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Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO:

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of 
State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives:

May 2006:

U.S. Public Diplomacy:

State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain 
Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges:

GAO-06-535:

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-535, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related 
Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward 
the United States in the Muslim world.  Public diplomacy activities—led 
by the State Department (State)—are designed to counter such sentiments 
by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, 
and advancing mutual understanding between nations.  GAO was asked to 
examine (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has 
directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a 
strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what 
challenges remain to be addressed.

What GAO Found: 

State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with 
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major 
initiatives directed at the Muslim world.  Comparing data for fiscal 
years 2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with 
the largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with 
significant Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized 
overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at 
all.  As part of the Secretary of State’s newly announced 
transformational diplomacy initiative, the department intends to 
reposition staff to better align with policy priorities.  Since 2002, 
State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on the 
Muslim world—a media campaign, a youth-oriented magazine, and a group 
of youth-focused exchange programs—but these initiatives have been 
largely terminated or suspended.   However, several exchange programs 
continue to target youth in the Muslim world. In addition, posts in the 
Muslim world use a range of standard programs and tools which the Under 
Secretary plans to supplement with several new initiatives. 

GAO’s fieldwork revealed that posts’ public diplomacy efforts generally 
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private 
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to 
better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having 
core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and 
analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated 
communication plan that brings all these elements together.  These 
findings were reinforced by State’s own post-level review.  State 
established a new strategic framework for public diplomacy in fiscal 
year 2006, calling for, among other things, marginalizing extremists 
and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures.  However, posts have not 
been given written guidance on how to implement this strategy.  Such 
guidance is a critical first step to developing in-depth communication 
plans in the field.

Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their 
public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with 
public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language 
capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language 
designated public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled 
by officers without the requisite language skills.  State has begun to 
address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the 
effectiveness of many of these efforts.  Further, State lacks a 
systematic, comprehensive means of sharing best practices in public 
diplomacy, which could help transfer knowledge and experience across 
posts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State develop (1) implementing 
guidance for its public diplomacy strategy modeled on private sector 
best practices, (2) a sample country-level communication plan that 
could be adapted for local use by posts, and (3) a systematic mechanism 
for sharing best practices data to address long-standing program 
challenges.  State agreed with the report’s recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-535].

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or 
fordj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim 
World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same:

Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance, 
but Improvements Are Planned:

Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in 
the Muslim World:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix II: Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim 
Populations:

Appendix III: Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions 
and Selected Programs:

Appendix IV: Private Sector Best Practices:

Appendix V: Comments from the State Department:

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal 
Years 2004 and 2006:

Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005 15:

Figures:

Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World:

Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in 
Cairo, October 2005:

Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:

Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs:

Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non- 
Muslim Worlds, October 2005:

Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria:

Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005):

Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy 
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language 
Requirements (as of August 2005):

Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:

Abbreviations:

BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors:

BDA: Business for Diplomatic Action:

DOD: Department of Defense:

PLUS: Partnerships for Learning-Undergraduate Study:

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:

USIA: U.S. Information Agency:

VOA: Voice of America:

YES: Youth Exchange and Study:

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO:

May 3, 2006:

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, and Related Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, foreign public opinion 
polls conducted by the State Department (State) and firms such as Zogby 
International have shown that negative attitudes toward the United 
States have generally grown worse in many countries around the world. 
One particular concern has been a marked worsening of such negative 
attitudes in the Muslim world[Footnote 1]--an audience of key strategic 
interest in the United States' war on terrorism.[Footnote 2] State's 
public diplomacy programs and activities are designed to counter such 
negative sentiments through ongoing attempts to communicate with elites 
and mass audiences overseas. These efforts include crisis management 
and daily news operations designed to explain U.S. foreign policy 
positions and actions; strategic information programs designed to more 
broadly engage, inform, and influence target audiences; and long-term 
activities, such as exchanges, to promote relationship building and 
mutual understanding.[Footnote 3]

As a follow-up to our April 2005 public diplomacy report,[Footnote 4] 
we reviewed State's current public diplomacy initiatives designed to 
reach out to countries with significant Muslim populations and 
determined how such initiatives are being implemented at the post 
level. Specifically, we examined: (1) what public diplomacy resources 
and programs State has directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts 
have adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and 
(3) what program challenges remain to be addressed.

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed State officials from the 
Under Secretary's office, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau 
of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of Resource Management. We also 
interviewed officials in State's Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs, South 
and Central Asian Affairs,[Footnote 5] African Affairs, and East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs. We collected and analyzed data on the allocation 
of public diplomacy staff and selected program costs by regional 
bureau. We also convened a roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts 
in Washington, D.C., who were identified by various U.S. government 
officials and others as knowledgeable of U.S. efforts to engage Muslim 
audiences, to discuss key program challenges, obstacles, and potential 
solutions.

We conducted fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt to review the 
implementation of U.S. public diplomacy efforts in countries of 
particular strategic interest to the United States. In each country, we 
met with a broad cross section of U.S. embassy officials, British 
Council and embassy staff, and local focus groups to discuss public 
perceptions of the United States, program implementation efforts, 
effectiveness measurement efforts, and program challenges. 
Additionally, we conducted phone interviews with State Public Affairs 
officers in Indonesia and Turkey to supplement the information we 
collected at the three posts we visited. The combined population of 
these countries is approximately 680 million, or 45 percent of the 
total population of the 58 countries and territories in the Muslim 
world.

The focus of our review was public diplomacy activities designed to 
communicate information about the United States to target audiences 
overseas. Thus, we did not review State-led reform initiatives, such as 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative.[Footnote 6] Aside from State, 
we examined U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts 
to tell America's assistance story and Department of Defense (DOD) 
efforts to support State's public diplomacy activities. In addition, we 
collected funding and program information on U.S. international 
broadcasting but did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio 
Sawa and the Alhurra satellite television network--the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors' (BBG) two primary initiatives aimed at Arab 
audiences. GAO is reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.

We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with 
significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major 
initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data from fiscal 
years 2004 and 2006, regional bureau budgets for overseas operations 
increased by 21 percent in total, with the largest percentage going to 
the South Asia (39 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (28 percent), 
and Near East (25 percent) regions, each of which includes countries 
with large Muslim populations. Over the past 3 years, however, the 
number of authorized overseas positions in all regional bureaus 
increased slightly or not at all. As part of the Secretary of State's 
newly announced transformational diplomacy initiative, the department 
intends to reposition some staff to better align available resources 
with its strategic priorities, including initial plans to shift 28 
public diplomacy officers from posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to 
India, China, and Latin America, as well as to the Muslim world. Since 
2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on 
the Muslim world--Shared Values, a media campaign; Hi, a youth-oriented 
magazine; and Partnerships for Learning, a group of exchange programs 
geared to younger audiences. While these particular initiatives have 
been largely terminated or suspended, posts continue to pursue a range 
of standard public diplomacy programs and tools available to embassies 
around the world. In addition, while Partnerships for Learning no 
longer provides a focal point for State's exchange efforts in the 
Muslim world, several exchange programs continue to target younger, 
marginalized sectors of society in the Muslim world. The new Under 
Secretary has introduced several new public diplomacy initiatives to 
help officers at all posts better advocate U.S. policy and respond to 
breaking news, while many other initiatives are still in their early 
stages of development.

Our fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally 
lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private 
sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to 
better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having 
core messages, segmented target audiences, detailed strategies and 
tactics, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate 
results, and a communication plan that brings it all together. These 
findings were reinforced by a worldwide review of mission performance 
plans conducted by State in 2005, which also concluded that a large 
number of posts lacked at least some of these key strategic elements. 
State recently established a strategic framework outlining priority 
goals for public diplomacy, such as marginalizing extremists, and 
related tactics that include education and empowerment; however, the 
department has not issued guidance on how these strategies and tactics 
should be implemented. Such guidance is a critical first step to 
developing detailed communication plans in the field.

U.S. embassies face multiple challenges in implementing their public 
diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public 
outreach and concerns related to staff numbers, time, and language 
capabilities. These challenges are particularly acute in countries with 
significant Muslim populations; for example, the threat level for 
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in 
the Muslim world, and 15 of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts 
are located in countries in the Muslim world. Security and budgetary 
concerns have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities 
and curtail certain public outreach efforts, sending foreign publics 
the unintended message that the United States is unapproachable. 
Efforts to compensate for this loss in public presence include the use 
of small-scale external facilities staffed with local employees, 
expanded embassy speaker programs, and traveling teams of embassy 
employees engaging in outreach efforts. Meanwhile, public diplomacy 
efforts at post are hindered by a shortage of officers, and these 
officers face an increasing administrative burden. Tours of duty for 
diplomats at posts in the Muslim world are shorter than elsewhere, 
which can limit the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts in these 
posts. Furthermore, State's data show that as many as 30 percent of 
public diplomacy positions in countries with significant Muslim 
populations are filled by officers with insufficient language skills. 
As a result, public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world spend less 
time communicating with local audiences than the position requires. 
While State has begun to address many of these challenges, it is too 
early to determine the effectiveness of such efforts. Further, 
opportunities to share best practices across posts on how to overcome 
some of these challenges remain underutilized.

To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. public 
diplomacy outreach efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to 
implement the Under Secretary's priority goals and tactics as they 
apply to the Muslim world. We recommend the development of a sample 
country-level communication plan to accompany this document as a guide 
for posts to use and adapt to their environment. Finally, we recommend 
that the Secretary develop a systematic mechanism for sharing best 
practices data to address long-standing program challenges, which have 
been particularly acute in the Muslim world. In commenting on a draft 
of this report, State concurred with our findings and recommendations. 
We have reprinted State's comments in appendix V. We also incorporated 
technical comments from State where appropriate.

Background:

The overall goal of U.S. public diplomacy efforts is to understand, 
inform, engage, and influence the attitudes and behavior of global 
audiences in ways that support the United States' strategic interests. 
U.S. public diplomacy efforts are implemented by several entities, 
including State, DOD, USAID, and BBG, and function under the broad 
guidance of the White House and the National Security Council.[Footnote 
7] Funding is concentrated in State and BBG, which together received 
approximately $1.2 billion for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2005. 
USAID and DOD have relatively small public diplomacy budgets.

State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts:

State's public diplomacy operations are guided by the Under Secretary 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, 
and Public Affairs. The department's regional and functional bureaus 
also contain public diplomacy offices, which report to the relevant 
assistant secretary.[Footnote 8] The Under Secretary has direct 
authority over the three public diplomacy bureaus but does not have 
line authority over public diplomacy operations in other regional or 
functional bureaus.[Footnote 9] In overseas missions, Foreign Service 
public diplomacy officers (including Public Affairs, Cultural Affairs, 
Information, Information Resources, and Regional English Language 
officers) operate under the authority of the chief of mission and 
report to their regional bureau managers in Washington, D.C.

Public Diplomacy Budget and Programs:

In fiscal year 2005, State dedicated $597 million to pubic diplomacy 
and public affairs. According to the department's performance plan, its 
investment in public diplomacy and public affairs continues to 
increase, particularly for efforts targeting audiences in the Middle 
East. Exchange programs received the majority of fiscal year 2005 
funding, $356 million, which was a 12.4 percent increase over fiscal 
year 2004. These programs include international visitors, citizen 
exchanges, the Fulbright academic exchange program, and English- 
language teaching. State's information programs received roughly $68 
million in fiscal year 2005 to fund programs such as the U.S. speakers 
program, mission Web sites, and American Corners, which are centers 
that provide information about the United States, hosted in local 
institutions and staffed by local employees. The remaining public 
diplomacy funds go to State's regional bureaus to pay for the salaries 
of locally engaged staff overseas, among other purposes. Appendix III 
provides a summary of selected programs managed by each bureau along 
with a description of staff positions.

