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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

April 2007: 

Transportation Security: 

DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant Background Check Investigations: 

GAO-07-756: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-756, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 9/11, the federal government has taken steps to ensure that 
transportation workers are screened to ensure that they do not pose a 
security risk. However, the number of DHS background check programs has 
raised concerns that such workers may be subject to redundant 
background check programs. The Security and Accountability for Every 
Port Act of 2006 required GAO to conduct a study of those DHS 
background check programs similar to the one required of truck drivers 
to obtain a hazardous material endorsement (HME). For this study, GAO 
examined DHS background check programs to identify (1) potential 
redundancies and inconsistencies, if any, connected with these 
programs, and (2) actions, if any, DHS is taking or planning to 
coordinate its background check programs. To address these objectives, 
GAO examined selected background check programs, interviewed DHS 
officials and private stakeholders, and reviewed relevant documents. 

What GAO Found: 

The six programs GAO reviewed—HME, Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential, Merchant Mariner Document, Free and Secure Trade, Secure 
Identification Display Areas, and Air Cargo—are conducted independently 
of one another and collect similar information and use similar 
background check processes. Also, each program operates separate 
enrollment facilities to collect background information and does not 
share it with the other programs. In some cases, GAO found variations 
in the fees applicants are charged, as well as differences in 
disqualifying offenses and renewal requirements between the programs. 
Redundant background checks will affect program costs to workers and 
the government, for example through inefficient use of existing 
facilities. However, DHS does not keep track of the number of those 
workers who, needing multiple credentials, are subjected to multiple 
background check programs. Thus, DHS is not able to determine either 
potential costs associated with redundant checks or potential benefits 
to be derived from eliminating redundant checks by aligning the 
background check requirements to make the programs more consistent. 

Several DHS components are in the initial stages of initiatives to 
consolidate, coordinate, and align background check programs, thereby 
potentially reducing redundancies among these programs. For example, in 
January 2007, TSA determined that the background checks required for an 
HME, Free and Secure Trade card, and Merchant Mariner Document issued 
during certain periods satisfy the background check requirement for a 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential. In addition, the 
Screening Coordination Office (SCO) was established in July 2006, in 
part, to coordinate DHS screening programs. In December 2006, SCO 
issued a report identifying common problems, challenges, and needed 
improvements in the credentialing programs and processes across the 
department. The SCO awarded a contract in April 2007 that will provide 
the methodology and support for developing an implementation plan to 
include common design and comparability standards and related 
milestones to coordinate DHS screening and credentialing programs. At 
the time of GAO’s review, DHS did not have a plan with budget 
requirements or implementation steps, and related milestones for 
consolidating, coordinating, and aligning its screening programs. Prior 
GAO work has shown that it is essential to establish long-term action-
oriented implementation goals and a time frame with milestone dates to 
track an organization’s progress toward its goals and that 
uncoordinated program efforts can exceed budget requirements. Further, 
other federal agencies have background check programs as well. A 
governmentwide examination of such programs is beyond the scope of 
GAO’s mandate; however, redundancies and inefficiencies may exist in 
the background check programs that GAO did not examine. Because DHS is 
responsible for a large number of background check programs, the 
department might be best positioned to explore—with other federal 
agencies—possible options to coordinate and align background check 
programs governmentwide. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DHS ensure that its coordination plan (1) includes 
implementation steps, time frames, and budget requirements, (2) 
discusses potential costs/benefits of program standardization, and (3) 
explore options for coordinating and aligning background checks within 
DHS and other federal agencies. DHS generally agreed with GAO’s 
findings and recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-756]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robert Goldenkoff at 
(202) 512-2757 or GoldenkoffR@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

DHS Actions to Reduce Redundancies in Background Check Programs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Briefing for Interested Committees and Subcommittees: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Abbreviations: 

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

CDL: commercial driver's license: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAST: Free and Secure Trade: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

HME: Hazardous Materials Endorsement: 

HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive: 

MMC: Merchant Mariner Credential: 

MMD: Merchant Mariner Document: 

MML: Merchant Mariner License: 

MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act: 

SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Act: 
A Legacy for Users: 

SCO: Screening Coordination Office: 

SIDA: Security Identification Display Areas: 

STCW: International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TWIC: Transportation Worker Identification Credential: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 26, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal 
government has taken steps to ensure that transportation workers, 
particularly those that transport hazardous materials or have access to 
secure areas, are properly screened to ensure they do not pose a 
security risk. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 
prohibited states from issuing hazardous material endorsements (HME) 
for a commercial driver's license (CDL) without a federally conducted, 
fingerprint-based applicant background check. In November 2002, the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act required the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct background checks on and issue 
credentials to merchant mariners and certain workers at seaports. The 
DHS background check programs prompted by these and other legal 
requirements have raised questions as to whether transportation workers 
may be subject to multiple background check programs with different 
standards and credentialing systems. 

