GAO-08-424, Mine Safety: Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners


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Emergency Response Plans Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal 
Miners' which was released on April 9, 2008.

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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

April 2008: 

Mine Safety: 

Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans 
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners: 

GAO-08-424: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-424, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Education and Labor, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law 
required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response 
plans that contain several components designed to improve accident 
preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to 
miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless 
communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their 
implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval 
process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA’s 
efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these 
questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response 
plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members 
of the mining community. 

What GAO Found: 

The effectiveness of MSHA’s process for approving underground coal 
mines’ emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, 
including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine 
operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of 
specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA 
revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one 
key requirement—providing a refuge of air to miners trapped 
underground—until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In 
addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the 
unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not 
specify the protections to be provided and information about these 
protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify 
whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain 
areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine 
after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the 
plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the 
event of an accident. 

Most of the components of the mines’ emergency response plans have been 
implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First, 
many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped 
miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have 
not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable 
alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because 
fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined 
what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The 
act provides that, where wireless systems are not available, 
alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While 
alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told 
us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what 
technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement 
because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by 
then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be 
able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the 
deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of 
miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive 
until they are able to be rescued. 

MSHA’s district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance 
with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to 
enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters 
officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to 
identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For 
example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations 
issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to 
inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA 
has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency 
response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that MSHA clarify its guidance on the requirements 
for key components of emergency response plans; develop guidance on how 
mines can meet the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications 
systems; and take steps to analyze information on plans and their 
enforcement. MSHA agreed with the recommendations and noted several 
actions it is taking or plans to take to implement them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-424]. For more 
information, contact Anne-Marie Lasowski at (202) 512-7215 or 
lasowskia@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Effectiveness of MSHA's Approval Process Was Hampered by Several 
Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans: 

While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components 
Have Not: 

While MSHA's District Offices Have Enforced Mines' Implementation of 
Emergency Response Plans, MSHA Headquarters Has Provided Limited 
Oversight of Enforcement and Plan Quality: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Citations Issued by MSHA Related to the Requirements of 
Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Components of Emergency Response Plans Required by the MINER 
Act of 2006: 

Table 2: Examples of Partially Wireless Communications Systems for Use 
in Underground Coal Mines: 

Table 3: Examples of Conditions Cited by Inspectors for Noncompliance 
with Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

Table 4: Correction Time Frames for Citations Issued under the MINER 
Act to Mines for Failing to Submit or for Not Complying with Their 
Emergency Response Plans: 

Table 5: Number of Emergency Response Plans, by District: 

Table 6: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act to Active Mines 
for Violating Components of Emergency Response Plans, August 15, 2006, 
to December 11, 2007: 

Table 7: Citations Issued under the MINER Act for Violations of 
Multiple Components of Mines' Emergency Response Plans as of December 
11, 2007: 

Table 8: Number and Percentage of Mines Cited per District under the 
MINER Act as of December 11, 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and Health District Offices and 
Number of Underground Coal Mines Located in Each District as of June 
2007: 

Figure 2: Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to 
2006: 

Figure 3: Example of Self-Contained Self-Rescuer That Provides 
Supplemental Air in Case of an Emergency: 

Figure 4: Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers in a Mine 
Tunnel: 

Figure 5: Timeline of Guidance and Key Events Related to Emergency 
Response Plans: 

Figure 6: Illustrations of Technologies Used to Meet the Current 
Requirement for Redundant Communication Systems: 

Figure 7: Methods for Providing Long-Term Postaccident Breathable Air 
for Trapped Miners and Percentages of Mines Planning to Use Each 
Method: 

Figure 8: Citations MSHA Issued to Mines under the MINER Act for 
Noncompliance with Each Emergency Response Plan Component, by 
Component, August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007: 

Figure 9: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act Each Month, 
August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007: 

Abbreviations: 

MINER Act Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006: 

MSHA: Mine Safety and Health Administration: 

NIOSH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 8, 2008: 

The Honorable George Miller: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Education and Labor : 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

In January 2006, at the Sago mine in West Virginia, 12 men lost their 
lives after an explosion prompted them to barricade themselves in the 
mine to await rescue, an effort that took almost 2 days to complete. 
They died hours after the explosion from the poisonous carbon monoxide 
gases produced by the explosion. In the wake of this and other fatal 
mine disasters in the United States, the Congress enacted the Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) in an 
effort to improve the safety of the nation's underground coal mines. 
[Footnote 1] As part of this act, mine operators were required to 
develop emergency response plans that detail how they will ensure the 
safety of underground coal miners immediately following any future 
disasters, such as how they plan to communicate with trapped miners 
after an accident. The act required mine operators to submit their 
plans to the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) for approval by August 14, 2006--2 months after 
the law was enacted. MSHA issued guidance to mine operators on plan 
development and assigned responsibility for reviewing and approving the 
plans to its 11 district offices. After approving the emergency 
response plans, MSHA inspectors in its district offices enforce mine 
operators' compliance with the requirements described in their plans as 
part of regular inspections of underground coal mines. 

The plans must contain several components designed to help ensure the 
safety of miners trapped in a mine after an accident, such as providing 
breathable air--air that has not been contaminated by carbon monoxide 
or other deadly gases released during an explosion or fire. Generally, 
mine operators must implement each component of the plan as soon as the 
component is approved by MSHA, rather than waiting for approval of the 
entire plan. In addition, by June 2009, the plans must provide for 
wireless communications and electronic tracking systems or alternatives 
to these systems. The MINER Act also required the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a research agency within 
the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, to study options for providing refuge to miners 
trapped underground after an accident.[Footnote 2] 

To learn about MSHA's efforts to approve and enforce implementation of 
the emergency response plans, you asked us to examine 1) the 
effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving mines' emergency response 
plans, 2) the status of implementation of underground coal mines' 
emergency response plans, and 3) the efforts MSHA has made to enforce 
implementation of the plans and oversee enforcement and plan quality. 

To address these topics, we reviewed relevant federal laws, 
regulations, and agency guidance. We reviewed data provided by MSHA on 
the approval and implementation status of the emergency response plans 
for all underground coal mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing 
mines as of June 21, 2007. Using MSHA's data on the approval status of 
the plans, we selected a nonprobability sample of plans from each of 
MSHA's 11 district offices for review.[Footnote 3] Our sample included 
both plans that had been fully approved and those that had only been 
partially approved. Because there were so few, we selected many of the 
partially approved plans to identify the factors delaying their 
approval. We also reviewed data on citations issued by MSHA's district 
offices to mine operators for noncompliance with their plans. To assess 
the reliability of the data obtained from MSHA, we reviewed related 
documentation to corroborate the data, including the sample of 
emergency response plans and completed citation forms, evaluated the 
data for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and interviewed 
agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. In 
addition, we interviewed officials at MSHA's headquarters and 11 
district offices to learn about the plan approval process, 
implementation of the plans, and MSHA's inspection efforts. We visited 
two of MSHA's district offices, located in West Virginia and Kentucky-
-the two states with the largest number of underground coal mines in 
the United States--and visited underground coal mines in those states 
to learn about the equipment and technologies they used to implement 
their emergency response plans. In addition, we consulted with 
individuals knowledgeable about the field of mine safety, mine company 
officials, and union and industry representatives. We conducted this 
audit from April 2007 through April 2008 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. See appendix I for further information on our scope and 
methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal 
mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, 
including revisions and delays in developing the guidance and the lack 
of specificity of the guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. 
While MSHA headquarters issued initial guidance to its district offices 
and mine operators in July 2006, the agency continued to refine and 
revise the guidance for several months and did not issue guidance on 
one key component of the plans--providing postaccident breathable air 
to miners--until 6 months after the plans were due. These revisions and 
delays caused mine operators to revise and resubmit the plans and 
district officials to review the changes, delaying their approval, and 
ultimately, the preparedness of mine operators to respond in the event 
of an accident. MSHA headquarters officials attributed the revisions to 
not having enough time to interpret the law and obtain input from the 
mining community given the 2-month period between the enactment of the 
MINER Act and the deadline for submitting plans to MSHA. In addition, 
the lack of specificity in MSHA's guidance compelled headquarters and 
district staff to spend time resolving questions about the guidance 
after it was issued. Further, while the content of the plans may differ 
because of differences in the characteristics of each mine, we found 
that some of the plans did not specify the protections to be provided, 
and information about these protections varied. For example, some of 
the plans did not specify whether postaccident breathable air would be 
provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine, while other 
plans did. As a result, it is uncertain whether all miners will be 
adequately protected in the event of an accident. 

As of January 2008, the operators of all active, producing underground 
coal mines had implemented most components of their emergency response 
plans, but many had not implemented two key components. Many mine 
operators could not implement one of the components--providing 
postaccident breathable air to trapped miners in the event of an 
accident--because all of the needed equipment was not yet available. 
For example, about one-fifth of the mines had not received breathing 
devices on order from manufacturers, and nearly three-quarters of the 
mines were waiting for refuge chambers--one of the methods operators 
may use to provide breathable air to trapped miners. In addition, mine 
operators have not yet begun to implement another key component of 
their plans--upgrading mines' communication systems to wireless or 
approved alternatives--because completely wireless systems are not 
available for underground mine use and MSHA has not determined what 
technologies it will allow mine operators to use to meet the June 2009 
statutory requirement. The MINER Act provides that, where wireless 
systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communication 
systems are acceptable. Some companies have developed and begun 
marketing partially wireless systems that, according to NIOSH, could 
enhance communications and the safety of miners. However, MSHA 
headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue 
guidance detailing what technologies will be acceptable in meeting the 
June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new 
technologies develop by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether 
mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate 
technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to 
improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after 
an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued. 

MSHA's district offices have conducted inspections and issued citations 
to enforce implementation of mines' emergency response plans, but MSHA 
headquarters has provided limited oversight of the districts' 
enforcement efforts and the overall quality of the plans. MSHA's 
districts have inspected many mines for compliance with their plans and 
issued citations to ensure immediate implementation of all components 
of the plans. Since late 2006, inspectors have issued over 350 
citations to mine operators who had not properly implemented the 
approved components of their plans. However, while its district offices 
have taken steps to enforce implementation of the plans, MSHA 
headquarters has not systematically evaluated the data on citations to 
identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. We 
reviewed the citations issued by MSHA's 11 district offices for 
violations of mines' emergency response plans from August 15, 2006, 
through December 11, 2007, and found large differences in the number of 
citations issued across districts. For example, one district had cited 
one of its 18 mines for noncompliance, while three districts had each 
issued citations to over two-thirds of their mines. While there may be 
valid explanations for these differences, MSHA headquarters officials 
have not reviewed the data to identify why they occurred and, when 
asked about these differences, they said they were not aware of them. 
Similarly, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed whether inspectors are 
issuing citations under the statute or regulations when both apply, 
which could prevent MSHA from adequately tracking compliance and lead 
to inconsistent penalty assessments. In addition, MSHA has provided 
insufficient oversight to ensure the content of underground coal mines' 
emergency response plans meets a consistent agency-wide standard and 
determine whether corrective actions are needed. 

To help ensure that underground coal mines' emergency response plans 
and their implementation improve the safety of underground coal miners 
in the event of an accident, we are recommending that the Secretary of 
Labor direct MSHA to develop additional guidance to clarify what is 
required for key components of the emergency response plans, such as 
providing postaccident breathable air for the maintenance of trapped 
miners; work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how 
to meet the June 2009 requirement to provide postaccident wireless 
communications systems; and take steps to ensure that district offices 
are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on approving and enforcing 
emergency response plans. In commenting on a draft of our report, the 
Department of Labor agreed with the recommendations and noted several 
actions that MSHA has begun or is planning to take to provide 
additional guidance and oversight for emergency response plans. In its 
comments, the Department of Health and Human Services concurred with 
our recommendation that NIOSH and MSHA work together to develop 
guidance on postaccident wireless communications systems. 

Background: 

Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"), 
Congress created MSHA and gave it primary responsibility for ensuring 
the safety and health of mine workers. MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and 
Health program office in headquarters is responsible for carrying out 
enforcement activities related to surface and underground coal mines, 
managing agency operations, and monitoring the activities of its 11 
district offices. MSHA's district offices have day-to-day 
responsibility for activities such as reviewing and approving mine 
plans, including emergency response plans, and for conducting 
inspections, issuing citations for violations of health and safety 
standards, and investigating mine accidents. As of December 2007, MSHA 
employed 460 underground coal mine inspectors in its 11 district 
offices.[Footnote 4] MSHA's principal enforcement responsibility for 
underground coal mines is fulfilled by conducting a minimum of four 
comprehensive inspections of every underground coal mine in the United 
States each year.[Footnote 5] When MSHA inspectors observe violations 
of mandatory federal health and safety standards, they are required to 
issue citations, or in some cases withdrawal orders,[Footnote 6] to 
mine operators. The mine operators generally are required by law to 
correct the hazardous situation on which the violation was based within 
the time frame set by the inspector, even if the mine operator contests 
the violation or penalty. 

As of June 2007, there were approximately 470 U.S. underground coal 
mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines. As shown in 
figure 1, the number of active, producing mines varies among districts. 

