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Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives: 

July 2006: 

Rail Transit: 

Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA's State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

GAO-06-821: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-821, a report to Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure. Safety and security oversight of rail 
transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies 
following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In this 
report, GAO addressed: (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is 
designed; (2) what is known about the program’s impact; and (3) 
challenges facing the program. We also provide information about 
oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To do our 
work we surveyed state oversight agencies and transit agencies covered 
by FTA’s program. 

What GAO Found: 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate 
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires 
states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of 
rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies 
are responsible for developing a program standard that transit agencies 
must meet and reviewing the performance of the transit agencies against 
that standard. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews 
as part of their responsibilities, TSA also has security oversight 
authority over transit agencies. 

Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit 
agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several 
transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such 
as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is 
ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA 
has not definitively shown the program’s benefits and has not developed 
performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as 
required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to 
its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, 
resulting in a lack of information to track the program’s trends. FTA 
officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance 
measures and goals to help determine the program’s impact, especially 
since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. 
However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that 
the program’s new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a 
top priority. 

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 
First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, 
officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not 
having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight 
agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical 
training would help address this variation. Second, transit and 
oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are 
to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail 
inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could 
result in duplication of effort. 

Figure: Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal 
Railway, GAO. 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct FTA to 
(1) set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for 
maintaining the stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies and (2) 
develop and encourage completion of a recommended training curriculum 
for oversight agency staff. Also, we recommend that the Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Assistant 
Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to 
coordinate their security oversight activities and audits with FTA and 
transit and oversight agencies. FTA and TSA generally concurred with 
the report and are considering how to implement the recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-821]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud on 
(202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program: 

Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; 
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document 
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and 
Security: 

FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems: 

Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They 
Oversee: 

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee 
Transit Agency Safety and Security: 

Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies: 

Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This 
Review: 

Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This 
Review: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State 
Safety Oversight Program: 

Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in 
State Safety Oversight Program: 

Abbreviations: 

APTA: American Public Transportation Association: 
ATSA: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 
CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DOT: Department of Transportation: 
DRPA: Delaware River Port Authority: 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 
FMCSA: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration: 
FRA: Federal Railroad Administration: 
FTA: Federal Transit Administration: 
FTE: full-time equivalent: 
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 
NJDOT: New Jersey Department of Transportation: 
MUNI: San Francisco Municipal Railway: 
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board: 
PATCO: Port Authority Transit Corporation: 
PennDOT: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation: 
PHMSA: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration: 
PTSB: Public Transportation Safety Board: 
TOC: Tri-State Oversight Committee: 
TSA : Transportation Security Administration: 
TSI: Transportation Safety Institute: 
WMATA : Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority: 

July 26, 2006: 

The Honorable Don Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James L. Oberstar: 
Ranking Democratic Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts 
for less than 6 percent of all public transportation's accidents while 
providing almost 32 percent of all public transportation's passenger 
trips, making it one of the safest modes of public transportation. 
However, safety and security are still concerns, especially as the 
number of rail transit systems--and therefore the number of passengers 
riding rail transit--increases. For example, the number of rail transit 
systems in FTA's State Safety Oversight program increased from 32 in 
1997 to 42 in 2006, and as many as 7 new systems are expected to open 
in the next 3 years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities and 
accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, while 
fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per year (with an approximate average 
of 40 per year) between 1999 and 2005, total reported accidents 
decreased 3 percent. Finally, recent acts of terrorism on European and 
Indian transit systems illustrate the need to maintain high levels of 
safety and security for transit. 

The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety 
and security of the nation's transportation system. For example, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several 
transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical 
standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective 
modes must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these 
agencies use federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to 
determine compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they 
issue. Finally, these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy 
fines to transportation operators who do not comply with regulations. 

FTA's oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT 
agencies. In 1982, FTA's role in transit safety evolved when Congress 
gave it the discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any 
operation financed by the agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to 
withhold funds until a plan for correcting the conditions had been 
approved, but did not give it power to levy fines or take legal actions 
against transit agencies.[Footnote 1] However, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) suggested that states and localities 
take a more proactive role in overseeing transit safety, and that FTA 
closely monitor this state and local oversight.[Footnote 2] 
Subsequently, in 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations 
requiring states to designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety 
and security of rail transit agencies and (2) withhold federal funds if 
a state did not comply with the regulations. Through the resulting 
State Safety Oversight program, which became effective in 1997, FTA 
requires states to designate an oversight agency to implement FTA 
safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies. In addition, 
in 2001, Congress passed legislation creating the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA), and defined its primary responsibility 
as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. While TSA's most 
public role to date has been its airport screening duties, the agency 
is taking several steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system, 
including developing a rail inspector force. 

To assist with Congress' oversight activities, we (1) describe how the 
State Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known 
about the impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, 
and (3) identify any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. 
In addition, you asked us to provide information on how the State 
Safety Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems cross 
state lines. See appendix I for a description of program implementation 
where transit systems cross state lines. 

To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range 
of stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed 
program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the 
impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed 
FTA documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit 
agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges 
facing the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state 
safety oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating 
rail transit agencies.[Footnote 3] We visited 8 oversight agencies and 
17 transit agencies. We selected these agencies to present a cross- 
section of transit and oversight agencies in major cities, smaller 
cities, states with several rail transit agencies, and states with only 
one rail system. In addition, 2 of the 17 transit agencies that we 
selected will soon begin operations to see how the program may be 
incorporated into new transit systems. Also, we selected 3 of the 17 
because they cross state boundaries, so that we could determine how the 
program functions in these regions. We interviewed staff of the transit 
and oversight agencies we visited and reviewed relevant program 
documentation such as interagency agreements and program standards. We 
conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III 
for more detailed information on our methodology.) 

Results in Brief: 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate 
to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. 

* FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight agency and 
develops rules and guidance that those designated agencies are to use 
to perform their oversight. FTA's rules and guidance are generally 
based on a system safety approach to provide a comprehensive and 
organized approach to safety and security. In addition, FTA officials 
require that oversight agencies include risk management components in 
what they require of the transit agencies they oversee. FTA officials 
stated that these risk management components, such as hazard analysis 
and risk mitigation procedures, are applicable to transit and are 
similar to those used in other transportation mode safety approaches. 
Although FTA develops and enforces regulations, it neither directly 
oversees transit operations, nor provides funding for the program after 
state oversight agencies are designated. 

* The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee transit 
agencies' activities. Among other things, they review transit agencies' 
safety and security system plans, audit the transit agencies at least 
every 3 years, and conduct periodic reviews of safety and security 
trends. States have designated several different types of agencies to 
serve as state oversight agencies. Most commonly, states have 
designated their transportation departments to fulfill this function, 
but public utility commissions, public safety agencies, and regional 
transportation authorities also serve in this role. In terms of 
funding, although states can use federal New Starts[Footnote 4] funding 
to set up a new oversight agency, states must support the continuing 
operation of the oversight agency with other, generally non-federal, 
sources of funding. Officials in 17 of the 24 state oversight agencies 
with whom we spoke reported that they use state funds for the program, 
while 10 of the 24 reported they charge the transit agency for 
oversight. 

* Transit agencies develop and implement safety and security plans, 
assess hazardous conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight 
agency, conduct self audits, and keep the state oversight agency 
apprised of corrective actions. 

* Federal agencies other than FTA have oversight responsibility for 
part of the safety and security of rail transit operations. Since 2003, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had a role in transit 
security. DHS's Office of Grants and Training provides grants to 
transit and other local agencies to enhance security while TSA has 
security regulatory authority over rail transit agencies. TSA recently 
hired and is deploying a rail security inspector force to oversee 
compliance with existing security directives and any future 
regulations. In addition, FRA has jurisdiction to regulate the safety 
of portions of rail transit systems that share track or rights-of-way 
with the general railroad system. 

Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety 
Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the 
safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited 
information showing its impact on safety and security. Officials at 23 
of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agency officials 
with whom we spoke believe the program is worthwhile. The transit 
agency officials primarily cite the importance of having state 
oversight agency staff "look over their shoulder," review safety and 
security trends, and require audits and corrective actions. Although 
many officials support the program, FTA's methods for obtaining 
information on transit safety and security (i.e., transit and oversight 
agency data and FTA audits of the oversight agencies) do not include 
performance measures and related program goals. FTA has not conducted 
audits every 3 years, as envisioned when the program began. According 
to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated audit schedule 
because they were reassessing the priorities for the program after the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FTA issued annual reports from 
1999 through 2003 that track transit accident, crash, fatality, and 
other safety data; however, FTA officials have had difficulty 
identifying performance measures for the program and setting 
performance goals, because of the relatively low number of fatalities 
and incidents, and the varying design of rail transit systems, such as 
street trolleys and heavy rail. Furthermore, FTA audited all oversight 
agencies at least once in the past 8 years (except those that began 
operations in 2004 or later). They noted that while they conducted only 
four audits of oversight agencies from 2001 to 2004, they also 
conducted nine "safety and security readiness reviews" to ensure 
transit systems about to begin operations would be able to safely and 
securely begin passenger operations. Although the agency was focused on 
security after September 11, 2001, this infrequent schedule limits 
FTA's ability to conduct oversight, including collecting information on 
the safety oversight agencies and making informed and timely revisions 
to the program. Recent changes in FTA's program regulations and 
leadership provide an opportunity to address this lack of information, 
performance measures, and program goals, and to resume its stated audit 
schedule. For example, FTA has issued a revision to the regulations 
governing the State Safety Oversight program, recommitted to the audit 
process, and signed a contract that includes developing performance 
measures by the end of fiscal year 2006 and evaluating how new rail 
systems are implementing the program.[Footnote 5] 

