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Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges' which was 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

November 2006: 

Darfur Crisis: 

Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and 
Operational Challenges: 

GAO-07-9: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-9, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel 
groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, 
known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million 
Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they 
require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has 
provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union 
Mission in Sudan’s (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. 
This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur 
and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union 
efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these 
efforts. 

What GAO Found: 

The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to 
Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through 
September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance 
consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, 
such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, 
humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing 
the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition 
and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other 
officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. 
However, USAID and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance 
have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or 
accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges 
include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government 
restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; 
and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-
funded programs. 

Figure: U.S. Food Aid in South Darfur; AMIS Troops in North Darfur: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of Figure] 

AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its 
mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. 
For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement—one 
mandate component—AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and 
identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not 
consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available 
to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via 
private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through 
September 2006 to build and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in 
Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have 
been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as 
negatively affecting AMIS’s efforts in Darfur. These challenges include 
inadequacies in AMIS’s organization, management, and capacity, such as 
inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small 
forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of 
intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the 
conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is 
being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a 
transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not 
been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur. 

What GAO Recommends: 

This report recommends that the Secretary of State encourage the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that a “lessons 
learned” assessment of AMIS operations is conducted in order to (1) 
strengthen future African Union peace support planning and operations 
and (2) optimize future donor assistance. The Department of State 
supports this recommendation. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-9]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at 202 512-
3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance 
Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved: 

Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and 
Oversight: 

African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have 
Been Incomplete or Inconsistent: 

Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Timeline of Darfur Events: 

Appendix III: Evolution of AMIS: 

Appendix IV: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance 
Funding during Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Bibliography: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of 
Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Sudan: 

Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map: 

Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003-October 2006: 

Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected 
Population, October 2005:  

Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance: 

Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur 
by International Donors, as of June 1, 2006: 

Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance 
to Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations:  

Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in 
South Darfur: 

Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal 
Years 2004-2006 by Sector: 

Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP 
Camps: 

Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian 
Assistance, April 2004-July 2006: 

Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North 
Darfur: 

Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur: 

Figure 17: AMIS Camps: 

Abbreviations: 

AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IDP: internally displaced person: 

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army: 

SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army: 

UN: United Nations: 

UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

November 9, 2006: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on International Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mike DeWine: 
The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
United States Senate: 

In 2003, violent conflict broke out in the Darfur region of western 
Sudan when rebel groups, believing that the region was marginalized by 
the Sudanese government, led attacks against the government. In 
response, the government armed and supported local Arab tribal 
militias, commonly known as the Janjaweed, to defeat the rebels. 
Attacks on the civilian population by these militias, sometimes in 
conjunction with the Sudanese armed forces, have resulted in the deaths 
of many thousands. These attacks have also displaced approximately 1.85 
million people within Darfur--internally displaced persons (IDP)--most 
of whom now live in camps in Darfur and have affected an additional 
1.91 million Darfur residents (affected residents) so that they now 
require humanitarian assistance.[Footnote 1] In addition, the attacks 
have forced about 220,000 Darfur refugees to take shelter in 
Chad.[Footnote 2] 

Since fiscal year 2004, the United States has provided humanitarian 
assistance to Darfur through various implementing partners-- 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations 
(UN) agencies--with funding from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). Over the same 
period, the U.S. government, through State contracts with two private 
sector firms, provided funding for building and maintaining 32 camps 
throughout Darfur for African Union forces involved in monitoring a 
2004 cease-fire agreement.[Footnote 3] Since May 2004, the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has deployed more than 7,000 personnel 
(comprising military observers, protection force troops, and civilian 
police) throughout Darfur on a peace support mission to respond to a 
three-part mandate: (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire 
agreement, which was signed in April 2004 by the three parties to the 
conflict; (2) assist in "confidence building"; and (3) contribute to 
improving the region's security environment. AMIS's mandate will expire 
on December 31, 2006, and a UN peacekeeping mission is currently under 
consideration. Meanwhile, a peace agreement signed by the government of 
Sudan and one rebel group in May 2006 gives AMIS new responsibilities, 
such as verifying disarmament of the Janjaweed and monitoring 
demilitarized zones around IDP camps. 

We were asked to review and assess, among other things, U.S. assistance 
in Darfur aimed at promoting health, peace, and security in Sudan. This 
report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help 
relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that USAID and its 
implementing partners have encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts 
to fulfill its peace support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors 
affecting the implementation of this mandate.[Footnote 4] 

To answer our first two objectives, we reviewed all USAID Darfur grants 
and cooperative agreements with UN agencies and NGOs for fiscal years 
2004 to 2005 and the first 8 months of fiscal year 2006; UN 
humanitarian information profiles for Darfur; and international 
standards for humanitarian assistance. To answer our third and fourth 
objectives, we reviewed State contracts, task orders, and expenditure 
information as well as documents prepared by the African Union, State, 
and a key U.S. contractor. For all four objectives, we discussed U.S. 
assistance with appropriate Sudanese, USAID, State, and Department of 
Defense (DOD) officials and advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., as 
well as UN officials in New York, NY. Further, we interviewed 
appropriate U.S., European Union, Sudanese, UN, NGO, African Union, and 
contractor officials in Khartoum, Sudan, and in the northern and 
southern Darfur states. We also visited seven IDP camps and discussed 
events in Darfur with IDPs, including the leaders of those communities. 
Although we reviewed data on U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur 
refugees in Chad, we did not assess this assistance in detail. Finally, 
we visited eight African Union camps within North and South Darfur and 
met with officials at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. (See app. I for a detailed discussion of our scope and 
methodology.) We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Results in Brief: 

In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided nearly $1 
billion in humanitarian assistance for Darfur, with over $275 million 
of this amount provided through supplemental legislation that augmented 
initial funding levels.[Footnote 5] USAID provided more than 68 percent 
of the total assistance as food aid, primarily by providing commodities 
to the UN World Food Program and to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. U.S. assistance to Darfur has also supported other vital 
needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and primary health care 
services. Since 2004, NGOs and UN agencies increased their presence in 
Darfur by several thousand staff and made significant progress in 
increasing the number of IDPs and affected residents receiving aid. In 
addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped between 
2004 and 2005, a trend that U.S. and other officials attributed in part 
to international humanitarian assistance efforts. 

NGOs and UN agencies implementing humanitarian activities and programs 
in Darfur have faced three key challenges in providing humanitarian 
assistance. First, continued insecurity, such as attacks on NGOs and UN 
agencies and banditry of aid convoys, has made it difficult for 
humanitarian agencies to provide assistance throughout the region. 
Second, NGOs' and UN agencies' efforts to deliver humanitarian 
assistance have been constrained by Sudanese government restrictions on 
access to IDP communities. Third, according to NGO and UN agency 
officials, the timing of U.S. funding in fiscal years 2006, as well as 
delays in funding from other international donors, hampered the 
provision of humanitarian assistance for 2006. For example, because 
more than half of U.S. food aid funding was not provided until late in 
fiscal year 2006, the UN World Food Program cut Darfur food rations to 
half the minimum daily requirement in May 2006; as of October 2006, the 
ration had not been fully restored. In addition, USAID's oversight of 
U.S. humanitarian assistance has been limited by a reduction of USAID 
program staff in Darfur since 2004--despite growing numbers of NGO and 
UN humanitarian staff and displaced and affected Darfurians--as well as 
incomplete reporting by implementing NGOs. 

Although the African Union has taken positive actions to fulfill its 
mandate, some of these actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. 
According to U.S. and other officials, AMIS is viewed as having 
lessened large-scale violence in the region through the deterrent 
effect of its presence. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire 
agreement--the first part of the AMIS mandate--AMIS military observers 
in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement 
violations and have identified numerous violations since 2004. However, 
the resulting reports have not been consistently reviewed at higher 
levels according to established procedure or made publicly available to 
identify parties who are violating the agreement. To build confidence 
and to improve security--the second and third parts of the mandate-- 
AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and escorting 
IDP women foraging for firewood outside IDP camps, to protect them from 
violent attacks. AMIS troops have also intervened to stop impending 
violence against civilians; however, AMIS has not intervened in other 
instances where attacks were imminent. Further, AMIS civilian police 
have worked with Sudanese police to improve law enforcement, although 
they have encountered difficulties, such as an inability to obtain 
information regarding Sudanese police activities. To support AMIS's 
efforts to fulfill the mandate, the U.S. government, via private 
contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through 
September 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house 
AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to State sources. Meanwhile, 
other international donors, such the European Union, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), supported AMIS with funding, goods, and services. 

Numerous factors have been identified by African Union or U.S. 
government officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's 
difficulties in meeting its mandate in Darfur. These challenges 
include: 

* inadequacies in AMIS's management, organization, and capacity; 

* the relatively small size of the AMIS force responsible for 
monitoring and patrolling Darfur; 

* constrained and inefficiently allocated AMIS resources; and: 

* a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties 
to the conflict. 

The challenges AMIS has faced have been magnified by the new 
responsibilities assigned to AMIS in the May 2006 peace agreement, such 
as the requirement to verify the eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed 
by the Sudanese government. As AMIS has faced challenges, the U.S. 
government and other parties have supported a transition of AMIS's 
responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping operation when AMIS's mandate 
expires at the end of December 2006. However, as of October 2006, the 
Sudanese government had rejected the proposed transition. In June 2006, 
following a NATO offer, the African Union formally requested assistance 
from NATO in, among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS 
operations; however, according to a State official, African Union 
headquarters had taken no further action to pursue this review as of 
August 2006. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence have continued in 
Darfur. 

In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that an 
assessment of AMIS operations is conducted so that "lessons learned" 
can be used to strengthen future African Union peace support planning 
and operations and future donor assistance can be provided in a manner 
that will minimize the difficulties experienced by AMIS. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense as well as USAID. We received comment letters from the 
Department of State and USAID. The Department of State supported our 
recommendation and noted that the report presents a balanced and 
accurate picture of the situation in Darfur. The department also 
suggested that the report provide additional details or 
characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, issues. We 
incorporated such information into the report as appropriate. See 
appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our response. USAID 
commented that in general, it found the report to be a comprehensive 
assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but felt that we should 
include additional information in our discussions of areas such as 
staffing levels and grant monitoring. We made adjustments as 
appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID's letter and 
our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report. 

Background: 

Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its 
population, estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent's 
most diverse. Sudan's population comprises two distinct major cultures, 
Arab and black African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions 
and language groups. More than half of Sudan's population lives in the 
northern states, which make up most of Sudan and include the majority 
of the urban centers; most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking 
Muslims. Residents of the southern region, which has a predominantly 
rural, subsistence economy, practice mainly indigenous traditional 
beliefs, although some are Christian. The South contains many tribal 
groups and many more languages than are used in the North. Darfur is 
another distinct region of Sudan, located in the west, and was an 
independent sultanate for most of the period between 1600 and 1916, 
when the British captured it and incorporated it into the Sudanese 
state. Darfur's population is predominantly Muslim. 

Figure 1: Map of Sudan: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO based on Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

Sudan's North-South War: 

For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and 
Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and 
religious divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the 
country, has sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam, 
whereas non-Muslims and other groups in the South have sought, among 
other things, greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to 
1972, the government signed a peace agreement that granted the South a 
measure of autonomy. However, civil war began again in 1983, when the 
President of Sudan declared Arabic the South's official language, 
transferred control of Southern armed forces to the central government, 
and, later that year, announced that traditional Islamic punishments 
drawn from Shari'a (Islamic law) would be incorporated into the penal 
code. The South's rebellion was orchestrated by the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 1989, the conflict intensified 
when an Islamic army faction, led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led 
a coup of the government and installed the National Islamic 
Front.[Footnote 6] 

In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his 
Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S. 
role in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian 
aid to Sudan's affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new 
arrangements for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable 
throughout Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under 
the new arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of 
First Vice President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to 
determine whether to become independent. To assist in implementing the 
peace agreement, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS), which currently has a force of more than 7,000.[Footnote 
7] 

Conflict in Darfur: 

While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion 
broke out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated 
preconflict population of about 6 million (see fig. 2).[Footnote 8] 

Figure 2: Darfur Preconflict Population Density Map: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO from UN OCHA. 
Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information 
Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

The South's success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a 
similar outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police 
stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see 
fig. 3 for an interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur 
and app. II for a related description of events). In El Fasher, the 
rebel groups destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed several 
Sudanese soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. After the 
government armed and supported local tribal and Arab militias--the 
Janjaweed[Footnote 9]--fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan 
military and Janjaweed intensified during late 2003.[Footnote 10] The 
principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), represent agrarian farmers who 
are black African Muslims.[Footnote 11] The SLM/A has recently split 
into two factions--one faction, with the larger military force, led by 
Minni Minawi and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour. 

Figure 3: Timeline of Darfur Events, January 2003-October 2006: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians, 
Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in 
many thousands of deaths.[Footnote 12] The Agreement on Humanitarian 
Ceasefire was signed by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM 
on April 8, 2004, in N'Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the 
parties agreed to accept an automatically renewable cessation of 
hostilities; to refrain from any military action and any reconnaissance 
operations; to refrain from any act of violence or any other abuse on 
civilian populations; to ensure humanitarian access; and to establish a 
Ceasefire Commission to monitor the agreement, along with a Joint 
Commission to which the Ceasefire Commission would report. The African 
Union was to monitor cease-fire compliance. Peace negotiations 
continued under African Union auspices with Chadian participation, and 
additional interim agreements were also reached. However, after a 
relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and violent incidents 
reportedly began to increase in the final months of that year and into 
2006. 

On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the 
SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key 
areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. 

* Power sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of 
Senior Assistant to the President--the fourth-highest position in the 
Sudanese government--appointed by the President from a list of nominees 
provided by the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the President 
will also serve as Chairperson of the newly created Transitional Darfur 
Regional Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the 
agreement and coordination among the three states of Darfur. Further, a 
referendum will be held by July 2010 to allow Darfurians to decide 
whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single 
government or to retain the existing three regions.[Footnote 13] 

* Wealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur 
Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for 
the resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and 
externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute 
$300 million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in 
2007 and 2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million 
in a fund for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by 
the conflict in Darfur. 

* Security arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the 
verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government by 
mid-October 2006.[Footnote 14] This disarmament must be verified by the 
African Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament and 
demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around IDP 
camps and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel forces 
and the Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to be 
established in the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group 
forces will be integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000 
former combatants will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000 
former combatants will be integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be 
supported through education and training programs. 

The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in 
more than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with 
populations up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and 
estimated population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of 
October 2005. 

Figure 4: Darfur IDP Camps Dispersion and Estimated Affected 
Population, October 2005: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO from UN OCHA. 
Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the Humanitarian Information 
Centre Darfur, United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. 
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. Locality boundaries are not complete for South Darfur. 
Affected population numbers are based on the October Humanitarian Needs 
Profile (HNP). For more information, please refer to the October HNP 
published by the OCHA Darfur Cell (located in UNDP compound Khartoum). 
Printing date February 09, 2006. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

African Union Mission in Sudan: 

Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support 
operations in Darfur through AMIS.[Footnote 15] Subsequent to its 
establishment of an African Union observer mission in Darfur in May 
2004,[Footnote 16] the African Union Peace and Security Council 
established a specific mandate for AMIS in October 2004 (see app. III 
for a discussion of the evolution of AMIS).[Footnote 17] AMIS's mandate 
has three components: 

* To monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian 
cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future; 

* To assist in the process of confidence building; and: 

* To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees 
to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of 
compliance of all parties with the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and 
to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout 
Darfur. 

Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the 
cease-fire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and 
Security Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and 
report on allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force 
presence as needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the 
Ceasefire Commission headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be 
submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to 
make consensus-based decisions on matters brought before it by the 
Ceasefire Commission. According to a senior African Union official, the 
Joint Commission was to submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African 
Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action. 
(Fig. 5 illustrates the established process for investigating, and 
reporting on, cease-fire agreement violations.) 

Figure 5: Process for Monitoring Cease-fire Agreement Compliance: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: The 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and related 
modalities agreement, Ceasefire Commission reports, and State and 
African Union officials. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its 
mandate, "protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat 
and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it 
being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the 
responsibility of the government of Sudan."[Footnote 18] The council 
also determined that AMIS would have, in addition to military observers 
and protection force troops, civilian police, to monitor the actions of 
Sudanese police and interact with IDPs and civilians, as well as 
appropriate civilian personnel. The AMIS force authorized and deployed 
in Darfur to execute its mandate has grown incrementally over time from 
several hundred personnel in 2004 to 7,271 personnel (military 
observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) deployed as of 
April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African Union, the UN, and 
others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been conducted that 
discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the newly created 
African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these reviews). 

The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new 
responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament 
of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also 
designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and 
running awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities 
and others understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling 
and monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer 
zones established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing 
and monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic 
migration along historic migration routes. 

U.S. and UN Policy Responses to the Darfur Conflict: 

The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur 
conflict.[Footnote 19] After the conflict began, senior State officials 
traveled to Sudan on a half-dozen occasions, stressing the need to end 
the violence. On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House and the Senate each 
passed separate resolutions citing events in Darfur as acts of 
genocide.[Footnote 20] Further, on September 9, 2004, in testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Secretary of 
State announced that "genocide" had been committed in Darfur, and noted 
that the Sudanese government had supported the Janjaweed, directly and 
indirectly, as they carried out a "scorched earth" policy toward the 
rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur.[Footnote 21] In a 
press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was 
occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the 
Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush 
signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which 
imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of 
civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in 
Darfur. 

Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it 
has repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July 
2004, the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communiqué 
emphasizing a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the 
region and establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to 
disarm the Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should 
"rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order 
immediately to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to 
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to 
identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring 
that those responsible are held accountable."[Footnote 22] In January 
2005, the UN issued a report stating that "the Government of Sudan and 
the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under 
international law."[Footnote 23] The report concluded that a policy of 
genocide had not been pursued but noted that "the crimes against 
humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no 
less serious and heinous than genocide." 

The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a 
travel ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace 
process or violate human rights[Footnote 24] and referring the 
situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court and calling on the government of Sudan and all other parties to 
the conflict to cooperate with the court.[Footnote 25] Further, in 
creating UNMIS to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, the council requested the UN Secretary-General to report to 
the council on options for the mission to reinforce the effort to 
foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS. 

International Response to Darfur Humanitarian Crisis: 

Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in 
Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID's 
Office of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World 
Food Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal 
of meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan's food aid needs as assessed by 
the World Food Program. In addition, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to 
respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the 
conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States 
was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal 
years 2004 to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all 
humanitarian assistance to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion 
in total pledges and obligations of assistance from all 
donors).[Footnote 26] The European Union and the United Kingdom 
provided the largest amounts of assistance pledged or obligated by 
other international donors. Figure 6 shows the percentages of total 
humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for Darfur by 
international donors. 

Figure 6: Total Humanitarian Assistance Pledged or Obligated for Darfur 
by International Donors, as of June 1, 2006: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of UN Resource Tracking Service data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

United States Primarily Contributed Food Aid; Meanwhile, Assistance 
Provision Grew and Other Conditions Improved: 

In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost $1 
billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68 
percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food 
aid in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the 
United States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs, 
such as health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access 
and coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved 
significantly. In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates 
decreased over time, a trend that U.S., UN, and other officials 
attribute in part to humanitarian assistance. 

United States Provided Nearly $1 Billion in Assistance, Partly through 
Supplemental Appropriations: 

U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled 
approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig. 
7). From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance 
increased from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In 
fiscal year 2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18 
percent. Funds provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for 
about $71 million--16 percent of the total--in 2005[Footnote 27] and 
$205 million--56 percent of the total--in 2006.[Footnote 28] 

Figure 7: U.S. Obligations for Food and Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance 
to Darfur by Fiscal Year, Including Supplemental Appropriations: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

U.S. Assistance Focused on Food Aid: 

For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over 
68 percent) as food aid for Darfur--approximately $113 million in 2004, 
$324 million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1). 

Table 1: U.S. Food Aid to Darfur in Metric Tons (MT) and Millions of 
Dollars in Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

Dollars in millions. 

Aid provided to: UN World Food Program; 
2004[A]: MT: 118,400; 
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $112.9; 
2005[B]: MT: 369,170; 
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $318.2; 
2006: MT: 308,140; 
2006: Dollar amount: $227.4; 
Total: MT: 795,710; 
Total: Dollar amount: $658.5. 

Aid provided to: International Committee of the Red Cross; 
2004[A]: MT: 0; 
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $0; 
2005[B]: MT: 7,710; 
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $6.3; 
2006: MT: 19,770; 
2006: Dollar amount: $16.5; 
Total: MT: 27,480; 
Total: Dollar amount: $22.8. 

Total; 
2004[A]: MT: 118,400; 
2004[A]: Dollar amount: $112.9; 
2005[B]: MT: 376,880; 
2005[B]: Dollar amount: $324.5; 
2006: MT: 327,910; 
2006: Dollar amount: $243.9; 
Total: MT: 823,190; 
Total: Dollar amount: $681.3. 

Source: USAID Food For Peace. 

[A] Includes commodities and funds approved for non-Darfur programs but 
transferred to Darfur at the beginning of the crisis in 2003. USAID did 
not transfer funds to the International Committee of the Red Cross in 
2004. 

[B] Includes Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust contribution of 200,000 MT 
valued at $172 million. Fiscal years 2004 and 2006 did not include such 
contributions. 

Note: The dollar amount of the food aid includes the cost of the 
commodities; ocean and air freight; and internal transport, storage, 
and handling. 

[End of table] 

As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 
2005, U.S. food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005 
to fiscal year 2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of 
food provided decreased by almost 13 percent.[Footnote 29] The UN World 
Food Program planned assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16 
percent between calendar years 2005 and 2006,[Footnote 30] while the 
food aid component of planned assistance decreased by 29 
percent.[Footnote 31] According to World Food Program and USAID 
officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half 
of the 2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN 
World Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C., 
stated that the U.S. government provided essential food aid 
contributions in fiscal year 2006 and that the reduction in the level 
of U.S. funding did not negatively impact the food situation in Darfur. 

USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004 
through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum 
nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. 

* Obligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID 
Food for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including 
transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to 
address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through 
2006.[Footnote 32] According to a USAID official, this assistance 
included commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern 
Sudan, which Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to 
respond to the emergency situation in Darfur before the official 
emergency program began. World Food Program officials said that U.S. 
food aid funding allowed the program to preposition food in various 
storage facilities in Darfur, enabling the program to avoid costly air 
drops. World Food Program officials indicated that prepositioning food 
helps avoid shortfalls during rainy seasons resulting from the typical 
6-month time lag between confirmation and distribution of food aid 
donations. 

* Obligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8 
million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. This assistance was intended particularly for rural village 
residents who had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose 
needs had not been addressed by other agencies in the region. 

During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program 
warehouses outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the 
distribution of food aid during the rainy season; we observed local 
staff repackaging U.S. wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to 
the storage facility in Nyala (see fig. 8). 

Figure 8: U.S. Commodities at a World Food Program Storage Facility in 
South Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP 
camp (although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN 
World Food Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in 
IDP camps), where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and 
wheat were distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9). 

Figure 9: Food Distribution in Zam Zam IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs: 

In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United 
States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian 
assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and 
sanitation, health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided 
through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of 
Transition Initiatives as well as State's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration.[Footnote 33] The U.S. government has provided 
nonfood assistance to the affected residents of Darfur through 31 NGOs 
and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs and activities to aid the 
people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and UN agencies that 
received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years 2004 to 
2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated for 
health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food 
security/agriculture (see fig. 10).[Footnote 34] 

Figure 10: U.S. Nonfood Humanitarian Assistance to Darfur in Fiscal 
Years 2004-2006 by Sector: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of data from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, and State's 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. 

Note: "Other sectors" includes information management, rehabilitation, 
capacity building, monitoring/evaluation, staff salaries, stockpiles, 
travel, and disaster assistance programs. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health 
sector, supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, 
and maternal health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics 
in Darfur IDP camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 
IDPs per day, provided basic medical examinations, referring serious 
illnesses to Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided 
vaccinations, reproductive health services for pregnant women, and 
medical services for victims of gender-based violence (see fig. 11). 

Figure 11: Health Clinic in Al Salaam IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million 
for water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and 
rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and 
conducting hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp 
water facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and 
dispensed approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per 
day (above the Sphere standard of 15 liters)[Footnote 35] to provide 
for IDPs' personal needs and to allow them to water their animals. 
According to NGO officials, in Abu Shouk camp, a water tank and hand 
pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per person per day (see fig. 12). 

Figure 12: Water Pump in Abu Shouk IDP Camp in North Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided 
about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for 
income-generation activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated 
helped protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to 
violence. We observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by 
requiring less wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women's 
wood-collecting forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability 
to attacks (see fig. 13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that 
could be sold--including making baskets and other goods, preparing 
fresh pasta, and sewing garments--to provide sources of income that 
would reduce their need to go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy 
and educational training was also provided to IDPs in camps in 
conjunction with income-generation and protection activities. 

Figure 13: Income Generation and Protection Activities in Various IDP 
Camps: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Provision of Assistance Grew and Health Indicators Improved, but Risk 
Remains: 

Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international 
donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of 
humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of 
humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected 
residents have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality 
rates among IDPs and affected residents have diminished. 

* Increased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN and 
NGO officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number of 
humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian 
profiles show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of 
international and national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded 
from 202 to about 13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies.[Footnote 
36] NGO and UN officials in Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution 
was essential to their operations, in some cases making up the totality 
of their budget, and that they would be unable to provide services 
inside and outside the camps without U.S. funding. 

* Increase coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in 
Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of 
affected residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig. 
14). The total affected population receiving assistance such as food, 
water, and health care increased, although substantial numbers of 
affected persons did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible 
areas, owing to continued security concerns. In addition, after August 
2005, the percentage of the targeted population receiving such 
assistance began to decrease, according to the UN, as continued 
conflict and insecurity in Darfur limited access to, and distribution 
of, humanitarian aid. 

Figure 14: Affected Population Compared with Recipients of Humanitarian 
Assistance, April 2004-July 2006: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO analysis of UN humanitarian profiles. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs 
also expanded.[Footnote 37] For example, the number of IDPs receiving 
sanitation assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000 
IDPs in April 2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006. 

* Reduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition 
rates recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food 
Program survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were 
significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although 
nutrition among IDPs in Darfur remains precarious, UN nutritional 
reports show improvement since 2004 and attribute the improvement 
partly to external assistance and large-scale food aid. According to UN 
Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments, the prevalence of 
global acute malnutrition in Darfur was reported at 11.9 percent in 
March of 2006, a significant decrease from the 21.8 percent reported in 
October 2004.[Footnote 38] 

Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality 
rates in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys 
conducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières 
(also known as Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality rates 
ranging between 1.5 to 9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in 2004. In 
September 2005, the UN World Food Program reported that the crude 
mortality rate in Darfur had dropped below the emergency threshold of 1 
death per 10,000 persons per day, as defined by Sphere.[Footnote 39] 
Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur by the United States and 
other international donors has been cited as contributing to improved 
mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN, and U.S. officials 
noted that other factors, such as reduced violence, can also contribute 
to a decrease in mortality rates. 

Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the 
numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide 
assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the 
situation in Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts 
humanitarian organizations' access to IDPs and affected residents of 
Darfur. In addition, NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and 
malnutrition rates would likely rise above emergency levels if 
necessary funding were not continued. 

Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and 
Oversight: 

Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities 
delivering U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs 
have faced numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has 
limited the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur 
and reach all affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese 
government and rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements 
on NGOs that have severely limited the NGO staffs' ability to travel to 
and in Darfur and to provide services to affected residents and IDPs. 
Further, the late timing of U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the 
operations of NGOs and UN agencies and threatened to force some 
reduction in services in Darfur. Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur 
and the large quantity of U.S. humanitarian assistance have challenged 
USAID's ability to ensure accountability for the assistance provided. 
In addition, targeting of humanitarian assistance for IDPs is 
complicated by the difficulty of counting and managing the numbers of 
people who receive assistance and their use of the goods provided. 

Insecurity in Darfur Has Limited Mobility and Access of Humanitarian 
Staff: 

The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur 
states have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to 
provide humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and 
harassment of, humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of 
humanitarian convoys, have increased throughout Darfur since the 
beginning of the humanitarian response; and according to the UN, 
violence, sexual abuse, and displacement have dramatically increased 
since May 2006. 

NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in 
attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have 
regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials. 
According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were 
attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff 
members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and 
other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on 
humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of 
harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in 
2005. USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had 
resulted in the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006--more 
than the number of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August 
2006, the UN reported that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a 
record high. 

In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity, 
according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN officials 
confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian 
aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has 
mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, 
rather than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program 
official estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur 
was lost to banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the 
theft of petty cash, fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food 
Program supplies. 

Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has 
been curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural 
areas. USAID, NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of 
security has forced humanitarian organizations to limit access to 
insecure areas. For example, in response to continued attacks and 
insecurity in West Darfur, in January 2006, the UN Department of 
Security and Safety announced the withdrawal of UN staff from most of 
West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also removed its staff from West 
Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted, some NGOs did not evacuate 
the area and were able to continue operations.) According to USAID, the 
situation dramatically curtailed the ability of organizations to access 
the affected residents and IDP population in the area and to implement 
life-saving programs in West Darfur. Additionally, the UN reported 
that, as a result of significant insecurity in North Darfur, 
approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from emergency food aid 
in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians remained blocked 
from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of August 2006, 
humanitarian aid organizations' access to IDPs and affected residents 
in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of 
inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people 
were displaced between June and August 2006. 

Sudan Government and Rebel Groups Have Restricted NGO and UN Staff 
Movements: 

The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have 
hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents 
and IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as 
well as UN reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to 
Darfur for NGOs and UN agencies since the initial international 
humanitarian response by delaying or denying visas and travel permits. 
NGO officials noted that issuance of visas for staff is often delayed 
or denied without explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials, 
although the government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase 
travel permits for all travel within Darfur, government police and 
other authorities do not always accept the permits and often deny 
access to NGO staff. According to USAID officials, in September 2006, 
the government of Sudan restricted movement of U.S. government 
personnel to within 25 miles of the presidential palace in Khartoum, 
which has forced USAID to remove all personnel from Darfur. This travel 
ban remained in place as of October 20, 2006. Rebel groups also place 
requirements on NGOs that delay transportation of humanitarian aid or 
services into rebel-controlled areas. For example, NGO and UN officials 
stated that they must contact numerous rebel leaders to safely 
transport humanitarian aid into a rebel-controlled area. 

Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials 
allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur 
and insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies 
provide assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN 
officials indicated that although the Sudanese government has an 
official policy of cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur, 
the government's actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance 
within the region. 

