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entitled 'Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and
the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season' which
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GAO:
June 2006:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Report to Congressional Committees:
Hurricanes Katrina And Rita:
Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the
2006 Hurricane Season:
Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims:
GAO-06-712:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-712, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Red Cross played a key role in providing relief to victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, mounting its largest ever disaster
response. Under the National Response Plan, and its emergency support
function-6 (ESF-6), the Red Cross and FEMA are tasked with working
together to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of
voluntary organizations, as well as state and local governments, as
they meet mass care needs—such as shelter, food, and first aid.
Questions have been raised about how the Red Cross and FEMA operated
following the Gulf Coast hurricanes and what improvements can be made
for the 2006 hurricane season.
This report includes GAO’s interim findings on the Red Cross and FEMA’s
hurricane operations. GAO will continue to analyze federal and
charitable hurricane relief efforts.
What GAO Found:
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Red
Cross—working together for the first time as co-primary agencies for
ESF-6 under the National Response Plan—disagreed about their roles and
responsibilities, and this disagreement strained working relationships
and hampered their efforts to coordinate relief services for hurricane
victims. Specifically, FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about the role
of the ESF-6 coordinator, a FEMA official charged with leading mass
care, housing, and human services assistance. FEMA officials told us
that the Red Cross should direct all requests for FEMA assistance
through the ESF-6 coordinator, while Red Cross officials stated that
the organization should be able to take requests directly to the FEMA
Operations Section Chief—not the ESF-6 coordinator. As a result, the
two organizations spent time negotiating operating procedures, rather
than focusing solely on coordinating mass care services in the early
days of the hurricane response effort. FEMA and the Red Cross have
noted that they are working to clarify their roles and responsibilities
under ESF-6, but as of May 24, 2006, had not reached agreement on these
responsibilities, including the role of the ESF-6 coordinator.
Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions, such as working
with FEMA to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of
sheltering and feeding, rotated frequently—often every 2 to 3
weeks—making it difficult for them to maintain strong working
relationships and gain expertise. These short rotations hindered
communications among staff, thus making it more difficult to mobilize
resources. Additionally, government officials stated that these short
rotations led to the loss of institutional knowledge about ESF-6
processes, such as how to collect shelter data correctly. Red Cross
officials said that 2- to 3- week rotations are standard because most
disasters do not require longer rotations, but acknowledged that short
rotations were a problem. Red Cross officials also told us they are
hiring permanent staff at the state level to help coordinate relief
services, including mass care under ESF-6, and are also considering
staffing options for national-level positions. However, as of May 24,
2006, the Red Cross has not implemented policies that would address the
issue at the national or local level.
FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track requests for
assistance it received from the Red Cross on behalf of voluntary
organizations and state and local governments for items such as water,
food, and cots; the absence of such a system created more work for the
Red Cross and slowed the delivery of relief services. These
organizations often did not know when, or if, they would be receiving
needed supplies and, as a result, scaled back relief services in some
instances. The Red Cross was only able to follow up on these requests
informally—a process that took time and was often ineffective.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that 1) FEMA work with the Red Cross to reach agreement
on 2006 hurricane season operating procedures, 2) the Red Cross
implement staffing strategies that would improve working relationships
and retention of institutional knowledge, and 3) that FEMA obtain the
Red Cross’s input when developing its resource tracking system. FEMA
had no comments on the recommendations. The Red Cross endorsed or is
taking actions, as applicable, to address the recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Cynthia Fagnoni at (202)
512-7215 or fagnonic@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Disagreement about Roles and Responsibilities Strained Working
Relationships between FEMA and the Red Cross:
Short Rotations Made It Difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 Staff to Develop
Effective Working Relationships and Gain Expertise:
FEMA's Inability to Track Requests Created More Work for the Red Cross
and Slowed Relief Services:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and the
2004 Hurricane Season:
Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by the Red Cross: Hurricane
Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6:
Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting Assistance:
Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESF: emergency support function:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 8, 2006:
Congressional Committees:
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, the
American National Red Cross (Red Cross) mounted its largest disaster
response effort in its more than 100 year history. The Red Cross, which
is chartered by Congress to provide volunteer aid to the military as
well as relief services to the public in the event of a disaster,
raised over $2 billion in private donations for its hurricane relief
efforts. Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, it opened nearly 1,100
shelters in 27 states and the District of Columbia and estimates that
it will have provided financial assistance to more than 3.7 million
hurricane victims.
In addition to providing hurricane relief services, the Red Cross also
was tasked to perform another role in the aftermath of the hurricanes-
-coordinating federal mass care assistance. In this role, the Red Cross
takes requests for assistance from state governments to meet the needs
of state or local governments or voluntary organizations and identifies
resources to fill those requests or calls upon the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), a federal agency under the jurisdiction of
the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to fill those
requests with federal resources. This role is outlined in the National
Response Plan--the purpose of which is to provide a single,
comprehensive framework for the federal response to incidents of
national significance, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks.
The plan--issued by DHS in December 2004--identifies specific emergency
support functions and names federal agencies and other entities
responsible for meeting needs in those areas in the event of a natural
disaster or other incident of national significance, such as a
terrorist attack. Under the plan's sixth emergency support function
(ESF-6), the Red Cross is the primary agency responsible for
coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of states and
local governments and other voluntary organizations, as they meet
needs, such as shelter, food, and emergency first aid. The Red Cross is
the only voluntary organization named as a primary agency in the plan,
although other voluntary organizations are included in the plan under
an umbrella organization and given support responsibilities. The Gulf
Coast hurricanes marked the first time the National Response Plan was
activated and the first time that the Red Cross served in a primary
agency capacity under the new, expanded version of ESF-6.
In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, which officially began on
June 1, this interim report focuses on how FEMA and the Red Cross
fulfilled their responsibilities under ESF-6 and identifies immediate
improvements both organizations can make to better coordinate federal
mass care assistance in the event that another devastating hurricane
hits the United States. This report--which builds on GAO's previously
issued work related to disasters, including a report about the
coordination of voluntary assistance following the events of September
11, 2001--presents the initial findings of GAO's ongoing work on how
voluntary organizations coordinated with the government to provide mass
care services following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued
preliminary observations in a December 2005 testimony, finding that
voluntary organizations took steps following September 11 to improve
coordination of relief efforts but still faced challenges coordinating
service delivery following the Gulf Coast hurricanes.[Footnote 1] We
anticipate releasing a final report later in 2006.