Figure 1: MSHA's Coal Mine Safety and Health District Offices and 
Number of Underground Coal Mines Located in Each District as of June 
2007[A]: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the United States illustrating MSHA's Coal Mine 
Safety and Health District Offices and Number of Underground Coal Mines 
Located in Each District as of June 2007. The following data is 
depicted: 

District 1: Anthracite coal mining regions in Pennsylvania[B]; 
Number of underground coal mines: 12. 

District 2: Bituminous coal mining regions in Pennsylvania; 
Number of underground coal mines: 33. 

District 3: Maryland, Ohio, and northern West Virginia; 
Number of underground coal mines: 30. 

District 4: Southern West Virginia; 
Number of underground coal mines: 122. 

District 5: Virginia; 
Number of underground coal mines: 57. 

District 6: Eastern Kentucky; 
Number of underground coal mines: 89. 

District 7: Central Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee; 
Number of underground coal mines: 66. 

District 8: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, northern 
Missouri, and Wisconsin; 
Number of underground coal mines: 19. 

District 9: All states west of the Mississippi River, except for 
Minnesota, Iowa, and northern Missouri; 
Number of underground coal mines: 22. 

District 10: Western Kentucky; 
Number of underground coal mines: 10. 

District 11: Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands; 
Number of underground coal mines: 7. 

Sources: MSHA (information); Art Explosion (map). 

[A] We included all underground coal mines categorized by MSHA as 
active, producing mines as of June 2007. MSHA defines active mines as 
those that operate on a full-time basis to produce coal. 

[B] While the map indicates that District 1 includes states north of 
Pennsylvania, there currently is no coal mining in those states. 

[End of figure] 

The number of active, producing coal mines changes frequently as new 
mines open, active mines are temporarily idled, or mines are 
abandoned.[Footnote 7] Some underground mines do not actively produce 
coal all year; some are only operated seasonally because of local 
weather conditions; and operations at smaller, less cost-effective 
mines are often suspended when the price of coal drops below a certain 
level. 

Underground coal mining is a dangerous industry for several reasons. 
For example, the presence of methane gas, which is highly explosive and 
is often produced in large quantities when coal is extracted, 
contributes to the hazardous working conditions. Additional risks 
include geological conditions in many areas of the country that make 
the roofs of mines unstable, the danger posed by a fire in an 
underground mine, and flooding from nearby abandoned mines. The danger 
posed by these factors has increased in recent years as miners dig 
deeper to reach remaining coal reserves. Further, while the number of 
underground coal miners was on the decline in the last half of the 
1990s, as shown in figure 2, this trend has reversed in recent years, 
exposing more workers to the dangers of underground coal mining. 

Figure 2: Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to 
2006: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Number of Workers in U.S. Underground Coal Mines, 1996 to 2006: 

Year: 1996; 
Underground mine employees: 56,905. 

Year: 1997; 
Underground mine employees: 55,869. 

Year: 1998; 
Underground mine employees: 53,284. 

Year: 1999; 
Underground mine employees: 49,061. 

Year: 2000; 
Underground mine employees: 46,133. 

Year: 2001; 
Underground mine employees: 48,394. 

Year: 2002; 
Underground mine employees: 46,615. 

Year: 2003; 
Underground mine employees: 43,629. 

Year: 2004; 
Underground mine employees: 45,282. 

Year: 2005; 
Underground mine employees: 49,395. 

Year: 2006; 
Underground mine employees: 52,197. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[End of figure] 

In March 2006, a few months after the Sago mine accident, MSHA issued 
an Emergency Temporary Standard that required mine operators to 
immediately implement certain health and safety improvements designed 
to enhance protections for underground coal miners.[Footnote 8] MSHA 
issued a final rule revising the standard in December 2006. In June 
2006, the Congress passed the MINER Act, which required mine operators 
and MSHA to undertake reforms, including developing and adopting 
emergency response plans, enhancing mine rescue teams, and instituting 
higher penalties for the most serious violations. 

The MINER Act required that, within 60 days of enactment, underground 
mine operators develop and adopt written emergency response plans. 
[Footnote 9] The act also required MSHA to review and approve 
emergency response plans. The agency implemented this requirement by 
issuing guidance for mine operators to use in developing their plans 
and by having its district offices review the plans submitted by mines 
under their jurisdiction to ensure that they conformed with the 
guidance.[Footnote 10] MSHA is also required to review approved plans 
at least every 6 months to ensure that they are updated to reflect 
changes in mine operations and advances in technology.[Footnote 11] The 
MINER Act specified several components that mine operators must include 
in their emergency response plans, including providing uncontaminated 
or "breathable" air for miners after an accident.[Footnote 12] The 
postaccident breathable air component includes two parts: (1) emergency 
supplies of air sufficient to maintain trapped miners for extended 
(long-term) periods and (2) caches of portable breathing devices--known 
as self-contained self-rescuers (see fig. 3)--positioned along mine 
tunnels leading to the mine entrance to aid in the miners' 
escape.[Footnote 13] Another component required by the act is 
postaccident lifelines--ropes that miners can use after an accident to 
find their way out of the mine and to find the caches of portable 
breathing devices stored in the mine[Footnote 14] (see fig. 4). 

Figure 3: Example of Self-Contained Self-Rescuer That Provides 
Supplemental Air in Case of an Emergency: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the Self-Contained Self-Rescuer. 

Source: CSE Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained Self-Rescuers in a Mine 
Tunnel: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a photograph of a Lifeline and Cache of Self-Contained 
Self-Rescuers in a Mine Tunnel. 

Source: MSHA. 

[End of figure] 

Table 1 describes all of the components of mines' emergency response 
plans required by the MINER Act. 

Table 1: Components of Emergency Response Plans Required by the MINER 
Act of 2006: 

Component: Postaccident communications; 
Description of requirement: Redundant (backup) means of two-way 
communication with the surface for persons underground; Plans must 
require wireless two-way systems or alternatives by June 2009. 

Component: Postaccident tracking; 
Description of requirement: System to enable above ground personnel to 
determine the current or immediately preaccident location of all 
underground personnel; Plans must require an electronic tracking system 
or alternative by June 2009. 

Component: Postaccident breathable air; 
Description of requirement: Emergency supplies of breathable air 
sufficient to maintain trapped miners for a "sustained period of time." 
Caches of self-contained self-rescuers providing, in total, not less 
than 2 hours per miner to be kept in escapeways (tunnels that lead to 
the mine entrance) from the deepest work area to the surface at 
intervals no farther than a miner could walk in 30 minutes and a 
schedule for checking the reliability of self-rescuers to ensure that 
the units will function properly in an emergency. 

Component: Training; 
Description of requirement: Training for proper donning of self-
contained self-rescuers, switching from one self-contained self-rescuer 
to another, and ensuring proper fit of self-contained self-rescuers; 
Training program for emergency procedures described in the plan. 

Component: Postaccident lifelines; 
Description of requirement: Directional lifelines (ropes with cones or 
other devices to indicate the direction of the mine entrance) used 
during an evacuation that are installed along mine tunnels leading from 
the areas where miners are extracting coal to the entrance of the mine 
(escapeways); Plans must require lifelines that meet MSHA's flame 
resistant standards by June 2009 or sooner, as existing lifelines are 
replaced. 

Component: Local coordination; 
Description of requirement: Procedures for coordination and 
communication between the mine operator, mine rescue teams, and local 
emergency personnel; and provisions for familiarizing local rescue 
personnel with surface functions that may be required in the course of 
mine rescue work. 

Source: GAO analysis of the MINER Act. 

[End of table] 

MSHA's headquarters allowed district offices to separately approve each 
component of a mine's emergency response plan so that the mine could 
begin implementing each component once it was approved, rather than 
waiting for approval of the entire plan. Most of the required 
components were to be implemented immediately upon approval or within 
the time frames set in the approved plan. However, the act gave 
operators additional time to implement certain components, including 
wireless communications and electronic tracking systems, or their 
alternatives, and flame-resistant lifelines, which generally are not 
required to be implemented until June 15, 2009. 

In addition, the MINER Act required NIOSH to study the utility, 
practicality, survivability, and cost of providing various refuge 
alternatives in underground coal mines and to report its findings, 
which it did, by December 2007.[Footnote 15] Under its Mining Safety 
and Health Research program, NIOSH conducts research on mine safety 
technology, including research on advancements in self-contained self-
rescuers, communications equipment, and tracking devices. In 2006, the 
Congress provided NIOSH with $10 million in emergency supplemental 
appropriations for research to develop mine safety technology. 

MSHA and NIOSH are both responsible for getting new safety technology 
into the mines. For certain types of mining products, MSHA's technical 
experts conduct evaluations and tests to ensure that they will not 
cause a fire or an explosion in a mine before they approve the use of 
such products. NIOSH is responsible for developing and adapting new 
technologies for use in the mining industry. Based on research 
findings, NIOSH may recommend that MSHA issue new safety and health 
standards. However, NIOSH does not have the authority to compel MSHA to 
take action on its recommendations. In our 2007 report on MSHA, we 
stated that coordination between MSHA and NIOSH was primarily informal 
and inconsistent and recommended that they develop a formal memorandum 
of understanding to guide their agencywide coordination efforts. 
[Footnote 16] However, at the time of our review, such a memorandum had 
not been finalized. 

The Effectiveness of MSHA's Approval Process Was Hampered by Several 
Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans: 

The effectiveness of MSHA's approval process for underground coal 
mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors that 
delayed approval of the plans. Specifically, MSHA issued its guidance 
multiple times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement until 
6 months after the initial plans were due. Once issued, MSHA's guidance 
lacked specificity and, as a result, MSHA district staff we interviewed 
said that they had to spend time resolving mine operators' questions 
about the guidance after it was issued. In addition, actions taken by 
some mine operators, such as their reluctance to submit adequate plans, 
further delayed the approval process. We also found that the plans we 
reviewed varied in content and did not always specify the protections 
to be provided for miners. 

MSHA's Revisions and Delays in Issuing Its Guidance Delayed Plan 
Approvals: 

Both MSHA district staff and mine operators we interviewed stated that 
MSHA's revisions of its guidance and delays in issuing the guidance 
caused mine operators to revise their mines' plans several times, 
delaying plan approvals. The MINER Act required underground coal mine 
operators to develop and adopt written emergency response plans by 
August 14, 2006. (See fig. 5 for a timeline of MSHA's guidance and key 
events related to the emergency response plans.) MSHA issued general 
guidance on the requirements for the emergency response plan components 
in July 2006 and revised it twice--in August and October of that year. 
According to district officials, by the time MSHA headquarters issued 
its revised guidance in October--2 months after mine operators were 
required to submit their plans for approval--the districts were in the 
process of reviewing and approving the plans. As a result, mine 
operators had to revise and resubmit their plans to reflect the revised 
guidance, and the districts had to review them to ensure that changes 
were incorporated. 

Figure 5: Timeline of Guidance and Key Events Related to Emergency 
Response Plans: 

[See PDF for image] 

The following data is depicted on the timeline: 

Date: January 2, 2006; 
Event: Sago mine explosion. 

Date: March 9, 2006; 
Event: MSHA issues an Emergency Temporary Standard on Emergency Mine 
Evacuation. 

Date: June 15, 2006; 
Event: Enactment of the MINER Act, including requirement for 
underground coal mine operators to develop and adopt emergency response 
plans within 60 days. 

Date: June 27, 2006; 
Event: MSHA solicits comments on implementation of the MINER Act’s 
requirement for underground coal mines to develop emergency response 
plans. 

Date: July 21, 2006; 
Event: MSHA issues initial guidance on the emergency response plan 
requirements. 

Date: August 4, 2006; 
Event: MSHA issues additional guidance revising its initial guidance on 
the emergency response plan requirements. 

Date: August 14, 2006; 
Event: Underground coal mine operators required to submit emergency 
response plans to MSHA. 

Date: August 30, 2006; 
Event: MSHA solicits information from the mining community on the 
postaccident breathable air for the maintenance of trapped miners’ 
requirement of the of the emergency response plans. 

Date: October 16, 2006; 
Event: Deadline for the mining community to submit information on 
postaccident breathable air to MSHA. 

Date: October 24, 2006; 
Event: MSHA issues guidance on the emergency response plan requirements 
that supersedes the previous guidance. 

Date: December 8, 2006; 
Event: MSHA issues final regulations on emergency mine evacuation. 
Regulation modifies the Emergency Temporary Standard and incorporates 
some requirements of the MINER Act. 

Date: February 8, 2007; 
Event: MSHA issues guidance on postaccident breathable air for the 
maintenance of trapped miners requirement of the emergency response 
plans. 

Date: August 9, 2007; 
Event: All but one of the underground coal mines’ emergency response 
plans fully approved by MSHA[A]. 

Date: October 26, 2007; 
Event: All underground coal mines’ emergency response plans fully 
approved by MSHA[A]. 

Sources: MSHA and GAO analysis of applicable laws, regulations, 
guidance, and Federal Register notices. 

[A] This includes only mines categorized by MSHA as active, producing 
as of June 2007. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, in February 2007, 6 months after mines were required to 
submit their emergency response plans to MSHA for approval, the agency 
issued new guidance on the MINER Act's requirement that the plans 
provide long-term postaccident breathable air for miners trapped 
underground. MSHA sought input from the mining community on this 
requirement, requesting comments on methods for providing safe and 
reliable supplies of postaccident breathable air in the summer of 2006. 
However, while MSHA received 11 comments from mine operators or their 
representatives during the comment period that closed on October 16, 
2006, it did little to act on these comments for several months. One 
senior level MSHA official told us that a working group established to 
develop this guidance did not begin to do so until January 2007 and 
that the agency did not finalize the guidance until February 2007, 4 
months after the comment deadline and 6 months after the deadline for 
mine operators to submit their plans to MSHA for approval. 