Timing of 2006 U.S. Funding Impacted Humanitarian Operations in Darfur: 

Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006 
limited NGO and UN agency partners' ability to supply needed food 
assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood 
assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006 
supplied approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid 
funding for Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the 
supplemental appropriation on June 15, 2006--9 months into the fiscal 
year--total U.S. food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the 
intended levels, including meeting at least half of the World Food 
Program's appeal for Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in 
Darfur did not receive the funds until late in the fiscal year, they 
were forced to reduce food rations and temporarily interrupt some 
humanitarian aid services. 

* Impact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent 
of 2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult 
for the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur 
in a timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between 
confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult 
for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season, 
according to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this 
delay, the program announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it 
would reduce rations in Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement 
(from 2,100 calories to as few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend 
limited food stocks. In response, the Sudanese government donated 
sorghum, and the President of the United States directed USAID to ship 
emergency food stockpiles to Darfur, raising the rations to 84 percent 
(1,770 kilocalories) of the daily requirement for Darfurians receiving 
food aid. In June, the cereal component of the ration was fully 
restored. However, as of October 2006, the World Food Program continued 
to face gaps in food aid, and, according to program officials, it 
planned to maintain the 84 percent ration through the end of the 
calendar year. 

According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current 
level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration 
cuts could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that, 
although the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly 
decrease the food aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137 
million (56 percent) of the 2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in 
the fiscal year negatively affected the food situation in Darfur 
earlier in the year. This outcome aligns with previous GAO findings 
that lack of sufficient, timely donations contributed to food aid 
shortfalls in other emergency situations.[Footnote 40] 

* Impact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian 
assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international 
donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on 
nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these 
officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been 
less than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of 
assistance to Darfur's affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the 
funding delays, the NGO officials said, their organizations would be 
forced to make cuts in the services and programs they provided or to 
reduce their humanitarian aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO 
official indicated that the reduction in funding had forced the 
organization to downsize its health program and to transfer 
responsibility for the clinics to the Sudanese government. Several NGO 
and UN officials also indicated that without additional funds, key 
indicators such as the malnutrition and mortality rates, which had 
improved in 2005, would likely rise again above emergency levels. USAID 
officials told us in October 2006 that after receiving the supplemental 
funding, USAID's partners had been able to restore humanitarian 
programs in Darfur to their previous levels and coverage. 

Oversight of Assistance Was Limited by Reduced Staff and Incomplete 
Reporting: 

USAID's ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S. 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its 
staff who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that 
implementing partners fulfilled reporting requirements. 

From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in 
Darfur significantly increased--from 202 to 13,500--USAID's staff in 
Darfur decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff 
ranged between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that 
number has been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials 
believe that the remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to 
oversee the implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID 
grant agreements, among other responsibilities.[Footnote 41] USAID 
officials indicated that other, external factors, such as UN and U.S. 
Embassy security requirements and restrictions imposed by the 
government of Sudan, limit the number of staff in Darfur. In addition, 
USAID officials indicated that they visited camps and communicated with 
NGO and UN agency officials regularly to discuss operations and 
difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian assistance. 
However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time and staff 
in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size of 
Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not 
monitor compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at 
locations in Darfur that were targeted for assistance. 

Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result, 
USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their 
performance, and measure the impact of the assistance 
provided.[Footnote 42] According to USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must 
submit proposals outlining the indicators and outcomes expected from 
the humanitarian activities and services provided for with U.S. funds. 
Each grant agreement also specifies that 90 days after the agreement's 
expiration, the NGO must submit a final report that includes the 
cumulative achievements and a comparison of actual accomplishments 
against the goals, objectives, indicators, and targets established for 
the agreement. Examples of indicators used by NGOs in proposals 
include, for example, the crude mortality rate in the target population 
or the number of latrines constructed. However, we found that 6 of 15 
final reports that NGOs were required to submit by June 1, 2006, had 
not been submitted to USAID. Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs 
submitted did not include all required information. 

USAID's Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain 
constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities 
in Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners' 
accomplishments, or lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness 
of most NGO reports. However, the reports and indicators are essential 
in monitoring and evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID 
staff are often constrained by limited access due to insecurity and 
violence throughout Darfur. In response to our observations USAID 
acknowledged the importance of obtaining required reports and has taken 
efforts to ensure reporting compliance from its NGO partners. As a 
result, USAID reported that in July 2006 it received all quarterly 
reports from current NGO partners. 

Difficulties Existed in Ensuring that U.S. Assistance Was Used as 
Intended: 

Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have 
made it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S. 
humanitarian assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In 
addition, some IDPs used humanitarian assistance for purposes other 
than those for which it was intended. 

* In part because the IDP camps' large size makes it difficult to 
control who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed 
to recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian 
profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in 
Kalma camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between 
103,000 and 163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for 
IDPs based on these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts 
to count the actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be 
invalid because of problems with the counts and an inability to stop 
non-IDPs from participating. An October 2005 count was completed by 
more than 400 staff from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with 
assistance from Sudanese government troops--who surrounded the camp to 
stop non-IDPs from entering--and AMIS civilian police, who provided 
security inside the camp. On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000 was 
declared accurate, approximately 70,000 IDPs less than the previous 
estimate. According to a USAID official, residents from the nearby 
state capital of Nyala had previously received improper food 
distributions at the camp. According to USAID, without accurate counts 
of camp populations, the humanitarian community struggles to distribute 
food aid appropriately to the populations with the greatest need. 

* Not all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although 
USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency 
situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in 
Abu Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make 
bricks, either for their own shelters or for sale on the market. 
According to a UN official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30 
percent of available water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result, 
8 of the 30 water pumps in Abu Shouk dried up. 

African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have 
Been Incomplete or Inconsistent: 

Although the African Union's peace support operation has reportedly 
contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS's 
actions to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an 
incomplete or inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-
fire agreement, the first component of its mandate, AMIS military 
observers in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire 
agreement violations. However, the resulting reports have not been 
reviewed according to established procedure or widely publicized to 
identify parties who have violated the agreement. To build confidence 
and to improve security, the second and third components of its 
mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and 
escorting IDP women who leave camps to forage for firewood. In 
addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop impending violence 
against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys in some 
instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances. 
Further, the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to 
improve law enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered 
difficulties with the Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS's efforts 
to meet its mandate, the U.S. government provided about $280 million 
from June 2004 through September 2006, according to State, primarily to 
build and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout 
Darfur. 

AMIS Is Seen as Having Made Important Contribution: 

AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in 
Darfur. U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for 
decreasing large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its 
presence in the region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS 
participants have a strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS 
initiative work and that the presence of AMIS's patrols has had a 
positive impact. Further, a senior UN official told us that AMIS 
"jumped into Darfur" with few resources in a genuine attempt to "put 
out this fire" and that AMIS's presence has had a notable impact. 
Further, State and UN officials noted that AMIS forces were deployed to 
Darfur quickly in comparison with other international peacekeeping 
missions. 

AMIS Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some actions Have Been 
Incomplete or Inconsistent: 

AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to 
its mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, 
(2) assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving 
security.[Footnote 43] However, some of these actions have been 
executed in an incomplete or inconsistent manner, limiting the extent 
to which AMIS has been able to fulfill its mandate. 

AMIS Has Monitored Cease-fire Compliance, but Monitoring Has Been 
Incomplete: 

To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers 
in Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the 
2004 cease-fire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not 
consistently reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation 
reports. Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire 
violation investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to 
establish how many total cease-fire violations have been identified by 
the Ceasefire Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties 
have been responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations. 

Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding 
violations.[Footnote 44] The commission found that all three parties to 
the conflict had committed violations, many of which occurred in South 
Darfur. Of the 80 allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that 
we reviewed,[Footnote 45] the Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a 
determination in 30 instances, often because an outside party (such as 
the Janjaweed) had allegedly committed the violation. These cases 
involved acts such as the killing of numerous civilians at a time and 
attacks on villages. In several cases, the Sudanese government was 
accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed. In three of the cases we 
reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined that no violation had 
occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of cease-fire agreement 
violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54 violations.[Footnote 46] 

* Sudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese 
government had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among 
these violations, 9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village 
attacks; 7 involved attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians; 
and 7 involved Sudanese troop movements into new territory without 
proper notification to the Ceasefire Commission. 

* SLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 cease- 
fire agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks 
on Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations, 
convoys); seven involved abductions of civilians, local political 
representatives, or Sudanese government personnel; two involved village 
attacks; and two involved civilian deaths. 

* JEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire 
agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese 
facilities. 

The Ceasefire Commission's recommendations in the reports vary from 
general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties 
to the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them 
that they are required to give the commission prior notice of any 
administrative troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate 
their members about the provisions of the agreement. More specific 
recommendations include those recommending that the Sudanese government 
disarm, neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop 
looting, or return looted goods, and release those whom it had 
abducted. In reports issued after November 2004, the Ceasefire 
Commission frequently appealed to the Joint Commission to become more 
involved in various aspects of the monitoring process. 

However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding 
parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the 
violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint 
Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing 
reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take 
action based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission 
has condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and 
asked all parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that 
officials at African Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint 
Commission to review or approve Ceasefire Commission reports. 

African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports 
are available on the African Union's Web site and publicly identify 
violators of the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties 
to the conflict to improve compliance with the agreement. The officials 
viewed this transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of 
the reports. However, we found that the public record of investigated 
cease-fire violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish 
the total number of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all 
responsible parties. For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116 
Ceasefire Commission reports listed as available on the African Union's 
Web site. Further, we were unable to locate any reports subsequent to 
September 2005 to validate other claims regarding violations. For 
example, no Ceasefire Commission reports are publicly available to 
substantiate or refute a January 2006 report, which was prepared by the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission and submitted to the Peace 
and Security Council, stating that cease-fire violations had escalated 
since October 2005 and that some of the most serious violations had 
occurred since that time.[Footnote 47] 

Confidence-Building and Security-Improvement Efforts Have Been 
Sporadic: 

To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces 
have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor 
staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese 
government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts 
have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services; 
AMIS forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and 
AMIS civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese 
police. 

AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All Attacks 
or Provided All Needed Protection: 

To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more 
secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting 
patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS 
escorts and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent 
attacks, and AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed 
escort services. 

* Patrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that 
AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two 
patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS's presence known and to 
interact positively with local communities, collect information, or 
investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied 
one confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of Kabkabiya; 
AMIS military observers interviewed local residents and a community 
leader to identify any problems that required AMIS attention. (See fig. 
15.) 

Figure 15: AMIS Confidence-Building Patrol Near Kabkabiya in North 
Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

* Escorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS 
troops have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for 
firewood outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S. 
officials, the presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from 
being attacked. We accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as 
they walked more than 9 miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur 
to find firewood for the next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection 
force troops and civilian police, as well as Sudanese government 
police, the 79 women went about their activities freely and without 
incident (see fig. 16). AMIS officials also told us that they have 
escorted NGO convoys to prevent theft and banditry. 

Figure 16: AMIS Firewood Patrol Near Kass in South Darfur: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have 
been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in 
rebel attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two 
local contractor staff in October 2005.[Footnote 48] In July 2006, 32 
AMIS soldiers escorting a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by 
one SLM/A faction; although the soldiers were eventually released, two 
fuel tanker drivers, the fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not 
released at that time. According to a senior U.S. contracting official 
working in Darfur, the drivers and tankers were released in October 
2006, and the vehicles have not been returned. According to a December 
2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS (with participation from the 
UN, European Union, and United States), such incidents "undermine the 
Mission's credibility in the eyes of civilians and embolden those who 
may target AMIS."[Footnote 49] Further, a UN official emphasized that 
AMIS's ability to provide services such as firewood escorts is limited 
and that AMIS cannot begin to cover all instances where such escorts 
would be useful. 

AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in 
Others: 

AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent 
threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For 
example, according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops 
were deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against 
IDPs when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of 
civilians by the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a 
Sudanese military advance on the town that could have resulted in the 
substantial displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the 
town of Labado in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS 
troops in January 2005 deterred further attacks and led to the return 
of many town residents, who began to repair their homes and rebuild 
their lives.[Footnote 50] 

However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent 
violence. For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did 
not maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in 
South Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated 
requests from the international community for a continuous AMIS 
presence. Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of 
several IDPs and subsequent displacement in early 2006.[Footnote 51] In 
addition, an NGO official told us that AMIS was slow in responding to 
requests for assistance from NGOs caught in a battle between SLM/A and 
Sudanese government forces in the Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did 
help evacuate NGO staff from the area 24 hours after the conflict 
began. According to an AMIS commander, although AMIS has taken 
preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, the territory is too 
large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall. 

AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have Been 
Difficult: 

AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security,[Footnote 
52] but some of its relations with the Sudanese police have been 
problematic. AMIS civilian police officers reported to us that they 
were working to ensure that the Sudanese police are acting on cases 
provided by the AMIS civilian police.[Footnote 53] AMIS civilian police 
also noted that, where appropriate, they have encouraged the use of 
village councils to resolve disputes, rather than referring every case 
to the Sudanese authorities. 

However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations 
with the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian 
police officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on 
cases provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in 
convictions or adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to 
obtain information from the Sudanese police regarding the status of 
referred cases. In addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that 
Sudanese police have at times perpetrated violent acts against citizens 
of Darfur and AMIS police. Moreover, the civilian police have had 
difficulty gaining access to some areas that are controlled by rebel 
groups and lack an official Sudanese police presence. 

Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS's civilian police 
frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police 
provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did 
not understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems 
arose. Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian 
police have visible stations adjacent to IDP camps.[Footnote 54] AMIS 
and UN officials also noted that because the civilian police are 
unarmed, they require AMIS protection force escorts, which are not 
always available. 

U.S. and Other External Donors Have Supported African Union's Efforts 
to Fulfill Its Mandate: 

The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the 
construction and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor, 
PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have 
provided funding or goods and services to support AMIS's peacekeeping 
operations.[Footnote 55] 

U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps: 

To support AMIS's efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government 
expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated 
another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and 
maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, 
according to a State official who tracks this funding.[Footnote 56] 
African Union and U.S. officials told us that camp sites were chosen to 
be near population centers and known conflict areas. State contracted 
with PAE to build and maintain the camps as well as to maintain AMIS 
vehicles and communication equipment (see fig. 17).[Footnote 57] PAE is 
also maintaining armored personnel carriers provided by Canada; the 
Canadian government has provided State with more than $20 million for 
fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally, PAE is responsible for 
hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military observers (referred to 
by State officials in Darfur as "U.S. representatives" owing to their 
range of contributions to AMIS beyond observing activities).[Footnote 
58] Although 16 U.S. military observers are authorized, only 11 were on 
the ground in Darfur during our February 2006 visit.[Footnote 59] 

Figure 17: AMIS Camps: 

[See PDF for image] - graphic text: 

Sources: GAO (photo), PAE (photos), and MapInfo (map). 