USAID, DOD, and BBG also support the U.S. government's communication 
efforts in the field. USAID reports that it has established an overseas 
network of more than one hundred Development Outreach and 
Communications officers, who work with Public Affairs officers to 
promote America's assistance story. DOD has also become involved in 
public diplomacy and is developing a strategy for "military support for 
public diplomacy" to identify ways it can effectively support State's 
operations. For example, DOD Military Information Support Teams have 
been dispatched to selected posts, at the request of the Ambassador, to 
assist with outreach efforts. Finally, U.S. international broadcasting, 
led by the BBG, is a major contributor to the United States' efforts to 
communicate directly with foreign audiences. Between fiscal years 2004 
and 2006, the BBG expects to spend nearly $240 million on its Middle 
East Broadcasting Network, which includes Alhurra satellite television 
network and the Arabic-language Radio Sawa.

Definition of the Muslim World:

According to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the 
Muslim world is composed of 58 countries and territories with 
significant Muslim populations, many of which are members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined 
population of more than 1.5 billion and are located in Africa, Asia, 
and Europe (see app. II). Figure 1 shows their locations.

Figure 1: Map of the Muslim World:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department.

[End of figure] 

State's public diplomacy investment in these 58 countries and 
territories has increased in recent years. According to department 
data, State provided funds for 179 speakers to travel to these 
countries in fiscal year 2005, up from 157 in fiscal year 2004. 
Additionally, the department funded nearly 5,800 exchange participants 
from these countries in fiscal year 2005, up from about 5,100 in fiscal 
year 2004. The department spent nearly $115 million on exchange and 
information programs in these countries in fiscal year 2005.

State Devotes Significant Public Diplomacy Resources to the Muslim 
World, but Programs Generally Remain the Same:

State devotes significant public diplomacy program and staffing 
resources to regions with large Muslim populations. Beginning in 2002, 
State introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and 
broader Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and 
information programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have 
been largely terminated or suspended. Nevertheless, posts in the Muslim 
world continue to generally employ the same exchange, cultural, and 
information programs used throughout the world.[Footnote 10] In fiscal 
year 2006, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
introduced several new initiatives designed to help officers in the 
field improve their advocacy of U.S. foreign policy and enhance their 
ability to quickly respond to breaking news stories, while other 
initiatives, some of which are specific to Muslim audiences, are still 
in development.

Resources Directed to Regions with Significant Muslim Populations:

In our 2003 report on public diplomacy, we reported that the department 
had increased its overall spending on public diplomacy since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, with the largest relative increases 
going to regions with large Muslim populations. Specifically, we noted 
that while State's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the 
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the 
largest percentage increases in such resources occurred in regions with 
significant Muslim populations. As table 1 shows, this pattern has 
continued over the past 3 years, with total spending on overseas public 
diplomacy increasing 21 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2006. The 
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs continues to receive the 
largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, with the 
largest percentage increases in resources going to regions with 
countries with large Muslim populations including South Asia (39 
percent), East Asia and Pacific (28 percent), and the Near East (25 
percent).

Table 1 provides data on public diplomacy funding and staffing for each 
of State's regional bureaus. The table also shows the number of 
countries with significant Muslim populations in each region, according 
to State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, along with the 
population of these countries.

Table 1: Overseas Public Diplomacy Resources by Regional Bureau, Fiscal 
Years 2004 and 2006:

Dollars in millions:

Region bureau: Africa; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $59; 
2006: (estimated): $70; 
Percentage increase: 19%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 24; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): 432.

Region bureau: Africa; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $90; 
2006: (estimated): $91; 
Percentage increase: 1%.

Region bureau: East Asia and Pacific; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $78; 
2006: (estimated): $100; 
Percentage increase: 28%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 3; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): 266.

Region bureau: East Asia and Pacific; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $89; 
2006: (estimated): $89; 
Percentage increase: 0%.

Region bureau: Europe and Eurasia; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $198; 
2006: (estimated): $229; 
Percentage increase: 16%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 9; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): 141.

Region bureau: Europe and Eurasia; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $192; 
2006: (estimated): $192; 
Percentage increase: 0%. 

Region bureau: Near East; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $69; 
2006: (estimated): $86; 
Percentage increase: 25%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 18; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): 341.

Region bureau: Near East; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $66; 
2006: (estimated): $68; 
Percentage increase: 3%. 

Region bureau: South Asia[A]; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $41; 
2006: (estimated): $57; 
Percentage increase: 39%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 4; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): 337.

Region bureau: South Asia[A]; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $38; 
2006: (estimated): $39; 
Percentage increase: 3%.

Region bureau: Western Hemisphere; Funding; 
2004 (actual): $74; 
2006: (estimated): $87; 
Percentage increase: 18%; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Number of countries (58 
total): 0; 
Countries with significant Muslim populations: Muslim population: 
(millions): N/A.

Region bureau: Western Hemisphere; Authorized officers; 
2004 (actual): $103; 
2006: (estimated): $103; 
Percentage increase: 0%. 

Source: State Department.

Notes: Funding data include American salaries for overseas staff 
including regional bureau employees and employees from the Bureau for 
International Information Programs and the Bureau for Educational and 
Cultural Affairs. Data do not include salary costs of locally engaged 
staff.

Funding data include exchange programs, regional bureau program funds, 
and program budgets managed by Information Resource officers and 
Regional English Language officers.

Authorized officer positions cover overseas staff including regional 
bureau employees, Information Resource officers, and Regional English 
Language officers.

[A] Data current as of January 2006.

[End of table]

In our 2003 report, we noted that authorized officer positions overseas 
had significantly expanded, with the most notable increases occurring 
in State's Near East (27 percent increase) and South Asia (15 percent 
increase) bureaus. However, current data show that staff numbers have 
stayed largely the same over the past 3 years with increases of 3 
percent or less. In January 2006, Secretary Rice announced plans to 
reposition officers as part of her transformational diplomacy 
initiative. State officials said that the department will initially 
reposition approximately 75 Foreign Service officers this year from 
posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin 
America, as well as to the Muslim world. According to these officials, 
over one-third of the positions that will be relocated are public 
diplomacy positions.

Muslim-Specific Initiatives Have Been Short-lived:

State has developed three programs specifically designed to reach 
Muslim audiences: the Shared Values media campaign, the Arabic-language 
Hi magazine, and the youth-oriented Partnerships for Learning exchange 
strategy. These initiatives have been largely suspended or terminated, 
but State continues to focus many of its exchange programs on younger 
audiences.

Shared Values Initiative:

In 2002, State launched the Shared Values Initiative to highlight the 
common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans, demonstrate 
that America is not at war with Islam, and stimulate dialogue between 
the United States and the Muslim world. The initiative, which cost 
about $15 million, centered on a paid television campaign, which was 
developed by a private sector advertising firm and attempted to 
illustrate the daily lives of Muslim Americans. This multimedia 
campaign also included a booklet on Muslim life in America, speaker 
tours, an interactive Web site to promote dialogue between Muslims in 
the United States and abroad, and other information programs. The 
initial phase of the Shared Values Initiative was aired in six 
languages in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kuwait, as well as on 
pan-Arab media. State estimates that 288 million people were exposed to 
these messages, but television stations in several countries, including 
Egypt and Lebanon, refused to air the programs for political and other 
reasons.

In 2003, the report by the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the 
Arab and Muslim World, commonly referred to as the Djerejian report, 
credited the campaign for having a solid research basis but criticized 
it for taking far longer to develop than similar private sector 
advertising campaigns.[Footnote 11] The report also noted that some 
embassies were reluctant to promote the ads. A department analysis of 
foreign reaction to the Shared Values Initiative concluded that media 
outlets in many countries found the campaign to be propaganda and 
unlikely to succeed as long as U.S. foreign policy remained unchanged. 
While some posts continue to host events on Muslim life in America, the 
Shared Values Initiative's centerpiece television campaign aired only 
for the holy month of Ramadan in the winter of 2002-03 and was 
subsequently discontinued. Additionally, the interactive Web site, 
"Open Dialogue," is no longer in operation.

Hi Magazine and Web Site:

Following the demise of the Shared Values Initiative, State launched 
the Arabic-language Hi magazine in July 2003 with an annual budget of 
$4.5 million. Designed to highlight American culture, values, and 
lifestyles, Hi was directed at Arab youth in the Middle East and North 
Africa and was expected to influence Arab youth to have a more positive 
perception of the United States. Hi was produced by a private sector 
magazine firm, and State estimated its circulation to be about 50,000 
in the Arab world. One official in Egypt, however, said that of the 
2,500 copies the embassy distributed monthly to newsstands in Cairo, 
often as many as 2,000 copies were returned unsold (see fig. 2). State 
officials in Washington noted that, as a matter of practice, these 
copies were subsequently redistributed to public institutions in Egypt, 
such as schools and libraries. According to embassy officials, they 
were unable to sell many copies of Hi because it was so new and 
relatively expensive. In December 2005, State suspended publication of 
Hi magazine pending the results of an internal evaluation, which was 
prompted by concerns over the magazine's cost, reach, and impact, 
according to State officials. State expects this evaluation to be 
completed by May 2006. According to one official, an initial assessment 
of the magazine found that most readers access Hi via its Web sites, 
which remain in operation.[Footnote 12]

Figure 2: Unsold Copies of Hi Magazine Returned to the U.S. Embassy in 
Cairo, October 2005:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Partnerships for Learning:

In 2002, State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs developed 
an exchange initiative specifically for youth from Muslim communities 
called Partnerships for Learning, which provided an organizing theme to 
help guide the department's exchange investments. Designed to reach a 
"younger, broader, deeper" audience in the Muslim world, one senior 
State official called Partnerships for Learning, "the heart of our 
extensive engagement with the Arab and Muslim world." According to a 
senior State official, the Partnerships for Learning program was 
terminated as an organizing theme in late 2005 with the appointment of 
the latest Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 
Nevertheless, department officials said that its exchange programs will 
continue to focus on younger audiences. These officials stated that the 
department is exploring other program models to engage the greatest 
number of undergraduate students while increasing cost effectiveness. 
Similarly, State told us that the Partnerships for Learning concept 
continues to infuse almost all of its citizen exchange programs.

Between 2002 and 2005, the department estimates that nearly $150 
million was spent on exchanges supporting the Partnerships for Learning 
theme. This figure includes new programs developed to implement this 
theme and funds spent on existing exchange programs that targeted a 
younger, more diverse, and less elite audience in the Muslim world. The 
two major new programs developed by the department were the Youth 
Exchange and Study (YES) program and the Partnerships for Learning 
Undergraduate Studies (PLUS) program.[Footnote 13] Between 2003 and 
2005, the YES program provided scholarships to more than 600 high 
school students from the Muslim world to study in the United States. 
Similarly, since 2004 the PLUS program has brought more than 170 
students from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia to the 
United States for 2 years of academic study at an American college or 
university. The YES and PLUS programs, with a combined budget of $25 
million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. The department has not yet 
conducted a formal evaluation of the YES and PLUS programs.[Footnote 14]

Public Diplomacy Efforts at Selected Posts Rely on Standard Programs 
and Tools:

Officials at the three posts we visited--Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt-
-said that they use a broad range of programs available to them, 
similar to the mix of programs used throughout the world, including 
information, exchange, and cultural programs. Table 2 provides a 
breakdown of selected activities at each post. In addition to these 
programs, these officials said that they spend a significant amount of 
time on news and crisis management, such as responding to media 
inquiries and coordinating media events. In Pakistan, for example, we 
observed the acting public affairs officer coordinate media events 
related to the Secretary of State's visit and arrange interviews for 
the Ambassador regarding U.S. relief efforts in the wake of the October 
2005 South Asian earthquake.

