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entitled 'Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and 
Recovery Missions RElated to Hurricane Katrina' which was released on 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

July 2006: 

Coast Guard: 

Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions 
Related to Hurricane Katrina: 

Coast Guard: 

GAO-06-903: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-903, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our 
nation’s history. Significant federal, state, and local resources were 
mobilized to respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including those 
of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard played a key role in the 
planning, response, and recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina in three 
mission areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and 
management of maritime commerce. This report discusses the activities 
undertaken by the Coast Guard, as well as the challenges and lessons 
learned as a result of the agency’s efforts. More specifically, it 
focuses on (1) the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform 
these three mission areas in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; (2) 
the Coast Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it 
faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate these 
challenges; and (3) the implications and lessons learned, as identified 
by the Coast Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina surge 
operations on its people, assets, financial resources, and operations. 

To determine the Coast Guard’s preparation factors, the challenges and 
lessons learned we interviewed officials responsible for preparing, and 
responding to disasters, and reviewed the Coast Guard’s disaster 
guidance and plans. 

GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over 
33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the 
Coast Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but 
underpinning these efforts were factors such as the agency’s 
operational principles. These principles promote leadership, 
accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility and action, 
based on relevant authorities and guidance. Another key factor was the 
agency’s reliance on standardized operations and maintenance practices 
that provided greater flexibility for using personnel and assets from 
any operational unit for the response. Up-to-date and regularly 
exercised hurricane plans were also key—preserving Coast Guard 
personnel and resources first, so they could then respond to search and 
rescue, marine environmental protection, and facilitation of commerce 
needs after the storm. These various factors are consistent with 
previous GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic 
disasters. 

GAO’s work shows that the Coast Guard was most relevant in search and 
rescue, marine environmental protection, and management of maritime 
commerce missions. While the Coast Guard performs these missions daily, 
the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency with several 
challenges that required innovative approaches. The Coast Guard was 
able to mitigate challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina’s damage as a 
result of planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard 
Auxiliary members. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant 
damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as a 
result of sending people and assets to the Gulf region. Although 
continuing operations at ports nationwide while conducting Katrina 
operations presented challenges, these challenges have been addressed 
to mitigate negative impacts on the Coast Guard. Finally, the Coast 
Guard has collected after-action reports from Hurricane Katrina and has 
made them available to Coast Guard personnel through an internal 
database. 

Figure: Helicopter Rescue and Stranded Vessel in the greater New 
Orleans Area: 

[see PDF for Image] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO. 

[End of Figure] 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-903]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at 
(202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations: 

Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced Several 
Challenges It Was Largely Able to Mitigate: 

Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and Collected 
Information to Improve Future Responses: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary 
Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast 
region during Peak Response, August 26--September 16, 2005: 

Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to 
the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak Response, August 26-September 16, 
2005: 

Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for 
Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of 
April 12, 2006: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform, 
Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies 
to the Gulf Coast Region: 

Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of 
Gulf Coast Region: 

Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana: 

Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina: 

Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area: 

Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation: 

Abbreviations: 

ARSC: Aircraft Repair and Supply Center: 
ATC: Aviation Training Center: 
COTP: Captain of the Port: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
NRP: National Response Plan: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 31, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our 
nation's history. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and 
disruption to the population, environment, and economy, Hurricane 
Katrina was clearly a catastrophe and arguably the most devastating 
natural disaster in United States history. More than 1,300 people lost 
their lives; damage stretched over a 90,000 square mile area; more than 
a million people were driven from their homes; buildings, bridges, 
roads, and power and communications infrastructure were destroyed or 
severely damaged; and millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the 
environment. We may never fully know the financial cost of Hurricane 
Katrina, but one projection has put it at more than $200 billion. 

Two congressional committees that investigated and reported on 
Hurricane Katrina activities were critical of several federal agencies' 
response.[Footnote 1] In contrast to some other federal agencies, the 
Coast Guard has generally escaped criticism by these two 
investigations. Our work indicates that the Coast Guard's major 
response to Hurricane Katrina was in three mission areas: search and 
rescue, marine pollution response, and management of maritime commerce. 

This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as 
well as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency's 
efforts. More specifically, it focuses on: 

* the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform in these three 
mission areas during Hurricane Katrina; 

* the Coast Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it 
faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate the 
challenges; and: 

* the implications and lessons learned, as identified by the Coast 
Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina operations on its 
people, assets, financial resources, and operations. 

In addition, we have undertaken a large body of work to address 
preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to 
Hurricane Katrina. Because of the widespread congressional interest in 
these subjects, our work is being completed under the Comptroller 
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own 
initiative.[Footnote 2] 

To determine the factors used by the Coast Guard to prepare for 
Hurricane Katrina, we interviewed officials responsible for planning, 
preparing for, and responding to disasters, including Hurricane 
Katrina, as well as city and state officials in areas affected by 
Hurricane Katrina and assisted by the Coast Guard. In addition, we 
reviewed documents provided by two Coast Guard districts, the Atlantic 
Area Command, and Coast Guard headquarters, including national plans; 
Coast Guard severe weather, continuity-of-operation, and mission- 
specific response plans; and Coast Guard guidance and directives. 

To obtain a more detailed understanding of the Coast Guard's response 
and challenges related to Hurricane Katrina, we visited and conducted 
interviews at Coast Guard locations, including districts and units that 
supported the Hurricane Katrina response effort, as well as the 
affected district and units in the Gulf Coast region. We also spoke 
with local government and port officials. We selected these specific 
locations based on several factors, including the proportion of Coast 
Guard assets allocated to respond to Hurricane Katrina; proximity to 
the area physically affected by the hurricane, specifically the Gulf 
Coast region; and the Coast Guard's responsibility for response, 
including the Atlantic Area Command and Coast Guard headquarters. 

Finally, to determine the implications of sending people and assets to 
respond to Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned, we spoke to officials 
responsible for identifying and prioritizing the people and assets to 
send to the Gulf Coast region, to personnel sent to the region to 
respond to Hurricane Katrina, and to personnel who were stationed in 
the region. We reviewed resource allocation data, and financial 
guidance and documents, and spoke with officials responsible for these 
areas within the Coast Guard. To assess the reliability of the 
personnel, asset, and financial data, we spoke with agency officials 
knowledgeable in these specific areas. We determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters to afflict 
the United States. Of the estimated 60,000 people needing to be rescued 
from rooftops and flooded homes, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast 
Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as 
it did to this disaster may be difficult, but underpinning these 
efforts were the agency's operational principles that promote 
leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take responsibility 
and action, based on relevant authorities and guidance. Another 
significant factor that allowed the Coast Guard to confront the 
destruction brought on by Hurricane Katrina was the agency's reliance 
on standardized operations and maintenance practices that allowed the 
Coast Guard to respond with greater flexibility using a mix of 
personnel and assets from any operational unit. Having up-to-date and 
regularly exercised hurricane plans was another factor that the Coast 
Guard employed to prepare for Hurricane Katrina enabling the agency to 
implement its plans to confront the hurricane by first preserving Coast 
Guard personnel and resources and then quickly responding with search 
and rescue assistance, marine environmental protection response, and 
facilitation of commerce measures--missions that the Coast Guard 
conducts every day. GAO findings on lessons learned from past 
catastrophic disasters have highlighted similar factors including such 
things as the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and 
communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of 
authority; (2) conducting strong planning and robust training and 
exercise programs; and (3) strengthening response and recovery 
capabilities. 

The Coast Guard's mission response to Hurricane Katrina centered most 
on three mission areas: search and rescue, marine environmental 
protection and management of maritime commerce. While the Coast Guard 
performs these missions daily, the severity of Hurricane Katrina 
presented the agency with several challenges that required innovative 
approaches--for example, conducting a full scale search and rescue 
mission without its full communications capacity. The Coast Guard was 
able to mitigate the communication challenges caused by Hurricane 
Katrina's damage as a result of advance planning and preparation, as 
well as assistance from the Coast Guard Auxiliary. For example, to 
overcome challenges resulting from communications outages following the 
storm, Coast Guard personnel implemented plans that they had developed 
prior to the storm that were not dependent upon communication systems 
to execute, and they also relied on pre-staged communications 
equipment, pre-distributed satellite and cell phones. In addition, 
Coast Guard auxiliarists provided a critical communications relay for 
search and rescue operations. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant 
losses to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as it 
moved people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to 
Hurricane Katrina. The Coast Guard conducted surge operations--which 
are high-intensity efforts often launched at short notice to address an 
emergency situation--in response to Hurricane Katrina while it 
continued operations at the homeports from where personnel and assets 
were borrowed. To address the health effects stemming from the mental 
stress that Coast Guard personnel experienced responding to Hurricane 
Katrina, the Coast Guard deployed Critical Incident Stress Management 
teams. These teams provided treatment to Coast Guard response personnel 
as well as to other Coast Guard personnel from the region whose homes 
had been damaged or destroyed. Finally, the Coast Guard has developed 
after action reports related to the Hurricane Katrina response and has 
disseminated this information to its personnel for use on other 
contingency planning efforts through the agency's Contingency 
Preparedness System database--known as CG SAILS. 