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 
First, the amount of staff and the level of state oversight-staff 
expertise (and thus their potential ability to oversee transit 
agencies) varies widely across the country. For example, one oversight 
agency requires its staff to have at least 5 years of rail transit 
experience. In contrast, another oversight agency assigned a state DOT 
transportation planner to work on safety and security oversight as a 
collateral duty. Although no officials identified a safety or security 
problem resulting from a lack of staff or expertise, officials from 16 
of 24 state safety oversight agencies raised concerns about possibly 
not having enough qualified staff to carry out their oversight. 
Officials from three state oversight agencies stated that additional 
funding to hire more staff for this program would be helpful. Most 
transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe that 
federal funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum would 
improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency 
personnel. While FTA provides technical support on and supports the 
exchange of best practices for meeting its regulations, these 
activities do not include training on oversight approaches or providing 
funding to attend training classes. This contrasts with the approach 
taken by other DOT agencies, such as FRA and PHMSA, which provide free 
training or use agency funds to pay for state agency personnel to 
attend training sessions, in at least some instances. Although FTA 
considered addressing the lack of consistency in qualifications among 
state agencies in its recent regulations, FTA officials determined the 
agency lacks the legal authority to direct states to hire state safety 
oversight personnel with specific experience, training, or 
certification. A second challenge to implementing the program, 
according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of 
37 transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the federal role in 
transit security given that TSA has no formally defined role in FTA's 
program--even though it is the lead agency on security matters and has 
regulatory authority over security activities in transportation 
including rail. Although TSA's program is still developing, several 
oversight and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were 
concerned about the potential for duplication of effort given that 
state safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and comment on 
transit systems' security plans. Several transit agency officials 
described this as a particular concern due to the already limited 
resources they had available for responding to oversight activities. 
TSA and FTA recognize this concern and have begun discussions on how to 
coordinate their oversight efforts. 

To help ensure that FTA has sufficient information to evaluate the 
program's performance, we are recommending that FTA's new program 
leadership set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for 
maintaining FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies' 
performance at least once every 3 years. Also, to help oversight agency 
staff obtain adequate training to perform their duties, we are 
recommending that FTA develop a recommended training curriculum for 
oversight agency staff and work with oversight agencies to identify 
ways to address training deficiencies that exist among oversight agency 
staff. Finally, to reduce the potential for duplication of effort and 
confusion on the part of oversight and transit agencies regarding the 
security portion of the program, we are recommending that FTA and TSA 
coordinate their security oversight activities, including performing 
security audits in a coordinated fashion. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from FTA, TSA, and 
NTSB provided comments generally concurring with the report. 
Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working to 
determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA provided a 
technical comment, which we included in the report. 

Background: 

In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),[Footnote 6] which added Section 28 to 
the Federal Transit Act.[Footnote 7] ISTEA required FTA to establish a 
state-managed safety and security oversight program for rail transit 
agencies. As a result, on December 27, 1995,[Footnote 8] FTA published 
a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety 
Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA's rule in this report), for 
improving the safety and security of rail transit agencies. State 
oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve transit 
agencies' safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by 
January 1, 1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they 
incorporated APTA's 1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit 
System Safety Program Plans to describe steps the state oversight 
agencies should take in developing the program standards that transit 
agencies would have to meet. 

In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule's publication, 5 of 19 states 
affected by the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail 
transit safety and security, and no oversight agency met all the 
requirements in the FTA rule. During the first few years of 
implementation, FTA worked with states to develop compliant programs 
that addressed FTA's requirements. Ten years after FTA promulgated the 
initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the Federal Register on 
April 29, 2005. The FTA rule stated that oversight agencies had to 
comply with the revised rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions address, in 
part, the needs of a growing oversight community[Footnote 9] and NTSB's 
recommendations arising from transit accident investigations. For 
example, according to FTA and NTSB, NTSB found that the initial rule 
did not include the requirement that oversight agencies verify transit 
agencies are following safe and secure operating procedures by formally 
documenting how transit agency employees were performing specific work 
functions in compliance with the transit agency's rules and procedures-
-a process known as "proficiency and efficiency testing." Thus, the 
revised rule specifies what the state oversight agency must require of 
rail transit systems regarding such verification, and incorporates into 
the regulation material previously incorporated by reference to the 
APTA manual. Finally, the revised rule included additional information 
on ensuring rail transit security and emergency preparedness. 

FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the 
State Safety Oversight program--and hired the current Program Manager 
in March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties 
in addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff 
within the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to 
transit and oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA 
has devoted a Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a 
Training Manager, Data Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available 
to assist on an as-needed basis. FTA regional personnel are not 
formally involved with the program's day-to-day activities, though 
officials from several FTA Regional Offices help address specific 
compliance issues that occasionally arise at transit agencies. Also, 
staff in at least one FTA Regional Office have taken it upon themselves 
to take an active role supporting transit agencies and oversight 
agencies in meeting the program's requirements. In addition, regional 
staff help states with new transit agencies establish new oversight 
agencies, help new transit agencies create safety and security plans, 
and have helped facilitate disputes between oversight and transit 
agencies as needed. However, after a transit system begins operations, 
the program is primarily managed from FTA's headquarters office. FTA 
also relies on contractors to do many of the day-to-day activities 
ranging from developing and implementing FTA's audit program of state 
oversight agencies to developing and providing training classes on 
system safety. 

FTA's rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems 
operating in their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed 
guideway system as any light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail, 
inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is not 
regulated by FRA and: 

* is included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles or 
receives funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 
U.S.C. 5336); or: 

* has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be 
included in FTA's calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive 
funding under FTA's formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 
5336). 

Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included 
in the State Safety Oversight program. 

Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal 
Railway; GAO. 

[End of figure] 

FTA's rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as 
commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are 
therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight 
authority over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that 
share track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system.[Footnote 
10] Furthermore, the revised rule's definition of "rail fixed guideway 
system" includes systems built entirely without FTA capital funds, but 
that intend to receive FTA formula funding. Examples of these systems 
include Houston's METRORail system and the New Jersey Transit RiverLINE 
system. Rail transit operations that do not receive FTA formula funds 
are not subject to oversight through FTA's program. Las Vegas' monorail 
line does not receive FTA formula funds and therefore does not fall 
within the FTA program. However, some of the rail transit systems-- 
including automated airport people-movers and sightseeing tramways-- 
that are not subject to the FTA program may be subject to state- 
mandated oversight in certain states. 

FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has 
implications for their ability to provide oversight.[Footnote 11] 
According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety and security 
operations at transit agencies except for purposes of national defense 
or in cases of regional or national emergency.[Footnote 12] In 
addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may, however, 
institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including 
safety-and security-related training, research, and demonstration 
projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through 
grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of 
grants, such as certain safety and security statutory and regulatory 
requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for noncompliance with the 
conditions of a grant.[Footnote 13] In relation to the State Safety 
Oversight program, both the authorizing statute and the FTA rule state 
FTA may withhold urbanized area program funds from states that do not 
meet the requirements of the program.[Footnote 14] For example, FTA 
invoked this authority and withheld federal funding from two states 
that failed to meet initial deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA 
withheld approximately $95 million in federal funding from one state 
for its failure to designate a state safety oversight agency and 
approximately $2.3 million from another state for failure to meet the 
FTA rule's implementation deadlines. 

FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA 
oversees over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in 
addition to Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly 
enforce safety statutes or regulations against railroads using a 
"toolkit" of consequences, which vary in severity and are used to 
compel rail carriers to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly, 
FRA will issue a civil penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in 
compliance with a particular regulation. Depending on the infraction, 
however, FRA can also issue an emergency order (the strongest response 
to noncompliance) or it can cite a defect (a minor deficiency that 
needs to be addressed but is not egregious enough to warrant a fine). 
FRA officials stated that the agency trains and maintains its own cadre 
of safety inspectors that are authorized to conduct safety inspections 
at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. In addition to these 
inspectors, FRA manages a program called the State Rail Safety 
Participation Program which allows states to employ their own FRA- 
certified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations. 

Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), 
federal agencies should design programs with measurable goals that 
support the agency's strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift 
agencies' focus from simply monitoring activities undertaken to 
measuring the results of these activities. Each agency's strategic plan 
is to include a mission statement, a set of outcome-related strategic 
goals, and a description of how the agency intends to achieve these 
goals. To measure progress toward the strategic goals, we have 
previously reported that the agency should also have a plan for 
collecting data to measure and evaluate program performance.[Footnote 
15] Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is difficult to 
determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended purpose and 
whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts should be 
increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere. 

Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program: 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 
other federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies 
collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. 
Under the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations 
and guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight 
agencies to ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing 
technical assistance and other information; FTA provides funding to 
oversight agencies in only limited instances under the program. State 
oversight agencies directly oversee the safety and security of rail 
transit systems by reviewing safety and security plans, performing 
audits, and investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies are 
responsible for developing safety and security plans, reporting 
incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other 
regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, 
federal agencies such as FRA, DHS's Office of Grants and Training, and 
TSA also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit 
safety and security. 

