GAO-07-651, Hurricane Katrina: EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection Efforts Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast


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entitled 'Hurricane Katrina: EPA's Current and Future Environmental 
Protection Effects Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and 
Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast' which was released on June 25, 
2007. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

June 2007: 

Hurricane Katrina: 

EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection Efforts Could Be 
Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced on the Gulf Coast: 

GAO-07-651: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-651, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s impact on the Gulf Coast included damage 
to the environment from chemical and hazardous materials releases. 
Also, the widespread demolition and renovation activities still under 
way in New Orleans may release asbestos fibers into the air, posing a 
potential additional health risk. This report, conducted at the 
Comptroller General’s initiative, addresses (1) the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) actions to assess and mitigate Katrina’s 
environmental impacts, (2) the extent to which EPA has assurance that 
public health is protected from asbestos inhalation risks in New 
Orleans, (3) the extent to which EPA’s environmental health risk 
communications provided useful information to the public, and (4) 
challenges EPA faces in addressing environmental impacts. 

What GAO Found: 

Under challenging circumstances, EPA worked with federal and state 
partners to respond to chemical and oil spills, collect abandoned 
chemical containers, coordinate recycling of damaged appliances, and 
collect and recycle electronic waste. EPA also conducted air, water, 
sediment, and soil sampling; helped assess drinking water and 
wastewater infrastructures; and issued timely information to the public 
on a variety of environmental health risks. 

However, as cleanup continues, EPA’s assurance that public health is 
protected from risks associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers is 
limited because the agency has not deployed air monitors in and around 
New Orleans neighborhoods where demolition and renovation activities 
are concentrated. While EPA took steps to monitor asbestos after the 
hurricane —for example, more than doubling the number of ambient 
(outdoor) air monitors and monitoring emissions at debris reduction 
sites—monitors were not placed in areas undergoing substantial 
demolition and renovation, such as the Ninth Ward. This is problematic 
because monitors effectively detect releases of asbestos from 
demolition activities only if they are located immediately adjacent to 
demolition sites. Further, many thousands of homes being demolished and 
renovated by or for individual homeowners are generally not subject to 
EPA’s asbestos emissions standards aimed at limiting releases of fibers 
into the air. 

While EPA provided useful environmental health risk information to the 
public via flyers, public service announcements, and the EPA Web page, 
the communications were at times unclear and inconsistent on how to 
mitigate exposure to some contaminants, particularly asbestos and mold. 
Further, the usefulness of three key reports on EPA’s environmental 
sampling in New Orleans—developed with, among others, the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality to address potential health risks 
from exposure to floodwaters, sediments, and air—was limited by a lack 
of timeliness and insufficient disclosures about EPA’s sampling 
program. For example, EPA did not state until August 2006 that its 
December 2005 report—which said that the great majority of the data 
showed that adverse health effects would not be expected from exposure 
to sediments from previously flooded areas—applied to short-term 
visits, such as to view damage to homes. 

Mitigating several challenges EPA faces addressing Hurricane Katrina 
could better protect the environment in the future. First, EPA did not 
remove hazardous materials from national wildlife refuges in a timely 
manner as part of its response in part because disaster assistance 
funding generally is not used for debris cleanups on federal lands. 
Second, because states generally have authority over landfill 
decisions, EPA does not have an effective role in emergency debris 
disposal decisions that could cause pollution. Finally, lack of clarity 
in federal debris management plans and protocols precluded the timely 
and safe disposal of some appliances and electronic waste. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that EPA develop an asbestos air monitoring plan for New 
Orleans, improve its communications on environmental risks for future 
disasters, and take steps to address several challenges EPA has faced. 
EPA agreed with all but one recommendation, commenting that other 
agencies should address the challenge of obtaining timely funding for 
the removal of hazardous materials from federal lands after disasters. 
GAO modified its recommendation to include additional relevant agencies 
with which EPA should work to address the problem GAO identified. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-651]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact John Stephenson at (202) 
512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

EPA Has Taken Numerous Actions to Mitigate and Assess the Environmental 
Impacts of Katrina: 

EPA's Air Monitoring for Releases of Asbestos Fibers in New Orleans 
Does Not Adequately Address Neighborhoods with Substantial Building 
Demolition and Renovation Activities: 

Some Shortcomings in EPA's Communications on Environmental Health Risks 
Have Limited the Communications' Usefulness to the Public: 

EPA Faced Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating Some Environmental 
Impacts of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Abbreviations: 

C&D: construction and demolition: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act: 

Corps: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

NIOSH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health: 

OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration: 

RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: 

June 25, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

The scope and severity of the destruction that Hurricane Katrina caused 
on the Gulf Coast in 2005 are staggering. More than 1,600 people lost 
their lives and more than a million were driven from their homes, many 
still unable to return. Moreover, tens of thousands of homes in New 
Orleans were flooded, many requiring either demolition or gutting 
before reconstruction. This natural disaster affected an area of over 
90,000 square miles, destroying or severely damaging not only countless 
buildings but also bridges, roads, and the area's power and 
communications infrastructures. Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the 
environment as well: Millions of gallons of oil and unknown quantities 
of potentially hazardous chemicals were released into the 
environment.[Footnote 1] Hazardous materials--such as industrial drums 
containing toxic and flammable chemicals, asbestos-containing 
materials, household chemicals, paints, pesticides, and propane tanks-
-were commingled with the storm's unprecedented levels of other debris, 
slowing its collection and disposal. The environmental contamination 
caused by this natural disaster could have both short-and long-term 
effects on the health of residents in affected areas, as well as on 
workers, volunteers, and wildlife. 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
establishes programs and processes for the federal government to 
provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local 
governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private 
nonprofit organizations. Under the Stafford Act, state governors may 
request assistance from the federal government when an incident 
overwhelms state and local resources. Such assistance has been--and to 
some extent continues to be--provided to the Gulf Coast under the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Response Plan. This 
plan serves as a basis for how federal departments and agencies are to 
work together with state, local, and tribal governments and the private 
sector in managing incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, 
including a major disaster such as Hurricane Katrina that was 
determined to be an "incident of national significance." Key federal 
agencies with responsibilities for supporting and implementing state 
and local recovery efforts in the Gulf Coast include DHS's Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

EPA serves as the coordinator of emergency support for the oil and 
hazardous materials response, 1 of 15 emergency support functions 
identified in the National Response Plan. When the National Response 
Plan is activated, EPA and the Coast Guard are the primary agencies 
that provide federal support in response to actual or potential 
discharges of oil or hazardous materials, including assessments and 
cleanups. The National Response Plan incorporates many aspects of the 
National Contingency Plan, a plan for responding to releases of oil or 
hazardous materials.[Footnote 2] This plan implements provisions of the 
Clean Water Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, also called the 
Superfund law).Under the Superfund law, EPA conducts short-term 
cleanups to address immediate threats to communities from actual or 
potential releases of hazardous substances and conducts or oversees 
long-term cleanups of the nation's Superfund sites. 

EPA also has a role in assisting other agencies that are coordinating 
other emergency support functions under the National Response Plan, 
including public works and engineering (assisting with such tasks as 
contaminated debris management) and public health and medical services 
response (providing such support as technical assistance in assessing 
the health aspects of situations involving hazardous materials). Aside 
from the emergency support roles defined in the plan, EPA enforces key 
environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act. To facilitate the 
removal of the extraordinary amounts of debris in Louisiana and 
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, EPA is not enforcing certain Clean 
Air Act emissions standards for asbestos in the case of government- 
ordered demolitions of homes. In addition, these emissions standards 
generally do not apply to the demolition or renovation of homes by or 
for individual homeowners. Nevertheless, because asbestos inhaled into 
the lungs can cause cancer, it is important for EPA to ensure that 
public health risks are minimized during the demolition and renovation 
of buildings containing asbestos, activities that can release asbestos 
fibers into the air. 

In this context, we (1) reviewed EPA's actions under the National 
Response Plan to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina, (2) determined the extent to which EPA has assurance 
that public health in New Orleans is being protected from asbestos 
inhalation health risks posed by extensive demolition activities, (3) 
determined the extent to which EPA's communications on environmental 
health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided useful 
information to the public, and (4) identified challenges EPA has faced 
in addressing environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina that, if 
mitigated, could enable EPA to better protect the environment in future 
disasters. Because of the widespread congressional interest in these 
subjects, we are conducting this work at the Comptroller General's 
initiative. 

In conducting our work, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, 
DHS's National Response Plan, federal and state protocols related to 
the hazardous materials response to Katrina, and evaluations of the 
federal government's Katrina response actions. We also reviewed, for 
example, EPA planning documents, environmental risk assessment 
summaries and related communications, and federal guidance to state and 
local agencies related to the 2005 hurricane response. We interviewed 
officials from EPA's Office of Emergency Management, Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Office of Water, Office of Air 
and Radiation, and Office of Solid Waste, among other headquarters 
offices. We met with EPA officials in Regions 4 and 6 in Mississippi 
and Louisiana, visited EPA's Incident Command Centers in Mississippi 
and Louisiana, and toured affected areas in both states. We also 
interviewed federal officials from FEMA, the Department of Health and 
Human Services' Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service. In addition, we interviewed state and local officials involved 
with EPA's response efforts from the Louisiana and Mississippi 
Departments of Environmental Quality and from Jefferson, Plaquemines, 
Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana and from Jackson, 
Hancock, and Harrison Counties in Mississippi. We also spoke with 
national and regional stakeholder groups, including the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, the 
Louisiana Environmental Action Network, the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil 
and Gas Association, the Mississippi Environmental Recovery Alliance, 
the Mississippi Power Company, and Sierra Club chapters in Louisiana 
and Mississippi. In determining the extent to which EPA's 
communications on Hurricane Katrina's environmental health risks 
provided useful information to the public, we focused on the 
communications themselves and did not evaluate the agency's 
environmental risk assessment methodology. (See app. I for a more 
detailed description of the scope and methodology of our review.) We 
conducted our work from November 2005 through June 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Under challenging circumstances, EPA conducted a wide variety of 
activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina. As of December 2006, EPA had spent an estimated $416 
million on its hurricane response and, at its peak, employed about 
1,600 staff and contractors on response activities. For example, EPA 
and its contractors, along with other federal and state partners, have 
responded to chemical and oil spills at industrial facilities; have 
collected over 200,000 large abandoned containers, such as drums and 
tanks; and continue to oversee cleanup of a million-gallon oil spill at 
a facility in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, that affected neighboring 
homes. EPA has also coordinated recycling efforts for damaged 
refrigerators and other appliances (referred to as "white goods") to 
remove chlorofluorocarbons and other refrigerants that are harmful to 
the environment from 380,000 abandoned refrigerators, freezers, and air 
conditioners. In addition, EPA helped collect and recycle over 660,000 
units of electronic waste and removed and safely disposed of almost 5 
million household hazardous waste containers, such as paint cans and 
propane tanks. Because of the extensive number of home demolitions and 
renovations that have yet to be completed in the New Orleans area, 
debris removal from uninhabited residences is far from complete. 
Regarding assessing the environmental contamination caused by the 
hurricane, EPA conducted air, water, and sediment and soil sampling for 
chemicals of potential concern in Louisiana and Mississippi. In 
particular, EPA reports having collected about 1,800 sediment and soil 
samples since September 2005 in and around New Orleans. EPA has 
analyzed most of these samples for over 200 potentially harmful metals 
and organic chemicals. In coordination with state and local partners, 
including the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, EPA 
concluded that, in general, the sediments left behind by the flooding 
are not expected to cause adverse health impacts to individuals 
returning to New Orleans. In addition, EPA helped both the Louisiana 
and Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality perform 4,000 
drinking water and wastewater infrastructure assessments to help bring 
these facilities back online as quickly as possible. 

However, as cleanup continues, EPA's assurance that the public health 
is being protected from the risks associated with the inhalation of 
asbestos fibers is limited because the agency has not deployed air 
monitors in and around neighborhoods in New Orleans where demolition 
and renovation activities are concentrated. EPA took steps to monitor 
asbestos after Hurricane Katrina, initially more than doubling the 
ambient (outdoor) air monitors that were in the area before the storm 
and then conducting emissions monitoring at specific sites, such as 
landfills, that involve waste handling or debris reduction activities-
-for example, grinding. However, EPA has neither conducted emissions 
monitoring at demolition sites nor placed ambient air monitors in 
neighborhoods with substantial demolition and renovation activities. 
For example, no monitors have been located in the Ninth Ward, where 
flooding was widespread and extensive demolition and renovation are 
occurring. This is problematic because, according to officials from 
EPA's Office of Research and Development, monitors are effective in 
detecting asbestos emissions from demolitions only if they are located 
immediately adjacent to the sites. Further, in July 2006, the agency 
scaled back its ambient monitoring to the prestorm level and reduced 
the frequency of sampling. EPA said it based this decision, in part, on 
not having found measurable amounts of asbestos in the air samples. 
However, EPA's expanded monitoring covered only the first few months of 
demolition activities. For these reasons, the results may not be 
representative of asbestos exposures in some neighborhoods. Further, 
for building demolition and renovation activities, EPA regulates 
asbestos emissions by setting standards for work practices. However, 
EPA's asbestos work practice standards generally do not apply to the 
demolition or renovation of a residential building by or for an 
individual homeowner. In addition, to help expedite cleanup and 
rebuilding, EPA is not enforcing some of the work practice standards 
for certain residences under government demolition orders, although for 
these demolitions, some work practice standards--such as the wetting of 
materials from before demolition through disposal in order to control 
emissions--are still required. The fact that many thousands of 
demolitions and renovations may occur in the same geographic area and 
in the same general time frame--some of which are not subject to the 
enforcement of certain asbestos work practice standards while others 
are not subject to the standards at all--represents a potential health 
problem that warrants monitoring. 

In addition, while EPA provided a substantial amount of useful 
information to the public on environmental health risks using reports 
(environmental assessment summaries), flyers, public service 
announcements, and EPA's Web page, the usefulness of this information 
was limited in several ways. Specifically, some key communications 
about the environmental contamination in New Orleans stemming from 
Hurricane Katrina were not timely or complete. For example, EPA's 
communications about the potential health risks from environmental 
contamination--three environmental assessment summaries prepared with, 
among others, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality--were 
released about 3, 6, and 11 months after the hurricane, limiting their 
usefulness to residents who would have benefited from more timely 
information about the environmental health risks they could face when 
returning home. Further, EPA did not disclose until August 2006 that 
its December 2005 assessment summary--which said that the great 
majority of the data showed that adverse health effects would not be 
expected from exposure to sediments from previously flooded areas-- 
applied to short-term visits, such as to view damage to homes. In 
addition, the summaries do not disclose an important EPA assumption-- 
that the results of sediment samples from streets and other outdoor 
public access areas can be extrapolated to private properties, such as 
yards and the inside of homes. This is important because, for example, 
environmental contamination levels inside buildings can be 
significantly higher than and different from the contamination outside, 
potentially causing more adverse health effects. Finally, some of EPA's 
flyers and other public service communications provided unclear and 
inconsistent information on actions residents should take to mitigate 
exposure to contaminants that were likely to be found in many homes. 
For example, the most widely distributed flyer on environmental health 
risks stated that buildings constructed before 1970 are likely to 
contain asbestos, while a document on debris and damaged buildings on 
EPA's Web page stated that all structures built before 1975 may contain 
significant amounts of asbestos and that structures built after 1975 
may also contain asbestos. EPA also used varying and confusing terms 
when identifying the respiratory protection that residents should wear 
in many cases when cleaning up their homes. 

EPA faced some challenges in addressing the environmental impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina that, if mitigated, could better enable EPA to 
protect the environment in future disasters. 

* First, EPA did not remove clearly visible abandoned chemical drums 
and tanks from several national wildlife refuges in Louisiana in a 
timely manner as part of its Katrina response activities in part 
because FEMA disaster assistance funding generally is not used for 
debris cleanups on federal lands. As a result, more than a year later, 
debris containing hazardous materials continued to pose an 
environmental threat to natural resources at several national wildlife 
refuges, and at least one major refuge remained closed to the public. 
While the Fish and Wildlife Service obtained funding for this activity 
as part of a June 2006 supplemental appropriation and signed 
interagency agreements with EPA and the Coast Guard to obtain these 
agencies' assistance in the fall of 2006, the delay in removing the 
debris from this and other wildlife refuges complicated and increased 
the cost of its removal--some of which is not yet completed. 

* Second, EPA's debris management role is limited under federal law and 
the National Response Plan; consequently, its guidance to states and 
localities on planning for disposal of disaster debris could be 
especially important in helping ensure that hazardous storm debris is 
disposed of in landfills with appropriate safeguards, thereby 
preventing contaminants from migrating and causing air, soil, or water 
pollution. However, while EPA's 1995 guide on planning for disposal of 
disaster debris acknowledges that such debris can overwhelm existing 
landfills or force communities to use disposal options that otherwise 
would not be acceptable, the guide does not make specific suggestions 
for addressing these potential problems--such as studying potential 
sites for future use--or practices that state agencies should consider 
when making special debris disposal accommodations following 
disasters.[Footnote 3] Along these lines, in its emergency orders 
following Hurricane Katrina, the state of Louisiana made decisions 
about landfill sites and the disposal of debris that some studies 
indicate could have long-term, negative environmental impacts. 

* Finally, because of a lack of clarity in the National Response Plan 
and the absence of interagency protocols about federal roles in debris 
management, EPA, in the immediate aftermath of the storms, could not 
ensure that debris such as white goods and electronic waste was handled 
in a timely and appropriate manner that mitigated the potential for 
environmental contamination. Local officials in both Louisiana and 
Mississippi told us that confusion about responsibility for this work 
resulted in delays in removing and disposing of the debris, creating 
the potential in the weeks following Katrina that it was improperly 
disposed of in landfills. 

We are making recommendations to EPA to implement an asbestos 
monitoring plan that addresses the potential health impacts in New 
Orleans from ongoing extensive demolition and renovation activities, 
improve its future communications to the public on environmental risks 
resulting from disasters, and take several actions to better enable the 
agency to minimize environmental risks following disasters. In 
commenting on a draft of this report, EPA's Associate Administrator for 
Homeland Security agreed with all but one of the recommendations. 
Specifically, EPA agreed with the recommendations to provide additional 
asbestos air monitoring in New Orleans, improve environmental health 
risk communications following disasters, provide more guidance to 
states on managing debris disposal following disasters, and clarify 
debris management roles with the Army Corps of Engineers. However, EPA 
disagreed with our recommendation that the agency convene a working 
group that includes potentially affected federal land management 
agencies and the Coast Guard to develop protocols or memorandums of 
understanding on the steps the agencies should take to obtain disaster 
funding for environmental cleanups on federal lands in the future--and 
thereby address damage to federal lands and wildlife in a timely and 
efficient manner. Rather, EPA asserted that this recommendation would 
be more appropriately addressed to the Department of the Interior and 
FEMA. We continue to believe that EPA should be involved in helping 
resolve these issues because, under the National Response Plan, EPA is 
the chair of the National Response Team, whose duties include national 
planning and response coordination for oil and hazardous materials 
incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined to provide funding to 
the Department of the Interior for cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, and 
DHS, which coordinates the federal response to such incidents as major 
disasters under the National Response Plan, should also take part in 
planning efforts to resolve funding issues concerning the removal of 
hazardous materials from federal lands following a disaster. 
Accordingly, we have modified our recommendation to state that EPA 
should also work with DHS and FEMA, as well as with federal land 
management agencies and the Coast Guard, to determine what actions are 
needed to ensure that environmental contamination on federal lands, 
such as national wildlife refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently 
addressed in future disasters. EPA also provided comments on aspects of 
the report it considered misleading or inaccurate, as well as technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA's letter and our 
detailed response to it appear in appendix II. 

Background: 

Issued in December 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's National 
Response Plan establishes a comprehensive framework for the management 
of domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. Hurricane 
Katrina marked the first time the National Response Plan was 
implemented in response to an "incident of national significance"--an 
actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated 
response by a combination of federal, state, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, or private-sector entities in order to save lives, 
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery 
and mitigation activities.[Footnote 4] The National Response Plan 
describes the structure and process of this national approach, sets 
forth federal roles and responsibilities, and includes 15 emergency 
support function annexes that describe the missions and 
responsibilities of federal agencies for coordinating resource and 
program support in specific disaster response areas. 

Under the National Response Plan, EPA serves as the coordinator of the 
federal emergency support function for oil and hazardous materials 
releases. Under this support function, both EPA and the U.S. Coast 
Guard are the primary agencies charged with providing the federal 
support, including assessments and cleanups in response to releases. 
According to the plan, EPA generally leads responses to inland 
releases, while the Coast Guard leads responses to releases in coastal 
zones. The National Response Plan incorporates the structures and 
response mechanisms of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan, the federal government's guide to oil and 
hazardous substances spill response under the Clean Water Act and the 
Superfund law. EPA's role under the National Response Plan and the 
National Contingency Plan is similar: providing response and recovery 
actions to minimize threats to public health, welfare, or the 
environment caused by the actual or potential release of oil and 
hazardous materials. However, in the context of providing major 
disaster assistance to the states under the Stafford Act, EPA's 
response is approved and funded by FEMA, while when it responds under 
the National Contingency Plan, EPA uses its own processes and funding, 
based on its authority under the Clean Water Act or Superfund law. 
Thus, in its Hurricane Katrina response, EPA actions were primarily 
funded by FEMA; however, EPA used Superfund authority and funding to 
test for contamination at Superfund sites in the affected Gulf Coast 
area. 

Under the National Response Plan, other agencies, including the 
Department of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) and the Department 
of Health and Human Services, are given supporting roles in the federal 
response to oil and hazardous materials releases. The Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps) is also the primary federal agency tasked with 
providing technical assistance, engineering, and construction 
management resources and support during response activities related to 
public works and engineering. Among other things, the Corps is 
responsible for providing debris removal and disposal and the repair, 
replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged public facilities. EPA 
provides support to the Corps for, among other activities, assessing 
drinking water supplies and wastewater and solid waste facilities. The 
Department of Health and Human Services is the primary federal agency 
tasked with assisting state, local, and tribal governments in 
identifying and meeting public health and medical services needs. 
Health and Human Services' responsibilities include providing medical 
care personnel, equipment, and supplies and coordinating with EPA and 
the Corps on water and wastewater issues, solid waste disposal issues, 
and other environmental health issues. The Department of Health and 
Human Services also determines the appropriateness of requests for 
public health and medical information.[Footnote 5] 

EPA can exercise its existing environmental authorities during disaster 
response activities. For example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA 
regulates emissions of volatile organic compounds in gasoline, which 
contribute to the formation of ground-level ozone. Also under the Clean 
Air Act, EPA regulates emissions of air toxics such as asbestos. Under 
the Superfund law, EPA responds to the actual or threatened release of 
hazardous substances that pose a threat to public health or welfare or 
the environment. In this regard, EPA maintains the National Priorities 
List, its: 

list of seriously contaminated Superfund sites.[Footnote 6] Under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA has a role in 
establishing criteria for classifying different types of solid waste 
disposal facilities (generally referred to as landfills) and solid 
waste disposal practices that may result in adverse effects on health 
or the environment. In order to facilitate response and recovery 
activities following the hurricanes, EPA exercised its enforcement 
discretion by issuing "no action assurance" letters stating that EPA 
would not enforce certain Clean Air Act requirements for building 
demolitions involving asbestos-containing material to facilitate debris 
removal in Louisiana and Mississippi. According to EPA, the agency also 
waived some Clean Air Act fuel requirements to prevent fuel supply 
interruptions in the months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

EPA Has Taken Numerous Actions to Mitigate and Assess the Environmental 
Impacts of Katrina: 

Under challenging circumstances, EPA conducted a wide variety of 
activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, EPA and federal and state partners 
have responded to chemical and oil spills at industrial facilities, 
collected abandoned chemical drums and tanks, and coordinated recycling 
efforts for damaged refrigerators and other appliances. EPA has also 
taken a number of actions to assess the environmental contamination 
caused by the hurricane, including conducting air, water, and sediment 
and soil sampling for chemicals of potential concern in Louisiana and 
Mississippi. 

EPA Has Conducted a Variety of Activities to Mitigate the Impacts of 
Oil Spills and Hazardous Materials Releases: 

As of December 2006, EPA had spent an estimated $416 million on a wide 
variety of activities to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts 
of the hurricanes.[Footnote 7] At its peak, EPA had about 1,600 staff 
and contractors working in the Gulf Coast region to assist with 
response and cleanup activities, as well as thousands of additional 
employees supporting the agency's response from headquarters and 
regional offices across the country.[Footnote 8] Because EPA's 
environmental protection responsibilities require it to be among the 
first federal agencies to arrive after a disaster, before Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall, EPA deployed personnel and resources to FEMA and 
state emergency operations centers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
and Florida to facilitate a quick response in the states threatened by 
Katrina. In this regard, the agency assumed an unanticipated role in 
New Orleans, joining federal, state, and local responders in the 
massive search and rescue efforts in the days following the storm. 
Using watercraft equipped to address oil and hazardous substances 
releases, EPA staff and contractors helped save nearly 800 residents 
from the New Orleans floodwaters. 

