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GAO: 

July 2007: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 

Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize 
Capabilities: 

GAO-07-836: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-836, a report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as 
high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is 
investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the 
warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD’s efforts to integrate UAS 
into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. 
Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken 
steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and 
(2) DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers 
all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO 
also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR 
assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters’ needs. To perform this 
work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and 
interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to 
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed 
guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of 
Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not 
address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them 
to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a 
critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD 
addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue 
to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets 
into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such 
as limited bandwidth. 

DOD’s approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, 
hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does 
not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command 
charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be 
allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness 
of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for 
obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for 
coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on 
how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions 
they’ve been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information 
on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are 
being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. 
This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism 
for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets 
are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to 
allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all 
ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR 
assets and optimize their use. 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets 
because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently 
receive feedback to ensure the warfighter’s needs were met. Although 
the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with 
developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with 
limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned 
versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials 
acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the 
qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset 
effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR 
missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional 
quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide 
milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for 
an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD 
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring 
due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and 
feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters’ 
needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing 
assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending actions to improve DOD’s ability to coordinate the 
deployment of its UAS and other ISR assets, consider the availability 
of all ISR assets in allocating and tasking them, and evaluate the 
performance of its ISR assets. DOD generally concurred with our 
recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 

[end of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further 
Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges: 

DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does 
Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets: 

DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the 
Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Table: 

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: Central Command: 
CONOPS: concept of operations: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: 
JFACC: Joint Force Air Component Commander: 
JFCC-ISR: Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 
UAS: unmanned aircraft systems: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 11, 2007: 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jim Saxton: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being 
transformed by new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), 
and strike capabilities, some of which have been achieved through the 
use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Effective ISR can provide early 
warning of enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable 
U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and 
lethality. ISR data can come from a variety of sources, including 
surveillance and reconnaissance systems such as satellites; manned 
aircraft like the U-2; unmanned aircraft systems like the Air Force's 
Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's Hunter; other ground, air, sea, 
or space-based equipment; and human intelligence teams. 

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations are supported by 
the Department of Defense's (DOD) ISR assets, including theater-level 
ISR assets that are generally used to support combatant commander ISR 
priorities, tactical ISR assets that are generally used to support 
operational units including conventional and special operations forces, 
and assets acquired by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization to aid in the identification and elimination of improvised 
explosive devices. Additionally, combatant commanders receive support 
from ISR assets controlled by U.S. intelligence agencies such as the 
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. U.S. allies also provide ISR 
assets to support ongoing combat operations. 

Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the 
information they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that 
is reflected in DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR 
assets at every level of command is growing, and DOD is making 
investments in a number of ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft 
systems, manned platforms, and space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial 
systems. Specifically, for UAS, funding has increased from $363 million 
in fiscal year 2001 to $2.23 billion in fiscal year 2007, and DOD has 
requested $2.54 billion for fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 1] As of 
February 2007, DOD had more than 3,900 unmanned aircraft in its 
inventory[Footnote 2] compared to fewer than 50 in 2000. The majority 
of these aircraft are currently being used in support of ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In December 2005, we reported that while commanders are experiencing 
mission success with UAS in ongoing operations, they face challenges in 
fully optimizing the use of these assets, due in part to the growing 
number of UAS.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we reported that DOD had 
achieved operational successes with UAS, but challenges such as 
interoperability and limited communications bandwidth were hampering 
joint operations or preventing timely UAS deployment. Additionally, in 
April 2006, we testified that while DOD continues to request funds to 
support service plans for acquiring UAS, it lacks a viable strategic 
plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions.[Footnote 4] 

You asked us to review DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing 
combat operations while optimizing the capabilities offered by all DOD 
ISR assets. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has 
taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat 
operations; and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR 
assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those 
provided by UAS. We are also providing information on the extent to 
which DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, 
in meeting the warfighters' needs. 

To address our objectives, we reviewed DOD and military service 
publications and documentation pertaining to ISR, including those 
specific to UAS such as joint publications, concepts of operations, 
manuals on tactics and procedures, and the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. We 
also interviewed officials from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning 
Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of the 
military services; U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and associated Army 
and Air Force component commands; and the Joint Functional Component 
Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). 
Further, we reviewed documentation, such as joint publications and 
briefings that explain the process for tasking ISR assets, and 
interviewed officials at CENTCOM to better understand how ISR assets 
are assigned to specific missions. Additionally, we discussed the use 
of UAS in military operations with Combined Air Operations Center 
officials in Qatar and units that recently returned from or are 
currently supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To 
understand how requests for ISR support are generated and satisfied at 
the tactical level, we spoke with units that recently returned from, or 
are currently supporting, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
well as units within the services such as the Marine Corps' Tactical 
Fusion Center that are involved in determining if tactical assets are 
available to satisfy those requests or if the requests need to be 
forwarded for theater-level support. We performed our work from June 
2006 to June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. More details on our scope and methodology are 
presented at appendix I. 

In addition to this report, we recently issued a report that discussed 
whether DOD is acquiring its ISR assets in the most efficient manner. 
We are also conducting work for the committee examining how DOD 
determines its requirements for ISR systems and expect to report on 
this work early next year. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 
UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to fully 
coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed a 
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical 
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of 
Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.[Footnote 5] This guidance 
represents an important first step for the use of UAS in combat 
operations and DOD officials acknowledge these documents will continue 
to evolve as DOD learns more about the capabilities of UAS and other 
ISR assets and their application in combat operations. However, the 
guidance does not address, on a DOD-wide basis, the issue of advance 
coordination, which CENTCOM has recognized is a critical factor in 
integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling efficient deployment 
and utilization of assets and by allowing the combatant commander time 
to plan to support incoming assets. In the absence of such guidance, 
CENTCOM has established procedures for the services to coordinate 
system requirements prior to ISR assets arriving into CENTCOM's theater 
of operations. These procedures apply only to CENTCOM's theater of 
operations. However, we found that CENTCOM's procedures for advance 
coordination were not always followed because the services indicated 
that they were not aware of the requirement. According to CENTCOM 
officials, they distributed these procedures to each of CENTCOM's 
service components, such as Central Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval 
Forces Central Command, but were not aware if they were distributed 
further, and the service officials we interviewed were not aware of the 
requirement. As a result of this lack of advance coordination, CENTCOM 
is not always aware, on a timely basis, of assets entering theater, 
which can potentially exacerbate existing operational challenges such 
as limited interoperability and communications bandwidth. While this 
example is limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to 
establish operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD- 
wide procedure for advance coordination is critical to enable DOD to 
quickly support UAS and other ISR assets once deployed to support these 
operations. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide 
advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in 
successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat 
operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges such as 
the lack of interoperability and limited bandwidth. Therefore, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 
service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide 
requirements for coordination in advance of introducing ISR assets into 
theater; develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout 
DOD; and establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these 
requirements. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation. DOD 
noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with 
the combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and 
cited several examples including the annual process for allocating 
theater-level UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in 
theater to plan for deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however, 
acknowledged that a more standardized method could improve efficiency 
of the coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process and 
evaluate and provide direction for an improved coordination process. 
Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if direction is 
required, it will be issued via a Chairman's directive which is 
mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism that ensures 
compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes related to UAS 
but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, represent a 
standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and combatant 
commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of deploying 
UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that 
a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure 
compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing how 
implementation of the directive will be monitored. 

DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking DOD's ISR assets, 
including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of DOD's ISR 
assets because it does not consider the availability of all ISR assets 
in determining how best to meet warfighting needs. The Joint Functional 
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(JFCC-ISR), which is charged with recommending to the Secretary of 
Defense how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support 
the operational requirements of combatant commanders, has an awareness 
of, or visibility into, most DOD ISR assets, but it does not have an 
awareness of all ISR assets available to support the combatant 
commanders, such as assets that are owned and controlled by U.S. 
national intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency or 
by our allies supporting ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR 
officials, although they are working to gain better visibility over all 
ISR assets, they currently do not have this level of visibility. DOD 
does not currently have a mechanism for obtaining information on all 
ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and allied assets, operating 
in each of the combatant commanders' area of operations. Absent a 
mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn more about the 
capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building relationships with other 
national and allied intelligence agencies and addressing limitations 
related to intelligence agency system access. Similarly, during ongoing 
operations, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), who is 
responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air 
operations, does not have information on how tactical assets embedded 
in and controlled by tactical units are being used on a daily basis or 
what missions they have been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units 
have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in 
other units are being tasked. DOD does not currently have a mechanism 
for tracking the missions both theater and tactical-level ISR assets 
are supporting or how they are being used on a daily basis. This lack 
of visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being tasked could 
result in unnecessary duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to 
leverage all available ISR assets. DOD recognizes the opportunity to 
better plan for and control its ISR assets and has initiated a study to 
assess this, but this study is not expected to be completed until 
August or September 2007. Without an approach to its allocation and 
tasking processes that considers all ISR capabilities, DOD may not be 
in a sound position to fully leverage all the capabilities of available 
ISR assets and to optimize the use of those assets, and therefore 
cannot be assured that it is addressing warfighter needs in the most 
efficient and effective manner. To provide greater visibility into the 
availability and use of ISR assets, including UAS, we are recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism to gain information 
on all available ISR capabilities, where they are operating, and how 
they are being used. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation. 
DOD agreed that a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets 
is needed and commented that work is underway to develop such a 
mechanism. DOD also stated that it is not currently practical to 
provide situational awareness on some UAS, such as the small, hand- 
launched UAS at the lowest operational level because of technological 
limitations. It noted it will determine the operational levels that 
will provide widespread situational awareness. We recognize that 
obtaining situational awareness may not currently be practical for some 
UAS but would encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage in 
exploring options for improved situational awareness. 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the success of its ISR missions because 
it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive 
feedback from operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the 
warfighter's needs were met. Although the JFCC-ISR has been tasked with 
developing metrics and standards of performance to assess DOD ISR 
mission accomplishment, DOD evaluates its ISR missions with limited 
quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the 
number of targets collected. While these metrics are a good start, DOD 
officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account 
all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR 
asset effectiveness, such as the cumulative knowledge provided by 
numerous ISR missions, or provide insight on how the intelligence 
collected contributed toward accomplishment of the mission. JFCC-ISR is 
working with the combatant commanders to develop additional 
quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to evaluate the 
performance of ISR collection assets, but no DOD-wide milestones have 
been established. Milestones would include the required steps and 
planned dates for completion of those steps leading up to metrics 
development. Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-01 calls for intelligence 
personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate feedback on 
how well intelligence operations perform to meet commander's 
intelligence requirements; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this 
feedback is not consistently occurring due, mainly, to the fast pace of 
operations in theater. Without feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR 
assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the 
warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and 
whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new 
systems DOD should acquire in order to best support warfighting needs. 
To improve DOD's ability to evaluate the effectiveness of its ISR 
missions, we recommend DOD establish DOD-wide milestones for metrics 
development, develop a process for systematically capturing feedback on 
how effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighter requirements and 
consider this information when making ISR acquisition, allocation, and 
tasking decisions. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation. 
DOD agreed milestones for development of ISR metrics should be 
established, but pointed out that organizations within the department 
collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies. While the feedback 
captured by those organizations is noteworthy, it is often not 
immediate or specific to individual missions. DOD further commented 
that it has mechanisms in place to inform its decision-making processes 
on the acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets such as 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System which 
assesses, among other things, capability gaps and solutions. We agree 
that the mechanisms mentioned in DOD's response exist; however, DOD 
currently does not have sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics 
needed to collect data on UAS performance nor does it have a means for 
incorporating such data into the processes currently used to make 
decisions on ISR assets. 

Background: 

UAS represent one of many DOD airborne ISR assets available to support 
ongoing combat operations. Unmanned aircraft are deployed and 
controlled at different levels of command and can be categorized into 
three main classes: man-portable, tactical, and theater. Table 1 
illustrates examples of UAS in each category. Man-portable UAS are 
small, self-contained, and portable and are generally used to support 
the small ground combat teams in the field. Tactical UAS are larger 
systems that are generally used to support operational units at 
tactical levels of command such as the battalion or brigade. Tactical 
UAS are locally operated and controlled by the units. Theater UAS are 
operated and controlled by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
(JFACC) and are generally used to support combatant commander ISR 
priorities, although in certain circumstances they can be assigned to 
support tactical operations, such as when troops are being fired on. 
Theater UAS traditionally have been more capable than tactical or man- 
portable systems. For example, theater UAS typically contain 
characteristics that make them more capable than other categories of 
UAS, such as their more robust communications architecture and more 
capable payloads that allow for production of more diverse intelligence 
data products. However, some tactical systems, such as the Army's 
Warrior UAS, are being developed that are capable of performing theater-
level requirements and, as currently envisioned, will be embedded in 
and controlled at the tactical level by units. 