To gain a better understanding of how FEMA and the Red Cross worked
together following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we visited Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas in January and March of 2006. During these site
visits, we toured federal disaster operations centers and distribution
centers that the Red Cross and other national and local voluntary
organizations established to provide services to hurricane victims. We
also met with representatives from federal, state, and local
governments and held discussion groups with officials from both
national and local voluntary organizations. In addition to conducting
site visits, we analyzed FEMA and Red Cross documents, including
documented requests for assistance that the Red Cross, as the primary
agency for mass care under ESF-6, had placed to FEMA and the operating
procedures that the Red Cross and FEMA said they used to carry out its
ESF-6 responsibilities. We interviewed officials from DHS's Office of
Inspector General and FEMA's national headquarters, as well as
representatives from national voluntary organizations, including the
Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention.
Finally, we reviewed reports on the response to the Gulf Coast
hurricanes issued by the DHS Office of Inspector General,[Footnote 2]
the House of Representatives,[Footnote 3] the White House,[Footnote 4]
The International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red Cross,
and the American Bar Association.[Footnote 5]
We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
FEMA and the Red Cross's differing views about their roles and
responsibilities under ESF-6 hampered efforts to coordinate federal
mass care assistance. The two organizations differed in their
understanding of the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a key FEMA official
tasked with providing strategic vision and leading efforts to
coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services assistance.
FEMA officials said that the Red Cross should direct all requests for
FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator, while Red Cross
officials stated that the Red Cross needed to communicate directly with
the FEMA Operations Section Chief--not the ESF-6 coordinator. This
difference in expectations about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator
created tension between FEMA and the Red Cross and affected the
organizations' working relationship. Although Red Cross and FEMA
officials have stated they are working to clarify future roles and
responsibilities, they had not reached agreement on these roles and
responsibilities as of May 24, 2006.
Red Cross staff assigned to fulfill specific ESF-6 functions rotated
frequently, making it difficult for these staff to develop strong
working relationships and gain specific knowledge about ESF-6
processes. In general, Red Cross staff who worked for ESF-6 rotated
every 2 to 3 weeks. Officials from FEMA and state and local governments
told us that these short rotations presented two problems during Gulf
Coast hurricane relief efforts. First, these short rotations hampered
the ability of Red Cross staff to establish and maintain relationships
with officials from FEMA and other government agencies. Maintaining
strong relationships was particularly important following the
hurricanes because normal communication channels were disrupted and
staff needed to rely on personal contact to call upon needed resources.
Second, these short rotations made it difficult for Red Cross staff to
gain institutional knowledge about processes and procedures, such as
data collection procedures, that were part of their ESF-6 roles. The
International Committee of the Red Cross, in its review of various
aspects of the American Red Cross's response to the hurricanes, also
cited short rotations as problematic, stating that rapid volunteer
turnover resulted in the loss of knowledge volunteers had acquired on
the job. Officials from the Red Cross said that 2-to 3-week rotations
are standard because most disasters do not require longer rotations,
but acknowledged that short rotations were a problem after the Gulf
Coast hurricanes. In addition, Red Cross officials stated that they are
hiring permanent staff at the state level to help coordinate relief
services, including mass care under ESF-6, and are also considering
staffing options to address this issue at the national level. However,
as of May 24, 2006, the Red Cross had not yet implemented staffing
strategies to address this issue at the national or local level.
FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to determine the status of
official requests for assistance it had received, which slowed service
delivery and required the Red Cross to expend resources trying to
determine when and if mass care service providers would receive
promised goods. As the DHS Office of Inspector General noted in its
review of FEMA's response to Katrina, FEMA did not have a system in
place to track requests for assistance, including those requests it
received from the Red Cross in its ESF-6 capacity. FEMA officials
therefore were often unable to provide the Red Cross with accurate
information about when expected items would be delivered, or if FEMA
would be able to fulfill a request, causing many requests to go
unfilled or be filled too late to be of use. The unreliability of
FEMA's supply systems required the Red Cross to try to follow up on
requests through other informal channels--a process the Red Cross
reported as being inefficient and only marginally effective. Other
voluntary organizations also told us that in many cases the
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems challenged their attempts to
provide mass care services, and as a result they had to scale back on
their service provision.
To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006
hurricane season, we are recommending that FEMA work with the Red Cross
as soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating procedures that
they will both use in the event of an incident of national
significance. We are also recommending that the Red Cross implement ESF-
6 staffing strategies that would enable them to better facilitate the
development of working relationships and retain institutional
knowledge. In addition, to help ensure that FEMA's resource tracking
system will meet the needs of those requesting FEMA assistance, we are
recommending that FEMA obtain input from the Red Cross to aid in the
system's design.
In comments on a draft of this report, DHS officials indicated that
they had no comments on the draft, except for a few technical
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate in this report.
The Red Cross also provided comments on the draft and expressed general
agreement with our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the
Red Cross could be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red
Cross highlighted actions it is taking with respect to our first two
recommendations, and said that it heartily endorsed our third
recommendation. Additionally, the Red Cross provided important
contextual information about its role under the National Response Plan
and the length of its ESF-6 staff rotations. We incorporated this
information into the final report. Finally, the Red Cross maintained
that our draft report's characterization of problems pertaining to the
operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross following the
hurricanes was not fully accurate, and specifically that the versions
of procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross were the same in every
relevant respect. In response to the Red Cross's comments, we again
requested FEMA's operating procedures, which we received. We compared
the operating procedures FEMA and the Red Cross said they used and
determined the wording was the same in relevant respects. Specifically,
the versions stated that the Red Cross would not be precluded from
taking priorities directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief, as
necessary, but that the Red Cross would coordinate with other
designated FEMA officials. Subsequently, we modified the report to
focus on disagreements between FEMA and the Red Cross regarding their
roles and responsibilities during the relief efforts, rather than
specific versions of operating procedures. Even though the wording of
the operating procedures the Red Cross and FEMA said they used during
hurricane relief efforts was the same, it is clear that they disagreed
about their roles and responsibilities, and specifically the role of
the ESF-6 coordinator, following the hurricanes. Additionally, our
evidence indicates that this disagreement strained FEMA and Red Cross
working relationships and may have led to breakdowns in the provision
of mass care services. Both FEMA and Red Cross officials have confirmed
they are working to finalize a memorandum of understanding to clarify
ESF-6 roles and responsibilities for future incidents of national
significance. As both organizations work to finalize this memorandum,
they need to clearly define key terms pertaining to their roles and
responsibilities that may be ambiguous to avoid future confusion
resulting from differing interpretations of the same document.
