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entitled 'The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: Systematic Assessment
Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy
Objectives' which was released on December 14, 2007.
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Report to Congress:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2007:
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo:
Systematic Assessment Is Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward
U.S. Policy Objectives:
GAO-08-188:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-188, a report to Congress.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Relief,
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress
established 15 U.S. policy objectives to address the DRC’s
humanitarian, development, economic and natural resource, governance,
and security issues and mandated that GAO review actions taken by U.S.
agencies to achieve these objectives. In this report, GAO identifies
(1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act’s objectives, (2)
major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives, and
(3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward the objectives. GAO obtained
and analyzed agencies’ program documents and met with officials of
agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
What GAO Found:
U.S. programs and activities support the Act’s policy objectives. In
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, State, and the
Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
allocated $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70
percent of the funds were allocated for programs that support the Act’s
humanitarian and social development objectives, while the remainder was
allocated for programs and activities that support the Act’s economic,
governance, and security objectives. Although U.S. agencies have not
acted on the Act’s objective of bilaterally urging nations contributing
peacekeeping troops to prosecute abusive peacekeepers, U.S.
multilateral actions address this issue.
The DRC’s unstable security situation, weak governance, mismanagement
of its vast natural resources, and lack of infrastructure are major
interrelated challenges that impede efforts to achieve the Act’s policy
objectives. For example, the unstable security situation in the eastern
DRC has worsened humanitarian and social problems and forced U.S. and
NGO staff to curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented
deliveries of needed aid. DRC’s weak governance structures prevent the
country from meeting the requirements for debt relief and discourage
private-sector investment, thus hindering economic growth.
The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically
assessing its progress toward achieving the Act’s policy objectives.
While some U.S. agencies collect information about their respective
activities in the DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall
progress. State and USAID are developing a joint planning and budgeting
process that may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance.
However, State’s Director of Foreign Assistance has yet to complete the
fiscal year 2007 DRC operations plan, which does not include a
comprehensive assessment of the collective impact of State and USAID
programs and does not address activities funded by other agencies.
While a National Security Council-sponsored interagency group discusses
DRC policies and helps coordinate some activities, it does not include
several relevant agencies and, according to key officials, does not
systematically assess progress in the DRC.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, through the Director of
Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies
implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically
assessing the extent to which the U.S. government is making progress in
achieving the Act’s policy objectives. The Department of State endorsed
our recommendation. Several U.S. agencies provided technical comments
that were incorporated, as appropriate.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-188]. For more information, contact David
Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act's Policy Objectives:
Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Act's Policy
Objectives:
U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward Achieving
the Act's Policy Objectives:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Examples of Programs by Policy Objective Category:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category:
Table 2: U.S. Agencies' Funding Allocations for the DRC by Category:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
Figure 3: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
Abbreviations:
Act: DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DFA: Director of Foreign Assistance:
DOL: Department of Labor:
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo:
EITI: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Country:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
NSC: National Security Council:
OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance:
OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
UN: United Nations:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
USDA: Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 14, 2007:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
Because of its large size, central location in sub-Saharan Africa, and
abundant natural resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
is important to the stability of central Africa and is of long-term
interest to the United States. However, since achieving independence in
1960, the DRC--one of the world's poorest countries--has suffered from
despotic rule, underdevelopment, economic problems, and conflicts with
neighboring countries that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 3.9
million Congolese within the past decade. Government and other armed
forces also committed abuses against thousands of Congolese women and
girls. According to the U.S. Department of State, Western nations
provided the DRC with considerable aid during the Cold War era, but
support for the DRC fell in the early 1990s owing to concerns about
human rights abuses and the need for internal reforms.
U.S. aid to the DRC began to increase again in 2001, following the
initiation of peace talks that led first to the withdrawal of foreign
armies and then to the installation of a transitional DRC government in
2003. Subsequently, the U.S. President stated that the United States
would work closely with the transitional government to promote "peace,
prosperity and democracy" for all Congolese people. The transition
process culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's
first democratically elected president in more than 40 years. Following
the DRC elections, on December 22, 2006, Congress enacted the DRC
Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the
Act).[Footnote 1] The Act established 15 policy objectives aimed at
addressing a range of concerns regarding humanitarian, social
development, economic and natural resource, governance, and security
issues in the DRC.[Footnote 2] Also, it stated the Secretary of State
should withhold certain assistance to the DRC if the Secretary
determined that the DRC was not making sufficient progress toward
accomplishing these policy objectives. The Act mandated that GAO review
actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve the Act's policy objectives.
In this report, we identify (1) U.S. programs and activities that
support the Act's objectives, (2) major impediments hindering
accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess
progress toward accomplishing the objectives. Because the Act directed
us to review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve its objectives,
we focused on the fiscal year in which the Act was enacted, and also
considered the fiscal year before its enactment to provide context. In
conducting our work, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and
programming documents describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC
provided by key U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA),
Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and
the Treasury; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We identified
the amount of funding each agency allocated for its DRC programs in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007; we did not determine the extent to which
each agency obligated or expended its allocated funds. We also met with
representatives from each of these agencies, the National Security
Council (NSC), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other
organizations with expertise on DRC-related issues. To identify key
challenges hindering the accomplishment of the Act's policy objectives,
we analyzed relevant policy and program documents; interviewed U.S.
agency officials; conducted a round-table session with a nonprobability
sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of experience and expertise
implementing programs and projects in the DRC; and interviewed
representatives from other organizations with experience in the DRC. To
examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act's
policy objectives and to make decisions regarding additional actions,
we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and implementation documents.
Although we did not travel to the DRC, we conducted several telephone
interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID mission staff located in the
DRC. We performed our work from May 2007 to December 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. I for
a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
U.S. programs and activities support the Act's policy objectives. In
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, U.S. agencies--USDA, DOD,
HHS, DOL, State, the Treasury, and USAID--allocated a total of about
$217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of the
funds were allocated for programs that support the Act's humanitarian
and social development objectives, while the remainder was allocated
for programs and activities that support the Act's economic,
governance, and security objectives. For example, USAID is providing
humanitarian assistance that includes emergency supplies, food, and
water and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations. Treasury
has worked to provide the DRC with interim debt relief. State is
working to provide training and other assistance aimed at
professionalizing members of the DRC's military. Although the agencies
have not acted on the Act's policy objective of working bilaterally to
urge nations contributing peacekeeping troops to prosecute abusive
troops, U.S. multilateral actions address this issue.
U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major
challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy
objectives, including (1) an unstable security situation, (2) weak
governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural
resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. These challenges are
interrelated and can negatively impact progress in multiple areas. For
example, the unstable security situation in the eastern DRC has
worsened humanitarian and social problems, while forcing U.S. and NGO
staff to curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented
deliveries of critically needed humanitarian assistance. Similarly,
corruption and other governance problems have hindered efforts to
provide roads and other needed infrastructure, which impedes the
efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the DRC's weak
governance structures prevent the country from meeting the requirements
for badly needed debt relief, as well as discourage private-sector
investment, thus hindering economic growth.
The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically
assessing its progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives.
Some of the agencies we reviewed collect information about their
respective activities in the DRC; for example, two USAID Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance program officers regularly visit project
sites in the DRC and publish quarterly reports of the office's
activities. However, although we identified two executive branch
mechanisms for coordinating some of the agencies' activities in the
DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall U.S. progress. State and
USAID have begun to develop a joint planning and budgeting process
that, according to State officials, may eventually assess all U.S.
foreign assistance. However, State's Director of Foreign Assistance
(DFA) has yet to finalize the DFA plan for operations in the DRC during
fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007. As of February
2007, the draft plan was incomplete, consisting of a listing of
individual programs that did not include a systematic assessment of the
collective impact of State and USAID efforts during fiscal year 2007.