Table 1: UAS Nomenclature/Characteristics: 

Man-portable UAS. 

Dragon Eye; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 500 AGL[B]; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 1. 

Raven; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 1,000 AGL; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 1. 

Tactical UAS. 

Hunter; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 15,000 MSL[C]; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 8-9. 

Shadow; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 15,000 MSL; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 5. 

ERMP (Warrior); 
Maximum altitude (feet): 29,000 MSL; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 36. 

Theater UAS. 

Predator; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 26,000 MSL; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 20. 

Global Hawk; 
Maximum altitude (feet): 60,000 MSL; 
Maximum endurance (hours)[A]: 28. 

Source: DOD. 

[A] Endurance equals total time from takeoff to landing. 

[B] AGL is feet above ground level. 

[C] MSL is feet above mean sea level. 

[End of table] 

DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available DOD 
theater-level airborne ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant 
commanders. The allocation process is managed by U.S. Strategic 
Command's Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). In 2003, DOD altered its 
unified command plan to give U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for 
planning, integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and 
global operations. To execute this responsibility, U.S. Strategic 
Command established the JFCC-ISR in March 2005. The JFCC-ISR is charged 
with recommending to the Secretary of Defense how DOD's theater-level 
ISR assets should be allocated, or distributed, among combatant 
commanders and for the integration and synchronization of DOD, 
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. 

Once DOD's ISR assets are allocated to the combatant commanders, they 
are available to be assigned or tasked based on combatant commander 
priorities against specific missions in support of ongoing operations. 
Authority for tasking ISR assets, including UAS, is generally 
determined by the level of the objective the asset is deployed to 
support and the command level of the unit that controls the asset. 
Therefore, most theater-level UAS assets that are controlled and tasked 
by the JFACC are generally used to support theater-level objectives and 
priorities, as established by the combatant commander. Most tactical 
UAS assets controlled by the services or the U.S. Special Operations 
Command are used to support tactical objectives and priorities, which 
may differ from theater-level priorities. For example, authority to 
task the Army's Hunter resides with the commander of the unit in which 
it is embedded, whereas authority for tasking the Air Force's Predator 
resides with the JFACC. 

In August 2005 DOD issued its current UAS Roadmap which was developed 
to assist DOD in developing a long-range strategy for UAS development, 
acquisition, and other planning efforts as well as to guide industry in 
developing UAS related technology. According to DOD officials, DOD is 
in the process of developing an update to this Roadmap and expects to 
issue the updated version in late summer 2007. The UAS Roadmap is 
intended to guide UAS planning; however, it does address limited 
operational aspects such as operational issues or challenges that have 
emerged as a result of operating UAS in support of ongoing operations. 
For example, the Roadmap acknowledges that the limited number of 
bandwidth frequencies constrains DOD's ability to operate multiple 
unmanned aircraft simultaneously. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further 
Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges: 

DOD components have developed guidance--such as a Multi-Service 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS--to 
facilitate UAS integration. However, DOD continues to face UAS 
integration challenges, such as the lack of interoperability and 
limited communications bandwidth. These challenges may be exacerbated 
because DOD has not established DOD-wide advance coordination 
procedures for integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD takes 
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may 
continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat 
operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges. 

DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS: 

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of 
UAS into combat operations. For example, in August 2006 DOD issued its 
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical 
Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This document was designed to 
serve as a planning, coordination, and reference guide for the services 
and provides a framework for warfighters employing UAS. Furthermore, in 
March 2007 DOD issued its Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, which provides overarching principles, a discussion 
of UAS capabilities, operational views, and a discussion of UAS use in 
various operational scenarios. Each of the above documents represent an 
important first step for the use of UAS in combat operations, and DOD 
officials acknowledge these documents will continue to evolve as DOD 
learns more about the capabilities of UAS and their application in 
combat operations. 

DOD Continues to Face UAS Integration Challenges: 

DOD continues to face challenges, such as interoperability and 
communications bandwidth, in integrating UAS into combat operations. In 
December 2005 we reported that challenges such as the lack of 
interoperability and limited communications bandwidth have emerged to 
hamper recent joint operations or prevent timely UAS 
employment.[Footnote 6] Specifically, some UAS cannot easily exchange 
data, sometimes even within a single service, because they were not 
designed with interoperable communications standards. Additionally, as 
we previously reported, U.S. forces are unable to interchangeably use 
some payloads from one type of UAS on another, a capability known as 
"payload commonality." Furthermore, electromagnetic spectrum 
frequencies, often referred to as bandwidth, are congested by a large 
number of UAS and other weapons or communications systems using the 
same frequency simultaneously. While some UAS can change to different, 
less congested, frequency bands, most UAS were built without the 
ability to change frequency bands. Thus, commanders have had to delay 
certain missions until frequency congestion cleared. DOD is taking 
steps to address these challenges such as equipping UAS with the 
Tactical Common Data Link[Footnote 7] and, according to DOD officials, 
it is developing common ground control stations to improve 
interoperability of its UAS. 

Lack of DOD-wide Advance Coordination May Exacerbate Integration 
Challenges of UAS and Other ISR Assets: 

Existing UAS integration challenges may be exacerbated because DOD has 
not established DOD-wide advance coordination procedures for 
integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations. 
Specifically, DOD officials indicate that assets arriving in theater 
without advance coordination may exacerbate UAS integration challenges, 
such as further taxing the limited available bandwidth. As additional 
ISR assets are rapidly acquired and fielded to meet the increasing 
demand for ISR support in ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized 
that advance coordination is a critical factor in integrating UAS into 
combat operations by enabling efficient deployment of assets and 
effective utilization of them once they are in theater. Furthermore, 
advance knowledge of system requirements is crucial to allow the 
combatant commander sufficient time to adequately plan to support 
incoming assets. DOD officials acknowledge that having to incorporate 
assets quickly into the theater infrastructure creates additional 
challenges and further emphasizes the need for advance coordination. 

