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entitled 'Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy 
Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting 
Fires' which was released on June 26, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2007: 

Wildland Fire Management: 

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to 
Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires: 

GAO-07-655: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-655, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires have 
increased substantially over the past decade, in recent years totaling 
about $3 billion. The Forest Service within the Department of 
Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the Interior 
(Interior) are responsible for responding to wildland fires on federal 
lands. GAO determined what steps federal agencies have taken, in 
response to findings from previous studies, to (1) address key 
operational areas that could help contain the costs of preparing for 
and responding to wildland fires and (2) improve their management of 
their cost-containment efforts. To address these objectives, GAO 
reviewed previous cost-containment studies and other agency documents 
and interviewed agency officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of 
steps to address key operational areas previously identified as needing 
improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but 
the effects on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of 
these steps are not yet complete. First, federal firefighting agencies 
are developing a system to help them better identify and set priorities 
for lands needing treatment to reduce fuels, but they have yet to 
decide how they will keep data in the system current. Second, federal 
agencies have taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use 
personnel, equipment, and other firefighting assets—such as 
implementing a computerized system to more efficiently dispatch and 
track available firefighting assets—but have not yet completed the more 
fundamental step of determining the appropriate type and quantity of 
firefighting assets needed for the fire season. Third, the agencies 
have clarified certain policies and are improving analytical tools that 
assist officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate 
response to a given fire, but several other policies limit the 
agencies’ use of less aggressive firefighting strategies, which 
typically cost less. Fourth, federal agencies, working with nonfederal 
entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance to better 
ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that 
threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, but it is 
unclear how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is followed. 

The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified 
weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they 
have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and 
objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them—steps that are 
fundamental to sound program management. Although the agencies have 
established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum 
cost—considering firefighter and public safety and resources and 
structures to be protected—they have no defined criteria by which to 
weigh the relative importance of these often-competing priorities. As a 
result, according to agency officials and reports, officials in the 
field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance the 
agencies’ leadership places on containing costs and therefore are 
likely to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of 
the costs of suppression. The agencies also have yet to develop a 
vision of how the various cost-containment steps they are taking relate 
to one another or to determine the extent to which these steps will be 
effective. The agencies are working to develop a better cost-
containment performance measure, but the measure may take a number of 
years to fully refine. Finally, the agencies have taken, or are 
beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and increase 
accountability—such as requiring agency officials to evaluate 
firefighting teams according to how well they contained costs—although 
the extent to which these steps will assist the agencies in containing 
costs is unknown. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior 
take several steps to improve their management of cost-containment 
efforts, including establishing clearly defined goals and measurable 
objectives and a strategy to achieve them, and provide this information 
to Congress in preparation for the 2008 fire season. The Forest Service 
and Interior generally disagreed with GAO’s findings, stating that GAO 
did not accurately portray some of the agencies’ actions to contain 
costs. They neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-655]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 
512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target 
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are 
Unknown: 

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management 
of Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed: 

GAO Products: 

Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports: 

Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports: 

National Academy of Public Administration Reports: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of 
the Interior: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and 
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through 
2005: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 1, 2007: 

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Larry E. Craig: 
United States Senate: 

The federal government's cost of preparing for and responding to 
wildland fires, which burn millions of acres each year, has increased 
substantially over the past decade. Five federal land management 
agencies--the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture 
(Agriculture) and the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service within 
the Department of the Interior (Interior)--are responsible for managing 
wildland fires on federal lands. A firefighting agency's response to a 
wildland fire can range from monitoring the fire while letting it burn 
to aggressively suppressing it. In choosing a response, agency 
officials must assess a number of factors that can affect the size and 
severity of the fire as well as the value of threatened resources, such 
as communities, watersheds, or natural resources. In recent years, 
accumulations of fuels, due in part to past suppression policies, and 
severe drought and weather in some areas of the country have 
contributed to more-severe fires and longer fire seasons. At the same 
time, wildland fires have increasingly threatened not only federal 
lands and public resources, such as forests and watersheds, but also 
nonfederal lands and resources, including homes and other structures, 
as development has continued to expand into areas in or near wildlands-
-commonly known as the wildland-urban interface. Consequently, 
preparing for and responding to wildland fires has become more costly. 
Over the past decade, annual wildland fire appropriations to prepare 
for and suppress wildland fires, including appropriations for reducing 
fuels, have increased from an average of $1.1 billion from fiscal years 
1996 through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from fiscal years 2001 
through 2005; adjusted for inflation, the appropriations increased from 
$1.3 billion to $3.1 billion[Footnote 1]. 

Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, federal agency 
officials, and others have expressed concerns about the mounting 
federal wildland fire expenditures. Over the last decade, these 
concerns have led federal agencies (including the Forest Service, 
Interior, the Agriculture Office of Inspector General, and GAO) and 
other organizations (including the National Association of State 
Foresters and the National Academy of Public Administration[Footnote 
2]) to conduct numerous reviews of the federal wildland fire program. 
These reviews generally sought to identify the reasons for worsening 
wildland fire severity and increasing expenditures and to recommend 
possible steps that federal agencies could take to contain costs. 
Despite the dozens of studies conducted, problems identified, and 
hundreds of recommendations for agency action, concerns remain about 
the increasing costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires 
and the effectiveness of the agencies' efforts to contain those costs. 

In this context, we examined the responsible federal agencies' efforts 
to contain wildland fire costs. This report discusses steps the Forest 
Service and Interior agencies have taken, in response to findings from 
previous studies, to (1) address key operational areas that could help 
contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires and 
(2) improve their management of their cost-containment efforts. 

To address these issues, we reviewed selected studies--most conducted 
since 2000 by federal, state, and nongovernmental entities--that 
evaluated issues related to wildland fire cost containment, including 
studies of several large fires. We reviewed the issues these studies 
identified as needing improvement to help contain costs and categorized 
them into broad areas corresponding to key operational areas of 
preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To corroborate our 
understanding and categorization of the issues and the steps that 
federal agencies have taken to address the issues, we interviewed 
officials from the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and 
Office of Wildland Fire Coordination within Interior at the national 
offices in Washington, D.C., and at the National Interagency Fire 
Center in Boise, Idaho.[Footnote 3] We also reviewed program documents 
from the Forest Service and Interior agencies. These documents, along 
with Congressional Research Service reports, provided information on 
the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. Appendix I 
describes our scope and methodology in more detail, and appendix II 
lists many of the studies we reviewed. We performed our work in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which 
included an assessment of data reliability, from May 2006 through May 
2007. 

Results in Brief: 

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of 
steps to address issues that previous studies identified as needing 
improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but 
the effects of these steps on containing costs are unknown, in part 
because many of the steps are not yet complete. These issues are 
generally related to the key operational areas of reducing accumulated 
fuels, acquiring and using firefighting personnel and equipment, and 
selecting firefighting strategies. Concerns have also been raised about 
the framework used to share firefighting costs between federal and 
nonfederal entities. 

² Reducing accumulated fuels. Federal firefighting agencies have made 
progress in developing a system to help them better identify and set 
priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce accumulated fuels. 
Many studies have identified fuel reduction as important for containing 
wildland fire costs because accumulated fuels can contribute to more- 
severe and more costly fires. The agencies' new system, LANDFIRE, is 
scheduled for completion in 2009, but the agencies have yet to decide 
how they will keep data in the system current. Forest Service and 
Interior officials told us they recognize the importance of ensuring 
that data are periodically updated, and they are developing a plan to 
operate and maintain the system, including determining how often data 
will be updated. 

² Acquiring and using firefighting assets. Federal firefighting 
agencies have also taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use 
firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and supplies-- 
assets that constitute a major cost of responding to wildland fires-- 
but much remains to be done. Agencies have computerized their systems 
for dispatching and monitoring firefighting assets and for gathering 
and analyzing cost data, although project officials could not quantify 
the savings resulting from such efforts. Agencies have not yet improved 
their systems for determining the appropriate type and quantity of 
firefighting assets needed for the fire season or for effectively and 
efficiently procuring them. 

² Selecting firefighting strategies. The agencies have clarified 
certain policies and are improving analytical tools that assist agency 
officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate response to a 
given fire, but shortcomings remain. Officials have a wide spectrum of 
strategies available to them when responding to wildland fires, some of 
which can be significantly more costly than others. For individual 
fires, studies have found that officials may not always consider the 
full range of available strategies and may not select the most 
appropriate one, which would consider the cost of suppression; value of 
structures and other resources threatened by the fire; and, where 
appropriate, any potential benefits to natural resources. The agencies 
use the term "appropriate management response" for a strategy that 
considers these factors. The agencies updated their policies in 2004 to 
require officials to consider the full spectrum of available strategies 
when selecting a firefighting strategy, but studies have identified 
several policies that limit the agencies' use of less aggressive 
strategies, which typically cost less. The agencies are also continuing 
to refine existing tools, and to develop new ones, for analyzing both 
fuel and predicted weather conditions to model expected fire behavior, 
information that officials can use to identify appropriate suppression 
strategies. These tools are still being designed and tested, however, 
and it is not yet clear to what extent these tools will affect 
officials' selection of firefighting strategies. 

² Sharing wildland fire costs. We and others have also reported that 
the existing framework for sharing firefighting costs between federal 
and nonfederal entities insulates state and local governments from the 
cost of protecting homes and communities in or near wildlands, which 
may reduce those governments' incentive to adopt building codes and 
land use requirements that could help reduce the cost of suppressing 
wildland fires. Federal agencies, working with some nonfederal 
entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance and better 
ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that 
threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. It is 
unclear, however, how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is 
followed in the field. 

The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified 
weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they 
have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and 
objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them--steps that are 
fundamental to sound program management. To manage their cost- 
containment efforts effectively, the Forest Service and Interior 
agencies should, at minimum, have (1) clearly defined goals and 
measurable objectives, (2) a strategy to achieve the goals and 
objectives, (3) performance measures to track progress, and (4) a 
framework for holding the appropriate agency officials accountable for 
achieving the goals.[Footnote 4] First, although the agencies have 
established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost 
considering firefighter and public safety and the resources and 
structures to be protected, they have established neither clear 
criteria by which to weigh the relative importance of these often- 
competing priorities, nor measurable objectives by which to determine 
if they are meeting their goals. Without such criteria and objectives, 
according to agency officials we interviewed and reports we reviewed, 
officials in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative 
importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing costs 
and, therefore, are likely to select firefighting strategies without 
due consideration of the costs of suppression. Second, the agencies 
have not developed a vision of how the various cost-containment steps 
they are taking relate to one another or determined the extent to which 
these steps will be effective. Third, the agencies are working to 
develop a better performance measure for containing costs, but the 
measure may take a number of years to fully refine, and, moreover, the 
agencies have yet to identify the cost-containment goals they are 
trying to achieve. Finally, the agencies have also taken, or are 
beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and accountability 
framework--such as requiring officials to evaluate firefighting teams 
according to how well they contained costs--although the extent to 
which these steps will assist the agencies in containing costs is 
unknown. 

Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire costs, 
the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently manage their 
myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire costs. To help them do 
so, and to assist Congress in its oversight role, we are recommending 
that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior work together to 
direct their respective agencies to (1) establish clearly defined goals 
and measurable objectives for containing wildland fire costs, (2) 
develop a strategy to achieve these goals and objectives, (3) establish 
performance measures that are aligned with these goals and objectives, 
and (4) establish a framework to ensure that officials are held 
accountable for achieving the goals and objectives. Because of the 
importance of these actions and continuing concerns about the agencies' 
response to the increasing cost of wildland fires--and so that the 
agencies can use the results of these actions to prepare for the 2008 
fire season--the agencies should provide Congress with this information 
no later than November 2007. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and 
Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of our 
findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. 
In particular, the Forest Service and Interior stated that they did not 
believe we had accurately portrayed some of the significant actions 
they had taken to contain wildland fire costs, and they identified 
several agency documents that they believe provide clearly defined 
goals and objectives that make up their strategy to contain costs. We 
added further clarifying language, where appropriate, to more 
accurately characterize some of the agencies' actions. Although 
documents cited by the agencies provide overarching goals and 
objectives, we believe that they lack the clarity and specificity 
needed by their land management and firefighting officials in the field 
to help manage and contain wildland fire costs. We believe that our 
recommendations, if effectively implemented, would help the agencies 
better manage their cost-containment efforts and improve their ability 
to contain wildland fire costs. The Forest Service and Interior's joint 
comments, and our evaluation of them, are included in appendix III. 

Background: 

Wildland fires triggered by lightning are both natural and inevitable 
and play an important ecological role in the nation's landscapes. These 
fires shape the composition of forests and grasslands, periodically 
reduce vegetation densities, and stimulate seedling regeneration and 
growth in some species. Over the past century, however, various land 
use and management practices--including fire suppression, grazing, and 
timber harvest--have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many 
forest and rangeland ecosystems and contributed to abnormally dense, 
continuous accumulations of vegetation. Such accumulations not only can 
fuel uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires, but also can 
threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure as more 
homes and communities are built in or near areas at risk from wildland 
fires. Over the past decade, the number of acres burned annually by 
wildland fires in the United States has substantially increased. 

Federal appropriations to the Forest Service and Interior agencies to 
prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including appropriations for 
fuel treatments have almost tripled, from an average of $1.1 billion 
from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 to more than $2.9 billion from 
fiscal years 2001 through 2005 (see table 1). Adjusting for inflation, 
the average annual appropriations for these periods increased from $1.3 
billion to $3.1 billion. The Forest Service received about 70 percent 
and Interior about 30 percent of the funds appropriated. 

Table 1: Forest Service and Interior Wildland Fire Appropriations and 
Distribution, by Wildland Fire Activity, Fiscal Years 1996 through 
2005: 

Dollars in millions. 

Fiscal year: 1996; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: $772.3; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: $924.8; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 55.2%; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 44.8%; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 1997; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,081.9; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,273.3; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 42.8; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 57.2; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 1998; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,119.3; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,301.6; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 42.5; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 57.5; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 1999; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,159.2; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,330.6; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 45.9; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 54.1; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 1,588.9; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 1,787.6; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 36.8; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 63.2; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,863.6; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,147.4; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 32.4; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 67.6; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: N/A. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,269.1; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 2,447.2; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 39.8; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 31.0; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: 29.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 3,195.6; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,378.1; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 27.8; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 53.9; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: 18.4. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 3,293.8; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 3,394.1; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 28.1; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 52.7; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: 19.2. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Total appropriations: Nominal: 2,998.6; 
Total appropriations: Inflation-adjusted[A]: 2,998.6; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Preparedness[B]: 31.2; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Suppression[C]: 46.4; 
Distribution of appropriations, by wildland fire activity (percentage): 
Other[D]: 22.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Research Service data. 

Note: N/A, not applicable. 

[A] We adjusted the appropriations dollars for inflation, using the 
chain-weighted gross domestic product price index with fiscal year 2005 
as the base year. 

[B] Includes appropriations for hiring, training, and paying fire 
organization personnel; for acquiring needed equipment; and for 
prevention activities, including public education efforts. 

[C] Includes emergency supplemental and contingent appropriations that 
Congress provided to fund suppression activities in years when 
agencies' suppression expenditures exceeded the funds initially 
appropriated. 

[D] Includes appropriations for fuel reduction activities for fiscal 
years 2002 through 2005; fuel reduction activities were limited before 
fiscal year 2002 and are included in the suppression column. 

[End of table] 

Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost 
of preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to 
fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For 
decades, federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and 
were generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In 
some parts of the country, however, rather than eliminating severe 
wildland fires, decades of suppression contributed to the disruption of 
ecological cycles and began to change the structure and composition of 
forests and rangelands, thereby making lands more susceptible to fire. 
Increasingly, the agencies have recognized the role that fire plays in 
many ecosystems and the role that it could play in the agencies' 
management of forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together to 
develop a federal wildland fire management policy in 1995, which for 
the first time formally recognized the essential role of fire in 
sustaining natural systems. This policy was subsequently reaffirmed and 
updated in 2001. The agencies, in conjunction with Congress, also began 
developing the National Fire Plan in 2000.[Footnote 5] To align their 
policies and to ensure a consistent and coordinated effort to implement 
the federal wildland fire policy and National Fire Plan, Agriculture 
and Interior also established the Wildland Fire Leadership Council in 
2002.[Footnote 6] In addition to noting the negative effects of past 
successes in suppressing wildland fires, the policy and plan also 
recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban interface 
has placed more structures at risk from wildland fire at the same time 
that it has increased the complexity and cost of wildland fire 
suppression. Forest Service and university researchers estimated in 
2005 that about 44 million homes in the lower 48 states are located in 
the wildland-urban interface. 

To help address these trends, current federal policy directs agencies 
to consider land management objectives--identified in land and fire 
management plans developed by each local unit, such as a national 
forest or a Bureau of Land Management district--and the structures and 
resources at risk when determining whether or how to suppress a 
wildland fire. When a fire starts, the land manager at the affected 
local unit is responsible for determining the strategy that will be 
used to respond to the fire. A wide spectrum of strategies is available 
to choose from, some of which can be significantly more costly than 
others. For example, the agencies may fight fires ignited close to 
communities or other high-value areas more aggressively than fires on 
remote lands or at sites where fire may provide ecological or fuel- 
reduction benefits. In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor a 
fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that the fire 
continues to pose little threat to important resources, a practice 
known as "wildland fire use." 

An incident commander is responsible for implementing the suppression 
strategy selected by the land manager, including determining the 
tactics to use and ordering the firefighting assets needed to carry out 
the strategy. For large and complex fires, an incident management team 
comprising not only an incident commander but also a cadre of personnel 
to handle command, planning, logistics, operations, and finance 
functions manages suppression operations. The incident management team 
orders firefighting assets--including personnel, aircraft, equipment, 
and supplies--through a three-tiered system of local, regional, and 
national dispatch centers. 

Because one firefighting agency alone cannot handle all wildland fires 
that may burn in its jurisdiction and because a single fire may burn 
across federal, state, and local jurisdictions, the five federal land 
management agencies work together with tribal, state, and local 
firefighting entities to respond to a fire. These entities develop 
agreements, often called master agreements, that guide cooperative fire 
protection efforts and include provisions for sharing the costs of 
these efforts. When a fire is first detected, firefighting entities 
normally follow a principle of "closest available resource," whereby, 
regardless of jurisdiction, the closest available firefighting 
personnel and equipment respond to the fire. As the fire continues to 
burn, these entities use an interagency incident management system with 
an organizational structure that expands to meet a fire's complexity 
and demands; this system enables entities to share firefighting assets 
and facilitates an effective response. 

Since the mid-1990s, when annual federal expenditures for wildland fire 
suppression approached $1 billion for the first time, numerous studies 
have been conducted examining steps that federal agencies could take to 
contain wildland fire suppression costs (see app. II). Some of these 
studies were produced in response to direction from Congress, some were 
initiated by the agencies themselves, and the National Academy of 
Public Administration conducted a series of five studies beginning in 
2000. In addition, Agriculture's Inspector General, the National 
Association of State Foresters, and GAO have all examined the agencies' 
efficiency and effectiveness in wildland firefighting. In 2005, the 
Forest Service hired a consultant to review 22 recent reports and to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the reports' more than 300 
recommendations. 

Because previous reports have, year after year, identified many of the 
same issues as needing improvement and recommended similar steps to 
address those issues, some recent studies have concluded that the 
agencies lack the leadership commitment to make the changes needed to 
contain wildland fire costs. The National Association of State 
Foresters, for example, reported that strong national leadership and a 
mechanism to hold officials throughout the agencies accountable for 
their decisions are needed to effectively contain wildland fire costs. 
The report concluded, however, that the Forest Service and Interior 
agencies had made little progress in developing a broad and effective 
response and appeared to lack the leadership commitment to make needed 
changes. An independent panel convened by the Wildland Fire Leadership 
Council reached a similar conclusion. Further, the Agriculture 
Inspector General reported that shortcomings identified in Forest 
Service management, although not specific to the wildland fire program, 
have proven resistant to change. In particular, the Inspector General 
noted that the Forest Service delegates broad authority to field units 
but does not have adequate internal controls, including appropriate 
performance measures, to ensure that agency policies are followed. 

To Help Contain Costs, Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Target 
Operational Areas Identified as Needing Improvement, but Results Are 
Unknown: 

Dozens of studies by federal agencies and other organizations examining 
federal agencies' management of wildland fire have repeatedly 
identified a number of similar issues related to wildland fire 
operations as needing improvement to help contain wildland fire costs. 
These issues generally fall into one of three operational areas-- 
reducing accumulated fuels, acquiring and using firefighting assets, 
and selecting firefighting strategies. Recent studies have also raised 
concerns about the framework used to share the cost of fighting fires 
between federal and nonfederal entities. Federal agencies have a number 
of efforts under way to address needs for improvement, but in part 
because many of the efforts are incomplete, the results of these 
efforts are unknown. 

System to Help Identify and Set Priorities for Lands Needing Fuel 
Treatment Is under Development but Not Yet Completed: 

Numerous studies have reported that reducing accumulated vegetation and 
other fuels, although not directly part of wildland firefighting, is a 
key area needing attention if the agencies are to effectively contain 
wildland fire preparedness and suppression costs. These fuels can 
contribute to larger and more-severe wildland fires and, consequently, 
to increasing preparedness and suppression costs. The studies also 
identified several factors that hindered the agencies' ability to 
effectively reduce fuels. For example, we issued a number of reports, 
beginning in 1999, that found that the agencies lacked (1) basic data 
needed to identify and prioritize lands needing fuel reduction 
treatment; (2) a sound framework to ensure that funds appropriated to 
reduce fuels were spent in an effective, efficient, and timely manner; 
and (3) a cohesive strategy for addressing accumulated fuels and 
wildland fire problems.[Footnote 7] Other organizations, including the 
Agriculture Inspector General and the National Association of State 
Foresters, reported similar findings. A 2001 update of the federal 
wildland fire management policy also reported that no centralized 
database was available to agency officials and scientists for compiling 
consistent information and using that information for long-term 
monitoring, research, or planning. 