[End of figure] - graphic text: 

Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005, 
involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in 
Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying 
generators and, particularly as construction was beginning, 
transporting supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the 
camps, which together can house 9,300 people,[Footnote 60] was 
complicated by the difficulty of finding international staff willing to 
come to Darfur and local staff possessing adequate skills. In addition, 
the remote locations of camp sites, combined with the inadequate 
condition of roads throughout the region, made it difficult to 
transport building supplies to the sites; PAE officials told us that in 
some cases, supplies were transported across insecure areas via 
donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS over time 
(including the introduction of the civilian police component) had to be 
incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the relatively 
small size of some of the land parcels provided by the government of 
Sudan made it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct sufficient 
perimeter protection around camps. Other sites provided by the 
government are in vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials 
identified one camp that was built in a natural "bowl," making 
protection problematic, although steps were recently taken to relocate 
portions of this camp. 

According to PAE and State officials, PAE's current costs for 
maintaining the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and 
vehicles, are about $7.8 million per month.[Footnote 61] PAE faces 
additional challenges in maintaining AMIS facilities, with the 
provision of water a key difficulty. According to a PAE situation 
report dated May 5, 2006, there are significant concerns regarding the 
provision of an uninterrupted supply of water to several AMIS 
camps.[Footnote 62] In some cases, unprotected water bore holes have 
been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of jet 
fuel. A PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to 
maintaining the camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand. 

Other International Donors Have Provided Cash, Goods, and Services: 

The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200 
million as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per 
diem[Footnote 63] and food, according to a State official. Many other 
donor contributions have been "in kind"--that is, goods and services 
rather than direct funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned 
AMIS 25 helicopters and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British 
government provided vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government 
provided communications equipment; and the Norwegian government is 
building civilian police stations near IDP camps.[Footnote 64] Further, 
since October 2004, the UN has provided assistance to AMIS via a 
technical assistance cell working in Addis Ababa and funded by the UN 
Mission in Sudan. According to an official in the cell, it has provided 
services such as technical support (including an August 2005 UN-led 
exercise to prepare AMIS for troop deployments and identify areas where 
capacity building was required) and training (such as arranging 
training for military observers and bringing a financial officer to 
African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist with financial 
management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS personnel and has 
assisted with troop rotation efforts.[Footnote 65] 

Numerous Factors Have Complicated AMIS Efforts: 

Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government 
officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS's difficulties in 
meeting its mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management, 
organization, and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that 
have been constrained or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of 
information regarding, and cooperation from, parties to the 
conflict.[Footnote 66] As AMIS has faced operational and other 
challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur 
when AMIS's mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the Sudanese 
government had rejected the proposal. In June 2006, following a NATO 
offer, the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO in, 
among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations; 
however, according to a State official, African Union headquarters had 
taken no further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. 
Meanwhile, instability and violence have continued in Darfur. 

Inadequacies in Management, Organization, and Capacity Have Hampered 
AMIS Deployment: 

AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its 
management, organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to 
carry out its mandate. 

Inadequate and Inconsistent Management: 

Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly 
expressed the view that AMIS's command and control has been inadequate 
and confused.[Footnote 67] A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005 
stated, "The evolution of the mission has been such that it has 
depended on individual components conducting their own planning rather 
than tackling problems from a mission perspective. This has led to 
considerable disparity between components, duplication of effort, and 
the potential for planning at cross purposes."[Footnote 68] A State 
official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines of authority 
between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack of 
coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations 
problematic. A Refugees International study reported that "AMIS has 
suffered from language and cultural barriers between officers from 
various countries, confusion in procedures, limited future planning, 
and ineffective communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of 
peacekeeping experience."[Footnote 69] The Brookings Institution- 
University of Bern study also stated that AMIS command and control had 
been slow and cumbersome and that "[t]he unwieldy bureaucracy at 
African Union headquarters hampered all aspects of deployment; there is 
no institutional expertise for peace operations yet in the [African 
Union]."[Footnote 70] 

Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in 
interpreting the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and 
civilians and limiting its protection of civilians within its 
capabilities.[Footnote 71] AMIS leadership's willingness to take 
certain actions to meet the mandate--for example, to protect civilians-
-has varied throughout Darfur, as already noted. State officials have 
observed that AMIS's willingness to actively protect Darfur residents 
to the extent provided for in the mandate has been "uneven." A U.S. 
official we met with in Sudan noted that in some cases, the degree to 
which AMIS's mandate was robustly interpreted seemed to depend on 
leadership personalities.[Footnote 72] 

Lack of Coordination: 

According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS, 
"military and police mission components are not operating in a 
sufficiently joint and coordinated manner."[Footnote 73] The Brookings 
Institution--University of Bern study noted a similar problem, stating 
that the civilian police "rely on the AMIS protection force for their 
movements, but they are not currently integrated into military planning 
structures."[Footnote 74] Many parties, including U.S. and UN 
officials, have called for the creation of a joint operations center 
that would serve as the focal point for the coordination and 
integration of AMIS military and civilian police operations; however, 
such a unit has not yet been created. On the other hand, a joint 
logistics operations center has been established to improve the 
logistical coordination of the AMIS components.[Footnote 75] 

Limited Capacity: 

African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with 
the capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor 
negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings 
Institution-University of Bern study, "For many commanders, this 
African Union mission is their first operational experience."[Footnote 
76] Troops are also viewed as having limited experience. For example, 
according to a Human Rights Watch report, "[African Union] troop- 
contributing countries have sometimes struggled to identify and deploy 
properly trained staff officers, particularly those with appropriate 
language skills…. Most troop-contributing countries have previously 
contributed to UN missions that were often western-led operations, thus 
leaving the [African Union] troops with limited operational experience 
above the tactical level."[Footnote 77] An African Union official and a 
U.S. official noted separately that, although AMIS has training 
standards, little is done to verify that AMIS troops arriving in Darfur 
have received appropriate training. Further, according to the Brookings 
Institution-University of Bern study, the quality of AMIS police is not 
adequate, with limited screening prior to deployment to 
Darfur.[Footnote 78] 

Small Size of AMIS Force Has Limited Its Ability to Patrol and Protect: 

The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a 
relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol 
all of Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing 
environment (however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north, 
are largely unpopulated [see fig. 2]).[Footnote 79] According to State 
officials, the small size of the force has limited AMIS's ability to 
patrol such a large, difficult region and sufficiently interact with 
residents and other parties in Darfur. Further, according to a Refugees 
International report, "AMIS doesn't have enough troops to sufficiently 
protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians and humanitarian 
organizations."[Footnote 80] In addition, an International Crisis Group 
document stated in July 2005 that as many as 15,000 troops were needed 
in Darfur to protect villages and IDPs, provide security for 
humanitarian operations, and neutralize militias.[Footnote 81] The 
December 2005 African Union-Led Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that 
the absence of an authorized battalion had a significant operational 
impact and overstretched existing personnel.[Footnote 82] 

Constrained and Inefficiently Allocated Resources Have Restricted AMIS 
Operations: 

African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have 
sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct 
the activities necessary to fulfill its mandate.[Footnote 83] A senior 
African Union official told us that AMIS's reliance on outside donors 
has resulted in a lack of control for the mission because basic 
operational elements, such as facilities, logistics, and funding rest 
in the hands of other parties. According to January 2006 African Union 
documentation, the African Union has not been able to provide critical 
resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, in a timely 
fashion; as a result, AMIS has functioned with about half of the needed 
logistical capacity. U.S. officials have countered that the African 
Union has at times been slow to respond to offers of assistance or to 
prioritize resource needs. During some periods, donor support for AMIS 
has been less than what the African Union had expected, with African 
Union documentation stating that a lack of funds has been a major 
constraint. 

According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as 
vehicles and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS 
operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has 
inadequate transportation equipment[Footnote 84] and communications 
equipment, as well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials 
whom we interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate 
communications equipment limited their ability to interact with 
different camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police 
official noted that the civilian police often receive less equipment 
than the military component of AMIS, which has resulted in situations 
such as the need to rely on military colleagues' equipment to 
communicate with their civilian police colleagues. One AMIS commander 
also noted that AMIS required more printers, computers, and 
photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that until AMIS makes the 
most efficient use of its current resources, such as vehicles and 
communications equipment, it is unclear whether more resources are 
needed.[Footnote 85] Further, the December 2005 African Union-led 
report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned, 
equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed.[Footnote 
86] 

A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and 
the residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central 
problem hindering AMIS's ability to monitor compliance with the cease- 
fire agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the 
African Union's Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 
interpreters; however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 
interpreters. The lack of interpreters has been attributed to the 
difficulty in finding people who speak both Arabic and English. One 
U.S. military observer told us that many uneducated people in Darfur 
speak only their tribal language, further complicating AMIS's ability 
to ensure effective communication. In addition, we were told that at 
times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties to the conflict 
as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not verify that 
translators were conducting the interview in an objective fashion, 
asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately. In 
one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in 
South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was 
"helped" in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she 
had been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was 
able to discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to 
the rest of the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of 
civilian police translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond 
to IDPs reporting violence in the camps. 

AMIS Has Had Limited Information on, and Cooperation from, Parties to 
the Conflict: 

Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to 
collect needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The 
International Crisis Group has noted that "AMIS does not have an 
intelligence apparatus or collection capacity and does not actively 
analyze or disseminate intelligence." The Brookings Institution- 
University of Bern study further stressed that "[g]ood intelligence is 
vital in Darfur, yet AMIS's capacity to gather, analyze and act on 
information has been very weak."[Footnote 87] According to a former 
U.S. military observer to AMIS, "The African Union does not understand 
the importance of having an 'intelligence cell' and of having good 
information on the command structure, for example, of the Janjaweed." 
The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS emphasized, "If 
AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of intelligence is 
essential," and further noted that the lack of intelligence collection, 
analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the effectiveness and 
focus of operations.[Footnote 88] 

The December 2005 African Union-led assessment also noted: 

The effectiveness of AMIS is directly related to the level of 
cooperation it receives from the parties to the conflict. Thus far, 
that cooperation has been extremely inconsistent. The [Sudanese] 
government continues to create bureaucratic obstacles to AMIS's ability 
to operate freely. These include curfews, early airport closings, and 
long delays in issuing permits and visas. AMIS has not, as they should 
have, protested against these restrictions on movements, notably the 
curfew. The government's use of white vehicles and aircraft (which 
resemble AMIS) in military operations is also inconsistent with its 
commitments to support the [African Union] Mission…. The [SLM/A] and 
JEM bear an equal responsibility for accepting and supporting the 
presence of AMIS. Ongoing obstruction of [African Union] activities by 
the rebels has included obstruction of movement, threatening patrols, 
harassment, theft of equipment, and even abduction of 
personnel.[Footnote 89] 

U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of 
Sudan detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the 
border and released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S. 
embassy official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch 
communications equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months, 
demonstrating how the Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than 
facilitate, AMIS operations. 

In addition, all parties to the conflict--the Sudanese government, the 
SLM/A, and the JEM--have been cited several times for violating the 
2004 cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to 
Ceasefire Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese 
government, routinely file objections to final report conclusions. 
According to an International Crisis Group report, "AMIS was born out 
of the N'djamena agreement [2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement], 
which lacked a true enforcement mechanism and was based on the 
assumption of compliance and goodwill by the parties. International 
pressure on those parties to respect their commitments has been 
ineffective, thus undermining the [African Union] mission."[Footnote 
90] 

UN and NATO Offers of Assistance Have Not Been Acted On; Meanwhile, 
Violence in Darfur Continues: 

While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered 
to assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping 
force when AMIS's mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and 
identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government 
and other parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS 
responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the 
African Union's Peace and Security Council officially declared its 
approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN 
operation.[Footnote 91] In March, the council reaffirmed this position, 
and in May it declared that "concrete steps should be taken to effect 
the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation."[Footnote 92] 
The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution endorsing 
this African Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping 
operation and emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to the extent 
possible, a strong African participation and character.[Footnote 93] In 
August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expanding 
UNMIS's mandate and calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur.[Footnote 
94] 

According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to 
build on AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in 
AMIS would be "bluehatted"--that is, could transition to UNMIS. 
According to a State official, under this scenario, the UN mission 
would have a unified command for the entire operation, with separate 
commanders for UNMIS efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to 
the Department of State fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State 
official, this UN effort in Sudan would cost the U.S. government about 
$442 million in fiscal year 2007; a State official roughly estimated 
that the Darfur portion of this operation would cost the United States 
between $160 million and $180 million for the year.[Footnote 95] 

As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to 
a UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president 
expressed support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to 
provide assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of 
equipment and personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following 
ways: logistical and material support, military staff support, advisory 
support to civilian police, and other staff support in the areas of 
assistance in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement, public 
information, mine action, and humanitarian coordination. 

In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson 
of the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among 
other things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to 
identify "lessons learned," which could help the African Union better 
execute any future peace support efforts. However, a State official 
reported that, although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 
formally accepted NATO's offer of this assistance, as of August 2006, 
the African Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue 
the review.[Footnote 96] Such reviews are typically conducted after 
peacekeeping operations are completed; for example, the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operation's Best Practices Section undertakes such 
reviews following UN peacekeeping efforts.[Footnote 97] 

Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering 
calls for UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission, as of May 2006, "the 
region has continued to witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire 
violations, banditry activities, hijacking of vehicles, attacks on 
villages and killing of unarmed civilians by the various parties, 
particularly the janjaweed." One NGO reported 200 sexual assaults 
around Kalma camp in South Darfur within 5 weeks during the summer of 
2006 and the African Union reported that two AMIS soldiers were killed 
in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment in Darfur remained 
insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and, during some 
periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the Sudanese 
government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties that did 
not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability 
of AMIS to conduct operations, the African Union's ability to implement 
the agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior State 
official reported that "Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous downward 
spiral. The parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their 
fighting." The level of acceptance of the peace agreement overall in 
Darfur is uncertain, owing to a general lack of information throughout 
the population regarding the terms of the agreement as well as concern 
over the fact that the smaller SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to 
sign the deal. UN officials have warned that continued militia attacks 
on IDPs are affecting implementation of the peace agreement and 
emphasized that successful implementation of the agreement is key to 
peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider region. In September 
2006, an African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué noted that 
"the security situation remains volatile and continues to deteriorate 
even further in some parts of Darfur, consequently worsening the 
humanitarian and human rights situation, and the current build-up of 
forces by all the parties poses further risks and challenges to the 
peace efforts." On September 19, 2006, the U.S. President named former 
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a Presidential Special Envoy to 
lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding disputes in Darfur. 

Conclusions: 

As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United 
States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved 
the health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S. 
assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis 
would likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the 
affected population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining 
all AMIS facilities has also been essential, along with other donor 
assistance, to AMIS's ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity 
continues in Darfur, such support may be required well into the future. 

At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and 
UN operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners' ability to provide 
services to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved 
levels of health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation 
from the government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and 
conflict within Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian 
organizations to provide consistent and complete coverage to the 
affected residents and IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken 
steps to ensure more complete reporting, the limitations in its 
oversight of U.S. assistance have made it difficult to accurately 
determine the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The fact that the 
violence in Darfur has not abated, and has even worsened in some 
instances, indicates the region's need for continued assistance. 

Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in 
Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its 
mandate has been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some 
of its actions--such as efforts to protect civilians--in addition to 
numerous operational challenges. Some of these challenges--for example, 
AMIS's small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of 
cooperation from the parties to the conflict--have remained beyond its 
control. However, other challenges, such as AMIS's inadequate 
management, organization, and capacity, may stem from the African 
Union's lack of experience with peace support efforts. At the same 
time, the ongoing and increasing violence in Darfur, as well as AMIS's 
added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace agreement, make it 
likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will intensify. The proffered 
NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a typical "lessons 
learned" activity following a peacekeeping initiative--could provide a 
useful critical analysis of these challenges and their root causes. The 
resulting insights could assist the African Union in strengthening 
AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in planning and executing 
any future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger AMIS or 
intervention by another international party such as the UN, the 
conflict in Darfur could continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy 
the lives of Darfurians. 

