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entitled 'Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report:
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed' which was released on June
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2008:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed:
GAO-08-837:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-837, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global
war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In
January 2007, the President announced The New Way Forward to stem
violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national
reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to
achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008.
GAO discusses progress in meeting key goals in The New Way Forward: (1)
improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces;
and help the Iraqi government (3) enact key legislation, (4) spend
capital budgets, and (5) provide essential services. GAO also discusses
U.S. strategies for Iraq.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies,
the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff
stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq-
related audits, which provided baseline information for this
assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s
authority.
What GAO Found:
The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that
prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or
belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. Overall violence, as
measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq,
from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day
in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the
increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental
security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army’s
declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher
levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security
environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi
forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May
2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the
Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi
units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has
remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the
development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single
unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued
dependence on U.S. and coalition forces.
The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some
Ba’athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define
provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important
legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections.
Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled. A goal
of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis’ efforts to enact
all key legislation by the end of 2007.
Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it
budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq’s
central ministries, responsible for security and essential services,
spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007—down
from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years.
Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak
procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq’s efforts to spend
its capital budgets.
Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008
production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below
the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about
half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S.
goals for Iraq’s water sector are close to being reached. The unstable
security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have
contributed to the shortfalls.
The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New
Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed
and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy
given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January
2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet
goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Departments of Defense and State, in
conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy
for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and
addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern,
defend, and sustain itself.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-837]. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background: Evolution of U.S. Strategies for Iraq:
Improving Security Conditions:
Developing Iraqi Security Forces:
Enacting Key Iraqi Legislation:
Spending Capital Budgets:
Delivering Essential Services:
U.S. Efforts to Update Strategies to Stabilize and Rebuild Iraq:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18
Iraq Benchmarks:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: The Administration's Comparison of Key Assumptions in The New
Way Forward and Prior U.S. Strategy:
Table 2: Number of Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005, January 2007, and
April 2008:
Table 3: Iraq Investment Budget and Expenditures, 2005-2007:
Table 4: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18 Iraq
Benchmarks Assessed in GAO September 2007 Report:
Figures:
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008:
Figure 2: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to May 2008:
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected
Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008:
Figure 4: U.S. Forces in Iraq, March 2003 to July 2008:
Figure 5: Location of Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in
Baghdad Security Districts, as of August 2007:
Figure 6: Number of Trained Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005 through
2010:
Figure 7: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels, January
2007 and March 2008:
Figure 8: Provinces That Have Transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control,
as of April 2008:
Figure 9: Timeline for Transfer of Security Responsibilities to
Provincial Iraqi Control:
Figure 10: Status of Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
Figure 11: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and
Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007:
Figure 12: Iraq's Reported Crude Oil Production, Exports, and U.S.
Goals, June 2003 through May 2008:
Figure 13: Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq,
January 2004 through May 2008:
Abbreviations:
AQI: al Qaeda in Iraq:
CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority:
CRC: Constitutional Review Committee:
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IDP: internally displaced person:
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government:
MANPADS: man-portable air defense system:
mbpd: million barrels per day:
MNF-I: Multinational Force-Iraq:
MWH: megawatt hour:
NSC: National Security Council:
NSVI: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq:
ORA: Operational Readiness Assessment:
SIGIR: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction:
UN: United Nations:
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 23, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem
the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government
foster conditions for national reconciliation. The Administration
stated that the security and political conditions in Iraq were more
difficult than it had anticipated earlier in the war. To improve these
conditions, The New Way Forward established near-term (12 to 18 months)
goals that the Administration stated were achievable in this time
period. In addition, the strategy reasserted the Administration's long-
term goal or end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq
that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war
on terror. In support of this new strategy, the United States increased
its military presence and financial commitments for operations in Iraq.
U.S. troops and civilian personnel have performed courageously under
dangerous and difficult circumstances. In April 2008, the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General of the Multinational
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) testified before congressional committees on
conditions in Iraq. They stated that significant progress had been made
toward achieving U.S. goals but that progress was fragile and
reversible.
From fiscal year 2001 through December 2007, Congress has provided
about $635.9 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global
War on Terrorism.[Footnote 1] The majority of this amount has been for
military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including
the cost of equipping, maintaining, and supporting our deployed forces.
Moreover, since fiscal year 2003, about $45 billion[Footnote 2] was
provided to DOD and several other U.S. agencies for stabilization and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security
forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil,
electricity, and water sectors, among others.
This report discusses progress in meeting key U.S. goals outlined in
The New Way Forward, specifically, (1) improving security conditions;
(2) developing Iraqi security forces' capabilities and transferring
security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3) facilitating
Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative
initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to spend budgets;
and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key essential services to
its people. In addition, we discuss U.S. strategies for stabilizing and
rebuilding Iraq. We are concurrently issuing a classified report on the
Joint Campaign Plan--the U.S. operational plan for Iraq.[Footnote 3]
The Chairmen of the Senate's Armed Services Committee, Appropriations
Committee, and Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, requested that
GAO complete this work. Due to broad congressional interest in Iraq
issues, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
This report updates and builds upon an extensive body of GAO work,
including our September 2007 report assessing Iraq's progress toward
meeting 18 legislatively mandated benchmarks.[Footnote 4] To complete
this work, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the
Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; MNF-I and its
subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. We also reviewed
translated copies of Iraqi documents. In support of this work, we
extensively utilized staff stationed in Baghdad from January through
March 2008. See appendix I for a more complete description of our scope
and methodology. Appendix II contains a crosswalk between the 18
benchmarks and the five objectives we address in this report. We
provided drafts of this report to the Departments of State, the
Treasury, and Defense for review and comment. We received written
comments from all three agencies, which are included in appendixes III,
IV, and V.
We conducted this performance audit from March to June 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that
prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or
belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. The United States
has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way
Forward. For example, overall violence in Iraq has declined and Iraq
has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government and
give amnesty to detained Iraqis. However, we agree with assessments
that progress made in Iraq is fragile and many unmet goals and
challenges remain. For example, although The New Way Forward stated
that the Iraqi government would take responsibility for security in all
18 provinces by November 2007, only 9 of 18 provinces had transitioned
to Iraqi control as of May 2008. In addition, Iraq has spent only 24
percent of the funds it budgeted for reconstruction. Future U.S.
strategies should build on recent security and legislative gains and
address the remaining challenges for the near and long term.
Improving Security Conditions:
Establishing a basic level of security is a key component of The New
Way Forward. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks,
fell about 70 percent from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to
about 50 attacks per day in February 2008--primarily due to decreases
in violence in Baghdad and Anbar provinces. Fighting continues
throughout Iraq. Average daily attack levels were higher during March
and April before declining in May 2008. Further, the influence and
areas of operation of al Qaeda in Iraq have been degraded, although the
United States has not achieved its goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq
and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. Security
gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat
forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as
Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire.
However, the security environment remains volatile and dangerous.
Developing Iraqi Security Forces:
The New Way Forward set the goal of transferring security
responsibilities to all 18 Iraqi provinces by the end of 2007. Since
2003, the United States has provided more than $20 billion to develop
Iraqi security forces. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased
from about 323,000 in January 2007 to about 478,000 in May 2008; many
units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, DOD reports
that the number of Iraqi security force units deemed capable of
performing operations without coalition assistance has remained at
about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of
capable Iraqi security forces, including the lack of a single unified
force, sectarian and militia influences, continued dependence on U.S.
and coalition forces for logistics and combat support, and training and
leadership shortages. In addition, the time frame for transferring
security responsibilities to Iraqi provincial governments now extends
into 2009. As of May 2008, 9 of 18 provincial governments had lead
responsibility for security in their provinces.
Enacting Legislation:
To facilitate national reconciliation, The New Way Forward identified
legislation that the Iraqi government committed to enact with U.S.
support. The Iraqi government has enacted de-Ba'athification reform,
amnesty, and provincial powers legislation after considerable debate
and compromise among Iraq's political blocs. However, questions remain
about how the laws will be implemented and whether the intended
outcomes can be achieved. For example, the government has not yet
established the commission needed to reinstate former Ba'athists in the
government. In addition, the government has not enacted legislation
that will provide a legal framework for managing its oil resources,
distributing oil revenues, or disarming militias. The Iraqi government
also faces logistical and security challenges in holding the scheduled
2008 provincial elections--a key element of reconciliation for Sunnis.
Finally, the government has not completed its constitutional review to
resolve issues such as the status of disputed territories and the
balance of power between federal and regional governments. A goal of
The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all
key legislation by the end of 2007.
Spending Capital Budgets:
The New Way Forward emphasizes the need to build capacity in Iraq's
ministries and help the government execute its capital investment
budgets; this need is particularly important, as the $45 billion in
U.S. funding for Iraq reconstruction projects is nearing completion.
However, Ministry of Finance expenditure data show that between 2005
and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for
its own reconstruction efforts. Specifically, Iraq's central ministries
spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007, a
decline from similarly low spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005
and 2006, respectively. Spending rates for critical ministries varied
from the 41 percent spent by the Water Resources Ministry in 2007 to
the less than 1 percent spent by the Ministries of Oil and Electricity.
Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak
procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend
capital budgets and thereby contribute to its own rebuilding. GAO
recommended that U.S. agencies develop an integrated plan for
developing competent Iraqi ministries that can execute their budgets
and effectively deliver government services.[Footnote 5] As of June
2008, an integrated strategy had not been developed.
Providing Essential Services:
Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and
helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports are key goals of The
New Way Forward. Overall crude oil production has increased or improved
for short periods; however, production has not reached the U.S. goal of
an average crude oil production capacity of 3 million barrels per day
(mbpd) and export levels of 2.2 mbpd. In May 2008, oil production was
about 2.5 mbpd and exports were 1.96 mbpd. Meanwhile, the daily supply
of electricity met only 52 percent of demand in June 2008. The State
Department (State) reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are
close to being reached. Since April 2006, U.S. efforts have focused on
producing enough clean water to reach up to an additional 8.5 million
Iraqis. As of March 2008, State reported that U.S.-funded projects had
provided an additional 8 million Iraqis with access to potable water.
Several factors present challenges in delivering essential services,
including an unstable security environment, corruption, a lack of
technical capacity, and inadequate strategic planning. GAO will issue a
separate report on Iraq's estimated unspent and projected oil revenues
from 2003 through 2008. As of the end of May 2008, Iraqi crude oil was
selling at about $104 per barrel, higher than the $57 per barrel used
to develop Iraq's 2008 budget. Oil exports generate over 90 percent of
government revenues.
As The New Way Forward and the military surge end in July 2008, an
updated strategy is needed for how the United States will help Iraq
achieve key security, legislative, and economic goals. This strategy
should build on recent security and legislative gains, address the
remaining unmet goals and challenges for the near and long term, and
clearly articulate goals, objectives, roles and responsibilities, and
the resources needed. In this report, GAO is recommending that DOD and
State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated
strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July
2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself.
The departments of State and Defense disagreed with our recommendation
to develop an updated strategic plan for Iraq, stating that The New Way
Forward strategy remains valid. They did, however, state that they will
review and refine the strategy as necessary. DOD also stated that the
classified MNFI-U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is a comprehensive,
government wide plan that guides the effort to achieve an Iraq that can
govern, defend and sustain itself. An updated strategy is needed for
several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq since January 2007,
when the President announced The New Way Forward. Violence is down but
U.S. surge forces are leaving. In addition, the United States is
negotiating a status of forces agreement with Iraq. Second, The New Way
Forward only articulates U.S. goals and objectives for the phase that
ends in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way
Forward are contained in disparate documents rather than a single
strategic plan. Furthermore, the classified Joint Campaign Plan is not
a strategic plan; it is an operational plan with limitations that we
discuss in the classified report we are issuing concurrently with this
report.
We affirm our recommendation that DOD and State should update the U.S.
strategy for Iraq, given the importance of the war effort to U.S.
national security interests, the expenditure of billions of dollars for
U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq, and the continued
deployment of at least 140,000 troops in Iraq.
Background: Evolution of U.S. Strategies for Iraq:
Since late 2003, the United States has employed numerous strategies to
address the security and reconstruction needs of Iraq. First, the
multinational force's security transition strategy called for Iraqi
security forces to assume security responsibilities on an accelerated
basis during spring 2004. This strategy failed when Iraqi security
forces performed poorly during an insurgent uprising. Second, a series
of campaign plans and a strategy document attempted to integrate U.S.
military and civilian efforts in Iraq but did not anticipate the
escalation in violence during 2006. Third, to address the high levels
of violence, the administration announced a new strategy, The New Way
Forward.
Multinational Force's Strategy Assumed Capable Iraqi Forces Could Begin
to Take Over Security Responsibilities in Spring 2004:
In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan
for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces.[Footnote
6] The four phases were (1) mutual support, where the multinational
force established conditions for transferring security responsibilities
to Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in
a local area assumed responsibility for security; (3) transition to
regional control, where Iraqi forces were responsible for larger
regions; and (4) transition to strategic overwatch, where Iraqi forces
on a national level were capable of maintaining a secure environment
against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the
multinational force. The plan's objective was to allow a gradual
drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the
neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the development of
Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted
to shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed
in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered about
203,000, including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection
officers, and about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps.[Footnote 7]
Police and military units performed poorly during an escalation of
insurgent attacks against the coalition in April 2004. According to a
July 2004 executive branch report to Congress, many Iraqi security
forces around the country collapsed during this uprising. Some Iraqi
forces fought alongside coalition forces. Other units abandoned their
posts and responsibilities and, in some cases, assisted the insurgency.
A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security
forces, including problems in training, equipping, and vetting them.
U.S. Strategy Revisions Did Not Anticipate Escalation of Violence in
2006:
After the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in the spring of 2004,
the Administration completed three key documents that outlined the
evolving U.S. strategy for Iraq, none of which anticipated the level of
sectarian violence that occurred after the Samarra mosque bombing in
February 2006. First, during the summer of 2004, MNF-I completed a
campaign plan that elaborated on and refined the original strategy for
transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces at the local,
regional, and national levels. Further details on this campaign plan
are classified.[Footnote 8] Second, in November 2005, the National
Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
(NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for achieving U.S.
political, security, and economic goals in Iraq.[Footnote 9] Third, in
April 2006, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad issued the first
joint campaign plan, which attempted to integrate U.S. political,
military, and economic efforts in Iraq. Further details of this
campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 10]
In July 2006, we reported that the NSVI represented an incomplete
strategy. The desirable characteristics of an effective national
strategy are purpose, scope, and methodology; detailed discussion of
problems, risks, and threats; the desired goal, objectives, activities,
and outcome-related performance measures; description of future costs
and resources needed; delineation of U.S. government roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms; and a description of the
strategy's integration among and with other entities. On the one hand,
the NSVI's purpose and scope were clear because the strategy identified
U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and Iraq as a
central front in the war on terror. The strategy also discussed the
threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provided a
comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic
goals and objectives in Iraq over the short term, medium term, and long
term. However, the NSVI only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing it, the current and future costs of U.S.
involvement in Iraq, and Iraq's contribution to its future needs.
[Footnote 11]
The strategy also did not anticipate that security conditions in Iraq
would deteriorate as they did in 2006, as evidenced by the increased
numbers of attacks and the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian strife that followed
the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. Enemy-
initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners
increased through October 2006 and remained at high levels through the
end of the year. During 2006, according to State and United Nations
(UN) reports, insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists
increased their attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian
basis. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) in
Iraq sharply increased, primarily as a result of sectarian intimidation
and violence that forced many people from their homes. By the end of
2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad neighborhoods had become
divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were increasingly controlled by
armed groups claiming to act as protectors and defenders of these
areas. According to the President, the violence in Iraq--particularly
in Baghdad--overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made.
The New Way Forward Addressed Escalating Violence:
In response to the escalating violence, the President in January 2007
announced a new strategy--The New Way Forward--that established a new
phase in U.S. operations for the near term of 12 to 18 months, or until
July 2008. According to State and DOD officials, the Administration did
not revise the NSVI strategy document when it announced The New Way
Forward. Instead, four documents outline the goals and objectives of
The New Way Forward: (1) NSC, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,
January 2007; (2) the President's address to the nation, January 10,
2007; (3) Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10, 2007; (4)
Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Background Briefing by
Senior Administration Officials, January 10, 2007.
According to the NSC document, the new strategy altered the
administration's assumptions regarding the security and political
conditions in Iraq and how they would help or hinder the achievement of
U.S. goals. For example, the Administration previously believed that
the Iraqi elections in 2005 would lead to a national compact for
democratic governance shared by all Iraqis and the continued training
and equipping of Iraqi security forces would facilitate reductions in
U.S. military forces. The New Way Forward acknowledged that national
reconciliation might not take the form of a comprehensive national
compact but could come from piecemeal efforts (see table 1). Similarly,
The New Way Forward stated that while many Iraqi security forces were
leading military operations, they were not yet ready to handle security
challenges independently.
