This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-641 
entitled 'Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to 
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations' which was 
released on May 18, 2007. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2007: 

Military Base Closures: 

Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve 
Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National 
Guard Recommendations: 

GAO-07-641: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-641, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 
62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 
units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type 
of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. 
To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of 
aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this 
report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC 
actions. GAO’s objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide 
replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress 
and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the 
cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller 
General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is 
one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO 
conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states 
affected by BRAC 2005. 

What GAO Found: 

Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air 
Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected 
units that supported either the future force structure or the National 
Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation 
with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force 
developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but 
let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to 
assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from 
the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to 
affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 
flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions 
where possible. 

ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC 
recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation 
challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay 
when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has 
developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the 
ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces 
challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions 
required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that 
provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is 
sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel 
requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 
personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school 
can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has 
worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these 
have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining 
security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. 
Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that 
will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also faces possible 
delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, 
and training. Finally, some ANG units believe there has been 
insufficient communication with ANG headquarters about new mission 
requirements, which impacts their ability to recruit and train 
personnel. 

GAO’s analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will 
be annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26 
million annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, 
the Air Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for 
military construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement 
missions for units losing their flying mission. However, because these 
costs are not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, 
Congress does not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation 
costs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Department of Defense develop a strategy 
to address challenges, enhance communication, and provide more 
transparent cost reporting. DOD partially concurred with the 
recommendations on strategy and communication, but did not concur with 
the recommendation on cost reporting. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and 
Assign Replacement Missions: 

ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely 
to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions: 

No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC 
Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over 
All BRAC-Related ANG Costs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their 
Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005: 

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between 
the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for 
ANG-Related Recommendations: 

Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations 
Affecting ANG: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units 
and Personnel: 

Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units: 

Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs: 

Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC 
Account: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 16, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its 
recommendations to realign and close bases, which it projected would 
yield nearly $50 billion in net savings over 20 years. Although Air 
National Guard (ANG) units were affected by 37 of the 42 Air Force 
recommendations, these actions were aimed primarily at transforming ANG 
to better support the future force structure rather than producing 
significant savings. In July 2005, we reported that DOD's proposed 
recommendations affected 56 ANG installations with 22 units potentially 
losing their flying mission.[Footnote 1] We also observed that the Air 
Force had not identified new missions for many of those units. Air 
Force officials said at the time that they planned to use positions in 
these units for emerging missions to support the future force structure 
in such areas such as homeland defense, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 
and intelligence, which they expected to further refine as part of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. After performing its own analysis, the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission[Footnote 2] made 
substantial changes to the recommendations published in its September 
8, 2005 report. The BRAC recommendations affected 56 (62 percent) of 
ANG flying units with 14 units losing their flying mission, 4 units 
reducing their flying mission, 5 units converting from one type of 
aircraft to another, 4 units associating[Footnote 3] with another unit, 
and 29 units receiving an increase in the number of aircraft assigned 
to them. The BRAC Commission estimated that the Air Force 
recommendations would result in an annual recurring savings of about 
$1.1 billion and those affecting ANG would be about $26 million of the 
Air Force projected annual recurring savings. The BRAC Commission 
recommendations were accepted by the President and Congress and became 
effective on November 9, 2005. 

Once the recommendations became effective, the Air Force became 
responsible for implementing recommendations affecting ANG. The Office 
of the Secretary of Defense required the Air Force to submit a detailed 
business plan for each recommendation that included a schedule for any 
personnel, equipment, or aircraft movements between installations and 
updated costs and savings estimates. All the plans affecting ANG were 
approved by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group between 
April and October 2006. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, 
DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 
2011.[Footnote 4] 

This report is one in a series of reports that detail progress DOD has 
made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the 
2005 BRAC round. We performed our work under the Comptroller General's 
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative[Footnote 5] and 
are reporting the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight 
role of DOD's infrastructure and BRAC initiatives. In this report, we 
address the Air Force's efforts to implement the BRAC recommendations 
affecting ANG. Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the 
process the Air Force used to identify and assign new missions to ANG 
units who will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005, (2) the 
progress the Air Force has made and the challenges it faces in 
implementing the BRAC recommendations, and (3) changes to the estimated 
cost and savings associated with implementation of recommendations 
affecting ANG since the BRAC recommendations became effective. 

To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Air Force 
headquarters, including the Total Force Integration office[Footnote 6] 
and the BRAC Project Management Office; and ANG Directorate of the 
National Guard Bureau,[Footnote 7] in Washington, D.C. We also 
interviewed ANG officials in 11 states that were affected by the 2005 
BRAC recommendations.[Footnote 8] During these meetings, we interviewed 
key officials involved in implementing the recommendations to 
understand the process used to identify and assign new missions to ANG 
units as well as the role that Air Force and ANG headquarters, the 
state adjutants general, and affected units played in the process and 
to identify the challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the 
recommendations. Finally, we analyzed the changes to the costs and 
savings estimates between the approved BRAC Commission recommendations 
and the business plans developed by the Air Force and approved by the 
Secretary of Defense. On the basis of our assessments, we believe the 
DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 
conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details 
on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Through an evolutionary and consultative process involving all key 
stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG headquarters assigned 
replacement missions for affected units that supported either the 
future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize the 
number of ANG flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its 
major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force identified 
potential missions for ANG, which it then categorized into a 
prioritized list based on mission significance. The Air Force then let 
ANG headquarters, with input from state leadership, decide which of 
those missions to assign to specific units. Our analysis indicated that 
23 of the 30 missions assigned were on the prioritized list. In 
addition to the prioritized list, ANG leadership sought to ensure that 
each state had at least one flying mission and to assign additional 
flying missions where possible. Our analysis shows that the remaining 7 
missions assigned were new flying missions based on this premise. For 
example, Connecticut was assigned a new flying mission because it no 
longer had one, and additional flying missions were assigned in 
Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and two in Ohio. 

ANG is making progress toward implementing the 2005 BRAC 
recommendations, but some related challenges remain that could delay 
when some units are able to be mission capable. The Air Force has 
developed business plans that have been approved by the Secretary of 
Defense, created 59 programming plans, developed a plan for the 
movement of aircraft, and assigned missions to all affected units. 
However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in managing the timing and 
sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC 
recommendations. First, ANG headquarters faces challenges in developing 
the large number of unit manning documents and requirements templates 
that provide the specific skill mixes required for replacement 
missions. ANG headquarters also does not know the specific skill sets 
needed for all missions because some of these missions are new and the 
skill sets are still being defined. Second, ANG headquarters faces 
challenges in ensuring that there is sufficient space in Air Force 
training schools for all the personnel requiring training. For example, 
ANG headquarters projects they need to train about 3,000 personnel for 
intelligence-related replacement missions, but the intelligence school 
currently cannot fully accommodate this requirement in a timely manner. 
The Air Force is working on potential solutions, such as increasing the 
number of instructors and shortening the required curriculum for one 
intelligence specialty, but these solutions have yet to be fully 
implemented and may add to ANG costs. Third, ANG officials are 
concerned there could be delays in obtaining security clearances for 
some of the personnel assigned new missions due to the time required to 
process a clearance application. Fourth, ANG headquarters has not 
identified bridge missions for all units that will face a delay between 
the removal of their old mission and the startup of their replacement 
mission. Fifth, ANG faces possible delays in obtaining required funding 
for new equipment, construction, and training due to residual impacts 
of the continuing resolutions for fiscal year 2007 and requirements 
that were not included in the budget. Finally, according to some state 
and ANG unit commanders,[Footnote 9] communication with ANG 
headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the 
units, and they are not receiving key information--such as new mission 
requirements and the new personnel skill mix that each unit will 
require--which impacts units' ability to recruit and train personnel. 
These challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC 
recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. Without 
a strategy to deal with these related challenges, some units may face 
delays in when they are able to be mission capable. 

In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current 
Air Force estimates indicates that no annual recurring savings will be 
achieved as a result of the recommendations related to ANG, ANG one- 
time implementation costs are projected to increase, and Congress has 
not been given full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation 
costs. Specifically, our analysis indicates that implementing the ANG 
related recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs 
of $53 million dollars rather than annual recurring savings of $26 
million estimated by the BRAC Commission. The $79 million per year 
difference occurred primarily due to language in the Commission's 
report that prevents ANG from reducing its current end strength in some 
states. Also, our analysis shows one-time implementation cost estimates 
are projected to increase $68 million dollars (13.5 percent; from $504 
million to $572 million) primarily due to additional military 
construction requirements and inflation.[Footnote 10] Further, the Air 
Force decided to fund over $300 million to establish replacement 
missions for units that lost their flying missions outside the BRAC 
account and did not report these costs in their BRAC budget submission. 
Therefore, Congress does not have full visibility over ANG BRAC-related 
implementation costs. 

We are making recommendations to ensure the challenges we identified 
are addressed, to improve communication between ANG headquarters and 
the affected units, and to increase cost transparency. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with 
our recommendations regarding ensuring the challenges we identified are 
addressed and improving communication between ANG headquarters and the 
affected units and did not concur with our recommendation regarding 
increasing cost transparency. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-
related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of 
the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct 
specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC 
Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain 
all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate, retrain 
personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we 
believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and 
should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. 
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as 
appropriate. 

Background: 

ANG is a reserve component of the United States Air Force. It performs 
both federal and state missions, consists of about 107,000 members, and 
makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. ANG provides 100 
percent of the air sovereignty missions and plays a key role in the Air 
Force's Aerospace Expeditionary Force,[Footnote 11] including 49 
percent of theater airlifts and 45 percent of tanker missions. In their 
state role, ANG units report to the governor of their respective state 
or territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding 
general of the District of Columbia National Guard and participate in 
emergency relief support during natural disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue operations; support to 
civil authorities; maintenance of vital public services; and counter- 
drug operations. For example, ANG was involved in the relief effort 
following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. 