As the coordinator for the federal response to actual or potential oil 
and hazardous materials releases under the National Response Plan, EPA 
led efforts to evaluate and clean up such spills on land and in inland 
waters, while the Coast Guard led these efforts for spills into coastal 
waters.[Footnote 9] EPA conducted "reconnaissance" activities at the 
many industrial facilities, such as oil refineries and chemical plants, 
in the Gulf Coast area to identify and plan any cleanup needed as a 
result of Katrina's impact. Specifically, EPA conducted aerial and 
ground assessments of these facilities and used facility self- 
assessments to determine the magnitude of potential hazardous releases 
and to prioritize facilities needing additional assessments. EPA also 
conducted cleanups at stores selling chemicals for swimming pools, home 
repair and building supply stores, and other sites. Working with the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, EPA also evaluated 
potentially hazardous chemicals at over 350 chemistry and biology 
laboratories in schools in southern Louisiana, removing chemicals from 
more than 130 schools. 

In addition, EPA worked with the Coast Guard and the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality to oversee sampling and cleanup of 
a large oil spill at the Murphy Oil USA refinery in St. Bernard Parish, 
Louisiana. The floodwaters from Katrina had damaged a large aboveground 
storage tank at the refinery, releasing about 1 million gallons of 
mixed crude oil onto the facility and an adjacent residential 
neighborhood, affecting approximately 1,800 homes. EPA and the Coast 
Guard divided responsibility for overseeing Murphy Oil's voluntary 
cleanup of the spill. EPA worked with the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality to oversee Murphy Oil's cleanup in residential 
areas accessible to the public, such as parks, school yards, roads, and 
sidewalks.[Footnote 10] In addition, EPA is continuing to oversee 
Murphy Oil's soil sampling at residential and other properties--for 
example, by having 10 percent of the soil samples Murphy Oil collects 
analyzed by both Murphy Oil and a separate laboratory as a quality 
control measure. According to EPA officials, the agency will continue 
to oversee Murphy Oil's cleanup of affected areas until these 
activities are complete.[Footnote 11] 

Other EPA efforts to mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane 
Katrina have centered on managing the disposition of debris that may 
contain hazardous materials. Specifically, EPA established a plan to 
segregate, collect, and properly dispose of debris such as household 
hazardous waste (household cleaning chemicals, paints, and pesticides); 
electronic waste (computers, televisions, printers, DVD players, and 
other electronics); and white goods (large appliances such as air 
conditioners, dishwashers, refrigerators, stoves, and freezers). These 
items frequently contain contaminants, such as lead, mercury, or 
chlorofluorocarbons, that can enter the ground, water, or air if they 
are not disposed of properly. In both Louisiana and Mississippi, EPA 
organized neighborhood curbside pickups of household hazardous waste 
and circulated information about them; EPA also worked with local 
officials to establish collection and drop-off sites for debris that 
may contain hazardous materials. In addition, EPA established debris 
staging areas for sorting and categorizing industrial and household 
hazardous waste that EPA and its contractors had collected, draining 
and recycling hazardous chemicals, and ensuring that hazardous 
containers were disposed of properly. As of September 1, 2006, EPA's 
efforts to facilitate the appropriate disposal of debris that may 
contain hazardous materials had resulted in the: 

* collection of more than 5.1 million containers of potentially 
hazardous waste consisting of about 4.9 million small household 
containers and about 200,000 large abandoned containers, such as drums, 
tanks, and cylinders; 

* removal of the chlorofluorocarbons and other refrigerants that are 
harmful to the environment and recycling of 380,000 white goods; and: 

* collection and recycling of over 660,000 units of electronic waste. 

EPA Has Sampled the Air, Water, and Sediment and Soil in Affected Gulf 
Coast Areas to Identify and Assess Environmental Contamination Caused 
by the Storm: 

EPA also conducted numerous activities to identify and assess air, 
water, and sediment and soil contamination in Gulf Coast areas affected 
by Katrina. For example, EPA was concerned about the potential 
environmental impact of Katrina on the 24 Superfund sites in the 
affected Gulf Coast areas. These sites are on EPA's National Priorities 
List, which identifies the agency's highest-priority cleanup sites. 
Many of the Gulf Coast Superfund sites have been cleaned up and have 
remedies in place to maintain the standard of cleanup 
achieved.[Footnote 12] To determine whether the hurricane had caused 
additional contamination, from September 29 to October 14, 2005, EPA 
collected sediment, surface water, and groundwater samples at or near 
the 24 Superfund sites in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, 
comparing the samples obtained after the hurricane with pre-Katrina 
samples collected during remedial investigations or routine monitoring 
activities.[Footnote 13] EPA found that four sites in Louisiana had 
elevated contaminant levels, one with contaminants that had not been 
previously detected.[Footnote 14] Given the particular situations at 
these four Superfund sites, EPA determined that continued monitoring 
according to the sites' routine operation and maintenance plans would 
address these problems. On the basis of the sampling results, EPA 
concluded that the other 20 sites reviewed were not impacted by 
Katrina. Additionally, EPA Region 4 conducted soil and sediment samples 
near several industrial facilities in the affected areas of Mississippi 
to determine if flooding from Katrina had released hazardous materials. 
With one exception, the region found that there did not appear to be 
any indication of any potential releases due to the hurricane.[Footnote 
15] 

In addition, potential sources of air pollution that could occur as a 
result of a hurricane include spills of volatile chemicals, releases or 
leaks from industrial plants, dust from building demolition and debris 
transport, contaminated sediments that can be resuspended as dust, and 
smoke from open burning of debris. EPA began screening air quality in 
Louisiana and Mississippi in coordination with state departments of 
environmental quality on August 30, 2005, to provide initial air 
quality assessments. EPA employed such equipment as the agency's (1) 
Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology 
flying laboratory, equipment mounted in a small aircraft that can 
obtain detailed chemical information from a safe distance; and (2) 
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer mobile laboratories, which are self- 
contained units capable of real-time sampling and analysis, to conduct 
air monitoring immediately following Katrina. In addition, EPA worked 
with state partners to restore damaged or lost air quality monitoring 
stations. EPA has performed air sampling to test for contaminants such 
as lead, arsenic, asbestos fibers, volatile organic compounds, 
particulate matter, and other pollutants using temporary ambient air 
monitoring stations in Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Another key component of EPA's activities to assess the environmental 
impacts of Katrina focused on helping both Louisiana and Mississippi 
perform drinking water and wastewater infrastructure assessments. Many 
of these facilities along the Gulf Coast were damaged and became 
inoperable. EPA helped perform about 4,000 drinking water and 
wastewater infrastructure assessments to help bring these facilities 
back online as quickly as possible after the hurricane. Among other 
things, EPA provided assistance to help assess the status of both 
states' public water systems; helped collect and analyze drinking water 
samples, including providing mobile labs to help with this effort; and 
provided information to the public, such as flyers about drinking water 
quality. EPA's Office of Emergency Management also noted in its 
September 2006 annual report that EPA was working closely with FEMA and 
Louisiana and Mississippi state officials to establish long-term 
recovery plans, with an emphasis on water and wastewater 
infrastructure. 

EPA also coordinated with various federal and state agencies to test 
surface water bodies (such as rivers, lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico) 
and floodwaters in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Among 
other efforts, EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. 
Geological Survey coordinated an environmental impact assessment of the 
coastal waters throughout the affected region. By integrating response 
activities aboard two EPA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration survey and research vessels, small boat teams were able 
to characterize the magnitude and extent of the coastal contamination 
and ecological effects from these hurricanes. These efforts, which were 
conducted between September 27 and October 14, 2005, generally found 
that the water was safe for recreational use, including swimming. EPA 
also coordinated with the Mississippi Department of Environmental 
Quality to conduct a water quality study in the rivers and bays along 
the Mississippi coast in September 2005. The objective of this study 
was to provide sediment and water quality data on the major bay systems 
along the Mississippi Sound.[Footnote 16] According to this study, few 
pollutants were identified. 

The severe and sustained flooding of about 80 percent of New Orleans 
and large areas of Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes from Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita prompted EPA and the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality to test the floodwaters and the resulting 
sediment from the hurricanes. Because the flooded portions of the New 
Orleans area were below sea level and had little natural drainage, 
there were grave concerns about the environmental health risks as the 
floodwaters commingled with contaminants such as oil and gas from 
ruptured lines and storage tanks; sewage; and various chemicals leached 
from abandoned drums, containers, and vehicles. The additional storm 
surge from Hurricane Rita, which occurred about 1 month after Katrina, 
further exacerbated the situation when it reflooded much of New Orleans 
and the surrounding parishes. To determine the potential environmental 
effects of the floodwaters, EPA and the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality collected nearly 400 water samples of the flooded 
areas and also periodically collected samples from Lake Pontchartrain 
as the floodwaters were being pumped from the flooded areas around New 
Orleans into the lake. The samples from the floodwaters were tested for 
bacteria and about 200 chemicals. While numerous samples revealed 
elevated bacteria levels, EPA and the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality reported that this was expected, given the 
commingling of floodwaters with sewage collection system waters. 
Although a small number of samples contained concentrations of 
chemicals that exceeded short-term (i.e., 90 days) standards for dermal 
contact and incidental ingestion, the agencies concluded that there was 
realistically no circumstance that would lead to continuous exposure to 
the floodwaters beyond a few days.[Footnote 17] Unlike Louisiana, areas 
in Mississippi and Alabama hit by Katrina did not experience any 
sustained flooding, although they did experience severe damage from the 
hurricane's storm surge, high winds, and rainfall. 

Once the Army Corps of Engineers completed draining the floodwaters 
from the New Orleans area on October 11, 2005, the environmental health 
risk to area residents and emergency responders from the waters was 
eliminated. However, renewed concerns arose over the potentially 
contaminated sediment the floodwaters left behind. As the floodwaters 
in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes receded, sediments ranging 
in depth from less than an inch to several feet remained in some 
areas.[Footnote 18] As would be expected, sediment was more prevalent 
in those areas where the floodwaters flowed over or breached levees, 
while in other areas, little or no sediment was left behind. 

EPA, in coordination with the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality and several other federal and state agencies, carried out 
sediment testing in four phases, collecting up to 1,800 sediment and 
soil samples. The samples were collected from streets and other public 
access areas, including golf courses, in sections of New Orleans that 
had been flooded. On the basis of these samples, EPA and the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality generally concluded, in conjunction 
with other federal and state agencies, that the sediments left behind 
by the flooding were not expected to cause adverse health effects to 
individuals returning to New Orleans. Specifics regarding the four 
phases of the sediment testing follow. Unless otherwise noted, the 
samples were (1) analyzed for about 200 metals and organic chemicals, 
including lead, arsenic, gasoline, diesel fuel, and oil, as well as for 
bacteria; and (2) evaluated using Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Program Screening Option 
Standards and EPA's risk criteria based on long-term (30 years) 
residential exposure assumptions.[Footnote 19] 

* Phase 1 of the sediment sampling included about 450 samples as 
follows: (1) 430 individual samples EPA collected from September 10 to 
October 14, 2005, in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard 
Parishes; (2) 23 samples collected by the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality on November 10, 2005;[Footnote 20] and (3) 14 
samples collected on November 19 and 20, 2005, by EPA and the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality at locations tested previously 
where contaminant concentrations exceeded the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality and EPA risk criteria.[Footnote 21] 

* Phase 2 of the sediment sampling included about 280 individual 
samples collected in the Lower Ninth Ward (part of Orleans Parish) and 
St. Bernard Parish from October 29 to November 27, 2005--areas that 
were severely impacted by the flooding. 

* Phase 3 of the sediment sampling focused primarily on 43 locations in 
flood-impacted areas where elevated concentrations of arsenic, lead, or 
benzo(a)pyrene had been found in phases 1 and 2.[Footnote 22] To 
determine whether the elevated levels of these contaminants were 
limited to the specific location originally sampled or reflected more 
widespread contamination, up to 10 composite samples were collected 
within a 500-foot radius of each of the 43 locations from February 16 
to February 22, 2006. The composite samples combined four discrete 
sediment or soil samples, and most were analyzed only for the 
individual contaminant that was elevated in the original sediment 
sample. 

* Phase 4 sediment sampling included 586 samples collected in Orleans 
and St. Bernard Parishes from February 6 to June 30, 2006.[Footnote 23] 
These samples were analyzed for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 
pesticides, herbicides, diesel and oil range organic chemicals, and 
metals. In this phase, potential sampling sites were selected using a 
grid of the "eastern half of the flooded area." EPA identified 1,676 
potential sampling sites on the grid. EPA did not collect samples from 
a majority of these sites (1,090) because (1) the sampling site was in 
a commercial area, (2) the sediment was less than 0.5 centimeters thick 
(less than one-quarter of an inch), or (3) no sediment was present. 

EPA's response activities have included providing a substantial amount 
of information to the public on the environmental health risks from 
Katrina, including three environmental assessment summaries that 
focused primarily on the results of these sediment samples taken in New 
Orleans. The first summary also conveyed the results of air and water 
sampling in the New Orleans area. Beginning shortly after Hurricane 
Katrina, in September 2005, EPA started to provide other information to 
the public on environmental health risks and actions to mitigate 
exposures via flyers, health advisories, and public service 
announcements that were distributed at various locations throughout the 
hurricane-damaged areas, made available to the media, and posted on 
EPA's Web page. For example, EPA reported that it distributed over 3.8 
million flyers on various topics, such as hazardous waste collection, 
mold problems, and potential environmental health hazards. 

Overall, EPA's response activities varied in Louisiana and Mississippi 
based, in part, on the environmental impacts and needs of the affected 
parishes and counties. While EPA's response is complete in Mississippi, 
EPA Region 6 continues to assist the state of Louisiana with its 
recovery efforts and currently plans to continue to do so until at 
least September 2007. State and local government decisions continue to 
affect the length of time EPA will need to maintain a presence in 
Louisiana parishes. For example, local government decisions about home 
condemnation and demolition processes will affect the length of time 
EPA needs to continue its debris management and air monitoring 
activities in the New Orleans area. 

EPA's Air Monitoring for Releases of Asbestos Fibers in New Orleans 
Does Not Adequately Address Neighborhoods with Substantial Building 
Demolition and Renovation Activities: 

EPA's Clean Air Act asbestos regulation seeks to minimize the 
significant human health risks--including lung disease and cancer-- 
associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers from building demolition 
and other activities. To facilitate and expedite demolition and 
rebuilding following Hurricane Katrina, EPA stated that it would not 
enforce certain requirements under the asbestos regulation, at the 
request of the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of Environmental 
Quality. In addition, many demolition and renovation activities--those 
by individual homeowners--are generally unregulated under EPA's 
asbestos regulation. EPA took steps to measure asbestos emissions after 
Hurricane Katrina--for example, initially more than doubling from 5 to 
12 the ambient (outdoor) air monitors in the area prior to the 
storms.[Footnote 24] However, air monitors generally have not been 
located in areas in which much of the building demolition and 
renovation is occurring. 

EPA's Clean Air Act Asbestos Regulation Covering Building Demolition 
Activities Seeks to Minimize the Significant Human Health Risks 
Associated with Exposure to Asbestos Fibers in the Air: 

The Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended, requires EPA to develop and 
enforce regulations to protect the general public from exposure to 
hazardous air pollutants--also called air toxics--that are known to be 
hazardous to human health. Asbestos is an air toxic consisting of 
naturally occurring fibrous minerals with high tensile strength, the 
ability to be woven, and resistance to heat and most chemicals. Because 
of these properties, asbestos fibers have been used in a wide range of 
manufactured goods, including roofing shingles, ceiling and floor 
tiles, paper and cement products, and textiles. Exposure to asbestos 
can be harmful to human health if asbestos fibers are released into the 
air, such as when asbestos is disturbed or in poor condition and these 
fibers are inhaled into the lungs. Such releases of asbestos fibers can 
occur during building renovations and demolitions. Asbestos was among 
the first air toxics EPA regulated. EPA has promulgated regulations 
governing the renovation and demolition of buildings with asbestos- 
containing materials to protect the public from the risks associated 
with exposure to asbestos fibers.[Footnote 25] 

Some significant health effects associated with asbestos exposure--such 
as asbestosis and lung cancer--have been recognized for many years. 
Asbestosis is a serious, progressive, long-term disease caused by 
inhaling asbestos fibers that produces scarring and inflammation of the 
lung tissue, thereby making it harder for the lungs to get oxygen into 
the blood. Lung cancer causes the largest number of deaths related to 
asbestos exposure. Individuals working in occupations involving the 
mining, milling, manufacturing, and use of asbestos and its products, 
including construction and demolition workers, are more likely to get 
lung cancer than the general population. 

Diseases linked to asbestos exposure take a long time to develop. 
Specifically, most cases of lung cancer or asbestosis in asbestos 
workers occur 15 years or more after initial exposure to asbestos, and 
cases of mesothelioma (cancer of the lining of the lungs) are commonly 
diagnosed 30 years or more after exposure. Cases of mesothelioma have 
been reported in family members of asbestos workers after exposure to 
these workers at home and in individuals without occupational exposure 
who live close to asbestos mines.[Footnote 26] 

According to EPA, scientists have not been able to identify a safe, or 
threshold, level for exposure to airborne asbestos. Rather than 
regulating this air toxic by setting emission standards for emission 
sources, as is typically done to mitigate health risks, EPA's national 
emissions standards for asbestos regulate various potential sources of 
asbestos emissions, including renovation and demolition activities, by 
setting standards for work practices.[Footnote 27] EPA has granted some 
states, including Louisiana and Mississippi, approval to implement and 
enforce the asbestos standards. However, EPA retains the authority to 
enforce its requirements; to oversee states' implementation of the air 
toxics program in general; and to withdraw the delegation of the 
program if a state does not, for example, adequately enforce the 
program. Under EPA's regulations of demolitions involving asbestos, the 
owner or operator of the demolition activity generally must: 

* inspect buildings for asbestos where demolition or substantial 
renovation activity will occur; 

* provide written notice to EPA or the state of intention to renovate 
or demolish buildings that have asbestos-containing material; 

* remove all regulated asbestos-containing material before any activity 
begins that would break up, dislodge, or disturb the material;[Footnote 
28] 

* wet all regulated asbestos-containing material exposed during cutting 
or disjoining operations and stripping operations so that no emissions 
are visible during the demolition; 

* take steps to contain asbestos-containing material in preparation for 
disposal, such as wetting the material or encasing it in leak-tight 
wrapping; and: 

* undertake the removal of asbestos-containing material in the presence 
of an on-site representative who has been trained to comply with the 
provisions of the asbestos standard. 

However, if a building is to be demolished by government order because 
it is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse, it is 
not required to be inspected for asbestos, and the regulated asbestos- 
containing materials are not required to be identified and removed 
first. Nevertheless, specified notification requirements and emission 
control requirements--primarily the wetting of asbestos-containing 
materials to limit releases of asbestos fibers--still apply to the 
demolition operation.[Footnote 29] Importantly, these standards 
generally do not apply to the demolition or renovation of a residential 
building by or for an individual homeowner.[Footnote 30] 

Many of the flooded homes in New Orleans that will be demolished or 
substantially renovated are likely to contain asbestos-containing 
materials, such as roof shingles, siding, flooring, and ceilings. For 
example, analysis by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
shows that the majority of land tracts in the New Orleans area contain 
homes built before 1980, when use of asbestos products was prevalent. 
As of January 2007, about 25,000 homes had been identified as awaiting 
demolition--98 percent of which are concentrated in the Orleans and St. 
Bernard Parishes.[Footnote 31] According to the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality, another 80,000 homes that were flooded in the 
New Orleans area are not yet included in the demolition estimates, but 
many of them will likely be demolished. Those that are not demolished 
will very likely have to be substantially renovated. 

EPA Has Issued "No Action Assurances" for Certain Clean Air Act 
Asbestos Requirements Governing the Demolition of Buildings to Help 
Expedite the Gulf Coast Cleanup: 

On rare occasions, EPA issues "no action assurance" letters stating 
that it will not enforce certain legal requirements. EPA recognizes 
that such assurances could erode the credibility of the agency's 
enforcement program by creating real or perceived inequities in the 
agency's treatment of the regulated community. Consequently, under EPA 
policy guidance, such assurances are to be used only in extremely 
unusual cases when clearly necessary to serve the public interest--such 
as to avoid extreme risks to public health or safety or to obtain 
important information for research purposes--when no other mechanism 
can adequately address the problem presented. 

To facilitate and expedite demolition and rebuilding following 
Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana and Mississippi requested that EPA issue 
no action assurance letters concerning some provisions of the national 
emissions standard for asbestos. In light of the extraordinary 
demolition, cleanup, and debris disposal required on the Gulf Coast, 
EPA issued several no action assurance letters to Louisiana and 
Mississippi. Under letters issued in February 2006, residences that are 
subject to a government-issued demolition order based on the residence 
being (1) structurally unsound but not necessarily in danger of 
imminent collapse, (2) moved off of its foundation, or (3) 
uninhabitable for other environmental reasons, such as flooding, are 
effectively not subject to otherwise applicable requirements for 
inspection and removal of asbestos prior to demolition. Such structures 
must nonetheless be demolished, transported, and disposed of in 
accordance with specified requirements aimed at ensuring adequate 
protection of any asbestos the buildings may contain. These 
requirements include notification, thorough wetting of the building 
both prior to and during the demolition process, and proper disposal of 
all of the debris as if it contained asbestos.[Footnote 32] EPA's 2006 
no action assurance letters also allowed government-issued demolition 
orders to be expanded to groups of residences instead of only 
individual residences because it may not be practical for state or 
local officials to make an individual determination for every 
residential structure. The no action assurances apply to the Louisiana 
and Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality, to local 
governments, and to the Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to any 
persons operating at the direction of these government entities. 

The Army Corps of Engineers is the prime contractor for many of the 
demolitions covered by the no action assurances, including all of them 
in Orleans Parish. Some parishes--most notably St. Bernard Parish--use 
other contractors or a mix of the Corps and other contractors. 
According to data from FEMA, of the vast majority of the remaining 
25,000 demolitions estimated as of January 2007, approximately half are 
in Orleans Parish and half in St. Bernard. Regarding demolitions 
conducted by the Corps and its contractors, the Corps said that 
approximately 85 percent of the 2,600 demolitions conducted in Orleans 
Parish, which includes the Ninth Ward, were classified as containing 
regulated asbestos-containing materials, primarily because inspections 
could not be performed inside properties.[Footnote 33] The Corps also 
said that in other parishes, between 10 percent and 40 percent of the 
structures it had demolished were classified as containing regulated 
asbestos-containing materials on the basis of inspections. 

Initially, the no action assurance letters were in effect for 1 year-- 
that is, until February 2007. Officials from Louisiana told us that 
while EPA's no action assurances were helpful in allowing demolitions 
to proceed at a faster pace, a number of other issues, such as landfill 
capacity and the building condemnation process, have contributed to 
demolition delays. As a result, on December 21, 2006, the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality requested an extension of the no 
action assurances until February 2008 because many demolitions have yet 
to be conducted. Citing information from the Army Corps of Engineers, 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality told EPA that, as of 
December 2006, 10,000 residences had been demolished, but more than 
25,000 demolitions are likely to be needed.[Footnote 34] In 
supplemental information supporting the extension request, the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality provided EPA with 
repopulation estimates on the basis of estimates by The Brookings 
Institution's December 2006 report, Katrina Index: Tracking Variables 
of Post-Katrina Recovery. For the Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes, 41 
percent and 39 percent, respectively, of the residents were estimated 
to have returned as of August 2006, compared with Census 2000 
population estimates.[Footnote 35] The Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality also cited a plan for the recovery of the Ninth 
Ward that stated about 20 percent of the residents of the Ninth Ward 
had returned.[Footnote 36] This plan also stated that homeowners have 
gutted 30 percent of the houses in this ward and that owners have 
repaired or are in the process of repairing another 30 percent of the 
housing. A March 2007 update to the Katrina Index, which did not update 
the August 2006 repopulation estimates, stated that thousands of 
college students and families on spring break are coming to the Gulf 
Coast to help with rebuilding; it also reported that the New Orleans 
metropolitan area gained more than 50,000 workers from November 2006 to 
January 2007. 

On February 2, 2007, EPA approved an extension of the no action 
assurances through September 30, 2007, for the 11 parishes covered 
under Louisiana Emergency Declarations and Administrative Orders. EPA 
also approved an extension of the no action assurance it provided the 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality through September 30, 
2007, for four counties in Mississippi. In its no action assurance 
letters to Louisiana and Mississippi, EPA stated that it reserved the 
right to revoke or modify the assurances if it determined that doing so 
was necessary to protect public health or the environment. Moreover, we 
believe that the potential public health effect of demolition and 
renovation activities by individual homeowners--which are generally not 
regulated under EPA's asbestos work practice standards--also warrants 
evaluation. 

Current Asbestos Monitoring Is Not Sufficient to Assess the Potential 
Public Health and Environmental Impacts of Demolition and Renovation 
Activities: 

Many homes in the New Orleans area contain hazardous materials such as 
asbestos that could be released during demolition and renovation 
activities, posing health hazards for individuals exposed to asbestos 
fibers. The bulk of these demolition and renovation activities have yet 
to occur. For example, in December 2006, the Army Corps of Engineers 
said it had completed about 2,000 of the 6,000 to 12,000 residential 
demolitions it expected to perform in the Orleans Parish.[Footnote 37] 
In addition to these demolitions covered by the no action assurances, 
the demolition and renovation activities by individual homeowners that 
are outside the scope of EPA's asbestos national emissions standards 
will likely be substantial. For example, in December 2006, the Corps 
stated that the demolition effort by individual homeowners was 
approximately equal to the public demolition effort. Further, because 
of mold problems caused by the extensive flooding, many residences that 
do not require demolition must nonetheless be gutted--stripping the 
walls down to the studs--before they can be renovated. Numerous 
volunteer organizations continue to help individual owners by gutting 
the homes. For example, the Corps reported that, as of October 2006, 
6,500 homes were on a list for gutting services to be provided by 
volunteers from various nonprofit organizations. According to EPA, 
whether demolitions by volunteer groups would be subject to the 
asbestos work practice standards depends upon the number and location 
of sites and who is supervising the demolition. That thousands of 
demolitions and substantial renovations may occur in the same 
geographic area and in the same general time frame without being 
subject to the asbestos work practice standards represents a potential 
health problem--especially since the protective requirement to wet any 
asbestos-containing materials does not apply to unregulated demolitions 
and disposal. 