In response to this issue, CENTCOM has developed procedures to ensure 
the services coordinate their plans prior to deploying UAS to CENTCOM's 
theater of operations. In May 2005 CENTCOM established the Concept of 
Operations for Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, which states 
that when a full-motion video-capable asset[Footnote 8] or weapons 
system is scheduled for deployment to CENTCOM's theater of operations, 
the controlling unit will notify CENTCOM of the deployment no later 
than 30 days prior to arrival of the asset in theater. It also states 
that the controlling unit will provide a system and platform concept of 
operations to CENTCOM no later than 15 days prior to the asset's 
arrival. According to CENTCOM officials, they distributed these 
procedures to each of CENTCOM's service components, such as Central 
Command Air Forces and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. However, they 
were unaware if the procedures were distributed further to the 
services, and service officials we interviewed, including those at the 
service Headquarters as well as those stationed within units returning 
from ongoing operations, indicated they were not aware of the 
requirement. CENTCOM officials indicate that the procedures have not 
always been followed. 

The Warrior Alpha, which was fielded by the Joint Improvised Explosive 
Device Defeat Organization and operated by the Army to aid in the 
identification and elimination of improvised explosive devices, 
illustrates why this advance coordination is so critical. As a result 
of coordinating with CENTCOM, the Army was made aware of limitations 
such as bandwidth and limited ramp space and decided to deploy the 
Warrior Alpha to an alternate location. While CENTCOM and Army 
officials disagree on whether the coordination was completed in a 
timely manner, all agree it was ultimately completed. While this 
example is limited to CENTCOM's area of operations, the potential 
exists for DOD to have to quickly establish operations in other areas 
of the world, which makes the need for advance coordination even more 
critical. 

CENTCOM officials acknowledge the need for advance coordination for all 
ISR assets entering CENTCOM's theater of operations, not just those 
assets that are capable of full-motion video. To address this need, 
CENTCOM developed in November 2006 an ISR Systems Concept of Operations 
Standardization Memo. CENTCOM officials stated that the ISR memo is 
intended to provide CENTCOM with awareness of what assets are coming 
into theater and to allow CENTCOM to ensure the asset is able to be 
incorporated into the existing infrastructure, given operational 
challenges such as limited communications bandwidth. This memo requires 
the inclusion of certain elements in all ISR system concepts of 
operations, including how the asset will be tasked; how intelligence 
will be processed, exploited, and disseminated; and system bandwidth 
requirements that must be coordinated with CENTCOM prior to deployment 
of ISR assets. 

This ISR memo applies only to CENTCOM's theater of operations and does 
not constitute DOD-wide guidance. While the Warrior Alpha example is 
limited to CENTCOM, the potential exists for DOD to need to establish 
operations in other areas of the world very quickly. A DOD-wide 
procedure for advance coordination would be critical for quickly 
supporting UAS and other ISR assets once deployed. Until DOD takes 
steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be 
unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat 
operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated. 

DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does 
Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets: 

DOD's current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, 
including UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets 
because it lacks an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities 
available to support the combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets 
are being used, which hinders DOD's ability to optimize the use of its 
assets. Although DOD has established a process for allocating available 
DOD ISR assets, including UAS, to the combatant commanders to meet 
their needs, it does not have an awareness of all ISR assets, which 
impairs its ability to distribute or allocate DOD assets while 
considering the capabilities of all ISR assets. Additionally, DOD's 
process for tasking its ISR assets does not currently allow for 
information at all levels into how DOD's ISR assets are being used on a 
daily basis, which hinders its ability to leverage other assets 
operating in an area and to avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings. 
Without an approach to its allocation and tasking processes that 
considers all ISR capabilities, DOD is not in a sound position to fully 
leverage all the capabilities of available ISR assets and to optimize 
the use of those assets, and therefore cannot be assured that it is 
addressing warfighter needs in the most efficient and effective manner. 
DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR 
assets and has initiated a study to examine the issue. 

DOD Does Not Have Visibility over All ISR Assets Available to Meet the 
Warfighters' Needs: 

Although DOD has established a process for allocating available DOD ISR 
assets to the combatant commanders to meet the warfighters' needs, it 
does not have an awareness or visibility over the total number and 
types of ISR assets available to support combatant commanders or the 
capabilities represented by those assets. DOD uses an annual process 
for allocating or distributing its available ISR assets, including UAS, 
to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs. That process 
is managed by U.S. Strategic Command's JFCC-ISR, which is tasked with 
making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to 
allocate DOD ISR resources for theater use across the combatant 
commands and ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD, 
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. DOD 
officials indicate that annual allocation levels are constrained by the 
number of ISR assets in DOD's inventory and believe that JFCC-ISR is, 
therefore, not able to allocate to the combatant commanders ISR assets 
in sufficient numbers to meet all requests for ISR support. However, 
our work suggests that additional information is needed to assess the 
true demand for ISR assets and the best way to meet this demand. 
Specifically, JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of integrating 
DOD, national, and allied partner ISR capabilities and making 
recommendations on how best to allocate ISR assets to support the 
warfighter depends, in part, on the extent to which it has awareness 
and visibility over all ISR assets, including DOD, national, and allied 
ISR assets. JFCC-ISR does not have complete visibility into all assets 
that could be used to support combatant commanders' needs, which 
hinders its ability to optimally distribute or allocate DOD ISR assets. 
JFCC-ISR officials estimate it has 80-90 percent visibility into DOD 
ISR assets but does not have the same level of visibility into other 
national and allied ISR assets available to support theater-level 
requirements, such as assets that are owned and controlled by U.S. 
national intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency or 
by our allies supporting ongoing operations. According to JFCC-ISR 
officials, although they are working to gain better visibility over all 
ISR assets, they currently do not have this level of visibility because 
DOD does not currently have a mechanism for obtaining information on 
all ISR assets--including all DOD, national, and allied assets-- 
operating in each of the combatant commanders' area of operations. 
Absent such a mechanism, JFCC-ISR has been trying to learn more about 
the capabilities of non-DOD ISR assets by building relationships with 
other national and allied intelligence agencies and addressing 
limitations related to intelligence agency system access. Without an 
approach to its allocation process that considers all available ISR 
capabilities, JFCC-ISR does not have all the information it needs to 
leverage the capabilities of all available ISR assets and to optimize 
the allocation of DOD's ISR assets. 

