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entitled 'Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors'
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2006:
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Progress Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by
Sectors' Characteristics:
Critical Infrastructure Protection Coordination Issues:
GAO-07-39:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-39, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
As Hurricane Katrina so forcefully demonstrated, the nation’s critical
infrastructures and key resources have been vulnerable to a wide
variety of threats. Because about 85 percent of the nation’s critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector, it is vital that the
public and private sectors work together to protect these assets. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a
national protection strategy including formation of government and
private sector councils as a collaborating tool. The councils, among
other things, are to identify their most critical assets, assess the
risks they face, and identify protective measures, in sector-specific
plans that comply with DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP).
GAO examined (1) the extent to which these councils have been
established; (2) the key facilitating factors and challenges affecting
the formation of the councils; and (3) the overall status of the plans
and key facilitating factors and challenges encountered in developing
them. GAO obtained information by reviewing key documents and
conducting interviews with federal and private sector representatives.
GAO is not making any recommendations at this time since prior
recommendations are still being implemented. Continued monitoring will
determine whether further recommendations are warranted.
What GAO Found:
All 17 critical infrastructure sectors have established their
respective government councils, and nearly all sectors have initiated
their voluntary private sector councils in response to the NIPP.
However, council activities have varied due to council characteristics
and level of maturity. For example, the public health and health-care
sector is quite diverse and collaboration has been difficult as a
result; on the other hand, the nuclear sector is quite homogenous and
has a long history of collaboration. As a result, council activities
have ranged from getting organized to refining infrastructure
protection strategies. Ten sectors, such as banking and finance, had
formed councils prior to development of the NIPP and had collaborated
on plans for economic reasons, while others had formed councils more
recently. As a result, the more mature councils could focus on
strategic issues, such as recovering after disasters, while the newer
councils were focusing on getting organized.
Council members reported mixed views on what factors facilitated or
challenged their formation. For example, long-standing working
relationships with regulatory agencies and within sectors were
frequently cited as the most helpful factor in establishing councils.
Challenges most frequently cited included the lack of an effective
relationship with DHS as well as private sector hesitancy to share
information on vulnerabilities with the government or within the sector
for fear the information would be released and open to competitors.
GAO’s past work has shown that a lack of trust in DHS and fear that
sensitive information would be released are recurring barriers to the
private sector’s sharing information with the federal government, and
GAO has made recommendations to help address these barriers. DHS has
generally concurred with these recommendations and is in the process of
implementing them.
At the time of GAO’s review, all of the sectors were preparing plans,
although these plans were at varying stages of completion—ranging from
nearly complete to an outline. Nevertheless, all sectors expected to
submit their plans to DHS by the December 2006 deadline. DHS’s 18-month
delay in issuing the NIPP and the changing nature of DHS guidance on
sector plans were cited as challenges to developing the plans. As of
August 2006, collaboration between the sector and government councils
on the plans, which is required by the NIPP, had yet to take place for
some sectors. Issuing the NIPP and completing sector plans are only
first steps to ensure critical infrastructure is protected. More
remains to be done to ensure the adequate protection of our nation’s
critical infrastructure. A number of sectors still need to identify
their most critical assets across their sectors, assess their risks,
and agree on protective measures.
DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental
Protection Agency had no formal comments on the draft report but
provided technical comments.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-39].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202)
512-8777 or LarenceE@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Sectors Have Established Government and Sector Councils, Which are
Generally Representative of their Sectors; Council Activities Have
Varied Depending on Their Maturity and Other Characteristics:
Good Prior Working Relationships, Willingness to Share Critical
Information, and Sufficient Resources Are Key to Council Formation and
Progress:
Councils Delayed Their Work on Sector-Specific Plans until the NIPP Was
Issued but Despite Challenges, Expect to Complete Plans by the End of
December 2006:
Concluding Observations:
Appendix I: Key Federal Initiatives in Developing Critical
Infrastructure Protection Policy, 1996 to Present:
Appendix II: Government Sector Council Membership, by Sector as of
August 2006:
Appendix III: Sector Council Membership, by Sector as of August 2006:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Operating ISACs, as of July 2006:
Table 2: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Designated Sector-Specific
Agencies:
Table 3: Status of Government Council and Sector Council Formation, as
of August 2006:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Challenges That Affected Establishing Government
Councils:
Figure 2: Key Challenges That Affected Establishing Sector Councils:
Figure 3: Key Challenges to Developing Sector-Specific Plans, according
to Government Council Representatives:
Figure 4: Key Challenges to Developing Sector-Specific Plans, according
to Sector Council Representatives:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FACA: Federal Advisory Committee Act:
GMU: George Mason University:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSIN: Homeland Security Information Network:
HSIN-CS: Homeland Security Information Network Critical Sectors:
HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7:
HSPD-9: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9:
ISAC: information sharing and analysis center:
NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan:
PCII: protected critical infrastructure information:
PCIS: Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security:
PDD-63: Presidential Decision Directive 63:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 16, 2006:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Todd Platts:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance and Accountability:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Robert F. Bennett:
United States Senate:
The nation's critical infrastructures and key resources--including
those cyber and physical assets essential to national security,
national economic security, and national public health and safety--have
been and continue to be vulnerable to a wide variety of threats. In
2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, damaging critical
infrastructure such as oil platforms, pipelines and refineries; water
mains; electric power lines; and cellular phone towers. The chaos
resulting from this infrastructure damage disrupted the functioning of
government and business alike and produced cascading effects far beyond
the physical location of the storm. In 2004, authorities discovered
detailed surveillance of the New York Stock Exchange and the Citigroup
Center in the laptop computer of an Al Qaeda operative captured in
Pakistan, part of a plan to target financial institutions in New York.
Moreover, a series of coordinated suicide bombings in 2005 that struck
London's public transportation system demonstrated how an attack on the
transportation system could disrupt a city's transportation and mobile
telecommunications infrastructure. Because the private sector owns
approximately 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure--such
as banking and financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and
energy production and transmission facilities--it is vital that the
public and private sectors form effective partnerships to successfully
protect these assets.
A key player in these partnerships is the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and gave
it wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the
overall national critical infrastructure protection effort.[Footnote 1]
Among other requirements, the Homeland Security Act required DHS to
develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the nation's
critical infrastructures and recommend measures to protect key
resources. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) further
defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and
those federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry
sectors such as transportation, energy, and telecommunications, known
as sector-specific agencies. Among other responsibilities, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is to establish uniform policies,
approaches, guidelines, and methodologies to help ensure that critical
infrastructure within and across the 17 infrastructure sectors is
protected,[Footnote 2] and is to use a risk management approach to
coordinate protection efforts. This includes using risk assessments to
set priorities for protective measures by the department, sector-
specific agencies, tribal, state, and local government agencies and
authorities with critical assets and resources in their jurisdiction,
owners and operators of these assets, and other entities.
Consistent with the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-7 required DHS to
develop a comprehensive and integrated plan by December 2004 that
outlines national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives
necessary to fulfilling these responsibilities. In response, DHS
developed a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) issued in
June 2006. The NIPP is a base plan that is to serve as a road map for
how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk management
principles to prioritize protection activities within and across
sectors in an integrated, coordinated fashion. The NIPP also requires
the individual sector-specific agencies to submit plans to DHS by the
end of December 2006 detailing the application of the national plan's
core elements to each of their respective sectors. These individual
plans are to establish the means by which the sectors will identify
critical assets within the sector, assess risks of terrorist attacks or
other hazards on them, assess and prioritize those which have national
significance, and develop protective measures for the sector. These
plans are to be developed by the designated federal sector-specific
agencies in coordination with relevant government and private-sector
representatives and are, among other things, to address the unique
characteristics and risks of each sector. DHS is to use these
individual plans to evaluate whether any gaps exist in the protection
of critical infrastructures on a national level and, if so, to work
with the sectors to address them. While the NIPP establishes a deadline
for the submission of these plans, DHS anticipates that the NIPP and
sector-specific plans will continue to evolve as the critical
infrastructures, threats against them, and strategies for protecting
and responding to these threats and incidents evolve.
The NIPP describes a partnership model as the primary means of
coordinating government and private sector efforts to protect critical
infrastructure. For each sector, the model requires formation of
government coordinating councils (government councils)--comprised of
federal, state, local, or tribal agencies with purview over critical
assets--and encourages voluntary formation of sector coordinating
councils (sector councils)--comprised of owner-operators of these
critical assets (some of which may be state or local agencies) or their
respective trade associations. These councils create the structure
through which representative groups from all levels of government and
the private sector are to collaborate in planning and implementing
efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The sector councils are
envisioned to be policy-related and to represent a primary point of
contact for government to plan the entire range of infrastructure
protection activities unique to the sector. These functions are
distinct from those of the private sector's information sharing and
analysis centers (ISACs) that were previously established to serve as
mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information on
infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities to and from private
infrastructure sectors and the government but are not to serve as
policy-making bodies. These councils also are to collaborate with the
sector-specific agencies in the development and review of their
respective individual sector plans.
In response to your request to determine the extent to which DHS has
developed a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure, including how the department
intends to work with other federal departments and agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector to develop this strategy, our
objectives were to:
* determine the extent to which government and sector councils have
been established for each sector and compare their general
characteristics;
* identify the key facilitating factors and challenges that critical
infrastructure protection stakeholders encountered in establishing
their respective councils; and:
* ascertain the status of individual sector-specific plans and the key
facilitating factors and challenges that critical infrastructure
protection stakeholders encountered in developing their plans thus far.
To address these objectives, we reviewed our prior work that focused on
government and private sector critical infrastructure protection
coordination efforts as well as related studies by others. (See
"Related GAO Products" at the end of this report for a list of our
prior work). We reviewed the interim, draft, and final versions of the
NIPP as well as sector-specific plan guidance, to determine council
roles and responsibilities and requirements for individual sector-
specific plans. We also conducted structured interviews to determine
the status of the government councils and individual sector-specific
plans with designated representatives of each of the sector-specific
agencies with critical infrastructure protection responsibility for the
17 critical infrastructure sectors: DHS,[Footnote 3] the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of the
Interior, the Department of the Treasury, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. We also conducted structured interviews with the
chairs, co-chairs, or steering committee representatives of each of the
14 sector councils[Footnote 4] that are part of the NIPP framework and
a representative of the Rail Sector Coordinating Council to determine
the status of the councils and the sector-specific plans. These
officials also presented their views on the facilitating factors and
barriers to creating and maintaining their respective councils and
drafting sector-specific plans, but they did not necessarily represent
the views of each member of the councils. For both the government and
sector council contacts, the structured interviews solicited
information including (1) the status of council formation, leadership,
organization, and goals; (2) views on whether specific factors
facilitated or impeded council formation; (3) the status of sector-
specific plan development; and (4) views on whether specific factors
facilitated or impeded plan development. We also spoke with the Deputy
Director, Infrastructure Partnerships Division and the Director of the
Infrastructure Programs Office within DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection about the formation of the councils and the development of
sector-specific plans.[Footnote 5] We conducted our work from October
2005 through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Each of the infrastructure sectors has established government councils,
and voluntary sector councils have been formed in response to the
recommended NIPP partnership model for all sectors except
transportation systems. The characteristics and levels of maturity vary
significantly across the sectors. For example, the public health and
healthcare sector is quite diverse and collaboration has been difficult
as a result; on the other hand, the nuclear sector is quite homogenous
and has a long history of collaboration. As a result, council
activities have ranged from getting organized to refining their
infrastructure protection strategies. To develop effective protection
plans, it is important that council membership represent these unique
and varied interests, and we found this generally to be true for most
of the councils. For example, members of the drinking water and water
treatment systems sector council included the American Water Works
Association as well as local entities, such as the City of Portland
Bureau of Environmental Services. According to representatives from
several sector councils, these councils are not intended to replace the
information sharing functions provided by the information sharing and
analysis centers, and two of the centers are members of their
respective sector councils. The age and maturity of the councils also
varied. Ten sectors had formed councils prior to the development of the
NIPP model because they were already collaborating on protective
measures, while the remaining sectors had formed councils more
recently. The more mature councils, including banking and finance and
telecommunications, were able to focus on strategic activities, such as
developing plans on how to resume operations as soon as possible after
a disaster. In contrast, the newer councils--including public health
and healthcare and commercial facilities--were still focusing on
identifying key stakeholders and members, developing charters, and
getting organized. The transportation systems sector had yet to form a
sector council and, as of August 2006, Transportation Security
Administration officials said they were working with contractors to
help each transportation mode establish its own sector council.