Background:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused extensive human suffering and damage
in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Katrina made landfall
in Mississippi and Louisiana on August 29, 2005, and alone caused more
damage than any other single natural disaster in the history of the
United States. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an
estimated 300,000 homes--more than three times the total number of
homes destroyed by the four major hurricanes that hit the continental
United States in August and September 2004. Hurricane Rita followed on
September 24, 2005, making landfall in Texas and Louisiana and adding
to the devastation. Hurricane Katrina alone caused $96 billion in
property damage, more than any other natural disaster in the history of
the United States. (See fig. 1.)
Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and the
2004 Hurricane Season:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that
struck the continental United States in August and September 2004:
Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne. Regarding the 2005 Gulf Coast
Hurricanes, we were unable to obtain comparable home and property
damage for Hurricane Rita.
[End of figure]
The Red Cross:
The Red Cross provides relief services after disasters, such as
hurricanes or terrorist attacks, and is the nation's largest disaster
relief organization. Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has
offered humanitarian care to the victims of war and devastating natural
disasters. The organization is unique in that it is a private nonprofit
entity but, since 1905, has had a congressional charter. The
congressional charter requires that the organization provide volunteer
humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serve as a medium of
communication between the people of the United States and the armed
forces, and provide disaster prevention and relief services. Eight of
the 50 members of the Red Cross Board of Governors are appointed by the
President of the United States, and 7 of these individuals must be
federal officials.
Following an incident of national significance, the Red Cross serves as
a direct service provider to disaster victims. In this capacity, the
organization provides services that include:
* feeding,
* sheltering,
* financial assistance, and:
* emergency first aid.
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross estimated that it will
have provided more than 3.7 million hurricane victims with financial
assistance, 3.4 million overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and
more than 27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks for survivors
of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. According to the Red Cross, its efforts
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were larger than for any previous
disaster relief effort. For example, the Red Cross provided more than
six times the number of shelter nights after Katrina and Rita than it
did in the entire 2004 hurricane season. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by the Red Cross: Hurricane
Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that
struck the continental United States in August and September 2004:
Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne.
[End of figure]
National Response Plan:
The National Response Plan is designed to provide the structure for the
coordination of federal support for disaster response, including
support for voluntary organizations providing shelter, food, and other
mass care services. Major federal government agencies, the Red Cross,
and an umbrella organization of voluntary organizations are signatories
to the plan. DHS released the plan in December 2004, and Hurricane
Katrina was the first time the plan was used in response to an incident
of national significance. The plan incorporates and replaces several
previous plans for disaster management, including the Federal Response
Plan, which was originally signed in 1992. The Red Cross is the only
voluntary organization named as a primary agency under both the Federal
Response Plan and the National Response Plan. One way the National
Response Plan changed the Federal Response Plan was by incorporating
the services of other voluntary organizations under an umbrella
organization, National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster.
The National Response Plan is designed on the premise that disaster
response is generally handled by local jurisdictions. In the vast
majority of disasters, local emergency personnel, such as police, fire,
public health, and emergency management personnel, act as first
responders and identify needed resources to aid the community. Local
jurisdictions can also call on state resources to provide additional
assistance. If an incident is of such severity that it is deemed an
incident of national significance, DHS and FEMA coordinate with other
federal agencies to provide the affected state and local governments
with additional resources and supplemental assistance. In these
instances, state and local governments can request federal assistance
for needed items.
Emergency Support Function-6:
In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond
to disasters, the National Response Plan designates 15 emergency
support functions that address specific disaster response needs. ESF-6,
the function most relevant to voluntary organizations involved in
disaster relief, creates a working group of key federal agencies and
voluntary organizations to coordinate federal assistance in support of
state and local efforts to provide:
* mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid;
* housing, both short-and long-term; and:
* human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and
identifying support for persons with special needs.
Under the Federal Response Plan, ESF-6 included only the mass care
function. The National Response Plan marks the first time these three
functions were included under one emergency support function.
FEMA and the Red Cross both serve important leadership roles in ESF-6.
FEMA--an agency within DHS--serves as both the ESF-6 coordinator and as
the primary agency for housing and human services. (See fig. 3.) In its
role as ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the implementation of ESF-6
and ensures coordination among mass care, housing, and human services.
In its role as primary agency for housing and human services, FEMA has
responsibility for leading and coordinating federal efforts to provide
these services to the victims of disasters.
Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to its role as a direct service provider, the Red Cross
serves as the primary agency for mass care under ESF-6, which includes
sheltering, feeding, and the provision of emergency first aid. In this
role, the Red Cross is responsible for coordinating federal mass care
assistance in support of state and local efforts. Red Cross staff work
at FEMA headquarters and field offices to help coordinate ESF-6 relief
efforts across organizations. In this role, the Red Cross takes
requests for assistance from state governments to meet the needs of
state or local governments or voluntary organizations. The Red Cross
then identifies resources to meet those needs or calls upon FEMA to
meet those needs with federal resources. (See fig. 4.) In addition to
being the only voluntary organization to serve as a primary agency in
the National Response Plan, the Red Cross also has responsibilities
under other emergency support functions, such as providing counseling
services under ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services.
Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting Assistance:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act:
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) specifies additional roles for the Red Cross--and other
voluntary organizations--after a disaster. [Footnote 6] The Stafford
Act authorizes FEMA--under a delegation from the President--to
coordinate the relief activities of government and private disaster
assistance organizations (including the Red Cross). These organizations
agree to operate under a federal coordinating officer, who coordinates
relief following major disasters and emergencies declared by the
President. The Stafford Act also specifies that in providing relief and
assistance, FEMA may use--with consent--the personnel and facilities of
disaster relief organizations in the distribution of medicine, food,
supplies, or other items, and in the restoration, rehabilitation, or
reconstruction of community services housing and essential facilities.
Specifically named in the statute are the Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, and the Mennonite Disaster Service.
Disagreement about Roles and Responsibilities Strained Working
Relationships between FEMA and the Red Cross:
Before the hurricanes made landfall, FEMA and the Red Cross--working
together under ESF-6 for the first time--disagreed about their roles
and responsibilities under the National Response Plan. This
disagreement strained working relationships both before and during the
response effort. Immediately following the hurricanes, each
organization had a different understanding of certain ESF-6 operating
procedures, according to both FEMA and Red Cross officials. This
disagreement was primarily about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a
FEMA official tasked with providing strategic vision and leading
efforts to coordinate mass care, housing, and human services
assistance. FEMA officials told us that according to their
understanding of the operating procedures, the Red Cross should direct
all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator. The Red
Cross maintained that the operating procedures permitted it to take
priorities directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief--not the ESF-
6 coordinator.