Table 2: Selected Public Diplomacy Activities at Posts in Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Egypt, Fiscal Year 2005:

American Corners: Number-opened;
Nigeria: 10; 
Pakistan: 0; 
Egypt: 0.

American Corners: Number-planned; 
Nigeria: 2; 
Pakistan: 5; 
Egypt: 2.

Number of speakers; 
Nigeria: 5; 
Pakistan: 18; 
Egypt: 7.

Number of exchange participants; 
Nigeria: 143; 
Pakistan: 215; 
Egypt: 359.

Local language magazine; 
Nigeria: Magama; 
Pakistan: Khabr-o-Nazar; 
Egypt: Hi.

Sources: GAO and State Department. 

[End of table]

Academic and professional exchanges were an important public diplomacy 
tool at each post we visited. In fiscal year 2005, State obligated more 
than $12 million for such exchanges in these countries. All of the 
posts we visited had an active Fulbright exchange program, managed by 
the embassy in Nigeria and by binational commissions in Pakistan and 
Egypt. In Nigeria, the embassy has participated in the Partnerships for 
Learning-YES program since 2003 and has sent about 35 Nigerian high 
school students and their teachers to study in Iowa through this 
program. According to the Public Affairs officer in Nigeria, the 
embassy has shifted resources to assure that 50 percent of exchange 
participants are Muslim, reflecting their overall proportion of 
Nigeria's population. Additionally, the Public Affairs officer in 
Islamabad is working to develop a database of Pakistani exchange alumni 
to enable the embassy to maintain better contact with this audience.

Posts have also made use of information programs such as speakers, 
magazines, information resource centers, and, to a limited extent, 
American Corners. Data from State's Bureau of International Information 
Programs show that the bureau funded 5 speakers in Nigeria, 18 in 
Pakistan, and 7 in Egypt in fiscal year 2005. These speakers discussed 
topics such as the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Muslim life and 
religious tolerance in America, and U.S. foreign policy. In addition, 
these posts take advantage of "target of opportunity" speakers-- 
American experts who already happen to be in the region. Each post we 
visited also distributes a U.S.-funded magazine in local languages, 
such as the Hausa Magama in Nigeria and the Urdu Khabr-o-Nazar in 
Pakistan. Further, these posts operate small reference libraries within 
the embassy compound, known as Information Resource Centers. According 
to officials in Egypt, the embassy's resource center receives more than 
1,000 visitors per month, on average, while security concerns in 
Pakistan have limited the numbers of visitors to its center. 
Additionally, the embassy in Nigeria has established 10 American 
Corners, with plans to open more in the near future. While there are no 
American Corners in Egypt or Pakistan, embassy officials in those 
countries told us they are currently seeking local partners to host 
such a facility.

Finally, other agencies have played a limited role in supporting the 
mission's overall public diplomacy efforts in the countries we visited. 
USAID has hired Development Outreach and Communication officers in 
Nigeria and Egypt and was in the process of hiring an officer in 
Pakistan in October 2005. DOD has sent two Military Information Support 
Teams to Nigeria to help publicize the department's humanitarian 
assistance programs in the country. In addition, U.S. broadcasting 
reaches audiences in Nigeria and Pakistan through Voice of America's 
(VOA) Hausa, English, and Urdu services, and the Arabic Radio Sawa and 
Alhurra satellite television network reach some audiences in Egypt. 
Finally, in November 2005, VOA announced the launch of a new half-hour 
television program in Urdu to be broadcast on GEO-TV, a commercial 
station in Pakistan.

Recent Initiatives Focus on Improving State's Policy Advocacy and News 
Management Operations:

During the past 6 months, State has launched a number of initiatives 
designed to broadly improve its ability to explain U.S. foreign policy 
decisions and respond to breaking news both within and outside the 
Muslim world. These initiatives, created in Washington, D.C., impact 
field operations to the extent that Ambassadors and other spokespersons 
at posts will be better positioned to advocate U.S. foreign policy 
decisions and actions and effectively react to developing news stories. 
These initiatives include the following:

* A Rapid Response Unit established in the Bureau of Public Affairs to 
produce a daily report on stories driving news around the world and 
give the U.S. position on those issues. This report is distributed to 
U.S. cabinet and subcabinet officials, Ambassadors, public affairs 
officers, regional combatant commands, and others.

* "Echo Chamber" messages to provide U.S. Ambassadors and others with 
clear guidance so they are better able to advocate U.S. policy on major 
news stories and policy issues. These policy-level statements are 
posted to State's internal Web site and can be broadly accessed by post 
staff around the world. These statements are also made available to 
VOA's policy office for use in crafting editorials reflecting the views 
of the U.S. government.

* Establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, a key media 
market, this summer. The hub, which will operate out of commercial 
office space to facilitate public access, will be staffed with two to 
three spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional 
media outlets, with a focus on television given its broad reach, to 
advocate U.S. policies. According to State officials, a regional center 
is needed since embassy public affairs staff focus on bilateral issues 
and no one in the department is specifically responsible for 
transregional media operations.

In addition to these initiatives, several other efforts are under way. 
These efforts include empowering the American Muslim community to speak 
out for the United States,[Footnote 15] creating an Office of Public/ 
Private Partnerships to stimulate private sector involvement, and 
developing enhanced technology to expand the use of new communication 
venues in order to better reach target audiences.

Post Program Planning and Evaluation Efforts Lack Appropriate Guidance, 
but Improvements Are Planned :

Our review of mission performance plans for the countries we visited 
found that they lacked key strategic planning elements recognized by 
GAO and the private sector as vital to effectively communicating with 
target audiences. Among the missing elements are core messages and 
themes, target audience segmentation and analysis, details on program 
strategies and tactics, in-depth research and evaluation to inform 
strategic communication decisions, and a fully developed communication 
plan to tie everything together.[Footnote 16] In 2005, State 
established a strategic framework for U.S. public diplomacy efforts; 
however, these early efforts lack guidance from Washington to the field 
on strategies and tactics. In addition, posts are not required to 
develop in-depth analysis to better inform and support their program 
decisions or country-specific communication plans to help inform and 
guide their implementation efforts.

Posts Lack Strategic Approach to Public Diplomacy:

GAO and other groups, including the Defense Science Board,[Footnote 17] 
have suggested that State adopt a strategic approach to public 
diplomacy by modeling and adapting private sector communication 
practices to suit its purposes (see app. IV). Key best practices 
identified in GAO's September 2003 report are shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Key Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO.

[End of figure] 

Based on our review of mission performance plans[Footnote 18] and on 
fieldwork in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt, we found that posts' public 
diplomacy programming generally lacked these important elements of 
strategic communications planning. In particular, posts lacked a clear 
theme or message and specific target audiences were generally not 
identified. Posts also failed to develop detailed strategies and 
tactics to direct available public diplomacy programs and tools toward 
clear, measurable objectives in the most efficient manner possible. 
Further, research and evaluation efforts to inform all facets of 
strategic communications are limited by the relatively small budget in 
Washington, D.C., allocated to such efforts and a general lack of 
expertise in the field with regard to commissioning and conducting such 
studies. Finally, posts lack detailed, country-level communication 
plans to tie everything together. These findings are reinforced by a 
worldwide review of fiscal year 2007 mission performance plans 
conducted by State's Bureau of Resource Management in 2005. In 
particular, State determined that post efforts were generally not 
directed at specific target audiences, lacked specific and reasonable 
communication objectives and strategies, and often failed to provide 
outcome and impact measures of program success.

Post Efforts Not Directed Toward a Core Message or Theme:

Private sector communication best practices suggest the need for a core 
message or theme, which can be developed on a worldwide, regional, or 
country-by-country basis, and should be consistently applied to and 
woven through all program activities and events. The posts we visited 
did not have a core message or theme to direct their communication 
efforts. We found that post efforts focused on general program goals 
established in Washington, D.C., which are found in the mission 
performance plans. For public diplomacy, these goals are promoting 
mutual understanding, advancing American values, and influencing 
international public opinion. According to State officials, these goals 
can be interpreted in many different ways and have limited practical 
utility for developing a targeted communication strategy. As one senior 
embassy official in Nigeria noted, these goals are "amorphous" in 
nature and "hard to quantify" in practice. Specifically, posts noted 
the following communication goals in their fiscal year 2006 mission 
performance plans:

* Nigeria--Influencing International Public Opinion: Nigeria's fiscal 
year 2006 mission performance plan simply states that the post intends 
to move the opinions of Northern Nigerians to mirror those of the rest 
of the Nigerian population, which is largely supportive of U.S. values 
and principles.[Footnote 19]

* Pakistan--Promoting Mutual Understanding: Pakistan's mission 
performance plan states that the post will seek to enhance the image of 
the United States in Pakistan and increase the depth of understanding 
among Pakistanis of how American society, culture, and values shape the 
objectives behind and reasons for U.S. policies towards Pakistan.

* Egypt--Advancing American Values: Egypt's mission performance plan 
notes that the post will use information activities, exchanges, and 
local information programming to bolster awareness among Egyptians of 
values shared with Americans and increase Egyptian public understanding 
of American society.

The Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan told us that, while specific 
messages have been developed at post, there are in fact too many 
competing messages (such as the United States is a great place to live, 
the United States is a great place to visit, American cultural 
diversity and democracy are good things), and the post needed to do a 
better job of defining and clarifying its message. A senior embassy 
official in Nigeria echoed this point by stating that his post needed a 
core message that could be coordinated across State, USAID, DOD, and 
other supporting agencies.

Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined:

Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in 
depth and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective 
information campaigns. The posts we visited generally had not used 
these practices to help refine and focus their communication efforts. 
In its worldwide review, State's Resource Management Bureau found that 
some posts had done a poor job of answering the basic question of 
whether to direct their communication efforts at a mass audience or 
opinion leaders. The reviewers concluded that posts should focus on 
opinion leaders in the 130 less developed countries with poor 
communications infrastructure (many countries with significant Muslim 
populations fall in this group), while posts in roughly 40 other 
countries with adequate communications infrastructures should focus on 
reaching the general public. As a first step, the reviewers recommended 
that posts in the former group undertake an inventory of opinion 
leaders they wished to influence. This "key influencers analysis" could 
be segmented into various groups such as youth; women; opinion and 
editorial writers; professors; and ethnic, religious, and business 
leaders, who could serve as message multipliers. In 2004, Washington 
sought to supplement mission performance planning activities by asking 
posts worldwide to prepare an analysis of key influencers. According to 
senior officials in Washington, D.C., only about one-half of posts 
worldwide ever submitted the requested analysis. Among the posts we 
visited, only Nigeria was able to produce a copy of an influence 
analysis, which we found to be rudimentary in nature and not fully 
responsive to the guidance provided by Washington, D.C.

The posts we visited generally neither focused on important 
subcategories such as urban versus rural, men versus women, and 
religious versus nonreligious, nor did they segment based on the level 
or intensity of opposition (ranging from "soft" to "hard") toward the 
United States. However, posts have attempted to reach a "younger, 
broader, and deeper" audience[Footnote 20] through exchange programs 
such as YES, which targets high school students. Also, some efforts are 
under way to target exchange program alumni,[Footnote 21] locals who 
have studied in or visited the United States, and expatriates living in 
the United States who could serve as goodwill ambassadors for the 
United States.