According to DHS officials, once the modes are organized the
transportation systems sector council will be formed.
Representatives of the councils most frequently cited prior long-
standing working relationships and effective information sharing within
their sector as well as access to contractor resources through DHS as
key in establishment of a number of the councils. Conversely, the lack
of an effective relationship with DHS, private sector hesitancy to
provide sensitive information on infrastructure vulnerabilities to the
government or within the sector, and the lack of prior relationships
with federal agencies or within the sector were the most frequently
cited challenges to developing other councils. In terms of facilitating
factors, sectors that had been regulated by federal agencies for years,
such as the banking and finance sector, reported developing long-
standing and trusted working relationships both with the federal
agencies and within the sectors, which facilitated council development.
These sectors also recognized the need to share information in order to
collaborate on protection efforts. Our past work has also identified
trusted working relationships and effective information sharing as
critical factors for successful public-private partnerships, and we
have made recommendations in these areas that DHS generally agreed
with, but has yet to fully implement.[Footnote 6] Another key
facilitating factor was having access to resources and technical
assistance from DHS contractors, filling resource and skill gaps some
sectors had in establishing and operating their councils. For example,
one of the contractors provided guidance on lessons learned in how
other sector councils were organized that representatives of the
emergency services and the telecommunications councils said were very
helpful. In terms of challenges, some government and sector councils
cited high turnover of some DHS staff and the staff's lack of
understanding about infrastructure operations as hindering council
formation. While DHS officials reported that staff turnover should not
affect the formation of sector councils, the officials said that this
turnover could hinder the establishment of trusted working
relationships. Representatives from various sectors also noted, as has
our past work, that some in the private sector are reluctant to share
sensitive infrastructure information with the federal government for
fear the information might be publicly disclosed or make them subject
to litigation for failure to disclose their vulnerabilities. To address
this concern about public disclosure of sensitive information and to
enhance information sharing, in March 2006 DHS created the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council--open to members of all
councils--that is exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee
Act,[Footnote 7] but it is too soon to determine if this council has
promoted more sharing.
As of August 2006, each of the 17 sector-specific agencies was in the
process of preparing a sector-specific plan to demonstrate how that
sector will comply with the NIPP. However, the sectors were at varying
stages of completion in developing their plans, ranging from almost
complete to having only completed an outline. For example, the chemical
and nuclear sectors said their plans were nearing completion while the
commercial facilities sector said its plan was still in outline form.
Some in the private sector said collaboration between the sector
council and the government council on the plans had yet to take place.
Despite these differences, all the sectors expected to submit initial
plans to DHS by the December 2006 deadline. Like the NIPP, these plans
are only a first step; they are to lay out how the sector will identify
its most critical assets and resources and what methodologies each will
use to assess the risks posed to it, but DHS guidance does not require
the plans to address how the sector is actually assessing risk and
protecting its most critical assets. Council members cited as a key
facilitating factor the existence of prior plans that they could update
to satisfy NIPP requirements. For example, the energy sector had
developed a protection plan in anticipation of the Year 2000 ("Y2K")
computer threat, and that process was beneficial in developing its
sector-specific plan for the NIPP. Two other frequently cited factors
that helped with developing plans, as well as developing the councils
themselves, were when sectors had pre-existing relationships with
federal agencies or within the sector and access to contractor support
through DHS. The most frequently cited challenges included the lack of
a final NIPP that outlined stable requirements for the plans as well as
the changing nature of DHS guidance on how to develop the plans. For
example, DHS revised its initial 2004-plan guidance after a year with
new requirements including how the sectors will collaborate with DHS on
risk assessment processes. DHS then issued additional guidance in 2006
that required the plans to have a new chapter describing how sector-
specific agencies are to manage and coordinate their responsibilities.
Several council members said it was frustrating to have to update their
protection plans in response to changes from the interim, the draft,
and the final NIPP, even though DHS made some of these changes in
response to industry comments. For example, DHS incorporated changes in
the final NIPP in response to comments that it should better recognize
the need to focus on both protecting against and recovering from a
disaster. Finally, several cited the heterogeneous characteristics of
some sectors, such as the different industries that make up the
agriculture and food sector, as making collaboration and consensus on
their plans a challenge. While DHS has made progress with some critical
infrastructure challenges, until it addresses our already outstanding
recommendations, it will have difficulty achieving results in its role
as a federal focal point for critical infrastructure. Because our
findings in this report echo many of those in our previous reports and
are covered by previous recommendations to DHS that have yet to be
fully implemented, we are not making any new recommendations at this
time. Continued monitoring will determine whether further
recommendations are warranted.
DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental
Protection Agency had no formal comments on the draft report, but they
provided technical comments that we used to clarify the report as
appropriate.
Background:
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Has Emphasized Government and
Private Sector Coordination:
The protection of the nation's critical infrastructure against natural
and man-made catastrophic events has been a concern of the federal
government for over a decade. Several federal policies address the
importance of coordination between the government and the private
sector in critical infrastructure protection. For example, in May 1998,
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established critical
infrastructure protection as a national goal and presented a strategy
for cooperative efforts by the government and the private sector to
protect the physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and the government. Among other things, this
directive designated government agencies to coordinate and support
critical infrastructure protection efforts and identified lead federal
agencies to work with coordinators in eight infrastructure sectors and
five areas called special functions at the time. The directive also
encouraged development of information sharing and analysis centers
(ISACs) to serve as mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating information on infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities
to and from private infrastructure sectors and the federal government.
(See table 1 for a list of functional ISACs).
Table 1: Operating ISACs, as of July 2006:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
ISAC: Food;
ISAC Established: Feb. 2002.
Sector: Banking and finance;
ISAC: Financial Services;
ISAC Established: Oct. 1999.
Sector: Chemical;
ISAC: Chemical;
ISAC Established: April 2002.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
ISAC: Real Estate;
ISAC Established: Feb. 2003.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
ISAC: Water;
ISAC Established: Dec. 2002.
Sector: Emergency services;
ISAC: Emergency Management and Response;
ISAC Established: Oct. 2000.
Sector: Energy;
ISAC: Electric; Energy;
ISAC Established: Oct. 2000; Nov. 2001.
Sector: Government facilities;
ISAC: Multi-State;
ISAC Established: Jan. 2003.
Sector: Information technology;
ISAC: IT Research & Education Network;
ISAC Established: Dec. 2000 Feb. 2003.
Sector: Telecommunications;
ISAC: National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications;
ISAC Established: Jan. 2000.
Sector: Transportation systems;
ISAC: Public Transit Surface Transportation (rail) Highway Maritime;
ISAC Established: Jan. 2003 May 2002 Mar. 2003 Feb. 2003.
Source: Government council and sector council representatives and prior
GAO reports.
Note: The following critical sectors do not have ISACs: dams; defense
industrial base; national monuments and icons; commercial nuclear
reactors, materials, and waste; postal and shipping; and public health
and healthcare.
[End of table]
In December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)
was issued, superseding PDD-63. HSPD-7 defined responsibilities for
DHS, federal agencies that are responsible for addressing specific
critical infrastructure sectors--sector-specific agencies,--and other
departments and agencies. HSPD-7 instructs these sector-specific
agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of
attacks. HSPD-7 makes DHS responsible for, among other things,
coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts and
establishing uniform policies, approaches, guidelines, and
methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and
risk management activities within and across sectors. HSPD-7 requires
DHS to (1) produce a national plan summarizing initiatives for sharing
information, including providing threat warning data to state and local
governments and the private sector and (2) establish the appropriate
systems, mechanisms, and procedures to share homeland security
information (including information on critical infrastructure
protection such as threat-warning data) with other federal departments
and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector in a
timely manner. According to the NIPP, additional DHS responsibilities
regarding critical infrastructure protection include developing and
implementing comprehensive risk management programs and methodologies;
developing cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional protection guidance;
recommending risk management and performance criteria and metrics
within and across sectors; and establishing structures to enhance the
close cooperation between the private sector and government at all
levels. (For additional key federal initiatives related to critical
infrastructure protection, see app. I).
Sector-Specific Agencies Are to Coordinate Protection Efforts and
Develop Plans:
HSPD-7 designated sector-specific agencies for each of the critical
infrastructure sectors. These federal agencies are responsible for
infrastructure protection activities in their assigned sectors, which
include coordinating and collaborating with relevant federal agencies,
state and local governments, and the private sector to carry out sector
protection responsibilities. These activities also include facilitating
the sharing of information about physical and cyber threats,
vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best
practices. HSPD-7 also requires that these agencies submit an annual
report to DHS on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate
the protection of critical infrastructures in their respective sectors.
DHS serves as the sector-specific agency for ten of the sectors:
information technology; telecommunications; transportation systems;
chemical; emergency services; commercial nuclear reactors, material,
and waste; postal and shipping; dams; government facilities; and
commercial facilities. (See table 2 for a list of each sector-specific
agency and a brief description of each sector).
Table 2: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Designated Sector-Specific
Agencies:
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Agriculture[A], Dept. Of Health and
Human Services, Food and Drug Administration[B];
Sector: Agriculture & food;
Description: Provides for the fundamental need for food. The
infrastructure includes supply chains for feed and crop production.
Carries out the postharvesting of the food supply, including processing
and retail sales.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Defense;
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Description: Supplies the military with the means to protect the nation
by producing weapons, aircraft, and ships and providing essential
services, including information technology and supply and maintenance.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Energy;
Sector: Energy;
Description: Provides the electric power used by all sectors and the
refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas. The sector is
divided into electricity and oil and natural gas.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Health and Human Services;
Sector: Public health and healthcare;
Description: Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also
provides recovery assistance if an attack occurs. The sector consists
of health departments, clinics, and hospitals.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of the Interior;
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Description: Memorializes or represents monuments, physical structures,
objects, or geographical sites that are widely recognized to represent
the nation's heritage, traditions, or values, or widely recognized to
represent important national cultural, religious, historical, or
political significance.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of the Treasury;
Sector: Banking and finance;
Description: Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation. This
sector consists of commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
government-sponsored enterprises, pension funds, and other financial
institutions that carry out transactions.