FTA Oversees and Administers the State Safety Oversight Program: 

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety 
approach in developing the State Safety Oversight program.[Footnote 16] 
Federal, state, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the 
rail transit system is operated safely; each of these agencies has some 
monitoring responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA 
oversees and administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA 
is responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state 
oversight agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail 
transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for informing oversight and 
transit agencies of new program developments, facilitating and 
informing the transit and oversight agencies of available training 
through FTA or other organizations, facilitating information sharing 
among program participants, and providing technical assistance. One 
avenue FTA uses to provide these services is the annual meeting to 
which all program participants are invited. FTA also calls special 
meetings and communicates information to program participants via e- 
mail when applicable. (See fig. 2 showing roles and responsibilities of 
participants in the State Safety Oversight program.) 

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State 
Safety Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO adaptation of State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report 
2003, FTA Office of safety and Security. 

[End of figure] 

FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk- 
management approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and 
risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that 
each state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they 
oversee. This is consistent with our position that agencies make risk- 
based decisions on where their assets can best be used, both in 
transportation security and safety. However, FTA recognizes that only 
parts of the State Safety Oversight program are risk-based. The parts 
of the program that are risk-based are the areas where it believes risk 
management is most applicable to safety and security. These areas are 
similar to those in which other transportation modes, such as aviation 
and pipelines, also use risk-based approaches. Areas that are not risk- 
based would include such things as requiring minimum standards for all 
transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or 
ridership.[Footnote 17] 

While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies 
with regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through 
audits and reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight 
agencies comply with the program requirements. For example, according 
to the FTA rule, when a state proposes to designate an oversight 
agency, FTA may review the proposal to ensure the designated agency has 
the authority to perform the required duties without any apparent 
conflicts. FTA has recommended in two instances that a state choose a 
different agency because the oversight agency that the state proposed 
appeared to be too closely affiliated with the transit agency and did 
not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is responsible for 
reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit to (1) ensure 
they include all the required information (e.g., descriptions of 
program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions), and (2) 
look for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. FTA also 
has authority, under the FTA rule, to request additional information 
from oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore, FTA is responsible 
for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure they are 
complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits evaluate 
how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the FTA 
rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating 
accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews 
properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is 
required. Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the 
operation of their oversight programs. However, states may use FTA 
Section 5309 (New Starts program) funds--normally used to pay for 
transit-related capital expenses--to defray the cost of setting up 
their oversight agency before a transit agency begins operations. Also, 
FTA officials stated this year that FTA used a portion of the funding 
originally designated for FTA audits to pay for one person from each 
oversight agency to attend training on the revisions to the FTA rule, 
which oversight agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006. 

State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit 
Agencies: 

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are 
directly responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to 
the FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight 
function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New 
Starts project involving a new rail transit system, or before the 
transit agency applies for funding under FTA's formula program for 
urbanized areas. States have designated several different types of 
agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most frequently--in 17 cases-
-states have designated their departments of transportation to serve in 
this role, either due to their expertise on rail transportation, or 
because state officials believed they had no other agencies with 
transportation expertise. In three instances--California, Colorado, and 
Massachusetts--states have designated utilities commissions or 
regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security. Officials from 
these states stated that since these bodies already had regulatory and 
oversight authority over utilities in these states, it was a natural 
extension of their powers to add rail transit to the list of industries 
they oversee. In fact, the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) has been overseeing railroads and rail transit in that state 
since 1911. The commission has issued and enforces several "general 
orders" that rail transit agencies in California must follow or face 
fines and suspended service. Two states have designated emergency 
management or public safety departments to oversee their rail transit 
agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two 
separate oversight agencies--both local transportation funding 
authorities--to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the 
state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail 
transit system runs between two states and the District of Columbia. 
These states and the District of Columbia established the Tri-State 
Oversight Committee as the designated oversight agency.[Footnote 18] 
Finally, one state, New York, has given its oversight authority to its 
Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they 
have authority similar to the public utilities commissions discussed 
above, but have no other mission than ensuring and overseeing transit 
safety in New York. See appendix I for further discussion of multi- 
state operations. Also, see appendix II for a table showing each 
oversight agency and the rail transit agencies they oversee. 

The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit 
agencies varies widely. While FTA's rule gives state oversight agencies 
authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the 
oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies 
authority to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit 
agencies or shutting down their operations. However, we found five 
states where the oversight agencies have some enforcement authority 
over the rail transit agencies they oversee. In all cases, this was due 
to the regulatory authority states have granted their oversight 
agencies. For instance, state utilities commissions may have this 
authority written into their authorizing legislation. In other 
instances, states had given this authority to the oversight agency in 
state legislation. Officials from oversight agencies that have the 
authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated 
that they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that 
they believed it gives their actions extra weight and forced transit 
agencies to acquiesce to the oversight agency more readily than they 
otherwise might. A majority of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with 
which we spoke, have no such punitive authority, though officials from 
some oversight agencies stated they may be able to withhold grants 
their oversight agencies provide to the transit agencies they 
oversee.[Footnote 19] Although officials from several of these agencies 
stated that they believe they would be more effective if they did have 
enforcement authority, under the current program this authority would 
be granted by individual states. 

While the states have designated a number of different types of 
agencies with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a 
basic set of rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the 
program, oversight agencies are responsible for the following: 

* Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail 
transit agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program 
standard "provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties 
concerning processes and procedures they must have in place to be in 
compliance with the State Safety Oversight program." FTA requirements 
for the program standard are procedural rather than technical. For 
example, the program standard must include, at a minimum, areas dealing 
with the oversight agency's responsibilities, how the program standard 
will be modified, how the oversight agency will oversee the transit 
agency's internal safety and security reviews, how the oversight agency 
will conduct the triennial audits, and requirements for the rail 
transit agency to report accidents. According to FTA, oversight 
agencies may choose to develop technical standards, such as 
requirements for the strength of track, crashworthiness of rail 
vehicles, or brightness of signals. In addition, the standard must 
contain sections describing how the oversight agency will investigate 
accidents, how the rail transit agency will develop a corrective action 
plan to address investigation and audit findings, and the minimum 
requirements in the agency's separate safety and security plans. FTA 
mandates that the transit agency's safety plan must include, among 
other requirements, a process for identifying, managing, and 
eliminating hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the transit agency's 
security plan must include, among other requirements, a process for 
managing threats and vulnerabilities, and a method for conducting 
internal security reviews. 

* Reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans and annual 
reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these 
plans and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure 
they meet the program requirements. 

* Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at 
least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to 
audit the rail transit agencies' implementation of their safety and 
security plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight 
agency that performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we 
found five others that perform the audit on a continuous basis, 
auditing the rail transit agency on a portion of their safety and 
security plans each year. FTA has approved both these alternative 
auditing schedules. 

* Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA 
requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and 
approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits. 
Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and 
eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the 
oversight agency outside the audit process. 

* Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to 
investigate accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or 
severity threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes 
leading to the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or 
allow the transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf. 

* Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule, 
oversight agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their 
oversight activities, including results of accident investigations and 
the status of ongoing corrective actions. 

Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for 
meeting the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them. 
However, the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that 
oversight agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as 
developing separate system safety and security plans, performing 
internal safety and security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a 
hazard-management process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight 
agencies within 2 hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are 
included in each oversight agency's program standard. The locations and 
types of transit agencies participating in the program are shown in 
figure 3. 

Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in 
State Safety Oversight Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: FTA's National Transit Database; MapArt. 

[End of figure] 

Other Federal Agencies Play a Role in Ensuring Rail Transit Safety and 
Security, but Often Their Roles Are Outside the State Safety Oversight 
Program: 

In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit 
agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the 
safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is 
DHS' TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),[Footnote 
20] passed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, gave TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, 
including authority to issue security regulations.[Footnote 21] While 
TSA's most public transportation security duties are its airport 
screening and aviation related activities, TSA has taken steps to 
enhance rail transit security. For example, in May 2004, TSA issued 
security directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies 
were implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has 
hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.[Footnote 
22] While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being 
determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce 
compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as 
well as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies, 
riders, and others. The inspectors have begun outreach activities with 
rail transit systems aimed at enhancing security in rail and mass 
transit systems. TSA officials stated their responsibilities encompass 
the security of other rail systems, including freight rail, which is 
consistent with ATSA. 

In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and 
Training within DHS' Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring 
rail transit security through supporting security initiatives. The 
Office of Grants and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness) is the primary federal source of security funding for 
passenger rail systems, and is the principal component of DHS 
responsible for preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. In 
carrying out its mission to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts 
of terrorism, the Office of Grants and Training provides training, 
funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and 
execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to 
assist states, local jurisdictions (such as municipalities and transit 
agencies), and the private sector. The Office of Grants and Training 
has provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the 
Urban Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program. 