In addition, the DFA draft plan did not address activities funded by
other agencies, including DOD, the Treasury, and HHS, although the DFA
plan may eventually include other agencies to some degree. The NSC has
established an interagency group, including State, Defense, and the
Treasury, to help discuss policies and approaches to addressing the
challenges in the DRC and coordinate certain agencies' activities.
However, the group does not include several relevant agencies, such as
DOL, HHS, or USDA, in its discussions of policies and approaches and,
according to NSC and State officials, does not systematically assess
U.S. progress in the DRC.
To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations
for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or
multilateral actions, we are recommending that the Secretary of State,
through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the
other U.S. agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan
for systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S. government as
a whole is making progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, State, and the
Treasury; from the Administrator of USAID; and from the Director of
Congressional Relations of OPIC. We received written comments from
State, which are reprinted in appendix III. State commented that it
endorsed our recommendation and noted that our recommendation would
likely be met as DFA's joint planning and budgeting processes are
extended to include all U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. In addition,
State provided specific comments which we have incorporated as
appropriate in this report. We also received technical comments on our
draft report from Defense, HHS, Labor, the Treasury, and USAID, which
we have incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
The DRC's size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to
its importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more
than 900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United
States east of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa,
the DRC borders nine nations (see fig. 1). Its abundant natural
resources, which constitute its primary export products, include 34
percent of world cobalt reserves; 10 percent of world copper reserves;
64 percent of world coltan reserves; and significant amounts of wood,
oil, coffee, diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and other minerals.[Footnote
3] In addition, rain forests in the DRC provide 8 percent of world
carbon reserves.[Footnote 4] The DRC has a population of 58 million to
65 million people, including members of more than 200 ethnic groups.
Figure 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after
the nation achieved its independence from Belgium, a military regime
seized control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than
three decades. It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups
and neighboring countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda,
after dissident Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent
efforts by a new DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and
Ugandan troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the
armies of three more African nations into the DRC. According to the
International Rescue Committee, this second war resulted in an
estimated 3.9 million deaths. Beginning in 1999, a United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC. After a series of peace
talks, the other nations withdrew all or most of their troops and an
interim government was established. Elections held in 2006 with
logistical support provided by UN peacekeepers culminated in the
December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's first democratically
elected president in more than 40 years.
Partially as a result of this turbulent history, the DRC suffers from a
wide range of problems, including acute poverty. The DRC is one of the
poorest and least developed countries in the world. It was ranked 167th
of 177 nations surveyed by the UN Development Program in terms of life
expectancy, education, and standard of living, and its ranking on these
measures has declined more than 10 percent over the past decade. The
current life expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers
from high rates of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. According to
USAID, more than 2 of every 10 children born in the DRC die before
their fifth birthday (owing in part to chronic malnutrition and low
vaccination rates), and the maternal death rate is the world's highest.
Congolese women also suffer from the effects of rampant sexual attacks
and other forms of gender-based violence against women, particularly in
the eastern regions of the country. A UN expert reported in July 2007
that widespread atrocities against women in one eastern DRC province
constituted the worst crisis of sexual violence that the expert had yet
encountered. An international group of donor nations recently concluded
that the DRC's educational system is failing and in a state of crisis.
Most rural children do not attend school at all, in part because their
parents cannot afford to pay school fees. As a result of such problems,
the Fund for Peace ranked the DRC second on its "failed states" scale,
after Sudan.
The DRC's economic prospects are uncertain. It once derived about 75
percent of its export revenues and 25 percent of its gross domestic
product from its natural resources, but wars and turmoil have reduced
its economy to dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal
activities. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that as of
2001, the DRC's per capita gross domestic product had contracted to
$100 from a preindependence level of $400, in constant dollars.
Although the DRC's gross domestic product grew at an average rate of
5.5 percent from 2002 through 2005, growth has recently slowed. Also,
the DRC's prospects are encumbered by an external debt load of around
$8 billion.[Footnote 5] The value of this debt--which represents more
than 90 percent of the DRC's gross domestic product, 300 percent of its
exports, and 700 percent of its government's revenues--is three times
greater than the level of debt that the World Bank and the IMF consider
sustainable. The DRC has not fully qualified for debt relief under the
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.[Footnote 6]
The DRC receives assistance from an array of donor nations and
organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC
were the World Bank's International Development Association, the
European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The World Bank
is preparing a country assistance strategy to support the DRC's 2007-
2010 poverty-reduction goals. The United States and 16 other donor
nations and organizations are contributing to the World Bank's effort
by preparing a country assistance framework document that assesses the
major challenges facing the DRC and identifies major areas for donor
focus. Some donor nations and organizations have also begun an effort
to coordinate assistance for reforming the DRC's troubled army, police,
and judiciary.
According to the Department of State, the United States' goal for its
assistance to the DRC is to strengthen the process of internal
reconciliation and democratization to promote a stable, developing, and
democratic DRC. The Department of State has also reported that the
United States is seeking to ensure that the DRC professionalizes its
security forces and is at peace; develops democratic institutions;
supports private-sector economic growth and achieves macroeconomic
stability; meets the basic needs of its people; and, with its
international partners, provides relief in humanitarian crises. As
described by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S.
policy is to support--but not lead--the efforts of the DRC to address
its problems.
In October 2006, continued violence and armed conflict in the eastern
DRC led the President of the United States to issue an executive order
blocking the property of certain persons contributing to the conflict
in the DRC.[Footnote 7] In October 2006, the President reiterated the
United States' commitment to the goal of creating a prosperous
Congolese democracy. In October 2007, the President, meeting with the
newly elected president of the DRC, again cited the importance of
democracy and economic growth in the DRC and noted the need for
progress on security and health issues.
Section 102 of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of
2006 includes 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC. Table 1 presents
these objectives in five categories of assistance--emergency
humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resources,
governance, and security.
Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category:
Policy objective: Help promote, reinvigorate, and support the political
process in the DRC to press all parties in the Transitional National
Government and the succeeding government to implement fully and to
institutionalize mechanisms, including national and international
election observers, fair and transparent voter registration procedures,
and a significant civic awareness and public education campaign created
for the July 30, 2006, elections and future elections in the DRC to
ensure that elections are carried out in a fair and democratic manner.
Category: Governance.
Policy objective: Urge the DRC to recognize and act upon its
responsibilities to immediately bring discipline to its security
forces, hold those individuals responsible for atrocities and other
human rights violations, particularly the rape of women and girls as an
act of war, accountable and bring such individuals to justice.
Category: Governance and security.
Policy objective: Help ensure that, once a stable national government
is established in the DRC, it is committed to multiparty democracy,
open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious
freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace
and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial
system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting
economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to
promote private investment.
Category: Governance and economic/natural resources.
Policy objective: Assist the DRC as it seeks to meet the basic needs of
its citizens, including security, safety, and access to health care,
education, food, shelter, and clean drinking water.
Category: Humanitarian, social development, and security.
Policy objective: Support security sector reform by assisting the DRC
to establish a viable and professional national army and police force
that respects human rights and the rule of law, is under effective
civilian control, and possesses a viable presence throughout the entire
country, provided the DRC meets all requirements for US military
assistance under existing law.
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Help expedite planning and implementation of programs
associated with the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
reintegration, and rehabilitation process in the DRC.
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Support efforts of the DRC, the UN peacekeeping
force, and other entities, as appropriate, to disarm, demobilize, and
repatriate the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and other
illegally armed groups.
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Make all efforts to ensure that the DRC (a) is
committed to responsible and transparent management of natural
resources across the country; and (b) takes active measures to (i)
promote economic development; (ii) hold accountable individuals who
illegally exploit the country's natural resources; and (iii) implement
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by enacting laws
requiring disclosure and independent auditing of company payments and
government receipts for natural resource extraction.