Recommendation: 

We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of 
the African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such 
as NATO, provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to 
identify the key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those 
challenges. Such a "lessons learned" assessment would provide 
information necessary to allow (1) the African Union to strengthen its 
future peace support planning and operations and (2) the donor 
community to support future African Union peace support efforts in a 
manner that could minimize difficulties such as those encountered by 
AMIS. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense as well as USAID. We received written comments from the 
Department of State and USAID. The Department of State supported our 
recommendation and noted that the report presents a balanced and 
accurate picture of the situation in Darfur. The department also 
suggested that the report provide additional details or 
characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, issues. For 
example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize the speed 
with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note that the 
Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign the 
Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to 
conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as 
appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and 
our response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to 
be a comprehensive assessment of USAID's involvement in Darfur but said 
that we should include additional information in our discussions of 
areas such as the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the 
variety of efforts used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically, 
USAID stated that our reference to reduced staff in Darfur was 
incomplete and felt that our discussion of incomplete reporting did not 
highlight other monitoring efforts, such as site visits and meetings 
with NGOs. We made adjustments as appropriate. See appendix VI for a 
reproduction of USAID's letter and our response. DOD provided no 
comments on the draft report. 

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the 
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send 
copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID 
Administrator, relevant congressional committees, and other interested 
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, the report will be available on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Other contacts and major 
contributors are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

David Gootnick, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help 
relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have 
encountered, (3) the African Union's efforts to fulfill its peace 
support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation 
of this mandate. 

We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts) 
for Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September 
2003 through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both 
amounts committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international 
donors. We did not include pledges and commitments from international 
donors that support the refugees located in Chad, because we did not 
review U.S. obligations to refugees in Chad. We made this decision 
because (1) security restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us 
from observing U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for 
refugees in Chad was small in comparison with assistance provided to 
Darfur. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purpose of broadly comparing the United States' contributions with 
those of other international donors. We noted several limitations in 
the data, notably, that the data include verbal pledges that were self- 
reported to the UN Resource Tracking System by the donors. According to 
a UN official, the data may exceed other, similar UN data on donor 
contributions, because they include verbal pledges that have not been 
formally submitted to and verified by UN sources. Furthermore, we were 
unable to determine the reliability of financial records and the dollar 
amounts reportedly pledged by donors. 

To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance--our first objective-
-we collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for 
Darfur from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of 
Transition Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The 
Department of State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed 
State and USAID officials regarding their methods for managing and 
tracking the obligation data, and we compared these data with the 
amounts listed in State's and USAID's agreements with nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) and UN agencies. According to a USAID official, 
expenditure data for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are not 
tracked in the office's reporting system, but the data are reconciled 
on a daily basis and include any amounts that may have been de- 
obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated that the 
office's tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis. 
Therefore, we concluded that the data we collected on obligations from 
each agency are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S. 
humanitarian assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through 
September 30, 2006. 

To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian 
assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID 
and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials 
located in New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for 
Darfur. In February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to 
examine the activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In 
Khartoum we met with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN 
agencies, as well as an official from the government of Sudan's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, we visited seven camps for 
internally displaced persons (IDP)--Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif, 
Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam Zam--located in North and South Darfur to 
observe activities and programs implemented with U.S. funds. We 
observed a variety of programs and activities supported by U.S. 
assistance, including food distribution, medical clinics, clean water 
and sanitation facilities, income-generation activities, provision of 
shelter materials, and nutritional feeding centers. We spoke with 
officials from the NGOs and UN agencies implementing these activities 
programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs in the camps to obtain 
their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the 
camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State Regional Security 
Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited the area in 
which we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in Darfur. 

To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we 
reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID's Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to 
identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also 
reviewed USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators 
included in the original proposals to the reported indicators in each 
final report and identified the indicators that were absent from the 
final reports. We interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID's 
efforts to monitor and evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well 
as efforts to motivate NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed 
the Office of Food for Peace performance review questionnaires 
submitted by implementing partners providing food aid for Darfur. In 
addition, we spoke with an official from the USAID Office of Transition 
Initiatives to discuss an ongoing program review. We also reviewed UN 
Humanitarian Profile reports that provide an overview of humanitarian 
assistance from April 2004 to July 2006. These reports were also used 
to identify the IDP and affected resident population in Darfur, by 
month. According to UN officials and the profiles, NGOs and UN agencies 
operating throughout Darfur submitted the information from the reports 
to the UN on a monthly basis until January 2006, and now submit it 
quarterly. Although the data contained in the reports are self- 
reported, UN officials indicated that they confirm data to the extent 
possible and update the data each month. Furthermore, the UN 
Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of information regarding the 
total number of IDPs and affected residents in Darfur and the number of 
IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We determined that the 
population data and the data regarding the population receiving 
assistance were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general 
overview of assistance in Darfur. 

To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies-
-our second objective--we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables 
discussing humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We 
interviewed USAID, UN, and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the 
challenges they face in implementing assistance program and activities 
in Darfur. We also met with officials from the Sudan government 
Humanitarian Assistance Committee to discuss the obstacles and concerns 
of NGOs and UN officials operating in Darfur and obtain the perspective 
and input of the Sudan government regarding these issues. 

In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and 
the operational challenges AMIS has faced--our third and fourth 
objectives--as well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its 
mandate, we used numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African 
Union Peace and Security Council communiqués, as well as reports 
prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were 
submitted to the council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of 
AMIS, conducted in March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led 
assessment of AMIS performance conducted in August of that year. In 
February 2006, we met with AMIS leadership (military and civilian 
police) at AMIS headquarters in El Fasher and the following AMIS group 
sites in North and South Darfur--Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um 
Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El Daein--where we discussed the AMIS mandate 
and AMIS activities at each location. We also discussed AMIS efforts 
with the U.S. representative to the African Union-led Ceasefire 
Commission, as well as U.S. representatives (military observers) in 
four locations. We were unable to travel to AMIS sites in West Darfur 
owing to security concerns. At African Union headquarters in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African Union officials, including 
the Commissioner for the African Union's Peace and Security Council and 
the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in February 2006. To 
assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire Commission, we analyzed 
the contents of all publicly available reports from the African Union's 
Web site, [Hyperlink, http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm]. 

We also discussed the African Union's initiative in Darfur and external 
donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in 
Washington, D.C; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia) and Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we 
discussed the situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following 
bureaus and offices: Administration, African Affairs; International 
Organization Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population, 
Refugees, and Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the 
staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed 
UN Security Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the 
situation in Darfur, and a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS 
operations. We met with officials from the UN's Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations in New York. We also met with European Union 
and UN officials at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. In 
addition, we met with officials from, and reviewed reports prepared by, 
expert and advocacy groups such as the International Crisis Group, 
Human Rights Watch, and Refugees International. Finally, we met with 
Sudanese government officials in Khartoum and Washington, D.C. 

To review the U.S. government's support for AMIS, we discussed this 
support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State 
and Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the 
contract documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE 
Government Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE 
weekly situation reports, describing events related to camp 
construction and maintenance and submitted to State, and met with 
officials from PAE in Washington, D.C., and North and South Darfur. We 
also discussed PAE's efforts with an official who was working on 
contract in Darfur as State's Contracting Officer's Technical 
Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us on our visit to 
AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as to the 
logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating base in 
Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining AMIS 
facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were sufficiently 
reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount of U.S. 
funding that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS camps, we 
spoke with State officials from the African Affairs and Administration 
bureaus. In particular, we had detailed discussions with a key official 
from the African Affairs Bureau who provided information on funding, 
provided by fiscal year, and the funding source. The official prepared 
a calculation of U.S. funding for PAE efforts independently. All 
figures addressing State funding to support AMIS provided in the report 
are attributed to this State official and were not independently 
verified. However, after discussions with multiple State officials 
knowledgeable about State support for PAE who cited the State official 
as a key source within State for this information, combined with a 
review of State's information by PAE officials, we have determined that 
the funding information provided is sufficiently reliable for inclusion 
in our report with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight 
regarding this funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington. 

We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Timeline of Darfur Events: 

Topic: Beginning of conflict; 
Date: Early 2003; 
Summary: Darfur conflict begins; 
Description: In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police 
stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In 
El Fasher, the rebels destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed 
numerous soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. In response, the 
government armed and supported local tribal and other militias (the 
Janjaweed). Fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan military 
and other armed militia intensified during late 2003. The principal 
rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/ A) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: April 2004; 
Summary: 202 humanitarian staff working in Darfur; 
Description: In April 2004, there was limited humanitarian presence in 
Darfur, with only 202 humanitarian staff working in the region. In 
addition, some of the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating in 
Darfur provided only limited humanitarian assistance, since their 
primary focus was on development assistance. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: December 2004; 
Summary: Save the Children-UK withdraws after death of four staff; 
Description: On December 21, 2004, Save the Children-UK announced that 
it was discontinuing humanitarian operations in Darfur following two 
incidents in October and December that resulted in the deaths of four 
staff members. Save the Children had operated in Darfur for 20 years. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: End of 2004; 
Summary: Donors provide $890 million in humanitarian assistance; 
Description: At the end of 2004, total pledges and commitments for 
Darfur from international donors in 2004 totaled more than $890 
million. The United States committed or pledged more than $271 million 
(31 percent). 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: July 2005; 
Summary: Over 3 million people affected by crisis; 
Description: The population of Darfur estimated to be affected by the 
violence, both internally displaced persons (IDP) and affected 
residents, rose to more than 3.2 million people, 1.9 million of whom 
are IDPs. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: October 2005; 
Summary: Humanitarian staff increase to almost 14,000; 
Description: The number of humanitarian aid workers in Darfur grew to a 
total of 13,715 workers from 13 UN agencies and 82 NGOs. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: End of 2005; 
Summary: Donors provide $675 million in humanitarian assistance; 
Description: Total pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2005, from all 
donors, totaled almost $675 million. The United States committed or 
pledged nearly $365 million (54 percent). 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: January 2006; 
Summary: GOAL suspends operations in Jebel Mara; 
Description: Following an escalation of violence in the Jebel Mara area 
of West Darfur, on January 25, 2006, GOAL, an international NGO, 
evacuated all staff in the region and abandoned operations. During the 
evacuation of staff, a helicopter crash resulted in the death of one 
GOAL aid worker. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: April 2006; 
Summary: World Food Program (WFP) announces cuts in Darfur food 
rations; 
Description: On April 28, the UN WFP announced that shortages in funds 
would force WFP to begin reducing the daily food rations for the people 
of Darfur in May. WFP indicated that the reduced rations would extend 
limited food stocks during the "hunger season," when needs are 
greatest. Owing to contributions by the U.S. and Sudanese governments, 
the rations were only cut to 84 percent of the daily requirement. 

Topic: Humanitarian assistance events; 
Date: June 2006; 
Summary: Donors provide $331 million in humanitarian assistance; 
Description: As of June 2006, international pledges and commitments for 
Darfur in 2006 totaled almost $331 million. According to the UN, this 
amount was approximately $320 million less than the required funding 
for 2006. The United States committed almost $240 million (72 percent). 

Topic: African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) events; 
Date: May 2004; 
Summary: First African Union observer mission to Darfur; 
Description: On May 25, 2004, the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council issued a communiqué stressing the need for the three parties to 
the conflict-
-the government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM--to implement the 
April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Further, the Peace and 
Security Council authorized the initial deployment of an African Union 
Observer Mission to support the work of the newly created Ceasefire 
Commission. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: October 2004; 
Summary: African Union's Mission in Sudan established with 3,320 
personnel; 
Description: On October 20, 2004, the African Union's Peace and 
Security Council issued a communiqué that established an AMIS presence 
in Darfur of 3,320 personnel. These personnel were to include 2,341 
military personnel, among them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian 
police as well as appropriate civilian personnel. Further, AMIS was 
given a specific mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the 
ceasefire agreement, assist in the process of confidence building, and 
contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief. This was the first time the council called for a civilian 
police presence. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: April 2005; 
Summary: AMIS forces increased to 7,731; 
Description: On April 28, 2005, the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council issued a communiqué praising AMIS efforts and noting 
improvements where the mission was deployed in Darfur but concluding 
that the current force was overstretched. The communiqué increased 
AMIS's strength to a total of 6,171 military personnel, with an 
appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police 
personnel, for a total force of at least 7,731. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: August 2005; 
Summary: Violence against AMIS personnel increases; 
Description: From August 2005 on, 35 AMIS personnel were abducted; 
4 Nigerian protection force soldiers were killed; 
and vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition were 
lost. According to an African Union assessment of AMIS, these attacks 
on AMIS undermined the mission's credibility in the eyes of civilians 
and emboldened those who might target AMIS. In July 2006, 32 AMIS 
personnel were abducted. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: March 2006; 
Summary: African Union supports, in principle, AMIS transition to UN; 
Description: On March 10, 2006, the African Union's Peace and Security 
Council confirmed its January 2006 expression of support for a 
transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The council requested that the 
African Union Commission vigorously pursue its efforts toward reaching, 
as quickly as possible, the authorized AMIS strength of 7,731. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: April 2006; 
Summary: AMIS deployment is over 7,200, but below authorized level of 
about 7,700; 
Description: On April 30, 2006, AMIS deployment reached 7,271 (755 
military observers, 5,086 protection force troops, and 1,430 civilian 
police). In addition, another 155 personnel were serving as air crew or 
interpreters or in other roles. Of total AMIS deployment, 312 were 
women. Protection force troops came from Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Gambia, and South Africa. AMIS deployment was below the authorized 
level of about 7,731, primarily because an expected contingent of South 
African troops was never deployed. 

Topic: AMIS events; 
Date: September 2006; 
Summary: AMIS mandate is extended to December 31, 2006; 
Description: On September 20, the African Union Peace and Security 
Council extended the mandate of AMIS from September 30, 2006 to 
December 31, 2006. 

Topic: Peace negotiation efforts; 
Date: September 2003; 
Summary: Sudan and rebel group sign cease-fire; 
agreement later collapses; 
Description: The initial cease-fire agreement between the parties to 
the conflict (the Sudanese government and SLM/A) and mediated by the 
government of Chad, is signed; 
the agreed collapsed by December of 2003. 

Topic: Peace negotiation efforts; 
Date: April 2004; 
Summary: Three negotiating parties sign cease-fire; 
Description: On April 8, 2004 the three parties to the conflict signed 
the "Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur" in 
N'djamena, Chad. The parties agreed to, among other things, refrain 
from any act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations. 
The parties further agreed to establish a cease-fire commission to, 
among other things, plan, verify, and ensure implementation of the 
cease-fire agreement provisions. 

Topic: Peace negotiation efforts; 
Date: November 2004; 
Summary: Three parties sign two protocols to improve humanitarian and 
security situation; 
Description: On November 9, 2004, the three parties to the conflict 
signed two protocols in Abuja, Nigeria. (1) "Protocol Between the 
Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement 
of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur" commits the parties to, among 
other things, guarantee unimpeded and unrestricted access for 
humanitarian workers and assistance to reach all needy people 
throughout Darfur and take all steps required to prevent all attacks 
against civilians by any party or group, including the Janjaweed. The 
protocol also requests the UN to expand the number of human rights 
monitors in Darfur. (2) "Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan 
(GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in 
Darfur in Accordance with the N'djamena Agreement" commits the parties 
to, among other things, recommit themselves to ensuring an effective 
cease-fire by refraining from all hostilities and military actions, 
submit to the cease-fire commission all information needed to carry out 
its mandate, and release all persons detained in relation to the 
hostilities in Darfur. The Sudanese government also agreed to implement 
its stated commitment to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed. 

