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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public:
Terrorist Watch List and Redress:
GAO-06-1031:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1031, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
A consolidated watch list managed by the FBI’s Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) contains the names of known or suspected terrorists, both
international and domestic. Various agencies whose missions require
screening for links to terrorism use watch list records. For example,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens travelers at ports of
entry. Because screening is based on names, it can result in
misidentifications when persons not on the list have a name that
resembles one on the list. Also, some names may be mistakenly included
on the watch list. In either case, individuals can be negatively
affected and may express concerns or seek agency action, or redress, to
prevent future occurrences. This report addresses: (1) the extent to
which the numbers of misidentified persons are known and how they could
be affected, (2) the major reasons misidentifications occur and the
actions agencies are taking to reduce them or minimize their effects,
and (3) the opportunities for redress available to individuals with
watch list-related concerns. In conducting work at TSC and the
principal federal agencies that use watch list data, GAO reviewed
standard operating procedures and other relevant documentation and
interviewed responsible officials.
GAO makes no recommendations at this time because the agencies have
ongoing initiatives to improve data quality, reduce the number of
misidentifications or mitigate their effects, and enhance redress
efforts.
What GAO Found:
Annually, millions of individuals—from international travelers to visa
applicants—are screened for terrorism links against the watch list. At
times, a person is misidentified because of name similarities, although
the exact number is unknown. In some cases, agencies can verify the
person is not a match by comparing birth dates or other data with watch
list records, but agencies do not track the number. In other cases,
they ask TSC for help. From December 2003 (when TSC began operations)
to January 2006, agencies sent tens of thousands of names to TSC, and
about half were misidentifications, according to TSC. While the total
number of people misidentified may be substantial, it likely represents
a fraction of all people screened. Even so, misidentifications can lead
to delays, intensive questioning and searches, missed flights, or
denied entry at the border.
Misidentifications most commonly occur with names that are identical or
similar to names on the watch list. To rapidly screen names against the
watch list, agencies use computerized programs that account for
differences due to misspellings and other variations. TSC has ongoing
initiatives to improve computerized matching programs and the quality
of watch list records. Also, CBP and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) have established procedures designed to expedite
frequently misidentified persons through screening, after confirming
they are not on the watch list.
Because security measures regrettably may cause personal
inconveniences, TSA and CBP, with the support of TSC, provide
opportunities for people who have been misidentified or mistakenly
included on the watch list to seek redress. Most of these are
misidentified persons who are not on the watch list but have a similar
name and, therefore, may be repeatedly misidentified. Thus, TSA, for
example, provides redress that relies heavily on efforts to expedite
frequently misidentified persons through screening by allowing them to
submit personal information that helps airlines more quickly determine
that they are not on the watch list. If TSA and CBP cannot resolve
questions from the public, they ask TSC for help. For 2005, TSC
reported that it processed to completion 112 redress referrals and
removed the names of 31 mistakenly listed persons from the watch list.
To ensure that opportunities for redress are formally documented across
agencies and that responsibilities are clear, the Justice Department is
leading an effort to develop an interagency memorandum of understanding
and expects a final draft to be ready for approval by fall 2006. TSC
and frontline-screening-agency officials recognize that, after the
agreement is finalized, the public needs to clearly understand how to
express concerns and seek relief if negatively affected by screening.
So, these officials have committed to making updated information on
redress publicly available.
GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the departments of Justice,
Homeland Security, and State. They provided technical clarifications
that GAO incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Recommends:
[Hyperlink http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1031].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202)
512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, the
Thousands of Persons Misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List Can
Experience Additional Questioning, Delays, and Other Effects:
Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on the
Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the Incidence
of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals through the
Screening Process:
The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are
Addressing Concerns Related to Watch List Screening, and an Interagency
Agreement Is Being Developed to Further Ensure an Effective Means for
Seeking Redress:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
Scope and Methodology:
Data Reliability:
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center Terrorist-Watch-List Redress
Process:
Appendix III: Transportation Security Administration Traveler Identity
Verification Program:
Exhibit A: "Our Traveler Identity Verification Program"
Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 2006):
Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Online Information:
Background and Preliminary Observation:
Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: Comments from the State Department:
Tables:
Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to the
Terrorist Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005:
Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited by
GAO:
Figures:
Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to Screen
Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List:
Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center's Process
for Handling Concerns Involving Watch-List-Related Screening:
Abbreviations:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
IAFIS: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System:
IDENT: Automated Biometrics Identification System:
IBIS: Interagency Border Inspection System:
RFID: radio frequency identification:
SENTRI: Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center:
US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 29, 2006:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
To identify individuals with known or potential links to terrorism,
since the tragedies of September 11, 2001, agencies such as the
departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security have implemented
enhanced procedures to screen international travelers, airline
passengers, and visa applicants. One important homeland security tool
used by these federal frontline-screening agencies is the terrorist-
screening database, otherwise known as the consolidated watch list,
containing the names of individuals with known and suspected links to
terrorism. The database, which contains names of foreign and U.S.
citizens, is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, an entity
that has been operational since December 2003 under the administration
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Based upon agency-
specific policies and criteria, relevant portions of the Terrorist
Screening Center's consolidated watch list can be used in a wide range
of security-related screening procedures. For instance, the
Transportation Security Administration's No Fly and Selectee lists--
used by airlines to screen passengers prior to boarding--are portions
of the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list.[Footnote
1] Also, to help ensure that known or suspected terrorists do not enter
the United States, applicable portions of the watch list are to be
checked by Department of State consular officers before issuing U.S.
visas and by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers before
admitting persons at air, land, and sea ports of entry.
Because terrorist watch list screening involves comparisons based on
personal-identifying information such as names and dates of birth,
there is potential to generate misidentifications--given that two or
more persons, for example, may have the same or similar names.[Footnote
2] As such, the screening inevitably can raise concerns from
individuals who assert that they are being misidentified because of a
name similarity to some other person whose name is on the watch list.
Misidentifications can result in travel delays and other inconveniences
for the respective individuals. Specific instances have been widely
reported in newspapers and other media, including cases involving
members of Congress and other high-profile individuals.
Misidentifications highlight the importance of having a process--often
referred to as redress--for affected persons to express their concerns,
seek correction of any inaccurate data, and request other actions to
reduce or eliminate future inconveniences.[Footnote 3] Similarly, such
a process would apply to other persons affected by the maintenance of
watch list data, including persons whose names are actually on the
watch list but should not be ("mistakenly listed persons") as well as
persons who are properly listed.[Footnote 4] Accordingly, in reference
to terrorist watch list screening, this report addresses the following
questions:
* To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list
misidentifications known, and generally, how could misidentified
persons be affected?
* What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and what
actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and frontline-screening
agencies taking to reduce the number of misidentified persons or
expedite them through the screening process?
* To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons,
what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and
frontline-screening agencies established?
In answering these questions, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening
Center's standard operating procedures, statistics on watch-list-
related screening encounters that resulted in referrals to the center,
and other relevant documentation; and we interviewed Terrorist
Screening Center officials, including the director, principal deputy
director, chief information officer, and privacy officer. Similarly, we
interviewed officials at and reviewed documentation obtained from the
principal frontline-screening agencies--Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Department
of State--whose missions most frequently and directly involve
interactions with travelers.[Footnote 5] Regarding the screening of air
passengers, in addition to contacting the Transportation Security
Administration to broadly discuss the procedures of air carriers, we
interviewed security officials at five major, domestic air carriers.
Also, we visited various land and air ports of entry in four states--
California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Collectively, these states
have ports of entry on both the northern and southern borders of the
United States. Regarding statistical data we obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center--such as the number of misidentifications
and the results of the redress process, particularly the number of
mistakenly listed persons whose names have been removed from the watch
list--we discussed the sources of the data with center officials,
including the chief information officer, and we reviewed documentation
regarding the compilation of the statistics. We determined that the
statistics were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting
overall patterns and trends. We performed our work from April 2005
through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Appendix I presents more details about our
objectives, scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Although the total number of misidentifications that have occurred as a
result of watch-list-related screening conducted by all frontline-
screening agencies and airlines is unknown, Terrorist Screening Center
data indicate that about half of the tens of thousands of potential
matches sent to the center between December 2003 and January 2006 for
further research turned out to be misidentifications.[Footnote 6] The
frontline-screening agencies and, in the case of air travel, airlines
are able use other identifying information to resolve some possible
matches without Terrorist Screening Center involvement, but when the
agencies are unable to do so, they are to refer the information to the
center for clarification and resolution. Frontline-screening agencies
and airlines generally do not have readily available statistics
quantifying the number of potential matches they have been able to
resolve without consulting the Terrorist Screening Center. Although the
total number of misidentified persons may be substantial in absolute
terms, it likely represents a small fraction of the hundreds of
millions of individuals screened each year. For example, in fiscal year
2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection alone reported that its
officers managed about 431 million border crossings into the United
States at land, air, and sea ports of entry. Nonetheless,
misidentifications resulting from terrorist watch list screening can
affect the respective individuals by, for example, delaying their
travel, subjecting them to more intensive questioning and searches, and
denying them conveniences such as self-serve check-in at airports.
Also, in some cases, travelers have missed flights.
Misidentifications most commonly occur because the names of some
persons being screened are similar to those on the terrorist watch
list. The federal screening agencies we studied and most airlines use
computer-driven algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals
against the terrorist watch list.[Footnote 7] Generally, these name-
recognition technologies may be designed to balance minimizing the
possibility of false negatives--that is, failing to identify an
individual whose name is on the terrorist watch list--while not
generating an unacceptable number of false positives
(misidentifications). Thus, the computerized algorithms may be
configured to return a broad set of possible matches based on the name
input in order to account, for example, for differences in names due to
misspellings or transcription errors. The Terrorist Screening Center
has formed an interagency working group to improve the effectiveness of
identity matching across agencies, and the group's efforts were ongoing
the time of our review. The center also has ongoing quality-assurance
initiatives to identify and correct incomplete or inaccurate records
that contribute to misidentifications. Further, agencies are taking
actions to expedite frequently misidentified persons through the
screening process. For example, in February 2006, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection began annotating its database to help ensure that
travelers who have been inadvertently stopped in the past--because they
have the same or similar name as a watch list record--are no longer
subjected to intensive screening, unless warranted by new data. As a
future enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center is planning to have
links to other agencies' biometric data, such as fingerprints.
According to center officials, the capability to link biometric data to
supplement name-based screening may be more relevant for confirming the
identities of known terrorists than minimizing misidentifications or
false positives.
The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security
Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have processes
in place to help resolve concerns or complaints submitted by persons
adversely affected by terrorist watch list screening.[Footnote 8] The
processes are interdependent in that the frontline-screening agencies
are to receive all redress queries, resolve those that, based on other
identifying information, clearly involve misidentified persons, and
refer the other queries to the Terrorist Screening Center--particularly
queries submitted by persons whose names are actually contained on the
watch list. For calendar year 2005, the center reported that it
processed to completion 112 redress referrals and removed the names of
31mistakenly listed individuals from the watch list. In contrast, the
frontline-screening agencies processed thousands of redress queries.
Most redress queries are submitted by misidentified persons, and their
names cannot be removed from the watch list because they are not the
persons on the list. Instead, some frontline-screening agencies have
undertaken initiatives to expedite the future processing of persons who
are frequently misidentified. For example, under the Transportation
Security Administration's process, affected individuals can voluntarily
provide additional personal-identifying information as a basis for the
agency to determine whether their names can be put on a cleared list.
Airlines are to use the cleared list to more quickly distinguish these
individuals from persons who are on the No Fly and the Selectee lists.
This procedure is intended to reduce delays in obtaining airline-
boarding passes. The Terrorist Screening Center, from its unique
position as administrator of the consolidated terrorist watch list, has
noted significant differences among agencies in providing watch-list-
related redress. For instance, whereas the Transportation Security
Administration has designated an official accountable specifically for
redress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not and also has not
followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate redress queries
to the Terrorist Screening Center. Thus, at the Terrorist Screening
Center's request, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to
develop an interagency memorandum of understanding to ensure that
opportunities for redress are formally documented and that agency
responsibilities are clear, with designated officials specifically
accountable for supporting the continued success of watch-list-related
redress. This effort, according to the Terrorist Screening Center, has
been ongoing since fall 2005, and a final draft of the memorandum of
understanding is expected to be ready for interagency clearances by
fall 2006. The Department of Justice and the Terrorist Screening Center
have acknowledged that, upon finalization of an interagency agreement
that documents the redress opportunities and designates agencies'
responsibilities, it is important that appropriately updated
information on redress and points of contact be made available to the
public, including updates of Web- based guidance.
We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies
have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either
reduce the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and
to provide more effective redress.
Background:
In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous
federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and
uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible
links to terrorism.[Footnote 9] Our report recommended that the
Department of Homeland Security's Secretary, in collaboration with the
heads of the departments and agencies that have and use watch lists,
lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the federal government's
watch list structures and policies. Subsequently, pursuant to Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6, dated September 16, 2003, the
Terrorist Screening Center was established to consolidate the
government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the
appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening
processes. The center began "24/7" operations on December 1, 2003, and,
about 3 months later, on March 12, 2004, announced that watch list
consolidation was completed with establishment of the terrorist-
screening database. This consolidated database is the U.S. government's
master repository for all known and suspected international and
domestic terrorist records used for watch-list-related screening.
Records for inclusion in the consolidated database are submitted to the
Terrorist Screening Center from the following two sources:
* Identifying information on individuals with possible international
terrorism ties is provided through the National Counterterrorism
Center, which is managed by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
* Identifying information on individuals with ties to purely domestic
terrorism, such as Ted Kaczynski (the "Unabomber"), is provided by the
FBI.