Sector-specific agency: Environmental Protection Agency;
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Description: Provides sources of safe drinking water from more than
53,000 community water systems and properly treated wastewater from
more than 16,000 publicly owned treatment works.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of
Infrastructure Protection;
Sector: Chemical;
Description: Transforms natural raw materials into commonly used
products benefiting society's health, safety, and productivity. The
chemical sector produces more than 70,000 products that are essential
to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, electronics, water
treatment, health, construction, and other necessities.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of
Infrastructure Protection;
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Description: Includes prominent commercial centers, office buildings,
sports stadiums, theme parks, and other sites where large numbers of
people congregate to pursue business activities, conduct personal
commercial transactions, or enjoy recreational pastimes.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of
Infrastructure Protection;
Sector: Dams;
Description: Manages water retention structures, including levees, more
than 77,000 conventional dams, navigation locks, canals (excluding
channels), and similar structures, including larger and nationally
symbolic dams that are major components of other critical
infrastructures that provide electricity and water.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of
Infrastructure Protection;
Sector: Emergency services;
Description: Saves lives and property from accidents and disaster. This
sector includes fire, rescue, emergency medical services, and law
enforcement organizations.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of
Infrastructure Protection;
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Description: Provides nuclear power, which accounts for approximately
20% of the nation's electrical generating capacity. The sector includes
commercial nuclear reactors and non-power nuclear reactors used for
research, testing, and training; nuclear materials used in medical,
industrial, and academic settings; nuclear fuel fabrication facilities;
the decommissioning of reactors; and the transportation, storage, and
disposal of nuclear materials and waste.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of Cyber
Security and Telecommunications;
Sector: Information technology;
Description: Produces information technology and includes hardware
manufacturers, software developers, and service providers, as well as
the internet as a key resource.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Office of Cyber
Security and Telecommunications;
Sector: Telecommunications;
Description: Provides wired, wireless, and satellite communications to
meet the needs of businesses and governments.
Sector-specific agency: Dept. of Homeland Security: Transportation
Security Administration;
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Description: Delivers private and commercial letters, packages, and
bulk assets. The U.S. Postal Service and other carriers provide the
services of this sector.
Sector-specific agency: Transportation Security Administration and U.S.
Coast Guard;
Sector: Transportation systems;
Description: Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to
our economy, mobility, and security with the use of aviation, ships,
rail, pipelines, highways, trucks, buses, and mass transit.
Sector-specific agency: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal
Protective Service;
Sector: Government facilities;
Description: Ensures continuity of functions for facilities owned and
leased by the government, including all federal, state, territorial,
local, and tribal government facilities located in the U.S. and abroad.
Source: NIPP, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and the
National Strategy for Homeland Security.
[A] The Department of Agriculture is responsible for food (including
meat, poultry, and eggs) and agriculture.
[B] The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
Administration is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and
egg products.
[End of table]
Under the NIPP, the sector-specific agencies are also responsible for
developing individual plans for their sectors. These plans are to
support the NIPP by identifying the specific protective activities and
information-sharing mechanisms and protocols that each sector will be
using for its protection efforts. Specifically, these plans are to be
tailored to address the unique characteristics and risks of each sector
and are to, among other things, (1) define the security roles and
responsibilities of members of the sector; (2) establish the methods
that members will use to interact and share information related to
protection of critical infrastructure; (3) describe how the sector will
identify its critical assets; and (4) identify the approaches the
sector will take to assess risks and develop programs to protect these
assets. DHS is to use these individual plans to evaluate whether any
gaps exist in the protection of critical infrastructures on a national
level and, if so, to work with the sectors to address them. Each sector-
specific agency is to collaborate with its respective government and
sector councils to develop these plans, and each is to submit its plan
to DHS within 180 days of issuance of the NIPP (by the end of December
2006).
NIPP Relies on a Partnership Model for Coordination of Protection
Efforts:
DHS published an Interim NIPP in February 2005 that was intended to
provide the framework for a coordinated national approach to address
the full range of physical, cyber, and human threats and
vulnerabilities that pose risks to the nation's critical
infrastructure. DHS released subsequent drafts of the NIPP for comment
in November 2005 and January 2006 before it released a final NIPP in
June 2006. The NIPP relies on a sector partnership model as the primary
means of coordinating government and private sector critical
infrastructure protection efforts. Under this model, each sector has
both a government council and a sector council to address sector-
specific planning and coordination. Each council is to work in tandem
to create the context, framework, and support for coordination and
information-sharing activities required to implement and sustain that
sector's critical infrastructure protection efforts. The council
framework allows for the involvement of representatives from all levels
of government and the private sector, so that collaboration and
information-sharing can occur to assess events accurately, formulate
risk assessments, and determine appropriate protective measures.
The government councils are to coordinate strategies, activities,
policy, and communications across government entities within each
sector. Each government council is to be comprised of representatives
across various levels of government (i.e., federal, state, local, and
tribal) as appropriate to the security needs of each individual sector.
In addition, a representative from the sector-specific agency is to
chair the council and is to provide cross-sector coordination with each
of the member governments. Each council is also co-chaired by the DHS
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection or a designee.
Sector councils are encouraged under the NIPP model to be the principal
entities for coordinating with the government on a wide range of
critical infrastructure protection activities and issues. Under the
model, critical asset owners and operators are encouraged to be
involved in the creation of sector councils that are self-organized,
self-run, and self-governed, with a spokesperson designated by the
sector membership.[Footnote 8] Specific membership can vary from sector
to sector, but should be representative of a broad base of owners,
operators, associations, and other entities--both large and small--
within the sector.
The NIPP also identified cross-sector entities that are to promote
coordination, communications, and the sharing of key practices across
sectors. On the government side, the Government Cross-Sector Council is
comprised of two subcouncils: (1) the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership
Council, comprised of representatives of each of the sector-specific
agencies, that is to enhance communication and coordination between and
among these agencies and (2) the State, Local, and Tribal Government
Coordinating Council--comprised of state, local, and tribal homeland
security advisors--that is to serve as a forum for coordination across
these jurisdictions on protection guidance, strategies, and programs.
On the private sector side, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security (PCIS), comprised of one or more members and alternates from
each of the sector councils, is to, among other things, provide senior-
level, cross-sector strategic coordination through partnership with DHS
and the sector-specific agencies and to identify and disseminate
protection best practices across the sectors.
Sectors Have Established Government and Sector Councils, Which are
Generally Representative of their Sectors; Council Activities Have
Varied Depending on Their Maturity and Other Characteristics:
All of the sectors have established government councils, and voluntary
sector councils under the NIPP model have been formed for all sectors
except transportation systems. These councils were formed as early as
2002 to as recently as 2006. The nature of the 17 sectors varies and
council membership reflects this diversity. The government councils are
generally comprised of representatives from various federal agencies
with regulatory or other interests in the sector as well as some state
and local officials with purview over the sectors. In addition, members
of the sector councils are generally representative of the asset owners
and operators within the sectors. Because some of the councils are
newer than others, council activities vary based on the council's
maturity and other characteristics, with some younger councils focusing
on establishing council charters while more mature councils focused on
developing protection strategies.
Some Councils Formed in Response to the NIPP, While Others Formed
Earlier Because of Increased Vulnerabilities:
Each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors has established its
government council, and sector councils have been formed for all
sectors except transportation systems.[Footnote 9] While seven sectors
did not form either a government council or sector council prior to the
drafting of the NIPP, ten of the sectors had formed at least one of
these councils prior to DHS's drafting of the NIPP. These sectors said
they recognized the need to collaborate to address risks and
vulnerabilities that could result in economic consequences for their
sectors. The sectors with pre-existing councils are generally using
them to serve as the councils laid out in the NIPP model. For example,
prior to the development of the NIPP, DHS and the Department of
Agriculture established a government coordinating council for the
agriculture and food sector to coordinate efforts to protect against
agroterrorism. Also, prior to NIPP development, DHS helped the
agriculture and food sector establish a sector council to facilitate
the flow of alerts, plans, and other information between federal and
state governments and private infrastructure groups. The transportation
systems sector had yet to form a sector council, and, at the time of
our review, Transportation Security Administration officials said they
were working with contractors to help each transportation mode
establish its own sector council. TSA officials attributed the delay to
the heterogeneous nature of the Transportation sector--ranging from
aviation to shipping to trucking. (See table 3 for the status of
government and sector council formation by sector).
Table 3: Status of Government Council and Sector Council Formation, as
of August 2006:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
Government council formed: 2003;
Sector council formed: June 2004.
Sector: Banking and finance;
Government council formed: January 2002;
Sector council formed: June 2002.
Sector: Chemical;
Government council formed: March 2005;
Sector council formed: June 2004.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Government council formed: Summer 2005;
Sector council formed: Fall 2005.
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Government council formed: October 2004;
Sector council formed: September 2004.
Sector: Dams;
Government council formed: January 2005;
Sector council formed: May 2005.
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Government council formed: July 2006;
Sector council formed: August 2006.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Government council formed: April 2005;
Sector council formed: September 2004.
Sector: Emergency services;
Government council formed: April 2005;
Sector council formed: July 2003.
Sector: Energy[A];
Government council formed: Spring 2004;
Sector council formed: June 2004.
Sector: Government facilities;
Government council formed: November 2005;
Sector council formed: Not applicable[B].
Sector: Information technology;
Government council formed: April 2005;
Sector council formed: January 2006.
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Government council formed: September 2005;
Sector council formed: Not applicable[B].
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Government council formed: July 2005;
Sector council formed: December 2004.
Sector: Public health and healthcare;
Government council formed: Pre- 2005;
Sector council formed: Initiated in 2003, reorganized in 2006.
Sector: Telecommunications;
Government council formed: May 2005;
Sector council formed: May 2005.
Sector: Transportation systems;
Government council formed: January 2006;
Sector council formed: Not formed.
Source: Government council and sector council representatives.
[A] The energy sector includes the production, refining, storage, and
distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except for commercial
nuclear power facilities.
[B] There is no private sector component to this sector.
[End of table]
Council Leaders Believe That Their Memberships Are Generally
Representative of Government Agencies with Purview over the Sectors and
Are Generally Representative of Asset Owners and Operators:
The composition, scope, and nature of the 17 sectors themselves vary
significantly, and the memberships of their government and sector
councils reflect this diversity. The enormity and complexity of the
nation's critical infrastructure require council membership to be as
representative as possible of the entities that make up the respective
sector and that are responsible for or have some role in protecting
them. As such, council leaders--government sector representatives and
private council chairs--believe that their membership is generally
representative of their sectors. In terms of government councils,
members are generally comprised of representatives from various federal
agencies with regulatory or other interests in the sectors (see app. II
for government council membership by sector). For example, the chemical
sector government council membership includes officials with DHS; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Department of
Commerce; the Department of Justice; the Department of Transportation;
and the Environmental Protection Agency. This is because each entity
has an interest in some form in the chemical sector. As permitted in
the NIPP model, some government councils also include officials from
state and local governments with jurisdiction over entities in the
sector. An example of this is the dams sector, in which its government
council includes not only federal officials with purview over the
sector but also state officials from the California Department of Water
Resources; the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; the
Ohio Department of Natural Resources; the Virginia Department of
Conservation and Recreation; and the Washington Department of Ecology.
These states represent the other states and all local governments in
their regions. According to agency representatives for each of the
government councils, the memberships may change over time if needed--
for example, if knowledge of new threats would require the involvement
of additional government entities.
Sector council membership varies, reflecting the unique composition of
entities within each, but is generally representative of a broad base
of owners, operators, and associations--both large and small--within a
sector (see app. III for sector council membership by sector). For
example, members of the drinking water and water treatment systems
sector council include national organizations such as the American
Water Works Association and the Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies and also members of these associations that are
representatives of local entities including Breezy Hill Water and Sewer
Company and the City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services. In
addition, the commercial facilities sector council includes more than
200 representatives of individual companies spanning 8 different
subsectors, including public assembly facilities; sports leagues;
resorts; lodging; outdoor events facilities; entertainment and media;
real estate; and retail. According to sector council representatives,
memberships generally represent the majority of private industries
within each sector. This provides the councils opportunities to build
the relationships needed to help ensure critical infrastructure
protection efforts are comprehensive. The two exceptions are the
transportation systems sector council and the public health and
healthcare sector council. According to government and sector
representatives, because the transportation systems sector has yet to
establish a council, memberships are yet to be determined. Because of
the vast number of business entities within the private sector that are
very diverse in their interests, it has been difficult for the public
health and healthcare sector council to engage a mix of critical asset
owners that everyone considers representative. There are a large number
of public health and healthcare organizations involved in the sector
that do consider themselves representative of the market. According to
DHS's Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office within the Office
of Infrastructure Protection, owners and operators are necessary
members of the council because they have the responsibility to invest
time, money, and other resources to secure their critical assets and
are held responsible by their customers and by the public they serve to
respond and recover when their operations are disrupted. Recently, a
new public health and healthcare chair of the sector council has been
designated and is working to solidify the council's structure and
membership. While these efforts may help, it is unclear how soon this
will happen.