Topic: Peace negotiation efforts; 
Date: July 2005; 
Summary: Three negotiating parties sign declaration of principles; 
Description: On July 5, 2005, the three parties to the conflict signed 
the "Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese 
Conflict in Darfur." This declaration established 17 principles to 
guide future deliberations and constituted the basis for a settlement 
of the Darfur conflict. These principles address issues such as; 
* respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people, democracy, 
political pluralism, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and 
freedom of the media;; 
* effective representation in all government institutions by the 
citizens of Sudan, including those from Darfur;; 
* equitable distribution of national wealth;; 
* provision of humanitarian assistance;; 
* return to places of origin for IDPs;; 
* rehabilitation/reconstruction of Darfur; and; 
* broad security arrangements. 

Topic: Peace negotiation efforts; 
Date: May 2006; 
Summary: Sudan and the largest faction of SLM/A sign Darfur Peace 
Agreement; 
Description: On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the SLM/A 
faction with the largest military force signed the Darfur Peace 
Agreement. This agreement has provisions on; 
* power sharing (including the creation of the Senior Assistant to the 
President, the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government, 
appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the 
rebel movements);; 
* wealth sharing (including the creation of a Darfur reconstruction and 
development fund that will receive $700 million in funds from the 
Sudanese government between 2006 and 2008); and; 
* security arrangements (including a requirement for verifiable 
disarmament of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government); 
The smaller SLM/A faction and JEM did not sign the agreement. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: April 2004; 
Summary: USAID establishes Disaster Assistance Response Team; 
Description: In 2003 and 2004, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) deployed field staff to Sudan to assess the extent of 
the Darfur crisis. In April 2004, responding to the growing 
humanitarian emergency, USAID/OFDA mobilized a Disaster Assistance 
Response Team. USAID continued a phased deployment of humanitarian 
personnel as official access and improved security allowed for its 
increased presence in Darfur. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: June 2004; 
Summary: Secretary of State Powell visits Sudan; 
Description: Secretary Powell visited Sudan, the first U.S. Secretary 
of State to do so in 26 years. Powell met with Sudan's President Omar 
Al-Bashir, emphasizing the need to dismantle the Janjaweed to restore 
security to the region and enable IDPs to return home. The government 
of Sudan agreed to this objective as well as to removing restrictions 
on humanitarian aid and participating in a political resolution of the 
Darfur crisis facilitated by the African Union. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: June 2004; 
Summary: U.S. company begins building camps for African Union troops; 
Description: PAE, a U.S. company, via a contract with the U.S. 
Department of State and with assistance from another U.S. contractor, 
began building camps for AMIS troops in Darfur. PAE initially 
constructed five camps (in El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina, Tine, and 
Kabkabiya) for AMIS troops. Significant challenges were identified in 
building these camps, such as transporting materials to building sites 
and providing water to AMIS personnel. PAE eventually built a total of 
32 AMIS camps. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: July 2004; 
Summary: Both houses of Congress pass resolutions declaring atrocities 
to be genocide; 
Description: On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives and 
Senate unanimously passed separate resolutions [H.Con.Res. 467, 108th 
Cong. (2004); 
S.Con.Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004)] declaring the crisis in Darfur to 
be genocide, based on articles of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. These resolutions declare 
that the government of Sudan has violated the Convention and call upon 
the member states of the United Nations to undertake measures to 
prevent genocide in Darfur from escalating further. The resolutions 
also commend the administration's efforts in seeking a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict and in providing humanitarian assistance and 
urge it to continue to lead an international effort to stop the 
genocide in Darfur. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: September 2004; 
Summary: President Bush and Secretary Powell declare that genocide is 
occurring; 
Description: On September 9, 2004, Powell testifies before Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and declares atrocities in Darfur to be 
genocide, based on evidence collected by the Department of State. 
Further, he states that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are 
responsible and that the United States, as a contracting party to the 
Genocide Convention, will demand that the UN initiate a full 
investigation. President Bush made similar statements that day. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: May 2006; 
Summary: Secretary Rice reaffirms that Darfur violence constitutes 
genocide; 
Description: On May 9, 2006, addressing the UN Security Council 
Ministerial on Sudan, Secretary of State Rice reaffirmed the 
administration's declaration that the violence in Darfur constitutes 
genocide. Additionally, Secretary Rice stated that the Darfur Peace 
Agreement is an opportunity to end the crisis in the region and allow 
people to return to their homes, emphasizing a role for UN troops to 
implement the peace agreement. Secretary Rice also stated that the 
United States had provided nearly all of the support that the WFP's 
mission in Darfur had received. 

Topic: Major U.S. actions; 
Date: October 2006; 
Summary: U.S. President signs Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 
2006; 
Description: On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the 
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 which imposes sanctions 
against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity; 
supports measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian 
operations; 
and supports peace efforts in Darfur. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: December 2003; 
Summary: UN Under- Secretary-General calls humanitarian situation "one 
of the worst" worldwide; 
Description: On December 5, 2003, the UN Under-Secretary- General in 
charge of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
stated, "The humanitarian situation in Darfur has quickly become one of 
the worst in the world.". 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: July 2004; 
Summary: Sudan commits to facilitate assistance and disarm Janjaweed; 
Description: On July 3, 2004, the government of Sudan and the UN signed 
a joint communiqué in which the Sudanese government pledged to remove 
obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur and committed to 
disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: July 2004; 
Summary: UN calls for cooperation from Sudan and disarmament of 
militias; 
Description: The UN Security Council called for the Sudanese government 
to fulfill its commitment to facilitate humanitarian relief in Darfur 
and remove restrictions that might hinder humanitarian aid to Darfur. 
In addition, the council called for the government to disarm the 
Janjaweed militias and bring perpetrators of human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities to 
justice. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: January 2005; 
Summary: UN reports that Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide; 
Description: On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of 
Inquiry, established by the UN, issued a report stating that the 
government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. However, the 
commission reported that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, 
have committed international offences such as crimes against humanity 
and war crimes that may be no less serious and heinous than genocide. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: March 2005; 
Summary: UN establishes UN Mission in Sudan; 
Description: On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the 
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) after determining that the situation in 
Darfur continued to threaten international peace and security. UNMIS 
was mandated to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement; 
to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs 
and humanitarian assistance; 
to contribute to international efforts to protect and promote human 
rights in Sudan; 
and to coordinate international efforts to protect civilians. The 
council also called on all Sudanese parties to take immediate steps to 
achieve a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict and take all 
necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: March 2005; 
Summary: UN refers Darfur situation to International Criminal Court; 
Description: On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the 
situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, taking note of the International Commission of Inquiry report on 
violations of international law and human rights in Darfur. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: March 2006; 
Summary: UN requests planning to transition AMIS to UN; 
Description: On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council called for 
preparatory planning for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The 
plan was to include options for reinforcing the Darfur peace effort 
through additional appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS, 
including assistance in logistics, mobility and communications. 

Topic: Major UN actions; 
Date: August 2006; 
Summary: UN calls for UNMIS deployment to Darfur; 
Description: On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council commended the 
efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS but 
reaffirmed its concern that ongoing violence in Darfur might further 
negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region. The UN 
Security Council expanded UNMIS's mandate and determined that UNMIS 
should deploy to Darfur. As of October 2006, the Sudanese government 
had refused a transition to a UN force in Darfur. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Evolution of AMIS: 

The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union 
has authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to 
carry out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three 
parties signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the 
African Union's Peace and Security Council authorized an observer 
mission to Darfur.[Footnote 98] This mission began operations in June 
2004 with 60 military observers and 300 protection force soldiers as 
well as observers from the Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and 
Security Council called for a comprehensive plan to enhance the 
effectiveness of the mission, including the possibility of transforming 
the mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping mission to ensure the 
effective implementation of the cease-fire agreement.[Footnote 99] In 
October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance of an African Union 
report that discussed the status of the mission and described the 
situation in Darfur,[Footnote 100] the council decided to enhance AMIS 
to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel 
(military observers and protection force troops), among them 450 
observers; up to 815 civilian police personnel (the first time that a 
civilian police component was formally established); and appropriate 
civilian personnel.[Footnote 101] 

The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the 
following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to 
monitor and observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire 
agreement; (2) to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3) 
to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their 
homes, and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation 
throughout Darfur. In working to meet this mandate, the council decided 
that AMIS II would, among other tasks, "protect civilians whom it 
encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within 
resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of 
the civilian population is the responsibility of the government of 
Sudan." 

In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In 
April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the 
size of AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate 
civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel 
(for a total of more than 7,700).[Footnote 102] This further expansion 
is referred to as AMIS II-E. These AMIS personnel operate throughout 
eight sectors in Darfur that have been established to help organize 
AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated Task Force was established at African 
Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to assist with planning, 
force generation, procurement and logistics, and administrative support 
and to interact with AMIS donors. 

The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence 
until AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police 
component was added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior 
UN official, further the "rule of law" by working with Sudanese police. 
The European Union was a strong proponent of a civilian police 
component, and European Union officials told us that the civilian 
police gave European Union member states the opportunity to play a 
direct role in AMIS by providing police staff. Specifically, the role 
of the civilian police is, among other things, to establish and 
maintain contact with the Sudanese police, observe and report on 
Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the security of IDPs. 

As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military 
observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian 
police).[Footnote 103] According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its 
troops much faster than the UN could have done (although UN efforts 
have higher standards regarding aspects of deployment such as required 
troop skills and equipment). The majority of AMIS soldiers have come 
from Rwanda and Nigeria, with additional troops from Senegal, Gambia, 
and South Africa.[Footnote 104] Military observers from more than 20 
countries (numerous African countries and the United States, the 
European Union, and the three parties to the conflict) and civilian 
police are participating in AMIS. The total number of the AMIS force 
deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size of more 
than 7,700--according to African Union sources, primarily because 
expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur. 

In January 2006, the African Union's Peace and Security Council 
officially declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of 
AMIS to a UN operation.[Footnote 105] In March, the council reaffirmed 
this position, and in May it declared that "concrete steps should be 
taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping 
operation."[Footnote 106] The UN Security Council subsequently adopted 
a resolution commending AMIS's role in reducing large-scale, organized 
violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union decision to transition 
AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing that a UN operation 
would have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and 
character.[Footnote 107] In August 2006, the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS's mandate and calling for an UNMIS 
deployment to Darfur.[Footnote 108] The mandate of AMIS expires on 
December 31, 2006. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: NGOs and UN Agencies Receiving U.S. Nonfood Assistance 
Funding during Fiscal Years 2004-2006: 

NGO/ UN agency: Action Contre le Faim. 

NGO/ UN agency: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development. 

NGO/ UN agency: American Refugee Committee. 

NGO/ UN agency: CARE. 

NGO/ UN agency: CHD. 

NGO/ UN agency: Coalition for International Justice. 

NGO/ UN agency: Community, Habitat, Finance. 

NGO/ UN agency: CONCERN. 

NGO/ UN agency: Catholic Relief Services. 

NGO/ UN agency: Development Alternatives, Inc. 

NGO/ UN agency: Freedom House. 

NGO/ UN agency: GOAL. 

NGO/ UN agency: Harvard School of Public Health. 

NGO/ UN agency: Halo Partnership. 

NGO/ UN agency: International Committee of the Red Cross. 

NGO/ UN agency: International Medical Corps. 

NGO/ UN agency: International Rescue Committee. 

NGO/ UN agency: Internews Network. 

NGO/ UN agency: Mercy Corps. 

NGO/ UN agency: MEDAIR. 

NGO/ UN agency: MERLIN. 

NGO/ UN agency: Relief International. 

NGO/ UN agency: Samaritan's Purse. 

NGO/ UN agency: Save the Children-UK. 

NGO/ UN agency: Save the Children-US. 

NGO/ UN agency: Solidarites. 

NGO/ UN agency: Tearfund. 

NGO/ UN agency: Tufts University. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Methodist Committee on Relief. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Department of Safety and Security. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Children's Fund. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations World Food Program. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations Joint Logistics Center. 

NGO/ UN agency: United Nations World Health Organization. 

NGO/ UN agency: World Relief. 

NGO/ UN agency: World Vision - USA. 

Source: USAID and State. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Darfur 
Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing 
Violence and Operational Challenges," GAO Job Code 320375. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Jason Small, Deputy Director, Bureau of African Affairs, at (202) 647- 
4084. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 

cc: GAO - Leslie Holen: 
AF - Jendayi Frazer: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by 
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges, (GAO-07-9, GAO Code 
320375): 

Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to 
comment on the draft report Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace 
Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges. 

The Department of State commends the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office for the thorough research and overall objective analysis of the 
successes and challenges of providing humanitarian assistance and 
support for peacekeeping operations since the beginning of the Darfur 
conflict. In general, we believe the report presents a balanced and 
accurate picture of the situation. We understand that USAID will 
provide more directed comments on the humanitarian aid sections. 

The Department of State supports the recommendation of the report to 
encourage the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission to 
conduct a "lessons learned" assessment. In a June 2, 2006 letter to 
NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer, AU Chairperson Konare invited 
NATO to join other partners in establishing mechanisms for the AU to 
collect and analyze lessons learned from the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS). We will continue to encourage the AU Commission 
Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as NATO, to establish 
these mechanisms as soon as possible. 

After a thorough review, we would like to make some modest suggestions 
to certain areas we believe could have been better emphasized and/or 
characterized. 

1. Actions of the U.S. and international community to strengthen AMIS: 

The efforts of the African Union have reduced large-scale organized 
violence and we are pleased to see African nations become increasing 
involved in peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa. As AMIS 
increased to its current deployment level, some of its command and 
control and logistics deficiencies magnified, reducing its overall 
effectiveness. As a result, the African Union decided as early as its 
January 2006 Peace and Security Council meeting to transition to a 
larger, more robust UN peacekeeping operation. In the interim, the 
international community, led by the U.S., has committed to 
strengthening AMIS. The U.S. participated in j oint assessment missions 
with the AU, UN, and key donors, and having identified shortcomings, 
sought to offer the AU the assistance it needed as it transitioned to a 
UN mission. The Department offered to double the number of U.S. 
military observers (from 16 to 32), send military officers to assist in 
the formation of a Joint Operations Center and to help the AU carry out 
a verification mission called for by the Darfur Peace Agreement, and 
engaged NATO in providing vital training assistance. The United States 
has also provided training and equipment to African battalions (notably 
Rwanda) preparing to deploy to Darfur, which emphasizes the importance 
of Department of State programs such as the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance (ACOTA), which train troops for peacekeeping operations. 
Some of these offers, particularly those of NATO, have not been fully 
accepted by the African Union. We continue to urge the AU to accept 
these offers. 

2. Rapidity of AU deployment: 

Other international donors have commended the speed with which the AU, 
supported by international donors, was able to deploy peacekeeping 
forces to Darfur, compared to other international peacekeeping 
missions. The AU proved successful in addressing the severe challenges 
of quickly deploying and sustaining peacekeeping troops in this austere 
region. 

3. Role of Rebel Commanders: 

The report tended to over-emphasize the role of rebel commanders in 
restricting humanitarian access. In most cases, rebel commanders have 
supported the delivery of humanitarian assistance in their areas of 
control. The greater impact on humanitarian access is continued 
fighting between the parties and acts of banditry, especially those 
targeted at humanitarian convoys. 