Tensions resulting from this disagreement negatively affected the
working relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross. Because of the
lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, the agencies spent
time during the response effort trying to establish operations and
procedures, rather than focusing solely on coordinating services. For
example, FEMA and the Red Cross debated if the Red Cross would attend
and present information at daily FEMA policy meetings. Specifically,
Red Cross officials reported that in the early days of the response
effort, the ESF-6 coordinator informed the Red Cross that she would
represent all components of ESF-6 at FEMA policy meetings. Under this
model, the Red Cross attended but did not present information. Red
Cross officials expressed concern with this model because they
indicated that it undermined their authority as the primary agency for
mass care. The Red Cross additionally told us that FEMA's vision of the
ESF-6 coordinator did not best use the Red Cross's expertise in mass
care service provision. FEMA officials have argued that the ESF-6
coordinator role is important because the coordinator can provide a
broad vision for all of ESF-6, which includes housing and human
services as well as mass care. Additionally, FEMA officials have
reported that confusion about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may
have led to breakdowns in service provision.
In its review of operations following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, the
DHS Office of Inspector General also noted that FEMA and the Red Cross
held different expectations of their responsibilities. To address this
issue, the Inspector General recommended that the FEMA director
establish an ESF-6 working group to define the explicit roles and
responsibilities of FEMA and the Red Cross, develop standard operating
procedures, and implement a concept of operations plan. FEMA and the
Red Cross have stated they are working to clarify future roles and
responsibilities, but as of May 24, 2006, had not reached agreement on
these responsibilities, including the role of the ESF-6 coordinator.
Short Rotations Made It Difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 Staff to Develop
Effective Working Relationships and Gain Expertise:
Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions rotated frequently,
often working from several different locations in the aftermath of the
Gulf Coast hurricanes. These staff--who were responsible for
coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of state and local
efforts to provide shelter and food to evacuees--generally rotated
every 2 to 3 weeks. For example, one Red Cross employee told us that in
a 3 1/2-month period, which began immediately before Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, he rotated on seven occasions to different ESF-6 offices
in Washington, D.C., Atlanta; New Orleans; and Baton Rouge. During this
time, he also worked for short periods at Red Cross headquarters on
five separate occasions.
Short rotations made it difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 staff to develop
and maintain effective working relationships with staff from other
organizations, which were critical to relief efforts. Specifically,
FEMA officials told us that short rotations hindered coordination by
requiring that Red Cross ESF-6 staff members develop new working
relationships every time they rotated. For example, when rotating into
a new state, ESF-6 staff would have to form new working relationships
with the FEMA officials in that state, state and local government
officials, and officials from various local voluntary organizations.
These short rotations were problematic because strong relationships
between ESF-6 workers and other organizations facilitate communication
between workers and ensure that individuals are aware of the roles and
capacities of other disaster response organizations. In addition,
officials told us that following the hurricanes, strong relationships
were particularly important because usual communication channels were
often not functioning and people needed to rely on personal
relationships to mobilize resources.
Short rotations also limited Red Cross ESF-6 staff members' knowledge
of ESF-6 processes. For example, FEMA officials said that frequent
rotations resulted in Red Cross staff sometimes not knowing how to
correctly fill out forms and collect shelter data. FEMA officials said
that inconsistencies in data collected by Red Cross ESF-6 staff made it
difficult to track trends in mass care and identify where additional
services were needed. Red Cross officials noted that FEMA processes and
procedures were not always clear and required time to learn. Although
not specifically addressing ESF-6, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), a humanitarian nongovernmental agency based in
Geneva, Switzerland, also found that short rotations by Red Cross
volunteers in various positions were problematic. According to an ICRC
review of the American Red Cross's overall response to the hurricanes,
"the volunteers remain normally for a period between 2-3 weeks…Due to
the rapid change-over training is difficult and acquired knowledge is
lost."
Red Cross officials gave several reasons for using short rotations
after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Officials told us that short rotations
for ESF-6 staff are standard because most disasters are not large
enough to require an ESF-6 role for more than 2 or 3 weeks. In
contrast, the Gulf Coast hurricanes required that Red Cross staff fill
ESF-6 functions from August 27, 2005, until December 16, 2005, a period
of approximately 3 1/2 months. In addition, Red Cross officials said
that short rotations made it easier to fill ESF-6 staff positions
because volunteers were more likely to accept work for a short time
period than for a long period.
Officials from the Red Cross have recognized the problems posed by
short rotations by ESF-6 staff--who included both paid employees and
trained volunteers--and stated that they are working to resolve the
problem. The Red Cross told us that it is hiring 14 additional
employees at the state level who will work with state emergency
management agencies to help coordinate relief services, including mass
care under ESF-6. Red Cross officials also told us that they are
considering hiring reserve staff that could fill ESF-6 positions at the
national level for longer periods. However, as of May 24, 2006, no new
staffing policies had been implemented to resolve the problem of
frequent rotations at the national or local levels.
FEMA's Inability to Track Requests Created More Work for the Red Cross
and Slowed Relief Services:
FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track the requests for
assistance that the Red Cross submitted--in its official ESF-6 role--on
behalf of state and local governments and other voluntary
organizations. (See fig. 5.) Red Cross records indicate that it
submitted 16 requests to FEMA headquarters and dozens more to field
offices in Atlanta, Georgia; Denton, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
Jackson, Mississippi; and Austin, Texas during the response effort.
According to the Red Cross, FEMA approved the majority of these
requests for assistance such as requests for water, fuel, and cots for
shelters, but did not have a system in place to determine whether:
* the appropriate FEMA unit received the request,
* the requested items had been located,
* these items had been loaded and shipped to the intended location,
and:
* these items had been delivered.
Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Without a comprehensive system to keep track of requests for
assistance, many requests were lost before FEMA could fill them. For
example, FEMA officials were only able to provide us with records of
less than one-third of the 16 requests that Red Cross documents
indicate were submitted to FEMA headquarters. Additionally, other
voluntary organizations and state and local government officials have
told us that because of FEMA's inability to track requests, they did
not know when, or if, they would receive the supplies that they needed
to continue providing mass care services. The DHS Office of Inspector
General noted this problem in its report, indicating that FEMA's
inability to monitor requests for assistance often resulted in requests
being lost or filled too late. In some instances, lost requests
resulted in duplicate requests being submitted to FEMA. The DHS Office
of Inspector General has recommended that FEMA develop a means to
standardize and streamline the resource ordering and tracking process
as well as develop and implement a resource-tracking system that is
capable of documenting whether resources were delivered and the
efficiency with which the resource was provided. The Under Secretary
for Preparedness of DHS has stated that FEMA is working on the
development of a resource-tracking system. However, FEMA officials told
us they would not be able to create such a system before the 2006
hurricane season.
Red Cross officials have reported that often, the only way for them to
determine the status of previously submitted requests was through
informal channels, a situation that created more work for Red Cross
staff. Because there was no comprehensive system in place to formally
track the status of requests, Red Cross staff followed up on requests
primarily through telephone calls, a procedure that was particularly
challenging because the Gulf Coast hurricanes compromised communication
systems. Furthermore, when the Red Cross officials were able to follow
up on requests by telephone, FEMA officials were often not able to
provide the needed information, according to Red Cross officials.
State and local governments that submitted requests for assistance to
FEMA through the Red Cross and ESF-6 reported service delivery problems
as a result of FEMA's inability to track and meet requests. For
example, the city of Austin, Texas, had difficulties meeting the needs
of evacuees when FEMA did not fill its request for 6,000 cots as
expected. According to Austin officials, FEMA had indicated that it had
processed the request and shipped the cots, which would arrive the same
day. However, the cots did not arrive until much later in the response
effort, and in the interim, FEMA was unable to determine where they
were. As a result, the city of Austin needed to develop alternate
sheltering strategies and later had to redirect the cots, which arrived
too late to be of use to the city. An official from the state of Texas
reported similar fulfillment and reliability problems with FEMA's
system and stated that in preparation for the next hurricane season,
the state is developing alternate plans with the private sector to
reduce its dependency on FEMA to meet its mass care needs.
Voluntary organizations also reported that, in many cases, the
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems challenged their attempts to
provide mass care services. For example, the Southern Baptist
Convention submitted several requests to FEMA through the Red Cross on
September 1, 2005, for items such as refrigerated vehicles, forklifts,
and hand washing stations to establish 13 large-scale kitchens that
would serve Southern Baptist Convention and Red Cross shelters in
Mississippi. A Southern Baptist Convention official told us that FEMA
was unable to provide information about these requests after the
requests had been submitted. Consequently, the organization's ability
to continue providing food for hurricane evacuees was compromised
because most of the supplies it requested did not arrive until
approximately September 10--a week and a half after placing the
requests.
Conclusions:
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought widespread devastation and
challenged all levels of government and voluntary organizations to help
thousands of victims get food, medical help, shelter, and other
assistance. As we and others have reported, the agencies responsible
for disaster relief after the Gulf Coast hurricanes were clearly
overwhelmed, and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of
preparedness and the collective response. The Red Cross and FEMA--the
two organizations responsible for working together to coordinate
federal mass care assistance under the National Response Plan--also
faced challenges coordinating with each other to ensure that critical
aid and resources from the federal government reached workers on the
ground in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
As the 2006 hurricane season begins, these two organizations, with
their access to vast resources and long histories of providing disaster
relief services, are uniquely positioned to improve the level of care
provided following a disaster. But this partnership cannot function
efficiently in the aftermath of a disaster without improved working
relationships. Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross will
continue to be difficult unless they reach agreement on their
respective roles and responsibilities and find ways to ensure that
staff in critical positions serve at sites long enough to make contacts
and retain on-the-job experience. Furthermore, as FEMA works to develop
a system to track requests for assistance, it has an opportunity to
improve service delivery by engaging the Red Cross. As the primary
agency for mass care under the National Response Plan and the entity
charged with submitting mass care-related requests to FEMA, the Red
Cross could provide valuable input in identifying end user needs of a
resource-tracking system and aiding in the design of system
capabilities. The DHS Office of Inspector General has made longer-term
recommendations for improving ESF-6 processes. However, changes are
needed to enable this partnership to function more effectively as the
2006 hurricane season is beginning.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006
hurricane season, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to
work with the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the Red
Cross as soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating
procedures that they will both use in the event of an incident of
national significance. Given the lack of progress FEMA and the Red
Cross have made thus far in reaching agreement on the operating
procedures and that the new hurricane season is beginning, they may
wish to use mediation to speed the agreement.
We recommend that the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing strategies that better
facilitate the development of working relationships and retain
institutional knowledge. For example, such strategies might include
lengthening ESF-6 staff rotations in incidents of national significance
or primarily using permanent staff to fill ESF-6 positions.
To help ensure that FEMA's resource tracking system will meet the needs
of those requesting FEMA assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of
DHS direct FEMA to ensure that it obtains input from the Red Cross as
it develops a resource tracking system.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security. DHS officials indicated that they had no comments
on the draft, except for a few technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate in this report. DHS did not provide a
response to our recommendations, noting that FEMA was actively
preparing for the hurricane season. DHS's written comments are
reproduced in appendix II at the end of this report.
We also provided a draft of this report to the Interim President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross. The Red Cross's written
comments on the draft are reproduced in appendix III. Overall, the Red
Cross agreed with our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the
Red Cross could be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red
Cross also highlighted actions under way with respect to our first two
recommendations. For example, the Red Cross said it has been working
closely with FEMA in recent months to develop and finalize a memorandum
of understanding that outlines areas of mutual support and cooperation
with respect to response and recovery in presidentially declared
disasters and emergencies. With respect to our recommendation about
staffing strategies, the Red Cross said that it is in the process of
hiring ESF-6 reservists who will be deployed for extended periods of
time to perform Red Cross ESF-6 mass care functions at the federal
level. Additionally, the Red Cross said that it heartily endorsed our
third recommendation about FEMA's resource tracking system.
In its response, the Red Cross also provided additional information to
help clarify the Red Cross's role under the National Response Plan and
its ESF-6 operations. Specifically, the Red Cross maintained that in
several places in the draft, our characterization of its role under the
National Response Plan and ESF-6 was too broad. In response, we revised
the report to clarify that under the National Response Plan, the Red
Cross is responsible for coordinating federal mass care assistance in
support of state and local mass care efforts. The Red Cross also
provided additional information about the length of ESF-6 staff
rotations, which we incorporated into the final report.