To be responsive to potential public questions and concerns, EPA took 
steps to measure asbestos emissions after Hurricane Katrina--initially 
more than doubling from 5 to 12 the number of the ambient (outdoor) air 
monitors in the New Orleans area prior to the storm. EPA officials said 
the agency's monitoring network was designed to include measuring the 
effects from both the regulated asbestos-containing material to which 
no action assurance letters might apply and activities not regulated, 
which would include demolition or renovation activities by or for 
individual homeowners.[Footnote 38] In July 2006, the agency scaled 
back ambient air monitoring to its prestorm level of five ambient air 
quality monitors and also reduced the frequency of sampling to several 
times a month.[Footnote 39] EPA said the decision to reduce the 
monitoring sites was based in part on the fact that no measurable 
amounts of asbestos fibers were found for the period of time that a 12- 
monitor network had been in place.[Footnote 40] However, because the 
demolition activities in the New Orleans area generally did not start 
until 7 or more months after Hurricane Katrina, EPA's cutback in 
asbestos air monitoring occurred before (1) most of the demolitions 
that are now completed had taken place and (2) the substantial number 
of remaining demolitions had begun.[Footnote 41] 

While officials from EPA's Office of Research and Development said the 
use of air monitors would not be effective in detecting asbestos 
emissions from home demolitions and renovations unless monitors were 
located immediately adjacent to demolition and renovation sites, 
monitors generally have not been located in areas in which much of the 
building demolition and renovation is occurring. For example, since 
Hurricane Katrina, EPA has not located ambient or emissions monitors in 
the Ninth Ward, a residential area subjected to widespread flooding in 
which extensive demolition and renovation are occurring. Specifically, 
the closest monitor is in Arabi, a city south of the Ninth Ward. EPA's 
air monitoring focus has not included proximity to demolition sites. 
EPA officials said the locations for the monitors, initially selected 
in October 2005, were chosen based on proximity to public access (e.g., 
near populated areas), wind and geographical factors, and locations of 
waste-moving activities. 

In January 2007, EPA said that its air monitoring currently focuses on 
more limited geographic areas where "grinding and other remediation 
activities are ongoing"--for example, at debris volume reduction sites, 
which are often landfills. This monitoring does not rely solely on the 
five ambient air monitors around New Orleans but instead includes some 
monitoring at sites involving waste handling, burning, or grinding 
activities. According to EPA, conducting air monitoring at debris 
reduction sites is more conservative than at demolition sites since 
volume reduction activities such as grinding or burning have the 
potential to release more asbestos fibers as the material is destroyed. 
While this focus on debris and landfills is important, so, too, is 
monitoring data from areas undergoing concentrated levels of demolition 
and renovation. 

Along these lines, according to EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers and 
its contractors who are conducting demolitions under government orders 
have monitored the air at demolition sites for asbestos emissions, and 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has told EPA that 
this monitoring has found "little or no asbestos emissions." For 
example, in November 2006, one Corps contractor reported on air 
sampling conducted at demolition sites where samples were primarily 
taken from the site perimeters (using personal sampling pumps) and from 
employees wearing personal monitoring equipment required by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).[Footnote 42] Most 
of the sampling was conducted at sites that the Corps classified as 
containing regulated asbestos materials, and the contractor concluded 
that exposures to asbestos were minimal and respiratory protection was 
needed only as a precautionary measure. 

Such air monitoring data from the Corps and its contractors do not, 
however, address potential asbestos emissions from the privately 
sponsored demolitions and renovations by individual homeowners. Since 
these activities are not regulated--and emissions control actions such 
as wetting the material from before the demolition process through 
disposal are not required--the potential for asbestos emissions at 
these sites is greater than at the regulated sites. Because EPA's air 
monitors have not been deployed in and around neighborhoods where 
demolition and renovation activities--both publicly and privately 
sponsored--are concentrated, the agency's finding of no measurable 
amounts of asbestos at its ambient monitoring sites does not 
necessarily address the asbestos to which residents, workers, and 
volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods. 

This monitoring gap exists even though immediately after Hurricane 
Katrina, EPA recognized the potential health and environmental issues 
that could arise in New Orleans from asbestos emissions at both 
demolition and disposal sites. Specifically, EPA's September 2005 
Overview Plan for Ambient Air Monitoring After Hurricane Katrina--which 
addresses air monitoring in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama-- 
discusses asbestos monitoring tentatively planned at a number of fixed 
sites and states that additional monitoring requirements to more 
specifically address both asbestos demolition and disposal operations 
may be established. The October 2005 Regional Air Monitoring Plan for 
Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, developed by EPA Region 6, mentions air 
monitoring for potential emissions during decontamination, demolition, 
removal, and remedial action in impacted areas, but it does not 
establish additional monitoring requirements for asbestos demolition or 
disposal operations. This plan also notes that a site-specific air 
sampling plan will be established to assess air pollutants resulting 
from debris burns and building demolition. In this regard, EPA Region 6 
issued its Air Monitoring and Sampling Plan for Construction and 
Demolition Debris Burning or Grinding Sites in February 2006.[Footnote 
43] This plan addresses the asbestos sampling methodology to be used 
around activity areas such as debris piles or landfills. While this 
plan notes that numerous properties are expected to contain hazardous 
materials such as asbestos that could result in inhalation exposure, 
posing health hazards for individuals in the vicinity, it does not 
include any requirements for monitoring asbestos emissions at building 
renovation or demolition sites. 

In contrast, EPA's conditions for granting the first Hurricane Katrina- 
related asbestos no action assurance to Louisiana in October 2005-- 
which Louisiana chose not to use and which expired in April 2006-- 
included a requirement that the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality ensure that adequate monitoring was conducted prior to and 
during demolition of residences.[Footnote 44] EPA's conditions, which 
were reviewed by EPA's Science Advisory Board, specifically directed 
Louisiana to develop a plan for monitoring that provides information 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection of public health and the 
environment and to have the plan approved by EPA Region 6. EPA further 
directed that the plan must, at a minimum, include representative 
asbestos monitoring at demolition sites. 

Along these lines, an EPA pilot study conducted in 2006 in Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, demonstrates that air monitoring close to the source of 
asbestos emissions is important to detect releases of asbestos fibers. 
The pilot was designed to test the effectiveness of an alternative 
asbestos control method for building demolitions using monitoring 
information from the demolition site and the landfill.[Footnote 45] 
Specifically, the quality assurance project plan for the pilot--which 
had been subject to independent peer review--called for, among other 
things, perimeter asbestos monitoring during demolition as well as at 
landfill sites.[Footnote 46] The quality assurance project plan also 
specified that an air monitoring network consisting of two concentric 
rings of monitors would be placed at intervals around each of the two 
buildings being demolished. According to EPA officials, it is 
preferable to have emissions monitors stationed as close to a potential 
source of asbestos emissions as possible because the risk of exposure 
decreases by orders of magnitude the farther away one is from the 
emissions source. For this reason, EPA's pilot was intentionally 
located in Arkansas in a "remote, secure location to ensure no public 
exposure," with the nearest residence approximately 2 miles from the 
demolition site. The plan also called for asbestos monitoring in the 
soil at the demolition site, in dust that settled on surfaces near the 
demolition site, and in collected runoff water from wetting the 
building and debris during demolition and debris loading. EPA officials 
said that any monitoring of asbestos emissions at demolition sites in 
New Orleans would not need to be as elaborate as that done for the 
pilot, which was conducted to develop data for potential use in a 
revision to EPA's asbestos regulation. However, they noted that using 
the second concentric ring of monitors in the pilot allowed EPA's 
Office of Research and Development to compare air monitor results 
between the outer perimeter ring and the inner ring and project 
emissions levels outward with increased accuracy. 

Some Shortcomings in EPA's Communications on Environmental Health Risks 
Have Limited the Communications' Usefulness to the Public: 

EPA's key communications about the potential health risks from exposure 
to environmental contamination in New Orleans--three environmental 
assessment summaries prepared with, among others, the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality--did not sufficiently disclose some 
information that would have helped residents better understand the 
potential health risks of returning home and how to mitigate them. In 
addition, some of EPA's other communications, including flyers and 
public service announcements, provided unclear and inconsistent 
information on mitigating exposure to some contaminants many returning 
residents would likely be exposed to in their homes. 

EPA's Insufficient Disclosure about Its Decisions Regarding Sampling of 
Contaminants Limited Residents' Understanding of the Potential Health 
Risks of Returning Home: 

Following disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, an immediate and primary 
concern of evacuees is whether and when it is safe to return to their 
homes. Accurate and timely information on many factors is important for 
residents to make this assessment--and to determine what they should 
bring with them when they do return, including items to mitigate 
potential health risks. One important factor residents need information 
on is the environmental contamination to which they may be exposed when 
they return home. Such contamination was a particular concern in New 
Orleans, a densely populated, older urban area in proximity to 
petroleum and chemical industry sites, as well as a number of Superfund 
sites, from which contaminants may have migrated into residential 
areas. 

EPA worked with other federal and state agencies to support local 
officials evaluating home and neighborhood safety. In addition, as 
discussed earlier, EPA provided a substantial amount of information to 
the public on environmental health risks using reports (environmental 
assessment summaries), flyers, public service announcements made 
available to the media, and EPA's Web page. However, EPA's 
communications about the potential health risks from environmental 
contamination in New Orleans--three environmental assessment summaries 
prepared with, among others, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality[Footnote 47]--were released about 3, 6, and 11 months after 
Hurricane Katrina, limiting their usefulness to residents who would 
have benefited from more timely information about the environmental 
health risks they could face when returning home. These environmental 
assessment summaries convey some helpful information about the 
floodwaters, sediments, and air quality in the New Orleans area after 
the hurricanes--that is, about the potential health risks of being 
outdoors in the New Orleans area. 

However, because some sampling decisions that EPA made were not 
sufficiently disclosed, residents could have been given the wrong 
impression about the potential health risks they could face in 
returning to their homes. For example, the first environmental 
assessment summary, released in December 2005, states that "the great 
majority of the data available show that adverse health effects would 
not be expected from exposure to the sediments from previously flooded 
areas provided people used common sense and good personal hygiene and 
safety practices." However, 8 months later in its third and final 
assessment summary, released in August 2006, EPA said that the December 
2005 summary indicated no immediate health risk to residents returning 
for a quick assessment of damage to their homes. The August 2006 
summary said that the focus of the analyses of sediments reported on in 
December 2005 was to assess "(1) whether hazardous substances were 
present in the sediment in residential areas and (2) the potential 
health effects to emergency workers and residents from short-term 
exposure to any hazardous substances found in the sediment." Because 
the December 2005 summary did not include this qualification, residents 
could have misinterpreted it and assumed it was generally safe to 
return to their homes. 

EPA also insufficiently disclosed an important decision it had made 
about sampling in New Orleans. That is, all sediment samples analyzed 
were taken outdoors, from streets and other areas of public access in 
previously flooded residential areas, and samples were not collected 
from private property, such as residents' yards or inside residences. 
Regarding disclosure of this sampling decision, EPA states in its first 
assessment summary that all of its sampling was conducted "outdoors." 
While the subsequent assessment summaries issued in March 2006 and 
August 2006 provide overviews of the previous assessment summaries, 
they do not disclose that the assessments did not include sediment 
samples taken inside buildings or on private property. For example, the 
March 2006 summary states only that the December 2005 assessment 
summary was based on the results of "samples from floodwaters and 
sediments analyzed throughout the flood-impacted areas." 

However, according to EPA officials, in its assessments, the agency 
assumes that results from sediment samples collected from streets or 
other public access areas in residential neighborhoods can be used to 
characterize the degree and nature of contamination in New Orleans, 
including inside homes and in yards. We believe this assumption is 
important and warrants highlighting in the EPA environmental assessment 
summaries for two main reasons. First, environmental contamination 
levels inside buildings can potentially be significantly higher than 
and different from the contamination levels outside for a variety of 
reasons, potentially causing more adverse health effects. For example, 
contaminants that could have been washed into a building during the 
flooding--such as petroleum-based products and arsenic--are not 
dispersed into the atmosphere over time if confined indoors. Moreover, 
any toxic chemicals or other contaminants already in a building at the 
time of the flooding--such as pesticides, asbestos, and lead-based 
paint--may be released inside the building. Finally, after flooding, 
mold frequently forms and spreads. For example, in the case of the Gulf 
Coast 2005 hurricanes, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) concluded that the duration and extent of the flooding and the 
number of structures flooded made massive mold contamination a 
certainty.[Footnote 48] Along these lines, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council conducted tests in several mold-contaminated homes in 
New Orleans and found that mold in one home was at concentrations that 
would render the building "dangerously uninhabitable"; in three other 
homes, mold spore concentrations were "dangerously high." In addition 
to causing respiratory discomfort, mold also can cause major allergic 
reactions, asthma attacks, and a pneumonia-like illness (pneumonitis) 
that causes breathing difficulty and fever. Second, to understand the 
level of assurance that EPA can provide about the extent to which 
localized areas of contamination may exist throughout the city, it is 
important to understand that limiting sediment and soil sampling to 
outdoor, public access areas can be problematic in that, for example, 
sediments in streets may be subject to more dispersion than those that 
settled in more protected areas, such as close to residences. 

Further, regarding indoor sampling, in September 2005, EPA's Science 
Advisory Board had suggested that EPA consider some indoor sampling in 
New Orleans, including sampling of surface films on walls and 
structures, because material deposited outdoors may have been different 
from material indoors, where the potential for human exposure is likely 
to be greater. At that time, EPA said that indoor testing of private 
homes could not be conducted in the initial sampling effort because of 
worker safety issues and difficult logistical issues--such as obtaining 
owners' consent--that could not be quickly resolved. EPA stated the 
agency would revisit this recommendation as these issues were 
addressed. To date, while CDC has tested some New Orleans homes for 
mold contamination, EPA has not tested for contamination inside homes 
that were flooded as a result of the hurricanes. EPA officials told us 
the agency has not tested indoors because state and local governments 
did not request this assistance and because EPA determined that indoor 
testing was not necessary to characterize the environmental 
contamination resulting from the storm. 

During the time EPA was conducting the sediment sampling program, the 
agency posted test results on its Web page as the results became 
available, identifying the general area of the sampling sites on a map 
of the New Orleans area. Thus, any residents with access to the 
Internet and with experience in searching and reviewing government Web 
sites could obtain some information about the environmental 
contamination in New Orleans prior to the release of the assessment 
summaries. However, the information about the individual samples on 
EPA's Web page is highly technical and would be of limited value to 
individuals who are not experts in health risk assessment. For example, 
the Web page provides information on the micrograms per kilogram (µg/ 
kg) of arsenic and benzo(a)pyrene in the sediment at one sampling site. 
Accompanying text indicates whether the detected levels were above or 
below the "LDEQ RECAP value" and states that in cases where they 
exceeded the RECAP value, "the levels fall within EPA's risk range of 1 
in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000 risk of an individual developing cancer 
over a lifetime from exposure to those concentrations in residential 
soils." Although we believe that posting data on the individual samples 
on EPA's Web site was not a particularly effective tool for 
communicating information to residents about potential health risks and 
mitigation strategies, we agree with EPA's Inspector General that EPA's 
posting of information on sediment contamination on its Web page 
provided timely information to the states and other federal decision 
makers for use in determining associated risk and impact 
assessment.[Footnote 49] 

Some Information EPA Provided to Residents in Its Public Service 
Communications Was Unclear and Inconsistent: 

Although EPA did not perform environmental assessments of any flooded 
homes in New Orleans, it did provide information to residents based on 
general knowledge and assumptions about potential environmental health 
risks inside buildings following disasters. Specifically, EPA relied on 
flyers, public service announcements, and EPA's Web site to provide 
information on the potential health risks in buildings stemming from 
exposure to, for example, asbestos, lead, and mold--three contaminants 
that were of concern to EPA and other officials immediately after the 
hurricanes. While the flyers, public service announcements, and 
documents on EPA's hurricane Web page provide information on mitigating 
exposure to these contaminants, some information lacks clarity and 
consistency on certain key points.[Footnote 50] For example, EPA's most 
widely distributed flyer on environmental health risks--EPA and 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Warn of Potential 
Environmental Health Hazards When Returning to Homes and 
Businesses[Footnote 51]--states that buildings constructed before 1970 
are likely to contain asbestos, including pipe and other insulation, 
ceiling tiles, exterior siding, and roof shingles. In contrast, another 
document available on EPA's hurricane Web page, Dealing with Debris and 
Damaged Buildings, states that all structures built before 1975 may 
contain significant amounts of asbestos, and structures built after 
1975 may also contain asbestos. Further, in developing estimates of the 
number of homes that may contain asbestos, the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality included homes built before 1980 as those likely 
to contain asbestos.[Footnote 52] Accurate and consistent information 
about the age of buildings that are most likely to contain asbestos is 
important in helping residents understand what protections they may 
need when entering and working in their homes. 

In addition, EPA's flyer on potential environmental health hazards 
recommends seeking assistance from public health authorities and 
specially trained contractors, if possible, when a resident knows or 
suspects that asbestos or lead-based paint may be in the home and these 
materials have been damaged or will be disturbed during cleanup. 
However, the flyer does not contain the following more strongly worded 
guidance from the Frequent Questions document on EPA's hurricane Web 
page: "Before you begin your cleanup, seek help from public health 
authorities and specially trained contractors. Although conditions 
following a hurricane may make it difficult to obtain such assistance, 
EPA strongly advises against individuals attempting to handle such 
materials themselves." 

Both the flyer and the Frequent Questions document then list a number 
of steps individuals should take when handling this debris. However, 
the information provided on the hurricane Web page regarding 
respiratory protection that individuals should wear is more clear and 
useful than the information in the widely distributed flyer on 
potential environmental health hazards and in the relevant EPA public 
service announcement. Specifically, the flyer states, "In handling 
materials that are believed to be contaminated with asbestos or lead, 
EPA recommends that, at a minimum, you wear gloves, goggles, and most 
importantly, OSHA-approved respiratory protection, if available." The 
public service announcement recommends wearing "gloves, goggles, and a 
face mask." The information on EPA's hurricane Web page, however, is 
more specific about what respiratory protection is required, where it 
can be purchased, and the importance of wearing it: "Wear gloves, 
goggles, pants, shirts, socks, and most importantly, a tightly-fitted N-
95 OSHA-approved respiratory mask. A regular 'dust mask' is not enough 
to protect against lead or asbestos. N-95 masks are available at 
minimal cost at the hardware store. Carefully follow instructions when 
using a respiratory mask to make sure it fits correctly. A tight fit is 
important, and despite the heat, it is the best way to protect 
yourself." 

However, a safety step EPA recommended on its hurricane Web page that 
many individuals were not likely to have been able to perform was to 
determine if asbestos-containing products--specifically, asbestos- 
cement corrugated sheet, asbestos-cement flat sheet, asbestos pipeline 
wrap, roofing felt, vinyl-asbestos floor tile, asbestos-cement shingle, 
millboard, asbestos-cement pipe, and vermiculate-attic insulation-- 
were present in their damaged homes. How individuals would determine if 
these asbestos-containing products were present is not clear, as 
another EPA document (available on the general EPA Web site but not 
cited in either the flyer for residents or the Frequent Questions 
document) states that unless they are labeled, materials containing 
asbestos cannot be identified by visual inspection. This document 
further cautions readers to treat the material as if it contained 
asbestos when in doubt or have it sampled and analyzed by a qualified 
professional. 

Some communications about exposures to mold also were not sufficiently 
clear or consistent to be helpful to residents whose homes had been 
flooded. For example, a flyer distributed to many residents 
specifically addressing mold is more focused on urging people to clean 
up than on providing information on how to protect themselves while 
doing so. The flyer, Cleaning Up After a Flood: Addressing Mold 
Problems, gives this general safety advice: "Take precautions to limit 
your exposure to mold and mold spores when attempting to clean up mold. 
If you have health concerns, you may want to have someone else clean up 
the mold." Yet this flyer does not explain what precautions to take. 
Moreover, the flyer urges residents to act quickly to remove materials 
contaminated with mold and bacteria, explaining that these contaminants 
can trigger allergic reactions and induce respiratory infections. For 
"more specific information on mold," the flyer refers readers to EPA's 
Indoor Air Quality Hotline, EPA and CDC Web sites, and two documents 
available on EPA's Web page (one addressing mold in schools and 
commercial buildings and the other addressing mold in homes). The 
document that addresses mold in homes includes the following somewhat 
tentative guidance: "In order to limit your exposure to airborne mold, 
you may want to wear an N-95 respirator, available at many hardware 
stores and from companies that advertise on the Internet…." However, 
other information on EPA's general Web site that is not specifically 
cited in the flyer less ambiguously recommends wearing an N-95 
respirator. Specifically, Flood Cleanup and the Air in Your Home says 
to wear an "N-95 respirator" over the mouth and nose to avoid breathing 
in mold. This publication further explains that a dust mask or 
handkerchief does not provide protection from mold because it can pass 
through them. In contrast, EPA's flyer on potential environmental 
health hazards advises readers to wear "an N-95 respirator, if 
available, or a dust mask" when, for example, cleaning significant 
areas of mold contamination. 

Importantly, as of March 2007, none of EPA's communications, including 
its hurricane Web page, were updated to highlight comprehensive 
information on mold exposure released by CDC on June 9, 2006. 
Specifically, CDC's report Mold Prevention Strategies and Possible 
Health Effects in the Aftermath of Hurricanes and Major Floods includes 
population-specific recommendations for protection from exposure to 
mold in buildings after hurricanes and major floods.[Footnote 53] For 
example, CDC states that healthy individuals do not need to take 
special precautions for exposure to mold in buildings after hurricanes 
when they are observing from outside or simply inspecting or assessing 
damage. However, if healthy individuals are recovering moldy personal 
belongings (thereby disturbing some dust or mold), CDC recommends that 
they wear respiratory protection (N-95 filtering face pieces), gloves, 
and dermal protection. This report also identifies individuals who 
should avoid specific activities (inspecting, recovering belongings, 
sweeping, etc.) and specifies the protection they should have to 
conduct the activities. For example, pregnant women and those over the 
age of 65 may recover personal belongings wearing respiratory 
protection, dermal protection, and eye protection but are to avoid any 
sweeping or cleaning activities. Individuals with "profound 
immunosuppression"-- such as those with HIV infection--are to avoid all 
exposures, while those with "immunosuppression"--such as those in 
cancer treatment--or those with lung disease can conduct some specified 
activities with recommended protective gear. 

In addition, some information in EPA's December 2005 environmental 
assessment summary was inconsistent. For example, according to the 
summary, it does not address indoor environmental issues associated 
with re-entry into flooded homes and structures. However, the following 
excerpt from the conclusions section of the summary appears to 
contradict this statement: 

Good personal hygiene should be practiced with frequent hand washing, 
laundering of clothing, and cleaning of the homes (i.e. vacuuming, 
dusting, etc.) Efforts should be made to avoid tracking sediments into 
homes from un-vegetated or uncovered areas as well as stirring up dust 
from those same areas. Obvious signs of hazardous material or oil 
spillage should be avoided and reported, as well. 

This guidance does not acknowledge that sediments and contaminants may 
have been washed into or spilled inside structures as a result of 
flooding. Thus, the detailed guidance the summary provides for working 
outdoors, which may also be applicable for working inside homes, is not 
recommended for working indoors. Specifically, the December assessment 
summary provides the following "good personal hygiene" guidance for 
those working with or near exposed sediments outdoors: 

* "Wear gloves, boots, and safety glasses. 

* Wear a dust mask (an N-95 dust mask is recommended and can be 
purchased at your local pharmacy or building supply stores). 

* Keep arms and legs covered. Wear long sleeves and long pants. 

* Wash hands frequently with soap and water. 

* Wash work clothes separate from other laundry." 

In general, EPA's communications recommend wearing some sort of 
respiratory protection as a key step in mitigating potential health 
effects of exposure to sediments and three contaminants--asbestos, 
lead, and mold--likely to be present in many homes damaged by the 2005 
Gulf Coast hurricanes. However, EPA refers to this protection 
inconsistently and with varying levels of specificity: 

* "a face mask"; 

* "N-95 masks"; 

* "OSHA-approved respiratory protection"; 

* "a dust mask (an N-95 dust mask is recommended…)"; 

* "an N-95 respirator, if available, or a dust mask"; and: 

* "a tightly fitted N-95 OSHA-approved respiratory mask--a regular 
'dust mask' is not enough to protect against lead or asbestos." 

These varying terms are confusing and could result in an insufficiently 
protective choice. For example, "OHSA-approved respiratory protection" 
is not a common term or household item, and people might not understand 
what to look for and where to find it. Moreover, the federal agency 
that approves respirators to protect against a variety of hazards is 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 
Thus, respirators approved by NIOSH that are available for purchase 
will be labeled as in compliance with specified NIOSH 
requirements.[Footnote 54] Further, it is not clear what a "face mask" 
is, and "dust masks" and "dust respirators" vary widely in terms of the 
respiratory protection they provide. That is, dust masks can provide 
some protection to the lungs from the irritating effects of nontoxic 
dust and airborne particles such as pollen, common household dust, and 
cut grass, but they are not protective against mold spores or toxic 
dusts. Given the number and variety of dust masks and respirators that 
are available and that provide varying levels of protection, EPA's 
communications would be more useful if they clearly and consistently 
named and described the type of respiratory protection the agency is 
recommending for the specific exposures being addressed. 