Table 1: The Administration's Comparison of Key Assumptions in The New
Way Forward and Prior U.S. Strategy:
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Primary challenge is a Sunni-based insurgency;
New Way Forward:
* Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities;
the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Political progress will help defuse the insurgency and dampen levels
of violence;
New Way Forward:
* While political progress, economic gains, and security are
intertwined, political and economic progress is unlikely absent a basic
level of security.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Iraqi security forces are gaining in strength and ability to handle
Iraq's security challenges;
New Way Forward:
* Many elements of Iraqi security forces are in the lead but not yet
ready to handle Iraqi security challenges independently.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* A national compact is within the grasp of Iraqi leaders and will have
meaningful impact on security;
New Way Forward:
* Effective national reconciliation may not take the form of a
comprehensive package deal; it could come about as the product of
piecemeal efforts.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Majority of Iraqis will support the coalition and Iraqi efforts to
build a democratic state;
New Way Forward:
* Iraqis are increasingly disillusioned with coalition efforts.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Majority of Iraqis and Iraqi leaders see their interests as best
advanced by a unified Iraq;
New Way Forward:
* While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also
advancing sectarian agendas.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Dialogue with insurgent groups will help reduce violence;
New Way Forward:
* Dialogue with insurgent groups has not improved security and may not
produce strategic gains in current context.
Key assumptions: Prior strategy:
* Region has a strategic interest in the stabilization of Iraq;
New Way Forward:
* Many Arab states remain wary of throwing their full support behind
the Iraqi government.
Source: National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy
Review, January 2007.
[End of table]
The January 2007 strategy documents defined the original goals and
objectives that the Administration believed were achievable by the end
of this phase in July 2008. For example, the President pledged to
increase the number of U.S. military forces in Iraq to help the Iraqis
carry out their campaign to reduce sectarian violence and bring
security to Baghdad and other areas of the country. The strategy also
called for MNF-I to transfer security responsibilities to all 18 Iraqi
provinces by the end of 2007. Further, the President committed to hold
the Iraqi government to its pledges to (1) enact and implement key
legislation to promote national reconciliation, (2) execute its capital
budget, and (3) provide essential services to all Iraqi areas and
communities and help Iraq maintain and expand its oil exports.
Improving Security Conditions:
The following section provides information on security conditions in
Iraq from mid-2007 through May 2008, including factors affecting these
conditions.
Security Conditions Improved from Mid-2007 through Early 2008:
Establishing a basic level of security is a key goal of The New Way
Forward. Figure 1 shows that the overall levels of violence in Iraq--as
measured by enemy-initiated attacks--decreased about 70 percent from
June 2007 to February 2008, a significant reduction from the high
levels of violence in 2006 and the first half of 2007. Similarly, as
depicted in figure 2, the average daily number of enemy-initiated
attacks declined from about 180 in June 2007 to about 60 in November
2007 and declined further to about 50 in February 2008. From 2003
through 2007, enemy-initiated attacks had increased around major
political and religious events, such as Iraqi elections and Ramadan. In
2007, attacks did not increase during Ramadan.[Footnote 12] In a March
2008 report, DOD noted that reductions in violence across Iraq have
enabled a return to normal life and growth in local economies.
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Month, May 2003 to May 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Attacks on:
Coalition;
Civilians;
Iraqi security forces;
Total attacks.
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
May 2008.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Average Daily Attacks, May 2003 to May 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Average daily attacks on civilians;
Average daily attacks on Iraqi security forces;
Average daily attacks on coalition;
Total average daily attacks.
Also depicted is the timeframe of the New Way Forward, which began in January, 2007.
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
May 2008.
[End of figure]
However, data for March 2008 show an increase in violence in Iraq.
Security conditions deteriorated in March 2008, with the average number
of attacks increasing from about 50 per day in February 2008 to about
70 attacks per day in March--about a 40 percent increase (see fig. 2).
According to an April 2008 UN report,[Footnote 13] the increase in
attacks resulted from Shi'a militias fighting Iraqi security forces
throughout southern Iraq, as well as an increase in incidents of
roadside bomb attacks against Iraqi security forces and MNF-I in
Baghdad. The average number of attacks declined to about 65 per day in
April and to about 45 per day in May.
The enemy-initiated attacks counted in the Defense Intelligence
Agency's (DIA) reporting include car, suicide, and other bombs;
ambushes; murders, executions, and assassinations; sniper fire;
indirect fire (mortars or rockets); direct fire (small arms or rocket-
propelled grenades); surface-to-air fire (such as man-portable air
defense systems, or MANPADS); and other attacks on civilians. They do
not include violent incidents that coalition or Iraqi security forces
initiate, such as cordon and searches, raids, arrests, and caches
cleared.
According to DIA, the incidents captured in military reporting do not
account for all violence throughout Iraq. For example, they may
underreport incidents of Shi'a militias fighting each other and attacks
against Iraqi security forces in southern Iraq and other areas with few
or no coalition forces. DIA officials stated, however, that they
represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security
situation.
According to DOD reports, the reduction in overall violence resulted
primarily from steep declines in violence in Baghdad and Anbar
provinces, though the violence in Baghdad increased in March 2008 (see
fig. 3). These two provinces had accounted for just over half of all
attacks in Iraq around the time the President announced The New Way
Forward. As of February 2008, during one of the lowest periods for
attacks in Iraq since the start of The New Way Forward, about one-third
of all attacks in Iraq occurred in Baghdad and Anbar provinces.
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq for Selected
Provinces, August 2005 through Early May 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data for ten specific timeframes:
Average daily attacks per Province:
Ninewa;
Diyala;
Salah ad Din;
Al Anbar;
Baghdad.
Note: Each data point represents the average number of daily attacks
for the specified period of time, as reported in DOD's quarterly
reports to Congress.
[End of figure]
Security Conditions Remain Volatile and Dangerous:
Despite improvements in the security situation, an April 2008 UN report
found that violence has continued throughout Iraq and could rapidly
escalate. According to the UN, toward the end of 2007, suicide
bombings, car bombs, and other attacks continued with devastating
consequences for civilians. While security improved in Baghdad and
other locations, it deteriorated elsewhere, including in the city of
Mosul in Ninewa province and in Diyala province. According to the UN
report, religious and ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups
were victims of violent attacks. Armed groups also carried out
assassinations of government or state officials, religious figures,
professional groups, and law enforcement personnel.
The violence in Iraq continues to result in the displacement of many
Iraqis from their homes. In late March 2008, the Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) Working Group[Footnote 14] reported that the number of
IDPs remained very high, but new displacement was occurring at a lower
rate. The working group attributed the lower rate of displacement to,
among other things, the increasing ethnic homogenization within Iraq;
the decrease in security incidents in some areas of Baghdad; and
restrictions on freedom of movement in many Iraqi provinces. During
April 2008, according to UN and International Organization for
Migration reports, hundreds of Iraqi families fled their homes in the
Sadr City area of Baghdad, with the majority returning by early June
2008. The IDP Working Group estimated that over 2.77 million people
were displaced inside Iraq, of which more than 1.5 million were
displaced from 2006 through March 20, 2008. [Footnote 15] Further, the
IDP Working Group estimated that 2 million additional Iraqis have left
the country, including 1.2 million to 1.5 million who went to Syria and
450,000 to 500,000 who went to Jordan.[Footnote 16] The IDP Working
Group also reported that as of March 20, 2008, large- scale return
movements have not occurred.[Footnote 17] According to a May 2008 State
Department report, more Iraqis were entering Syria in early 2008 than
were returning to Iraq. State also reported that overall conditions for
refugees in the region and Iraqis internally displaced continue to
deteriorate.
Moreover, the dangerous and volatile security conditions continue to
hinder the movement and reconstruction efforts of international
civilian personnel throughout Iraq. For example, according to a March
2008 DOD report, security concerns continue to discourage international
investors and hinder private sector growth in most parts of the
country. Due to the dangerous security conditions, State Department-led
Provincial Reconstruction Teams continue to rely heavily on military
assets for movement security and quick reaction force support, among
other areas. Further, in April 2008, the UN reported that it has
limited access throughout Iraq due to security constraints that hinder
UN movement and daily activities.
The United Nations also reported an increase in attacks against secure
facilities that house and employ international diplomatic and military
personnel. For example, from October 2007 through mid-March 2008, the
indirect fire attacks aimed at the International Zone were less than a
dozen. However, during the last week of March, the International Zone
received 47 separate indirect fire barrages consisting of 149 rounds of
122-millimeter and 107- millimeter rockets and at least three larger
240-millimeter rockets, one of which hit the UN compound. In addition,
according to the UN report, the incidence of indirect fire attacks on
Basra air station, the British military base that also houses U.S. and
other international civilian personnel, rose steadily during the first
3 months of 2008, with 48 attacks from January to March.
Al Qaeda in Iraq Has Sustained Significant Losses but Remains
Resilient:
The New Way Forward has the goal of defeating al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
and its supporters and ensuring that no terrorist safe haven exists in
Iraq. According to MNF-I, DOD, and State reports, rejection of al Qaeda
in Iraq by significant portions of the population and operations to
disrupt AQI networks have helped decrease violence in Iraq; however,
AQI is not defeated and maintains the ability to carry out high-profile
attacks. According to MNF-I's Commanding General, the loss of local
Sunni support for AQI had substantially reduced the group's capability,
numbers, areas of operation, and freedom of movement. DOD reported in
March 2008 that AQI lost strength and influence in Anbar province,
Baghdad, the belts around Baghdad, and many areas of Diyala province.
The report notes, however, that AQI remains highly lethal and maintains
a significant presence in parts of the Tigris River Valley, Ninewa
province, and other areas of Iraq. According to an MNF- I report, AQI
is now predominately based in northern Iraq, especially in Mosul, where
frequent high-profile attacks continue.
Three Key Factors Contributed to Security Gains:
DOD, State, and UN reports attribute the reductions in violence in Iraq
to three key actions: (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the
establishment of nongovernmental Iraqi security forces, and (3) the
cease-fire declaration of the Mahdi Army leader.
U.S. Surge Allowed a Change in Tactics for The New Way Forward:
In announcing The New Way Forward in January 2007, the President cited
two primary reasons for ordering an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq.
First, the President acknowledged that earlier efforts to provide
security in Baghdad had failed, in part, due to an insufficient number
of U.S. and Iraqi troops to secure neighborhoods cleared of terrorists
and insurgents. He therefore called for an increase of over 20,000 U.S.
combat and other forces, including an additional 5 brigades. The vast
majority of these troops would help Iraqis clear and secure
neighborhoods and protect the local population. Second, to support
local tribal leaders who had begun to show a willingness to take on
AQI, the President ordered the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops to Anbar
province. Figure 4 shows the increase of U.S. forces in Iraq from about
132,000 in December 2006 to about 169,000 in August 2007, an overall
increase of about 37,000 troops-- almost 30 percent above the December
2006 force level.
Figure 4: U.S. Forces in Iraq, March 2003 to July 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:
Date: March-03;
Number of troops: 93,850.
Date: April-03;
Number of troops: 145,675.
Date: May-03;
Number of troops: 147,370.
Date: June-03;
Number of troops: 149,415.
Date: July-03;
Number of troops: 146,000.
Date: August-03;
Number of troops: 130,312.
Date: September-03;
Number of troops: 136,940.
Date: October-03;
Number of troops: 131,345.
Date: November-03;
Number of troops: 123,715.
Date: December-03;
Number of troops: 126,895.
Date: January-04;
Number of troops: 108,430.
Date: February-04;
Number of troops: 119,620.
Date: March-04;
Number of troops: 131,705.
Date: April-04;
Number of troops: 139,815.
Date: May-04;
Number of troops: 144,265.
Date: June-04;
Number of troops: 140,615.
Date: July-04;
Number of troops: 144,265.
Date: August-04;
Number of troops: 137,725.
Date: September-04;
Number of troops: 134,585.
Date: October-04;
Number of troops: 135,930.
Date: November-04;
Number of troops: 142,600.
Date: December-04;
Number of troops: 152,285.
Date: January-05;
Number of troops: 161,250.
Date: February-05;
Number of troops: 147,800.
Date: March-05;
Number of troops: 147,925.
Date: April-05;
Number of troops: 139,980.
Date: May-05;
Number of troops: 141,130.
Date: June-05;
Number of troops: 139,260.
Date: July-05;
Number of troops: 139,175.
Date: August-05;
Number of troops: 143,730.
Date: September-05;
Number of troops: 149,975.
Date: October-05;
Number of troops: 159,840.
Date: November-05;
Number of troops: 156,165.
Date: December-05;
Number of troops: 155,080.
Date: January-06; 139,275.
Date: February-06;
Number of troops: 133,460.
Date: March-06;
Number of troops: 132,525.
Date: April-06;
Number of troops: 132,260.
Date: May-06;
Number of troops: 130,330.
Date: June-06;
Number of troops: 127,280.
Date: July-06;
Number of troops: 133,540.
Date: August-06;
Number of troops: 143,445.
Date: September-06;
Number of troops: 142,630.
Date: October-06;
Number of troops: 151,190.
Date: November-06;
Number of troops: 136,950.
Date: December-06;
Number of troops: 131,515.
Date: January-07 (New Way Forward speech);
Number of troops: 138,300.
Date: February-07;
Number of troops: 141,230.
Date: March-07;
Number of troops: 147,865.
Date: April-07;
Number of troops: 147,075.
Date: May-07;
Number of troops: 145,000.
Date: Jun-07;
Number of troops: 159,565.
Date: Jul-07;
Number of troops: 161,400.
Date: Aug-07;
Number of troops: 169,100.
Date: Sep-07 (U.S. troop drawdown announcement);
Number of troops: 164,700.
Date: Oct-07;
Number of troops: 167,600.
Date: Nov-07;
Number of troops: 165,700.
Date: Dec-07;
Number of troops: 159,700.
Date: Jan-08;
Number of troops: 158,400.
Date: Feb-08;
Number of troops: 158,100.
Date: Mar-08;
Number of troops: 160,500.
Date: Apr-08;
Number of troops: 162,300.
Date: May-08;
Number of troops: 158,900.
Date: June-08;
Number of troops: 149,450.
Date: July-08 (Projected U.S. drawdown to 140,000 troops; end of New
Way Forward);
Number of troops: 140,000.
Source: DOD, Joint Staff and State Department data.
Note: For all months prior to February 2008, DOD provided GAO with end-
of-month data for the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. In February 2008,
DOD began to provide GAO with data from the beginning of the month.
[End of figure]
In September 2007, the President announced that the United States would
withdraw the surge forces by July 2008--the end of The New Way Forward--
resulting in a decline in U.S. brigade combat teams from 20 to 15 and a
projected force level of about 140,000 U.S. troops. The MNF-I
Commanding General reported in April 2008 that he would need 45 days
after the surge brigades leave Iraq to consolidate his forces and
assess how the reduced U.S. military presence will affect conditions on
the ground. After that time, he would assess whether U.S. forces could
be further reduced.
According to DOD reporting, the additional surge forces allowed MNF-I
to increase its operational tempo and change tactics in providing
security to the Iraqi people. Specifically, the additional troops
enabled MNF-I to maintain a continuous presence in Baghdad and
surrounding areas by establishing about 60 joint security stations with
Iraqi forces and combat outposts outside of its large operating bases
as of August 2007 (see fig. 5). In May 2008, the former commander of
the Multinational Corps-Iraq reported that the number of joint security
stations and combat outposts had since increased to 75.
Figure 5: Location of Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in
Baghdad Security Districts, as of August 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the Baghdad Security districts indicating the
locations of the following types of stations and outposts:
District JSS;
Satellite JSS;
COP (Occupied).
Source: Multilateral Division-Baghdad.
[End of figure]
In March 2008, DOD reported that these security stations and outposts
had a stabilizing effect along ethnic fault lines, complemented MNF-I's
efforts to reconcile former insurgents, and helped maintain pressure on
domestic and external insurgent elements. Over time, according to the
DOD report, MNF-I will transfer the joint security stations and combat
outposts to Iraqi forces as it draws down and moves to a support role.
Nongovernmental Security Forces Have Opposed AQI but Generally Have Not
Reconciled with the Iraqi Government:
According to DOD and MNF-I reports, the establishment of local
nongovernmental security forces that oppose AQI has helped decrease the
levels of violence in parts of Iraq, most notably in Anbar province,
but these groups by and large have not yet reconciled with the Iraqi
government. The groups, including those now known as the Sons of Iraq,
began forming in Anbar province in late 2006, with the movement
spreading to other areas of Iraq during 2007 and 2008. As Sons of Iraq,
these former insurgents take an oath to be law-abiding citizens and
work with MNF-I and, in some cases, the Iraqi government to protect
their local communities. Most work on MNF-I contracts. Overall,
according to an April 2008 MNF-I report, the various Sons of Iraq
groups consisted of about 105,000 members. Sons of Iraq groups do not
have a national or regional structure, as local groups are generally
organized along sectarian lines based on the neighborhoods in which
they operate.
In March 2008, DOD reported that the Sons of Iraq program has helped to
improve security at the local level by involving local citizens in the
security of their communities. According to the DOD report, the Sons of
Iraq are a key component of the counterinsurgency fight due to their
knowledge of the local populace and their ability to report activities
that might otherwise escape the attention of MNF-I and Iraqi forces.
These groups also provide security for roads, municipal buildings,
power lines, and other key facilities in their local communities under
the direction of MNF-I or Iraqi forces, thereby allowing MNF-I and
Iraqi forces to pursue and engage the enemy.