To help address these shortcomings, the agencies are developing a 
geospatial data and modeling system, called LANDFIRE, but the agencies 
have yet to decide how they will keep data in the system current. 
LANDFIRE--about a $39 million undertaking shared by the Forest Service 
and Interior--is intended to produce consistent and comprehensive maps 
and data describing vegetation, wildland fuels, and fire regimes across 
the United States.[Footnote 8] The agencies will be able to use this 
information to help identify fuel accumulations and fire hazards across 
the nation, help set nationwide priorities for fuel reduction projects, 
and assist in identifying the appropriate response when wildland fires 
do occur. According to Forest Service and Interior officials, the 
agencies completed mapping the western United States in April 2007; 
mapping of the eastern states is scheduled to be completed by 2008 and 
of Alaska and Hawaii by 2009. The agencies are developing, but have not 
yet finalized, a plan for routinely updating data to reflect changes to 
fuels, including from landscape-altering events, such as hurricanes, 
disease, or wildland fires themselves. Such a step is critical for 
keeping the system both current and relevant over the long term and for 
ensuring that the funds invested in LANDFIRE will be of more than short-
term value. Forest Service and Interior officials told us that they 
recognize the importance of ensuring that data are periodically 
updated, and they are developing a plan to operate and maintain the 
system, including determining how often data will be updated. The 
officials expect to submit this plan in June 2007 to the Wildland Fire 
Leadership Council for approval. 

The agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy, including long- 
term options and associated funding, to address accumulated fuels and 
wildland fire problems, although they agreed with our recommendation 
that they do so. In February 2006, the agencies completed a document 
titled Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels 
Treatment Strategy. Our review of this document, however, showed that 
it did not include long-term options and associated funding, which are 
key elements of an effective cohesive strategy. Officials from the 
Office of Management and Budget told us they would not allow the 
firefighting agencies to publish long-term funding estimates until the 
agencies had sufficiently reliable data on which to base those 
estimates. As a result, we recommended that the agencies develop a 
joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, together with related 
time frames, that they would take to complete a cohesive strategy. Such 
a strategy and tactical plan would help Congress and the agencies in 
making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term 
approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems, but as of 
April 2007, the agencies had developed neither a cohesive strategy nor 
a tactical plan. Because containing costs is one of several goals of 
the wildland fire program, developing a cohesive strategy that 
addresses all aspects of the agencies' preparation for and response to 
wildland fires is fundamental if the agencies are to contain costs. 

Agencies Have Addressed Few of the Problems Identified in Their 
Acquisition and Use of Firefighting Assets: 

Federal firefighting agencies have taken some steps to improve how they 
acquire and use firefighting personnel, aviation resources, equipment, 
and supplies--an area that studies have identified as needing 
improvement to better contain costs, especially because firefighting 
assets constitute a major cost of responding to wildland fires--but 
much remains to be done. Issues identified as needing improvement 
included that (1) federal agencies lacked a shared or integrated system 
for effectively determining the appropriate type and quantity of 
firefighting assets needed for a fire season; (2) the agencies' 
processes and systems for acquiring firefighting assets lacked controls 
to ensure that the agencies were procuring assets cost-effectively; and 
(3) the agencies sometimes used firefighting assets ineffectively or 
inefficiently, often in response to political or social pressures. 

Determining the Appropriate Type and Quantity of Wildland Firefighting 
Assets for a Fire Season: 

Studies have reported that the agencies do not use a shared or 
integrated system for determining the appropriate type and quantity of 
firefighting assets--personnel, aviation resources, equipment, and 
supplies--that they need during a fire season to respond effectively 
and efficiently to wildland fires. This problem is part of a larger 
issue: the agencies have no standardized budgeting and resource 
allocation process. In 2001, a team of Forest Service, Interior, and 
state officials evaluated the processes used by the Forest Service and 
Interior agencies to determine wildland fire budget needs and to 
allocate resources among fire management activities. The team found a 
number of problems.[Footnote 9] First, agencies' budgeting and resource 
allocation systems differed from one to the other, and as a result, it 
was difficult to evaluate and compare information across agencies. Yet 
given the cooperative firefighting system used in the United States, a 
common federal budgeting and allocation system would help ensure that 
each agency's resources and firefighting assets are considered when 
determining type, quantity, and location of firefighting assets needed 
for a fire season. Second, the systems to budget and allocate resources 
for different fire management activities within an agency, such as fuel 
reduction and wildland fire response, were not integrated, even though 
these programs can complement one another in achieving overall land 
management goals and objectives. For example, funds spent to reduce 
accumulated fuels may help reduce the number of severe wildland fires 
and, accordingly, wildland firefighting costs. Third, the team found 
that some of the systems used by individual agencies did not provide 
managers with the tools to determine the most cost-effective type and 
quantity of firefighting assets or where they should be located to most 
effectively respond to wildland fires. Determining the appropriate 
types, quantity, and location of firefighting assets is key to carrying 
out a rapid, effective, and efficient response. The review team 
recommended that Agriculture and Interior develop and implement a 
common interagency process that would identify resource needs for the 
full scope of fire management activities and develop the most cost- 
effective allocation of fire program resources across and within these 
activities. In 2002, the National Academy of Public Administration 
similarly reported that the agencies needed a national budgeting 
methodology to analyze the cost, benefit, number, composition, 
location, mobility, productivity, and seasonality of each type of 
firefighting asset.[Footnote 10] 

Although the agencies are working on two efforts that could potentially 
improve their ability to determine the appropriate type and quantity of 
firefighting assets needed for a fire season, it is unclear whether 
these efforts will actually do so. The first effort is development of a 
Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system, which was proposed and funded to 
help the agencies: 

* determine national budget needs by analyzing budget alternatives at 
the local level--using a common, interagency process for fire 
management planning and budgeting--and aggregating the results; 

* determine the relative costs and benefits for the full scope of fire 
management activities, including potential trade-offs among investments 
in fuel reduction, fire preparedness, and fire suppression activities; 
and: 

* identify, for a given budget level, the most cost-effective mix of 
personnel and equipment to carry out these activities. 

Recent design modifications to the system, however, raise questions 
about the agencies' ability to fully achieve these key goals. A 
midcourse review of the developing system resulted in the Wildland Fire 
Leadership Council's approving in December 2006 modifications to the 
system's design. FPA and senior Forest Service and Interior officials 
told us they believed the modifications will allow the agencies to meet 
the key goals. The officials said they expected to have a prototype 
developed for the council's review in June 2007 and to substantially 
complete the system by June 2008. We have yet to systematically review 
the modifications, but after reviewing agency reports on the 
modifications and interviewing knowledgeable officials, we have 
concerns that the modifications may not allow the agencies to meet 
FPA's key goals. For example, under the redesigned system, local land 
managers will use a different method to analyze and select various 
budget alternatives, and it is unclear whether this method will 
identify the most cost-effective allocation of resources. In addition, 
it is unclear how the budget alternatives for local units will be 
meaningfully aggregated on a nationwide basis, a key FPA goal. 

The agencies are also working together to develop national strategies 
for the organization, procurement, and management of aviation resources 
and firefighting crews. Although national Forest Service and Interior 
officials originally indicated that these strategies would be completed 
by the end of 2006, as of March 2007, the strategies were unfinished. 
Agency officials said that it could be another year before the 
strategies are completed. 

Acquiring Firefighting Assets Cost-Effectively: 

Studies also reported that federal firefighting agencies lacked 
effective systems for acquiring needed firefighting assets cost- 
effectively, that is, ensuring that vendors provided equipment of 
sufficient quality at competitive prices. Once the agencies have 
determined the type and quantity of firefighting assets needed, they 
must decide where and how to acquire these assets. They have a variety 
of procurement options to choose from: 

* National contracts are used for assets that can be deployed anywhere 
in the nation, including some firefighting crews; aviation resources, 
such as large helicopters and air tankers; and camp resources, such as 
catering and shower facilities. 

* Regional contracts are similar to national contracts, but they are 
executed at the regional or state level. 

* Emergency equipment rental agreements are often developed before the 
fire season, but they are executed only when needed; they are used for 
assets such as firefighting crews, engines, bulldozers, water tenders, 
and other equipment. 

* Fire caches store firefighting equipment and other items that can be 
delivered to a fire; 11 national caches are strategically located 
around the country. 

* Buying teams support an incident management team at a fire by 
procuring services and supplies and renting land and equipment locally. 

Several studies reported, however, that despite the agencies' growing 
reliance on contracted personnel and equipment to carry out 
firefighting activities, the agencies' acquisition systems had several 
shortcomings. The National Academy of Public Administration reported 
that the agencies' acquisition process was unable to help federal 
firefighting agencies determine the best source for needed firefighting 
assets--for example, in-house or contracted. The academy, the Forest 
Service, and other organizations also reported problems with the Forest 
Service's process for developing contracts and rental agreements for 
emergency equipment, observing, for example, that requirements varied 
from contract to contract and did not ensure that the agencies obtained 
the most cost-effective assets. Further, inadequate administration and 
oversight of the agreements by the agencies resulted in poor contractor 
performance and high rental rates. A 2003 interagency report 
recommended that the Forest Service and Interior agencies establish 
national standards for agreements and strengthen national control and 
oversight to better ensure standard operating procedures and policies. 
Nevertheless, when the Agriculture Inspector General evaluated the same 
issue in 2005, it found that the problems remained.[Footnote 11] The 
Inspector General reported that the Forest Service's administration of 
the agreements provided the agency with neither the best value nor the 
best vendor for its dollar. Further, although the Forest Service 
identified potential vendors and equipment before a fire season, the 
agency did not use a competitive bidding process to improve either the 
price or equipment quality. 

Despite planned improvements in the acquisition process, the agencies 
have made limited progress in implementing needed changes. The effort 
to improve acquisition practices--led by the Forest Service--is 
initially focused on developing a nationwide Web-based system for 
managing the rental agreements for emergency equipment. Such a system 
would make it easier to locate reliable, cost-effective firefighting 
assets. The agencies could use the system to help choose suppliers at 
the time of a fire--using information provided by contractors on 
equipment specifications, price, and other information--and to evaluate 
and record contractor performance afterward. A Forest Service official 
said that when fully implemented, the system will let the agencies 
better evaluate "best value," rather than just lowest price for 
firefighting assets, although the official said that it may be 
difficult to measure the system's effect on containing costs. This 
effort faces some challenges, however. First, while testing a 
prototype, the Forest Service found problems that are likely to delay 
completion of the system by more than a year, until fiscal year 2009. 
Moreover, although using this system will be mandatory for the Forest 
Service, it will not be required for either Interior or state agencies, 
according to Forest Service officials, and Interior agencies have 
expressed concerns about the security of a Web-based system. The Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management have also begun an effort to 
evaluate the national cache system to ensure that the appropriate types 
and quantities of items are maintained in the caches. A strategic plan 
has been developed but, according to the Forest Service national 
manager in charge of the effort, no changes to the cache system have 
been made. Finally, a senior Forest Service acquisition official said 
that the agencies also planned to improve national and regional 
contracts, but they have not begun these efforts. 