In contrast to post practices, we noted that the British 
Council,[Footnote 22] which maintains a presence in all three countries 
we visited, relies on a four tier audience system, which is used 
worldwide to target their outreach efforts.[Footnote 23] Also, the 
Defense Science Board has reported that target audiences in the Muslim 
world can be divided into five categories, ranging from hard opposition 
to hard support. Their report notes that identifying audiences that are 
"winnable" in terms of increased public support is critical to 
successful strategic communication and requires borrowing from campaign 
and private sector methodologies and conducting political-style 
attitudinal research and identifying the highest priority support 
groups that can most likely be influenced.

Strategies and Tactics Lack Detail:

The private sector uses sophisticated strategies to integrate complex 
communication efforts involving multiple players. Our review of mission 
performance plans revealed that only limited attention had been given 
to developing detailed public diplomacy strategies and tactics to guide 
their implementation of an array of public diplomacy programs and 
tools. While such strategies can include message amplification tactics 
or the use of third-party spokespersons to increase the credibility of 
delivered messages,[Footnote 24] the mission performance plans we 
reviewed were noteworthy for their brevity and lack of detail on such 
strategies. For example, the Nigerian post's goal paper on public 
diplomacy and public affairs runs just over two pages. These two pages 
serve as the road map for implementing the post's public diplomacy 
efforts, which involve several agencies, assorted programs and 
projects, and substantial program funds. The plan devotes one sentence 
to describe its strategy to achieve its performance goal and three 
sentences to describe the tactics that will be used to implement the 
strategy.

On occasion, the strategies and tactics outlined in mission performance 
plans were or will be supplemented by additional planning efforts. In 
Pakistan, we noted that the Public Affairs officer had drafted a 
summary level plan to guide the efforts of the public affairs section. 
In Egypt, the Public Affairs officer told us that the Chief of Mission 
has directed his section to develop an "Islamic strategy" for Egypt to 
include details on working with religious leaders, integrating English 
language teaching efforts, working with local universities, and so on.

In its review, State's Resource Management Bureau also found that posts 
had generally not developed meaningful strategies and tactics that 
would lead to quantifiable results. The reviewers suggested that posts 
adopt a more rigorous and measurable outreach strategy focused on 
opinion leaders in countries where a mass audience cannot easily be 
reached. As defined earlier, the first step entails identifying the 
opinion leaders the post would like to influence. Second, posts should 
identify a "critical mass" of opinion leaders who must be reached and 
influenced in order to have a significant impact on the target 
audience. Third, posts should develop programs and initiatives designed 
to reach these specific individuals, with the goal of persuading and 
motivating opinion leaders to spread the message. The reviewers 
suggested that exchange programs could be reinforced with targeted 
strategic information programs. Public Affairs officers were briefed on 
these findings in 2005, and mission performance plan guidance has been 
updated to incorporate most of these recommended elements.

Research and Evaluation Efforts Are Limited:

Private sector best practices highlight the value of a research driven 
approach to designing, implementing, evaluating, and fine-tuning 
strategic communications efforts. Given the relatively small budgets 
devoted to research and evaluation efforts, posts had access to a 
limited amount of information to help guide their strategic 
communication activities.[Footnote 25] Valuable research can include 
such topics as: (1) audience attitudes and beliefs; (2) root causes 
driving negative sentiments and beliefs; (3) country-specific social, 
economic, political, and military environments; (4) local media and 
communication options; and (5) diagnosis of deeper performance issues 
and possible program fixes.

Because the posts we visited did not have the budgets or required 
expertise to conduct this type of research or program evaluation on 
their own, they relied on the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and 
evaluation staff in Washington, D.C., to conduct such studies for them. 
However, only a limited range of research and evaluation data is 
available to posts. Most of this data is not tailored to a specific 
country and it was unclear whether available research and evaluation 
results are incorporated in post planning and evaluation activities. 
Available research and evaluations products include the following:

* Broad public opinion polling data: Conducted by State's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, these polls document that local populations, 
to a significant degree, hold negative views toward the United States. 
Such polls serve a valuable role in identifying the depth of the public 
perception problem but are of limited utility in diagnosing the source 
of the problem or the specific impact that U.S. public diplomacy 
efforts have had on alleviating such negative perceptions.

* Root cause polling data: In particular, State's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research released an opinion analysis in March 2003 
based on a series of surveys examining the root causes of anti-American 
sentiments in 10 Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia). Significantly, the 2003 analysis notes that "the belief 
that the U.S. is hostile toward Muslim countries was the single largest 
component of anti-American sentiments in all 10 countries, outweighing 
even the publics' view of how the United States treats their own 
country." This type of insight can provide the basis for identifying 
and developing a core message or theme--one of the key private sector 
best practices discussed earlier. Our roundtable of nongovernment 
Muslim experts noted that this view is grounded in Muslim concerns over 
U.S. foreign policies and actions in the Muslim world. All of our 
panelists agreed that U.S. foreign policy is the major root cause 
behind anti-American sentiments among Muslim populations and that this 
point needs to be better researched, absorbed, and acted upon by 
government officials. According to our panelists, these core issues 
include the Arab/Israeli conflict, the war in Iraq, U.S. support for 
antidemocratic regimes in the region, perceptions of U.S. imperialism, 
and U.S. support for globalization, which is viewed as hurting Muslims.

* Program evaluations: While State has traditionally focused its 
evaluation activities on exchanges, the department has established an 
evaluation schedule that includes ongoing assessments of key public 
diplomacy programs and initiatives, including the English ACCESS 
Microscholarship program, Hi magazine, American Corners, and a contract 
with the Performance Institute to examine State's performance 
measurement framework for public diplomacy. Planned evaluations include 
media training and outreach and the U.S. speakers programs. These 
evaluations are conducted by staff in the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and 
the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in the Under Secretary's 
office.

Additionally, other forms of research are not being fully utilized. In 
particular, the Central Intelligence Agency sponsored a series of 
public diplomacy planning papers in 2005 for six countries of strategic 
national interest to the United States (China, Egypt, France, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela). These papers included detailed 
country profiles and issue analyses, recommended public diplomacy 
strategies for each country, and served as the focus of two conferences 
that sought to promote dialogue among academic and agency experts 
regarding how to improve and refine U.S. public diplomacy efforts in 
each country. However, we found that State officials in both Egypt and 
Nigeria were not familiar with this exercise or the papers produced for 
their host countries.

Country-Level Communication Plans Lacking:

Private sector best practices suggest that a detailed, country-specific 
communication plan serves to pull together the complex data and 
analysis required for a feasible plan of action that can be monitored 
and improved as needed based on performance feedback. However, none of 
the posts we visited had such a detailed communication plan. Prior to 
1999, when public diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA), detailed communication plans were developed 
on a country-by-country basis. These plans included details on core 
messages and themes, target audiences, and research on key opinion 
leaders, audience attitudes, and the local media environment. With the 
integration of the USIA into State in 1999, these country plans were 
eliminated, leaving the mission performance plans as the focal point 
for such information. As suggested by several post officials, the 
country plans prepared by USIA were superior to the mission performance 
planning process since they focused on public diplomacy (a program 
driven function that is distinct from the policy focus predominant in 
other department operations) and provided a detailed road map to guide 
program implementation efforts.

In marked contrast to State, we noted that USAID's new Development 
Outreach and Communications officers are developing country-level 
communication plans. These plans are based on guidance prepared by 
public affairs staff in Washington, D.C., pertaining to roles and 
responsibilities, coordination requirements, communication tips and 
techniques, and the development of a long-term communication strategy. 
This guidance notes that "having a thoughtful communication strategy 
that is understood by the key leadership of the Mission is integral to 
communicating most effectively." The guidance suggests that a good 
communication strategy should adequately describe the Mission's public 
relations goals, should be linked to a specific time frame and resource 
request, and should identify the Mission's communication strengths and 
weaknesses, key themes and messages, priority audiences, and the best 
means to reach them. Most importantly, the messages must be repeated 
over and over again to ensure that they are heard.

Strategic Framework Lacks Implementing Guidance:

In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S. 
public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) 
support the President's Freedom Agenda with a positive image of hope; 
(2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote understanding 
regarding shared values and common interests between Americans and 
peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The Under 
Secretary noted she intends to achieve these goals using five tactics-
-engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and evaluation--and by 
using various public diplomacy programs and other means. This framework 
represents a noteworthy start; however, the department has not yet 
developed written guidance that provides details on how the Under 
Secretary's new strategic framework should be implemented in the field.

Our past reports have detailed the difficulties the White House and the 
department have encountered in developing any type of written 
communication strategy. In our 2003 report and again in our 2005 
report, we noted several attempts by State and the National Security 
Council to develop a communication strategy for the interagency 
community. In 2004, the National Security Council and the department 
created the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to 
develop an interagency strategy to marginalize extremists. The 
committee collected information from embassies around the world to help 
develop a draft outreach strategy, but it was ultimately not released 
to posts pending further guidance from the new Under Secretary. On 
April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordinating 
Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. This 
committee, to be led by the Under Secretary, is intended to coordinate 
interagency activities. According to department officials, one of the 
committee’s tasks will be to issue a formal interagency public 
diplomacy strategy. It is not clear how long this effort will take or 
when a strategy will be developed.

Post Planning and Evaluation Improving but Certain Elements Still 
Lacking:

While the department has not yet issued guidance on how to implement 
the strategic framework established by the Under Secretary, officials 
in Washington acknowledged the need to improve message delivery at the 
post level and have begun to implement a more rigorous approach to 
program planning and evaluation. Based on prior reports by GAO and 
others, the department has begun to institute a "culture of 
measurement," which should significantly impact the rigor and 
sophistication of its strategic planning and evaluation efforts. 
Beginning 2 years ago, the department sought to establish this culture 
through a variety of means, including the creation of an Office of 
Policy, Planning, and Resources within the office of the Under 
Secretary; the creation of a Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council to 
share best practices; the creation of a unified office of program 
evaluations; and the development of an expanded evaluation schedule, 
which places a new emphasis on assessing the department's strategic 
information programs.

The department also plans to institutionalize the use of the "logic 
model" approach endorsed by GAO and others, which could have a 
significant impact on the department's program design, implementation, 
and evaluation efforts.[Footnote 26] The logic model calls for program 
managers to define their key inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and 
impact. The head of the Public Diplomacy Evaluation Council has briefed 
field staff on the logic model using the illustration in figure 4.

Figure 4: Logic Model for State Public Diplomacy Programs:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department.

[End of figure] 

The logic model will be implemented via a performance measurement 
framework contract led by the Performance Institute. Implementation 
details, guidance, training, and so on will be developed by the 
Performance Institute in coordination with key State stakeholders. 
Major elements of the model should be in place by September 2006, with 
full implementation expected by the 2009 mission performance plan cycle.

In January 2006, the department issued guidance on preparing mission 
performance plans that embodies its desire to increase the rigor and 
sophistication of post strategic planning and evaluation efforts. 
Issued for the fiscal year 2008 planning cycle, this guidance calls for 
more strategic thinking and planning than was required in the past, 
noting that "there are increased expectations for measurement and 
specificity in planning for public diplomacy and this leads to requests 
for more sophisticated information from the field." The guidance calls 
for identification of specific target audiences, key themes and 
messages, detailed strategies and tactics, and performance outcomes 
that can be measured with a reasonable degree of precision and clearly 
demonstrate the ultimate impact of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. If 
fully implemented, this guidance should begin to address the 
shortcomings we found in mission performance plans in Nigeria, 
Pakistan, and Egypt. However, such guidance will not be implemented for 
another 2 years, raising significant concerns about what the department 
intends to do now to address strategic planning shortfalls.