While the Sons of Iraq are playing an important role at the local level
to quell violence, DOD reported that they also pose some challenges for
the Iraqi government and the coalition. These challenges include the
potential for infiltration by insurgents,[Footnote 18] the possible
distortions in the local economy if salaries are not carefully managed,
and the lack of a cohesive Iraqi plan to transition the Sons of Iraq to
the Iraqi forces or civilian employment. According to DOD reporting,
the Iraqi government continues to debate the future of the Sons of
Iraq, raising concerns over infiltration by irreconcilable elements,
the merits of supporting or employing a large number of former
insurgents, and the methods for transitioning Sons of Iraq members into
the Iraqi forces, private sector employment, or educational programs.
Further, according to the April 2008 UN report, despite their relative
success and growing numbers, during early 2008 some tribal security
forces temporarily withdrew their support of MNF- I and the Iraqi
security forces in Diyala and Babil provinces. Fraying relations
between these groups and the Iraqi government in Anbar province caused
a spike in violence in this area. As of March 2008, DOD reported that
about 20,000 Sons of Iraq had already transitioned to the Iraqi
security forces or civil employment.
Declared Cease-fire of the Mahdi Army Is Tenuous:
According to DOD and UN reports, the cease-fire declared in August 2007
by the leader of the Mahdi Army, an extremist Shi'a militia,
contributed significantly to the decline in violence in the second half
of 2007. However, the cease-fire appears tenuous as the militia
recently increased attacks against other Shi'a militias, the coalition,
and Iraqi security forces before declaring another cease- fire on May
11. The Mahdi Army and its affiliated special groups remain the largest
and most dangerous Shi'a militia in Iraq, according to an MNF-I report,
with a combined nationwide strength of approximately 25,000 to 40,000
active members supported by a large body of non-active supporters.
According to DOD and UN reports, the cease-fire showed signs of fraying
in late 2007, as tensions increased in southern Iraq among the various
Shi'a militia factions. These tensions led the various Shi'a militia
factions to begin routinely launching attacks against each other's
interests and periodically engaging in open conflict lasting several
days, or even weeks, before Iraqi security forces and MNF-I intervened.
In February 2008, according to the UN report, there were numerous
public demonstrations against the political and security leadership in
Basra. Despite the reaffirmation of the Mahdi Army ceasefire in
February, the Iraqi government launched an offensive against criminal
and militia elements in Basra in late March 2008, which sparked
widespread fighting in Baghdad, Basra, and other southern cities.
According to a UN report, violence declined in Basra in April as the
Iraqi government and various armed groups reached agreement to stop
fighting, but violence continued in Sadr City, a Mahdi Army- controlled
area of 2.5 million people. Moreover, the Iraqi security forces have
conducted operations targeting the Mahdi Army in Nassiriyah, al-Amarah,
al-Kut, and Hillah, thus escalating the level of violence in these
cities. Najaf and Karbala also suffered explosive attacks in the last
week of March, which, according to the UN, are rare occurrences in
these two cities. On May 20, 2008, the International Organization for
Migration reported that the security situation had improved somewhat in
Sadr City due to a truce between the Mahdi Army and government forces
on May 11.
Developing Iraqi Security Forces:
This section discusses the strength and capabilities of Iraqi security
forces and efforts to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi
government.
Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased:
The New Way Forward set the goal of developing capable Iraqi security
forces and transferring security responsibilities to the government of
Iraq. Since 2003, the United States has provided more than $20 billion
to develop Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces comprise
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size.
Overall, the number of Iraqi military and police personnel has
increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 445,000 in April
2008.[Footnote 19] The number of Iraqi security forces is almost three
times that of the 162,300 U.S. forces in Iraq as of April 2008. The
Iraqi total includes about 203,000 under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
and about 238,000 under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2 provides the
force levels for the major components of the Iraq security forces in
March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD stated that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi
security forces had grown to about 478,000 as of May 2008.
Table 2: Number of Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005, January 2007, and
April 2008:
Ministry: Defense;
Component: Iraqi Army;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 59,880;
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 132,700[C];
April 2008 trained[B]: 200,013[D].
Ministry: Defense; Component: Air Force;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 186;
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 900;
April 2008 trained[B]: 1,370.
Ministry: Defense; Component: Navy;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]:517;
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 1,100;
April 2008 trained[B]: 1,194.
Ministry: Defense; Subtotal;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 60,583[E];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 134,700[E];
April 2008 trained[B]: 202,577.
Ministry: Interior; Component: Iraqi Police Service;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 55,015[F];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 135,000;
April 2008 trained[B]: 166,037.
Ministry: Interior; Component: Other Ministry of Interior forces;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
April 2008 trained[B]: [Empty].
Ministry: Interior; Component: National police;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 24,400;
April 2008 trained[B]: 44,156.
Ministry: Interior; Component: Border enforcement;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
April 2008 trained[B]: Ministry: 28,023.
Ministry: Interior; Subtotal:
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 26,874;
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 53,300;
April 2008 trained[B]: 72,179.
Ministry: Subtotal;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 81,889[G];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 188,300[G];
April 2008 trained[B]: 238,216.
Ministry: Counterterrorism Bureau; Component: Special Operations;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
April 2008 trained[B]: 3,709.
Ministry: Counterterrorism Bureau; Subtotal;
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: [Empty];
April 2008 trained[B]: 3,709.
Total:
March 2005 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 142,472;
January 2007 operational/trained and equipped[A]: 323,000[H];
April 2008 trained[B]: 444,502[I].
Sources: U.S. State Department and Multinational Security Transition
Command Reports.
Notes:
[A] The term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The
term "trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces.
Numbers are from the State Department's March 9, 2005 and January 31,
2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition
Command Iraqi Security Forces Update, January 26, 2007.
[B] The term "trained" refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April 30,
2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report.
[C] Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.
[D] Army numbers include support forces.
[E] Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of
Defense numbers.
[F] The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway
patrol forces.
[G] Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior
numbers.
[H] Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection
Service personnel working in 27 ministries.
[I] Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some
of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, absence without
leave, and normal separation.
[End of table]
Ministry of Defense forces consist of 12 Iraqi army divisions and a
small air force and navy. These forces have grown by more than 230
percent since March 2005. Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of
Iraqi police--which, as of April 2008, represent about 70 percent of
personnel within the Ministry of Interior--and other units,
specifically, the national police (formerly the special police),
Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection.
Iraqi police precincts are under the operational control of their local
municipality and the corresponding provincial government. Ministry of
Interior forces have grown by more than 200 percent since March 2005.
Future projections show that the Iraqi security forces will continue to
grow. DOD reported that Iraqi security forces--military, police, and
special operations forces--could reach 646,000 by 2010 (see figure 6).
Specifically, the Ministry of Interior is projected to grow to about
389,000 employees in the Iraqi police service, national police, and
Directorate of Border Enforcement. Ministry of Defense forces will
include 13 army divisions (12 infantry, 1 armored) along with
supporting forces, 1,500 navy personnel, 4,000 air force personnel, and
5,750 counterterrorism forces.
Figure 6: Number of Trained Iraqi Security Forces, March 2005 through
2010:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Date: March 2005;
Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 60,580;
Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 82,000
Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 0;
Number of troops, Total: 142,580.
Date: January 2007;
Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 134,700;
Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 188,000;
Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 0;
Number of troops, Total: 322,700.
Date: April 2008;
Number of troops, Ministry of Defense: 202,580;
Number of troops, Ministry of Interior: 238,000;
Number of troops, Counter Terrorism Bureau: 4,000;
Number of troops, Total: 444,580.
Date: 2010 (projected);
Number of troops, Projected Total: 646,000.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. State Department, Multinational Security
Transition Command, and Department of Defense Reports.
[End of figure]
The number of trained Iraqi security forces may overstate the number of
troops present for duty. According to DOD, the number of trained troops
includes personnel who are deceased or absent without leave.[Footnote
20] For example, DOD reported that approximately 24,500 soldiers were
dropped from the Iraqi Army rolls in 2007 because they deserted or were
absent without leave. However, these troops are still counted in
trained numbers. An April 2008 Special Inspector General for Iraqi
Reconstruction report confirmed that a substantial number of Iraqi
personnel still on the payroll were not present for duty for various
reasons, such as being on leave, absent without leave, injured, or
killed.[Footnote 21]
Iraqi Security Forces Capabilities Have Shown Limited Improvement:
In September 2007, GAO assessed the Iraqi government's progress in
increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of
operating independently. This was a benchmark established by the U.S.
Congress and derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the
Iraqi government beginning in June 2006. The number of independent
Iraqi security forces as measured by Operational Readiness Assessments
(ORA) level 1 continues to be an important measure of the capabilities
of Iraqi security forces.
Although Iraqi security forces have grown in number and many are
leading counterinsurgency operations, MNF-I assessments of their
readiness levels show limited improvements. MNF-I uses ORA to determine
when Iraqi units can assume the lead for security operations.[Footnote
22] The ORA is a classified joint assessment prepared monthly by the
unit's coalition and Iraqi commanders. For the Iraqi army, commanders
use the ORA process to assess a unit's personnel, command and control,
equipment, sustainment and logistics, and training and leadership
capabilities. ORA level 1 is a unit capable of planning, executing, and
sustaining counterinsurgency operations;[Footnote 23] level 2 is
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency
operations with Iraqi security force or coalition force assistance;
level 3 is partially capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations with coalition force assistance; level 4
is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.
In April 2008, the Commanding General of MNF-I reported that more Iraqi
security force battalions were leading security operations in Iraq. He
stated that MNF-I handed over the lead security responsibility to 19
additional Iraqi army battalions between January 2007 and March 2008,
as displayed in figure 7.
Figure 7: Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels, January
2007 and March 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a combination of two stacked vertical bar graphs
depicting the number of battalions in each of four categories indicating
the Iraqi Security Force Operational Readiness Levels for the National
Police and Iraqi Army:
ORA level 1 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations;
ORA level 2 - capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations with Iraqi security force or coalition
force assistance;
ORA level 3 - partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency
operations in conjunction with coalition units;
ORA level 4 - forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency
operations.
Source: GAO analysis of data presented in testimony by the Commanding
General of MNF-I and MNC-I documents.
[End of figure]
While 65 percent of the Iraqi units were in the lead in
counterinsurgency operations as of March 2008, the number of Iraqi army
battalions rated at the highest readiness level accounts for less than
10 percent of the total number of Iraqi army battalions. While the
number of battalions "in the lead"--that is, leading counterinsurgency
operations with or without coalition support--increased from 93 in
January 2007 to 112 in March 2008, MNF-I is now including some units at
ORA level 3 as in the lead, which are assessed as partially capable of
conducting counterinsurgency operations. In contrast, the January 2007
report did not include ORA Level 3 units as in the lead. GAO is
completing work assessing the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces
at each ORA level.
According to DOD, the Iraqi national police battalions, organized under
the Ministry of Interior, generally have been less capable and have
shown less progress than Iraqi army battalions. While the number of
Iraqi national police battalions increased from 27 in January 2007 to
36 in March 2008, no units achieved ORA level 1, and about 11 units
were at ORA level 2.
Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Capable Iraqi
Security Forces:
The United States faces several challenges in enhancing the
capabilities of Iraq's security forces: (1) the lack of a single
unified force; (2) sectarian and militia influences; (3) continued
dependence upon U.S. and coalition forces for logistics and combat
support; and (4) training and leadership shortages.
First, Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a
primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Only one major
component of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi army, has
counterinsurgency as its primary mission. The Iraqi army represents
about 45 percent of 445,000 trained Iraqi security forces.[Footnote 24]
The Iraqi local police represent 37 percent of total trained security
forces and have civilian law enforcement as a primary mission. The
Iraqi national police account for 10 percent of total trained Iraqi
forces. According to the Independent Commission on the Security Forces
of Iraq, the national police are not a viable organization, as they
face significant challenges, including public distrust, real and
perceived sectarianism, and uncertainty as to whether it is a military
or police force.[Footnote 25] The commission recommended that the
national police be disbanded and reorganized under the Ministry of
Interior. As a smaller organization with a different name, it would be
responsible for specialized police tasks such as explosive ordnance
disposal, urban search and rescue, and other functions.
Second, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of
the Iraqi security forces. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom[Footnote 26] reported that Iraq's Shi'a-
dominated government has engaged in sectarian-based human rights
violations and has tolerated abuses committed by Shi'a militias with
ties to political factions in the governing coalition. According to the
commission, the Iraqi government, through its security forces, has
committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without due process,
targeted executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In September
2007, we determined that the Iraqi government had not eliminated
militia control over local security forces and that sectarianism in the
Iraqi security forces was a serious problem in Baghdad and other areas
of Iraq. According to DOD, in March 2008, sectarianism and corruption
continue to be significant problems within the Ministries of Interior
and Defense. For example, some army units sent to Baghdad have had ties
to Shi'a militias, making it difficult to target Shi'a extremist
networks. According to the March 2008 State Department Human Rights
Report, the effectiveness of Ministry of Interior forces, particularly
the national police, was seriously compromised by militia influence.
[Footnote 27]
Third, as we reported in November 2007, Iraqi units remain dependent
upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and
intelligence capabilities.[Footnote 28] The Ministries of Defense and
Interior were not capable of accounting for, supporting, or fully
controlling their forces in the field, nor do the Iraqi security forces
have critical enablers such as intelligence and logistics systems and
processes that permit independent planning and operations. Due to
Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and police units
will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and logistics
support through 2008. Further, the Independent Commission on the
Security Forces of Iraq stated that the Iraqi Army remains heavily
dependent on contracted support to satisfy day-to-day requirements, and
it appears that contracted logistics support in some form will be
necessary for 2 to 3 years.
Fourth, shortfalls in training, leadership, personnel, and sustainment
have contributed to the limited progress in the number of Iraqi
battalions capable of operating independently, according to DOD
reports. To address this problem, the Iraqi government has expanded its
training capacity. According to DOD's March 2008 report, the Ministry
of Interior has expanded the number of its training facilities from 4
to 17 over the past year and is implementing its first annual strategic
plan. In addition, the Iraqi army plans to develop training centers in
2008 that will train an additional 2,000 soldiers per cycle. However,
DOD noted that Ministry of Interior and Defense basic combat and police
training facilities are at or near capacity and that the shortage of
leaders in the Iraqi security forces will take years to address.
Furthermore, the influx of about 20,000 of the 105,000 Sons of Iraq who
are currently working with coalition forces will place an additional
strain on the capacity of the Iraqis to train their forces,
particularly the police.
Transfer of Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Control Has Not Met
Expected Time Frames:
The ability of a province to transfer from MNF-I to provincial Iraqi
control is dependent on security and governance in each province. Due
to increased levels of violence and the lack of capable Iraqi security
forces, the projected transition dates for the completion of the
provincial Iraqi control process have shifted over time.
In June 2005, Iraq's Prime Minister announced a joint decision between
the government of Iraq and MNF-I to systematically hand over security
responsibility in Iraq's 18 provinces under the control of the
province's governor. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security
Responsibility was commissioned in July 2005 to develop a set of
conditions assessing the readiness of each province for Iraqi control.
Four conditions are used to determine whether a province should be
transferred to provincial Iraqi control. These conditions include (1)
the threat level of the province, (2) Iraqi security forces'
capabilities, (3) the governor's ability to oversee security
operations, and (4) MNF-I's ability to provide reinforcement if
necessary. According to MNF-I, as these conditions are met, MNF-I
forces will then leave all urban areas and assume a supporting role to
Iraq's security forces.
In January 2007, The New Way Forward stated that the Iraqi government
would take responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November
2007. However, this date was not met, as only 8 of 18 provinces had
transitioned to Iraqi control at that time. According to DOD, in
September 2007, the principal cause for the delay in transitioning
provinces to Iraqi control was the inability of the Iraqi police to
maintain security in the provinces. For example, as a result of the
February 2007 Baghdad Security Plan, an increased number of terrorists,
insurgents, and members of illegal militia fled Baghdad for other
provinces, and the Iraqi police were unable to handle these threats.
As of May 2008, nine provincial governments have lead responsibility
for security in their province. Six of the nine provinces that have
assumed security responsibilities are located in southern Iraq, where
the British forces had the lead and have continued to draw down their
forces. The remaining three provinces are located in northern Iraq, in
the area controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Figure 8
displays the degree to which the provinces had achieved provincial
Iraqi control as of May 2008.
Figure 8: Provinces That Have Transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control,
as of May 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Iraq depicting provinces that have transitioned
to provincial Iraqi control, as of May 2008. The following data is
depicted:
Province: Baghdad;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Dahuk;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Irbil;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Sulaymaniyah;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Ninewa;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Ta'mim;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Salah Ad Din;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Diyala;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Babil;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Wasit;
Status: Partially ready.
Province: Qadisiyah;
Status: Projected within 6 months.
Province: Anbar;
Status: Projected within 6 months.
Province: Karbala;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: An Najaf;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Muthanna;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Dhi Qar;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Maysan;
Status: Transitioned.
Province: Basra;
Status: Transitioned.
Source: GAO analysis of MNF-I data.
[End of figure]
According to the MNF-I Commanding General, eight of the nine remaining
provinces are expected to transition to provincial Iraqi control by
early 2009. One of the provinces (Ta'mim) has no expected transition
date. Figure 9 shows the projected timelines for transferring security
responsibilities to the remaining provincial governments.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Timeline for Transfer of Security Responsibilities to
Provincial Iraqi Control:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a timeline for transfer of security responsibilities to
Provincial Iraqi Control, as follows:
Completed: Muthanna;
Date: July 2006.