Using Firefighting Assets Effectively and Efficiently: 

The agencies have taken steps to develop and implement systems to help 
improve the effective and efficient use of firefighting assets--another 
area that studies have identified as needing improvement. Studies have 
reported that agencies sometimes used more, or more-costly, 
firefighting assets than necessary, often in response to political or 
social pressures. For example, firefighting assets may sit idle at a 
fire rather than be released for use elsewhere because managers are 
concerned that they will be unable to recall an asset if they need it 
later, or air tankers may drop flame retardants when on-the-ground 
conditions may not warrant such drops. Agency and other studies 
reported that to more effectively use their firefighting assets, the 
agencies needed to improve their systems for (1) requesting, deploying, 
tracking, and releasing firefighting assets for a fire and (2) 
recording and analyzing data about the cost and use of these assets at 
the time of the fire. The studies also recommended that agencies should 
make greater use of local incident commanders to reduce the need to 
mobilize more-costly incident management teams. 

The agencies have implemented two systems to help improve the use of 
their firefighting assets. They completed implementation of a computer- 
based dispatching system called the Resource Ordering and Status 
System, or ROSS, in December 2006. For many years, agencies used a 
manual, paper-based system for requesting and assigning firefighting 
assets; ROSS was designed to allow the agencies to more effectively and 
efficiently monitor firefighting assets during a fire or other 
incident.[Footnote 12] A project official told us that he could not 
quantify the actual cost savings resulting from ROSS, but he provided 
us with a cost-benefit analysis for the project. This analysis 
indicated potential cost savings from increasing the use of local 
firefighting assets, which could hasten response and thus perhaps 
reduce fire size, and from reducing the personnel needed to dispatch 
resources. In addition, the agencies can also use ROSS to identify 
individuals qualified and available to serve in various firefighting 
positions, which may help increase the agencies' use of local incident 
commanders and reduce the need to mobilize more-costly incident 
management teams. 

The agencies have also implemented a system, known as I-Suite, to 
improve the accuracy and completeness of cost and other data needed to 
effectively monitor and manage firefighting assets. The National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group[Footnote 13] chartered a task group in 
April 2001 to evaluate and recommend a data management application to 
address what was identified as a perennial problem for incident 
management teams: lack of data management tools to use at a fire. I- 
Suite, completed by the Forest Service in October 2006, is a set of 
computer applications designed to automate and improve business 
practices at a fire through a common system to track and analyze 
information about firefighting assets, such as personnel hours worked, 
contractor costs, and fire costs. According to a Forest Service 
official, I-Suite has helped contain costs by reducing the number of 
timekeepers needed to process records for personnel and equipment and 
has improved the accuracy of payment documents, although officials 
could not quantify the cost savings. Only the Forest Service, however, 
requires that I-Suite be used on all fires; Interior has recommended 
but not mandated its use, and I-Suite is optional for state-managed 
fires. 

In addition to implementing these systems, the agencies have taken 
other steps to improve the agencies' use of aviation resources, which 
can account for about one-third of all firefighting costs on a large 
fire. In 2004, the agencies assigned a helicopter coordinator to the 
national dispatch center in Boise, Idaho, to monitor helicopter use and 
help identify situations where less expensive helicopters could be 
deployed. An estimated $1.8 million in savings were identified in 2005 
as a direct result of the helicopter coordinator's efforts. In 2006, 
the agencies began testing a computer program to assist the helicopter 
coordinator in identifying the best-value helicopter, given a 
particular fire's elevation and the temperature. Also beginning in 
2006, the national dispatch center assumed control of national aviation 
resources, including helicopters and air tankers, rather than leaving 
them under the control of regions or incident management teams. 
National control of these assets will allow the agencies to evaluate 
where best to deploy them from a national perspective, rather than from 
a regional or local perspective. National aviation officials said that 
this step is important because little incentive exists at the local 
level to contain costs. Interagency guidance states that the assignment 
of national assets will be reviewed daily, and national dispatch center 
officials will make the final decision. 

Agencies May Miss Opportunities to Increase Their Use of Lower-Cost 
Firefighting Strategies: 

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken steps, and are 
considering taking additional steps, to improve their policies on how 
firefighting strategies are chosen and the analytical tools managers in 
the field use to compare alternative strategies, issues that previous 
studies have identified as needing improvement to help contain costs. 
Although the agencies have made some progress, considerable work 
remains if they are to seize additional opportunities to increase their 
use of less aggressive strategies, which typically cost less. 

Land managers and incident management teams have a wide spectrum of 
strategies available to them when responding to wildland fires, some of 
which can be significantly more costly than others. These strategies 
range from having a few personnel monitor a fire while allowing it to 
burn to achieve ecological benefits, a practice known as wildland fire 
use, to mobilizing all available personnel and equipment to try to 
control the entire perimeter of the fire or otherwise suppress it as 
quickly as possible. In selecting a strategy for a particular fire, 
land managers are required to consider the cost of suppression; value 
of structures and other resources threatened by the fire; and, where 
appropriate, potential ecological benefits. The agencies use the term 
"appropriate management response" for a strategy that considers these 
factors. 

Previous studies have raised concerns that federal policies and 
shortcomings in the agencies' analytical tools are limiting the ability 
of land managers and incident management teams to use the full spectrum 
of available strategies, including less costly ones. Interagency 
policy, for example, directs land managers to select firefighting 
strategies in accordance with local federal units' land and fire 
management plans. If a plan has not been developed and approved, the 
policy directs land managers to suppress the fire. A 2006 Agriculture 
Inspector General report also found that for the Forest Service, 
several existing policies unduly restrict land and fire managers from 
using lower-cost firefighting strategies. In particular, Forest Service 
policy prohibits (1) managing a fire for both suppression and wildland 
fire use concurrently, (2) deciding to let a fire burn after initially 
deciding to suppress it, and (3) considering potential ecological or 
fuel-reduction benefits of letting a fire burn certain areas if the 
decision has already been made to suppress it. Interior agencies face 
similar constraints. Previous studies also reported that key elements 
of the analytical tools agency managers use to compare alternative 
firefighting strategies are based on subjective or incomplete 
information; these tools may therefore not provide accurate information 
that would enable managers to select the appropriate firefighting 
strategy, that is, one that neither unnecessarily increases suppression 
costs nor unnecessarily places resources at risk. 

Steps to Improve Policies Regarding Firefighting Strategies: 

The agencies have taken steps to clarify their policies on, and to 
emphasize the importance of, selecting appropriate firefighting 
strategies. For example, in 2004, the agencies updated their 
Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations to require 
that land managers consider the full range of strategies available in 
developing their response to a wildland fire. They also have emphasized 
the importance of considering appropriate firefighting strategies in 
the action plans they develop annually to provide guidance for the 
pending fire season. In addition, agency officials told us that since 
2000 they have substantially increased wildland fire use, a strategy at 
one end of the response spectrum. For example, Forest Service officials 
estimated that the agency managed approximately 250,000 acres for 
wildland fire use in fiscal year 2005--compared with less than 70,000 
acres annually in fiscal years 2000 through 2002--but we were unable to 
verify the reliability of these data. According to one Forest Service 
official, this trend represented an improvement, but opportunities 
remained to further increase wildland fire use. 

Considerable work remains if the agencies are to fulfill the potential 
of using less costly strategies. First, the Forest Service and Interior 
agencies are working together to revise their policies--revisions that 
could allow different areas of the same fire to be managed for 
suppression and wildland fire use concurrently and could allow a fire 
that was previously being suppressed to be managed instead for wildland 
fire use. It is still too early, however, to determine how the policies 
may change or the extent to which any changes will help contain costs. 
Second, Agriculture's Inspector General recently reported that the 
agencies lack qualified staff to manage wildland fire use 
fires.[Footnote 14] A wildland fire use official for the Forest Service 
estimated that for trained staff to be located in the field where 
decisions are made about whether to suppress a fire or manage it for 
wildland fire use, the agency needed about 300 wildland fire use 
managers. As of fall 2006, the Forest Service had fewer than 100 
qualified managers, although about another 100 were being trained. 
Senior Forest Service officials said that once these managers were 
trained, they believed that the agency would have sufficient staff 
trained in wildland fire use. An Interior official said that Interior 
also needed more personnel qualified in wildland fire use, but this 
official did not have any estimate of additional staff needed. Third, 
we recently reported that although 95 percent of the agencies' land 
management units had completed fire management plans that could allow 
them to select lower-cost firefighting strategies, the agencies did not 
require that these plans be updated to reflect new data, such as data 
from LANDFIRE.[Footnote 15] If the plans do not contain accurate 
information on current fuel conditions, land managers and incident 
management teams may be more likely to select more-aggressive 
firefighting strategies. Fourth, although agency policy directs land 
managers to consider the full range of available strategies, our 
discussions with agency officials and review of a recent Agriculture 
Inspector General report show that the agencies lack a method for 
ensuring that land managers follow this direction. 

Steps to Improve Tools That Managers Use to Select Firefighting 
Strategies: 

Federal firefighting agencies, led by the Forest Service, are also 
taking steps to improve decision-support tools that help land managers 
select appropriate firefighting strategies, but shortcomings with these 
tools remain. If firefighters are unable to contain a fire during 
initial attack, land managers are directed to analyze alternative 
strategies for suppressing it. The agencies have taken steps in recent 
years to improve the current tool for conducting such an analysis, 
which is known as wildland fire situation analysis. Forest Service 
researchers, for example, have made wildland fire situation analysis a 
Web-based system, and they have created different versions of the tool, 
which provide additional elements for land managers to use for larger 
or more-severe fires. The Web-based version, first released in 2005, 
has several advantages, according to a Forest Service researcher. 
First, the Web-based version is updated centrally, thus ensuring that 
land managers in the field are using the most up-to-date version. 
Second, it provides an easier means for managers near a fire to share 
information with experts elsewhere about a fire's expected behavior and 
the likely values at risk, and can provide a way for senior officials 
to review the basis for strategic decisions while there is still time 
to change them. Third, the Web-based version also includes some 
geospatial mapping capabilities, which helps land managers and incident 
management teams quickly identify key geographic features, roads, 
structures, and other resources that may be threatened by the fire. 

Many critical inputs to wildland fire situation analysis are estimates, 
whose accuracy depends to a great extent on the knowledge and 
experience of land managers in the field, and this knowledge and 
experience can vary. The firefighting strategy ultimately used--which 
greatly influences a fire's final cost--is chosen largely on the basis 
of these estimates. First, the range of firefighting strategies 
considered in the analysis depends on the knowledge and experience of 
the land managers in the field who identify possible alternatives. 
Second, estimating the probability of success for each alternative is 
critical to making an informed decision in selecting a firefighting 
strategy; yet this estimate is based on the manager's subjective 
assessment of fuel conditions, topography, weather predictions, and the 
availability of firefighting resources. Third, the expected suppression 
cost for each alternative is also an estimate, often based on the cost 
per acre of suppressing previous fires in the area--which may or may 
not be an accurate predictor of future costs--and on the final size of 
the fire, which is also an estimate. Finally, land managers identify 
structures and other resources that may be threatened by the fire, but, 
agency officials told us, there is no consistent method for estimating 
the value of the identified structures and resources. Senior Forest 
Service and Interior officials told us that professional judgment is an 
inherent element of managing wildland fires, and local managers' 
estimates and predictions are important in selecting appropriate 
firefighting strategies, but that they also recognized the importance 
of establishing robust processes and tools to assist managers in making 
informed decisions. 