Finally, in its written comments, the Red Cross maintained that in our
draft report the manner in which we characterized problems pertaining
to the operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross following
the hurricanes was not fully accurate. FEMA and Red Cross officials had
previously told us that the organizations used different versions of
the operating procedures. However, in its comments on our draft report,
the Red Cross said that statements we made in the draft regarding
differences in the versions of the operating procedures it and FEMA
used were not accurate, as the versions were the same in every relevant
respect. Further, the Red Cross stated that that the use of two
different versions of operating procedures by FEMA and the Red Cross--
if it ever occurred--did not result in negative consequences, as our
draft reported. In response to the Red Cross's comments, we again
requested the version of the operating procedures used by FEMA during
hurricane relief efforts. We subsequently received a version of the
operating procedures from FEMA; our review of this document indicated
that the versions the Red Cross and FEMA said they used were the same
in relevant respects. Specifically, the versions stated that the Red
Cross would not be precluded from taking priorities directly to the
FEMA Operations Section Chief, as necessary, but that the Red Cross
would coordinate with other designated FEMA officials. As such, we
modified the report to focus on disagreements between FEMA and the Red
Cross regarding their roles and responsibilities during the relief
efforts, rather than specific versions of operating procedures. Even
though the wording of the operating procedures the Red Cross and FEMA
said they used during hurricane relief efforts was the same, it is
clear that FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about their roles and
responsibilities following the hurricanes and specifically the role of
the ESF-6 coordinator. Further, our evidence indicates this difference
strained their working relationships. High-ranking officials from both
the Red Cross and FEMA confirmed to us on numerous occasions that there
was confusion and differing views over how the agencies should operate
under ESF-6 and specifically how the role of the ESF-6 coordinator
should be defined. After reviewing our draft, FEMA officials did not
disagree with our characterization that disagreement over the operating
procedures and the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may have led to
breakdowns in the provision of mass care services. Further, both FEMA
and Red Cross officials have confirmed they are working to finalize the
aforementioned memorandum of understanding to clarify ESF-6 roles and
responsibilities for future incidents of national significance. As both
organizations work to finalize this memorandum, they need to clearly
define key terms pertaining to their roles and responsibilities that
may be ambiguous to avoid future confusion resulting from differing
interpretations of the same document.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Red Cross, appropriate congressional
committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your
staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Cynthia M. Fagnoni:
Managing Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Chairman:
The Honorable Max Baucus:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi:
Chairman:
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions: United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: United States
Senate:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable William M. Thomas:
Chairman:
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Ways and Means:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
As part of GAO's ongoing body of work examining the response of the
federal government and others to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we
conducted a review of how Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and voluntary organizations operated in concert with one another after
the Gulf Coast hurricanes. To obtain information about coordination
between FEMA and the voluntary organizations during the response to the
Gulf Coast hurricanes, we interviewed officials from FEMA's national
headquarters and from national offices of voluntary organizations,
including the Red Cross, National Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster, the Salvation Army, the United Way, Habitat for Humanity, the
Southern Baptist Convention, and Louisiana Association of Nonprofit
Organizations. Additionally, to better understand two key tools used in
coordination, we observed a National Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster conference call in November 2005. These conference calls took
place daily after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and included
representatives from local and national voluntary organizations, as
well as federal agencies, such as FEMA. We also observed the
Coordinated Assistance Network database, a database that allowed
multiple organizations to access information about the services
provided to evacuees. To coordinate efforts with other oversight
entities, we met in person and by telephone with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General, Congressional
Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, the Urban Institute, and
the RAND Corporation. Finally, we reviewed reports on the response to
the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued by the DHS Office of Inspector
General, the House of Representatives, the White House, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red Cross, and
the American Bar Association.
We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Site Visits:
To learn about the operations of voluntary organizations in the field,
we conducted site visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana, as
well as Biloxi and Jackson, Mississippi, in January of 2006.
Additionally, we visited Austin and Houston, Texas, in March of 2006.
We toured damage caused by the hurricanes in New Orleans, Louisiana,
and Biloxi, Mississippi. Additionally we toured the FEMA Joint Field
Offices that were located in Baton Rouge, Biloxi, and Austin; local
emergency operations centers in Baton Rouge and Austin; as well as
distribution centers established by the Red Cross and the Salvation
Army.
We spoke with FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons in Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas. Additionally, we met with local chapters of the Red Cross,
the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. In
addition, we spoke with key officials from the East Baton Rouge Parish
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Office of
Homeland Security and Public Safety: City of New Orleans, Texas Office
of Homeland Security, Austin/Travis County Health and Human Services
Department, City of Austin Office of Emergency Management, City of
Houston Mayor's Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security, the
Harris County Citizen Corps, and the Harris County Judge's office. We
also met with representatives from the OneStar Foundation, a charitable
organization established in coordination with Texas' Governor Perry's
office.
Discussion Groups:
To gain additional perspectives on disaster response, we conducted
discussion groups of voluntary organizations that responded to the
hurricanes. We attended the January Board of Directors meeting for the
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. At this meeting,
we observed the board members offering guidance to an organization that
was new to disaster response and conducted a discussion group with
board members, including representatives from the United Methodist
Committee on Relief, America's Second Harvest, and Lutheran Disaster
Response. We held two additional discussion groups--one in Jackson,
Mississippi, and one in Houston, Texas--to learn the perspectives of
local voluntary organizations that provided disaster relief. At these
discussion groups, we heard from representatives of local chapters of
the United Way and Catholic Charities USA, the Houston Food Bank,
Independence Heights Ministerial Alliance, community action agencies
from two counties in Mississippi, and the Christian Outreach Center.
Analysis of Red Cross Documents:
To better understand the Red Cross's responsibilities and response to
the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we analyzed numerous documents provided to
us by the Red Cross. These documents included an August 2005 draft of
the Standard Operating Procedures for Emergency Support Function-6; the
American Red Cross Responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan; a
statement of understanding between FEMA and the Red Cross; key
statements of understanding between the Red Cross and other voluntary
organizations that pertain to the Gulf Coast Response--including
memorandums with Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army; training
materials for Red Cross Emergency Support Function-6 personnel and
disaster operation summary reports; after-action report by the Red
Cross; and a spreadsheet of all Red Cross shelters. We also reviewed a
Red Cross summary document that listed each action request form it, as
a primary agency for Emergency Support Function-6, submitted to FEMA
between August 29, 2005, and September 30, 2005. Red Cross officials
told us that they created this document after the Gulf Coast hurricanes
in response to inquiries by us and others about their role as the
primary agency for mass care. Additionally, we reviewed documents that
the Red Cross provided to the Senate Committee on Finance, including
documentation of Board of Governors' meeting agendas from the years
2001 through 2005 and communication from Red Cross executives to board
members. As aforementioned, we also reviewed mission reports of the
response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes by the International Committee of
the Red Cross and the British Red Cross.