Completed: Dhi Qar;
Date: September 2006.
Completed: An Najaf;
Date: December 2006.
Completed: Maysan;
Date: April 2007.
Completed: Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk.
Date: May 2007.
Completed: Karbala;
Date: October 2007.
Completed: Basra;
Date: December 2007.
Projected: Anbar;
Date: June 2008.
Projected: Qadisiyah;
Date: July 2008.
Projected: Wasit and Babil;
Date: November 2008.
Projected: Diyala and Baghdad;
Date: December 2008.
Projected: Salah An Din and Ninewa;
Date: January 2009.
Ta'mim has no projected date for transitioning to provincial Iraqi
control.
Source: GAO analysis of MNF-I data.
[End of figure]
According to the MNF-I Commanding General, the coalition continues to
provide assistance even after security responsibilities have
transferred to provincial Iraqi control. For example, the coalition
continues to support Iraqi-led operations in those provinces with
planning, logistics, close air support, intelligence, and embedded
transition teams.
Enacting Key Iraqi Legislation:
This section describes progress toward the U.S. goal of helping Iraq
enact key legislation that would promote national reconciliation.
Iraq Has Enacted Some Legislation to Promote National Reconciliation,
but Critical Laws Are Still Being Debated:
To promote national reconciliation and unify the country, the Iraqi
government, with U.S. support, committed in 2006 to address political
grievances among Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd populations. The U.S.
and Iraqi governments believed that fostering reconciliation through
political compromise and the passage of legislation, such as
reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing hydrocarbon resources
equitably, were essential. In 2007, in The New Way Forward, the U.S.
government identified legislation that the Iraqi government committed
to enact by December 31, 2007.[Footnote 29] The United States also
promoted Iraq's reconciliation by assisting the country in its
constitutional referendum and legislative elections and building the
capacity of Iraq's legislature.[Footnote 30]
Since September 2007, the Iraqi government has enacted three laws that
could address some Sunni concerns--de-Ba'athification reform, amnesty
for certain detainees in Iraq's justice system, and provincial powers.
These three laws were enacted after considerable debate and compromise
and, according to State and DOD reports, represented positive signs of
political progress. De-Ba'athification and amnesty laws are steps to
address Sunni and Sadrist concerns that they had been removed from
government service or detained and arrested. According to the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq, the number of Iraqis currently held in detention is
a significant problem. The provincial powers law established a date for
new provincial elections, which could address Sunni under
representation in several provincial governments.
However, three additional laws considered critical for national
reconciliation have not been enacted. These include laws that set the
rules for Iraq's provincial elections, define the control and
management of Iraq's oil and gas resources, and provide for disarmament
and demobilization of Iraq's armed groups. According to U.S. reports,
the oil law and law on disarmament and demobilization are stalled.
According to U.S. and other officials and documents, although the
process is evolving, enacting legislation generally includes the
following steps: The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers
have authority to draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature-- either a
committee or 10 members--has the authority to propose laws. Laws
drafted by the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed
for legal soundness and subject matter by the Shura Council, an
institution in the Ministry of Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature
must first pass through its Legal Committee. The legislation then
proceeds through three readings. The legislation is presented at the
first reading. The relevant committee may amend the law, and the
Speaker's Office places it on the calendar. After the first reading,
the legislature discusses the proposed law at a second reading. At the
third reading, a final vote is taken article by article. Laws that
receive an affirmative vote are sent to the Presidency Council, which
can disapprove the law. The legislature can override the disapproval
with a three-fifths majority. This ratification process only applies
during the transition period when the Presidency Council is in
existence. Final laws are published in the Official Gazette and become
effective on the date of publication in the Gazette unless stipulated
otherwise.
Figure 10 shows the law enacted since September 2007, identifies the
steps left to enact the remaining legislation, and indicates the status
of implementation, which will be discussed in the next section.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Status of Iraqi Legislation to Promote National
Reconciliation:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a table depicting the status of Iraqi legislation to
promote national reconciliation, as follows:
De-Ba'athification:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007;
Implementing: Not implemented. Mandatory Commission not established.
Amnesty:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: step taken since September
2007;
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step
taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken
since September 2007;
Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
step taken since September 2007;
Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007;
Implementing: Implementation in process. Thousands approved for
amnesty.
Provincial powers:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Ratification procedures: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Law published in gazette: step taken since September 2007;
Implementing: Takes effect once provincial elections occur.[A]
Elections: Electoral commission:
Implementing: Implemented.
Elections: Provincial election law:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: step taken since September
2007;
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step
taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: step taken
since September 2007;
Enacting: First reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Second reading completed: step taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
[Empty]; Third reading completed; vote taken:
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty];
Implementing: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Framework:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee: step
taken since September 2007;
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty];
Implementing: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Revenue sharing:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty];
Implementing: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Ministry of Oil Restructuring:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty];
Implementing: [Empty].
Hydrocarbon laws: Iraqi National Oil Company:
Drafting laws: Laws drafted and reviewed: No legislation drafted;
Enacting: Draft referred to Council of Representatives/Committee:
[Empty];
Enacting: Draft placed on calendar by Speaker's office: [Empty];
Enacting: First reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Enacting: Second reading completed: [Empty];
Enacting: Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's
office: [Empty];
Draft amended by Committee; placed on calendar by Speaker's office:
Third reading completed; vote taken: [Empty];
Enacting: Ratification procedures: [Empty];
Enacting: Law published in gazette: [Empty];
Implementing: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN
and Iraqi government data.
[A] The provincial powers law set an October 1, 2008, deadline for
holding provincial elections.
[End of figure]
Since we last reported on legislation to promote national
reconciliation in September 2007, the Iraqi government has passed the
following laws.
* As of September 2007, drafts of de-Ba'athification reform legislation
were under initial review by the Council of Representatives. After
extensive debate, the Iraqi legislature passed the de-Ba'athification
reform law on January 12, 2008. The Presidency Council approved the law
in February 2008 and it was published in the Official Gazette.
According to a March 2008 DOD report, if implemented in the spirit of
reconciliation, this law could allow some former Ba'athist party
members, many of whom were Sunni, to return to government. The new law
establishes a national commission to complete the removal of former
high-level officials of the Ba'athist party, consistent with measures
outlined in the law. The law, however, allows some lower-ranking
members of the Ba'athist party to return to or continue working for the
government. In May 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1
provided for investigation and removal of even junior members of the
party from government, universities, and hospitals.[Footnote 31]
* As of September 2007, the Iraqi government had not drafted an amnesty
law. After considerable negotiation among the political blocs, the
legislation was combined with other pieces of legislation and passed as
part of an overall package in February 2008. According to a March 2008
DOD report, the law represents an important step toward addressing a
long-standing demand for detainee releases, but the ultimate effect on
national reconciliation will depend on its implementation. The law
provides for amnesty and release of Iraqis sentenced to prison and
those under investigation or trial, provided they are not involved in
certain crimes such as kidnapping, murder, embezzling state funds,
smuggling antiquities, or terrorism that results in killing or
permanently disabling victims. The law also requires the Iraqi
government to undertake the necessary measures to transfer those
detained in the MNF-I facilities to Iraqi facilities so that the
provisions of this law can be applied to them. This law is important to
Sunnis and Sadrists, according to State and USIP officials, as many
were detained or held without trial.
* As of September 2007, the Iraqi legislature had completed the second
reading of a draft of the provincial powers legislation. In February
2008, after considerable negotiation, the Iraqi government passed the
provincial powers legislation as part of an overall legislative package
and after an initial veto by the Shi'a vice president of the Presidency
Council was withdrawn. According to a March 2008 DOD report, the law is
an important step toward establishing a balance between adequate
central government authority and strong local governments, some of
which represent provinces with large or majority Sunni populations. The
law outlines the specific powers of the provinces and provides the
structure of government for the provincial and local councils. The law
also sets the date for provincial council elections as no later than
October 1, 2008.
Other key legislation has not passed, including the provincial
elections law, hydrocarbon laws, and disarmament and demobilization.
* As of September 2007, a provincial elections law had not been
drafted. Since then, the Prime Minister's Office has drafted a
provincial elections law and presented it to the Iraqi legislature,
where it has completed its second reading. As of May 2008, the Iraqi
legislature is debating its provisions. This draft law would provide
the rules for holding provincial elections, which are critical to
promote national reconciliation. According to a DOD report, new
elections would enhance reconciliation by enabling the creation of
provincial councils that are more representative of the populations
they serve. Many Sunnis did not vote in the 2005 provincial elections,
resulting in underrepresentation of Sunnis in some provincial councils.
In Baghdad, for example, the population is about 40 percent Sunni, but
the council has 1 Sunni representative out of 51, according to a March
2008 State report.
* As of September 2007, the Iraqi government had drafted three of the
four separate but interrelated pieces of legislation needed to
establish control and management of Iraq's hydrocarbon resources and
ensure equitable distribution of revenues. Since that time, only the
hydrocarbon framework draft, which establishes the control and
management of the oil sector, has progressed to the Council of
Representatives. The three additional laws include legislation to
establish revenue sharing, restructure the Ministry of Oil, and
establish the Iraqi National Oil Company. According to State officials,
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government
disagree on many areas of the proposed legislation, particularly on the
issue of how much control the KRG will have in managing its oil
resources. For example, the KRG has passed its own oil and gas law.
Furthermore, the KRG has negotiated an estimated 25 contracts with
foreign oil firms, which the Iraqi federal government claims are
illegal.
* As of September 2007, the Iraqi legislature had not drafted
legislation on disarmament and demobilization of militias and armed
groups. Since then, no progress has been made on drafting legislation.
According to the United Nations, minimum requirements for a successful
disarmament and demobilization program in Iraq include a secure
environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an overarching
political agreement, sustainable funding, and appropriate reintegration
opportunities. As of May 2008, these conditions were not present. For
example, the United Nations reported that since March 27, 2008, intense
fighting in Sadr City has occurred among militias linked to Muqtada Al
Sadr and the Iraqi security forces and MNF-I. According to the Iraqi
government, between late March 2008 and the end of April 2008, 925
persons were killed and 2,600 persons injured during the military
operation.
Iraqi Government Faces Challenges Implementing Legislation and Outcomes
Are Uncertain:
Although Iraq has enacted some legislation it judged important for
national reconciliation, implementation of the legislation and its
outcomes are uncertain. For example, the amnesty legislation is
currently being implemented as detainees have been approved for
release, but a limited number have been set free as of May 2008.
Moreover, implementation of the de-Ba'athification law has stalled, and
holding free and fair provincial elections poses logistical and
security challenges.
Implementation of the amnesty law began on March 2, 2008. According to
the Iraq Higher Juridical Council, as of May 1, 2008, almost 17,000
prisoners and detainees have been approved for release. According to
State officials, the law is implemented at the provincial level by
committees of provincial judges. These committees are more likely to
implement the law, according to State officials, because several are
located in provinces with large Sunni populations where many detainees
are located. However, according to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, the
process of releasing prisoners and detainees is slow, and, according to
State, approximately 1,600 have been released to date. The legislation
does not provide a time frame for the approximately 25,000 MNF-I
detainees to be turned over to Iraqi custody.
Although the de-Ba'athification law was enacted in February 2008,
implementation of the law has stalled, delaying the possible
reinstatement of an estimated 30,000 former government employees. The
Iraqi government has yet to appoint members of the Supreme National
Commission on Accountability and Justice, which has primary
responsibility for implementing the law. According to State officials,
Sunnis are concerned about the law's implementation and the choice of
commissioners.
The Iraqi government faces challenges in holding provincial elections
by October 2008, as required by the provincial powers law. According to
State officials, a provincial election law has not been enacted and the
draft law contains confusing and contentious issues. For example, the
draft law states that any political entity that possesses an armed
militia is prohibited from participating in the election. According to
State, this provision could eliminate some political parties, such as
the Sadrist Trend.
According to a UN report and U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) officials, there are challenges for the Iraqi government to
hold these elections by late 2008. UN and IFES reports estimate that it
would take about 8 months to prepare for the elections, and State
estimates that elections could probably be held 4- 5 months after an
elections law is passed.[Footnote 32] Although some elections
preparations have begun, numerous tasks remain and some cannot begin
until the election rules are set by law. According to USAID and IFES,
the tasks remaining included establishing voter registration lists;
making voting provisions for internally displaced persons; registering
candidates for the councils, including vetting them through the de-
Ba'athification process; designing and printing ballots; identifying
polling sites; and providing time for the candidates to campaign in
their districts.
According to U.S. officials, holding provincial elections will face
security challenges due to likely sectarian violence, insurgent
attacks, and political party militias. Elections in several areas may
be fiercely contested as militias and sectarian groups may fight for
control of the provincial councils and their financial resources,
according to State and USAID officials. State and USAID officials said
MNF-I is working with the Iraqi government to help provide support for
the election.[Footnote 33]
Iraq Has Made Little Progress in Completing the Constitutional Review
Process:
Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October
2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, including the
powers of the presidency, claims over disputed areas such as oil- rich
Kirkuk, and the relative powers of the regions versus the federal
government.[Footnote 34] According to State officials, these unresolved
issues were core points of dispute among Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd
political blocs. According to the United Nations, Iraqi leaders
included a compromise provision in the draft constitution that required
the formation of the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) to review
the Constitution and propose necessary amendments. Since September
2007, the constitutional review process has made little progress. The
CRC recommended a draft package of amendments to the Council of
Representatives in May 2007, but these have not moved forward. Since
then, the CRC has received multiple extensions to complete its work,
but has not proposed a new package of amendments. According to a March
2008 DOD report, Kurdish leaders have prevented progress in the review
process until the issue of disputed territories, especially Kirkuk, is
settled.
The following summarizes three key issues in the Constitution that have
not been resolved.
* Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of
the Sunni bloc, believes that the Presidency Council should have
greater power in relation to the prime minister to allow for better
power sharing among Iraq's political groups. According to the Iraqi
Constitution, in the current electoral term, a presidency council
consisting of a president and 2 vice-presidents exercises the powers of
the presidency. The Presidency Council--currently a Shi'a, a Sunni, and
a Kurd--can approve or disapprove legislation in the current electoral
term.[Footnote 35] However, the legislature can adopt disapproved
legislation by a three-fifths majority vote. On the other hand, the
prime minister, selected from the legislature's largest political bloc
and currently a Shi'a, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, names
the ministers for each ministry, and directs the Council of Ministers,
which directs the work of all government ministries and departments,
develops their plans, and prepares the government budget.
* Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Kurdistan Regional Government
officials want a referendum to be held in Kirkuk to determine its
status. Even though the deadline for holding the referendum was
December 31, 2007, the KRG and the Iraqi government agreed to a 6-month
extension on implementation. While KRG officials wanted a referendum to
be held as soon as practical, other Iraqi legislators believe that a
referendum should be deferred due to border disputes and displacement
of people in the area. The United Nations is currently consulting with
various groups about the status of other disputed territories, such as
the districts of Akre and Makhmour currently in Ninewa province.
According to the UN, there is no agreed upon listing of disputed areas
and their boundaries. If these discussions succeed, it could be a model
for determining the status of Kirkuk, according to the UN.
* Power of the federal government versus regions. Shi'a, Sunni, and
Kurdish political blocs disagree over fundamental questions of
federalism--relative power among the federal, regional, and provincial
governments. The CRC proposed several amendments to better define and
clarify the relative powers but has not achieved compromise among major
political factions. The Kurdish bloc rejected the proposed changes,
stating it would decrease regional power while concentrating power in
the federal government.
Spending Capital Budgets:
This section discusses Iraq's progress toward spending its capital
budget and U.S. efforts to improve Iraqi budget execution.
Iraq Has Made Little Progress Spending Capital Investment Budgets:
The New Way Forward emphasized the need to build capacity in Iraq's
ministries and help the government execute its capital investment
budgets. This U.S. goal is particularly important as current U.S.
expenditures on Iraq reconstruction projects are nearing completion.
However, Iraq continues to spend small percentages of its capital
investment budgets[Footnote 36] needed to improve economic growth.
Iraq's inability to spend its considerable resources limits the
government's efforts to further economic development, advance
reconstruction projects, and, at the most basic level, deliver
essential services to the Iraqi people. In recognition of this critical
need, U.S. capacity development efforts have shifted from long-term
institution-building projects to an immediate effort to help Iraqi
ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital investment
budgets. As U.S. funding for Iraq reconstruction totaling $45 billion
is almost 90 percent obligated ($40 billion) and about 70 percent
disbursed ($31 billion) as of April 2008, the need for Iraq to spend
its own resources becomes increasingly critical to economic
development.
Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq budgeted about $27 billion in capital
investments for its own reconstruction effort, as shown in table 3.
However, the government spent about 24 percent of the amount budgeted.
According to Ministry of Finance total expenditure reports displayed in
figure 11, Iraq has spent low percentages of capital investment budgets
between 2005 and 2007 in several key categories. Total government
spending for capital investments increased slightly from 23 percent in
2005 to 28 percent in 2007. However, Iraq's central ministries spent
only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007--a decline
from similarly low spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and
2006, respectively. Last, spending rates for ministries critical to the
delivery of essential services varied from the 41 percent spent by the
Water Resources Ministry in 2007 to the less than 1 percent spent by
the Ministries of Oil and Electricity.