In the absence of written guidance, some district officials we 
interviewed said that they provided mine operators with verbal guidance 
that was inconsistent with written guidance later issued by MSHA 
headquarters. For example, officials in one district told us that they 
had informed mine operators, based on discussions with headquarters 
officials, that they would be required to provide 48 hours of long-term 
postaccident breathable air. However, when headquarters later issued 
written guidance requiring mine operators to provide 96 hours of 
postaccident breathable air, the district officials had to meet with 
mine operators to explain the new guidance and ask them to revise their 
plans, which delayed approval. 

According to MSHA officials, some of the revisions and delays in 
developing guidance resulted from the tight time frames specified in 
the MINER Act for developing and adopting the plans. MSHA headquarters 
and district officials told us that, between the enactment of the MINER 
Act in mid-June 2006 and the deadline for submitting emergency response 
plans to MSHA for approval in mid-August, there was not enough time to 
develop complete guidance outlining what mine operators should include 
in their plans. At the same time, MSHA headquarters officials said that 
they were also trying to meet the December 2006 deadline for finalizing 
the Emergency Temporary Standard the agency issued in March. MSHA 
headquarters officials said they needed additional time to interpret 
the law, discuss it with key stakeholders from the mining community, 
and incorporate the results of these discussions in the guidance. 
Similarly, MSHA headquarters officials stated that they needed time to 
review and evaluate acceptable methods for meeting the MINER Act's 
requirement for postaccident breathable air before making decisions 
about the type, amount, and location of breathable air mines would be 
required to provide. However, because of the revisions and delays in 
issuing the guidance, mine operators' ability to provide the equipment 
and information needed to protect miners' safety in the event of an 
accident, as intended by the MINER Act, was also delayed. 

The Lack of Specificity of MSHA's Guidance Also Hampered Approval of 
the Plans: 

The effectiveness of the approval process was also hampered by the lack 
of specificity of MSHA's guidance on the emergency response plans' 
components, including its guidance on the postaccident tracking, 
lifelines, and postaccident breathable air requirements of the MINER 
Act. As a result, MSHA's district staff had to spend time resolving 
mine operators' questions about the guidance after it was issued, which 
further delayed approval of the plans and the preparedness of mine 
operators to respond to an accident. To resolve some of the questions 
posed by mine operators, some district officials told us that they 
asked headquarters staff for additional guidance but did not always 
receive a response, and sometimes the response was not timely. Staff in 
a few districts said that, if they did not receive a response from 
headquarters officials, they made their own decisions about how to 
interpret the guidance. In some instances, they said that headquarters 
officials later made decisions about the requirements of the plans that 
differed from those made by the districts. As a result, the districts 
had to ask mine operators to revise their plans to comply with 
headquarters' revised interpretations of the requirements, further 
delaying approval of the plans. The following examples illustrate the 
impact of MSHA's guidance: 

* Although MSHA's guidance indicated that operators could satisfy the 
postaccident tracking requirement by using a dispatcher system, it did 
not specify certain aspects of what should be included in the plans. A 
few of the district officials we interviewed said that some mine 
operators stated in their plans that they intended to divide their 
mines into large zones to minimize the number of phones they had to 
provide and make it easier for miners to move around the mine without 
having to report their location to staff working above ground.[Footnote 
17] However, because MSHA's guidance did not specify the allowable 
sizes of the zones or provide criteria for determining their 
appropriate sizes, the district officials said they had to spend time 
negotiating with mine operators to establish smaller zone sizes, which 
would improve the chances of identifying the location of trapped miners 
after an accident. 

* MSHA's guidance did not specify the materials mine operators needed 
to use to meet the requirement for postaccident lifelines. One district 
official told us some of the mine operators in his district wanted to 
use existing water lines as lifelines, rather than providing new, flame 
resistant lifelines. As a result, the official had to negotiate with 
them to resolve this issue. MSHA headquarters later specified in 
writing that some water lines were not a suitable option for meeting 
this requirement of the MINER Act. 

* Further, MSHA's guidance did not specify what methods mine operators 
could use or what methods they were prohibited from using to provide 
oxygen to and remove hazardous gas from refuge areas. A few of the 
district officials we interviewed said that they had many discussions 
with mine operators and headquarters officials about whether MSHA would 
consider chemically-generated oxygen an acceptable method for supplying 
long-term breathable air. Similarly, some officials were seeking 
guidance from MSHA headquarters on acceptable methods of removing 
hazardous gas from refuge areas several months after the initial 
guidance was issued. MSHA's technical support division provided 
additional guidance after researching the technical issues involved. 
District officials then had to notify the mine operators who intended 
to use these methods that their plans had to be revised, which delayed 
their approval. 

Approval of Plans Sometimes Delayed by Mine Operators' Actions: 

In addition to the delays caused by issues related to MSHA's guidance, 
actions taken by some mine operators delayed plan approval. While 
district officials said that most mine operators were cooperative and 
responsive during the approval process, some district officials said 
some mine operators submitted initial plans that did not meet all of 
the requirements, which contributed to delays in the review process. 
For example, a few district officials said that some mine operators 
used vague language in their plans. In addition, a few district 
officials responsible for reviewing the plans told us that it was 
difficult to reach some of the mine operators to discuss deficiencies 
in their plans or ask them to resubmit their plans when revisions were 
needed, further delaying the approval process. One official added that, 
once MSHA gave mine operators deadlines for submitting revisions, the 
process for reviewing the revisions moved more quickly. 

Some mine operators proposed methods for meeting the requirements of 
the MINER Act that took time for MSHA to evaluate because they were 
unfamiliar with these methods. For example, a company that owned nine 
mines in one district proposed an alternative method of meeting the 
postaccident tracking requirement: using telephone answering machines 
to track the locations of miners working underground. Since this method 
differed from the typical dispatcher system used by other mines, 
district staff sought input from headquarters on whether the proposed 
system was an acceptable method of complying with the postaccident 
tracking requirement for emergency response plans. MSHA's technical 
support division observed the system before making a decision and 
determined that it was not sufficient. The process of reviewing such 
alternative methods prolonged the approval of some mines' plans. 

By June 2007, MSHA had resolved most of the issues with the mine 
operators and approved their plans, but the approval of a few plans was 
delayed for several months. After discussion with the mine operators, 
two districts reached an impasse with three mines on the postaccident 
breathable air component of their plans.[Footnote 18] However, MSHA 
subsequently reached agreement with these mines on their emergency 
response plans. As of October 26, 2007, more than a year after the 
initial deadline for submitting plans, MSHA had approved all 
underground coal mines' emergency response plans that were part of our 
analysis.[Footnote 19] 

Mines' Approved Emergency Response Plans Vary in the Information 
Provided on Certain Plan Components, Raising Uncertainties about the 
Protections Provided to Miners: 

The approved emergency response plans we reviewed varied in the 
information provided and, therefore, it is uncertain whether certain 
protections will be afforded to all miners. It is understandable that 
the content of the plans may differ because there are differences in 
the specific characteristics of mines. However, in our review of the 
plans we sampled, we found that some plans did not specify the 
protections to be provided and the amount of information about these 
protections varied from plan to plan. The following examples illustrate 
the variations in the plans we reviewed. 

Postaccident breathable air. Some of the plans we reviewed specified 
the materials that the mine needed to provide long-term postaccident 
breathable air for trapped miners, but other plans did not. For 
example, the plans we reviewed in three districts included worksheets 
for mine operators to complete that specified the quantity of oxygen, 
number of compressed air cylinders, and materials needed to remove 
contaminants from the air. An official in one of the districts said the 
district also required mines that chose refuge chambers as a method of 
providing long-term postaccident breathable air to trapped miners to 
indicate the size and type of refuge chambers they purchased. The 
official said they asked for this information to help ensure that the 
locations in the mines where the chambers would be placed were large 
enough to accommodate the inflated chambers without puncturing them. In 
contrast, some of the plans we reviewed in other districts only 
indicated the possible options or combinations of methods of providing 
breathable air that the mine might choose; the plans did not indicate 
the specific methods that the mines chose for meeting the breathable 
air requirement or specify the amount of oxygen, air, or materials 
needed to remove contaminants from the air. As a result, it was unclear 
how the districts determined that the methods identified in the plans 
will be sufficient for those mines. 

Postaccident breathable air in certain locations of the mine. The plans 
we reviewed varied in whether they specified that the mine operator 
would provide long-term postaccident breathable air in locations 
between the working section of the mine where coal was being extracted 
and the entrance of the mine, known as outby locations.[Footnote 20] 
For 6 of the 10 districts with approved plans,[Footnote 21] all of the 
approved plans we reviewed either specified that postaccident 
breathable air would be provided in these locations and the method to 
be used to provide air, or they indicated that air was not required in 
these locations and explained why.[Footnote 22] However, for 4 of the 
10 districts with approved plans, some plans did not specify whether 
postaccident breathable air was required for miners working in outby 
locations or the methods for providing it. As a result, in some mines, 
miners working in these locations may not have access to postaccident 
breathable air if they become trapped in the mine after an accident. 

Postaccident tracking. We also found large differences in the 
information contained in the plans we reviewed for the postaccident 
tracking component. All of the plans we reviewed for one district 
detailed the responsibilities of surface and underground personnel for 
this component and described the underground areas or zones to be used 
in identifying the location of miners. In contrast, in another 
district, none of the plans we reviewed described the responsibilities 
of the mine personnel or the zones to be used to identify the location 
of miners. Without providing specific information about how to track 
miners, it was not clear how the districts determined that the methods 
identified in the plans will be sufficient for those mines and how mine 
operators will identify where trapped miners are located in the event 
of an accident. 

While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components 
Have Not: 

Most of the components of mines' emergency response plans have been 
implemented, but two key components remain. As of January 2008, all 
underground coal mines had implemented all or most components of their 
emergency response plans. However, few of the mines had implemented one 
key component--postaccident breathable air--because needed equipment 
was not available. In addition, mines had not begun to implement 
another component--wireless communications systems or a comparable 
alternative--because fully wireless technology is not available and 
MSHA had not determined what alternative technologies mine operators 
will be allowed to use to meet this requirement of the MINER Act, which 
mines must implement by June 2009. 

Mines Had Implemented All or Most Components of Their Emergency 
Response Plans: 

As of January 2008, all underground coal mines had implemented all or 
most of the components of their emergency response plans[Footnote 23] 
that were required to be implemented immediately after approval. Twenty 
percent of all underground coal mines had fully implemented all 
components of their emergency response plans. The remaining mines had 
implemented all of the components, except the requirement for 
postaccident breathable air. Specifically, according to MSHA district 
officials, all mines had implemented the redundant communication and 
tracking systems required by their plans, had provided training on 
emergency procedures and the use of self-contained self-rescuers, and 
had developed procedures for coordinating and communicating with local 
emergency responders, as required. In addition, many mines had 
installed flame-resistant lifelines, although the MINER Act generally 
does not require their installation until June 2009. 

Generally, as with most plan components, mines are using widely 
accepted methods to implement the current postaccident communications 
and tracking requirements of their emergency response plans and are 
moving toward using electronic tracking systems to meet the June 2009 
requirement of the MINER Act. To meet the redundant communications 
requirement, according to NIOSH, most mines are using hardwired mine 
phones and leaky feeder cable systems with handheld radios[Footnote 24] 
(see fig. 6). To meet the postaccident tracking requirement, nearly 90 
percent of the plans we reviewed specified that a dispatcher or 
equivalent system would be used to track miners.[Footnote 25] At the 
time of our review, according to the manufacturers we interviewed, 
approximately 13 mines were installing electronic tracking systems. 
[Footnote 26] 

Figure 6: Illustrations of Technologies Used to Meet the Current 
Requirement for Redundant Communication Systems: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a series of three photographs of technologies used to 
meet the current requirement for redundant communication systems. 
Pictured are: 
* Mine pager phone; 
* Leaky feeder cable, which receives signals from and transmits it to 
handheld radios; 
* Handheld radios. 

Sources: GAO presentation of miner’s equipment used to summon help; 
images partially from Art Explosion. 

[End of figure] 

One Key Component Had Not Been Fully Implemented Because Equipment Was 
Not Available: 

As of January 2008, because needed equipment was not available, more 
than three-quarters of the mines had not been able to fully implement 
the requirement to provide long-term postaccident breathable air for 
trapped miners, and one-fifth of the mines had not been able to provide 
all of the required self-contained self-rescuers to aid in miners' 
escape.[Footnote 27] According to MSHA's guidance, mines can use 
several alternative methods to provide long-term postaccident 
breathable air for trapped miners. These methods include providing a 
premanufactured refuge chamber, either hard-sided or inflatable, that 
can be easily moved around the mine; building a protected room in the 
mine--called a prebuilt safe haven--where breathable air and survival 
supplies will be available; and providing a skid that contains 
materials for constructing an airtight barricade after an accident, 
equipment to provide breathable air, as well as water, food, and other 
supplies. As shown in figure 7, most mines planned to use at least one 
refuge chamber to provide long-term postaccident breathable air to 
trapped miners. 