Category: Economic/natural resources.
Policy objective: Promote a viable civil society and enhance NGOs and
institutions, including religious organizations, the media, political
parties, trade unions, and trade and business associations, that can
act as a stabilizing force and effective check on the government.
Category: Governance.
Policy objective: Help rebuild and enhance infrastructure,
communications, and other mechanisms that will increase the ability of
the central government to manage internal affairs, encourage economic
development, and facilitate relief efforts of humanitarian
organizations.
Category: Humanitarian and social development.
Policy objective: Help halt high prevalence of sexual abuse and
violence perpetrated against women and children in the DRC and mitigate
the detrimental effects from acts of this type of violence by
undertaking health, education, and psychosocial support programs.
Category: Social development.
Policy objective: Work aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge
governments of countries contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping
force to enact and enforce laws on trafficking in persons and sexual
abuse that meet international standards, promote codes of conduct for
troops serving as part of UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately
investigate and punish citizens who are responsible for abuses in the
DRC.
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Assist the DRC as it undertakes steps to (a) protect
internally displaced persons and refugees in the DRC and border regions
from all forms of violence, including gender-based violence and other
human rights abuses; (b) address other basic needs of vulnerable
populations with the goal of allowing these conflict-affected
individuals to ultimately return to their homes; and (c) assess the
magnitude of the problem of orphans from conflict and HIV/AIDS in the
DRC, and work to establish a program of national support.
Category: Security, social development, and humanitarian.
Policy objective: Engage with governments working to promote peace and
security throughout the DRC and hold accountable individuals, entities,
and countries working to destabilize the country.
Category: Security.
Policy objective: Promote appropriate use of the forests of the DRC in
a manner that benefits the rural population in that country that
depends on the forests for their livelihoods and protects national and
environmental interests.
Category: Economic/natural resource management.
Source: GAO analysis of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy
Promotion Act of 2006.
[End of table]
The National Security Council has established an interagency working
group to focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of
central Africa, which encompasses the DRC. The group meets bimonthly
and includes officials from DOD, State, USAID, and Treasury. Its
mission is to establish a coordinated approach, policies, and actions
to address issues (such as security) in the DRC and other countries in
the region.
To ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance provided to the
DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy
objectives, the Secretary of State in 2006 appointed a Director of
Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of
USAID. The DFA is charged with:
* developing a coordinated U.S. government foreign assistance strategy,
including multiyear country-specific assistance strategies and annual
country-specific assistance operational plans;
* creating and directing consolidated policy, planning, budget, and
implementation mechanisms and staff functions required to provide
umbrella leadership to foreign assistance; and:
* providing guidance to foreign assistance delivered through other
agencies and entities of the U.S. government, including the Millennium
Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.
U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act's Policy Objectives:
U.S. programs and activities provide support to the Act's policy
objectives. Most recently, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, U.S. agencies
allocated the largest share of their funds for the DRC to programs that
supported the Act's humanitarian and social development goals. Although
the U.S. government has not acted on the Act's policy objective that it
bilaterally urge nations contributing UN peacekeepers to prosecute
abusive peacekeeping troops, it has taken other steps to address this
objective.
U.S. Funding for the DRC:
Recent U.S. funding for the DRC has focused primarily on the Act's
humanitarian and development goals.[Footnote 8] Seven U.S. agencies
allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, as shown in table 2[Footnote
9].:
Table 2: U.S. Agencies' Funding Allocations for the DRC by Category
(Dollars in millions):
Fiscal year: 2006;
Humanitarian: $85.3;
Social development: $51.9;
Economic: $66.4[A];
Governance: $7.5;
Security: $6.9;
Total: $217.9.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Humanitarian: 88.4;
Social development: 58.2;
Economic: 9.6;
Governance: 14.5;
Security: 10.8;
Total: $181.5.
Total:
Humanitarian: $173.7;
Social development: $110.1;
Economic: $76.0;
Governance: $22.1;
Security: $17.7;
Total: $399.4.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data.
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[A] Includes $44.6 million allocated by the Treasury to help address
costs of DRC debt relief. The DRC has received interim debt relief but
must meet additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced.
[End of table]
As shown in figure 2, most of these funds were allocated by State and
USAID.
Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the allocation of U.S. funding for
the DRC by Agency, Fiscal Years 2006-2007 (dollars in millions). The
following data is depicted:
State/USAID emergency assistance: $173.7 (44%);
State/USAID nonemergency: $142 (36%);
Treasury: $44.6 (11%);
HHS: $23.6 (6%);
USDA: $9.6 (2%);
DOL: $5.5 (1%);
DOD: $0.4 (less than 1%).
Source: GAO analysis of executive agencies' data.
[End of figure]
The agencies allocated about 70 percent of these funds for programs
that would support the Act's emergency humanitarian and social
development objectives (see fig. 3).[Footnote 10] They allocated about
30 percent of the funds for programs and activities that would support
the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives.[Footnote 11]
Figure 3: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal
Years 2006-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the allocation of U.S. funding for
the DRC by Category, Fiscal Years 2006-2007. The following data is
depicted:
Humanitarian Assistance: 43%;
Social Development: 27%;
Economic development/natural resource management: 19%;
Governance: 6%;
Security: 5%.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data.
[End of figure]
Humanitarian Assistance:
USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to help the DRC
meet the basic needs of its citizens and vulnerable populations. The
following examples illustrate these efforts.
* USAID has provided emergency food assistance to the DRC, primarily
through the UN World Food Program and Food for the Hungry
International. USAID-funded emergency food assistance included general
distribution of food to internally displaced persons who need food aid;
vulnerable groups such as people infected with, and orphans and widows
affected by, HIV/AIDS; and victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. USAID
emergency assistance also supported road rehabilitation and bridge
reconstruction projects; schools; and the socioeconomic reintegration
of ex-child soldiers, adult combatants, and their families. In
addition, USAID provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition
programs, water and sanitation improvements, food, and agriculture
assistance to vulnerable populations in the DRC--including malnourished
children, war-affected populations, internally displaced people, and
formerly displaced households--primarily through NGOs. Recent program
activities have focused on road rehabilitation; primary health care and
specialized care services to malnourished children in certain eastern
regions; medical care, treatment, and confidential counseling to
victims of sexual and gender-based violence; and access to water and
sanitation at health facilities.
* State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate,
integrate, and resettle refugees in the DRC. It has also helped fund
refugees' food needs and supported mental health assistance and market
access programs in areas of high refugee return. In fiscal year 2007,
State supported refugee assistance activities in the DRC, which were
implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, other
international organizations, and NGOs. In addition, State contributed
to overall Africa assistance programs implemented by the UN High
Commissioner on Refugees and the International Committee of the Red
Cross, which help support refugees and conflict victims in central
Africa.
Social Development Assistance:
USAID, HHS, and DOL allocated funds to support the Act's social
development and rehabilitation objectives. The following examples
illustrate these efforts.
* USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and
family planning. It has implemented activities to reduce abandonment of
children; provide psychosocial support, medical assistance, and
reintegration support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence
in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase access to education
for vulnerable children. USAID also funds efforts to train medical
staff and nurses in the management of primary health care, distribute
bed nets to prevent the spread of malaria and polio, provide family
planning services, and support voluntary counseling and testing centers
for HIV/AIDS.
* HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the
surveillance and control of, infectious diseases such as polio,
measles, and HIV/AIDS. HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
has also sought to strengthen the capacity of public health personnel,
promote infrastructure development and improve the quality of clinical
laboratories through grants and cooperative agreements. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention have also (1) provided ongoing
technical, programmatic, and funding support through the World Health
Organization and the UN Children's Fund for the DRC immunization
program with an emphasis on polio eradication and measles mortality
reduction, and (2) assisted the World Health Organization with a recent
outbreak of Ebola virus. In addition, HHS's National Institutes of
Health has granted funds to U.S. academic institutions to conduct basic
and clinical biomedical research, which involves collaboration with
research partners in the DRC.