The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each 
have a role in the management of ANG. The Air Force and its major 
commands play a key role in determining ANG's force structure, 
approving new missions, and equipping ANG to perform its missions. The 
National Guard Bureau administers the federal functions of ANG and 
works with the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs 
that directly affect ANG. The Bureau also formulates and administers 
programs for training, development, and maintenance of ANG units. The 
National Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of communication between 
the Air Force and the 54 states and territories where National Guard 
units are located.[Footnote 12] 

Prior to this round of BRAC, ANG had 91 units with flying missions. As 
part of DOD's BRAC report, the Air Force proposed actions that would 
have affected 56 of these units with 22 units losing their flying 
mission. In July 2005, we reported that many of the personnel positions 
associated with the units losing a flying mission did not have a new 
mission identified. Air Force officials stated they planned to use 
these positions for emerging missions in such areas as homeland 
defense, UAVs, and intelligence, which they expect to further refine as 
part of the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review. After examining these 
proposals, the BRAC Commission made substantial changes to the 
recommendations affecting ANG with 14 units losing their flying 
mission, other units reducing or converting aircraft, and others 
increasing the number of aircraft. Table 1 summarizes the BRAC 
Commission recommendations affecting ANG flying units. 

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation's Impact on ANG Flying Units 
and Personnel: 

Type of action: Ceasing flying mission; 
Number of: Units: 14; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 6,000. 

Type of action: Converting aircraft type[B]; 
Number of: Units: 5; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 1,000. 

Type of action: Increasing assigned aircraft; 
Number of: Units: 29; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 3,900. 

Type of action: Associating with another unit[C]; 
Number of: Units: 4; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 1,100. 

Type of action: Reducing assigned aircraft; 
Number of: Units: 4; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 700. 

Type of action: Total; 
Number of: Units: 56; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 12,700. 

Type of action: ANG (end strength/flying units); 
Number of: Units: 91; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 106,800. 

Type of action: Percentage affected; 
Number of: Units: 62%; 
Number of: Personnel[A]: 12%. 

Source: ANG. 

[A] Rounded to the nearest 100. 

[B] Units that lost one aircraft type and gained another due to BRAC 
recommendations. 

[C] Units that lost their aircraft and are directed to share the 
aircraft of an active or reserve unit due to BRAC recommendations. 

[End of table] 

While the BRAC Commission directed the removal of aircraft from 14 
units, it did not identify replacement missions for these units. 
Instead, the Commission recommended that the affected units would 
assume a new mission that would integrate the unit into the Future 
Total Force such as air mobility; engineering; flight training; or 
UAVs, if the state agreed to change the organization, composition, and 
location of the affected unit. Future Total Force transformational 
missions, also known as Total Force Integration missions, are managed 
through a new directorate established by the Air Force in March 2005, 
called the Total Force Integration office.[Footnote 13] In addition, 
the Commission recommended that the loss of a flying unit not change 
the authorized end strength of ANG in each affected state. 

The President and Congress approved the BRAC Commission 
recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the 
recommendations became effective, the Secretary of Defense designated 
one of the military services or defense agencies as the executive agent 
responsible for implementing each recommendation. The Air Force is the 
executive agent for the recommendations involving ANG.[Footnote 14] The 
Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group required the executive 
agent to submit detailed business plans to update estimated costs and 
savings and identify a schedule for implementing each recommendation. 
The Air Force BRAC Project Management office prepared the business 
plans for the recommendations affecting ANG. The business plans to 
implement ANG recommendations were approved between April and October 
2006 by the Infrastructure Steering Group, an office chaired by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
that oversees BRAC implementation. 

While planning to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations, ANG 
headquarters had to manage several other issues that affected its end 
strength. ANG headquarters identified that unit manning documents 
guardwide included about 3,500 positions more than permitted by 
authorized ANG end strength. ANG headquarters had to identify and 
remove these excess positions across various states and units. 
Furthermore, in December 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed ANG to 
eliminate about 14,000 positions between fiscal years 2007 and 
2011.[Footnote 15] After several months of planning for these 
reductions, in May 2006, ANG reduced its budget in other areas by $1.8 
billion rather than reduce its end strength. As a result, the new 
mission plan for each state had to be altered and was not completed 
until October 2006. 

Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and 
Assign Replacement Missions: 

The Air Force and ANG headquarters identified and assigned new missions 
to units that will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005 
through an evolutionary and consultative process that involved key 
stakeholders such as its major commands and individual units. A best 
practice we have identified in previous work indicates that during 
major organizational transformations it is important to involve 
stakeholders to obtain their ideas and to gain their ownership of the 
transformation. Further, stakeholder involvement helps to increase 
stakeholder understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and 
objectives, and gain ownership for new policies and procedures. In 
addition to basing decisions on a prioritized list of possible 
missions, ANG headquarters also sought replacement missions that 
supported the future force structure of the Air Force and tried to 
maximize flying missions wherever possible. 

The process to identify new relevant missions for ANG units took place 
in phases. In June 2005, the Air Force Total Force Integration office 
prioritized mission ideas provided by ANG using working groups that 
included staff at different levels as well as key stakeholders from all 
components of the Air Force, state adjutants general, and major 
commands. The Total Force Integration office developed a prioritized 
list of potential missions by grouping them into one of the following 
four bands: 

* Band 1--the highest priority, missions the Air Force "must do" to 
satisfy congressional mandates and existing laws. 

* Band 2--missions that are considered "mission critical" to the Air 
Force achieving its objectives. 

* Band 3--missions that are "mission significant," meaning that failing 
to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall effectiveness. 

* Band 4--missions that are "mission enhancing," meaning that they 
would be nice to do if resources are available. 

The Air Force Total Force Integration office sent the banded mission 
list to ANG headquarters,[Footnote 16]which used the list to assign 
replacement missions to units based on a number of variables. These 
included the existing skill sets in the affected units, recruiting 
trends in the affected unit's state, the states' expressed desires, and 
the mission requirements. According to ANG officials, they wanted to 
assign missions that were consistent with the preexisting mission or 
capitalize on the strengths of the states to minimize transition 
challenges. Subsequent to the development of the banded list, the Air 
Force identified some flying missions that could be assigned to ANG. 
According to ANG officials, these flying missions were assigned to 
units instead of other missions on the banded list. Most of the 
replacement missions ANG headquarters assigned were either in the top 
two bands or were flying missions. Our analysis indicated that 23 of 
the 30 missions assigned were on the banded list and the remaining 7 
missions assigned were new flying missions, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units: 

Source: Replacement flying mission; 
Missions: Number: 7; 
Missions: Percentage: 23; 
Positions affected: Number: 1,875; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 29. 

Source: Band I; 
Missions: Number: 12; 
Missions: Percentage: 40; 
Positions affected: Number: 3,410; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 53. 

Source: Band II; 
Missions: Number: 6; 
Missions: Percentage: 20; 
Positions affected: Number: 472; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 7. 

Source: Band III; 
Missions: Number: 1; 
Missions: Percentage: 3; 
Positions affected: Number: 65; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 1. 

Source: Band IV; 
Missions: Number: 4; 
Missions: Percentage: 13; 
Positions affected: Number: 616; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 10. 

Total; 
Missions: Number: 30; 
Missions: Percentage: 100[A]; 
Positions affected: Number: 6,438; 
Positions affected: Percentage: 100. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data. 

[A] Numbers do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 2, about 83 percent of the missions assigned and 89 
percent of their personnel were band I or II missions or a new flying 
mission (see app. II for the unit assignments and their respective 
priority level). Although the missions assigned in bands III and IV 
constitute 5 of the 30 missions assigned (about 16 percent), they 
require about 681 positions, which is approximately 11 percent of the 
total affected positions of all positions in replacement missions. The 
one band III replacement mission is an intelligence instructor mission 
assigned to the ANG unit at Ellington, Texas. Many new positions in ANG 
replacement missions are in the intelligence career field. Anticipating 
the increased intelligence training requirement, this mission is 
designed to augment the instructor staff at the Air Force intelligence 
training school at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The four band IV 
missions assigned consist of two engineering missions assigned to 
Mansfield, Ohio, and Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, an intelligence 
production mission assigned to Nashville, Tennessee, and a classified 
mission assigned to Nashville. According to Air Force officials, ANG 
headquarters assigned the engineering missions to Ohio and Pennsylvania 
based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets 
regionally. 

In phases subsequent to the development of the banded list, flying 
missions were assigned with direct involvement of senior leadership 
from the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, and ANG. Throughout the 
process to replace missions for affected ANG units there was an effort 
to assign replacement flying missions to the greatest extent possible. 
According to ANG officials, if any flying missions became available, 
ANG headquarters would match those missions to units instead of other 
missions on the banded list. The replacement flying missions are the 
joint cargo aircraft,[Footnote 17] a B-2 association with an active 
wing, and an F-16 foreign military sales training mission. The joint 
cargo aircraft mission was assigned to ANG units at Bradley, 
Connecticut; Kellogg, Michigan; Mansfield, Ohio; Key Field, 
Mississippi; and Nashville, Tennessee. According to ANG officials, 
Bradley received the joint cargo aircraft mission because it was in the 
only state that did not have a flying mission, while units in Michigan, 
Ohio, Mississippi, and Tennessee were selected based on the ANG desire 
to distribute homeland defense assets regionally. Additionally, 
two[Footnote 18] of the five joint cargo aircraft mission assignments 
were made to units that currently fly the C-130, another airlift 
aircraft, and one assignment was made to a unit that currently flies 
the KC-135 tanker, which ANG headquarters officials believe will 
minimize transition costs. According to ANG officials, the Air Combat 
Command identified the potential for the ANG unit in St. Louis, 
Missouri, to associate with the B-2 mission at Whiteman Air Force Base, 
Missouri. The two bases are in the same state and it provides an 
opportunity for an ANG unit to associate with an active Air Force 
mission using an aircraft that is new for ANG and relevant for the 
future of the Air Force. Finally, the unit in Springfield, Ohio, was 
assigned an F-16 foreign military sales training mission because this 
unit currently is an F-16 training unit. 

ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That Are Likely 
to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their Missions: 

ANG headquarters has completed some key planning tasks for the 
implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but we believe that 
challenges remain that could delay when some units may be able to 
become mission capable.[Footnote 19] To date, ANG headquarters has 
completed programming plans, an aircraft movement schedule, and a state-
by state new mission plan. However, ANG headquarters faces challenges 
in completing manning documents, potentially insufficient training 
school capacity, obtaining security clearances for many personnel in a 
prompt manner, ensuring that personnel at affected units have a mission 
to perform when their old mission is removed, and funding delays. 
Further, some ANG unit commanders state that communication with ANG 
headquarters is ad hoc and inadequate to meet their needs. These 
challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC 
recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. ANG 
officials have stated these challenges could delay when some units are 
mission capable. A strategy for managing these challenges and improved 
communication between ANG headquarters and affected ANG units will be 
required to help minimize delays. 

Some Key Planning Tasks Completed: 

The Air Force has created a business plan for each recommendation that 
will be used as planning tools for BRAC implementation. These plans 
include a description of the actions required including an aircraft 
movement schedule, financial plans, and construction required for each 
recommendation. These plans have been approved by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, and will be updated as implementation details 
change. 

ANG headquarters completed 59 BRAC-related programming plans between 
December 2006 and January 2007. According to an ANG official, these 
plans provide guidance from the major commands to units on how to 
implement changes to unit structures and missions. Specifically, each 
plan identifies the key organizations involved, lists key milestones 
and objectives for specific actions, and assigns primary responsibility 
to the offices that will assist with the implementation. 

ANG headquarters has also completed a plan to manage the movement of 
hundreds of aircraft that will relocate into or out of 56 ANG units. 
This plan provides a schedule that identifies when aircraft will move 
around the country by fiscal quarter, through 2011. According to an ANG 
official, this movement schedule was in part designed to ensure that 
units losing their aircraft are not left without a mission by 
implementing a replacement mission before the aircraft depart, and to 
ensure that existing homeland defense missions are continued.[Footnote 
20] 

ANG headquarters has also produced a state-by-state new mission plan 
that identifies all the changes to ANG units that are occurring within 
each state. This plan includes BRAC actions, new missions assigned 
through the Total Force Integration process,[Footnote 21] the ANG 
headquarters review of each unit manning document (UMD) to remove 
excess personnel, and standardizing squadron size so that units 
conducting the same missions are uniform in size. Specifically, the new 
mission plan identifies the general number of people that will be 
assigned to each mission; unit commanders can use this information as a 
basic guide to plan for required internal manpower changes. For 
example, if the new mission plan identifies that one mission is ceasing 
and losing 150 positions and a new mission is starting in the same unit 
or state that requires 150 new positions, unit commanders can begin to 
approach the personnel in the ceasing mission to determine if they are 
willing and able to qualify for the new mission. 

Challenges in Managing Many Sequential Implementation Actions and 
Communicating with Units: 

ANG headquarters may face challenges in managing the timing and 
sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC 
recommendations and to complete the conversion process for units taking 
on a new mission. First, ANG headquarters faces difficulties in 
completing the UMDs that units require to determine retraining or 
recruitment requirements. Second, ANG may also have difficulty in 
securing training at technical and flight schools for all personnel in 
time to perform their new missions as scheduled. Third, there may be 
delays in getting security clearances for individuals who require one 
for their new mission. Fourth, there are some units that will require a 
temporary bridge mission to carry them over until their new mission is 
available. Fifth, delays in funding for equipment and facilities could 
delay when units are able to perform their replacement missions. Sixth, 
according to some ANG units, communication with ANG headquarters is 
limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the units, such as new 
mission requirements. Though ANG headquarters officials are aware of 
these challenges and developing some solutions at the working level, 
they lack an overarching strategy to manage and mitigate these 
implementation challenges and any potential domino effects and to 
communicate solutions to the affected units, which increases the risk 
that ANG headquarters will face delays in establishing replacement 
missions and could result in decreased readiness and potentially 
inefficiently utilized personnel. 

Completing Manpower Documents: 

ANG headquarters is behind schedule in completing some UMDs and at the 
time we had completed our audit work an ANG official projected that 
they may not be able to meet current stated internal deadlines as a 
result. ANG headquarters must develop new UMDs for all converting ANG 
units, which includes units receiving a replacement mission, converting 
aircraft type, or forming an association with another unit. 
Additionally, UMD changes are required for units gaining or losing some 
aircraft or personnel. A UMD allows unit commanders to recruit and 
train new personnel or identify existing personnel who require training 
for a new mission. 

According to an ANG official, they have to complete many UMDs this 
year, and over 100 in order to implement BRAC and replacement missions. 
Although, according to an ANG official, Air Force regulations require 
UMDs to be issued to units 6 months before the units are supposed to 
begin their assigned mission, ANG officials have stated that their goal 
is to get a UMD to units up to 1 year prior. An ANG official stated 
that they had hoped to complete all UMDs for units that are supposed to 
begin conversion by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 by March 31, 
2007, but at the time we had completed our audit work another ANG 
official stated that they may be unable to meet this deadline because 
of delays in major commands approving the draft UMDs. 

According to ANG headquarters, all UMDs have to be approved by the 
major commands before they can be completed and issued.[Footnote 22] 
According to an ANG official, they have been waiting for approval for 2 
to 3 months, and the process typically takes 30 days to complete. One 
ANG official stated that these delays may in part prevent ANG from 
meeting its March 31, 2007, UMD issuance deadline, which could cause 
delays at some affected units. 

Though required issuance deadlines have not been missed, ANG 
headquarters faces challenges in completing the UMDs required for those 
units that are transforming in the coming year. For example, ANG 
headquarters has yet to complete the UMD for its Distributed Ground 
System, an intelligence mission assigned to Terre Haute, Indiana, 
though the Initial Operational Capability date for this unit is 
scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. Of the 11 state 
ANG commanders we interviewed, none have a final UMD for their new 
missions. Missing internal deadlines for completing UMDs increases the 
risk that ANG headquarters will miss other deadlines or the Air Force 
requirement to issue UMDs 6 months prior to the start of new missions. 
These delays could affect the sequencing of other actions, which could 
in turn delay the establishment of replacement missions. 

ANG officials stated that they are working on a solution that will 
provide unit commanders with information about their new manpower 
requirements through a document called a requirements template. 
According to ANG officials, the templates will inform each unit 
commander of the personnel requirements for their new mission, and 
would permit some initial actions, such as sending existing personnel 
to training. However, ANG officials stated these templates cannot be 
used as a funding authorization for recruiting new personnel. According 
to ANG documentation, all existing flying mission templates, including 
those for F-15, F-22, A-10, and C-5, have been completed, but they are 
still working to complete the templates for the joint cargo aircraft, 
the Component Numbered Air Force mission, support staff at all units 
including wing command elements and administrative personnel, and units 
that are associating with an active or reserve unit. According to ANG 
officials, templates for the support staff were to be done after those 
for existing flying missions in part to ensure that individuals 
requiring flight training or other lengthy technical training could 
have time to reserve seats in flight schools, while support personnel 
will likely not require further training. ANG unit commanders state 
that they require the templates for support missions so they can 
determine their new command structures. For example, Indiana ANG 
commanders stated that they will not know if the command staff for the 
fighter wing at Terre Haute will be responsible for commanding the new 
Distributed Ground System and Air Support Operations Squadron missions 
assigned to that unit, or if these will be assigned to a new command 
staff. ANG officials stated that they had hoped to have requirements 
templates issued to all units by December 31, 2006. However, as of 
February, 2007, ANG headquarters had not issued templates to some of 
the units we interviewed that were also assigned new missions, 
including Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio. 

According to ANG officials, the challenge in completing the UMDs and 
requirements templates is due to the volume of work required. According 
to ANG officials, nearly every ANG unit will require a new or modified 
UMD as a result of BRAC, the Total Force Integration process, and 
standardizing unit sizes. Completing the UMDs for some units may be 
more difficult than for others. For example, completing the UMD for a 
unit that is increasing or decreasing its allotted number of aircraft 
by two or three is easier than completing a UMD for a unit that is 
taking on an entirely new mission or converting from one mission or 
aircraft to another. As a result of BRAC and the Total Force 
Integration process, ANG headquarters has to complete many complicated 
conversion UMDs, which is more time consuming; specifically, the ANG 
manpower office is typically only required to complete five unit 
conversion UMDs per year, but in order to implement the BRAC 
recommendations, it will have to complete hundreds of conversion UMDs. 
The Director, ANG, stated that ANG in general was not adequately 
structured to complete the volume of work required by BRAC. Recognizing 
that it does not have sufficient staff, according to state officials, 
the ANG manpower office requested assistance from the units. However, 
ANG headquarters is still expected to miss internal deadlines while 
receiving this support from the field. Without significant augmentation 
to the manpower office or some other change in the UMDs creation 
process, delays in meeting sequential deadlines may continue, which 
increases the risk that ANG headquarters will not be able to complete 
UMDs in the time frames required. An ANG official also indicated that 
ANG switched to a new manpower planning computer program at around the 
same time as BRAC implementation, which delayed initial manpower 
planning actions. Further, some of the replacement missions, such as 
the still to be acquired joint cargo aircraft, are new and thus still 
have undefined requirements. 

Potential Training Capacity Shortfall: 

ANG will have to train many individuals to qualify to fly a new 
aircraft or to perform a new mission. According to ANG officials, these 
requirements will create a surge of personnel needing training for the 
coming years, and there may not be enough space in some training 
schools to accommodate this demand. ANG officials have identified 
shortfalls spanning from 2008 through 2012 for A-10 and F-15 pilot 
training schools.[Footnote 23] For example, ANG officials stated that 
ANG typically requires only 8 seats in the initial qualification 
courses per year, but as a result of BRAC it will require 30 or more 
seats in initial qualification courses per year. Without adjustments, 
it will be difficult for some schools to incorporate the additional 
requirements; for example, the only A-10 school is currently operating 
at 100 percent capacity. An ANG official stated that without an 
increase in available school seats, some pilot training delays may 
stretch through 2014. 