Figure 7: Methods for Providing Long-Term Postaccident Breathable Air 
for Trapped Miners and Percentages of Mines Planning to Use Each 
Method[A]: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a series of illustrations of methods for providing long-
term postaccident breathable air for trapped miners and percentages of 
mines planning to use each method. The following data is illustrated: 

Method: Prebuilt safe haven (contains airlock area and skid, which 
contains oxygen equipment for cleaning contaminants from the air, food, 
water, and other survival supplies);
Percentage of mines using this system: 14%. 

Method: Miners using barricading materials from a skid to erect a safe 
haven after an accident (materials include food, water, oxygen, tools, 
wood beams and brattice cloth); 
Percentage of mines using this system: 27%. 

Method: Inflatable and hard-sided refuge chambers; 
Percentage of mines using this system: 69%. 

Source: GAO’s illustration of miner’s refuge in an emergency. 

[A] Mines may use more than one method to provide breathable air to 
trapped miners. For example, a mine may choose to use a refuge chamber 
at the working section of the mine (i.e., where the coal is being 
removed) and a prebuilt safe haven at locations nearer the mine 
entrance along an exit route. 

Note: District officials reported that 7 percent of mines were using 
something other than the above alternatives to provide postaccident 
breathable air, such as forcing air into the mine through preinstalled 
pipes or through a borehole or shaft drilled from the surface into the 
mine. 

[End of figure] 

Refuge chambers. Although, according to MSHA, 69 percent of all 
underground coal mines had ordered either inflatable or hard-sided 
refuge chambers, only 4 percent of these mines had received the 
chambers as of January 2008. Manufacturers had difficulty increasing 
production to meet the demand from mine operators prompted by enactment 
of the MINER Act, and they encountered shortages of needed materials 
and equipment. According to the MSHA officials and manufacturers we 
interviewed, manufacturing limitations may delay delivery of some 
refuge chambers until 2009. In light of these delays, senior MSHA 
headquarters officials told us that they were considering requiring 
mine operators who had not yet received refuge chambers to make interim 
arrangements, such as providing prebuilt safe havens or barricading 
materials to allow miners to construct safe havens. In addition, mine 
operators we interviewed said they were concerned that, based on 
NIOSH's evaluation of the chambers, MSHA might develop guidance that 
requires modification or replacement of the chambers they have ordered, 
which might further delay their delivery or increase the costs. 
[Footnote 28] 

Prebuilt safe havens and skids with barricading materials. Fourteen 
percent of the mines opted to build their own safe havens, and 27 
percent opted to provide skids with supplies needed for breathable air, 
barricades, and other survival necessities. However, as of January 
2008, only 12 percent of the mines using safe havens and 50 percent of 
the mines using skids had fully implemented these methods. Unavailable 
equipment prevented full implementation for many mines, often because 
manufacturers were not able to meet the increased demand for items such 
as oxygen tanks, airlock doors, and equipment needed to eliminate 
carbon dioxide from refuge areas. 

Self-contained self-rescuers. At the time of our review, manufacturers 
of self-contained self-rescuers were beginning to catch up with the 
sudden increased demand created by the requirements of the MINER Act. 
However, as of January 2008, 20 percent of the mines were waiting for 
delivery of some of the self-contained self-rescuers required by their 
plans. The manufacturers we interviewed told us that they did not 
expect this large increase in demand to continue into the foreseeable 
future and, therefore, did not greatly increase their production 
capacity, which limited the number of units they could produce in the 
short term. 

MSHA Has Not Determined What Technologies Will Be Acceptable in Meeting 
the MINER Act Requirement for Wireless Communications Systems: 

Although the MINER Act requires mines to provide postaccident wireless 
two-way communications systems or approved alternatives by June 2009, 
MSHA has not determined what technology mine operators will be allowed 
to use to meet this requirement. The MINER Act does not define wireless 
communications systems, except to state that mines' emergency response 
plans must include provisions for postaccident communications between 
underground and surface personnel via a "wireless two-way medium." 
However, the act also states that, if such components cannot be adopted 
by mine operators, their plans may instead include alternative methods 
that "approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional 
utility and safety protection" that would be provided by a wireless 
system.[Footnote 29] The Senate committee report on the act stated that 
the intent of this requirement is for mine operators to use the most 
advanced technology available that works best in their particular mine. 
The report also noted that the intent is to avoid interpreting the law 
so narrowly as to stifle innovation and delay implementation of methods 
or equipment that would have significant safety benefits.[Footnote 30] 

According to NIOSH, the term "wireless," as used by the global 
telecommunications industry, has come to mean that the end user device, 
such as a cell phone, is not connected locally by a wire. However, 
these systems require a hardwired infrastructure to support 
communications. In its research, NIOSH has found that infrastructure-
free systems that can provide wireless two-way communications--which we 
refer to in this report as fully wireless systems--do not exist for 
most underground coal mines due to operational constraints. According 
to NIOSH officials, their research has demonstrated that, for wearable 
and portable two-way communications devices to work in most underground 
coal mines, infrastructure will be required to support any postaccident 
communications systems that will be available in the foreseeable 
future. 

Although researchers and manufacturers have developed fully wireless 
communications systems, there are concerns about the viability and 
practicality of these systems, and there are significant limitations 
for their use in underground coal mines. For example, according to 
NIOSH, systems that use antennae placed underground and on the surface 
above the mine (referred to as through-the-earth systems) have a very 
limited range and most provide only one-way text communication from 
individuals on the surface to miners underground. Individuals we 
interviewed who were knowledgeable about the mine industry--including 
representatives of NIOSH, MSHA's technical support division, and 
companies that develop new technology for use in underground coal 
mines--and the research we reviewed indicated that fully wireless two-
way communications systems may not be available for many years because 
the conditions in the mines make it extremely difficult for 
communication signals to cover significant distances. 

According to NIOSH, MSHA's technical support division staff, and 
manufacturers, some partially wireless systems in which the coal miner 
is not tethered to the infrastructure are available now, and other 
alternatives that could enhance communications and the safety of miners 
in underground coal mines are nearly ready for use. The use of these 
partially wireless communications systems--such as leaky feeder or 
fiber optic cable systems--is becoming more widespread in mines. In 
addition, NIOSH and manufacturers are developing other options for 
providing partially wireless communications in mines, including 
ethernet networks and wireless mesh networks. Examples of some of these 
systems are shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Examples of Partially Wireless Communications Systems for Use 
in Underground Coal Mines: 

Type of system: Leaky feeder; 
Description: Signal "leaks" to and from a feeder cable, radiating a 
signal that allows communication throughout much of the mine. 

Type of system: Ethernet; 
Description: Ethernet local area network that uses a special data 
communications protocol transmitted over coaxial cable or twisted-pair 
wires to permit voice communications in mines. 

Type of system: Wireless mesh; 
Description: Wireless mesh networks use wireless modems (called nodes) 
placed throughout a mine. The signal "hops" from node to node, 
permitting two-way voice, data and video to be sent and received. If 
some nodes fail in a mine accident, the network can reconfigure itself 
and create a new path for communication signals using nodes that are 
still functional. 

Type of system: Parasitic signal propagation; 
Description: A signal is transmitted along existing mine 
infrastructure, such as wires, rails, and cabling, and can "jump" from 
one medium to another, such as traveling from a wire to a rail. In some 
instances, the signal can bypass a damaged section of cable by 
traveling along an alternate medium until it is past the damaged 
section. 

Source: NIOSH. 

[End of table] 

Although some of these systems are currently available, others are 
still being developed, and some components have not yet been approved 
by MSHA as being safe for use in underground coal mines.[Footnote 31] 
In early 2008, MSHA approved the first wireless mesh network for 
tracking miners and is reviewing the manufacturer's application for 
approval of a modification that would enable two-way text messaging 
using this network. An MSHA official responsible for approving 
equipment for use in underground coal mines told us that the agency is 
working with a number of other manufacturers seeking MSHA's approval of 
wireless mesh systems that would allow two-way voice communications. 

NIOSH has developed plans for ensuring that advanced and survivable 
communications systems are provided in the mines. Given the progress 
that has been made in developing alternatives to fully wireless 
technology, NIOSH has developed a phased approach in which underground 
coal mines would install systems using partially wireless technology. 
Mines could install these improved communications systems alongside 
traditional systems, such as mine pager phones, or combine systems that 
use one type of technology, such as leaky feeder cable, with those that 
use other technologies, such as wireless mesh, to create communications 
systems more likely to survive a mine accident. NIOSH officials told us 
that their approach is focused on ensuring that mine operators can make 
use of existing technologies as they upgrade to more survivable 
communications systems. 

Similar to NIOSH's approach, West Virginia requires mines to use 
wireless communications systems but defines them as systems that allow 
individual communications by a miner through a mine communication and 
tracking system without a physical connection. West Virginia allows 
mines to use leaky feeder cable and WiFi communications systems to meet 
this requirement, both of which are partially, rather than fully, 
wireless systems. West Virginia's state mining office has approved 
communications and tracking technologies developed by several 
manufacturers, but not all of them have been approved by MSHA for use 
in underground coal mines. West Virginia officials said that they 
expect their mines to have operational systems to meet this requirement 
by late 2008. 

Despite these advances in partially wireless technology, MSHA had not 
yet determined what types of technology will be acceptable for mines to 
use to meet the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications. In 
its guidance on emergency response plans issued in October 2006, MSHA 
defined the term wireless to mean systems with no underground wires 
that might be damaged by fire or explosion. As previously noted, 
according to NIOSH, such infrastructure-free systems will not be 
possible for most mines. MSHA's guidance noted that specific conditions 
in each mine would be taken into account in determining whether the 
system was likely to withstand an accident intact. At the time of our 
review, MSHA officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue 
guidance detailing what technology will be acceptable in meeting the 
June 2009 requirement for wireless communications because they wanted 
to wait and see what technology is available closer to the deadline. As 
a result, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan 
for and order enhanced communications systems to meet the deadline. In 
justifying the delay, one official expressed concern that manufacturers 
would stop trying to develop fully wireless technology if MSHA 
announced that partially wireless technology is acceptable. However, 
some manufacturers told us that, because MSHA has not determined what 
technology will be acceptable, they are concerned that they are 
investing time and money in developing technology that may not 
ultimately be acceptable to MSHA. 

While MSHA's District Offices Have Enforced Mines' Implementation of 
Emergency Response Plans, MSHA Headquarters Has Provided Limited 
Oversight of Enforcement and Plan Quality: 

MSHA's district offices have conducted inspections and issued citations 
to enforce implementation of mines' emergency response plans, but MSHA 
headquarters has provided limited oversight of the districts' 
enforcement efforts and the overall quality of the plans. MSHA's 
districts have inspected many mines for compliance and issued citations 
to enforce implementation of their emergency response plans, but MSHA 
headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on 
citations related to emergency response plans to identify potential 
problems with implementation or enforcement. In addition, MSHA 
headquarters has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality 
of underground coal mines' emergency response plans or to identify 
whether corrective actions might be needed. 

District Offices Have Used Inspections and Citations to Enforce 
Implementation of Plans: 

In October 2006, MSHA headquarters provided the districts with guidance 
stating that inspectors should begin checking for compliance with 
approved emergency response plan components during the regular 
inspection process. If an inspector finds a mine operator has not 
implemented a component of its approved plan, MSHA can cite the mine 
for noncompliance with its plan. According to district officials, all 
of MSHA's districts began incorporating individual components of mines' 
plans into their regular inspections as soon as the components were 
approved. Inspectors were notified of the approval of individual 
components of the mines' plans through updates of the mines' uniform 
mine files, which contain all of the mines' plans and must be reviewed 
by inspectors prior to each inspection.[Footnote 32] 

As of December 2007, inspectors had issued over 350 citations to mine 
operators who had not properly implemented the approved components of 
their emergency response plans. MSHA inspectors began issuing citations 
for noncompliance in November 2006, shortly after MSHA headquarters 
issued its guidance.[Footnote 33] Prior to November 2006, MSHA district 
offices only issued citations to mines that had failed to submit or 
revise their emergency response plans for approval. From November 2006 
through mid-December 2007, the most frequently issued citations were 
related to postaccident communications, postaccident tracking, 
postaccident breathable air, and additional plan content.[Footnote 34] 
The citations for noncompliance with the postaccident breathable air 
component of mines' plans included violations for not having the 
required self-contained self-rescuers and supplies for providing oxygen 
to miners trapped underground for a long period of time. Figure 8 
indicates the percentage and number of citations issued for 
noncompliance with each component of the mines' emergency response 
plans. 

Figure 8: Citations MSHA Issued to Mines under the MINER Act for 
Noncompliance with Each Emergency Response Plan Component, by 
Component, August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Citation MSHA Issued: Additional plan content provisions; 
Number: 101; 
Percentage: 30%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccidnet communications; 
Number: 98; 
Percentage: 29%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident tracking; 
Number: 53; 
Percentage: 16%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident breathable air; 
Number: 50[A]; 
Percentage: 15%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Other; 
Number: 12; 
Percentage: 4%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Postaccident illness; 
Number: 9; 
Percentage: 3%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Multiple; 
Number: 11; 
Percentage: 3%. 