* DOL has allocated funds to address children's involvement in mining
and related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other
forms of child labor in the DRC. This effort would build on a recently
completed project that assisted a small number of former child soldiers
by fostering their withdrawal from militias and discouraging their
reenlistment.
Economic and Natural Resource Management Assistance:
The Treasury, USAID, State, and USDA have provided support for the
Act's economic objectives. The following examples illustrate these
efforts.
* The Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve
the DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC
with interim debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments)
in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, following the DRC's admittance into
the HIPC debt relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion
of its HIPC debt relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of
full U.S. bilateral debt relief to the DRC ($1.3 billion) with $44.6
million allocated in fiscal year 2006, about $80 million in previously
appropriated funds, and about $178 million in fiscal year 2008
funds.[Footnote 12]
* USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource
management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the
Central African Regional Program for the Environment. The program is a
20-year regional initiative that aims to reduce deforestation and loss
of biological diversity in the DRC and its eastern neighbors. A
component of the U.S.-sponsored Congo Basin Forest Partnership, the
program also promotes forest-based livelihoods in the DRC. USAID has
also allocated funds to encourage productivity in the agricultural,
private, and small enterprise sectors and to support agriculture
development. In addition, USAID's Global Development Alliance program
works with private companies to promote transparent mining practices
and reinvestment into DRC mining communities.
* State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the natural
resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme which deals with rough diamond
trade,[Footnote 13] and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI).[Footnote 14]
* USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity,
increase rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and
rural infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water
for irrigation in the DRC.
Governance Assistance:
USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that support the
Act's governance objectives. The following examples illustrate such
assistance.
* USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions in
relatively inaccessible parts of the DRC. These sessions are intended
to bring justice institutions closer to citizens, facilitate greater
access to justice for vulnerable people, and provide quality legal
assistance to the population. It has also supported an NGO's
establishment of democracy resource centers to assist political party
leaders, civic activists, elected local and national officials, and
government institutions in consolidating good governance and democracy.
To promote judicial independence, USAID has supported an NGO's efforts
to (1) foster the adoption and implementation of priority improvements
to the DRC's legal framework, including laws on sexual violence and the
rights of women, and (2) provide legal assistance activities for
victims of sexual and gender-based violence.
* State allocated funds for more than 30 programs by the National
Endowment for Democracy during 2006. Several of these programs were
aimed at informing women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse
and corruption, and promoting political participation. For example, the
endowment used State funds to support the political role of women in
one eastern province before and after the elections, to call attention
to the continued victimization of women in eastern Congo, and to visit
detention centers throughout the DRC to facilitate release of illegally
detained men and women.
Security Assistance:
State, USAID, and DOD programs and activities have provided support for
most of the Act's security-related policy objectives. The following
examples illustrate these efforts.
* State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus
Commission, to encourage other nations to play a constructive role in
the DRC's security affairs. The commission provides a forum for the DRC
and the nations on its troubled eastern border--Uganda, Rwanda, and
Burundi--to discuss regional security issues, including militias
operating illegally in the eastern DRC. State has also supported a
center where these nations can share intelligence regarding militias.
* USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some
former fighters into Congolese society. The programs are intended to
provide the former fighters incentives to remain in civilian society.
* State is refurbishing the DRC's military officer training school and
training multiple levels of the military, including brigade-and
battalion-staff level officers, on military justice reform, civil-
military relations, and other issues of concern. According to State
officials, State funds will be used for an initial DOD assessment of
the military justice sector to identify needs to be addressed with
future funds. State may also use these funds to help train DRC
personnel to combat armed fighters in the eastern regions of the DRC.
* Key State senior-level and program officials informed us that they
were unaware of any U.S. efforts to bilaterally urge nations
contributing UN peacekeeping troops to take steps to help those nations
prosecute any of their peacekeeping troops who may commit abuses in the
DRC.[Footnote 15] State officials informed us that the United States
has encouraged the UN to take actions to guard against further abuses
of DRC citizens by UN peacekeepers. The United States also supports the
Global Peace Operations Initiative, a 5-year program to train and, as
appropriate, equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide with a focus
on African nations.
Major Challenges in the DRC Impede Efforts to Achieve the Act's Policy
Objectives:
U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major
challenges that impede U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy
objectives. These challenges include (1) the unstable security
situation, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3)
mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic
infrastructure.[Footnote 16] Because these challenges are interrelated,
they negatively impact progress in multiple areas.
Unstable Security Situation:
The DRC's weak and abusive security forces have been unable to quell
continuing militia activities in the DRC's eastern regions, where
security grew worse during 2007. During 2006 and 2007, reports by
several organizations described the security challenge in the DRC.
* According to a report by the International Crisis Group,[Footnote 17]
militias control large portions of the eastern regions of the DRC. The
report concludes that the DRC's security forces are poorly disciplined,
ill equipped, and the worst abusers of human rights in the DRC.
* According to a UN report,[Footnote 18] the DRC army is responsible
for 40 percent of recently reported human rights violations--including
rapes, mass killings of civilians, and summary executions--and DRC
police and other security forces have killed and tortured civilians
with total impunity. The report states that the DRC has generally
promoted, rather than investigated and prosecuted, army officers
suspected of such abuses.
* According to a report by Amnesty International,[Footnote 19] women
have been raped in large numbers by government and other armed forces
throughout the DRC.
* According to State, government and other armed forces in the DRC have
committed a wide range of human rights abuses, including forcing
children into the security forces.[Footnote 20]
The DRC's unstable security situation has worsened the DRC's
humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these
problems, according to NGO representatives, agency officials, and other
sources.
* The renewed conflict has prompted increased NGO and UN assistance
programs, including those aimed at addressing basic needs and
psychosocial, legal, and socioeconomic support for victims of sexual
and gender-based violence. NGOs have noted that active combatants
typically commit crimes of sexual violence against women, with 4,500
sexual violence cases reported in the first 6 months of 2007
alone.[Footnote 21]
* The lack of security in the DRC has impeded efforts to address
humanitarian needs as well as efforts aimed at promoting social
development. U.S. agency officials informed us that the conflict has
forced them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, and NGOs
implementing development and humanitarian assistance activities in the
DRC have reported that the lack of security has resulted in attacks on
their staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel and
reschedule work. The UN has also stated that although access to
displaced populations has improved somewhat in a few areas, in general
it remains difficult because of the lack of security.
* The DRC's unstable security situation has negatively affected the
country's economic potential by discouraging investment, which in turn
could worsen security through renewed conflict. DRC donors and the IMF
agree that improved security in the DRC is necessary to strengthen the
economy. Research on the security of property rights confirms this
view. World Bank research has also found that a lack of economic growth
increases a postconflict nation's likelihood of falling back into
conflict.[Footnote 22] Other researchers have estimated that a
democratic nation is roughly 10 times more likely to be overthrown if
its economy experiences negative growth 2 years in a row.[Footnote 23]
Weak Governance and Corruption:
By many accounts, corruption in the DRC is widespread, civil liberties
are limited, and the DRC's governance institutions have been severely
damaged.
* State has described corruption in the DRC as "pervasive." In 2007, an
international donor study concluded that corruption in the DRC "remains
widespread and is taking a heavy toll on public service capacity to
deliver key services." Transparency International's 2007 Corruption
Perceptions Index identifies the DRC as one of the 10th most corrupt
countries in the world.[Footnote 24]
* Freedom House in 2007 continued to rate the DRC as "Not Free" and
scored it near the bottom of its scales for civil liberties and
political freedom.[Footnote 25] USAID has pointed to limited
opportunities for Congolese women to participate in the DRC's
governance.