EPA Faced Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating Some Environmental 
Impacts of the Gulf Coast Hurricanes: 

EPA did not remove clearly visible abandoned chemical drums and tanks 
from several national wildlife refuges in Louisiana as part of its 
Katrina response activities, in part because FEMA disaster assistance 
funding generally is not used for debris cleanups on federal land. As a 
result, more than a year later, debris containing hazardous materials 
continued to pose an environmental threat to natural resources at 
several refuges. In addition, EPA's guidance to states on making some 
emergency debris disposal decisions is limited, and the agency has a 
limited debris management role under the National Response Plan and 
federal law. Finally, because of a lack of clarity in the National 
Response Plan and the absence of interagency protocols about federal 
roles in debris management, EPA, in the immediate aftermath of the 
storms, could not ensure that debris such as white goods and electronic 
waste was handled in a timely and appropriate manner that mitigated the 
potential for environmental contamination. 

Funding Issues Delayed Cleanups at National Wildlife Refuges for More 
Than a Year: 

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused debris containing hazardous 
materials to be released into several national wildlife refuges in 
Louisiana, posing an environmental threat to natural resources and 
requiring that some refuges be closed to the public because of safety 
issues. Under the National Response Plan, EPA is to take appropriate 
actions to prevent, minimize, or mitigate a threat to public health, 
welfare, or the environment--including the protection of natural 
resources--caused by actual or potential oil and hazardous materials 
incidents.[Footnote 55] As EPA and contractor responders worked to 
clean up releases of oil and hazardous materials in areas adjacent to 
several national wildlife refuges using disaster assistance funding 
authorized by FEMA, they identified clearly visible abandoned drums and 
tanks on the federal lands, and they could have efficiently removed 
them. However, FEMA did not approve the Department of the Interior's 
request for funding to clean up this debris in part because it was on 
federal lands. Consequently, EPA did not remove clearly visible 
abandoned chemical drums and tanks from national wildlife refutes in 
Louisiana as part of its hurricane response activities because disaster 
assistance funding was unavailable for debris cleanup actions on these 
federal lands. According to FEMA officials relying on the agency's 
regulations and debris management guidance, federal agencies are 
responsible for their own property, and FEMA does not have authority to 
provide assistance to federal agencies for debris removal following 
disasters unless the debris constitutes an immediate threat to life, 
public health, and safety. 

According to Fish and Wildlife Service officials, in the fall of 2006-
-a year after the hurricanes--chemical drums and tanks remained in the 
Sabine and Cameron Prairie refuges in western Louisiana and may also 
have remained at the Bayou Sauvage and Big Branch Marsh refuges in the 
New Orleans area in eastern Louisiana. For example, a January 2006 
study conducted for the Fish and Wildlife Service estimated that about 
1,400 containers--potentially holding a total of between 115,000 and 
350,000 gallons of hazardous liquids and gases--were at the Sabine 
National Wildlife refuge, a 125,000-acre refuge that consists almost 
entirely of marshland and open water. The study identified hazardous 
materials in containers ranging in size from 35-gallon drums to 10,000- 
gallon liquid storage tanks. 

According to Fish and Wildlife officials, leaving this debris in place 
for about a year caused containers holding hazardous materials to 
settle into marshlands and begin to corrode and leak. For example, 
officials said that after a chemical sheen was observed on the water 
during a flight over a refuge in August 2006, a hazardous materials 
team found a leaking 55-gallon drum containing hydraulic fluid. Also in 
August 2006, a fire in the Big Branch Marsh refuge spread over 120 
acres, reaching a debris field with propane and other hazardous 
material containers. When containers began exploding, firefighters had 
to let the fire burn through the field because it was too dangerous for 
them to attempt to put the fire out. 

In addition to presenting safety concerns to responders cleaning up the 
debris, the delay in removing the debris complicated the required 
cleanup efforts and increased the cost of removal. Fish and Wildlife 
officials said that many containers were 2 or 3 feet under water, 
requiring excavation using heavy equipment. While smaller materials can 
be removed by hand, specialized equipment such as airboats, sleds or 
skids, and amphibious marsh vehicles are required to remove larger 
containers to minimize adverse effects to the marsh. Such excavations 
are costly and could damage sensitive marshy areas, which could have 
been avoided if drums and tanks had been removed expeditiously. In 
addition, Fish and Wildlife officials said that cleanup crews may not 
be able to locate all of the containers that have sunk into marshlands 
until the containers begin leaking, which could take several years. 

According to the Fish and Wildlife Service, Sabine and other national 
wildlife refuges are important to the long-term recovery of Louisiana 
coastal communities because of the tourism they generate. For example, 
prior to being closed in 2005 because of safety concerns related to the 
debris from Hurricane Rita, the Sabine refuge, a principal component of 
the Creole Nature Trail All-American Road, a National Scenic Byway, and 
an All-American Road designated by the Federal Highway Administration, 
helped attract about 300,000 visitors each year. The Sabine refuge's 
125,000 acres are home to concentrations of ducks, geese, alligators, 
muskrats, nutria, raptors, and other wildlife. Visitors to the refuge 
have opportunities to observe wildlife and have access to a wetland 
walkway and a visitors center; recreational options include boating, 
fishing, and hunting. 

According to a Fish and Wildlife official, previous hurricanes in other 
Gulf states have not affected national wildlife refuges as severely as 
the hazardous material debris impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on 
Louisiana's refuges. Consequently, he said that Fish and Wildlife has 
not sought funding for hazardous material debris removal under the 
Stafford Act following other hurricanes in recent years. Because 
disaster assistance funding from FEMA was not available for cleaning up 
hazardous materials on these federal lands following Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service sought appropriations 
for this activity, which the agency received as part of a June 2006 
supplemental appropriation for disaster response activities.[Footnote 
56] The Fish and Wildlife Service allocated $12 million for the cleanup 
of the Sabine refuge and $8 million for the other refuges. The agency 
received this appropriation 8 months after EPA's cleanup of the 
adjacent area under the National Response Plan. In addition, EPA and 
the Fish and Wildlife Service do not have a protocol for expeditiously 
handling circumstances such as cleanup of national wildlife refuges 
following disasters, and developing interagency agreements with EPA and 
the Coast Guard for the cleanups required time and resulted in further 
delays. 

In September 2006, Fish and Wildlife signed agreements with EPA and the 
Coast Guard to obtain these agencies' assistance in cleaning up the 
Sabine refuge. Subsequently, EPA provided the incident commander for 
the team that oversaw the hazardous materials recovery and debris 
cleanup in the Sabine and Cameron Prairie refuges in Cameron Parish, 
Louisiana, while the Coast Guard provided the deputy incident commander 
and other support. The project was completed in January 2007. While the 
Fish and Wildlife Service had estimated that about 1,400 containers 
potentially filled with hazardous liquids and gases had been deposited 
into the refuge, about 2,200 such containers were found and removed, 
along with several thousand household hazardous waste items, tires, 
batteries, munitions, and white goods. Fish and Wildlife estimated that 
cleanup at Bayou Sauvage and Big Branch Marsh would be completed by May 
2007. 

EPA Has a Limited Debris Management Role under Federal Law and the 
National Response Plan, and Its Guidance to States on Making Certain 
Emergency Debris Disposal Decisions Is Limited: 

EPA's 1995 guide on planning for disposal of disaster debris 
acknowledges that disaster debris can overwhelm existing landfills-- 
solid waste management facilities--or force communities to use disposal 
options that otherwise would not be acceptable.[Footnote 57] The guide 
also notes that state waste management agencies can make special 
accommodations for the unusual waste management needs resulting from a 
disaster, such as temporarily lifting permit requirements for 
landfills. However, the guide does not provide specific guidance on the 
selection of emergency landfill sites or practices that state agencies 
should consider when making special debris disposal accommodations 
following disasters. 

In addition, as set forth in the Stafford Act and other executive 
policy, EPA and other federal agencies generally provide disaster 
assistance at the request of state or local governments.[Footnote 58] 
Along these lines, when the National Response Plan is activated in 
response to a Stafford Act major disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, 
EPA's role regarding waste disposal is to provide assistance requested 
by a state. For example, EPA may supply environmental scientists and 
engineers to assess landfills, help locate disposal sites for debris 
clearance activities, and assist with contaminated debris management 
activities.[Footnote 59] EPA's support may also include providing 
technical assistance and consultation to the Department of Health and 
Human Services on solid waste disposal issues related to public health 
effects.[Footnote 60] 

Further, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the federal 
law addressing the management of hazardous and other solid wastes, 
addresses nonhazardous solid wastes under subtitle D. According to 
subtitle D, states have primary responsibility for permitting and 
monitoring solid waste disposal facilities (generally referred to as 
landfills) and developing solid waste management plans in accordance 
with minimum federal requirements.[Footnote 61] EPA regulations 
establish criteria for classifying different types of landfills and 
practices that may result in adverse effects on health or the 
environment, among other things. The act prohibits "open dumping"--the 
disposal of solid waste in landfills failing to meet the relevant 
criteria--and requires state plans to prohibit the establishment of 
open dumps. RCRA provides EPA with limited authority to address 
environmental problems at solid waste landfills. 

Solid waste landfills may generally receive household waste (garbage), 
industrial waste (solid waste generated by manufacturing, industrial, 
or mining processes), commercial nonhazardous waste (solid waste 
generated by stores, offices, restaurants, and other nonmanufacturing 
entities), and construction and demolition (C&D) waste (nonhazardous 
waste that is not water soluble, such as metal, concrete, and asphalt). 
Under Louisiana solid waste regulations, landfills that receive 
household waste, industrial waste, or commercial nonhazardous waste 
must have safeguards that include a liner designed to control 
groundwater contamination.[Footnote 62] The regulations do not require 
C&D landfills to have liners in place.[Footnote 63] Louisiana 
regulations exclude asbestos-contaminated waste, white goods, 
furniture, trash, and treated lumber from the categories of debris that 
may be disposed of at C&D landfills. 

Because EPA's debris management role is limited under federal law and 
the National Response Plan, its guidance to states and localities on 
planning for disposal of disaster debris could be especially important 
in helping ensure that hazardous materials are disposed of in landfills 
with appropriate safeguards when disposal options that would not 
otherwise be acceptable are used for disaster debris, thereby 
preventing contaminants from migrating and causing air, water, and soil 
contamination. Such guidance could help states and localities consider 
the potential environmental impacts of debris management accommodations 
that may be made in emergency situations if affected areas are to be 
cleared of debris without causing adverse public health effects in the 
future. One potential example of a prior problem with hurricane debris 
is the Agriculture Street Superfund site in New Orleans, which was a 
municipal landfill from about 1909 until the late 1950s. During this 
period, oil was used to burn the refuse at the dump, and during the 
1940s and 1950s the area was routinely sprayed with DDT. The landfill 
was reopened after Hurricane Betsy occurred in 1965 to receive debris 
from destroyed buildings and ash from municipal incinerators. In the 
1970s and continuing into the late 1980s, portions of the site were 
developed with private and public housing units, an elementary school, 
and a community center. Following health concerns among residents in 
the area, EPA initiated investigations at the site in 1986, ultimately 
identifying elevated levels of lead, arsenic, and carcinogenic 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons--the primary contaminants of concern 
identified in sediment tests following Hurricane Katrina. Analyses of 
the health effects of these contaminants found at the Agriculture 
Street Landfill led EPA to place the site on the Superfund National 
Priorities List in 1994. Cleanup of the site, which primarily entailed 
soil excavation, placement of clean cover and soil, and resodding, was 
completed in 2001.[Footnote 64] As part of litigation involving EPA 
efforts to recover its cleanup costs at the site, some private parties 
have argued that the debris disposed of at the Agriculture Street 
Landfill in the wake of Hurricane Betsy contained hazardous substances 
that contributed to the contamination at the site.[Footnote 65] EPA 
officials told us that after years of case development research and 
discovery the agency has no evidence that hazardous substances were 
disposed of at the Agriculture Street Landfill during the Hurricane 
Betsy response. The case is pending, and settlement negotiations are 
under way. 

As the entity with primary responsibility for solid waste disposal 
under RCRA subtitle D, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality has made decisions about landfills and the disposal of debris 
that some studies suggest could have long-term, negative environmental 
impacts. For example, under a November 2005 Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality amendment to an emergency order addressing 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, the types of debris that C&D 
landfills could receive were broadened to include some potentially 
hazardous wastes, including furniture, painted or stained lumber from 
demolished buildings, and asbestos-contaminated waste that cannot be 
extracted from demolition debris.[Footnote 66] The order states that 
this and other actions were taken because Hurricane Katrina created 
conditions that require immediate action to prevent irreparable damage 
to the environment and serious threats to life or safety. A Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality official told us that the 
department elected to include these categories of waste because 
separating this waste from other debris took considerable effort, and 
the department determined the environmental risks resulting from the 
expanded definition were minimal. The official also noted that the 
expanded definition allowed this waste to be cleaned up more quickly, 
enabling residents to return home. 

However, a draft 1995 study prepared for EPA identifies a number of the 
debris components being allowed at C&D landfills under the emergency 
order--including asbestos insulation and shingles, furniture, and wood 
paints and stains--as "problematic," even though these materials are 
not necessarily classified as hazardous wastes under RCRA.[Footnote 67] 
Moreover, studies by a Louisiana State University research institute 
and an environmental engineering firm state that these categories of 
waste can introduce hazardous materials into landfills, increasing the 
likelihood of pollution.[Footnote 68] For example, wood treated with 
chromated copper arsenate as a preservative can leach arsenic, which 
can cause problems with circulatory systems and may increase cancer 
risk if ingested. Chromated copper arsenate is often used to prevent 
termite infestation in areas where termites are prevalent, such as New 
Orleans. Lumber with lead paint also poses health hazards. Lead 
poisoning in children can cause learning disabilities, impaired 
hearing, and behavioral problems, and in pregnant women, it can result 
in adverse developmental effects to fetuses. Even before Hurricane 
Katrina struck, concentrations of lead as much as 10 times EPA's 
screening level were detected in soil samples taken in New Orleans. In 
addition, some household furniture is treated with fire retardants 
containing polybrominated diphenyl ethers, carcinogens that have been 
found as environmental pollutants accumulating in human breast milk and 
wildlife. 

The inclusion of asbestos-contaminated waste mixed with other debris in 
the state's expanded definition of C&D debris may also present a 
potential health hazard. As we previously noted, asbestos exposure has 
been recognized for many years as causing serious human health 
problems. Moreover, the requirements of the Clean Air Act's asbestos 
work practice standard generally do not apply to residential buildings 
with four or fewer units, and unregulated asbestos-containing material 
may be disposed of in C&D landfills.[Footnote 69] The extensive 
renovation and demolition activities in New Orleans create the 
potential for large quantities of asbestos-contaminated waste to enter 
C&D landfills. 

Furthermore, while white goods and household hazardous waste may 
generally not be disposed of at C&D landfills, until recently the 
emergency order stated that such wastes should be segregated from other 
solid waste prior to disposal in C&D landfills except in cases where 
segregation is not practicable. The order did not specifically state 
what must happen in cases where segregation is not practicable. 
Environmental groups filed a lawsuit against Louisiana in August 2006 
alleging that the state's order authorizes the disposal of white goods 
and household hazardous waste in landfills that do not meet RCRA 
criteria for these types of debris and, therefore, that the state has 
authorized "open dumping" of potentially dangerous solid wastes in 
violation of RCRA's prohibition on such dumping.[Footnote 70] The state 
contends that the order does not authorize any practices that violate 
RCRA and, accordingly, that the groups' suit is without merit. EPA is 
currently mediating settlement negotiations between the parties. On 
January 19, 2007, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
issued an amended emergency order that, among other things, deleted the 
phrase "where segregation is not practicable." 

In addition, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
authorized the controversial use of two landfills to receive C&D waste 
in locations of concern to nearby communities and environmental 
organizations. Specifically, pursuant to its Katrina emergency 
authorities, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
authorized (1) the utilization of an existing C&D landfill in proximity 
to hurricane-devastated areas in New Orleans called the Gentilly 
Landfill and (2) the construction and operation of the Chef Menteur 
landfill, located near a minority residential community and a national 
wildlife refuge.[Footnote 71] Studies conducted by an environmental 
engineering firm and Louisiana State University raised concerns about 
debris disposal at the Gentilly and Chef Menteur landfills, citing 
possible surface water and groundwater implications from potentially 
hazardous storm debris. These studies suggest that debris disposal in 
landfills without appropriate safeguards could result in the migration 
of contaminants, potentially causing pollution and affecting public 
health and the environment.[Footnote 72] For example, the studies 
identified concerns about the potential discharge of leachate (water 
that has come into contact with waste) into water--in the case of 
Gentilly, into groundwater and surface water, and in the case of Chef 
Menteur, into surrounding wetlands. In both cases, concerned groups 
filed lawsuits. The Gentilly suit was settled, with the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality agreeing to limit the amount of 
debris entering the landfill daily. In the case of Chef Menteur, an 
environmental group alleged that proper procedures had not been 
followed in issuing an emergency authorization for the landfill under 
the Clean Water Act--in particular, that the public had not been 
provided notice and the opportunity to comment on the action.[Footnote 
73] 

In authorizing the use of the Gentilly landfill under the Hurricane 
Katrina emergency order, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality stated that it had considered alternative sites and determined 
that the Gentilly site met state solid waste requirements and was 
located in proximity to the bulk of the hurricane-generated C&D debris. 
The department further noted that allowing debris disposal at Gentilly 
would decrease waste-hauling time and expense and alleviate traffic 
problems, thereby aiding New Orleans' recovery. In addition, although 
the Chef Menteur site faced opposition, the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality maintained that it was environmentally suitable, 
citing independent sampling of air and water quality in May and June of 
2006. The air results found no contaminants at or above health risk 
levels, while the water quality results showed that the contaminants 
tested for fell within the daily maximum limits of the site's discharge 
permit, though ammonia was detected above the monthly average discharge 
limit. Furthermore, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
underscored the importance of the centrally located landfill to 
disaster cleanup in Orleans Parish. 

EPA's review of the Gentilly site following its authorization to 
receive Hurricane Katrina debris found that current use of the landfill 
appeared to be consistent with the types and volumes of wastes for 
which it was designed and permitted by the state, but noted that there 
is no way to insulate the federal government against future Superfund 
liability absolutely. EPA recommended steps that Gentilly operators 
should take to minimize risks, including posting signs, developing 
debris inspection and segregation procedures, and working with the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality on groundwater 
monitoring. EPA officials told us the agency worked with the Department 
of Environmental Quality to develop a process for reviewing key 
technical areas of concern at the Gentilly site, and EPA officials said 
that the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has put 
effective measures in place to address these areas of concern. In May 
2007, EPA said that the Gentilly landfill operator installed 
groundwater monitoring wells and inclinometers at the Gentilly site and 
reported that the environmental samples "do not indicate any problem." 
The newly constructed Chef Menteur landfill continued to generate 
considerable controversy, and the Mayor of New Orleans allowed the 
local order authorizing the zoning of the landfill to expire on August 
14, 2006--closing it 4 months after it opened. 

While EPA provided consultations to the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality on some landfill decisions, under the National 
Response Plan and RCRA, the agency does not have a formal role in this 
decision making. Further, EPA did not review or approve state decisions 
regarding the use of the Gentilly or Chef Menteur landfills. However, 
at the request of the state, EPA did provide technical support and 
conducted some oversight activities at New Orleans area landfills to 
supplement existing controls at landfills.[Footnote 74] Specifically, 
EPA took steps to promote the segregation of debris before it entered 
landfills, such as organizing hazardous waste collection events. At the 
request of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, EPA also 
began sending landfill observers to about 12 landfills in the New 
Orleans area in February 2006.[Footnote 75] EPA's landfill observers 
usually visited landfills unannounced and documented that they were 
generally operating appropriately--with entrance tower monitors and 
dump-site spotters in place, record keeping on violations, and 
financial and other documentation in order--and prepared and 
transmitted a report to the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality citing any problems.[Footnote 76] EPA officials told us the 
problems observers identified were minor, such as excessive dust on 
roads or instances of debris segregation not taking place. Moreover, 
EPA officials believe that work practices at the landfills, such as 
periodic covering, mitigate the potential migration of specific 
materials from the landfills. However, the officials also noted that 
while EPA's limited oversight provided assistance to the state, it did 
not allow the agency to ensure that debris containing hazardous 
materials would not enter landfills. 

Finally, detailed guidance from EPA to the states on advance planning 
for potential emergency landfill sites and practices to consider when 
making special debris disposal accommodations following disasters might 
have helped Louisiana avoid some of the controversies and lawsuits it 
faced as a result of its emergency debris management decisions in New 
Orleans. Along these lines, after reviewing its Hurricane Katrina 
response actions in Mississippi, EPA's Region 4 identified helping 
states with hurricane-prone coastal areas with such advance planning as 
one of several steps EPA could take to improve its emergency responses 
in the future. Specifically, Region 4's September 2006 summary report 
on its response actions in Mississippi stated that advance planning for 
landfill sites would allow geologic and other crucial data to be known 
before an incident, including data for staging areas or temporary 
landfills for vegetative and C&D debris. The report said that EPA 
Region 4 could provide assistance to states so that debris-clearing 
operations have preapproved disposal sites that would not pose long- 
term environmental issues after they were used during an emergency. 

Lack of Clarity on Federal Debris Management Roles Delayed Actions to 
Ensure That White Goods and Electronic Waste Were Handled in a Timely 
and Appropriate Manner: 

The recycling and disposal of debris such as white goods and electronic 
waste also presented the agency with a challenge in mitigating the 
potential for environmental contamination following the storms. Because 
of a lack of clarity in the National Response Plan and the absence of 
interagency protocols about federal roles in debris management, EPA 
could not ensure that debris such as white goods and electronic waste 
was handled in a timely and appropriate manner. Specifically, the plan 
does not state whether EPA or the Army Corps of Engineers should manage 
the collection, processing, recycling, and disposal of white goods, 
such as refrigerators and freezers, and electronic waste, such as 
televisions, computers, and printers. Recycling of white goods entails 
the removal of chemicals, such as chlorofluorocarbons and other 
refrigerants that are harmful to the environment. Recycling of 
electronic waste entails removing toxic components, such as lead and 
mercury. Computers contain toxic chemicals such as mercury, while the 
average television contains more than 4 pounds of lead. 

The National Response Plan assigns the Corps primary responsibility for 
the public works and engineering emergency support function, which 
includes debris removal and disposal. In addition to EPA's role as the 
coordinator for the federal response to actual or potential discharges 
of oil and hazardous materials, the plan states that EPA can, among 
other things, assist the Corps with contaminated debris management 
activities by coordinating and providing resources, assessments, data, 
expertise, technical assistance, monitoring, and other appropriate 
support. In this regard, EPA's Hurricane Katrina response activities 
included the collection and disposal of household hazardous waste such 
as paints, pesticides, and propane tanks. While debris such as white 
goods and electronic waste contain hazardous materials, neither the 
plan nor interagency protocols address whether EPA or the Corps should 
manage the collection, processing, recycling, and disposal of these 
types of waste. 

After initial delays in determining whether EPA or the Corps would be 
responsible for white goods and electronic waste disposal, the agencies 
agreed that they would fulfill this role jointly in Louisiana, while 
the Corps or local agencies would handle white goods and electronic 
waste disposal in Mississippi. Local officials in Louisiana and 
Mississippi told us that confusion about EPA's role in white goods and 
electronics waste disposal resulted in delays in removing and disposing 
of this debris. A parish official in Louisiana also said that the 
delays may have resulted in the inappropriate disposal of some 
electronic waste in landfills without proper safeguards. 

In Mississippi, county officials from the three coastal counties hit by 
Katrina expressed frustration that EPA did not assist with either white 
goods or electronic waste disposal. Officials in one county told us 
that the collection of white goods was delayed for 7 weeks because of 
confusion among EPA, the Corps, and the county about responsibility for 
this task. Officials from another county said that while they 
appreciated EPA's assistance with household hazardous waste collection, 
the county would have also appreciated EPA's help with other activities 
that they believed involved environmental issues, such as white goods 
and electronic waste disposal and removing and cleaning up fuel that 
leached into waterways and bayous from abandoned automobiles. Although 
EPA did help coordinate some electronic waste recycling in one 
Mississippi county, an official from this county said that the effort 
was limited and only came about at the county's insistence. According 
to officials from all three counties, EPA generally informed them that 
white goods and electronic waste disposal were beyond the purview of 
the agency's disaster response activities in Mississippi. One of these 
officials suggested that EPA and the Corps should develop a better plan 
to address the collection of white goods following future disasters. 
According to EPA, the agency has been having a series of discussions 
with the Corps and FEMA to clarify roles and responsibilities and 
enhance coordination, based on Katrina experience related to debris, 
among other things. EPA said it has not yet been determined how the 
discussions will be documented, but possibilities include a memorandum 
of understanding or supporting documents to the National Response Plan. 