Some ANG pilots who need to qualify to fly a new aircraft as a result 
of the BRAC recommendations may face delays when they are qualified for 
their new mission. The projected shortfall may delay when some flying 
units will achieve mission capability, and impact ANG readiness. 
Specifically, the following units will be converting to an F-15 mission 
or increasing their number of F-15 aircraft within the BRAC 
implementation period: Great Falls, Montana; Portland, Oregon; New 
Orleans, Louisiana; Jacksonville, Florida; and Barnes, Massachusetts. 
Additionally, the following units will be converting to an A-10 mission 
or increasing their number of A-10 aircraft within this time period: 
Boise, Idaho; Fort Smith, Arkansas; Selfridge, Michigan; and Martin 
State, Maryland. Some solutions to mitigate the shortfall in space at 
flight schools have been discussed by ANG headquarters officials, but 
to date none have been implemented. Some potential solutions that ANG 
officials mentioned include increasing flight simulator training, 
sending pilots to training early to avoid later delays,[Footnote 24] 
and establishing ANG-owned flight schools. According to ANG officials, 
this training shortfall could not only delay Initial and Full 
Operational Capability for some units, but could also have an impact on 
warfighting capabilities. ANG officials also identified that converting 
units will face a period of time while their newly-trained personnel 
are gaining the on-the-job experience required before the units can 
achieve a Full Operational Capability. Without this on-the-job 
experience, newly converted units potentially face decreased readiness 
and capability. 

An increase in personnel requiring training is projected for some 
nonflight technical schools as well. For example, ANG headquarters and 
Air Force officials have stated that some missions--such as the 
Predator UAV mission--will have a high demand for personnel trained in 
intelligence skills. ANG officials have estimated that the ANG is 
increasing the total number of intelligence-related positions by 
approximately 3,000 positions (200 percent) with an increase from 1,500 
to 4,500. ANG and the Air Force realized that there would be a high 
demand for the limited number of seats at the Air Force intelligence 
training facility at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. The Air Force 
and ANG headquarters developed two solutions to limit the impacts of 
this shortfall. First, ANG headquarters is increasing the number of 
instructors available to teach at the school by assigning a new 
intelligence training mission to the Texas ANG. However, Texas ANG 
officials stated that they did not know if they would be able to staff 
this mission on time since the mission requires trained intelligence 
instructors, and stated that late 2008 would be the earliest practical 
date that this mission could be fully operational. Second, the Air 
Force is decreasing the length of some courses. Specifically, ANG 
headquarters and the Air Force arranged to decrease the training course 
for personnel assigned to the UAV sensor operator specialty from 6 to 3 
months because they recognized that these personnel did not initially 
require all the skills provided in the full-length course. Instead, ANG 
headquarters and the Air Force will allow personnel in these positions 
to delay part of their initial training until later in their careers, 
thus allowing them to report to their units faster while freeing up 
seats in the schools. According to ANG officials, these solutions 
should greatly reduce the strain on the intelligence training school 
and should increase the throughput capability, though the increased 
demand has yet to reach the school to test the efficacy of these 
solutions. If these solutions do not increase the capacity of the 
school to required levels, there could be personnel who are unable to 
attend training as scheduled, resulting in a potentially inefficient 
use of personnel and units that are unable to fully perform their 
mission due to insufficient numbers of trained personnel, which 
subsequently impacts unit readiness. 

Lengthy Security Clearance Process: 

All of the approximately 3,000 individuals who will be converting to a 
new intelligence mission, such as a Predator UAV mission, will require 
a security clearance, as will some personnel in communications 
positions supporting an intelligence unit. According to ANG 
headquarters officials and some unit commanders, there is a concern 
that the length of time required to obtain a top secret clearance, 
estimated by ANG officials as 1-1 ½ years, could delay when some 
personnel are able to perform their mission. As we have previously 
reported, there are long-standing delays and other problems with DOD's 
personnel security clearance program, and this area remains on our high-
risk list.[Footnote 25] If affected units do not receive personnel 
requirements that state the number of personnel requiring a clearance 
for their new missions, some or all personnel may not have a clearance 
in time. As a result, some personnel may be unable to perform their 
mission until they obtain their clearance. For example, the unit 
commander at the Otis, Massachusetts, ANG base does not have a 
requirements template or a UMD for either of the two intelligence 
missions that were assigned to Otis. One mission has an initial 
operational capability date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008; 
Massachusetts ANG officials estimate that it will take several years to 
establish the new mission, in part due to the time required to get 
personnel top secret security clearances. 

Identifying Bridge Missions: 

ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for some units that 
will require one, which could leave personnel without a mission to 
perform and waste resources. Some units may face a period of time when 
they have no mission to perform because their original mission was 
removed and their new mission lacks required resources or is scheduled 
to begin later. In order to prevent the inefficient use of personnel 
who otherwise may have no mission to perform, these units will require 
ANG headquarters to assign them a bridge mission that would temporarily 
give personnel a mission to perform until they can transition to their 
new mission. ANG headquarters has planned for bridge missions for some 
locations, such as assigning C-21 light cargo aircraft to some 
locations awaiting the joint cargo aircraft. An ANG official has also 
stated that in some locations they may keep their currently assigned 
aircraft in place past the planned removal date in order to provide a 
mission for unit personnel. However, delaying the movement of aircraft 
may further delay implementation at other locations that are waiting to 
receive these aircraft. Alternatively, if the aircraft that are 
departing are destined to be retired, there will be additional costs to 
ANG to keep these aircraft in service. 

ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for several units 
that will have a mission gap. For example, ANG headquarters timelines 
identify that Massachusetts loses its aircraft at Otis in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, and Massachusetts ANG officials stated that they will 
face a gap between missions and that they have not been given a bridge 
mission. If no bridge mission is identified, personnel may have no 
mission for almost 2 years until the new mission is established. 
According to Massachusetts state commanders, ANG headquarters has not 
given them any information about a potential bridge mission nor is one 
identified in an ANG headquarters BRAC implementation tracking 
database. Similarly, Ohio ANG officials expressed concern that the C- 
130s based at Mansfield are leaving in 2010 but that the replacement 
joint cargo aircraft mission has no solid implementation date since the 
aircraft is yet to be acquired. No bridge mission for Ohio has been 
identified by ANG headquarters, nor is one listed in an ANG 
headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. The Director, ANG, 
estimates the deployment date for the joint cargo aircraft between 2012 
and 2015. The DOD Budget Justification books state that requirements 
are still being defined and predict initial Air Force procurement in 
fiscal year 2010. Further, the Director, ANG, identified that there 
will be a gap at Syracuse, New York; Tucson, Arizona; Fargo, North 
Dakota; and Ellington, Texas, due to delays in procuring new UAVs. 
Without a bridge mission, personnel at these locations and any others 
that face a gap due to implementation delays will be unable to perform 
a mission, resulting in an inefficient use of personnel and a reduction 
in ANG readiness. 

Delays in Funding: 

According to ANG documentation, there may be delays in funding for 
required training, equipment, and construction projects that may impact 
some units converting to a new mission in fiscal year 2008. 
Specifically, ANG has identified $127 million in funding shortfalls in 
2008 for personnel, equipment, construction, and operations and 
maintenance requirements to establish replacement missions. According 
to an Air Force official, these costs were not included in the budget 
due to internal Air Force prioritization and there are unfunded 
requirements every year. According to ANG, these unfunded requirements 
could result in delays in when some missions will be capable of 
converting and performing their missions. For example, according to an 
ANG official, residual impacts of the fiscal year 2007 continuing 
resolutions may limit the funding available for some construction 
projects in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 26] For example, significant 
construction was planned for Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and 
Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, but funding delays due 
in part to impacts from the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may 
postpone this construction.[Footnote 27] Construction at Barnes is 
scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by July 2009; 
construction at Elmendorf is scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be 
completed by August 2011. The schedule for construction at Elmendorf-- 
which is already constrained by the short construction season in Alaska 
--leaves little margin for error if construction delays develop. An ANG 
official has stated that construction may not begin by the scheduled 
dates because of funding delays. If required construction activity at 
Barnes or Elmendorf is not completed as scheduled, these units may not 
receive their new aircraft as scheduled, which could delay other 
implementation actions. 

Shortfalls in training funding may also delay implementation of some 
missions: Indiana ANG officials stated that they need to send 
approximately 100-200 people to training for one of their new missions 
that is scheduled to reach an Initial Operational Capability in the 1st 
quarter 2008, but so far they have only been able to send 2 people to 
training due to an insufficient training budget. Similarly, Texas ANG 
officials stated that they had their Initial Operational Capability 
date for their Predator mission postponed for almost 2 years because 
there was not adequate funding to send personnel to training. The 
Comptroller of ANG stated that the fiscal year 2007 continuing 
resolutions constituted a large reduction in available funds that will 
be hard to manage, and another ANG official stated that residual 
impacts from the continuing resolutions may cause a major slip in 
milestones. ANG officials have stated that they may need to take steps, 
such as obtaining a supplemental appropriation or reallocating funds 
internally, in order to ensure that required equipment, construction, 
and personnel funds are available in order to achieve fiscal year 2008 
actions on schedule and to avoid potentially cascading implementation 
delays. For example, the Air Force has developed workaround solutions 
for some affected units, such as using temporary facilities in lieu of 
actual construction, but these solutions may be less efficient and more 
costly in the long term. 

Communication between ANG Headquarters and Units Has Been Inadequate: 

Communications at the headquarters level within ANG offices and between 
ANG headquarters and the Air Force appear to be regular and adequate, 
but it is inadequate between ANG headquarters and ANG units, according 
to units we visited. Specifically, ANG headquarters and Air Force 
officials stated that they work together to identify potential 
implementation challenges and create potential solutions. However, 
according to senior leadership at ANG units we spoke with, including 
adjutants general, assistant adjutants general, wing commanders, deputy 
wing commanders, and one chief executive officer, communication between 
the units in the field and ANG headquarters is ad hoc and the 
information they are provided by ANG headquarters is not adequate to 
meet their needs. For example, ANG headquarters developed an Internet- 
accessible database that would provide information and milestones to 
the units, but did not make this system available until 10 months after 
it was created. One state ANG official said information received is 
often due to their contacting or traveling to ANG headquarters rather 
than through headquarters-initiated communication. The Director, ANG, 
acknowledged that there are challenges in communicating with the units 
and that some unit commanders may not have the information that they 
feel they need to implement the BRAC recommendations and their new 
missions. To address this challenge, the Director, ANG, has started 
quarterly visits to affected units. 