Background: 

There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that 
support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the 
Stafford Act)[Footnote 3] primarily establishes the programs and 
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and 
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, 
individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), part of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), has responsibility for administering the provisions of 
the Stafford Act. 

For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations 
under the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and 
Mississippi and Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major 
disaster declarations for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, the same day that 
Hurricane Katrina made final landfall in the affected states. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the DHS to consolidate 
existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, 
coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the 
National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all- 
hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the 
management of domestic incidents where federal involvement is 
necessary. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the NRP applied only to 
incidents of national significance, defined as actual or potential high-
impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by an 
appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, 
nongovernmental, or private sector entities in order to save lives and 
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery 
and mitigation activities.[Footnote 4] The NRP includes planning 
assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and 
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national 
response to a "catastrophic incident"--defined as any natural or 
manmade incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary 
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions.[Footnote 5] 

The Coast Guard's authority under federal law to conduct maritime 
operations, such as search and rescue and port security, is 
continuously in effect, rather than dependent upon a presidential 
Stafford Act declaration or the implementation of the NRP. This ongoing 
authority uniquely positioned the Coast Guard to respond to Hurricane 
Katrina before the President made emergency or major disaster 
declarations under the Stafford Act, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security designated Katrina an incident of national significance under 
the NRP. Concurrent with the Coast Guard's historical missions and 
authorities, the NRP identifies the Coast Guard as a primary agency in 
the oil and hazardous materials response, and the support agency in six 
other emergency support functions, including urban search and rescue, 
and aspects of clearing waterways. 

The Coast Guard is responsible for performing a variety of homeland and 
non-homeland security missions, including ensuring security in 
territorial and international waters, and within U.S. ports, conducting 
search and rescue, interdicting illegal drug shipments and illegal 
aliens, enforcing fisheries laws, ensuring the safety and facilitation 
of commerce, and responding to reports of marine pollution. According 
to Coast Guard officials, they train for and perform these missions 
every day, in units located all over the United States. 

To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard employs a wide range of 
personnel. In 2005, the Coast Guard consisted of about 39,000 active 
duty, 7,000 civilian, and 8,100 reserve members, for a total of 
approximately 54,100 personnel. The Coast Guard also has access to 
approximately 31,000 volunteer auxiliary members.[Footnote 6] During 
the peak response time period for Hurricane Katrina, August 26-- 
September 16, 2005, the Coast Guard had approximately 5,600 personnel 
in the Gulf Coast region. About 53 percent of these were active duty 
and civilian personnel who came from other parts of the United States 
to assist in the response. 

Table 1 shows the total number of personnel within the Coast Guard by 
type, compared to the number of personnel who responded in the Gulf 
Coast region during the August through September 2005 period. 

Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary 
Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in the Gulf Coast 
region during Peak Response, August 26--September 16, 2005: 

Coast Guard personnel: Active duty; 
Approximate total number of personnel: 39,000; 
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 4,026; 
This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana (2,045); and the number of Coast Guard personnel sent to 
Gulf Coast region from other geographical areas (1,981). 

Coast Guard personnel: Civilian; 
Approximate total number of personnel: 7,000; 
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 733; 
This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana (170); and number of Coast Guard personnel sent to Gulf 
Coast region from other geographical areas (563). 

Coast Guard personnel: Reserve; 
Approximate total number of personnel: 8,100; 
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 541. 

Coast Guard personnel: Auxiliary; 
Approximate total number of personnel: 31,000; 
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 305. 

Coast Guard personnel: Total; 
Approximate total number of personnel: 85,100; 
Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina: 5,605. 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

Note: The number of auxiliary personnel is an estimate based on a total 
of 13,510 hours (563 days based on a 16-hour day) of operational and 
administrative support for Hurricane Katrina operations. 

[End of table] 

Of the Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas identified in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002,[Footnote 7] three are particularly 
relevant to the Hurricane Katrina response.[Footnote 8] They are the 
following: 

² Finding and rescuing mariners in distress--a mainstay of Coast Guard 
operations under its search and rescue mission. To conduct this 
mission, the Coast Guard operates aircraft and boats throughout the 
nation's coastlines and interior waterways. The Coast Guard also 
operates a national distress and response communication system that 
facilitates communication with mariners in danger. 

² Marine environmental protection--a program area focused on preventing 
and responding to oil and chemical spills in the maritime environment, 
preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and garbage, and preventing 
biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species. The Coast Guard 
typically conducts this mission with locally based staff but also has 
specially trained and equipped teams that travel nationally and 
worldwide to attend to this mission when needed. 

² Managing waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and accessible 
marine transportation system--a mission area that includes such 
activities as maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids and 
monitoring and inspecting merchant vessels, among other 
activities.[Footnote 9] 

Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina Operations: 

Several factors, including operational principles, the use of 
standardized practices, and planning, contributed to preparing the 
Coast Guard to conduct its missions following Hurricane Katrina. The 
Coast Guard promotes principles of leadership and accountability, 
whereby personnel are trained to take responsibility and action, as 
needed, based on relevant authorities and guidance. Organizational 
structure and standardization--of training, assets, and exercises-- 
allowed the Coast Guard to send personnel and assets to the Gulf Coast 
region from units across the United States. Also, the Coast Guard's 
focus on planning enabled personnel to learn emergency processes and 
procedures to respond to situations like that of Hurricane Katrina. 
These factors, which prepared the Coast Guard to conduct its Hurricane 
Katrina missions, are also reflected in previous GAO findings on 
lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 10] 

Coast Guard Operational Principles Aided in Hurricane Katrina 
Preparations: 

The Coast Guard response was aided by basic operational principles. 
Throughout our fieldwork, Coast Guard officials referred to the seven 
principles of Coast Guard operations that guide the agency's 
operations, and though they were not necessarily always referred to by 
name, the themes were relayed to our staff frequently, and Coast Guard 
personnel view these principles as instrumental in their preparation 
for Hurricane Katrina. These principles collectively form the 
foundation of Coast Guard culture and actions during 
operations.[Footnote 11] 

* The Principle of Clear Objective directs every operation toward a 
clearly defined and attainable objective. The Commander's Intent, a 
commanding officer's general instruction to his/her subordinates, 
defined the objectives for Coast Guard units with regard to hurricanes, 
including to ensure the safety of personnel and assets, respond to 
statutory responsibilities (e.g., search and rescue), and reopen 
waterways as soon as possible. 

* The Principle of Effective Presence requires that the right assets 
and capabilities be at the right place at the right time. This also 
reflects the importance of assigning units depending on the anticipated 
need. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina response, the Coast 
Guard recognized the need to send security units to address security 
concerns during rescue operations. 

* The Principle of Unity of Effort describes the performance of 
cooperative operational objectives, by working in concert with 
different Coast Guard units and coordinating these efforts with a 
diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental entities. For example, 
the Coast Guard units worked with members of local area maritime 
security committees to address maritime-related issues and coordinate 
security planning efforts.[Footnote 12] 

* The Principle of On-Scene Initiative involves Coast Guard personnel 
being given latitude to act quickly and decisively within the scope of 
their authority, without waiting for direction from higher levels in 
the chain of command. For example, during the initial response to 
Hurricane Katrina, a junior-level C-130 pilot, who first arrived on- 
scene in New Orleans with the planned mission of conducting an 
environmental inspection overflight, recognized that search and rescue 
helicopters in the area could not communicate with officials on the 
ground, including those located at hospitals and at safe landing areas. 
This pilot took the initiative to redirect her planned mission, 
changing it from an environmental flight to creating the first airborne 
communication platform in the area. Doing so helped ensure that 
critical information was relayed to and from helicopter pilots 
conducting search and rescue so that they could more safely and 
efficiently continue their vital mission. Figure 1 is a picture of the 
type of aircraft flown by this Coast Guard pilot. 

Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform, 
Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies 
to the Gulf Coast Region: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* The Principle of Flexibility describes how the Coast Guard pursues 
multiple missions with the same people and assets by adjusting to a 
wide variety of tasks and circumstances. Following this principle 
allows the Coast Guard to conduct "surge operations," which are high- 
intensity efforts often launched at short notice in response to an 
emergency situation. The effect of surge operations is not only on 
people and units directly involved; it demands that the entire service 
adapt to find the resources to meet the needs of the surge operation 
while still continuing critical day-to-day operations. During the 
response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard found ways to send 
people and assets to the Gulf Coast region while maintaining required 
levels of readiness in homeports. For example, in District 1, Air 
Station Cape Cod, worked with Canadian counterparts to cover search and 
rescue needs in the area to minimize the impact of sending some air 
assets to respond to Hurricane Katrina. 

* The Principle of Managed Risk involves two dimensions: First, the 
commander is obligated to ensure that units are properly trained, 
equipped, and maintained, and second, the commander is obligated to 
assess the crew and equipment capabilities against the operational 
situation to determine whether and how to execute a mission. For 
example, Coast Guard units in District 8 are required to develop and 
exercise hurricane plans. Figure 2 illustrates Coast Guard Area 
Commands and Districts. In the face of an oncoming storm, the District 
Commander will order Coast Guard personnel and dependents to evacuate. 
Finally, once the storm passes, commanding officers have the discretion 
to assess the safety of deploying Coast Guard personnel and assets. 

* The Principle of Restraint reflects the obligation of Coast Guard 
personnel to act with good judgment and treat American citizens and 
foreign visitors with dignity. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers 
we spoke to indicated that they made efforts to keep evacuated families 
together and to handle frustrated evacuees with sensitivity. 

Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of 
Gulf Coast Region: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Coast Guard Organizational Structure and Standardization Practices 
Supported Hurricane Katrina Preparations: 

Building upon its principles of operations, the Coast Guard's 
organization and practice of standardization streamlines operations 
processes and works to efficiently maintain assets. The Coast Guard has 
a broadly dispersed organization and asset structure--that is, having 
personnel and assets located throughout the United States to expedite 
the movement of assets to respond to disasters.[Footnote 13] This 
organizational structure, coupled with the Coast Guard's standardized 
training, allows the mixing of personnel and assets from anywhere in 
the country to form operational response teams. For Coast Guard asset 
mechanics, standardization means that they can assess, repair, and 
maintain the same type of Coast Guard asset at any unit at any time 
because they are required to have a common understanding of the Coast 
Guard's standard maintenance and repair requirements for its assets. 

To ensure this consistency, the Coast Guard conducts on-site 
inspections--called standardization reviews--at air and boat stations 
to evaluate crew members' skills and knowledge and to inspect air and 
boat assets. Standardization review teams are composed of experienced 
operators whose mission it is to teach, examine, and evaluate the 
principles of sound operations. For air operations, teams review 
standardized training to ensure that flight operations are conducted in 
the safest possible manner consistent with flight mission requirements, 
Coast Guard-wide. According to the Coast Guard's air operations manual, 
standardization also permits randomly selected aviators to form a 
disciplined, coordinated crew on any aircraft. This directly supports 
the Coast Guard's ability to provide a surge capability to meet rapidly 
escalating situations. Similarly, for boat operations, teams conduct 
inspections to evaluate the condition of boats and to review crew 
member proficiency in boat operations. For the Hurricane Katrina 
response, standardization enabled Coast Guard personnel from anywhere 
in the country to form unified crews to perform operations and 
maintenance. For example, a helicopter pilot from Florida, a copilot 
from Alabama, and a rescue swimmer from Alaska formed a crew to perform 
numerous search and rescue operations. Additionally, mechanics arriving 
at Aviation Training Center (ATC) Mobile in the days after Hurricane 
Katrina's landfall were able to perform maintenance on air assets 
deployed to the Gulf Coast region from various Coast Guard units. 

Coast Guard Contingency Planning and Exercises Contributed to Hurricane 
Katrina Preparations: 

Based on the Coast Guard's organizational structure and its practice of 
standardization, plans and complementary exercises are developed to 
clarify processes and procedures (to learn which elements of a plan 
work or need to be made more efficient) and to identify opportunities 
that benefit from the Coast Guard's unique characteristics. According 
to Coast Guard officials, prior to every hurricane season, specific 
severe weather guidance is provided to Coast Guard units to describe 
procedures for responding to a hurricane. For example, in the Gulf 
Coast region, units within District 8 rely on guidance from their 
leadership (known as the Commander's Intent), as well as the District 
Severe Weather/Hurricane Plan and their own unit-focused hurricane 
plans, which would include plans for continuity of operations in the 
event of an ordered evacuation.[Footnote 14] Coast Guard officials 
stated that these plans are reviewed annually in the spring to ensure 
an opportunity to practice evacuation, continuity of operations, and 
personnel and facility preparedness. 

According to the guidance, during a pending storm situation, the Coast 
Guard maintains its ability to conduct search and rescue missions until 
it is unsafe to do so; efforts are made to warn boaters of the 
impending bad weather; dependents of Coast Guard personnel are 
evacuated in accordance with the continuity of operations plans; units 
and their equipment are secured; and assets (e.g., aircraft, including 
helicopters and planes, and cutters, and other smaller boats) are moved 
away from the storm. Once the storm clears the area, personnel and 
assets that were scattered will reconstitute forces and return to the 
affected area to begin search and rescue, homeland security, and other 
mission activities. 

Consistent with these plans, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, 
Coast Guard units in the Gulf Coast region moved their command and 
control centers out of the threat area, and staged assets and crews 
outside the predicted storm path. For example, District 8 headquarters 
moved from New Orleans, Louisiana, to St. Louis, Missouri, and Sector 
New Orleans Command moved from New Orleans to Alexandria, Louisiana. 
Air assets were moved from Coast Guard air stations in the Gulf Coast 
region to locations in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Jacksonville, 
Florida. Cutters located in the Gulf Coast region moved to avoid the 
storm and into positions to assist with poststorm efforts. The Coast 
Guard also activated its mission-specific plans in preparation for 
Hurricane Katrina. For example, in the marine environmental protection 
area, the Coast Guard activated its area contingency plan and 
integrated the assistance of a Coast Guard Strike Team with its 
specialized environmental response capabilities. In particular, the 
Strike Team provided assistance in the response to Hurricane Katrina, 
using its inventory of specialized pollution response equipment and 
highly trained first response teams to combat environmental pollution. 

Previous GAO work identifies critical disaster preparation factors: 

Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricane Katrina are similar to 
those GAO identified in past work on Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed 
much of South Florida. Based on our previous review of preparing for 
and responding to catastrophic disasters, we noted several critical 
factors necessary to confront catastrophic disasters: (1) clearly 
defined and communicated leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines 
of authority; (2) strong planning and robust training and exercise 
programs; and (3) strong response and recovery capabilities.[Footnote 
15] In our review of the Coast Guard's hurricane preparation practices, 
it seems many of the factors we raised in the past, have been addressed 
by the Coast Guard. 

Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced Several 
Challenges It Was Largely Able to Mitigate: 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard performed 
several functions, including search and rescue, marine pollution 
response, and management of maritime commerce--missions it performs 
every day. As the most destructive natural disaster in American 
history, Hurricane Katrina caused tens of thousands of people to be 
rescued during several weeks after the storm made landfall; spilled 
over 8 million gallons of oil, and produced considerable debris, which 
polluted the Gulf Coast region; and in the days following the storm, 
threatened maritime commerce. While conducting its missions during 
Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard experienced several unique 
challenges that required quick and innovative thinking. The Coast Guard 
was able to mitigate communication challenges caused by Hurricane 
Katrina's damage to communications infrastructure as a result of 
planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary 
members. Another challenge included the need to provide security 
protection, particularly for search and rescue operations. Logistics 
also proved a challenge as the Coast Guard worked to address food and 
water needs of rescuees, as well as its own need for fuel. 