The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port 
Act)[Footnote 1] required GAO to conduct a study of the DHS background 
check programs that are similar to those required of truck drivers to 
obtain an HME. The act required us to (1) identify any redundancies and 
inefficiencies in connection with such programs, and (2) recommend ways 
of eliminating any redundancies and inefficiencies. To fulfill this 
requirement, we examined--in consultation with committee staff--DHS 
background record check programs with requirements that are similar to 
the HME-related background check to identify: 

* potential redundancies and inconsistencies, if any, in connection 
with these background check programs, and: 

* actions, if any, DHS is taking or planning to coordinate its 
background check programs. 

DHS components are in the preliminary stages of implementing several 
initiatives, that may consolidate, coordinate, and harmonize[Footnote 
2] such background check programs. Because it is too early to determine 
the effectiveness of these initiatives, we did not make specific 
recommendations to eliminate any redundancies and inefficiencies 
specific to the DHS background check programs examined. 

To identify programs with background check requirements similar to 
those for the HME program, we examined the various programs' background 
check requirements and held discussions with Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
and DHS Screening Coordination Office (SCO) officials. On the basis of 
this information and as agreed with committee offices, we compared the 
HME program to the following five DHS programs: 

* Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) for 
credentialed merchant mariners and personnel requiring unescorted 
access to secure areas at maritime facilities and vessels; 

* Coast Guard's Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) for mariners on 
merchant vessels, which serves as a qualification and identity 
document; 

* Customs and Border Protection's Free and Secure Trade (FAST), a 
voluntary program for commercial drivers to receive expedited border 
processing; 

* Security Identification Display Areas (SIDA) badges for aviation 
workers who have unescorted access to an airport's secure areas; and: 

* Air Cargo security threat assessment for certain individuals with 
unescorted access to air cargo. 

To identify any redundancies and inconsistencies, we examined the 
background check requirements and interviewed DHS and private 
stakeholders representing trucking, rail, and aviation transportation 
workers to help identify any gaps or overlaps in their coverage. We 
also spoke with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) concerning their roles in the 
background check programs. Further, we reviewed relevant laws--such as 
the USA PATRIOT Act, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act--and agency actions, such as 
the TSA and Coast Guard rulemakings. We discussed with TSA's 
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office the data 
collection methods and process that transportation workers may undergo. 
We did not (1) evaluate the effectiveness of the background check 
programs and (2) include other potential DHS programs or any other 
federal agencies that also have background check programs. 

To identify how redundancies and inefficiencies might be eliminated, we 
identified actions that DHS has taken or is planning to take to 
coordinate its background check programs by reviewing reports completed 
by the TSA, SCO, and Coast Guard, as well as relevant TSA regulations. 
We used prior GAO work on performance management to evaluate DHS 
efforts to minimize redundancies and inefficiencies in its background 
check programs. 

In April 2007, we briefed your offices on the results of our work. This 
report conveys the information provided during those discussions in 
appendix I. 

We performed our work from November 2006 through April 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

DHS Actions to Reduce Redundancies in Background Check Programs: 

The six programs we reviewed for this report are conducted 
independently; that is, they collect similar information and use 
similar background check processes. Also, each program operates 
separate enrollment facilities to collect information and does not 
share background information with the other programs. In some 
instances, we found variations in the fees applicants are charged as 
well as differences in disqualifying offenses and renewal requirements 
between the programs. DHS does not keep track of the number of those 
workers who, needing multiple credentials, are subjected to multiple 
background check programs. As a result, DHS is not in a position to 
determine the costs/benefits associated with reducing the number of 
redundant background checks. 

At the time of our review, DHS did not have a plan that included the 
development of a common set of design and comparability standards, 
implementation steps, budget requirements, or related milestones for 
consolidating, coordinating, and aligning DHS screening programs. As 
our prior work has shown,[Footnote 3] linking costs with performance 
data and budgetary deliberations prompts agencies to reassess their 
performance goals and strategies. In July 2006, DHS created SCO to 
coordinate DHS background check programs. The SCO was established, in 
part, to coordinate DHS screening programs, but the SCO is in the early 
stages of developing its plans to coordinate DHS's screening programs. 
In December 2006, SCO issued a report identifying common problems, 
challenges, and needed improvements in the credentialing programs and 
processes across the department. The office awarded a contract in April 
2007 that will provide the methodology and support for developing an 
implementation plan to include common design and comparability 
standards and related milestones to coordinate DHS screening and 
credentialing programs. Prior GAO work has shown that long-term action- 
oriented goals and a timeline with milestones are necessary to track an 
organization's progress toward its goals.[Footnote 4] 