Conclusions: 

Working under extraordinary conditions, EPA undertook a broad range of 
activities to support state and local entities in Louisiana and 
Mississippi in assessing and minimizing the environmental risks 
resulting from Hurricane Katrina, including search and rescue efforts 
that brought 800 New Orleans residents to safety. Because of the 
breadth and scope of this disaster, cleanup and recovery efforts are 
still under way in the New Orleans area. For example, many homes have 
yet to be demolished or substantially renovated. A significant number 
of them will be demolished or renovated during the next year, and 
likely these activities will continue for a longer period of time. 
Given the age of many New Orleans residences, environmental hazards 
such as asbestos are likely to be present. For the demolitions covered 
by the no action assurances, in lieu of the requirement for prior 
identification and removal of regulated asbestos-containing materials, 
homes that are not inspected before demolition are required to be 
wetted during the demolition and disposition processes to reduce 
potential asbestos emissions. However, much of the demolition and 
renovation activities, including house gutting, will be undertaken by 
individual homeowners; these activities are not regulated and therefore 
none of the asbestos control requirements apply. While EPA has taken 
steps to monitor asbestos concentrations in the air in New Orleans, it 
is not clear how its approach can accomplish the agency's stated goal 
of measuring the effects from both the regulated asbestos-containing 
material, to which the no action assurances might apply, and the 
unregulated activities, which would include demolitions and renovations 
by individual homeowners. To date, according to EPA, the asbestos air 
data it has collected have not identified potential problems regarding 
public exposure to asbestos fibers. However, these results may not be 
representative of asbestos releases to which residents, workers, and 
volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods because of monitoring 
gaps stemming from monitor locations and the scaling back of monitoring 
sites a few months after demolitions began. Specifically, without 
sufficient and targeted asbestos air monitoring data from neighborhoods 
where demolitions and renovations are concentrated, EPA has limited 
assurance that the public health is protected from risks associated 
with inhalation of asbestos fibers potentially stemming from the 
substantial levels of both regulated and unregulated demolition and 
renovation activities occurring in concentrated geographic areas. 

In addition, EPA could improve the effectiveness of its communications 
about the potential health risks from exposure to environmental 
contamination when responding to future disasters. Following a disaster 
that has involved evacuation, residents are typically anxious to return 
to their homes, and public leaders are eager to take steps to return to 
normalcy, including having residents return as soon as it is safe for 
them to do so. Among the important information residents need in order 
to minimize their environmental health risks when they do return is 
timely, complete, clear, and consistent guidance about the 
environmental contamination they may be exposed to, both indoors and 
outdoors, and how to best protect themselves from it. Without such 
information, people may return too soon or without the proper 
protective gear and supplies, which might expose them to both short- 
term and long-term negative health effects. This could well have been 
the case in New Orleans since, for example, EPA did not state until 
August 2006 that its December 2005 assessment summary applied to short- 
term visits, such as to view the external damage to their homes. This 
situation was exacerbated by some confusing information EPA provided in 
public service communications--for example, about the respiratory 
protection residents should use to mitigate potential exposure to 
asbestos, lead, and mold in their homes. 

Mitigating some challenges EPA faced addressing Hurricane Katrina could 
better protect the environment in the future. For example, while under 
the National Response Plan, EPA's responsibilities include mitigating 
threats to the environment--including the protection of natural 
resources--funding may not always be available to carry out these 
essential actions. It is shortsighted, inefficient, and potentially 
dangerous to limit the removal of debris containing hazardous materials 
to state lands and waterways, halting such cleanups arbitrarily at 
federal land or water boundaries. Thus, while the Department of the 
Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service ultimately requested and received 
funding through supplemental appropriations that it then provided to 
EPA to conduct the cleanups, this is not an effective or efficient 
solution in disaster situations. In such situations, timely cleanup can 
lessen the damage to the environment, better protect the public from 
exposure to contaminants, prevent further migration of hazardous 
materials, and likely be more cost-effective. Without a framework in 
place to enable EPA, the Coast Guard, and federal land management 
agencies such as the Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Agriculture to quickly obtain funding to respond to environmental 
impacts of disasters on federal lands and waterways, these natural 
resources--and state areas that can be harmed by the migration of 
chemical releases from federal lands--are at risk. 

In addition, given EPA's limited role in ensuring that states dispose 
of storm debris appropriately, EPA's lack of sufficient guidance to 
state and local entities on selecting additional landfill sites and on 
practices that state agencies should consider when making special 
accommodations for debris disposal following disasters becomes 
increasingly important. Such guidance could help avoid controversies 
over landfill sites selected under emergency conditions, assist state 
and local agencies in planning for accommodations that may be needed to 
handle large volumes of hazardous materials after disasters, and 
identify strategies needed to mitigate the potential environmental 
impacts of such accommodations. Finally, greater clarity in the roles 
of EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in recycling and disposing of 
white goods and electronic waste could help minimize the inappropriate 
disposal of these wastes in the immediate aftermath of disasters. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance EPA's ability to monitor and assess information on asbestos 
emissions resulting from the extensive demolition and renovation 
activities in New Orleans, we recommend that the EPA Administrator 
develop and implement an asbestos monitoring plan that addresses the 
potential health effects of both (1) the nonenforcement of certain 
asbestos requirements covering government-ordered demolitions of 
residences and (2) the general exemption from EPA's asbestos work 
practice standards for demolition and renovation activities of 
residential buildings with four or fewer dwelling units when done at 
the initiative of individual homeowners. 

To provide environmental health risk information to the public that is 
timely, complete, clear, and consistent about (1) the environmental 
contamination to which individuals may be exposed subsequent to 
disasters and (2) how individuals can best protect themselves, we 
recommend that the EPA Administrator take the following two actions: 

* Develop protocols to ensure that the agency's communications 
following disasters are timely and sufficiently disclose all of the 
information that affected residents would need to understand the 
potential health risks they may face upon returning, including 
information on the scope and methodology for EPA's assessments of 
environmental health risks. 

* Develop clear and consistent generic information for the public 
regarding mitigating exposure to contaminants--such as asbestos, lead, 
and mold--likely to be present in many disaster situations and ensure 
that this information can be expeditiously communicated via all 
appropriate media, thereby providing the public with basic protective 
information at the same time that EPA is developing any additional 
event-specific health risk information that is needed. 

To better enable EPA and its partner agencies to minimize the 
environmental risks resulting from future disasters, we recommend that 
the EPA Administrator take the following three actions: 

* Work with potentially affected federal land management agencies, the 
Coast Guard, DHS, and FEMA to determine what actions are needed to 
ensure that environmental contamination on federal lands, such as 
national wildlife refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently 
addressed in future disasters. Potential actions include the 
development of protocols or memorandums of understanding or amendments 
to the Stafford Act if the agencies determine that amendments are 
needed to achieve the timely availability of such funding when 
responding to disasters involving federal lands. 

* Provide more detailed guidance to state and local entities on 
managing debris disposal following disasters to better ensure 
protection of public health and the environment and prevent the 
creation of future Superfund sites. This guidance should address the 
selection of landfill sites for disaster debris, including advance 
selection of potential landfill sites, and practices to consider when 
making special accommodations for debris disposal in emergency 
situations. 

* Work with the Army Corps of Engineers to clarify each agency's role 
in debris disposal and develop a memorandum of understanding or other 
agency protocol to allow the agencies to quickly manage and recycle 
white goods and electronic waste following future disasters. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA's Associate Administrator 
for Homeland Security agreed with all but one of the recommendations. 
Specifically, EPA agreed with the recommendations to provide additional 
asbestos air monitoring in New Orleans, improve environmental health 
risk communications following disasters, provide more guidance to 
states on managing debris disposal following disasters, and clarify 
debris management roles with the Army Corps of Engineers. However, EPA 
disagreed with our recommendation that the agency convene a working 
group that includes potentially affected federal land management 
agencies and the Coast Guard to develop protocols or memorandums of 
understanding on the steps the agencies should take to obtain disaster 
funding for environmental cleanups on federal lands in the future--and 
thereby address damage to federal lands and wildlife in a timely and 
efficient manner. EPA asserted that this recommendation would be more 
appropriately addressed to the Department of the Interior and FEMA. We 
continue to believe that EPA should be involved in helping to resolve 
these issues because, under the National Response Plan, EPA is the 
chair of the National Response Team, whose duties include national 
planning and response coordination for oil and hazardous materials 
incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined to provide funding to 
the Department of the Interior for cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, and 
DHS, which coordinates the federal response to disasters under the 
National Response Plan, should also take part in planning efforts to 
resolve funding issues concerning the removal of hazardous materials 
from federal lands following a disaster. Accordingly, we have modified 
our recommendation to state that EPA should also work with DHS and 
FEMA, as well as with federal land management agencies and the Coast 
Guard, to determine what actions are needed to ensure that 
environmental contamination on federal lands, such as national wildlife 
refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future 
disasters. This recommendation is aimed at supporting EPA's efforts in 
conducting its environmental protection and coordination missions 
expeditiously in future disasters, thereby avoiding situations in which 
the removal of hazardous materials is halted at federal land or water 
boundaries and individual federal land management agencies waste 
valuable time seeking appropriations to pay EPA to conduct cleanup, as 
was the case during the year following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. 
Further, as was the case following Hurricane Katrina, EPA will often 
have the necessary cleanup infrastructure in place (such as 
contractors, equipment, and personnel with cleanup oversight expertise) 
to respond rapidly and effectively to contamination. EPA also provided 
comments on aspects of the report it considered misleading or 
inaccurate, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. EPA's letter and our detailed response to it appear in 
appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, EPA; 
appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. We 
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, this 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Other GAO staff who made major 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

signed by: 

John B. Stephenson:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James M. Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John D. Dingell: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joe Barton: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of our work on environmental issues stemming from 
Hurricane Katrina were to (1) review the Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) actions under the Department of Homeland Security's 
National Response Plan to assess and mitigate the environmental impacts 
of Hurricane Katrina; (2) determine the extent to which EPA has 
assurance that public health in New Orleans is being protected from 
asbestos inhalation health risks posed by extensive demolition 
activities; (3) determine the extent to which EPA's communications on 
environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided 
useful information to the public; and (4) identify challenges EPA has 
faced in addressing the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina 
that, if mitigated, could enable EPA to better protect the environment 
in future disasters. 

In reviewing EPA's actions under the National Response Plan to assess 
and mitigate the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina, we 
analyzed the National Response Plan and its accompanying annexes-- 
particularly the Emergency Support Function Annexes, which specify the 
various responsibilities EPA and other agencies have with regard to 
providing emergency assistance. We discussed EPA's hurricane response 
actions with EPA's Offices of Emergency Management, Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, Water, Air, and Solid Waste and reviewed 
documentation related to these actions. We visited the EPA Incident 
Command Centers in both Metairie, Louisiana, and Biloxi, Mississippi, 
and discussed with various EPA officials from Region 6 (covering 
Louisiana) and Region 4 (covering Mississippi) their overall Hurricane 
Katrina response actions. We visited affected areas to survey the 
massive damage and cleanup operations, including the Lower Ninth Ward 
and the Murphy Oil Spill in Louisiana and some of the Mississippi's 
most severely damaged areas, such as Waveland, Bay St. Louis, Biloxi, 
and Gulfport. We interviewed other federal, state, and local officials 
who were either directly or indirectly involved with EPA's response 
efforts, such as officials with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services' Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry and Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of the 
Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. State and local officials 
interviewed included representatives with the Louisiana and Mississippi 
Departments of Environmental Quality and local officials from 
Jefferson, Plaquemines, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana 
and from Jackson, Hancock, and Harrison Counties in Mississippi. In 
addition, we spoke with national and regional stakeholder groups, 
including the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Lake Pontchartrain 
Basin Foundation, the Louisiana Environmental Action Network, the 
Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, the Mississippi 
Environmental Recovery Alliance, the Mississippi Power Company, and 
Sierra Club chapters in both Louisiana and Mississippi. We also 
reviewed various Congressional Research Service reports that provided 
an overall context for various environmental issues emerging from 
Hurricane Katrina, as well as reports from the EPA Inspector General on 
the hurricane response. 

To analyze the extent to which EPA has assurance that public health in 
New Orleans is being protected from asbestos inhalation health risks 
posed by extensive demolition activities, we reviewed key documents, 
such as relevant Clean Air Act provisions; EPA's national emissions 
standards for asbestos, which set work practice standards for building 
demolition and renovation activities; and EPA's no action assurance 
letters to Louisiana and Mississippi. Other key documents reviewed 
include EPA's September 2005 Overview Plan for Ambient Air Monitoring 
After Hurricane Katrina, EPA's October 2005 Regional Air Monitoring 
Plan for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, and EPA's February 2006 
Contingency Air Monitoring and Sampling Plan for C&D Burning or 
Grinding Sites, all of which cover areas of southern Louisiana impacted 
by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We also reviewed EPA's March 2006 
Quality Assurance Project Plan for a building demolition project in 
Fort Smith, Arkansas, testing an alternative asbestos control method 
for building demolition. Additionally, we examined the air monitoring 
data EPA posted on its "Response to 2005 Hurricanes" Web page, which 
identified the location of the various air monitors the agency used to 
measure air quality after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Louisiana and 
Mississippi and the pollutants each monitor measured. We spoke with 
officials from EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 
regarding EPA's asbestos no action assurance letters and its approach 
to addressing asbestos issues resulting from the hurricanes. We also 
spoke with EPA officials in the Office of Emergency Management, Office 
of Research and Development, and Regions 4 and 6 regarding asbestos and 
demolition issues, as well as with officials from the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of 
Environmental Quality. 

To determine the extent to which EPA's communications on environmental 
health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided useful 
information to the public, we reviewed the agency's key communications 
about the potential health risks from environmental contamination in 
New Orleans--three environmental assessment summaries that were 
released in December 2005, March 2006, and August 2006. We also 
reviewed EPA's various flyers, public service announcements, 
advisories, and other documents on EPA's "Response to 2005 Hurricanes" 
Web page that provide information to the public about environmental 
health risks and how to mitigate them. We spoke with EPA officials from 
the Office of Emergency Management and Regions 4 and 6 about the 
agency's efforts to communicate information regarding the environmental 
health risks from the hurricanes and reviewed comments provided by 
EPA's Science Advisory Board related to EPA's sediment sampling plan. 
Additionally, we reviewed various reports from the Department of Health 
and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
including the agency's June 2006 report Mold Prevention Strategies and 
Possible Health Effects in the Aftermath of Hurricanes and Major 
Floods. We also reviewed EPA Inspector General reports on EPA's 
response activities. The focus of our review of EPA's communications of 
environmental health risks following Hurricane Katrina was on their 
content and the extent to which they provided clear and consistent 
information; we did not evaluate the scientific merits of EPA's 
environmental risk assessment methodology. 

In conducting this work, we identified several challenges EPA faced in 
addressing the environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina, based on our 
interviews with the federal, state, local, and private-sector officials 
identified above; our site visits in Louisiana and Mississippi; and a 
review of federal and private-sector reports and articles about 
environmental cleanup activities in the Gulf Coast after the 
hurricanes. Regarding the landfill issues, we reviewed related laws and 
guidance such as the Stafford act, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, the National Response Plan, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency debris management guidance, state regulations and emergency 
orders, and independent reports that addressed potential debris issues 
at landfill sites in Louisiana that received debris from Katrina. 
Finally, we visited the Chef Menteur and Old Gentilly landfill sites to 
observe debris management activities. Officials of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the Department of the Interior's Fish and 
Wildlife Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers reviewed sections of 
the draft report that applied directly to their agencies. We conducted 
our work from November 2005 through June 2007 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency: 

United States Environmental Protection Agency: 
Washington, D.C. 20460: 
The Administrator: 

May 9 2007: 

Ms. Christine Fishkin: 
Assistant Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W. 
Washington DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Fishkin: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Draft Report entitled 
"Hurricane Katrina: EPA's Current and Future Environmental Protection 
Efforts Could Be Enhanced by Addressing Issues and Challenges Faced in 
the Gulf Coast". We appreciate your acknowledgement of the extensive 
work conducted by EPA under challenging circumstances. We are proud of 
our contributions to this unprecedented response and also of the 
progress that we have made in our preparedness and response operations 
in recent years. We, along with other federal agencies, are continuing 
to make improvements in our work in light of our experience with the 
Hurricane Katrina response. 

While we generally agree and have implemented many of your 
recommendations, we have concerns with several aspects of the report as 
they are misleading and in some instances, inaccurate. In these 
instances, the report does not provide a complete picture of the 
challenges faced and the work that was successfully completed. These 
themes are summarized below: 

* The report creates a misleading impression that EPA was not timely in 
providing sufficient information about environmental conditions, i.e., 
that the information was not provided until December 2005 through an 
"assessment summary." In fact, EPA provided comprehensive information 
to FEMA in September 2005 which was combined with other information to 
assist local officials in their determination of when to allow 
displaced residents to return to their homes. Also, EPA provided almost 
daily web postings, informational handouts and numerous press releases 
immediately following the storm's landfall in August and beyond that 
assisted displaced residents to understand the potential health risks 
of returning home and how to mitigate them. 

* The report creates a misleading impression that it was EPA's role to 
determine if it was "safe" for residents to return to their homes. In 
fact, that is the proper role of state and local officials in close 
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. Also, the report 
does not recognize that communication about the environmental 
conditions represented a coordinated effort among appropriate federal 
and state agencies. 

* The report does not recognize that EPA worked with the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ, the Louisiana Department of 
Health and Hospitals (LDHH), the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 
development of the environmental sampling summaries. Importantly, a 
number of comments in the draft report are related to the decisions and 
language included in the "assessment summary" that were the work 
product of other agencies with primary jurisdiction in addition to EPA. 

* The report suggests that EPA's sampling program was incomplete 
because sediment samples were only collected in public access areas, 
but does not provide any data to demonstrate how these data would be 
significantly different from sediments collected on or inside nearby 
private properties. EPA believes that sediment samples collected in the 
median of a street or right-of-way between a curb and a sidewalk can be 
extrapolated to characterize the private properties in the immediate 
vicinity of the sample from the public access area. EPA did not find 
evidence of widespread contamination of petroleum-based products or 
arsenic "that could have been washed into a building during flooding." 

* The report claims that the environmental contamination caused by this 
natural disaster could have both short-and long-term effects on the 
health of residents in impacted areas, as well as workers, volunteers, 
and wildlife. The data collected by EPA to date does not support this 
statement. 

* The report asserts that EPA's August 2006 summary indicates that the 
data presented in the December 2005 summary applied only to short term 
visits. In fact, both summaries discuss how samples were compared to 
both short and long term health criteria. 

* The report underestimates the extent of asbestos monitoring that was 
conducted in that it does not include a complete picture of the robust 
federal and state network created to provide necessary information 
regarding exposure to workers and the public. The US Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and EPA have collected over 20,000 asbestos samples in locations 
where major demolition is taking place. 

* The report is misleading regarding responsibility for mitigation of 
environmental impacts on national wildlife refuges during incidents of 
national significance. The decision to remove hazardous materials from 
the national wildlife refuge was the responsibility of FEMA and DOI, 
and did not involve EPA. 

* The report asserts that EPA had a limited role in ensuring that 
states dispose of storm debris appropriately. Even though EPA has 
limited formal authority over solid waste landfills, it did work 
closely with federal, state and local partners to institute extensive 
procedures to address waste segregation, recycling, and landfill 
operations. These procedures were reflected in a comprehensive "Debris 
Management Plan" to which EPA was a party. 

I will continue by commenting on the five recommendations outlined in 
the report and I will also provide specific comments on the report for 
clarification and accuracy. 

Response to Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1, page 62: "We recommend that the EPA Administrator 
develop and implement an asbestos monitoring plan that addresses the 
potential health impacts of both (1) the non-enforcement of certain 
asbestos requirements covering government -ordered demolitions of 
residences and (2) the general exemption from EPA's asbestos work 
practice standards for demolition and renovation activities of 
residential buildings with four or fewer dwelling units when done at 
the initiative of individual homeowners." 

Response: EPA shares GAO's concern regarding the potential impacts from 
asbestos. On September 20, 2006, EPA sent a letter to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) outlining our shared 
goals of protecting the public and response workers from the dust and 
contaminants that could be released during demolition or similar 
activities in southern Louisiana. EPA believes that the established 
engineering controls protect the public from the inhalation of asbestos 
and the asbestos monitoring network provides additional assurance. 

EPA believes that the current asbestos monitoring network, which 
extends beyond regulatory requirements, is more than adequate to 
provide necessary information. EPA, working with its federal and state 
partners, has established an asbestos monitoring network that is made 
up of area wide, waste reduction and demolition specific components. 
The USACE conducts air monitoring along the perimeter of demolition 
sites as well as from employees wearing personal monitoring equipment 
required by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). LDEQ 
is the principal Agency monitoring the demolition activities at 
facilities that are not regulated by NESHAP. LDEQ inspectors frequently 
inspect and issue enforcement notices where these demolition activities 
appear to present environmental harm. LDEQ has developed guidance 
documents and provides compliance assistance to the private contractors 
conducting the majority of these demolitions. This multi-layered 
network has resulted in the collection of over 20,000 asbestos samples 
in Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes alone. A review of data collected 
from this network has not identified any environmental concerns. 

Asbestos is designated a hazardous air pollutant under Section 112 of 
the Clean Air Act. With respect to hazardous air pollutants, such as 
asbestos, for which it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce an 
emission standard, Section 112(h) of the Clean Air Act allows the 
Agency to establish a design, equipment, work practice, or operational 
standard, or some combination thereof. In the case of asbestos, EPA 
promulgated work practice standards designed to minimize the release of 
asbestos fibers. Even though section 112 does not mandate ambient air 
monitoring for asbestos, EPA included it in the monitoring plan 
developed for the Katrina response to be responsive to potential public 
questions and concerns. The Science Advisory Board reviewed this 
monitoring plan in October 2005. The network was designed to measure 
impacts from both the regulated asbestos containing material to which 
no action assurance letters might apply, as well as asbestos from 
materials not regulated. 

There are several areas in the report which are misleading concerning 
the monitoring that is underway. For example, the report indicates that 
our area wide component is not effective because the stations are not 
adjacent to demolition sites. The report fails to capture the proactive 
engineering controls that are in place to prevent asbestos from being 
released. These controls include wetting before, during and after 
demolition, wrapping of the waste, and establishment of an asbestos 
work zone. Additionally, EPA's efforts to conduct perimeter air 
monitoring of grinding sites where volume reduction was occurring, was 
established to address the specific issue of potential asbestos 
releases from unregulated sources. EPA believes that this targeted 
approach is more conservative than monitoring at demolition sites since 
volume reduction activities have the potential to release more asbestos 
fibers as the material is being destroyed. 

EPA will continue to evaluate the data collected from this monitoring 
network. With regard to the unregulated activities, building upon the 
September 20, 2006 letter mentioned above (which EPA previously 
provided to GAO) and subsequent advisories, EPA will work with state 
and local officials to develop further demolition/renovation advisories 
that can be used throughout the area to advise individuals to take 
appropriate precautions. 

Although EPA believes that these current activities have been more than 
adequate, to address GAO concerns expressed in the report, we will work 
with our federal, state and local partners to develop and implement a 
plan for additional monitoring. 

Recommendation 2, page 62: "We recommend that the EPA Administrator: 

* develop protocols to ensure that the agency's communications 
following disasters are timely and sufficiently disclose all the 
information that affected residents would need to understand the 
potential health risks they may face upon returning, including 
information on the scope and methodology for EPA's assessments of 
environmental health risks, and: 

* develop clear and consistent generic information for the public 
regarding mitigating exposure to contaminants-such as asbestos, lead, 
and mold-likely to be present in many disaster situations and ensure 
that this information can be expeditiously communicated via all 
appropriate media, thereby providing the public basic protective 
information at the same time that EPA is developing any additional 
event-specific health risk information that is needed. 

Response: EPA's communications activities following Hurricane Katrina 
were unprecedented. In a timely manner, the Agency provided information 
to the public to identify potential risks, increase awareness, and 
prevent careless actions. We worked through the media, web postings and 
also through distribution of over 3.8 million flyers. Throughout the 
response, we saw evidence of our successful public communications 
through voluntary curbside sorting of household chemicals and 
recyclable electronics, careful return of residents to their homes, 
inquiries for certified contractors and distribution of supplies by non-
profit organizations. 

Following the Katrina response, EPA created a Crisis Communications 
Work Group which is co-chaired by the Office of Public Affairs, the 
Office of Emergency Management and includes representatives from 
offices across the Agency. This group was tasked with the development 
of a crisis communications plan to address internal and external 
processes during response to Incidents of National Significance, 
building on the Katrina response. The plan has been reviewed by 
appropriate Agency personnel and will be finalized in the near future. 
Additionally, the group will begin developing a resource guide which 
will revise and organize existing crisis communication facts sheets, 
message maps, templates and other information to ensure that accurate 
and consistent information can be accessed quickly at the time of 
response. The guide will also include new information that will be 
developed based on identified needs. The guide is expected to be 
completed during early 2008 and will be reviewed and revised annually 
thereafter. 

Recommendation 3, page 63: Convene a working group with potentially 
affected federal land management agencies and the Coast Guard to 
develop protocols or memoranda of understanding on the steps the 
agencies should take to obtain disaster funding for environmental 
cleanups on federal lands in the future so that damage to federal lands 
and wildlife, such as on national wildlife refuges, can be addressed in 
a timely and efficient manner or seek amendments to the Stafford Act 
should EPA determine that amendments are needed to achieve the timely 
availability of such funding when responding to disasters. 

Response: The report contains a misleading statement "EPA did not 
remove hazardous materials from national wildlife refuges in a timely 
manner as part of its hurricane response in part because disaster 
assistance funding generally is not used for debris cleanups on federal 
lands." This statement implies that EPA was involved in the decision to 
remove or not to remove hazardous materials from national wildlife 
refuges. On page 45, the report correctly states that FEMA did not 
approve Interior's request for funding to cleanup this debris. 