4. Inconsistencies in the period of evaluation: 

The report seemed to cover the period up to August 2006, although in 
many areas, particularly the analysis of the effectiveness of the 
Ceasefire Commission and Joint Commission, the analysis ended at the 
signing of Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. The renewed GOS 
offensive against non-signatories that began in August 2006 should be 
mentioned, as it has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to conduct 
operations, the AU's ability to implement the DPA (including its 
support on the ground, which has eroded for many other reasons as 
well), and the delivery of humanitarian aid. 

5. AMIS Civilian Police: 

Especially since the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur 
since the May 2006 signing of the DPA, civilian police have played an 
increasingly greater role in the overall operations of AMIS. The report 
appeared to undervalue their role, particularly their positive impact 
in the camps. There are some instances where the IDPs have lauded the 
civilian police while at the same time protesting the ineffectiveness 
of the AMIS military. 

6. Impact on Mortality Rates: 

We believe the report should have emphasized the combined impact of 
U.S. diplomatic efforts and U.S. humanitarian assistance to the 
contribution in reduction of mortality rates in Darfur. For example, 
Secretary Powell and UN Secretary-General Annan traveled to Sudan in 
July 2004 to press the government to open up humanitarian access, and 
to expedite visas for international humanitarian workers. The 
government subsequently instituted a 48-hour visa policy. Since the 
beginning of the conflict, the United States continues to press the 
Government of Sudan and rebel leaders to provide unrestricted 
humanitarian access, and it has been the combination of active 
diplomacy and the delivery of humanitarian assistance that has 
contributed to reductions in mortality rates. 

7. Cross-border implications: 

The report omits the important point that insecurity in Darfur 
negatively affects the humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad as well. 

Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated 
October 2, 2006. 

GAO Comments: 

1. We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping 
Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65. 

2. We have added State's perspective regarding the quick deployment of 
AMIS troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN 
official working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

3. The report's discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian 
access reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report 
cites banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as 
attacks and the killing of humanitarian workers. 

4. Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS 
operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State's 
point regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did 
not sign the agreement. 

5. As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent 
to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we 
have identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police 
since that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station 
and three vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2) 
the killing of a civilian police language assistant and the attack of 
eight civilian police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such 
incidents appear contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between 
the civilian police and IDPs provided here by State. 

6. The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have 
been attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the 
United States. 

7. We have added this point to footnote 5. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

Oct 17 2006: 

David Gootnick: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gootnick: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled Darfur Crisis: 
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and 
Operational Challenges (GAO-07-9). 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report and for 
the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review. We 
applaud GAO for the tremendous efforts your staff undertook to produce 
the comprehensive document which details the three years of USAID's 
involvement in Darfur. We would also like thank GAO for addressing many 
of USAID's comments in the report. 

USAID comments on the draft report focus on GAO's observations of 
USAID's staff, capacity to monitor programs and funding received. 
Because of the level of detail, we are providing our response in an 
enclosure. 

Thank you for the opportunity to formally comment. We look forward to 
continued collaboration which supports U.S. Government accountability 
in Darfur. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Mosina H. Jordan: 
Counselor to the Agency: 

Enclosure: a/s: 

U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
www.usaid.gov: 

Detailed USAID Comments of the draft GAO report entitled Darfur Crisis: 
Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and 
Operational Challenges (GAO-07-9): 

1. Reduced Staff: 

We appreciate GAO's inclusion of the numerous factors which influence 
USAID staffing levels in Darfur, most notably including security and 
U.S. Embassy directives. The 11 th bullet in the table of contents and 
page 8 of the report, however, still state "oversight of assistance was 
limited by reduced staff and incomplete reporting." We disagree with 
the reference to reduced staff. Although the current number of Darfur 
Field Office (DFO) staff stands at six, there are three critical staff 
which directly support the six DFO core staff. 

2. Reporting and monitoring of USAID programs in Darfur: 

We appreciate GAO's inclusion of external factors which affect USAID's 
ability to monitor programs, including security, time constraints, and 
the size of Darfur. However page 32 notes: 

Furthermore, required NGO reporting is incomplete. As a result, USAID 
lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their 
performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided. 

We believe this is an inaccurate appraisal of USAID's ability to 
monitor its programs in Darfur. Notwithstanding security constraints, 
bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the Government of Sudan (visas, 
travel permits, etc.), and other external factors, USAID employs a 
variety of wide-ranging efforts to monitor grants, including, but not 
limited to, reports, site visits, and meetings with NGOs in the field 
and in Washington. We would especially appreciate the report's 
inclusion of USAID's recent efforts at collecting NGO reports, which 
resulted in a 100% compliance rate - that is, USAID received quarterly 
reports from all current partners in July 2006, and we anticipate 
receipt of all reports due for the period of July to September 2006 at 
the end of October. 

3. Updated IDP numbers: 

Although we have received verbal confirmation from the U.N. Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) that the number of IDPs in 
Darfur has increased to 1.9 million as of September 2006, we have not 
yet received written confirmation. As soon as we do, we will forward 
this information to GAO. 

Following are GAO's comments on USAID's letter dated October 17, 2006. 

GAO Comments: 

1. The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as 
many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although 
the crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and 
affected residents that require assistance and a greater number of NGOs 
and UN agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID does not 
always have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes limited by 
staff ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the absence of 
complete reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff, complicated by 
the current inability of these staff to work in Darfur, affects USAID's 
ability to provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.-funded humanitarian 
assistance in Darfur. 

2. We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not 
submitted by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not 
provide all required information. The lack of required reporting 
prevented USAID from fully monitoring NGO performance and measuring the 
impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur. However, we report 
additional USAID monitoring and evaluation efforts, such as regular 
communication with NGOs, performed by USAID in Darfur. In addition, we 
note that such efforts can be limited by issues identified in our 
report such as travel restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government 
and continuing insecurity throughout the region. We also have added 
information to the report noting recent USAID efforts to collect 
reports from its implementing partners that reportedly resulted in 100 
percent compliance with quarterly reporting requirements in July 2006. 
USAID's recent emphasis on collecting required reports may improve its 
ability to conduct oversight of U.S.-funded humanitarian operations in 
Darfur. 

3. In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1, 
2006, that had become available to the public. This document stated 
that the number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant 
Director), Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo, 
Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Bibliography: 

Published Reviews of AMIS Operations: 

[African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10 - 20 December 2005. 

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS Renaissance 
After Action Review, August 2005. 

The [African Union] Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March 
2005: Report of the Joint Assessment Team. 

Human Rights Watch, "Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The 
African Union: 

Mission in Sudan," January 2006 (available at [Hyperlink, 
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106].) 

International Crisis Group, "The [African Union]'s Mission in Darfur: 
Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547].) 

International Crisis Group, "The [European Union]/[African Union] 
Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination," Africa Report 
No. 99, October 2005 (available at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766].) 

Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect: The African 
Union Mission in Sudan," Refugees International, November 2005 
(available at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222].) 

William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million 
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African 
Union in Darfur," Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution- 
University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005 
(available at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm].) 

(320375): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The United Nations (UN) defines IDPs as "[p]ersons or groups of 
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order 
to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
border." Affected residents are defined as "habitual residents or 
returnees, not including IDPs, seriously affected by the recent 
conflict and as a result in need of humanitarian assistance." Together 
these groups are referred to as the affected population. 

[2] According to U.S. law (8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)), a refugee is 
any person who is outside his or her country of nationality and who is 
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion. 

[3] The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was 
launched in 2002 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity. 
The African Union has 53 member states, including Sudan. Its objectives 
are, among other things, to achieve greater unity and solidarity 
between African countries and the people of Africa; to defend the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states; 
to accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the 
continent; and to promote peace, security, and stability on the 
continent. 

[4] Simultaneously with the release of this report, we are issuing a 
separate report evaluating various estimates of deaths attributable to 
the crisis in Darfur; identifying general challenges involved in making 
such estimates; and suggesting measures that the U.S. government can 
take to improve death estimates in the future. See GAO, Darfur Crisis: 
Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and 
Credibility Could Be Enhanced, GAO-07-24 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 
2006). 

[5] In addition to the U.S. assistance provided for Darfur, an 
additional $197 million has supported Darfur refugees located in 
Eastern Chad from fiscal year 2004 through September 2006. For this 
report, we did not evaluate the U.S. assistance to refugees in Chad. 
State has emphasized that insecurity in Darfur has negatively affected 
the humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad. 

[6] According to a State document, as a result of this coup, the U.S. 
government suspended official development assistance to Sudan. In 
addition, although Sudan has provided concrete cooperation against 
international terrorism since September 11, 2001, the Bashir government 
had previously provided sanctuary to terrorists such as Osama bin 
Laden. As a result, Sudan remains on the U.S. list of states that 
sponsor terrorism, and comprehensive economic, trade, and financial 
sanctions have been imposed on Sudan by the United States since 1997. 
In addition, in 1998 the U.S. government launched cruise missiles to 
destroy a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum in retaliation for attacks 
on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya earlier that year; the 
attack was justified on the grounds that the plant was involved in 
producing chemical weapons and had ties with al Qaeda. 

[7] UN Security Council Resolution 1590, adopted March 24, 2005. 

[8] Estimates for the preconflict population of Darfur range from about 
4 million to close to 7 million. Experts that we have interviewed noted 
uncertainty regarding the population estimate for Darfur due to the 
lack of a current census and the fact that migration in this region 
occurs even during nonconflict times. 

[9] In the past, the nomadic Arab Muslims known as the Janjaweed had 
grazed their cattle, camels, and other livestock on the land of 
farmers, with occasional conflicts that were managed through a 
traditional dispute resolution process. However, as desertification in 
the northern region of Darfur led to southward movement by nomadic 
herders, such conflicts increased in frequency, straining relations 
between the two groups prior to the intense conflict that began in 
2003. 

[10] Attacks by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed have been 
targeted at the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit ethnic groups in Darfur. 

[11] Although the various Arab and African tribes of Darfur have 
historically intermarried, creating fluid ethnic identities, the 
hardening of these identities is a recent phenomenon, resulting from 
the Arabization undertaking by the Sudanese government in Khartoum. 

[12] State has estimated the total number of deaths in Darfur, between 
March 2003 and January 2005, at 98,000 to 181,000. Estimates prepared 
by other parties for varying periods of time range up to about 400,000. 
See GAO-07-24. 

[13] Unlike the agreement between the North and the South, the Darfur 
Peace Agreement does not provide an option allowing citizens of Darfur 
to eventually determine whether the region will become independent. 

[14] According to a State official, very little, if any, real 
disarmament had occurred as of November. 

[15] According to a State official, State encouraged African Union 
involvement in Darfur, in part, in order to support the concept of 
"African solutions for African problems." 

[16] African Union Peace and Security Council, 10TH meeting, communiqué 
dated May 25, 2004. 

[17] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, communiqué 
dated October 20, 2004. 

[18] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, communiqué 
dated October 20, 2004. 

[19] The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of 
the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or 
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The 
U.S. government ratified the convention in 1988. Sudan is not a party 
to this convention. The convention requires parties to enact domestic 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the convention and to 
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide. The 
convention also requires parties to grant extradition in accordance 
with their laws and treaties in force. Furthermore, while the 
convention grants parties the authority to call upon the competent 
organs of the UN to take action for the prevention and suppression of 
acts of genocide, it does not specify further requirements on the 
parties. 

[20] H. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Con. Res. 133, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 

[21] According to a State official, the key factor in the genocide 
determination was the intent of the Sudanese government regarding its 
actions in Darfur (i.e., its intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
specific group of people); the number of deaths attributable to the 
crisis was not a critical factor. 

[22] UN Security Council resolution 1564, adopted September 18, 2004. 

[23] United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva: 2005). 

[24] UN Security Council resolution 1591, adopted March 29, 2005. UN 
Security Council resolution 1672, adopted April 25, 2006, identified 
four individuals subject to these sanctions. 

[25] UN Security Council resolution 1593, adopted March 31, 2005. In 
June 2006, the International Criminal Court's Prosecutor briefed the UN 
Security Council and noted that the International Criminal Court had 
gathered significant evidence on crimes committed in Darfur, but no 
conclusions will be drawn regarding allegations that some of those 
crimes had been committed with specific genocidal intent until the 
completion of a full and impartial investigation. According to the UN, 
the Prosecutor stated that identifying those with greatest 
responsibility for the most serious crimes was a key challenge for the 
investigation, and the complexity of the Darfur conflict exacerbated 
that challenge, given that it involved multiple parties, varying over 
time throughout the different states and localities. 

[26] The assistance reported by the UN as provided by other donors 
includes both pledges and obligations. According to the UN, a pledge is 
a nonbinding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by 
the donor. An obligation represents a contractual obligation of funding 
by the donor against which agencies can begin spending. 

[27] The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief for 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 231 (2005) appropriated $40 million for international 
disaster and famine asssistance, $48.4 million for migration and 
refugee assistance, and up to $240 million for food aid for Darfur (see 
H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 at 128, 130, and 134). According to USAID and 
State officials, from this supplemental appropriation, $40 million of 
international disaster and famine assistance, $6 million of migration 
and refugee assistance, and $25 million of food aid assistance was 
obligated for Darfur. 

[28] The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of Defense, The 
Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-234, 
120 Stat. 418 (2006) appropriated $161.3 million for international 
disaster and famine assistance and $350 million for P.L. 480 Title II 
grants. USAID and State officials told us that from these supplemental 
appropriations, $66 million of international disaster and famine 
assistance, $2 million of migration and refugee assistance, and $137 
million of food aid assistance was allocated for Darfur. 

[29] The quantity, or tonnage, of food aid fell by less than the 
funding amount due to the fact that the 2006 funding does not include 
the value of some commodities provided for Darfur in fiscal year 2006. 
According to a USAID official, these commodities, originally intended 
as aid for another African country, were transferred to Darfur after 
the other country's program ended in November-December 2005. 

[30] UN Work Plans for the Sudan, including midyear revisions, show 
that the World Food Program's planned assistance to Sudan decreased 
from $1.08 billion for 2005 to $900 million for 2006. According to 
World Food Program and USAID officials, the lowered appeal for 2006 
reflected (1) a larger harvest in Sudan in 2005 than in 2004, resulting 
in greater food supplies for some of the nondisplaced communities in 
Darfur in 2006, (2) a significant amount of food aid carried over by 
the program from 2005 to 2006, and (3) the World Food Program's use of 
UN internal funding mechanisms to cover urgent food needs in Darfur in 
2005. 

[31] The World Food Program activities included in the UN Work Plan for 
the Sudan include food aid, as well as other activities such as basic 
infrastructure and development, education and vocational training, and 
food security and livelihood recovery. 

[32] This amount includes $172 million of commodities that USAID 
transferred through the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust--a USDA-managed 
reserve of commodities for unanticipated emergency needs in developing 
countries--to address Darfur food needs in fiscal year 2005. USAID Food 
for Peace provided the food aid for Darfur through funding provided by 
Public Law 480, Title II. 

[33] About $47 million of humanitarian aid was also provided to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross for all of Sudan, including 
Darfur, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 by State's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration. However, according to a State official, there 
is no way to accurately determine the funds provided solely to Darfur. 
This contribution is therefore not included in the total amount. 