While Washington's guidance is designed to significantly improve the 
strategic decisions summarized in mission performance plans, it does 
not require that missions prepare in-depth analyses to better inform 
and support their strategic program decisions. Such analyses include 
country-situation papers, in-depth audience research, media analyses to 
understand how people receive information and who the key media 
providers are, and details on how related agency programs and planning 
efforts should be integrated to achieve common communication 
objectives. Finally, this guidance does not require that missions 
develop a separate communication plan to incorporate Washington and 
post-conducted analyses and planned strategies and tactics. The lack of 
a country-level communication plan increases the risk that planning 
will remain largely conceptual and fall short in terms of effectiveness 
at the tactical level. Also, country-level communication plans could be 
prepared and updated as needed, apart from the mission performance 
planning cycle, particularly as the new guidance for mission 
performance plans will not take effect until fiscal year 2008.

Security and Staffing Pose Challenges to Public Diplomacy Efforts in 
the Muslim World:

Public diplomacy officers struggle to balance security with public 
access and outreach to local populations. The public diplomacy corps in 
the field faces several human capital challenges, such as the lack of a 
sufficient number of officers, lack of staff time, shortened tours of 
duty, and limited language proficiency. While State has taken steps to 
address these challenges, it is too early to assess the effectiveness 
of some of these efforts, and officers at the three posts we visited 
told us that many of these issues remain unresolved. In addition, State 
lacks an effective means to share embassy best practices that could 
help address some of these challenges.

Embassy Must Balance Security and Public Outreach:

Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public 
access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between 
safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, "Safety is one of our 
top priorities… but it can't be at the expense of the mission." While 
posts around the world have faced increased threats, security concerns 
are particularly acute at many posts in countries with significant 
Muslim populations. As figure 5 illustrates, the threat level for 
terrorism is rated as "critical" or "high" in 80 percent of posts in 
the Muslim world, compared with 34 percent of posts elsewhere.

Figure 5: Terrorist Threat Ratings for Posts in the Muslim and Non- 
Muslim Worlds, October 2005:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department.

[End of figure] 

Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly 
accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and 
Libraries. According to one State official, in 1990 the majority of 
posts had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do. In 
Pakistan, for example, all of the American Centers have closed for 
security reasons, with the last such facility, in Islamabad, closed in 
February 2005. These same concerns have prevented the establishment of 
a U.S. presence elsewhere. Officials in Nigeria said they would like to 
open a facility in the north of the country to serve the region's 70 
million predominantly Muslim inhabitants, but security and budgetary 
concerns prevent them from doing so--one senior embassy official in 
Nigeria said that nothing they can do from the capital, Abuja, would be 
as effective as having a permanent presence in the north. As a result, 
embassies have had to find other venues for public diplomacy programs, 
and some activities have been moved onto embassy compounds.

Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to 
reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report 
concluded that "security concerns often require a 'low profile' 
approach during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier 
times, would have been able to generate considerable good will for the 
United States."[Footnote 27] This constraint is particularly acute in 
Pakistan, where the embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and 
exchange programs. For example, an official in Peshawar, Pakistan, said 
that consulate staff handpicked students for a 9/11 Commission Report 
reading group because the consulate could not widely publicize the 
program. While several officials in Pakistan described the reading 
group as a success, its reach was limited due to security concerns.

Furthermore, precautions designed to improve the security of American 
facilities have had the ancillary effect of sending the message that 
the United States is unapproachable and distrustful, according to State 
officials. Concrete barriers and armed escorts contribute to this 
perception, as do requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones 
and pagers within the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, 
visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center have fallen to as 
few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the 
embassy's rigorous security procedures. In Egypt, one of the 
ambassador's priorities is remodeling the embassy in order to make it 
more inviting to visitors.

State Has Developed Initiatives to Respond to Security Concerns:

State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly 
accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including 
American Corners, which are centers that provide information about the 
United States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local 
employees. According to State data, there are currently approximately 
300 American Corners throughout the world, including more than 90 in 
the Muslim world, with another 75 planned (more than 40 of which will 
be in the Muslim world). Several recent studies on public diplomacy 
have recommended the expansion of the American Corners program, but its 
effectiveness has not been evaluated.[Footnote 28] While one State 
official told us that American Corners are the best solution given the 
current security environment, others have described them as public 
diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner we visited in Nigeria was 
confined to a single small room housing a limited reference library and 
a small selection of donated books (see fig. 6); at a meeting with a 
focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated in U.S. 
sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the American 
Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding hosts for 
American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming terrorist targets.

Figure 6: Photographs of American Corner, Abuja, Nigeria:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO.

[End of figure] 

Information Resource Centers, small reference libraries for limited 
audiences created to replace some of the functions of American Centers' 
open libraries, most of which have closed, are another attempt to 
balance security and access. State's Bureau of International 
Information Programs operates more than 170 such centers worldwide. 
Because they are located within the embassy compound, however, public 
access to these facilities is often limited. For example, in Abuja, the 
center is open only to students and other specific demographic groups, 
and access is granted by appointment only; officials in Islamabad 
reported similar restrictions. The head of the center in Abuja said 
that accessibility was one of his primary challenges.

State has also made departmentwide efforts to expand public outreach 
beyond external facilities, and individual posts are devising creative 
solutions to this challenge. In Nigeria, several embassy staff, 
including the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a 
permanent American presence; according to embassy officials, these 
"embassy on the road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve 
dozens of individuals. Additionally, in Pakistan we observed an embassy-
funded American Discovery Center, a small kiosk providing information 
on America, placed in a local school. There are over 180 such kiosks in 
schools across Pakistan, although one embassy official remarked that as 
many as half of these schools have restricted access to the kiosk for a 
variety of reasons.

Addressing concerns over the United States' decreased outreach 
capabilities, Secretary Rice recently announced plans to deploy more 
diplomats in areas with a limited U.S. presence by increasing the 
number of American Presence Posts. There are currently 8 such 
posts,[Footnote 29] which are staffed by one Foreign Service officer 
and are intended to extend the U.S. diplomatic presence beyond foreign 
capitals and reach out to "emerging communities of change." We visited 
one such post in Alexandria, Egypt, which contained a publicly 
accessible reading room, offered free computer access, and hosted 
frequent cultural events. One advantage of the American Presence Posts 
over American Corners, according to the principal officer in 
Alexandria, was that the post was able to maintain control over the 
facility.

Another means of reaching large audiences in high-threat posts while 
minimizing security concerns is through international 
broadcasting.[Footnote 30] However, in a 2003 survey conducted by GAO, 
almost 30 percent of public diplomacy officers in the field said that 
transmission strength was ineffective in helping to achieve public 
diplomacy goals in their country. Officials we spoke with in Pakistan 
and Egypt said this challenge still exists, suggesting that poor signal 
strength for U.S. broadcasts in their host countries limits the impact 
of broadcasting. The administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request 
includes a request to increase U.S. broadcasting to countries in the 
Muslim world while reducing broadcasts elsewhere, particularly in 
Europe and Eurasia.

Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time, 
and Language Capability:

Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder 
outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. Additionally, tours of 
duty tend to be shorter in the Muslim world than elsewhere, which 
negatively impacts continuity at a post, as well as the ability to 
cultivate personal relationships. Further, we found that public 
diplomacy officers at many posts cannot communicate effectively with 
local populations in local languages, hampering overall U.S. public 
diplomacy efforts. To address these challenges, State has taken several 
steps, both at the department and post level, highlighted by the 
Secretary's transformational diplomacy initiative, but it is too early 
to evaluate the effectiveness of this initiative.

Lack of Staffing and Staff Time Hinders Public Diplomacy Efforts:

While several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended an 
increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy 
officials told us that, with current staffing levels, they do not have 
the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State 
data, the department had established 834 public diplomacy positions 
overseas in 2005, but 124, or roughly 15 percent, were vacant. 
Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy officers to 
temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State official, has 
drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also 
limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive. 
According to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "the 
need to fill a post quickly often prevents public diplomacy officers 
from receiving their full training."[Footnote 31]

In addition, public diplomacy officers at post are burdened with 
administrative tasks and thus have less time to conduct public 
diplomacy outreach activities than previously. One senior State 
official said that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, 
and internal reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy 
responsibilities. Another official in Egypt told us that there was 
rarely enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. In 
addition, State officials in Washington acknowledged that additional 
requirements for posts to improve strategic planning and evaluation of 
their public diplomacy programs would need to be accompanied by 
additional staff with relevant expertise.

Short Tours of Duty in the Muslim World:

Staffing challenges in public affairs sections at posts in the Muslim 
world are exacerbated by shorter tours of duty and fewer officers 
bidding on public diplomacy positions than in the non-Muslim world. 
According to data provided by State, the average tour length at posts 
in the Muslim world is 2.1 years, compared with 2.7 years in the non- 
Muslim world. Figure 7 shows the average tour length by region. 
Furthermore, as a result of the security concerns mentioned above, 
tours at many posts in the Muslim world are for only 1 year, without 
family members. Of State's 20 so-called unaccompanied posts, 15 are in 
the Muslim world.

Figure 7: Average Tour of Duty Length by Region (as of December 2005):

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department.

[End of figure] 

Shorter tours contribute to insufficient language skills and limit 
officers' ability to cultivate personal relationships, which, according 
to a senior public diplomacy officer, are vital to understanding Arabs 
and Muslims. Another senior State official, noting the prevalence of 
one-year tours in the Muslim world, told us that Public Affairs 
officers who have shorter tours tend to produce less effective work 
than officers with longer tours. In Pakistan, we were told that the 
Public Affairs officer views himself as a "management consultant," in 
part because of his short tour in Islamabad. Furthermore, the 
department's Inspector General observed that the rapid turnover of 
American officers in Pakistan was a major constraint to public 
diplomacy activities in the country.[Footnote 32]

In addition, public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world have 
received fewer bids than public diplomacy positions elsewhere. An 
analysis of data from State's summer 2005 posting cycle shows that 
public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world received fewer than half 
the average number of bids of non-Muslim posts--averaging 3.7 bids per 
position at posts in the Muslim world, compared with 8.9 bids per 
position elsewhere. As a result of the lower number of bids for public 
diplomacy positions in the Muslim world, it has been harder to fill 
these positions.

Language Deficiencies Pronounced in the Muslim World:

Many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world do not meet the 
language requirements established for their positions by 
State.[Footnote 33] According to data provided by State, in countries 
with significant Muslim populations, 30 percent of language-designated 
public diplomacy positions are filled by officers without the requisite 
proficiency in those languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In 
Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of language-designated public 
diplomacy positions are filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the 
designated level. In addition, State officials told us that there are 
even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on television or 
engage in public debate in Arabic. The Information Officer in Cairo 
stated that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to engage 
the Egyptian media effectively. Figure 8 shows the percentage of public 
diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting 
language requirements.

Figure 8: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy 
Positions in the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language 
Requirements (as of August 2005):

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State Department.

[End of figure] 

As a result, many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot 
communicate as well with local audiences as their position requires. 
According to the Djerejian report, "The ability to speak, write, and 
read a foreign language is one of the recognized prerequisites of 
effective communications. Foreign Service officers who are fluent in 
Arabic immediately convey a sense of respect for and interest in the 
people to whom they speak, and fluency prevents the distortion of 
translation." State's Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural 
Affairs has said that communicating in other languages is a public 
diplomacy challenge and that encouraging Americans to speak foreign 
languages is a priority for public diplomacy.

State Has Taken Several Steps to Address These Human Capital Challenges:

State has recently made several efforts to address its human capital 
challenges; in particular, following the Secretary of State's comment 
that public diplomacy is the job of the entire embassy, officials in 
Washington have encouraged posts to expand their embassy employee 
speaker programs. By increasing the number of American officers 
speaking to foreign audiences, posts have attempted to compensate for 
the loss of public diplomacy staff and the diminished amount of time 
public diplomacy officers have available for outreach. We observed 
these efforts in Abuja, Islamabad, and Peshawar, where the embassies 
have developed mission speaker bureaus, which are lists of embassy 
staff willing to speak to local audiences on a variety of topics 
related to America. In Egypt, however, the department's Inspector 
General noted that non-public diplomacy officers rarely engage in 
public outreach, missing a valuable opportunity to further increase 
understanding of U.S. policies, culture, and values.