In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring 
transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its 
jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit system that share track with 
the general railroad system, or places where a rail transit system and 
the general railroad system share a connection (e.g., a grade 
crossing).[Footnote 23] Rail transit systems that share track or grade 
crossings--or are subject to FRA regulations for other reasons--may 
apply to FRA for a waiver from these rules. According to FRA, if a rail 
transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and at the same time 
as general railroads, FRA would make the rail transit agency operating 
the vehicle meet the safety standards of the general railroads. This 
would likely require rail transit agencies to use much sturdier (and 
more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive for the rail 
transit agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested 
waivers from FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at 
different times than heavy freight trains, and will not be on the track 
at the same time, meaning the risk of collision is low or non-existent. 
According to an FRA official, as of June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 
10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied for them.[Footnote 24] 
After granting a waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA and the relevant 
transit and oversight agencies to address any safety questions or 
problems that arise. 

NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety, 
though it has no formal role in FTA's oversight program. NTSB has 
authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, 
including rail transit agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to 
NTSB, within 2 hours, all accidents involving fatalities, multiple 
injuries, evacuations, or damage over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB 
officials stated they generally will investigate only the more serious 
accidents, such as those involving fatalities or injuries, or those 
involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident investigations 
of rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to federal 
agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led 
to the accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its recommendations, but 
NTSB states that, historically, agencies have implemented over 80 
percent of its recommendations. NTSB also maintains expertise on 
transportation safety across all modes of transport and conducts 
studies on pressing issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both stated 
that they consult NTSB periodically when they have safety questions, in 
addition to reporting accidents to it. 

Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; 
However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document 
the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and 
Security: 

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom 
we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety 
and security in their organizations. These officials provided 
illustrations about how the program enhanced safety or security; 
however, they have limited statistical evidence that the oversight 
program improved safety or security. FTA has obtained a variety of 
information on the program from sources such as national transit data, 
annual reports from oversight agencies, and its own audits of the 
oversight agencies. FTA has used national transit data and oversight 
agencies' annual reports to collate information on safety, including 
information about fatalities and the causes of incidents; FTA last 
issued a report summarizing this information in 2003. However, this 
data is not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA 
officials recognize the need for performance measures for its safety 
and security programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address 
this need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the oversight 
agencies every 3 years, it has not conducted these audits as frequently 
as it had planned (it has conducted eight since September 2001). 
However, program officials stated they are committed to getting "back 
on track" to meet the planned schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes 
enough resources to conduct the planned audits, and develops and uses 
planned performance goals and measures to improve the program, will be 
important for future assessments of the program. 

Transit and Oversight Agencies Describe the Oversight Program as 
Worthwhile and Valuable: 

Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA's 
State Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it 
helps them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit 
agency officials with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that 
oversees their safety and security is worthwhile. Several officials 
stated that it is important and beneficial to have an independent 
agency verify their safety and security progress. One transit agency 
official explained that the oversight agency helps transit officials to 
identify larger, or systemic, issues. In addition, the program provides 
support to exert extra influence on a transit agency's board of 
directors or senior management to get safety or security improvements 
implemented faster. Furthermore, officials identified specific examples 
illustrating how oversight agencies helped improve safety or security. 
Officials from 15 transit agencies explained that the program helped 
modify equipment to improve safety and security. For example, one 
transit agency had problems with train operators failing to stop at red 
light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety department exert 
enough influence with the transit agency's senior management to replace 
all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were brighter 
and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA's 
program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security. 
Several officials said that having a state or local (rather than 
national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security 
improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight 
staff. 

In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 
state safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the 
State Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for 
improving transit systems' safety and security. Several officials 
commented that the program provides an incentive to examine safety and 
security issues and avoid complacency. It also helps the transit 
agencies by providing an independent third party, since self oversight 
is not, in the officials' view, the best way to have an agency identify 
and resolve its safety and security issues. Furthermore, several 
officials commented that they believed the current system worked well, 
and that the program provides consistency and endows the state safety 
oversight agencies with enough authority to accomplish their tasks. 
Also, officials said that having the states carry out the program 
provides ongoing oversight in addition to formal audits, which helps 
maintain a constant oversight of safety and security issues. 

Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that, 
because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved 
safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided 
safety statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions 
at the San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC 
became its oversight agency, to 2005.[Footnote 25] Although FTA changed 
its definition of a reportable accident during this time period--making 
it impossible to determine exactly what impact external oversight had 
on MUNI safety--both MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident 
CPUC's efforts had been a major factor in the reduction in accidents. A 
MUNI representative estimated that the reduction in accidents was more 
likely about 15 percent, but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to 
develop a comprehensive safety program, which helped reduce accidents 
and increase the agency's focus on meeting safety goals. In another 
example, New York oversight officials stated that, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, fires were prevalent in New York City's transit 
system. After the New York State Legislature created the PTSB in 1984 
to oversee public transportation safety in New York, the PTSB tracked 
incident numbers, approached the transit agency and, according to 
oversight and transit agency officials, was able to develop and 
implement an action plan which heightened the awareness of (and 
ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts occurred 
several decades ago, the data that might support the officials' 
statements were not easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and 
New York City transit officials all cited this as an early success of 
state oversight of rail transit. 

APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State 
Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and 
security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry 
officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving for 
improved safety and security.[Footnote 26] However, transit officials 
with whom we spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal program. 
For example, a transit agency official explained that a benefit of 
FTA's rule is that it standardized rail transit safety and security 
across the country. In addition, officials from 17 transit agencies 
reported that respective state safety oversight agencies imposed 
requirements above those required in FTA's requirement. For example, 
three state safety oversight agencies reported that they require 
transit agencies under their purview to have an "hours of service" type 
policy which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to 
rest. In addition, several oversight agencies have established more 
stringent reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA. 
For example, officials from two transit agencies reported that their 
oversight agencies require them to report accidents occurring in a rail 
yard, while two others stated that their oversight agencies require 
notification of any accident involving contact between vehicles, no 
matter how minor. 

FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information but Does Not Have the 
Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and 
Security: 

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight 
program's impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects 
through the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to 
submit. The reports include information on many different issues, 
including program resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous 
conditions, and any corrective actions taken resulting from audits or 
accident investigations. FTA officials stated they have used the 
oversight agency information, as well as national transit data, to 
publish its own annual reports from 1999 to 2003. FTA's reports 
included ridership data, fatality and injury data, and the results of 
accident investigations to identify common incident causes. Although 
these reports may have informed oversight agencies about what safety or 
security problems existed, the information was not tied to any program 
goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued a report 
since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety, it is 
unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example, one 
state safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that FTA 
provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from 
oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify 
trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and 
collegial relationship with each other. 

According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better 
information and performance measures for its safety and security 
programs; also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has 
been looking for ways to improve the type of safety and security data 
it can collect, and how it can use the information to track program 
performance and progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA's 2006 
business plan for its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to 
continue developing and implementing a data-driven performance analysis 
and tracking system to help ensure management decisions are informed by 
data and focused on performance and accountability. As part of these 
efforts, FTA is working with a contractor to develop performance 
measures for the State Safety Oversight program. FTA officials stated 
that their contractor is working with oversight and transit agencies to 
identify measures that they use and find useful in tracking the safety 
and security of their systems. Although it may be difficult to identify 
such measures--many of the oversight agencies with whom we spoke do not 
have performance measures, either--this effort could allow FTA to more 
readily determine areas where the program is having a positive impact 
on transit safety and security, and areas where more focus is needed. 

Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies 
that FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide 
detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not 
brought together information from these audits to provide information 
on the safety and security of transit systems across the country. FTA 
tracks the deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with 
oversight agency staff to assure that each state safety oversight 
agency resolves the suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has 
not conducted the audits frequently enough to provide a current picture 
of transit system safety and security, or to identify some challenges 
that oversight and transit agency officials raised during our 
interviews with them. FTA has audited each state safety oversight 
agency that existed prior to 2004 at least once since the program 
began; two agencies were audited twice. According to the FTA 
contractor, they piloted the audit program in late 1998 by conducting 
audits in three states with different legal authorities and a range of 
differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly scheduled audits 
began in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program 
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that 
the agency's priorities shifted in the wake of the attacks. FTA has 
audited 8 of 24 existing oversight agencies since September 2001. 
However, during that time period, FTA also conducted nine security and 
safety reviews to evaluate whether new rail transit projects could 
enter operations safely and securely. In addition, the program had 
several staffing changes after 2001, causing some oversight and transit 
officials to state that the program did not seem to be a priority for 
FTA.[Footnote 27] According to FTA officials, including the Program 
Manager, who started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting audits 
in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and time to help states 
comply with the revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach 
effort to this end, including a workshop for oversight agency officials 
to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit 
schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to 
begin with the states that it has judged to have had the weakest 
program standards and procedures, based on their initial submission 
under the new rule. 

FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State Safety 
Oversight Program: 

Despite the program's popularity with participants, FTA faces 
challenges in implementing the program's revised rule and continuing to 
manage the program. First, several oversight agency officials stated 
they are not confident they have adequate numbers of staff to 
effectively oversee rail transit system safety and security and they 
are unsure the current training available to them is sufficient. Also, 
we found the level of staffing and expertise of oversight agency staff 
varies widely across the country. A second challenge FTA faces in 
implementing the program is that many transit and oversight agency 
personnel are confused about how security issues in the program will be 
handled, and what agencies will be responsible for what actions, as TSA 
takes on a greater role in rail transit security. 