While Newer Councils Are Just Forming, More Mature Councils Are
Addressing Long-Term Strategies:
Council activities have varied based on the maturity of the councils.
Because some of the councils are newer than others, council meetings
have addressed a range of topics from agreeing on a council charter to
developing industry standards and guidelines for business continuity in
the event of a disaster or incident. For example, the commercial
facilities government council, which formed in 2005, has held meetings
to address operational issues--such as agreeing on a charter, learning
what issues are important to the sector, learning about risk management
tools, and beginning work on the sector-specific plan. Councils that
are more mature have been able to move beyond these activities to
address more strategic issues. For example, the banking and finance
sector council, which formed in 2002, focused its efforts most recently
on strengthening the financial system's ability to continue to function
in the event of a disaster or incident (known as "resilience");
identifying a structured and coordinated approach to testing sector
resilience; and promoting appropriate industry standards and guidelines
for business continuity and resilience.
Sector councils are not intended to replace the information sharing
functions provided by the ISACs. For those sectors that had established
ISACs prior to the development of the NIPP, the sectors may continue to
rely on them for operational and tactical capabilities for information
sharing, such as threat alerts, and, in some cases, support for
incident response activities. In contrast, sector councils are to serve
as strategy and policy-making bodies for critical infrastructure
protection. The NIPP also supports the continued use of ISACs by those
sectors that have established them, but notes that each sector has the
ability to implement a tailored information sharing solution that may
include existing ISACs or other methods, such as trade associations,
security organizations, or infrastructurewide or corporate operations
centers. In fact, the ISACs for the banking and finance sector as well
as the information technology sector are members of their respective
sector councils. Many sectors are exploring a relatively new DHS
information sharing mechanism, the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN). This network, in particular the portal for critical
infrastructure protection called Critical Sectors (HSIN-CS), is a suite
of tools that sector councils can use for information sharing,
coordination, and communication about alerts, incidents, and planning
efforts within the sector. At the time of our review, according to
DHS's Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office within the Office
of Infrastructure Protection, DHS had created access portals for all 17
sectors and 6 sector councils had signed formal memorandums of
understanding with DHS to use the system, declaring the councils'
intent to implement access and use for their entire sector. Once HSIN-
CS is fully deployed, some sectors may use it instead of developing
separate ISACs or as a supplement to an existing ISAC.
Good Prior Working Relationships, Willingness to Share Critical
Information, and Sufficient Resources Are Key to Council Formation and
Progress:
Government and sector council representatives most commonly cited long-
standing working relationships between entities within their respective
sectors and with the federal agencies that regulate them, the
recognition among some sector entities of the need to share
infrastructure information with the government and within the sector,
and operational support from DHS contractors as factors that
facilitated council formation. However, these representatives also most
commonly identified several key factors that posed challenges to
forming some of the councils, including (1) difficulty establishing
partnerships with DHS because of issues including high turnover of its
staff and DHS staff who lacked knowledge about the sector to which they
were assigned; (2) hesitancy to provide sensitive information or
industry vulnerabilities to the government due to concerns that the
information might be publicly disclosed; and (3) lack of long-standing
working relationships within the sector or with federal agencies.
Recognizing the Need to Work Together, Share Information, and Obtain
Support Were Most Common Factors That Helped Facilitate Council
Development:
One of the factors assisting the formation of many of the government
and sector councils was the existence of long-standing working
relationships within the sectors and with the federal agencies that
regulate them. As noted earlier in this report, ten of the sectors had
formed either a government council or sector council that addressed
critical infrastructure protection issues prior to DHS's development of
the NIPP. These sectors generally had ready-made councils in terms of
the NIPP model, compared to sectors that did not have prior
relationships. In addition, according to government and sector council
representatives, sectors in which the industries have been highly
regulated by the federal government--such as the banking and finance
sector as well as the commercial nuclear sector--were already used to
dealing with the federal government on many issues. Therefore, forming
a relationship between the government and the private sector and within
the sector was not very difficult. For example, the banking and finance
sector has had a functional equivalent of both the government and
sector councils since 2002 as well as an ISAC since 1999. Government
and sector council representatives reported that members of both
councils have developed long-standing and trusted working relationships
between respective members of each council and across the two councils
and an effective means of information sharing via their ISAC. As we
reported in 2001, developing trusted relationships among their members
was one of four key factors critical to the success of information
sharing organizations in addressing cyber infrastructure
threats.[Footnote 10] We reported that trust was critical to overcome
members' reluctance to disclose their weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and
other confidential or proprietary business information, but that trust
had to be built over time and through personal relationships.
The private sector's recognition of the need to share information with
the government about security threats, infrastructure vulnerabilities,
and protective measures also helped with council formation, according
to representatives of government and sector councils in 15 of the
sectors. This recognition dates back to PDD-63 with the formation of
the ISACs between 1999 and 2003 and continues today. As we reported in
July 2004, the private sector recognized the need to share information
with the federal government and many sectors voluntarily created ISACs
to provide an appropriate system to do so.[Footnote 11] Information
sharing can communicate both actionable information on threats and
incidents as well as information about the overall protection status of
critical assets so that owners and operators, federal agencies, states,
localities, tribal governments, and others can assess risks, make
appropriate security investments, and take effective and efficient
protective actions. Government and sector representatives generally see
the formation of the councils as another step to improve information
sharing between the federal government and the private sector that can
ultimately lead to more efficient and effective investments by owners
and operators as they protect their infrastructure.
The availability of DHS contractors that provided administrative and
other assistance to the government and sector councils was a third
facilitating factor cited by representatives of 13 government and 5
sector councils. DHS entered into contracts with the following three
organizations[Footnote 12] to provide administrative and other
assistance to help fill resource and skill gaps for the councils:
* DHS contracted with VSE Corporation, an engineering and technical
support services firm, in September 2005. Under this contract,
Energetics, a subcontractor, was to provide support to any of the
sectors that requested assistance in developing a common vision for
their sector-specific plans. Under this same contract, Meridian
Institute, a subcontractor to Energetics, was to provide support to any
sector councils that requested help to convene their councils and to
build consensus on a governance structure. This contract also supported
development of reports and studies related to the partnership model and
information sharing with the sectors. According to the most currently
available data, VSE-Energetics was provided $3 million for September
2005 to September 2006.
* DHS contracted with SRA International, Inc., in January 2004 to
provide "secretariat" support to the government councils. This support
was to include meeting planning, logistics, minutes, record keeping,
and administrative support. This contract also supported the National
Infrastructure Advisory Council, a presidential advisory committee,
with administrative, research, and technical writing support. A number
of study and analysis efforts were also supported under this contract.
SRA was provided $7.8 million from January 2004 to August 2006.
* DHS contracted with George Mason University (GMU) in October 2004 to
provide administrative and other support to the Partnership for
Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and those sector councils that
request support. GMU was provided $2.2 million for October 2004 to
December 2006.
The council representatives generally viewed these contractors as
invaluable in providing administrative, meeting-arrangement, and
meeting-facilitation services to the councils. For example, DHS's
contract with GMU was to provide meeting-planning, facilitation and
logistics support, develop materials, record and produce minutes,
deliver progress reports, and support development of governance
documents, if requested by the sector councils. Representatives of the
emergency services sector council and the telecommunications sector
council commended the services GMU provided for being very helpful,
including guidance GMU's staff provided on lessons learned from how
other sector councils were organized.
Difficulties in Developing Partnerships with DHS, Concerns about
Sharing Information, and the Lack of Long-standing Working
Relationships Were the Most Common Challenges to the Formation of Some
Councils:
While not all government and sector council representatives cited any
particular challenges to forming their councils, those who did
mentioned several key factors that included (1) difficulty establishing
partnerships with DHS because of issues including high turnover of its
staff and lack of staff knowledgeable about their sector; (2) hesitancy
to provide sensitive information or industry vulnerabilities to the
government or to other sector representatives due to concerns that it
might be publicly disclosed; and (3) lack of long-standing working
relationships within the sector or a close association with federal
agencies. (See figures 1 and 2 for information on the number of
councils that listed key factors that posed challenges for government
and sector councils, respectively).
Figure 1: Key Challenges That Affected Establishing Government
Councils:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Values do not add to 17 because council representatives may have
indicated more than one challenge.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Key Challenges That Affected Establishing Sector Councils:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Values do not add to 15 because the 14 council representatives
and the rail sector representative may have indicated more than one
challenge.
[End of figure]
Representatives of Eleven Councils Cited Establishing Partnerships with
DHS as a Challenge in Forming Councils:
Council representatives with three government and eight sector councils
reported that they experienced problems forming their councils due to a
number of challenges establishing partnerships with DHS.[Footnote 13]
Specifically, these reported challenges included high turnover of
staff, poor communications with councils, staff who were unfamiliar
with the sector and did not understand how it works, shifting
priorities that affected council activities, and minimal support for
council strategies. DHS acknowledged that its recent reorganization has
resulted in staff turnover, but according to DHS's Director of the
Infrastructure Programs Office within the Office of Infrastructure
Protection, this should not have affected formation of the councils.
According to this official, DHS has taken a consistent approach to
implement the partnership model, and the individual person in a
particular staff position does not matter because the DHS
implementation guidance is consistent. However, the director
acknowledged that continuing staff turnover could affect the eventual
success of the government-private sector partnerships because they will
be dependent on the actual interactions between the sector-specific
agency representatives and the sector council members and the trust
they develop. Continuity of government staff is a key ingredient in
developing trusted relationships with the private sector.