Citation MSHA Issued: Training; 
Number: 5; 
Percentage: 1%. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[A] The 50 citations for noncompliance with the postaccident breathable 
air component include 42 violations of plans' provisions for the long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground, 7 violations of plans' 
provisions for self-contained self-rescuers, and 1 violation of both 
provisions for both. 

[End of figure] 

The reasons for the citations varied; instances of noncompliance cited 
included, among other things, mines not installing required equipment 
or equipment not functioning properly. Table 3 includes examples of the 
conditions cited by inspectors. 

Table 3: Examples of Conditions Cited by Inspectors for Noncompliance 
with Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

Emergency response plan component: 
Postaccident communications; Summary of violation: The plan stated that 
a second and separate communications system would be installed in the 
primary escapeway. The plan also stated that the second system would be 
a telephone line that would extend with the lifeline as mining 
progressed. This second line was to be installed within 30 days of the 
approval of the plan. No secondary communications system had been 
installed. 

Emergency response plan component: Postaccident tracking; 
Summary of violation: The mine operator failed to comply with the 
tracking plan in the mine's emergency response plan. The tracking plan 
was not effective in that one miner was recorded as being in two 
different working sections of the mine at the same time and two miners 
were recorded as being underground when they were actually both on the 
surface. 

Emergency response plan component: Postaccident breathable air: long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground; 
Summary of violation: The operator's emergency response plan required 
that arrangements be made to provide breathable air for the active 
section of the mine within 60 days after the plan was approved. The 
plan had been approved and 60 days had elapsed, but the operator had 
not made arrangements to provide breathable air. 

Emergency response plan component: Postaccident breathable air: self-
contained self-rescuers; 
Summary of violation: A self-contained self-rescuer storage container 
was not being maintained. The container had been damaged; the lids were 
badly bent and hanging; and the self-contained self-rescuers were 
exposed to dirt, dust, and water. 

Emergency response plan component: Training; 
Summary of violation: Discussions with seven miners indicated that they 
were not adequately trained in transferring from one self-contained 
self-rescuer to another, as required by the approved emergency response 
plan. 

Emergency response plan component: Postaccident lifelines; 
Summary of violation: The lifeline installed in the alternate escapeway 
along the conveyor belt was broken in several locations. A section of 
the lifeline was wrapped around other equipment. 

Emergency response plan component: Additional plan content; 
Summary of violation: The following items were not available on the 
working section: claw hammer, protective gloves, eight roof jacks, four 
brattice boards, nails, and food and water in sufficient amounts. 

Emergency response plan component: Multiple; 
Summary of violation: The operator had not installed a lifeline in the 
primary escapeway from the surface to the working section. Also, the 
mine operator had not installed an additional means of communication 
from the surface to the working section of the mine. 

Emergency response plan component: Multiple; 
Summary of violation: The mine operator was not keeping a written 
record of the location of miners underground, as required by the mine's 
emergency response plan. In addition, the items listed in the plan's 
section for additional plan contents were not provided on the working 
section for the maintenance of miners trapped underground. 

Source: GAO summary of MSHA data. 

[End of table] 

MSHA issued more citations to mines beginning in May 2007 when more 
plans had been fully approved. Citations issued for failure to submit 
or revise a plan were generally issued earlier in light of the August 
2006 deadline, and citations issued for long-term postaccident 
breathable air for miners trapped underground tended to be issued 
later, since MSHA did not provide guidance on this issue until February 
2007. Excluding these two categories, the number of monthly citations 
increased from 9 in April 2007 to 30 in May 2007 and had increased to 
nearly 60 by October 2007 (see fig. 9). According to MSHA's 
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health, the number of citations 
increased as more approved plans became eligible for inspection, and 
will likely decrease as more mines successfully implement their plans 
and properly maintain their equipment. 

Figure 9: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act Each Month, 
August 15, 2006, to December 11, 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Date: August 2006; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 25. 

Date: September 2006; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1. 

Date: October 2006; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 0; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: November 2006; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 3; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: December 2006; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 4; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: January 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 5; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: February 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 5; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: March 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 9; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1. 

Date: April 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 9; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 3. 

Date: May 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 2; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 30; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: June 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 0; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 25; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: July 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 4; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 31; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: August 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 19; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 27; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: September 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 14; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 46; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1. 

Date: October 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 2; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 58; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Date: November 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 1; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 32; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 1. 

Date: December 2007; 
Citations issued, postaccident breathable air[A]: 1; 
Citations issued, other citations[B]: 12; 
Citations issued, plan submission[C]: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[A] "Postaccident breathable air" includes citations issued for not 
providing supplies for the long-term maintenance of miners trapped 
underground. These citations were related to MSHA's February 2007 
guidance on providing postaccident breathable air for the maintenance 
of miners trapped underground. Citations issued for failure to comply 
with the requirement for providing caches of self-contained self-
rescuers, which MSHA addressed in its general guidance in the summer 
and fall of 2006, are included in "other citations." We categorized the 
citations this way to demonstrate the increase in citations related to 
postaccident breathable air that occurred after MSHA issued the 
guidance on this component. One citation that was issued for both the 
maintenance of trapped miners and for self-contained self-rescuers is 
included in this category. 

[B] "Other citations" includes citations issued for multiple 
components, including one from August 2007 that cited a mine for, among 
other things, not providing postaccident breathable air for the long-
term maintenance of miners trapped underground. The category also 
includes citations issued regarding self-contained self-rescuers, 
which were addressed in MSHA's general guidance on emergency response 
plans issued in the summer and fall of 2006. 

[C] "Plan submission" includes failure to submit a plan or revise a 
plan. For example, after MSHA released its February 2007 guidance on 
postaccident breathable air for the long-term maintenance of trapped 
miners, MSHA required mine operators to resubmit their plans to show 
how the mine would address this component. 

[End of figure] 

Most citations MSHA issued for violations of mines' emergency response 
plans were promptly addressed by the mine operators. Upon issuing a 
citation, the MSHA inspector is required to establish a deadline for 
correction of the safety or health hazard identified in the citation. 
More than half of the hazards identified in citations issued to 
underground coal mines through December 11, 2007, were corrected within 
a week of being issued, and one-quarter were corrected on the same day 
that the citations were issued (see table 4). About 7 percent of the 
citations reviewed were still outstanding at the end of 2007 and 
pertained to mines' failure to comply with their plans' requirement to 
provide long-term postaccident breathable air to trapped miners. Half 
of these outstanding citations have not been terminated because the 
equipment the mine operators planned to use to meet the requirement was 
unavailable. 

Table 4: Correction Time Frames for Citations Issued under the MINER 
Act to Mines for Failing to Submit or for Not Complying with Their 
Emergency Response Plans: 

Correction time frame: Same day; 
Number of violations: 94; 
Percent of total violations: 25.3%. 

Correction time frame: Within 1 week; 
Number of violations: 134; 
Percent of total violations: 36.1. 

Correction time frame: Within 2 weeks; 
Number of violations: 39; 
Percent of total violations: 10.5. 

Correction time frame: Within 3 weeks; 
Number of violations: 39; 
Percent of total violations: 10.5. 

Correction time frame: Within 4 weeks; 
Number of violations: 18; 
Percent of total violations: 4.9. 

Correction time frame: Greater than 4 weeks; 
Number of violations: 20; 
Percent of total violations: 5.4. 

Correction time frame: Not corrected[A]; 
Number of violations: 27; 
Percent of total violations: 7.3. 

Total: 
Number of violations: 371; 
Percent of total violations: 100%. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[A] These citations were still outstanding, as of January 1, 2008. 

[End of table] 

In a November 2007 report, the Department of Labor's Office of 
Inspector General indicated that decreasing inspection resources has 
made it difficult for MSHA to complete all required inspections of 
underground coal mines.[Footnote 35] Management officials we 
interviewed in 4 of the 11 district offices indicated that they did not 
have an adequate number of inspectors to complete the required 
emergency response plan inspections. However, several managers also 
said that this situation will be remedied when newly hired inspectors 
become fully qualified to conduct inspections. One former district 
manager said that inspectors were able to complete the required 
inspections of mines' emergency response plans but may not have had 
time to proactively recommend improved safety practices to mine 
operators during these inspections. 

MSHA Has Not Systematically Evaluated Citation Data to Identify 
Potential Problems with Implementation or Enforcement: 

MSHA headquarters has not examined the available data on citations to 
assess the extent to which each emergency response plan component has 
been violated or whether enforcement of the plans may differ across 
districts. Senior officials at MSHA headquarters told us that they had 
not analyzed the citations related to emergency response plans, apart 
from totaling the number of citations issued under the MINER Act. The 
MSHA specialist responsible for reviewing the citation data said that 
MSHA headquarters analyzes the citation data more to oversee the 
compliance of individual mine operators and mines, rather than to 
oversee districts' enforcement efforts. As a result, MSHA headquarters 
officials were not aware that the number of citations related to 
emergency response plans varies across districts. We reviewed the 
citations issued by MSHA's 11 district offices for violations of mines' 
emergency response plans from August 15, 2006, through December 11, 
2007, and found large differences in the number of citations issued 
across districts. For example, as of December 11, 2007, one district 
had cited one of its 18 mines for failing to comply with its emergency 
response plan; in contrast, three districts had cited over two-thirds 
of their mines for noncompliance with their plans. (See app. II for 
details on the number of citations issued and the number of mines cited 
per district.) When we informed a senior MSHA official of these 
differences, he said he was not aware of them or the reasons for these 
differences. While some differences can be expected, MSHA has not 
identified the causes of these differences or whether they are the 
result of inconsistent enforcement, which may warrant corrective 
actions. 

MSHA headquarters also has not analyzed and compared citations issued 
under the MINER Act with citations issued under related agency 
regulations.[Footnote 36] Some of the emergency response plan 
requirements of the MINER Act are also contained in MSHA's regulations. 
For example, both the MINER Act and MSHA regulations require mines to 
have lifelines or equivalent devices.[Footnote 37] MSHA has not 
established a clear policy for when inspectors should cite the 
emergency response plan requirement of the MINER Act or the regulations 
when both apply. We found that both types of citations have been issued 
for the same requirement, indicating that it would not be possible to 
assess mines' compliance with a requirement by evaluating either type 
of citation in isolation. Specifically, based on our analysis of MSHA's 
citation data, we found that, while inspectors issued only 14 citations 
for noncompliance with the lifeline requirements of the MINER Act, they 
issued over 150 citations for noncompliance with regulations regarding 
lifelines over the same period.[Footnote 38] One assistant district 
manager said that inspectors use the regulations as the basis for 
citations because they are more specific than the language of the MINER 
Act; therefore, the regulations allow the inspector to better specify 
the nature of the violation and defend the citation if it is 
contested.[Footnote 39] While data on citations for noncompliance with 
the MINER Act and the regulations are available, MSHA headquarters does 
not review both data sources and, as a result, may not have accurate 
information to reflect the full extent of operator compliance with 
emergency response plan requirements. 

The option to cite either the emergency response plan requirement of 
the MINER Act or regulations for certain kinds of violations could also 
prevent MSHA from appropriately considering one of the statutory 
factors that is used to calculate penalty assessments. Specifically, 
MSHA is required to consider the mine operator's history of previous 
violations in assessing penalties. The formula it uses to assess 
penalties results in a higher penalty if the mine has been cited 
previously five or more times for violating the same statutory 
provision or regulation in the preceding 15 months. However, if 
citations for repeat violations by the same mine are not issued 
consistently under the same provision--either the applicable statute or 
the regulations--MSHA's penalty assessment system will not identify 
them as repeat violations, even though the nature of the violation is 
the same. Therefore, if an inspector issued five citations to a mine 
operator for failing to maintain the mine's lifelines under the 
emergency response plan requirement of the MINER Act and subsequently 
issued a sixth citation under the regulations, rather than the MINER 
Act, MSHA's penalty assessment system would not flag the violation as a 
repeat violation, and the higher penalty assessment would not apply. 
For example, MSHA issued two citations to one mine under the MINER Act 
and assessed the minimum penalty amount. Between the dates that these 
two citations were issued, however, the mine received at least four 
citations for violations of regulations that overlapped with the 
requirements of the MINER Act. Had these four citations been issued 
under the MINER Act per MSHA headquarters' guidance to its districts, 
rather than under MSHA's regulations, the penalties assessed would have 
been higher to reflect the mine's repeated violations of the emergency 
response plan requirements of the MINER Act. 

MSHA Has Not Provided Sufficient Oversight to Ensure Plan Quality: 

Although MSHA headquarters has reviewed some of the mines' emergency 
response plans, it has not provided sufficient oversight of the 
district offices to ensure that the levels of safety protection 
required by the plans are adequate across all of its district offices. 
Internal control standards for the federal government advise that 
internal controls should be designed so that monitoring is ongoing and 
ingrained in agency operations.[Footnote 40] During mine inspections, 
inspectors must ensure that the mines are adhering to the requirements 
described in the content of their emergency response plans. However, as 
discussed earlier in this report, the plans we reviewed varied in the 
information provided for certain plan components, such as postaccident 
breathable air and postaccident tracking, raising uncertainties about 
the protections provided to miners. One senior MSHA headquarters 
official said that the district offices have submitted samples of 
mines' approved plans to headquarters but the review of such plans has 
not been systematic or comprehensive. He further indicated that such a 
review would be time-consuming and resource intensive. MSHA 
headquarters officials said they plan to review the emergency response 
plans as part of the agency's peer review process, but each district 
office only undergoes a peer review once every 2 years. Without 
monitoring the quality of the plans across all districts, it is unclear 
how MSHA headquarters can ensure that its guidance and the requirements 
of the MINER Act are applied consistently and that mines are held to 
the same standards. 