Search and Rescue Was Coast Guard's Initial Hurricane Katrina Mission: 

After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the primary mission was search 
and rescue. As Hurricane Katrina caused damage and destruction for 
90,000 square miles and precipitated an overwhelming flood in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, tens of thousands of people needed to be rescued 
from their homes. Some estimates are that about 60,000 people were 
rescued by federal, state, and local officials after Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall, and approximately 33,500 of them were rescued by the 
Coast Guard.[Footnote 16] The military, of which the Coast Guard is a 
member, sent massive resources to the Gulf Coast region to assist in 
Hurricane Katrina's response and recovery.[Footnote 17] According to 
data from Coast Guard officials, during the peak response period, the 
Coast Guard deployed approximately 4,000 of its 39,000 active duty 
personnel and deployed more than 45 percent of its air assets to the 
Gulf Coast region from across the United States. Notably, Coast Guard 
officials reported that air and boat operations, which involved 
rescuing or evacuating over 33,500 people, were conducted over a period 
of 17 days without any accidents or casualties. Rescue operations began 
quickly, with the first rescue occurring approximately 9 hours 
following Hurricane Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005. By 12 hours 
after landfall, approximately 29 Coast Guard helicopters were 
conducting rescues over New Orleans. 

Search and rescue operations, including both air and boat rescues, were 
conducted by a number of agencies. Coast Guard officials involved in 
boat operations told us that they worked closely with federal, state, 
and local officials to conduct rescues. According to Coast Guard 
officials, the agency leveraged approximately 130 boats and worked with 
FEMA teams to conduct urban rescues in flooded New Orleans 
neighborhoods. Attempts were also made to partner local responders with 
out-of-area responders in order to share local knowledge and facilitate 
rescues. According to Coast Guard officials involved in boat 
operations, personnel used Zephyr Field in Jefferson Parish, as a base 
of operations and deployed boat convoys from launching points such as 
bridges and highway overpasses. The boat rescues that they were 
involved with continued through September 16, 2005, almost 3 weeks 
after the storm. 

Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: USGS. 

[End of figure] 

Coast Guard officials operating in the Gulf Coast region told us that 3 
days into the response, approximately 43 aircraft and over 2,000 
personnel had arrived at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, 
Alabama, from other parts of the United States to join the Hurricane 
Katrina response. Rescue swimmers--80 of whom were operating out of Air 
Station New Orleans at the peak of air operations--worked among power 
lines, flying debris, and other obstacles not routine to maritime 
rescues to hoist individuals from rooftops. Helicopter crews also 
conducted search and rescue operations in Mississippi, which, according 
to officials at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, were 
completed within the first 36 hours following Hurricane Katrina's 
landfall. Pilots who conducted rescues in Mississippi explained that 
the first responder infrastructure in Mississippi was not destroyed, as 
it was in New Orleans, and thus Mississippi police and fire personnel 
were able to conduct many of the ground search and rescue operations-- 
allowing for quicker completion of the mission. 

Coast Guard officials told us that they coordinated closely with 
various responders for search and rescue operations. Specifically, the 
Louisiana State Police provided police escorts and shared information 
regarding 911 calls, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries provided local knowledge of areas to be searched. The 
Louisiana Department of Transportation also assisted response 
operations by providing two ferries that were used to evacuate 
individuals across the Mississippi River to higher ground. Coast Guard 
officials also explained that the Louisiana Air National Guard provided 
assistance with transportation of evacuees by air in some locations, 
and both were located at Zephyr Field delivering large quantities of 
ready-to-eat meals and water to survivors at various locations. Coast 
Guard officials explained that at the local level, the New Orleans fire 
and police personnel accompanied search teams to provide assistance and 
local knowledge. In addition, sheriff's office officials from Jefferson 
Parish provided police escorts, and St. Bernard Parish police and fire 
departments provided boat assets to Coast Guard disaster assistance 
teams. On the north side of Lake Pontchartrain, the Coast Guard 
coordinated search and rescue operations with the St. Tammany Parish 
Sheriff. Figure 4 shows a Coast Guard helicopter hoisting a rescuee to 
safety. 

Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

[End of figure] 

However, some aspects of search and rescue operations were not as 
efficient as they could have been.[Footnote 18] For example, different 
organizations involved in search and rescue did not always coordinate 
with each other. In New Orleans, there were two separate command 
centers for search and rescue operations, one being run by the 
Louisiana National Guard and one being run by the Coast Guard. In 
addition, there was a lack of clear search and rescue guidance across 
agencies because the National Response Plan and the National Search and 
Rescue Plan had never been fully integrated.[Footnote 19] 

Coast Guard Responded and Continues to Address Environmental Concerns: 

The Coast Guard oversaw the cleanup of over 8 million gallons of oil 
spilled as a result of Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 20] As the oil and 
chemical manufacturing industries have a significant presence in the 
Gulf Coast region, particularly in Louisiana, the potential for an 
unprecedented level of oil and hazardous substance contamination, 
especially in and around New Orleans, grew as Hurricane Katrina 
approached. To manage this response, unified commands were set up with 
the Coast Guard and its partners in advance of the storm.[Footnote 
21]These commands were involved in a range of decisions that allowed 
them to collectively assess the environmental situation and make 
tactical decisions. Coast Guard and state officials noted that persons 
representing federal, state, local, and industry entities were involved 
in these commands, and they worked together to manage the marine 
environmental protection response. As a result, Coast Guard officials 
told us that they were as prepared as possible to manage pollution 
events stemming from Hurricane Katrina. 

According to Coast Guard and Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality officials, the initial response to environmental concerns 
following Hurricane Katrina involved multi-agency assessment teams. 
Following the hurricane's landfall, these teams surveyed the entire 
coastal zone, including all area ports, marinas, and related 
facilities. A state official noted that assessment teams recorded the 
location and size of oil spills and assessed the damage.[Footnote 22] 
He stated that it took two helicopters, flying full-time for 3 weeks, 
to document all the debris to be cleaned up. Coast Guard officials said 
they coordinated their environmental mission priorities with other 
pressing Coast Guard missions by contracting for rented commercial 
planes for their pollution assessment overflights, rather than 
competing for aircraft needed to conduct pressing search and rescue 
missions. In addition, boat crews involved in search and rescue 
missions collected water samples to help document the damage to 
infrastructure and threats to human health, such as sewage plant 
flooding. 

Oil cleanup efforts were complicated by the magnitude of the spills and 
the location of the spills. According to the Coast Guard, the oil 
appeared as black film, covering dozens of neighborhoods and protected 
marshes and swamps along the Mississippi River. Most spills occurred 
south of New Orleans as a result of ruptured and spilled oil tanks. The 
Coast Guard estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were released, 
including 6 major spills, 4 medium spills, and about 1,000 minor 
spills.[Footnote 23] For example, 1 spill in the city was notable 
because it affected approximately 1,800 homes. The oil residue could be 
seen on vacated homes months later, when the odor of oil in the earth 
and debris still permeated the air. Another significant spill came from 
the discharge of about 3 million to 4 million gallons of oil dispersed 
into remote marshes, which were difficult to reach and therefore 
difficult to clean up. In addition, the storm destroyed 115 oil 
platforms offshore, significantly damaged 52, and set 19 adrift. 
Although, according to Coast Guard officials, there were no spills of 
significance offshore. 

To address the many spills, the Coast Guard reported that each 
pollution incident was prioritized, investigated, and resolved either 
through a private owner taking action to get it cleaned up or a rapid 
response team providing on-site mitigation. However, clean up in many 
cases was complicated by a number of environmental conditions, 
according to the Coast Guard. For example, responders faced heat stress 
and dehydration as well as a profusion of insects, poisonous snakes, 
and alligators as they conducted clean up operations in remote 
locations. Responders also faced uncertain communications, impassible 
roadways, and clogged waterways. 

Overall, about 1,000 personnel from federal, state, and local agencies 
and private industry were involved in the response to oil spills 
resulting from Hurricane Katrina. At one sector, Mobile, Alabama, over 
400 active duty and reserve personnel were brought in from Coast Guard 
commands throughout the United States, at various times, to assist with 
marine environmental protection response. Recognizing the Coast Guard's 
role in the prevention of spills, a Coast Guard official reported that 
numerous medium and major hazardous material releases and oil spills 
were prevented by response personnel. For example, response personnel 
removed oil and hazardous materials with the potential to be released 
into navigable waters from grounded vessels. In addition, Coast Guard 
Strike team members repaired piping, and multi-agency entry teams 
conducted entries into laboratories and chemical plants to recover 
hazardous materials.[Footnote 24] Larger issues were addressed first, 
such as leaking propane tanks that posed a threat to human health. 
Coast Guard officials also noted that response personnel disposed of 
thousands of containers and drums, some filled with petroleum products 
and pesticides. 