Many Oversight Agency Officials Are Unsure That Their Staff Are 
Adequately Trained and That They Have Adequate Numbers of Staff: 

While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials 
with whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety 
Oversight program, many of these same officials stated that they were 
unsure that they were adequately trained for their duties. 
Specifically, 18 of 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated 
they believed additional training would help them provide more 
efficient and effective safety and security oversight. We found that 
the level of expertise of oversight agency staff varied widely across 
the country. For example, we found that 11 of the 24 oversight agencies 
we examined had oversight staff that had no career or educational 
background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another 11 
oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of 
experience or education. For example, while New York's PTSB requires 
its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety, the 
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its 
lead oversight staff person to have an engineering degree. According to 
some oversight agency officials who had no previous transit safety or 
security background, they had to rely on the transit agency staff they 
were overseeing to teach them about transit operations, safety, and 
security. Therefore, it took them several years before they were 
confident that they knew enough about rail transit operations to 
provide effective oversight. These officials stated that if they left 
their positions, any new staff taking over for them would face a 
similar challenge. 

Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are 
helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through 
overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training 
curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. 
Officials from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training 
would be useful cited several examples of how additional training could 
benefit them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies 
stated that the training they had received in transit operations, 
accident investigations, and other areas was beneficial, but they had 
not received any training on how to perform specific oversight 
functions. Thus, they were unsure how to carry out their agencies' 
primary oversight role. Officials at a majority of oversight agencies 
(15 of 24) stated that they felt the training that had been made 
available to them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute 
(TSI), or the National Transit Institute had been adequate.[Footnote 
28] However, officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies also stated 
that they were somewhat unsure of which courses they should take to be 
effective in their oversight role. For example, several oversight 
agency personnel stated that, while FTA officials have encouraged 
oversight agencies' staff to obtain certifications from TSI in transit 
safety and security and have encouraged oversight agency staff to take 
selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not developed or recommended a 
course specifically related to oversight. 

Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency 
staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state 
oversight agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay 
staff to travel to these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay 
their own tuition and travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA 
or TSI.[Footnote 29] Officials from 10 of the 24 oversight agencies 
with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as one reason why they could 
not attend training they had hoped to attend. 

Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA 
provided some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition 
for training they wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight 
agencies to spend their limited resources on direct oversight 
activities, such as staff overtime, travel expenses to visit transit 
agencies, or hiring contractors. Several oversight agency officials 
also cited the example of other DOT agencies that provide free training 
or pay for state staff to travel to attend training. For example, 30 
states participate in FRA's State Safety Participation Program. These 
states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce FRA safety 
regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom training 
and state staff's travel to this training. In addition, the federal 
agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed 
inspectors to inspect pipelines in many states. To help defray their 
costs, PHMSA provides up to 50 percent of a state's expenses in 
carrying out their pipeline safety program. PHMSA also recently paid 
for two inspectors from each state to attend training when it 
instituted a new inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA 
stated that providing funding to states to train their employees helps 
federal agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement 
activities, easing the states' burden of paying to enforce federal 
regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies' 
personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. 
Louis, where FTA provided technical assistance and shared best 
practices in meeting the requirements of the revised rule. This 
instance could provide a model for future funding of training or 
training-related travel for oversight agency personnel. 

FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training 
in transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety 
Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best 
practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies. 
However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training 
specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a 
recommended training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated 
that it would not be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also, 
FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of 
consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were 
revising the FTA rule in 2005. However, they stated they did not have 
the legal authority to direct states to require certain education, 
experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff. Also, these 
officials stated that FTA has not issued any guidance to states about 
what level of training is appropriate for oversight staff or what level 
of staffing is appropriate for an oversight agency. However, these 
officials noted that, despite the lack of formal guidance, FTA checks 
to ensure oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its 
audits; in five instances, FTA has recommended that oversight agency 
staff take additional training. FTA officials also stated that FTA 
could issue informal guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies 
about the level of training their oversight staff should have. 

In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure 
about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately 
oversee a transit agency's operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of 
24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would 
help them do their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight 
agency personnel who were highly dedicated to performing oversight, 
even though they said they had no assistance and their states had 
limited resources to allocate to the task. Some staff took it upon 
themselves to stay informed about a transit agency's operations by 
staying in regular contact with transit agency personnel, attending 
transit agency safety meetings, and making regular inspections of the 
system--even though these tasks were not required by their oversight 
agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they 
had devoted the equivalent of less than one person working half-time to 
oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the oversight part of 
their job as a "collateral duty." Personnel from some of these 
oversight agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform the 
kind of active oversight that involved attending transit agency 
meetings, making spot inspections, and staying in regular contact with 
transit agency personnel. While in some of these instances, the transit 
agencies overseen are small, such as small streetcar lines, some of the 
transit agencies with the highest ridership levels have similar levels 
of oversight. For example, one state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-
time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program functions is responsible for 
overseeing a major transit agency that averages nearly 200,000 daily 
passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time with the 
services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of the 
transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to 
oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies 
(including two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The 
oversight staff in this state reported that it was difficult to 
maintain active oversight when their responsibilities were so spread 
out. Furthermore, we found 13 oversight agencies that estimated 
dedicating less than one full-time equivalent staff member to the 
oversight task. This meant that the person (or persons) assigned to the 
oversight tasks had other duties, in addition to oversight of a transit 
agency. Table 1 shows the amount of personnel oversight agency 
representatives estimated their agencies dedicate to oversight 
responsibilities. (See app. II for information on estimated FTE and 
transit system information for each state safety oversight agency and 
related transit agency). 

Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee 
Transit Agency Safety and Security: 

Estimated FTEs: Number of oversight agencies; 
0.5 or less: 11; 
0.6-1: 5; 
1.1-3: 6; 
3.1-5: 1; 
Over 5: 1; 
Total: 24. 

Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses. 

[End of table] 

Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to 
this program, providing appropriate and continuing training and 
experience may increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states 
have to dedicate to this program. 

Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA's Emerging 
Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program: 

Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and 
its rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As 
discussed above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over 
transportation security across all modes, and TSA officials stated the 
agency has hired 100 rail inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among 
other duties, monitor and enforce compliance with rail security 
directives TSA issued in May 2004. However, of the officials at 24 
oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20 stated they did not have a 
clear picture of who was responsible for overseeing transit security 
issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit agencies were also 
unsure of lines of responsibility regarding transit security oversight. 
Several state oversight agencies were particularly concerned that TSA's 
rail inspectors would be duplicating their role in overseeing transit 
security. One oversight agency official stated that he felt transit 
agencies could begin to experience "audit fatigue" if both TSA and 
oversight agencies audited transit agencies' security practices. This 
official stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency 
staff audited transit agencies' security practices at the same time. 
Officials at several transit agencies were also confused about what 
standards they would be required to meet. For example, while oversight 
agencies are free to create their own standards, TSA issued rail 
security directives in May 2004--and could issue future directives or 
requirements that transit agencies must meet. Security officials at one 
transit agency specifically voiced concern that there could be 
conflicting security requirements and hoped that TSA would coordinate 
with oversight agencies' requirements and vice versa. 

TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at 
a meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May 
2006. FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that 
they were committed to avoiding duplication in the program and 
communicating their respective roles to transit and oversight agency 
officials as soon as possible. However, as TSA is still developing 
their program, currently there is no formally defined role for TSA in 
the State Safety Oversight program, and TSA has not determined the 
roles and responsibilities for their rail inspectors. While the FTA 
rule discusses requirements for a transit agency's security plan (e.g., 
a method for conducting internal security reviews and a process for 
determining security threats and vulnerabilities to a transit agency), 
and requires oversight agencies to include security performance in 
their audits of transit agencies, the FTA rule does not discuss TSA's 
specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA officials stated that 
exactly how TSA would participate in the program was still to be 
determined. However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they are 
committed to working together to ensure inspection activities are 
coordinated to foster consistency and minimize disruption to rail 
transit agency operations. Also, a TSA regional manager of rail 
inspectors with whom we spoke was unsure what the rail inspectors' role 
would be in relation to the program; in addition, the manager was 
unsure what the details of the program were, including the identity of 
the relevant oversight agencies for the region. However, he stated that 
he was working to learn these details, and that he and his staff had 
been in touch with transit agency security officials to introduce 
themselves and gather information. 

Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with 
transit and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were 
engaged in an ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to 
determine how the rail inspectors could best assist oversight agencies 
in reviewing transit agency security. TSA gave several examples of 
activities resulting from this coordination. For example, TSA reported 
that they had designated 26 rail inspectors as liaisons to state 
oversight agencies. Also, TSA officials stated that they are working 
with FTA and the oversight agency from California to pilot a 
coordination approach they could use with oversight agencies across the 
country. Additionally, the director of the rail inspector program 
attended a meeting with representatives from almost all oversight 
agencies to discuss the concept of rail inspectors participating in 
oversight-agency audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA is working to 
bring the 26 TSA rail inspectors involved in the State Safety Oversight 
program to the next annual meeting for the program's participants, so 
that the rail inspectors can learn more about the program and develop a 
"game plan" for how the inspectors will participate in the program. 