In their terrorist-screening processes, the three federal frontline-
screening agencies that we reviewed use records exported by the
Terrorist Screening Center. That is, the applicable exported records
are incorporated, respectively, into the Transportation Security
Administration's No Fly and Selectee lists, U.S. Customs and Border
Inspection's Interagency Border Inspection System, and the State
Department's Consular Lookout and Support System. The following listing
discusses the frontline-screening agencies' use of watch list records
more specifically:
* Transportation Security Administration's No Fly and Selectee Lists:
As needed, the Transportation Security Administration provides updated
No Fly and Selectee lists to airlines for use in prescreening
passengers. Through the issuance of security directives, the agency
requires that airlines use these lists to screen passengers prior to
boarding. The agency's Office of Intelligence (formerly called the
Transportation Security Intelligence Service) provides assistance to
airlines in determining whether passengers are a match with persons on
the lists.[Footnote 10]
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Interagency Border Inspection
System: U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers use the Interagency
Border Inspection System to screen travelers entering the United States
at ports of entry, which include land border crossings along the
Canadian and Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S. airports for
international flight arrivals. This system includes not only the
applicable records exported by the Terrorist Screening Center, but also
additional information on people with prior criminal histories,
immigration violations, or other activities of concern that U.S.
Customs and Border Protection wants to identify and screen at ports of
entry.
* State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System: This system
is the primary sensitive but unclassified database used by consular
officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to identify
terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas
based on criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal
statute. According to the State Department, all visa-issuing posts have
direct access to the system and must use it to check each applicant's
name before issuing a visa.
Also, the Terrorist Screening Center makes applicable records in the
consolidated database available to support the terrorist-screening
activities of other federal agencies--such as U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, which is the largest investigative component of
the Department of Homeland Security--as well as state and local law
enforcement agencies. For example, the FBI's National Crime Information
Center has a file--the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File--
which is accessible by federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers for screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, or
other criminal justice purposes.[Footnote 11] A subset of this file
consists of the Terrorist Screening Center's records to be used to
screen for possible terrorist links.
Figure 1 presents a general overview of the name-matching process
typically used by frontline-screening agencies and airlines to screen
individuals against applicable records exported by the Terrorist
Screening Center, which has an important role in verifying identities.
When the computerized name-matching system of a frontline-screening
agency or, in the case of air travel, an airline generates a "hit" (a
potential name match) against a terrorist database record, the agency
or airline is to review each potential name-match. Any obvious
mismatches (misidentifications) are to be resolved by the frontline
agency or airline.
Conversely, clearly positive or exact matches generally are to be
referred to the applicable screening agency's intelligence center and
to the Terrorist Screening Center to provide law enforcement an
opportunity for a counterterrorism response.[Footnote 12] Similarly,
hits involving inconclusive matches--that is, uncertain and other hard-
to-verify potential matches--typically are to be referred to the
applicable screening agency's intelligence center. In turn, if the
intelligence center cannot conclusively determine whether a hit is an
exact match, the Terrorist Screening Center is to be
contacted.[Footnote 13] Referring inconclusive matches to the Terrorist
Screening Center for resolution or confirmation is important because
the possible consequences of not identifying a known or suspected
terrorist could be worse than the inconveniences associated with
misidentifications. In conducting its research, the Terrorist Screening
Center has access to classified data systems that may contain
additional information not available to the referring agency. Once the
Terrorist Screening Center has confirmed the individual as either a
positive match or a misidentification, the frontline-screening agency
is to be informed.
Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to Screen
Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Homeland security-related screening processes entail some level of
inconvenience for all travelers. Also, in an operational context,
people can be and frequently are screened for reasons not related to
the terrorist watch list but rather for reasons related to an agency's
mission. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection screens
travelers for any conditions that may make them inadmissible to the
country, including past violations of immigration, drug, customs, or
other laws. The agency also randomly selects certain individuals for
more thorough screening. Similarly, prospective airline passengers may
be randomly selected for additional screening, and others may be
selected if they exhibit unusual behavior.[Footnote 14] Generally,
screening agencies and airlines are not to disclose the reason they
select an individual for more thorough screening measures, so persons
may mistakenly assume it is because they are on a terrorist watch list.
Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, the
Thousands of Persons Misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List Can
Experience Additional Questioning, Delays, and Other Effects:
Annually, hundreds of millions of individuals--international travelers,
airline passengers, and visa applicants--are screened against relevant
portions of the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list.
The number of persons misidentified during terrorist watch list
screening may be substantial in absolute terms but likely represents a
small fraction of the total screenings. Nonetheless, misidentifications
resulting from terrorist watch list screening can affect the respective
individuals in various ways, with perhaps the most common situation
involving delays and related inconveniences experienced by travelers.
Although a Substantial Number, Misidentified Persons Likely Constitute
a Small Percentage of All People Screened:
Although the full universe of persons misidentified by terrorist watch
list screening may be substantial in absolute terms, the total number
likely represents a small fraction of all persons who are screened.
During the 26-month period we studied--from December 2003 (when the
Terrorist Screening Center began operations) to January 2006--the
center received tens of thousands of screening-encounter referrals from
frontline-screening agencies and determined that approximately half
involved misidentified persons with names the same as or similar to
someone whose name was contained on the terrorist watch list. The
number of referrals to the Terrorist Screening Center does not
constitute the universe of all persons initially misidentified by
terrorist watch list screening because the names of many persons
initially misidentified are not forwarded to the Terrorist Screening
Center. Rather, by comparing birth dates or other data, the frontline-
screening agencies (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection) are able
to resolve many initial misidentifications without contacting the
Terrorist Screening Center. Additionally, for air passengers, the
airlines often are able to resolve initial misidentifications without
contacting the Transportation Security Administration.[Footnote 15] The
screening agencies and airlines generally do not maintain readily
available statistics on these resolutions.
Nonetheless, although the full universe of such misidentifications may
be substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely represents a
small fraction of all persons who are subject to terrorist watch list
screening procedures, as in the following examples:
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that its officers managed
a total of 431 million border crossings into the United States at land,
air, and sea ports of entry in fiscal year 2005.
* Domestic airline flights--flights within the United States--carried
658 million passengers during the 12 months ending January 2006,
according to Department of Transportation statistics.[Footnote 16]
* The State Department reported that it processed about 7.4 million
nonimmigrant visa applications in fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 17]
In addition to these international travelers, domestic flight
passengers, and visa applicants, any other person can be subject to
terrorist watch list screening in conjunction with routine law
enforcement activities. For instance, in stopping a motorist for a
traffic violation, a state or local law enforcement officer can check
the motorist's name against the National Crime Information Center's
various files, which include terrorist watch list records exported by
the Terrorist Screening Center. The National Crime Information Center,
according to the FBI, is available to virtually every law enforcement
agency nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
Misidentified Individuals Can Experience Delays and Other Effects:
People who are misidentified to the terrorist watch list can be
affected in various ways, most commonly experiencing delays and related
inconveniences, including being subjected to more intensive questioning
and searches. Generally, the extent of the effects of terrorist watch-
list-related misidentification can vary by individual circumstances and
the operational nature of the screening agency's mission. For example,
an individual with a name similar to someone who is on the
Transportation Security Administration's No Fly list likely will be
unable to utilize the convenience of Internet, curbside, and airport
kiosk check-in options. This effect of misidentifications is reflected
in a sample of 24 complaint letters to the Transportation Security
Administration that we reviewed.[Footnote 18] Many of the complainants
described their frustrations with not being able to use alternative
check-in options such as the Internet or airport kiosks. Similarly, in
a survey conducted in June 2006 by the National Business Travel
Association, many companies' travel managers responded that their
employees have expressed frustration about repeatedly having to go to
the airline ticket counter to obtain a boarding pass.[Footnote 19]
Also, misidentifications can cause other effects, such as missed
airline flights by either leisure travelers or business travelers,
which could have economic and other consequences, although we found no
readily available data on how frequently these effects occurred.
However, according to Transportation Security Administration data, two
international flights--one in December 2004 and another in May 2005--
were diverted from landing at their scheduled destinations in the
United States due to potential matches to the No Fly list. In each
instance, following the diversions of the flights and further
investigation after the airplanes landed, federal authorities
determined that the respective passengers were misidentified and not
true matches to the No Fly list. Nonetheless, the diversions resulted
in delays and related inconveniences for all passengers on these
flights.
The Transportation Security Administration has acknowledged that
misidentifications can be embarrassing and time consuming for
individuals and also potentially can erode the public's confidence in
the agency's security efforts. Similarly, a recent Department of
Homeland Security report recognized that "individuals who are
mistakenly put on watch lists or who are misidentified as being on
these lists can potentially face consequences ranging from
inconvenience and delay to loss of liberty."[Footnote 20]
Also, an individual can experience an immediate delay at a port of
entry when U.S. Customs and Border Protection's automated search of the
Interagency Border Inspection System database returns a potential match
to a terrorist watch list record. For such potential matches, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's operating protocol is to escort the
person to another screening area for further questioning and inspection
(a process referred to as secondary screening). The length of time the
person spends in secondary screening can be several hours, depending
partly on the difficulty or ease of verifying whether the person is or
is not the individual on the watch list. In the four states we visited-
-California, Michigan, New York, and Texas--U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers told us that given the importance of the homeland
security mission, their practice is to err on the side of caution by
conducting very thorough screenings.[Footnote 21]
The effects of such misidentifications and the related secondary
screenings can be emotional as well as physical, as reflected in
complaint letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. A sample of 28
complaint letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection that we
reviewed alleged a range of effects, such as experiencing travel
delays, which resulted in missing airline flights and incurring
additional travel costs; being subjected to extensive questioning and
searches, while not being allowed to contact family members, friends,
or business associates to inform them about the delays; and feeling
embarrassed and frustrated.[Footnote 22]
The State Department's screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants
against the terrorist watch list may not affect individuals in the same
way as does screening by the Transportation Security Administration and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Generally, the State Department's
screening differs from other screening agencies because there is more
time to search records and make decisions. According to State
Department officials, the average time for processing a nonimmigrant
visa application is about 2 days. However, additional processing time
may be needed if initial screening of the applicant shows a possible
link to terrorism--that is, the applicant's name possibly matches that
of a person whose name is on the terrorist watch list. The officials
explained that this additional processing time is needed because a
decision on the visa applicant cannot be made until a security advisory
opinion is obtained. That is, the consular post must ask the Department
of State headquarters in Washington, D.C., to initiate a process of
requesting that various agencies check their respective databases or
systems for the existence of any investigative or intelligence
information regarding the individual and pass the results back to a
central point. This interagency review process includes the FBI, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
others. According to State Department officials, visa applicants are
routinely told not to buy tickets or incur other travel-related
expenses until the clearance process has been completed and the
application approved.
In acknowledging that the interagency review process may extend the
processing time for a visa decision, the State Department provided us
(in June 2006) the following contextual perspectives:
* In the last 2 years, the department and its interagency partners have
worked to decrease the processing time in order to reduce the impact on
the traveling public.
* Nevertheless, the department's position is that the time it takes to
screen a visa applicant is a necessary part of the application
procedure and, therefore, is not an adverse governmental action. At
times, additional processing must be done in order to determine whether
a visa applicant is eligible for a visa under the law, including for
national security reasons. The additional processing is the
inconvenient consequence of the proper functioning of the visa
screening system.
* Moreover, the extended processing time generally is a one-time
occurrence. Once an alien is cleared through the process, the clearance
is noted in the department's consular visa database. Thus, this person
may not be subject to the same processing delay when applying for
another visa in the future, unless additional investigative or
intelligence information arises after issuance of the first
visa.[Footnote 23]
Screening by state and local law enforcement also differs from
screening by the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and the State Department. Essentially, federal
agencies (or air carriers, as applicable) initiate screening when
individuals make an airline reservation, arrive at a port of entry, or
apply for a visa. In contrast, a state or local law enforcement agency
may initiate screening by, for example, pulling over a motorist for
speeding. Generally, a routine procedure for the law enforcement
officer is to query the motorist's name against records in the National
Crime Information Center, which contains criminal history records as
well as terrorist watch list records. According to congressional
testimony presented in March 2004 by the Director of Public Security
for the State of New York, it takes about 12 to 15 minutes, on average,
for a New York patrol officer to contact the Terrorist Screening Center
and resolve a potential name match.[Footnote 24] More recently, in July
2006, the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center told us that the
average time nationally is now down to about 5 minutes--that is, the
time period beginning with the center's receipt of the call from a
state or local law enforcement officer and ending with the response to
the officer regarding the potential name match.[Footnote 25]
Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on the
Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the Incidence
of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals through the
Screening Process:
The most common cause of misidentifications is similarity of the names
of persons being checked to names on the Terrorist Screening Center's
consolidated watch list, for which there is no complete remedy, but
agencies are taking actions to minimize the effect on frequently
misidentified persons. The Terrorist Screening Center has formed an
interagency group to improve the effectiveness of identity matching
across agencies and also has ongoing initiatives regarding data
quality. As a future enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center's
strategy is to develop the capability to link name-based watch list
searches to relevant biometric systems maintained by other agencies,
although this capability may be more useful for confirming positive
matches than for reducing the incidence of misidentifications.
Misidentifications Result Because a Traveler's Name Is Similar to
Someone with a Terrorist Watch List Record:
Misidentifications occur most often because the names of some persons
being screened are the same or similar to those in the consolidated
terrorist watch list. To handle the large volumes of travelers and
others who must be screened, federal agencies and most airlines use
computer-driven algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals
against the applicable terrorist watch list records. A primary factor
in designing a computerized name-matching process is the need to
minimize the possibility of generating false negatives--that is,
failing to identify an individual whose name is on the terrorist watch
list--without generating an unacceptable number of false positives
(misidentifications). To help ensure that name-based screening does not
miss detecting someone who is on the watch list, agencies and airlines
may configure their algorithms in such a way that they return a broad
set of possible matches for any given name input. For instance, the
computerized algorithms may account for differences in names due to
misspellings or transcription errors.