Conclusions: 

At the Sago mine, 12 miners died hours after an explosion in the mine 
after being exposed to the carbon monoxide that accumulated in the 
mine. The MINER Act now requires underground coal mines to develop 
emergency response plans to ensure that miners have the tools and 
technology needed to protect them in the event of future mine 
accidents. However, because of differences in the mines' emergency 
response plans, it is not clear that all mines are being held to the 
same standards for providing these tools to trapped miners and, 
ultimately, for providing the protections needed to ensure the safety 
of miners. We understand that not all of the mines' emergency response 
plans will be exactly the same because they must take into account the 
specific characteristics of each mine. However, the differences in the 
plans we reviewed seemed to reflect a lack of specific guidance, rather 
than the unique characteristics of each mine. MSHA's current guidance 
will continue to be a problem as districts approve emergency response 
plans for new mines and review compliance with emergency response plans 
as part of their inspections of all mines. In addition, despite 
advances in technology, MSHA has not developed guidance indicating what 
technologies it will allow mine operators to use to meet the June 2009 
wireless communications requirement of the MINER Act because they want 
to wait and see what will be available. However, if MSHA does not act 
soon to determine what will be acceptable, it is not clear that 
manufacturers and mine operators will be able to plan and prepare for 
the implementation of new technologies before the deadline, thereby 
missing opportunities to improve trapped miners' chances of survival 
after an accident. Finally, by not monitoring district offices to 
determine the quality of the emergency response plans and district 
enforcement efforts, MSHA headquarters officials will not be aware that 
the district offices may be holding mines to different standards. As a 
result, all mines may not be prepared to adequately protect their 
miners in the event of an accident. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that new and existing mines are held to the same agencywide 
standards in preparing for future accidents, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and 
Health to develop and issue additional guidance to district offices to 
clarify what is required for key components of the emergency response 
plans, such as providing postaccident breathable air for the 
maintenance of trapped miners. 

To improve trapped miners' chances of survival after future accidents 
through the use of advanced technology, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to 
work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how to meet 
the June 2009 requirement to provide postaccident wireless 
communications systems. 

To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency 
response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the 
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure 
that district offices are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on 
approving and enforcing emergency response plans, such as: 

* analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the 
information to clarify policies across districts if these analyses 
reveal discrepancies in policies; 

* analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to 
identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being 
assessed, particularly for repeat violations; and: 

* reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the 
content of the plans meets a consistent agencywide standard and, if 
not, take corrective action by clarifying the guidance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services, which are 
reproduced in their entirety in appendixes III and IV. Both agencies 
concurred with our recommendations and the Department of Health and 
Human Services provided technical comments and clarification, which we 
incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

In response to our recommendation that MSHA issue additional guidance 
to its district offices clarifying the requirements for key components 
of emergency response plans, the Department of Labor agreed and stated 
that MSHA will issue more detailed guidance to district managers, 
including checklists that clarify what must be included in reviewing 
new emergency response plans and 6-month reviews of the plans. The 
agency also noted that, in developing guidance on the breathable air 
component of the plans, MSHA needed time to evaluate all available 
technology to ensure that breathable air was provided safely in an 
underground mine environment. We understand that the safety issues 
involved warranted careful consideration and that MSHA needed to obtain 
input from the mining community as it developed the guidance. However, 
as stated in our report, MSHA, for several months, did little to act on 
the comments it received on the draft guidance which made it difficult 
for its district offices and mine operators to move forward in 
providing miners with the protections intended by the MINER Act. 

In response to our recommendation that MSHA work with NIOSH to develop 
guidance for mine operators on meeting the June 2009 requirement to 
provide postaccident wireless communications systems, both the 
Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services agreed with the 
recommendation. The Department of Labor stated that it expects MSHA to 
develop guidelines at least 6 months prior to the June 2009 deadline. 
In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services emphasized 
the need for MSHA to issue its guidance in time for mine operators to 
respond quickly, indicating that at least 10 months would be needed for 
them to develop plans, order equipment, and install the new systems. 
Given the upcoming June 2009 deadline and steps mine operators and 
manufacturers must take, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human 
Services should work quickly to develop the needed guidance. The 
Department of Labor also indicated that our report omitted the fact 
that MSHA maintains up-to-date lists of approved equipment on its 
website. However, while these lists indicate which equipment has been 
approved as safe for use in underground coal mines, they do not address 
what equipment will be sufficient to meet the postaccident wireless 
communications requirement in the MINER Act. 

In response to our recommendation that MSHA provide additional 
oversight to ensure that district offices are consistently applying the 
agency's guidance on approving and enforcing emergency response plans, 
the Department of Labor agreed. It stated that MSHA plans to review 
citations issued by its district offices; provide inspectors with 
guidance to help ensure that consistent methods are used in citing 
statutory provisions of the MINER Act or regulations violated by mine 
operators; and formalize headquarters' reviews of emergency response 
plans to ensure consistency in their content, implementation, and 
enforcement. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services, interested 
congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also 
make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report 
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Anne-Marie Lasowski: 
Acting Director: 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct this work, we interviewed officials at the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration's (MSHA) Coal Mine Safety and Health headquarters 
and its 11 district offices to learn about MSHA's guidance for 
approving the emergency response plans, the status of implementation of 
the plans, and MSHA's inspection efforts. In each district, we 
interviewed the district manager or assistant district manager, 
[Footnote 41] the specialist responsible for reviewing and 
approving emergency response plans, and an underground coal mine 
inspector. We visited two of MSHA's district offices located in West 
Virginia and Kentucky--the two states with the largest number of 
underground coal mines in the United States. We selected District 3 in 
West Virginia because of the state's stringent mine safety laws. During 
this visit, we accompanied MSHA officials to observe conditions in an 
underground coal mine. We selected District 7 in Kentucky because of 
the unique and hazardous conditions in some of its mines, such as mines 
that release high amounts of methane. During this site visit, we 
accompanied an MSHA inspector to observe a system used by one mine that 
incorporated relatively new technology to meet the requirement for a 
postaccident tracking system. We also interviewed officials from the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); MSHA's 
Approval and Certification Center; and manufacturers of refuge 
chambers, breathing devices, and communications and tracking 
technologies to learn about the status of mine safety technology 
research and development. In addition, we interviewed the director of 
MSHA's penalty assessment office to determine how citations for 
violations related to mines' emergency response plans are processed. 

We examined relevant federal laws and regulations that govern MSHA, the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, and NIOSH, as they 
applied to our research. Further, we reviewed the decisions that 
resolved the cases in which MSHA reached an impasse with mine operators 
on the requirements of their emergency response plans mentioned in our 
report. Finally, we consulted with outside individuals knowledgeable 
about the field of mine safety; mine company officials; and other 
representatives of the mining community, including the United Mine 
Workers of America, the National Mining Association, and the Bituminous 
Coal Operators' Association to obtain their views on mine safety 
efforts and the new requirements of the Mine Improvement and New 
Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) for emergency response 
plans. 

We also obtained and analyzed data provided by MSHA on the approval, 
implementation, and enforcement of the emergency response plans that 
all underground coal mines were required to submit to MSHA as part of 
the MINER Act. Our review included all mines that MSHA categorized as 
active, producing mines, which MSHA defines as those mines that operate 
on a full-time basis to produce coal. 

Data on the Approval Status of Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

To determine the approval status of mines' emergency response plans, we 
obtained copies of the tracking reports from each district office used 
by MSHA headquarters officials to track the approval status of each 
component of the mines' plans. The reports indicate which components of 
each mine's plan had been approved, as of June 21, 2007. MSHA's 
district offices updated these tracking reports weekly and provided 
them to MSHA headquarters. To assess the accuracy and reliability of 
the data recorded on the tracking reports, we (1) reviewed a 
nonprobability sample of emergency response plans and the supporting 
approval and deficiency letters sent by MSHA's district offices to mine 
operators that corroborated the reports provided to us by MSHA's 
district offices; (2) ensured that the data included all mines that 
became active, producing mines prior to June 21, 2007; and (3) 
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We worked 
with district officials to correct any discrepancies we found before 
conducting our analyses. MSHA's tracking reports contained data for 462 
of 467 mines; for the 5 mines that were omitted, we obtained the mines' 
emergency response plans and supplemented MSHA's tracking reports with 
information for these mines. We verified our assessment of the approval 
status of these plans with MSHA. After completing these steps, we 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
our review. 

We selected the nonprobability sample of mines' emergency response 
plans from mines that were included in the data provided by MSHA. Our 
sample included 77 of the plans submitted to MSHA by the 462 mines for 
which MSHA was tracking the approval status of their plans as of June 
21, 2007. As of June 21, 2007, with the exception of District 1, all of 
MSHA's district offices had fully approved most of their mines' 
emergency response plans.[Footnote 42] Districts 2 through 11 had fewer 
than five plans that had only been partially approved. Therefore, we 
included all of the partially approved plans from these districts in 
our sample to determine why they had not been fully approved and what 
factors were delaying their approval. We also randomly selected a 
minimum of five fully approved plans for the mines in these districts 
and 10 percent of the plans in the four districts with over 50 mines. 
Because none of the emergency response plans for the 12 mines in 
District 1 had been fully approved as of that date, we randomly 
selected a sample of 5 of these 12 partially approved plans for review. 
As shown in Table 5, our sample included 63 of the 441 plans that had 
been fully approved and 14 of the 21 plans that had been partially 
approved as of June 21, 2007. 

Table 5: Number of Emergency Response Plans, by District: 

Underground coal mines' emergency response plans tracked for approval, 
as of June 21, 2007: 
District office: 1: 12; 
District office: 2: 33; 
District office: 3: 29; 
District office: 4: 120; 
District office: 5: 57; 
District office: 6: 89; 
District office: 7: 64; 
District office: 8: 19; 
District office: 9: 22; 
District office: 10: 10; 
District office: 11: 7; 
Total: 462. 

Partially approved plans, as of June 21, 2007; 
District office: 1: 12; 
District office: 2: 2; 
District office: 3: 0; 
District office: 4: 0; 
District office: 5: 2; 
District office: 6: 0; 
District office: 7: 0; 
District office: 8: 4; 
District office: 9: 1; 
District office: 10: 0; 
District office: 11: 0; 
Total: 21. 

Partially approved plans selected for review; 
District office: 1: 5; 
District office: 2: 2; 
District office: 3: 0; 
District office: 4: 0; 
District office: 5: 2; 
District office: 6: 0; 
District office: 7: 0; 
District office: 8: 4; 
District office: 9: 1; 
District office: 10: 0; 
District office: 11: 0; 
District office: Total: 14. 

Fully approved plans, as of June 21, 2007; 
District office: 1: 0; 
District office: 2: 31; 
District office: 3: 29; 
District office: 4: 120; 
District office: 5: 55; 
District office: 6: 89; 
District office: 7: 64; 
District office: 8: 15; 
District office: 9: 21; 
District office: 10: 10; 
District office: 11: 7; 
Total: 441. 

Fully approved plans selected for review; 
District office: 1: 0; 
District office: 2: 5; 
District office: 3: 5; 
District office: 4: 12; 
District office: 5: 6; 
District office: 6: 9; 
District office: 7: 6; 
District office: 8: 5; 
District office: 9: 5; 
District office: 10: 5; 
District office: 11: 5; 
Total: 63. 

Total number of plans selected for review; 
District office: 1: 5; 
District office: 2: 7; 
District office: 3: 5; 
District office: 4: 12; 
District office: 5: 8; 
District office: 6: 9; 
District office: 7: 6; 
District office: 8: 9; 
District office: 9: 6; 
District office: 10: 5; 
District office: 11: 5; 
Total: 77. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[End of table] 

We also used the 77 plans that we sampled to review the content of the 
plans and analyze the differences in the plans. We developed a data 
collection instrument to record information on each component contained 
in the plans. We used this data collection instrument to analyze and 
compare differences across the plans we reviewed. 

Because, at the time of our review, MSHA had only recently approved 
most of the mines' emergency response plans, we did not include in the 
scope or our work the 6-month reviews of approved plans that the MINER 
Act requires MSHA to conduct. 

Data on the Implementation Status of Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

To determine the status of mines' implementation of the components of 
their emergency response plans, we obtained data as of September 2007 
from MSHA headquarters detailing whether the mines' plans had been 
partially or fully implemented and what supplies mines had on order. We 
obtained these data for 439 of the 449 mines categorized by MSHA as 
active, producing mines as of October 30, 2007. We used this more 
recent date, rather than the June 2007 date, because it better 
reflected the implementation status of the emergency response plans of 
mines categorized as active, producing mines.[Footnote 43] We could not 
obtain information on the implementation status of 10 mines' emergency 
response plans because MSHA did not track the status of their plans. 

The September 2007 data on the implementation status of the mines' 
emergency response plans were compiled by MSHA's district offices as 
part of a one-time request from MSHA headquarters for this information. 
In January 2008, we asked the district offices to provide updated 
information on the implementation status of the emergency response 
plans for each of the 449 mines that were still active, producing 
mines. We used the January 2008 data to assess the extent to which 
mines had implemented their emergency response plans and the extent to 
which they were using certain methods to implement the requirements of 
their plans, such as whether they were using refuge chambers to meet 
the requirement to provide postaccident breathable air to trapped 
miners. 