Table 3: Iraq Investment Budget and Expenditures, 2005-2007 (Dollars in
millions):
Total Government[A]:
2005: Budget: $6,316;
2005: Expenditures: $1,432;
2006: Budget: $8,312;
2006: Expenditures: $1,615;
2007: Budget: $12,168;
2007: Expenditures: $3,435;
Total 2005-2007: Budget: $26,796;
Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $6,482.
Central Government Ministries[B]:
2005: Budget: $5,720;
2005: Expenditures: $825;
2006: Budget: $7,688;
2006: Expenditures: $1,003;
2007: Budget: $8,086;
2007: Expenditures: $896;
Total 2005-2007: Budget: $21,494;
Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $2,724.
Selected Ministries: Water Resources;
2005: Budget: $184;
2005: Expenditures: $120;
2006: Budget: $200;
2006: Expenditures: $91;
2007: Budget: $262;
2007: Expenditures: $109;
Total 2005-2007: Budget: $646;
Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $320.
Selected Ministries: Oil;
2005: Budget: $3,001;
2005: Expenditures: $111;
2006: Budget: $3,106;
2006: Expenditures: $143;
2007: Budget: $2,383;
2007: Expenditures: $0.8;
Total 2005-2007: Budget: $8,491;
Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $254.
Selected Ministries: Electricity;
2005: Budget: $297;
2005: Expenditures: $142;
2006: Budget: $1,167;
2006: Expenditures: $268;
2007: Budget: $1,389;
2007: Expenditures: $0.8;
Total 2005-2007: Budget: $2,853;
Total 2005-2007: Expenditures: $411.
Source: GAO analysis of Ministry of Finance data.
Note: The 2005-2007 time frame represents fiscal year spending for
January through December.
[A] The total government budget includes the central government
ministries, provinces and Kurdistan region.
[B] The central government ministries include the ministries of oil,
water, oil, electricity, public works, health, housing and
construction, and other spending units.
[End of table]
Figure 11: Iraqi Budget Execution Ratios for Total Government and
Selected Ministries, 2005 to 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Total government:
2005: 23%;
2006: 19%;
2007: 28%.
Central ministries:
2005: 14%;
2006: 13%;
2007: 11%.
Water resources:
2005: 65%;
2006: 46%;
2007: 41%.
Oil:
2005: 4%;
2006: 5%;
2007: 0.03%.
Electricity:
2005: 48%;
2006: 23%;
2007: 0.06%.
Source: GAO analysis of official Ministry of Finance budget and
expenditure data.
[End of figure]
As discussed in the next section, low spending rates for the oil,
electricity, and water sectors are problematic since U.S. investments
in these sectors have ended and increased production goals for these
sectors have consistently not been met. Iraq will have additional
resources for capital investments in 2008. Iraq's 2008 budget was
developed with the assumption that Iraq would receive $57 per barrel
for oil exports. As of May 2008, Iraqi crude oil was selling at about
$104 per barrel. Oil exports generate about 90 percent of total
government revenues each year. GAO will issue a separate report on
Iraq's estimated unspent and projected oil revenues for 2003 through
2008.
Iraqi Special Reports Show High Budget Execution Rates:
In March 2008,[Footnote 37] DOD reported that preliminary Iraqi budget
execution data for the period January to October 2007 show that the
government spent 45 percent of its capital budget, and central
ministries executed 47 percent of their capital budgets. Further, in
commenting on a draft of this report, the Treasury Department stated
that the Iraqi government spent and committed about 63 percent of its
investment budget in 2007, as documented in special reports developed
by the Ministry of Finance. The special reports include Iraqi
commitments to spend as well as actual expenditures. "Commitments" is
defined under Iraq's Financial Management Law, as "an undertaking to
make an expenditure following the conclusion of a binding agreement
that will result in payment." We did not use the special reports for
our analyses for two reasons: (1) Treasury Department officials stated
in our meetings with them that the special reports contain unreliable
data, and (2) the special reports do not define commitments, measure
them, or describe how or when these commitments would result in actual
expenditures. In addition, our reviews of these special reports show
inconsistent use of poorly defined budget terms, as well as columns and
rows that do not add up.
In addition, we note that the Iraqi government operates on a cash basis
in which expenditures are reported when paid. Commitments, such as
signed contracts, would normally not be included in expenditures until
paid. Given the security and capacity challenges currently facing Iraq,
many committed contracts may not be executed and would not result in
actual expenditures, according to U.S. agency officials.
Iraq Faces Many Challenges in Attempting to Spend Its Capital
Investment Budgets:
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified
a number of factors that challenge the Iraqi government's efforts to
fully spend its budget for capital projects. These challenges include
violence and sectarian strife, a shortage of trained staff, and weak
procurement and budgeting systems.
First, U.S., coalition, and international officials have noted that
violence and sectarian strife remain major obstacles to developing
Iraqi government capacity, including its ability to execute budgets for
capital projects. The high level of violence has contributed to a
decrease in the number of workers available and can increase the amount
of time needed to plan and complete capital projects. The security
situation also hinders U.S. advisors' ability to provide the ministries
with assistance and monitor capital project performance.
Second, U.S., coalition, and international agency officials have
observed the relative shortage of trained budgetary, procurement, and
other staff with technical skills as a factor limiting the Iraqi
government's ability to plan and execute its capital spending. The
security situation and the de-Ba'athification process have adversely
affected available government and contractor staffing. Officials report
a shortage of trained staff with budgetary experience to prepare and
execute budgets and a shortage of staff with procurement expertise to
solicit, award, and oversee capital projects. According to State and
other U.S. government reports and officials, there has been decay for
years in core functions of Iraqi's government capacity, including both
financial and human resource management.
Finally, weak procurement, budgetary, and accounting systems are of
particular concern in Iraq because these systems must balance efficient
execution of capital projects while protecting against reported
widespread corruption. A World Bank report notes that corruption
undermines the Iraqi government's ability to make effective use of
current reconstruction assistance.[Footnote 38] According to a State
Department document, widespread corruption undermines efforts to
develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources; by
eroding popular faith in democratic institutions, perceived as run by
corrupt political elites; and by spurring capital flight and reducing
economic growth.
Efforts Are Under Way to Improve Iraqi Budget Execution:
In early 2007, U.S. agencies increased the focus of their assistance
efforts on improving the Iraqi government's ability to effectively
execute its budget for capital projects, although it is not clear what
impact this increased focus has had, given the relatively low rates of
spending. The new U.S. initiatives included greater coordination
between the U.S. embassy and an Iraqi task force on budget execution,
and the provision of subject matter experts to help the government
track expenditures and provide technical assistance with procurement.
According to U.S. officials, these targeted efforts also reflect an
increased interest of senior Iraqi officials in improving capital
budget spending. In addition, improving Iraqi government budget
execution is part of a broader U.S. assistance effort to improve the
capacity of the Iraqi government through automation of the financial
management system, training, and advisors embedded with ministries.
As we reported in October 2007, the development of competent and loyal
Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq.
[Footnote 39] In 2005 and 2006, the United States provided funding of
about $169 million for programs to help build the capacity of key
civilian ministries and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. As part
of The New Way Forward, the Administration sought an additional $395
million for these efforts in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Ministry
capacity development refers to efforts and programs to advise and help
Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute
their budgets, and effectively deliver government services such as
electricity, water, and security. We found multiple U.S. agencies
leading individual efforts and recommended that Congress consider
conditioning future appropriations on the completion of an integrated
strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department
reiterated prior comments that it already had an integrated plan for
building capacity in Iraq's ministries. In addition, State and Treasury
cited a new Public Financial Management Action Group they were forming
to help integrate and coordinate U.S. government assistance on
improving budget execution. Adding a new program to the uncoordinated
and multiple U.S. capacity development programs we found does little to
address GAO's recommendation for an integrated strategy.
The government of Iraq also has made recent efforts to address
impediments to budget execution. For example, State reported in May
2008 that the Council of Ministers recently approved new regulations to
lift the ceiling on the amounts ministerial contracting committees can
approve. Committees in the ministries of Defense, Interior, Oil, Trade,
Health, Electricity, Industry and Minerals, Water Resources, and
Municipalities can now approve contracts up to $50 million. This
represents a $30 million increase for Defense, Oil, Electricity and
Trade and a $10 million increase for the other ministries. A newly
formed Central Contracts Committee will approve contracts exceeding the
$50 million limit.
Delivering Essential Services:
This section discusses the extent to which key U.S. goals for oil,
electricity, and water production have been met.
Crude Oil Output Has Consistently Fallen below U.S. Goals:
Providing essential services to all Iraqi areas and communities and
helping Iraq maintain and expand its oil export are key goals of The
New Way Forward. The oil sector is critical to Iraq's economy,
accounting for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and about 90
percent of its revenues. Iraq's crude oil reserves, estimated at a
total of 115 billion barrels, are the third largest in the world. After
5 years of effort and $2.7 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, Iraqi
crude oil output has improved for short periods but has consistently
fallen below the U.S. goals of reaching an average crude oil production
capacity of 3 million barrels per day and export levels of 2.2 mbpd
[Footnote 40] (see figure 12).
Figure 12: Iraq's Reported Crude Oil Production, Exports, and U.S.
Goals, June 2003 through May 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data, im
millions of barrels per day:
Date: June 2003;
Production exported: 0.2 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.396 mbpd;
Total production: 0.596 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: July 2003;
Production exported: 0.322 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.605 mbpd;
Total production: 0.927 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: August 2003;
Production exported: 0.646 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.762 mbpd;
Total production: 1.408 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: September 2003;
Production exported: 0.983 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.722 mbpd;
Total production: 1.705 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: October 2003;
Production exported: 1.149 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.897 mbpd;
Total production: 2.046 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: November 2003;
Production exported: 1.524 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.6 mbpd;
Total production: 2.124 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: December 2003;
Production exported: 1.541 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.737 mbpd;
Total production: 2.278 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: January 2004;
Production exported: 1.537 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.869 mbpd;
Total production: 2.406 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: February 2004;
Production exported: 1.382 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.907 mbpd;
Total production: 2.289 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: March 2004;
Production exported: 1.825 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.596 mbpd;
Total production: 2.421 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: April 2004;
Production exported: 1.804 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.641 mbpd;
Total production: 2.445 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: May 2004;
Production exported: 1.38 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.769 mbpd;
Total production: 2.149 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: June 2004;
Production exported: 1.148 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.751 mbpd;
Total production: 1.899 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: July 2004;
Production exported: 1.406 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.804 mbpd;
Total production: 2.210 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: August 2004;
Production exported: 1.114 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 1.034 mbpd;
Total production: 2.148 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: September 2004;
Production exported: 1.679 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.86 mbpd;
Total production: 2.539 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: October 2004;
Production exported: 1.607 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.828 mbpd;
Total production: 2.435 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: November 2004;
Production exported: 1.351 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.565 mbpd;
Total production: 1.916 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: December 2004;
Production exported: 1.607 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.549 mbpd;
Total production: 2.156 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: January 2005;
Production exported: 1.467 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.709 mbpd;
Total production: 2.176 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: February 2005;
Production exported: 1.431 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.672 mbpd;
Total production: 2.103 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: March 2005;
Production exported: 1.394 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.697 mbpd;
Total production: 2.091 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: April 2005;
Production exported: 1.398 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.723 mbpd;
Total production: 2.121 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: May 2005;
Production exported: 1.308 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.819 mbpd;
Total production: 2.127 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: June 2005;
Production exported: 1.44 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.7 mbpd;
Total production: 2.14 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: July 2005;
Production exported: 1.55 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.622 mbpd;
Total production: 2.172 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: August 2005;
Production exported: 1.504 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.649 mbpd;
Total production: 2.153 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: September 2005;
Production exported: 1.609 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.48 mbpd;
Total production: 2.089 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: October 2005;
Production exported: 1.239 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.705 mbpd;
Total production: 1.944 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: November 2005;
Production exported: 1.168 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.813 mbpd;
Total production: 1.981 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: December 2005;
Production exported: 1.071 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.907 mbpd;
Total production: 1.978 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: January 2006;
Production exported: 1.094 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.619 mbpd;
Total production: 1.713 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: February 2006;
Production exported: 1.473 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.356 mbpd;
Total production: 1.829 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: March 2006;
Production exported: 1.325 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.747 mbpd;
Total production: 2.072 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: April 2006;
Production exported: 1.596 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.587 mbpd;
Total production: 2.183 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: May 2006;
Production exported: 1.507 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.624 mbpd;
Total production: 2.131 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: June 2006;
Production exported: 1.702 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.519 mbpd;
Total production: 2.221 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: July 2006;
Production exported: 1.685 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd;
Total production: 2.189 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: August 2006;
Production exported: 1.582 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.656 mbpd;
Total production: 2.238 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: September 2006;
Production exported: 1.74 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.608 mbpd;
Total production: 2.312 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: October 2006;
Production exported: 1.511 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.737 mbpd;
Total production: 2.239 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: November 2006;
Production exported: 1.436 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.66 mbpd;
Total production: 2.096 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: December 2006;
Production exported: 1.45 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.706 mbpd;
Total production: 2.156 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: January 2007;
Production exported: 1.29 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.305 mbpd;
Total production: 1.595 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: February 2007;
Production exported: 1.49 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.59 mbpd;
Total production: 2.018 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: March 2007;
Production exported: 1.57 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.502 mbpd;
Total production: 2.072 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: April 2007;
Production exported: 1.49 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.65 mbpd;
Total production: 2.14 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: May 2007;
Production exported: 1.63 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.393 mbpd;
Total production: 2.023 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: June 2007;
Production exported: 1.47 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.19 mbpd;
Total production: 1.66 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: July 2007;
Production exported: 1.72 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.19 mbpd;
Total production: 1.91 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: August 2007;
Production exported: 1.69 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.25 mbpd;
Total production: 1.94 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: September 2007;
Production exported: 1.9 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.43 mbpd;
Total production: 2.33 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: October 2007;
Production exported: 1.91 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.44 mbpd;
Total production: 2.35 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: November 2007;
Production exported: 1.88 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.52 mbpd;
Total production: 2.4 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: December 2007;
Production exported: 1.928 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.51 mbpd;
Total production: 2.438 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: January 2008;
Production exported: 1.93 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.3 mbpd;
Total production: 2.23 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: February 2008;
Production exported: 1.93 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd;
Total production: 2.47 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: March 2008;
Production exported: 1.93 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.45 mbpd;
Total production: 2.38 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: April 2008;
Production exported: 1.88 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.52 mbpd;
Total production: 2.4 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Date: May 2008;
Production exported: 1.96 mbpd;
Production for domestic use: 0.54 mbpd;
Total production: 2.5 mbpd;
Export goal: 2.2 mbpd;
Production capacity goal: 3.0 mbpd.
Source: GAO analysis of Iraq Ministry of Oil data collected by State
Department.
[End of figure]
In May 2008, crude oil production was 2.5 million barrels per day and
exports were 1.96 million barrels per day, according to the State
Department. Poor security, corruption and smuggling continue to impede
the reconstruction of Iraq's oil sector. For example, according to
State Department officials and reports, as of 2006, about 10 to 30
percent of refined fuels was being diverted to the black market or
smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a profit. According to DOD,
investment in Iraq's oil sector is below the absolute minimum required
to sustain current production and additional foreign and private
investment is needed. U.S. officials and industry experts have stated
that Iraq would need an estimated $20 billion to $30 billion over the
next several years to reach and sustain a crude oil production capacity
of 5 mbpd. This production goal is below the level identified in the
2005-2007 National Development Strategy--at least 6 mbpd by 2015.
Electricity Generation Continues to Fall Short of Demand:
Since 2003, the United States has provided $4.7 billion to the
reconstruction of Iraq's electricity sector. Despite this substantial
investment, electricity generation did not consistently achieve past
U.S. goals and demand continues to outpace supply from Iraq's national
grid (see fig. 13). For example, a recent State Department report shows
that for June 3 to 9, the daily supply of electricity from the grid met
only 52 percent of demand. In addition, average hours of electricity
were 7.8 hours in Baghdad and 10.2 hours nationwide, compared to the
U.S. 2006 goal of 12 hours of daily electricity and the Iraqi Ministry
of Electricity goal of 24 hours. State Department's technical comments
on a draft of this report stated that it is well-documented that in
parts of Iraq, and even in parts of Baghdad, on a given day there are
upwards of 16 hours of power a day; and in some locations there is 24
hours of power. We analyzed data from State's weekly status reports for
the period January 3, 2008 to June 4, 2008 and found that number of
hours of electricity in Baghdad ranged from 6.5 to 12 and averaged
about 8 hours per day. For other parts of Iraq, hours of electricity
ranged from 8.2 to 14.3 with an average 10.2 hours per day. According
to DOD, the electricity sector suffers from several problems, including
fuel shortages, interdictions, damage to power lines, reliance on
foreign sources of power, and prior years of neglect.
Between 2004 and 2006, the United States reported electricity
generation goals that ranged from 110,000 megawatt hours (mwh) to
127,000 mwh. However, since 2007 the United States has stopped setting
metric goals for the electricity sector. According to both the U.S.