* The World Bank has reported that the DRC's judicial system is one of
the world's six weakest in terms of enforcing commercial contracts.
* The State Department has described significant failures in the
criminal justice system, as well as "harsh and life-threatening" prison
conditions.
Historically weak governance and corruption in the DRC have hindered
efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators
accountable.
* According to U.S. officials, the lack of a DRC government office with
clear authority on security issues has impeded efforts to promote
security sector reform. The officials informed us that the absence of
clear authority over security sector issues has hindered efforts to
determine both the DRC government's priorities for security sector
reform and the most effective role for international donors in
promoting security sector reform.
* According to the country assistance framework, the DRC has not
established a clear and functioning payroll system for its armed
forces. One NGO reported that much of the $8 million the DRC paid in
2005 for its soldiers' salaries was "diverted" and the remainder rarely
reached soldiers in a timely manner. NGOs and media sources have
reported that soldiers have committed human rights abuses as a result.
The country assistance framework states that the DRC Ministry of
Defense controls only a small number of budget items and is not
accountable for the defense budget's use.
* According to one NGO report,[Footnote 26] efforts to reform the
command structure, size, and control of the security forces have been
frustrated by political manipulation, pervasive corruption, and a
failure to hold officials accountable. A U.S. State Department official
told us that efforts to reform the DRC's police may be impeded by lack
of support from DRC institutions that suffer from corruption and have
no interest in reform.
* According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective judiciary
impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable for their
actions, which in turn promotes a "culture of impunity." One NGO
reported that a severe shortage of DRC judicial personnel--particularly
in the eastern portion of the nation--prevents courts from hearing
cases, public prosecutor offices from conducting investigations, and
prisons from operating. Another NGO stated that the judiciary is
subject to corruption and manipulation by both official and unofficial
actors. As a result, courts have recently failed to hold individuals
accountable for human rights violations, including a massacre of more
than 70 people and the reported rape by police of 37 women and girls in
a village in a western province. A representative of one NGO told us
that local government officials had tortured his organization's
grantees in an effort to stop their democracy and governance training
programs.
Governance problems have also hindered efforts to implement economic
reforms required for debt relief and promote economic growth.
* According to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the government's
lack of commitment to meet certain requirements has jeopardized the
DRC's ability to receive some interim debt relief, qualify for full
debt relief, and improve the country's overall economic prospects. To
receive the estimated $6.3 billion in debt relief for which it may
qualify under HIPC, the DRC must meet various conditions that include
satisfactory macroeconomic performance under an IMF-supported program,
improved public sector management, and implementation of structural
reforms. Although donors had expected the DRC to qualify for full debt
relief in 2006, the government instead has fallen back into arrears and
has failed to implement needed policies; as a result, IMF has suspended
its program assistance to the DRC.[Footnote 27] Although IMF has
determined that the DRC cannot sustain its current debt levels, donors
do not expect the DRC to qualify for full debt relief until mid-2008.
* The judiciary's ineffective enforcement of commercial contracts in
the DRC has likely discouraged private sector investment and hence
economic growth. The enforcement of contracts, typically a
responsibility of the judicial system, is important to establishing
incentives for economic activity. According to the World Bank, the
DRC's enforcement of contracts is among the weakest in the world, such
that a company might need to expend roughly 150 percent of a typical
contract's value to ensure enforcement through court proceedings.
Mismanagement of Natural Resources:
International donors, NGOs, and the DRC government have focused on
improving natural resource management through increased transparency
and international instruments of enforcement. However, owing in part to
governance and capacity challenges, these efforts have made only
limited progress.
* Until recently, the DRC had not met EITI implementation requirements
or followed EITI guidelines, according to U.S. officials. These
officials informed us that the DRC had excluded civil society
representatives and replaced EITI's Permanent Secretary with a new
representative. As a result, EITI was reviewing the DRC's signatory
status, and key donors were withdrawing technical assistance. U.S.
officials informed us that in September 2007, EITI granted the DRC
additional time to meet threshold criteria to continue participation in
the initiative and that the DRC subsequently made progress in meeting
those criteria.
* The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized the DRC for
weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to track diamonds
extracted by large number of self-employed miners.[Footnote 28] State
and USAID officials reported that the DRC's certification process is
failing to capture as much as 50 percent of diamonds mined in the DRC.
* U.S. and NGO officials have expressed concern that the DRC is not
enforcing a moratorium on forestry concessions instituted in May 2002.
An NGO reported that after the moratorium took effect, the DRC signed
107 of 156 forestry contracts now under review and that a third of the
contracts involve areas identified for conservation. Although the DRC
government is reviewing mining and forestry concessions signed during
the war,[Footnote 29] U.S. officials told us that the DRC is conducting
the mining contract review with limited transparency. U.S. and NGO
officials expressed concern that the DRC has not published its terms of
reference or all of the contracts or clearly defined the role of
representatives of civil society.
Mismanagement of the DRC's natural resources has fueled continued
conflict and corruption, according to U.S. officials, the UN,
international donors, and NGOs.
* The DRC's abundant natural resources are serving as an incentive for
conflict between neighboring countries' militias and armed domestic
factions. These groups seek to control specific mining sites and
illegal trade networks to finance operations and buy arms. For example,
the UN has reported that profits from Congolese coltan have financed a
large part of Rwanda's military budget and that gold smuggled into
Uganda continues to finance militias. Such reports are consistent with
World Bank research, which commonly finds that countries with valuable
natural resources have more conflict than countries without such
resources.[Footnote 30]
* In addition to fueling conflict, the DRC's abundance of natural
resources continues to foster corruption as government officials use
bribery to share in resource profits. For example, NGOs have reported
that through extensive bribery and corruption in the mining sector,
exports of large quantities of DRC copper and cobalt have been
undeclared and that 60 to 80 percent of the DRC's 2005-2006 customs
revenue was embezzled. USAID has also reported on the postconflict
proliferation of natural resource contracts based on joint ventures
between the DRC government and private partners, who are receiving a
disproportionate share of profits.
Lack of Basic Infrastructure:
The DRC lacks many key elements of basic infrastructure, such as
buildings, equipment, and transportation.
* The transportation sector is "broken," according to one recent
international assessment. The DRC has fewer than 1,740 miles of paved
roads to connect 58 million to 65 million people distributed over more
than 900,000 square miles.[Footnote 31] According to a recent study
prepared by 17 donor nations, no roads link 9 of the DRC's 10
provincial capitals to the national capital, and no roads link the
DRC's northern and southern regions or its eastern and western regions.
* About 90 percent of DRC airfields lack paved runways. More air
crashes have occurred in the DRC since 1945 than in any other African
state.
* International observers have reported that the DRC's educational and
penal infrastructures are dilapidated.
* An international group of donor nations recently identified major
deficiencies in electrification, communications, supplies of clean
water, and credit.
The DRC's lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in
humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs.
* U.S. officials told us that the lack of an adequate in-country
transportation system increases the time required to get supplies to
those in need. Such problems limit access to vulnerable groups and
cause delays in providing humanitarian assistance such as food
aid.[Footnote 32] NGO and U.S. officials implementing emergency food
aid and nonemergency food security programs in the DRC have reported
that excessive delays in delivering assistance are common because of
the lack of roads linking the DRC's regions and several of its major
cities and ports. One NGO has reported that it must compete with
commercial contracts for the limited space on the DRC's troubled rail
system and that its commodities and equipment are often given lower
priority.
* U.S. and NGO officials also pointed out that the lack of roads in the
DRC has increased the expense or difficulty associated with their
programs, in part because they must increase their reliance on air
transport.[Footnote 33] The dearth of accessible roads in the DRC has
prompted USAID's emergency assistance programs to use some of their
funds for road rehabilitation programs, to ensure safe and reliable
routes to reach those in need. The lack of roads and other adequate
infrastructure also affects private companies trying to import and
export goods. According to the World Bank's Cost of Doing Business
survey, DRC's average export costs in 2006, at more than $3,100 per
container, were the world's third highest.