DOD Does Not Have Visibility over the Tasking of All DOD Airborne ISR 
Assets, Including UAS: 

DOD's process for tasking its airborne ISR assets, including UAS, does 
not provide for visibility at all levels into how DOD airborne ISR 
assets are being used on a daily basis. Once DOD ISR assets have been 
allocated, those assets are available to the combatant commanders to be 
assigned, or tasked, against specific requests for ISR support in 
ongoing operations. The JFACC is responsible for planning, 
coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations to focus the effect 
of air capabilities and for assuring their effective and efficient use 
in achieving the combatant commanders' objectives. However, while the 
JFACC has visibility into how all theater-level ISR assets, like the 
Air Force's Predator, are being used, he or she does not have 
visibility into how tactical ISR assets, such as the Army's Hunter, are 
being used on a daily basis or what missions they are supporting. The 
JFACC generally tasks assets that support theater-level objectives, 
while assets that support tactical-level objectives are tasked and 
controlled by the services or by the U.S. Special Operations Command. 
Tactical units utilize their embedded, or tactical, assets first to 
satisfy unit intelligence needs. However, when tactical assets are not 
available or capable of satisfying a unit's need for ISR support, the 
unit requests theater-level ISR support. Requests for most theater- 
level assets are entered into a central DOD database, but there is no 
similar database that captures requests for tactical-level assets. 
While there are procedures, such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace 
Control Order, for tracking where theater-and tactical-level assets are 
operating for airspace control and deconfliction purposes, a comparable 
mechanism for tracking the missions these assets are supporting or how 
they are being used on a daily basis does not exist. For example, the 
Air Tasking Order would track the time, date, and location where a UAS 
was operating, but there is no mechanism that would track what 
intelligence the UAS was supposed to gather on a mission or why the UAS 
was being used on a mission. Without a database or similar mechanism 
providing visibility into how tactical-level assets are being tasked, 
the JFACC is limited in his or her awareness of how those assets are 
being used on a daily basis, which hinders the JFACC's ability to 
optimize the use of those assets. 

This lack of visibility limits the JFACC's ability to leverage those 
assets using techniques such as cross-cueing, which is the 
collaborative effort of using capabilities offered by multiple ISR 
platforms to fulfill a mission. By using techniques such as cross- 
cueing, the JFACC has been able to use the different types of 
capabilities brought by different theater-level manned and unmanned ISR 
assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For example, a manned 
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System was tasked to monitor an 
area. When this system sensed movement in the area, a Predator was then 
tasked to collect imagery to confirm suspected activity. Without 
visibility into how tactical assets are being utilized, the JFACC is 
limited in his or her ability to optimize the use of all available DOD 
ISR assets and to focus the effect of these assets to ensure their 
efficient and effective use. Such visibility will become even more 
important given that services such as the Army are acquiring, and 
planning to embed in units, ISR assets capable of satisfying theater- 
level requirements, such as the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose or Warrior 
UAS, which could otherwise be leveraged to support JFACC requirements. 

Duplicative taskings that occur are often driven by a lack of 
visibility into where ISR assets at all levels are operating and what 
they are tasked to do. For example, a DOD official shared with us an 
example of unnecessary duplication where an Army unit requested a full- 
motion video-capable asset to support a high-priority requirement. When 
the asset, a Predator UAS, arrived to support the requirement, its 
operator realized the Army unit had also tasked one of its tactical 
assets, a Hunter UAS, against the requirement. As a result of the lack 
of visibility over all assets, the potential exists for multiple ISR 
aircraft to be tasked to operate in the same area and against the same 
requirement. However, some level of duplication may be necessary when 
driven by mission requirements and system capabilities. Certain 
missions, such as special operations, often need a certain amount of 
duplication in order to achieve the desired result. For example, a 
mission intended to track activity of suspected terrorists may require 
multiple systems to follow identified individuals who flee the scene in 
different directions. Furthermore, assets such as the Predator UAS 
experience system limitations when equipped with a full-motion-video 
sensor in that they are only able to provide surveillance of a narrow 
or "soda straw" view. A certain level of duplication of UAS may be 
necessary to support a mission to obtain a complete view of the area 
under surveillance. 

Greater visibility at the tactical level could provide units with a 
greater awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater- 
level and those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what 
they are being used to do. A mechanism that provides this visibility 
would allow tactical units, when appropriate,[Footnote 9] to leverage 
other assets operating in their area to optimize the information 
captured and avoid unnecessary duplicative taskings. 

DOD recognizes the opportunity to better plan for and control its ISR 
assets and has initiated a Persistent ISR Capabilities Based Assessment 
Study. The study, sponsored by the Battlespace Awareness Functional 
Capabilities Board, focuses on what other actions such as better 
planning, direction, command and control, and better fusion and 
exploitation of information can provide the warfighter with more 
persistent surveillance capability. The study is expected to be 
completed in the August-September 2007 time frame. 

DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the 
Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter's Needs Are Met: 

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets 
because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently 
receive feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure 
the warfighter's needs are met. Specifically, although JFCC-ISR is 
tasked with developing metrics and standards of performance to measure 
the success of DOD ISR missions, existing metrics are limited and no 
DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD officials 
acknowledged that they do not consistently receive feedback from 
operators and intelligence analysts to ensure the warfighter's needs 
are met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating 
its ISR assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how 
well the warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR 
assets, and whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to 
acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. 

DOD Is Developing Metrics to Measure Success of Its ISR Assets, but 
Progress Has Been Limited and DOD Has Not Established Milestones: 

DOD is working to develop additional quantitative ISR metrics as well 
as qualitative metrics to measure the success of its ISR assets, but 
existing quantitative metrics are limited and no milestones have been 
established. The JFCC-ISR is tasked with developing metrics and 
standards of performance to assess DOD ISR mission accomplishment. 
Moreover, we recommended in a December 2005 report[Footnote 10] that 
DOD ensure its performance measurement systems measure how effectively 
UAS perform their missions, identify performance indicator information 
that needs to be collected, and systematically collect identified 
performance information. We continue to believe this recommendation has 
merit, and DOD officials agree that metrics are needed not only for 
UAS, but for all ISR missions. However, DOD currently assesses its ISR 
missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of 
targets planned versus the number collected against. While these 
metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current 
metrics do not take into account all of the qualitative considerations 
associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the 
cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions, whether the ISR 
asset did what it was intended to do, whether it had the intended 
effect, and whether the intelligence captured contributed towards 
accomplishment of the mission. 