The Secretary of State also recently proposed changes in staff 
incentives as part of her call for transformational diplomacy. New 
requirements for career advancement would include service in at least 
one hardship post, fluency in two or more languages, and expertise in 
two or more regions. In addition, the Secretary has announced plans to 
reposition staff in all career tracks, starting in summer 2006, from 
posts in Europe and Washington, D.C., to India, China, and Latin 
America, as well as to the Muslim world. It is too early to evaluate 
the impact of these efforts.

Recognizing a persistent national foreign language deficit, in January 
2006 President Bush announced plans for a National Security Language 
Initiative to further strengthen national security by developing 
foreign language skills.[Footnote 34] The President's original request 
for this initiative was $114 million in fiscal year 2007, split between 
State, DOD, the Department of Education, and the Director of National 
Intelligence--State's share of this funding is about $27 million, 
according to department officials. State's efforts will focus on 
critical languages spoken in the Muslim world, such as Arabic, Farsi, 
Turkish, and Urdu, among others. Under this initiative, State will 
provide opportunities for U.S. high school students, undergraduates, 
and graduate students to study these and other languages abroad and 
will strengthen foreign language teaching in the United States through 
exchanges and professional development. State has also established a 
facility in Tunis for advanced Arabic language instruction, including 
courses to train staff to appear on Arabic-language television and 
radio.

State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices:

While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome 
the challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally 
lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these 
practices and transferring knowledge and experience across posts. For 
example, in Nigeria, we noted the embassy practice of taking a team, 
headed by the Ambassador, on coordinated outreach efforts to key cities 
in the country where the United States currently lacks a diplomatic 
presence. The Deputy Chief of Mission noted frustration with the post's 
inability to share this and other practices with posts that might 
benefit from lessons learned in Nigeria.

Existing means of sharing best practices among public diplomacy 
officers tend to be regional in scope, ad hoc in nature, or 
underutilized in practice. These mechanisms include annual Public 
Affairs officer conferences in each region, anecdotal submissions in 
State's RESULTS database, and weekly newsletters issued by regional 
public diplomacy offices. While some officers stated that the regional 
Public Affairs officer conferences were helpful for sharing these 
practices, one official noted that no formal reports were generated at 
these conferences and that there has only been one global conference. 
The department maintains a database of public diplomacy program 
results, which is based on anecdotes submitted by officers in the field 
following speaker, exchange, or other public diplomacy programs. While 
it is a potential tool for retaining institutional memory at State, 
some State officials said that anecdotes were not systematically 
entered into the database. Others suggested that this database be 
modified to enable officers to flag best practices to make them easier 
to locate in the future. In March 2006, State officials told us that 
the Under Secretary's office was working on a Web-based system for 
officers in the field and in Washington, D.C., to share ideas and 
expected this system to be operational within the next month.

A strengthened, institutionalized system for sharing best practices 
could improve the retention of institutional memory at State. However, 
given the constraints on public diplomacy officers' time, any means of 
sharing best practices should not create an additional reporting burden 
on officers in the field. Furthermore, whichever method State chooses 
to communicate best practices, it should ensure that the practices are 
not self-submitted but rather reviewed by a third party for 
appropriateness.

Conclusions:

In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the 
Muslim world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to 
reach Muslim audiences have been short-lived. Lacking specifically 
targeted programs, posts in Muslim-majority countries continue to use 
the same information and exchange programs available to posts 
throughout the world. GAO and others have suggested the adoption of 
private sector best practices as a means to improve the department's 
communication efforts in Washington and at the post level. These 
practices call for the use of central messages or themes, target 
audience segmentation and analysis, in-depth audience research and 
evaluation, and the preparation of detailed communication plans to pull 
these various elements together. Communication efforts at the posts we 
visited generally lacked these strategic elements. State has taken 
several steps to address this problem, including the development of a 
strategic framework with goals and tactics, the creation of a 
transformational diplomacy initiative to implement some of these best 
practices, and the issuance of updated guidance to improve fiscal year 
2008 mission performance plans. These are all positive steps. However, 
Washington still lacks written guidance to implement the strategic 
framework developed by the current Under Secretary. In addition, posts 
have not prepared in-depth analyses or detailed communication plans to 
support their strategic communication decisions. Compounding this lack 
of strategic planning and evaluation are challenges related to staffing 
and security at posts in the Muslim world. State currently lacks a 
systematic mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help 
address some of these challenges.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim 
audiences around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
direct the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs to take the following two actions:

* To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach 
efforts, develop written guidance detailing how the department intends 
to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim 
world and incorporates the strategic communication best practices 
discussed in this report. This guidance should be developed in 
consultation with the White House, affected government agencies, and 
outside experts who have a practical knowledge of what is needed to 
translate private sector best practices into practical steps which can 
be taken in the field. To accompany this guidance, we recommend that 
State develop a sample country-level communication plan that posts can 
tailor to local conditions.

* To meet the challenges facing public diplomacy officers in the field, 
including the need to balance security with outreach and short tours of 
duty at certain posts, strengthen existing systems of sharing best 
practices in order to more systematically transfer knowledge among 
embassies around the world.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

The State Department provided written comments on a draft of this 
report (see app. V). State concurred with the report's findings and 
conclusions. State also indicated that it has begun to address the 
recommendations contained in this report. State said it is developing 
an integrated strategic plan that includes elements of private sector 
best practices. State also said it is developing a sample country-level 
communication plan and constructing a Web-based system for conveying 
best practices. State did not indicate when the strategic plan or 
sample country-level communication plans will be completed. We modified 
our findings regarding State's exchange programs, noting their 
continued focus on younger audiences. In addition, State provided 
technical comments, which have been incorporated throughout the report 
where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of 
Congress and the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you 
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 
at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Signed By:

Jess T. Ford: 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade:

[End of section]

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State 
Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State 
budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and 
other documents. We also interviewed officials from State's Office of 
the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; the Office 
of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public 
Affairs; the Bureau of Resource Management; and regional bureaus. We 
also observed training classes for new public diplomacy officers at 
State's Foreign Service Institute. We obtained and analyzed documents 
on public diplomacy budgets and program descriptions from these offices 
and bureaus. To assess the reliability of State's data, we reviewed 
documentation related to the data sources and discussed the data with 
knowledgeable State officials. We determined the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. We also compared data on the 
populations of countries in the Muslim world from the United Nations, 
World Bank, and CIA World Factbook, and found them sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report.

We based our definition of the Muslim world on State's Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs' list of 58 countries and territories 
with significant Muslim populations. These countries are spread across 
the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and have a combined 
population of more than 1.5 billion people. Appendix II lists these 
countries.

To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing 
public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance 
planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and 
Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review 
of mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource 
Management, public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, and related strategic planning and 
evaluation documents prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs. In Egypt, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 mission performance 
plans and related strategic planning and evaluation documentation, and, 
to discuss the scope and adequacy of each post's strategic planning and 
evaluation efforts, also met with a wide range of embassy officials 
including the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission, public affairs 
section staff, political and economic officers, regional affairs 
officers, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
Department of Defense (DOD) officials. To discuss a range of strategic 
planning, research, and evaluation issues in Washington, we met with 
representatives from the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources; the 
Bureau of Resource Management; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs; and the Bureau of 
International Information Programs. We also discussed private sector 
communication best practices with a representative from Business for 
Diplomatic Action.

To identify the challenges facing U.S. public diplomacy efforts in the 
Muslim world and what State has done to address these challenges, we 
reviewed recent studies and reports on public diplomacy. In addition:

* We met with officials from State's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the Office of Policy, 
Planning, and Resources; the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs; and 
regional bureaus in Washington, D.C.

* We met with U.S. embassy officers and foreign government, academic, 
and nongovernmental organization representatives in Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Egypt to learn about and observe challenges facing public diplomacy 
efforts at posts abroad. We also spoke with U.S. embassy officials in 
Indonesia and Turkey by telephone. We selected these countries based on 
their strategic importance to the United States, their proportion of 
the total population of the Muslim world, their geographic 
distribution, and their mix of public diplomacy programs.

* We analyzed State data on staffing, language requirements, bids for 
public diplomacy positions, and threat ratings from 2005. To assess the 
reliability of these data, we surveyed agency officials responsible for 
collecting and analyzing these data. We determined the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

* In September 2005, we convened a roundtable of Muslim experts in 
Washington, D.C., to discuss program challenges and potential 
solutions. Participants included experts in public opinion and public 
affairs, foreign journalists, and representatives from think tanks and 
academia.

We did not review covert strategic communications efforts managed by 
DOD or the intelligence community. We limited our review of USAID to 
the agency's efforts to communicate its assistance efforts and did not 
review the assistance efforts themselves. We limited our review of DOD 
to its support of State's public diplomacy activities. We did not 
review State-led reform initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative but focused instead on public diplomacy activities designed 
to communicate information about the United States to target overseas 
audiences. For the BBG, we collected funding and program information 
but did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of Radio Sawa and the 
Alhurra satellite network--the BBG's two primary initiatives aimed at 
Arab audiences. We are reviewing these broadcast initiatives separately.

We performed our work from April 2005 to February 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Countries and Territories with Significant Muslim 
Populations:

Region: Africa; Country: Benin; 
Population[A]: 7.5; 
Percentage Muslim: 20%.

Region: Africa; Country: Burkina Faso; 
Population[A]: 13.9; 
Percentage Muslim: 50%.

Region: Africa; Country: Cameroon; 
Population[A]: 16.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 20%.

Region: Africa; Country: Chad; 
Population[A]: 9.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 51%.

Region: Africa; Country: Comoros; 
Population[A]: 0.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 98%.

Region: Africa; Country: Cote d'Ivoire; 
Population[A]: 17.3; 
Percentage Muslim: 35-40%.

Region: Africa; Country: Djibouti; 
Population[A]: 0.5; 
Percentage Muslim: 94%.

Region: Africa; Country: Eritrea; 
Population[A]: 4.6; 
Percentage Muslim: >50%.

Region: Africa; Country: Ethiopia; 
Population[A]: 73.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 45-50%.

Region: Africa; Country: Gabon; 
Population[A]: 1.4; 
Percentage Muslim: <1%.

Region: Africa; Country: Gambia; 
Population[A]: 1.6; 
Percentage Muslim: 90%.

Region: Africa; Country: Guinea; 
Population[A]: 9.5; 
Percentage Muslim: 85%.

Region: Africa; Country: Guinea-Bissau; 
Population[A]: 1.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 45%.

Region: Africa; Country: Mali; 
Population[A]: 12.3; 
Percentage Muslim: 90%.

Region: Africa; Country: Mauritania; 
Population[A]: 3.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 100%.

Region: Africa; Country: Mozambique; 
Population[A]: 19.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 18%.

Region: Africa; Country: Niger; 
Population[A]: 11.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 80%.

Region: Africa; Country: Nigeria; 
Population[A]: 128.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 50%.

Region: Africa; Country: Senegal; 
Population[A]: 11.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 94%.

Region: Africa; Country: Sierra Leone; 
Population[A]: 6.0; 
Percentage Muslim: 60%.

Region: Africa; Country: Somalia; 
Population[A]: 8.6; 
Percentage Muslim: >50%.

Region: Africa; Country: Sudan; 
Population[A]: 40.2; 
Percentage Muslim: 70%.