Operationally, for each name that is screened against the watch list,
the computerized algorithm may return a list of possible matches. If
applicable, screening agency or airline security personnel then review
these results of possible matching records arrayed by probability
scores to determine which, if any, is a positive match with the person
being screened. To help ensure awareness of best practices among
agencies, the Terrorist Screening Center has formed and chairs a
working group--the Federal Identity Match Search Engine Performance
Standards Working Group--which met initially in December 2005.[Footnote
26] An objective of the working group is to provide voluntary guidance
for federal agencies that use identity-matching search engine
technology. Essentially, the prospective guidance is intended to
improve the effectiveness of identity matching across agencies by,
among other means, assessing which algorithms or search engines are the
most effective for screening specific types or categories of names. At
the time of our review, a target date for completing the initiative to
develop and provide voluntary guidance to screening agencies had not
been set.
Some Misidentifications Can Result from Inaccurate or Incomplete Data:
Some misidentifications can result from inaccurate or incomplete data
in the consolidated terrorist watch list. Generally, the FBI and
intelligence agencies are the original collectors of the information
used to determine whether a given individual should be added to the
terrorist watch list. The Terrorist Screening Center, in turn, is
responsible for ensuring that information received from the
intelligence community is accurately maintained in the consolidated
watch list. One of the Terrorist Screening Center's primary goals is to
maintain accurate and complete information.
In June 2005, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector
General reported that its review of the Terrorist Screening Center's
consolidated watch list found several problems--such as inconsistent
record counts and duplicate records, lack of data fields for some
records, and unclear sources for some records.[Footnote 27] Among other
things, the Inspector General recommended that the Terrorist Screening
Center develop procedures to regularly review and test the information
contained in the consolidated terrorist watch list to ensure that the
data are complete, accurate, and non-duplicative. The Terrorist
Screening Center agreed and noted that it was taking steps to implement
the recommendation. Also, the Terrorist Screening Center has quality-
assurance initiatives ongoing to identify and correct troublesome
records related to misidentifications.
Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center's director and principal
deputy director stressed to us that quality of data is a high priority
for the center and also is a continuing challenge, particularly given
that the database is dynamic, changing frequently with additions,
deletions, and modifications. The officials noted the equal importance
of ensuring that (1) the names of known and appropriately suspected
terrorists are included in the watch list and (2) the names of any
mistakenly listed individuals are removed. In this regard, the
officials explained that the center's standard operating practices
include at least two opportunities to review records. First, Terrorist
Screening Center staff--including subject matter experts detailed to
the center from other agencies--review each incoming record submitted
(nominated) to the center for inclusion in the consolidated watch list.
Also, every time there is a screening encounter--for example, a port-
of-entry screening of an individual that generates an actual or a
potential match with a watch list record--that record is reviewed again.
In addition to the Terrorist Screening Center's quality-assurance
initiatives, screening agencies also have been looking at ways to
reduce misidentifications. One way that holds promise, where
applicable, is to use additional personal-identifying information to
enhance name-based searching. For example, as part of its efforts to
develop the Secure Flight program, the Transportation Security
Administration conducted tests between November 2004 and April 2005 to
determine what combinations of names and associated personal-
identifying attributes were most effective in matching airline
passenger data against terrorist watch list records. According to the
Transportation Security Administration, the testing indicated that
searches using additional personal-identifying attributes could
potentially result in decreasing the number of misidentifications.
However, the Transportation Security Administration concluded that more
testing was needed to determine, among other things, the point of
diminishing returns in using combinations of personal-identifying
information to enhance name-based watch list searches.
Agencies Are Taking a Number of Actions to Expedite Frequently
Misidentified Persons through the Screening Process:
In addition to initiatives aimed at reducing the number of
misidentifications, screening agencies also are taking actions to
expedite the screening of frequently misidentified persons.
Transportation Security Administration Maintains a Cleared List of
Individuals to Expedite Screening and Mitigate Negative Effects:
The Transportation Security Administration has instituted a process
designed to help frequently misidentified air passengers obtain
boarding passes more quickly and avoid prolonged delays. Under this
process, an individual can voluntarily provide the Transportation
Security Administration with additional personal-identifying
information. Then, the Transportation Security Administration will use
this information to decide whether the person's name should be put on a
cleared list--that is, a list that contains the names and other
personal-identifying information of individuals who have been checked
and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly and Selectee lists.
Airlines are to use the cleared list to more quickly determine that
these passengers are not the persons whose names are on the No Fly and
Selectee lists. As needed, the Transportation Security Administration
provides the airlines with updates of the No Fly and Selectee lists and
the cleared list. As discussed later in this report, the cleared list
is integral to the Transportation Security Administration's redress
process for watch-list-related complaints.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Annotating Its Database to Help
Frequently Misidentified Travelers Avoid Additional Screening and
Delays:
According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, the agency
has implemented procedures designed to help frequently misidentified
travelers avoid additional screening and delays. Specifically, in
February 2006, the agency began annotating its database regarding
travelers who were inadvertently stopped because they have the same or
similar name as a watch list record but are not the actual subject of
the record. The officials explained that the agency uses the data
routinely collected on a traveler during the initial inspection
process, and no further action is necessary by the traveler. The
officials noted that these travelers should no longer be stopped on
subsequent visits because of the records in question. As of September
2006, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, the
agency had annotated more than 10,300 such instances and had prevented
more than 7,200 unnecessary inspections from occurring. [Footnote 28]
The Department of State Is Annotating Its Database to Avoid Future
Delays for Visa Applicants:
As mentioned previously, the State Department's processing of a visa
application takes additional time if initial screening shows a possible
link to terrorism, because a decision on the visa applicant cannot be
made until a security advisory opinion request is forwarded to
Washington, D.C., and a response is received. However, the State
Department has taken steps to help minimize visa-processing delays for
any subsequent application filed by a previously screened person.
Specifically, according to State Department officials, when a visa
applicant is screened through the security advisory opinion process and
is found to be a person who is not on the terrorist watch list, the
State Department enters clarifying comments in its database or even on
the visa itself. This information is available for review by consular
officers in processing any subsequent visa applications filed by the
individual. Thus, according to State Department officials, the
individual's future applications should not incur any additional
processing times, unless new information has been acquired in the
interim period that would cast doubt on the applicant's eligibility for
a visa.
As a Future Enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center Plans to Have
Links to Biometric Data; Various Traveler-Screening Programs Already
Use Biometric Data:
Within the law enforcement community, fingerprint identification has
been used and accepted for decades and is the de facto international
standard for positively identifying individuals. Thus, as is widely
recognized throughout government, the use of biometric technologies
based on fingerprint recognition, facial recognition, or other
physiological characteristics offer opportunities for enhancing the key
homeland security objective of preventing known or suspected terrorists
from entering the country.[Footnote 29]
Conceptually, biometrics can be used to screen a traveler against a
consolidated database, such as the terrorist watch list--a screening of
one record against many records. However, the Terrorist Screening
Center presently does not have this capability, although use of
biometric information to supplement name-based screening is planned as
a future enhancement. Specifically, the Terrorist Screening Center's
strategy is not to replicate existing biometric data systems. Rather,
the center's strategy, according to the director and principal deputy
director, is to develop a "pointer" capability to facilitate the online
linking of name-based searches to relevant biometric systems, such as
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS)--a computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging
fingerprint data in a digital format, which contains the largest
criminal biometric database in the world. Center officials recognize
that even biometric systems have screening limitations, such as
relevant federal agencies may have no fingerprints or other biometrics
to correlate with many of the biographical records in the center's
consolidated database. For instance, watch list records may be based on
intelligence gathered by electronic wire taps or other methods that
involve no opportunity to obtain biometric data. Also, the availability
of interoperable technology to facilitate online linking among agencies
is a long-standing issue that presents challenges. Nonetheless, center
officials anticipate that biometric information, if available, can be
especially useful for confirming matches to watch list records when
individuals use false identities or aliases.
On the other hand, the Terrorist Screening Center has no plans for
trying to reduce the incidence of misidentifications by collecting or
maintaining biometric information on persons who are not on the watch
list. Center officials noted that collecting and using biometric
information on innocent persons would raise significant privacy
concerns, which would have to be thoroughly considered in interagency
discussions and weighed against the possible benefits.
Presently, the Department of Homeland Security uses biometric data for
operating various programs to screen travelers, one of which is a
required-enrollment program for selected foreign nationals who travel
to the United States and others are voluntary-enrollment or trusted-
traveler programs. However, enrollment in these programs, whether
required or voluntary, does not exempt individuals from being screened
against the terrorist watch list. As mentioned previously, for
instance, the watch list is dynamic, changing frequently with
additions, deletions, and modifications.
The required-enrollment program that uses biometric data is the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program,
which is an entry/exit tracking system designed to collect, maintain,
and share information on selected foreign nationals who travel to the
United States. The program uses a related system--the Automated
Biometrics Identification System (IDENT), developed by the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service--to collect two fingerprints
(right and left index fingers) and a digital photograph to provide for
the biometric identification of visitors.[Footnote 30] Required
enrollment in the US-VISIT program is conducted by the Department of
State at visa-issuing consulates before the visitors depart or by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection at ports of entry when the visitors
arrive. American citizens, permanent legal residents, Canadian
nationals, and Mexican nationals with border-crossing cards are not
required to submit to US-VISIT screening at ports of entry. In July
2006, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General
provided an update on progress toward achieving biometric
interoperability between IDENT and IAFIS.[Footnote 31] The Inspector
General's progress report noted that the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security have formed a working group to make US-VISIT, IDENT,
and IAFIS interoperable by December 2009.
Under the US-VISIT program, at each subsequent reentry into the United
States, applicable individuals are biometrically screened against the
fingerprints collected during the initial enrollment. Such biometric
screening is for identity verification purposes--screening that
involves a one-to-one matching of fingerprints to determine if the
traveler is the person enrolled in the program. Enrollment in the U.S.-
VISIT program does not exempt individuals from being screened against
the terrorist watch list and generally may not reduce the possibility
of the individuals being misidentified based on name similarities. As
such, when there are potential matches to a name on the watch list, the
individuals may still be subject to more extensive screening at ports
of entry.
Another biometrics-based program--Registered Traveler--is being pilot
tested by the Transportation Security Administration.[Footnote 32] The
program, commonly categorized as a trusted-traveler program, collects
biographical information and biometric data from airline passengers who
volunteer to undergo a security threat assessment. The pilot program is
being tested in partnership with selected airlines and airports across
the country. Under the program, prior to boarding at airports,
participants are to be screened using the biometric data.
In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection operates various
trusted-traveler programs, which are intended to provide expedited
processing for pre-approved, low risk travelers who frequently cross
U.S. borders. For instance, a commuter program on the southern border
is known as Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection
(SENTRI) and on the northern border as "NEXUS." For these voluntary
programs, the biometric component generally involves only the
enrollment process, such as conducting fingerprint-based background
checks using IDENT or IAFIS to ensure that applicants are eligible for
expedited processing before allowing their participation.[Footnote 33]
Thereafter, cross-border commuting is facilitated by use of radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology, whereby an embedded chip in
each membership card transmits the person's arrival to a reader-antenna
at the port of entry.[Footnote 34]
While trusted-traveler programs are most commonly applicable to cross-
border commuters, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials told us
that all persons who believe they are frequently misidentified with
similar names on the terrorist watch list can apply and will be
accepted if they are found to meet program requirements. Also, a
benefit of these programs from a watch list perspective is that U.S.
Customs and Border Protection has greater assurance of the identity of
the enrollees and that these individuals are not persons on the watch
list. Enrollment in a trusted-traveler program does not exempt
individuals from being screened against the terrorist watch list;
although, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials,
enrollment does mitigate the possibility of the individuals being
misidentified and selected for more extensive screening at ports of
entry. The officials also noted that the trusted-trusted traveler
programs are not widely applicable to all ports of entry. Rather, the
programs are helpful only to individuals eligible to use trusted-
traveler lanes at the border, not at airports or seaports.
The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are
Addressing Concerns Related to Watch List Screening, and an Interagency
Agreement Is Being Developed to Further Ensure an Effective Means for
Seeking Redress:
It is important that individuals who are inadvertently and adversely
affected by watch list screening be provided an opportunity to seek
redress. The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security
Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have processes
in place to address individuals' concerns involving watch-list-related
screening and have reported some successes, such as removing from the
watch list the names of several mistakenly listed persons. Most watch-
list-related redress concerns usually involve misidentified persons--
individuals who are not on the watch list but have name similarities
with known or suspected terrorists. To help ensure that opportunities
for redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities
are clear, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to develop an
interagency memorandum of understanding. A final draft of the
memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency
clearances by fall 2006, according to Terrorist Screening Center
officials.
The Terrorist Screening Center and the Federal Frontline-Screening
Agencies Have a Role in Addressing the Concerns of Individuals Who are
Adversely Affected by Watch List Screening:
The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security
Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have important
responsibilities in providing individuals who are inadvertently and
adversely affected by watch list screening with opportunities to seek
redress. As mentioned previously, all aggrieved individuals may seek
redress, including persons who express concerns or complaints that they
are being misidentified and adversely affected because they have a name
similar to someone whose name is on the terrorist watch list and
persons who actually are on the terrorist watch list. Any such concern
or complaint raised formally by an affected individual is what the
Terrorist Screening Center calls a redress query. Specifically, the
Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress query" as communication
from individuals or their representatives inquiring or complaining
about an adverse experience during a terrorist watch-list-related-
screening process conducted or sponsored by a federal agency, including
congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of constituents.
