegal armed group, such as FARC or 
ELN. Those who have been displaced by criminal gangs, by economic 
hardship, or by eradication programs are not eligible for benefits. 

[61] While the majority were pardoned, over 2,000 AUC combatants were 
implicated in major crimes. 

[62] According to the government of Colombia, since 2002, over 14,000 
individuals have deserted from other illegal armed groups, primarily 
FARC. 

[63] The intelligence received from FARC deserters has been useful to 
Colombian military officials. FARC desertion is on the rise; according 
to the government of Colombia, 50 percent more FARC members deserted in 
2007 than in 2006. 

[64] USAID also supports the consolidation of security gains made 
through governance support in conflictive zones. 

[65] A Colombian constitutional mandate gives citizens the right to a 
public defender. 

[66] The 5-year Regional Governance Consolidation Program supports the 
Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action (CCAI) in 26 
municipalities, which the Colombian military regained control of from 
the FARC more than 2 years ago, where CCAI works to provide both 
security and services for the local population in order to consolidate 
military gains. USAID assists CCAI in building the capacity of local 
institutions (such as mayors' offices and city councils) to implement 
good governance practices and improve the delivery of services. 

[67] The Initial Governance Response Program supports CCAI in high- 
priority municipalities in areas traditionally held by the FARC, which 
are major producers of coca, and also the location of ongoing military 
operations of the Colombian military. The program supports a Colombian 
government project to combine military, police, and civilian efforts to 
simultaneously support the different components of the "clear, hold, 
and consolidate" strategy. 

[68] USAID is also supporting CCAI on the development of a second 
consolidation plan for four municipalities in the departments of Sucre 
and Bolivar. 

[69] The oral accusatory system was implemented in four geographic 
phases between 2005 and January 2008. The Colombian constitution 
requires that criminal cases be processed under either the old written 
system or the new oral accusatory system, depending on when the alleged 
crime occurred. 

[70] These programs are the Army's Aviation Brigade and Infrastructure 
Security Strategy, the Air Force's Air Bridge Denial Program, and the 
National Police's Air Service and Aerial Eradication Program. 

[71] State noted that it will seek to maintain pre-Plan Colombia 
support levels, adjusted for inflation, to main "high impact" programs 
such as the National Police's air service and aerial eradication 
program, rural police support, and maritime interdiction efforts. 

[72] In 2004, the NAS and the Office of Aviation in Bogotá brought key 
staff together to discuss and develop a formal contractor reduction 
plan for the Army Aviation Brigade centered on replacing contract 
pilots and mechanics with Colombian Army personnel trained to Office of 
Aviation standards. The working group defined "nationalization" as a 
sustained capability within the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade to 
support its operations using trained and equipped soldiers able to (1) 
safely and successfully execute assigned missions while operating and 
maintaining assigned aircraft to State's Office of Aviation standards, 
and (2) operate with minimal U.S. government oversight while the 
government of Colombia incrementally assumes funding responsibility. 

[73] As of June 2008, 43 out of 336 pilots and 87 out of 283 mechanics 
were contract personnel. 

[74] According to the U.S. Military Group, it identified 20 programs it 
considers vital to achieving "irreversibility" and maintaining a 
strategic partnership with Colombia while still absorbing mandated 
budget cuts. These programs are divided into eight program categories 
ranked by funding priority as follows: rotary wing operations, ground 
operations, riverine operations, fixed wing operations, joint 
initiatives, naval interdiction, governability, and intelligence and 
communication. 

[75] In 2003 and 2004, we recommended that U.S. agencies develop plans 
to guide future U.S. assistance to the Colombian military, National 
Police, and civilian agencies. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783] and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726]. 

[76] State declined to provide a copy of this strategy to us citing its 
deliberative nature but claimed it substantially reflects congressional 
concerns and will be made available to us and Congress as soon as 
possible. 

[77] Proposals developed by State, call for total military and 
nonmilitary assistance of about $4 billion (fiscal years 2007 through 
2013). 

[78] Center for Strategic and International Studies. Back from the 
Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007 (Washington, D.C.: 
November 2007). 

[79] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783]. 

[80] The Department of Homeland Security concluded our report did not 
deal with any programs or projects under its control. As a result, they 
offered no comments on the report's contents, findings, or 
recommendations. 

[End of section] 

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