Analysis of FEMA Documents:
To gain a better understanding of how FEMA worked with voluntary
organizations after the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we reviewed documents
that it provided to us. Specifically, we reviewed copies of the action
request forms that FEMA had records of the Red Cross submitting to FEMA
headquarters and a list documenting the status of these action request
forms. We also reviewed FEMA maps of shelter locations. Following
agency comments, we also reviewed a version of the ESF-6 standard
operating procedures FEMA said it used during hurricane relief efforts
and compared it to the version the Red Cross said that it used.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Washington, DC 20528:
Homeland Security:
May 24, 2006:
Ms. Cynthia M. Fagnoni:
Managing Director:
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: U. S. Government
Accountability Office: 441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Fagnoni:
Re: Draft Report GAO-06-712, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination
between FEMA and the Red Cross Could Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane
Season (GAO Job Code 130529):
The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the opportunity to
review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's draft
report. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials have been
actively preparing for hurricane season. At the present time, FEMA
officials have no comments on the draft report.
We will provide technical comments under separate cover.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of Section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross:
American Red Cross:
Office of the General Counsel:
2025 E Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20006:
(202) 303-5433:
(202) 303-0143 (Fax):
Writer's Direct Dial:
(202) 303-5466:
polacheck@usa.redcross.org:
Legal Assistant:
(202) 303-5519:
osumit@usa.redcross.org:
Direct Fax:
(202) 303-0143:
May 24, 2006:
By E-Mail:
Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director: Education, Workforce, and Income
Security Issues: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO): 441 G
Street N W.
Washington DC 20548:
RE: GAO Draft Report:
Dear Ms. Fagnoni:
Attached please find Comments of the American Red Cross on the U.S
Government Accountability Office Draft Report, "Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Could Be Improved far
the 2006 Hurricane Season." Please feel free to contact me with any
questions:
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lori Polacheck:
Senior Counsel:
Attachment:
Comments of the American Red Cross on the U.S. Government
Accountability Office Draft Report, "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Could Be Improved for the
2006 Hurricane Season"
The American Red Cross appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
GAO Draft Report, "Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between
FEMA and the Red Cross Could Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season"
("Draft Report"). Overall, the Red Cross agrees with the GAO's
conclusion that the coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross could
be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. That is why the Red Cross
has been working closely with FEMA in recent months to develop a new
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that outlines areas of mutual support
and cooperation with respect to response and recovery in Presidentially-
declared disasters and emergencies The finalization of this MOU is
imminent. In addition, the Red Cross and FEMA are working together to
reach a better understanding regarding their respective roles under
Emergency Support Function ("ESF") #6 of the National Response Plan
("NRP"), which was activated for the first time in the response to the
Gulf' Coast hurricanes They expect to document their understanding in a
separate document:
The Red Cross role in disaster response and ESF #6 of the NRP:
The GAO correctly notes that the Red Cross is chartered by Congress to
provide a system of disaster relief and that in response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita the Red Cross mounted the largest disaster response in
its history For more than 125 years, the mission of the Red Cross - a
non-profit, charitable organization --has been to help Americans
prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies. The Red Cross
accomplishes this mission with a unique, community-based network of
more than 800 local chapters, together with regional service areas and
our national headquarters in Washington D C The Red Cross has expertise
in meeting the human needs associated with disasters and it often
partners with governmental entities in providing emergency shelter,
food and other mass care services as well as short-term financial
assistance to address basic human needs. The Red Cross' response to
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma included serving nearly 65 million
meals and snacks, sheltering nearly 500,000 hurricane survivors with
approximately 3.4 million shelter nights, and providing emergency
financial assistance to nearly 1.4 million families:
The Red Cross is concerned, however, that the Draft Report does not
accurately characterize the Red Cross' other role in disaster response:
its role under ESF #6 of the NRP ESP #6 covers mass care, housing and
human services. Under the NRP, the Red Cross is the Primary Agency for
the mass care part of ESF #6, while FEMA is the Primary Agency for
housing and human services. In the words of the NRP, the Red Cross'
function as Primary Agency for mass care is to "coordinate Federal mass
care assistance in support of State and local mass care efforts."
National Response Plan, ESF #6 Annex, page 5. This means that the Red
Cross works within the federal government structure to help bring
federal resources to state and local governments. Among other things,
the Red Cross receives resource requests from state and local
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and transmits
them to FEMA FEMA then decides which resource requests will be filled
and assigns them to the appropriate federal agency:
The Red Cross' role under ESF #6 of the NRP has been the subject of
much confusion For example, in its Draft Report the GAO erroneously
states that under ESF #6 the Red Cross is tasked with "coordinating the
nations' delivery of mass care services" (Draft Report, page 1),
"coordinating the provision of mass care" (Draft Report, page 8), and
"meeting the nation's mass care needs" (Draft Report, page 17). Similar
erroneous statements are found throughout the Draft Report, including
in the Highlights and on pages 3, 9, and 13. In fact, under the NRP the
Red Cross' ESF #6 role is much mote limited. The Red Cross'
responsibilities as Primary Agency for mass care under ESF #6 relate
solely to the system by which the federal government provides resources
to support local disaster relief activities.
During the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross
fulfilled its responsibilities as Primary Agency for mass care under
ESF #6 by, among other things, sending specially-trained Red Cross
staff to FEMA locations to serve as contacts for state and local
governmental entities and NGOs seeking federal resources to support
their local relief efforts. Red Cross ESF #6 staff documented these
resource requests and submitted them to FEMA's logistics system; FEMA,
not the Red Cross, decided which resource requests would be funded. Red
Cross ESF #6 staff also supplied subject matter expertise to state and
local government entities regarding mass care activities and worked
with liaisons from other voluntary agencies and ESFs to help on issues
relating to the federal resourcing of state and local mass care
response efforts.