DHS components have also taken steps to reduce redundancies. For 
example, in January 2007, TSA determined that the background checks 
required for an HME, FAST card, and MMD (issued between Feb. 3, 2003, 
and Mar. 26, 2007) satisfy the background check requirement for a TWIC. 
Further, the TWIC and HME background check requirements were designed 
to closely resemble each other to reduce redundancy. Meanwhile, the 
Coast Guard plans to consolidate four credentials and require that 
pertinent information previously submitted by an applicant at a Coast 
Guard Regional Examination Center be submitted to TSA through the TWIC 
enrollment process and be shared with the Coast Guard by TSA. Other 
federal agencies such as the Departments of Defense and Energy also 
have background check programs. A governmentwide examination of such 
programs is beyond the scope of our mandate; however, the existence of 
redundancies and inefficiencies in the programs that we did examine may 
not be unique. Homeland Security Presidential Directive -11 (HSPD-11) 
on comprehensive terrorist-related screening procedures directs DHS to 
coordinate with other federal agencies to develop a strategy for 
developing coordinated terrorist screening procedures and capabilities. 

Conclusions: 

Recent TSA and Coast Guard initiatives to harmonize background check 
programs are useful first steps. However, because workers are 
potentially subject to redundant information requests if they apply for 
more than one background check, duplication of efforts may continue 
until DHS further develops common standards for its background check 
programs. 

The costs and benefits that can ultimately be derived by harmonizing 
background check programs will be determined in part by the number of 
individuals currently subject to multiple background check programs, as 
the costs of fees and inconvenience to workers and costs to government 
from inefficient use of facilities may be reduced by eliminating 
redundant checks. As our prior work has shown,[Footnote 5] agencies can 
use performance information to make decisions that affect future 
strategies, planning and budgeting, identifying priorities, and 
allocating resources. Without knowing the potential costs/benefits 
associated with the number of redundant background checks that would be 
eliminated through harmonization, DHS lacks the performance information 
that would allow its program managers to compare their program results 
with goals and thus determine where to target program resources to 
improve performance. 

Coordinating federal background check programs is a cross-cutting, 
governmentwide issue. Other federal agencies also have background check 
programs. Although these programs are outside the scope of this study, 
the existence of multiple programs highlights the importance of 
interagency coordination to ensure the most efficient use of resources. 
As a result of its current and planned initiatives, DHS should be in a 
position to support the needed coordination, in accordance with HSPD- 
11. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help prevent redundancies and inefficiencies, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: 

* Ensure that the plan being developed by DHS for coordinating its 
background check programs include, at a minimum, the steps the agency 
will take to align its screening and credentialing activities and 
include specific time frames and budget requirements for 
implementation. In addition, the plan should describe how and when DHS 
will establish and apply a common set of design and comparability 
standards for DHS's background check programs. 

* Ensure that the plan being developed by DHS for coordinating its 
background check programs include, at a minimum, a discussion of the 
potential costs/benefits associated with the number of redundant 
background checks that would be eliminated through harmonization. 

* Because of DHS's responsibility for a large number of background 
check programs, explore with other federal agencies options for 
harmonizing background check programs within DHS and other federal 
agencies. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, FBI, and DOT for review and 
comment. On April 20, 2007, we received technical comments on the draft 
report, which we incorporated where appropriate. DHS, FBI, and DOT 
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DHS component 
agencies provided technical comments on our draft report, which we have 
incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies to DHS, FBI, and DOT and other interested 
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any further questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202)-512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Robert N. Goldenkoff: 
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Gordon H. Smith: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, 
Infrastructure, Safety and Security: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable David R. Obey: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jerry Lewis: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Steven C. LaTourette: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jim McCrery: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Ways and Means: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Briefing for Interested Committees and Subcommittees: 

Transportation Security: DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant Background 
Check Investigations: 

Briefing Prepared for Staff of: 

Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, 
Infrastructure, Safety and Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, U.S. Senate: 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives: 

Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives: 

Overview: 

* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

* Summary: 

* Background: 

* DHS Background Check Programs: 

* Efforts to Streamline Background Check Programs: 

* Conclusions: 

* Recommendations: 

* Appendixes: 

Objectives, Scope, And Methodology: 
Objectives: 

This study responds to a mandate in the Security and Accountability for 
Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), Pub. L. No. 109-347, Section 
105, which requires GAO to examine DHS background check programs that 
are similar to those that require truck drivers to obtain a hazardous 
materials endorsement (HME) for their commercial driver's licenses 
(CDL). The Act required us to: 

* identify any redundancies and inefficiencies in connection with such 
programs, and: 

* recommend ways of eliminating any redundancies and inefficiencies. 

In conducting our study and in consultation with committee staff, we 
examined DHS background record check programs with requirements that 
are similar to the HME related background check to identify: 

* potential redundancies and inconsistencies, if any, in connection 
with these background check programs, and: 

* actions, if any, DHS is taking or planning to coordinate its 
background check programs. 