According to the Terrorist Screening Center's standard operating
procedures for redress matters, frontline-screening agencies, such as
the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, have a key role in handling redress queries. Significantly,
for example, the frontline-screening agencies--and not the Terrorist
Screening Center--are to receive and initially handle redress queries
from the public. The operating procedure of having frontline agencies
receive redress queries serves at least two purposes, according to the
Terrorist Screening Center. First, the applicable frontline-screening
agency is better positioned to know the details of the screening
encounters and to respond appropriately. Second, many screening
encounters may be based on factors other than terrorism--factors such
as narcotics trafficking or incomplete currency or customs
declarations--which are not within the mission of the Terrorist
Screening Center and must be resolved by the frontline agencies. Also,
as a practical matter, the frontline agencies are the entities visible
to complainants or inconvenienced persons.
Further, after a frontline-screening agency receives a complaint or
concern from an individual, the agency is to begin its internal
complaint-resolution or redress process. As part of this process, the
agency is to determine whether the person's complaint is related to a
potential match to a terrorist watch list record. If the determination
is "no"--that is, the person is not actually on the watch list but was
misidentified because of a name similarity to someone who is on the
terrorist watch list--the frontline-screening agency is responsible for
resolving the complaint and responding to the misidentified individual.
If the frontline-screening agency's determination is "yes"--which
includes not only definite matches but also any potential or "maybe"
matches that require additional research to confirm--the frontline
agency is to refer the redress query to the Terrorist Screening Center.
Then, the center is to check its database to determine whether the
individual is indeed on the terrorist watch list or whether the person
is misidentified with someone on the watch list. If the person is
actually on the terrorist watch list, the Terrorist Screening Center is
to consult with applicable intelligence community and law enforcement
agencies to assess whether the person is appropriately listed and
should remain on the watch list or is mistakenly listed and should be
removed from the list. In either instance, the center is to inform the
applicable frontline-screening agency, which is responsible for
responding to the individual. If the complainant is a misidentified
person, the Terrorist Screening Center is to send the redress query
back to the applicable frontline-screening agency for that agency to
resolve. Also, as part of its quality-assurance efforts, the center is
to review the underlying watch list record that caused the person's
adverse experience to determine, for example, the record's validity or
whether a modification is needed, including possible removal of the
record. Finally, any referrals received by the Terrorist Screening
Center not related to its mission--that is, "other issues" with no
nexus to terrorism such as complaints involving employee misconduct or
random screening--are to be sent back to the applicable frontline-
screening agency, which is to provide a response to the individual.
In January 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center established its formal
redress process. An overview of the redress process, including
interaction between the center and the frontline-screening agencies, is
illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center's Process
for Handling Concerns Involving Watch-List-Related Screening:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
Note: As a general overview, the figure does not reflect all ways that
complaints or concerns can be resolved. For instance, regarding
clearance difficulties experienced by an individual at a port of entry,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection may determine that the person was
selected for intensive screening based on information provided by
another federal law enforcement agency. If so, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection may refer the complainant's query to the applicable agency-
-which, in turn, would reply directly to the individual.
[End of figure]
The Terrorist Screening Center does not directly provide final
disposition letters to individuals who have submitted redress queries.
Rather, the center works with the frontline-screening agencies--and, as
applicable, any relevant intelligence or law enforcement agencies--to
develop a written response. In providing a final response to an
individual who submits a redress query, the frontline-screening
agencies use a response letter that neither confirms nor denies the
existence of any terrorist watch list records relating to the
individual. For example, one of the Transportation Security
Administration's standardized response letters states, in part, "Where
it has been determined that a correction to records is warranted, these
records have been modified to address any delay or denial of boarding
that you may have experienced as a result of the watch list screening
process."
Generally, this type of language reflects the Terrorist Screening
Center's policy of neither confirming nor denying whether an individual
is on the consolidated terrorist watch list because this information is
derived from classified and sensitive law enforcement and intelligence
sources. The policy of nondisclosure to the public is intended to
protect the operational counterterrorism and intelligence collection
objectives of the government and the personal safety of those involved
in counterterrorism investigations.
The Terrorist Screening Center's Handling of Redress Referrals Has
Resulted in Removing the Names of Several Mistakenly Listed Persons
from the Terrorist Watch List:
During calendar year 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center processed to
completion 112 redress queries referred by frontline-screening
agencies. Of this total, according to the Terrorist Screening Center,
31 were determined to be mistakenly listed individuals and their names
were removed from the watch list (see table 1). The center reported
that for another 54 queries the individuals were on the terrorist watch
list and the center either did not change the watch list records (48)
or made some updates (6).
Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to the
Terrorist Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005:
Disposition of redress query: Positive match: The name of the
mistakenly listed person was removed from the watch list; Number: 31[A].
Disposition of redress query: Positive match: No change to the watch
list record was needed; Number: 48.
Disposition of redress query: Positive match: The record was changed or
updated but not removed from the watch list; Number: 6.
Disposition of redress query: Misidentification: The redress query was
referred back to the frontline-screening agency to process and provide
a response to the individual; Number: 19.
Disposition of redress query: Other: These queries involved issues not
relevant to the terrorist watch list and should not have been referred
to the Terrorist Screening Center; Number: 8.
Disposition of redress query: Total; Number: 112.
Source: Terrorist Screening Center data.
[A] According to Terrorist Screening Center officials, the center was
already in the process of removing a few of these names before the
center received the respective redress queries. The officials explained
that although the names were properly included on the watch list
initially, subsequent events warranted removing the names.
[End of table]
Also, as table 1 indicates, 19 of the 112 referrals in calendar year
2005 involved misidentified persons--that is, the Terrorist Screening
Center determined that these individuals were not on the terrorist
watch list but have names similar to someone who is a known or
suspected terrorist. The center referred each of these queries back to
the applicable frontline-screening agency for processing under the
respective agency's redress procedures. These 19 misidentifications do
not constitute the annual universe of all redress queries involving
misidentifications. Rather, thousands of such queries from
misidentified persons are handled by the frontline-screening agencies
and are not referred to the Terrorist Screening Center.
To enhance public awareness of redress availability, the Web site of
the FBI--the Terrorist Screening Center's administering agency--
presents an overview of applicable policy and procedures, provides
answers to frequently asked questions, and gives contact information
for three frontline-screening agencies--the Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the State
Department. This information is also presented in appendix II of this
report.
Most Redress Queries Involve Misidentified Persons and Are Handled by
Frontline-Screening Agencies:
Most redress queries involve misidentified rather than mistakenly
listed individuals. Therefore, inherently the disposition or resolution
of a redress query involving a misidentification cannot be removal of
the individual's name from a watch list because the individual is not
the person on the list. Instead, an objective of the frontline-
screening agencies is to address complaints of misidentified
individuals by providing alternative relief--that is, by developing
procedures and having sufficient information in screening databases to
expedite the processing of frequently misidentified persons.
Transportation Security Administration: For Individuals Who Are
Frequently Misidentified Due to Name Similarities with Known or
Suspected Terrorists, the Agency Has Compiled a Cleared List:
The Transportation Security Administration has a contact center that
centrally receives nonmedia public inquiries and complaints. According
to the agency, the contact center's customer service representatives
and contact security specialists are trained to handle and analyze
incoming calls, e-mails, correspondence, and facsimiles from the
public, the Congress, and private industry. The functions of these
representatives and specialists, as specified in the contact center's
operating procedures, are to analyze letters and electronic messages,
sort them by subject matter, and confer with appropriate offices
throughout the agency (including field staff) to provide responses.
Generally, any inquiries and complaints regarding watch-list-related
screening--that is, screening against the No Fly and Selectee lists--
are to be handled by the agency's Office of Transportation Security
Redress, which was established in November 2004.[Footnote 35] As part
of the redress process, an individual can voluntarily provide
additional personal-identifying information to the Office of
Transportation Security Redress. Specifically, the individual can
submit a completed Traveler Identity Verification Form (reproduced in
app. III), along with a copy of a U.S. passport or copies of three
types of other identification documents, such as birth certificate,
driver's license, military identification card, military discharge
paper, voter registration card, and naturalization certificate or
certificate of citizenship.[Footnote 36] Then, the agency will use this
information in deciding whether the person's name should be put on a
cleared list--which airlines are to use for distinguishing the
individual from persons who are in fact on the No Fly or Selectee
lists.[Footnote 37] Along with as-needed updates of the No Fly and
Selectee lists, the Transportation Security Administration transmits
updated cleared list information to the airlines for the purpose of
enabling the airlines to more quickly determine that these passengers
are not the persons who are on the No Fly and Selectee lists. The
purpose of the cleared list is to mitigate or minimize delays or other
inconveniences by facilitating the check-in process for passengers who
have names similar to known or suspected terrorists. An individual on
the cleared list may still have to obtain a boarding pass at the ticket
counter rather than using Internet, curbside, or airport kiosk check-in
options. Nonetheless, the intent of the cleared list is to reduce the
delay or wait time for applicable air passengers in obtaining a
boarding pass at the ticket counter.
According to the Director of the Office of Transportation Security
Redress, over 30,000 individuals had submitted identify verification
forms and supporting documentation to the agency, as of December 2005,
and the names of the overwhelming majority of these individuals were
added to the cleared list. The director explained that although the
agency requires air carriers to use the cleared list, responsibility
for utilizing the list rests with the air carriers, and all carriers do
not operate in the same way or have equal capabilities. Further,
according to the director, some customers (air passengers) call and
complain about having problems even though they have taken the
necessary steps to be placed on the cleared list. The director said
that his office forwards information regarding these complaints to
another component of the agency--the Office of Transportation Sector
Network Management--which is responsible for contacting the respective
air carriers to address relevant issues.
According to Transportation Security Administration officials, the
Secure Flight program is a prospective solution to current issues
regarding inconsistent use of the cleared list by air carriers--as well
as any inconsistent use of the No Fly and Selectee lists. Under the
Secure Flight program, the Transportation Security Administration plans
to take over, from commercial airlines, the responsibility for
comparing identifying information of airline passengers against
information on known or suspected terrorists.[Footnote 38] We note,
however, that the Transportation Security Administration has been in
the process of developing a passenger prescreening system, presently
known as the Secure Flight program, for more than 3 years. We have
reported and the Transportation Security Administration has
acknowledged significant challenges in developing and implementing the
Secure Flight program.[Footnote 39] Earlier this year, the
Transportation Security Administration suspended Secure Flight's
development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. The rebaselining
effort includes reassessing the program goals to be achieved, the
expected benefits and capabilities, and the estimated schedules and
costs. As of July 2006, the Transportation Security Administration had
not publicly announced any decisions regarding the future of the Secure
Flight program, although the agency anticipates that the rebaselining
effort will be completed by the end of September 2006.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Considering Realigning Its Watch-
List-Related Redress Responsibilities and Is Updating Its Procedures:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection headquarters has a Customer
Satisfaction Unit that functions as a centralized source for recording,
tracking, and reviewing all complaint information related to U.S.
Customs and Border Protection interactions with travelers, the general
public, industry, and government entities. This unit is responsible for
responding to customer complaints, irrespective of the subject matter-
-that is, the unit focuses on all complaint topics, not just complaints
involving terrorist watch-list-related screening. For instance, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection routinely uses a comment card that allows
travelers to express any complaint regarding the port-of-entry
processing experience. U.S. Customs and Border Protection policy is to
provide a comment card to (1) all air and sea travelers who are
subjected to a secondary examination and (2) all air, land, and sea
travelers who undergo a personal search.
In June 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials explained
that the agency was actively considering ways to enhance the capability
of the Customer Satisfaction Unit to support redress efforts regarding
terrorist watch-list-related concerns or complaints. For instance, a
realignment being considered is to move the responsibility for handling
certain categories of complaints--those not involving terrorist watch
list screening--from the Customer Satisfaction Unit to the Office of
Public Affairs. Also, the officials further noted that the agency's
Office of Regulations and Rulings was updating the Customer
Satisfaction Unit's standard operating procedures, including redress
procedures regarding terrorist watch-list-related concerns or
complaints.
Further, in commenting on a draft of this report in September 2006,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials said that the agency is
working with the Terrorist Screening Center to ensure that its process
aligns with the center's process. Also, another Department of Homeland
Security component--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement--
commented that its Office of Intelligence serves as a point of contact
and works closely with the Terrorist Screening Center's redress team to
ensure the removal or modification of records, as appropriate, from the
terrorist-screening database and the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System/Interagency Border Inspection System. For
instance, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement noted that if the
Terrorist Screening Center determines that an individual should no
longer be listed in the terrorist-screening database, the Office of
Intelligence coordinates with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
have the record expunged from the Treasury Enforcement Communications
System/Interagency Border Inspection System.
As part of our study, we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center to determine what overview
information regarding watch-list-related redress was publicly available
(see app. II). In turn, from the FBI's overview Web site, we followed
up on any references or online links to the redress processes of key
frontline-screening agencies--the Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
In contrast to the online link to the Transportation Security
Administration's redress guidance (see app. III), we found limited
usefulness in the online link to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
redress guidance. The FBI's overview Web site lists the Customer
Satisfaction Unit as the redress-related contact point for U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. Also, the overview Web site provides an online
link to a fact sheet describing the Interagency Border Inspection
System--a system that provides U.S. Customs and Border Protection and
other law enforcement entities with access to computer-based
information. However, the fact sheet (reproduced in app. IV) has no
specific guidance regarding terrorist-watch-list-related redress.
Rather, the fact sheet answers basic questions regarding the
Interagency Border Inspection System, such as who uses the system and
what information is in the system. Moreover, the overview Web site
provides no references or online links to U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's trusted-traveler programs--such as SENTRI and NEXUS. As
mentioned previously, agency officials told us that persons who believe
they are frequently misidentified with the terrorist watch list or who
continuously experience delays and other inconveniences during
screening could apply to one of these programs and, if accepted,
receive expedited processing at applicable ports of entry.