We and others have similarly reported on DHS's struggles to achieve
organizational stability and to provide infrastructure expertise across
all sectors in the past as well as in our most recent work on Internet
security issues. For example, in May 2005, we reported that DHS faced a
number of challenges that impeded its ability to fully address its
cybersecurity critical infrastructure protection responsibilities,
including achieving organizational stability and establishing effective
partnerships with stakeholders.[Footnote 14] Specifically, we reported
that DHS continued to have difficulties in developing partnerships, as
called for in federal policy, with other federal agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector. We recommended that DHS
engage appropriate stakeholders to prioritize key cybersecurity
responsibilities as well as identify performance measures and
milestones for fulfilling them. DHS concurred with our recommendation
to engage stakeholders in prioritizing its key cybersecurity
responsibilities, noting that continued and expanded stakeholder
involvement is critical. However, DHS did not agree that the challenges
it experienced prevented it from achieving significant results in
improving the nation's cybersecurity posture. In addition, DHS did not
concur with our recommendations to (1) develop a prioritized list of
key activities for addressing the underlying challenges and (2)
identify performance measures and milestones for fulfilling its
prioritized responsibilities and for performing activities to address
its challenges and track organizational progress. Nonetheless, in its
strategic plan for cybersecurity, DHS acknowledges that it needs to
establish performance measures and milestones and to collect
performance data for its key initiatives. More recently, in March 2006,
the Council on Foreign Relations, in a study of private sector efforts
to protect critical infrastructure, reported that DHS was still
struggling with many issues that prevented the full cooperation of the
private sector in terms of improving homeland security and protecting
critical infrastructure.[Footnote 15] For example, the council noted
that DHS suffered from high management turnover, poor quality
management, and a shortage of experienced personnel as factors that
contributed to the difficulty in improving relationships with the
private sector. Finally, in June 2006, we reported that DHS faced
similar challenges that impeded its ability to protect the Internet
infrastructure, including organizational and leadership changes at the
department.[Footnote 16]
Representatives for about a Third of Councils Expressed Concerns about
Sharing Sensitive Information about Infrastructure Vulnerabilities with
the Government and with Other Sector Members:
Representatives with six government and five sector councils noted that
the private sector continues to be hesitant to provide sensitive
information regarding vulnerabilities to the government as well as with
other sector members due to concerns that, among other things, it might
be publicly disclosed. For example, these representatives were
concerned that the items discussed, such as information about specific
vulnerabilities, might be subject to public disclosure under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act and thereby be available to competitors
or potentially make the council members subject to litigation for
failure to publicly disclose any known threats or
vulnerabilities.[Footnote 17]
This issue continues to be a longstanding concern and one that
contributed to our designating homeland security information sharing as
a high-risk issue in January 2005.[Footnote 18] We reported then that
the ability to share security-related information is critical and
necessary because it can unify the efforts of federal, state, and local
government agencies and the private sector in preventing or minimizing
terrorist attacks. In March 2006, we reported that more than 4 years
after September 11, the nation still lacked governmentwide policies and
processes to help agencies integrate a myriad of ongoing efforts to
improve the sharing of terrorism-related information that is critical
to protecting our homeland.[Footnote 19]
More recently, in April 2006, we reported that DHS continued to face
challenges that impeded the private sector's willingness to share
sensitive security information with the government.[Footnote 20] In
this report, we assessed the status of DHS efforts to implement the
protected critical infrastructure information (PCII) program created
pursuant to the Homeland Security Act. This program was specifically
designed to establish procedures for the receipt, care, and storage of
critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to the
government. We found that while DHS created the program office,
structure, and guidance, few private sector entities were using the
program. Challenges DHS faced included being able to assure the private
sector that such information will be protected and specifying who will
be authorized to have access to the information, as well as to
demonstrate to critical infrastructure owners the benefits of sharing
the information. We concluded that if DHS were able to surmount these
challenges, it and other government users may begin to overcome the
lack of trust that critical infrastructure owners have in the
government's ability to use and protect their sensitive information. We
recommended that DHS better define its critical infrastructure
information needs and better explain how this information will be used.
DHS concurred with our recommendations and in September 2006 issued a
final rule that established procedures governing the receipt,
validation, handling, storage, marking, and use of critical
infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to DHS.
To help address council concerns about sharing sensitive security
information, DHS in March 2006 created the Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council, open to members of each of the government
and sector councils. The purpose of the Advisory Council is to
facilitate interactions between government representatives and private
sector owners and operators of critical assets. To accomplish this
goal, DHS exempted council proceedings from requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. However, it is too soon to determine whether
the council has helped facilitate information sharing.
Several Council Representatives Cited a Lack of Prior Working
Relationships as a Challenge to Council Formation:
Four government and four sector council representatives stated that the
lack of prior working relationships either within their sector or with
the federal government created challenges in forming their respective
councils. For example, the public health and healthcare sector
struggled with creating a sector council that represented the interests
of the sector because it is comprised of thousands of entities that are
not largely involved with each other in daily activities.[Footnote 21]
According to the sector-specific agency representative of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), historically, there was
relatively little collaboration on critical infrastructure protection-
related issues among sector members. Some individual members, such as
pharmaceutical companies, do have vigorous critical infrastructure
protection programs to address their company's challenges. The official
also noted that many other companies work cooperatively to evaluate
cybersecurity requirements. However, the official said by and large,
such initiatives are unique to specific industries, are not applicable
to the entire sector, and are geared to specific business objectives
(e.g., prevention of industrial espionage). The official indicated that
most sector members have few strong, continuing incentives to
collaborate with one another in understanding and resolving critical
infrastructure protection-related issues. Despite these reported
challenges, the public health and healthcare sector has been able to
form a sector council that is in the early stages of organization.
The commercial facilities sector, which also involves varied and often
unrelated stakeholders nationwide, similarly reported that the
disparities among stakeholders made forming a council challenging. This
sector encompasses owners and operators of stadiums, raceways, casinos,
and office buildings, that have not previously worked together. In
addition, the industries comprising the commercial facilities sector
did not function as a sector prior to the NIPP and did not have any
prior association with the federal government. As a result, this sector
council has been concentrating its efforts on identifying key
stakeholders and agreeing on the scope of the council and its
membership. The council has established eight subcouncils to allow the
disparate members to organize in a meaningful way. Because
approximately 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is
owned by the private sector, developing trusted partnerships between
the federal government and the private sector across all sectors is
critical to ensure the protection of these assets, as we reported in
2001 and in a number of subsequent reports on critical infrastructure
protection issues.
Councils Delayed Their Work on Sector-Specific Plans until the NIPP Was
Issued but Despite Challenges, Expect to Complete Plans by the End of
December 2006:
Each of the 17 sectors is preparing sector-specific plans. Sector-
specific agencies anticipate that all plans will be finalized by the
end of December 2006, as required by the NIPP, but some sectors were
farther along than others as of August 2006. Representatives from both
the government and sector councils cited factors that have facilitated
the development of their plans--similar to those that facilitated
development of their councils--most commonly citing pre-existing plans;
historical relationships between the federal government and the private
sector or across the private sector; and contractor support. Sector
representatives most commonly reported that key challenges in drafting
their plans were the lack of a final NIPP, which caused some sectors to
delay work on their plans, the changing nature of DHS guidance on how
to develop the plans, and the diverse make-up of sector membership.
Sector-Specific Agencies Believe They Will Complete Plans on Time:
Sector-specific agency representatives believe they will meet the
deadline to complete their plans by December 2006.[Footnote 22] DHS
requires these plans to contain definitions of the processes the
sectors will use to identify their most critical assets and resources
as well as the methodologies they will use to assess risks, but not
information on the specific protective measures that will be utilized
by each sector. Nevertheless, as of August 2006, some sectors reported
being further along in developing a plan than others, and some private
council representatives said collaboration between the private council
and the government council on the plans had yet to take place. For
example, representatives of the chemical and nuclear sectors
anticipated completing their plans before the December deadline.
However, while TSA officials reported that they had drafted an overall
plan, they had only begun drafting plans for each transportation mode
such as aviation, rail, and ports, as of August 2006. Additionally, the
overall plan had yet to be shared with the private sector at the time
of our review. Moreover, the commercial facilities sector-specific
agency representative said that as of May 2006, the agency had only
developed a plan outline because it was still conducting outreach with
the sector council and other relevant government councils.
Nevertheless, the sector co-chair said the sector should be able to
meet the December 2006 deadline.
The NIPP requires agencies to coordinate the development of plans in
collaboration with their security partners represented by government
and sector councils and provide documentation of such collaboration. To
date, the level of collaboration between sector-specific agencies and
the sector councils in developing the sector-specific plans has varied-
-ranging from soliciting stakeholder comments on a draft to jointly
developing the plan.[Footnote 23] For example, the Department of
Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration are initiating a draft
agriculture and food plan and plan to provide it to a working group of
government and sector council representatives to add relevant
information and comments, while representatives of the energy sector
council are working with the Department of Energy to draft the energy
plan. Despite the consistent belief among the sectors that they will be
able to provide their plans to DHS by the December 2006 deadline, the
extent to which some of the sector-specific agencies that are
responsible for the less developed and organized sectors are going to
be able to achieve the required collaboration is uncertain since
effective relationships within the sectors and with federal agencies
had yet to be established, which is a crucial step.
Pre-existing Plans, Collaboration, and Contractor Support Were Factors
Most Commonly Cited as Facilitating Development of Sector-Specific
Plans:
Representatives from both sector-specific agencies and sector councils
identified a number of factors that have helped in the development of
their plans. The most common factors included having (1) pre-existing
plans, (2) pre-existing relationships between the government and the
private sector, and (3) assistance from DHS officials and contractors.
Sector representatives from the agriculture and food, banking and
finance, chemical, and energy sectors said their sectors had already
developed protection plans prior to the interim NIPP published in
February 2005 because they had recognized the economic value in
planning for an attack. These representatives said they were able to
revise their previous plans to serve as the plans called for in the
NIPP. For example, the Department of Energy, with input from the
sector, had developed a protection plan in anticipation of the Year
2000 ("Y2K") computer threat; Department of Energy officials noted that
both this plan and the relationships established by its development
have been beneficial in developing the protection plan for the energy
sector. Likewise, HHS and U.S. Department of Agriculture
representatives said that the agriculture and food plan will follow and
document infrastructure protection practices that the sector was
already doing as a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9
(HSPD-9)--which established a national policy to defend the agriculture
and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies--and will be based on a previous plan developed in 2004 in
response to the directive. Similarly, the banking and finance sector
council, which worked closely with the Department of Treasury, has had
a critical infrastructure protection plan in place for the banking and
finance sector since 2003 and planned to use it, along with other
strategies, to fit the format required by the NIPP.
Representatives from 13 government and 10 sector councils agreed that
having prior relationships--either formally between the federal
government and the private sector based on regulatory requirements, or
informally within and across industries--facilitated sector-specific
plan development. For example, a nuclear sector representative said
that its regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, had already laid
out clear guidelines for security and threat response that facilitated
developing the sector's plan. Representatives from the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and the banking and finance government
council also said that previous regulatory relationships with their
sectors helped with plan development. The TSA official said that the
flow of information and coordination between the federal government and
the transportation industry occurred continually and that these
existing networks would also assist in plan development. Sectors with
operating ISACs--such as the telecommunications and information
technology sectors--found them to have assisted in developing sector-
specific plans because of their longer involvement in public-private
information sharing. The drinking water and wastewater sector council
representative said that its long-standing culture of sharing
information and decades of work with the Environmental Protection
Agency helped with plan development. In addition, according to
officials on the telecommunications sector council's steering
committee, communications companies, electric power suppliers, and
information technology providers have a history of working together to
ensure the continuity of services during potentially disrupting events.
This history facilitated cooperation and coordination in developing the
sector-specific plans.
Representatives from seven sector-specific agencies and five sector
councils said that assistance from DHS officials or DHS contractors was
also a factor that helped with plan development. In addition to the
contractor assistance identified above, DHS entered into the following
contract to provide support for the development of the NIPP and the
sector-specific plans:
* DHS contracted with ICF International, a professional services
consulting firm, in January 2004. Under this contract, ICF
International was to support the development of the guidance for the
sector-specific plans, conduct technical assistance sessions for sector-
specific agencies to facilitate plan development, and provide subject
matter experts to each of the 17 sectors to support drafting and review
of each sector's plan. According to DHS, ICF International was provided
$11.2 million for work performed from January 2004 through December
2006.
Representatives from the national monuments and icons and the
government facilities sectors said that DHS officials have been
accessible and responsive to questions regarding plan guidance. In
addition, five sector representatives cited the help provided through
DHS's contract with the George Mason University's Critical
Infrastructure Protection program as being useful in understanding the
plan guidance and in facilitating sector communication. These and other
sector representatives said that the DHS-provided contractor assistance
also helped in the development of their plans. By having access to
these contractors, sectors were able to access additional support when
needed for plan development activities such as research and drafting.
For example, DHS contract staff assisted the Department of the Interior
and DHS's Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness and Protection Division in
drafting the plans for the national monuments and icons and emergency
services sectors, respectively. Representatives from the chemical,
emergency services, nuclear, and telecommunications sector councils
said that contractors hired by DHS were helpful as resources providing
research or drafting services.