The Red Cross' activities as Primary Agency for mass care under the NRP
are quite different from the sheltering, feeding, and other mass care
activities the Red Cross performs due to its humanitarian mission and
Congressional Chatter. In its ESF #6 role, the Red Cross' staff do not
manage or direct the delivery of mass care by the Red Cross, other
NGOs, or state and local governments.
ESF #6 Standard Operating Procedures and the role of the ESF #6
coordinator:
The Draft Report's discussion of the ESF #6 standard operating
procedures (Highlights, pages 11-12) contains a number of errors.
First, the draft report erroneously suggests that FEMA and the Red
Cross generated separate, conflicting standard operating procedures for
ESF #6 In fact, the draft ESF #6 standard operating procedures were
developed jointly by FEMA and the Red Cross. Throughout the spring and
summer of 2005, the Red Cross and FEMA had a continuing dialog about
the standard operating procedures, with FEMA circulating updated drafts
and the Red Cross providing comments. Contrary to the statement in the
Draft Report, the Red Cross did not develop any ESF #6 standard
operating procedures on its own.
Second, the Draft Report erroneously states that the August 2005
version of the standard operating procedures differed significantly
from the June 2005 standard operating procedures and that the Red
Cross' and FEMA's adherence to different versions resulted in tension
that affected the working relationship (Draft Report, pages 11-12) In
fact, the June 2005 and August 2005 versions are the same in every
relevant respect Most importantly, both versions contain the same
description of the role of the ESF #6 coordinator. There is no basis
for saying that the use of different versions of the standard operating
procedures (if it even occurred) had any negative consequences
Furthermore, the Red Cross and FEMA did not continue negotiating the
standard operating procedures while the response to the Gulf Coast
hurricanes was underway.
Third, with respect to the Draft Report's discussion of the role of the
ESF #6 coordinator (pages 3, 11-12), it is important to note that the
Red Cross followed the appropriate chain of command, processed requests
for federal resources through the appropriate channels, and worked
closely with FEMA's designated ESF #6 coordinator. FEMA and the Red
Cross continue to work together to ensure that they share an under
standing about the role of the coordinator for purposes of the next
major disaster, and they will develop policies and procedures
incorporating that agreement.
Rotations of Red Cross ESF #6 staff:
The Draft Report's discussion of the rotations of Red Cross ESF #6
staff (Highlights, pages 3-4 and 13-14) omits important background and
looks at the issue out of context In the vast majority of major
disasters, an ESF #6 assignment for a Red Cross staff' member or
volunteer will last from a few days to a few weeks. Hurricane Katrina
was an extraordinary event making unusual demands on all of the ESFs to
support numerous deployments at multiple locations for unprecedented
lengths of time. Federal ESP #6 efforts continued for much longer than
they ever had before. This is why Red Cross ESF #6 staff-many of whom
are volunteers-often could not continue to serve in the ESF #6 role
throughout the weeks or months that a particular FEMA office was in
operation. During the response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red
Cross tried to ensure as much consistency as possible in its staffing
of the ESF #6 positions at FEMA locations Contrary to the statement in
draft report, no Red Cross employee rotated 12 times. The employee to
which the Draft Report refers rotated to six ESF #6 assignments and
then returned to his home duty station at Red Cross national
headquarters:
The Red Cross is taking various steps to lengthen the rotations of its
ESF #6 personnel and ensure that ESF #6 personnel have the strong
working relationships and ESF #6 expertise that ate necessary to
provide the highest level of service Among other things, the Red Cross
has revised its training course for ESF #6 staff so that they will be
more knowledgeable about ESF #6 processes and policies. The Red Cross
is in the process of hiring ESF #6 reservists, who will be deployed for
extended periods of time to perform the Red Cross' ESF #6 mass care
function at the federal level In addition, the Red Cross is hiring 14
additional employees who will work in specific states and focus on
coordination with state emergency management agencies concerning mass
care issues, including ESF #6 These new staff will be knowledgeable
about the mass care activities of state and local governments and will
work closely with the Red Cross ESF #6 mass care personnel who will be
deployed to FEMA locations during a disaster, thereby enhancing the
communications about the state and local resource needs that can be
addressed through the federal system These new staff will not, however,
"fill ESF 6 positions at the state level," as the GAO reports (Draft
Report, pages 4, 14), because the Red Cross does not perform the ESF #6
role at the state government level.
Tracking resource requests:
Although coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross is important, the
more fundamental issue is FEMA's fulfillment of the requests for
federal resources that are processed by ESF #6 Thus, the Red Cross
heartily endorses the GAO's recommendation that FEMA should develop a
comprehensive and effective system for tracking requests for federal
mass care resources and incorporate Red Cross input in the development
process.
Other issues:
Draft Report, page 1, 7: The Red Cross is the only voluntary
organization specifically named in the plan as a primary agency. The
National VOAD represents other voluntary organizations and is
designated as a Support Agency.
Draft Report, pages 4, 13: The report issued by the International
Committee for the Red Cross ("ICRC") does not pertain to FSF #6 The
ICRC report contains only a general statement regarding the normal
deployment period for a Red Cross disaster volunteer and does not
mention either ESF #6 or the NRP:
Draft Report, page 6: Pursuant to the Red Cross' Congressional Charter,
36 U S.C. §§ 300101 et seq, the Red Cross' purposes include carrying
out a nationwide system of disaster prevention and relief' and serving
as a medium of communication between the people of the United States
and the members of the armed forces.
[End of Section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Cynthia M. Fagnoni, (202)512-7215, fagnonic@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Andrew Sherrill, Assistant Director, and Tamara Fucile, Analyst in
Charge, managed this assignment and made significant contributions to
all aspects of this report. Mallory Barg Bulman, Scott Spicer, and
Matthew Kundinger also made significant contributions. Additionally,
Norm Rabkin, Bill Jenkins, Gale Harris, Mike Brostek, Michael Zola,
Brodi Fontenot, and Walter Vance aided in this assignment. In addition,
Jessica Botsford assisted in the legal analysis, and Rachael Valliere
assisted in the message and report development.
[End of Section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable
Assistance, GAO-06-297T (Washington, D.C. Dec. 13, 2005).
[2] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina. OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C. March 2006).
[3] United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A
Failure of Initiative. (Washington, D.C. Feb. 15, 2006).
[4] The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned. (Washington, D.C. Feb. 2006).
[5] American Bar Association. In the Wake of the Storm: The ABA
Responds to Hurricane Katrina. (Chicago, Illinois: 2006).
[6] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5201.
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