Forest Service researchers are developing a new tool, called the 
wildland fire decision support system, which may alleviate some of 
these shortcomings. The exact capabilities of the new tool are still 
being determined, but it is expected to greatly increase the analytical 
power available to land managers. For example, the new tool will likely 
allow managers in the field to predict the probability that a wildland 
fire will reach certain areas--considering the fire's current location, 
adjacent fuel conditions, and forecast weather conditions--and to 
identify nearby structures and other highly valued resources. The 
results of this analysis can be combined to provide land managers and 
incident management teams with a map illustrating the probability that 
a particular wildland fire, barring any suppression actions, will burn 
a certain area within a specified time and which structures or other 
resources may therefore be threatened. In addition, the tool is 
expected to improve the precision of the cost estimates for different 
suppression strategies. Having such information would better help land 
managers and incident management teams understand the resources 
threatened by a wildland fire, the costs associated with different 
firefighting strategies, and the probability of successfully 
suppressing the fire, and it could result in less intensive, and 
therefore less costly, responses. Although the new tool will not be 
available to managers in the field before 2009, Forest Service 
researchers have begun to use several of its components to provide 
analysis to land managers. The researcher leading this effort said that 
information on predicted fire spread and the locations of structures 
and other highly valued resources at risk has been provided for more 
than 70 fires since 2005 and that the information contributed to 
strategic decisions that likely reduced costs, although he was unable 
to estimate the impact. For example, for a 2006 fire in Idaho, he said 
that managers in the field used the information to identify where best 
to position firefighting assets and to determine that fewer assets were 
needed than initially projected, thus reducing costs. 

Several challenges have been identified, however, to the full 
development and deployment of the wildland fire decision support 
system. First, the fire spread probability model relies on data from 
LANDFIRE about fuel conditions, and, as we previously discussed, the 
agencies have yet to decide how they will keep data on fuel conditions 
updated over time. If LANDFIRE data do not reflect current fuel 
conditions, land managers and incident management teams are unlikely to 
trust the fire spread probability maps, which we believe could result 
in the selection of more-aggressive and more-costly firefighting 
strategies than necessary. Second, according to the lead researcher, 
successful deployment of the system requires (1) training staff in the 
field to use it, (2) acquiring new computer hardware capable of quickly 
running data-intensive calculations, and (3) ensuring adequate 
bandwidth in field locations to allow remote access to complex Web- 
based applications. Third, although the tool would help managers 
estimate the probability that particular locations will burn, an 
element of risk is inherent in decisions about firefighting strategies. 
According to the lead agency researcher, whether the wildland fire 
decision support system results in less aggressive and less costly 
strategy decisions will depend greatly on the framework the agencies 
establish to define acceptable levels of risk and to ensure that 
managers in the field select appropriate strategies. 

Agencies Have Updated Guidance for Sharing Suppression Costs with 
Nonfederal Entities but Have No Clear Plan for Ensuring That 
Appropriate Cost-Sharing Methods Are Used: 

Finally, we and others have reported that federal and nonfederal 
entities need to work together to better share wildland fire 
suppression costs.[Footnote 16] For example, we reported that agencies 
lacked clear guidance on how federal and nonfederal entities should 
share the cost of fighting fires that burned or threatened both federal 
and nonfederal lands, an issue of increasing importance because of the 
rising number of homes in the wildland-urban interface and the 
increasing costs of protecting these homes from fires. We further 
reported that the existing framework for sharing costs insulates state 
and local governments from the cost of protecting the wildland-urban 
interface, which may reduce those governments' incentive to adopt 
building codes and land use requirements that could help reduce the 
cost of suppressing wildland fires. 

Federal agencies, working with nonfederal entities, have recently taken 
steps to clarify guidance and better ensure that firefighting costs are 
shared consistently for fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal 
lands and resources. In early 2007, the Forest Service and Interior 
agencies approved an updated template that land managers can use when 
developing master agreements--which establish the framework for sharing 
costs between federal and nonfederal entities--as well as agreements on 
how to share costs for a specific fire. It may take several years to 
fully incorporate this new guidance into master agreements because they 
are normally updated every 5 years. Although the guidance states that 
managers must document their rationale for selecting a particular cost- 
sharing method, according to officials, the agencies have no clear plan 
for how they will provide oversight to ensure that appropriate cost- 
sharing methods are used. 

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Management 
of Wildland Fire Cost-Containment Efforts: 

To effectively manage their cost-containment efforts, the Forest 
Service and Interior agencies should, at a minimum, have (1) clearly 
defined goals and measurable objectives, (2) a strategy to achieve 
these goals and objectives, (3) performance measures to track their 
progress, and (4) a framework for holding the appropriate agency 
officials accountable for achieving the goals.[Footnote 17] The 
agencies, however, have yet to clearly define their goals or establish 
measurable objectives for containing costs or to develop a strategy for 
achieving those goals. In addition, while the agencies have adopted a 
new cost-containment performance measure and have taken, or are 
planning to take, steps to improve accountability within the agencies 
for containing costs, the extent to which these steps will help contain 
costs is unknown. 

Agencies Lack Clear Cost-Containment Goals and Objectives: 

Federal firefighting agencies have yet to establish clear goals and 
measurable objectives for their wildland fire cost-containment efforts. 
Since 2000, the agencies have issued many documents--including updates 
to the federal wildland fire policy, agency strategic plans, and annual 
interagency fire and aviation operations plans--that recognize the 
importance of cost containment. These documents may have raised 
awareness in the agencies about containing costs, but none of them 
clearly states the agencies' cost-containment goals and objectives. For 
example, several key documents--including the 2001 Review and Update of 
the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, the Interagency 
Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, and the Forest 
Service's and Interior's policy manuals--state that wildland fires are 
to be suppressed at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public 
safety and resources to be protected. The agencies, however, have 
established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the relative 
importance of the often-competing elements of this broad goal, nor 
measurable objectives by which to determine if they are meeting the 
goal. Without such criteria and objectives, the importance of 
containing costs, relative to the other elements, is not clear. As a 
result, according to agency officials we interviewed and reports we 
reviewed, managers in the field lack a clear understanding of the 
relative importance that the agencies' leadership places on containing 
costs and are therefore likely to continue to select firefighting 
strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. 

Agencies Lack a Clear Strategy to Contain Wildland Fire Costs: 

The Forest Service and Interior agencies have also yet to establish an 
overall cost-containment strategy. Without a strategy designed to 
achieve clear cost-containment goals, the agencies (1) have no 
assurance that the variety of steps they are taking to help contain 
wildland fire costs are prioritized so that the most important steps 
are undertaken first and (2) are unable to determine to what extent 
these steps will help contain costs and if a different approach may 
therefore be needed. The agencies have issued several documents 
addressing the increased costs and severity of wildland fires, but none 
of the documents we reviewed provided an overall strategy for how the 
agencies would contain costs. For example, the 2005 Quadrennial Fire 
and Fuel Review Report identifies several factors contributing to more- 
severe fires and higher costs but does not indicate the steps the 
agencies would take to respond effectively to those factors. In 
contrast, a March 2003 document, Large Fire Cost Reduction Action Plan, 
lists many steps the agencies planned to take to help contain costs but 
does not indicate to what extent the steps would in fact do so. 
Although senior fire officials in both the Forest Service and Interior 
said the agencies did not have a written strategy for containing costs, 
some of these officials said they believed the steps they were taking 
were useful and reflected a sound approach to containing costs. 

Performance Measures for Containing Costs Have Improved, but Concerns 
Remain: 

Recent reports, as well as Office of Management and Budget reviews, 
have raised concerns that the Forest Service's and Interior agencies' 
performance measures do not allow the agencies to measure their 
progress effectively or report their accomplishments in containing 
wildland fire costs. The Forest Service, in its strategic plan for 
fiscal years 2004 through 2008, established as its primary cost- 
containment performance measure the percentage of large fires in which 
the value of protected resources exceeded the cost of suppression. This 
measure, however, evaluates neither the effectiveness nor the 
efficiency of the agencies' suppression activities. For example, the 
Forest Service might carry out suppression activities that cost less 
than the value of the resources protected, but those actions might not 
contribute to containing the fire and might therefore be unnecessary. 
In other cases, the agency might have been able to protect the same 
resources by taking different, less costly actions. The Forest Service 
has recognized the shortcomings of this performance measure and has not 
reported any results for the measure in its annual performance and 
accountability reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Unlike the 
Forest Service, Interior has not adopted any performance measures 
related to containing wildland fire costs in its strategic plan. In 
conjunction with the Forest Service and nonfederal partners, however, 
Interior adopted a performance measure in the May 2002 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy as part of the National Fire Plan to track the 
average suppression cost per acre for wildland fires (1) in different 
size classes and fire regimes, (2) near and away from the wildland- 
urban interface, and (3) in areas with and without approved fire 
management plans. Such information, collected and tracked over time, 
could assist the agencies in gauging their progress in containing 
costs. However, the agencies have not reported the results of this 
measure, in part because of difficulties in obtaining accurate data, 
according to Forest Service officials. 

To address these concerns, federal firefighting agencies have adopted a 
new performance measure that may improve their ability to evaluate 
their progress in containing costs.[Footnote 18] Since 2005, the 
agencies, led by the Forest Service, have been developing a measure 
known as the stratified cost index. This index is based on models that 
estimate suppression costs for a particular fire on the basis of the 
costs of previous fires with similar characteristics.[Footnote 19] The 
new performance measure identifies the percentage of fires whose 
suppression costs exceeded the cost estimated by the stratified cost 
index. The Forest Service has reported that 31 of 117 fires (26 
percent) in fiscal year 2005 cost significantly more than predicted by 
the stratified cost index, and that 24 fires (21 percent) cost 
significantly less than predicted by the index. In part because of the 
development of the index, the Office of Management and Budget recently 
recognized that the Forest Service has improved the wildland fire 
program's performance measures, although it also stated that further 
improvement is needed. 

Several concerns have been raised about the stratified cost index. 
First, although the agencies have improved their data on suppression 
costs and fire characteristics in recent years, additional improvement 
is needed. In particular, cost data for "fire complexes"--that is, two 
or more fires burning in proximity that are managed as a single 
incident--are particularly difficult to identify. Thus, the costs of 
many of the largest fires are not included in the models, limiting 
their effectiveness. Second, the wide variation in the costs of past 
fires with similar characteristics means that the models' ability to 
estimate suppression costs is limited. For example, although the models 
estimated an average cost of $317 per acre for fires in fiscal year 
2005, the range of estimated costs was $88 to $1,132.[Footnote 20] This 
range is expected to narrow over time as data from more fires are 
incorporated into the models. Third, to date, the models are based 
solely on fires managed by the Forest Service. Forest Service 
researchers are developing, at Interior's request, similar models for 
fires managed by the Interior agencies. However, it will be several 
years, at the earliest, before enough data have been collected for the 
model to be useful. In addition, we are concerned that because the 
stratified cost index is based on costs from previous fires--and 
because the agencies have only recently emphasized the importance of 
using less aggressive suppression strategies--the index does not 
include data from many fires where less costly firefighting strategies 
were used. As a result, the index may not accurately identify fires 
where more, or more-expensive, resources were used than needed. 
According to Forest Service officials, data from recent fires will be 
added to the models annually; therefore, over time, the models should 
include more fires where less aggressive firefighting strategies were 
used. 