The Lack of a Final NIPP, Changing Guidance, and Other Challenges
Impeded Progress on Some Sector-Specific Plans:
The most common key challenges sector representatives reported as
having contributed to delays in the development of their plans included
(1) the lack of a final NIPP, (2) changing DHS guidance, and (3) the
diverse makeup of sector membership. Representatives from seven
government councils and six private councils did not report any major
challenges to plan development. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the key
challenges in developing plans cited by council representatives.
Figure 3: Key Challenges to Developing Sector-Specific Plans, according
to Government Council Representatives:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Values do not add to 17 because council representatives may have
indicated more than one challenge.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Key Challenges to Developing Sector-Specific Plans, according
to Sector Council Representatives:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Values do not add to 15 because the 14 council representatives
and the rail sector representative may have indicated more than one
challenge.
[End of figure]
Representatives from six government councils and six sector councils
said that the lack of a final NIPP contributed to delays in developing
their sector plans. Furthermore, representatives with three sectors
specifically stated that they suspended revisions to their sector plans
primarily because they wanted to be sure the plans followed the
requirements in the final NIPP and to minimize revisions. The sector-
specific agencies are required to complete their plans and submit them
to DHS 180 days from the final issuance date of the NIPP. Since DHS
issued the final NIPP in June 2006, the agencies have until the end of
December 2006 to submit their plans. According to DHS, sectors had
begun drafting their sector-specific plans following the issuance of
initial sector-specific plan guidance in April 2004. After DHS issued
the interim NIPP in February 2005, it continued to refine the NIPP
based on stakeholder comments and also issued revised sector-specific
plan guidance. For example, DHS revised its 2004 plan guidance a year
later with new requirements including how the sector will collaborate
with DHS on risk assessment processes as well as how it will identify
the types of protective measures most applicable to the sector. DHS
then issued additional guidance in 2006 that required the plans to have
a new chapter describing how sector-specific agencies are to manage and
coordinate their responsibilities. These changes required some sectors-
-such as dams, emergency services, and information technology--to make
significant revisions to their draft plans. Representatives from these
sectors expressed frustration with having to spend extra time and
effort making changes to the format and content of their plans each
time DHS issued new guidance. Therefore, they decided to wait until
final guidance was issued based on the final, approved NIPP.
However, some sectors found the changes in the NIPP and plan guidance
to be improvements over prior versions that helped them prepare their
plans. For example, representatives from the emergency services sector
said that guidance became more specific and, thus, more helpful over
time, and representatives from the national monuments and icons sector
said that the DHS guidance has been useful. Representatives from five
sectors also reported that DHS incorporated changes to address their
concerns. For example, representatives from the information technology,
public health, energy, telecommunications, and transportation systems
sectors, among others, had commented that the NIPP should emphasize
resiliency rather than protection. According to some of these
representatives, it is impossible and cost-prohibitive to try to
protect every asset from every possible threat. Instead, industries in
these sectors prefer to invest resources in protecting the most
critical assets with the highest risk of damage or destruction and to
plan for recovering quickly from an event. Representatives from the
telecommunications sector added that resiliency is especially important
for interdependent industries in restoring services such as
communications, power, the flow of medical supplies, and transportation
as soon as possible. DHS incorporated this concept of resiliency into
the final NIPP to address these concerns.
As in establishing their councils, in developing their sector-specific
plans, officials from three government councils and five sector
councils said that their sectors were made up of a number of disparate
stakeholders, making agreement on a plan more difficult. For example,
as noted earlier, the commercial facilities sector is comprised of
eight different subsectors of business entities that have historically
had few prior working relationships. According to the government
council representative, the magnitude of the diversity among these
subsectors has slowed the process of developing a plan so that the
sector only had an outline of its plan as of May 2006. Similarly,
government and private council representatives of the agriculture and
food sector indicated that the diversity of industries included in this
sector such as farms, food processing plants, and restaurants, each of
which has differing infrastructure protection needs, has made
developing a plan more difficult.
Concluding Observations:
Critical infrastructure protection is vital to our national security,
economic vitality and public health. Significant damage to critical
infrastructure and key resources could disrupt the functioning of
business and government alike, underscoring the need for the private
and public sectors to take a coordinated approach to critical
infrastructure protection. While DHS is to be commended for its efforts
to incorporate private sector comments into the final NIPP, the 18-
month delay in issuing that document and changing DHS planning guidance
have slowed down the progress of some sectors in developing specific
plans to protect sectors. As a result, some less mature sectors were
still in the outline phase of developing their sector-specific plans at
the time of our review, leaving much to do and not a lot of time left
to do it before the December deadline. In addition, some private
council representatives said collaboration between the private council
and the government council on the plans, which is required by the NIPP,
had yet to take place. Not only is this collaboration required by the
NIPP, but also the ability of the private sector to achieve the goals
of HSPD-7 and the National Strategy for Homeland Security depends on
it. The extent to which some of the sector-specific agencies that are
responsible for the less developed councils and plans are going to be
able to achieve this collaboration is uncertain since neither had yet
established effective relationships, a crucial step. In addition, both
the NIPP and the sector plans only represent a first step toward
ensuring sufficient protection of critical infrastructure. The NIPP
lays out guidance for critical infrastructure protection planning and
risk assessments, yet the sector plans must only demonstrate how the
sectors will identify their critical assets, plan for infrastructure
protection, and assess risk across their infrastructure base, not
identify critical assets and assess risk levels. Conducting these
identifications and assessments will be the next step under the NIPP
guidelines.
The inability to share information critical to homeland security and
infrastructure protection continues to pose a significant risk to the
nation. This report, as well as our past work, demonstrates that many
private sector partners do not trust the government enough yet to share
information on their security vulnerabilities. DHS's creation of the
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council in March 2006 may
help alleviate private sector concerns about the sharing of sensitive
security information, but it is too soon to determine whether the
council has helped facilitate information sharing. Similarly,
developing successful working relationships continues to be an
important issue for DHS. Our previous work, dating back to 2001, shows
that the establishment of trusted relationships is vital to the success
of information sharing and critical infrastructure protection efforts.
Given the long-term relationships that are necessary for the successful
implementation of the NIPP, factors that impact these relationships,
such as continuing staff turnover, could affect the eventual success of
the government-private sector partnerships. Because our findings in
this report echo many of those in our previous reports and are covered
by previous recommendations to DHS that have yet to be fully
implemented, we are not making any new recommendations at this time.
Continued monitoring will determine whether further recommendations are
warranted.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this
report to appropriate departments and interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at larencee@gao.gov. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Key Federal Initiatives in Developing Critical
Infrastructure Protection Policy, 1996 to Present:
Policy action: Executive Order 13010;
Date: July 1996;
Key elements: Established the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection to study the nation's vulnerabilities to both
cyber and physical threats; Identified the need for the government and
the private sector to work together to establish a strategy for
protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats and
assuring their continued operation.
Policy action: Presidential Decision Directive 63;
Date: May 1998;
Key elements: Established CIP as a national goal and presented a
strategy for cooperative efforts by government and the private sector
to protect the physical and cyber-based systems essential to the
minimum operations of the economy and the government; Designated
government agencies to coordinate and support CIP efforts; Identified
lead federal agencies to work with coordinators in eight infrastructure
sectors and five special functions; Encouraged the development of
information-sharing and analysis centers; Required every federal
department and agency to be responsible for protecting its own critical
infrastructures, including both cyber-based and physical assets;
Superseded by HSPD-7 (see details on HSPD-7 below).
Policy action: National Plan for Information Systems Protection[A];
Date: Jan. 2000;
Key elements: Provided a vision and framework for the federal
government to prevent, detect, and respond to attacks on the nation's
critical cyber-based infrastructure and to reduce existing
vulnerabilities via federal computer security and information
technology requirements.
Policy action: Executive Order 13228;
Date: Oct. 2001;
Key elements: Established the Office of Homeland Security, within the
Executive Office of the President, to develop and coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the
United States from terrorist threats or attacks; Established the
Homeland Security Council to advise and assist the President with all
aspects of homeland security and to ensure the coordination of homeland
security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and
effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.
Policy action: Executive Order 13231;
Date: Oct. 2001;
Key elements: Established the President's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board to coordinate cyber-related federal efforts and
programs associated with protecting our nation's critical
infrastructures and to recommend policies and coordinating programs for
protecting CIP-related information systems.
Policy action: National Strategy for Homeland Security[B];
Date: July 2002;
Key elements: Identified the protection of critical infrastructures and
key assets as a critical mission area for homeland security; Expanded
the number of critical infrastructures from the 8 (identified in
Presidential Decision Directive 63) to 13 and identified lead federal
agencies for each; Specified 8 major initiatives for CIP, one of which
specifically calls for the development of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan.
Policy action: Homeland Security Act of 2002[C];
Date: Nov. 2002;
Key elements: Created the Department of Homeland Security and assigned
it the following CIP responsibilities: (1) developing a comprehensive
national plan for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructures of the United States; (2) recommending measures to
protect the key resources and critical infrastructures of the United
States in coordination with other entities; and (3) disseminating, as
appropriate, information to assist in the deterrence, prevention, and
preemption of or response to terrorist attacks.
Policy action: The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets[D];
Date: Feb. 2003;
Key elements: Provided a statement of national policy to remain
committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets from
physical attacks; Built on Presidential Decision Directive 63 with its
sector- based approach and called for expanding the capabilities of
information sharing and analysis centers; Outlined three key
objectives: (1) identifying and assuring the protection of the most
critical assets, systems, and functions; (2) assuring the protection of
infrastructures that face an imminent threat; and (3) pursuing
collaborative measures and initiatives to assure the protection of
other potential targets.
Policy action: Executive Order 13286;
Date: Feb. 2003;
Key elements: Amended Executive Order 13231 but generally maintained
the same national policy statement regarding the protection against
disruption of information systems for critical infrastructures;
Designated the National Infrastructure Advisory Council to continue to
provide the President with advice on the security of information
systems for critical infrastructures supporting other sectors of the
economy through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Policy action: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7;
Date: Dec. 2003;
Key elements: Superseded Presidential Decision Directive 63 and
established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to
identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources
and to protect them from terrorist attack; Defined roles and
responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security and sector-
specific agencies to work with sectors to coordinate CIP activities;
Established a CIP Policy Coordinating Committee to advise the Homeland
Security Council on interagency CIP issues.
Source: GAO analysis of documents listed above.
[A] The White House, Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for
Information Systems Protection: Version 1.0: An Invitation to Dialogue
(Washington, D.C.: January 2000).
[B] The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security.
[C] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
[D] The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Government Sector Council Membership, by Sector as of
August 2006:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
Government council members: Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials; Intertribal Agriculture Council; National Assembly of State
Chief Livestock Health Officials; National Association of County and
City Health Officials; National Association of State Departments of
Agriculture; US Dept. of Agriculture; US Dept. of Defense; US Dept. of
Health and Human Services; US Dept. of Homeland Security; US
Environmental Protection Agency; Ex Officio Members; Association of
Food and Drug Officials; US Dept. of Commerce; US Dept. of Justice; US
Dept. of the Interior.
Sector: Banking and finance;
Government council members: Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
Conference of State Bank Supervisors; Farm Credit Administration;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Housing Finance Board;
Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Federal Reserve Board; National
Association of Insurance Commissioners; National Association of State
Credit Union Supervisors; National Credit Union Administration; North
American Securities Administration Association; Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight; Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency; Office of Thrift Supervision; Securities and Exchange
Commission; Securities Investor Protection Corporation; US Dept. of
Treasury.