Conclusions: 

While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight 
program, most participants in the program consider it a success at 
improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can 
cite anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive 
impact. Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit 
and oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for 
demonstrating the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and 
security. As new leadership takes over administration of the program, 
this is an opportune time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact 
of the program, including determining a way to measure the impact of 
the program, setting performance goals, and developing and providing 
the means to meet a consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies. 

Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and 
qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although 
it is unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety 
and security. In other federally mandated transportation safety 
programs where states partner with the federal government to perform 
oversight duties, the federal government pays for a portion of the 
training expenses of oversight staff, (or for oversight staff to travel 
to attend training) because having well-trained state officials makes 
the federally mandated oversight more efficient and effective. Yet, in 
this program, FTA relies entirely on the states to determine how to 
fund their direct oversight of rail transit agencies and does not help 
defray their training or travel costs. While the program is generally 
thought of as bringing about positive change, these differing levels of 
training and qualifications are a cause for concern; it is conceivable 
that inadequately trained staff, especially staff that have no 
experience overseeing transit agency safety, might miss safety problems 
they otherwise would notice, or may be unable to effectively evaluate a 
transit agency's proposals for resolving existing safety problems 
(though it is not clear whether either of these have occurred). One way 
to help ensure that oversight agency staff have at least a basic 
understanding of how to oversee rail transit operations would be to 
evaluate the amount of training oversight agency staff have obtained 
and, subsequently, develop a training curriculum that FTA could 
recommend to oversight agency personnel. Also, since many oversight 
agency personnel have little experience conducting rail transit safety 
oversight, including the basic tenets of conducting oversight in the 
training curriculum would help ensure that oversight agency staff did 
not have to rely on transit agency personnel for advice on conducting 
oversight. In addition, FTA could review oversight staff qualifications 
in more detail during its audits of oversight agencies to help ensure 
oversight staff are adequately trained to perform their duties. 

Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the 
existence and deployment of TSA's rail inspectors will complicate 
security oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts 
to coordinate their activities and determine the roles and 
responsibilities of the rail inspectors, the official role of the rail 
inspectors in the State Safety Oversight program remains unclear. 
Therefore, it is understandable why transit and oversight agency 
officials fear possible duplication of effort, especially for 
activities such as reviewing security plans and auditing transit 
security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have had some 
difficulties coordinating their actions in the past,[Footnote 30] such 
concern is warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to 
address this issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are 
a positive step. 

Recommendations: 

In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff 
resources to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient 
information to evaluate the performance of the program, and supports 
state oversight agencies in adequately training their staff to perform 
their oversight duties, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Transportation take the following two actions: 

* Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by having new program leadership to set short-and long-term 
goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program 
is making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance 
goals for the agency's other approaches for evaluating the impact of 
this program on safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining 
FTA's stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once 
every 3 years. 

* Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency 
personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their 
activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment, 
work with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any 
deficiencies they identify. This strategy should include developing an 
appropriate training curriculum, including training on conducting 
oversight for oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies 
encouraging them to have their staff complete the training curriculum. 
If FTA determines that it does not have the authority to issue such 
guidance, it should seek such statutory authority from Congress. 

Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies 
about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the 
potential duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit 
agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 
the Assistant Secretary of TSA to: 

* coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to 
state oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and 
responsibilities TSA develops for its rail inspectors; and: 

* work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security 
audits whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help 
ensure effective coordination with these agencies. 

Agency Comments: 

Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of 
this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred 
with the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they 
are working to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, 
TSA provided a technical comment which we included in the report. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary 
of Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Katherine A. Siggerud: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems: 

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States--the 
Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink 
in St. Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA) in Washington, D.C.--cross state lines. Therefore, these 
systems require the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run 
the State Safety Oversight program or states can agree that one state 
will be responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each of these 
multi-state transit systems has a different structure to handle 
oversight responsibilities. The oversight programs in Philadelphia and 
St. Louis have both developed strategies to centralize decision making, 
streamline collaboration, and respond promptly to safety and security 
audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), 
which serves as the oversight agency in the D.C. area, requires 
majority decision making by the six committee members of the agency, 
including at least one member from each jurisdiction, and has 
experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding to Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring audit findings 
are addressed. 

Multi-State State Safety Oversight Agencies Have Varied Structures and 
Handle Oversight Responsibilities Differently: 

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each 
performs oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, 
authority to serve as the oversight agency was delegated to one of the 
two state agencies--namely, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation (PennDOT) agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of 
Transportation to serve as the sole oversight agency for the PATCO 
heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to oversight 
from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County Transit District) and 
Missouri (through the Missouri Department of Transportation); the two 
organizations share oversight duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed 
of multiple representatives from each jurisdiction (including Virginia, 
Maryland, and Washington, D.C.) provides oversight for WMATA. 

The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders 
daily and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO's 
track is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. 
Until early 2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared 
by Pennsylvania and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port 
Authority (DRPA), a regional transportation and economic development 
agency serving both southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. 
When DRPA implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA and 
PATCO leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as 
the designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. 
As a result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey 
Department of Transportation (NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight 
agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take corrective 
action without seeking additional levels of approval from Pennsylvania, 
although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania informed of its 
activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to the NJDOT by 
having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations, 
passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports 
any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the 
performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or 
other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by 
the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by 
New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one part- 
time staff members to its oversight program, and while these staff 
members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their 
sole responsibilities for safety and oversight functions. 

The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis 
International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside 
Shiloh, Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the 
system included about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles 
of track in Illinois. Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois 
officials agreed to allow the Missouri Department of Transportation to 
provide safety and security oversight for the entire system. However, 
in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which 
roughly equalized the amount of track in both states. Because of this, 
the states agreed that it was appropriate for Illinois to play a 
greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois designated 
the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. 
Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight 
agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create 
challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken 
steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri 
oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and 
security standard across the entire MetroLink system.[Footnote 31] 
According to area officials, this arrangement creates consistency 
throughout the system and allows both agencies to perform their 
oversight functions in a consistent manner. In addition, the agencies 
use a single contractor who is responsible for the triennial audit. All 
other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri oversight 
agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies coordinate 
very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, there 
is one employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to 
safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several 
employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to 
the program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for 
coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that 
responding to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the 
agency works quickly to implement changes. 

WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the 
District of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the 
District of Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities 
through a collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed 
of six representatives--two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary 
duties, and their activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily 
duties, as is the case with staff at several other oversight agencies. 
TOC does not have any dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited 
rail operational experience. To gain access to additional experience 
and expertise in rail oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to 
provide technical knowledge, perform required audits of WMATA, and 
ensure that audit recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC 
funding comes from, and must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions 
every year. The Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds 
and handles its contracting procedures. These issues result in a 
lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly funding and process its 
expenses. 

Multi-State Oversight Programs Have Addressed Administrative Challenges 
in Different Ways: 

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have 
attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more 
collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed 
strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration, 
albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New 
Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO's 
territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency's 
staff. New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety 
Oversight program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates 
communication, and provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with 
on the implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although 
St. Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight 
agencies have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing 
consistent information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating 
activities so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts about the 
same issue. To do this, the Missouri and Illinois representatives stay 
in close contact with each other. Both oversight agencies stated they 
have in-house staff dedicated to safety and security oversight, and the 
agencies have very good working relationships. Oversight agency staff 
admitted that St. Louis could face challenges in the future if staff 
turned over in either agency and new employees did not establish a 
similar working relationship. In addition, officials indicated that, if 
oversight agency staff had disagreements over safety or security 
standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it would be highly 
problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and Missouri oversight 
agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the current 
arrangements have produced one set of standards, good communication, 
and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight agency staff 
in St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment where 
this system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well. 

In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making 
decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have 
contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA 
information requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would 
perform TOC's audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior 
to the audit to facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not 
submit the requested State Safety Oversight program materials despite 
several FTA requests and an extension by FTA to move the audit to a 
later date. At the end of August, FTA initiated its audit even though 
it had not received requested information, but was not able to complete 
the audit until the end of September, when it received all requested 
materials. FTA's Final Audit Report to TOC cited 10 areas for 
improvement and provided TOC 60 days to resolve these issues. According 
to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within the time period. FTA held a 
follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to check on the status of the 
remaining areas for improvement. As of June 2006, FTA was evaluating 
how many of the remaining audit findings remained open, although FTA 
stated that TOC had created a detailed set of internal operating 
procedures to address many of FTA's findings and concerns. In addition, 
TOC representatives stated that some of the areas for improvement FTA 
found were complicated issues, such as reviewing WMATA's accident 
investigation procedures and approving modifications, and could not be 
addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC staff 
emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to TOC 
audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased with 
their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to TOC. 
Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated 
the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA's findings. 

TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track 
outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on 
at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, 
TOC members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to 
FTA's initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds 
for the year and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working 
with the consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and 
maintained their files. According to TOC officials, since the process 
for acquiring additional funding would require approval from all three 
jurisdictions represented on TOC, it was not feasible to obtain 
additional funding quickly. In addition, TOC cannot take any action 
without a majority of its members, and at least one member from each 
jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such majority agreements 
can be time consuming since all members of TOC have other primary 
responsibilities. This is especially a concern when quick decisions are 
necessary, such as responding to FTA's audit recommendations. 

TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission, 
including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy 
process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of 
corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they 
believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and 
oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and 
proximity to FTA's headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the 
chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time on 
overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the 
administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a 
full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a full-
time capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However, funding 
this position could be a challenge and the administrator would need to 
have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They 
Oversee: 

Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies: 

State: Singe State Systems: Arkansas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Arkansas State Highway 
and Transportation Department (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Central Arkansas Transit Authority 
(0.08); 
City center served: Little Rock, AR; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 159,458; 2.8. 

State: Singe State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bay Area Rapid Transit (7); 
City center served: San Francisco, CA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 99,296,028; 209. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (1.5); 
City center served: Los Angeles, CA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 74,242,912; 141.6. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Francisco Municipal Railway 
(7); 
City center served: San Francisco, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail, trolley, and cable car; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 53,768,895; 81.7. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): San Diego Trolley, Inc. (0.9); 
City center served: San Diego, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 29,334,362; 96.6. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sacramento Regional Transit 
District (N/A); 
City center served: Sacramento, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 12,008,620; 58.4. 

State: Single State Systems: California; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): California Public 
Utilities Commission (9.6);
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Santa Clara Valley Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: San Jose, CA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 6,780,431; 58.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Colorado; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Denver Regional Transit District 
(1.25); 
City center served: Denver, CO; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 11,142,220; 31.6. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metro-Dade Transit Authority 
(N/A); 
City center served: Miami, FL; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 26,479,423; 53.5. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Jacksonville Transportation 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: Jacksonville, FL; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 736,510; 5.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Florida; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Florida Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hillsborough Area Regional Transit 
(0.85); 
City center served: Tampa, FL; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 565,002; 4.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Georgia; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Georgia Department of 
Transportation (0.1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority (6); 
City center served: Atlanta, GA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 70,984,053; 96.1. 

State: Single State Systems: Illinois; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Regional Transportation 
Authority (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chicago Transit Authority (11); 
City center served: Chicago, IL; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 186,759,524; 206.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Louisiana; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Louisiana Department of 
Transportation (0.1)[ A]; 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Orleans Regional Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: New Orleans, LA; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,667,952; 25.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Maryland; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Department of 
Transportation (1.3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Maryland Transit Administration; 
(5); 
City center served: Baltimore, MD; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 18,059,117; 87. 

State: Single State Systems: Massachusetts; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Department 
of Telecommunication and Energy (2.67); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (5.1); 
City center served: Boston, MA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 215,787,440; 127.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Michigan; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Michigan Department of 
Transportation (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Detroit Transit Corporation (1.1);
City center served: Detroit, MI; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,340,646; 2.9. 

State: Single State Systems: Minnesota; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Minnesota Department of 
Public Safety (0.1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Hiawatha Metro Transit (1-1.5); 
City center served: Minneapolis, MN; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 7,901,668; 24.4. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Newark City 
Subway (0.5); 
City center served: Newark, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 14,312,676; 99.9[B]. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit Hudson-Bergen 
Light Rail (N/A); 
City center served: Jersey City, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: New Jersey; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New Jersey Transit River Line (2); 
City center served: Trenton, NJ; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: New York; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public 
Transportation Safety Board (3.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): New York City Transit (15); 
City center served: New York City, NY; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,803,536,486; 493.8. 

State: Single State Systems: New York; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): New York Public 
Transportation Safety Board (3.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Niagara Frontier Transit Authority 
(0.5); 
City center served: Buffalo, NY; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 5,373,321; 12.4. 

State: Single State Systems: Ohio; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Ohio Department of 
Transportation (1); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Authority (1.2); 
City center served: Cleveland, OH; 
Type of system: Heavy rail and light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,236,840; 68.5. 

State: Single State Systems: Oregon; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of 
Transportation (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Tri-Met (10); 
City center served: Portland, OR; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 34,755,147; 92.9[B]. 

State: Single State Systems: Oregon; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Oregon Department of 
Transportation (1.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Portland Streetcar (0.5); 
City center served: Portland, OR; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: [Empty]. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit 
Authority (2); 
City center served: Philadelphia, PA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail, light rail, and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 113,252,100; 141.1. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority of Allegheny County 
(0.3); 
City center served: Pittsburgh, PA; 
Type of system: Light rail and inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 8,072,099; 45.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.5); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Cambria County Transit Authority 
(1); 
City center served: Johnstown, PA; 
Type of system: Inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 86,031; 0.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Puerto Rico; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico State 
Emergency and Disaster Management Agency (3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Puerto Rico Highway and 
Transportation Authority Tren Urbano (1.6); 
City center served: San Juan, Puerto Rico; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 2,182,668; (N/A). 

State: Single State Systems: Tennessee; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of 
Transportation (0.25); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Chattanooga Area Rapid Transit 
Authority (N/A); 
City center served: Chattanooga, TN; 
Type of system: Inclined plane; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 435,780; 2. 

State: Single State Systems: Tennessee; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Tennessee Department of 
Transportation (0.25); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Memphis Area Transit Authority 
(0.3); 
City center served: Memphis, TN; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,015,448; 10. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Galveston Island Transit (0.25); 
City center served: Galveston, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 47,706; 4. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Dallas Area Rapid Transit (0.75); 
City center served: Dallas, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail and trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 17,487,057; 87.7. 

State: Single State Systems: Texas; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Texas Department of 
Transportation (0.4); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Metropolitan Transit Authority of 
Harris County (2); 
City center served: Houston, TX; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 10,233,638; 14.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Utah; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Utah Department of 
Transportation (0.8); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Utah Transit Authority (1.5); 
City center served: Salt Lake City, UT; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 13,101,791; 37.3. 

State: Single State Systems: Washington; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State 
Department of Transportation (0.35); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Sound Transit Tacoma Link (N/A); 
City center served: Tacoma, WA; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 884,895; 3.6. 

State: Single State Systems: Washington; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Washington State 
Department of Transportation (0.35); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Seattle Center Monorail (0.02); 
City center served: Seattle, WA; 
Type of system: Automated guideway; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 1,506,240[C]; 1.8. 

State: Single State Systems: Wisconsin; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (0.3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Kenosha Transit (0.85); 
City center served: Kenosha, WI; 
Type of system: Trolley; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 68,209; 1.9. 

State: Multi-state systems: Illinois and Missouri; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): St. Clair County Transit 
District (0.25-0.5) and Missouri Department of Transportation (0.9); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Bi-State Development Agency - St. 
Louis Metro (2); 
City center served: St. Louis, MO; 
Type of system: Light rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 15,648,233; 75.8. 

State: Multi-state systems: New Jersey and Pennsylvania; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): NJDOT (2-3); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Port Authority Transit Corporation 
(1); 
City center served: Philadelphia, PA; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 9,362,839; 31.5. 

State: Multi-state systems: Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC; 
State safety oversight agency (estimated FTE): PennDOT (0.2); 
Rail transit agency (estimated FTE): Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority (1); 
City center served: Washington, DC; 
Type of system: Heavy rail; 
Annual ridership and directional route miles: 259,430,055; 206.6. 

Source: GAO interviews and National Transit Database. 

Notes: FTE data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and 
transit agencies. The data do not include contractor staff that assist 
transit or oversight agencies, though several agencies reported using 
contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the 
total number of passengers boarding the rail system annually (also 
known as "unlinked passenger trips") as provided by FTA. Directional 
route miles--the miles of track in each direction over which 
transportation vehicles travel while carrying passengers--are current 
as of 2004, and were obtained from data published by FTA in the 
National Transit Database. The data in this table are presented for 
background purposes and were not verified. FTA defines trolley 
operations as "light rail" for statistical purposes. However, to 
differentiate between vintage trolley operations and modern light rail 
operations, we have created separate categories for them in this chart. 
N/A = Not available: 

[A] Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE 
data was provided by FTA. 

[B] Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles 
represent the total for all systems within a transit agency. 

[C] According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this 
table represents a year when the monorail was out of service for an 
extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. In 
prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 2 
million. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology: 

To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail 
transit systems and what is known about the impact of the State Safety 
Oversight program on rail safety and security, we met with FTA 
management and consultants to discuss the history, mission, and design 
of the oversight program. In addition, we discussed system safety and 
risk management approaches used by FTA, but we did not independently 
verify that oversight agencies use these approaches. We met with 
officials from other federal agencies such as the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); we also met 
with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit 
industry association. We met with these organizations to determine how 
oversight responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent 
to which duplication of safety and security guidance existed among 
these agencies. We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor. To 
compare other transportation safety and security approaches to the 
oversight program, we interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from 
Canadian transit agencies. 

In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents, 
including rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State 
Safety Oversight program; the triennial audits FTA performs on 
oversight agencies; documents tracking the performance of corrective 
action items; and memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to 
facilitate safety oversight coordination. At the state level, we 
reviewed annual reports that the oversight agencies provide to FTA. 
When states were willing to share these documents, we reviewed audits 
performed by the oversight agencies on transit agencies (40 percent of 
the states provided these documents) and authorizing legislation, or 
executive action, creating the state safety oversight agency (more than 
80 percent provided the legislation or executive action). To compare 
the State Safety Oversight program with other transportation safety 
approaches, we reviewed our past work on pipeline, aviation, motor 
carriers, and highway safety. 