Unit commanders and state adjutants general want details of the skill 
mix required to perform their new missions as soon as possible so they 
can determine how to best fit individual guardsmen in the new missions 
and avoid retention problems. Several ANG units that we interviewed 
stated that they were able to get in contact with ANG headquarters 
offices, but that the information they received in response to 
questions was not sufficient to meet their requirements. One of the ANG 
units attributed the communications deficiencies to the high workload 
that ANG headquarters is undertaking. State-and unit-level ANG 
commanders identified the following examples of challenges in 
communicating with ANG headquarters: 

* Texas ANG officials stated that they do not know how many jobs will 
accompany their Predator UAV mission, or if they will even be receiving 
any Predator aircraft as part of the mission or rather flying UAVs 
belonging to other units instead. This has led to retention issues 
among guardsmen who fear losing their jobs, with 50 percent of their 
maintenance personnel planning to leave the unit. 

* Virginia ANG officials stated that they find it difficult to 
communicate with ANG headquarters because they do not have a single 
point of contact at headquarters to approach with concerns. 

* Missouri and Ohio ANG officials are concerned that there may not be 
funding available to send their guardsmen to required training and they 
cannot get assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be adequate 
funding or other solutions. 

* South Carolina officials told us that they did not know the date of 
their expected Initial Operational Capability, and consequently cannot 
adequately plan for the transition even though they already have some 
new aircraft on the ground. 

* Massachusetts and Texas ANG officials stated that they cannot get any 
information or assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be 
"bridge missions" for their personnel until the new mission arrives. 
Consequently, unit personnel may be underutilized. 

Though ANG headquarters created an information-sharing system for the 
BRAC implementation process, it did not promptly make this system 
available to the units, which resulted in unit commanders not having 
important information about their unit conversions. ANG headquarters 
developed the computer-based information-sharing system in June 2006 to 
facilitate frequent communication and to provide updates on the status 
of implementation and requirements for each unit. However, ANG 
headquarters only provided access to this system on March 9, 2007, 
approximately 10 months after it was created.[Footnote 28] The system, 
informally called "dashboard," lists all actions related to BRAC and 
Total Force Integration by state and unit and provides dates for key 
implementation milestones and requirements for each unit. According to 
the Director, ANG, the release was delayed until the President's budget 
was finalized. 

Our prior work has identified that a best practice for organizations 
undergoing a major transformation includes establishing a communication 
strategy specific to the transformational action that communicates 
progress and expectations. Importantly, we have identified that such a 
strategy should include means for providing specific information to 
meet the needs of stakeholders, and that the strategy should identify 
the importance of communicating early and often to build trust with 
stakeholders. Furthermore, we have found that promoting two-way 
communication is important for major transformations to ensure the 
transformation's successful completion.[Footnote 29] 

ANG headquarters has recently created a draft Strategic Communication 
Plan, but we found this plan to be general in scope and not specific to 
BRAC implementation. Specifically, this plan identifies key 
stakeholders and general tools for communicating information to the 
public and ANG stakeholders, but it focuses more on managing the ANG 
"brand" through specific talking points for use in external 
communications. Airmen, unit commanders, and state adjutants general 
are identified as being target audiences, but there is no specific 
discussion of how ANG headquarters will provide information to them. 
For example, although the purpose of the plan is to improve trust 
between all stakeholders by delivering consistent, frequent, and 
relevant communications, it does not identify exactly what specific 
tools ANG headquarters will use to communicate information to each 
affected unit. Instead, the plan generally discusses the use of news 
media and the ANG Web site to promote the ANG brand, messages, and 
initiatives. ANG headquarters also has a section in the instruction 
document they use to guide the unit conversion process that assigns 
responsibilities for communications during the unit conversion process 
to the communications and information directorate, but this section 
does not discuss communicating any information to the affected 
units.[Footnote 30] 

No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC 
Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over 
All BRAC-Related ANG Costs: 

Compared to cost estimates contained in the BRAC Commission's report, 
our analysis of the Air Force's current estimates to implement ANG- 
related BRAC actions indicates that there will be net annual recurring 
costs rather than net annual recurring savings, and one-time costs are 
projected to increase by $68 million (13.5 percent). Furthermore, 
Congress has not been given full visibility over all BRAC-related 
implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs 
funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC- 
related costs. Air Force budget submissions have not provided complete 
and transparent information on the costs to implement BRAC-related 
actions because the Air Force decided to fund some costs required to 
establish replacement missions outside of the BRAC account and did not 
report these costs in its annual BRAC budget. 

Current Estimates Indicate Annual Recurring Costs Rather Than Annual 
Recurring Savings for ANG Recommendations: 

Although the BRAC Commission projected that the recommendations 
affecting ANG would result in estimated annual recurring savings of $26 
million, our analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that 
there will be annual recurring costs of $53 million instead (see app. 
III).[Footnote 31] However, Air Force officials still expect to realize 
annual recurring savings overall as a result of other BRAC actions 
affecting the active and reserve components. 

The change in estimates occurred primarily due to language in the 
Commission's report that prevents the Air Force from reducing its 
current end strength in some states.[Footnote 32] For example, annual 
recurring savings decreased an estimated $33 million from BRAC 
Commission projections in the recommendation to realign ANG units at 
Otis, Massachusetts; St. Louis, Missouri; and Atlantic City, New 
Jersey.[Footnote 33] These projections were based on the elimination of 
about 240 positions. Furthermore, annual recurring savings decreased an 
estimated $55 million in seven recommendations[Footnote 34] from BRAC 
Commission projections. According to Air Force officials, these BRAC 
Commission projections were based on the assumption that additional 
positions would be eliminated in the seven recommendations to realign 
other ANG units. However, since no positions could be eliminated from 
those states as a result of BRAC--and, overall, ANG headquarters 
reassigned affected positions elsewhere rather than reducing end 
strength--those projected savings will not materialize. Thus, in 
preparing the business plans the Air Force had to reduce the projected 
savings for these recommendations. 

In addition, our analysis revealed that the BRAC Commission's projected 
savings related to facilities maintenance are not likely to be 
realized. DOD facilities' maintenance costs[Footnote 35] are partly 
tied to the number of personnel positions and the mission assigned at a 
particular facility. Since there will be no personnel eliminations and 
limited facility eliminations across ANG, the associated facility 
maintenance savings that would have occurred as a result of personnel 
eliminations will not be realized. Air Force BRAC project management 
officials concurred with our analysis. For example, savings estimates 
included in the BRAC Commission report in the recommendation affecting 
ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City would have saved about 
$11 million annually. In its updated estimates for this recommendation, 
the Air Force projects an annual cost of about $1 million in facilities 
maintenance for these installations. 

ANG One-Time Implementation Cost Estimates Have Increased: 

The estimated one-time costs to implement 2005 BRAC recommendations 
affecting ANG are also projected to increase. One-time implementation 
costs include military construction costs and other costs associated 
with moving personnel and equipment. In comparison to the BRAC 
Commission estimates, our analysis of current Air Force estimated 
implementation costs (see app. IV) indicates that one-time 
implementation cost estimates for recommendations affecting ANG have 
increased by a net of $68 million (13.5 percent) primarily due to 
updated construction requirements and inflation,[Footnote 36] as seen 
in table 3. 

Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs: 

Dollars in millions. 

Military construction; 
BRAC Commission estimate: $247; 
Current Air Force estimate: $366; 
Difference: $119. 

Other[A]; 
BRAC Commission estimate: 257; 
Current Air Force estimate: 206; 
Difference: (51). 

Total; 
BRAC Commission estimate: $504; 
Current Air Force estimate: $572; 
Difference: $68. 

Source: GAO Analysis of BRAC Commission and Air Force data. 

[A] Other includes costs associated with moving personnel and 
equipment. 

[End of table] 

Although updated site surveys that clarified requirements for mission 
changes resulted in decreased cost estimates for some activities, the 
survey process revealed an estimated $119 million in additional 
military construction requirements, causing the overall estimate of one-
time costs to increase.[Footnote 37] For example, estimated military 
construction costs to close Kulis, Air Guard Station, Alaska, and 
transfer the mission to Elmendorf, Air Force Base, Alaska, increased by 
$87 million. Air Force officials determined that there was inadequate 
utility capacity within the proposed development area to support new 
missions, and that an engineer training complex, an upgraded fuel cell 
maintenance hangar, and an upgraded helicopter maintenance hangar were 
required. Likewise, estimated military construction costs in the 
recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic 
City increased by $46 million after site surveys at those locations 
determined the existing squadron operations facilities were too small 
to support the new mission requirements, and the affected ANG units did 
not have facilities to meet the Air Sovereignty Alert mission 
requirement. In addition, other one-time cost estimates decreased by a 
net of $51 million.[Footnote 38] According to Air Force officials, 
these estimates decreased primarily due to the Commission language that 
retained personnel at the realigning bases. The greatest decreases were 
in training and civilian personnel severance and relocation costs that 
were not required because positions were not realigned. For example, 
estimated other one-time costs to realign Springfield Air Guard 
Station, Ohio, decreased by $14 million. 

Congress Has Not Been Given Full Visibility over All ANG BRAC-Related 
Implementation Costs: 

Congress has not been given full visibility over all ANG BRAC-related 
implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs 
funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC- 
related costs. The Air Force is funding about $309 million for military 
construction, equipment, and training to establish replacement missions 
for 14 ANG units who lost their flying missions outside the BRAC 
account, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC 
Account: 

Dollars in millions. 

Military construction; 
Estimated cost[ A]: $136. 

Equipment[B]; 
Estimated cost[ A]: 101. 