Agencies Have Yet to Establish an Effective Oversight and 
Accountability Framework: 

Federal firefighting agencies lack effective oversight mechanisms to 
increase accountability for containing costs, according to previous 
studies. Even though land managers and incident management teams make 
critical decisions affecting suppression costs, previous studies have 
found that managers and teams have few incentives to consider cost 
containment in making those decisions. Some of these and other studies 
have also reported that despite longtime recognition of the lack of 
incentives, the agencies have not yet established effective oversight 
mechanisms to increase managers' and teams' accountability. The 
agencies, for example, do not consistently review decisions made in the 
field that affect suppression costs. The studies reported that the lack 
of a clear and valid measure evaluating both the benefits and costs of 
alternative suppression strategies was a key impediment to the 
agencies' establishing more effective oversight mechanisms. In 
addition, an independent panel convened by the Wildland Fire Leadership 
Council concluded that the current budget framework was perceived as 
providing a "blank check" for firefighting and provided few incentives 
for the agencies to contain costs. To increase such incentives, the 
panel recommended that the agencies allocate suppression funds on a 
regional basis and penalize regions that exceed their allocation by 
reducing the funds from the region's other accounts, such as those for 
land management activities. 

Federal firefighting agencies have taken a number of steps to establish 
or improve oversight mechanisms, but the extent to which these steps 
will assist the agencies in containing costs is unknown. These steps 
include: 

* Reviewing the costs of large fires. The Forest Service has reviewed 
the costs of many large fires, a practice that could help identify 
instances where officials could have taken less costly actions. Since 
2003, the Forest Service has directed its regional offices to review 
all fires in each region that cost more than $2 million to suppress, 
and directed the Washington, D.C., office to review fires costing more 
than $5 million. Agriculture's Inspector General, however, recently 
reported that the Forest Service reviewed only 11 of the 91 fires (12 
percent) requiring regional review and 7 of the 50 fires (14 percent) 
requiring national review.[Footnote 21] Forest Service officials told 
us they did not review more of these fires because it would have taken 
too much staff time to complete all of the reviews. They therefore 
decided to conduct fewer but more-detailed reviews. These officials 
also said that they are in the process of changing their policy to 
require regional reviews of fires costing more than $5 million and 
national reviews of fires costing more than $10 million. In addition, 
Congress directed the Forest Service to establish an outside 
independent review panel to examine, beginning in fiscal year 2004, 
Forest Service fires with suppression costs that exceeded $10 million. 
Together, these reviews identified many steps that local land managers 
and incident management teams could have taken to help contain costs. 
However, some studies have questioned the effectiveness of these 
reviews because, for example, managers were not required to respond to 
the issues the reviews raised or to implement the recommended steps. 
Forest Service officials told us that, beginning with fires that 
occurred in fiscal year 2006, land managers are required to respond to 
recommendations made in the reviews, either by agreeing to implement a 
recommendation or by explaining why not. 

* Clarifying land managers' responsibility for containing costs. The 
agencies have issued guidance clarifying that land managers, not 
incident management teams, have primary responsibility for containing 
wildland fire costs, but they have not yet determined how the land 
managers are to be held accountable for doing so. Rather, the agencies 
have taken several incremental steps intended to assist land managers 
in carrying out this responsibility. First, a Forest Service official 
told us that because many land managers lack both wildland fire 
experience and the time to closely monitor incident management teams, 
the agencies require that an "incident business advisor" be assigned to 
fires expected to cost more than $5 million and recommend that an 
advisor be assigned to fires expected to cost more than $1 million. An 
incident business advisor represents the land manager's interest in 
containing costs by observing firefighting operations and working with 
the incident management team to identify ways those operations could be 
more cost-effective. For example, an incident business advisor may 
observe the types and quantity of firefighting personnel and equipment 
assigned to a fire and how they are used, observe how equipment and 
supplies are procured, and ensure that the most expensive personnel and 
equipment are released first as a fire comes under control. The overall 
impact of incident business advisors has most likely been moderate, 
Forest Service officials told us, in large part because the advisors do 
not examine the firefighting strategies being used. Second, the 
agencies require land managers to include cost containment as a 
consideration when they delegate authority to an incident management 
team to fight a particular fire and to evaluate the team for how well 
it achieves the land managers' goals. These requirements are intended 
to provide a mechanism for land managers to hold a team accountable for 
achieving cost-containment goals. The Forest Service officials told us, 
however, that there is no clear method of evaluating the cost- 
effectiveness of the firefighting actions taken by the incident 
management team. Moreover, land managers may be reluctant to identify 
instances where firefighting actions were not cost-effective, since 
poor performance by the incident management team also reflects poorly 
on the land managers. Third, the agencies have adopted policies 
requiring land managers to consider expected fire suppression costs 
when developing land and fire management plans. Decisions made in these 
plans can affect future suppression costs, and this requirement is 
intended to ensure that managers consider this impact. It is too early 
to determine the effectiveness of this requirement. 

* Establishing a comptroller to monitor costs. In August 2006, the 
Chief of the Forest Service established a comptroller position to 
oversee Forest Service wildland fire suppression expenditures. The 
current comptroller, the Associate Deputy Chief for State and Private 
Forestry, told us that the duties of the position are not defined, 
although in 2006 he reviewed several high-cost fires, including fires 
in California and Washington. During these reviews, to identify 
opportunities for achieving firefighting goals at a lower cost, the 
comptroller discussed with managers in the field, and with the 
appropriate regional foresters, the firefighting strategies selected 
and the quantity of firefighting assets used. The comptroller told us 
he believed these efforts were helpful, in part because managers in the 
field were aware that their decisions could be reviewed, but he could 
not provide an example where his involvement led directly to a change 
in strategy or tactics that could have reduced costs. The role of the 
comptroller for 2007 and later is still being determined. The Forest 
Service has also indicated that, beginning with fires in 2007, it will 
designate a small team to monitor fires having the potential to be 
costly or otherwise complex and to work with field managers and 
regional officials to represent the Chief's interest in containing 
costs. 

Although the agencies have taken some steps to improve their oversight 
of wildland fire costs, they have made little progress in two key areas 
identified by previous studies. First, the agencies have yet to 
establish a clear measure to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
alternative firefighting strategies, even though some studies have 
concluded that absence of such a measure fundamentally hinders the 
agencies' ability to provide effective oversight. Second, the agencies 
considered the recommendation to provide budgetary incentives to 
regions to contain wildland fire costs but decided against pursuing it, 
in part because of concerns that transferring funds from other 
appropriations accounts would violate appropriations law. The co-chair 
of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council panel recently testified before 
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources that the panel 
continues to believe that this recommendation provides the greatest 
opportunity for the agencies to contain wildland fire costs. 

Conclusions: 

Continuing concerns over the last decade about the mounting federal 
cost of preparing for and responding to wildland fires have spurred 
numerous studies and actions by federal wildland fire agencies to 
address areas needing improvement, but little in the way of a 
coordinated and focused effort to rein in these costs. Although the 
agencies have taken--and continue to take--steps intended to contain 
wildland fire costs, the effect of these steps on containing costs is 
unknown, in part because the agencies lack a clear vision for what they 
want to achieve. Without clearly defined cost-containment goals and 
objectives, federal land and fire managers in the field are more likely 
to select strategies and tactics that favor suppressing fires quickly 
over those that seek to balance the benefits of protecting the 
resources at risk and the costs of protecting them. Further, without 
clear goals, the agencies will be unable to develop consistent 
standards by which to measure their performance. Perhaps most 
important, without a clear vision of what they are trying to achieve 
and a systematic approach for achieving it, the agencies--and Congress 
and the American people--have little assurance that cost-containment 
efforts will lead to substantial improvement. Because cost-containment 
goals should be considered in relation to other wildland fire program 
goals--such as protecting life, resources, and property--it is 
important that the agencies integrate cost-containment goals within the 
overall cohesive strategy for responding to wildland fires that we 
previously recommended. The conditions that have contributed to 
increasing wildland fire severity and expenditures are complex, have 
been decades in the making, and will take decades to resolve. 
Developing an effective and affordable strategy for addressing these 
conditions is therefore critical, particularly in light of the large 
federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Without clear goals and a strategy for containing wildland fire costs, 
the agencies are unable to effectively and efficiently manage their 
myriad ongoing efforts to contain wildland fire costs. Thus, to help 
manage these efforts and to assist Congress in its oversight role, we 
recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior work 
together to direct their respective agencies to take the following four 
actions: 

* Establish clearly defined goals and measurable objectives for 
containing wildland fire costs. 

* Develop a strategy to achieve these goals and objectives. 

* Establish performance measures that are aligned with these goals and 
objectives. 

* Establish a framework to ensure that officials are held accountable 
for achieving these goals and objectives. 

Because of the importance of these actions and continuing concerns 
about the agencies' response to the increasing cost of wildland fires-
-and so that the agencies can use the results of these actions to 
prepare for the 2008 fire season--the agencies should provide this 
information to Congress no later than November 2007. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and 
Interior generally disagreed with the characterization of many of our 
findings; they neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. 
In particular, the Forest Service and Interior stated that they did not 
believe we had accurately portrayed some of the significant actions 
they had taken to contain wildland fire costs, and they identified 
several agency documents that they believe provide clearly defined 
goals and objectives that make up their strategy to contain costs. We 
acknowledge that the agencies have established a broad goal of 
suppressing fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public 
safety and resources to be protected, but we also found that the 
agencies have established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the 
relative importance of these often-competing priorities nor measurable 
objectives by which to determine if they are meeting this goal. Our 
review suggests that without measurable objectives, the importance of 
containing costs relative to the other program priorities is not clear 
and that managers in the field are therefore likely to select 
firefighting strategies without due consideration of suppression costs. 
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendations, if 
effectively implemented, would help the agencies better manage their 
cost-containment efforts and improve their ability to contain wildland 
fire costs. The Forest Service and Interior's joint comments, and our 
evaluation of them, are included in appendix III. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report 
until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies 
of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries 
of Agriculture and the Interior, the Chief of the Forest Service, the 
Director of the Bureau of Land Management, and other interested 
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Robin M. Nazzaro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the steps that federal agencies have taken to address the 
areas identified by previous studies, we first reviewed selected 
studies--most conducted since 2000 by federal, state, and 
nongovernmental entities--that examined issues related to wildland fire 
cost containment. Studies reviewed included independent reviews by GAO, 
the Department of Agriculture (Agriculture) Office of Inspector 
General, the National Academy of Public Administration, the National 
Association of State Foresters, and the Wildland Fire Leadership 
Council, as well as studies by the Forest Service and Department of the 
Interior (Interior) agencies, including several reviews of individual 
wildland fires. Forest Service and Interior officials at the national 
offices in Washington, D.C., reviewed our list of studies and agreed 
that we had included those key to addressing issues related to cost 
containment. We reviewed the issues these studies identified as needing 
improvement to help contain costs and categorized them into broad 
operational areas corresponding to key aspects of preparing for and 
responding to wildland fires. To determine the steps that federal 
agencies have taken to address these issues--and to corroborate our 
understanding and categorization of the issues--we interviewed 
officials from the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and 
Office of Wildland Fire Coordination within Interior at the national 
offices and at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. To 
determine the current status and results or intended results of the 
steps that the agencies identified, we reviewed relevant agency 
documents, including agency policies, manuals, other guidance, 
implementation strategies, and project plans. We also interviewed 
pertinent agency officials and nonagency officials, including those 
from the National Academy of Public Administration and state 
representatives on the Wildland Fire Leadership Council's independent 
panel. 