Embassy's 2007 Electrical Action Plan and the 2008 Transition Plan, the
U.S. goal is to "provide electricity in a reliable and efficient manner
to as many Iraqi citizens as possible, and for as many hours as
possible." According to a State Department official, the United States
no longer sets metric goals for the entire electricity sector because
U.S. projects only constitute a portion of the electricity sector.
Moreover, the senior electricity advisor stated that there are too many
variables that may affect any projections.
Figure 13: Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq,
January 2004 through May 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the estimated demand as
well as the seven-day supply of electricity over the time period of
January 1, 2004 through March 27, 2008.
Source: Department of State.
[End of figure]
The Ministry of Electricity estimated in its 2006-2015 plan that the
government will need $27 billion over 6 to 10 years to reach its goal
of providing reliable electricity across Iraq by 2015. The ministry's
goal is to achieve 24 hours of power nationwide and meet demand plus 10
percent.
Iraq Needs an Integrated Energy Plan:
As we reported in May 2007,[Footnote 41] a variety of security,
corruption, legal, planning, and sustainment challenges have impeded
U.S. and Iraqi efforts to restore Iraq's oil and electricity sectors.
These challenges have made it difficult to achieve the current crude
oil production and export goals that are central to Iraq's government
revenues and economic development. In the electricity sector, these
challenges have made it difficult to achieve a reliable Iraqi
electrical grid that provides power to all other infrastructure sectors
and promotes economic activity.
Although the oil and electricity sectors are mutually dependent, the
Iraqi government lacks integrated planning for these sectors leading to
inefficiencies that could hinder future rebuilding efforts.
Specifically, the Iraqi government lacks an integrated energy plan that
clearly identifies future costs and resource needs; rebuilding goals,
objectives, and priorities; stakeholder roles and responsibilities,
including steps to ensure coordination of ministerial and donor
efforts; an assessment of the environmental risks and threats; and
performance measures and milestones to monitor and gauge progress. For
example, the lack of cooperation and coordination between the Oil and
Electricity ministries, particularly in supplying appropriate fuels to
the electricity sector, has resulted in inefficiencies such as
increased maintenance costs and frequent interruptions in electricity
production, according to U.S. officials.
We recommended that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with
relevant U.S. agencies and in coordination with the donor community,
work with the Iraqi government to develop an integrated energy strategy
for the oil and electricity sectors that identifies, among other items,
key goals and priorities, future funding needs, and steps for enhancing
ministerial coordination. In a May 2008 letter, the MNF-I Commanding
General asked the Iraqi Prime Minister to establish a ministerial-level
oversight committee to develop an Iraqi National Energy Strategy. In
commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department indicated
that it was encouraging the Iraqi government to develop an integrated
energy strategy.
United States Is Close to Meeting Goals for Its Water Sector Programs,
but Need for Clean Water Is Still Unmet:
Unsafe drinking water can carry diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and
dysentery. Since April 2006, U.S. reconstruction projects have focused
on producing enough clean water to reach up to an additional 8.5
million Iraqis.[Footnote 42] As of March 2008, U.S.- funded projects
had the capacity to provide an additional 8 million Iraqis with potable
water. The World Bank has estimated that $14.4 billion is needed to
rebuild the public works and water system in Iraq; the U.S. government
has allocated about $2.4 billion for improvements in the water and
sanitation sector.[Footnote 43]
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, insecurity, population displacement, and a lack of maintenance
are placing pressure on existing water and sanitation facilities,
leaving a large number of Iraqis either without water or with access to
water that puts them increasingly at risk of water borne diseases.
According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), only one in
three Iraqi children under the age of 5 has access to safe drinking
water, and only 17 percent of Iraq's sewage is treated before being
discharged into the country's rivers and waterways. A UNICEF 2006
survey that measured the reliability of water supplies indicated
widespread infrastructure problems. For example, although 79 percent of
Iraqis reported having access to an improved drinking water source,
this figure does not reflect the condition and reliability of services.
Nearly half of those with access to water sources reported problems
with their water service, with 21 percent of this population reporting
problems on a daily basis. In addition, only 43 percent of rural
residents reported having access to an improved drinking water source.
Monitoring progress toward increasing Iraqis' access to clean water is
complicated by several factors. As we reported in 2005 and recently
confirmed with the State Department, Iraq has no metering for water
usage and no measurement of the quality of the potable water supply.
Moreover, State lacks comprehensive and reliable data on the capacity
of water treatment and sewage facilities that have not been constructed
or rehabilitated by U.S.-funded projects. Finally, as we reported in
2005 and as noted in recent U.S. government and UN reports, not all
facilities may be operating as intended due to looting, unreliable
electricity, inadequate supplies, or the lack of trained personnel.
U.S. Efforts to Update Strategies to Stabilize and Rebuild Iraq:
According to State and DOD officials, as of late May 2008, the
Administration has not revised its prior Iraq strategy document (NSVI)
to include U.S. goals and objectives for The New Way Forward, which
ends in July 2008, or the phase that follows. Instead, according to
State and DOD officials, future U.S. goals and objectives in Iraq are
contained in the following documents:
* the President's September 13, 2007, address on "the way forward" in
Iraq;
* the President's April 10, 2008, address on Iraq;
* Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Iraq, April 10, 2008; and:
* the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, April 10, 2008.[Footnote
44]
These documents clearly state the importance the Administration places
on continued U.S. involvement in and support for Iraq. They also
discuss the ongoing drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq that will end in
July 2008 and generally describe the U.S. military transition that
would occur in Iraq over an unspecified period of time in the future.
[Footnote 45] The Secretary of Defense's testimony defined the desired
U.S. end state for Iraq as (1) a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq
that can govern, defend, and sustain itself; (2) an Iraq that is an
ally against Jihadist terrorism and a net contributor to security in
the gulf; and (3) an Iraq that helps bridge the sectarian divides in
the Middle East. The documents, however, do not specify the
administration's strategic goals and objectives in Iraq for the phase
after July 2008 or how it intends to achieve them. Further, while they
predict continued progress in the security, political, and economic
areas, they do not address the remaining challenges to achieving either
unmet U.S. goals and objectives or the desired U.S. end state for Iraq.
A clear statement about the U.S. military transition and remaining
challenges is important, as the UN mandate for the multinational force
in Iraq, under Security Resolution 1790, expires December 31, 2008.
This resolution reaffirmed MNF-I's authority to take all necessary
measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq. The United States
and Iraq are negotiating a status of forces agreement to provide the
United States and its coalition partners with the authorities necessary
to conduct operations to support the Iraqi government after the UN
mandate ends.
In May 2008, the State Department reported that the MNF-I/U.S. Embassy
Joint Campaign Plan provides a road map for the future.[Footnote 46]
This campaign plan is classified. To reflect changing U.S. goals and
conditions in Iraq, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad revised their
Joint Campaign Plan in July 2007. At the President's direction, they
updated it in November 2007 to reflect the decision to withdraw the
surge forces by July 2008--the end of The New Way Forward. According to
the May 2008 State Department report, the Joint Campaign Plan supports
the implementation of U.S. efforts in Iraq along four lines of
operation: political, security, economic, and diplomatic. The plan
recognizes the importance of enhancing security and protecting the
Iraqi population and of advancing the political line of operation to
help Iraqis establish legitimate, representative governance in their
country at both the national and provincial levels.
However, a campaign plan is an operational, not a strategic plan,
according DOD's doctrine for joint operation planning.[Footnote 47] A
campaign plan must rely on strategic guidance from national authorities
for its development. For example, the April 2006 MNF-I/U.S. embassy
Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan relied on the NSC's prior strategic plan,
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, as a basis for the plan's
development.[Footnote 48]
Activities at the strategic level include establishing national and
multinational military objectives, as well as defining limits and
assessing risks for the use of military and other instruments of
national power. In contrast, a campaign plan is developed at the
operational level. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy
by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve strategic
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives,
initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain
these events. The development of a campaign plan, according to
doctrine, should be based on suitable and feasible national strategic
objectives formulated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-- with appropriate
consultation with additional NSC members, other U.S. government
agencies, and multinational partners. Doctrine states that in
developing operational plans, commanders and their staffs must be
continuously aware of the higher-level objectives. According to DOD
doctrine, if operational objectives are not linked to strategic
objectives, tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall
strategy at cross-purposes.
Joint doctrine also states that effective planning cannot occur without
a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must
exist to end military operations and draw down forces. According to
doctrine, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and
forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or
termination. Our review of the classified Joint Campaign Plan, however,
identified limitations in these areas, which are discussed in a
classified GAO report accompanying this report.[Footnote 49]
Weaknesses in "the way forward" and the Joint Campaign Plan are
symptomatic of recurring weaknesses in past U.S. strategic planning
efforts. Our prior reports assessing (1) the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq, (2) U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of Iraq's
ministries, and (3) U.S. and Iraqi efforts to rebuild Iraq's energy
sector found strategies that lacked clear purpose, scope, roles and
responsibilities, and performance measures.[Footnote 50] For example,
we found that the NSVI only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing the strategy, the current and future
costs, and Iraq's contributions to future needs. Although multiple U.S.
agencies have programs to develop the capacity of Iraqi ministries,
U.S. efforts lack an integrated strategy. Finally, although the United
States has spent billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq's oil and
electricity sectors, Iraq lacks an integrated strategic plan for the
energy sector. We recommended that the National Security Council, DOD,
and State complete a strategic plan for Iraq and that State work with
the Iraqi government to develop integrated strategic plans for ministry
capacity development and the energy sector. Clear strategies are needed
to guide U.S. efforts, manage risk, and identify needed resources.
Conclusion:
Since 2003, the United States has developed and revised multiple
strategies to address security and reconstruction needs in Iraq. The
current strategy--The New Way Forward--responds to failures in prior
plans that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi
forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. The United
States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New
Way Forward, but progress is fragile and unmet goals and challenges
remain:
* Violence has declined from the high levels of 2006 and early 2007,
largely the result of an increase in U.S. combat forces, the creation
of nongovernmental security forces, and the Mahdi Army's cease fire.
However, the security environment remains volatile and dangerous.
* The number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces is
approaching one-half million. However, the number of Iraqi units
capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained
about 10 percent. Efforts to turn security responsibilities over to
Iraqi forces remain a continuing challenge.
* The Iraqi government has passed key legislation to return some
Ba'athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define
provincial powers. However, it has not enacted other important
legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections,
and its efforts to complete a constitutional review have stalled.
* Finally, Iraq has not followed through on commitments to spend more
money on its own reconstruction efforts. Low spending rates for the
critical oil, electricity, and water sectors are problematic since U.S.
investments have ended and increased production goals for these sectors
have not been met.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
As The New Way Forward and the military surge end in July 2008, and
given weaknesses in current DOD and State plans, an updated strategy is
needed for how the United States will help Iraq achieve key security,
legislative, and economic goals. Accordingly, we recommend that DOD and
State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated
strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July
2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself. This strategy should build on
recent security and legislative gains, address the remaining unmet
goals and challenges for the near and long term, clearly articulate
goals, objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed
and address prior GAO recommendations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State,
Treasury and Defense for their comments. Their comments are provided in
Appendices III through V. The agencies also provided technical comments
that we have incorporated in the report, where appropriate.
The State Department disagreed with our recommendation to develop an
updated strategic plan stating that while the military surge ends, the
strategic goals of The New Way Forward remain largely unchanged.
Similarly, DOD did not concur with our recommendation stating that The
New Way Forward strategy remains valid. However, the departments stated
they shall review and refine the strategy as necessary. In addition,
DOD stated that the MNFI-U.S. Embassy Joint Campaign Plan is a
comprehensive, government wide plan that guides the effort to achieve
an Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself. We reaffirm the
need for an updated strategy for several reasons.
First, much has changed in Iraq since January 2007, including some of
the assumptions upon which the New Way Forward was based. Specifically:
* Violence in Iraq is down but U.S. surge forces are leaving and over
100,000 armed Sons of Iraq remain.
* Late 2007 target dates for the government of Iraq to pass key
legislation and assume control over local security have passed.
* The United States is currently negotiating a status of forces
agreement with Iraq to replace UN Security Council Resolutions.
* The Secretary of Defense recently articulated a new long term goal
for Iraq--an Iraq that helps bridge sectarian divides in the Middle
East.
Second, The New Way Forward is an incomplete strategic plan because it
articulates goals and objectives for only the near-term phase that ends
in July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward
and the phase that follows it are contained in disparate documents such
as Presidential speeches, White House fact sheets, and an NSC power
point presentation, rather than in a strategic planning document
similar to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the prior U.S.
strategy for Iraq. Fourth, the limited documents that describe the
phase after July 2008 do not specify the administration's long term
strategic goals and objectives in Iraq or how to achieve them.
Furthermore, the classified Joint Campaign Plan is not a strategic
plan; it is an operational plan with significant limitations that we
discuss in a separate, classified report that accompanies this report.
The Treasury Department stated that the our draft report dismissed the
significance of the increase in Iraq's budgetary "commitments", stating
that GAO's analyses relied only on Iraqi Ministry of Finance's total
expenditure reports rather than the Ministry's special capital reports.
The latter report includes budgetary "commitments." Iraq has stated
that it has spent and committed about 63 percent of its investment
budget. We did not use the special reports in our analyses for two
reasons: (1) Treasury Department officials stated that the special
reports contained unreliable data, and (2) the reports do not define
commitments, measure them or describe how or when these commitments
would result in actual expenditures. In addition, our reviews of these
special reports show inconsistent use of poorly defined budgetary
terms, as well as columns and rows that did not add up.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report is available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R Biden, Jr.
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chair:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chair:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[See PDF for image]
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chair:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chair:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chair:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chair:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In this report, we discuss progress in meeting key U.S. goals outlined
in The New Way Forward, specifically, (1) improving security
conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces' capabilities and
transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3)
facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and implement
key legislative initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to
spend budgets; and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key
essential services to its people. The New Way Forward established goals
to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents or interviewed
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the
Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the
United Nations. We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi government
documents. In support of this work, we extensively utilized information
collected by GAO staff assigned to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad from
January through March 2008. We provided drafts of the report to the
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment. We received formal
written comments from the Departments of State, the Treasury, and
Defense, which are included in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively.
We conducted this performance audit from March through June 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
To provide information on the evolution of the U.S. strategy for Iraq,
we relied extensively on prior GAO reports and updated information on
the current strategy. To identify the U.S. strategy documents for The
New Way Forward and the phase that followed it, we obtained information
from State and DOD officials. These officials informed us that the
administration did not revise the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
strategy document when it changed its Iraq strategy in January 2007. A
number of documents outline the goals and objectives of The New Way
Forward: (1) National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy
Review, January 2007; (2) the President's address to the nation,
January 10, 2007; (3) Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10,
2007; (4) Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Background
Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, January 10, 2007; and (5)
the July and November 2007 MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign
Plans. For the goals and objectives of the phase that follows The New
Way Forward, State and DOD officials directed us to (1) the President's
speeches on Iraq on September 13, 2007, and April 10, 2008; (2) a White
House Fact Sheet on the Way Forward, April 10, 2008; and (3)
testimonies of the Secretary of Defense, the Commanding General of MNF-
I; and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Security Conditions:
To determine the progress made in improving security in Iraq, we relied
extensively on a number of prior GAO reports. Where appropriate, we
updated data on security trends. To update these data, we obtained and
assessed MNF-I data on enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition
and its Iraqi partners from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for establishing
general trends in the number of enemy-initiated attacks in Iraq. To
determine the reliability of the data, we reviewed MNF-I's attacks
reporting guidance, compared the unclassified data to classified
sources, and discussed how the data are collected, analyzed, and
reported with DIA officials.
We also collected data on the three main factors that contributed to
the security improvements (1) U.S. combat forces; (2) nongovernmental
Iraqi security forces, such as the Sons of Iraq; and (3) the declared
cease-fire by the Mahdi Army. To determine the reliability of the U.S.
combat forces data, we compared the unclassified U.S. troop numbers to
classified sources, and discussed how the data are collected and
reported with Department of Defense (DOD) officials. In addition, we
reviewed MNF-I, DOD, and United Nations (UN) documents on
nongovernmental Iraqi security forces and the declared cease-fire of
the Mahdi Army leader. We also interviewed officials from State, DOD,
including DIA and the Joint Staff, in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad,
Iraq.
Iraqi Operational Readiness and the Transfer of Security
Responsibilities:
[End of section]
To determine if progress has been made in improving the capabilities of
Iraq's security forces and transferring security to the government of
Iraq, we relied on a number of prior GAO reports and, where
appropriate, we updated data. To update data on the results of U.S.
efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and MNF-I
documents showing the capabilities and size of the Iraqi army and
police units. For example, we analyzed MNF-I's Operational Readiness
Assessments (ORA), formerly known as Transitional Readiness
Assessments, for Iraqi army units.
To update information on factors affecting the development of Iraqi
security forces, we reviewed DOD, State, and UN reports, as well as a
report of an independent commission and MNF-I guidance on Iraqi
readiness assessments. We relied on DOD and State reports for the
number of trained Iraqi security forces. We recognize limitations to
these reported data, but determined that they are sufficiently reliable
to show a general trend in the growth of Iraqi security forces. We
reviewed DOD and State documents showing planned and actual transfer of
provinces to provincial Iraqi control. We interviewed officials from
DOD, DIA, State, and the National Intelligence Council.