Based on our observations regarding the limited usefulness of the
online links from the FBI's overview Web site, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officials acknowledged a need to coordinate with the FBI and
the Terrorist Screening Center to provide more appropriate online links
regarding redress guidance. The officials noted, for example, that U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Web site does provide information
regarding the Customer Satisfaction Unit and how complaints are handled
as well as information on trusted-traveler programs.
Department of State: Applicants Who Are Denied a Visa Have No Legal
Basis to Appeal, but an Agency-Initiated Process Is Used to Remove
Erroneous or Outdated Entries from the Consular Lookout and Support
System:
The term "redress," according to the State Department, is not
applicable to complaints about visa denials, which are final decisions
not subject to appeal or judicial review. However, the State Department
has an agency-initiated process for removing erroneous or outdated
entries from the Consular Lookout and Support System, which contains
applicable terrorist watch list records. As mentioned previously, the
system is used by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa
applicants to identify terrorists and other aliens who are potentially
ineligible for visas based on criminal histories or other reasons
specified by federal statute. All visa-issuing posts have direct access
to the system and are required to use it to check each applicant's name
before issuing a visa, according to the State Department.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, gives
Department of State consular officers at overseas posts exclusive
authority for adjudicating applications submitted by foreign citizens
for visas to enter the United States.[Footnote 40] The process for
determining who will be issued or refused a visa consists of several
steps--including checking or cross-referencing each applicant's name
against the Consular Lookout and Support System, which contains
applicable names and biographical data exported from the Terrorist
Screening Center's database. According to the State Department, no
applicant is denied a visa simply because the person's name appears in
the Consular Lookout and Support System, which is only a flag or tool
to help the consular officer know if further screening may be required.
Rather, visa denials are by law based either on statutory grounds of
ineligibility, which are specifically set out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended,[Footnote 41] or on the applicant's failure
to present evidence to establish eligibility for the type of visa
requested. In addition to security and terrorism concerns, statutory
grounds of ineligibility include, for example, criminal history
reasons, previous violations of immigration law, and health-related
grounds.
According to State Department instructions provided to consular offices
worldwide, visa denials are to be reviewed by the consular officer's
supervisor. If an error has been made or a question exists about
interpreting immigration law in reference to the facts surrounding the
applicant, the consular officer can request a legal advisory opinion.
Also, if there are misunderstandings about the application process,
individuals can correspond with the overseas consular section and the
Public Inquiries Division of the Visa Office in Washington, D.C.
However, federal courts have consistently held that a consular
officer's final decision to issue or deny a visa is not subject to a
formal appeal or to judicial review.[Footnote 42] That is, there is no
way to directly appeal the visa denial, nor is there a way to directly
overturn the consular officer's denial decision because it is not
subject to judicial review. Thus, in explaining why it would be
incorrect and legally misleading to use the term "redress" in reference
to any complaint about a visa denial, officials in the State
Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs commented that a visa refusal
(denial) is a final decision in which the consular officer makes a
legal determination that the applicant is not eligible for a visa based
on a statutory ground. The State Department officials reiterated that
the consular officer's decision is a final governmental adjudication,
for which there is no appeal or judicial review, and the only recourse
for the person is to submit a new application with sufficient
information to "overcome" the grounds for ineligibility.
Consular officers are required to provide each applicant an explanation
of the legal basis for denying the visa.[Footnote 43] However, if the
basis for ineligibility is terrorism--under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended[Footnote 44]--the consular
officer normally would not be able to explain the reasons behind the
denial because of national security grounds.
According to Bureau of Consular Affairs officials, the State Department
does have an agency-initiated process for removing erroneous or
outdated information from the Consular Lookout and Support System. In
explaining why the correction-of-records process is initiated by the
agency and not the visa applicant, the officials commented
substantially as follows:
* Visa applicants usually would not even know whether their names are
on the terrorist watch list. If a visa application results in the
overseas post's requesting a security advisory opinion and additional
screening, the applicant might think that any processing delay is due
to a record entry in the Consular Lookout and Support System. However,
the additional screening could be due to reasons other than terrorism,
such as a criminal record, a contagious disease, or simply an overstay
on a previous visa.
* Thus, any deletion of entries from the Consular Lookout and Support
System normally would be initiated by the consular officer in the
field. That is, if the consular officer determines--based on evidence
presented during the course of a visa application--that an entry in the
Consular Lookout and Support System is incorrect or has been overtaken
by events, the officer is to initiate action to have the entry deleted
from the system.
Also, the Bureau of Consular Affairs officials noted that there has
been an occasional complaint that despite the issuance of a visa, the
alien experienced difficulties at a U.S. port of entry because, for
example, screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection showed a
potential match with a terrorist watch list record. Regarding these
instances, the officials said that based on an interest in data
integrity and customer service, the department works with the Terrorist
Screening Center to review relevant records and determine an
appropriate course of action, which could consist of a watch list
message or annotation specifying that the alien is not a person on the
watch list. In addition, as discussed previously, the State Department
is taking steps to annotate its database when it screens individuals
and finds that they are not on the watch list. Such annotations are
intended to expedite visa processing in the future and limit the
incidence of misidentifications.
The Department of Justice Is Leading an Effort to Finalize an
Interagency Agreement to Help Ensure That Effective Redress Is
Available:
The Terrorist Screening Center and the frontline-screening agencies
have interdependent responsibilities in providing redress for
individuals who are inadvertently and adversely affected by watch list
screening. The availability of redress is important for all affected
persons, including persons who are misidentified because of name
similarities and to persons who contend that they are mistakenly
included on the terrorist watch list. For any given watch-list-related
complaint or redress query, providing relief can necessitate
interaction among several governmental agencies. For instance, if the
query involves a person who is mistakenly listed, relevant redress
participants could include the Terrorist Screening Center and a
frontline-screening agency as well as the agency that originally
submitted or nominated the person's name for inclusion in the
consolidated terrorist watch list. Nominating agencies include the FBI
and various agencies within the intelligence community, such as the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Security Agency.
To help ensure that opportunities for terrorist-watch-list-related
redress are implemented effectively, the Department of Justice is
leading an effort--which has been ongoing since fall 2005--to develop
and finalize an interagency memorandum of understanding. Key purposes
of the final memorandum of understanding include ensuring that
opportunities for redress are formally documented and that agency
responsibilities are clear, with designated officials accountable for
supporting the continued success of the processes. The Department of
Justice has a lead role in developing the memorandum of understanding
because the Terrorist Screening Center has primary responsibility for
the consolidated terrorist-screening database. Interagency partners in
the effort to develop the memorandum of understanding include the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the
National Counterterrorism Center.
Also, another entity involved in developing the memorandum of
understanding is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which
is part of the Executive Office of the President and consists of five
members appointed by the president.[Footnote 45] According to the
board's executive director, the terrorist watch list redress process is
a top priority for the board. The executive director noted that since
June 2006 board staff have attended all meetings of the interagency
partners engaged in developing the memorandum of understanding. This
official opined that the board's participation has helped reprioritize
this matter among the constituent agencies and that the board is
committed to continuing its involvement.
According to Department of Justice officials, a final draft of the
memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency
clearances by fall 2006. Terrorist Screening Center officials
emphasized that the interagency memorandum of understanding was
definitely needed, particularly as a mechanism for ensuring the
accuracy of the watch list. The center officials noted, for instance,
that there have been disagreements at times between agencies over
nominations to the watch list. Thus, in handling watch-list-related
complaints, the center officials explained that the interagency
memorandum of understanding could help by clearly outlining a process
for coordinating with the National Counterterrorism Center and
nominating agencies to validate the accuracy and appropriateness of
watch list records.
Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center officials explained that the
interagency memorandum of understanding could help resolve significant
watch-list-related redress differences among the frontline-screening
agencies. Examples regarding Department of Homeland Security components
are as follows:
* The Transportation Security Administration has an office specifically
designated for redress issues, with an accountable official--the
Director, Office of Transportation Security Redress. Also, the office
has followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate watch-list-
related complaints to the Terrorist Screening Center.
* In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not have a
clearly designated official accountable for redress, and the agency has
not always followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate
watch-list-related complaints to the Terrorist Screening Center.
Additionally, regarding the State Department, the Terrorist Screening
Center officials stressed the importance of having clearly established
procedures and responsibilities. The center officials noted that even
though the State Department's operational context is somewhat different
than that of other frontline-screening agencies, the department
nonetheless has a substantial volume of interactions with the Terrorist
Screening Center. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs officials
acknowledged to us the value of having an interagency memorandum of
understanding that specifies standard operating procedures for redress
and designates points of contact. In this regard, the State Department
officials commented that they have been participating in meetings with
the Terrorist Screening Center and other interagency partners to
discuss the proposed memorandum of understanding. According to the
officials, a benefit to the State Department expected from the
interagency agreement would be clearly established and coordinated
procedures for removing--from the department's Consular Lookout and
Support System and the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch
list--any name that is mistakenly listed or has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
Concluding Observations:
Homeland security measures affect all travelers to some extent. Thus,
it may be argued that travel delays and other inconveniencies resulting
from terrorist watch-list-related screening can be viewed as
regrettable but inevitable consequences of enhanced security. However,
name-based screening and its inherent limitations--even full names, in
most cases, are hardly unique identifiers--may result in
disproportionate impact on individuals who repeatedly are singled out
for additional screening for no other reason than the similarity of
their names to someone on the watch list.
The Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency partners are
undertaking a number of efforts, including data-quality initiatives, to
reduce the occurrence and/or impact of watch list screening on U.S.
citizens and visitors who do not necessarily merit additional scrutiny
and the associated inconveniences. A continuing challenge for the
center will be ensuring that the consolidated watch list contains
accurate data, particularly given that the database is dynamic,
changing frequently with additions, deletions, and modifications. The
efforts of an interagency working group to improve the effectiveness of
name-matching computer algorithms may offer some promise for reducing
the number of people who experience unintended, adverse effects.
However, any policy trade-off considerations regarding use of
algorithms likely will favor ensuring homeland security over minimizing
inconveniences to travelers. Regarding future operations, the Terrorist
Screening Center is actively considering approaches for using biometric
data to supplement name-based searches, although the availability of
appropriate technology is an issue that has long confronted the
interagency screening community.
In any event, despite the best efforts of the interagency community to
maintain a fully accurate watch list and to conduct screening
efficiently, there likely will be continuing unintended consequences.
Thus, it is appropriate for the Terrorist Screening Center and its
interagency partners to continue their efforts to provide effective
redress for both mistakenly listed persons and misidentified persons.
Indeed, redress queries have already resulted in the removal of several
mistakenly listed names from the watch list. Comparatively, however,
the issue of redress arises more commonly regarding the thousands of
persons who are not on the watch list but are misidentified and
adversely affected because of a name similarity. Whether appropriate
relief is being afforded these individuals is still an open question,
for several reasons. For example, although a core element of the
redress provided by the Transportation Security Administration is the
maintenance of a cleared list, there are some indications that the
cleared list is not working as intended to reduce delays for air
passengers in obtaining boarding passes. Prospectively, the
Transportation Security Administration expects that development and
implementation of the Secure Flight program will help ensure consistent
and effective use of the cleared list among air carriers, although the
agency has not publicly disclosed its future plans for the program.
Another frontline-screening agency's initiative, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's database-annotation initiative, may prove to be an
even more efficient approach for assisting frequently misidentified
individuals. Unlike the Transportation Security Administration's
cleared list procedures, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
initiative is based on records in the agency's database and does not
necessitate any filing of forms and other documentation by travelers.
At the time of our review, U.S. Customs and Border Protection was
planning to develop a capability to monitor the effectiveness of the
initiative. This planning effort is particularly important, given that
the initiative may eventually prove to be a model for a proactive
solution if it functions as intended.
Finally, an overarching factor regarding whether appropriate relief is
being afforded to persons inadvertently and adversely affected by
terrorist watch-list-related screening is the absence of an interagency
agreement to help ensure that, among other matters, redress procedures
and responsibilities are clearly documented and implemented
effectively. The Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency
partners are working to address this fundamental deficiency and have
indicated their intent to provide the public with updated information
on the availability of redress, after finalization of an agreement.
We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies
have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either
reduce the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and
to provide more effective redress.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report for comments to the departments of
Homeland Security, State, and Justice. We received written responses
from each agency.
In its response, the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that
it currently is undertaking actions to enhance terrorist-screening and
redress efforts. Also, the response noted that in January 2006, the
departments of State and Homeland Security announced an initiative on
"Secure Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age," otherwise known
as the Rice-Chertoff Initiative. One purpose of the initiative is to
establish a governmentwide redress process to address perceived
problems in international and domestic traveler prescreening. According
to the Department of Homeland Security, a goal is to establish a one-
stop redress process for travelers by the end of calendar year 2006.
The department explained that this initiative, which will supplement
terrorist watch-list-related redress, focuses on a larger set of travel-
screening redress issues. The full text of the Department of Homeland
Security's written comments is reprinted in appendix V. The department
also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report
where appropriate.
The Department of State commented that the report accurately describes
the visa process and the department's position that the administrative
processing time required to screen a visa applicant--including, if
required, the processing of a security advisory opinion review--is a
necessary part of the visa application procedure rather than an adverse
governmental action. Also, the department noted that--in its use of the
terrorist watch list as a screening tool for visa adjudication--a
"misidentification" is not an adverse result for the visa applicant.
Rather, according to the department, this type of response helps to
determine that the visa applicant is not associated with terrorism. In
its written response, the department also provided a technical comment
regarding the security advisory opinion process, which we incorporated
in this report where appropriate. The full text of the Department of
State's written comments is reprinted in appendix VI.