DHS components are in the initial stages of a number of initiatives 
intended to consolidate, coordinate, and harmonize* such background 
check programs. Because it is too early to determine the effectiveness 
of these initiatives, we are not making specific recommendations to 
eliminate redundancies and inefficiencies in the DHS background check 
programs examined. 

* The term "harmonize" is used to describe efforts to increase 
efficiency and reduce redundancies by aligning the background check 
requirements to make the programs more consistent. 

Objectives, Scope, And Methodology: 
Scope and Methodology: 

In order to identify programs with background check requirements 
similar to those for the HME program, we examined various programs' 
background check requirements and held discussions with Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), and Screening and Coordination Office (SCO) 
officials. We also consulted with committee staff, who confirmed that 
their primary interest was in the HME, Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIG), and merchant mariner document 
programs, and agreed to examine, in addition to the HME program, the 
following five programs: 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) - a tamper- 
resistant biometric credential for credentialed merchant mariners and 
personnel requiring unescorted access to secure areas at maritime 
facilities and vessels. 

Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) -required for mariners who serve on 
merchant vessels of at least 100 gross tons and serves as a 
qualification and identity document, specifying each rating for which 
the holder is qualified. 

Free and Secure Trade (FAST) - a voluntary program for commercial 
drivers as part of a border accord Initiative between the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada to allow known low-risk participants to 
receive expedited border processing. 

Security Identification Display Areas (SIDA) -a security threat 
assessment for aviation workers who hold airport badges and have 
unescorted access to airport secure areas. 

Air Cargo - requires a security threat assessment for individuals with 
unescorted access to air cargo who are employees or agents of certain 
aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. 

In conducting our study, we: 

Reviewed relevant laws, strategies, directives, plans, and agency 
guidance to determine the objective and scope of the programs and DHS 
plans to implement the programs. 

Interviewed DHS officials responsible for managing the programs to 
determine how the programs are implemented and who is subject to the 
programs' requirements. 

Reviewed which industries were subject to the programs, type of 
information collected, fees, and the data bases used. 

Used prior GAO work on performance management as criteria to evaluate 
DHS coordination and planning efforts to minimize redundancies and 
inefficiencies in its background check programs. 

In accordance with the SAFE Port Act, the scope of the study was 
limited to DHS background check programs for transportation workers 
with special privileges or unescorted access to controlled locations 
(such as secure areas at ports and airports) and did not include other 
potential DHS programs or any other federal agencies that also have 
background check programs, such as agencies within the Department of 
Defense, U.S. Postal Service, or the Department of Energy. 

The study did not evaluate the effectiveness of the background check 
programs. 

We conducted our work between November 2006 and April 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

The six programs we examined collect similar information and use 
similar background check processes. 

Each background check program operates separate enrollment facilities 
for collecting biometric and biographic information. 

In some instances, we found variations among the DHS background 
programs we reviewed. 

DHS does not keep track by individual background check program of the 
number of workers who are subjected to multiple background check 
programs for each of DHS's background check programs. 

In July 2006, DHS announced the creation of the Screening Coordination 
Office (SCO) within the Office of the Secretary to coordinate DHS 
programs. 

In December 2006, SCO issued a report identifying common problems, 
challenges, and areas where DHS can improve credentialing programs and 
processes Department wide. 

The SCO is developing a plan for coordinating background check programs 
and common design and comparability standards for these programs. 

In January 2007, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
announced standards to determine if a background check conducted by 
another government agency or by TSA is comparable to two of its 
background check programs, TWIC or HME, the application of which could 
help minimize duplication and inefficiencies. 

TSA's HME and TWIC background check requirements were designed to 
closely resemble each other to reduce redundancy. 

The Coast Guard plans to consolidate four credentials including the 
Merchant Mariner Document and require pertinent information previously 
submitted by an applicant at a Coast Guard Regional Exam Center be 
submitted to TSA through the TWIC enrollment process and be shared with 
the Coast Guard by TSA. 

Background: 

Figure: Time Line --The Number of Background Check Programs Increased 
Since 9/11: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS provided information and related rules and 
regulations. 

[End of figure] 

Background Check Programs Exist In Multiple Federal Agencies: 

Coordinating federal background check programs is a cross-cutting, 
government wide issue. Other federal agencies also have background 
check programs, such as agencies within the Departments of Defense and 
Energy. Although these programs are outside the scope of this study, 
the existence of multiple programs highlights the importance of 
interagency coordination to ensure the most efficient use of resources. 

Various Laws, Directives, and Studies Have Called For Increased 
Coordination: 

As GAO has reported in the past, uncoordinated program efforts can 
waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit 
the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. 

In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported that having too many 
different biometric standards, travel facilitation systems, 
credentialing systems, and screening requirements: 

Hampers the development of information crucial for stopping terrorists 
from entering the country, 

Is expensive, and: 

Is inefficient. 