The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop 
additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to 
assess the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials 
acknowledge the progress in developing metrics has been limited. In 
developing these metrics, the JFCC-ISR is leveraging national 
intelligence attributes, which include characteristics such as whether 
the intelligence is comprehensive to perform all missions anywhere and 
at anytime in any weather; credible to allow users to make sound 
decisions and take appropriate action; persistent to collect often and 
long enough to get the job done; and timely to meet user needs. 
Furthermore, the JFCC-ISR has not made any progress in establishing DOD-
wide milestones for the development of these metrics. Milestones are 
the required steps and planned dates for completion of those steps 
leading up to metrics development. 

DOD officials indicate that determining the success of ISR missions is 
difficult given the nature of intelligence collection. Specifically, 
hundreds of hours of ISR missions and target tracking could culminate 
in the capture of a high value target; however, it may be difficult to 
measure the effectiveness of each individual ISR mission that led to 
the ultimate capture and mission success. This cumulative knowledge 
provided by ISR assets is difficult to quantify. An official from the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics also acknowledged that it may be more difficult to 
evaluate the success of ongoing operations due to the dynamic and 
subjective nature of requirements. The official noted, however, that 
DOD is better equipped to measure the success of its more mature and 
traditional ISR missions, such as sensitive reconnaissance operations, 
because the objectives are better defined allowing more direct 
determination of success. 

DOD Lacks Consistent Feedback on Whether ISR Assets Meet Warfighters' 
Needs: 

In addition to metrics, DOD also relies on feedback for evaluating how 
successful its ISR assets are in meeting the warfighter's needs. 
However, DOD lacks consistent feedback on whether ISR assets meet the 
needs of the warfighters. Joint Publication 2-01[Footnote 11] calls for 
intelligence personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate 
feedback on how well intelligence operations perform to meet 
commander's intelligence requirements. This information could be used 
to inform DOD's acquisition, allocation, and tasking of ISR assets. 
While DOD officials indicate they occasionally receive feedback on ISR 
asset performance, they acknowledge that feedback specific to how ISR 
assets performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently 
occurring. While there is real-time communication among unmanned 
aircraft system operators, requesters, and intelligence personnel 
during an operation, and agency officials indicate this communication 
is beneficial to providing real-time feedback, there is little to no 
feedback after the operation to determine whether the warfighters' 
needs were met. Officials indicate that the fast pace of operations in 
theater affects the ability of end users to provide feedback on every 
ISR mission. For example, according to Marine Corps officials, there is 
a mechanism for Marine Corps units to provide feedback, but the 
feedback is not consistently provided because there is no systematic 
process in place to ensure that this feedback is captured. Without 
developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables 
it to assess the extent to which ISR assets are successful in 
supporting warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the 
true demand for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and 
tasking its ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new 
systems that best support warfighting needs. 

Conclusions: 

DOD has achieved operational success with UAS in ongoing operations, 
but it continues to face operational challenges that limit its ability 
to fully optimize the use of these assets. These operational challenges 
have been exacerbated by the lack of advance coordination when new 
assets are being deployed in theater. While operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have been ongoing for some time, the potential exists for 
DOD to need to establish operations in other areas of the world very 
quickly. A DOD-wide procedure for advance coordination is critical to 
enable DOD to quickly support ISR assets once deployed to ongoing 
operations. Until DOD takes steps to address the need for DOD-wide 
advance coordination, it may be limited in its ability to efficiently 
deploy and utilize UAS assets and may not allow the combatant commander 
time to plan to support incoming assets. 

With the operational successes that have been realized with UAS, 
commanders are requesting them in greater numbers. In spite of a 
dramatic increase in UAS funding, DOD officials indicate that annual 
allocation levels are constrained by the number of ISR assets in the 
inventory and JFCC-ISR is, therefore, not able to allocate to the 
combatant commanders DOD ISR assets in sufficient numbers to meet all 
requests for ISR support. However, our work indicates that DOD's 
approach to UAS may not leverage all of the DOD ISR assets currently 
available and DOD may not be in the best position to determine if 
perceived demand is well-founded. Given the substantial investment DOD 
is making in UAS and the increasing demand for them, it is critical 
that DOD's approach to managing its ISR assets, including UAS, allow it 
to optimize the use of these assets. Without an approach to its 
allocation and tasking processes that considers all ISR capabilities, 
DOD may not be in a position to leverage all available ISR assets and 
to optimize the use of those assets. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility 
over the true demand for and use of ISR assets, which could hinder its 
ability to make informed decisions about the need to purchase 
additional UAS assets and what quantities should be purchased. 
Furthermore, without developing metrics and systematically gathering 
feedback that enables DOD to assess the extent to which ISR missions 
are successful in supporting warfighter needs, decision makers may not 
be in a position to determine which UAS systems would best support the 
warfighters' needs. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To mitigate challenges in integrating UAS, and other ISR assets, into 
combat operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the service secretaries and combatant commanders, take 
the following three actions: 

* establish DOD-wide requirements for coordinating with the combatant 
commanders in advance of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; 

* develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DOD; 
and: 

* establish a mechanism to ensure the services comply with these 
requirements. 

To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets 
when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for: 

* obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national, 
and allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders' area 
of operations; and: 

* allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational 
awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not 
prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do. 

To improve DOD's ability to evaluate the performance of its ISR 
missions, we recommend the Secretary of Defense: 

* establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and 
quantitative metrics; 

* develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from 
intelligence and operations communities to assess how effective ISR 
assets are in meeting warfighters' requirements; and: 

* create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD's 
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 
with all of our recommendations. DOD generally agreed with our 
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 
service secretaries and combatant commanders, establish DOD-wide 
requirements for coordinating with the combatant commanders in advance 
of bringing UAS into the theater of operations; develop a plan for 
communicating those requirements throughout DOD; and establish a 
mechanism to ensure the services comply with these requirements. DOD 
noted that it currently has a well-defined process to coordinate with 
the combatant commanders on the introduction of UAS into theater and 
cited several examples including the annual process for allocating 
theater-level UAS, and actions between stateside units and units in 
theater to plan for deployment of ISR capabilities. DOD, however, 
acknowledged that a more standardized method could improve efficiency 
of the coordination process and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
would be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process and 
evaluate and provide direction for an improved coordination process. 
Further, DOD noted that, based on this evaluation, if direction is 
required, it will be issued via a Chairman's directive which is 
mandatory and therefore establishes the mechanism that ensures 
compliance. We recognize that DOD has various processes related to UAS 
but note that none, including the examples cited by DOD, represent a 
standardized, DOD-wide approach that the services and combatant 
commanders can follow in coordinating the specific details of deploying 
UAS assets, regardless of geographic area. Furthermore, we believe that 
a directive requiring coordination, by itself, does not ensure 
compliance, and would encourage DOD to include provisions detailing how 
implementation of the directive will be monitored. 

DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary 
of Defense develop a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR 
assets--including all DOD, national, and allied assets--operating in 
each of the combatant commanders' area of operations; and allowing 
users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational awareness 
on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the 
mission, what they are being used to do. Specifically, DOD agrees that 
a mechanism for obtaining information on all ISR assets is needed and 
commented that work is underway within the JFCC-ISR to develop such a 
mechanism. DOD commented that it is not currently practical to provide 
situational awareness on some UAS such as the small, hand-launched UAS 
at the lowest operational level because these systems do not have the 
capacity or capability to communicate their position to a common point. 
DOD noted that it will determine the UAS operational levels that will 
provide widespread situational awareness, including operational details 
and timelines of data reporting. We recognize that situational 
awareness may not currently be practical for some UAS but would 
encourage the department to seek to maximize coverage in exploring 
options for improved situational awareness. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
establish DOD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and 
quantitative metrics and stated that JFCC-ISR is standing up an 
Assessments Division that will be responsible for the development of 
metrics. We recognize the Assessment Division has been tasked with 
development of ISR metrics and reemphasize the need to develop 
milestones for metrics development. DOD partially concurred with our 
recommendations that it develop a process for systematically capturing 
feedback from intelligence and operations communities to assess how 
effective ISR assets are in meeting warfighters' requirements and 
create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DOD's 
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its ISR assets. DOD agreed that 
an improved and standardized process for collection and reporting of 
feedback would enhance visibility and provide more effective warfighter 
support, but pointed out that organizations within the department 
collect feedback or conduct lessons learned studies. We acknowledge 
that DOD has organizations such as the Army's Center for Lessons 
Learned that are responsible for capturing feedback and developing 
lessons learned based on that feedback. However, these organizations 
are charged with capturing lessons learned on a number of issues and 
are not focused on ISR effectiveness. Furthermore, our recommendation 
pertains to DOD's guidance which states it is imperative that 
intelligence personnel and consumers to evaluate and provide immediate 
feedback on how well individual intelligence operations perform to meet 
commanders' intelligence requirements. While the feedback that may be 
captured by those lessons learned organizations is noteworthy, it is 
often not immediate and specific to individual missions. As we noted in 
our report, DOD officials acknowledged that feedback specific to how 
ISR assets performed in individual ISR missions is not consistently 
occurring. DOD further commented that it has mechanisms in place to 
inform its decision making processes on the acquisition, allocation, 
and tasking of its ISR assets such as the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System which assesses, among other things, 
capability gaps and solutions. We agree that the mechanisms mentioned 
in DOD's response exist; however, DOD currently does not have 
sufficient qualitative and quantitative metrics needed to collect data 
on UAS performance nor does it have a means for incorporating such data 
into the processes currently used to make decisions on ISR assets. 

The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II. 
DOD also provided technical comments separately and we have made 
adjustments where appropriate. In particular, the Army provided 
additional information on the coordination of the Warrior Alpha UAS in 
its technical comments, including a timeline for introduction of the 
asset into theater. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. We 
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions regarding 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff members who 
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Sharon Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken 
steps to facilitate the integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
into combat operations, we examined DOD and military service 
publications and documentation on UAS such as the 2005-2030 UAS 
Roadmap, the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 
Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Joint Concept of 
Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the Concept of Operations for 
Employment of Full Motion Video Assets, and the ISR Systems Concept of 
Operations Standardization Memo. Additionally, we met with key DOD and 
service officials, including those from the Joint UAS Center of 
Excellence and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Planning Task Force within 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Land Sea Application Center. We 
also met with officials from U.S. Central Command and the services, 
including units that had returned from deployment to the theater, or 
that were currently supporting ongoing operations, to discuss the 
integration of UAS into U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility 
and to better understand integration challenges. 

To determine the extent to which DOD's approach to allocating and 
tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets, including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize 
their capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials, 
including those from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air 
Force component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al 
Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations. 
We interviewed and obtained documentation including the fiscal year 
2007 ISR allocation briefing from officials of the Joint Functional 
Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to 
better understand the allocation process. We also reviewed 
documentation such as joint publications and briefings that explain the 
process for tasking ISR assets and interviewed officials at U.S. 
Central Command, Central Command Air Forces, and the Combined Air 
Operations Center in Qatar to better understand how ISR assets are 
assigned to specific missions. To understand how requests for ISR 
support are generated and satisfied at the tactical level, we spoke 
with units that recently returned from, or are currently supporting, 
ongoing operations in Iraq as well as units within the services such as 
the Marine Corps' Tactical Fusion Center that are involved in 
determining if tactical assets are available to satisfy those requests 
or if the requests need to be forwarded for theater-level support. To 
understand how manned and unmanned assets are being leveraged to 
optimize the intelligence captured, we met with manned and unmanned 
units stationed at the Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. 
To understand DOD's ongoing efforts to study its process for tasking 
ISR assets, we reviewed documentation and interviewed an official from 
the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board. 

To assess whether DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, 
including UAS, to ensure that warfighters' needs are met, we 
interviewed DOD and service officials to discuss the metrics for 
evaluating the performance of its ISR assets. We discussed with the 
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance its efforts to establish metrics for evaluating ISR 
assets performance. We reviewed metrics routinely captured to assess 
the success of DOD's ISR missions. We also met with service officials 
and service units recently returned from Iraq to determine the extent 
to which feedback is received on how effective ISR support is in 
meeting the warfighters' needs. We performed our work from June 2006 to 
June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

Jun 21 2007: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Pickup: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, GAO-
07-836, "Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased 
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities," dated May 15, 2007 (GAO 
Code 350891). 

The Department concurs with the draft report's recommendations 2, 4 
(first bullet), and 5. The Department partially concurs with 
recommendations 1, 3, 4 (second bullet), 6, and 7. The rationale for 
the Department's position is enclosed. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Technical comments were provided separately. For further 
questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dyke Weatherington 
at (703) 695-6188. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern:
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated May 15, 2007 GAO-07-836 (GAO Code 350891): 

"Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased 
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders, 
establish DoD-wide requirements for coordinating with the Combatant 
Commanders in advance of bringing unmanned aircraft systems into the 
theater of operations. 