In addition to undertaking the oil pollution response, the Coast Guard 
also helped to address marine debris problems resulting from the over 
620 commercial and recreational vessels that were sunk or grounded in 
the aftermath of the storm. A Coast Guard official described "piles" of 
shrimping vessels on dry ground. Figure 5 shows a damaged vessel 
stranded on a front lawn. The Coast Guard established a Vessel Recovery 
Branch to address those vessels leaking oil or having the potential to 
release oil into navigable waters. A vessel database was also developed 
and provided current information regarding vessel status and tracking 
information on vessel owners. At the height of the vessel recovery 
operations, 82 Coast Guard personnel supported this mission. 

Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

According to Coast Guard officials, marine pollution response, which 
began after Hurricane Katrina moved through the region, is ongoing, 
with full recovery not expected until at least 2007. For example, as of 
spring 2006, in Mississippi, marine pollution cleanup was 50 percent 
complete. According to Coast Guard personnel, members of the Gulf 
Strike Team continue to support marine hazardous material recovery 
operations involving abandoned drums and containers in Mississippi and 
Alabama. The Coast Guard is also participating in an Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)-led oil and hazardous waste removal and 
disposal effort inland along coastal states. As of February 2006, a 
Coast Guard official estimated that multi-agency environmental teams 
(consisting of Coast Guard, EPA, FEMA, and state and local agencies) 
had addressed over 5,100 hazardous material cases. 

In addition, the Coast Guard has the mission assignment to remove all 
marine debris from along the entire coast of Mississippi. A team of 
federal and state partners identified over 235 sites in residential 
canals that required marine debris removal action. Cleanup work on the 
9 worst sites has begun and is estimated to continue until at least 
2007. 

Limited Maritime Commerce Restored in Four Days: 

Despite the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard 
reopened a few ports and restored the movement of some commerce within 
days after Hurricane Katrina struck. This quick response was important 
because U.S. ports and waterways handle over 2 billion tons of cargo 
annually. Much of that commerce flows through Louisiana, Texas, 
Alabama, and Mississippi--the same coastal areas affected by Hurricane 
Katrina. For example, the Port of New Orleans serves as the focal point 
for waterborne transportation of cargo to 28 states, and its cargo 
activity supported $37 billion in economic benefits to the country and 
generated $2.8 billion in federal tax revenue, according to the 
American Association of Port Authorities. Senior Coast Guard officials 
commanding certain Coast Guard units possess broad authorities in their 
role as the Captain of the Port (COTP). This authority includes the 
power to close or reopen ports within their jurisdiction--an action 
taken by COTPs at Sector New Orleans, Mobile, and Miami. To do this, a 
COTP typically works collaboratively with key stakeholders, including 
the local Area Maritime Security Committee, Harbor Safety Committee, 
port authorities, and industry officials to determine when it is 
appropriate to close and then reopen a port for commerce. In 
preparation for Hurricane Katrina, COTPs in the Gulf Coast region 
issued Marine Safety Information Bulletins to provide information 
regarding hurricane conditions at the various ports and projected 
timelines for port closures. The bulletins informed the port 
communities of specific time frames for prohibited and authorized 
operations at the ports. 

Before a port is reopened, the COTP is to ensure that the waterways are 
safe and navigable. One element of ensuring the safe facilitation of 
commerce is the Coast Guard's Aids to Navigation program and its system 
of aids. The aids to navigation system assists mariners in determining 
their position and a safe course of travel, and warns them of dangers 
and obstructions. The system typically consists of a series of devices, 
such as buoys, beacons, and lighthouses that facilitate safe 
navigation. Coast Guard officials reported that approximately 1,800 
aids to navigation were missing, relocated, or destroyed because of 
Hurricane Katrina. The aids to navigation teams, which specialize in 
the maintenance of aids to navigation equipment, were deployed to 
assess the damage and repair the aids. Additionally, surveys conducted 
of the underwater and surface areas along the Gulf Coast were 
coordinated with the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Navy and 
helped to determine the conditions of the waterways. According to Coast 
Guard officials, the aids to navigation teams assisted the COTPs to 
reopen the ports. The criteria used to close or reopen ports consisted 
of a combination of factors such as the status of the aids to 
navigation system, the status of various dock facilities, and the 
availability of electrical power and marine pilots.[Footnote 25] The 
Coast Guard's Standard Operating Procedures for District 8 call for a 
prioritized list of aids to navigation in that district to help 
identify important repair decisions to ensure that the aids to 
navigation most critical to the waterways/facilitation of commerce are 
repaired first. 

The damaged aids to navigation from Hurricane Katrina were a 
contributing factor in the temporary closure of 11 ports in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.[Footnote 26] Meanwhile, the Coast 
Guard was aware of the importance of the Mississippi River to the 
nation's economy, particularly the export of bulk grain. Despite the 
shipping disruptions along the Gulf Coast, the Coast Guard reopened 
three ports 4 days after Hurricane Katrina struck. Both the Ports of 
New Orleans and Mobile reopened Friday, September 2, 2005, under travel 
restrictions.[Footnote 27] As of September 29, 2005, about 4 weeks 
after Hurricane Katrina struck, 850 of the 1,350 aids to navigation 
discrepancies identified by the Coast Guard were repaired with 
permanent or temporary aids, and as of late June 2006, Coast Guard 
officials stated that 149 aids to navigation discrepancies still needed 
to be permanently or temporarily repaired. Of the 149 outstanding aids 
to navigation discrepancies, Coast Guard officials reported that 67 
temporary repairs have been completed. The remaining discrepancies are 
planned for repair by the end of July 2006, contingent upon the 
completion of waterway dredging, calm weather, and availability of an 
appropriate inland construction cutter. Figure 6 shows the Coast Guard 
repairing aids to navigation. 

Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

[End of figure] 

Coast Guard Confronted Several Challenges in Conducting Hurricane 
Katrina Operations: 

The Coast Guard experienced personnel security, communications, and 
logistics challenges during the Hurricane Katrina response. However, it 
was able to adapt its existing capabilities to confront those 
challenges. 

* Personnel security concerns. District 8 officials explained that as 
the days of operations lengthened and citizens remained stranded, 
security capabilities became an important component of rescue 
operations. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers we interviewed 
told us that their own personal security became a concern as stranded 
individuals became increasingly frustrated because they had no food or 
water. In some instances, tensions among survivors became heated when 
rescue swimmers had to prioritize rescues of children, women, and the 
elderly over able-bodied men. To address such concerns, rescue swimmers 
employed various tactics, including deploying 2 swimmers at one time 
(which is not standard procedure)--one swimmer to triage victims, and 
the other swimmer to assist in hoisting victims into the helicopter. 
Rescue swimmers also learned to use their skills as negotiators by 
assigning a citizen leader from within a group of irritated survivors 
to promote order. For boat operations, officials explained that they 
deployed Coast Guard security teams to provide security coverage for 
both Coast Guard and FEMA search and rescue personnel.[Footnote 28] 

* Communication challenges. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate 
communications challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina's damage to 
communications infrastructure as a result of planning, preparation, and 
assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. Aware that 
communications systems could be heavily damaged or destroyed during a 
natural disaster, Coast Guard officials had developed plans that were 
not reliant on communications systems and allowed personnel to act 
independently or with limited guidance from commanding officers. In 
addition, Coast Guard personnel prestaged emergency communications 
equipment--such as a mobile communications unit--and distributed 
satellite phones and cell phones to mitigate communications 
infrastructure breakdowns.[Footnote 29] After the storm passed, Coast 
Guard personnel procured two-way radios, utilized text messaging when 
cell phones could not make calls, and opened commercial e-mail accounts 
when the agency's own data network was down. In addition, the Coast 
Guard auxiliarists provided communications capabilities after the storm 
passed, including establishing a communications relay critical for 
conducting search and rescue operations. 

* Lack of food and water. According to Coast Guard officials, 
addressing food and water shortages in the days following Katrina's 
landfall became an important part of rescue operations. To address 
these shortages, Coast Guard personnel from other regions flew food and 
water to New Orleans, and personnel at Air Station New Orleans 
distributed their own emergency food and water supplies to survivors. 
Helicopter crews loaded food and water onto helicopters and distributed 
these supplies to individuals awaiting rescue. According to Air Station 
New Orleans' commanding officer, shipments of water were also delivered 
to the Superdome on a daily basis. Coast Guard responders also provided 
food and water to individuals at evacuation sites. 

