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Counternarcotics Efforts, but Toms of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow 
into the United States' which was released on September 20, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

August 2007: 

Drug Control: 

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons 
of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States: 

U.S. Counternarcotics Aid to Mexico: 

GAO-07-1018: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1018, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, which is 
prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. One of the 
strategy’s priorities is to disrupt the illicit drug marketplace. To 
this end, since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided about 
$397 million to support Mexican counternarcotics efforts. According to 
the Department of State (State), much of the illicit drugs consumed in 
the United States flows through or is produced in Mexico. GAO examined 
(1) developments in Mexican drug production and trafficking since 
calendar year 2000 and (2) U.S. counternarcotics support for Mexico 
since fiscal year 2000. 

What GAO Found: 

According to the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community, hundreds 
of tons of illicit drugs flow from Mexico into the United States each 
year, and seizures in Mexico and along the U.S. border have been 
relatively small. The following illustrates some trends since 2000: 

* The estimated amount of cocaine arriving in Mexico for transshipment 
to the United States averaged about 275 metric tons per year. Reported 
seizures averaged about 36 metric tons a year. 

* The estimated amount of export quality heroin and marijuana produced 
in Mexico averaged almost 19 metric tons and 9,400 metric tons per 
year, respectively. Reported heroin seizures averaged less than 1 
metric ton and reported marijuana seizures averaged about 2,900 metric 
tons a year. 

* Although an estimate of the amount of methamphetamine manufactured in 
Mexico has not been prepared, reported seizures along the U.S. border 
rose from about 500 kilograms in 2000 to highs of almost 2,900 
kilograms in 2005 and about 2,700 kilograms in 2006. According to U.S. 
officials, this more than fivefold increase indicated a dramatic rise 
in supply. 

In addition, corruption persists within the Mexican government and 
challenges Mexico’s efforts to curb drug production and trafficking. 
Moreover, Mexican drug trafficking organizations operate with relative 
impunity along the U.S. border and in other parts of Mexico, and have 
expanded their illicit business to almost every region of the United 
States. 

U.S. assistance has helped Mexico strengthen its capacity to combat 
illicit drug production and trafficking. Among other things, 
extraditions of criminals to the United States have increased; 
thousands of Mexican law enforcement personnel have been trained; and 
controls over chemicals to produce methamphetamine were strengthened. 
Nevertheless, cooperation with Mexico can be improved. The two 
countries do not have an agreement permitting U.S. law enforcement 
officers to board Mexican-flagged vessels suspected of transporting 
illicit drugs on the high seas; an aerial monitoring program along the 
U.S. border was suspended because certain personnel status issues could 
not be agreed on; State-provided Vietnam-era helicopters have proved 
expensive and difficult to maintain and many are not available for 
operations; and a State-supported border surveillance program was cut 
short due to limited funding and changed priorities. 

In 2006, in response to a congressional mandate, ONDCP and other 
agencies involved in U.S. counternarcotics efforts developed a strategy 
to help reduce the illicit drugs entering the United States from 
Mexico. An implementation plan was prepared but, according to ONDCP, is 
being revised to address certain initiatives recently undertaken by 
Mexico. Based on our review of the plan, some proposals require the 
cooperation of Mexico, but according to ONDCP, they have not been 
addressed with Mexican authorities. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that ONDCP, in conjunction with the U.S. 
counternarcotics interagency community, coordinate with the government 
of Mexico before completing the Southwest Border Counternarcotics 
Strategy’s implementation plan to (1) help ensure Mexico’s cooperation 
with any initiatives that require it and (2) address the cooperation 
issues GAO identified. In commenting on a draft of this report, ONDCP 
concurred with the recommendation. 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4268 or fordj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking by Mexican Drug Organizations 
Has Continued Virtually Unabated: 

U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics 
Efforts, but Coordination Can Be Improved: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Descriptions of the Illicit Drugs Flowing into the United 
States from Mexico: 

Cocaine: 

Heroin: 

Marijuana: 

Methamphetamine: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Support for Mexican Counternarcotics 
Activities, Fiscal Years 2000-2006: 

Table 2: Estimated Amounts of Illicit Drugs Transiting Mexico, Produced 
in Mexico, and Seized in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
Calendar Years 2000-2006: 

Table 3: Number of Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United 
States, Calendar Years 2000-2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Areas of Influence of the Principal Mexican DTOs: 

Figure 2: AFI Interdiction Center, Mexico City: 

Figure 3: Mexican UH-1H Helicopter: 

Figure 4: Mexican Schweitzer 333 Helicopter: 

Abbreviations: 

AFI: Federal Investigative Agency: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

CENAPI: National Center for Analysis, Planning, and Intelligence: 

COFEPRIS: Federal Commission for the Protection against Sanitary Risk:  

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DTO: drug trafficking organization: 

IACM: Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets Control: 

IMET: International Military Education Training: 

INSCR: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: 

MPP: Mission Performance Plan: 

NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section: 

ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

SEDENA: Defense Secretariat: 

SIU: Sensitive Investigative Unit: 

State/INL: Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs: 

THC: delta-9- tetrahydrocannabinol: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

August 17, 2007: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Co-Chairman: 
Caucus on International Narcotics Control: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Mark E. Souder: 
House of Representatives: 

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, which is 
prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. One of the 
strategy's three elements or priorities for achieving this goal is to 
disrupt the illicit drug market to create inefficiencies in drug 
production and distribution.[Footnote 1] To this end, in fiscal years 
2000-2006, the United States provided more than $7 billion to countries 
in Latin America,[Footnote 2] including Mexico, for counternarcotics 
and related efforts. According to the Department of State (State), 
Mexico is the principal foreign source of marijuana and 
methamphetamine, as well as a major supplier of heroin consumed in the 
United States. Additionally, the bulk of cocaine destined for the U.S. 
market comes through Mexico. (See app. I for descriptions of these 
illicit drugs.) U.S. counternarcotics policy in Mexico has sought to 
support and strengthen the institutional capability of the government 
of Mexico to take measures against the production and trafficking of 
illicit drugs. Since at least 2000, the U.S. Embassy to Mexico has 
incorporated several strategies in its Mission Performance Plan (MPP) 
to assist Mexico in its counternarcotics efforts. 

State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(State/INL) through the embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) 
supports U.S. counternarcotics initiatives in Mexico and funds several 
programs and activities, primarily with Mexico's Attorney General's 
Office. The Department of Justice's (Justice) Criminal Division and 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense 
(Defense) also provide support for U.S. counternarcotics objectives in 
Mexico. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-- 
including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Coast Guard--and the Department of 
Treasury's (Treasury) Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are 
involved in combating various aspects of drug trafficking and related 
crimes in Mexico. Moreover, in 2006, ONDCP and the U.S. interagency 
counternarcotics community[Footnote 3] developed a Southwest Border 
Counternarcotics Strategy for stemming the flow of illicit drugs to the 
United States. In response to recent counternarcotics initiatives from 
the government of Mexico, the interagency community is revising the 
strategy's implementation plan, which is expected to be completed in 
the late summer or fall of 2007. 

You asked that we examine (1) developments in the illicit drug threat 
posed by Mexican drug production and trafficking to the United States 
since calendar year 2000 and (2) U.S. agencies' programs to support 
Mexican counternarcotics efforts since fiscal year 2000, and reported 
accomplishments. To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed 
congressional budget presentations, program and project status reports, 
and related information and, to obtain a better understanding of the 
scope and progress of each agency's program, met with cognizant 
officials from Defense, DHS, Justice, State, Treasury, USAID, and 
ONDCP. In addition, we traveled to Mexico to meet with U.S. embassy 
officials responsible for implementing U.S. programs and activities in 
Mexico and cognizant government of Mexico officials at the federal, 
state, and local levels. We determined that the program and project 
information provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of this report. We also reviewed various estimates of illicit drug 
production and seizures and disruptions[Footnote 4] in the transit 
zone[Footnote 5] from DHS, Justice, State, and ONDCP. In prior work, we 
reported on shortcomings in U.S. government agencies' data on 
production and seizure of illicit drugs, such as the inherent 
difficulty in obtaining reliable data on an illegal activity.[Footnote 
6] Notwithstanding such limitations, on the basis of conversations with 
cognizant U.S. and Mexican officials, we determined that the data 
provided to us by various U.S. agencies on production and seizures in 
Mexico were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall indication of 
the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug trade since 2000. See 
appendix II for a more complete discussion of our scope and 
methodology. We conducted our work from May 2006 through July 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

According to the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community, hundreds 
of tons of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine flow into 
the United States from Mexico each year, and seizures in Mexico and 
along the U.S.-Mexico border have been relatively small. 

* The interagency counternarcotics community estimated that about two- 
thirds of the cocaine that departed South America towards the United 
States through the transit zone was destined for transshipment through 
Mexico in 2000; this estimate rose to 90 percent in 2004 and 2005. 
Accounting for seizures along the way, an estimated 220 metric tons of 
cocaine arrived in Mexico in 2000, and between 260 and 460 metric tons 
arrived in 2005. The estimated amount of cocaine arriving in Mexico for 
transshipment to the United States averaged about 275 metric tons per 
year.[Footnote 7] Reported seizures in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico 
border averaged about 36 metric tons a year--with a low of 28 metric 
tons in 2003 to a high of 44 metric tons in 2005. 

* The estimated amount of export quality heroin produced in Mexico 
ranged from a low of 9 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 30 metric tons 
in 2003--averaging almost 19 metric tons a year. Reported seizures in 
Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border averaged less than 1 metric ton 
a year, or less than 5 percent of the export quality heroin produced in 
Mexico since 2000. 

* The estimated amount of marijuana produced in Mexico ranged from a 
low of 7,000 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 13,500 metric tons in 
2003--averaging about 9,400 metric tons a year. Reported seizures 
averaged less than 2,900 metric tons, or about 30 percent a year. 

* Reported seizures of methamphetamine produced in Mexico and along the 
U.S.-Mexico border rose from a low of 500 kilograms in 2000 to highs of 
almost 2,900 kilograms in 2005 and about 2,700 kilograms in 2006. 
Although the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community has not 
estimated the amount of methamphetamine manufactured in Mexico, they 
noted that the more than five-fold increase in seizures indicated a 
dramatic rise in supply. 

In addition, although Mexico has undertaken various initiatives to deal 
with corruption, including reorganizing its federal police and 
conducting aggressive investigations, corruption persists within the 
Mexican government and challenges Mexico's efforts to fight organized 
crime and curb drug trafficking. Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) operate with relative impunity in certain regions of Mexico, 
including areas along the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexican DTOs have also 
expanded their illicit drug business to almost every region of the 
United States. According to cognizant U.S. and Mexican government 
officials, Mexican DTOs have become increasingly sophisticated and 
violent in their activities. 

Although the U.S. goal of stemming the flow and production of illicit 
drugs destined for the United States has not been accomplished, U.S. 
counternarcotics assistance to Mexico has resulted in some progress 
since 2000. For example, 

* U.S.-Mexico collaboration on extraditions of drug traffickers 
gradually improved over the period. In 2006, Mexico extradited a record 
number of criminals to the United States, and, as of July 2007, has 
extradited 55 traffickers, including several major ones. 

* Bilateral cooperation to counter money laundering efforts has also 
advanced, although, according to U.S. officials, Mexico lacks a legal 
framework to allow aggressive seizure of drug traffickers' assets. 

* With U.S. technical support, Mexican states are implementing more 
transparent and open criminal trial systems to strengthen the rule of 
law, and Mexico has strengthened controls over imports and marketing of 
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine. 