The 9/11 Commission further reported that: 

A coordinating body should raise standards, facilitate information- 
sharing, and survey systems for potential problems, 

The President should direct DHS to lead the effort to design a 
comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting 
common standards with system-wide goals in mind, and: 

Only presidential leadership can develop government wide concepts and 
standards. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11 (HSPD-11) (August 2004), 
announced a new U.S. policy to "implement a coordinated and 
comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening - in immigration, 
law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and protection of 
the border, transportation systems, and critical infrastructure - that 
supports homeland security, at home and abroad." 

In November 2005, as required by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, 
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) 
(Pub. L. No. 109-59, August 2005), TSA issued a report on the 
implementation of fingerprint-based background checks. TSA acknowledged 
the potential for duplication in assessments among individuals who fall 
within the populations of multiple TSA programs and the related need to 
develop policies and/or regulations on comparability. The report stated 
that: 

TSA intended to establish a baseline "standard" of comparison for 
determining comparability. 

TSA could develop either a single or graduated standard of 
comparability that other federal agencies would be required to meet. 

When comparing TSA vetting and credentialing programs, similar 
requirements could be grouped together to develop thresholds of 
comparability under which multiple TSA programs would fall. 

How The Hazardous Materials Endorsement Program Is Conducted: 

Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) - authorizes an individual to 
transport hazardous materials (Hazmat) for commerce. HME must be 
indicated on an individual's CDL. 

TSA determines that an individual poses a security threat if he or she: 

Is not a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, alien 
granted asylum, or alien with a specified status or work authorization. 

Is wanted or under indictment for certain felonies. 

Has been convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of 
certain permanent disqualifying felonies. 

Has been convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of 
certain interim disqualifying crimes within the preceding seven years, 
or released from incarceration within the preceding five years after 
being convicted of an interim disqualifying crime. 

Has been adjudicated as lacking mental capacity or has been 
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. 

Is considered to pose a security threat based on review of pertinent 
intelligence, criminal, and immigration data bases. 

Figure: Overview Of HME Background Check Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA provided information. 

[End of figure] 

Objective 1: Background Check Program Comparison: Frequency and 
Content: 

Program: HME; 
Enrollment frequency: 5 years; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): A,B,C,D; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 1, 2. 

Program: TWIC; 
Enrollment frequency: 5 years; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): A,B,C,D; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 1,2. 

Program: MMD; 
Enrollment frequency: 5 years; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): A,B,C,D,E; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 1,2,3,4. 

Program: FAST; 
Enrollment frequency: 5 years; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): A,B,D; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 1,2,5. 

Program: SIDA; 
Enrollment frequency: Once, if continuously employed; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): A,B,D; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 1,2. 

Program: Air Cargo; 
Enrollment frequency: Once, if continuously employed; 
What's checked (A) criminal offenses, (B) immigration status, (C) 
mental capacity, (D) nexus to terrorism, (E) drug use): B,D; 
How checked (1) fingerprint-based criminal history check, (2) name-
based biographic check*, (3) drug test, (4) national driver registry, 
(5) interview: 2. 

* TSA checks a list of all individuals who have completed a TSA 
background check against databases that are updated regularly. 

Source: GAO based on review of DHS provided program information. 

[End of table] 

Profile of Each Program: 

Program: HME; 
Agency: TSA; 
Sector: Trucking (Hazmat); 
Number of Enrollment Centers: 189 TSA managed (fingerprint 
application), 366 State managed (fingerprint), 887 State managed 
(application); 
Number of workers: 2.7 million; 
Cost to applicant: $94(TSA managed), $58-$138 (State managed)*. 

Program: TWIC; 
Agency: TSA; 
Sector: All, except aviation; 
Number of Enrollment Centers: 130+; 
Number of workers: 750,000; 
Cost to applicant: $101.25-$137.25. 

Program: MMD; 
Agency: Coast Guard; 
Sector: Maritime; 
Number of Enrollment Centers: 17; 
Number of workers: 210,000; 
Cost to applicant: $45-$140*****. 

Program: FAST; 
Agency: CBP; 
Sector: Trucking; 
Number of Enrollment Centers: 17; 
Number of workers: 78,862; 
Cost to applicant: $50. 

Program: SIDA; 
Agency: TSA; 
Sector: Aviation, trucking****; 
Number of Enrollment Centers: Not applicable**; 
Number of workers: 2 million; 
Cost to applicant: $29***. 

Program: Air cargo; 
Agency: TSA; 
Sector: Aviation, trucking; 
Number of Enrollment Centers: Not applicable**; 
Number of workers: 51,625; 
Cost to applicant: $28. 

* 16 states manage the collection of HME background information. 
** Enrollment is conducted by airport, aircraft operator, or air 
carrier. 
*** Airport and aircraft operators may charge additional fees: 
**** The number of truck drivers that apply for a SIDA is limited and 
does not occur often, according to TSA. 
***** The Coast Guard does not charge a fee for the background check. 
MMD cost to applicant includes evaluation of medical fitness and 
professional qualifications. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS provided information. 