* State officials told us that the DRC government needs "everything
from bricks to paper." A USAID official told us that any effort to
establish new provincial legislatures would be hindered by the lack of
buildings to house the legislators or "even chairs for them to sit in."
* An NGO has reported that the DRC judicial system is being undermined
by destroyed infrastructure, equipment shortages, lack of reference
texts, and the dearth of roads, which makes some areas inaccessible to
legal authorities.
* A 2007 UN report noted that at least 429 detainees (including some
convicted of human rights violations) had escaped from dilapidated
prisons over the last 6 months of 2006.[Footnote 34]
* International donor nations and organizations concluded in their
assistance framework document that the lack of infrastructure has made
economic development almost impossible in many areas and may stifle the
potential for economic growth and private sector activity in most DRC
provinces.
U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward Achieving
the Act's Policy Objectives:
The U.S. government has not established a process to assess agencies'
overall progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the
DRC. Although State and the National Security Council (NSC) have
developed mechanisms to coordinate some of the agencies' activities in
the DRC, neither mechanism systematically assesses overall progress.
Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective
programs. For example, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project
sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner
organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on
their projects.[Footnote 35] Similarly, USAID officials told us that
USAID's Central African Regional Program for the Environment program
has an extensive and standard set of monitoring and evaluation tools
built into all cooperative agreements with implementers, such as use of
satellite imagery and remote sensing to analyze change in forest cover,
one of the principal "high-level" indicators. DOL informed us that it
relies on midterm and final evaluations, financial and programmatic
audits, and biannual technical and financial reports to monitor its
programs.[Footnote 36] USDA officials informed us that USDA requires
its partner organizations to conduct assessments of their projects.
However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide
process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S.
progress in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms
aimed at providing some degree of coordination among executive branch
agencies active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for
the systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals.
* A new State-USAID joint planning process is not yet fully operational
and does not include other agencies active in the DRC. State's newly
established Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as
USAID's administrator, has been charged with ensuring that foreign
assistance is being used as effectively as possible to meet broad U.S.
foreign policy objectives. Under DFA's guidance, State and USAID have
begun to develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according
to State officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance.
However, the Office of the DFA has yet to complete its plan for
operations in the DRC during fiscal year 2007, which ended on September
30, 2007. As of February 2007, the draft country operations plan was
incomplete and consisted of a listing of individual programs that did
not include a systematic assessment of the collective impact of State
and USAID efforts during fiscal year 2007. In addition, the DFA draft
plan did not address activities funded by other agencies, including
DOD, HHS, and the Treasury, although the DFA joint planning process may
eventually include other agencies to some degree. Under the DFA
process, the U.S. mission to the DRC has prepared a mission strategic
plan. However, the mission strategic plan pertains only to currently
projected fiscal year 2009 activities and is therefore subject to
change before submission of the fiscal year 2009 budget request in
2008.[Footnote 37]
* The NSC interagency group, intended to help coordinate certain
agencies' activities, does not systematically assess these activities
and does not include several relevant agencies. The NSC group assembles
agencies such the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury to
discuss policies and approaches to addressing the challenges in the
DRC. For example, according to State and NSC officials, these
discussions often focus on the eastern DRC's unstable security.
However, NSC and State officials told us that the NSC group has not
developed systematic tools for assessing the impact of all U.S.
agencies' efforts to achieve the objectives of the Act. Also, the NSC
effort has not included key agencies involved in the DRC, such as DOL,
HHS, or USDA, in its discussions of policies and approaches.
Conclusions:
The DRC appears to be at a crucial point in its turbulent history.
After decades of dictatorship and devastating wars with its neighbors
and internal groups, it has inaugurated its first democratically
elected government in more than 40 years. However, U.S. and NGO
officials agree that several interrelated challenges continue to pose
major impediments to achievement of the Act's policy objectives in the
DRC. Failure to make near-term progress in addressing the DRC's
unstable security, rampant corruption, economic mismanagement, and lack
of needed infrastructure could result in further war and instability in
a region of importance to U.S. national interests.
U.S. agencies have initiated a wide range of efforts to help the DRC
establish and maintain peace and stability. However, because the U.S.
government has not established a process to systematically assess its
overall progress in the DRC, it cannot be fully assured that it has
allocated these resources in the most effective manner. For example, a
systematic process for assessing governmentwide progress would allow
the United States to determine whether its allocations, which currently
emphasize humanitarian aid, should focus more on the DRC's unstable
security, which worsens the country's other problems and impedes the
delivery of U.S. assistance. Similarly, such a process could give the
U.S. government greater assurance that it has identified additional
bilateral or multilateral measures that may be needed to achieve the
Act's objectives. Given the DRC's significance to the stability of
Africa, the scope, complexity, and interrelated nature of its urgent
problems warrant an effective governmentwide response.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations
for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or
multilateral actions, we recommend that the Secretary of State, through
the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other
U.S. agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for
systematically assessing the U.S. government's overall progress toward
achieving the Act's objectives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, State, and the
Treasury. We also requested comments from the Administrator of USAID
and from the Director of Congressional Relations of OPIC.
We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in
appendix III. In its comments, State endorsed our recommendation. It
further noted that it believed that the recommendation would be met as
DFA's joint planning and budgeting processes are extended to include
all U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. State also provided several other
comments, for example, expressing concerns regarding the span of years
addressed in our report and what it characterized as a lack of
historical context. We addressed State's comments as appropriate in
this report.
We also received technical comments on our draft report from DOD, HHS,
DOL, the Treasury, and USAID. We have incorporated these comments into
our report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties. We
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in
appendix IV.
Singed by:
David Gootnick:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to identify (1) U.S. programs in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), (2) major impediments hindering
accomplishment of the policy objectives of the DRC Relief, Security,
and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), and (3) U.S. government
efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act's policy
objectives. Because the Act directed us to review actions taken by U.S.
agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on the fiscal year in
which the Act was enacted, and also considered the fiscal year before
its enactment to provide context.
To identify U.S. programs in the DRC, we interviewed officials from key
U.S. agencies who have programs in the DRC. These agencies included the
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health
and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury (Treasury); the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). We also reviewed program documents,
budget data, and policy statements. We identified the amount of funding
each agency had allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years 2006 and
2007 by analyzing official agency submissions to Congress and related
documents. We did not attempt to determine the extent to which each
agency had obligated or expended the funds it had allocated.
To determine the major impediments hindering accomplishment of the
Act's policy objectives, we reviewed a range of documents, plans, and
assessments provided to us by U.S. agencies with programs in the DRC.
We also interviewed officials from each of these agencies. We reviewed
economic literature and recent reports, program assessments, studies,
and papers written by nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations, multilateral banks, and think tanks. To discuss key
challenges to addressing the Act's policy objectives, we conducted a
round-table session with a nonprobability sample of 11 nongovernmental
organizations that offer a broad range of experience and expertise
implementing programs and projects in the DRC. For example, we included
panelists from organizations that focus on humanitarian, democracy, and
economic development issues. Additionally, we interviewed
representatives from other organizations with experience in the DRC.
Based on all of these responses, we compared and contrasted the
challenges identified to determine common themes and focused on
challenges that were internal to the DRC. We considered all of these
views as we finalized our analysis of these challenges. We defined
challenges as factors that are internal to the DRC--that is, they
represent impediments to the United States and other donors that are
providing assistance intended to improve the situation in that country.
To examine U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the
Act's policy objectives, we identified U.S. interagency assessments,
reports, and plans pertaining to programs in the DRC. We also
interviewed U.S. agency officials and a cognizant official of the
National Security Council. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we
conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID
mission staff located in the DRC.