Key Legislative Initiatives:
To determine progress made on actions related to Iraq's constitutional
review and enacting and implementing key legislation, we used prior GAO
reporting and updated information where appropriate. In updating the
information, we reviewed reports and documentation from the UN, U.S.
Institute for Peace, non-governmental organizations, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of
Defense and State in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq. We reviewed
draft laws and enacted legislation, as well as analyses of the laws. We
spoke to officials from the UN, State, Defense, USAID, the U.S.
Institute of Peace, and Iraqi officials.
Budget Execution:
To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is assisting Iraqi
government experts to execute budgets, we relied extensively on a prior
GAO report and updated the information where necessary. We interviewed
officials from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, DOD, and State in
Washington, D.C., as well as consultants under contract with the United
Kingdom's Department of International Development. To assess progress
in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues we reviewed Iraqi Ministry of
Finance capital budget and expenditure data for fiscal years 2006 and
2007 provided by the Treasury, and unofficial Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation data on capital expenditures reported by MNF-I.
To examine the data the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad uses to measure Iraqi
government spending, we obtained expenditure data from Treasury and the
U.S. embassy in Baghdad and interviewed knowledgeable U.S. agency
officials. We did not independently verify the precision of the data on
Iraq's budget execution. However, the disparity among the different
sets of data calls into question their reliability and whether they can
be used to draw firm conclusions about the extent to which the Iraqi
government has increased its spending on capital projects in 2007,
compared with 2006. We also reviewed U.S. embassy reports on Iraqi
budget execution, Iraqi government instructions for executing the
budget, Iraq's Financial Management Law, the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction's (SIGIR) Quarterly and Semiannual Report to
the Congress, and the Administration's July and September 2007
Benchmark Assessment Reports.
Essential Services:
To assess the extent to which the Iraqi government is providing key
essential services to the Iraqi people, we relied extensively on prior
GAO reports and updated the information where necessary. To do so, we
interviewed officials and reviewed documents from DOD and State. We
also reviewed prior GAO, U.S. agency inspector general, SIGIR, and
other audit agency reports. On the basis of this analysis, we found the
data sufficiently reliable for identifying production goals in both
sectors and whether actual production is meeting these goals.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18
Iraq Benchmarks:
In September 2007, as required by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans'
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of
2007,[Footnote 51] GAO provided Congress an independent assessment of
whether the government of Iraq had met 18 benchmarks contained in the
act, and the status of the achievement of the benchmarks.[Footnote 52]
While our current report covers almost all of the issues included in
our September 2007 report, our reporting objectives are derived from
the key goals outlined in The New Way Forward in Iraq. In many of the
areas, our current reporting objectives enabled us to provide a broader
context and updated analysis that expand on information included in the
benchmarks report. This report discusses progress in meeting key U.S.
goals outlined in The New Way Forward, specifically, (1) improving
security conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces' capabilities
and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3)
facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and implement
key legislative initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to
spend budgets; and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key
essential services to its people. We did not assess issues described in
benchmarks (viii) and (xvi) because we previously assessed those
benchmarks to have been met. We did not assess benchmark (iv) because
while the semi-autonomous regions law has been enacted, implementation
does not occur until one or more provinces attempt to form a region.
Table 4 provides a crosswalk between our current reporting objectives
and the 18 benchmarks.
Table 4: Comparison of Current GAO Reporting Objectives with 18 Iraq
Benchmarks Assessed in GAO September 2007 Report:
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (i)
Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the
constitutional review;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (ii)
Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (iii)
Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without
regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and
implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq
benefit Suni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an
equitable manner;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (iv)
Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-
autonomous regions;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Not included.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (v)
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High
Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council
authorities, and a date for provincial elections;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (vi)
Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (vii)
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia
disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable
only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 3.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (viii)
Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Not included.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (ix)
Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (x)
Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan
and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with
U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the
authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
Shiite militias;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xi)
Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xii)
Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said
"the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any
outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation";
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 1 and Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xiii)
Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating
militia control of local security;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 1 and Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xiv)
Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in
neighborhoods across Baghdad;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08- 837): Objective 1.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xv)
Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of
operating independently;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 2.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xvi)
Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature are protected;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Not included.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xvii)
Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on
an equitable basis;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 4 and Objective 5.
Benchmark assessed in GAO September 2007 report (GAO-07-1195): (xviii)
Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or
making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces;
Current reporting objective (GAO-08-837): Objective 2.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: We did not assess issues described in benchmarks (viii) and (xvi)
because we previously assessed those benchmarks to have been met.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Securing,
Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made,
Updated Strategy Needed," GAO Job Code 320578.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Matt
Amitrano, Iraq Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at (202)
647-5690.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Judy Mccloskey:
NEA - C. David Welch:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq:
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed (GAO-08-837,
GAO Code 320578):
The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to comment on the
GAO's draft report, Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq:
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed (GAO-08-837),
and offers the following comments.
Recommendation 1: As the New Way Forward and military surge end in July
2008, and given weaknesses in current DOD and State plans, an updated
strategy is needed for how the United States will help Iraq achieve key
security, legislative, and economic goals. Accordingly, we recommend
that DOD and State, in conjunction with relevant agencies, develop an
updated strategy for Iraq that defines US. goals and objectives after
July 2008 and address the long-term goal for achieving an Iraq that can
govern, defend, and sustain itself. This strategy should build on
recent security and legislative gains, address the remaining unmet
goals and challenges for the near and long term, clearly articulate
goals, objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the resources needed
and address prior GAO recommendations.
Response: [See comment 1] While the military surge ends, the strategic
goals of the New Way Forward remain largely unchanged. The Department
of State, in conjunction with other agencies, is focused on achieving
an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. Iraq has made some
progress, but as the GAO cites, there are still unmet goals. Iraq
continues to face many challenges in the near term. Therefore, we shall
review and refine the strategy as necessary, but we do not require a
new strategic document.
A number of specific efforts the report addresses contribute to
promoting the strategy of the New Way Forward; these also undergo
review and refinement as conditions change. One is the development of
ministerial capacity. The Coordinator for Economic Transition, Iraq
(CETI) has initiated a comprehensive independent review of all programs
in this sphere. This review, scheduled for completion by the end of the
calendar year, will inventory and assess the effectiveness of current
ministerial capacity building programs, and will develop
recommendations to address specific areas not already covered by our
ongoing programs.
The Embassy is in the process of implementing a previous GAO
recommendation that will enhance capacity development. In its January
2008 report, Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data needed to Assess Iraq's
Budget Execution, the GAO recommended that U.S. agencies develop an
integrated plan to develop competent Iraqi ministries capable of
executing their budgets and providing effective delivery of government
services. At the time, the Department of State explained to GAO that we
already had an integrated plan. The Department, working with our
implementing partners, has continued to adjust our programs to take
into account improvements in Iraqi capacity as well as emerging
specific needs. As an example of efforts to improve Iraqi budget
execution, the Government Assessment Team (GAT) Report recently
proposed a way forward combining civilian and military resources in a
newly-constituted group named the Public Finance Management Action
Group (PFMAG). While leaving existing assistance and ministerial
capacity groups in place, the PFMAG concept created a group focused on
budget execution - with outreach into the major Government of Iraq
(GOT) spending units, as well as access to budget advisors, who could
be deployed to resolve both individual and institutional problems in
budget execution. [See comment 2]
Regarding the report's recalling a previous GAO recommendation to
develop an integrated national energy strategy, the State Department,
in conjunction with relevant agencies and international partners, has
been urging the GOI since 2004 to develop an integrated national energy
strategy for the oil and electricity sectors. USG officials in Baghdad
and Washington have consistently raised the issue in their engagements
with the GOI, including the Ministries of Oil and Electricity.
Political, technical, and human resource challenges have impeded the
Iraqi government's progress in developing a national energy strategy.
Despite these challenges, since spring 2008, Prime Minister Maliki has
taken significant steps to improve coordination between the Oil and
Electricity Ministries, in part responding to the Embassy's efforts to
highlight the issue's importance. The Ministry of Electricity has
created a ten-year master plan, and the Ministry of Oil indicates it
will submit to the Council of Representatives its similar plan before
the end of 2008. These master plans are a significant step towards an
integrated energy policy. There are also a number of technical and
practical issues that need to be addressed to improve the efficiency of
operations in the energy sector. An Energy Fusion Cell was created last
year with the purpose of assisting the oil and electricity sectors to
develop a master strategy and address technical operational issues.
[See comment 3]
The Government of Iraq committed to enacting a national energy strategy
in the 2007 International Compact with Iraq. The GOI has also pledged
in its first Annual Report on implementation progress against the
commitments in the International Compact with Iraq to introduce
"legislation and regulatory frameworks for investment, fair
distribution of oil revenues and building energy sector institutions."
These steps may help to create conditions in which the Iraqi government
can produce an integrated national energy strategy.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter
dated June 16, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. State disagreed with our recommendation to develop an updated
strategic plan, stating that while the military surge ends, the
strategic goals of The New Way Forward remain largely unchanged. State
noted that Iraq continues to face many challenges in the near term and
there are still unmet goals. While State said it would review and
refine the strategy as needed, it commented that "we do not require a
new strategic document." We disagree. Much has changed in Iraq since
January 2007, including some of the assumptions upon which The New Way
Forward was based.
* Violence in Iraq is down but U.S. surge forces are leaving and over
100,000 armed Sons of Iraq remain.
* Late 2007 target dates for the government of Iraq to pass key
legislation and assume control over local security have passed.
* The United States is currently negotiating a status of forces
agreement with Iraq to replace UN Security Council Resolutions.
* The Secretary of Defense recently articulated a new long term goal
for Iraq--an Iraq that helps bridge sectarian divides in the Middle
East.
An updated U.S. strategy must reflect these changes by assessing the
progress made over the past 18 months, targeting the unmet goals of the
New Way Forward and articulating our long-term strategic objectives for
Iraq.
2. It is unclear if State is implementing GAO's prior recommendations
on building capacity in Iraq's ministries. In our October 2007 report,
we recommended that the State Department develop an integrated plan for
U.S. capacity development programs in Iraq. The Embassy stated that it
is in the process of implementing a previous GAO recommendation that
will enhance U.S. capacity development in Iraq. In contrast, State
department contends that our recommendation is not needed because such
a plan already exists. An integrated plan is still needed and becomes
even more important as State and Treasury announce another new capacity
development program - the Public Finance Management Action Group - to
help Iraq with budget execution issues.
3. We are encouraged that State is working with the Iraqi government to
develop the integrated national energy strategy we called for in our
May 2007 report: "Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to
Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors", GAO-07-677.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Department Of The Treasury:
Washington, D.C. 20220:
June 12, 2008:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the June 2008
draft of the GAO's report, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq -
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. Treasury has
been closely engaged with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance on improving
budget execution, and appreciates the GAO's attention to an issue that
is crucial for reconstruction and growth, in particular as Iraq
accelerates its transition to self-sufficiency.
Measuring Iraq's capital budget execution is a difficult task, as
technical capacity is low, data sources are limited and inconsistent,
and the Iraqis are still corning to grips with their implementation
last year of a new chart of accounts that changes capital expenditure
classifications. The U.S. government continues to work with the Iraqi
government on addressing these problems, and we believe that
incremental progress is being made. It is also important that Iraq
spend its budgeted funds thoughtfully on well-prepared projects, rather
than focusing narrowly on accelerating the pace of spending.
We have several significant concerns with the GAO's reporting on
capital budget execution in Iraq. The GAO's approach contributes to a
one dimensional picture of capital expenditure and misses much of the
progress that Iraq has made during 2007. [See comment 1]
* First, the report focuses solely on the capital budget, but does not
recognize that Iraq has improved its overall budget execution in 2007.
Overall budget spending increased to $26.6 billion from $23 billion in
2006, according to Iraqi Finance Ministry data, an increase of 16
percent. Executing the operating budget is critical for improving the
delivery of services to all Iraqis. Capital spending has also increased
significantly, as we will show on the next page. [See comment 2]
* Second, it is important to recognize more explicitly that Iraqi
budgets (the overall budget and the capital budget) have more than
doubled in size between 2005 and 2008. [See comment 3]
* Third, the report dismisses the significance of increased budgetary
commitments. Commitments demonstrate capacity to enter into contractual
obligations for capital projects, and represent an important step
toward increased budget execution. In particular, since Iraqi letters
of credit are 100 percent collateralized, a significant portion of
Iraqi capital budgets are encumbered by letters of credit yet to be
settled. [See comment 4]
* Lastly, the report incorrectly asserts that capital spending is only
contained in the Iraqi budget chapter for Non-Financial Assets.
According to Iraqi officials, the new chart of accounts spreads capital
spending throughout multiple chapters, resulting in capital expenditure
that is much higher than just the total figure for Non-Financial
Assets. We will elaborate on this point below. [See comment 5]
1) Why the GAO Report Understates Capital Spending Rates:
The GAO report understates the GOI's progress in capital budget
execution in part because the GAO only considers one of the budget
categories ("Non-Financial Assets") where capital expenditures are
being reported by the GOI (under IMF budget classification
requirements). The report acknowledges that the definition of capital
investment used does not include the $1 billion of Grant funds for
investment and reconstruction projects (page 42, footnote). Treasury
discussions with Iraqi counterparts in the Ministry of Finance have
confirmed that the new chart of accounts spreads capital spending
through more than one chapter, and is much higher than just the total
figure for Non-Financial Assets. Our interpretation is also consistent
with the IMF's understanding of Iraq's chart of accounts.
* Estimates based on Iraqi Finance Ministry data indicate that Iraqi
2007 investment spending likely increased by more than 50 percent
relative to 2006. In particular, counting only final disbursements (not
commitments), total investment budget execution for Iraq was roughly
$3.4 billion in 2007, compared with $2.2 billion in 2006, according to
Iraqi figures. Counting funds that were fully committed, total
investment budget execution rose to at least $6 billion in 2007. [See
comment 5]
2) Why Iraqi Figures Show Higher Spending Rates:
When evaluating capital spending, the GAO report only considers the
Iraqi Ministry of Finance's (MOF) total expenditure report rather than
also considering the additional monthly MOF Special Capital Reports,
which the Ministry began compiling specifically to address deficiencies
in the total expenditure report. The total expenditure report does not
include commitments, while the special capital report does. Treasury
receives both reports directly from the MOF and reports both sets of
figures, highlighting that the two reports are not directly comparable.
* The Iraqi government has stated that it spent and committed about 63
percent of its investment budget in 2007. Year-end special capital
reports from the Ministry of Finance show a rate above this figure, and
Iraqi officials have indicated that they will issue a final restatement
in June. [See comment 6]
3) Integrated Strategy:
Embassy Baghdad is now forming a Public Financial Management Action
Group to help integrate and coordinate U.S. government assistance on
improving budget execution across Iraqi ministries and provinces. U.S.
Treasury is doubling our cadre of technical experts to support this
group. We expect to have a dozen technical advisors in Baghdad later
this year. In addition, we expect that the Iraq Financial Management
Information System will be operational in the coming year. This system
will improve reporting and transparency, and provide the Iraqis with
more accurate and timely information to better manage their budget.
[See comment 7]
Signed by:
Andy Baukol:
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Middle East & Africa:
U.S. Department of the Treasury:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Treasury letter
dated June 12, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for
capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget in
February 2007. We focused on Iraq's efforts to spend its capital budget
because it is a key benchmark that the government committed to achieve
by the end of 2007. The New Way Forward identified Iraq's inability to
fully spend its own resources to rebuild its infrastructure and deliver
essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self-
reliance.
2. Treasury states that Iraq has improved its overall budget execution
in 2007, citing as an example an overall increase in Iraq's budget from
$23 billion in 2006 to $26.6 billion in 2007, an increase of 16
percent. However, the Ministry of Finance reports expenditures in Iraqi
dinar, not US dollars. When analyzed in dinars, Iraq's budget decreased
3 percent from 34.5 trillion dinars in 2006 to 33.5 trillion dinars in
2007. The 16 percent increase that Treasury reported is due to the 19
percent appreciation of Iraqi dinar in 2007.
3. We agree that Iraq's budget doubled in size between 2005 and 2008 in
dollar terms. However, much of the increase was due to a 25 percent
appreciation of the Iraqi dinar and a four fold increase in the budgets
of Iraq's security ministries.
4. Treasury states that the our draft report dismisses the significance
of the increase in Iraq's budgetary "commitments", stating that GAO's
analyses rely only on Iraqi Ministry of Finance's total expenditure
report rather than the Ministry's special capital reports. The latter
report includes budgetary "commitments". We did not use the special
reports in our analyses for two reasons: (1) Treasury Department
officials stated in our meetings with them that the special reports
contain unreliable and unverifiable data and (2) the special reports do
not define commitments, measure them or describe how or when these
commitments would result in actual expenditures. In addition, our
reviews of these special reports show inconsistent use of poorly
defined budgetary terms, as well as columns and rows that did not add
up.
5. Treasury stated that Iraq counts capital expenditures in the grants
section of its expenditure reports, as well as the non-financial assets
section. After reviewing the grants section, we have updated the data
presented in table 3 to include an additional $1.1 billion in budget
and expenditures for 2007. Accordingly, the percent of the budget spent
in 2007 was 28 percent.
6. We added information on the Iraqi government's report that it spent
and committed about 63 percent of its investment budget.