* Difficulties securing fuel. Coast Guard officials we interviewed 
explained that securing fuel was challenging in the days following 
Hurricane Katrina's landfall. According to a senior official at Sector 
Mobile, fuel shortages presented a major obstacle to moving supplies 
into Mississippi. One response by the Coast Guard to the lack of fuel 
was to send responding units into the Gulf Coast Region with adequate 
fuel to conduct their missions. For example, aids to navigation teams 
sent from District 7, arrived in the Gulf Coast region as self- 
contained units with sufficient fuel, food, and other supplies to 
immediately begin work addressing compromised buoys and other 
navigational aids. Concurrent with this fuel shortage was the lack of 
electrical power, which rendered fuel pumps--dependent on electricity-
-inoperable. As part of their lessons learned, officials told us that 
in the future, emergency vehicles and first responders need to bring 
fuel with them in order to be self-sufficient. Officials also explained 
that having battery-operated fuel pumps could address problems 
associated with power outages and that this lesson would be applied to 
future contingency planning. 

Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and Collected 
Information to Improve Future Responses: 

Because Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in 
our nation's history, significant federal resources were mobilized to 
respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including resources of the 
Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, they managed the surge 
of people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane 
Katrina without significant damage to personnel, assets, operations, or 
financial resources. The Coast Guard is also reviewing its actions 
during the Hurricane Katrina response in order to address challenges 
and prepare for future hurricane seasons. 

Response to Hurricane Katrina Seemed to Have Had Limited Impact on 
Coast Guard: 

As of late September 2005, Coast Guard personnel sent to respond to 
Hurricane Katrina had returned to their homeports, with the exception 
of Coast Guard personnel specially trained in environmental protection 
issues, who remained in the Gulf Coast region. Coast Guard officials 
told us that personnel were certainly exhausted during the surge 
response, but at no time did they violate required safety standards. 
For example, they said all pilots adhered to aviation standards, flying 
no more than the maximum 8 hours within a 24-hour period. However, 
Coast Guard personnel did report several health-related issues as a 
result of their response to Hurricane Katrina. For example, during the 
Katrina response rescue swimmers reported that they suffered an 
assortment of medical problems, including pink eye, respiratory issues, 
skin rashes, infections, cuts, and scratches from nails, flying 
fiberglass (from the helicopter swirling around homes with loose 
insulation), and other windswept articles. Although the rescue swimmers 
we spoke to noted that most of these medical concerns seemed to clear 
up a week or two after their experiences in the Gulf Coast region, it 
remains uncertain whether some ailments (e.g., respiratory issues) 
could have long-term effects. 

Health effects stemming from mental stress may also be a long-term 
issue for the Coast Guard Katrina responders. During the Katrina 
efforts, the Coast Guard recognized that personnel responding to 
Hurricane Katrina, as well as those personnel who experienced the loss 
of their homes, suffered from mental stress. Therefore, Critical 
Incident Stress Management teams were mobilized to treat those 
personnel who worked in or lived in the ravaged Gulf Coast region. For 
example, after every flight, the rescue swimmers underwent an 
assessment for stress, including a stress debriefing, in addition to a 
physical decontamination because of the pollutants they encountered in 
the flood waters of New Orleans. We were told that Critical Incident 
Stress Management teams also provided support to several District 8 
staff who had lost their homes or had assisted colleagues in cleaning 
out their destroyed homes and are only now beginning to deal with the 
mental stress effects of the Katrina tragedy. 

Coast Guard officials also told us that they complied with asset 
maintenance standards. For example, they said all required maintenance 
of aircraft took place at one of the maintenance hubs set up in either 
Mobile, Alabama; Houston, Texas; or Elizabeth City, North Carolina. 
According to an engineering official we spoke to at the Aviation 
Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, visiting Coast Guard aircraft from 
around the country were returned to their homeports with updated 
maintenance completed. One Coast Guard official did note a concern for 
the future availability of replacement parts. For example, hoists that 
pulled up rescuees are usually replaced every 3 to 5 years. However, 
given the number of hoist rescues performed during the Hurricane 
Katrina response, the Coast Guard official speculated that replacement 
may need to occur in 2 years, affecting the number of hoists in Coast 
Guard inventory. Coast Guard officials also noted that for the 
Hurricane Katrina response the agency complied with vessel maintenance 
standards, adding that some maintenance can be accomplished by the crew 
while ships are under way. However for responses that require surging 
assets from around the country, like that of Hurricane Katrina, 
officials said that only ships that are ready and able to be deployed 
or those that can safely delay maintenance are sent. For example, Coast 
Guard officials told us that the cutter Oak delayed its maintenance for 
10 days while it responded to Hurricane Katrina, because it could 
safely do so. 

Data show that in fiscal year 2005, during which the Hurricane Katrina 
response occurred, operational hours for Coast Guard assets (ships and 
aircraft) increased over the previous year's total. For the fourth 
quarter of 2004, Coast Guard operational hours totaled 287,725 hours, 
while in the fourth quarter of 2005, they totaled 302,112 hours--a 
difference of 14,387 hours, due in part to the Hurricane Katrina 
response. According to a senior Coast Guard official, no Coast Guard 
asset was affected by Hurricane Katrina, meaning that assets were 
returned to their homeports able to perform routine missions. 

A number of Coast Guard resources responded to Hurricane Katrina in the 
Gulf Coast region. Table 2 summarizes the types and total number of 
assets that the Coast Guard currently maintains, along with the number, 
name, and homeports of those assets that responded to the Gulf Coast 
region.[Footnote 30] 

Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to 
the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak Response, August 26-September 16, 
2005: 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Medium-endurance cutter, 270-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 13; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3; 
Assets and homeport: Harriet Lane from LANT[A] Portsmouth, Va. 
Northland from LANT/ Portsmouth, Va. Spencer from LANT/Boston, Mass. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Seagoing buoy tender, 225-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 16; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2; 
Assets and homeport: Cypress from D8[B] /Mobile, Ala. Oak from 
D7/Charleston, SC. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Medium-endurance cutter, 210-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 14; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2; 
Assets and homeport: Confidence from LANT/Cape Canaveral, Fla. Decisive 
from LANT/ Pascagoula, Miss. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Coastal buoy tender, 175-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 14; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3; 
Assets and homeport: Barbara Mabrity from D8/Mobile, Ala. Harry 
Claiborne from D8/Galveston, Tex. Joshua Appleby from D7/St. 
Petersburg, Fla. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Patrol coastals, 179-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 4; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2; 
Assets and homeport: Tornado from D8/Pascagoula, Miss. Shamal from 
D8/Pascagoula, Miss. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Inland construction tenders, 160-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 4; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3; 
Assets and homeport: Hudson from D7/Miami Beach, Fla. Pamlico from 
D8/New Orleans, La. Saginaw from D8/Mobile, Ala. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Inland construction tenders, 75-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 8; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 3; 
Assets and homeport: Clamp from D8/Galveston, Tex. Hatchet from 
D8/Galveston, Tex. Mallet from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Coastal patrol boat, 87-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 65; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 9; 
Assets and homeport: Bonito from D8/Pensacola, Fla. Coho from D8/Panama 
City, Fla. Pelican from D8/ Abbeville, La. Pompano from D8/Gulfport, 
Miss. Razorbill from D8/ Gulfport, Miss. Seahawk from D8/Carrabelle, 
Fla. Stingray from D8/ Mobile, Ala. Sturgeon from D8/Grand Isle, La. 
Cobia from D8/Mobile, Ala. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: River buoy tender, 75-foot; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 12; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 2; 
Assets and homeport: Greenbrier from D8/Natchez, Miss. Wedge from 
D8/Demopolis, Ala. 

Coast Guard asset: Cutters: Total cutters; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 150; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 29; 
Assets and homeport: [Empty]. 

Coast Guard asset: Small Boats: Boats under 65 feet; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 825; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 131;
Assets and homeport: Districts 8 and 9. 

Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HC-130 long-range surveillance 
aircraft; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 27; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 18; 
Assets and homeport: 4 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC 5 from D7/Clearwater, 
Fla. 3 from D11/Sacramento, Calif. 1 from D17/Kodiak, Ark. 5 from 
ARSC[D] / Elizabeth City, NC. 

Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HU-25 medium-range surveillance 
aircraft; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 23; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 19; 
Assets and homeport: 5 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass. 5 from D7/Miami, Fla. 3 
from D8/ Corpus Christi, Tex. 2 from D11/San Diego, Calif. 4 from ATC 
Mobile/ Mobile, Ala. 

Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HH-60 medium-range recovery helicopter; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 41; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 19; 
Assets and homeport: 4 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass. 3 from D5/Elizabeth 
City, NC 9 from D7/ Clearwater, Fla. 3 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala. 

Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: HH-65 multimission cutter helicopter; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 95; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 30; 
Assets and homeport: 2 from D5/Atlantic City, NJ 1 D7/Savannah, Ga. 6 
from D7/Miami, Fla. 1 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 5 from D8/New 
Orleans, La. 5 from D8/ Houston, Tex. 2 from D9/Detroit, Mich. 7 from 
ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala. 1 from ARSC Elizabeth City, NC. 

Coast Guard asset: Aircraft[C]: Auxiliary aircraft; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: unknown; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 14 
aircraft; 
Assets and homeport: Primarily from District 8. 

Coast Guard asset: Total aircraft; 
Total number of Coast Guard assets for each category of asset: 186 
Coast Guard operational plus any Auxiliary aircraft; 
Number of Coast Guard assets responding in Gulf Coast region: 86 Coast 
Guard, 14 Auxiliary, which totals 100 responding aircraft; 
Assets and homeport: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Coast Guard. 

[A] LANT refers to assets owned by Atlantic Area Command. 

[B] The Coast Guard is divided into geographical areas, or districts. 
D8 refers to District 8, which includes the Gulf Coast region and moves 
up the Mississippi River. D1 refers to Coast Guard's District 1, in the 
New England area; D5 refers to District 5, the mid-Atlantic region; D7 
refers to District 7, southeastern region; D9 refers to District 9, 
Great Lakes region; and D11 refers to District 11, west coast area. 

[C] Number of aircraft as of February 2006. 

[D] The Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (ARSC) in 
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, overhauls and makes major repairs and 
modifications to all Coast Guard aircraft and associated equipment. 

[End of table] 

With regard to operational impact, Coast Guard officials told us that 
in some cases, stations that sent personnel and assets to the Gulf 
Coast region experienced challenges in maintaining operations. Relative 
to other military services, the Coast Guard is small,[Footnote 31] and 
when resources are shifted to any one specific mission area, other 
mission areas may suffer. Although Coast Guard officials noted that 
they were generally able to continue with their various missions across 
the nation, including boarding high-interest vessels approaching United 
States ports, there were instances where the movement of Coast Guard 
assets out of their normal areas of operation affected activity levels 
in these locations. For example, Coast Guard units in Florida sent many 
air and surface assets to the Gulf Coast region to respond to Hurricane 
Katrina, and while these assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast region, 
the Coast Guard observed a spike in the level of illegal migration 
activity off of the Florida coast. In response, according to Coast 
Guard officials, once the assets returned to the Florida region, the 
Coast Guard initiated a more intensive air and sea patrol schedule to 
markedly announce its return to the area and focus on interdicting 
illegal migrants. 

Coast Guard Satisfied with Reimbursement of Hurricane Katrina Mission 
Costs: 

Part of Hurricane Katrina's impact on Coast Guard personnel, assets, 
and operations at its districts nationwide was that the Coast Guard 
incurred unexpected costs conducting Hurricane Katrina 
missions.[Footnote 32] When we discussed the amount of funding 
requested to reimburse the Coast Guard for its Hurricane Katrina 
activities, Coast Guard officials told us they were satisfied with the 
reimbursement process with both FEMA and EPA. According to these 
officials, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard had received "dollar 
for dollar" the amounts requested for reimbursement, meaning that for 
every bill submitted and processed, the Coast Guard received the same 
amount in reimbursement. Coast Guard officials added that the review of 
billing documentation by FEMA and EPA officials can take 30 to 60 days. 
Coast Guard officials also stated that they met with representatives 
from FEMA this year to reconcile Hurricane Katrina mission assignments, 
funding ceilings, and costs, and these accounting lines and totals were 
consistent. 

As table 3 shows, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard reported that 
it had spent $98,811,320 in its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
and had billed FEMA and EPA $66,746,961 and received $48,634,090 in 
reimbursements, given the 30-to 60-day delay in FEMA/EPA review of 
Coast Guard billing documentation. However, even with the delay, Coast 
Guard officials we spoke to were satisfied with the reimbursement 
process with both FEMA and EPA. 

Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for 
Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of 
April 12, 2006: 

Stafford Act funding: Coast Guard mission assignments (reimbursement 
from FEMA); 
Description of mission assignments: Search and rescue, wreck and debris 
removal, and deployment of strike forces, among other activities; 
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: $49,746,004; 
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: $34,701,729; 
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006: 
$16,588,858. 

Stafford Act funding: Coast Guard mission assignments (reimbursement 
from the EPA); 
Description of mission assignments: Marine pollution response effort, 
including technical assistance, and direct support to EPA, among other 
activities; 
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: 49,065,316; 
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: 32,045,232; 
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006: 
32,045,232. 

Stafford Act funding: Total; 
Description of mission assignments: [Empty]; 
Amount of Coast Guard expenditures: $98,811,320; 
Amount of reimbursement request submitted: $66,746,961; 
Amount of reimbursement funding received as of April 12, 2006: 
$48,634,090.  

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and FEMA data. 

Note: Tables 1 and 2 focused exclusively on the Coast Guard response to 
only Hurricane Katrina; table 3 focuses on the financial impact of the 
Coast Guard response to both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita missions. 
Coast Guard officials noted when accounting for costs associated with 
Hurricane Katrina, they included costs associated with Hurricane Rita. 
Note that table 3 does not include damages suffered by the Coast Guard, 
including the destruction of several stations, and damage to assets 
suffered during the storms. These infrastructure costs continue to be 
identified and updated by the Coast Guard, and supplemental funding has 
been requested to address these damages. Also note that the amount of 
reimbursement request submitted to EPA, and the amount of reimbursement 
funding received as of April 12, 2006, is the same. Coast Guard 
officials reported that the process of reimbursement from EPA allows 
for quick reimbursement because the missions are more typical of the 
types of environmental response conducted by the Coast Guard. We did 
not verify the accuracy of the data provided by the Coast Guard. 

[End of table]

Coast Guard Collected Information to Improve Future Storm Preparations: 

According to Coast Guard officials, the agency has collected 
information regarding its response to Hurricane Katrina and included it 
in a Coast Guard database. In addition, while we conducted site visits 
for this review, we met with a wide range of Coast Guard personnel who 
participated in the response to Hurricane Katrina who shared with us 
their views on certain actions that the Coast Guard could take in the 
future to further improve the agency's response to an event like 
Hurricane Katrina. These actions include efforts to (1) improve the 
agency's systems to track Coast Guard personnel in real time in order 
to better recall personnel when an evacuation is over and forces are 
sent to respond to the emergency event; (2) become more "expeditionary" 
in nature by having evacuating forces remove such things as certain 
tools and equipment that would allow them to be more self-sustaining in 
order to assist in a disaster response; (3) be more flexible in 
identifying safe places for Coast Guard personnel to relocate to in the 
event of an evacuation; and (4) be flexible in drafting orders for 
personnel to report for duty at a specific time and place in order to 
respond to contingencies that may arise during the course of an 
emergency. 

Furthermore, a senior Coast Guard official reported that the Coast 
Guard has developed a number of after-action reports that it has 
incorporated into its Contingency Preparedness System database--known 
as CG SAILS--the official Coast Guard database for lessons learned. 
According to this official, having these reports in this system allows 
Coast Guard personnel to access this information and incorporate it 
into other agency planning and contingency efforts. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, including the Coast Guard, 
for comment. DHS and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which 
have been incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other 
interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix I. 

Signed by: 

Stephen L. Caldwell: 
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Co-Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Maria Cantwell: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Don Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James L. Oberstar: 
Ranking Democratic Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bob Filner: 
Ranking Democratic Member: 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Harold Rogers: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice 
Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Individuals making key contributions to this report include Joel 
Aldape, Nancy Briggs, Lisa Canini, Billy Commons, Christine Davis, Josh 
Diosomito, Michele Fejfar, Kathryn Godfrey, Dawn Hoff, and Lori Kmetz. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future 
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 
May 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, 
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05- 
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 
2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 
January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime 
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: 
December 10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective 
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 
September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate 
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. 
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning 
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, 
D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing 
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 
31, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 
D.C.: December 16, 2003. 

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-04- 
315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003. 

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, 
D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 
Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term 
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force 
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02- 
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final 
Report of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington, D.C.: 
February 15, 2006), and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2006). These committees were also critical of 
nonfederal entities, including state and nongovernmental organizations. 

[2] 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1). 

[3] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206. 

[4] On May 25, 2006, DHS revised the NRP to address certain weaknesses 
or ambiguities identified following Hurricane Katrina. The revised NRP 
makes clear that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for 
declaring and managing incidents of national significance such as 
Hurricane Katrina. Incidents of lesser severity requiring federal 
involvement are also subject to the NRP, but implementation of the NRP 
is to be scaled and flexible depending on the nature of the event. 