Sector: Chemical;
Government council members: US Dept. of Commerce; Bureau of Industry
and Security; US Dept. of Homeland Security; Preparedness Directorate,
National Cyber Security Division; Preparedness Directorate, Office of
Infrastructure Protection; Science and Technology Directorate;
Transportation Security Administration; US Coast Guard; US Dept. of
Justice; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; US Dept. of Transportation; Federal Railroad
Administration; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; US Environmental
Protection Agency; Office of Emergency Management; Water Security
Division.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Government council members: National Endowment for the Arts; US Dept.
of Commerce; US Dept. of Education; US Dept. of Homeland Security;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Federal Protective Service;
Office of Infrastructure Protection, Risk Management Division; Private
Sector Office; US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development; US Dept. of
the Interior; US Environmental Protection Agency; US General Services
Administration; US Secret Service; Ex Officio Members; US Dept. of
Health and Human Services; US Dept. of Justice.
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Government council members: Nuclear Regulatory Commission; US Dept. of
Defense; US Dept. of Energy; US Dept. of Homeland Security; Office of
Infrastructure Protection, Chemical & Nuclear Preparedness and
Protection Division; Science and Technology Directorate; US Coast
Guard; US Dept. of Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; US
Environmental Protection Agency.
Sector: Dams;
Government council members: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; State
of California, Department of Water Resources; State of New Jersey,
Department of Environmental Protection; State of Ohio, Department of
Natural Resources; State of Virginia, Department of Conservation and
Recreation; State of Washington, Department of Ecology; Tennessee
Valley Authority ; US Dept. of Agriculture, Natural Resources
Conservation Service; US Dept. of Defense, US Army Corps of Engineers;
US Dept. of Homeland Security; Office of Infrastructure Protection,
Risk Management Division; US Dept. of Labor, Mine Safety and Health
Administration; US Dept. of State, International Boundary and Water
Commission; US Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation; US
Environmental Protection Agency.
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Government council members: US Dept. of Defense; Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Homeland Defense); Director, Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy);
Director, Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy; Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (International Technology Security); Director,
Technology Assessments; Director, Defense Contract Management Agency;
Director, Industrial Analysis Center; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel & Readiness); Director, Readiness Programming and
Assessment; Deputy Chief Information Officer; Office of the DASD for
Information Management and Technology; Director, Architecture &
Interoperability; Director, National Guard Bureau; Director, NGB-J3; US
Dept. of Homeland Security; Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Security (Infrastructure Protection); US Dept. of Treasury;
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States; Office of
Critical Infrastructure Protection & Compliance Policy; US Dept. of
Justice; Federal Bureau of Investigation; US Dept. of Commerce; Office
of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, Bureau of Industry and
Security.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Government council members: Association of State and Interstate Water
Pollution Control Administrators; Association of State Drinking Water
Administrators; US Army Corps of Engineers; US Dept. of Agriculture;
Natural Resources Conservation Service; US Dept. of Defense; US Dept.
of Health and Human Services; US Dept. of Homeland Security;
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/Information
Coordination Division; US Dept. of State; US Dept. of the Interior;
Bureau of Reclamation; US Environmental Protection Agency.
Sector: Emergency services;
Government council members: American Red Cross; US Dept. of Health and
Human Services; US Dept. of Homeland Security; Border & Transportation
Security; Office of Infrastructure Protection, Chemical & Nuclear
Preparedness and Protection Division; Federal Emergency Management
Agency; Fire Administration; Immigration Customs & Enforcement; Office
of Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure Partnerships Division;
Infrastructure Programs Office; Office of Grants & Training; Office of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness; Science and Technology
Directorate; Office of State and Local Government Coordination; Office
of Infrastructure Protection, Risk Management Division; US Coast Guard;
US Dept. of Transportation; National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration; US Secret Service.
Sector: Energy;
Government council members: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners; National
Association of State Energy Officials; US Dept. of Agriculture; Rural
Utility Service; US Dept. of Defense; US Army Corps of Engineers; US
Dept. of Energy; Office of Infrastructure Security and Energy
Restoration; Western Area Power Administration; US Dept. of Homeland
Security; Infrastructure Partnerships Division; Office of
Infrastructure Protection, Risk Management Division; Transportation
Security Administration; US Coast Guard; US Dept. of the Interior;
Minerals Management Service; US Dept. of State; International Boundary
and Water Commission; US Dept. of Transportation; Research & Special
Programs Administration; Maritime Administration; US Environmental
Protection Agency.
Sector: Government facilities;
Government council members: US Capitol Police Intelligence Section; US
Department of Agriculture; Office of Facility Security; US Department
of Commerce; Anti-Terrorism Division; US Department of Defense; Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense,; Critical
Infrastructure Protection; Office of Installations Requirements and
Management; Air National Guard; US Department of Education; US
Department of Energy; Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for
Counterterrorism; US Department of Health and Human Services;
Departmentwide Security; US Department of Homeland Security;
Preparedness Directorate; Office of Infrastructure Protection; Risk
Management Division; Infrastructure Partnerships Division; National
Cyber Security Division; Science and Technology Directorate; Federal
Emergency Management Administration; US Coast Guard; US Secret Service;
Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; US
Department of Justice; US Marshals Service, Judicial Security Division,
Judicial Security Systems; FBI, Special Advisor to the DHS G&T, Office
of Law Enforcement Coordination; US Department of Labor; Director of
Security; US Department of State; Bureau of Resources Management,
Intelligence, Resources, and Planning, and; Critical Infrastructure
Protection; US Department of the Interior; Law Enforcement and
Security; National Park Service; US Department of the Treasury;
Critical Infrastructure Physical Security, Cyber Security; US
Department of Transportation; Federal Aviation Administration, Security
and Hazardous Materials, Internal; Security Division; US Department of
Veterans Affairs; Office of Security and Law Enforcement; US Postal
Inspection Service; Administrative Offices of the US Courts- Court
Security Office; Architect of the Capital; Environmental Protection
Agency; Federal Facilities Council; General Services Administration;
Interagency Security Committee; National Aeronautical and Space
Administration; National Archives and Records Administration; National
Center for State Courts; Office of Personnel Management; Social
Security Administration.
Sector: Information technology;
Government council members: Director of National Intelligence;
Metropolitan Information Exchange; National Association of State Chief
Information Officers; National Institute of Standards and Technology;
Office of Management and Budget; US Dept. of Commerce; US Dept. of
Defense; US Dept. of Homeland Security; US Dept. of Justice; US Dept.
of State; US Dept. of the Treasury.
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Government council members: National Archives and Records
Administration; Smithsonian Institute; US Capitol Police; US Dept. of
Defense; US Dept. of Homeland Security; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Office of Federal Protective Service; US Dept. of the
Interior; National Park Service; US Park Police; US Secret Service.
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Government council members: US Dept. of Defense; US Dept. of Health and
Human Services; Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness; Food
and Drug Administration; US Dept. of Homeland Security; Customs and
Border Protection; Preparedness Directorate; Science and Technology
Directorate; US Dept. of Justice.
Sector: Public health and healthcare; Government council members:
American Red Cross; Association of Public Health Laboratories;
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials; District of
Columbia Department of Health; Federal Emergency Management
Administration; General Services Administration; Indian Health Service
Tribal Council; National Association of County and City Health
Officials; US Dept. of Agriculture; US Dept. of Defense; US Dept. of
Health and Human Services; US Dept. of Homeland Security; US Dept. of
Transportation; US Dept. of Veterans Affairs; US Environmental
Protection Agency; US Postal Service; White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
Sector: Telecommunications;
Government council members: Federal Communications Commission; US Dept.
of Commerce; National Telecommunications and Information
Administration; US Dept. of Defense; Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Networks and Information Integration; US Dept. of Homeland
Security; National Communication System; Preparedness Directorate,
National Cyber Security Division; US Dept. of Justice; US General
Services Administration.
Sector: Transportation systems;
Government council members: US Dept. of Defense; US Dept. of Energy; US
Dept. of Homeland Security; Infrastructure Partnerships Division;
Transportation Security Administration; US Coast Guard; US Dept. of
Transportation.
Source: Government council representatives and DHS.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Sector Council Membership, by Sector as of August 2006:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
Sector council members: Agricultural Retailers Association; American
Farm Bureau Federation; CF Industries, Inc; CropLife America; Food
Marketing Institute; Food Products Association; International
Association of Refrigerated Warehouses; International Dairy Foods
Association; International Food Service Distributors Association;
International In-flight Food Service Association; International
Warehouse Logistics Association; McCormick & Company, Inc; National
Association of Convenience Stores; National Cattlemen's Beef
Association; National Corn Growers Association; National Food Service
Security Council; National Milk Producers Federation; National Pork
Producers Association; National Restaurant Association; National Retail
Federation; TD Enterprises; United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association.
Sector: Banking and finance;
Sector council members: American Bankers Association; American Council
of Life Insurers; American Insurance Association; American Society for
Industrial Security International; America's Community Bankers; BAI;
BITS/The Financial Services Roundtable; Chicago Mercantile Exchange;
ChicagoFIRST, LLC; CLS Group; Consumer Bankers Association; Credit
Union National Association; Fannie Mae; Financial Information Forum;
Futures Industry Association; Independent Community Bankers of America;
Investment Company Institute; Managed Funds Association; NACHA--The
Electronic Payments Association; National Association of Federal Credit
Unions; National Association of Securities Dealers; New York Board of
Trade; Securities Industry Association; Securities Industry Automation
Corporation; The Bond Market Association; The Clearing House; The
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation; The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc;
The Options Clearing Corporation; VISA USA Inc.
Sector: Chemical;
Sector council members: American Chemistry Council; American Forest &
Paper Association; Agriculture Retailers Association; Chemical
Producers & Distributors Association; Chlorine Chemistry Council;
Compressed Gas Association; Crop Life America; Independent Liquid
Terminals Association; Dupont; Institute of Makers of Explosives;
International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration; National Association
of Chemical Distributors; National Paint & Coatings Association;
National Petrochemical & Refiners Association; Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association; The Adhesive and Sealant Council;
The Chlorine Institute; The Fertilizer Institute; The Society of the
Plastics Industry, Inc.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Sector council members: The council is comprised of 30 individuals who
represent the eight subcouncils. These subcouncils currently
incorporate over 200 members. Coordination across subcouncils happens
at the council level. Subcouncils are: Public Assembly Facilities;
Sports Leagues; Resorts; Lodging; Outdoor Event Facilities;
Entertainment and Media; Real Estate; and Retail.
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Sector council members: Arizona Public Service Company; Constellation
Energy Generation Group; Dominion Energy; Dominion Generation; Entergy
Operations; Excelon Generation Company, LLC; General Electric Energy
Nuclear Energy; National Institute of Standards and Technology; Nuclear
Energy Institute; Southern Nuclear Company; USEC Inc.
Sector: Dams;
Sector council members: Allegheny Energy; Ameren Services Company;
American Electric Power; Association of State Dam Safety Officials;
AVISTA Utilities; Canadian Dam Association; Chelan County; CMS Energy;
Dominion Resources; Duke Energy Corporation; Exelon Corporation;
National Hydropower Association; National Mining Association; New York
City, Department of Environmental Protection; New York Power Authority;
Pacific Gas & Electric Company; PPL Corporation; Scana Corporation;
South Carolina Public Service Authority; Southern California Edison;
Southern Company Generation; TransCanada; United States Society of
Dams; Xcel Energy Corporation.
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Sector council members: Aerospace Industries Association; American
Society for Industrial Security; Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association; Contractor Secret Asset Programs Security
Working Group; Industrial Security Working Group; National
Classification Management Society; National Defense Industrial
Association.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Sector council members: The council consists of two owner/operator
representatives, along with one non-voting association staff member,
from each of the eight water associations; Alexandria Sanitation
Authority; American Water; American Water Works Association; American
Water Works Association Research Foundation; Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies; Bean Blossom Patricksburg Water
Corporation; Boston Water and Sewer Commission; Breezy Hill Water and
Sewer Company; City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services; City
of Richmond, Department of Public Utilities; Columbus Water Works; East
Bay Municipal Utility District; Fairfax Water; Greenville Water System;
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; Manchester Water Works;
National Association of Clean Water Agencies; National Association of
Water Companies; National Rural Water Association; New York City
Department of Environmental Protection; Pima County Wastewater
Management Department; United Water; Water Environment Federation;
Water Environment Research Foundation.