When the Department of the Interior (DOI) received funding, it 
requested assistance from EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). EPA and 
USCG completed the requested work under budget and ahead of schedule. 

Nevertheless, we do not agree with this recommendation and suggest that 
the discussion of this issue be deleted from the report. As stated in 
the report, FEMA declined DOI's request for assistance to mitigate 
environmental impacts of the hurricane in several national wildlife 
refuges. EPA was informed of this decision through routine debris 
management meetings conducted by FEMA at the Joint Field Office. We 
suggest that this issue would be more appropriately addressed to FEMA 
and DOI. DOI, as a federal agency, is responsible for the mitigation of 
environmental impacts on land managed by DOI. 

Recommendation 4, page 63: Provide more detailed guidance to state and 
local entities on managing debris disposal following disasters to 
better ensure protection of public health and the environment and 
prevent the creation of future Superfund sites. This guidance should 
address the selection of solid waste disposal sites for disaster debris 
and practices that can mitigate air, water, and soil contamination 
resulting from the disposal of debris containing hazardous materials, 
including advance selection of potential landfill sites. 

Response: While EPA agrees that we should incorporate information 
learned during the Katrina response into our existing guidance, we 
believe that the assistance we provided in debris management was 
extensive and successful, resulting in the disposal of over 5 million 
containers of household hazardous waste, the proper handling and 
recycling of over 380,000 large appliances, and over 1,000,000 
electronic goods to save important landfill space and ensure the reuse 
of metal components. We disagree with statements in the report that the 
Agency's assistance was limited. 

The report correctly states that EPA does not have a formal role in the 
decision-making processes associated with the two specific landfills 
mentioned in the report. However, it should be noted that EPA consulted 
with LDEQ throughout the response. The report indicates that EPA 
provided oversight; this is not correct, rather EPA provided assistance 
in a variety of ways. The report raises the concern that the two 
landfills would allow waste materials to leach out of the landfills and 
impact the surrounding environment. However, it neglects to mention 
that the landfill operator installed groundwater monitoring wells and 
inclinometers at the active Gentilly landfill, and environmental 
samples do not indicate any problem. Further, the report does not 
acknowledge that the groundwater beneath the landfill and surrounding 
area is saline and generally of poor quality. 

The Agency has started to make revisions to its current Disaster Debris 
Manual and plans to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita and provide more detailed guidance to states and local 
entities regarding acceptable practices, siting criteria, and the need 
for advanced planning/selection of potential staging/disposal areas. 
The changes will help states build upon the successes and lessons of 
the recent responses as they make decisions geared towards protection 
of human health and the environment. The Agency expects to have a 
revised version of the Disaster Debris Manual by the end of the 
calendar year. 

Recommendation 5, page 63: Work with the Corps of Engineers to clarify 
each agency's role in debris disposal and develop a Memorandum of 
Understanding or other agency protocol to allow the agencies to quickly 
manage and recycle white goods and electronic waste following future 
disasters. 

Response: EPA and USACE worked cooperatively regarding the management 
of debris, meeting on a daily basis to assure timely and appropriate 
procedures were in place. As indicated above, EPA provided extensive 
assistance to both states, resulting in very successful operations. The 
report indicates that local officials indicated there were initial 
delays caused by confusion over roles for collection of white goods and 
electronics. However, in Louisiana, electronic wastes were first 
collected on September 10, 2005 and to date, over 1 million electronic 
units have been collected. Also, the USACE requested EPA's assistance 
with collection of white goods when they became overwhelmed. EPA began 
white goods collection on September 25, 2005 and collected or processed 
over 380,000 units prior to transition to the USACE in June 2006. 

Despite this successful coordination, EPA agrees it would be beneficial 
to clarify the roles of EPA and USACE with respect to debris disposal. 
As noted in the GAO report, EPA has already initiated discussions with 
USACE to address this issue. We will document our final agreements in 
appropriate protocols, which may include language in the NRP Emergency 
Support Functions (ESFs), ESF supporting documents, and/or a Memorandum 
of Understanding. 

Specific Comments: 

Highlights section, second paragraph under "What GAO found" "While the 
EPA took steps to monitor asbestos after Hurricane Katrina - for 
example, more than doubling the number of ambient (outdoor) air 
monitors in the area." This statement and subsequent statements 
incorrectly suggests that these monitors were focused mainly on 
emissions from debris. In fact those monitors were used to characterize 
ambient air quality concerning numerous potential pollutants from broad 
sources both local and regional. 

Highlights section, third paragraph under "What GAO found" "EPA's three 
reports on its environmental sampling in New Orleans conveyed important 
information on potential health risks from exposure to floodwaters, 
sediments and air. However, their usefulness was limited by a lack of 
timeliness and insufficient disclosures about EPA's environmental 
sampling. For example, EPA did not disclose until August 2006 that its 
December 2005 assessment summary - which indicated that it was 
generally safe for residents to return to New Orleans - applied only to 
short-term visits such as to view the damage to homes." 

The criticism regarding the timeliness of EPA's communications is 
reiterated on pages 6, 34, 35 and 60 of the report, and stems largely 
from a misinterpretation of the December 2005 assessment summary 
published on EPA's website. The report asserts that the December 2005 
assessment summary: 1) indicated that it was generally safe for 
residents to return to New Orleans, and; 2) applied only to short-term 
visits. In addition, the report states that information was provided 
too late and the assessment summary reports were EPA documents. As 
stated on page 1, EPA provided comprehensive information to FEMA in 
September 2005 to assist local officials in their determination of when 
to allow displaced residents to return to their homes. EPA also 
provided daily web postings, information hand-outs, and over 90 press 
releases following the storm's landfall in August 2005 and on an 
ongoing basis through December 2005. Examples of these communication 
efforts were documented in a 45 page matrix entitled, "Hurricane 
Katrina Meeting, Community Outreach and Information Distribution" which 
has been previously provided to GAO. The assessment summary report was 
a collaborative effort with EPA, LDEQ, LDHH, CDC, ATSDR, and FEMA. 

The December 2005 assessment does not state that it was "safe" for 
residents to return to New Orleans. The report assumes that it was 
EPA's role to answer the question of whether it was "safe" for 
residents to return to their homes, and also assumes that EPA was well 
placed to provide such advice. In fact, EPA was not in possession of 
adequate information to answer such a question, and to do so would have 
usurped the proper role of state and local officials, working in 
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

In the response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA gave EPA a mission 
assignment under ESF-10 to collect and maintain environmental data in 
order to characterize the nature of environmental impacts of the 
hurricane. The Department of Health and Human Services, specifically 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, had the mission 
assignment under ESF-8 to provide data and technical assistance related 
to the health and medical aspects of situations involving hazardous 
materials. DHS had the public communication assignment under ESF-15 of 
the National Response Plan, which gives DHS the responsibility to: 

* Provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to audiences 
affected by the hurricane, including governments, media, the private 
sector and individual citizens; 

* Coordinate messages among all levels of government; 

* Inform state and local officials on response efforts and recovery 
programs; 

* Coordinate with the state to identify community leaders and groups to 
assist in the rapid dissemination of information; 

* Establish and maintain a network for information exchange; and, 

* Facilitate planning and mutual support at all levels of government 
for the hurricane response effort. 

Under these responsibilities, EPA provided information on environmental 
issues to DHS beginning in September 2005. DHS shared this information 
with state and local officials for their use in making assessments 
regarding the impacts to human health and safety and the environment on 
environmental media affected by the hurricane. Specifically, a matrix 
of information on environmental conditions for each zip code was 
considered by Mayor Nagin when making his decision to allow residents 
to return to their homes. 

There were many factors that entered into the decision of whether it 
was safe to return to impacted areas, such as the integrity of the 
levees in the event of another storm or heavy rain, the structural 
soundness of storm-damaged homes, the adequacy of city services in a 
community (electricity, water utilities, sewerage, garbage collection, 
etc.), and the availability of police and fire protection, just to name 
a few. EPA collected data that was relevant to only a subset of the 
safety issues, such as whether drinking water at the point it enters 
the distribution system met federal standards. EPA endeavored to 
provide information to local officials and the public on those areas 
within our jurisdiction. 

EPA believes that the local officials were best placed to collect and 
assess all these pieces of information - data from the Corps of 
Engineers on the condition of the levees, from state building 
inspectors on the stability of houses, from CDC on the medical risks of 
mold, from EPA and the state DEQ on the levels of contaminants in the 
drinking water, and so on. It is then within their purview, as 
representatives of the community, to make the judgment of whether it is 
"safe" for people to return. City and parish officials were consistent 
in this approach throughout Louisiana. 

Lastly, the report asserts that EPA's August 2006 assessment summary 
indicates that the data presented in the December 2005 assessment 
"applied only to short-term visits." The basis for this assertion is 
unclear to us. The August 2006 summary discusses how the data from 
approximately 450 sediment samples were compared to both short-term and 
long-term health criteria. In addition, the December 2005 summary 
clearly discusses the comparison of the data to LDEQ's Risk Evaluation/ 
Corrective Action Program (RECAP) and US EPA's risk criteria (e.g., 
range of 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in 10,000 risk of an individual developing 
cancer over a lifetime) based on long-term (30 years) residential 
exposure assumptions. 

Suggested revisions to the Highlights section of the report to address 
the above concerns: However, as cleanup continues, (cut out-EPA's 
assurance that the public health is protected from) EPA needs to 
address potential risks associated with inhalation of asbestos fibers 
(cut out- is limited because the agency has not deployed air monitors) 
in and around New Orleans neighborhoods where demolition and renovation 
activities are concentrated. While EPA took steps to monitor asbestos 
after Hurricane Katrina-for example, more than doubling the number of 
ambient (outdoor) air monitors in the area and monitoring emissions at 
debris reduction sites-monitors were not placed in areas undergoing 
substantial demolition and renovation, such as the Ninth Ward. ( cut 
out- This is problematic because monitors are effective in detecting 
releases of asbestos from demolition sites.) Further, many thousands of 
homes being demolished and renovated by or for individual homeowners 
are generally not subject to EPA's asbestos emissions standards aimed 
at limiting releases of fibers into the air. 

EPA's three reports on its environmental sampling in New Orleans, which 
were coordinated with their federal and state partners, conveyed 
important information on potential health risks from exposure to 
floodwaters, sediments, and air. However, their usefulness was limited 
by a lack of timeliness. (cut out- and insufficient disclosures about 
EPA's environmental sampling. For example, EPA did not disclose until 
August 2006 that its December 2005 report-which indicated it was 
generally safe for residents to return to New Orleans-applied to only 
short term visits, such as to view the damage to homes.)Further, while 
EPA provided a substantial amount of useful information via flyers, 
public service announcements, and its Web page, these communications 
were at times unclear and inconsistent on how to mitigate exposure to 
some contaminants, particularly asbestos and mold. 

Mitigating some challenges EPA faces addressing Hurricane Katrina could 
better protect the environment in the future. (cut out- First, EPA did 
not remove hazardous materials from national wildlife refuges in a 
timely manner as part of its hurricane response in part because 
disaster assistance funding generally is not used for debris cleanups 
on federal lands. Second,) States generally have authority over 
landfill decisions, and EPA has limited statutory enforcement authority 
to address environmental problems posed by solid waste landfills. (cut 
out- does not have an effective oversight role over emergency debris 
disposal decisions that could result in pollution.) Finally, in some 
instances, lack of clarity in plans and protocols on federal debris 
management roles was perceived to precluded the timely and safe 
disposal of some appliances and electronic waste. 

Page 1: The draft report states, "The environmental contamination 
caused by this natural disaster could have both short-and long-term 
effects on the health of residents in impacted areas, as well as on 
workers, volunteers, and wildlife." The volume of data that EPA has 
collected to date does not support this statement. We recommend that 
this statement be deleted from the report. 

Page 2 (last sentence); page 6 (first paragraph referring to demolition 
or renovation by or for an individual homeowner; page 24 (2nd 
paragraph), page 28 (last 3 sentences)/ page 31 (first paragraph 
"privately sponsored demolitions and renovations...volunteers" 

The document contains numerous references that imply that the asbestos 
NESHAP requirements do not apply to individual homeowners or volunteer 
groups that are assisting the homeowner in the demolition/renovation of 
homes that may contain asbestos. This is not correct. There are 
situations where demolitions or renovations by homeowners or volunteer 
associations are covered by the NESHAP regulations. 

The July 28, 1995 Federal Register Notice (60 Fed. Reg. 38725-38726 
(1995)) entitled "Asbestos NESHAP Clarification of Intent" discusses 
the applicability of NESHAAs to demolitions and renovations of private 
homes by the owner or others. It addressed the conditions under which 
an owner or operator (e.g., a volunteer group) may be subject to the 
asbestos NESHAP requirements. 

If an owner or operator is demolishing two or more buildings on the 
same site (e.g., demolition of housing on several contiguous city 
blocks), the entire area is considered a site. EPA does not interpret 
the residential building exemption as applying to larger demolitions or 
renovations on a particular site, even where small residential 
buildings are involved. The definition of facility in the regulations 
includes an installation. Installation means any building or structure 
or any group of buildings or structures at a single demolition or 
renovation site that are under the control of the same owner or 
operator (or owner or operator under common control). Owner or operator 
is defined in the regulations and means any person who owns, leases, 
operates, controls, or supervises the facility being demolished or 
renovated. To determine if a volunteer group is subject to the NESHAP 
regulation, a determination would be needed as to the number and 
location of sites (contiguous or not) and who has control or is 
supervising the demolition or renovation. 

Page 6: The statement in the first paragraph that ".EPA is not 
enforcing some of the work practice standards for certain residences" 
is inaccurate. To expedite the demolition of homes, EPA decided to 
allow houses that the government had decided needed to be demolished 
due to major damage by the Hurricanes to be treated the same as 
buildings subject to similar demolition orders based on a determination 
that they were structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse. 
For a building which is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent 
collapse, the regulations do not require the owner/operator to inspect 
for and remove asbestos prior to the demolition of the building. The 
advance notification is also not required although notification is 
required. The regulations do require the owner/operator to assume that 
there is asbestos and implement work practices to minimize potential 
release of asbestos fibers on the assumption that the material may be 
asbestos. Materials must be adequately wetted to prevent releases of 
asbestos fibers prior to, during, and after demolition all the way 
through to disposal. Disposal must be tracked and debris must be 
disposed of in a NESHAP compliant landfill. The landfill must meet 
specific requirements found in the NESHAP regulation. This relief was 
deemed necessary to help expedite the demolition of thousands of homes. 

Page 6, bottom of the page: The report suggests that EPA's sampling 
program was incomplete due to the fact that sediment samples were only 
collected in public access areas. "In addition, the summaries do not 
disclose an important EPA assumption - that the results of sediment 
samples from streets and other outdoor public access areas can be 
extrapolated to private properties, such as yards and the inside of 
homes. This is important because, for example, environmental 
contamination levels inside buildings can be significantly higher than 
and different from the contamination outside, potentially causing more 
adverse health effects. For example, contaminants that could have been 
washed into a building during the flooding - like petroleum-based 
products and arsenic - are not dispersed into the atmosphere over time 
if confined indoors. Moreover, any toxic chemicals or other 
contaminants already in a building at the time of flooding - such as 
pesticides, asbestos and lead-based paint - may be released inside the 
building. Finally, after flooding, mold frequently forms and spreads." 

Criticism regarding the comprehensiveness of EPA's sampling program is 
reiterated on pages 35, 36, 37, and 60 of the report.  

Firstly, the report suggests that sediment data collected from public 
access areas would be significantly different from sediments collected 
on or inside nearby private properties. The report presents no data to 
support this assertion. EPA believes that sediment samples collected in 
the median of a street or the right-of-way between a curb and a 
sidewalk can be extrapolated to characterize the private properties in 
the immediate vicinity of the sample from the public access area. 
Similarly, EPA believes that the level of contamination in sediment 
samples collected outside of houses would be approximately the same as 
the level of contamination of any sediment found inside. With the 
exception of the area impacted by the Murphy Oil spill, EPA found no 
evidence of widespread contamination of petroleum-based products "that 
could have been washed into a building during flooding." Similarly, EPA 
found no evidence that arsenic contamination was widespread. 

Secondly, EPA saw evidence supporting our successful public service 
communications regarding toxic chemicals that may have been present 
inside a building at the time of the flooding. Throughout the Federal 
response, EPA observed voluntary curbside sorting of household 
chemicals and recyclable electronics, inquiries for certified 
contractors, nonprofit organization distribution of supplies and 
thoughtful (perhaps cautious) return of residents to their homes. 

Lastly, EPA is not clear of the intended meaning of the statement that 
"after flooding, mold frequently forms and spreads." It was obvious, 
upon visual inspection, that mold formed and spread in New Orleans 
after the flooding. The report includes a discussion of CDC's report, 
Mold Prevention Strategies and Possible Health Effects in the Aftermath 
of Hurricanes and Major Floods. CDC had the lead in providing 
information to the public regarding the potential health effects 
associated with exposure to mold, and did so. 

Page 11: In the first paragraph, the report acknowledges the EPA 
"exercised its enforcement discretion by issuing `no action assurance' 
letters stating that EPA would not enforce certain Clean Air Act 
requirements . to facilitate debris removal in Louisiana and 
Mississippi." The EPA wants to clarify that it issued the NAAs "in 
order to facilitate response and recovery activities" as the document 
says, but EPA did so because the conditions were extreme and EPA 
believed that the NAA included reasonable precautions. In order to 
provide the necessary regulatory flexibility, EPA's decision whether or 
not to monitor under the NAA was related to the existing regulatory 
requirements that we were agreeing to address. It is important to note 
that EPA, when developing the asbestos NESHAP regulations, determined 
that it is not feasible to establish a numeric emission standard for 
asbestos. Instead, the Agency believed asbestos emission controls were 
the best "technology" to control asbestos emissions. 

Page 13-14: The draft Report uses the phrase "hazardous debris" to 
imply that all household hazardous wastes, electronic wastes, and white 
goods are hazardous by definition. While types of electronic goods, 
such as computers, may contain hazardous materials, it is not accurate 
to imply all electronic goods are hazardous debris, as defined by 
statute. We suggest the draft report be revised to read as follows: 
"Specifically, EPA established a plan to segregate, collect and 
properly dispose of debris: such as household hazardous wastes 
(household cleaning chemicals, paints, and pesticides); electronic 
waste (computers, televisions, printers, DVD players, and other 
electronics); and white goods (large appliances such as air 
conditioners, dishwashers, refrigerators, stoves, and freezers)." 

Page 14, fifth line from the top of the page: The draft report 
characterizes chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as "hazardous" contaminants. 
CFCs and hydro-chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) are ozone-depleting 
substances and are regulated by EPA under Title VI of the Clean Air 
Act, but they are not hazardous substances. Not all regulated 
substances are hazardous. For a list of hazardous substances see 40 
C.F.R. § 302.4. CFCs and HCFCs are categorized as Class I Ozone 
Depleting Substances (CFCs) and Class II Ozone Depleting Substances 
(HCFCs) which have significantly less ozone depleting potential than 
Class I substances. Since 1995, refrigerators and freezers sold in the 
United States have used HCFCs, not CFCs. Thus, while there is a 
possibility that improper disposal of refrigerators and freezers may 
result in the release of Ozone Depleting Substances, it is more likely 
that Class II HCFCs that will be released instead of Class I CFCs, as 
stated in the GAO Report. 

Page 21, first paragraph: Although EPA's FEMA-funded activities are 
complete in Mississippi, EPA is still providing support to the State 
under the extension to the No Action Assurance for Mississippi granted 
on March 9, 2007. EPA and Mississippi will conduct enhanced compliance 
monitoring and oversight through monthly field inspections. 

Page 21, footnote 25: "monitors measure ambient concentrations up to 
six contaminants" this statement is followed by a list of several 
groups of chemicals including VOCs and PAHs that cover hundreds of 
pollutants. We recommend changing this statement to "monitors measure 
ambient concentrations of hundreds of pollutants in the following 
categories" 

Page 23: The report states "EPA has delegated the authority to 
implement and enforce the asbestos standards." We do not "delegate" 
authority to the states under the Clean Air Act NESHAP; we "authorize" 
their programs. The difference is important because in an "authorized" 
program, EPA retains the authority for direct enforcement in addition 
to its authority to oversee the State program. 

Page 23: Footnote 29 combines a number of definitions together from the 
regulations. Doing so results in re-defining terms found in the 
regulation. It is important to keep the definitions separate, i.e., the 
definition of Regulated Asbestos Containing Material (RACM) should not 
be combined with definitions for Category I and Category II and 
friable. We recognize that this was done because the definitions are 
long but ask that GAO simply refer to the regulatory definitions. If 
GAO believes the definitions must be included, then EPA requests that 
the regulation be cited and verbatim definitions be used from the 
regulation. 

Page 23: In the first full paragraph, the report states that ". EPA's 
national emissions standards for asbestos regulate various potential 
sources of asbestos emissions, including renovation and demolition 
activities, by setting standards for work practices." This sentence 
references footnote 28. For clarity, we suggest that GAO add to this 
footnote the following sentence: "See 40 CFR 61.145(c), Procedures for 
asbestos emission controls." 

Page 23: The second bullet on page 23 states that ". the owner or 
operator of the demolition activity generally must .provide written 
notice to EPA or the state of intention to renovate or demolish 
buildings that have asbestos-containing materials." Please note that 
owners or operators are only required to submit notifications for 
renovations if regulated asbestos-containing material which meets the 
regulatory threshold is present. 

Page 24, first full paragraph, second sentence: This is an incomplete 
description of how debris from a building that is structurally unsound 
and in danger of imminent collapse is treated under the asbestos 
NESHAP. It reads as if the asbestos NESHAP does not apply to 
structurally unsound buildings. We recommend that a comma be inserted 
at the end of that sentence followed by the phrase ".however debris 
from that structure must be treated as if it contains asbestos and 
properly wetted, contained, transported, and disposed of in a landfill 
authorized to accept asbestos contaminated waste." 

Page 24, footnote 31: Revise from "Demolition or renovation by the 
individual homeowner of residential buildings." to "Demolition or 
renovation by the individual. homeowner of a residential building. " A 
residential homeowner may not demolish/renovate more than one building 
or the residential exemption is lost, and all NESHAP requirements are 
applicable. 

Page 29, footnote 39: The footnote states "using 1 year screening 
level" referring to the asbestos screening level (SL) of 0.01 fibers 
>5umlength/cc, and it is referred to as being a "modified AHERA. ISO. 
standard". However, there is no "standard" and there is not an ISO 
"standard". 
We recommend the reference statement be changed to state the SL was 
developed with consideration of AHERA regulations and EPA's asbestos 
risk estimates. ISO only comes in as a method used on some percentage 
of the positive results: 

Page 30: The report says ".EPA said that its air monitoring currently 
focuses on more limited geographic areas where `grinding and other 
remediation activities are ongoing'-for example, at debris volume 
reduction sites." The report goes on to say "According to EPA, 
conducting air monitoring at debris reduction sites is more 
conservative than at demolition sites since volume reduction activities 
such as grinding or burning have the potential to release more asbestos 
fibers as the material is destroyed." The Agency wants to clarify that 
no burning or grinding of regulated asbestos containing material was 
performed under EPA's NAA. The October 2005 NAA set up a pilot program 
to explore the use of burning regulated asbestos materials, but the 
pilot never went forward. 

Page 32: In the first full paragraph, GAO notes that EPA's conditions 
for granting the October 2005 NAA for a burn and grind pilot contained 
a requirement for monitoring prior to and during demolition. The 
October 2005 NAA was EPA's effort to provide needed relief to LDEQ to 
expedite the demolition and disposal of thousands of homes in the 
damaged areas, including the possibility of burning asbestos-containing 
material, which is currently prohibited by the asbestos regulations. 
EPA's February 3 and February 24, 2006 NAA allowed houses being 
demolished under a government order to be treated as though they were 
under a demolition order based on a determination that they were 
structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse. Thus, EPA 
allowed the homes to be demolished without an inspection and prior 
removal of asbestos, provided certain emission controls were employed, 
i.e., those controls required for houses containing asbestos, and the 
resulting debris was disposed of as asbestos-containing waste. Note an 
asbestos trained person is required to supervise the demolition, and 
emission controls such as wetting the material before, during, and 
after demolition continued to apply as did transport and disposal 
requirements that are applicable to asbestos containing waste. 

EPA determined that this flexibility was appropriate given the 
potential hazards to workers entering the houses which could be 
uninhabitable (e.g., full of mold) and the pressing need to complete 
demolitions quickly to enable the state to rebuild the city. The 
initial request from LDEQ asked EPA to allow demolition of everything 
in a very short period of time. The request for burning, which the 
October 2005 NAA began to address, was primarily for volume reduction. 
However, over time, the quick demolition and volume reduction issues 
became less important because of the right of entry legal issues that 
arose which inhibited the demolition progress. For the later NAAs, 
where the focus was just on the demolition activities, EPA believed 
that the required work practices along with the OSHA required 
monitoring of workers, which provides surrogate data on asbestos levels 
in the vicinity of the demolition, provided protection reasonably 
comparable to the existing NESHAP regulations in these extreme 
circumstances while allowing necessary demolitions to move forward. 