[5] The responsibility for determining whether an incident of national 
significance meets the NRP's definition of a "catastrophic incident" 
rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary makes a 
"catastrophic incident" designation to activate the provisions of the 
annex. The Secretary declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national 
significance on August 30, 2005, but never declared it a catastrophic 
incident. The revised NRP makes explicit that the Secretary could 
activate the annex to address events that are projected to mature to 
catastrophic proportions, such as strengthening hurricanes. 

[6] The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a nonmilitary volunteer organization 
administered by the Commandant of the Coast Guard under the direction 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard Auxiliary was 
created to assist the Coast Guard to promote safety and effect rescues 
on and over the high seas and on navigable waters; promote efficiency 
in the operation of motorboats and yachts; foster a wider knowledge of, 
and better compliance with, the laws, rules, and regulations governing 
the operation of motorboats and yachts; and facilitate other operations 
of the Coast Guard. 

[7] See 6 U.S.C. § 468(a). The Coast Guard's 11 mission program areas 
include ports, waterways, and coastal security; illegal drug 
interdiction; undocumented migrant interdiction; defense readiness; 
other law enforcement; search and rescue; living marine resources; aids 
to navigation; ice operations; marine environmental protection; and 
marine safety. 

[8] The Coast Guard noted that activities associated with its ports, 
waterways, and coastal security mission program--which focus on 
protecting the maritime domain, preventing terrorist attacks, and 
responding to and recovering from those that do occur--were also 
heightened following Hurricane Katrina. Activities performed under this 
mission program include aerial, waterborne and shore surveillance 
patrols, vessel security boardings, vessel escorts, and enforcement of 
international and domestic security standards and regulations. 
According to the Coast Guard, ports, waterways, and coastal security 
program activities were heightened, both within the Gulf region and 
elsewhere, in recognition of the increased regional vulnerability and 
national risk that could have resulted from the consequences of an 
attack on the oil and chemical sector during this time. However, the 
scope of our review focused on the three mission programs that were 
most closely aligned and directly involved with the immediate response 
to the natural disaster presented by Hurricane Katrina. 

[9] One of the Coast Guard's key functions involves the facilitation of 
maritime commerce and ensuring the security of waterways and waterside 
facilities. These activities are typically conducted under several 
Coast Guard mission programs, including marine safety; ports, 
waterways, coastal security; and aids to navigation. Port security and 
commerce functions within ports resides with the Coast Guard Captain of 
the Port, whose responsibilities are summarized at 33 C.F.R. §1.01-30. 

[10] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006). 

[11] U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. 
Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, (Washington, D.C.: 2002). 

[12] Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the 
Secretary of Homeland Security has authority to create area maritime 
security committees at ports across the country to assist the Coast 
Guard in addressing vulnerabilities and risks at the port level. See 46 
U.S.C. § 70112(a) (2), 33 C.F.R. § 103.310. Composed of representatives 
from the federal, state, local and private sector, these committees 
provide a forum for sharing information on issues related to port 
security. See 33 C.F.R. § 103.305. 

[13] The Coast Guard is organized into two major commands that are 
responsible for overall mission performance: one in the Pacific area 
and the other in the Atlantic area, including the Gulf of Mexico 
region. These commands are divided into nine districts, which in turn 
are organized into over 20 air stations and 35 sectors that provide 
more localized command and control of field units and resources, 
including approximately 188 multimission stations and 119 patrol boats. 

[14] The Coast Guard mandates annual exercises for these Severe 
Weather/Hurricane plans. For example, Districts 1 (New England), 5 (mid-
Atlantic), 7 (Florida), and 8 (Gulf Coast region) must exercise their 
Hurricane Plan; while District 9 (Great Lake region) must exercise its 
Heavy Weather/Flood Plan. 

[15] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006). 

[16] Beginning on August 29, 2005 and continuing for about 17 days, 
Coast Guard officials reported conducting 24,135 rescues of people by 
boat and helicopter, and evacuating 9,409 people from hospitals, as a 
result of Hurricane Katrina. By comparison, for all of 2004, the Coast 
Guard responded to more than 32,000 calls for rescue assistance and 
saved nearly 5,500 lives. 

[17] To learn more about the Department of Defense and the National 
Guard response to Hurricane Katrina, please see GAO, Hurricane Katrina: 
Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to 
Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2006). 

[18] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[19] The National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) describes the roles and 
responsibilities of federal agencies during different search and rescue 
situations. The National Response Plan (2004), also provides guidance 
regarding search and rescue; it did not fully incorporate the roles 
previously described in the National Search and Rescue Plan. 

[20] To put this amount into perspective, the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill 
was around 11 million gallons. 

[21] Unified command is a unified team that manages an incident by 
establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. It is 
a structure that brings together the incident commanders of all major 
organizations involved in an incident and provides a forum for these 
agencies to coordinate an effective response and make consensus 
decisions. This is accomplished without loss or abdication of agency or 
organizational authority, responsibility, or accountability. 

[22] Photographs of the oil spills and debris were taken to document 
their location and size. The photographs not only showed the progress 
of the cleanup but established a record of the pollution and 
discouraged illegal dumping of oil or hazardous material that could be 
intentionally released and then attributed to the storm. 

[23] A major spill contains at least 100,000 gallons, and a medium 
spill contains at least 10,000 gallons, while amounts less than 10,000 
gallons would be considered minor spills. 

[24] The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force is composed of 168 
highly trained professionals with specialized skills for combating 
environmental pollution from oil discharges, hazardous substance and 
biological releases, and weapons of mass destruction events. The Strike 
Force is composed of three Strike Teams located in the Atlantic, 
Pacific, and Gulf Coast regions to allow for rapid deployment. 

[25] For the purposes of this report, a marine pilot is a person 
licensed under state or federal law who assumes responsibility for a 
vessel at a particular place for the purpose of navigating it through a 
river or a channel or from or into a port. 

[26] Affected ports included New Orleans, Mobile, Gulfport, Baton 
Rouge, Pensacola, Panama City, Pascagoula, Biloxi, Bayou La Batre, Port 
Fourchon, and Morgan City. 

[27] The COTP will activate maritime travel restrictions when waterways 
are difficult to navigate. These restrictions might include travel of 
ships only in the daytime or allowing only certain size ships to travel 
on the waterways. 

[28] The security teams consisted of Maritime Safety and Security Teams 
(MSSTs), which were established after September 11, 2001, and designed 
to provide quick-response capabilities to protect U.S. ports and 
waterways; and Port Security Units (PSUs), which are composed of Coast 
Guard reserve personnel and trained to provide port security and harbor 
defense duties for military assets overseas. 

[29] Although Coast Guard after-action reports indicate that mobile 
communications units did not provide communications capabilities needed 
for operations, officials in District 8 told us that these units were 
useful in providing communications support. 

[30] Along with assets, a wide range of Coast Guard operational and 
support teams were sent to assist in the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Port Security Units, Law Enforcement Detachment teams, and Maritime 
Safety and Security Teams assisted in security and force protection 
missions. Strike Teams addressed pollution concerns. Transportable 
Multi-Mission Communication Center and Transportable Multi-Agency 
Communication Center assets mitigated some of the communications 
challenges the Coast Guard experienced. Other teams deployed during the 
peak Coast Guard response included several Emergency Response Teams, 
Civil Engineering Unit Damage Assessment Teams, and Incident Management 
Assist Teams. 

[31] Consisting of approximately 39,000 active duty personnel, the 
Coast Guard is a multimission agency with a long-standing federal 
leadership role in protecting life and property at sea, such as 
directing search and rescue operations. Furthermore, the Coast Guard is 
a military service responsible for protecting U.S. ports and waterways. 
As of December 2005, other U.S. military branches were the U.S. Army, 
with approximately 489,000 active duty personnel; the U.S. Navy, with 
approximately 359,000 active duty personnel; the U.S. Air Force, with 
approximately 352,000 active duty personnel; and the U.S. Marines, with 
approximately 179,000 active duty personnel. 

[32] Coast Guard officials reported that as of April 12, 2006, its FEMA-
directed missions in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had a 
funding ceiling of $191,913,001, meaning FEMA authorized the Coast 
Guard to spend up to this amount to conduct missions in response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, the EPA authorized the Coast 
Guard to spend up to $171,327,000 to conduct specific pollution 
response missions. According to Coast Guard officials, this amount is 
likely to grow as mission assignments in the area of pollution response 
continue to be added, and could take at least a year to complete. 

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