We conducted our work from May 2007 to December 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Examples of Programs by Policy Objective Category:
Policy objective category: Humanitarian;
Examples of agencies active in each category: USAID, State;
Examples of programs pertaining to each category: Provision of the
following to vulnerable populations:
* emergency supplies;
* health care;
* nutrition programs;
* water and sanitation improvements;
* food and agriculture assistance;
Total category funding, fiscal years 2006-2007 (millions of dollars):
$173.7.
Policy objective category: Social development;
Examples of agencies active in each category: USAID, HHS, DOL, DOD;
Examples of programs pertaining to each category:
* Psychosocial support, medical assistance, and reintegration support
to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence;
* Immunization against infectious diseases (e.g., polio and measles);
* Address children's involvement in mining and related services, small-
scale commerce, child soldiering, and other forms of child labor;
Total category funding, fiscal years 2006-2007 (millions of dollars):
$110.1.
Policy objective category: Governance;
Examples of agencies active in each category: State, USAID;
Examples of programs pertaining to each category:
* Establishment of democracy resource centers;
* Legal assistance;
* Support for promoting political participation;
Total category funding, fiscal years 2006-2007 (millions of dollars):
$22.1.
Policy objective category: Economic/natural resource management;
Examples of agencies active in each category: Treasury, USAID, USDA;
Examples of programs pertaining to each category:
* Debt relief;
* Support for the Central African Regional Program for the Environment;
* Agricultural development assistance;
Total category funding, fiscal years 2006-2007 (millions of dollars):
$76.
Policy objective category: Security;
Examples of agencies active in each category: State, DOD;
Examples of programs pertaining to each category:
* Refurbishment of a military officer training school;
* Training brigade-and battalion-staff level officers on military
justice reform, civil-military relations, and other issues;
* Support for Tripartite Plus Commission;
Total category funding, fiscal years 2006-2007 (millions of dollars):
$17.7.
Source: GAO analysis of the Act and executive branch data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
December 3, 2007:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "The
Democratic Republic Of The Congo: Systematic Assessment Needed to
Determine Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives," GAO Job Code 320490.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Madeline Seidenstricker, Democratic Republic of Congo Desk Officer,
Bureau of African Affairs, at (202) 647-2216.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO — Zina Merritt:
AF — Jendayi Frazer:
State/OIG — Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: Systematic Assessment
Needed to Determine Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives
(GAO-08-188, Job Code 320490):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"The Democratic Republic Of The Congo (DRC): Systematic Assessment
Needed to Determine Progress toward US. Policy Objectives." The
Department of State has long played a leading role in assisting the
Congolese people to build a stable, democratic and prosperous nation.
The Department of State was instrumental in ending a regional conflict
waged on the territory of the DRC involving multiple national armies
and numerous domestic groups armed by regional actors. The State
Department actively supported the Lusaka Peace Process, culminating in
the Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in Sun City in 2002. The
Department of State was instrumental in the establishment of the United
Nations Organization Mission to the DRC (MONUC), whose facilitation
made possible DRC's historic national elections in 2006, the first
democratic election since 1960. MONUC continues to be the principal
security provider in the DRC.
The State Department has long supported the DRC's stabilization and
successful transition to democracy as the cornerstone of lasting
stability for the African Great Lakes region. The State Department
welcomes the GAO report on the DRC as an important indicator of
Congressional interest. However, we continue to believe that by
beginning its assessment in 2003, the GAO did not sufficiently take
into account the State Department's role in ending the war in the DRC.
Without that important contextual information, the present report
provides a somewhat incomplete snapshot of U.S. engagement with the DRC
before the adoption of the Act. While the report does provide a useful
snapshot of where the State Department currently stands in implementing
the provisions of the 2006 DRC Relief, Security and Democracy Promotion
Act, it presents an arbitrarily limited perspective on the State
Department's role in ending the regional war that left the DRC
devastated.
The fifteen policy objectives established in the Act are consistent
with State Department policies already in the process of
implementation. The Department of State endorses the GAO recommendation
that the U.S. Government systematically assess progress toward
achieving that Act's policy objectives. We believe this
recommendation will be met as the joint planning and budgeting processes
underway at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development are extended to include all U.S. agencies engaged in the
DRC under the Director of Foreign Assistance ("F").
The GAO report notes that Western aid fell in the early 1990s owing to
concerns about human rights and the need for internal reforms and then
moves immediately to note the beginning of increasing U.S. aid in 2001
without taking note of the horrific regional wars that took place
between the drop in assistance levels and its resumption. Given that
the Act suggests that the Secretary of State should withhold U.S.
assistance to the DRC if the DRC does not make sufficient progress on
the various policy objectives, the State Department submits that the
GAO and Congress should take note of what took place in the country
during the period when funding was withheld in the 1990s. The DRC's
governance capacity was decimated by previous government corruption,
the intense conflict, and the long absence of donor-support, making
progress today on most policy objectives critical but also extremely
challenging.
The Department of State suggests that the GAO clearly state under
"Results in Brief' that the GAO team was unable to travel to the DRC
and therefore did not consult with international donor governments and
UN agencies operating in the Congo.
Finally, the Department of State is concerned by the lack of historical
context in the report. Outside of the conclusion, the report devotes a
mere paragraph to the history of the DRC, summarizing the collapse and
subsequent reemergence of a nation as follows: "The DRC has had a
turbulent history." This lack of explanation of the historical factors
that explain why the DRC ranks second to Sudan on the Fund for Peace
scale of failed states does not appear to be in keeping with the spirit
of the Act. The turbulent history is important in understanding the
reason for the insecurity in the east of the country and the severe
underdevelopment in a country rich in natural resources.
Specific Notes:
* The GAO report states that the DRC's gross domestic product grew at
an average of 5.5 percent from 2002 to 2006 but has recently slowed.
Our understanding is that growth is expected to continue to grow at the
same rate in 2007.
* One additional challenge to the accomplishment of USG objectives
involves coordination among donor countries, including China, which has
been reticent to coordinate its activities in Congo with U.S. and
European donors. Coordination between the UN peacekeeping mission in
the Congo (MONUC) and international and local NGOs, which is essential
for the protection of civilians, particularly in eastern Congo, is also
particularly challenging. There are mechanisms that foster donor
coordination, including the Contact Group that the United States. has
actively supported, as well as mechanisms to foster UNNGO coordination
in the DRC. However, there remains room for improvement. Although
effectively addressing these important coordination challenges depends
in part on non-U.S. entities, the USG is working with our international
partners to pursue ways to address them more effectively.
* On page 10 of the GAO report, under #13, the term "Humanitarian
Assistance" should be added to the categories listed.
* On Page 15, the paragraph on State humanitarian assistance should
read as follows: State has provided humanitarian assistance to
repatriate and reintegrate refugees returning to the DRC as well as to
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRC. It has
provided funding for refugee returnee food needs as well as basic
health and nutrition, water and sanitation, livelihood creation and
market access, prevention and response to Gender Based Violence and
mental health assistance programs is areas of high refugee return. In
fiscal year 2007, State supported refugee return and reintegration
activities in the DRC, which were implemented primarily by the Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees, other international
organizations and NGOs. Contributions to UNHCR also addressed the needs
of refugees hosted by the DRC and persons displaced within the country.
In addition, State contributed to overall Africa assistance programs
implemented by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and
the International Committee of the Red Cross, of which a portion
supports refugees and conflict victims in Central Africa.
* Please note that proposed FY08 security assistance funding for the
DRC totals $8.35 million ($5.5 million PKO, $500,000 in IMET, $600,000
in FMF, and $1.75 in INCLE). It is worth noting that this amount
represents a decrease from the $10.8 million in security anticipated
for FY07. The FY08 decrease occurs at a time when violence in the
eastern DRC is on the rise.