* U.S. infrastructure support and training are strengthening the 
capacity of Mexican law enforcement entities to interdict illicit 
drugs. 

While U.S.-supported programs have strengthened some Mexican 
counternarcotics efforts, cooperation and coordination between U.S. and 
Mexican counterparts can be improved. For example, the two countries do 
not have an agreement permitting U.S. law enforcement officers to board 
Mexican-flagged vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs on the 
high seas without specific government of Mexico permission; an aerial 
monitoring program along the U.S. border was suspended because certain 
personnel status issues could not be agreed on; State-provided Vietnam- 
era helicopters for transporting Mexican law enforcement officers have 
proven expensive and difficult to maintain, and, as a result, many are 
not available for interdiction; and another State-supported helicopter 
program for border surveillance was cut short, with only 12 out of 28 
planned aircraft delivered, because of funding limitations and changed 
priorities. 

Newly inaugurated Mexican President Felipe Calderón[Footnote 8] has 
indicated that combating the illicit drug threat is a priority in his 
administration. Although ONDCP and the interagency counternarcotics 
community developed a Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy in 
2006, they have not completed an accompanying implementation plan. On 
the basis of our review of these documents, a number of initiatives 
require the cooperation of the government of Mexico, but ONDCP told us 
that the strategy and plan have not yet been addressed with Mexican 
authorities. Therefore, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP, as the 
lead agency for U.S. drug policy, and the cognizant departments and 
agencies in the U.S. counternarcotics interagency community coordinate 
with the appropriate Mexican officials before completing the strategy's 
implementation plan to (1) help ensure Mexico's cooperation with the 
efforts that require it and (2) address the cooperation issues we 
identified. In commenting on a draft of this report, ONDCP concurred 
with the recommendation. 

Background: 

Since the 1970s, the United States has collaborated with Mexican 
authorities and provided assistance to Mexico for counternarcotics 
programs and activities. The goal over the years has been to disrupt 
the market for illegal drugs, making it more difficult for traffickers 
to produce and transport illicit drugs to the United States. For 
Mexico, the U.S. embassy's MPP--which embassy officials described as 
their roadmap for providing assistance--has a goal of combating 
transnational crimes, including drug trafficking. Specifically, the 
United States has provided Mexico assistance for a range of projects, 
including interdicting cocaine shipments from South America; stemming 
the production and trafficking of opium poppy[Footnote 9] and 
marijuana; and, more recently, controlling precursor chemicals used to 
manufacture methamphetamine. 

However, from 1990 to 1996, Mexico's sensitivity over its national 
sovereignty presented a challenge for coordination of counternarcotics 
activities. In 1993, we reported that this sensitivity was one of 
several interrelated factors that resulted in delays and implementation 
problems faced by U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs.[Footnote 
10] As we reported in 1998, at the time, the government of Mexico 
elected to combat drug trafficking with reduced assistance from the 
United States.[Footnote 11] 

Cooperation with Mexico started to improve in the mid-1990s, and, in 
1998, the two countries agreed to the Bi-National Drug Control 
Strategy.[Footnote 12] Since then, the two countries have continued to 
cooperate through meetings of the U.S.-Mexico Senior Law Enforcement 
Plenary. The plenary, which is co-chaired by a Justice Criminal 
Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General and the Mexican Deputy 
Attorney General, is comprised of senior officials from both 
governments responsible for drug control. The plenary meets two or 
three times each year and oversees approximately ten operational 
working groups that focus directly or indirectly on drug control. 
Results of the meetings include the establishment of a bilateral 
interdiction working group and a bilateral precursor chemical working 
group. The bilateral interdiction working group, formed in April 2000, 
established bilateral air-to-air and ship-to-ship communication plans 
to better respond to suspicious air and maritime threats. According to 
Justice, the bilateral chemical working group, formed in 2003, 
facilitated Mexico's efforts to reduce the importation of precursor 
chemicals used to make methamphetamine. In addition, Justice's Criminal 
Division (Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section), as part of 
its work in the plenary, has drafted suggested reforms for Mexican 
money laundering and asset forfeiture statutory schemes, and has 
offered to consult with the government of Mexico on these drug control 
tools. 

After assuming power in December 2006, President Calderón made the war 
on drugs a centerpiece of his administration and vowed to deny drug 
traffickers control of any part of Mexico's national territory. In 
early 2007, he deployed about 27,000 military and police officers for 
counternarcotics operations in eight Mexican states, from Guerrero on 
the Southern Pacific coast to Baja California on the northern border 
with the United States. Their mission, in general, was to eradicate 
drug crops, intercept drug shipments, and apprehend wanted criminals. 
Calderón has also persuaded the Mexican Congress to agree to a 24 
percent increase in the security budget for 2007. According to U.S. 
officials, these actions and other Calderón initiatives, such as the 
recent extradition of several major drug traffickers (referred to as 
kingpins) to the United States, demonstrate a new level of commitment 
to combating drug trafficking, which they predict will lead to further 
bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics efforts. 

U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Mexico: 

Table 1 depicts assistance provided by U.S. agencies to support 
counternarcotics related programs and activities in Mexico during 
fiscal years 2000 through 2006. Other U.S. agencies were also involved 
in counternarcotics activities in Mexico during this period but did not 
provide funding to Mexican entities. 

Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Support for Mexican Counternarcotics 
Activities, Fiscal Years 2000-2006: 

Dollars in millions. 

State (INL): Port and border security: $72.7; 
State (INL): Law enforcement infrastructure: 28.4; 
State (INL): Interdiction and eradication: 23.3; 
State (INL): Aviation: 22.2; 
State (INL): Training: 14.8. 
State (INL): Other; 7.5. 
State (INL): Subtotal: $168.9. 

Justice (DEA): Mexico field offices: 123.9;
Justice (DEA): Intelligence and enforcement groups: 8.9; 
Justice (DEA): Special support and administrative support units: 7.2; 
Justice (DEA): Subtotal: $140.0. 

Defense: Counternarcotics support programs (sec. 1004)[A]: 51.2; 
Defense: International Military Education Training (IMET) and other[B]: 
6.6; 
Defense: Subtotal: $57.8. 

USAID: Rule-of-law: 15.6; 
USAID: Anti-corruption: 13.0; 
USAID: Financial transparency: 1.3; 
USAID: Subtotal: $29.9. 

Total for all agencies: $396.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense, Justice, State, and USAID data. 

[A] Defense does not track obligations by country; thus these figures 
reflect estimated expenditures in Mexico during fiscal years 2000-2006. 

[B] IMET is funded through State's foreign operations appropriation but 
provided by Defense. Since 2002, Defense also funded training through 
the Counter Terrorism Fellowship program. 

[End of table] 

From 2000 through 2006, State/INL obligated nearly $169 million to 
support Mexican law enforcement efforts, principally for 
counternarcotics related programs and activities.[Footnote 13] These 
funds supported the purchase of a wide range of items and activities 
including scanning machinery for security purposes at ports and border 
crossings; vehicles, computers, software, and other equipment used to 
improve Mexico's law enforcement infrastructure; interdiction and 
eradication initiatives; aircraft and related equipment and 
maintenance; training for Mexican law enforcement and judicial 
officials; and other programs designed to promote U.S. counternarcotics 
goals. 

DEA, Defense, and USAID obligated or expended an additional $228 
million for counternarcotics activities that directly or indirectly 
benefited Mexico from 2000 through 2006. DEA's funding primarily 
supported field offices throughout Mexico,[Footnote 14] from which DEA 
agents[Footnote 15] coordinated bilateral cooperation with Mexican 
federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, allowing both 
countries to collect drug intelligence, conduct investigations, 
prosecute drug traffickers, and seize assets. Defense supported 
programs designed to detect, track, and interdict aircraft and maritime 
vessels suspected of transporting illicit drugs--primarily cocaine from 
South America. Lastly, USAID's funding for Mexico promoted reform of 
Mexico's judicial system at the state level, as well as government 
transparency, which broadly supports U.S. counternarcotics objectives. 

Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking by Mexican Drug Organizations 
Has Continued Virtually Unabated: 

Since 2000, illicit drugs produced in and transiting through Mexico 
have continued to reach the United States in large quantities. 
Corruption persists within the Mexican government and challenges 
Mexico's efforts to curb drug trafficking. During this period, Mexican 
DTOs expanded their illicit activities throughout Mexico and expanded 
their reach to almost every region of the United States. DTOs have also 
developed increasingly sophisticated drug trafficking methods and have 
become more violent. 

Economic Cost of Drug Abuse is Escalating: 

With more drugs reaching the United States, the economic cost of drug 
abuse is escalating. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, 
the abuse of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs afflict 
over 35 million Americans, resulting in over 20,000 deaths in the 
United States in recent years. The total economic cost of drug abuse in 
the United States—defined by ONDCP as negative health and crime 
consequences, as well as loss of potential productivity from 
disability, death, and withdrawal from the legitimate workforce—was 
estimated to be approximately $180.9 billion in 2002 (the most recent 
year this data was reported). Since then, health and crime consequences 
have continued to worsen. For example, according to Justice, the number 
of methamphetamine-related treatment admissions doubled from 2002 to 
2004—now at 130,000 admissions—while drug-related homicides reached an 
all time high in 2003 at 680.

Tons of Illicit Drugs Reach the United States through Mexico: 

Mexico is the conduit for most of the cocaine reaching the United 
States, the source for much of the heroin consumed in the United 
States, and the largest foreign supplier of marijuana and 
methamphetamine to the U.S. market. As shown in table 2, based on U.S. 
and Mexican estimates, which vary from year-to-year, more cocaine 
flowed towards the United States through Mexico, and more heroin, 
marijuana, and methamphetamine were produced in Mexico during 2005 than 
in 2000. In addition, although reported seizures of these drugs within 
Mexico and along the U.S. southwest border generally increased, 
according to the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community and 
related reports, seizures have been a relatively small percentage of 
the estimated supply. 

We note that because of acknowledged shortcomings in the illicit drug 
production and seizure data collected and reported by various U.S. 
government agencies, the data cannot be considered precise[Footnote 16] 
but, on the basis of our review, can be used to provide an overall 
indication of the magnitude of the illicit drug trade since 2000. Table 
2 presents the available data, since 2000, on the amount of cocaine 
arriving in Mexico for transshipment to the United States; the amounts 
of heroin and marijuana produced in Mexico; and reported seizures of 
these illicit drugs and methamphetamine in Mexico and along the U.S.- 
Mexico border. 

Table 2: Estimated Amounts of Illicit Drugs Transiting Mexico, Produced 
in Mexico, and Seized in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
Calendar Years 2000-2006: 

Illicit drugs: Cocaine (metric tons): Arriving in Mexico for 
transshipment to the United States[A]; 
Calendar year: 2000: 220; 
Calendar year: 2001: 270; 
Calendar year: 2002: 270; 
Calendar year: 2003: 210; 
Calendar year: 2004: 220 to 440[B]; 
Calendar year: 2005: 260 to 460[B]; 
Calendar year: 2006: N/A. 

Illicit drugs: Cocaine (metric tons): Seized in Mexico; 
Calendar year: 2000: 20; 
Calendar year: 2001: 10; 
Calendar year: 2002: 8; 
Calendar year: 2003: 12; 
Calendar year: 2004: 19; 
Calendar year: 2005: 21; 
Calendar year: 2006: 10. 

Illicit drugs: Cocaine (metric tons): U.S. border seizures[C]; 
Calendar year: 2000: 23; 
Calendar year: 2001: 20; 
Calendar year: 2002: 23; 
Calendar year: 2003: 16; 
Calendar year: 2004: 22; 
Calendar year: 2005: 23; 
Calendar year: 2006: 27. 