7. We have added additional information on the Public Financial
Management Action Group that Treasury is forming to improve Iraqi
budget execution across Iraqi ministries and provinces.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
International Security Affairs:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2400:
June 17, 2008:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-837, "Securing,
Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made,
Updated Strategy Needed," dated June 4, 2008 (GAO Code 320578).
Recommendation: GAO recommends that the DoD and State, in conjunction
with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that
defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the
long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and
sustain itself.
DoD Response: The Department nonconcurs with the GAO recommendation.
The New Way Forward strategy remains valid. We recognize, as with all
strategies, updates and refinements occur at various intervals to take
into account changes in the strategic environment. [See comment 1]
In addition, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and U.S. Embassy-
Iraq (USMI) Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) is a comprehensive, government-
wide plan developed following an extensive review in mid-to-late 2007.
The JCP guides the effort to achieve an Iraq that can govern, defend,
and sustain itself. Moreover, the JCP is updated regularly to reflect
the changing situation in Iraq. [See comment 2]
The JCP coordinates the actions of the Coalition and U.S. agencies in
Iraq across political, security, economic, and diplomatic lines of
operation to achieve U.S. policy goals in Iraq. Periodic assessments
are conducted and reviewed by the MNF-I Commander and U.S. Chief of
Mission. The most recent assessment of the security line of operation
indicates that the goals for the mid-term (summer 2008) have been met,
and refinements have been made to guide the achievement of the goals in
the plan for the longer term (summer 2009). [See comment 3]
DoD is also concerned with the metrics and data used in the report. The
following are examples of cases in which the metrics used are
problematic and result in an understatement of the progress made in
Iraq:
* Iraqi Security Forces: It is misleading to characterize the Iraqi
Security Force (ISF) capability by giving the percentage of units at
Operational Readiness Assessment Level 1 (given as 10% in the report).
As of late May 2008, 70% of Iraqi units are in the lead in
counterinsurgency operations. [See comment 4]
* Power generation: measuring progress against an ever-rising demand
fails to make clear that power generation in Iraq has increased beyond
the level that was produced in Iraq before the beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. In fact, energy production over the past year has
averaged 10% higher than the previous year, despite a drought that has
left Iraq with much less hydropower (some 450 to 850 megawatts less).
[See comment 5]
* Oil Exports: measuring exports against the standard of three million
barrels per day, an arbitrary goal set by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, fails to capture the fact that oil exports are reaching
record levels. Production in the month of May 2008 was at the highest
level it has been since September 2004, and production over the last
four months has been the highest since the beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. [See comment 6]
* Distribution of Oil Wealth: though the Hydrocarbon Law is important
to the economic development of Iraq, Iraq's oil wealth is already
allocated to ministries and the provinces to provide for essential
services and capital investment based on provincial population
densities. As a result, oil revenues are currently being distributed to
provinces on a reasonably equitable basis. [See comment 7]
The draft GAO report is based on security data through April 2008.
Attached are data reflecting security activity through May 2008 which
may allow adjustments to assessments of security trends. [See comment
8]
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christopher C. Straub:
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East:
Attachments: As stated.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense letter
dated June 17, 2008.
GAO's Comments:
1. DOD recognized, as with all strategies, updates and refinements
occur at varying intervals to take into account changes in the
strategic environment. However, DOD did not concur with our
recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains
valid. We disagree for several reasons. First, much has changed in Iraq
since January 2007, including some of the assumptions upon which The
New Way Forward was based. Specifically:
* Violence in Iraq is down but U.S. surge forces are leaving and over
100,000 armed Sons of Iraq remain.
* Late 2007 target dates for the government of Iraq to pass key
legislation and assume control over local security have passed.
* The United States is currently negotiating a status of forces
agreement with Iraq to replace UN Security Council Resolutions.
* The Secretary of Defense recently articulated a new long term goal
for Iraq--an Iraq that helps bridge sectarian divides in the Middle
East.
Second, The New Way Forward is not a complete strategic plan because it
lays out goals and objectives for only the near-term phase that ends in
July 2008. Third, the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward and
the phase that follows it are contained in disparate documents such as
Presidential speeches, White House fact sheets, and an NSC power point
presentation, rather than in a strategic planning document similar to
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), the prior U.S.
strategy for Iraq. Fourth, the documents that describe the phase after
July 2008 do not specify the administration's long term strategic goals
and objectives in Iraq or how it intends to achieve them. In contrast,
while the NSVI was also an incomplete strategy, it contained a
comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic
goals and objectives in Iraq over the short term, medium term, and long
term.
We continue to believe that the Administration should update its
strategy for Iraq, given the importance of the war effort to U.S.
national security interests, the expenditure of billions of dollars for
U.S. military and civilian efforts in Iraq, and the continued
deployment of at least 140,000 troops in Iraq. An updated U.S. strategy
must reflect changes in conditions in Iraq by assessing the progress
made over the past 18 months, targeting the unmet goals of the New Way
Forward, and articulating our long-term strategic objectives for Iraq.
2. DOD cited the MNF-I/U.S. embassy-Iraq Joint Campaign Plan as a
comprehensive, government wide-plan that guides the effort to achieve
an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. In our review of
the classified Joint Campaign Plan, however, we identified limitations
to the plan, which are discussed in a separate, classified GAO report-
-Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the Conditions
Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of U.S. Forces.[Footnote 53]
Further, we believe that the Joint Campaign Plan is not a substitute
for an updated strategic plan for Iraq. As we stated in our report, a
campaign plan is an operational, not a strategic, plan, according DOD's
doctrine for joint operation planning. A campaign plan must rely on
strategic guidance from national authorities for its development. For
example, the April 2006 MNF-I/U.S. embassy Baghdad Joint Campaign Plan
relied on the NSC's prior strategic plan, the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq, as a basis for the plan's development. The classified
campaign plan does not provide Congress or the American people with the
administration's road map for achieving victory in Iraq.
3. According to DOD, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy recently assessed the
security line of operation and determined that the goals for the phase
ending in summer 2008 have been met. We disagree with DOD's statement
that the security goals for this phase have been met. For example, The
New Way Forward stated that the Iraqi government would take
responsibility for security in all 18 provinces by November 2007, but
only 8 of 18 provinces had transitioned to Iraqi control at that time.
As of June 18, 2008, only 9 of 18 provinces had transitioned. Our
classified report on the Joint Campaign Plan provides more information
on the goals of the security line of operation, the various phases of
the campaign plan, and a recent assessment of the security line of
operation.[Footnote 54]
4. DOD stated that it is misleading for our report to characterize the
Iraqi security forces capability by giving the percentage of units at
Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) level 1, noting that as of late
May 2008, 70 percent of Iraqi units were in the lead in
counterinsurgency operations. We added information on Iraqi units in
the lead to our report. However, we believe that the report is not
misleading by providing information on ORA level 1 units because this
was a benchmark established by Congress and derived from benchmarks and
commitments articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006.
Thus, the numbers of independent Iraqi security forces as measured by
ORA level 1 continue to be an important measure of the capabilities of
the Iraqi security forces. Further, as we discuss in the report, the
term "in the lead" has evolved to include less capable Iraqi security
forces. Specifically, according to testimony of the MNF-I Commanding
General, MNF-I counted only ORA level 1 and ORA level 2 units as "in
the lead" in January 2007. However, as of March 2008, MNF-I was also
counting some ORA level 3 units--that is, units only "partially capable
of conducting counterinsurgency operations"--as in the lead in
counterinsurgency operations.
5. DOD disagreed with our measuring progress in power generation
against an ever-rising demand for electricity and noted that energy
production has increased over the past year. We present data on the gap
between supply and demand for electricity in Iraq because the
Departments of State and Defense use this statistic to measure
progress. We have updated our report to reflect data through May 2008
and DOD's statement regarding the slight increase in electricity
generation over the past year.
6. DOD stated that the goal upon which we measure oil production
progress was an arbitrary goal set by the CPA. State Department had
similar technical comments. We used the goal of 3.0 mbpd production
capacity because the DOD command responsible for funding and managing
oil reconstruction projects in Iraq--the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers--
has consistently used this goal to measure progress in Iraq. As
recently as April 2008, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has included
this goal in its weekly update to the Secretary of the Army. We have
updated our report to include oil production statistics through May
2008.
7. DOD stated that although the hydrocarbon legislation is important to
the economic development of Iraq, Iraq's oil wealth is being
distributed to provinces on a reasonably equitable basis. Providing
Iraq's oil wealth through the budget process is not a sustainable
solution to equitably distribute resources since allocations must be
negotiated annually. The hydrocarbon legislation intends to provide an
enduring resolution for the management and control of Iraq's current
and future hydrocarbon resources and the distribution of revenues from
them. Furthermore, this legislation is to provide a transparent legal
framework that defines the rights of foreign investors and encourages
the foreign investment needed to modernize Iraq's oil sector.
8. We updated our report to include enemy-initiated attacks data for
May 2008. Unclassified attacks data for May were not available at the
time we sent our draft report to the agencies for comment.
[End of section]
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, the following staff contributed to the report:
Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant
Director; Minty Abraham; Ashley Alley; David Bruno; Monica Brym; Daniel
Chen; Lynn Cothern; Martin De Alteriis; Leah DeWolf; Timothy Fairbanks;
Walker Fullerton; Matthew Helm; Dorian Herring; Patrick Hickey; Rhonda
Horried; Bruce Kutnick; Jeremy Latimer; Stephen Lord; Kathleen Monahan;
Mary Moutsos; Elizabeth Repko; Jena Sinkfield; and Audrey Solis.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This figure includes appropriations for domestic and overseas
military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, such as
Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, as well as stabilization and reconstruction appropriations for
Iraq and Afghanistan.
[2] About $17.5 billion for improving Iraqi security forces included in
this amount is also included in DOD's reporting of Global War on
Terrorism appropriations.
[3] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Should Identify and Prioritize the
Conditions Necessary for the Continued Drawdown of US. Forces in Iraq,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C],
(Washington, D.C.: June 2008).
[4] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).
[5] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C.: Oct.1, 2007).
[6] The information in this section comes from GAO, Rebuilding Iraq:
Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security
Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
15, 2005). For more information on this security transition plan, see
GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential
Services, and Oversight Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-902R] (Washington, D.C: June 28, 2004).
[7] The Departments of State and Defense stopped counting the
Facilities Protection Service as part of the Iraqi security force
structure in September 2004. The mission of the Facilities Protection
Service is to guard and secure individual ministry and municipal
buildings against vandalism and theft.
[8] For information on this campaign plan, see GAO's classified report,
GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and
Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-868C] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
29, 2005).
[9] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed
to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006).
[10] For information on the April 2006 campaign plan, see our
classified report, GAO, Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-152C], (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
18, 2006).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788].
[12] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. In 2007,
Ramadan began on September 13. In prior years, the month of Ramadan
began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; October 5, 2005; and
September 24, 2006. In 2007, Ramadan began on September 13.
[13] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1770 (2007) (Apr. 22, 2008).
[14] IDP Working Group members include the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration,
other UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Working Group
reports are based on surveillance data gathered by IDP Working Group
members, as well as information provided by the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MODM), the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG), and the International Committee of the Red Cross and other non-
governmental organizations.
[15] We did not verify the accuracy of the data provided, and although
U.S. government, international, and nongovernmental organizations agree
that the data is of questionable reliability, they also agree that it
is currently the best data available.
[16] These estimates are based on the official estimates of the
governments of Syria and Jordan, respectively. We did not verify the
accuracy of the data provided.
[17] According to the IDP Working Group, most returns have been to
areas that have become ethnically or religiously homogeneous and are
under the control of the returnees' sect.
[18] According to an April 2008 MNF-I report, it is highly likely that
a large percentage of Sons of Iraq members had previously participated
in the insurgency on at least a part-time basis.
[19] As of April 2008, more than 538,000 personnel--including about
280,000 police--were assigned to the Ministries of Interior and
Defense. These figures do not include civilian staff or Facilities
Protection Service personnel, nor do they reflect present for duty
status. In December 2007, DOD reported that the number of personnel
assigned to the two ministries exceeds the number of total trained
personnel because many of them--mainly police--have never been trained.
According to DOD, rapid hiring of police over the past 2 years
outstripped academy training capacity.
[20] In March 2005 data, Ministry of Defense totals did not include
soldiers who were absent without leave.
[21] Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction,
Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the
Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
(Apr. 25, 2008).
[22] Operational Readiness Assessments were previously called
Transitional Readiness Assessments.
[23] Prior to March 2006, ORA level 1 was defined as "fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency
operations." See GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi
Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support
Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08143R] (Washington, D.C: Nov.
30, 2007).
[24] In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Iraqi
Army represents about 30 percent of the 541,000 authorized Iraqi
security forces and 33 percent of the 559,159 assigned personnel as of
May 2008.
[25] General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.), Chairman, The Report of the
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Sept. 6, 2007).
[26] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report
of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington
D.C.: May 2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
was created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA)
to monitor violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international
instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the
President, Secretary of State, and Congress.
[27] Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
Iraq: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
11, 2008).
[28] See GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security
Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities
Are Not Fully Developed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-143R] (Washington, D.C: Nov. 30, 2007).
[29] The key legislation identified was supposed to address de-
Ba'athification reform, hydrocarbons, semiautonomous regions,
elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament, which Iraq's Policy
Committee on National Security committed to enacting in September 2006
and the Presidency Council reaffirmed on October 16, 2006. See GAO,
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
4, 2007). The Iraqi government committed to enacting most of this
legislation in the International Compact for Iraq, which is an
initiative of the government of Iraq for a new partnership with the
international community. Its purpose is to achieve a national vision
for Iraq that aims to consolidate peace and pursue political, economic,
and social development over the next 5 years. As part of the
International Compact, a legislative timetable set a goal of December
31, 2007, to pass key legislation and conduct a constitutional review.
[30] See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005
Elections, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-932R]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated
Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C: Oct. 1,
2007).
[31] The CPA was the UN-recognized authority led by the United States
and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary
governance of Iraq until June 2004.
[32] IFES, formally known as the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, is an international election assistance organization. In
Iraq's 2005 elections, IFES provided election assistance to the Iraqi
government. IFES is also providing support for Iraq's upcoming
provincial elections.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-932R].
[34] The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1)
the Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents
to the council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that
could be made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be
presented to the council all at once for a vote and are approved with
the agreement of an absolute majority of the members of the council;
and (3) the articles amended by the council shall be presented to the
people in a referendum within 2 months from the date of approval by the
council. The referendum will be successful if approved by the majority
of voters and if not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or
more governorates.
[35] If these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the start
of the next electoral term, power will revert to a single president and
the power to approve and disapprove legislation that is explicitly
granted to the Presidency Council will lapse. The president will then
have the power to ratify and issue laws passed by the legislature,
although such laws are considered ratified 15 days after the president
receives them.
[36] We use "investment budgets" here to refer to budgets for capital
goods and capital projects. To comply with new International Monetary
Fund (IMF) budget classification requirements, beginning in 2007, the
Iraqi government began combining expenditures for capital goods and
capital projects under the heading of "nonfinancial assets," which we
refer to as investment. Capital projects represent almost 90 percent of
the Iraq investment budget.
[37] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008,
Section 9010, Public Law 109-289 (Washington, D.C.: March 2008).
[38] World Bank, Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition
(February 2006).
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117].
[40] In August 2003, the CPA established a U.S. program goal to
increase oil production to about 1.3 million barrels per day. The CPA
increased this goal every 2 to 3 months until July 2004, when the goal
became to increase crude oil production capacity to 3 million barrels
per day. The State Department also set an eventual crude oil production
goal of 2.8 million barrels per day in March 2006. Production capacity
differs from actual production. Production capacity is the maximum
amount of production a country can maintain over a period of time.
Since Iraq has been trying to increase its production of crude oil, we
use actual production as an indicator of Iraq's production capacity.
For example, EIA has defined production capacity as the maximum amount
of production that (1) could be brought online within 30 days and (2)
sustained for at least 90 days. Since Iraq has been trying to increase
its production of crude oil, we use actual production as an indicator
of Iraq's production capacity in this report.
[41] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help
Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677] (Washington, D.C.: May
15, 2007).
[42] State developed this metric in response to our 2005 recommendation
that it improve its metrics for measuring U.S. projects' contribution
to improving Iraqis' water service. See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S.
Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing
Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-872] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
7, 2005).
[43] In addition to potable water and sewage treatment, U.S. efforts in
the sector include projects for pumping stations, irrigation, and
drainage as well as equipment for the Mosul dam.
[44] DOD also identified the testimonies of the current and prospective
Commanding Generals of MNF-I, May 22, 2008, as articulating future U.S.
goals and objectives. However, DOD did not provide official written
statements for either officer's testimony.
[45] The U.S. military would continue to (1) conduct combat operations;
(2) train, equip, and support Iraqi security forces; (3) transfer
security responsibilities to them as provinces become ready; and (4)
over time move into an overwatch role. In this role, U.S. forces would
increasingly focus on targeted raids against the terrorists and
extremists, continue to train Iraqi forces, and be available to help
Iraq's security forces if required.
[46] State Department, Report to Congress: Submitted Pursuant to U.S.
Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163), as amended by
Section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (P.L. 110-181); May 2008.
[47] DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, Dec. 26,
2006.
[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788].
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C].
[50] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-677], and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-117].
[51] Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.
[52] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).
[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C].
[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-700C].
[End of section]
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