Training; 
Estimated cost[ A]: 68. 

Other; 
Estimated cost[ A]: 4. 

Total; 
Estimated cost[ A]: $309. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

[A] Air Force officials stated that the process of developing these 
cost estimates is ongoing and may understate the ultimate actual costs. 

[B] We did not include the equipment costs for three Predator 
replacement missions with a combined estimated equipment cost of about 
$400 million because the equipment is an Air Force-controlled asset and 
not under the direct control of ANG. We also did not include military 
construction or equipment costs for five joint cargo aircraft missions 
because the Air Force cannot determine these costs until the aircraft 
is selected. 

[End of table] 

The Air Force estimates are based on combined costs to replace 30 
missions for the 14 affected units. For example, the estimate of $136 
million for military construction includes about $23 million for major 
renovations and new facilities for the Predator mission at March Air 
Reserve Base in California. The projected cost of $101 million for new 
equipment includes $64 million for equipment associated with the 
Distributed Ground System missions assigned to units in Indiana, 
Kansas, and Massachusetts. The estimated training costs include $27 
million to recruit and train approximately 440 operations and 
maintenance personnel in a St. Louis ANG unit that will associate with 
the active B-2 wing at Whiteman Air Force Base. 

None of these costs are reported in the section of the Air Force's BRAC 
budget submission that would identify one-time costs funded outside of 
the BRAC account. Air Force officials informed us that the BRAC Closure 
Executive Group decided to fund all costs to establish replacement 
missions for the units losing their flying mission outside of the BRAC 
account. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and 
Logistics decided not to report replacement mission costs as BRAC- 
related costs because the Commission did not direct a specific 
replacement mission for the affected units. Nevertheless, the BRAC 
Commission report recommended that personnel in affected units should 
remain in place, assume a new mission, and where appropriate be 
retrained in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Although the 
Commission did not direct specific replacement missions, the language 
in the report requires DOD to provide replacement missions. Therefore, 
any costs associated with establishing replacement missions are BRAC- 
related. 

Conclusions: 

The successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations and 
establishment of new missions depend on the ability of ANG headquarters 
to execute hundreds of sequential actions in a very tight sequence with 
little room for delays. While ANG headquarters has developed various 
implementation plans, challenges remain that could delay when units are 
fully capable of performing their new mission. Furthermore, any delay 
or change in schedule could have a domino effect and impact other 
planned actions. The absence of a strategy that addresses mitigation of 
these and other challenges that may arise and is shared with all 
stakeholders increases the risk that delays will occur. Effective 
development of such a strategy for the BRAC implementation process 
would enable ANG headquarters to measure progress towards their goals; 
determine strategies and resources needed to effectively meet these 
goals; and identify strategies to meet goals that were not met due to 
implementation challenges. Further, improved communication between ANG 
headquarters and the affected units is essential to provide unit 
commanders with timely information to ensure they can train and recruit 
personnel to perform their new missions as planned. The lack of a 
communication strategy, specific to the BRAC implementation, period 
that addresses how ANG headquarters will provide frequently changing 
information as required by the units to carry out BRAC implementation 
increases the risk that implementation actions may not occur as 
scheduled. 

It is important for congressional decision makers to have complete 
information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions as they 
deliberate the budget. The Air Force is providing incomplete cost 
information by not including the costs to establish replacement 
missions for units that lost their flying mission in its annual budget 
submission. Including these costs in the BRAC budget would provide 
Congress with more complete and transparent information to implement 
BRAC and assist it in evaluating BRAC budget appropriation requests. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In order to ensure management of BRAC implementation challenges, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, National 
Guard Bureau, to task the Director, Air National Guard, with the 
following. 

* Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that 
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation 
challenges. At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames for 
actions and responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the 
ability of ANG headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential 
delays in interim milestones. 

* Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG 
headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the information 
needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. 

In order to provide more complete and transparent ANG BRAC cost 
information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Air Force to report in the Air Force annual BRAC 
budget submission the costs and source of funding required to establish 
replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying missions 
as a result of BRAC 2005. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with two recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation. 
DOD's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. 
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into 
this report as appropriate.  

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard, to 
develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that 
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation 
challenges throughout the BRAC implementation process. DOD suggested 
that we modify the recommendation to reflect that the Director, Air 
National Guard, is normally tasked by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. 
We changed the recommendation to reflect DOD's position because it 
clarifies accountability and respects the chain of command while still 
implementing the substance of our recommendation. DOD also stated that 
mitigation plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly 
vetted with all of the key stakeholders. At the same time, however, it 
is important to note that BRAC recommendations are required by law to 
be completed by September 15, 2011, and the limited time available 
coupled with the complexity of implementation actions led us to make 
this recommendation. Therefore, while we agree that the mitigation 
plans should be vetted with all of the key stakeholders, it will be 
important to do this in a timely manner. Further, we believe that 
affected state adjutants general are key stakeholders and as such 
should be included in the process to vet these plans. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 
Director, Air National Guard, expand the Strategic Communication Plan 
to include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG units 
with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. DOD 
stated that it is incumbent upon ANG and all affected units to maximize 
established chains of leadership and communication to effectively 
manage and execute BRAC actions. We agree. Our report points out that 
units are using the existing established chains of leadership and 
communication to ANG headquarters but the communication from ANG 
headquarters is nonetheless ad hoc and not adequate to meet their 
needs. Further, the Director, ANG, acknowledges that there are 
challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit 
commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to 
implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Air Force provide 
more complete and transparent cost information by including in its 
annual BRAC budget submission the costs required to establish 
replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying mission 
as a result of BRAC 2005. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC- 
related because establishment of replacement missions was not part of 
the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct 
specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC 
Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain 
all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate retrain 
personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we 
believe the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and 
should be reported in the Air Force's annual BRAC budget submission. 
DOD also stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to establish these 
missions and that the costs in question have been appropriately 
programmed and budgeted in the Air Force's regular military 
construction account. In making our recommendation, it was not our 
intent to prescribe which funds should be used to establish replacement 
missions but rather to recommend that DOD provide more complete and 
transparent cost reporting about these BRAC related costs. DOD said it 
was willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these 
costs. As a result, we modified our recommendation to include that DOD 
identify the source of funding for these costs in its BRAC budget 
documentation. Further, we continue to believe that the annual BRAC 
budget documentation would be the most complete and transparent place 
for DOD to report the costs to establish replacement missions because 
this documentation is used in evaluating BRAC implementation costs. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director, 
National Guard; the Director, ANG; and the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://wwww.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Additional contacts and staff 
acknowledgements are provided in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Brian Lepore, Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs, and 
Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

We performed our work at the Air Force Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Office, Air National Guard (ANG) headquarters, and in various 
states which had ANG units affected by the BRAC 2005 recommendations. 
We selected states to visit that had BRAC actions scheduled early in 
the 6-year implementation period and also had units that were going to 
lose, reduce, convert, or increase their flying mission or associate 
with another unit as a result of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. We 
visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in 
Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from 
state ANG officials in Mississippi. At all states except Indiana and 
Virginia we spoke with either the adjutant general, assistant adjutant 
general, or both; at every unit we spoke with the wing commanders or 
the deputy wing commanders of affected units. In Indiana, we spoke with 
the wing commanders and the deputy wing commanders, and in Virginia we 
spoke with the Virginia ANG chief executive officer. 

To assess the process the Air Force used to assign new missions to 
units that lost their flying mission, we interviewed all stakeholders 
to the process. These stakeholders included officials in the Total 
Force Integration Office, Headquarters Air Force; the Office of 
Transformation, ANG, and the aforementioned state ANG officials to 
determine how new flying missions were assigned to ANG units. In 
addition, we compared the banded list of potential missions developed 
by Air Force headquarters to the missions assigned by ANG headquarters 
to the affected units. 

To determine the progress that ANG headquarters has made in 
implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, we reviewed the BRAC 
business plans, the ANG aircraft movement plan, and the new mission 
plan by state for ANG units affected by BRAC. We interviewed officials 
in ANG headquarters, including the Director, ANG, and interviewed or 
obtained written responses from ANG officials in 11 states regarding 
these plans and to identity any challenges the Air Force faces in 
implementing the BRAC recommendations. We reviewed Air Force 
Instructions and Policy documents regarding Unit Manning Documents 
(UMD) and interviewed ANG headquarters manpower officials to obtain 
information on their plan for developing the unit manning documents and 
requirements templates for the affected units. We also reviewed 
documentation pertaining to the training requirements for new missions 
and for pilots converting to a new aircraft, and compared these 
requirements to the allocation of seats in pilot training schools for 
ANG for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to determine the likelihood of 
adequate pilot training seats being available. We interviewed officials 
in the Air Force Office of Total Force Integration and ANG training 
officials on their plans to address and mitigate these training 
shortfalls, and spoke with ANG officials in Texas about the training 
mission assigned to Ellington. To determine the impact of funding 
delays, we spoke with ANG officials including the Comptroller of ANG, 
and reviewed ANG documentation pertaining to funding delays. To assess 
the degree to which the states were aware of 2005 BRAC-related changes 
that were required for their units, we conducted interviews or field 
visits with or obtained written responses from senior ANG leadership 
and wing commanders from 11 states that had units that were impacted by 
BRAC. We asked these officials their perspective on communications with 
ANG headquarters, and to describe any challenges that they faced in 
BRAC implementation. We also met with ANG headquarters officials that 
were responsible for communicating 2005 BRAC changes with the states, 
including the A/8 Office of Transformation and the A/1 Manpower Office. 
We were briefed on the internal interface system called "dashboard" 
that ANG headquarters had developed for an eventual "roll out" to the 
states and units that would provide the affected units with 
transformation updates, and reviewed the information available on this 
system. 