To determine steps that the agencies have taken to improve their 
management of their cost-containment efforts, we reviewed wildland fire 
program reviews by the Office of Management and Budget, agency 
documents--including strategic plans and performance and accountability 
reports, federal wildland fire policy documents, and National Fire Plan 
documents--and interviewed agency officials. We also interviewed 
officials from the Office of Management and Budget. To determine 
management steps that agencies are required to take and best management 
practices, we reviewed relevant statutes and guidance, including the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and GAO's Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 22] as well as 
other GAO reports on improving federal agency management. 

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards, which included an assessment of data reliability, 
from May 2006 through May 2007. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Selected GAO Products and Other Reports Reviewed: 

To identify areas potentially in need of improvement for federal 
firefighting agencies to contain the costs of fighting wildland fires, 
we reviewed dozens of reports, most issued since 2000. In addition to 
our own reports on wildland fire issues, we also reviewed reports 
prepared or commissioned by Agriculture, Interior, the Agriculture 
Office of Inspector General, the National Association of State 
Foresters, and the National Academy of Public Administration. The 
following list does not include all of the reports we reviewed but is 
intended to illustrate the range of related topics that we examined. 

GAO Products: 

Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' 
Cost-Containment Efforts. GAO-07-427T. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 
2007. 

Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns about 
Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-570. 
Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006. 

Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a 
Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats. GAO-06-671R. 
Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006. 

Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but 
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. GAO-05-147. 
Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005. 

Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better 
Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. GAO-03-805. 
Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003. 

Forest Service: Little Progress on Performance Accountability Likely 
Unless Management Addresses Key Challenges. GAO-03-503. Washington, 
D.C.: May 1, 2003. 

Wildland Fire Management: Improved Planning Will Help Agencies Better 
Identify Fire-Fighting Preparedness Needs. GAO-02-158. Washington, 
D.C.: March 29, 2002. 

Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce 
Risks to Communities and Resources. GAO-02-259. Washington, D.C.: 
January 31, 2002. 

Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address 
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/RCED-99-65. Washington, D.C.: April 
2, 1999. 

Federal or State Firefighting Entity Reports: 

Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY 2005 
Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: April 2006. 

System Planning Corporation. Prioritizing Wildland Fire Cost 
Containment Strategies. A report prepared for the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service. Arlington, VA: March 2006. 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; U.S. Department of the 
Interior; and the National Association of State Foresters. Quadrennial 
Fire and Fuel Review Report. Washington, D.C.: June 2005. 

Secretary of Agriculture Independent Cost-Control Review Panel. FY 2004 
Large Cost Wildfires Report. Washington, D.C.: March 2005. 

Wildland Fire Leadership Council. Large Fire Suppression Costs: 
Strategies for Cost Management. Washington, D.C.: August 2004. 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department of 
the Interior. Developing an Interagency, Landscape-Scale Fire Planning 
Analysis and Budget Tool. Washington, D.C.: November 2001. 

National Association of State Foresters. Cost Containment on Large 
Fires: Efficient Utilization of Wildland Fire Suppression Resources. 
Washington, D.C.: July 2000. 

Department of Agriculture's Office of Inspector General Reports: 

Audit Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs. Report No. 
08601-44-SF. Washington, D.C.: November 2006. 

Audit Report: Implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative. Report 
No. 08601-6-AT. Washington, D.C.: September 2006. 

Management Challenges. Washington, D.C.: August 2006. 

Audit Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements. 
Report No. 08601-40-SF. Washington, D.C.: July 2005. 

National Academy of Public Administration Reports: 

Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Enhancing Hazard Mitigation Capacity. 
Washington, D.C.: January 2004. 

Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Utilizing Local Firefighting Forces. 
Washington, D.C.: December 2003. 

Containing Wildland Fire Costs: Improving Equipment and Services 
Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: September 2003. 

Wildfire Suppression: Strategies for Containing Costs. Washington, 
D.C.: September 2002. 

Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal 
Interagency Policy. Washington, D.C.: December 2001. 

Appendix III: Comments from the Forest Service and the Department of 
the Interior: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

The Department of Agriculture: 
The Department of the Interior: 
Washington: 

May 24, 2007: 

Robin M. Nazzaro, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Nazzaro: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO-07-655, "Wildland 
Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals and Strategy Hinders Federal 
Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires." As we 
discussed with you recently, the fire community has found GAO reports 
and recommendations to be constructive in addressing issues related to 
the fire program. However, the agencies generally disagree with the 
characterization of many of the findings in this report and believe 
that GAO has not accurately portrayed some of the significant actions 
the agencies have taken to address large fire suppression costs and 
management efficiencies. 

Our goal continues to be the protection of life, property and 
resources. While accomplishing our goal of protection, we continue to 
strive aggressively to contain the costs of fire suppression. 

GAO concludes the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have 
taken to contain costs are unknown because these steps are not 
complete, and recommends we establish clearly defined goals and 
objectives, a strategy to achieve them, and corresponding performance 
measures. We do have objectives and clearly defined goals that make up 
our strategy for better managing large fire suppression costs. The 
Federal Wildland Fire Policy, the Healthy Forests Initiative, Healthy 
Forests Restoration Act, and the 10-Year Strategy Implementation Plan 
provide overarching interagency goals and objectives. 

When we discussed our concerns with GAO regarding this report, we 
provided numerous, important clarifying comments on the draft. We did 
not see significant acknowledgment of these clarifications in the 
subsequent draft, and are concerned that important miscommunications 
remain. GAO presents an incomplete view on four key areas we discuss 
below that we believe will help us better manage and contain costs: 
Appropriate Management Response (AMR), Fire Program Analysis (FPA), 
LANDFIRE and the stratified cost index (SCI). 

GAO failed to recognize, and include in their report, a major component 
of our cost containment management strategy which we believe to be a 
significant improvement over past suppression strategies. AMR moves the 
agencies from aggressively attacking wildfires of all sizes to a more 
risk-informed, performance-based strategy that will reduce costs by 
increasing flexibility in wildland firefighting decisions. The 
transition to AMR has been underway for some time, and improvements 
have been made in using Wildland Fire Use as a tool for achieving 
desirable environmental outcomes with reasonable cost expenditures. 
Further use of AMR is expected in 2007 and 2008 as the agencies 
aggressively apply AMR more widely. 

GAO takes exception to recent FPA design modifications that they say 
may compromise the agencies' ability to fully achieve key goals. GAO 
goes on to say it is unclear whether this method will identify the most 
cost-effective allocation of resources, and that it is also unclear how 
budgets for local units will be meaningfully aggregated on a national 
basis. We strongly disagree. Additional information was supplied by the 
FPA project manager, although it was not incorporated or acknowledged. 
To restate: 

In December 2006, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council called for 
development of a revised analytical system for FPA. The revised system 
will be used to systematically evaluate alternative investment 
strategies and identify options that best reduce wildland fire losses, 
improve ecological conditions, and minimize cost. The system is 
designed to explicitly address uncertainty and risk in predicting 
future wildland fires. A combination of simulation models, GIS 
analyses, and sophisticated decision analysis tools array alternatives 
using quantitative performance measures that readily display inherent 
risks and trade-offs at both FPU and national levels. This approach 
provides a more robust basis for modeling real-world complexities than 
the linear optimization approach used in Phase 1, while maintaining the 
ability to compare the performance and effectiveness of alternative 
funding decisions. 

GAO views LANDFIRE as an unproven work in progress and they question 
our ability to complete and maintain LANDFIRE but offer no explanation. 
We strongly disagree with this characterization. LANDFIRE is an 
important tool to prioritize our fuels work through geospatial data and 
modeling that will help identify fuel accumulations and fire hazards 
across the nation, set nationwide priorities for fuel reduction 
projects, and assist in identifying the appropriate response when 
wildland fires do occur. Two of the four milestones are complete, the 
third milestone is 1/3 complete and work has begun on the fourth 
milestone. In addition, it was utilized during FY 2006 on more than 60 
wildland fire incidents to assist in maximizing firefighting safety, 
pre-position resources and evaluate wildland fire behavior under a 
variety of fire weather conditions. GAO also questions our ability to 
maintain the system but then acknowledges that the agencies are 
submitting a maintenance plan to the Wildland Fire Leadership Council 
in June 2007. Development of this plan has been underway for some time 
now and clearly indicates that we have planned for the necessity of 
routinely updating the data to reflect changing landscape conditions. 

Regarding the stratified cost index performance measure, GAO expresses 
concerns about cost data for fire complexes, the ability to precisely 
estimate suppression costs and that, to date, the data are based solely 
on Forest Service managed fires. The report also says that the agencies 
have not identified the goals we are trying to achieve with this 
measure. The agencies have openly, freely and frequently acknowledged 
that the SCI will continue to be refined and improved in the coming 
years as data is added to the model. However, in its current form, the 
SCI still provides very useful information that was not previously 
available and assists field managers in better managing their large 
fire suppression costs. Furthermore, the SCI is not meant, nor was it 
ever intended to, "precisely" estimate suppression expenditures. 
Instead, it was developed to provide managers with an acceptable 
expenditure range based on historic data. With the multitude of 
unknowns that occur daily on every large fire suppression incident, it 
is naive to believe that anything has the ability to "precisely" 
estimate expenditures. 

We disagree with GAO's conclusion that the agencies have not identified 
goals for this measure. SCI was adopted under Goal 1 of the 10-Year 
Strategy Implementation Plan which is to improve fire prevention and 
suppression. In addition, specific targets have already been set for 
the Forest Service. We first stated our goals for future years for this 
measure in the OMB PART reassessment in July 2006. We established the 
baseline in 2005 and subsequently established future year targets. 
These targets are also in the revised Forest Service Strategic Plan. 
GAO also says Interior has not adopted any performance measures related 
to containing wildland fire costs in its strategic plan and that it 
will be several years at the earliest before enough data have been 
collected for DOI for the SCI model to be useful. This is inaccurate. 
DOI adopted the stratified cost index measure in its new Strategic Plan 
(2008-2012) and expects to have the research results this summer. We 
expect 2006 data to be reported as baseline data and plan to report on 
the SCI in FY 2007. 