DoD Response: Partial Concur, The Department currently has a well 
defined process to coordinate with the Combatant Commanders for 
introduction of programmed Unmanned Aircraft Systems (OAS) into the 
specific theater of operations. Currently there are several processes 
at the theater and organic levels, including ones to address Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration/Joint Concept Technology Demonstration 
capabilities. The Global Force Management Allocation process is used 
for theater-level assets (Global Hawk, Hunter, Predator, and Reaper). 
For tactical-level UAS (Shadow, Raven, Pioneer), units conduct planning 
actions with theater counterparts to include the intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that will be 
deployed. Demonstration capabilities are coordinated by the host unit 
and may follow either of the above processes. The Department agrees 
that a more standardized method could improve efficiency of the 
coordination process, while allowing for the wide range of UAS 
capabilities and levels of command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
will be tasked to look at standardizing the coordination process to 
improve efficiency. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders, 
develop a plan for communicating those requirements throughout DoD. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Department concurs that during the 
coordination process, specific Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
requirements can be better articulated between the Military Services 
and Combatant Commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be tasked to 
evaluate and provide direction, if required, to the Military Services 
and Combatant Commanders for an improved coordination process focused 
on theater operation-specific UAS deployment requirements. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Service secretaries and Combatant Commanders, 
establish a mechanism to ensure the Services comply with these 
requirements. 

DoD Response: Partial Concur, Based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
evaluation, if direction is required, it will be provided through a 
Chairman's Directive, which is mandatory and therefore establishes the 
mechanism that ensures the Military Services comply with Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems requirements during coordination. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
develop a mechanism for: 

* obtaining information on all intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets, including all DoD, national, and allied assets 
operating in each of the Combatant Commander's area of operations; and: 

* allowing users at all levels within DoD to gain real-time situational 
awareness on where DoD intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
assets are operating and, where not prohibited by the mission, what 
they are being used to do, 

DoD Response: Concur with the first bullet. This task is currently 
being undertaken by USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command - 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Partial 
Concur with the second bullet. Real-time situational awareness on small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (OAS) operations is currently not practical. 
These hand-launched systems are employed at the lowest operational 
level and as such, do not have the capacity or capability to feed their 
position to a common operational picture. The Department will determine 
the UAS operational levels that will provide wide-spread situational 
awareness, including operational details and timeliness of data 
reporting. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
establish DoD-wide milestones for development of qualitative and 
quantitative metrics. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Joint Functional Component Command - 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance is currently standing up 
an Assessments Division that will be responsible for development of 
metrics for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance operations. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
develop a process for systematically capturing feedback from 
intelligence and operations communities to assess how effective 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets are in meeting 
warfighters' requirements. 

DoD Response: Partial Concur. The Department currently captures 
feedback from the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
operations across the range of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
capabilities, Organizations, such as the Joint Forces Command's Joint 
Warfare Center and the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned, conduct 
ongoing feedback collection operations. Additionally, all the Military 
Services conduct their own lessons-learned studies, The Joint Staffs 
UAS Center of Excellence consolidates all the Military Services' 
feedback and makes it available across the DoD. The Department agrees 
that an improved and standardized collection and reporting process will 
enhance visibility across the range of UAS process will enhance 
visibility across the range of UAS operations and allow better 
integration of all DoD capabilities to address shortfalls and provide 
more effective warfighter support. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
create a mechanism to ensure this information is used to inform DoD's 
acquisition, allocation, and tasking of its intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance assets. 

DoD Response: Partial Concur. There are already mechanisms in place to 
get information to DoD in regard to acquisition, allocation, and 
tasking of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 
For acquisition, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
Systems (JCIDS), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
3170.01F, Capabilities Based Assessment is the DoD mechanism for 
assessing how well current and programmed warfighting systems are 
meeting required warfighter needs; determining capability gaps that 
require solutions, and determining the associated timeframes in which 
those solutions are required. In addition, JCIDS identifies potential 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities solutions, The Joint Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) Materiel Review Board is the focal point within the JCIDS 
process to address specific joint UAS acquisition issues, including 
feedback from Combatant Commanders and Military Services. For 
allocation and tasking, there is a satisfaction/feedback "workbench" in 
place within the Planning tool for Resource Integration, 
Synchronization and Management collection management tool. With these 
types of mechanisms in place, the challenge for the Department becomes 
one of educating the ISR community that mechanisms exist, and 
continuing to improve timeliness and efficiency of the process. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Patty Lentini, Assistant 
Director; Renee Brown; Jamie Khanna; Kate Lenane; LaShawnda Lindsey; 
Elisha Matvay; and Susan Tindall made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems. GAO-07-578. 
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New 
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development. GAO-07-596T. 
Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies 
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.: 
April 6, 2006. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments. GAO-06-49. 
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning 
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 9, 2005. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Figures include procurement, operations and maintenance, and 
research, development and evaluation funding provided through DOD's 
regular appropriations and do not include funding provided in 
supplemental appropriations. 

[2] This number represents the number of unmanned aircraft including 
test and training assets, rather than unmanned aircraft systems, which 
include aircraft, sensors, communications equipment, and ground control 
stations. 

[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively 
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005). 

[4] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition 
Strategies Can Help Address Operational Challenges, GAO-06-610T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

[5] The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 
Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems was prepared under the 
direction of representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force for use 
by their respective commands and other commands as appropriate. The 
Joint Concept of Operations for UAS was prepared under the direction of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

[6] GAO-06-49. 

[7] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-163 § 141 (2006), required that the Secretary of Defense 
take such steps to ensure that all service tactical unmanned aerial 
vehicles (except those for which the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has waived this requirement 
through the procedures outlined in the Act) are equipped and configured 
so that the data link used is the Tactical Common Data Link and those 
vehicles use data formats consistent with the architectural standard 
for tactical UAS. Use of the tactical common data link will allow UAS 
to be programmed to a wider range of frequencies, thus reducing 
dependence on the currently congested frequencies such as C band. 

[8] A full-motion video-capable asset has the capability to collect and 
transmit real-time full-motion video imagery. 

[9] Some missions, such as special operations are classified and it is 
not always appropriate to share specifics of the missions. 

[10] GAO-06-49. 

[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National 
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, page III-56 (Oct. 7, 
2004). 

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