To assess changes to projected costs and savings, we compared DOD's 
current estimates to the estimates in the BRAC 2005 Commission report. 
BRAC Commission estimates are based on DOD's quantitative model, known 
as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). DOD has used the COBRA 
model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, has improved 
upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In our past 
and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a generally 
reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among 
various BRAC options. Air Force estimates did not segregate the ANG- 
related costs and annual recurring savings of the Air Force 
recommendations. Therefore, ANG officials provided us with the current 
estimated implementation costs from a Web-based tool, BRAC Management 
Tool (BMT). On the basis of that information, we were able to extract 
the estimated ANG related costs and savings of the BRAC 2005 Commission 
report, as well as the current estimated annual recurring costs. The 
Air Force BRAC Project Management Office identified a number of issues 
with our results. After reviewing their issues, we updated the data 
accordingly and satisfied their concerns. To determine the reasons why 
DOD's current estimates changed compared to the Commission's estimates, 
we interviewed officials at the Air Force BRAC Project Management 
Office, ANG headquarters, and reviewed explanations documented in the 
Air Force business plans and decision memorandums. Finally, to identify 
costs being funded outside of the BRAC account, we reviewed Air Force 
budget submissions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as well as obtained 
data from the Air Force Total Force Integration office on the estimated 
funding for equipment, military construction, and training to establish 
the cost of replacement missions for units that lost their flying 
mission due to the BRAC recommendations. We assessed the reliability of 
the Air Force Total Force Integration and BRAC Management Tool data by 
interviewing knowledgeable officials and determined the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost Their 
Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005: 

Replacement missions: Affected units: March, CA; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: Predator; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: Joint Space Operations Center[A]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Bradley, CT; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: Component Numbered Air Force (CNAF)[B]; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft [C]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Capital, IL; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Terre Haute, IN; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: Distributed Ground System (DGS)[D]; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: Air Support Operations Squadron 
(ASOS)[E]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: McConnell, KS; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: DGS; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Otis, MA; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: DGS, CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Kellogg, MI; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: St Louis, MO; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: B2 Association with Whiteman 
AFB[F]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Key Field, MS; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Mansfield, OH; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy 
Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (Red Horse)[G]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Springfield, OH; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: Measurement & Signatures Intelligence[H]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: F-16 training unit [I]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Willow Grove, PA; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: CNAF; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: Red Horse; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Nashville, TN; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: Classified, Intelligence Production; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Ellington, TX; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: Predator; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: ASOS; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: Intelligence Training[J]; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: [Empty]; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: [Empty]. 

Replacement missions: Affected units: Total; 
Replacement missions: Band 1: 12; 
Replacement missions: Band 2: 6; 
Replacement missions: Band 3: 1; 
Replacement missions: Band 4: 4; 
Replacement missions: Flying mission: 7. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data. 

[A] A Joint Space Operations Center integrates various joint-space 
capabilities to provide shared situational awareness to commanders and 
troops on the ground. 

[B] A Component Numbered Air Force is a combination of up to three 
separate missions, including an Air Operations Center (AOC, which 
includes Operations, Planning, Strategy, Intelligence, and Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance components), an Air Mobility Division (AMD), and an 
Air Force Forces group (AFFOR). 

[C] The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be a new, small, tactical 
airlift aircraft that has not yet been procured by the Air Force. 
According to senior ANG leadership, the JCA may not be ready for 
deployment until between 2012 to 2015. 

[D] A Distributed Ground System processes intelligence information. 

[E] An Air Support Operations Squadron provides support to ground 
forces by facilitating Air Force air strikes. 

[F] ANG personnel will operate B-2s at Whiteman in conjunction with 
active-duty Air Force personnel. 

[G] A Red Horse, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair 
Squadron Engineers, supports contingency and special operations 
missions with mobile, self-sufficient civil engineers. 

[H] Measurement & Signatures Intelligence units employ a variety of 
intelligence gathering techniques including advanced radar, electro- 
optical/ infrared, and materials sensing. 

[I] The Foreign Military Sales--F-16s unit is a school for foreign 
countries that acquire F-16s and require training. The FMS school at 
Springfield will train Dutch pilots. 

[J] This intelligence training unit will provide additional 
intelligence instructors for the school at Goodfellow, Texas. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings between 
the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and Current Air Force Estimates, for 
ANG-Related Recommendations: 

Dollars in millions. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and 
Atlantic City, NJ; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: $(27.875); 
Current estimated savings: $5.399; 
Difference: $33.274. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Great Falls, MT; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.050; 
Current estimated savings: 12.735; 
Difference: 12.685. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Martin State, MD; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (8.597); 
Current estimated savings: 0.117; 
Difference: 8.714. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and 
Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.339); 
Current estimated savings: 0.505; 
Difference: 6.844. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Mansfield, OH; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.708); 
Current estimated savings: 0.107; 
Difference: 6.815. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: March, CA; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (4.045); 
Current estimated savings: 2.749; 
Difference: 6.794. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force 
Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations[A]; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 17.008; 
Current estimated savings: 23.461; 
Difference: 6.453. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Boise, ID; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (6.291); 
Current estimated savings: 0.000; 
Difference: 6.291. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Grand Forks, ND; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 17.177; 
Current estimated savings: 20.905; 
Difference: 3.728. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (4.923); 
Current estimated savings: (1.642); 
Difference: 3.281. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Springfield, OH; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.524); 
Current estimated savings: 0.005; 
Difference: 2.529. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Nashville, TN; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.880); 
Current estimated savings: 1.568; 
Difference: 2.448. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Capital, IL and Hulman, IN; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.003); 
Current estimated savings: 0.070; 
Difference: 2.073. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Niagara Falls, NY; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.258); 
Current estimated savings: 1.504; 
Difference: 1.762. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Kulis and Elmendorf, AK; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (10.779); 
Current estimated savings: (9.059); 
Difference: 1.720. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Kellogg, MI; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (1.480); 
Current estimated savings: 0.042; 
Difference: 1.522. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, 
and Elmendorf, AK; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 9.072; 
Current estimated savings: 10.547; 
Difference: 1.475. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Portland, OR; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (7.004); 
Current estimated savings: (5.658); 
Difference: 1.346. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Hector, ND; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (1.016); 
Current estimated savings: 0.023; 
Difference: 1.039. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Key Field, MS; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.939); 
Current estimated savings: 0.010; 
Difference: 0.949. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Fairchild, WA; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.925); 
Current estimated savings: (0.153); 
Difference: 0.772. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, 
Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.508); 
Current estimated savings: 0.237; 
Difference: 0.745. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Ellington, TX; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (0.327); 
Current estimated savings: (0.090); 
Difference: 0.237. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: New Orleans, LA--F100 Engine 
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.140; 
Current estimated savings: 0.151; 
Difference: 0.011. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Willow Grove and Cambria, PA[A]; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (14.923); 
Current estimated savings: (14.923); 
Difference: 0.000. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Robins, GA; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 0.000; 
Current estimated savings: 0.000; 
Difference: 0.000. 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Lackland, TX; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: (2.902); 
Current estimated savings: (3.640); 
Difference: (0.738). 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Selfridge, MI and Beale, CA; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 12.808; 
Current estimated savings: 4.536; 
Difference: (8.272). 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Fort Smith, AR and Luke, AZ; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 12.674; 
Current estimated savings: 3.613; 
Difference: (9.061). 

Recommendations affecting ANG unites: Cannon, NM; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: 16.425; 
Current estimated savings: 0.000; 
Difference: (16.425). 

Total; 
BRAC Commission savings estimates (savings)/costs: $(25.892); 
Current estimated savings: $53.119; 
Difference: $79.011. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006). 

[A] Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC Recommendations 
Affecting ANG: 

Dollars in millions. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Kulis And Elmendorf, AK; 
Military construction: 174.569; 
Other costs[A]: 7.249; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 181.818. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and 
Atlantic City, NJ; 
Military construction: 66.340; 
Other costs[A]: 27.718; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 94.058. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force 
Leased Locations & National Guard Headquarters Leased Locations[B]; 
Military construction: 55.320; 
Other costs[A]: 3.431; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 58.751. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, 
Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, MD; 
Military construction: 11.931; 
Other costs[A]: 23.456; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 35.387. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Capital, IL, and Hulman, IN; 
Military construction: 6.104; 
Other costs[A]: 9.750; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.854. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: March, CA; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 15.821; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.821. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and 
Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX; 
Military construction: 5.014; 
Other costs[A]: 10.542; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 15.556. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Mansfield, OH; 
Military construction: 3.479; 
Other costs[A]: 10.885; 
Total one- time implementation costs: 14.364. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Selfridge, MI, and Beale, CA; 
Military construction: 4.360; 
Other costs[A]: 9.196; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 13.556. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Grand Forks, ND; 
Military construction: 5.232; 
Other costs[A]: 6.207; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 11.439. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Fairchild, WA; 
Military construction: 6.104; 
Other costs[A]: 4.091; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 10.195. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA; 
Military construction: 0.061; 
Other costs[A]: 9.935; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 9.996. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Hector, ND; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 8.950; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.950. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Ellington, TX; 
Military construction: 2.884; 
Other costs[A]: 5.544; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.428. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Lackland, TX; 
Military construction: 7.303; 
Other costs[A]: 1.056; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 8.359. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Great Falls, MT; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 7.999; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.999. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Program Management, Various 
Locations[C]; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 7.730; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.730. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: New Orleans, LA F100 Engine 
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities; 
Military construction: 7.185; 
Other costs[A]: 0.004; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 7.189. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Portland, OR; 
Military construction: 1.299; 
Other costs[A]: 5.648; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 6.947. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and 
Elmendorf, AK; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 4.763; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.763. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Kellogg, MI; 
Military construction: 2.066; 
Other costs[A]: 2.682; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.748. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Niagara Falls, NY; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 4.430; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 4.430. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Cannon, NM; 
Military construction: 0.000; 
Other costs[A]: 3.918; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 3.918. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Robins, GA; 
Military construction: 2.812; 
Other costs[A]: 0.721; 
Total one-time implementation costs: 3.533. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Martin State, MD. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Key Field, MS. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Springfield, OH. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Willow Grove and Cambria, PA[B]. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Boise, ID. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Nashville, TN. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Fort Smith, AR And Luke, AZ. 