Region: Africa; Country: Togo; 
Population[A]: 5.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 20%.

Region: Africa; Country: Uganda; 
Population[A]: 27.3; 
Percentage Muslim: 16%.

Region: East Asia and Pacific; 
Country: Brunei; Population[A]: 0.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 67%.

Region: East Asia and Pacific; Country: Indonesia; 
Population[A]: 242.0; 
Percentage Muslim: 88%.

Region: East Asia and Pacific; Country: Malaysia; 
Population[A]: 24.0; 
Percentage Muslim: 60%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Albania; 
Population[A]: 3.6; 
Percentage Muslim: 70%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Azerbaijan; 
Population[A]: 7.9; 
Percentage Muslim: 93%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kazakhstan; 
Population[A]: 15.2; 
Percentage Muslim: 47%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kosovo; 
Population[A]: N/A;
Percentage Muslim: N/A.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Kyrgyzstan; 
Population[A]: 5.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 75%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Tajikistan; 
Population[A]: 7.2; 
Percentage Muslim: 90%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Turkey; 
Population[A]: 69.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 100%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Turkmenistan; 
Population[A]: 5.0; 
Percentage Muslim: 89%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia; Country: Uzbekistan; 
Population[A]: 26.9; 
Percentage Muslim: 88%.

Region: Near East; Country: Algeria; 
Population[A]: 32.5; 
Percentage Muslim: 99.

Region: Near East; Country: Bahrain; 
Population[A]: 0.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 100%.

Region: Near East; Country: Egypt; 
Population[A]: 77.5; 
Percentage Muslim: 94%.

Region: Near East; Country: Iran; 
Population[A]: 68.0; 
Percentage Muslim: 98%.

Region: Near East; Country: Iraq; 
Population[A]: 26.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 97%.

Region: Near East; Country: Jordan; 
Population[A]: 5.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 92%.

Region: Near East; Country: Kuwait; 
Population[A]: 2.3; 
Percentage Muslim: 85%.

Region: Near East; Country: Lebanon; 
Population[A]: 3.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 60%.

Region: Near East; Country: Libya; 
Population[A]: 5.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 97%.

Region: Near East; Country: Morocco; 
Population[A]: 32.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 99%.

Region: Near East; Country: Oman; 
Population[A]: 3.0; 
Percentage Muslim: >75%.

Region: Near East; Country: Qatar; 
Population[A]: 0.9; 
Percentage Muslim: 95%.

Region: Near East; Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Population[A]: 26.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 100%.

Region: Near East; Country: Syria; 
Population[A]: 18.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 74%.

Region: Near East; Country: Tunisia; 
Population[A]: 10.1; 
Percentage Muslim: 98%.

Region: Near East; Country: UAE; 
Population[A]: 2.6; 
Percentage Muslim: 96%.

Region: Near East; Country: West Bank and Gaza; 
Population[A]: 3.8; 
Percentage Muslim: 75%.

Region: Near East; Country: Yemen; 
Population[A]: 20.7; 
Percentage Muslim: 90%.

Region: South Asia; Country: Afghanistan; 
Population[A]: 29.9; 
Percentage Muslim: 99%.

Region: South Asia; Country: Bangladesh; 
Population[A]: 144.3; 
Percentage Muslim: 83%.

Region: South Asia; Country: Maldives; 
Population[A]: 0.3; 
Percentage Muslim: >50%.

Region: South Asia; Country: Pakistan; 
Population[A]: 162.4; 
Percentage Muslim: 97%. 

Sources: State Department and Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook.

Note: As defined by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs.

[A] In millions.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Positions 
and Selected Programs:

Positions:

Public Affairs Officer (PAO): The PAO is the senior public diplomacy 
adviser in the embassy. He/she coordinates all aspects of mission 
public affairs ensuring that public diplomacy resources are deployed in 
support of mission goals. The PAO also supervises the public affairs 
section including the work of the information/press section and the 
cultural section.

Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO): The CAO manages the embassy's 
educational and professional exchange programs, including the Fulbright 
program. He/she also carries out cultural programs that highlight 
American society and achievements and administers the speaker program 
that brings U.S. experts to address targeted audiences in the host 
country.

Information Officer (IO): The IO is the embassy spokesperson and 
primary point of contact for information about the United States and 
mission affairs. The IO advises senior management on media relations 
and public affairs strategies and manages the distribution of 
information to members of the target audience.

Information Resource Officer (IRO): Generally librarians by training, 
IROs are responsible for embassies' Information Resource Centers (IRC) 
and American Corners. They are also responsible for supporting IRC 
programs and training local IRC staff. There are approximately 20 IROs 
at missions around the world.

Regional English Language Officer (RELO): Worldwide, State has 17 
experienced TEFL/TESL professionals, known as RELOs. RELOs help 
embassies design strategies to support English teaching and work with 
various partners to organize in teacher training seminars and workshops 
and offer general guidance.

Programs:

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Programs:

* Fulbright Program: Flagship U.S. government exchange program for 
graduate students, professors, researchers, professionals, and 
secondary level teachers to teach, study, and conduct research. 
Americans are hosted by schools or universities around the world, and 
foreign participants by U.S. secondary schools, colleges, or 
universities.

* International Visitors (IV): 3-week visits to the United States by 
rising leaders in diverse fields. IVs travel in groups or as 
individuals and experience American cultural life and society along 
with professional interchange with U.S. counterparts.

* Voluntary Visitors (VV): Programs for foreign nationals already 
traveling to the United States, including professional appointments and 
domestic travel support. VVs can partly be funded by an embassy.

* Office of Citizen Exchanges professional and institutional exchange 
programs: Exchanges designed to link private sector American expertise 
and resources with priority institutions to engage youth influencers 
and promote civil society, democracy, youth leadership, and 
volunteerism, among other topics.

* Humphrey Program: Midlevel professionals from developing countries 
come to the United States for a year of academic study and professional 
experience.

* English Language Teaching: Targeted English language programs in 
specific regions and countries of the world, coordinated with the 
embassy. Programs include the English ACCESS Microscholarship program, 
English Language Fellow program, English Language Specialist program, 
and E-Teacher program.

* Rhythm Road: Professional jazz and urban music groups who tour 
countries with limited exposure to American culture, playing concerts 
and talking about their music and American society.

* Feature Film Service: Films provided to posts by the Motion Picture 
Association of America and other organizations for festivals, 
screenings by Ambassadors, and other programmatic usage by post public 
affairs sections.

* Cultural Ambassadors: Utilizes world-renowned American cultural 
figures to reach out to young people around the globe.

* Cultural Envoys and Cultural Visitors: Cultural Envoys aims to 
utilize the talents of average Americans to engage with young people 
abroad. Cultural Visitors is designed to bring young "idea" leaders in 
the arts and humanities to the United States for internships.

* Arts Exchanges in International Issues: An annual grants competition 
designed to identify American partner organizations to conduct exchange 
programs in priority countries, utilizing cultural and artistic media 
and programs to address priority U.S. foreign policy goals.

* Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation: Assists less developed 
countries in preserving their cultural heritage and demonstrates U.S. 
respect for other cultures.

* International Partnership Among Museums: An institutional linkage 
program carried out with the American Association of Museums, selecting 
American museums to partner with a museum abroad to develop a 
collaborative program built around a theme.

* International Cultural Property Protection: Carries out the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, which protects 
cultural patrimony of signatory nations.

* National Security Language Initiative: Program activity will include 
in-country language training for U.S. Fulbright students in Arabic, 
Turkish, and Indic languages; summer intensive language programs abroad 
for undergraduate beginning students and intermediate/advanced training 
for undergraduate and graduate students; expansion of the Fulbright 
Foreign Language Teaching Assistant Program to bring 300 native 
speakers of critical languages to teach in U.S. universities and 
schools; and a new component to the teacher exchange program to assist 
U.S. teachers of critical need languages to study abroad.

* Study of the U.S.: Promotes better understanding of the United States 
through Summer Institutes for foreign university faculty, reference 
collections, and the Currents in American Scholarship series.

* EducationUSA: Promotes higher education abroad by supporting overseas 
advising centers and collaborating with U.S. educational organizations 
to strengthen international exchange.

Bureau of International Information Programs:

* U.S. Speakers: American subject-matter experts travel to a host 
country to address selected audiences on a range of policy issues and 
various aspects of American society.

* American Corners: Public diplomacy outposts in host-country 
organizations, such as libraries and universities, that provide access 
to information about the United States through book collections, the 
Internet, and local programming to the general public.

* Information Resource Centers: Computer-based knowledge platforms at 
embassies and consulates that provide information about U.S. policies 
and American society to targeted sectors of the host-country population.

* Digital video conferences: Two-way video/phone dialogues between U.S. 
subject-matter experts and their counterparts in a host country.

* USINFO: Authoritative, up-to-date Web site providing information on 
U.S. policy and American issues directed at foreign readers. Available 
in English and six world languages.

* Washington File: Daily compilations of news articles and official 
texts intended for foreign audiences. Available on the USINFO Web site.

* Electronic Journals: Web-based monthly publications focused on themes 
supporting mission performance plan goals. Available in several 
languages, Electronic Journals can be downloaded and printed for local 
distribution.

* Infocentral: On-line resource for U.S. government spokespersons and 
embassy officers who need information on policy issues, access to press 
clips, and cleared guidance.

* Mission Web sites: Each embassy maintains its own Web site with links 
to the State Department and other sources of information about the 
United States and U.S. policy.

* Issue Briefs: Background information on policy topics, available at 
the Infocentral Web site, intended for use only by U.S. officials who 
need to articulate and explain policy positions.

* Paper Shows: Exhibitions of 35-40 panels featuring photographic and 
documentary images and text on significant American personalities, 
issues, and events. Paper shows are produced in several languages and 
displayed in museums, libraries, theaters, and other public places 
worldwide.

Bureau of Public Affairs Programs:

* Foreign Press Centers: Support centers for foreign journalists in 
Washington, D.C., New York, and Los Angeles providing facilitative 
assistance, interviews with U.S. officials, and information resources.

* Office of Broadcast Services: Provides television and radio to 
overseas posts, runs American Embassy Television Network, and assists 
foreign TV crews making film documentaries in the United States on 
subjects of interest to the U.S. government.

Other Programs:

* Media reaction: Summary compilations of foreign editorial and op-ed 
reactions to issues of interest to the United States, available daily 
on the Web.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Private Sector Best Practices:

GAO and other groups have called for a transformation in how U.S. 
public diplomacy efforts are conducted. One key element of this 
proposed transformation is the perceived need to adopt and adapt 
strategic communication best practices from the private sector.

GAO suggested in its September 2003 report on State public diplomacy 
efforts that the department examine private sector public relations 
efforts and political campaigns' use of sophisticated strategies to 
integrate complex communication efforts involving multiple players. 
GAO's roundtable with public relations firms from the private sector 
revealed that the key strategic components of such efforts include 
establishing the scope and nature of the problem, identifying the 
target audience, determining the core message, and defining both 
success and failure. The panel emphasized the importance of 
synchronizing these activities in a systematic way, so that 
communication efforts are mutually reinforcing in advancing the 
campaign's overall objectives. They noted that without a carefully 
integrated plan, the various elements are at risk of canceling each 
other out and possibly damaging the overall campaign. Figure 9 
illustrates the steps in the process.

Figure 9: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO; developed from Weber Shandwick.