To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program 
and also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted semi- 
structured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To determine 
the universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies under the 
State Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We 
compared FTA's list of transit systems to information published by APTA 
regarding rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that 
were under development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that 
had initiated service as "proposed," and we were able to resolve this 
discrepancy by comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency's 
website, which showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all 
transit and oversight agencies participating in the program that were 
in operation as of October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight 
agencies and 42 rail transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five 
oversight agencies, and 37 of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to 
participate in these interviews. The New Orleans Regional Transit 
Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana Department of Transportation 
(an oversight agency) requested that we exclude them from our review 
due to the difficulties posed by recovering from Hurricane Katrina, and 
we agreed to the request. Four additional transit agencies--the 
Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Chattanooga Area Regional 
Transportation Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and Hudson-Bergen 
Light Rail line--did not participate in our interviews. The semi- 
structured interview guide included questions concerning issues that 
could create challenges for the program such as an estimate of the 
number of FTE employees dedicated to the program, availability of FTA 
or other federally sponsored safety training to oversight agency 
employees, state funding schemes to support the program, the workload 
associated with audit responsibilities, the role of outside contractors 
to conduct the triennial reviews, employee turnover, and frequency of 
communication between the transit agencies and federal security 
agencies. 

The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the 
oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly 
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a 
particular question is interpreted, the sources of information that are 
available to interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database 
or were analyzed, can introduce unwanted variability in the results 
obtained in these interviews. However, we took steps in the development 
of the interview questions, the data collection, and the data analysis 
to minimize these types of errors. For example, social science survey 
specialists developed the questions used in the interviews in 
collaboration with our own subject matter experts. Then, the questions 
were pretested to ensure that they were relevant, clearly stated, and 
easy to comprehend. When the data were analyzed, a second independent 
analyst checked all computer programs. Since the interviews were 
conducted using an electronic interviewing system, our interviewers 
entered answers obtained from officials directly into the electronic 
interview instrument. This eliminated the need to have the data keyed 
into a database by a third party, thus removing an additional source of 
error. 

We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of 
the challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8 
oversight agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states 
with several rail transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this 
variety to witness a cross-section of transit agencies and observe the 
interactions the transit agencies had with their oversight agencies. 
Complete lists of the transit and oversight agencies we visited are in 
Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. To determine how the program 
functions in regions where transit systems cross state boundaries, we 
visited three systems that crossed state boundaries. To identify how 
the program may be incorporated into new transit systems, we visited 
two systems that are in the design or construction phase, and one 
oversight agency that will eventually oversee a transit agency yet to 
begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of information presented in 
the report about state oversight and transit agencies by asking for the 
agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior to the publication of 
the report. We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This 
Review: 

Rail transit agency: Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART); 
Urban area served: San Francisco/Oakland, California;
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: Bi-State Development Agency (MetroLink); 
Urban area served: St. Louis, Missouri; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: Chicago Transit Authority; 
Urban area served: Chicago, Illinois; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: Kenosha Transit; 
Urban area served: Kenosha, Wisconsin; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (LACMTA); 
Urban area served: Los Angeles, California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: Maryland Transit Administration (MTA); 
Urban area served: Greater Washington, DC, and Maryland; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: New Jersey Transit River Line; 
Urban area served: Camden, New Jersey; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: New York City Transit (NYCT); 
Urban area served: New York, New York; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: North County Transit District; 
Urban area served: San Diego/Oceanside, CA; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: X.  

Rail transit agency: Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO); 
Urban area served: Lindenwold, New Jersey and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: Regional Public Transportation Authority (Valley 
Metro); 
Urban area served: Phoenix, AZ; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: X.  

Rail transit agency: Sacramento Regional Transit District (SRTD); 
Urban area served: Sacramento, California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: San Diego Trolley; Urban area served: San Diego, 
California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI); 
Urban area served: San Francisco, California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Rail transit agency: Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 
(SCVTA); 
Urban area served: San Jose, California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(SEPTA); 
Urban area served: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty]. 

Rail transit agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA); 
Urban area served: Washington, D.C; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

Source: National Transit Database. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This 
Review: 

State oversight agency: Arizona Department of Transportation; 
State(s) served: Arizona; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: X.   

State oversight agency: California Public Utilities Commission; 
State(s) served: California; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

State oversight agency: Missouri Department of Transportation; 
State(s) served: Missouri; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].   

State oversight agency: New Jersey Department of Transportation; 
State(s) served: New Jersey; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].   

State oversight agency: Oregon Department of Transportation; 
State(s) served: Oregon; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].   

State oversight agency: Regional Transportation Authority (RTA); 
State(s) served: Illinois; 
Multi-State region: [Empty]; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].   

State oversight agency: St. Clair County Transit District (SCCTD); 
State(s) served: Illinois; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].  

State oversight agency: Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC); 
State(s) served: District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia; 
Multi-State region: X; 
Not yet operating: [Empty].   

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Katherine A. Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant 
Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta; 
Stuart Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and 
Raymond Sendejas made key contributions to this report. 

(542068): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Prior to 1991, FTA was known as the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration. For simplicity, we will refer to the agency as FTA 
throughout this report. 

[2] NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating 
every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant 
accidents in the other modes of transportation--railroad, highway, 
marine, and pipeline--and issuing safety recommendations aimed at 
preventing future accidents. 

[3] One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to 
participate in our review. 

[4] The New Starts program awards full-funding grant agreements for 
capital expenses for fixed guideway rail projects, and certain bus, 
trolley, and ferry projects. A full-funding grant agreement establishes 
the terms and conditions for federal participation in a project, 
including the maximum amount of federal funds available, which, by 
statute, cannot exceed 80 percent of the project's net cost. 

[5] Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 
Pub. L. No. 103-62, in 1993. Under the act, federal agencies are to 
develop multiyear strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual 
performance reports. According to GPRA, federal agencies are to include 
performance goals for agency activities in their strategic plans. 

[6] Pub. L. No. 102-240. 

[7] Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330. 

[8] Codified at 49 CFR Part 659. 

[9] Since the beginning of the State Safety Oversight program, the 
transit community affected by this oversight program grew from 19 
states and 32 rail transit agencies to 26 states and 42 rail transit 
agencies as of July 2006. FTA anticipates that two new states and as 
many as seven new rail transit agencies will enter the State Safety 
Oversight program by 2009. 

[10] Information on FRA's jurisdiction over rail transit agencies with 
shared-use track can be found in FTA and FRA policy statements 
published in the Federal Register in July 2000. FRA clarified its 
position on safety jurisdiction over shared track situations. See 65 
Fed. Reg. 42529 (July 10, 2000). 

[11] We also contacted Canadian transit officials in Toronto and 
Montreal to discuss their safety and security oversight system. 
However, we found that there is no standard national system of rail 
safety and security oversight in Canada, except in cases where a 
transit system is classified as a regular railroad. According to 
officials, rail transit systems are usually self-regulated in Canada, 
though some submit to external safety audits conducted by APTA. 

[12] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b). 

[13] See 49 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330. 

[14] The Urbanized Area Formula Program makes federal resources 
available to urbanized areas and to state governors for transit capital 
assistance in urbanized areas. An urbanized area is an incorporated 
area with a population of 50,000 or more. Urbanized areas with 
populations of fewer than 200,000 people may also use FTA's formula 
funds for operating assistance. 

[15] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[16] A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and 
managerial skills, to identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards 
and risks. 

[17] FTA states that, to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on 
universally applied rules is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated 
that they felt it was inappropriate to use a risk-based approach in 
this area of the program. 

[18] The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives, two 
each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 

[19] Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some 
form of grant funding to transit agencies they oversee and that they 
could, potentially, withhold those grants to force a transit agency to 
take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials 
stated that they had taken this step. 

[20] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[21] ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to 
DHS. 

[22] These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 
2005 and its accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with 
$12 million in funding for rail security activities. 

[23] FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared 
track situations in a Federal Register posting in 2000. See 65 Fed. 
Reg. 42529. 

[24] FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail 
transit agency that did not receive its waiver that its application was 
unnecessary--what the agency proposed was already allowed under FRA 
regulations. 

[25] Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program, 
California law dictated that CPUC had oversight authority over rail 
transit agencies, but exempted municipally operated systems. Because 
the City of San Francisco operates MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC 
oversight. However, since 49 CFR 659 required that California designate 
an agency to oversee all rail transit systems receiving federal funds, 
the governor of California designated CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997. 

[26] Prior to the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program, 
according to APTA, most transit agencies were self-regulated and 
submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored safety audits as a way of 
obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas for 
potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their 
participation in these audits. 

[27] FTA's contractor stated that FTA conducted one audit of an 
oversight agency, at that agency's request, in 2002, and performed 
several audits of oversight agencies that FTA had not previously 
audited. 

[28] TSI is a part of DOT's Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration. The National Transit Institute, which FTA funds, is 
affiliated with Rutgers University and dedicated to training employees 
of the public transportation industry. 

[29] FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and 
oversight agencies but do charge a nominal fee for course books and 
materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests to teach courses in 
field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants. 

[30] GAO-05-851, GAO-03-263, and GAO-03-843. 

[31] In the most recent revision to 49 CFR 659, the Rail Fixed Guideway 
Systems; State Safety Oversight rule governing the State Safety 
Oversight program, FTA mandated that in areas where transit agencies 
ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure they use 
the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This way one 
transit agency does not have to meet two separate standards in 
different parts of the system. 

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