Recommendations affecting ANG units: Total; 
Military construction: $365.662; 
Other costs[A]: $205.939; 
Total one- time implementation costs: $571.601. 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006). 

[A] Other costs include costs associated with moving personnel and 
equipment. 

[B] Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard. 

[C] Our analysis indicated that Program Management Costs (if any) were 
included in each recommendation. On the basis of the information we 
received from Air Force officials, Program Management Costs were 
calculated separately for the current estimates of one-time costs. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
9000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20901-3000: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 

May 04 2007: 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO 
draft report, "Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to 
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations," dated April 4, 
2007, (GAO Code 350913/GAO-07-641). 

The Department partially agrees with two of the draft report 
recommendations concerning development of a mitigation strategy for 
implementation challenges and expansion of existing communications, 
building on the existing business plan process. However, the Department 
strongly disagrees with GAO's recommendation to "report" new mission 
cost in its annual Base Realignment and Closure budget because the 
Department's annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related 
costs. Elsewhere in its draft report, GAO characterizes new mission 
costs as "BRAC-related" costs that should be part of the BRAC budget 
submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization. 
Establishment of replacement missions, as directed by the Commission, 
are not part of these recommendations and, therefore, not actions 
necessary for implementation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these 
purposes. 

The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted 
in the Air Force's regular military construction account to support 
these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its oral 
comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated with 
new mission requirements and making sure Congress has visibility on 
these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the 
impression that they are "BRAC-related costs". The Department is 
willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs 
and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation. 

The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendations in the 
report are outlined in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the 
work performed by the GAO in this regard and appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Philip W. Grone: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated April 4, 2007 GAO Code 350913/GAO-07-641: 

"Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to develop a mitigation 
strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, 
identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges throughout 
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) implementation process. At a 
minimum, this strategy should include timeframes for actions, 
responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of ANG 
headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim 
milestones. 

DOD Response: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. As 
part of the National Guard Bureau (NGB), the ANG Directorate would 
normally be tasked by the Secretary of Defense through the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau as the agency head. Therefore, we believe the 
appropriate recommendation should read as follows: 

"The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, 
National Guard Bureau to task the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) to 
develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that 
anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation 
challenges throughout the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
implementation process." 

The Department will develop a mitigation strategy that expands 
stakeholder participation, building on the business plan process. 
However, implementation planning is a dynamic process; one which often 
involves working with each state separately to develop and refine 
tailored courses of action. In many cases these plans cannot be 
released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the key 
stakeholders. An unintended consequence of this process is that it may 
lead some to conclude that it is delayed when it is not. We agree that 
once a plan is developed and coordinated, the information should be 
made available to all affected parties. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Director, Air National Guard to expand the Strategic 
Communication Plan to include how ANG headquarters will provide the 
affected units with the information needed to implement the BRAC 
related actions. 

DOD Response: DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. 
Communication is critical to the successful accomplishment of tasks and 
achievement of goals. It is incumbent upon the ANG and all effected 
units to maximize established chains of leadership and communication to 
effectively manage and execute BRAC actions. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to "report" in its annual BRAC 
budget submission the costs required to establish replacement missions 
for units that will lose their flying mission as a result of BRAC 2005. 

DOD Response: The DoD non-concurs with the GAO recommendation to 
"report" new mission cost in its annual BRAC budget because the 
Department's annual BRAC budget properly includes only BRAC-related 
costs. Elsewhere in the report GAO characterizes new mission costs as 
"BRAC-related" costs that should be considered part of the BRAC budget 
submission. The Department disagrees with this characterization. BRAC 
2005 funds are only available to fund actions necessary to implement 
the BRAC 2005 recommendations. Establishment of replacement missions is 
not part of the recommendation and, therefore, not actions necessary to 
implement the recommendation. BRAC funds cannot be used for these 
purposes. The costs in question have been appropriately programmed and 
budgeted in the Air Force's regular military construction account to 
support these independent actions. As the Department indicated in its 
oral comments, we have no issue with identifying the cost associated 
with new mission requirements and ensuring Congress has visibility of 
these costs. However, we must do so in a way that does not give the 
impression that they are "BRAC-related costs". The Department is 
willing to caveat the BRAC budget documentation to annotate these costs 
and state they are reflected elsewhere in our budget documentation. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant 
Director; Ronald Bergman; Susan Ditto; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; 
James Madar; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key contributions to 
this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

[2] The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended 
by Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX) provides for an independent 
Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's realignment and closure 
recommendations and present its findings and conclusions on the 
Secretary's recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the 
President. 

[3] In an associate unit, a unit from one component (i.e., active, 
guard, or reserve) of the Air Force operates and maintains equipment 
that it shares with a unit from another component. By sharing 
equipment, the Air Force seeks to train more people and make more 
efficient use of the equipment. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904, as amended (1990). 

[5] 31 U.S.C. §717. 

[6] The Air Force Total Force Integration Office (A8F) was previously 
known as the Future Total Force Office. 

[7] The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau is hereafter 
referred to as ANG headquarters. 

[8] We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia. We also held video conferences with state ANG officials in 
Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from 
state ANG officials in Mississippi. 

[9] In conducting our work, we spoke with senior state and ANG unit 
commanders, including adjutants general and assistant adjutants 
general, as well as the wing commanders and some deputy wing commanders 
of affected units. 

[10] BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 
dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, 
which includes inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation 
period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. 
The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are 
incurred. 

[11] The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as 
the Air and Space Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, 
and Guard into one component that trains, deploys, and operates 
together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, tankers, and 
tactical air lifters. 

[12] 10 U.S.C. § 10501. 

[13] The directorate is staffed with representatives from stakeholder 
organizations including the Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force 
Reserve Command, and several states. 

[14] The Navy is the executive agent for one recommendation affecting 
ANG. 

[15] Program Budget Decision 720. 

[16] ANG headquarters also used the banded list to assign missions to 
units affected by other force structure changes that were occurring 
outside of BRAC. 

[17] The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a new, small airlift aircraft the 
Air Force plans to acquire. 

[18] Units assigned the joint cargo aircraft as a replacement mission 
that previously flew the C-130 are Mansfield, Ohio, and Nashville, 
Tennessee. The ANG unit at Key Field, Mississippi, previously flew the 
KC-135 air tanker and the ANG unit at Kellogg, Michigan, previously 
flew the A-10. 

[19] ANG has planned for two phases of mission capability for units 
converting to a new mission: Initial Operational Capability, and Full 
Operational Capability. According to ANG officials, Initial Operational 
Capability is a variable term that can apply to any predetermined level 
of partial capability, depending on the unit and mission, while Full 
Operational Capability is achieved when unit commanders report that the 
unit is ready to perform its mission. ANG officials stated that the 
conversion process typically takes approximately 4 years to complete. 

[20] One of the missions that ANG units perform is the homeland defense 
Air Sovereignty Alert mission, where fighter aircraft stationed around 
the country are always ready and available to intercept potentially 
hostile aircraft. 

[21] In addition to the replacement missions assigned to the 14 units 
losing their flying mission, ANG also assigned new Total Force 
Integration missions to nearly every U.S. state and territory in a 
simultaneous process unrelated to BRAC. 

[22] Major commands identified by ANG headquarters include Air Force 
Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. 

[23] Though these school shortfalls may not be caused by implementation 
of the BRAC recommendations, they may be exacerbated by the number of 
pilots converting to a new airframe as a result of the BRAC 
recommendations. 

[24] ANG officials stated that this solution may require pilots to 
temporarily relocate to another unit if their home unit does not yet 
have the new aircraft on the ground. This process results in increased 
costs for ANG. 

[25] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[26] DOD did not receive a permanent appropriation for military 
construction until Congress replaced the continuing resolutions with a 
permanent appropriation for fiscal year 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-05, 
February 15, 2007. 

[27] The ANG base at Kulis, Alaska, is required by BRAC to close; all 
personnel and aircraft from the 176th wing will relocate to the Air 
Force base at Elmendorf, which will require significant construction in 
order to accommodate the equipment. Barnes is directed to take the Air 
Sovereignty Alert mission from Otis, Massachusetts, which will require 
construction of an alert facility and other additional buildings. 

[28] The Air Force Total Force Integration office has a similar Web- 
based database that provides details for all the Total Force 
Integration missions that is accessible to the state leadership and 
unit commanders. However, one field commander that we spoke with stated 
that the system is of limited utility due to frequently changing 
information. Additionally, this system does not discuss any of the BRAC 
changes or how timing of all actions will occur. 

[29] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

[30] Air National Guard Instruction 10-406, March 10, 2006. 

[31] The estimates of the annual recurring savings associated with 24 
of the 30 recommendations affecting ANG decreased by a total of $114 
million and the estimated annual recurring savings for 4 increased by a 
total of $35 million. 

[32] The language affected Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia. 

[33] The projected $33 million decrease in annual recurring savings was 
primarily due to the elimination of personnel and facilities 
maintenance savings. 

[34] These seven recommendations affected ANG units at (1) Great Falls, 
Montana; (2) Martin State, Maryland; (3) Andrews, Maryland; Will Rogers 
and Tinker, Oklahoma; and Randolph, Texas; (4) Mansfield, Ohio; (5) 
March, California; (6) co-located miscellaneous Air Force leased 
locations and National Guard headquarters leased locations; and (7) 
Boise, Idaho. 

[35] Facilities maintenance costs include sustainment, 
recapitalization, and base operating support costs. 

[36] BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 
dollars, whereas budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, 
which include inflation. Over the 2006 through 2011 implementation 
period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 15 percent. 
The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are 
incurred. 

[37] There were 25 recommendations in which there was a change in 
estimated military construction costs. In 14 recommendations estimated 
military construction costs increased by a total of $168 million and in 
11 recommendations estimated military construction costs decreased by a 
total of $49 million. 

[38] There were 31 recommendations in which there was a change in 
estimated one-time costs. In 19 recommendations, estimated other one- 
time costs decreased by a total of $121 million and in 12 
recommendations estimated other one-time costs increased by a total of 
$70 million. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. 
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, 
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202) 
512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm: 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, D.C. 20548: