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and Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for 
Selected Equipment' which was released on October 26, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

October 2005: 

Military Readiness: 

DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program 
Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment: 

GAO-06-141: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-141, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of 
dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items 
while also planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure 
new systems to transform the department’s warfighting capabilities. GAO 
developed a red, yellow, green assessment framework to (1) assess the 
condition of 30 selected equipment items from across the four military 
services, and (2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified 
near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that 
these items can meet defense requirements. GAO selected these items 
based on input from the military services, congressional committees, 
and our prior work. These 30 equipment items included 18 items that 
were first assessed in GAO’s 2003 report. 

What GAO Found: 

While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected 
for review varied, GAO’s analysis showed that reported readiness rates 
declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. 
The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 
2003 and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of 
equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues 
caused by the advancing ages and complexity of the systems. Key 
equipment items—such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, 
and rotary wing aircraft—have been used well beyond normal peacetime 
use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense 
Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting 
future requirements. Until the department completes this review and 
ensures that condition issues for key equipment are addressed, DOD 
risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its 
ability to continue meeting mission requirements. 

The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term 
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 
selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that, 
in some cases, the services’ near-term program strategies have gaps in 
that they do not address capability shortfalls, funding is not included 
in DOD’s 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance 
issues that may affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term 
program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the 
equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements are not 
identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and 
upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet 
identified. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to 
develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement 
programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating 
capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO 
assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate attention 
because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered 
by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment 
plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to 
sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other 
DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, 
and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete 
sustainment and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for 
all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future 
requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops 
these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD’s budget 
decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. 

GAO’s red, yellow, and green assessments of the condition, program 
strategies, and funding plans for the 30 selected military equipment 
items are shown on the following page. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD reassess and report annually on its near- and 
long-term programs for all key equipment items until replacements are 
fielded. DOD partially agreed that it needs to reassess its program 
strategies but did not agree that it needed to provide this information 
in an annual report to Congress. As a result, GAO is recommending that 
Congress require DOD to report this information to ensure that key 
equipment deficiencies are addressed in DOD’s budget. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the High Pace 
of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of the Systems: 

Services Near-and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans Exist 
for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps Remain: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items: 

Army: 

Marine Corps: 

Navy: 

Air Force: 

Appendix III: Agency Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for 
Selected Equipment Items: 

Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies and 
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items: 

Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps Equipment 
Items, Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions): 

Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies and 
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items: 

Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank: 

Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle: 

Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier: 

Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle: 

Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter: 

Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D 
Apache Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter: 

Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook CH-47D/ 
F Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter: 

Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D Kiowa 
Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank: 

Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1 
Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle: 

Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps LAV-25 and 
LAV C-2, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle: 

Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Assault 
Amphibian Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement: 

Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Medium 
Tactical Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 2003 - 2004: 

Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet: 

Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B 
Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra: 

Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter: 

Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter: 

Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer: 

Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate: 

Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship: 

Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft: 

Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler: 

Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft: 

Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile: 

Figure 46: F-15 Eagle: 

Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle and 
Strike Eagle Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon: 

Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 Fighting 
Falcon Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber: 

Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer 
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber: 

Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit 
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft: 

Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy 
Transport Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker: 

Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135 
Stratotanker Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

Abbreviations: 

AAV: Assault Amphibian Vehicle: 

ARNG: Army National Guard: 

C2: Command and Control or Command and Communications: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FMTV: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

FYDP: Future Years Defense Program: 

GWOT: Global War on Terrorism: 

HEMTT: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

HMMWV: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

LAV: Light Armored Vehicle: 

MTVR: Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

USAR: U.S. Army Reserve: 

Letter October 25, 2005: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of dollars 
sustaining and transforming the current military force structure while 
it is heavily involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All of 
the military services have been utilizing selected equipment items for 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and must plan to sustain, 
recapitalize, or replace their existing equipment, while concurrently 
planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure new 
systems that will transform DOD's war-fighting capabilities. 

In December 2003, we reported that the condition of 25 selected 
military equipment items varied from very good to very poor and that, 
although the services had program strategies for sustaining, 
modernizing, or replacing most of the items reviewed, there were some 
gaps in those strategies.[Footnote 1] The report further stated that 
for 15 of the items reviewed, the funding requested by DOD did not 
appear to match the services' program strategies to sustain or replace 
the items. In that report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
reassess the program strategies and funding priorities for key 
equipment items to ensure that the equipment items are sustained until 
replacement items are fielded. We also recommended that DOD highlight 
for Congress the risks involved in not fully funding the sustainment of 
these equipment items and the steps the department is taking to address 
those risks. Congress included a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005[Footnote 2] 
that amends Title 10 of the U.S. code to require that, whenever a new 
major defense acquisition program begins development, the defense 
acquisition authority responsible for that program shall develop a 
sustainment plan for the existing system until the system under 
development replaces that system. 

Since our December 2003 report, DOD's continued operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have resulted in additional wear and tear on military 
equipment. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the President requested, and 
Congress appropriated, supplemental funds for ongoing military 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan that included funds to refurbish and 
replace vehicles, weapons, and equipment used in the 
operations.[Footnote 3] In February 2005, the President presented 
Congress with his fiscal year 2006 budget request and out-year 
projections that contained changes in DOD spending plans and delayed 
the fielding of some equipment replacement systems, as documented in 
DOD's Program Budget Decision 753. Congress is currently considering 
this request as well as over $40 billion in additional fiscal year 2005 
supplemental appropriations to include in the fiscal year 2006 regular 
defense appropriation. The military services have also begun developing 
the justification to request additional 2006 supplemental 
appropriations. While supplemental funds may enable DOD to meet near- 
term war-related equipment needs, the toll of continuing operations has 
raised concerns about the ability of DOD's long-term programming and 
funding strategies to meet equipment needs. 

DOD recognizes that additional wear and tear is being put on equipment 
used to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and has 
conducted a study to measure the effects of the sustained use of 
equipment at levels beyond normal peacetime use and in operations 
outside of the equipment's normal operating parameters. According to 
this study, equipment is being used at much higher rates in combat 
operations than it is in routine peacetime missions. In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, usage rates have run two to eight times higher than 
comparable peacetime rates. In Iraq, for example, Army Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles have been used at six times their peacetime rates. Moreover, 
equipment is also employed in harsher environments and in more 
demanding ways in these combat operations. Although initial results of 
this study and related costs have been released, DOD is continuing to 
assess the effects of high operating rates and harsh conditions on 
equipment. 

Since congressional interest in the wear and tear being placed on 
military equipment and the funding needed to reconstitute this 
equipment remains, we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military 
equipment items, including 18 items from our December 2003 report, to 
update your committees on which key equipment items warrant attention 
by DOD and/or Congress. The specific objectives of this review were to 
(1) assess the fleet-wide condition of selected key equipment items and 
(2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified near-and long-term 
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that selected key 
equipment items can meet requirements. Our assessments apply only to 
the 30 equipment items we reviewed; therefore, the results cannot be 
projected to the entire inventory of DOD equipment. 

We selected the 30 equipment items based upon input from the military 
services, congressional committees, and our prior work. To assess the 
condition of these equipment items, we obtained fleet-wide data on 
equipment age, expected service life, and other specific service 
performance indicators such as mission capable rates,[Footnote 4] 
utilization rates,[Footnote 5] and various other metrics for fiscal 
years 1999 through 2004. Our observations and assessments were made 
across the military services--Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps-
-for both the active duty inventory as well as equipment in the 
National Guard and reserve forces. In assessing fleet-wide equipment 
condition, we also considered the extent to which each equipment item 
was used for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and its associated 
performance indicators while deployed.[Footnote 6] Our review of DOD's 
near-and long-term program strategies for these equipment items focused 
on the extent to which the services have developed or updated their 
plans to sustain, modernize, or replace[Footnote 7] the equipment items 
in order to meet mission requirements. Our review of near-and long-term 
funding plans focused on the extent to which the funding for the 
strategies is projected in the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP).[Footnote 8] According to DOD officials, the FYDP takes the 
services' priorities into consideration, while balancing future 
investment and risk. We defined the near term as fiscal years 2005, 
2006, and 2007, and the long term as fiscal years 2008 and beyond. 

To determine which equipment items require additional attention by the 
department, the military services, and/or Congress, we developed an 
assessment framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the 
existence of a problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or 
issue, and (3) how soon the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To 
indicate the existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified for 
the 30 selected equipment items, we used a traffic light approach--red, 
yellow, or green--as follows: 

* Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress. 

* Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen. 

* Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress. 

While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three 
categories across all four of the military services, data availability 
varied significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments, 
therefore, are based on the data available from multiple sources; 
however, we did not independently verify the data provided by these 
sources. Our assessments also represent the problems and issues we 
identified at the specific point in time that we conducted our work, 
and can change quickly given current events. Although our assessments 
for each of the three categories--condition, near-term program 
strategies and funding plans, and long-term program strategies and 
funding plans--are largely qualitative in nature and are derived from 
consensus judgments, our analyses are based on data provided by the 
military services and discussions with military service officials and 
program managers for the individual equipment items. We assessed the 
reliability of the services' equipment readiness data by (1) comparing 
key data elements to our observations of equipment items at selected 
units, (2) reviewing relevant documents, and (3) interviewing 
knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data obtained from DOD, 
the military services, and the combatant commands were sufficiently 
reliable for our use. For a complete description of our methodology, 
see appendix I. Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each 
of the 30 equipment items. We performed our review from July 2004 
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Our assessments of the fleet-wide condition and near-and long-term 
program strategies and funding plans for the 30 military equipment 
items that we included in our review indicate that the items range from 
some that have severe problems and require immediate attention to those 
that do not have problems or issues warranting action by the DOD, 
military services, and/or Congress, as shown in figure 1. Specifically, 
we identified severe problems and issues related to the fleet-wide 
condition and/or program and funding strategies of the Army's Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle, M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, and CH-47D/F 
helicopter; the Marine Corps' M1A1 tank, CH-46E helicopter, and CH-53E 
helicopter; the Navy's P-3 aircraft and Standard Missile-2; and the Air 
Force's KC-135 aircraft and we rated all of these military equipment 
items as red in figure 1. For example, the Marine Corps' CH-46E 
helicopter received a red rating for its near-term program strategy and 
funding plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term 
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages. The 
fleet-wide condition or program strategies of many of the other 
equipment items shown as yellow in figure 1, while not yet severe 
enough to warrant immediate action by DOD, the military services, and/ 
or Congress, also showed signs of problems that, if not addressed, 
could become severe. For example, we assessed the fleet-wide condition 
of the Army's Abrams tank as yellow because, while it generally met or 
exceeded the service mission capable goal, the rates were on a downward 
trend as a result of shortages of both spare parts and the trained 
personnel needed to replace these parts and to repair the equipment 
items. Reserve military technicians who repair this equipment at home 
are, in many cases, currently deployed overseas. 

Figure 1: GAO's Assessment Summary of 30 Selected Equipment Items: 

[See PDF for image] --graphic text: 

Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough to 
warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress. 

Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen. 

Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress. 

Equipment: 

Army: 

Abrams Tank; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

CH-47 D/F Chinook Helicopter; 
Condition: Red; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

Marine Corps: 

M1A1 Abrams Tank; 
Condition: Red; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

Light Armored Vehicle Command and Control and 25 variants; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle- Personnel, C2, and Recovery variants; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

AV-8B Harrier Jet; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Red; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

Navy: 

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

P-3 Orion Aircraft; 
Condition: Red; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

Air Force: 

F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle Aircraft; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

F-16 Fighting Falcon Aircraft; 
Condition: Green; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

B-1 Lancer Bomber; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

B-2 Spirit Bomber; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Green; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Green. 

C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow. 

KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft; 
Condition: Yellow; 
Near-term program strategy and funding plan: Yellow; 
Long-term program strategy and funding plan: Red. 

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

[End of figure] 

While the fleet-wide condition of 30 equipment items we selected for 
review varied by service, level of current use, and age, our analysis 
showed that reported readiness rates[Footnote 9] are declining between 
fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items, particularly for 
those equipment items we rated as red or yellow in figure 1. The 
decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 
and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of 
equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues 
resulting from the advancing ages (such as equipment that is more than 
20 years old) and complexity (such as Navy ships, which are systems of 
systems) of the equipment items. Some key equipment items--such as Army 
and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and helicopters--have been 
used well beyond normal peacetime use while deployed. For example, 
according to Marine Corps officials, the Assault Amphibian Vehicles 
experienced utilization rates as high as 11 times the normal peacetime 
rates while operating in Iraq. Army and Marine Corps officials stated 
that a complete inspection of the deployed equipment will be necessary 
once it returns from theater before the full extent of its readiness 
deficiencies can be known. Many of the selected systems have either a 
fleet-wide average age of more than 20 years, such as the Navy's LPD-4 
Amphibious Transport Dock Ship, or entered the inventory prior to the 
1980s, such as the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. These 
systems are likely to reach the end of their useful lives in this 
decade unless major modernizations, some of which are planned or 
underway, are made. Some of the problems degrading the fleet-wide 
condition of these aging systems include maintenance problems due to 
parts shortages or obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance 
personnel, corrosion, deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For 8 
of the 30 items in this review we did not identify any specific 
problems that warrant additional attention by DOD, the military 
services, or Congress, or that previously identified problems were 
already being addressed, so we assessed their fleet-wide condition as 
green. Also, DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense 
Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting 
future requirements.[Footnote 10] Until the department completes this 
review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment items are 
addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which 
could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. 

The military services have not fully identified near-and long-term 
program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 
selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. For the 30 
selected equipment items, we found that some of the services' near-and 
long-term program strategies have gaps, and we rated them as red or 
yellow, as shown in figure 1, depending on the severity of the problem 
and how soon it needs to be addressed. Our analysis found, in some 
cases the services' near-term program strategies do not address 
capability shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD's 2006 
budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may 
affect near-term readiness. For example, the Marine Corp's CH-46E Sea 
Knight helicopter was rated red because the service may not be able to 
meet near-term requirements because of potential aircraft and parts 
shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Additionally, the long- 
term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of 
the equipment items we reviewed in that future requirements are not 
fully identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance 
and technological upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems 
were delayed or not yet identified. For example, the Army's Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle received a red rating because the Army has not fully 
identified the future requirements and funding for this item. Services' 
near-term program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment and 
address current condition issues include "resetting" or 
"reconstituting" (i.e., restoring) equipment back to its predeployment 
status, remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment, procuring new 
equipment, improving equipment through safety or technological 
upgrades, or improving maintenance practices. Services' long-term 
program strategies include improving the equipment through more complex 
maintenance or upgrades, or replacing the equipment with newer, more 
modern equipment, including those associated with DOD's force structure 
changes. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to 
develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement 
programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating 
capability before October 2008. Many of our selected military equipment 
items are not currently covered by this law because their replacement 
systems have either not begun development or will reach operational 
capability before October 2008. As a result, DOD is not required to 
report sustainment plans for these critical items. Most of the 
equipment items rated red and warranting immediate attention because of 
long-term planning and funding issues were not covered by this act. For 
the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment 
will have to compete for funding with other DOD priorities, such as 
current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system 
acquisitions. Without sufficient plans that provide for sustaining and 
modernizing all key equipment systems through the end of their expected 
useful lives and without identifying the risks associated with not 
fully funding or developing sustainment plans, DOD may be unable to 
meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until 
DOD develops these plans, Congress is unable to track the progress of 
equipment sustainment and modernization, or provide effective 
oversight. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the secretaries of the military services, reassess the near-and long- 
term program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment to 
ensure that the plans for those items that are needed to meet future 
defense capabilities, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2437, are complete and will ensure that DOD can sustain the equipment 
until it reaches the end of its serviceable life or a replacement 
system is fielded. We are further recommending that the Secretary of 
Defense provide this information in a report to Congress, at the same 
time the department submits its annual budget request, to ensure that 
Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight 
over DOD's program strategies. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department partially 
concurred with our first recommendation but did not agree that it 
should report their plans to Congress. Therefore, we are also 
suggesting that the Congress require the Secretary of Defense to report 
on program strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD's budget 
decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. DOD's 
comments and our evaluation are discussed in detail in a later section 
of this report. 

Background: 

The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined a strategy to 
sustain and transform the military force structure that had been in 
place since the mid-1990s. In that review, DOD committed to selectively 
recapitalize older equipment items, which the department recognized as 
being neglected for too long, to meet near-term challenges and to 
improve near-term readiness. DOD is currently conducting a new 
Quadrennial Defense Review, with the report scheduled to be issued in 
February 2006. The results of this Quadrennial Defense Review could 
identify changes to DOD's future force structure and capabilities, 
thereby impacting the funding needed for both current and replacement 
systems. 

Based on DOD guidance, the services develop a Program Objective 
Memorandum that details the specific programs and funding needed to 
meet DOD requirements as determined by the Quadrennial Defense Review. 
As part of this process, the services analyze alternative force 
structure, weapons systems, and support systems together with their 
multiyear resource implications and evaluate various trade-off options. 
Basically, it is a process for balancing and integrating resources 
among the various programs according to service and DOD priorities. 

The annual FYDP contains DOD's estimates of future funding needs for 
programs and priorities. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs for each 
element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years on 
the basis of proposals made by each of the military services. The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense considers the service proposals and 
the policy choices made by the current administration and, where 
needed, makes adjustments. For example, in preparing its 2006 budget, 
DOD made a number of significant changes in its long-term acquisition 
plans to meet budget targets established by the White House, as 
documented in Program Budget Decision 753. The 2005 FYDP extended from 
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 and the 2006 FYDP extended from 
fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. 

Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the High Pace 
of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of the Systems: 

While the condition of the 30 equipment items[Footnote 11] we reviewed 
varied, we found that average fleet-wide readiness rates for most of 
these items declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. The decline in 
readiness generally resulted from the high pace of recent operations 
and the advanced age or complexity of the equipment systems. Therefore, 
we rated the fleet-wide condition of 22 of the selected equipment items 
as red or yellow. However, 8 of the 30 items--including several 
tactical fighter aircraft and some newer equipment items such as the 
Marine Corps' Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement--were assessed as 
green (see fig. 1), indicating that we found no specific problems that 
warrant additional attention by DOD, the services, or Congress or that 
problems were already being addressed. DOD is currently conducting a 
Quadrennial Defense Review that will examine defense programs and 
policies and may change some equipment requirements. 

Eighteen of the equipment items we reviewed for this report were also 
included in our December 2003 report, and 12 of these equipment items 
received the same condition assessment in both analyses.[Footnote 12] 
For example, the surface ships examined in this study, the Navy's DDG- 
51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class 
Frigate, and the LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship received yellow 
condition ratings in both studies, as did the Air Force's B-2 Spirit 
Bomber, the C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft, and the KC-135 Stratotanker 
Aircraft. However, for 6 of the items, the assessment changed--3 
systems' fleet-wide condition improved, 2 going from red to yellow and 
1 from yellow to green, and 3 systems' condition degraded, going from 
green to yellow. The condition assessments for the Marine Corps' CH-46E 
helicopter and the Navy's F/A-18 aircraft and Standard Missile-2 
improved due, in part, to additional maintenance efforts and 
improvements that appear to address the condition concerns noted in our 
previous report. The condition assessments for the Army's Abrams tank 
and Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck and the Marine Corps' Light 
Armored Vehicle went from green to yellow largely as a result of 
increased use in ongoing operations overseas. 

Some Selected Equipment Items Have Significant Condition Issues that 
Warrant Additional Attention by DOD, the Military Services, and/or 
Congress: 

For many of the equipment items included in our assessment, average 
fleet-wide readiness rates have declined, generally due to the high 
pace of recent operations or the advanced age or complexity of the 
systems. We assessed the fleet-wide condition of 3 equipment items as 
red, indicating that immediate attention is warranted by DOD, the 
services, and/or Congress to address problems or issues. In addition, 
we assessed the fleet-wide condition of 19 items as yellow, indicating 
that attention is warranted to address existing problems that, if left 
unattended, may worsen. Table 1 below shows the primary reasons used to 
rate selected equipment items' condition and our assessment of those 
items as either red or yellow. 

Table 1: Primary Reasons for Rating Condition as Yellow or Red for 
Selected Equipment Items: 

Reason: High pace of operations increasing utilization beyond planned 
usage; 
Yellow rating: Army; 
* Abrams Tank; 
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle; 
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck; 
* AH-64A/D Apache Helicopter; 
Marine Corps: 
* Light Armored Vehicle; 
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle; 
* AV-8B Harrier Jet; 
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter; 
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter; 
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter; 
Red rating: Army; 
* CH- 47D/F Chinook Helicopter; 
Marine Corps: 
* M1A1 Abrams Tank. 

Reason: Maintenance issues resulting from the advancing ages and 
complexity of the equipment items; 
Yellow rating: Navy; 
* DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer; 
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate; 
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship; 
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft; 
* Standard Missile-2; 
Air Force: 
* B-1 Lancer Bomber; 
* B-2 Spirit Bomber; 
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft; 
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft; 
Red rating: Navy; 
* P-3 Orion Aircraft. 

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

[End of table] 

High Pace of Operations Increasing Utilization Beyond Planned Usage: 

Although selected equipment items have been able to meet wartime 
requirements, the high pace of recent operations appears to be taking a 
toll on selected equipment items and fleet-wide mission capable rates 
have been below service targets, particularly in the Army and Marine 
Corps. Further, according to officials, the full extent of the 
equipment items' degradation will not be known until a complete 
inspection of deployed equipment is performed. Elevated flying hours in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the harsh desert environment, have 
negatively impacted helicopters. For example, our assessment of the 
Army's CH-47D/F Chinook helicopter's condition as red reflects this 
platform's mission capable rates, which were consistently below service 
goals. Officials stated that the aircraft is currently being flown in 
Iraq and Afghanistan at three times more than planned peacetime rates. 
This usage has increased the amount of maintenance and number of parts 
needed to sustain the aircraft, which in turn has negatively impacted 
overall readiness. Ground equipment has also been affected by high 
wartime usage. For example, the Marine Corps' M1A1 Abrams tank fleet, 
also rated as red for condition, is being negatively impacted by 
operations in Iraq and a shortage of equipment maintainers due to 
transfers of personnel to units that are deploying. This system failed 
to meet its service readiness goals and recent trends indicate a steady 
decline away from these targets. 

Several heavily used equipment items included in our review did not 
have mission capable rates below their target; however, these rates 
have recently declined, primarily due to the high wartime usage. For 
example, while the Army's Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles 
met or exceeded the Army mission capable goals, they are both on a 
downward trend due to a shortage of spare parts and trained 
technicians. The shortage of spare parts is driven by the number of 
vehicles either deployed or being reset to a predeployment condition 
and the shortage of trained technicians is primarily due to the number 
of deployed National Guard military technicians. Both of these tracked 
vehicles have experienced high use in operations overseas in the past 
and will likely do so in the future. Similarly, while the readiness 
rates of the Marine Corps' Assault Amphibian Vehicle varied by vehicle 
type in recent years, the gap between mission capable rates and service 
goals increased, indicating a decline in the material condition of this 
equipment. 

Maintenance Issues Resulting from the Advancing Ages and Complexity of 
the Equipment Items: 

While not all of the equipment included in our review has been heavily 
used in recent overseas operations, in some cases, the advanced age or 
complexity of the equipment items have contributed to readiness 
declines. Many of the selected systems have either a fleet-wide average 
age of more than 20 years, such as the Navy's LPD-4 Amphibious 
Transport Dock Ship, or entered the inventory prior to the 1980s, such 
as the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. These systems are 
likely to reach the end of their useful lives in this decade unless 
major modernizations, some of which are planned or underway, are made. 
Some of the problems degrading the fleet-wide condition of these aging 
systems include maintenance problems due to parts shortages or 
obsolescence, shortages of trained maintenance personnel, corrosion, 
deferred maintenance, and airframe fatigue. For example, the Navy's P- 
3 Orion aircraft, while not as heavily tasked as Army and Marine Corps 
helicopters, have played an important role in overseas operations as a 
reconnaissance and surveillance asset despite consistently missing 
their mission capable goals by a significant percentage. The condition 
of the P-3 fleet, which has an average age of over 24 years, has been 
primarily degraded by the effects of structural fatigue on its airframe 
and the obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary war- 
fighting systems in this aircraft. 

Some Air Force equipment also has age-related condition issues that 
warrant attention and therefore received yellow ratings. For example, 
mission capable rates for the C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft were 
consistently below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. 
Officials stated that the size and age of the C-5 aircraft make it 
maintenance intensive, and that component items on the aircraft are 
older, making it difficult to find manufacturing sources for some 
parts, particularly avionics and engine components. In addition, the KC-
135 Stratotanker aircraft has not met its mission capable goals due to 
issues associated with age and corrosion, such as problems with the 
landing gear's steel brakes. 

Similarly, Navy surface ships examined in this study had a number of 
issues related to condition and these vessels also received yellow 
ratings. The Navy is challenged to maintain surface ships that are, in 
reality, a system of systems. The failure of any one of these complex 
systems affects the entire ship. For example, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke 
Class Destroyer, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate and the 
LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship all had problematic subsystems, 
for example, operating with limited communication ability or bandwidth, 
which affects their day-to-day operations such as on-line training and 
personnel activities. Older ships, such as the FFG-7 class which is, on 
average, almost 21 years old and the LPD-4 class with an average age of 
37 years, may be more challenging because as the ships age, more 
maintenance will be required. Other older Navy equipment also had 
condition issues in need of attention. For example, the EA-6B Prowler 
consistently missed the Navy's mission capable goal due to problems 
with communications equipment and wings. 

Some Selected Equipment Items Are in Favorable Condition: 

Our analysis showed that the fleet-wide condition of over one quarter 
of the equipment items included in our review was generally favorable, 
and consequently, we assessed the condition of 8 of the 30 selected 
military equipment items as green, as shown in figure 1. Not all 
equipment has been heavily used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and for some items, use has not increased significantly from that of 
planned peacetime operations. This was the case for several tactical 
fighter aircraft. In our assessment, all three selected aircraft that 
provide this capability, the Air Force's F-15 Eagle/Strike Eagle and F- 
16 Fighting Falcon, and the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet, were at 
or near-service mission capable rate goals. 

Moreover, we found that new equipment that has been heavily tasked in 
recent operations appears to be performing well. For example, the 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles has exceeded the Army's fully 
mission capable rate goals despite operating overseas at a rate that is 
nine times higher than in peacetime. In addition, the Marine Corps' 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles are being aggressively 
used in support of operations in Iraq, but also met their mission 
capable goals for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. These trucks are both 
relatively new; the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles is on average 6 
years old and the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement is on average 3 
years old. 

In addition, we assessed the fleet-wide condition of some older 
equipment items favorably. For example, the average age of the Army's 
OH-58D Kiowa is about 13 years with a life expectancy of 20 years; 
however, these reconnaissance helicopters have met or exceeded their 
mission capable goals from 1999 through 2004 while exceeding their 
planned flight hours in recent operations. With an average age of 
almost 16 years, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier has not experienced 
a significant decline in mission readiness as a result of recent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's High Mobility Multi- 
Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) are experiencing usage (i.e., 
operational tempo)[Footnote 13] that is six times their normal 
peacetime rate. Despite concerns over the availability of their armored 
protection,[Footnote 14] these vehicles exceeded Army readiness goals 
for the past 6 years and received a green rating. 

Services Near-and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans Exist 
for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps Remain: 

The military services have identified near-and long-term program 
strategies and funding plans to ensure that most of the 30 selected 
equipment items can meet defense requirements, but some gaps remain. 
For the 30 selected equipment items, we found that 20 of the services' 
near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address 
capability shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD's 2006 
budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may 
affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term program 
strategies and funding plans are incomplete for 22 of the equipment 
items we reviewed in that future requirements are not fully identified, 
studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and technological 
upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems are delayed or 
not yet identified. DOD is required to develop sustainment plans in 10 
U.S.C. § 2437, but this statute only applies to 9 of the selected 
equipment items.[Footnote 15] Although the services have identified 
near-and long-term program strategies and funding for most of the 
equipment items we reviewed, the gaps we identified may threaten DOD's 
ability to meet some future capability requirements. 

Services Have Not Fully Identified Near-Term Program Strategies and 
Funding Plans for Some Selected Equipment: 

The services have not fully identified near-term program strategies and 
funding plans for 20 of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, including 7 
of the 9 selected items covered by 10 U.S.C. § 2437. One of the items 
that will not be covered by this statute, the Marine Corps' CH-46E Sea 
Knight helicopter, was the only item we assessed as red for its near- 
term program strategy and funding plan because it may be unable to meet 
its near-term requirements. We assessed the near-term program 
strategies and funding plans of 19 of the 30 equipment items in our 
review as yellow because the services' program strategies for 
sustaining equipment lack sufficient planning or full funding to meet 
near-term requirements. Alternatively, the services have planned 
program and funding strategies to correct equipment deficiencies or 
improve equipment capabilities and safety for 10 of the 30 equipment 
items in our review so that the equipment items can meet near-term 
requirements, so we assessed their near-term program strategies and 
funding plans as green as shown in figure 1. The services' near-term 
program strategies to sustain or modernize equipment and address 
current condition issues include restoring equipment back to its 
predeployment condition, remanufacturing or recapitalizing equipment, 
procuring new equipment, improving equipment through safety or 
technological upgrades, or improving maintenance practices. Table 2 
below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment items' 
near-term program strategies and funding plans and our assessment of 
those items as either red or yellow. Without developing complete near- 
term plans and identifying the associated funding needs to ensure that 
all key equipment items can be sustained and modernized--and assessing 
the risk involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed--DOD 
may be unable to meet some future requirements for defense 
capabilities. 

Table 2: Primary Reasons for Rating Near-term Program Strategies and 
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items: 

Reason: Existing plans do not address capability shortfalls; 
Yellow rating: Marine Corps; 
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle; 
Navy: 
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate; 
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship; 
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft; 
* P-3 Orion Aircraft. 

Reason: Strategy not fully funded in DOD's fiscal year 2006 budget; 
Yellow rating: Army; 
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle; 
* M113 Armored Personnel Carrier; 
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck; 
* High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle; 
* Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles; 
Marine Corps: 
* M1A1 Abrams Tank; 
* Light Armored Vehicle; 
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter; 
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter. 

Reason: Anticipated parts shortages and maintenance issues; 
Yellow rating: Army; 
* Abrams Tank; 
* CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter; 
Navy: 
* F/ A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft; 
Air Force: 
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft; 
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft; 
Red rating: Marine Corps; 
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter. 

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

[End of table] 

Existing Near-Term Plans for Some Selected Equipment Items Do Not 
Address Capability Shortfalls: 

Some of the services' near-term program strategies do not address the 
issues that affect the condition of the equipment in the near-term, 
thus 5 of the 30 selected equipment items received a yellow rating as 
shown in table 2. For example, the Marine Corps identified a shortfall 
in the capability of the Assault Amphibian Vehicle to conduct parts of 
their war-fighting doctrine; however, instead of upgrading its 
capabilities, their plan is to return the capability of the vehicle to 
its original condition while they await its replacement. Although the 
Navy has a plan to correct serious LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock ship 
class deficiencies, those ships that are within 5 years of 
decommissioning can, by law,[Footnote 16] only receive safety 
modifications, resulting in a wide variance in the condition of ships 
in the class. Furthermore, while the Navy is making structural 
inspections and repairs to ensure that there will be sufficient P-3 
Orion aircraft to meet day-to-day requirements next year, they have not 
funded some improvements to communications and defense systems, which 
will continue to degrade the ability of this aircraft to fulfill all of 
its missions. 