The Department of Justice provided technical comments only, which we
incorporated in this report where appropriate.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until
30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to interested congressional committees and
subcommittees. We will also make copies available to others on request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Other key contributors to this report were Ronald J. Salo, Eric
W. Clemons, R. Eric Erdman, Susan L. Conlon, Michele C. Fejfar, Kathryn
E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung, Thomas F. Lombardi, Jan B. Montgomery, and
Danny R. Burton.
[Signed by]
Eileen Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
In response to a request from the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee and the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Homeland
Security, we addressed the following questions:
* To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list
misidentifications known, and generally, how could misidentified
persons be affected?[Footnote 46]
* What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and what
actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and frontline-screening
agencies taking to reduce the number of misidentified persons or
expedite them through the screening process?
* To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons,
what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and
frontline-screening agencies established?[Footnote 47]
Scope and Methodology:
Our work generally focused on the screening of travelers, although the
terrorist watch list is used for a variety of other screening purposes,
such as conducting background checks of workers who have access to
secure areas of the national transportation system. In performing our
work, we focused on the Terrorist Screening Center and three frontline-
screening agencies--the Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of State--whose
missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with
travelers. At the Terrorist Screening Center, we interviewed key
officials--including the director, principal deputy director, chief
information officer, and privacy officer--and reviewed standard
operating procedures and other relevant documentation.
Regarding the screening of air passengers against the No Fly and
Selectee lists prior to boarding, in addition to contacting the
Transportation Security Administration to broadly discuss the
procedures of air carriers, we interviewed security officials at five
major, domestic air carriers. At their request, the air carriers are
not identified in this report. Regarding U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's screening of travelers entering the United States, besides
conducting work at the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C., we
visited various land and air ports of entry in four states--California,
Michigan, New York, and Texas (see table 2). We judgmentally selected
these four states because each has major land and air ports of entry.
Also, the four states are geographically dispersed and collectively
have ports of entry on both the northern and southern borders of the
United States.
Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited by
GAO:
State: California; Land ports of entry: San Ysidro; Air ports of entry:
Los Angeles International Airport.
State: Michigan; Land ports of entry: Detroit Port Huron; Air ports of
entry: Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
State: New York; Land ports of entry: Niagara Falls; Air ports of
entry: John F. Kennedy International Airport.
State: Texas; Land ports of entry: Laredo; Air ports of entry: Dallas/
Fort Worth International Airport.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Regarding the State Department, we focused on screening of applicants
for nonimmigrant visas.[Footnote 48] We performed our work at State
Department headquarters in Washington, D.C, and did not visit consular
offices abroad.
More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding each
of the objectives are presented in the following sections, respectively.
Extent That the Numbers of Terrorist Watch List Misidentifications Are
Known, and Generally, How Misidentified Persons Could Be Affected:
From the Terrorist Screening Center, we obtained statistical
information on misidentifications covering a 26-month time period--
December 2003 (when the center began operations) to January 2006. These
statistics are based on screening encounters that were referred for
identity verification to the center by the frontline-screening
agencies, particularly U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which
conducts screening at ports of entry, and the Transportation Security
Administration, which provides guidance to air carriers, receives
encounter inquiries from them, and makes applicable referrals to the
center. Frontline-screening agencies are able to resolve some
misidentifications on their own without having to refer them to the
center. Similarly, in following federal guidance, airlines may also
resolve some misidentifications without involving the Transportation
Security Administration or necessitating subsequent referrals to the
Terrorist Screening Center. However, the agencies and airlines
generally do not maintain readily available statistics on how often
they do so. Thus, we were unable to quantify the universe of terrorist
watch-list-related misidentifications. However, to provide a contextual
perspective, we obtained national statistics on the numbers of persons
who were subject to terrorist watch list screening procedures
conducted, for example, in fiscal year 2005 at ports of entry.
To determine how misidentified persons could be affected, we
interviewed officials at the principal frontline-screening agencies--
the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Department of State--whose missions most frequently
and directly involve interactions with travelers. Also, as indicated in
table 2, we made on-site observations of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection screening operations at various ports of entry in
California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Our observations at these
locations helped us better understand how the name-match screening
process can affect misidentified persons, but these observations are
not projectable to other locations.
To obtain additional information on ways that misidentified individuals
could be affected by terrorist-watch-list-related screening, we asked
the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to provide us examples of actual complaint letters to review:
* The Transportation Security Administration provided us a selection of
24 terrorist watch-list-related complaint letters that the agency
received during December 1, 2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center
became operational) to April 20, 2006. The agency attempted to select
letters from different weeks throughout this time period; however,
because a statistically projectable methodology was not used for the
selections, the 24 letters are not representative of all complaints or
inquiries (an unspecified total) that the Transportation Security
Administration received during this time period.
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center
provided us a selection of complaint letters submitted by 28
individuals. The dates of the 28 complaint letters encompassed an 11-
month period, ranging from June 2005 to April 2006. The 28 letters were
not selected based on a statistically projectable methodology. Thus,
the 28 letters are not representative of all complaints or inquiries--
regarding watch-list-related secondary screening at ports of entry--
that U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Customer Satisfaction Unit
received during the 11-month time period and forwarded for research to
the agency's National Targeting Center.[Footnote 49]
The scope of our work did not include contacting or interviewing any of
the individuals who submitted complaint letters to the Transportation
Security Administration or U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
To further identify ways that misidentified persons could be affected
by watch-list-related screening, we contacted various associations that
represent air carriers, travel agencies, and business travelers.
Specifically, we contacted (1) the Air Transport Association, a trade
organization of the principal U.S. airlines; (2) the American Society
of Travel Agents; and (3) the National Business Travel Association,
which represents corporate travel management professionals and the
travel industry.
Also, we reviewed the results of a survey that the National Business
Travel Association conducted in June 2006. According to its Web site
(www.nbta.org), the association represents over 2,500 corporate travel
managers and travel service providers who collectively manage and
direct more than $170 billion of expenditures within the business
travel industry, primarily for Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006,
the association conducted a survey of 1,316 corporate travel managers;
the survey posed a range of questions that addressed how terrorist
watch list screening by the Transportation Security Administration and
air carriers affected travelers. A total of 444 corporate travel
managers responded to the survey. The responses may not be
representative of all of the association's corporate travel managers.
Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur, and Actions the Terrorist
Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are Taking to Reduce
the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite Them through the
Screening Process:
Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur:
Regarding why misidentifications occur, our work focused on
interviewing officials at and reviewing documentation obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center and three frontline-screening agencies--the
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Department of State. We also interviewed security
officers at five major domestic air carriers about their role in name-
match screening against the No Fly and Selectee lists and obtained
their views on the causes of misidentifications. Further, we reviewed
the work of two groups regarding factors they have identified that
contribute to misidentifications--the Terrorist Screening Center's
Search Engine Standardization Working Group[Footnote 50] and the
Department of Homeland Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory
Committee.[Footnote 51]
Actions to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite Them
through the Screening Process:
At the Terrorist Screening Center, we interviewed the director,
principal deputy director, chief information officer, and other senior
managers and staff regarding data-quality initiatives, including
efforts to identify and correct troublesome records related to
misidentifications. Additionally, we inquired about the status of the
center's efforts to implement recommendations made by the Department of
Justice's Office of the Inspector General in its June 2005
report.[Footnote 52] Among other things, the Inspector General
recommended that the Terrorist Screening Center develop procedures to
regularly review and test the information contained in the consolidated
terrorist watch list to ensure that the data are complete, accurate,
and nonduplicative.
At the three frontline-screening agencies, we interviewed applicable
program managers regarding initiatives being taken to expedite
frequently misidentified persons through the screening process. We
inquired particularly about any computer-based initiatives that use
applicable databases to help ensure that travelers who have been
frequently misidentified in the past are no longer subjected to
intensive screening, unless warranted by new data.
In further reference to potential initiatives for minimizing
misidentifications as well as better confirming the identities of
terrorists, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center's strategic plan
and discussed with center officials the outlook for using biometric
data--such as fingerprints--to supplement name-based screening.
Similarly, in our interviews with officials of the frontline-screening
agencies, we discussed programs that currently use biometric data, such
as the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) program, which is an entry-exit tracking system designed to
collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals
who travel to the United States.
Redress Opportunities Established by the Terrorist Screening Center and
Frontline-Screening Agencies to Address Concerns from Misidentified and
Mistakenly Listed Persons:
As used in this report, the term "redress" generally refers to an
agency's complaint-resolution process, whereby individuals may seek
resolution of their concerns about an agency action. We identified
elements of the opportunities for redress offered by the Terrorist
Screening Center and the three frontline-screening agencies, and we
generally analyzed their respective policies and procedures. However,
we did not address the relation between agency redress and other
possible remedies, such as judicial review, which involves invoking the
legal system through a civil action. Rather, the scope of our work
focused on means for redress made available by agencies for
inconvenienced persons.
We reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center's standard operating
procedures for redress and interviewed the center official (privacy
officer) principally responsible for watch-list-related redress. Also,
we obtained and reviewed statistics and general disposition or outcome
information regarding redress queries that the center received and
processed to completion in calendar year 2005.[Footnote 53]
Further, at the three frontline-screening agencies, we reviewed redress-
related documentation, including standard operating procedures and
training materials, and we interviewed the officials responsible for
redress. Specifically, we interviewed the Director of the
Transportation Security Administration's Office of Transportation
Security Redress, the head of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
Customer Satisfaction Unit, and program managers at the State
Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs responsible for processing
nonimmigrant visa applications.
Also, to generally determine what watch-list-related redress
information was publicly available, we reviewed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center. In turn,
from that overview Web site (see app. II), we followed up on any online
links or references to the redress processes of the Transportation
Security Administration (see app. III), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (see app. IV), and the State Department.
In addition, we contacted the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Policy, which has a lead role in ongoing efforts to develop an
interagency memorandum of understanding to help ensure that redress
processes are formally documented, with clearly established
responsibilities for the Terrorist Screening Center and all interagency
partners. Also, we contacted the executive director of the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board to discuss its role in facilitating
development of the interagency memorandum of understanding.[Footnote
54] However, because the memorandum of understanding was in draft form
at the time of our study, we have not had an opportunity to review it.
Data Reliability:
In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following statistics from
the Terrorist Screening Center:
* The number of watch-list-related screening encounters referred to the
center by frontline-screening agencies during the period December 2003
to January 2006.
* The number and general dispositions of redress queries that the
center received and processed to completion in calendar year 2005.
We discussed the sources of the data with Terrorist Screening Center
officials, including the chief information officer, and we reviewed
documentation regarding the compilation of the statistics. We
determined that the statistics were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of presenting overall patterns and trends.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: Terrorist-Watch-List Redress
Process:
This appendix, which consists of two sections, presents publicly
available information that we copied from the Web site of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation:
* The first section of the appendix is an overview of the Terrorist
Screening Center's watch-list-related redress process and also presents
contact information for three frontline-screening agencies--the
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Department of State.
* The second section covers frequently asked questions.
Overview and Contact Information [Copied from the FBI's Web site,
http://www.fbi.gov. Accessed August 2006.]
"The Terrorist Screening Center cannot confirm or deny whether an
individual is on the consolidated terrorist watch list, because this
information is derived from classified and sensitive law enforcement
and intelligence. The nondisclosure of the contents of the watch list
protects the operational counterterrorism and intelligence collection
objectives of the government, as well as the personal safety of those
involved in counterterrorism investigations. The watch list remains an
effective tool in the government's counterterrorism efforts because its
contents are not disclosed.
"The Terrorist Screening Center works with other agencies on a daily
basis to resolve complaints from individuals who are experiencing
repeated delays or difficulties during a screening process that may be
related to the terrorist watch list. Because individuals may experience
problems during screening for any number of reasons, and not just
because of the terrorist watch list, individuals should contact the
agency that is conducting the screening process in question. The
screening agency is in the best position to resolve issues.
"Contact information:
"The Terrorist Screening Center does not accept redress inquiries
directly from the public. Members of the public should contact the
relevant screening agency with complaints about a negative screening
experience.
"Please direct the public to contact the following screening agencies
to submit a complaint about a negative screening experience.
For air passenger screening:
Transportation Security Administration Ombudsman:
Phone: (866) 289-9673:
Email: tsa-contactcenter@dhs.gov:
Online: TSA Traveler Identity Verification Program[Footnote 55]
For U.S. borders and ports of entry:
Customs and Border Protection:
Customer Satisfaction Unit[Footnote 56]:
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 5.5C:
Washington, DC 20229:
Phone: (202) 344-1968:
Fax: (202) 344-2791:
Online: Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet[Footnote 57]
For visas:
Director, Information Management Liaison (CA/VO/I):
Bureau of Consular Affairs, SA-1:
U.S. Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
FAX: (202) 663-3535:
Online: Bureau of Consular Affairs"
"Frequently Asked Questions"
[Copied from the FBI's Web site, www.fbi.gov. Accessed August 2006.]
"Why was the Terrorist Screening Database created?
Prior to the creation of the terrorist-screening database, information
about known or suspected terrorists was dispersed throughout the U.S.
government and no one agency was charged with consolidating it and
making it available for use in terrorist screening. Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-6, the Terrorist Screening Center now
provides "one-stop shopping" so that every government screener is using
the same terrorist watch list--whether it is an airport screener, an
embassy official issuing visas overseas, or a state or local law
enforcement officer on the street. The Terrorist Screening Center
allows government agencies to run name checks against the same
comprehensive list with the most accurate, up-to-date information about
known and suspected terrorists.
Who gets included in the terrorist-screening database?
Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, only individuals who
are known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism are included in the terrorist-screening database.
Does the terrorist screening database contain information on domestic
terrorists, like Timothy McVeigh?
Yes. The terrorist-screening database contains information on both
international and domestic terrorists.
Does the terrorist-screening database contain information on people who
have been convicted of a crime?
The purpose of the terrorist-screening database is not to hold
information on individuals who have been convicted of a crime; however,
an individual appropriately included in the terrorist-screening
database may also have a criminal history. None of the information
pertaining to the criminal history is contained or referenced in the
terrorist-screening database.
Are there U.S. citizens in the terrorist-screening database?
Yes, U.S. citizens are included in terrorist-screening database if they
meet the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism nexus
criteria.
Can I find out if I am in the terrorism screening database?
The Terrorist Screening Center cannot reveal whether a particular
person is in the terrorist-screening database. The terrorist-screening
database remains an effective tool in the government's counterterrorism
efforts because its contents are not disclosed. If the Terrorist
Screening Center revealed who was in the terrorist-screening database,
terrorist organizations would be able to circumvent the purpose of the
terrorist watch list by determining in advance which of their members
are likely to be questioned or detained.
I am having trouble when I try to fly or cross the border into the
United States. Does this mean I am in the terrorist-screening database?
No. At security checkpoints like our nation's borders, there are many
law enforcement or security reasons that an individual may be singled
out for additional screening. Most agencies have redress offices (e.g.,
Ombudsman) where individuals who are experiencing repeated problems can
seek help. If an individual is experiencing these kinds of
difficulties, he/she should cooperate with the agency screeners and
explain the recurring problems. The screeners can supply instructions
on how to raise concerns to the appropriate agency redress office.
I have been told that I am on a terrorist watch list by an airline
employee and I frequently have difficulty when I fly. Does this mean I
am in the terrorist-screening database?
No; however, an individual may be a "misidentified person." A
misidentified person is someone who is experiencing a delay during
screening because they have a similar name to a person in the terrorist-
screening database. Misidentified persons are sometimes delayed while
the government works to distinguish them from the terrorist in the
terrorist-screening database. Because these delays are frustrating and
inconvenient, there are several initiatives in progress to help
streamline the clearance process for misidentified persons. If an
individual believes he/she is having a misidentification problem,
he/she should contact the screening agency's redress office for
assistance.
Are individuals removed from the terrorist-screening database?
Yes. The Terrorist Screening Center works with partner agencies through
a formal process to remove individuals who no longer meet the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism criteria.
How does the Terrorist Screening Center ensure that the terrorist-
screening database is accurate?
The Terrorist Screening Center has a staff dedicated to redress and
quality assurance that conducts comprehensive as well as case-specific
reviews of terrorist-screening database records to ensure they are
current, accurate, and thorough. The Terrorist Screening Center
conducts research and coordinates with other federal agencies to ensure
the terrorist record is as complete, accurate, and thorough as
possible. The Terrorist Screening Center's redress and quality
assurance process has resulted in the correction or removal of hundreds
of records in the terrorist-screening database.
What are the Terrorist Screening Center's redress procedures?
See the TSC Redress Procedures webpage for details. [GAO note: The
procedures are copied in the first section of this appendix.]
Does the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight program
have anything to do with the terrorist-screening database?
Secure Flight is a congressionally mandated program that will check the
names and dates of birth of passengers on domestic flights against the
terrorist-screening database. As with all government programs that
screen for terrorists, the Terrorist Screening Center provides this
program support to ensure that terrorist identity matches are correct.
What prevents the Terrorist Screening Center from violating the civil
liberties of Americans?
The Terrorist Screening Center only receives information collected by
other government entities with pre-existing authority to do so. Each
agency that contributes data to the Terrorist Screening Center must
comply with legislation, as well as its own policies and procedures to
protect privacy rights and civil liberties. The handling and use of
information, including information about U.S. citizens and legal
immigrants, is governed by the same statutory, regulatory, and
constitutional requirements as if the information was not to be
included in a Terrorist Screening Center managed database."
[End of section]
Appendix III: Transportation Security Administration: Traveler Identity
Verification Program:
This appendix presents an overview of the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) traveler identify verification program for air
passengers who are affected by terrorist watch list screening. An
individual can voluntarily provide TSA with additional personal-
identifying information, which the agency will use to decide whether
the person's name should be put on a cleared list--that is, a list that
contains the names and other personal-identifying information of
individuals who have been checked and cleared as being persons not on
the No Fly and Selectee lists. Airlines are to use the cleared list to
more quickly determine that these passengers are not the persons whose
names are on the No Fly and Selectee lists. As needed, TSA provides the
airlines with updates of the No Fly and Selectee lists and the cleared
list.
Specific information about TSA's traveler identity verification program
is publicly available on the agency's Web site (www.tsa.gov). The
following sections of this appendix reproduce--as exhibits A and B--
relevant information from TSA's Web site (accessed August 2006):
* Exhibit A: Our Traveler Identity Verification Program.
* Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 2006).
Generally, to participate in the program, an individual must complete a
traveler identity verification form and return the form and copies of
specified identity documents to TSA.
Exhibit A: "Our Traveler Identity Verification Program"
"Told that you are on a Federal Government Watch List?
Problems printing your boarding pass at the kiosk or from home?
Experience other delays while checking-in for flights?
Our Office of Transportation Security Redress is here to help with our
new Traveler Identity Verification Program.
Why am I having these problems?
TSA and the airlines are required to check and confirm that you are
properly identified prior to your flight for safety and security. You
may experience inconveniences when you present your identification
during check-in due to mistaken identity or incorrect information. Our
Traveler Identity Verification Program works with the relevant parties
(including airlines) to resolve any inaccuracies or inconsistencies
that may have resulted in misidentifications.
Am I on the No-Fly List?!:
If you receive a boarding pass, you are not on the No-Fly List. Most
commonly, passengers who are told that they are on the No-Fly List
have, in fact, a similar name to an individual on the Watch Lists.
What do I need to do?
You are invited to participate in the TSA Traveler Identity
Verification Program by completing and returning the following
information to TSA:
* Traveler Identity Verification Form (WORD 145 KB):
* A copy of your U.S. passport OR:
* Copies of three of the following:
* Driver's License:
* Birth Certificate:
* Voter Registration:
* Military ID Card:
* Visa:
* Naturalization Card:
* Government ID Card:
How does TSA review my information?
Your submission is reviewed to determine if the delays are caused by
mistaken identity or incorrect information. TSA will respond to you in
writing and provide air carriers with your identifying information to
help properly identify you at check-in and expedite your future travel.
I participated in the Traveler Identity Verification Program, but I'm
still experiencing problems.
Airline check-in procedures must still be followed. We currently
distribute the Watch Lists to the airlines, who compare your
reservation information to the Watch Lists prior to your flight. The
airlines use varying procedures and technology to conduct this
comparison, which could inadvertently lead to continued delays.
We are developing a program called Secure Flight to enhance the
security of air travel in the U.S. while reducing security-related
delays for the traveling public. It will allow the federal government,
instead of individual airlines, to compare passenger data against the
Watch Lists prior to check-in at the airport, while fully protecting
privacy and civil liberties.
Our goal going forward is to ensure travelers' security with minimal
disruptions.
Please note that you will be subject to screening procedures at the
checkpoint. Every passenger will still walk through a metal detector,
their carry-on bags will still be X-rayed, and every checked bag will
still be screened for explosives. Additionally, you may be randomly
selected at the airline counter or upon arrival at the checkpoint for
secondary screening.
We will continue to work with travelers to minimize any unnecessary
delays. We will continue to look at process and technology improvements
to ensure a safe and efficient travel experience."
Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 2006):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Online Information:
Background and Preliminary Observation:
Appendix II provides an overview of the redress process used by the
Terrorist Screening Center for addressing complaints or concerns
resulting from the use of terrorist watch lists to screen individuals.
As stated in appendix II, the Terrorist Screening Center is to work
with frontline-screening agencies to resolve complaints from
individuals who are experiencing repeated delays or difficulties during
a screening process that may be related to a terrorist watch list. For
instance, the Terrorist Screening Center's overview guidance notes that
complainants experiencing such problems at U.S. borders and ports of
entry should contact U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In further
reference to the redress process for misidentifications of these
individuals, the overview guidance provides an online link to the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Interagency Border Inspection System
Fact Sheet (reproduced below). The fact sheet does not specifically
mention terrorist watch lists and the redress process.
However, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Web site (www.cbp.gov),
which can be directly accessed by the public, does provide information
regarding the agency's Customer Satisfaction Unit and how complaints
are handled as well as information on trusted-traveler programs.
Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet:
GAO note: The fact sheet consists solely of the following six questions
and answers, which we copied from the Web site of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (accessed August 2006).
"What Is IBIS?"
"IBIS is the acronym for the Interagency Border Inspection System."
"Who Uses IBIS?"
"In addition to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, law enforcement and
regulatory personnel from 20 other federal agencies or bureaus use
IBIS. Some of these agencies are the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
U.S. National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police
Organization; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Internal Revenue
Service; the Coast Guard; the Federal Aviation Administration; the
Secret Service; and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
just to name a few. Also, information from IBIS is shared with the
Department of State for use by Consular Officers at U.S. Embassies and
Consulates."
"What Does IBIS Provide?"
"IBIS assists the majority of the traveling public with the expeditious
clearance at ports of entry while allowing the border enforcement
agencies to focus their limited resources on those potential non-
compliant travelers. IBIS provides the law enforcement community with
access to computer-based enforcement files of common interest. It also
provides access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center and
allows its users to interface with all fifty states via the National
Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems."
"Where Is IBIS?"
"IBIS resides on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System at the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Data Center. Field level access is
provided by an IBIS network with more than 24,000 computer terminals.
These terminals are located at air, land, and sea ports of entry."
"What Information Is in IBIS?"
"IBIS keeps track of information on suspect individuals, businesses,
vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. IBIS terminals can also be used to
access National Crime Information Center records on wanted persons,
stolen vehicles, vessels or firearms, license information, criminal
histories, and previous Federal inspections. The information is used to
assist law enforcement and regulatory personnel."
"Additional Questions?"
"Any concerns you may have as an international traveler or importer
about the use or application of IBIS may be addressed to:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Freedom of Information Act/ Customer
Satisfaction Unit Room 5.5 C 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington,
D.C. 20229"
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Homeland Security:
September 15, 2006:
Ms. Eileen Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: U.S. Government Accountability:
Office 441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report entitled, TERRORIST WATCH
LIST SCREENING: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public
(GAO-06-1031). Technical comments have been provided under separate
cover.
The Department of Homeland Security appreciates your report and
findings as well as your recognition of the many efforts we are
currently undertaking to enhance terrorist screening and our redress
efforts.
We do have one suggestion for an additional paragraph in your report,
perhaps in your Results in Brief and Concluding Observations sections.
The Department of Homeland Security is working with the Departments of
Justice, State and others on a larger set of travel screening redress
issues, which the interagency memorandum of understanding, with its
focus on redress related to the terrorist watch lists, will supplement.
On January 17, 2006, the Departments of State and Homeland Security
announced an initiative on "Secure Borders and Open Doors in the
Information Age," otherwise known as the Rice-Chertoff Initiative. Part
Three, "Smarter Screening," includes a "'One Stop' Redress for
Travelers." The purpose is to establish a government-wide redress
process to address perceived problems in international and domestic
traveler prescreening. Secretary Chertoff made it a goal to establish
this process by the end of the calendar year so that those with
complaints or legitimate issues can resolve them with greater
efficiency. US-VISIT and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties (CRCL) within DHS have been tasked with initiating from
within the relevant DHS components and the Department of State a
governance board and working group for this project. The new director
of DHS's Screening Coordination Office now chairs the governance board
with CRCL and US-VISIT as co-chairs. Representatives from State, the
Terrorist Screening Center, and DHS's U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, US-VISIT, CRCL and Office of Policy are all
involved with the working group.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
[Signed by]
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the State Department:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management:
and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D. C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office: 441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
SEP 14 2006:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "TERRORIST
WATCH LIST SCREENING: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the
Public," GAO Job Code 440374.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Timothy Smith, Chief, Coordination Division, Bureau of Consular Affairs
at (202) 663-1246.
Sincerely,
[Signed by]
Bradford R. Higgins
cc: GAO - Dan Burton:
CA - Maura Harty:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce:
Adverse Effects on the Public:
(GAO-06-1031, GAO Code 440374):
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on the draft report Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to
Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public.
The report accurately describes the visa process and the Department of
State's position that the administrative processing time required to
screen a visa applicant, including, if required, the processing of a
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) review, is a necessary part of the visa
application procedure rather than an adverse governmental action. The
report also acknowledges the Department's interest in data integrity
and taking steps to minimize the impact of the SAO process on the
traveling public. (Note: the SAO process is the means through which
Department of State Consular Officers screen visa applicants against
the Terrorist Watch List.)
The Department has the following comments:
1. The GAO notes, first on the page immediately following the report
cover sheet and several times throughout the document, that of the tens
of thousands of names sent to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) by
the frontline screening agencies, about half were "misidentifications."
From the perspective of the State Department, which uses the Terrorist
Watch List primarily as a screening tool for visa adjudication, a
"misidentification" is not an adverse result for the visa applicant.
Rather, a negative response would clear a visa applicant of an
association with a terrorist identity (though subject to a second
review upon seeking admission at a U.S. port of entry.)