* On pages 17 and 18, under the examples of the USG's Governance
Assistance programs, it might be worthwhile to include mention of DRL's
$3.4 million governance and human rights programs. These five programs,
which address anti-corruption, legal and other forms of assistance for
victims of gender-based violence, judicial strengthening, civil society
strengthening, and press freedom/media development, were funded with
FY06 money and the implementation of these programs will continue
through FY09.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant
Director), Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin
De Alteriis, Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key
contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384.
[2] We have grouped the Act's 15 objectives in five categories--
emergency humanitarian assistance, social development, economic and
natural resources, governance, and security.
[3] Coltan and cassiterite are metals used in the electronics industry.
[4] According to a recent report by Greenpeace--Carving Up the Congo
(Apr. 1, 2007)--forests play a critical role in keeping the planet's
climate stable by storing carbon. Central African forests constitute
the second largest area of rain forest in the world.
[5] We state external debt in present value terms, which take into
account the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and
principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate.
[6] The DRC did not service its external debt during the war. At the
end of 2001, the DRC's arrears on publicly guaranteed debt was about
$10.6 billion. Donors cleared about $2 billion in arrears, and the DRC
qualified for debt relief in 2003 through HIPC, a joint bilateral and
multilateral effort to relieve poor countries of debt to promote long-
term economic growth and debt sustainability. In qualifying for HIPC,
the DRC has been able to receive interim debt relief, primarily in
terms of lower debt-service payments. The DRC must meet certain
additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced through HIPC.
[7] Exec. Order No. 13413, 71 Fed. Reg. 64105 (Oct. 27, 2006).
[8] See appendix II for further details.
[9] We did not determine the extent to which the agencies have
obligated and expended the funds they allocated. In addition to
providing the funding shown, the United States also contributed funds
to international organizations that conducted activities in the DRC
during 2006 and 2007. For example, it contributed about $236 million
and $300 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, for the
support of UN peacekeeping activities in the DRC. As one of the largest
donors to the DRC, the World Bank has funded a wide range of programs-
-including macroeconomic management, infrastructure, and disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of militia fighters--that have
totaled around $366 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in
fiscal year 2007. The United States provides around 14 percent of donor
funds to the World Bank for such operations. It is also the largest
contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
which is active in the DRC.
[10] According to HHS, its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
obligates funds for projects that are part of research that can be
conducted in different countries, rather than allocating funds by
country. Our summary figures incorporate total Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention funding for the DRC for the 2 years depicted.
[11] For fiscal year 2008, State and USAID requested $80.2 million for
the DRC, including $39.8 million for social development assistance,
$20.9 million for governance assistance, $11 million for economic
development assistance, and $8.6 million for peace and security
assistance. The agencies have not yet allocated 2008 funding for
emergency humanitarian assistance. The Treasury requested $178.3
million in fiscal year 2008 funds in the event that the DRC qualifies
for debt relief. OPIC has approved $400 million in financing and
insurance for a U.S. company to invest in the DRC's mining sector and
will seek fiscal year 2008 funding to support this project.
[12] When the DRC reaches its HIPC completion point, debt relief from
all donors is expected to lower current levels of DRC external debt by
about $6.3 billion. The Treasury estimates that the budgetary cost of
reducing the $1.3 billion of DRC bilateral debt owed to the United
States is about $300 million, based on the Office of Management and
Budget's Circular Number A-11. This estimate includes factors such as
the likelihood of default, the interest rate, and the maturity period.
An interagency country risk assessment is used to calculate the DRC's
probability of loan default.
[13] The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aims to control the
international rough diamond trade and assure customers that diamonds
purchased have not helped to finance violent conflicts.
[14] Under EITI, countries publish and verify payments and government
revenues in the natural resource sector.
[15] Section 102(12) of the Act states that U.S. policy is to work
aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge governments of countries
contributing troops to the United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC
to enact and enforce laws on trafficking in persons and sexual abuse
that meet international standards, promote codes of conduct for troops
serving as part of UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately
investigate and punish citizens responsible for abuses in the DRC.
[16] In addition to the challenges in the DRC described in this section
of our report, the NGO round table also identified challenges outside
of the DRC relating to the level of U.S. engagement and commitment in
the DRC, as well as the prioritization of U.S. resources and the lack
of demonstrated results.
[17] International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa
Report 128 (Kinshasa and Brussels, July 5, 2007).
[18] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC Human
Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) during the period of July to December 2006 (Feb. 8,
2007).
[19] Amnesty International, Report 2007--The State of The World's Human
Rights (see hyperlink, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/download-the-
report).
[20] State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., March 6,
2007).
[21] One UN representative noted that the real number of sexual
violence cases is many times higher, as most victims live in
inaccessible areas, are afraid to report the attacks, or did not
survive them.
[22] The DRC country assistance framework document notes that an
additional 2 percent of economic growth sustained over 10 years could
reduce the risk of renewed civil war by about one-third. See also Paul
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford
Economic Papers, vol. 56 (2004).
[23] Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and
Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and
Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[24] The DRC, with three other countries, has a score of 1.9 on the
corruption index's 10-point scale, in which a score of zero would be
given for a highly corrupt state and 10 would be given for a "clean"
state. The index includes 179 nations (see hyperlink,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007).
[25] This index may be viewed at hyperlink,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=365&year=2007.
[26] International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa
Report 128 (Kinshasa and Brussels, July 5, 2007).
[27] For example, IMF reports that the DRC made little progress in
reforming the mining sector, public enterprises, the civil service, and
the central bank. The government incurred large budgetary overruns that
were monetized and resulted in a depreciation of the currency. In 2006,
the DRC's currency depreciated 15 percent against the U.S. dollar and
inflation rose above 18 percent.
[28] These challenges are common to many developing country members.
For further discussion of such challenges, see GAO, International
Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade, GAO-
02-678 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
[29] During wartime, the DRC and rebels alike sold advance mineral
extraction rights and forestry concessions to raise money. In June
2005, a parliamentary commission investigating economic and financial
contracts signed during the war reported to the National Assembly that
many mining contracts signed between 1996 and 2003 were illegal or of
limited value to the DRC's development. Although the commission
recommended that some contracts be rescinded or renegotiated, the DRC
government has not fully acted on this recommendation, and U.S.
officials we spoke with were uncertain about the recommendation's
likely impact on reviews of current contracts.
[30] The World Bank's Development Research Group identified the
percentage of a country's gross domestic product that is derived from
natural resource exports as the single most important structural factor
associated with conflict. Specifically, a country's risk of conflict
increases to about 22 percent from about 1 percent if natural resource
exports constitute as much as 33 percent of its gross domestic product.
See Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance" (2004).
[31] In contrast, neighboring Uganda, with less than 1/11th of the
DRC's land area and about half of its population, has nearly six times
as many miles of paved roads.
[32] See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Various Challenges Impede the
Efficiency and Effectiveness of U.S. Food Aid, GAO-07-560 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 13, 2007).
[33] We reported in 2007 that expenditures for food aid transportation-
-including in-country delivery and administration--have been rising
throughout the world, in part because of the expensive nature of
logistics in emergency situations. See GAO-07-560.
[34] See Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC
Human Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) during the period of July to December 2006
(Feb. 8, 2007).
[35] For example, in one report, OFDA noted that work conditions are
extremely difficult because many health centers are accessible only by
foot and that the local population is often too fearful of attacks by
armed groups operating in the area to make full use of the centers.
[36] One recent report noted that continuing or worsening security
problems were hampering the efficiency of a DOL project in the DRC.
[37] A DFA official informed us in early December 2007 that the draft
fiscal year 2007 operations plan had yet to be finalized. DFA staff
provided us with summary fiscal year 2007 funding data in September
2007 for the purposes of this report.
[End of section]
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