[End of table] 

Programs Determined Comparable by TSA: 

Program: HME; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: TWIC, 
FAST. 

Program: TWIC; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: HME, 
FAST, or MMD or Merchant Mariner License (issued during certain 
periods). 

Program: MMD; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: None. 

Program: FAST; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: None. 

Program: SIDA; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: None. 

Program: Air Cargo; 
Other Background Check Programs That Meet Program Requirements: SIDA, 
HME, TWIC, FAST. 

In the future, TSA may determine other background checks may be 
substituted for the for TWIC and HME background checks in order to 
satisfy the TWIC and HME related background check requirements. 

Source: GAO analysis based on review of DHS provided program 
information. 

[End of table] 

Redundancy: 

For the six programs we reviewed, we found several instances in which 
DHS component agencies: 

Use the same or similar background check process already completed on 
an individual by another program. 

Possible Effect: Workers are potentially subject to redundant 
information requests if they apply for more than one background check, 
although TSA and the Coast Guard have taken actions to reduce the 
redundancies. For example, TSA and the Coast Guard plan to share 
background check information for the TWIC and MMD programs. 

Each background check program operates separate enrollment facilities 
for collecting biometric and biographic information. 

Possible Effect: DHS may incur additional start-up and development 
costs. 

Possible Effect: Workers may have to enroll at a facility with less 
convenient location and hours than a comparable one in a different 
program. 

Redundancy Examples: 

Program: HME; 
Redundancy: An individual who has submitted fingerprints for the HME 
program and is later subject to another background check program with a 
criminal history records check would have to submit an additional set 
of fingerprints, pursuant to  Public Law 105-251. 

Program: TWIC; 
Redundancy: If an HME, MMD, or FAST cardholder  applies for a TWIC 
background check, he or she will pay a reduced fee.  To date, TSA has 
not worked out a process to reduce fees for an HME applicant who has 
completed a TWIC background check.  FAST is managed by CBP and is not a 
TSA program; as a result, TSA cannot reduce those fees.  Therefore, an 
individual may be subject to multiple background check fees. 
Individuals who satisfied an HME background check must still provide a 
biometric (fingerprint) if applying for a TWIC credential. 

Program: MMD; 
Redundancy: An individual that has already undergone a background check 
in connection with another program has to undergo a separate background 
check for an MMD. 

Program: FAST; 
Redundancy: A driver that has already undergone a background check in 
connection with another program has to undergo a separate background 
check for FAST. 

Program: SIDA; 
Redundancy: SIDA holders may be required to undergo another background 
check if they go to a different airport.
An individual applying for a SIDA who already underwent an HME, TWIC, 
MMD, or FAST background check will need to provide fingerprints and 
similar biographical information for the SIDA background check. 

Program: Air Cargo; 
Redundancy: An individual subject to an Air Cargo background check who 
has already undergone an MMD background check will need to provide 
similar biographical information for the Air Cargo background check. 

Source: GAO analysis based on review of DHS provided program 
information. 

[End of table] 

Variations: 

In some instances, we found variations among the DHS background 
programs we reviewed, including: 

* Disparity in the fees transportation workers are charged for the 
programs*: 

* Varying use of comparability standards; TSA has comparability 
standards, but CBP and the Coast Guard do not: 

* Different collection methods: 

* Different disqualifying offenses**:  

* Different look-back periods**: 

* Different renewal requirements: 

* Different appeal processes**: 

* Different adjudicating authorities: 

* Variations in fee levels result from the agency paying for a portion 
of the background check (FAST and SIDA) or all of the related expenses 
(MMD), whereas for others, the agency covers the entire cost of the 
background check through fees (TWIC, HME, Air Cargo), according to DHS 
officials. In addition, inconsistencies in fees also results from 
differences in services provided. For example, TSA charges a fee to 
produce a credential in the TWIC program but does not provide 
applicants with a credential for the SIDA and air cargo security 
programs. 

** DHS officials attributed some of the variations - differences in 
disqualifying offenses (SIDA) and look back periods (SIDA), and appeal 
processes (TWIC) - to statutory requirements. 

Variation Examples: 

Program: HME; 
Variation: Fees for non-TSA agent states vary from TSA agent states. 

Program: TWIC; 
Variation: At the time of our review, TSA has not worked out a process 
to reduce fees for an HME applicant who has completed a TWIC related 
background check. Therefore, an individual may be subject to greater 
background check fees. 

Program: MMD; 
Variation: TSA determined that TWIC, MMD, FAST, and HME are comparable 
programs. However, the Coast Guard does not accept other background 
checks in lieu of an MMD  background check. 