[34] Protection activities are intended to enhance the safety and basic 
rights of vulnerable persons affected by the conflict in Darfur, 
including protecting women from violence and rape outside of the camps. 
Logistics activities include humanitarian air transport and logistical 
support for humanitarian agencies and activities in Darfur. Food 
security/agriculture includes activities intended to increase food 
production and access to food, thereby reduce dependency on food aid, 
such as farming assistance and provision of seeds. 

[35] Sphere, launched in 1997 by a group of humanitarian NGOs and the 
Red Cross, developed standards to be attained in disaster assistance in 
five sectors, water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, 
shelter, and health services. 

[36] UN humanitarian profiles, developed by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, are intended to provide a 
comprehensive overview and analysis of the number and locations of the 
conflict affected population in Darfur, the humanitarian assistance 
provided, remaining gaps in assistance, humanitarian presence in the 
region, and sectoral issues. Information on IDPs and humanitarian 
assistance is provided monthly by NGOs and UN agencies implementing 
humanitarian assistance. 

[37] According to UN officials and the UN profiles, because UN 
officials assume that most affected residents have access to sanitation 
at a level that does not require additional emergency assistance, the 
target populations for sanitation include only IDPs. However, the other 
aid sectors target all affected residents and IDPs. 

[38] According to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards 
in Disaster Response (Geneva: Switzerland, 2004), also known as the 
Sphere Handbook, Global Acute Malnutrition refers to wasting or the 
thinness of children between the ages of 6 to 59 months. 

[39] According to the Sphere Handbook, the daily crude mortality rate-
-that is, the rate of death for the entire population, including both 
sexes and all ages--is the most specific and useful health indicator to 
monitor in a disaster situation, when mortality may change 
significantly during a short time interval. The Sphere standards report 
that a doubling of the baseline crude mortality rate indicates a 
significant public health emergency requiring an immediate response; if 
the baseline rate is unknown, health agencies should aim to maintain 
the crude mortality rate at below 1.0 per 10,000 per day. The normal 
crude mortality rate in the United States is about 0.25 deaths per 
10,000 per day. Typically, both the crude mortality rate and mortality 
rates for specific groups (such as those younger than 5 years or of a 
specific sex) are reported. 

[40] See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Sustained Efforts Needed to Help 
Southern Africa Recover from Food Crisis, GAO-06-644 (Washington, D.C.: 
Jun. 25, 2003), and Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and 
Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability, 
GAO-03-607 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003). 

[41] USAID routinely draws on technical, security, and communication 
specialists to supports its efforts in Darfur to conduct assessments on 
humanitarian assistance. USAID has deployed staff to conduct food 
assessments and for missions covering administrative, safety and 
security, and disease prevention tasks. 

[42] According to USAID, the UN is not subject to reporting 
requirements, thus the requirements apply only to a small portion of 
the total U.S. assistance to Darfur. 

[43] Our assessment does not include the changes made to AMIS 
responsibilities and activities included in the May 2006 Darfur Peace 
Agreement. For example, in June 2006, a Darfur Ceasefire Commission was 
inaugurated to implement and monitor the cease-fire provisions of the 
peace agreement and other previous agreements between the Sudanese 
parties. We are not reviewing the activities of this newly created 
body. 

[44] These reports, covering allegations received between July 2004 and 
September 2005, were available on the African Union Web site 
(Hyperlink, http://www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm) as of June 
2006. According to a State official, this Web site is the only public 
source of the reports. 

[45] We were able to open 79 reports on the African Union Web site that 
contained 88 claims of possible cease-fire violations. Eight of these 
reports were incomplete with respect to determinations, leaving 80 
claims for us to assess. 

[46] In seven cases, the Ceasefire Commission determined that two 
parties were in violation of the 2004 agreement. 

[47] According to a DOD official, the African Union will only release 
Ceasefire Commission reports that have been approved by the Joint 
Commission. The inactivity of the Joint Commission over the past 
several months is a likely explanation for the lack of available 
reports subsequent to September 2005. 

[48] In addition, a Senegalese soldier was killed and 10 other AMIS 
troops were injured in January 2006. 

[49] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
p. 3. 

[50] William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million 
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African 
Union in Darfur," Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution- 
University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005 
(available at Hyperlink, 
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm). 

[51] AMIS reportedly increased the frequency of its patrols, and the 
civilian police established a base in Mershing subsequent to this 
event. 

[52] AMIS civilian police are deployed in Darfur to build confidence 
and monitor the activities of Sudanese police, who are ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that Darfur citizens are adequately protected. 
AMIS civilian police have no authority for direct involvement with 
Sudanese police matters. 

[53] AMIS police provide an avenue for civilians--many of whom distrust 
the Sudanese police--to report crimes. In particular, women can report 
cases of rape and violence, many of which would not be reported without 
the presence of the civilian police and its female officers. AMIS 
police refer these cases to the Sudanese police. 

[54] Currently, 26 such stations exist, and another 39 stations to be 
built by the Norwegian government, are planned. 

[55] We were unable to locate a comprehensive list of all donor 
assistance that has been provided for AMIS. According to a U.S. Embassy 
official in Addis Ababa, the donor community meets weekly to discuss 
AMIS resource needs, with this effort coordinated by the European 
Union. 

[56] Of the total of $240 million expended, over 20 percent ($50 
million) was provided via emergency supplemental legislation. According 
to a State official, the Fiscal Year 2006 Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane 
Recovery provides about $173 million for AMIS-related activities. 

[57] According to a senior PAE official, PAE's contract provides time 
and materials for labor, and cost plus reimbursable for materials and 
equipment and other direct costs. Another U.S. company, DynCorp, won 
bids to provide troop equipment and strategic transport for U.S. 
efforts to build AMIS camps. According to a State official, DynCorp has 
received approximately $23.5 million of the total funding that has gone 
to support AMIS. 

[58] For example, one U.S. military observer told us that, in addition 
to being an observer, he provides advice on operational issues to AMIS 
commanders and their staffs, with a goal toward building capacity. He 
also provides training to AMIS leaders who in turn pass on this 
training to lower levels. Further, he works as a coordinator to 
facilitate collaboration between AMIS components, local agencies, PAE, 
parties to the conflict, and NGOs. 

[59] According to a State official, the number of U.S. military 
observers in Darfur has ranged from about 4 to 16 at various times 
during the past 2 years. 

[60] PAE also maintains a forward operating base in Nyala that can 
house 300 transient and 330 overflow AMIS personnel. In addition, the 
AMIS camp in Zam Zam can house 400 transient AMIS personnel. 

[61] The Department of State's Contracting Officer's Technical 
Representative in Darfur is the principal U.S. government official 
responsible for oversight of PAE's activities in Darfur. State 
Department officials told us that it can be difficult to determine 
whether PAE's costs are appropriate and reasonable. One State official 
noted that PAE's costs on a "per soldier" basis (which he placed at 
approximately $30 per soldier per day) are similar to other initiatives 
to build camps for peacekeeping efforts. This official noted that State 
reviews weekly "situation reports" submitted by PAE and interacts 
frequently with PAE staff in Washington, D.C. State officials who have 
experience with past similar peace support efforts are also involved 
with the Darfur initiative and can provide insights based on their 
historical experience. Further, during our visit to Darfur, the 
Technical Representative told us that he reviewed PAE invoices over 
$15,000 and had imposed a freeze on increases in employment and vehicle 
numbers. 

[62] Differences in water usage between AMIS camps have been 
substantial. For example, according to PAE data for the last week of 
April 2006, water usage per person in Umm Barro camp was about 53 
liters per day, while at Sarif Umra camp, water usage per person was 
about 237 liters per day. PAE has had difficulty convincing AMIS 
leaders to encourage AMIS personnel to use less water. 

[63] According to a European Union official, military observers and 
civilian police receive $80 per person per day, while protection force 
troops receive $25 per person per day (after $10 is deducted for 
rations/food). 

[64] According to contractor documents, AMIS has, for example, over 750 
vehicles, 675 Motorola handheld radios, and 100 Thuraya satellite 
telephones. 

[65] According to a DOD official, DOD's direct contributions to address 
the Darfur crisis have been limited to staff expertise, military 
observers, training and the provision of airlift to move troops in and 
out of Darfur. This official noted that U.S. military assistance has 
been funneled through NATO since July 2005. State officials emphasized 
in particular U.S. government efforts to train and equip Rwandan and 
Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance program. 

[66] A detailed discussion of challenges that have faced UN 
peacekeeping missions, some of which are similar to what AMIS has 
experienced, can be found in the UN's August 2000 "Report of the Panel 
on United Nations Peace Operations" (available at http://www.un.org/ 
peace/reports/peace_operations). This document was prepared by a panel 
convened by the UN Secretary-General to assess the UN's ability to 
conduct peace operations effectively, and to offer recommendations for 
ways in which to enhance that capacity. 

[67] "Command and control" generally refers to the exercise of 
authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control 
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. For a discussion of 
command and control in peace operations see GAO, United Nations: 
Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace, GAO/ 
NSIAD-97-34 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 1997). 

[68] African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS 
Renaissance After Action Review, August 2005, p. 3. 

[69] Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect: The 
African Union Mission in Sudan," Refugees International, November 2005 
(available at Hyperlink, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222), 
p. 9. 

[70] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 50. 

[71] AMIS has a responsibility to "protect civilians whom it encounters 
under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources 
and capability" and does not have what is known as a "Chapter VII" 
mandate, which refers to Chapter VII of the UN charter entitled "Action 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts 
of aggression." According to UN documentation, aware of the dangers of 
deploying peacekeepers in situations where there is no real peace to 
keep, the UN Security Council now provides, when it deems necessary, UN 
peacekeeping operations with more "robust" mandates based on Chapter 
VII. These mandates allow and in fact require peacekeepers to "use all 
necessary means" to protect civilians, prevent violence against UN 
staff and personnel and deter armed elements from ignoring peace 
agreements. 

[72] Adding to the concern over AMIS's actions is the belief among some 
organizations that AMIS should have a stronger mandate that allows for 
more active protection of civilians and IDPs, given, among other 
things, the Sudanese government's apparently limited willingness to 
protect its own citizens. The International Crisis Group, the Brookings 
Institution, and Refugees International have called for a strengthened 
AMIS mandate. The December 2005 African Union-led joint assessment 
proposes that AMIS's current mandate is adequate but is not clearly 
understood by commanders at all levels. It further notes that a robust 
interpretation of the mandate is required to maintain force credibility 
and to provide the necessary degree of protection to civilians within 
capabilities. It states that mandate training at the commander level, 
as well as rules of engagement to ensure consistent interpretation, are 
needed. The study noted the importance of maximizing existing 
capabilities through a robust interpretation of the AMIS mandate when 
protection of civilians is at issue. U.S. officials stated that the 
AMIS mandate is sufficient but that, to maximize AMIS performance, 
improvements in command and control are needed. 

[73] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
p. 8. 

[74] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 54. 

[75] The creation of a joint logistics operations center is intended to 
improve resource management between the various AMIS components and 
reduce problems such as unequal resource allocation to the civilian 
police. However, the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS 
noted that "there is limited support for the concept from the military 
component of AMIS and the joint logistics operations center lacks 
sufficient authority to fulfill its role." 

[76] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," pp. 50-51. 

[77] Human Rights Watch, "Imperatives for Immediate Change, The African 
Union Mission in Sudan," January 2006 (available at Hyperlink, 
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106), p. 41. 

[78] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 31. 

[79] A lack of troops to carry out mandates has been an issue with 
other peacekeeping efforts. See GAO, Issues in Implementing 
International Peace Operations, GAO-02-707R (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 
2002). 

[80] Chin and Morgenstein, "No Power to Protect," p. 7. 

[81] International Crisis Group, "The [African Union]'s Mission in 
Darfur: Bridging the Gaps," Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 
(available at Hyperlink, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547), p. 1. 

[82] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
p. 10. 

[83] Sufficiency of resources has been a long-standing concern for 
peacekeeping efforts. For example, see GAO, "UN Peacekeeping: Issues 
Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform," GAO/T-NSIAD-97-139 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1997). 

[84] This official emphasized the importance of 105 armored personnel 
carriers recently provided by Canada. One AMIS official emphasized to 
us that virtually all ground vehicles are useless in Darfur during the 
rainy season, which runs from June through September. 

[85] According to this official, when AMIS received a donation of 100 
Thuraya satellite telephones, the majority of them were kept at AMIS 
headquarters in El Fasher for AMIS leadership, instead of being 
distributed to the field where the telephones were most needed. 

[86] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
p. 13. 

[87] O'Neill and Cassis, "Protecting Two Million," p. 53. 

[88] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
pp. 11, 16. 

[89] [African Union]-Led Joint Assessment Mission 10-20 December 2005, 
pp. 2-3. 

[90] International Crisis Group, "The [European Union]/[African Union] 
Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination," Africa Report 
No. 99, October 2005 (available at Hyperlink, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766), p. 4. 

[91] African Union Peace and Security Council, 45TH meeting, communiqué 
dated January 12, 2006. 

[92] African Union Peace and Security Council, 46TH meeting, communiqué 
dated March 10, 2006.African Union Peace and Security Council, 51ST 
meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 2006. 

[93] UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006. 

[94] UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The 
expanded UNMIS mandate includes, among other things, supporting the 
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2004 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also states that, per 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary 
means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within 
its capabilities, to, for example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian 
workers, and assessment and evaluation commission personnel. The 
resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 17,300 
military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up 
to 3,300 civilian police. 

[95] This cost is reportedly less than if UN operations in Darfur were 
starting up without a presence already established in Sudan; the 
current presence of the UN in Sudan would result in economies of scale 
for the Darfur component that would lower costs. 

[96] State regularly works with the African Union to facilitate NATO 
assistance, according to a State official. 

[97] A DOD official reported that by capturing "lessons learned," 
relevant parties learn from past experiences, prevent repeating 
avoidable mistakes, adapt quickly to new and equally complex 
situations, and can share constructive criticisms with other interested 
parties. 

[98] African Union Peace and Security Council, 10TH meeting, communiqué 
dated May 25, 2004. 

[99] African Union Peace and Security Council, 13TH meeting, communiqué 
dated July 27, 2004. 

[100] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, "Report 
of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Darfur, 
the Sudan," dated October 20, 2004. 

[101] African Union Peace and Security Council, 17TH meeting, 
communiqué dated October 20, 2004. 

[102] African Union Peace and Security Council, 28TH meeting, 
communiqué dated April 28, 2005. 

[103] This information is taken from a situation report prepared by 
PAE, the U.S. contractor responsible for maintaining all AMIS camps, 
and submitted to the Department of State. This report also notes that 
an additional 155 personnel were serving as air crew, interpreters, or 
in other roles, and of the total AMIS deployment 312 were women. 

[104] Kenya has contributed a small number of military police. 

[105] African Union Peace and Security Council, 45th meeting, 
communiqué dated January 12, 2006. 

[106] African Union Peace and Security Council, 46th meeting, 
communiqué dated March 10, 2006. African Union Peace and Security 
Council, 51st meeting, communiqué dated May 15, 2006. 

[107] UN Security Council Resolution 1679, adopted May 16, 2006. 

[108] UN Security Council Resolution 1706, adopted August 31, 2006. The 
expanded UNMIS mandate includes, among other things, supporting the 
implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and the 2004 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The resolution also states that, per 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS is authorized to use all necessary 
means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within 
its capabilities, to, for example, protect UN personnel, humanitarian 
workers, and assessment and evaluation commission personnel. The 
resolution states that UNMIS shall be expanded to as many as 17,300 
military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up 
to 3,300 civilian police, and that elements of UNMIS shall begin to be 
deployed in Darfur no later than October 1, 2006. 

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