Page 32: In the second full paragraph, the report discusses the Fort 
Smith project. The Agency wants to clarify that the Fort Smith research 
project had a very different purpose - to develop data to show that an 
alternative work practice provided the same protections as is currently 
required under the asbestos regulations. The layers of air monitors 
deployed by ORD were necessary to collect asbestos emissions. The 
results of this alternative work practice will be used to determine if 
it is acceptable. This in turn may lead to amending the asbestos 
regulations so that the work practice can be used nationally and 
without a limited time frame for its use. The NAA granted to the Fort 
Smith research project provided similar relief for the demolition of 
houses that were severely damaged by the hurricane which were subject 
to a government issued demolition order for being structurally unsound 
and in danger of imminent collapse. Similar conditions were established 
for the Fort Smith research project whereby flexibility for some of the 
NESHAP requirements for asbestos emission controls was provided during 
the demolition but all other asbestos requirements applied to the 
resulting debris including wetting, transport requirements, and 
disposal pursuant to the NESHAP requirements. While extensive 
monitoring occurred at the Fort Smith research project, current 
asbestos regulations do not require air monitoring to be conducted at 
demolition operations. 

Although EPA did not conduct the level of monitoring it conducted at 
its research project in Fort Smith, there was monitoring from Louisiana 
and Mississippi, which found little or no asbestos when demolishing the 
homes subject to the NAAs. In addition, the state had access to the 
data developed by the USACE to meet OSHA requirements for the 
monitoring of workers on the site. Those results indicate low levels of 
asbestos well below the permissible exposure limit. When considering 
the recent request from LDEQ for an extension of the NAA, EPA evaluated 
the data from air monitoring stations and worker monitoring in 
Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Page 32, footnote 46: The footnote states "the pilot had more stringent 
requirements before and during the demolition than EPA is requiring 
under the current asbestos no action assurance." This statement can be 
misleading if the reader is unaware as to why the pilot had more 
stringent requirements. We recommend adding: The pilot test required 
more stringent requirements as it was geared toward potential use to 
amend a regulation. The data requirements for this type of project are 
much more stringent than one-time demolitions that are the result of a 
natural disaster. 

Page 33, last paragraph: EPA does not agree that our "primary 
communications about the health risks from exposure to environmental 
contamination in New Orleans-three environmental assessment summaries 
prepared with, among other, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality-did not sufficiently disclose some information that would have 
helped residents better understand the potential health risks of 
returning home and how to mitigate them." EPA issued numerous press 
releases and almost daily web postings providing this information to 
the public and the media. These messages contained health warnings and 
information about how to mitigate them. Examples of these communication 
efforts were documented in a 45 page matrix entitled, "Hurricane 
Katrina Meeting, Community Outreach and Information Distribution" which 
has been previously provided to GAO. 

Page 48, second line from the bottom: Replace "sanitary engineers" with 
"experienced Environmental Scientists and Environmental Engineers". The 
phrase `sanitary engineers' refers to persons who operate wastewater 
treatment systems, not landfills. 

Page 49: The report notes that "While RCRA does not provide EPA with 
authority to directly enforce this prohibition or the landfill 
criteria, the act authorizes EPA to take enforcement action, including 
issuing administrative orders, to address waste management activities 
that present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment." The Agency wants to clarify that, according to Subtitle 
D, states have primary responsibility for permitting and monitoring 
solid waste disposal facilities and developing solid waste management 
plans in accordance with minimum federal requirements established by 
EPA. EPA regulations establish criteria for classifying different types 
of landfills and practices that may result in adverse effects on health 
or the environment, among other things. RCRA provides EPA with limited 
enforcement authority to address environmental problems posed by solid 
waste landfills. More specifically, EPA has the authority to enforce 
the municipal landfill criteria (40 CFR Part 258) only in those states 
where it has determined the state permit program for landfills that 
receive household hazardous waste or conditionally exempt hazardous 
waste from small quantity generators is not adequate. In such cases, 
EPA may exercise the enforcement authorities provided in RCRA sections 
3007 and 3008. See RCRA section 4005 (c)(2)(A). EPA also maintains the 
authority to address solid waste activities that may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the 
environment. 

Page 50, first full paragraph, line 12: This discussion of the 
Agriculture Street Landfill Superfund Site contains some inaccuracies. 
We recommend editing as follows: "During this period, trash collected 
from various sectors of the City and ash from municipal incinerators, 
among other things, was disposed of at the Site. Oil was used to burn 
the refuse at the dump, and during the 1940s and 1950s the area was 
routinely sprayed with DDT. The landfill was reopened after Hurricane 
Betsy to receive hurricane debris (cut out- from destroyed buildings 
and ash from municipal incinerations)." [Keep next sentence as 
written]. "Following concerns (cut out-about cancer) among residents in 
the area, EPA initiated investigations at the site in 1986, ultimately 
identifying elevated levels of lead, arsenic, and carcinogenic 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, the primary contaminants of concern 
identified in sediment tests following Hurricane Katrina but also 
ubiquitous in an urban, industrial setting. Analyses of the health 
effects ^ potential for exposure to these contaminants." 

Page 53, second line: Delete "unless these buildings are subject to a 
government demolition order" because it is inaccurate. With respect to 
a residential building that meets the relevant exclusion from the term 
"facility," the fact that such a facility may be subject to a 
government demolition order, which would have to be issued because the 
facility is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse, is 
not enough to bring the facility back within coverage of the asbestos 
NESHAP. 

Page 53: Footnote 69 says, "Louisiana also authorized some landfills . 
to operate as `enhanced' C&D landfills that may receive regulated 
asbestos-containing material as well as unregulated material." The 
Agency wants to clarify that enhanced landfills in Louisiana are 
landfills that meet the requirements for disposal sites under the 
asbestos NESHAP. The NESHAP regulations have specific requirements for 
waste disposal sites that receive asbestos-containing wastes from a 
source covered under 40 C.F.R §61.150 (included demolition/renovation 
activities covered by the NESHAP) as well as other sources. These 
requirements remain in effect. 

Page 55, last line: Substitute "technical assistance" for "oversight". 

Page 56, last sentence of first paragraph: Revise as follows: "While it 
is LDEQ's regulatory responsibility to ensure that debris containing 
hazardous materials would not enter landfills, multiple layers of 
technical assistance were provided by EPA to the state." The following 
explanation also applies to misleading sections in the last paragraph 
of the Highlights section: 

EPA provided assistance to the state and not oversight. The assistance 
EPA provided was far from limited. EPA provided the assistance to the 
State of Louisiana via FEMA tasking. These assistance activities 
resulted in the establishment of several mechanisms to help ensure the 
proper sorting of debris prior to disposal. Below is a summary of these 
mechanisms: 

* Education through the distribution of flyers that identified the 
proper categories of segregation. 

* Additional curbside segregation during collection activities. These 
efforts were closely coordinated with the appropriate ESF 3 party 
responsible for general debris (i.e., USACE or local governments). 

* EPA and USACE oversight of curbside collection activities conducted 
by response contractors. 

* Landfills also posted signs identifying the type of waste that the 
landfill could accept. 

* Inspection towers were in place to inspect loads of debris prior to 
its entrance into the landfill. 

* Landfill operators also had landfill spotters that worked the 
landfill and watch the loads as they were being placed in the landfill. 

* The landfill machine operators also reviewed the material as it was 
being pushed into the landfill. 

* The landfill operators maintained logs of rejected loads and kept a 
roll-off container to place unauthorized waste that was found through 
these precautions at the landfill. This waste was then disposed of at a 
proper facility off-site. 

* LDEQ conducted inspections of these operations and kept a full time 
representative at 5 of the landfills. 

* EPA performed landfill observation twice a week at several site to 
ensure that the precautions described above were in place and working. 

These efforts are not "limited." In fact, these efforts resulted in 
more than 5 million containers being separated from the general debris 
stream. While these efforts could not guarantee 100 percent 
segregation, they do demonstrate a due diligence and help to ensure 
that any hazardous debris placed in a landfill would be de minimis. 
Describing this assistance as oversight and limited is an inaccurate 
statement. 

Page 58, second full paragraph: The report indicates that "In 
Mississippi, county officials from the three coastal counties hit by 
Katrina expressed frustration that EPA did not assist with either white 
goods or electronic waste disposal." Shortly after the Hurricane 
Katrina debris efforts began, EPA issued to MDEQ, USACE and contractors 
working on debris reduction a four-page Guidance for Handling 
Refrigerant Containing Appliances/Vehicles Damaged by Hurricanes and a 
one-page memorandum entitled Handling Procedures for White Goods 
Containing Refrigerants. This latter memo included management practices 
for white goods that would help to ensure that refrigerant would be 
removed and recovered as required by the federal regulations. EPA 
fulfilled its supporting role under Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3 
by helping the USACE and the counties understand how to handle white 
goods and properly evacuate refrigerants from refrigerators and 
freezers prior to disposal. USACE is the primary agency for ESF#3 and 
they did not request any additional support from EPA regarding white 
goods or electronic waste disposal. 

EPA also had an electronics waste recycler, Global Investment Recovery, 
Inc., under the Recycling Electronics and Asset Disposition (READ) 
program remove several tractor-trailer loads of electronics from 
Mississippi. Further, in March of 2006, one of EPA's Plug-in-to- 
eCycling Partners, Best Buy, Inc., held a very successful electronics 
collection event in Mississippi that resulted in almost 50 tons of 
electronic components being collected and taken by Best Buy for 
recycling. Both events occurred several months before GAO began its 
investigation, yet both are omitted from the GAO report. 

Page 61, first paragraph, third sentence: The report incorrectly 
describes EPA and the United States Coast Guard as "land management 
agencies". 

Finally, I am attaching a list of corrections in the sections of the 
report which deviated from statutory or regulatory language. 

Should you need additional information or clarifications related to 
these comments, please contact Dana Tulis at 202-564-7938. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Thomas P. Dunne: 
Associate Administrator for Homeland Security: 

Attachment: 

The following are GAO's comments on the Environmental Protection 
Agency's letter dated May 9, 2007. 

GAO Comments: 

1. As stated in the draft report, we reviewed the extent to which EPA’s 
communications on environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina 
have provided useful information to the public. In this regard, the 
issue with timeliness that we raise focused on EPA’s three key 
environmental assessment summaries covering its environmental sampling 
in New Orleans after the floodwaters had receded. The draft report also 
addressed the many other communications on environmental health risks 
EPA provided to the public via flyers and health advisories distributed 
at various locations throughout the hurricane-damaged areas, public 
service announcements made available to the media, and information 
posted on EPA’s Web page. We recognize that many of these 
communications preceded the release of the environmental assessment 
summaries. Therefore, to address EPA’s concern that the report may be 
construed as indicating that EPA did not release information about 
environmental conditions following Hurricane Katrina until December 
2005, when it released the first assessment summary, we have added a 
statement on the Highlights page that “EPA issued timely information to 
the public on a variety of environmental health risks.” Also, in the 
body of the report, we now state that EPA started its communications 
efforts shortly after the storm, beginning in September 2005. In 
addition, EPA suggested we include some information it provided to 
FEMA, but we did not because it was not relevant to this report, which 
addresses EPA’s communications to the public. 

2. We do not agree that the draft report created an impression that it 
was EPA’s role to determine if it was safe for residents to return to 
their homes. The draft report stated that :EPA worked with other 
federal and state agencies to support local officials evaluating home 
and neighborhood safety." 

3. We disagree with EPA’s statement that the draft report did not 
recognize that EPA worked with the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality and other federal and state agencies in the 
development of the environmental assessment summaries. The draft report 
explicitly stated in several places, starting with the Results in Brief 
section and again in the body of the report, that EPA worked with the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and others in developing 
the summaries. All of the other federal and state entities are 
identified in the body of the draft. We have, however, added the 
language used in the Results in Brief section of the report to the 
Highlights page. 

4. We disagree with EPA’s assertion that the draft report suggested 
that EPA’s sampling program was incomplete. The draft report explicitly 
stated that we (1) determined the extent to which EPA’s communications 
on environmental health risks posed by Hurricane Katrina have provided 
useful information to the public and (2) did not evaluate the agency’s 
environmental risk assessment methodology. In the context of the 
usefulness of the communications to the public, the draft report stated 
that we believe EPA’s assumption (that the results from sediment 
samples from streets or other public access areas can be used to 
accurately characterize the degree and nature of contamination in New 
Orleans, including inside homes and in yards) is important and warrants 
highlighting in the environmental assessment summaries for two main 
reasons. First, as the draft report stated, environmental contamination 
levels inside buildings can potentially be higher than and different 
from the contamination levels outside for a variety of reasons, 
potentially causing more adverse health effects. Further, as the draft 
report also stated, EPA’s Science Advisory Board had suggested that EPA 
conduct some indoor sampling in New Orleans for this reason. Second, 
the draft report stated that to understand the level of assurance that 
EPA can provide about the extent to which localized areas of 
contamination may exist throughout the city, it is important to know 
that limiting sediment and soil sampling to outdoor, public access 
areas can be problematic. For example, sediments in streets may be 
subject to more dispersion than those that settled in more protected 
areas, such as on private property close to residences. Our point is 
that EPA should have disclosed, and provided its rationale for, 
important assumptions such as this in the assessment summaries 
themselves. 

5. EPA said that the data the agency has collected to date do not 
support the statement in the draft report that the environmental 
contamination caused by this natural disaster could have both short- 
and long-term effects on the health of residents in impacted areas, as 
well as workers, volunteers, and wildlife. We believe that it would be 
premature to conclude that the environmental contamination caused by 
Hurricane Katrina has not and will not cause any short- and long-term 
public health effects. Further, EPA has not demonstrated that it has 
assurance that the environmental contamination both has not and will 
not cause any short- and long-term public health effects. 

6. EPA takes issue with the draft’s assertion that EPA’s August 2006 
summary indicates that the data presented in the December 2005 summary 
applied to only short-term visits. In fact, the statement that EPA is 
questioning is taken directly from its August 2006 summary, which 
describes the results of EPA’s analysis of 450 samples (termed phase I 
by EPA) addressed in its December 2005 summary. The complete statement 
in EPA’s summary is as follows: "The results of the phase I sampling 
indicated that hazardous substances were not detected in the sediments 
at levels that would pose an immediate health risk to workers involved 
in response activities or to residents returning for a quick assessment 
of damage to their homes." Further, the August 2006 summary also states 
that the data from the phase I analysis were used to assess "(1) 
whether hazardous substances were present in the sediment in 
residential areas; and (2) the potential health effects to emergency 
workers and residents from short-term exposure [emphasis ours] to any 
hazardous substances found in the sediment." EPA’s summary of the 
results of the testing, combined with its explanation of the goal of 
this testing, indicates that the data presented in the December 2005 
summary apply to short-term visits. 

Moreover, in its comments, EPA appears to question the assessment 
results it reported by stating that 'both summaries discuss how samples 
were compared to both short and long term health criteria." While the 
summaries do not "discuss" the health criteria, they do state that the 
samples were compared to both "LDEQ Risk Evaluation/Correction Action 
Program (RECAP) and EPA’s risk criteria based on long-term (30 years) 
residential exposure assumptions." EPA appears to be suggesting in its 
comments that a reader of the August 2006 summary should independently 
infer—on the basis of its reference to technical (and to the general 
public, arcane) risk criteria—that the December 2005 analysis also 
provided assurance that longer-term exposures would not pose any health 
risks. However, EPA’s assessment of the initial 450 sediment samples 
addressed only short-term visits, according to the agency’s August 2006 
summary as quoted above. We believe this example, and EPA’s response to 
it, illustrates the need for EPA to improve its environmental risk 
communications, as we are recommending.

7. We disagree with EPA’s statement that the draft report 
underestimated the extent of asbestos monitoring. We believe the draft 
report accurately presented information about the monitoring conducted 
by the federal and state network—the ambient air monitors; some 
monitoring conducted at some debris reduction sites; and the monitoring 
conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors, who are 
conducting demolitions under government orders. Further, although the 
draft report stated that the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality has told EPA that monitoring by the Army Corps of Engineers and 
its contractors has found “little or no asbestos emissions,” it also 
stated that such air monitoring data from the Army Corps of Engineers 
and its contractors do not address potential asbestos emissions from 
the privately sponsored demolitions and renovations by individual 
homeowners. Since these activities are not regulated—and emissions 
control actions such as wetting the material from before the demolition 
process through disposal are not required—the potential for asbestos 
emissions at these sites is greater than at regulated sites. Because 
EPA’s air monitors have not been deployed in and around neighborhoods 
both where publicly and privately sponsored demolition and renovation 
activities are concentrated, the agency’s finding of no measurable 
amounts of asbestos at its ambient monitoring sites does not 
necessarily address the asbestos to which residents, workers, and 
volunteers may be exposed in some neighborhoods. 

8. EPA said that the draft report was misleading regarding 
responsibility for mitigating environmental impacts on national 
wildlife refuges following disasters, stating that the decision to 
remove hazardous materials from the national wildlife refuges was the 
responsibility of FEMA and the Department of the Interior and did not 
involve EPA. We have revised the language in the report to clarify the 
discussion of responsibilities. In presenting this issue—which we cite 
as a challenge EPA faced in addressing the environmental impacts of 
Hurricane Katrina—the draft report explained that EPA did not remove 
hazardous materials from national wildlife refuges in a timely manner 
as part of its response in part because disaster assistance funding 
generally is not used for debris cleanups on federal lands. The draft 
report also explained that FEMA did not approve the Department of the 
Interior’s request for funding to clean up this debris because it was 
on federal lands. The draft report showed the impact on national 
wildlife refuges from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes: Debris that could 
have been removed in conjunction with EPA cleanup activities in areas 
immediately adjacent to refuges was instead left in place for a year or 
more, allowing containers holding hazardous materials to settle into 
marshlands and begin to corrode and leak. In one refuge, a fire spread 
to a 120-acre debris field with propane and other hazardous material 
containers, causing explosions that endangered firefighters. We 
continue to believe that EPA should be involved in helping resolve 
these issues because, under the National Response Plan, EPA is the 
chair of the National Response Team, whose duties include national 
planning and response coordination for oil and hazardous materials 
incidents. We do agree that FEMA, which declined to provide funding to 
the Department of the Interior for cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, and 
DHS, which coordinates the federal response to disasters under the 
National Response Plan, should also take part in planning efforts to 
resolve funding issues concerning the removal of hazardous materials 
from federal lands following a disaster. Accordingly, we have modified 
our recommendation to state that EPA should also work with DHS and 
FEMA, as well as with federal land management agencies and the Coast 
Guard, to determine what actions are needed to ensure that 
environmental contamination on federal lands, such as national wildlife 
refuges, can be expeditiously and efficiently addressed in future 
disasters. Timely cleanup can lessen the damage to the environment, 
better protect the public from exposure to contaminants, and prevent 
further migration of hazardous materials to state and local waters and 
land—and would likely be more cost-effective. 

9. We disagree with EPA’s statement that the draft report asserted that 
EPA had a limited role in ensuring that states dispose of storm debris 
appropriately. Specifically, we stated in the draft that EPA’s debris 
management role is limited; however, we did not say that EPA had a 
limited role in helping states dispose of storm debris appropriately. 
In fact, our draft report specifically highlighted EPA’s efforts with 
its partners in addressing waste segregation, recycling, and landfill 
operations—the areas EPA’s comments cited as not being recognized in 
the draft report. Our finding and recommendation in this area relate to 
current limitations in EPA guidance to states on making certain 
emergency debris disposal decisions—such as where to locate emergency 
landfills and the implications of selecting disposal options that 
otherwise would not be acceptable. We note that EPA has agreed to 
implement our recommendation as it makes revisions to its disaster 
debris manual in calendar year 2007. 

10. The information EPA provides on its asbestos monitoring activities 
in this paragraph was presented and analyzed in the draft report. 
Specifically, the draft cited the asbestos monitoring conducted by 
demolition contractors using personal sampling pumps and employees 
wearing personal monitoring equipment required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. In addition, the draft report cited 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality’s report to EPA that 
this monitoring has found “little or no asbestos emissions.” Further, 
the draft report discussed reasons we believe additional monitoring is 
warranted: (1) Neither ambient nor demolition site monitors have been 
located in neighborhoods with substantial demolition and renovation 
activities, such as the Ninth Ward; (2) EPA scaled back its ambient 
monitoring to the prestorm level and reduced the frequency of 
sampling—thus EPA’s expanded monitoring covered only the first few 
months of demolition activities, when few demolitions were conducted; 
and (3) many thousands of demolitions and renovations may occur in the 
same geographic area and in the same general time frame—some of which 
are not subject to the enforcement of certain asbestos work practice 
standards, while others are not subject to the standards at all. The 
draft report also stated that as of January 2007, about 25,000 homes 
concentrated in the Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes were awaiting 
demolition, and another 80,000 homes that were flooded in the New 
Orleans area were not yet included in the demolition estimates, but 
many of these homes will likely be demolished. Those not demolished 
will likely have to be substantially renovated. 

11. This information cited by EPA is background information about 
asbestos and EPA’s asbestos regulation, which was provided in the draft 
report. 

12. Contrary to EPA’s assertion, the draft report did identify the 
emission controls required by EPA’s no action assurances (in its 
comments, EPA refers to these controls as engineering controls). The 
draft also discussed the monitoring of air at grinding sites and EPA’s 
rationale for focusing on these sites rather than demolition sites. We 
continue to believe it is appropriate for EPA or the state to conduct 
monitoring at both demolition and volume reduction sites. Further, 
while some emission controls may be in place at demolitions covered by 
the no action assurances, the many demolitions and substantial 
renovations by individual homeowners generally are not subject to any 
of these controls; further, the debris from these unregulated 
activities may be transported without emission controls to construction 
and demolition landfills. 

13. We encourage EPA to expeditiously implement the plan the agency 
discusses in its comments to work with state and local officials to 
develop further demolition/renovation advisories that can be used 
throughout the area to advise individuals to take appropriate 
precautions. We note that numerous volunteers of all ages travel to the 
Gulf Coast to help with demolitions and renovations, particularly 
during the summer months and holiday periods, and they should have 
clear guidance on protective measures to take when they are in areas 
undergoing demolition or renovation. 

14. We urge EPA, in developing a plan for additional air monitoring, to 
evaluate the number and location of the air monitors to ensure 
sufficient coverage of areas with substantial demolition and renovation 
activities, both regulated and unregulated. If air monitors are not 
appropriately located in neighborhoods undergoing demolition and 
renovation, the monitoring network will not be adequate to ensure that 
public health is being protected. 

15. Our draft report highlighted EPA’s communications activities, which 
EPA reiterates in its comments. 

16. Our draft report illustrated the need for EPA to revise and 
organize existing crisis communication fact sheets and other 
information to ensure that accurate and consistent information can be 
accessed quickly at the time of response. In its comments, EPA states 
its intention to do so by developing and using a resource guide to be 
completed in early 2008. 

17. EPA’s comments describe as misleading a statement in the draft 
report explaining that EPA did not remove hazardous materials from 
national wildlife refuges because disaster assistance funding generally 
is not used for debris cleanups on federal lands. We believe this 
statement is factual as written and does not imply that EPA was 
involved in the decision to remove or not to remove hazardous materials 
from national wildlife refuges. Further, the draft report also 
explained that FEMA did not approve the Department of the Interior’s 
request for funding to clean up this debris because it was on federal 
lands. See comment 8. 

18. EPA’s comment that EPA and the Coast Guard completed their cleanup 
work at the national wildlife refuges “under budget and ahead of 
schedule” does not acknowledge the fact that the hazardous materials 
were left in place in national wildlife refuges for a year or more 
before the cleanup was initiated. During that time, containers holding 
hazardous materials settled into marshlands and began to corrode and 
leak. When the cleanup of the Sabine National Wildlife Refuge was 
completed—16 months after Hurricane Rita—about 2,200 containers 
potentially filled with hazardous liquids and gases had been found and 
removed, along with several thousand other hazardous waste items, 
tires, batteries, munitions, and white goods. At another refuge, a fire 
spread to a 120-acre debris field with propane and other hazardous 
material containers, causing them to explode and endanger the 
firefighters. EPA’s comments also do not acknowledge that the delays in 
removing the debris complicated the cleanup efforts and increased the 
cost of removal—or that hurricane response actions to collect hazardous 
materials in adjacent areas were halted at federal boundaries. 

19. EPA commented that it consulted with the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality regarding landfills. The draft report so 
indicated. Further, EPA stated that its staff assisting the state at 
landfills did not provide oversight as the draft report indicated but 
“provided assistance in a variety of ways.” Some of the assistance EPA 
provided, such as sending observers to landfills to monitor and report 
on activities, constitutes oversight. EPA also said that the operator 
of the Gentilly landfill has conducted monitoring of groundwater at the 
landfill. We have added this information to the report. 

20. EPA said in its comments that it is revising the agency’s disaster 
debris manual. If the revisions include detailed guidance to states and 
local entities on selecting additional landfill sites under emergency 
situations, and practices that agencies can adopt to mitigate the 
potential environmental impacts of special accommodations to address 
storm debris, EPA could help states avoid controversies over landfill 
sites selected under emergency conditions and help state and local 
agencies plan for accommodations that may be needed to handle hazardous 
storm debris after disasters. 

21. Our report discusses delays in determining whether EPA or the Army 
Corps of Engineers would be responsible for white goods and electronic 
waste disposal in Louisiana and Mississippi. Local officials in both 
states told us that confusion about EPA’s role in disposing of white 
goods and electronics waste caused delays in removing and disposing of 
this debris. We note that EPA has agreed to clarify the roles of EPA 
and the Corps regarding debris disposal activities. 

22. Among other things, our report addresses the extent to which EPA 
has assurance that public health is protected from asbestos inhalation 
risks in New Orleans, and the Highlights page appropriately discusses 
key actions by EPA to monitor asbestos after Hurricane Katrina. The 
body of the draft report provides more contextual information—that the 
ambient air monitors in and around New Orleans used to measure asbestos 
are also used to measure other contaminants. The report states that 
monitors measure ambient concentrations of the following pollutants: 
arsenic, lead, particulate matter, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon 
chemicals, and volatile organic compounds. 