We did not independently verify the information provided by MSHA on the 
implementation status of each mine's emergency response plan, but we 
assessed its reliability. To assess the reliability of the data 
provided by MSHA on the implementation status of each mine's emergency 
response plan, we (1) reviewed MSHA's citation data to corroborate the 
data on implementation of the mines' emergency response plans and (2) 
interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
our review. 

Data on MSHA's Citations: 

To analyze MSHA's enforcement efforts, we obtained data from MSHA's 
headquarters office on citations issued by its inspectors for 
violations of the emergency response plan section of the MINER Act. The 
data represent citations issued from August 15, 2006, through December 
11, 2007. We analyzed citations issued to underground coal mines that 
were among the 449 categorized by MSHA as active, producing mines as of 
October 30, 2007. Many mines may have changed status during that time 
frame; therefore, we used the data on the status of each mine as of 
October 30, 2007 that we obtained in conjunction with the data on the 
status of the implementation of the mines' plans because obtaining data 
on the status of each mine on the date that it received a citation 
would have been too cumbersome. We also obtained data on citations 
issued for violations of 30 C.F.R. Part 75 during this same general 
period because some of the provisions it contains overlap with 
requirements of the MINER Act. We reviewed these citations, as well as 
those issued for violations of the of the emergency response plan 
section of the MINER Act, to obtain a complete picture of MSHA's 
enforcement efforts. We also analyzed whether some of these overlapping 
requirements posed a problem for inspectors in deciding how to issue 
the citations and for MSHA in assessing accurate penalties. We did not, 
however, review the extent to which mine operators contested citations 
issued by MSHA. 

To assess the reliability of MSHA's citation data, we (1) reviewed a 
sample of completed citation forms to corroborate the data provided by 
MSHA, (2) performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy 
and completeness, and (3) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable 
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of our review. 

We conducted this audit from April 2007 through April 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Citations Issued by MSHA Related to the Requirements of 
Mines' Emergency Response Plans: 

The following tables summarize MSHA's citations of the MINER Act, by 
district, from August 15, 2006, through December 11, 2007. Table 6 
shows the number of citations issued by each district for each 
component of mines' emergency response plans. Table 7 provides 
additional detail on citations issued for violations of multiple 
components of the mines' plans. Table 8 indicates the number of mines 
per district that have been issued citations under the MINER Act. 

Table 6: Number of Citations Issued under the MINER Act to Active Mines 
for Violating Components of Emergency Response Plans, August 15, 2006, 
to December 11, 2007: 

(Continued From Previous Page) 

Violation: Failure to submit; 
District 1: 2; 
District 2: 2; 
District 3: 5; 
District 4: 3; 
District 5: 0; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 17; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 3; 
Totals: 32. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident communications; 
District 1: 3; 
District 2: 7; 
District 3: 10; 
District 4: 24; 
District 5: 23; 
District 6: 3; 
District 7: 14; 
District 8: 1; 
District 9: 3; 
District 10: 1; 
District 11: 9; 
Totals: 98. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident tracking; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 9; 
District 3: 8; 
District 4: 8; 
District 5: 20; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 4; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 1; 
District 10: 3; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 53. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Maintenance 
of miners trapped underground; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 2; 
District 3: 0; 
District 4: 0; 
District 5: 26; 
District 6: 8; 
District 7: 4; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 2; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 42. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Self-
contained self-rescuers; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 5; 
District 4: 0; 
District 5: 0; 
District 6: 2; 
District 7: 0; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 7. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident breathable air: Maintenance 
of miners trapped underground and self-contained self-rescuers; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 0; 
District 4: 0; 
District 5: 1; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 0; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 1. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Training; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 1; 
District 4: 2; 
District 5: 0; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 0; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 5; 
Totals: 5. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Postaccident lifelines; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 0; 
District 4: 1; 
District 5: 1; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 6; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 1; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 9. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Local coordination; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 0; 
District 4: 0; 
District 5: 0; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 0; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 0. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions; 
District 1: 3; 
District 2: 4; 
District 3: 3; 
District 4: 44; 
District 5: 15; 
District 6: 3; 
District 7: 25; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 4; 
Totals: 101. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions: 
Multiple[A]; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 3; 
District 4: 3; 
District 5: 1; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 4; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 0; 
Totals: 11. 

Violation: Failure to comply: Additional plan content provisions: 
Other; 
District 1: 0; 
District 2: 0; 
District 3: 2; 
District 4: 7; 
District 5: 1; 
District 6: 0; 
District 7: 1; 
District 8: 0; 
District 9: 0; 
District 10: 0; 
District 11: 1; 
Totals: 12. 

Total number of citations issued: 
District 1: 8; 
District 2: 24; 
District 3: 37; 
District 4: 92; 
District 5: 88; 
District 6: 16; 
District 7: 75; 
District 8: 1; 
District 9: 7; 
District 10: 4; 
District 11: 19; 
Totals: 371. 

Number of active, producing mines, as of October 30, 2007: 
District 1: 11; 
District 2: 33; 
District 3: 30; 
District 4: 119; 
District 5: 54; 
District 6: 85; 
District 7: 61; 
District 8: 18; 
District 9: 21; 
District 10: 10; 
District 11: 7; 
Totals: 449. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[A] See table 7 for a breakdown of citations issued for multiple 
violations. 

[End of table] 

Table 7: Citations Issued under the MINER Act for Violations of 
Multiple Components of Mines' Emergency Response Plans as of December 
11, 2007: 

Emergency response plan components violated: 

District 3: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident communications, 
postaccident lifelines, postaccident tracking, training; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 3: 
Postaccident communications, postaccident lifelines; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 3: 
Postaccident communications, postaccident tracking; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 4: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident communications; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 2. 

District 4: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident lifelines; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 5: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident tracking; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 7: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident tracking; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

District 7: 
Postaccident communications, postaccident lifelines; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 2. 

District 7: 
Additional plan content provisions, postaccident breathable air: 
maintenance of miners trapped underground; 
Number of instances in which a mine in a district was issued one 
citation for violating multiple components: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[End of table] 

Table 8: Number and Percentage of Mines Cited per District under the 
MINER Act as of December 11, 2007: 

District: District 1; 
Number of mines in district: 11; 
Number of mines cited: 5; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 36%. 

District: District 2; 
Number of mines in district: 33; 
Number of mines cited: 15; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 45. 

District: District 3; 
Number of mines in district: 30; 
Number of mines cited: 17; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 57. 

District: District 4; 
Number of mines in district: 119; 
Number of mines cited: 50; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 42. 

District: District 5; 
Number of mines in district: 54; 
Number of mines cited: 39; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 72. 

District: District 6; 
Number of mines in district: 85; 
Number of mines cited: 11; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 13. 

District: District 7; 
umber of mines in district: 61; 
Number of mines cited: 41; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 67. 

District: District 8; 
Number of mines in district: 18; 
Number of mines cited: 1; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 6. 

District: District 9; 
Number of mines in district: 21; 
Number of mines cited: 5; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 24. 

District: District 10; 
Number of mines in district: 10; 
Number of mines cited: 3; 
Percentage of mines cited by district: 30. 

District: District 11; 
Number of mines in district: 7; 
Number of mines cited: 6.
Percentage of mines cited by district: 86. 

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Labor: 

U.S. Department of Labor:
Mine Safety and Health Administration: 
1100 Wilson Boulevard: 
Arlington, Virginia 22209-3939: 

March 31, 2008: 

Ms. Anne-Marie Lasowski
Acting Director: 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Lasowski: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report titled 
"Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans 
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners" (GAO-08-424). As 
you note in your report, MSHA has been diligent in taking actions to 
enhance mine safety since passage of the MINER Act in June 2006. As of 
March 17, 2008, 552 Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) for all active 
producing underground coal mines have been fully approved and 
implemented except where technology or products are not yet available. 

MSHA continues to improve mine safety and values GAO's input in its 
efforts. A more detailed response to each of your agency's 
recommendation is enclosed. Also included is a summary of the MSHA 
actions taken to date to improve coal miner health and safety following 
enactment of the MINER Act. 

We look forward to continued dialogue with your staff regarding any 
additional improvements that will benefit our nation's miners.
If you have any questions, please contact Ken Bullock at (202) 693-
9778. 

Signed by: 

Richard E. Sickler:
Acting Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health: 

Enclosures: 

You can now file your MSHA forms online at [hyperlink, 
http://www.MSHA.gov]. It's easy, it's fast, and it saves you money! 

Enclosure: 

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Responses to GAO Report: 

GAO Recommendation: 

To ensure that new and existing mines are held to the same agency-wide 
standards in preparing for future accidents, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and 
Health to develop and issue additional guidance to district offices to 
clarify what is required for key components of the emergency response 
plans, such as providing post-accident breathable air for the 
maintenance of trapped miners. 

MSHA Response: 

MSHA continually reviews Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) every six 
months to ensure consistency and constant improvement. MSHA is pleased 
that GAO determined that MSHA has successfully implemented all 
technologically feasible Emergency Response Plan (ERP) requirements of 
the MINER Act in all active, producing underground coal mines. We also 
appreciate that GAO acknowledged that the two exceptions to full 
implementation are outside the control of MSHA and the coal mining 
industry due to supply constraints and technological feasibility. 

To address the specific GAO recommendation, MSHA will issue updated 
guidance from the Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health (CMS&H) 
to the District Managers with more detailed information on the content 
and reviews of ERPs. This will include a national checklist and 
guidance on what must be included in a new emergency response plan 
review and a 6-month review. Each ERP will be different because of the 
unique conditions of the mine; however, as mine specific ERP 
implementation experience is gained and additional knowledge is 
learned, providing further guidance on the specific protections 
required will help to ensure that operators "(i) provide for the 
evacuation of all individuals endangered by an emergency; and (ii) 
provide for the maintenance of individuals trapped underground in the 
event that miners are not able to evacuate the mine." 

One concern we have with the report, however, is GAO's criticism of 
MSHA's implementation schedule for the breathable air component of 
ERPs. The MINER Act required that ERPs must: 

a. Afford miners a level of safety protection at least consistent with 
the existing standards, including standards mandated by law and 
regulation; 

b. Reflect the most recent credible scientific research; 

c. Be technologically feasible, make use of current commercially 
available technology, and account for the specific physical 
characteristics of the mine; and 

d. Reflect the improvements in mine safety gained from experience under 
the [MINER] Act and other worker safety and health laws. 

Stockpiling large amounts of oxygen for breathable air underground 
could create a significant safety issue. Thus, in requiring breathable 
air underground, MSHA had to evaluate all available technology to 
determine how breathable air could be most safely provided. Without 
careful consideration, premature implementation could have actually 
increased the danger to miners in the event of a mine
accident, rather than improving their chances of survival, which is the 
overarching goal of MSHA. 

GAO Recommendation: 

To improve trapped miners' chance of survival after future accidents 
through the use of advanced technology, we recommend that the Secretary 
of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to 
work with NIOSH to develop guidance for mine operators on how to meet 
the June 2009 requirement to provide post accident wireless 
communications systems. 

MSHA Response: 

MSHA concurs with the recommendation and has been working diligently 
with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
to evaluate all communication and tracking technologies since the MINER 
Act was signed in June 2006. For example, NIOSH has a number of 
research and development contracts that have completion dates later 
this year that may develop new technology to meet the goals of the 
MINER Act. MSHA has also been working with NIOSH on guidance for mine 
operators on how to meet the June 2009 requirement to provide post 
accident wireless communications systems, and expects to implement 
guidelines well in advance of the required deadline -- at least six 
months prior to June 2009. 

As GAO's report notes, currently available communication systems are 
not truly wireless. In the event of a significant accident underground, 
the infrastructure that these systems rely upon is almost certainly 
going to be damaged or destroyed - exactly when communications are 
needed most. Moreover, MSHA believes that mandating technologies that 
do not ensure communications in the event of an accident, could 
actually hinder the development of truly wireless technologies and 
thereby preclude an important safety improvement. 

Should technology take longer to develop, the MINER Act allows for 
alternative means of compliance if the necessary, completely wireless 
technologies are not fully developed by June 2009. As noted, MSHA 
currently plans to provide guidance on a performance-based criteria for 
acceptable technological alternatives by January 2009, and later 
provide performance-based criteria for completely wireless solutions 
when such systems become commercially available. 

Also, while we share GAO's concern that operators be given formal 
guidance as soon as possible, we believe GAO's report omits the 
important fact that MSHA maintains an up-to-date listing of MSHA-
approved technologies and evaluation results of such technologies on 
its website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.msha.gov/techsupp/commoandtracking.asp], which can be easily 
referenced by operators in evaluating systems for their mines. 

GAO Recommendation: 

To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency 
response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the 
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure 
that district offices are consistently applying MSHA's guidance on 
approving and enforcing emergency response plans, such as: 

* analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the 
information to clarify policies across districts if these analyses 
reveal discrepancies in policies; 

MSHA Response: 

MSHA is pleased that GAO found that MSHA's diligent enforcement of ERP 
requirements has resulted in mine operators promptly improving safety - 
the majority "within a week" when cited -- and that any ongoing 
problems with ERP implementation are due to manufacturing back orders 
of breathable air components and technological limitations, which are 
outside the control of mine operators and MSHA. As noted above, MSHA is 
constantly seeking to improve the ERP review process for the benefit of 
miners in the course of it twice annual reviews of each ERP. To 
specifically address GAO's recommendation, the Administrator for CMS&H 
will issue a memo to District Managers requesting that all citations 
issued for ERP violations be scanned and transmitted to Headquarters 
for review and analysis. Internal guidance will be issued to 
underground coal mine inspectors to cite the statutory provision of the 
MINER Act applicable to emergency response plans when inspectors find a 
violation of the plan, unless there is a more specific regulation that 
applies to the violation. Headquarters staff will evaluate the issued 
violations and determine if any policy clarifications are necessary to 
improve consistency in issuances, and as MSHA does in all other areas, 
it will hold regular discussions with District Managers to receive 
input and develop best practices and improvements for ERPs. 

* analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to 
identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being 
assessed, particularly for repeat violations; 

MSHA Response: 

Penalties are an essential part of the Mine Act's enforcement scheme 
and deter mine operators from committing violations. When operators 
ignore their responsibilities, repeat violations rightfully incur a 
much higher penalty. Currently, there are only some specific safety 
regulations, such as those for lifelines, that apply to the components 
of the required ERPs; other requirements are covered by the statute and 
are more general. As GAO notes in its report, to ensure the fullest 
protection of miners, MSHA prefers to issue citations under the more 
protective regulations it has developed in cooperation with miners, 
operators and scientific experts through the rulemaking process, as 
opposed to more general statutory provisions. As a legal matter, we 
note that a violation of the regulations may not also violate the MINER 
Act and vice versa. 

MSHA, however, appreciates the importance of requiring that repeat 
violations under either the statute or the regulation are deterred. 
Accordingly, MSHA will issue guidance to its inspectors to cite the 
statutory provision of the MINER Act where it is applicable unless 
there is a more protective regulation that applies to the violation. 
This policy will ensure that repeat violations are accurately
captured in a mine's violation history and that the resulting 
assessment amount will reflect that history and ensure that the most 
protective standard for miners is met by operators. 

* reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the 
content of the plans meets a consistent agency-wide standard and, if 
not, take corrective action by clarifying the guidance. 

MSHA Response: 

As noted in GAO's report, MSHA headquarters personnel have been 
reviewing ERPs from mines throughout the country and working to ensure 
consistency of ERPs. In order to formalize that effort, MSHA will issue 
a memo to the Director, Office of Accountability (OA) and the 
Administrator, CMS&H, requiring the review of ERPs during any national 
OA review and CMS&H headquarters accountability review and district 
peer reviews to ensure consistency in plan provisions, operator 
implementation of the ERPs, and enforcement efforts. 

CMS&H headquarters has already developed a list of mines, encompassing 
an appropriate cross-section of coal mine types and operators, for ERP 
review. The national ERP checklist and guidance, described previously, 
will be used to ensure that the content and approval of the ERPs meet 
the applicable agency-wide guidance. Based on a recurring review of 
sample ERPs from the districts, corrective action will be taken to 
update and clarify headquarters' guidance to address discrepancies and 
inconsistencies from established policy on the approval of these 
emergency response plans. 

Conclusion: 

MSHA concurs with all of the GAO's recommendations for additional 
guidance and oversight of the approval and enforcement of mine 
operators' emergency response plans, and had already been working on 
improvements that address a number of GAO's recommendations. We will 
continue our efforts in that regard and expect these actions will 
further improve the consistency in ERPs approved and enforced 
nationwide for the benefit of our nation's miners. 

[End of enclosure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Department Of Health & Human Services: 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 
Washington, D.C. 20201: 

April 2, 2008: 

Anne-Marie Lasowski: 
Acting Director: 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Lasowski: 

Enclosed are the Department's comments on the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report entitled: Mine Safety: 
Additional Guidance and Oversight of Mines' Emergency Response Plans 
Would Improve the Safety of Underground Coal Miners (GAO 08-424).
The attached comments serve as the final comments for publication. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on 
this report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: [Illegible] for: 

Vince Ventimiglia: 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 

General Comments Of The Department Of Health And Human Services (HHS) 
On The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Draft Report Entitled: 
Mine Safety: Additional Guidance And Oversight Of Mines' Emergency 
Response Plans (GAO 08-424): 

We have reviewed the report with particular attention to the issues, 
findings, and recommendations that relate to NIOSH's research 
activities. Overall we concur with those aspects of the report.
Below is an explanation/clarification of the timeline and excel 
spreadsheet sent with our earlier comments, which makes reference to 
the 10 month timeframe. 

* We especially want to emphasize the importance of GAO's finding on 
page 28 that fully wireless systems may not be available for many 
years. 

* As GAO correctly observed on page 27, the MINER Act itself does not 
define "wireless" communication, but as noted in the Senate HELP 
Committee Report on the Act, the intent is for mine operators to use 
the most advanced technology available for a particular mine, and to 
avoid interpretation of the law so narrowly as to stifle innovation and 
delay implementation of methods or equipment that would have 
significant safety benefits. 

* These are critical points. NIOSH has informed MSHA that its policy 
statement on wireless communication is too narrowly defined. 

* Moreover, we have estimated that it will take many operators at least 
10 months after MSHA issues policy guidance to develop a post-accident 
communication plan, place equipment orders, and begin in-mine 
installation. 

* Therefore, this guidance should be issued as soon as practicable, if 
the goal is to meet the June 2009 target established by the MINER Act. 

* For this reason, we fully support GAO's recommendation that MSHA work 
with NIOSH to develop this guidance. 

* It should be noted that MSHA has made a commitment to work with us on 
this issue. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Anne-Marie Lasowski, (202) 512-7215 or lasowskia@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Revae Moran, Assistant Director, and Cady Panetta, Analyst-in-Charge, 
managed this report. Other staff who made key contributions to the 
report include Alana Finley and Jill Yost. Sheila McCoy provided legal 
assistance. Cindy Gilbert and Shana Wallace assisted with the 
methodology and statistical analysis. Susanna Compton and Mimi Nguyen 
helped prepare the final report and the graphics. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 109-236. 

[2] NIOSH is responsible for developing or adapting new technologies 
for use in the mining industry and may make recommendations to MSHA 
based on its research findings. 

[3] A nonprobability sample cannot be generalized to the population 
from which it was drawn. 

[4] These offices also employed approximately 76 inspectors who are 
authorized to inspect surface coal mines but not underground mines. 

[5] Mines that are recognized as being especially dangerous, such as 
those containing high levels of methane gas, are required to be 
inspected more frequently. 

[6] Withdrawal orders compel mine operators to remove miners from the 
affected work areas until the hazardous situation cited is corrected, 
which could halt production in those areas of the mine. 

[7] MSHA categorizes mines that have ceased production but anticipate 
reopening in the future as temporarily idled; mines that are closed for 
the foreseeable future as being abandoned; and mines that have been 
abandoned with their underground openings sealed as being abandoned and 
sealed. 

[8] MSHA has the authority to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard 
when it determines that miners are exposed to grave danger from 
exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically 
harmful, or to other hazards, and that an emergency standard is needed 
to protect miners from such danger. The standard becomes effective upon 
publication in the Federal Register and remains in effect until 
replaced by final regulations subject to the rulemaking process, but 
for no longer than 9 months. 

[9] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(A). 

[10] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(C). 

[11] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(D). 

[12] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iii). 

[13] According to MSHA's guidance, self-contained self-rescuers are not 
an acceptable method of providing emergency supplies of air for the 
long-term maintenance of trapped miners. 

[14] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iv). 

[15] NIOSH, Research Report on Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal 
Mines (Washington, D.C., Dec. 2007). 

[16] GAO, Mine Safety: Better Oversight and Coordination by MSHA and 
Other Federal Agencies Could Improve Safety for Underground Coal 
Miners, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-622] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007). 

[17] Generally, underground areas of the mine are divided into zones. 
Miners are required to contact mine staff working above ground when 
they move from one zone to another to let them know in which zone they 
are located in case of an accident. 

[18] Under the MINER Act, if MSHA and a mine operator reach an impasse 
on the approval of the mine's emergency response plan, MSHA must issue 
the mine a citation. Such a citation is immediately referred to the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, where an 
administrative law judge must render an expedited decision to resolve 
the dispute. That decision is reviewable by the Commission. 

[19] This included all underground coal mines that were categorized by 
MSHA as active, producing mines as of June 2007. 

[20] MSHA's guidance on long-term postaccident breathable air issued in 
February 2007 did not clearly specify whether the plans must require 
postaccident breathable air in these locations. It was later, in April 
2007, in a questions and answers document, that MSHA headquarters 
clarified that the plans should require breathable air in outby 
locations. 

[21] One of MSHA's districts did not have any fully approved plans when 
we collected the sample of plans to be reviewed and, therefore, was not 
included in this analysis. 

[22] According to MSHA's guidance, some mines are not required to 
provide postaccident breathable air if the working section of the mine 
(the area where the coal is being removed) is less than 2,000 feet from 
the mine entrance. 

[23] This includes 449 mines characterized by MSHA as active, producing 
mines as of October 30, 2007. 

[24] These are systems that use feeder cables that allow radio signals 
to "leak" into and out of the cable, radiating a signal throughout most 
areas of a mine and allowing miners working underground and personnel 
above ground to communicate using these signals. 

[25] Miners report their changes in location to a dispatcher on the 
surface, who notes their new location on a map of the mine. 

[26] Identifying tags attached to miners' helmets or belts are read by 
electronic readers when the miners pass by the readers. The tags 
transmit each miner's location to electronic equipment on the surface. 
The system provides each miner's location on an electronic map of the 
mine. 

[27] The postaccident breathable air component includes two parts: (1) 
emergency supplies of air sufficient for the long-term maintenance of 
trapped miners and (2) caches of self-contained self-rescuers 
positioned along mine tunnels leading to the mine entrance to aid in 
the miners' escape. According to MSHA guidance, self-contained self-
rescuers are not an acceptable method for providing emergency supplies 
of air sufficient for the long-term maintenance of trapped miners. 

[28] In April 2007, MSHA specified in a questions and answers document 
that state-approved refuge chambers were an acceptable alternative for 
providing postaccident breathable air for trapped miners. NIOSH 
released its research report on refuge alternatives in December 2007, 
which identified shortcomings in selected refuge chambers that must be 
corrected before they are installed in mines. As of February 2008, MSHA 
had not responded to the NIOSH report with specific guidance on the use 
of refuge alternatives. Its response is required by June 2008. 

[29] 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(F). 

[30] S. Rep. No. 109-365 (2006). 

[31] Equipment installed in an underground coal mine must have prior 
approval from MSHA as being either intrinsically safe for use in an 
underground coal mine or explosion-proof. 

[32] Each district office maintains all of the plans that each mine is 
required to have approved by MSHA, including its emergency response 
plan, in a uniform mine file for that mine. In addition to the 
emergency response plans, mines are required to have many other plans 
approved by MSHA, including ventilation plans and roof control plans. 

[33] Unless otherwise specified, the citations referred to in this 
report are citations written under the MINER Act, in which the 
inspector cites either § 316(b) or § 316 as the section of the act that 
was violated. We analyzed the citations MSHA issued from August 15, 
2006, through December 11, 2007, to mines that were categorized by MSHA 
as active, producing mines, as of October 30, 2007. 

[34] The MINER Act does not specify the requirements for additional 
plan content; however, the requirements for this component of the plans 
are detailed in MSHA's guidance to underground coal mine operators on 
the content of emergency response plans. The guidance specifies 
provisions that the plan should include for the maintenance of miners 
trapped underground, including barricading materials, food and water, 
and emergency supplies. 

[35] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Underground 
Coal Mine Inspection Mandate Not Fulfilled Due to Resource Limitations 
and Lack of Management Emphasis, 05-08-001-06-001 (Washington, D.C., 
Nov. 2007). 

[36] 30 C.F.R. Part 75 contains regulations relating to mandatory 
safety standards for underground coal mines. 

[37] See 30 U.S.C. § 876(b)(2)(E)(iv) and 30 C.F.R. § 75.380(d)(7) and 
§ 75.381(c)(5). 

[38] Lifeline citations included in this analysis were those issued 
under 30 C.F.R. §75.380(d)(7)(i)-(ii) and 30 C.F.R. §75.381(c)(5)(i). 

[39] For example, MSHA's regulations contain more specific requirements 
regarding the spacing between directional indicators and the use of 
reflective material to mark the location of lifelines. 

[40] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

[41] Due to changes in MSHA's staffing that occurred during our review, 
we interviewed the former managers of some of the district offices who 
oversaw the approval process, rather than the current managers who were 
not knowledgeable about the process because they were not in the 
district at the time that the approval process was being developed. 

[42] None of the emergency response plans for the 12 underground coal 
mines in District 1 had been fully approved because, at the time, the 
mine operators were contesting the MINER Act's requirements for some 
components of their plans. 

[43] MSHA was in the process of collecting the implementation data 
throughout the month of September 2007 and provided it to us in late 
October 2007. In order to examine only active, producing mines, we 
requested mine status information, and MSHA was able to accommodate 
this request on October 30, 2007. 

[End of section] 

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