GAO also states in the report that agencies have updated guidance for 
sharing suppression costs with nonfederal entities, but have no clear 
plan for ensuring that appropriate cost-sharing methods are used. 
Clarifying the guidance was recommended in an earlier GAO report. We 
clarified the guidance as GAO recommended. As our formal responses to 
the earlier report stated, the guidance will serve as a place to begin 
negotiations with our partners, but the final cost-sharing method will 
be based on a multitude of factors that will be determined at the 
incident. The agencies work in partnership with our cooperators, so we 
cannot guarantee or ensure that our preferred cost-sharing method will 
be the one selected on an incident. 

Finally, GAO says that the agencies need to establish a framework to 
ensure that officials are held accountable for achieving cost 
containment goals and objectives. We have established a framework to 
hold officials accountable for achieving cost containment goals. The 
Forest Service has already adopted significant elements this year, and 
Interior is also addressing these on an interagency basis as 
appropriate. These include a line officer certification process, a 
competency in their annual performance appraisals, and oversight on 
significant incidents by a "Chief's Principle Representative". Both 
agencies continue interagency large fire cost reviews that require 
regions to respond to and implement recommendations made by the review 
teams. 

If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact Sandy 
T. Coleman, Forest Service Assistant Director for GAO/OIG Audit Liaison 
staff, at 703-605-4699, or Deborah Williams, DOI/GAO Liaison at 202 208-
3963. 

Signed by: 

Abigail R. Kimbell: 
Chief: 
U.S. Forest Service: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

Signed by: 

James E. Cason: 
Associate Deputy Secretary: 
U.S. Department of the Interior: 

GAO's Comments: 

1. Our draft report stated that the effects of the steps the agencies 
are taking to contain costs, not the steps themselves, are unknown. We 
recognized that the agencies established--in several documents, 
including the federal wildland fire management policy--a broad goal of 
suppressing fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public 
safety and resources to be protected. However, because the different 
components of this broad goal often compete, our review suggests that 
it is also important for the agencies to establish clear criteria by 
which to weigh the relative importance of the components, as well as to 
establish clear objectives to measure their progress. We therefore 
recommended that the agencies take these steps. We believe that the 
importance of establishing clear goals and objectives will increase as 
the agencies continue their transition to using less aggressive 
firefighting strategies under their "appropriate management response" 
policy. 

2. We fully considered the agencies' comments and clarified our draft 
report as appropriate to address the four key areas raised (see 
comments 3 through 6). 

3. Our draft report discussed the agencies' transition to using less 
aggressive firefighting strategies in appropriate circumstances, 
although it did not use the phrase "appropriate management response." 
We have added this phrase to the report. Our review, however, found 
that several agency policies limit the agencies' use of such 
strategies, a finding also recently reported by the Department of 
Agriculture Office of Inspector General. 

4. We continue to believe that the modifications may not allow the 
agencies to meet key FPA goals. As we noted in our draft report, the 
agencies believe that the modifications will achieve key FPA goals, but 
because they provided no analysis, we also stated that it is possible 
that the modifications may not do so. The paragraph that the agencies 
cite in their comments clearly acknowledges a difference between the 
two designs. However, this paragraph consists of summary, general 
assertions about the benefits of the modifications, and the agencies 
provided no detailed, comparative supporting analysis. Thus, it remains 
unclear how or how much the designs differ in identifying the most cost-
effective alternatives, either locally or nationally. We remain 
concerned because, as officials told us, the agencies have not yet done 
a formal comparison of the differences between the modified and the 
original design. 

5. We removed from the report the statement questioning the agencies' 
ability to complete the LANDFIRE system. Our draft report stated that 
the agencies recognized the importance of updating LANDFIRE data and 
expected to submit a plan for doing so in June 2007 to the Wildland 
Fire Leadership Council for approval. The plan, however, is not yet 
final, and it is therefore not clear how data will be updated. 

6. We acknowledge that the stratified cost index is an improvement over 
the agencies' previous performance measures, but our report also raises 
several concerns about the index. The Forest Service and Interior seem 
to have misinterpreted our concern about the agencies' lack of goals. 
Our concern does not pertain to the stratified cost index performance 
measure itself. Rather, we believe that in general, for performance 
measures to be useful, they must accurately measure progress toward 
established goals and objectives, and we found that the agencies had 
not established clear cost-containment goals and objectives. We agree 
with the Forest Service and Interior that the index was not intended to 
precisely estimate suppression costs and have removed the word 
precisely from the report. The Forest Service and Interior also 
disagree with our statements that Interior had not adopted a 
performance measure related to containing costs in its strategic plan 
and that it would be several years before Interior would have 
sufficient data for the stratified cost index to be useful. Our review 
of Interior's strategic plans for 2003 through 2008 and for 2007 
through 2012, the most recent plan available, did not identify any 
performance measure related to cost containment, including the 
stratified cost index. We do acknowledge that Interior is developing a 
stratified cost index, but our discussions with a key official 
developing this index indicates that to date it is based on data from 
few fires and that it will be several years for sufficient data to be 
available to refine the index's underlying models. 

7. We acknowledge that the agencies have clarified their guidance, as 
we previously recommended. The guidance is an important first step in 
ensuring that suppression costs are shared equitably between federal 
and nonfederal entities. We agree that the agencies need to work with 
their nonfederal partners and that there may be disagreement about 
which cost-sharing method is appropriate in a given situation. 
Nonetheless, we believe that it is important that the federal agencies 
provide sufficient oversight of, and support to, their officials in the 
field as this guidance is implemented. Without such oversight and 
support, we believe that the guidance they have adopted may not address 
a concern our May 2006 review identified--that inconsistent application 
of cost-sharing methods was leading to inequities in how the federal 
government was treating nonfederal entities in different states. 

8. Our draft report acknowledged several of the actions the agencies 
cite to enhance their oversight of wildland fire costs but also found 
that the agencies had not established a clear measure to evaluate the 
benefits and costs of alternative firefighting strategies, a key 
shortcoming identified by previous studies. As the agencies continue 
the transition to appropriate management response, such a measure is 
critical if--as the agencies state in their comments-- appropriate 
management response is to be a performance-based approach. We continue 
to believe that such a measure is needed to help the agencies evaluate 
decisions about firefighting strategies and to hold officials 
accountable for those decisions. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Robin M. Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact person named above, David P. Bixler, 
Assistant Director; Ellen W. Chu; Brian Chung; Elizabeth Curda; 
Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Timothy Guinane; Carol Henn; Kevin 
Jackson; Richard Johnson; Chester Joy; and John Warner made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

(360717): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Federal expenditures are a more direct measure of the federal 
government's investment in wildland fire activities, but the Forest 
Service and Interior agencies were unable to provide us with consistent 
data on these expenditures for the years we reviewed. As a result, we 
are instead reporting appropriations data. We adjusted the 
appropriations dollars for inflation, using the chain-weighted gross 
domestic product price index with fiscal year 2005 as the base year. 

[2] The National Association of State Foresters is a nonprofit 
organization representing the directors of the forestry agencies of the 
50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 United States territories. 
The National Academy of Public Administration is an independent, 
nonpartisan organization chartered by Congress to help federal, state, 
and local governments improve the management and administration of 
government agencies. 

[3] The National Interagency Fire Center is the nation's support center 
for wildland firefighting. Representatives from each of the five 
wildland firefighting agencies, as well as from the National 
Association of State Foresters, National Weather Service, and Office of 
Aircraft Services, are located there and work together to coordinate 
and support wildland fire and disaster operations. 

[4] Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are 
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 and GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

[5] The National Fire Plan is a joint interagency effort to respond to 
wildland fires. Its core comprises several strategic documents, 
including (1) a September 2000 report from the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and the Interior to the President in response to the 
wildland fires of 2000, (2) congressional direction accompanying 
substantial new appropriations in fiscal year 2001, and (3) several 
approved and draft strategies to implement all or parts of the plan. 

[6] The Wildland Fire Leadership Council is composed of senior 
Agriculture and Interior officials, including the Agriculture 
Undersecretary for Natural Resources and Environment; the Interior 
Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget; the Interior 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Business Management and Wildland Fire; 
and the heads of the five federal firefighting agencies. Other members 
include representatives of the Intertribal Timber Council, the National 
Association of State Foresters, and the Western Governors' Association. 

[7] GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to 
Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, GAO/RCED-99-65 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999); Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and 
Accountability Needed to Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources, GAO-
02-259 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002); Wildland Fire Management: 
Additional Actions Required to Better Identify and Prioritize Lands 
Needing Fuels Reduction, GAO-03-805 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2003); 
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but 
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005); and Wildland Fire Management: Update 
on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address 
Wildland Fire Threats, GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006). 

[8] A fire regime generally classifies the role that wildland fire 
plays in a particular ecosystem on the basis of certain 
characteristics, such as the average number of years between fires and 
the typical severity of fire under historic conditions. 

[9] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and U.S. Department 
of the Interior, Developing an Interagency, Landscape-Scale Fire 
Planning Analysis and Budget Tool (Washington, D.C.: November 2001). 

[10] National Academy of Public Administration, Wildfire Suppression: 
Strategies for Containing Costs (Washington, D.C.: September 2002). 

[11] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit 
Report: Forest Service Emergency Equipment Rental Agreement, Report No. 
08601-40-SF (Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

[12] This effort came not in response to reports issued since 2000 but 
rather from investigations and interagency management reviews of 
disasters in 1994 involving the loss of life and property. Findings 
from the investigations and reviews at that time cited shortcomings in 
the dispatch systems for fire and other incidents, insufficient 
documentation on the status of firefighting personnel and equipment, 
and the inability to mobilize appropriate resources in a timely manner. 
The Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, in a December 1995 
policy memorandum, directed the agencies to correct the deficiencies in 
the dispatch process. 

[13] The purpose of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group is to 
coordinate programs of the participating federal and state wildfire 
management agencies. 

[14] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit 
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs, Report No. 08601- 
44-SF (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2006). 

[15] GAO-07-427T. 

[16] GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises 
Concerns about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities, 
GAO-06-570 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006). 

[17] Principles of sound program management for federal agencies are 
established in, among other sources, the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 and GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[18] The Forest Service used this measure in its July 2006 submission 
to the Office of Management and Budget and has indicated that it will 
also adopt the measure in its revised strategic plan, which is 
currently being developed. The Forest Service and Interior agencies, 
along with their nonfederal partners, also adopted this measure in a 
December 2006 update to the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, although 
data for Interior are not yet available. 

[19] Forest Service researchers have developed two regression models to 
date, one for the western United States (Forest Service regions 1 
through 6) and one for the eastern United States (Forest Service 
regions 8 and 9). Characteristics affecting suppression costs include 
fire size; fuel types; fire intensity; physical terrain; proximity to 
the nearest community; total value of structures close to the fire; and 
special management considerations, such as whether the fire was burning 
in a wilderness or other designated area. 

[20] The range of $88 to $1,132 per acre reflects one standard 
deviation from the mean; several fires' cost per acre were outside of 
this range. 

[21] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Audit 
Report: Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs. 

[22] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

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