[End of figure] 

Business for Diplomatic Action:

Testimony by the President of Business for Diplomatic Action 
(BDA)[Footnote 35] provides a suggested strategic road map for the 
government to follow, building on private sector best 
practices.[Footnote 36] BDA suggests that U.S. public diplomacy efforts 
be redesigned following a five step plan: (1) listen, ask questions, 
and analyze; (2) participate in foundation building process for a 
comprehensive communication strategy; (3) introduce a "positioning 
concept" for the United States in a post-9/11 world; (4) develop a 
comprehensive communication plan; and (5) put someone in charge. Under 
step one, BDA notes that "there are knowledge gaps with regard to 
issues of anti-American sentiment and public diplomacy programming." 
Under step two, BDA suggests that a task force of public and private 
sector parties explore the significance and implications of the 
research data collected under step one. Under step three, a 
"positioning concept" for the United States would be developed, 
capturing a point of view, a promise, and a personality. Step four 
requires the development of a comprehensive communication plan which 
can take the form of a multiaudience grid listing existing attitudes, 
desired attitudes, barriers standing between existing and desired 
attitudes, and the best means to address and remove these barriers. BDA 
notes that answers to these questions will vary by target audience 
(e.g., Muslim parents, Muslim youth, Chinese business leaders, etc.), 
but all must be translations of the "positioning concept" agreed to in 
step three. Finally, someone must be in put in charge to ensure that 
all activities, behaviors, and messages are aligned to the new 
positioning concept.

Defense Science Board:

In its September 2004 report on strategic communications, the Defense 
Science Board makes a case that borrowing and adapting private sector 
communication practices is a critical step toward revitalizing U.S. 
public diplomacy efforts.[Footnote 37] The report notes that the United 
States approaches modern warfare with cutting-edge strategies, tactics, 
and weapons, designed to be effective against modern foes, and 
constantly updated. By contrast, the report argues, U.S. current 
strategic communication planning and execution is mired in diplomatic 
and marketing tactics of yesteryear. The United States has no clearly 
defined strategic framework, themes, or messages. The report goes on to 
note that building an effective strategic communication culture that 
borrows the most effective private sector marketing and political 
campaign techniques will be at the core of rebuilding and reinventing 
the way the United States listens, engages, and communicates with the 
world.

The report notes that achieving this goal will involve the following 
three key steps:

* As in a successful political campaign, the United States must clearly 
define what success means in terms of its benefits for all target 
audiences. All constituents must understand what success means for them 
in personal terms. A carefully defined set of themes and messages must 
reinforce targeted audiences' perceived and personal benefits.

* The United States must communicate what its vision for the future 
promises on individual terms, not national or pan-national religious 
terms. The United States should personalize the benefits of its defined 
future, for example, personal control, choice and change, personal 
mobility, meritocracy, and individual rights (in particular, women's 
rights).

* As with most effective private sector and political marketing 
campaigns, the United States must understand what target populations 
must be reached and influenced to achieve success. And the United 
States must understand what it takes to move them. More importantly, it 
must target audiences that can be moved--pragmatically and 
strategically picking its target audiences.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the State Department: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520:

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N. W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,

"U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 
Challenges," GAO Job Code 320339.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Bud 
Jacobs, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 
Office of Planning and Resources, at (202) 647-0444.

Sincerely, 

Signed By:

Bradford R. Higgins:

cc: GAO-Michael Ten Kate: 
R/PPR - Gretchen Welch: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda:

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 
Challenges, (GAO-06-535, GAO Code 320339):

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the GAO's report on U.S. 
public diplomacy in the Muslim world. We appreciate the fact that the 
report acknowledges steps the Department has taken to adopt a strategic 
approach to engage Muslim audiences. As we reported to GAO auditors, we 
are in the midst of developing an integrated strategic communication 
plan that includes core messages, segmented target audiences, detailed 
strategies and tactics, and in-depth research and analyses to monitor 
and evaluate results. (This survey has been conducted - we are awaiting 
final reports on which to base our plan.)

We have worked closely with the GAO to correct technical inaccuracies 
we found in this draft report. However, we remain concerned about two 
issues the report raises with respect to our exchange programs. The 
draft report states that the State Department has not created new and 
lasting programs to engage key audiences in the Arab and Muslim Worlds 
and that the Partnerships for Learning (P4L) Program has been 
terminated. In fact, we have put in place innovative exchange programs 
directed at Muslim and Arab audiences and we have adapted longstanding 
exchanges of demonstrated effectiveness to help achieve our goals. 
While many of these programs no longer carry the P4L label, the concept 
remains sound and imbues these youth-oriented programs.

The Department believes that the recommendations contained in the draft 
report are in sync with the improvements we have underway. We have laid 
the foundations for a broad public diplomacy strategy that includes 
elements of private sector best practices. We are developing a sample 
country-level communication plan and specific plans for a number of 
individual countries that are key to this effort. We have asked our 
embassies in a number of pilot countries to prepare analyses of their 
"key influencers" as part of that process. We are currently building an 
intranet website devoted to best practices that will encourage 
interactive engagement and sharing of information among our public 
diplomacy practitioners. The site will also contain a wealth of 
practical information on how to access and use public diplomacy 
resources.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Jess Ford (202) 512-4128:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to the individual named above, Diana Glod, Assistant 
Director; Michael ten Kate; Robert Ball; Mehrunisa Qayyum; Richard 
Bakewell; and Joe Carney made significant contributions to this report. 
Martin de Alteriis, Elaine Vaurio, and Ernie Jackson provided technical 
assistance.

(320339): 

[End of section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] For the purposes of this report, the "Muslim world" refers to the 
58 countries and territories identified as "countries with significant 
Muslim populations" by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs. This list includes Muslim-majority countries and 
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Appendix II 
lists these countries.

[2] These negative trends amongst Muslim populations have been 
documented in a variety of analyses and polls. For example, see Office 
of Research, State Department. "Independent Survey of Arab Publics 
Shows Bad U.S. Image Based Primarily on U.S. Regional Policy." Opinion 
Analysis. Washington, D.C.: M-34-05, Mar. 23, 2005.

[3] Public diplomacy programs and tools also support the department's 
traditional policy-oriented goals such as promoting regional stability, 
democracy and human rights, and economic prosperity and security.

[4] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts 
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2005).

[5] In February 2006, State moved the Central Asian nations of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan from 
the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to the Bureau of South 
Asian Affairs, creating the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

[6] In August 2005 GAO issued a report on the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative. See GAO, Foreign Assistance: Middle East Partnership 
Initiative Offers Tools for Supporting Reform, but Project Monitoring 
Needs Improvement, GAO-05-711 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2005).

[7] In March 2005, the President reorganized the National Security 
Council and created a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 
Communications and Global Outreach, whose responsibilities include U.S. 
public diplomacy efforts.

[8] State's regional bureaus are the Bureaus of African Affairs, East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern 
Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere 
Affairs. Functional Bureaus with public diplomacy responsibilities 
include: Administration; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Economic 
and Business Affairs; Intelligence and Research; International Security 
and Nonproliferation; Information Resource Management; Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and Political- 
Military Affairs.

[9] State has begun to appoint "dual-hatted" Deputy Assistant 
Secretaries for Public Diplomacy in each of the six regional bureaus. 
These individuals report directly to both their Regional Assistant 
Secretary and to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs.

[10] These programs are outlined in appendix III.

[11] Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 
Changing Minds Winning Peace (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).

[12] State estimated that Hi's Web sites received approximately 3 
million hits in December 2005.

[13] Other Partnerships for Learning programs include CultureConnect, 
which supports American cultural figures' engagement of young audiences 
in the Muslim world, and English ACCESS Microscholarships, which 
provide English language instruction to low-income and underserved 
youth abroad.

[14] State officials noted however, that the Youth Exchange and Study 
program was modeled after the department's Future Leaders Exchange 
program, which was assessed in 2003 and found to be meeting its goals.

[15] GAO's roundtable of nongovernment Muslim experts focused on the 
importance given to reaching out to American Muslims and empowering 
them to reach out to the Muslim world. State has begun to take specific 
steps toward this end. For example, the department sponsored a 
symposium in Brussels in November 2005 to bring together American and 
Belgium Muslims to discuss common areas of concerns. State officials 
noted that this symposium was intended to serve as a prototype and that 
similar conferences could be held elsewhere in Europe and beyond.

[16] Appendix IV provides more details on such private sector best 
practices.

[17] The Defense Science Board advises DOD on scientific, technical, 
manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special 
interest to the department.

[18] Mission performance plans serve as top-level statements of agency 
program goals and objectives, resource requirements, strategies and 
tactics, and performance indicators.

[19] Post officials in Nigeria are faced with the prospect of reaching 
a countrywide audience of over 130 million people, roughly half of whom 
are concentrated in the Northern portion of the country, where the 
United States does not have a permanent diplomatic presence.

[20] According to a senior official in Washington, D.C., the term 
"younger" implied the need to target even high school students who 
might be tomorrow's opinion leaders. "Broader" implied the need to 
reach beyond elites and target disadvantaged youth as well. "Deeper" 
implied a desire that all program participants have as meaningful an 
experience as possible.

[21] State officials noted that they have developed a worldwide 
database of exchange participants, established a global alumni Web site 
to encourage dialogue, provided field staff with training and best 
practices information to facilitate the establishment of local alumni 
programs, and codified the responsibilities of the Alumni Division in 
Washington with regards to these and other activities. 

[22] The British Council manages the British government's exchanges and 
cultural programming outreach efforts. 

[23] The British Council divides its audiences into four tiers: T-1: 
top 100 most influential individuals in the host country; T-2: 
academics, professional networks (journalists/lawyers), alumni 
associations, and teachers; T-3: young professionals; and T-4: informed 
audience. 

[24] Message amplification involves using a positive story about U.S. 
assistance or actions and delivering it to a mass audience via 
available communication channels including newspapers, radio, and 
television. The use of third-party spokespersons, such as local 
religious leaders, can help ensure message credibility, which is often 
difficult when information is transmitted from the United States to a 
target audience.

[25] As noted in GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands 
Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-03-951 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 4, 2003), our roundtable of public relations experts estimated 
that State would need to spend up to $50 million to conduct adequate 
opinion research and performance measurement given the size of its 
public diplomacy budget and scope of operations. We reported that 
State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research spent only about $3.5 
million annually on overseas opinion research. In fiscal year 2005, 
this amount increased to $4.4 million.

[26] See GAO-03-951 and GAO, Program Evaluation: Strategies for 
Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals, 
GAO-02-923 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002).

[27] USAID, Operating in High Threat Environments (Washington, D.C.: 
June 2005).

[28] The department is currently evaluating the American Corners 
program.

[29] American Presence Posts are located in Alexandria, Egypt; Medan, 
Indonesia; Winnipeg, Canada; and Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Rennes, and 
Toulouse, France.

[30] GAO has reviewed U.S. broadcasting efforts in the Middle East 
separately. See GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but 
Face Significant Challenges, GAO-04-435T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 
2004). A separate GAO review will evaluate the effectiveness of Radio 
Sawa and the Alhurra satellite network--the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors' two primary initiatives aimed at Arab audiences.

[31] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Report 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2005).

[32] State Department Office of the Inspector General, Inspection of 
Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan, ISP-I-05-35A (Washington, D.C.: August 
2005).

[33] In January 2002, GAO reported on language proficiency shortfalls 
at State and other agencies. See GAO, Foreign Languages: Human Capital 
Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02- 
375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).

[34] For a detailed description of the National Security Language 
Initiative, see appendix III.

[35] Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders, 
BDA seeks to counter anti-American sentiments that can harm U.S. 
business interests by helping to coordinate the outreach efforts of 
U.S. multinational companies.

[36] Reinhard, Keith. Testimony before the U.S. Congress. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. The 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations on Public Diplomacy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations. 108th 
Cong. 2nd sess., Aug. 23, 2004.

[37] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
Communication (Washington, D.C.: September 2004).

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