23. The introduction and background sections of the draft report 
provided information on the roles of EPA, the Coast Guard, the Army 
Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human Services as 
they relate to the topic of our review, EPA’s hurricane response 
activities. 

24. See comment 6. In addition, rather than stating that EPA’s December 
2005 risk assessment summary indicated it was generally safe for 
residents to return to New Orleans, we revised the report to cite EPA’s 
exact language in that summary: “the great majority of the data showed 
that adverse health effects would not be expected from exposure to 
sediments from previously flooded areas.” 

25.Although EPA questions our statement that the asbestos work practice 
standards generally do not apply to individual homeowners, this 
statement is accurate as stands. We added wording to the final report 
regarding the possible applicability of the work practice standards to 
volunteer groups. 

26.We disagree with EPA’s statement that it is inaccurate to say that 
the agency is not enforcing some of the work practice standards for 
certain residences. Under most circumstances, EPA’s asbestos work 
practices require the demolition operator to inspect buildings for 
asbestos and to remove the asbestos prior to demolition. In letters to 
the Louisiana and Mississippi Departments of Environmental Quality, EPA 
explicitly stated that its no action assurance letters would “allow 
[specified] houses to be demolished without inspection and removal of 
asbestos prior to demolition.” Our draft report stated that EPA’s no 
action assurance letters did not extend to some other elements of the 
asbestos work practice standards. Finally, we note the purpose of EPA’s 
no action assurance letters is to provide assurance that it will not 
enforce certain legal requirements—as it has done for certain asbestos 
requirements. 

27.EPA’s public service announcements and communications, which we 
highlighted in the draft report, addressed generic environmental health 
risks and guidance. The actions by the public that EPA cites in its 
comments (voluntary curbside sorting of household chemicals) may be 
related to those communications efforts. However, EPA appears to be 
making a link between these communications and actions and the 
comprehensiveness of EPA’s sampling program—a connection we do not find 
supportable. 

28.EPA questioned the “intended meaning” of the draft report’s 
statement that “after flooding, mold frequently forms and spreads.” 
This statement was provided to identify mold as a likely indoor air 
contaminant in the discussion of contamination inside New Orleans 
residences that had been flooded. The draft then highlighted the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s conclusion that “the 
duration and extent of the flooding and the number of structures 
flooded made massive mold contamination a certainty.” 

29.Key information about EPA’s no action assurances was included in our 
draft report. 

30.We edited the sentence on household hazardous wastes as suggested. 

31.In its comments, EPA incorrectly states that we characterized 
chlorofluorocarbons as “hazardous.” Actually, the draft report said 
that electronic waste and white goods frequently contain “potentially 
hazardous contaminants, such as lead, mercury, or 
chlorofluorocarbons….” The final report refers to these substances 
simply as “contaminants.” 

32.The draft report reflected that EPA approved an extension of the no 
action assurance through September 30, 2007, for four counties in 
Mississippi. 

33.Rather than stating that monitors measure ambient concentrations of 
up to six contaminants, we have revised the report in response to EPA’s 
comment to state that the monitors can measure ambient concentrations 
of the following potential pollutants and categories of pollutants from 
local and regional sources: arsenic, asbestos, lead, particulate 
matter, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon chemicals, and volatile organic 
compounds. 

34.EPA disagreed with the statement that EPA “delegated the authority” 
to states to implement and enforce the asbestos standard, asserting 
instead that EPA “authorizes” the programs. According to 40 C.F.R. § 
61.04(c), EPA “delegates” the relevant authority to states. 
Nevertheless, the Clean Air Act uses the term “approve,” and we revised 
the report as EPA suggested. We express no view concerning the apparent 
conflict between EPA’s comments and the agency’s decision to employ the 
term “delegate” in its regulations. 

35.We revised our footnote defining regulated asbestos-containing 
materials to quote the regulations verbatim as EPA recommended. 

36.We added the regulatory citation to the footnote as EPA suggested. 

37.We state that the demolition owner or operator “generally” must 
notify EPA, which encompasses the contingency EPA notes here. 

38.Our draft report stated that specified wetting and notification 
requirements still apply to demolition operations in which the building 
is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse. 

39.We made the editorial change EPA suggested for clarity. 

40.We made the recommended revision to the footnote that specifies 
EPA’s asbestos screening level. 

41.The draft report stated that Louisiana chose not to use the October 
2005 no action assurance, which authorized, among other things, a test 
of an open burn technology for disposing of construction and demolition 
debris. 

42.EPA said that the agency wanted to clarify the purpose of the Fort 
Smith research project. We believe the draft report clearly stated the 
purpose of this pilot. For example, the second sentence of the short 
paragraph describing the Fort Smith project identified the purpose of 
this research project. Further, the draft report stated that “EPA 
officials said that any monitoring of asbestos emissions at demolition 
sites in New Orleans would not need to be as elaborate as that done for 
the pilot which was conducted to develop data for potential use in a 
revision to EPA’s asbestos regulation.” 

43.The draft report provided information on EPA’s asbestos monitoring 
efforts and on monitoring data from the Army Corps of Engineers. 

44.The draft report referred to EPA’s environmental assessment 
summaries as “EPA’s primary communications about the health risks from 
exposure to contamination in New Orleans.” EPA disagreed that these 
summaries represented its primary communications, referring to the 
other health risk communications—which the draft report also discussed. 
To address EPA’s concern, we have revised the draft, describing the 
assessment summaries as key health risk communications because they are 
significant in that they provide EPA’s analyses of its sediment 
sampling efforts in New Orleans. 

45.As suggested, we replaced the term “sanitary engineers” with 
“environmental scientists and engineers.” 

46.The draft report identified the primary subtitle D responsibilities 
of states that EPA cited in its comments. As suggested, we clarified 
that EPA’s enforcement authority is limited. 

47.EPA proposed several deletions from the paragraph on the Agriculture 
Street Landfill. In response, we have replaced “concerns about cancer” 
with “health concerns.” However, we did not delete “debris from 
destroyed buildings and ash from municipal incinerators” because EPA’s 
comments conflict with EPA documentation that we obtained during our 
review. 

48.We made the suggested deletion. 

49.We made the suggested clarification in the footnote. 

50.We revised the draft to reflect that EPA provided technical support 
and undertook some oversight activities at New Orleans landfills 
because some of the activities involved overseeing and reporting on 
landfill operations. 

51.EPA provided information on guidance the agency issued in 
Mississippi on management practices for white goods. However, the 
implementation of the procedures was problematic, as indicated by the 
comments of Mississippi county officials cited in the draft report. 

52.Our finding and recommendation regarding problems with the 
disposition of electronic waste focused on the issues Louisiana and 
Mississippi officials described to us—these problems occurred in the 
weeks immediately after the storm because of confusion regarding the 
roles of EPA and the Corps. We did not identify problems after EPA and 
the Corps defined their responsibilities. Therefore, we did not report 
on all electronics recycling activities, such as the activities EPA 
says were omitted from the report. 

53.We revised the sentence to more clearly separate the land management 
agencies referred to from the other agencies cited (EPA and the Coast 
Guard).

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John B. Stephenson, (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Christine Fishkin, Assistant 
Director; Joanna Owusu; Kirk Menard; Nancy Crothers; Richard Johnson; 
Karen Keegan; and Omari Norman made key contributions to this report. 
Jessica Lemke and Hilary Sloan also made important contributions to 
this report. 

(360648): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Unless otherwise noted, this report addresses EPA's response to 
Hurricane Katrina, the storm that caused the bulk of the hurricane- 
related damage to the Gulf Coast in 2005. Other storms, in particular 
Hurricane Rita, also caused significant damage to the region in 2005, 
some in the same areas hit by Katrina. 

[2] Under the National Contingency Plan, EPA and the Coast Guard also 
serve as primary responders. 

[3] EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Planning for 
Disaster Debris (December 1995). 

[4] The National Response Plan applies to all incidents requiring a 
coordinated federal response as part of an appropriate combination of 
federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental 
entities. For incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, but 
of lesser severity than an incident of national significance, the plan 
includes a comprehensive network of incident annexes and supplemental 
federal contingency plans that may be implemented by the departments 
and agencies with established authorities in coordination with the 
National Response Plan framework. 

[5] In addition, the primary Joint Information Center, established in 
support of the National Response Plan, is authorized to release general 
medical and public health response information to the public after 
consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
Joint Information Center is a physical location where public affairs 
professionals from organizations involved in incident management 
activities provide emergency information, crisis communications, and 
public affairs support. 

[6] The Hazard Ranking System is the principal mechanism EPA uses to 
place sites on the National Priorities List. The system serves as a 
screening device to evaluate the potential for releases of uncontrolled 
hazardous substances to cause human health or environmental damage. 

[7] EPA officials said that, as of December 31, 2006, EPA had received 
funding from FEMA totaling $718.4 million. Of this amount, EPA had 
obligated $563.7 million and had expended $415.5 million, including 
$80.1 million passed directly to the U.S. Coast Guard. In addition, EPA 
had expended approximately $13 million of appropriated resources in 
support of the responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

[8] EPA used its existing emergency support contracts during its 
Katrina response: (1) Emergency and Rapid Response Services contracts 
for personnel, equipment, and materials to provide emergency removal 
and remedial response cleanup services, including containing, 
recovering, and disposing of hazardous substances; and (2) Superfund 
Technical Assessment and Response Team contracts for personnel 
providing technical support for gathering and analyzing site assessment 
technical data, preparing reports on oil and hazardous substance 
investigations, and providing technical support for cleanup efforts. 

[9] The Coast Guard estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were 
released due to Katrina and that the hurricane caused six major spills 
(at least 100,000 gallons each) and numerous minor ones (less than 
10,000 gallons each). 

[10] The Coast Guard oversaw the company's removal of oil from the 
canals in the area, an oil tank farm containment area, and storm 
drains. 

[11] Murphy Oil agreed to settle a class action lawsuit brought against 
the company by individuals and entities that were allegedly injured or 
damaged from the oil spill. In January 2007, a court approved a $330 
million settlement agreement that pays for the acquisition of property, 
damage remediation, and compensation for losses. Turner v. Murphy Oil 
U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-4206 (E.D. LA. filed Aug. 9, 2005). 

[12] EPA also assessed the potential impact on an additional 30 
Superfund National Priorities List sites in southwest Louisiana and 
southeast Texas after Hurricane Rita struck this area. 

[13] EPA Region 4 also compared the sample results from the Superfund 
sites reviewed in Mississippi and Alabama with the EPA Office of Water 
2004 National Recommended Water Quality Criteria and EPA Region 9 
Preliminary Remediation Goals to determine if those sites' conditions 
might also represent previously unrecognized risks to human health and 
the environment. 

[14] EPA concluded from the assessment of the Agriculture Street 
Landfill in New Orleans, 1 of the 24 Superfund sites reviewed, that the 
flooding did not cause any lead (the contaminant of concern) to migrate 
up through the site's soil cover. However, sediment samples EPA 
collected on the site and in the area contained benzo(a)pyrene levels 
that exceeded Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality risk 
standards. EPA reported on August 17, 2006, that it had contacted the 
Housing Authority of New Orleans (the property owner and manager) 
regarding the sampling results and planned to work with the authority 
to ensure plans for the site addressed this contamination. 
Additionally, EPA stated it would provide a closeout report when the 
authority announced its specific plans. 

[15] The one exception EPA Region 4 identified involved the Naval 
Construction Battalion Center in Gulfport, Mississippi. Although EPA 
detected elevated dioxins at some of the sampling points near this 
facility, the agency concluded that none of the concentrations detected 
caused concern about effects on human health and that the site was not 
adversely impacted by Katrina. 

[16] The Mississippi Sound spans the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast and 
is separated from the Gulf of Mexico by a series of narrow islands and 
sandbars. Numerous coastal bays are contained within the system, 
including St. Louis Bay, Biloxi Bay, and Pascagoula Bay. EPA stated 
that the study was not designed to identify specific pollutant sources 
or provide definitive information on the potential long-term effects of 
the hurricanes on human or ecological health. 

[17] Additionally, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
and the U.S. Geological Survey collected over 100 samples from 50 
pumping stations in the Lake Pontchartrain area during September and 
October 2005 that showed low bacteria concentrations in the lake within 
recreational standards. 

[18] For purposes of its hurricane response sampling effort, EPA 
defined sediment as "residuals deposited by receding floodwaters which 
may include historical sediment from nearby water bodies, soil from 
yards, road and construction debris, and other materials." 

[19] The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality has developed a 
Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Program to address risks to human 
health and the environment from the release of chemical constituents. 
The program consists of a screening option and three management 
options. The screening option may be used to manage an area of concern 
expeditiously, or determine if it warrants further investigation, while 
the three-tiered management options allow site evaluation and 
corrective action efforts to be tailored to site conditions and risks. 

[20] These 23 samples were analyzed for arsenic, lead, polynuclear 
aromatic hydrocarbons, and total petroleum hydrocarbons. 

[21] The agencies resampled at 14 of the 145 locations at which the 
initial sampling exceeded the risk criteria based on their resampling 
criteria: the sediment depth had to exceed 1.5 centimeters (a little 
more than one-half inch). 

[22] To address public concerns, phase 3 also included samples in 
public access areas of a neighborhood near a former pesticide blending 
facility that had not been included in phases 1 and 2. These composite 
samples were analyzed for a complete spectrum of pesticides. 

[23] Duplicate samples were collected at 126 of the locations, 
resulting in the analysis of 712 samples. 

[24] According to EPA, the monitors can measure ambient concentrations 
of the following potential pollutants and categories of pollutants from 
local and regional sources: arsenic, asbestos, lead, particulate 
matter, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon chemicals, and volatile organic 
compounds. 

[25] See National Emissions Standard for Asbestos, 40 CFR Part 61, 
Subpart M. 

[26] Related information on the adverse health effects due to asbestos 
can be found via the Department of Health and Human Services, Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Web page at Hyperlink, 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects. 

[27] The Clean Air Act provides EPA with the authority to promulgate a 
work practice standard to mitigate health risks if it is not feasible 
to establish an emission standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h). In its 1978 
rule amending EPA's asbestos standard, the agency said that it was not 
feasible to prescribe a numerical emission standard for building 
demolitions or renovations. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c), Procedures for 
asbestos emissions control. 

[28] Regulated asbestos containing material (RACM) means (a) Friable 
asbestos material, (b) Category I nonfriable ACM that has become 
friable, (c) Category I nonfriable ACM that will be or has been 
subjected to sanding, grinding, cutting, or abrading, or (d) Category 
II nonfriable ACM that has a high probability of becoming or has become 
crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by the forces expected to 
act on the material in the course of demolition or renovation 
operations regulated by the asbestos work practice standards. Category 
I nonfriable asbestos-containing material (ACM) means asbestos- 
containing packings, gaskets, resilient floor covering, and asphalt 
roofing products containing more than 1 percent asbestos as determined 
using the method specified in appendix E, subpart E, 40 C.F.R. part 
763, section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy. Category II nonfriable ACM 
means any material, excluding Category I nonfriable ACM, containing 
more than 1 percent asbestos as determined using the methods specified 
in appendix E, subpart E, 40 C.F.R. part 763, section 1, Polarized 
Light Microscopy that, when dry, cannot be crumbled, pulverized, or 
reduced to powder by hand pressure. 

[29] 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a)(3); see EPA Office of Compliance, Managing 
Your Environmental Responsibilities: A Planning Guide for Construction 
and Development, at VII-15 (April 2005). 

[30] Demolition or renovation by the individual homeowner of a 
residential building with four or fewer dwelling units is not covered 
by EPA's asbestos national emissions standards, unless the demolition 
is part of a larger overall project carried out by one owner or 
operator. 

[31] Summary of homes remaining for demolition. Information compiled 
from the January 6, 2007, weekly status report from the Department of 
Homeland Security. 

[32] EPA also issued an April 28, 2006, no action assurance letter to 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality allowing a staging 
process for debris from approximately 70 residential structures to be 
used in debris grinding and burning pilot studies in Louisiana until 
July 31, 2006. However, FEMA did not approve funding for these pilot 
studies for several reasons. 

[33] According to the Army Corps of Engineers, residences it had 
demolished were inspected for asbestos prior to demolition except when 
it was not safe to enter a structure, the structure had transite 
shingles or siding (which the Corps classifies as regulated asbestos- 
containing materials), or the structure was completely demolished. 

[34] In February 2007, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality stated that 12,000 residences had been demolished and estimated 
30,000 more home demolitions were needed. 

[35] The margin of error for the estimates was plus or minus 9.8 
percent for Orleans Parish and plus or minus 14.4 percent for St. 
Bernard Parish. 

[36] A Peoples' Plan for Overcoming the Hurricane Katrina Blues (draft 
study prepared by ACORN Housing/University Partnership, Feb. 1, 2007). 

[37] According to the Corps, the number of residence demolitions 
continues to be speculative and is dependent on the city of New Orleans 
finalizing condemnation packages. 

[38] EPA is using a 1-year screening level of 0.01 fibers of the length 
greater than 5 µm found per cubic centimeter of air. According to EPA, 
this screening level was developed with consideration of the Asbestos 
Hazard Emergency Response Act regulations and EPA's asbestos risk 
estimates. 

[39] One monitor is in St. Tammany Parish, north of Lake Ponchartrain 
and Orleans Parish; one is in Metairie, west of Orleans; one is in St. 
Bernard Parish (Arabi); and two are in Orleans Parish--in the north at 
the University of New Orleans and in the east at a fire training 
academy near some landfill operations. 

[40] According to air sampling information on EPA's Web page, 
measurements of asbestos were below the method detection limit, a value 
below the minimum detectable by the method used. According to EPA, the 
reduction in air monitors was also a response to the delays in the 
demolition activities. 

[41] The Army Corps of Engineers demolished the first storm-damaged 
homes in Orleans Parish in March 2006, and demolition activities 
started in St. Bernard Parish in April 2006. According to Corps data 
reported in the December 2006 Brookings Institution Katrina Index cited 
above, the Corps had completed 195 demolitions in Orleans Parish as of 
July 2006 and 2,289 as of December 2006. 

[42] While the report includes some samples covering other activities, 
such as canal cleaning and debris removal, 93 percent of the samples 
identified in the report were collected at demolition sites. 

[43] Region 4 officials told us they did not develop additional air 
monitoring plans for Mississippi because they determined that the 
overview plan developed for both states was adequate. 

[44] The initial no action assurance letter largely focused on 
disposition of the construction and demolition debris using an open 
burning technology. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality 
officials said the state chose to not conduct the test burn required 
under the terms of the letter or exercise the flexibility EPA 
authorized in the letter because of the conditions for the test burn 
and the time it would take to reach agreement with EPA on a test 
protocol. 

[45] The methods used in the pilot had more stringent requirements 
before and during demolition than EPA is requiring under the current 
asbestos no action assurances in Louisiana and Mississippi. 

[46] Environmental Quality Management and EPA, Quality Assurance 
Project Plan: Evaluation of an Alternative Asbestos Control Method for 
Building Demolition (Mar. 31, 2006). 

[47] In addition, EPA worked with the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, and FEMA. 

[48] Generally, CDC has said that any structure flooded after 
hurricanes or major floods should be presumed to contain materials 
contaminated with mold if those materials were not thoroughly dried 
within 48 hours. 

[49] EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Provided Quality and Timely 
Information on Hurricane Katrina Hazardous Material Releases and Debris 
Management, Report No. 2006-P-00023 (Washington, D.C., May 2, 2006). 

[50] EPA's hurricane Web page, "Response to 2005 Hurricanes," is still 
accessible on EPA's Web site using a search function, but it is no 
longer highlighted on EPA's home page. 

[51] In August 2006, EPA reported that more than 1.3 million of these 
flyers had been distributed, as had about 900,000 flyers on mold 
problems. 

[52] This date is consistent with other sources we reviewed that 
indicate that any building constructed before 1980 can be presumed to 
contain asbestos. See "Asbestos: A Legal Primer for Air Force 
Installation Attorneys," Air Force Law Review (2004); and "Asbestos in 
Construction Hazard Alert," The Center to Protect Workers' Rights 
(2004). 

[53] CDC, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 55(RR08); 1-27 (June 
9, 2006). 

[54] Respirator labels may cite compliance with both NIOSH and OSHA 
requirements. OSHA regulations require certain employers to have 
respiratory protection programs to protect employees against workplace 
hazards. A requirement of the programs is the selection of appropriate 
respirators approved by NIOSH. 

[55] The National Response Plan directs the Departments of Agriculture 
and the Interior, which are responsible for incidents affecting 
agriculture and natural resources, to coordinate with EPA and other oil 
and hazardous materials response partners on the removal of debris 
affecting natural and cultural resources. 

[56] The Fish and Wildlife Service also considered requesting EPA 
cleanup assistance under the Superfund law, the Clean Water Act, and 
the Oil Pollution Act. In a draft 2006 letter to EPA, the Fish and 
Wildlife regional director stated that these authorities extended to 
the cleanup needed on the refuges because the debris was deposited on 
these lands by the hurricanes, not because of any action on the part of 
Fish and Wildlife. While Fish and Wildlife worked with EPA to draft a 
letter requesting EPA assistance under the Superfund law, the request 
was never sent to EPA. Under this law, the Superfund is generally 
unavailable at federal facilities. Funds from the Superfund may be used 
to pay for removal actions on federal lands at EPA's discretion but 
must be reimbursed by the relevant federal agency. 

[57] EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Planning for 
Disaster Debris (December 1995). 

[58] See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 et seq; Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 (Feb. 28, 2003). 

[59] EPA provides this support to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
federal coordinator for the public works and engineering emergency 
support function, which addresses debris removal and disposal, among 
other things. 

[60] EPA provides this support under the public health and medical 
services emergency support function, which is coordinated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The department, in 
coordination with EPA's oil and hazardous materials response, may 
request this support from agencies such as EPA. 

[61] While EPA may review approved state subtitle D permit programs and 
withdraw approval of state programs it determines do not meet the 
national minimum requirements, EPA officials told us the agency has 
never withdrawn approval of a state subtitle D permit program. 

[62] These landfills are designated as Type I or II facilities under 
Louisiana solid waste regulations. These facilities must have a 
composite liner that consists of a geomembrane liner at least 30-mil 
thick installed directly above and in uniform contact with a 3-foot 
recompacted clay liner. 

[63] These landfills are designated as Type III facilities under 
Louisiana solid waste regulations. 

[64] Soil samples collected at the Agriculture Street Landfill site 
following Hurricane Katrina revealed elevated levels of benzo(a)pyrene, 
a polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon. EPA and local authorities are 
developing a plan to address this contamination. 

[65] United States v. City of New Orleans, et al, Civil Action No. 02- 
3618, Section E, Magistrate 3 (E.D. La.) 

[66] State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Second 
Amended Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order regarding 
Hurricane Katrina and Its Aftermath (Nov. 2, 2005). The Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality extended the emergency order 
several times, most recently extending the broadened definition through 
May 18, 2007. 

[67] ICF Inc., Construction and Demolition Waste Landfills (draft 
document prepared for the EPA Office of Solid Waste, 1995). 

[68] G.F. Lee, Summary of Findings on the Environmental Impacts of the 
Proposed C&D Landfill on Top of the Closed Gentilly Landfill (February 
2006); and John H. Pardue, Director, Louisiana Water Resources Research 
Institute, Louisiana State University, Anticipating environmental 
problems facing hurricane debris landfills in New Orleans East 
(undated). 

[69] Louisiana also authorized some landfills in the New Orleans area 
to operate as "enhanced" C&D landfills that may receive regulated 
asbestos-containing material as well as unregulated material. These 
facilities are required to have additional controls in place, such as 
air monitoring for asbestos emissions. According to the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality, these landfills meet the landfill 
requirements under the federal asbestos standard (40 C.F.R. § 61.154). 

[70] The lawsuit further alleges that because the emergency orders 
conflict with RCRA's open dumping prohibition, the state's issuance and 
implementation of the orders violates the Supremacy Clause in Article 
VI of the U.S. Constitution. 

[71] The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality issued a permit 
to conduct construction and demolition waste disposal to the Gentilly 
Landfill in 2004 and an Order to Authorize Commencement of Operations 
on August 29, 2005. However, according to the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality, following the litigation related to a lawsuit 
against the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, "It became 
apparent that although the decision to use the Gentilly landfill was 
properly based upon the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality's 
emergency authority under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, this 
authority and the underlying reasoning for arriving at that decision 
was not clearly reflected in the Order." Therefore, the order was 
revoked and an administrative order and decision were issued 
authorizing use of the landfill pursuant to state law and the Hurricane 
Katrina emergency order. 

[72] See footnote 68. 

[73] This lawsuit was dismissed by the court 2 days after the landfill 
was closed on August 14, 2006, when, as is discussed later in this 
report, the local order authorizing the zoning of the landfill expired 
and was not renewed. 

[74] According to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 
landfills were subject to several controls intended to minimize 
hazardous waste disposal, including monitoring at entrance towers and 
debris dump sites. In addition, daily inspections by department 
officials at five construction and demolition landfills in the New 
Orleans area, an increase from twice-weekly inspections, were conducted 
in May and June 2006. 

[75] According to EPA, as of December 2006, EPA landfill observers were 
observing at seven landfills, the reduced number reflecting the fact 
that some landfills are no longer receiving hurricane-related debris. 

[76] EPA landfill observers also visited landfill sites in Mississippi 
from October 2005 to June 2006. 

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