Program: FAST; 
Variation: The FAST background check has no fixed time limit for crimes 
involving violence, weapons, narcotics, or customs and immigration 
offenses.  Other felonies have a 10 year limit.  In comparison, HME and 
TWIC have a 7 year limit from a conviction and a 5 year limit from 
release from incarceration for considering interim disqualifying 
crimes, Coast Guard looks at varying assessment periods based on the 
offense for the MMD program, SIDA has a 10-year limit from conviction 
for considering disqualifying crimes, and Air Cargo does not include 
disqualifying crimes.
The FAST program does not have a waiver/appeal process. 

Program: SIDA; 
Variation: Unlike the HME, TWIC, and MMD background check programs in 
which the component agency serves as the adjudicator, the airport 
operator or aircraft operator serves as the adjudicator for the 
Criminal History Records Check results for SIDA. 

Program: Air Cargo; 
Variation: Unlike the HME, TWIC, MMD, and FAST programs, that require 
applicants to submit biographical information every 5 years, the air 
cargo program only requires applicants to submit biographical 
information once, as long as they are continuously employed.
In contrast to some other programs in which the agency collects 
biographical information, aircraft operators and air carriers collect 
biographical information for Air Cargo background checks. 

Source: GAO analysis based on review of DHS-provided program 
information. 

[End of table] 

Objective 2: DHS Actions Taken/Planned: Screening Coordination Office 
(SCO): 

In response to HSPD 11, Secretary Chertoff established the Screening 
Coordination Office (SCO) at DHS on July 31, 2006. The SCO reports to 
the Deputy Secretary. 

SCO goals include: 

* Identifying opportunities to harmonize and enhance screening and 
credentialing processes across DHS "people screening" programs; 

* Developing metrics for evaluating and improving screening processes 
and credentialing; and: 

* Conducting a review of DHS credentialing programs from a business 
process perspective and establishing common capabilities. 

Among other duties, the SCO is responsible for coordinating background 
checks that are conducted on individuals to ensure that DHS's 
background check programs are not duplicative, according to SCO 
officials. 

SCO Background Check Program Initiatives: 

In December 2006, SCO issued a report identifying common problems, 
challenges, and areas where DHS can improve credentialing programs and 
processes department wide. As part of the report, SCO: 

developed an inventory comparing and contrasting 28 traveler/ 
transportation worker credentials and their supporting background 
checks: 

identified common business processes shared by 28 programs. 

The SCO awarded a contract in April 2007 to develop a methodology to 
coordinate credentialing programs and to serve as support for SCO's 
data collection and analysis efforts. This will provide the basis for 
developing an implementation plan and related milestones for 
coordinating DHS screening and credentialing programs. 

Our prior work has shown that interim goals and measures can be used to 
show progress or contribution to intended results. Long-term action 
oriented goals and a timeline with milestone dates are necessary to 
track the organization's progress towards its interim and long-term 
goals. 

In addition, an agency's planning efforts should consider and discuss 
efforts to coordinate its programs with other internal and external 
federal programs performing related activities and provide evidence of 
such coordination. 

The SCO is focusing on reducing unnecessary redundancies. However, at 
this point they do not know the extent of unnecessary background 
checks. With this information SCO would be in a position to understand 
the extent of redundancy, the number of workers that are affected and 
the related potential cost implications for both the federal government 
and transportation workers. 

TSA Background Check Program Initiatives: 

In January 2007, TSA determined that the background checks required for 
an HME, FAST card, and MMD (issued between Feb. 3, 2003 and March 26, 
2007) satisfy the background check requirement for a TWIG. Thus, a TWIG 
applicant who has already undergone a background check in association 
with the HME, FAST, or MMD program does not have to undergo an 
additional background check and pays a reduced fee to obtain a TWIG. 

TSA's HME and TWIG background check requirements were designed to 
closely resemble each other to eliminate or minimize duplication. 

TSA also promulgated a list of factors that TSA will consider to 
determine whether other background checks satisfy the TWIG background 
check requirement. The factors are: 

* The minimum standards used for the background check, 

* The frequency of the background check, 

* The date of the most recent background check, and: 

* Whether the background check includes biometric identification and a 
biometric credential. 

TSA determined that the background checks required for a SIDA ID, TWIG, 
HME, and FAST satisfy the background check requirement for the Air 
Cargo security program. Thus, an aircraft or air carrier employee or 
agent who is seeking unescorted access to air cargo and already has a 
SIDA ID, TWIG, HME, or FAST credential does not have to undergo the Air 
Cargo background check. 

TSA used the statutory look back periods and appeal/waiver requirements 
in MTSA for TWIG when developing the hazmat rule, so that when TSA 
issued the final TWIG rule, HME and TWIG could be harmonized. 