Illicit drugs: Heroin (metric tons): Produced[D]; 
Calendar year: 2000: 9; 
Calendar year: 2001: 21; 
Calendar year: 2002: 13; 
Calendar year: 2003: 30; 
Calendar year: 2004: 23; 
Calendar year: 2005: 17; 
Calendar year: 2006: N/A. 

Illicit drugs: Heroin (metric tons): Seized in Mexico; 
Calendar year: 2000: .27; 
Calendar year: 2001: .27; 
Calendar year: 2002: .28; 
Calendar year: 2003: .31; 
Calendar year: 2004: .30; 
Calendar year: 2005: .46; 
Calendar year: 2006: .40. 

Illicit drugs: Heroin (metric tons): U.S. border seizures[C]; 
Calendar year: 2000: .07; 
Calendar year: 2001: .35; 
Calendar year: 2002: .30; 
Calendar year: 2003: .35; 
Calendar year: 2004: .29; 
Calendar year: 2005: .32; 
Calendar year: 2006: .47. 

Illicit drugs: Marijuana (metric tons): Produced; 
Calendar year: 2000: 7,000; 
Calendar year: 2001: 7,400; 
Calendar year: 2002: 7,900; 
Calendar year: 2003: 13,500; 
Calendar year: 2004: 10,400; 
Calendar year: 2005: 10,100; 
Calendar year: 2006: N/A. 

Illicit drugs: Marijuana (metric tons): Seized in Mexico; 
Calendar year: 2000: 1,619; 
Calendar year: 2001: 1,839; 
Calendar year: 2002: 1,633; 
Calendar year: 2003: 2,248; 
Calendar year: 2004: 2,208; 
Calendar year: 2005: 1,786; 
Calendar year: 2006: 1,849. 

Illicit drugs: Marijuana (metric tons): U.S. border seizures[C]; 
Calendar year: 2000: 533; 
Calendar year: 2001: 1,083; 
Calendar year: 2002: 1,072; 
Calendar year: 2003: 1,221; 
Calendar year: 2004: 1,173; 
Calendar year: 2005: 974; 
Calendar year: 2006: 1,015. 

Illicit drugs: Methamphetamine (kilograms): Seized in Mexico; 
Calendar year: 2000: 560; 
Calendar year: 2001: 400; 
Calendar year: 2002: 460; 
Calendar year: 2003: 750; 
Calendar year: 2004: 950; 
Calendar year: 2005: 980; 
Calendar year: 2006: 600. 

Illicit drugs: Methamphetamine (kilograms): U.S. border seizures[C]; 
Calendar year: 2000: 500; 
Calendar year: 2001: 1,150; 
Calendar year: 2002: 1,320; 
Calendar year: 2003: 1,750; 
Calendar year: 2004: 2,210; 
Calendar year: 2005: 2,870; 
Calendar year: 2006: 2,710. 

Sources: The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement; the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report , National Drug 
Intelligence Center, the Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and 
Narcotics Center, ONDCP, and the El Paso Intelligence Center. 

[A] The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) estimates the 
metric tons of cocaine departing South America and flowing through the 
transit zone towards the United States. It also estimates what 
percentage of this amount is flowing towards Mexico for transshipment 
to the United States and reports seizures of cocaine in the transit 
zone. To estimate the amount of cocaine available in Mexico for 
transshipment to the United States, we multiplied the IACM's total 
estimate of cocaine flowing towards the United States by the IACM's 
estimated percentage of what was flowing towards Mexico (which ranged 
from 66 percent in 2000 to 90 percent in 2004 and 2005). We then 
subtracted the IACM's reported cocaine seizures and disruptions in the 
eastern Pacific Ocean, western Caribbean Sea, and Central America for 
each year to estimate how much cocaine was available to transit Mexico. 
Because of the uncertain nature of the estimates involved, we rounded 
the figures we derived to the nearest "ten." 

[B] For 2000 through 2003, the IACM reported "point" estimates of the 
cocaine flow. For 2004 and 2005, the IACM began reporting low and high 
estimates of the metric tons of cocaine flowing through the transit 
zone due to certain methodological concerns over providing point 
estimates. 

[C] DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (and the IACM) defines drug 
seizures at the U.S. southwest border to include seizures at the U.S.- 
Mexico border or within 150 miles on the U.S. side of the border, 
including 88 border counties in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and 
Texas. 

[D] This estimate does not include heroin that is produced in Colombia 
and may transit Mexico on the way to the United States. 

[End of table] 

Cocaine: Virtually all the cocaine consumed in the United States is 
produced along the South American Andean ridge--primarily, in Colombia. 
The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community prepares an annual 
assessment (the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM)) 
that, among other things, estimates the amount of cocaine departing 
South America towards the United States. In 2000, the IACM reported 
that an estimated 66 percent of the cocaine that departed South America 
towards the United States was flowing to Mexico for transshipment. By 
2003, this estimate had risen to 77 percent, and in 2004 and 2005, the 
IACM reported that as much as 90 percent of the cocaine departing South 
America towards the United States was destined for transshipment 
through Mexico. As shown in table 2, 

* Between 2000 and 2002, the cocaine estimated arriving in Mexico rose 
about 23 percent--from 220 to 270 metric tons. In 2003, the estimated 
flow to Mexico declined 60 metric tons, or about 22 percent. 

* For 2004 and 2005, the IACM did not provide "point" estimates for 
cocaine flow because of certain methodological concerns; rather, a 
range was provided for each year. Using the mid point of the IACM 
ranges for 2004 and 2005, the amount of cocaine estimated arriving in 
Mexico during 2000-2005 averaged about 275 metric tons per year. 

* Using the IACM range for 2005, between 260 and 460 metrics tons of 
cocaine arrived in Mexico. The mid point of the IACM range (360 metric 
tons) was about 140 metric tons more than the estimate for 2000. 

* Despite the apparent increases in cocaine arriving in Mexico, the 
amount of cocaine reported seized in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico 
border for 2000-2005 did not increase proportionately with 43 metric 
tons reported in 2000, a low of 28 metric tons in 2003, and a high of 
44 metric tons in 2005. Reported seizures for 2000-2005 averaged about 
36 metric tons a year, or about 13 percent of the estimated amount of 
cocaine arriving in Mexico.[Footnote 17] 

Heroin: During 2000-2005, the estimated amount of heroin produced for 
export in Mexico averaged almost 19 metric tons a year--ranging from a 
low of 9 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 30 metric tons in 2003. 
Although the estimated amount of heroin produced declined in 2004 and 
2005, the 2005 estimate (17 metric tons) was nearly double the 
estimated amount produced in 2000 (9 metric tons). Reported heroin 
seizures in Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexico border averaged less than 
1 metric ton or less 5 percent a year of the estimated export quality 
heroin produced in Mexico since 2000. (See table 2.) 

Marijuana: During 2000-2005, the estimated amount of marijuana produced 
in Mexico each year averaged about 9,400 metric tons--ranging from a 
low of 7,000 metric tons in 2000 to a high of 13,500 metric tons in 
2003. Although estimated production declined to 10,100 metric tons 
2005, this was over 3,000 metric tons more than the estimated 
production in 2000. Reported seizures of marijuana in Mexico and along 
the U.S.-Mexico border ranged from about 2,150 metric tons in 2000 to 
nearly 3,500 in 2003--averaging less than 2,900 metric tons a year, or 
about 30 percent of the annual production estimates. (See table 2.) 

Methamphetamine: Neither the United States nor the government of Mexico 
prepare estimates of the amount of methamphetamine produced in Mexico. 
However, DEA, CBP, and other officials in the U.S. interagency 
counternarcotics community told us that the large increases in reported 
methamphetamine seizures from 2000 through 2006 point to significantly 
greater amounts being manufactured. On the basis of the reported data, 
seizures along the U.S.-Mexico border rose more than 5 times--from an 
estimated 500 kilograms in 2000 to almost 2,900 metric tons in 2004 and 
over 2,700 kilograms in 2006. (See table 2.) 

Mexico Has Transitioned to a Major Consumer of Illicit Drugs: 

According to a 2005 U.S. embassy study, Mexico has transitioned from 
being a drug-producing and transit country to a major consumer of 
illicit drugs. Official surveys indicate that until 10 years ago 
cocaine and other hard drug use in Mexico was low except in pockets 
along the border with the United States. However, Mexico is now one of 
the world’s largest markets for cocaine—still behind the United States, 
but on par with European countries, such as Great Britain. Mexican 
treatment officials have also documented the expansion of heroin and 
methamphetamine consumption at an alarming pace. Consequently, 
Mexicans’ perception of drug abuse as a threat has grown, and 
government authorities have drawn attention to the adverse effects of 
the drug trade on public health, security, and economic development.

Corruption Persists: 

In 2001, State reported that pervasive corruption within the government 
of Mexico was the greatest challenge facing Mexico's efforts to curb 
drug trafficking. Since then State has reported on government of Mexico 
efforts to target and deter corruption. Nevertheless, increasing 
illicit drug proceeds from the United States--estimated by the National 
Drug Intelligence Center at between $8 billion and $23 billion in 
2005[Footnote 18] has afforded Mexican DTOs considerable resources to 
subvert government institutions, particularly at the state and local 
level. U.S. and Mexican government officials and various other 
observers, including academics, investigative journalists, and 
nongovernmental organizations that study drug trafficking trends in 
Mexico, told us that profits of such magnitude enable drug traffickers 
to bribe law enforcement and judicial officials. 

Since 2000, Mexico has undertaken several initiatives to address 
corruption. In 2001, when Mexican authorities created the Federal 
Investigative Agency (AFI)[Footnote 19] in the Mexican Attorney 
General's Office, they disbanded the Federal Judicial Police, which was 
widely considered corrupt. In 2003, Mexico passed a civil service 
restructuring law for the Attorney General's Office that outlined 
standards of conduct and procedures for dismissal and provided for 
better pay and benefits. Mexico also conducted aggressive 
investigations into public corruption, resulting in the arrest and 
prosecution of officials, as well as the dismissal and suspension of 
others. According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report (INSCR),[Footnote 20] in 2002, Mexico arrested 25 mid level 
officials from the Attorney General's Office and other agencies and, in 
2006, reported that it had dismissed 945 federal employees and 
suspended an additional 953. 

Despite these actions, corruption remains a major factor adversely 
affecting efforts to fight organized crime and combat drug trafficking. 
U.S. and some Mexican law enforcement agents also told us that in 
certain parts of the country, they do not have vetted counterparts to 
work with. Moreover, AFI represents only about one-third of Mexico's 
estimated 24,000 federal law enforcement officials. According to U.S. 
officials, the majority--about 17,000--belong to the Federal Preventive 
Police,[Footnote 21] whose personnel are not subject to the same 
requirements as AFI for professional selection, polygraph and drug 
testing, and training. 

Partly to address the problem of corruption, the Calderón government 
recently began to consolidate various federal civilian law enforcement 
entities into one agency and triple the number of trained, professional 
federal law enforcement officers subject to drug, polygraph, and other 
testing. This initiative will combine AFI and the Federal Preventive 
Police, along with law enforcement officers belonging to other 
entities, into one agency, known as the Federal Police Corps, which 
would operate in cities and towns of more than 15,000 people.[Footnote 
22] However, this initiative will not affect the vast majority of 
Mexico's law enforcement officials, most of whom are state and local 
employees and, according to one source, number approximately 425,000. 

DTOs Operate throughout Mexico: 

According to DEA, four main DTOs control the illicit drug production 
and trafficking in Mexico and operate with relative impunity in certain 
parts of the country. These organizations are the so-called Federation, 
which operates throughout Mexico and along the U.S. border, and the 
Tijuana, Juarez, and Gulf cartels, which operate primarily along the 
U.S.-Mexico border. Figure 1 illustrates the presumed areas of 
influence for the predominant Mexican drug cartels. 

Figure 1: Areas of Influence of the Principal Mexican DTOs: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DEA. 

[End of figure] 

According to DEA and other U.S. officials, Mexican DTOs exert influence 
over large areas of Mexico where much of the opium poppy and marijuana 
is cultivated--along much of the southern Pacific coast and north to 
Baja California--and fight for influence and control over areas along 
the U.S.-Mexico border to help expedite smuggling of illicit drugs into 
the United States. 

* The Federation is an alliance of drug traffickers operating out of 
the Mexican state of Sinaloa near the city of Culiacán. U.S. and 
Mexican officials told us that it may have the most extensive 
geographic reach in Mexico among DTOs. According to these officials, 
the Federation's influence in Sinaloa is so pervasive that Mexico 
seldom mounts counternarcotics operations in the interior of that 
state. 

* The Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization 
after its founder, operates from the border city of Tijuana in the 
Mexican state of Baja California. Its activities center in the 
northwestern part of Mexico. According to local investigative 
journalists and U.S. officials, this criminal organization exerts 
considerable influence over local law enforcement and municipal 
officials. The extent of corruption in Tijuana became evident in 
January 2007, when Mexican federal authorities forced local police to 
hand in their weapons in an effort to crack down on local corruption 
and drug related violence. 

* The Juarez Cartel is based in Ciudad Juarez, in the border state of 
Chihuahua. According to DEA officials, the Juarez Cartel has extensive 
ties to state and local law enforcement officials. Over the years, it 
has been implicated in a series of violent crimes linked to corruption. 
Up until recently, the Juarez Cartel was considered part of the 
Federation, but a series of murders led by a member of the Federation 
caused a division between the two cartels. 

* The Gulf Cartel operates out of Matamoros on the Gulf of Mexico, in 
the border state of Tamaulipas. According to DEA officials, the Gulf 
Cartel has infiltrated the law enforcement community throughout 
Tamaulipas, including the border city of Nuevo Laredo.[Footnote 23] The 
Gulf Cartel has also employed a criminal gang referred to as the Zetas, 
which is primarily composed of rogue former Mexican military commandos. 
The Zetas are known for their violent methods and intimidation and are 
thought to be working closely with corrupt law enforcement officials. 
In June 2005, in a possible demonstration of the cartel's influence 
over local law enforcement authorities, Mexican Army patrols sent to 
stem drug related violence in Nuevo Laredo were openly attacked by 
local police units. 

DTOs Have Expanded Operations in the United States: 

According to ONDCP and other officials in the interagency 
counternarcotics community, the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico land border 
presents numerous challenges to preventing illicit drugs from reaching 
the United States. With 43 legitimate crossing points, the rest of the 
border consists of hundreds of miles of open desert, rugged mountains, 
the Rio Grande River, and other physical impediments to surveillance. 
The result, according to these same officials, is the flow of hundreds 
of tons of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine into the 
United States from Mexico, of which only a small percentage is seized. 

According to the 2007 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican DTOs 
have expanded their presence in drug markets throughout the United 
States. Over the past few years, Mexican DTOs have moved into cities 
east of the Mississippi River, previously controlled by Colombian and 
Dominican drug traffickers. In addition, according to National Drug 
Intelligence Center officials although DTOs tend to be less structured 
in the United States than in Mexico, they have regional managers 
throughout the country and rely on Mexican street gangs to distribute 
illicit drugs at the retail level. 

Mexican DTOs Are Becoming More Sophisticated: 

With significant resources at their disposal, DTO's are also developing 
more sophisticated drug trafficking methods. According to U.S. 
officials, Mexican DTOs are taking over the transportation of cocaine 
drug shipments from South America that was previously managed by 
Colombians.[Footnote 24] To evade U.S. maritime detection and 
interdiction efforts, these organizations are increasingly using 
elaborate networks of go-fast boats[Footnote 25] and refueling vessels 
that travel as far west as the Galapagos Islands off the coast of South 
America before heading north to Central American or Mexican Pacific 
coast ports. 

According to Justice officials and related reports, Mexican drug 
traffickers are also taking advantage of advances in cell phone and 
satellite communications technology. These advances have allowed 
criminal organizations to quickly communicate and change trafficking 
routes once they suspect their plans have been compromised. Defense, 
Justice, and State officials also highlighted the use of tunnels under 
the U.S.-Mexico border as another indication of the increased 
sophistication of Mexican drug trafficking operations. From 2000 to 
2006, U.S. border officials found 45 tunnels--several built primarily 
for narcotics smuggling. According to DEA and DIA officials, the 
tunnels found in the last 6 years are longer, deeper, and more discrete 
than in prior years.[Footnote 26] 

DTOs Are Growing More Violent: 

Drug related violence in Mexico has continued to increase in recent 
years. In a recent speech, Mexican President Felipe Calderón emphasized 
the importance of public security by stating that nothing harms Mexico 
as much as the lack of security on the streets and unpunished crime. 
During the administration of Mexico's former President, Vicente Fox 
(2000-2006), federal authorities declared the activities of DTOs to be 
a serious threat to Mexico's national security. From 2000 to 2006, the 
Fox Administration actively targeted major drug kingpins. Although this 
strategy does not appear to have significantly reduced drug trafficking 
in Mexico,[Footnote 27] it disrupted the cartels' organizational 
structure. However, the disruption caused by the removal of some of the 
leadership presented opportunities for other drug traffickers to take 
advantage of the changing balance of power, and, in particular, to gain 
control of important transit corridors leading to the United States, 
such as Nuevo Laredo. Such struggles led to increased violence 
throughout Mexico, with drug related deaths estimated at over 2,000 in 
2006. 

Members of DTOs were not the only victims of drug related crime and 
violence. Recently, an increasing number of drug related incidents 
targeting law enforcement officers and government officials have been 
documented in Mexico. In June 2005, the police chief of Nuevo Laredo 
was assassinated just hours after being sworn into office and declaring 
he would step up the fight against drug cartels. Two months later, the 
official who oversaw Nuevo Laredo public security was murdered. In 
February 2007, the secretary of public safety of the border city of 
Agua Prieta was gunned down by suspected drug traffickers. In May 2007, 
the newly appointed head of Mexico's drug intelligence unit in the 
attorney general's office was shot and killed in a street ambush in 
Mexico City. Three days later, 50 heavily armed Gulf Cartel gunmen 
fought the Sonora State Police, taking the lives of 22 people-- 
including 15 gunmen, 5 policemen, and 2 civilians. 

Journalists have also been targeted as a result of investigative 
articles written about DTO activities. According to press reports, 
during the first 9 months of 2006, 208 acts of aggression were reported 
against Mexican journalists and 20 journalists were reported killed-- 
more than any prior year. An investigative reporter in one of Mexico's 
major metropolitan areas explained that journalists are compelled to 
practice self-censorship on a daily basis and are increasingly 
reluctant to report on drug trafficking, fearing that they or their 
families will be targeted by drug traffickers. In some cases, editors 
encouraged their journalists to avoid the subject because of fear of 
possible violent repercussions. For example, after a group of armed men 
forced their way into the local newspaper office in Nuevo Laredo using 
hand grenades and machine guns and seriously wounding one reporter, the 
managing editor indicated that his paper would no longer cover drug 
gangs and their wars. Due to the risks associated with reporting on 
narco-trafficking, Mexico was recently ranked as the second most 
dangerous country in the world for journalists, after Iraq. 

U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics 
Efforts, but Coordination Can Be Improved: 

According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, one of its primary goals is to 
assist the government of Mexico combat transnational crimes, 
particularly drug trafficking. Over the years, U.S. assistance has 
supported four key strategies: (1) to apprehend and extradite drug 
traffickers and other persons committing transnational crimes, (2) to 
counter money laundering by seizing the assets of DTOs, (3) to 
strengthen the application of the rule of law, and (4) to interdict or 
disrupt the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Since 2000, 
U.S. assistance has made some progress in each of the strategic areas, 
but drug production and trafficking in Mexico since 2000 has not 
abated, and Mexico and the United States can improve cooperation and 
coordination in some areas. 

Extraditions of Mexican Drug Traffickers Have Increased: 

A key component of the U.S. embassy's counternarcotics goal is to 
combat drug trafficking by working closely with Mexican police, 
military, and judicial authorities to investigate, arrest, prosecute, 
and incarcerate or extradite persons who commit transnational crimes, 
including drug trafficking. According to U.S. officials, the goal in 
extraditing these individuals is to deny them continued access to and 
control over DTOs and to ensure that they are held accountable for 
their crimes against U.S. citizens and interests. As shown in table 3, 
U.S. extradition efforts have progressed gradually since 2000. 

Table 3: Number of Individuals Extradited from Mexico to the United 
States, Calendar Years 2000-2007: 

Calendar Year: Extraditions; 
2000: 12; 
2001: 17; 
2002: 25; 
2003: 31; 
2004: 34; 
2005: 41; 
2006: 63; 
2007: (through July): 55. 

Sources: INCSR and State. 

[End of table] 

Although the United States and Mexico have had an extradition treaty 
since 1980, according to Justice officials, it was not effective in the 
early years.[Footnote 28] U.S. officials--primarily, Justice's Criminal 
Division in collaboration with State--continued to press Mexico to 
extradite drug traffickers by consulting with Mexico's Attorney 
General's Office and Secretary of Foreign Relations, providing 
extradition training for their Mexican counterparts, and working to 
develop and assemble presentations of evidence for U.S. and Mexican 
extradition request cases. In 2004, for example, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the U.S. Marshals Service, in conjunction with the 
Mexican Attorney General's Office, developed a vetted unit in AFI 
specializing in fugitive apprehension. According to the U.S. embassy, 
in its first year in operation, AFI's fugitive apprehension team 
arrested 11 top tier and second tier targeted criminals, a significant 
increase over the prior 2 fiscal years.[Footnote 29] In part, as a 
result of these efforts, the number of fugitives Mexico extradited to 
the United States, including Mexican nationals, increased from 17 in 
2001 to 63 in 2006, with 30 of these for narcotics related offenses. 
Nevertheless, Justice officials expressed frustration that the 
individuals extradited through 2006 were mostly low-level drug 
traffickers. 

In January 2007, under the new administration of President Felipe 
Calderón, Mexico extradited several high-level drug kingpins, such as 
the head of the Gulf Cartel Osiel Cardenas, whose extradition had been 
sought by U.S. authorities for some time. U.S. officials cited Mexico's 
decision to extradite Cardenas and other drug kingpins as a major step 
forward in cooperation between the two countries and expressed optimism 
about the prospects for future extraditions. Through July 2007, Mexico 
has extradited 55 individuals and, according to State, an additional 52 
extraditions are pending. Justice's Criminal Division is working with 
prosecutors across the United States to help ensure that U.S. 
prosecutions move forward without delay, and U.S. prosecutors and law 
enforcement agencies continue to work closely with their Mexican 
counterparts to foster additional extraditions of U.S. fugitives from 
Mexico. 

Efforts to Counter Money Laundering Are Progressing: 

A second strategy under the U.S. embassy's performance goal to combat 
drug trafficking in Mexico has been to counter money laundering 
activities by promoting asset forfeiture. DHS' ICE, DEA, Treasury's 
OFAC, NAS, and other U.S. agencies have supported Mexican police 
personnel, investigators, and prosecutors to identify and, when 
possible, seize the assets of DTOs. U.S. Treasury officials told us 
that current Mexican law restricts the authorities' capacity to seize 
assets and have them forfeited. Treasury and other U.S. agencies are 
encouraging the government of Mexico to undertake legal and regulatory 
reforms to facilitate forfeiture of drug trafficking assets. 

In 2002, ICE and DEA supported Mexican authorities who established a 
vetted unit for investigating money laundering within AFI, consisting 
of about 40 investigators and prosecutors. These AFI officials 
collaborated with ICE on money laundering and other financial crime 
investigations and developed leads. With funding provided by NAS, ICE 
developed several training initiatives for Mexican law enforcement 
personnel targeting bulk cash smuggling via commercial flights to other 
Latin American countries. From 2002 to 2006, in collaboration with ICE, 
Mexican Customs and AFI's money laundering unit seized close to $56 
million in illicit cash, primarily at Mexico City's international 
airport. 

In 2004, the Mexican Congress passed financial reform legislation as 
part of a comprehensive strategy to prevent and combat money laundering 
and terrorist financing. In May of that year, the Financial 
Intelligence Unit under Mexico's Treasury Secretariat brought together 
various functions previously undertaken by different Treasury 
Secretariat divisions with the goal of detecting and preventing money 
laundering and terrorist financing.[Footnote 30] To support these 
efforts, NAS provided over $876,000 for equipment and to refurbish 
office space for the Financial Intelligence Unit. Since 2004, the 
Financial Intelligence Unit has established closer monitoring of money 
service businesses and financial transactions.[Footnote 31] According 
to Financial Intelligence Unit officials, this resulted in the seizure 
of millions of dollars. 

U.S. Treasury officials noted improvements in the level of cooperation 
with Mexican authorities under the Fox Administration. For example, 
they highlighted how the Financial Intelligence Unit started to issue 
accusations against individuals named on OFAC's Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons list of drug kingpins and suspected money 
launderers.[Footnote 32] These accusations were forwarded to the 
Mexican Attorney General's Office for possible legal action. Treasury 
officials also expressed optimism that continued collaboration with 
Mexican authorities under the Calderón Administration would lead to 
more aggressive action on asset forfeitures. 

DEA also works closely with AFI to identify the assets of Mexican DTOs. 
In March and April 2007, DEA conducted asset forfeiture and financial 
investigative training to the newly formed Ad Hoc Financial 
Investigative Task Force in Mexico's Attorney General's Office. In 
March 2007, DEA efforts in an investigation of chemical control 
violations resulted in $207 million in currency being seized at a 
residence in Mexico City.[Footnote 33] In another investigation, DEA 
assistance led Mexican authorities to seize in excess of $30 million in 
assets from a designated kingpin and his DTO. DEA officials share 
Treasury's optimism that continued collaboration with Mexican 
authorities will lead to significant seizures of drug trafficking 
assets. 

USAID, DEA, INL, and Other U.S. Agencies Support Mexico's Rule-of-Law 
Efforts: 

A third strategic area under the embassy's goal of combating drug 
trafficking in Mexico has been to support reform of law enforcement and 
judicial institutions to promote more efficient and transparent 
administration of justice. As part of its rule-of-law portfolio in 
Mexico, USAID has promoted criminal justice reforms at the state level 
since 2003. The criminal procedures system that prevails in Mexico 
today is based on the Napoleonic inquisitorial written model, with 
judges working independently using evidence submitted in writing by the 
prosecution and defense to arrive at a ruling. According to U.S. 
officials, this system has been vulnerable to the corrupting influence 
of powerful interests, particularly criminal organizations. To promote 
greater transparency in judicial proceedings, USAID has supported 
initiatives to introduce adversarial trials in Mexico. Such trials 
entail oral presentation of prosecution and defense arguments before a 
judge in a public courtroom. Since this system is open to public 
scrutiny, USAID officials explained that it should be less vulnerable 
to corruption. To date, USAID has provided technical assistance to 14 
Mexican states to implement criminal justice reforms, including oral 
trials.[Footnote 34] 

U.S. agencies have also pursued legal and regulatory reforms related to 
chemicals that can be used in the production of methamphetamine in 
Mexico. Specifically, the United States has encouraged the government 
of Mexico to implement import restrictions on methamphetamine precursor 
chemicals and impose stricter controls on the way these substances are 
marketed once in Mexico. In 2004, the Mexican Federal Commission for 
the Protection against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS)[Footnote 35] conducted 
a study that revealed an excess of imports of pseudoephedrine products 
into Mexico. Subsequently, Mexico implemented several controls on 
pseudoephedrine, including (1) limiting retail sales to pharmacies; (2) 
limiting sales quantities allowed to individual consumers; and (3) 
obtaining agreement from commercial distributors to limit sales to 
customers with appropriate government registrations (pharmacies) and 
with legitimate commercial needs. In 2005, COFEPRIS officials reduced 
legal imports of pseudoephedrine by nearly 40 percent--from 216 metric 
tons in 2004 to about 132. In 2006, pseudoephedrine imports were 
further reduced to 70 metric tons. 

U.S. Support for Mexican Interdiction Efforts Has Helped, but 
Improvements Are Needed: 

The fourth strategy under the embassy's counternarcotics goal is to 
support Mexican efforts to interdict illicit drugs. U.S. assistance has 
provided for (1) infrastructure upgrades for law enforcement entities; 
(2) professional training for law enforcement and judicial personnel; 
(3) military coordination, particularly for maritime interdiction and 
surveillance; and (4) aviation support for interdiction and 
surveillance. Overall, these U.S.-supported programs have strengthened 
Mexican counternarcotics efforts, but areas for improvement remain, 
particularly regarding cooperation and coordination with Mexican 
counternarcotics agencies and the provision of U.S. aviation support. 

Infrastructure Upgrades and Equipment: 

From 2000 through 2006, a significant share of State/INL's assistance 
to Mexico--about $101 million of nearly $169 million--supported the 
Embassy's interdiction strategy for Mexico through the purchase of 
equipment to enhance border security measures and upgrade the 
infrastructure of various Mexican law enforcement entities. According 
to Mexican officials, NAS infrastructure support was particularly 
helpful for two units in the Mexican Attorney General's Office with 
counternarcotics responsibilities established under the Fox 
administration. 

In October 2001, when the Fox administration created AFI under the 
jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office, NAS provided 
infrastructure and equipment for counternarcotics operations. Some of 
the major acquisitions included computer servers, telecommunications 
data processing hardware and software, systems for encrypting 
telecommunications, telephone systems, motorcycles, and a 
decontamination vehicle for dismantling methamphetamine processing 
labs. In addition, NAS funded the renovation of a building where AFI 
staff were located, as well as the construction of a state-of-the-art 
network for tracking and interdicting drug trafficking aircraft (see 
fig. 2). According to State reports, since 2001, AFI personnel have 
figured prominently in investigations, resulting in the arrests of 
numerous drug traffickers and corrupt officials, becoming the 
centerpiece of Fox administration efforts to transform Mexican federal 
law enforcement entities into effective institutions. 

Figure 2: AFI Interdiction Center, Mexico City: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: AFI. 

[End of figure] 

In July 2003, the Mexican Attorney General's Office reorganized its 
drug control planning capacity under the National Center for Analysis, 
Planning and Intelligence (CENAPI).[Footnote 36] This unit, which 
reports directly to the Attorney General, assumed a broad mandate to 
gather and analyze strategic intelligence on organized criminal 
organizations in Mexico, including drug trafficking and money 
laundering. According to State/INL reports, confirmed by CENAPI 
officials, NAS equipped the new unit with a state-of-the-art computer 
network for collecting, storing, and analyzing crime related 
information. CENAPI analysts also noted that software provided by NAS 
allowed them to process large volumes of data--including background 
files on more than 30,000 criminals--and make considerable progress in 
investigations of unsolved crimes. 

In 2005, NAS provided computer equipment for COFEPRIS to monitor 
imports of methamphetamine precursor chemicals at major international 
points of entry into Mexico. This complemented efforts by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to enhance COFEPRIS' capabilities to 
track shipments and imports of precursor chemicals and controlled 
medicines through a National Drug Control System database. 

NAS also funded the procurement of nonintrusive inspection equipment 
for Mexican customs officials to scan container trucks, railroad cars, 
and other cargo for illicit contraband at Mexican ports and the border. 
Such border security measures also support counternarcotics efforts, 
since drug traffickers are known to exploit opportunities provided by 
legitimate U.S.-Mexico cross border trade to smuggle illicit drugs. 
Border security funding was also used to enhance secure rapid 
inspection lanes at six U.S.-Mexico border crossings. 

In addition to support provided by NAS, Justice's DEA provided 
specialized equipment to the Attorney General's Office and other 
Mexican law enforcement entities to allow them to detect and properly 
handle hazardous materials at clandestine methamphetamine laboratories. 
This included safety suits required for clandestine lab clean-ups, 
evidence containers, and drug-testing chemical kits. DEA also donated 
eight specially designed vehicles equipped with oxygen tanks and other 
equipment necessary to handle toxic chemicals typically found at 
facilities where methamphetamine is produced. These trucks were 
recently refurbished and will be based at locations throughout Mexico 
where a large number of methamphetamine labs are suspected of 
operating. 

Law Enforcement and Judicial Personnel Training: 

U.S. agencies have sought to strengthen Mexico's interdiction 
capabilities through training for Mexican law enforcement, judicial, 
and military personnel. According to State, the overall purpose of this 
training is to help Mexican police personnel and prosecutors more 
effectively combat all transnational crimes affecting U.S. interests, 
including drug trafficking and money laundering. NAS has taken the lead 
in funding such training, and courses are typically taught by U.S. law 
enforcement agencies and various contractors in Mexico and the United 
States. From 2000 through 2006, NAS provided approximately $15 million 
for such training. DEA has also funded some training for members of its 
vetted units, and Defense has provided training for Mexican military 
officials. 

According to U.S. and Mexican officials, this training was an integral 
part of the Mexican Attorney General's efforts to develop a 
professional cadre of investigative agents within AFI, and it also 
supported more general efforts by the Fox Administration to upgrade the 
capabilities and ethical awareness of Mexican law enforcement officials 
at the federal, state, and local levels. By 2006, the United States had 
supported training for over 2,000 federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officials with a goal of training 2,000 more in 2007. 

DEA funded some Mexican law enforcement training provided to AFI 
investigative agents and prosecutors. Mexican officials we interviewed, 
who had completed the DEA training, stressed the importance of their 
coursework in securing crime scenes and properly handling chemicals 
found in methamphetamine labs. DEA also funded specialized training for 
vetted Mexican law enforcement units dedicated to sensitive 
investigations. Members of these vetted units participate in a 
specially designed training course at DEA's International Training 
Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The total cost of this training for 298 
special investigative agents amounted to about $1.4 million during 2002-
2006. 

According to DEA officials, since 2002, DEA has also supported Mexican 
efforts to disrupt and dismantle DTOs through specially vetted units 
within AFI. DEA provided this support under its Sensitive Investigative 
Unit (SIU) program.[Footnote 37] SIU members are vetted by Mexico, but 
trained and equipped by DEA. According to DEA officials and related 
reports, the SIU program has been an effective mechanism for sharing 
sensitive data between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies, and, 
over the past 5 years, SIU units have undertaken investigations leading 
to the arrest of numerous drug traffickers, including several top drug 
kingpins. 

Interdiction Cooperation and Coordination Can Be Improved: 

In some areas of interdiction, cooperation and coordination can be 
improved. Since 2000, Defense has spent a total of about $58 million 
for equipment and training for the Mexican military, particularly to 
help the Mexican Navy interdict aircraft and vessels suspected of 
transporting illicit drugs. But Defense officials told us that U.S. 
efforts to interdict Mexican-flagged suspect vessels are hampered by 
the lack of a maritime cooperation agreement and, also, that 
coordination with the Mexican Army that manually eradicates drug crops 
can be improved. In addition, from 2001 until late 2006, CBP provided 
eight Citation jets for detection and monitoring of suspected drug 
trafficking aircraft along the U.S.-Mexican border under a program 
known as Operation Halcon in cooperation with AFI drug interdiction 
operations.[Footnote 38] U.S. officials cited the program as a 
successful cooperative relationship, but the program has been suspended 
since November 2006 because of concerns over the status of U.S. 
personnel in the program, as well as U.S. liability in the event of an 
accident. 

Defense. During 2000-2006, Defense provided training for about 2,500 
Mexican military personnel in the use of certain kinds of equipment, as 
well as training to enable them to coordinate with U.S. aircraft and 
vessels. The training provided was designed to strengthen the Mexican 
military's ability to detect, monitor, and interdict suspected drug 
trafficking aircraft and vessels, as well as help professionalize 
Mexico's military and build good relations between U.S. and Mexican 
military personnel. 

Since 2000, Defense initiatives have facilitated coincidental maritime 
operations between Mexico and the United States and have resulted in 
greater cooperation between the two countries, particularly with 
respect to boarding, searching, and seizing suspected vessels 
transiting Mexican waters. In recent years, the Mexican Navy has 
regularly responded to U.S. information on suspect vessels transiting 
Mexican waters--46 times in 2006, for example. In addition, the Mexican 
Navy agreed on several occasions to temporarily place Mexican liaison 
officers aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels, as well as placing U.S. Coast 
Guard officers aboard Mexican vessels. The Mexican Navy also permitted 
U.S. law enforcement personnel, on some occasions, to participate in 
dockside searches and post-seizure analyses. 

However, the United States and Mexico have not agreed to a bilateral 
maritime cooperation agreement that would allow U.S. law enforcement 
personnel to board and search Mexican-flagged vessels on the high seas 
suspected of trafficking illicit drugs without asking the government of 
Mexico for authority to board on a case-by-case basis.[Footnote 39] 
According to Defense officials, a request to board and search a 
suspicious Mexican-flagged vessel--or one whose captain reports it is 
Mexican-registered--can be complex and time consuming, involving, at a 
minimum, the Mexican Foreign Affairs Secretariat and the Mexican Navy. 
Waiting for approval or the arrival of the Mexican Navy typically 
creates delays, which can result in the loss of evidence as the illicit 
drugs are thrown overboard or the vessel is scuttled or escapes. In 
addition, while the Mexican Navy has proved willing to respond to U.S. 
information on suspicious vessels transiting Mexican waters, according 
to Defense officials, the Mexican Navy does not normally conduct 
patrols more than 200 nautical miles from shore.[Footnote 40] 

In addition, according to embassy and Defense officials, Defense has 
little contact with Mexico's Defense Secretariat (SEDENA),[Footnote 41] 
which oversees the Mexican Army and Air Force. According to these 
officials, the Mexican Army has conducted counternarcotics operations 
throughout Mexico, including in Acapulco, Nuevo Laredo, and Tijuana to 
reduce the violence caused by drug trafficking, and it manually 
eradicates opium poppy and marijuana. But, according to Defense 
officials, none of these efforts took advantage of U.S. expertise or 
intelligence. In the past, some eradication efforts were also done by 
the Mexican Attorney General's Office, which worked with its U.S. 
counterparts. Now, however, the Calderón administration plans to 
consolidate all eradication efforts under SEDENA, which makes greater 
cooperation with SEDENA all the more important. 

Customs and Border Protection. According to CBP officials, in recent 
years Operation Halcon was a successful interdiction effort that helped 
prevent drug traffickers from flying aircraft near the U.S.-Mexican 
border, which made it more difficult to transport illicit drugs to the 
United States. They also noted that CBP and AFI personnel worked very 
closely and one CBP official worked full time at the AFI Command 
Center. Moreover, CBP officials maintained that the embassy 
infrastructure, operational staffing, and relationships developed under 
Halcon provided critical daily interface with the Mexican authorities, 
facilitating quick responses to operational needs along the border and 
the sharing of intelligence. Overall, in 2005, between 15 and 25 
percent of the 294 suspect aircraft identified by Operation Halcon 
resulted in seizures of aircraft and other vehicles or arrests. 

In March 2006, the United States sought to formalize Operation Halcon 
to limit liability for U.S. pilots involved in the patrols in the event 
of an accident. However, the Mexican government did not respond with 
terms acceptable to CBP and, in November 2006, the government of Mexico 
suspended the program. As a result, U.S. embassy officials said that 
fewer suspect flights are being identified and interdicted. According 
to CBP officials, since the suspension, seizures of illicit drugs along 
the U.S.-Mexican border have increased, which, according to DEA, CBP, 
and other cognizant officials, is an indication that more drugs are 
finding their way to northern Mexico.[Footnote 42] 

U.S. Aviation Support for Interdiction Can Be Better Coordinated: 

During 2000-2006, NAS provided about $22 million, or 13 percent of 
State/INL's obligations for Mexico, to support aviation programs for 
counternarcotics efforts by the Attorney General's Office and one 
program for the Mexican Air Force. NAS aviation support for the Mexican 
Attorney General's Office provided helicopter transport for law 
enforcement officers to interdict traffickers and other helicopters to 
enhance surveillance. Assistance to the Mexican Air Force facilitated 
the maintenance and operation of certain U.S.-provided aircraft. 

Since 1990, NAS has provided 41 Vietnam-era UH-1H helicopters, of which 
28 remain in service, to the Mexican Attorney General's Office for 
transporting law enforcement personnel to interdict drug trafficking 
aircraft landing in Mexico.[Footnote 43] Since 2000, NAS expended $4.5 
million to refurbish eight of the aircraft.[Footnote 44] According to 
State, the aircraft have served as the transportation work horse for 
the Attorney General's air services section, flying a total of 
approximately 14,000 hours from 2001 to 2006. However, according to the 
embassy, the UH-1H program did not meet its target of interdicting 15 
percent of all aircraft detected in the transport of illicit drugs and 
crops--in 2005, 4 percent were interdicted. In addition, the 
helicopters' readiness rates have progressively declined from about 90 
percent in January 2000 to 33 percent in January 2007. NAS and Mexican 
officials attributed the reduced readiness rates to a lack of funding 
and a lack of spare parts for these aging aircraft, which Defense will 
stop supporting in 2008. In January 2007, NAS officials told us that 
State/INL does not intend to provide any further support for the UH-
1Hs. (Fig. 3 is a photograph of a Mexican UH-1H helicopter.) 

Figure 3: Mexican UH-1H Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Beginning in 2004, NAS provided the Attorney General's Office 12 
Schweizer 333 helicopters, of which 11 remain operational.[Footnote 45] 
The total expended for these helicopters was $14.2 million, which 
included a 2-year support package. Equipped with forward looking 
infrared sensors for nighttime operations as well as television 
cameras, the Schweizers are designed to provide the Attorney General's 
Office with a reconnaissance, surveillance, and command and control 
platform.[Footnote 46] According to State officials, the Schweizers 
were used in Nuevo Laredo and other locations, providing support for 
surveillance operations, flying a total of approximately 1,750 hours 
from September 2004 to February 2007. (Fig. 4 is a photograph of a 
Mexican Schweitzer helicopter.) 

Figure 4: Mexican Schweitzer 333 Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Originally, NAS had planned to provide 28 Schweizers, deploying them to 
various points throughout Mexico; however, according to State 
officials, due to funding limitations and changed priorities, NAS 
capped the number of Schweizers at 12. According to State, the Mexican 
government requested the Schweizers after Mexican law enforcement 
officials saw them operate in the United States. After consultation 
with the government of Mexico State reached agreement on the provision 
of the helicopters in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the two 
governments. However, Mexican Attorney General officials, told us that 
they would have preferred a helicopter with both a surveillance 
capability and troop transport capacity.[Footnote 47] 

During 2000-2006, NAS also expended about $4.2 million to repair, 
maintain, and operate four C-26 aircraft provided by the United States 
to Mexico in 1997. At the time, the aircraft did not have a 
surveillance capability, and the Mexican Air Force indicated it had no 
plans to invest in the necessary equipment. In 1998, we reported that 
the Mexican Air Force was not using the aircraft for any 
purpose.[Footnote 48] After Mexico upgraded these aircraft with forward 
looking infrared radar in 2002, NAS funded maintenance of the aircraft 
and sensors, as well as training for sensor operators and imagery 
analysts. Part of the NAS funding was also used to provide contractor 
logistical support, including spare parts. 

Southwest Border Strategy's Implementation Plan Is under Development: 

In March 2006, ONDCP, in conjunction with the National Security Council 
and other agencies involved in U.S. interagency counternarcotics 
community, developed a strategy to help reduce the illicit drugs 
entering the United States across the southwest border with 
Mexico.[Footnote 49] The stated objectives of the strategy are to: 

* enhance and better coordinate the collection of intelligence; 

* effectively share information, when appropriate, with Mexican 
officials; 

* investigate, disrupt, and dismantle Mexican DTOs; 

* interdict drugs and other illicit cargo by denying entry by land, 
air, and sea routes; 

* deny drug traffickers their profits by interdicting bulk currency 
movement and electronic currency transfers; 

* enhance Mexico's counter drug capabilities; and: 

* reduce the corruption that facilitates illicit activity along and 
across the border. 

According to ONDCP officials, an implementation plan addressing the 
seven objectives and each of a number of goals was prepared. Each goal 
was designated with a lead agency as well as other major U.S. agency 
stakeholders to develop plans of action, including needed resources. On 
the basis of our review of the strategy and implementation plan, a 
number of the U.S. proposals require the cooperation of the government 
of Mexico, but ONDCP told us that the strategy and plan have not been 
addressed with Mexican authorities. ONDCP noted that the strategy and 
implementation plan were originally prepared with emphasis on what the 
United States could do to stem the flow of illicit drugs from Mexico. 
However, the plan is being revised in response to recent 
counternarcotics initiatives undertaken by the government of Mexico. 
ONDCP officials indicated that the plan should be completed in the late 
summer or fall of 2007. 

Conclusions: 

U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico since 2000 has made some 
progress in helping Mexico strengthen its law enforcement institutions 
and capacity to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. Among 
other things, extraditions of drug kingpins to the United States have 
begun, thousands of Mexican counter-drug law enforcement personnel have 
been trained and vetted and work closely with their U.S. counterparts, 
and Mexico has begun limiting the import of precursor chemicals for 
manufacturing methamphetamine. Other efforts are under way to enhance 
Mexican law enforcement's ability to counter money laundering. 

However, overall, the flow of illicit drugs through Mexico to the 
United States has not abated, and interdiction efforts in Mexico have 
seized relatively small quantities of the illicit drugs estimated to be 
transiting through or produced in Mexico. Moreover, drug related 
corruption persists throughout much of Mexico, and Mexican DTOs have 
increasingly become a threat in Mexico, which has seen an increase in 
drug related violence, and expanded their presence throughout much of 
the United States. Mexican officials have recognized the increasing 
threat. Mexico's President, Felipe Calderón, has indicated that 
combating the illicit drug threat will be a priority and has signaled 
an interest in greater cooperation with the United States. 

On the basis of our review, greater cooperation and coordination 
between the U.S. interagency counternarcotics community and their 
government of Mexico counterparts is needed to address issues related 
to several on going U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs. For 
example, 

* Although the Mexican Navy has acted on U.S.-provided information 
regarding maritime vessels suspected of carrying illicit drugs, it is 
limited in its ability to act on some suspected vessels because the 
Navy cannot go more than 200 nautical miles from shore without special 
authorization. In many cases, the United States cannot take action 
because the existing requirement that Mexico authorize boarding on a 
case-by-case basis is too time consuming to allow searches before 
evidence is destroyed or the vessel is scuttled. 

* An aerial surveillance program along the U.S.-Mexico border was 
suspended because the United States and Mexico could not reach 
agreement on certain personnel status issues. Without an air 
surveillance and interdiction program along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
cognizant U.S. law enforcement officials report indications of 
increased drug trafficking. 

* The Vietnam-era UH-1H helicopters provided to the Mexican Attorney 
General's Office have proved expensive and difficult to maintain 
because they are old.[Footnote 50] Furthermore, Defense is phasing out 
support for this aircraft. As a result, the Attorney General's Office 
will increasingly have difficulty transporting law enforcement officers 
to interdiction sites. 

* The Schweitzer helicopter border surveillance program apparently did 
not meet the needs of the Mexican Attorney General's Office. State has 
halted the program after the delivery of 12 out of 28 planned aircraft. 
Officials in the Attorney General's Office told us they needed 
helicopters with a greater transportation capacity. 

With the Calderón administration, the United States may have an 
opportunity to work with the government of Mexico to reduce drug 
production and trafficking. An important first step is for ONDCP and 
the U.S. counternarcotics interagency community to complete the 
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy's implementation plan, 
including coordinating any proposed initiatives that require Mexico's 
cooperation. In addition, any future U.S. counternarcotics assistance 
should be closely coordinated with government of Mexico authorities to 
develop a mutually acceptable approach to stemming the production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To help counter the increasing threat of illicit drugs reaching the 
United States from Mexico, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP, as 
the lead agency for U.S. drug policy, in conjunction with the cognizant 
departments and agencies in the U.S. counternarcotics interagency 
community, coordinate with the appropriate Mexican officials before 
completing the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy's 
implementation plan to help ensure Mexico's cooperation with any 
efforts that require it and address the cooperation issues we 
identified. To help maximize ongoing U.S. assistance programs, such 
efforts should include, but not be limited to (1) promoting greater 
cooperation and coordination between Defense and the Mexican military 
services; (2) agreeing to a maritime cooperation agreement; (3) 
resolving the personnel status issue to allow aerial patrols along the 
U.S.-Mexico border to resume; and (4) reviewing Mexico's overall 
aviation requirements for interdiction purposes and determining how 
best the United States can assist. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

ONDCP provided written comments on a draft of this report. See appendix 
III. In its comments, ONDCP concurred with the recommendation. ONDCP 
emphasized that the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy's 
implementation plan must be a living document with the flexibility to 
adjust as resources become available. ONDCP added that it will 
facilitate U.S. lead agency coordination with Mexican agencies, either 
directly or through one of the several existing binational working 
groups. 

The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Treasury and USAID did not provide written comments. However, we 
discussed the draft report with cognizant officials at each of the 
departments and USAID. Overall, the departments, ONDCP, and USAID 
concurred with the report's findings and provided us technical comments 
and updates that we have incorporated throughout the report, as 
appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees; the Director of ONDCP; the Secretaries of 
Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, and State; the Attorney General; 
and the Director of Foreign Assistance and the USAID Administrator. We 
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Jess T. Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Descriptions of the Illicit Drugs Flowing into the United 
States from Mexico: 

The four principal illicit drugs that flow into the United States from 
Mexico are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine. The bulk of 
cocaine destined for the U.S. market comes through Mexico, and Mexico 
is a major supplier of the heroin consumed in the United States. In 
addition, Mexico is the principal foreign source of marijuana and 
methamphetamine. The following descriptions of these drugs are adapted 
from the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy's web site. 
To obtain more information and to link to various studies and reports 
addressing illicit drug use in the United States, go to [hyperlink, 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov]. 

Cocaine: 

Pure cocaine was first used in the 1880s in eye, nose, and throat 
surgeries as an anesthetic and for its ability to constrict blood 
vessels and limit bleeding. However, many of its therapeutic 
applications are now obsolete because of the development of safer 
drugs. 

Cocaine is the most potent stimulant of natural origin. This substance 
can be snorted, smoked, or injected. When snorted, cocaine powder is 
inhaled through the nose where it is absorbed into the bloodstream 
through the nasal tissues. When injected, the user uses a needle to 
release the drug directly into the bloodstream. Smoking involves 
inhaling cocaine vapor or smoke into the lungs where absorption into 
the bloodstream is as rapid as by injection. Each of these methods of 
administration pose great risks to the user. 

Crack is cocaine that has been processed from cocaine hydrochloride to 
a free base for smoking. Crack cocaine is processed with ammonia or 
sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and water. It is then heated to remove 
the hydrochloride producing a form of cocaine that can be smoked. 

According to the 2005 National Survey on Drug Use and Health,[Footnote 
51] approximately 33.7 million Americans ages 12 and older had tried 
cocaine at least once in their lifetimes, representing 13.8 percent of 
the population ages 12 and older. Approximately 5.5 million (2.3 
percent) had used cocaine in the past year and 2.4 million (1 percent) 
had used cocaine within the past month. 

Heroin: 

Heroin is a highly addictive drug and is the most widely abused and 
most rapidly acting of the opiates. Heroin is processed from morphine, 
a naturally occurring substance extracted from the seed pod of certain 
varieties of poppy plants. Pure heroin, which is a white powder with a 
bitter taste, is rarely sold on the streets. Most illicit heroin is a 
powder varying in color from white to dark brown. The differences in 
color are due to impurities left from the manufacturing process or the 
presence of additives. Another form of heroin, black tar heroin, is 
primarily available in the western and southwestern United States. This 
heroin, which is produced in Mexico, may be sticky like roofing tar or 
hard like coal, with its color varying from dark brown to black. Heroin 
can be injected, smoked, sniffed, or snorted. 

According to the 2005 National Survey, approximately 3.5 million 
Americans aged 12 or older reported trying heroin at least once during 
their lifetimes, representing 1.5 percent of the population aged 12 or 
older. Approximately 379,000 (0.2 percent) reported past year heroin 
use and 136,000 (0.1 percent) reported past month heroin use. 

Marijuana: 

Marijuana is a green, brown, or gray mixture of dried, shredded leaves, 
stems, seeds, and flowers of the hemp plant (cannabis sativa). Cannabis 
is a term that refers to marijuana and other drugs made from the same 
plant. Other forms of cannabis include sinsemilla, hashish, and hash 
oil. All forms of cannabis are mind-altering (psychoactive) drugs. 

The main active chemical in marijuana is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC). Short-term effects of marijuana use include problems with memory 
and learning, distorted perception, difficulty with thinking and 
problem solving, loss of coordination, increased heart rate, and 
anxiety. Marijuana is usually smoked as a cigarette (called a joint) or 
in a pipe or bong. Marijuana has also appeared in blunts, which are 
cigars that have been emptied of tobacco and refilled with marijuana, 
sometimes in combination with another drug, such as crack. It can also 
be mixed into foods or used to brew a tea. 

Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug. According to the 2005 
National Survey, an estimated 97.5 million Americans aged 12 or older 
have tried marijuana at least once in their lifetimes, representing 40 
percent of the U.S. population in that age group. The number of past 
year marijuana users in 2005 was approximately 25.4 million (10.4 
percent of the population aged 12 or older) and the number of past 
month marijuana users was 14.6 million (6 percent). 

Methamphetamine: 

Methamphetamine is a highly addictive central nervous system stimulant 
that can be injected, snorted, smoked, or ingested orally. 
Methamphetamine users feel a short yet intense rush when the drug is 
initially administered. The immediate effects of methamphetamine 
include increased activity and decreased appetite. The drug has limited 
medical uses for the treatment of narcolepsy, attention deficit 
disorders, and obesity. 

Most amphetamines distributed to the black market are produced in 
clandestine laboratories. Methamphetamine laboratories are, by far, the 
most frequently encountered clandestine laboratories in the United 
States. The ease of clandestine synthesis, combined with tremendous 
profits, has resulted in significant availability of illicit 
methamphetamine. Large amounts of methamphetamine are also illicitly 
smuggled into the United States from Mexico. 

According to the 2005 National Survey, an estimated 10.4 million 
Americans aged 12 or older used methamphetamine at least once in their 
lifetimes for nonmedical reasons, representing 4.3 percent of the U.S. 
population in that age group. The number of past year methamphetamine 
users in 2005 was approximately 1.3 million (0.5 percent of the 
population aged 12 or older) and the number of past month 
methamphetamine users was 512,000 (0.2 percent). 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To address developments in the illicit drug threat posed by Mexican 
drug trafficking to the United States since calendar year 2000, we 
reviewed various studies, such as the National Drug Threat Assessment 
produced each year by the National Drug Intelligence Center. We 
reviewed department and agency planning, reporting, and budgeting 
documents and obtained and reviewed the various strategy documents 
produced by the United States that are the basis for overall drug 
control efforts, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy's 
(ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy, the Synthetic Drug 
Control Strategy published in September 2006, and the U.S. embassy's 
Mission Performance Plans for fiscal years 2002 through 2006. We also 
reviewed the government of Mexico's National Drug Control Strategy for 
the period 2001-2006. In March 2006, ONDCP and the interagency 
counternarcotics community completed the Southwest Border 
Counternarcotics Strategy, which includes several objectives and goals 
dealing with Mexico. Although ONDCP officials provided us access to the 
strategy in May 2007 and the implementation plan in June 2007, the 
implementation plan had not been finalized by the time we completed 
this report. 

To report on illicit drug production and seizure data since 2000, we 
obtained estimates from various sources. Overall, the data have 
limitations, due in part to the illegal nature of the drug trade and 
the timelag inherent in collecting meaningful data. 

* To track changes in the amount of cocaine flowing towards the United 
States from South America, we relied on the Interagency Assessment of 
Cocaine Movement, an annual interagency study designed to advise 
policymakers and resource analysts whose responsibilities include 
detection, monitoring, and interdicting illegal drug shipments. 

* Because no similar interagency flow assessments are done for heroin, 
marijuana, and methamphetamine, we obtained estimates of production and 
seizures from the Department of State's (State) annual International 
Narcotics Strategy Report (INCSR) produced in March of each year and 
the National Drug Threat Assessments. 

To understand how these estimates were developed, we discussed the 
studies and overall trends in the illicit drug threat from Mexico with 
cognizant officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, and State, as well as ONDCP. Specifically, we discussed the 
development of cocaine flow data with officials from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, Crime and 
Narcotics Center, and the compilation of U.S.-Mexico border seizure 
data with officials from the El Paso Intelligence Center in El Paso, 
Texas. We also met with and discussed these issues with cognizant 
Mexican officials in the Attorney General's Office and Mexican law 
enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the drug production and seizure 
data, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable to 
provide an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of the 
illicit drug trade since 2000. 

To document the assistance provided by the United States to support 
Mexico's counternarcotics efforts since fiscal year 2000, we reviewed 
and analyzed congressional budget presentations, program and project 
status reports, and related information. We also reviewed program, 
budgetary, and expenditure data from the various departments and 
agencies in Washington, D.C., that manage these programs and met with 
officials responsible for managing these programs, including officials 
from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Treasury; as well as ONDCP and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. In addition, we observed U.S. programs and talked with 
program mangers at the El Paso Intelligence Center in El Paso, Texas; 
Customs and Border Protection's Air and Maritime Operations Center in 
Riverside, California; and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South in 
Key West, Florida. We also met with some Mexican federal and state 
officials undergoing Drug Enforcement Administration sponsored training 
at its Academy in Quantico, Virginia. In Mexico, we obtained copies of 
relevant program and budgetary data, including the embassy's Mission 
Performance Plan for fiscal years 2002 through 2008, and met with U.S. 
officials responsible for implementing and monitoring these programs in 
several cities, as well as their Mexican counterparts at the federal, 
state, and local levels. The cities included Mexico City, Guadalajara, 
Mazatlan, Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, and Tijuana. On the basis of our 
observations in the field and our assessment of the programmatic and 
budgetary data provided, we concluded that the program data provided to 
us were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. 

Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report 
do not reflect our independent legal analysis, but is based on 
interviews with cognizant officials and secondary sources. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy: 

Executive Office Of The President: 
Office Of National Drug Control Policy: 
Washington, D.C. 20503: 

July 25, 2007: 

Mr. Jess Ford: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade Issues: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548-0001: 

Dear Mr. Ford: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft GAO 07-1018 
report entitled Drug Control: U. S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican 
Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow to 
the United States. Your report comes during a unique period in our bi-
lateral relations with Mexico. Given the enormous political will 
presently exhibited by the Government of Mexico to eliminate illegal 
drug trafficking, coordination is necessary and useful to improve the 
effectiveness of programs designed to destroy criminal organizations 
that operate in both of our countries and to reduce the availability of 
illegal drugs in both countries. 

We accept your recommendation that ONDCP lead USG coordination of the 
Southwest Border Strategy Implementation Plan with the Government of 
Mexico. Our intention is to maximize cooperation and coordination with 
Mexico. In this pursuit, the implementation plan must be a "living 
document" with the flexibility to allow adjustments as resources become 
available. As part of the roll out of the Southwest Border Strategy, we 
will brief Mexican officials and solicit their input on which Mexican 
agencies should be brought into a coordinated effort to implement the 
Strategy. We will facilitate U.S. lead agency coordination with Mexican 
agencies, either directly or through one of several existing bi-
national working groups. 

Once again, we appreciate the opportunity to review this report and 
believe we are already on the right course concerning your 
recommendation.

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

John P. Walters: 
Director: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Al Huntington, Assistant 
Director; Joe Carney; Francisco Enriquez; Juan Gobel; José Peña; and 
Julia Roberts made key contributions to this report. 

Footnotes: 

[1] The other two are: (1) stopping drug use before it starts and (2) 
healing America's drug users. 

[2] Approximately $5 billion of these funds went to Colombia and the 
rest to other countries in the region. 

[3] The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community includes the 
Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center; the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's Counternarcotics Trafficking Office, Defense's 
Joint Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counternarcotics; DHS' ICE, CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Counternarcotics and Enforcement, 
and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; Justice's DEA, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, National Drug 
Intelligence Center, and the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task 
Force; the National Security Agency; ONDCP; State/INL; and Treasury's 
Internal Revenue Service and OFAC. 

[4] Seizures are defined as taking physical possession of the illicit 
drug. Disruptions are defined as forcing individuals suspected of 
transporting the drugs to jettison or abandon their cargo. For purposes 
of this report, we refer to both events as seizures. 

[5] The transit zone encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean 
Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. 

[6] See GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in 
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for 
Transit Zone Operations, GAO-06-200 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2005); 
and Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International 
Efforts, GAO/NSIAD-97-75 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 1997). 

[7] In response to certain methodological issues, the interagency 
counternarcotics community reported low and high ranges of cocaine 
flowing through the transit zone for 2004 and 2005. To calculate the 
average for the period 2000-2005, we used the mid points of the IACM 
ranges for 2004 and 2005. 

[8] Felipe Calderón was elected President of Mexico in July 2006 and 
inaugurated in December 2006. 

[9] Opium poppy is the raw ingredient for heroin. 

[10] GAO, Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in 
Mexico, GAO/NSIAD-93-152 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993). 

[11] GAO, Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face 
Difficult Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-98-154 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
1998). 

[12] U.S./Mexico Bi-National Drug Control Strategy (February 1998). 

[13] Some State/INL funding, notably for port and border security, 
supports U.S. goals in several law enforcement related areas, such as 
deterring terrorist threats or preventing alien smuggling, as well as 
combating drug trafficking. 

[14] DEA proposed the creation of several new offices along the U.S.- 
Mexico border, including Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Nogales. This 
proposal is being closely coordinated with the government of Mexico. 

[15] In cooperation with Justice's Criminal Division. 

[16] GAO-06-200. 

[17] The 13 percent figure is based on using the mid point of the IACM 
ranges for 2004 and 2005. 

[18] According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, drug proceeds 
in Mexico in 2005 ranged from $2.9 billion to $6.2 billion for cocaine 
(including Central America), $324 million to $736 million for heroin, 
$3.9 billion to $14.3 billion for marijuana, and $794 million to $1.9 
billion for methamphetamine. Mexican drug traffickers also grow 
marijuana in the United States; therefore, the amount of proceeds 
returned to Mexico is likely greater than the reported estimates. 

[19] AFI is the Spanish acronym for Agencia Federal de Investigación. 

[20] INCSR is a congressionally mandated report (22 U.S.C. sec. 
2291h(a)). It requires that State report annually on the efforts of 
source and transit countries to attack all aspects of the international 
drug trade. 

[21] The Federal Preventive Police was the result of a reorganization 
to reduce, prevent, and combat crime in 1999. 

[22] The plan would also create two other police forces: one consisting 
principally of former military police, whose role would be one of 
policing rural communities with less than 15,000 people, and a Coast 
Guard. 

[23] Laredo, Texas, on the U.S. side of the border from Nuevo Laredo 
handles approximately 40 percent of all Mexican exports to the United 
States. Extensive legitimate commercial shipments offer many 
opportunities for smuggling illicit drugs. 

[24] As we reported in November 2005, improved intelligence on South 
American cocaine shipments resulting from U.S. law enforcement 
operations, notably Panama Express, has facilitated the targeting of 
suspected drug shipments. According to DHS officials, this partly 
explains the shift in drug trafficking activities from Colombian to 
Mexican control. (See GAO-06-200.) 

[25] Go-fast boats are capable of traveling over 40 knots and are 
difficult to detect in open water. Even when detected, go-fast boats 
can often outrun conventional ships. Some go-fast boats are capable of 
carrying up to 8 metric tons of cocaine or other cargo. 

[26] One such tunnel found in 2006 was a half-mile long. It was the 
longest cross border tunnel discovered, reaching a depth of more than 
nine stories below ground and featuring ventilation and groundwater 
drainage systems, cement flooring, lighting, and a pulley system. 

[27] According to U.S. officials, drug kingpins still found ways to 
exert control over their organizations while in prison. 

[28] Mexico will not extradite individuals facing death penalty charges 
because of the Mexican Constitution's strict limitations on the use of 
the death penalty. However, in November 2005, Mexico's Supreme Court 
cleared the way for extraditing fugitives facing life imprisonment in 
the United States for major drug trafficking and violent crimes. 

[29] Justice maintains the Consolidated Priority Organization Target 
List that is an agreed-upon list of the highest level drug trafficking 
targets as determined by interagency law enforcement agreement. Based 
on their position in these criminal organizations, Justice classifies 
individuals as tier 1--top ranked--or tier 2--secondary ranked-- 
targets. In 2003, Mexican authorities arrested seven tier 1 and 2 
criminals and, in 2002, the number was six. 

[30] According to Financial Intelligence Unit officials, past money 
laundering investigations were complicated by the fact that one 
Treasury Secretariat unit was responsible for collecting periodic 
reporting on financial transactions by banks and financial 
institutions, while another unit was responsible for analyzing these 
reports to determine whether there was suspicious activity meriting 
investigation, and a third unit responded to inquiries or requests for 
financial information from Mexican law enforcement entities. 

[31] In April 2006, the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network issued an advisory to all U.S. financial institutions on the 
repatriation of currency smuggled into Mexico from the United States, 
which provided guidance on how to identify suspicious financial 
transactions presumed to be proceeds from narcotics trafficking. 

[32] The Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is 
maintained by OFAC. It lists individuals and organizations whose assets 
are blocked by various sanctions programs administered by OFAC, 
primarily for suspected involvement in terrorist or criminal 
activities, such as drug trafficking. Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act, as of June 2007, 25 of the 54 individuals 
designated as drug kingpins were Mexican nationals. 

[33] DEA also noted that during 2006 and 2007, besides the record large 
drug cash seizure, Mexican law enforcement authorities seized over 30 
clandestine laboratories, over 20 tons of chemicals, and approximately 
6.4 million dosage units of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine. 

[34] USAID noted that in 2004 they sought to support Mexican judicial 
reform efforts at the federal level, but the Mexican Congress failed to 
pass a comprehensive criminal justice reform package. 

[35] COFEPRIS is the Spanish acronym for Comisión Federal para la 
Proteccion contra Riesgos Sanitarios. 

[36] CENAPI is the Spanish acronym for Centro Nacional de Planeación, 
Análisis e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia 

[37] In fiscal year 1997, DEA was directed to initiate a vetted unit 
program in Mexico, among other countries. See H. Rept. 104-676, p. 25, 
accompanying that year's Omnibus Appropriations Act, Public Law No. 104-
208 (1996). 

[38] When in Mexico, all activity was coordinated with the Air 
Interception Director of AFI and an AFI pilot was aboard the aircraft. 
The Citations would track the suspect aircraft, and UH-1Hs provided to 
the Attorney General's Office would transport law enforcement officers 
to the landing site. 

[39] The United States has bilateral maritime cooperation agreements 
with more than 20 other countries in the Caribbean or Central and South 
America. 

[40] The Mexican Constitution prohibits the deployment of forces more 
than 200 nautical miles from Mexican territory during peacetime unless 
the deployment is requested by the President and authorized by 
Congress. 

[41] SEDENA is the Spanish acronym for Secretaría de la Defensa 
Nacional. 

[42] For example, in the Tucson, Arizona, area, reported drug seizures 
have increased by 40 percent. 

[43] In addition, prior to 2000, NAS provided 39 other aircraft, 
including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to the Attorney 
General's Office. 

[44] The remaining UH-1H helicopters were refurbished before 2000. 

[45] One Schweizer crashed in June 2006. 

[46] The Schweizer 333 normally carries a three-person crew--a pilot, a 
co-pilot, and an observer to operate the forward-looking infrared 
sensor and TV camera and communicate to commanders on the ground. 

[47] State has undertaken a study to access its overall aviation 
fleet's composition, identify investment needs, and assess alternative 
approaches for meeting those needs. See GAO, State Department: State 
Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for Managing Its Aviation 
Fleet, GAO-07-264 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2007). 

[48] GAO/NSIAD-98-154. 

[49] The Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 
2006, enacted in December 2006, states that not later than 120 days 
after the act's enactment and every 2 years thereafter, ONDCP will 
submit to the Congress a Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy 
that, among other things, identifies specific resources required to 
implement the strategy. According to ONDCP, the strategy--although not 
its implementation plan--was completed in March 2006, 9 months prior to 
the enactment of this legislation. 

[50] This is not a new issue. In 1998, we reported that UH-1H 
helicopters provided to the Mexican Army were not being properly 
maintained, and they eventually were returned to the United States. See 
GAO/NSIAD-98-154. 

[51] Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies; 
Results from the 2005 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National 
Finding; NSDUH Series H-30, DHHS Publication No. SMA 06-4194 
(Rockville, MD: September 2006). The survey tracks the incidence and 
prevalence of substance abuse in the general population by surveying 
individuals over 12 years old living in households. 

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