Sector: Emergency services;
Sector council members: International Association of Chiefs of Police;
International Association of Emergency Managers; International
Association of Fire Chiefs; National Association of State EMS
Officials; National Emergency Management Association; National
Sheriff's Association.
Sector: Energy;
Sector council members: American Gas Association; American Petroleum
Institute; American Public Gas Association; Anadarko Canada Corp;
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation; Arizona Public Service Company;
Association of Oil Pipe Lines; BP; Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers; Chevron Corporation; ConocoPhillips; Domestic Petroleum
Council; Dominion Resources Inc; Edison Chouest Offshore, LLC; El Paso
Corp; Energy ISAC; Exelon Corporation; ExxonMobil; Gas Processors
Association; Independent Electricity System Operator, Ontario Canada;
Independent Liquid Terminals Association; Independent Petroleum
Association of America; International Association of Drilling
Contractors; Interstate Natural Gas Association of America; Leffler
Energy; Marathon Petroleum Company, LLC; National Association of
Convenience Stores; National Ocean Industries Association; National
Petrochemical & Refiners Association; National Propane Gas Association;
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; New York Independent
System Operator; Newfoundland Ocean Industries Association; NiSource,
Inc; North American Electric Reliability Council; Offshore Marine
Service Association; Offshore Operators Committee; Petroleum Marketers
Association of America; Reliability First Corporation; Rowan Companies,
Inc; Shell Oil Company; Shipley Stores, LLC; Society of Independent
Gasoline Marketers of America; Southern Company Services, Inc; U.S. Oil
& Gas Association; Valero Energy Corporation; Western States Petroleum
Association.
Sector: Government facilities;
Sector council members: Not applicable[A].
Sector: Information technology;
Sector council members: Bell Security Solutions Inc; BellSouth
Corporation; Center for Internet Security; Cisco Systems, Inc; Citadel
Security Software, Inc; Computer and Communications Industry
Association; CA, Inc; Computer Sciences Corporation; Computing
Technology Industry Association; Cyber Security Industry Alliance;
Electronic Industries Alliance; Entrust, Inc; EWA Information &
Infrastructure Technologies, Inc; IBM Corporation; Information Systems
Security Association; Information Technology - Information Sharing &
Analysis Center; Information Technology Association of America; Intel
Corporation; International Security, Trust, and Privacy Alliance;
International Systems Security Engineering Association; Internet
Security Alliance; Internet Security Systems; KMPG LLC; Lockheed
Martin; McAfee, Inc; Microsoft Corporation; NTT America; R&H Security
Consulting LLC; Seagate Technology; Symantec Corporation; U.S. Internet
Service Provider Association; Unisys Corporation; VeriSign; Verizon.
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Sector council members: Not applicable[A].
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Sector council members: DHL; FedEx Corp; United Parcel Service; US
Postal Service.
Sector: Public health and healthcare;
Sector council members: AABB (formerly the American Association of
Blood Banks); Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed); Aiken
Regional Medical Centers; Air Force Medical Support Agency, Medical
Logistics Division; American Association of Colleges of Nursing;
American Association of Occupational Health Nurses, Inc; American
College of Occupational & Environmental Medicine; American Hospital
Association; American Industrial Hygiene Association; American Medical
Association; American Medical Depot; American Nurses Association;
American Red Cross; Association for Healthcare Resources & Materials
Management; Association of State and Territorial Directors of Nursing;
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials; BASF
Corporation; Baylor Healthcare System; Biotechnology Industry
Organization; BlueCross BlueShield Association; California Hospital
Association; Cedars-Sinai Hospital; Chamber of Commerce Manhattan
Beach; Childrens Hospital Los Angeles; Columbia University School of
Nursing; Concentra, Inc; Cremation Association of North America;
Cumberland Plateau Health District, Buchanan, Dickenson, Russell and
Tazewell County Health Departments; Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center;
DST Output; Duke University Medical Center; Eli Lilly; ER One
Institutes for Innovation in Medicine/Institute for Medical
Informatics, Washington Hospital Center; Exponent, Inc; ExxonMobil;
Florida Department of Health/Office of Public Health Nursing; Florida
Hospital Association; Greater NY [City] Hospital Association; Health
Industry Distributors Association; Health Information and Management
Systems Society; Healthways, Inc; HemoSense, Inc; Henry Schein, Inc;
Hill-Rom; Honeywell International; Hospital Association of Southern
California; ICFA - International Cemetery & Funeral Association;
ICTM/Intercet, Ltd; INOVA Health System; International Chemical Workers
Union Council/United Food and Commercial Workers; International
Coalition for Mass Casualty Education; James B. Haggin Memorial
Hospital; John Deere Harvester Works; Johns Hopkins University/Johns
Hopkins Health System; Johnson & Johnson Health Care Systems; Joint
Council on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations; Kaiser
Permanente/TPMG Executive Offices; Kent & O'Connor; LA Biomedical
Research; LabCorp; Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce; McKesson; MedStar
Health, Washington National Medical Center; Memorial Sloan Kettering
Cancer Center; Metropolitan Chicago Hospital Council; Nassau County, NY
Office of Emergency Management; National Association of County and City
Health Officials; National Council of State Boards of Nursing; National
Defense University/ Information Resources Management College; National
Funeral Directors and Mortuary Association; National Funeral Directors
Association; Nevada Hospital Association; Occidental Chemical
Corporation; Oschner Foundation Hospital; Owens & Minor; Pfizer;
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America; PSE&G (Exelon
Electric & Gas); Quest Diagnostics; Samaritan Health Services; The
George Washington University Medical Center; The Regence Group; The
Regional Medical Center, Cook and Associates; United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense; University of Illinois
at Chicago, School of Public Health; University of North Carolina,
School of Public Health; University of Pittsburgh Medical Center;
Vanderbilt School of Nursing; Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt
University Medical Center; VerdaSee Solutions, Inc.
Sector: Telecommunications;
Sector council members: Americom; AT&T; BellSouth; Boeing; Cellular
Telecommunications & Internet Association; Cincinnati Bell; Cingular
Wireless; Cisco Systems; Computer Sciences Corporation; Internet
Security Alliance; Intrado; Level 3 Communications; Lucent
Technologies; McLeodUSA; Qwest Communications; Rural Cellular
Association; Satellite Industry Association; Savvis; Sprint-Nextel;
Telecommunications Industry Association; U.S. Internet Service Provider
Association; United Telecom Council; USTelecom Association; VeriSign;
Verizon.
Sector: Transportation systems;
Sector council members: Council not yet developed.
Source: Sector council representatives and DHS.
[A] There is no private sector component to this sector.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, R.E. Canjar, William Carrigg, Michael
Gilmore, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Dave Powner, Susan H. Quinlan,
Nik Rapelje, Deena D. Richart, and E. Jerry Seigler made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[2] These critical infrastructure and key resource sectors include:
agriculture and food; banking and finance; chemical; commercial
facilities; commercial nuclear reactors, materials and waste; dams;
defense industrial base; drinking water and water treatment systems;
emergency services; energy; government facilities; information
technology; national monuments and icons; postal and shipping; public
health and healthcare; telecommunications; and transportation systems.
Critical infrastructure are systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security,
national economic security, and national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters. Key resources are publicly or
privately controlled resources essential to minimal operations of the
economy or government, including individual targets whose destruction
would not endanger vital systems but could create a local disaster or
profoundly damage the nation's morale or confidence. For purposes of
this report, we will use the term critical infrastructure to also
include key resources.
[3] DHS is the sector-specific agency for ten sectors: information
technology; telecommunications; transportation systems; chemical;
emergency services; commercial nuclear reactors, material, and waste;
postal and shipping; dams; government facilities; and commercial
facilities.
[4] The government facilities sector and the national monuments and
icons sector do not have sector councils because they have no private
sector components.
[5] DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection is to identify and assess
current and future threats to the nation's physical and informational
infrastructure and to issue warnings to prevent damage to the
infrastructure that supports community and economic life. It is also
responsible for oversight of NIPP development and implementation of the
partnership model.
[6] See GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical
Infrastructure Protection. GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.15, 2001);
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-
434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005); and Internet Infrastructure: DHS
Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/ Private Recovery Plan,
GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
[7] The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
app. 2) was enacted, in part, to control the advisory committee process
and to open to public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies
obtain advice from private individuals and groups. See 648 F. Supp.
1353, 1358-59 (D.D.C. 1986). Pursuant to authority conferred by the
Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S.C. § 451, DHS established the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council as a FACA exempt body to
support the free flow of information and the need for regular,
interactive discussions concerning threats and vulnerabilities. See 71
Fed. Reg. 14,930 (Mar. 24, 2006).
[8] Owners and operators of these assets include private sector
entities and, in some cases, state and local governments.
[9] There is no private sector component for the government facilities
sector or the national monuments and icons sector, so these sectors
established government councils but not private sector councils.
[10] GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical
Infrastructure Protection, GAO-02-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.15, 2001).
[11] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information
Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July
9, 2004).
[12] According to DHS officials within its Office of Infrastructure
Protection, as of July 2006, it was in the process of re-bidding the
support services for all councils.
[13] As noted earlier, DHS serves as the sector-specific agency for ten
of the sectors: information technology; telecommunications;
transportation systems; chemical; emergency services; commercial
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; postal and shipping; dams;
government facilities; and commercial facilities. In addition, each
government council is co-chaired by a DHS representative.
[14] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland
Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities,
GAO-05-434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005).
[15] Council on Foreign Relations, Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the
Private Sector to Support Homeland Security, CSR Number 13 (New York,
N.Y.: March 2006).
[16] GAO, Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a
Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June
16, 2006).
[17] The Federal Advisory Committee Act (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2)
was enacted, in part, to control the advisory committee process and to
open to public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain
advice from private individuals and groups. See 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-
59 (D.D.C. 1986).
[18] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005). Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government
operations that we have identified as "high-risk." In January 2005, we
designated information sharing for homeland security as a
governmentwide high-risk area because, although information sharing was
receiving increased attention, this area still faced significant
challenges.
[19] GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and
Sensitive but Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2006).
[20] GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical
Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.17,
2006).
[21] According to Department of Health and Human Services officials,
there are thousands of entities that could be considered stakeholders
in the sector. On the public side of the public health and healthcare
sector stakeholders include three cabinet level departments (the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, and
the Department of Veterans Affairs), 57 state and territorial
authorities, 3,066 counties, and approximately 10,000 municipalities.
On the private side (roughly 92 percent of the total sector),
stakeholders are far more numerous. For example, there are over 6,500
hospitals, over 492,000 ambulatory healthcare facilities, and nearly
70,000 nursing and residential care facilities.
[22] DHS has delegated plan preparation responsibilities among several
of its component agencies for the 10 sectors for which DHS is the
designated sector-specific agency. Specifically, DHS's Office of
Infrastructure Protection is the sector-specific agency for the
chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; and
commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waster sectors. The Office
of Cyber Security and Telecommunications is the sector-specific agency
for the information technology and telecommunications sectors. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the sector-specific
agency for the postal and shipping sector and jointly shares
responsibility for transportation systems with the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Federal Protective Service is responsible for the government
facilities sector.
[23] Two sectors, government facilities and national monuments and
icons, do not have private sector councils.
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