TSA began conducting "perpetual vetting" in 2006, reducing the effect 
of inconsistencies relating to renewal requirements. Perpetual vetting 
allows TSA to compare a list of all individuals who have completed a 
background check with databases that are updated regularly, so that TSA 
can identify individuals who have successfully completed the background 
check but who later appear in a database indicating the individual 
might be a threat, according to TSA officials. 

Coast Guard Background Check Program Initiatives: 

In May 2006, the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
that would: 

* Consolidate four documents including the Merchant Mariner Document 
(MMD) into one - Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC). 

* Require pertinent information previously submitted by an applicant at 
a Coast Guard Regional Exam Center be submitted by the applicant to TSA 
through the TWIG enrollment process and be shared with the Coast Guard 
by TSA. 

* Move all identity verification and security-vetting processes from 
the Coast Guard to TSA. The Coast Guard would continue to conduct a 
safety review. 

* Result in the MMC process being completed by mail. 

* Potentially reduce mariner travel costs and time required to obtain a 
credential because the Coast Guard expects there to be more TWIG 
enrollment centers than Coast Guard's Regional Examination Centers. 

Conclusions: 

For the programs we reviewed, we found instances of redundancies in 
each of the programs' use of the same or similar background check 
process already completed on an individual by another program. In 
addition, the HME, TWIC, MMD, and FAST programs operate separate 
enrollment facilities for collecting biometric and biographic 
information. 

Redundancies may result in workers having to provide redundant 
information if they apply for more than one background check. In 
addition, DHS may incur additional start up and development costs 
because the HME, TWIC, MMD, and FAST programs operate their own 
facilities. 

DHS components have several initiatives underway to minimize the 
redundancies and inefficiencies of the background check programs for 
determining if an individual is a low risk to transportation security. 

* The SCO was established, in part, to coordinate DHS screening 
programs, but the SCO is in the early stages of developing its plans to 
coordinate DHS's screening programs. As our prior work has shown, 
federal programs contributing to the same or similar results should be 
closely coordinated to ensure that goals are consistent and, as 
appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing. Uncoordinated 
program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program 
customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. 

* Recent TSA and Coast Guard initiatives to harmonize background check 
programs are useful steps. However, duplication of efforts may continue 
until DHS develops further common standards for its background check 
programs. As our prior work has shown, interagency coordination is 
often hindered by incompatible procedures, processes, data, and 
computer systems. 

In addition, as our prior work has shown, intermediate goals and 
measures, such as outputs or intermediate outcomes, can be used to show 
progress or contributions to intended results. For instance, when it 
may take years before an agency sees the results of its programs, 
intermediate goals and measures can provide information on interim 
results. It is essential to establish long-term action-oriented 
implementation goals and a timeline with milestone dates to track the 
organization's progress towards its intermediate and long-term 
transformation goals. 

The number of redundant background checks will affect background check 
program costs. As we have previously reported, linking cost with 
performance information infuses performance concerns into planning and 
budgetary deliberations, prompting agencies to reassess their 
performance goals and strategies and to more clearly understand the 
cost of performance. 

Coordinating federal background check programs is a cross-cutting, 
government wide issue. Other federal agencies also have background 
check programs, such as agencies within the departments of Defense and 
Energy. Although these programs are outside the scope of this study, 
the existence of multiple programs highlights the importance of 
interagency coordination to ensure the most efficient use of resources. 
As the 9/11 Commission reported, having too many different biometric 
standards, travel facilitation systems, credentialing systems, and 
screening requirements is expensive and inefficient. 

Recommendations: 

To help prevent redundancies and inefficiencies, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: 

* Ensure that the plan being developed by SCO for coordinating its 
background check programs include, at a minimum, the steps the agency 
will take to align its screening and credentialing activities and 
include specific time frames and budget requirements for 
implementation. In addition, the plan should describe how and when DHS 
will establish and apply a common set of design and comparability 
standards for DHS's background check programs. 

* Ensure that the plan being developed by DHS for coordinating its 
background check programs include, at a minimum, a discussion of the 
potential costs/benefits associated with the number of redundant 
background checks that would be eliminated through harmonization. 

* Because of DHS's responsibility for a large number of background 
check programs, explore with other federal agencies possible means to 
achieve harmonization and reduction of redundancies between background 
check programs within DHS and other agencies. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Robert N. Goldenkoff, (202)-512-2757, goldenkoffr@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Robert E. White, Assistant 
Director; Richard Ascarate; Nikki Clowers; Cindy Gilbert; David Hooper; 
Tracey King; Gary Malavenda; Jean Orland; and Meg Ullengren made key 
contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 105 (2006). 

[2] The term harmonize is used to describe efforts to increase 
efficiency and reduce redundancies by aligning the background check 
requirements to make the programs more consistent. 

[3] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance 
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, 
D.C.: September 2005). 

[4] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 
Learned For a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 
Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: November 2002). 

[5] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance 
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, 
D.C.: September 2005). 

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