2. The description of the Department's visa name check process in the
body of the report is accurate. However, the general overview
description and chart on pages 11-13 are not accurate as descriptions
of the visa SAO process. The description and chart state that
"inconclusive .. uncertain and other hard-to-verify potential
matches.." are to be referred to the applicable screening agency. If
that agency is unable to conclusively determine whether a hit is an
exact match, then it contacts the Terrorist:
Screening Center. In describing visa operations, it is more accurate to
say (and depict on a chart) that consular officers are required to
submit to the Department for a Security Advisory Opinion all hits that
cannot positively be labeled a mismatch. That SAO request is
automatically routed to the TSC and other screening agencies, and the
Department will not recommend a course of action to a post until the
TSC and other screening agencies have advised us that either the hit is
a mismatch, or that derogatory information exists and must be reviewed
to determine whether a legal basis for a visa denial exists.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the Transportation Security Administration, persons on
the No Fly list should be precluded from boarding an aircraft bound
for, or departing from, the United States. In contrast, being on the
Selectee list does not mean that the individual will be precluded from
boarding a plane or entering the United States. Instead, any person on
the Selectee list is to receive additional screening, which may involve
a physical inspection of the person and a hand-search of luggage.
[2] The term "misidentification" refers to a person initially matched
by a screening agency to a name on the watch list, but upon closer
examination, the person is found to not match any watch list record.
[3] As used in this report, the term "redress" generally refers to an
agency's complaint-resolution process, whereby individuals may seek
resolution of their concerns about an agency action. In the report, we
describe elements of the opportunities for redress offered by several
agencies, and we generally analyze their respective policies and
procedures. However, we do not address the relation between agency
redress and other possible remedies, such as judicial review.
[4] For purposes of this report, the term "mistakenly listed persons"
includes two categories of individuals--(1) persons who never should
have been included on the watch list but were due to some type of error
and (2) persons who were appropriately included on the watch list at
one time but no longer warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list
due to subsequent events.
[5] Although the terrorist watch list is used for a variety of
screening purposes, such as conducting background checks of workers who
have access to secure areas of the national transportation system, our
work generally focused on the screening of travelers. At the
Transportation Security Administration, we examined the screening of
air passengers prior to their boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, we examined the screening of travelers entering the
United States through ports of entry; and at the Department of State,
we examined the screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants.
[6] According to the FBI, the specific number of potential matches sent
to the Terrorist Screening Center that turned out to be
misidentifications is sensitive information; however, the total is
substantially less than 100,000.
[7] An algorithm is a prescribed set of well-defined, unambiguous rules
or processes for the solution of a problem in a finite number of steps.
Pursuant to Transportation Security Administration security directives
and implementing guidance, airlines are to prescreen passengers by
matching their names against the No Fly and Selectee lists.
[8] Any such concern or complaint raised formally by an affected
individual is what the Terrorist Screening Center calls a redress
query. Specifically, the Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress
query" as communication from individuals or their representatives
inquiring or complaining about an adverse experience during a terrorist
watch-list-related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a
federal agency, including congressional inquiries to federal agencies
on behalf of their constituents.
[9] GAO, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be
Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003).
[10] The Transportation Security Administration is developing a new
passenger prescreening program, known as Secure Flight. Under the
Secure Flight program, the agency plans to take over, from commercial
airlines, the responsibility to compare identifying information on
airline passengers against information on known or suspected
terrorists. The agency expects that Secure Flight will improve
passenger prescreening as compared with the current airline-operated
process. In June 2006, we reported that the Transportation Security
Administration still faces significant challenges in developing and
implementing the Secure Flight program. See, GAO, Aviation Security:
Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 2006).
[11] Also, the FBI and designated state and local criminal justice
agencies access the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File in
conducting background checks on individuals seeking to purchase
firearms or obtain permits to possess, acquire, or carry firearms. See
GAO, Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related
Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2005).
[12] Airlines are to contact the Transportation Security
Administration, which may then contact the Terrorist Screening Center,
as necessary.
[13] In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department
noted that the general overview presented in figure 1 is not fully
reflective of the process for screening nonimmigrant visa applicants
against the terrorist watch list. Specifically, the department
emphasized that for any hit that clearly is not a mismatch, consular
officers are required to obtain a security advisory opinion. That is,
the consular post must ask Department of State headquarters to initiate
a process of requesting that the Terrorist Screening Center and other
relevant agencies check their respective databases or systems for the
existence of any investigative or intelligence information regarding
the individual and pass the results back to the department for use in
recommending a course of action to the post.
[14] Since the late 1990s, airline passenger prescreening has been
conducted using the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS I)--in which data related to a passenger's reservation and
travel itinerary are compared against characteristics (known as CAPPS I
rules) used to select passengers who require additional scrutiny--and
through the matching of passenger names to terrorist watch lists. See,
GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under
Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-
356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005), which reported that
approximately 99 percent of all passengers on domestic flights are
screened under the air carrier-operated, automated CAPPS I system, and
the remaining 1 percent of passengers are screened by air carriers who
do not have an automated system.
[15] The Transportation Security Administration provides security
directives and implementing guidance to foreign and domestic aircraft
operators for use in ensuring that individuals who pose a threat to
civil aviation are denied boarding passes or are subjected to
additional screening, as appropriate.
[16] Also, terrorist-watch-list-screening procedures are applicable to
international flights--of foreign and domestic air carriers--into or
from the United States.
[17] A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the
United States, seeking to enter the United States temporarily for a
specific purpose, such as business or pleasure.
[18] As discussed in appendix I, the Transportation Security
Administration provided us a selection of 24 terrorist watch-list-
related complaint letters that the agency received from December 1,
2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center became operational) to April
20, 2006. The agency attempted to select letters from different weeks
throughout this time period; however, because a statistically
projectable methodology was not used for the selections, the 24 letters
are not representative of all complaints or inquiries (an unspecified
total) that the Transportation Security Administration received during
this time period.
[19] According to its Web site (www.nbta.org), the National Business
Travel Association represents over 2,500 corporate travel managers and
travel service providers who collectively manage and direct more than
$170 billion of expenditures within the business travel industry,
primarily for Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006, the association
conducted a survey of 1,316 corporate travel managers, and 444
responded to the survey. Of the responding travel managers, 107
reported that they have employees who repeatedly have had to go to the
airline ticket counter to obtain a boarding pass. (Accessed August
2006.)
[20] Department of Homeland Security, Report on Effects on Privacy &
Civil Liberties--DHS Privacy Office Report Assessing the Impact of the
Automatic Selectee and No Fly Lists on Privacy and Civil Liberties as
Required under Section 4012(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006).
[21] As discussed in appendix I, besides conducting work at U.S.
Customs and Border Protection headquarters in Washington, D.C., we
visited various land and air ports of entry in four states--California,
Michigan, New York, and Texas. We judgmentally selected these four
states because each has major land and air ports of entry, and the
states collectively have ports of entry on both the northern and
southern borders of the United States.
[22] As discussed in appendix I, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
provided us a selection of complaint letters submitted by 28
individuals. The dates of the 28 complaint letters encompassed an 11-
month period, ranging from June 2005 to April 2006. The 28 letters were
not selected based on a statistically projectable methodology. Thus,
the 28 letters are not representative of the approximately 220
complaints or inquiries--regarding watch-list-related secondary
screening at ports of entry--that U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
Customer Satisfaction Unit received during the 11-month time period and
forwarded for research to the agency's National Targeting Center.
[23] The extended or additional processing time is not always a one-
time occurrence. In processing visa applications, consular posts may
request security advisory opinions for a variety of reasons. Thus, even
though an individual previously has been the subject of a security
advisory opinion, a new visa application may present facts and
circumstances that lead the consular post to request another security
advisory opinion.
[24] Testimony of Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, Office of Public
Security, State of New York, at a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
and the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives (Mar. 25,
2004).
[25] The response to the state or local law enforcement officer may be
provided by the Terrorist Screening Center or by the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division (Terrorist Screening Operations Unit), as
applicable.
[26] The working group's membership includes representatives from the
departments of Homeland Security (including Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection), State, and
Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (including the National
Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology acts as a special advisor to the working
group.
[27] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005).
[28] Although a purpose is to expedite frequently misidentified persons
through the screening process, the database-annotation initiative is
not a "redress" process as defined in this report. Under the
initiative, the agency is taking action proactively rather than
responding to specific complaints or redress queries submitted by
individuals.
[29] In an earlier report, we assessed various biometric technologies.
See, GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
[30] In July 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that US-
VISIT would be enhanced to collect 10-finger scans.
[31] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Evaluation and Inspection Division, Follow-up Review of the FBI's
Progress Toward Biometric Interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT
(Washington, D.C.: July 2006).
[32] The Transportation Security Administration is authorized to
"establish requirements to implement trusted passenger programs and use
available technologies to expedite security screening of passengers who
participate in such programs, thereby allowing security screening
personnel to focus on those passengers who should be subject to more
extensive screening." See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 109(a)(3), 115 Stat.
597, 613 (2001).
[33] In the SENTRI program, for example, applicants must volunteer for
(1) a biographical background check against criminal, law enforcement,
customs, immigration, and terrorist databases; (2) a 10-fingerprint law
enforcement check; and (3) a personal interview with a U.S. Customs and
Border Protection officer.
[34] RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data
remotely from devices. For instance, the technology allows information
to be written to tags, which can be scanned or read from a distance.
See, GAO, Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification
Technology in the Federal Government, GAO-05-551 (Washington, D.C.: May
27, 2005).
[35] Previously, the agency's Office of the Ombudsman handled all
inquiries and complaints, including those regarding watch-list-related
screening.
[36] The Traveler Identity Verification Form (May 2006) replaced an
earlier form, the Passenger Identity Verification Form. Regarding the
latter, the Transportation Security Administration's instructions
required the submission of notarized copies of three identification
documents. Instructions for the new form do not require that the
submitted documents be notarized.
[37] The cleared list procedure began in May 2003 under the agency's
Office of the Ombudsman.
[38] In March 2003, the Transportation Security Administration began
developing CAPPS II, a second-generation computer-assisted passenger
prescreening program, to provide improvements over CAPPS I and to
screen all passengers flying into, out of, and within the United
States. CAPPS II was to perform different analyses and access more
diverse data, including data from government and commercial databases,
to classify passengers according to their level of risk (i.e.,
acceptable risk, unknown risk, or unacceptable risk), which would in
turn be used to determine the level of security screening each
passenger would receive. Because of a variety of challenges, the
Department of Homeland Security cancelled the development of CAPPS II
in August 2004 and announced that a new prescreening program, called
Secure Flight, would be developed.
[39] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
[40] Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101, et seq.) However, obtaining a visa from an American consul does
not guarantee an alien's entry into the United States. Rather, a visa
authorizes the alien to arrive at a port of entry, at which point a
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer will independently examine
the alien's eligibility for admission.
[41] See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
[42] Courts have long held that a consular officer's decision to grant
or deny a visa is not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Saavedra
Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Centeno v. Schultz,
817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800
F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986); Ventura-Escamilla v. I.N.S., 647 F.2d 28 (9th
Cir. 1981); Rivera de Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1976);
U.S. ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929). See also,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 752 (1972) (holding that courts may not
look behind the exercise of an official's discretionary authority to
deny admission to an alien).
[43] Secretary of State cable to all diplomatic and consular posts,
Subject: Reminder Regarding Visa Refusal Procedures (June 12, 2001).
[44] See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
[45] The board was established by section 1061 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638, 3684-88. The board advises the president and other senior
executive branch officials as to whether privacy and civil liberties
protections are appropriately considered in the development and
implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies
related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. The five
board members were sworn in and had their first meeting on March 15,
2006. Additional information about the role of the board and its
operations is available at www.privacyboard.gov.
[46] For purposes of this report, the term "misidentification" refers
to a person initially matched by a screening agency to a name on the
watch list, but upon closer examination, the person is found to not
match any watch list record.
[47] As used in this report, the term "mistakenly listed persons"
includes two categories of individuals--(1) persons who never should
have been included on the watch list but were due to some type of error
and (2) persons who were appropriately included on the watch list at
one time but no longer warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list
due to subsequent events.
[48] A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the
United States, seeking to enter the United States temporarily for a
specific purpose, such as business or pleasure.
[49] According to Customer Satisfaction Unit managers, all complaints
regarding the terrorist watch list are forwarded to the agency's
National Targeting Center, which has access to classified information
that may be needed to determine if the incidents cited by complainants
involved individuals who either are on the watch list or were
misidentified. National Targeting Center managers told us that if
research indicates that the substance of the complaint does involve
watch-list-related screening conducted by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the National Targeting Center will draft a response letter,
which is to be signed by the Customer Satisfaction Unit and mailed to
the individual.
[50] The working group's membership includes representatives from the
departments of Homeland Security (including Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection), State, and
Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (e.g., the National
Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology acts as a special advisor to the working
group.
[51] The charter of the committee is to advise the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Department of Homeland Security's chief
privacy officer on programmatic, policy, operational, administrative,
and technological issues within the department's areas of
responsibility that affect individual privacy, data integrity, data
interoperability, and other privacy-related matters.
[52] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005).
[53] The Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress query" as
communication from individuals or their representatives inquiring or
complaining about an adverse experience during a terrorist watch-list-
related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a federal agency,
including congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of
their constituents.
[54] The five-member board, which is part of the Executive Office of
the President, was established by section 1061 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638, 3684-88. The board advises the president and other senior
executive branch officials as to whether privacy and civil liberties
protections are appropriately considered in the development and
implementation of laws, regulations, and executive branch policies
related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. The five
board members were sworn in and had their first meeting on March 15,
2006. Additional information about the role of the board and its
operations is available at www.privacyboard.gov.
[55] See appendix III.
[56] On September 12, 2006, in providing technical comments on a draft
of this report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials noted that
the contact information given on the FBI's Web site should be as
follows: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Freedom of Information
Act/Privacy Act Branch. Also, the comments noted that the telephone
number should be removed. We suggested to the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officials that they coordinate with the FBI to ensure that
appropriate contact information is available to the public.
[57] See appendix IV for a copy of the fact sheet.
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