Some Near-Term Strategies Are Not Fully Funded in DOD's Fiscal Year 
2006 Budget Request: 

The full funding requirements for nine of the Marine Corps and Army 
near-term strategies we reviewed were not included in DOD's fiscal year 
2006 budget request; therefore, we rated these equipment items as 
yellow as shown in table 2. According to service officials, the 
services submit their budgets to DOD and the department has the 
authority to increase or decrease the service budgets based upon the 
perceived highest priority needs. As shown in table 3 below, the Marine 
Corps identified requirements that were not funded in DOD's 2006 budget 
request totaling $314.7 million for four of its selected equipment 
items. 

Table 3: Unfunded Requirements for Four Selected Marine Corps Equipment 
Items, Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions): 

Marine Corps equipment item: M1A1 Abrams Tank; 
Unfunded requirements: $ 86.4. 

Marine Corps equipment item: Light Armored Vehicle; 
Unfunded requirements: $113.0. 

Marine Corps equipment item: AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter; 
Unfunded requirements: $63.6. 

Marine Corps equipment item: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter; 
Unfunded requirements: $51.7. 

Marine Corps equipment item: Total; 
Unfunded requirements: $314.7. 

Source: DOD data. 

[End of table] 

The four equipment items for which the Marine Corps did not request 
funding are a concern because a capability or need that the service 
identified as a priority may not receive funding unless Congress 
intervenes. For example, the Marine Corps identified but did not 
request $113 million in funding needed to complete the standardization 
of its older Light Armored Vehicles. The Marine Corps also identified 
funding shortages in its tank remanufacturing program for fiscal years 
2006 and 2007, noting that only 33 percent of the plan has been funded. 

In addition, for five of the selected Army items, DOD has not included 
funding for part of the near-term program strategies in its regular 
2006 budget request. Instead the Army is relying on supplemental 
appropriations or congressional adjustments to their regular 
appropriations to fund these activities and we rated these items yellow 
given the uncertainty of future supplemental appropriations or 
congressional adjustments. For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion 
in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to accelerate 
recapitalization of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles by producing 93 
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 to meet its modernization 
needs, and has begun planning another request for supplemental 
appropriations to fund other near-term procurement requirements 
associated with their transformational objectives. Further, in the 
past, the Army has consistently relied on supplemental appropriations 
and congressional adjustments for the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, 
and included $132 million in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding 
request to recapitalize vehicles deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Anticipated Parts Shortages and Maintenance Issues May Affect Equipment 
Condition and Indicate Near-Term Planning and Funding Concerns: 

Anticipated parts shortages or maintenance issues may affect the 
services' ability to maintain adequate condition of 6 of the 30 
selected equipment items we reviewed; therefore, we assessed their near-
term program strategies and funding plans as yellow or, in one case, 
red as shown in table 2. Of the 30 equipment items we reviewed, the 
Marine Corps' CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter received a red rating for 
its near-term program strategy and funding plan because the service may 
be unable to meet its near-term requirements due to potential aircraft 
and repair parts shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Because 
of fielding delays of its replacement aircraft, the MV-22, the CH-46E 
will not be retired as originally scheduled, which may lead to 
additional repair parts shortages. The uncertainty in whether the near- 
term program strategy addresses existing parts shortages is also a 
concern for items such as the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet 
aircraft and resulted in a yellow rating. Although the Navy is 
currently able to maintain readiness for the Super Hornet fleet, there 
is an anticipated shortage for critical spare parts like extra fuel 
tanks and bomb racks, and the current program strategy does not fund 
the efforts necessary to ensure adequate replacements. Additionally, we 
rated the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft as yellow because 
officials expect its age-related maintenance issues, such as fuel 
bladder leaks and parts obsolescence, to increase, resulting in 
additional maintenance requirements. Officials also stated that the 
severity of potential problems from newly discovered corrosion remains 
unknown, so the potential exists for additional maintenance 
requirements. 

Some Selected Equipment Items Have No Near-Term Program Strategy or 
Funding Issues of Concern: 

We rated 10 of the 30 equipment items examined in this review as green, 
as shown in figure 1, because we did not identify any significant 
program or funding issues in the near term. The services had identified 
program and funding strategies to correct these equipment items' 
immediate deficiencies, or to improve the platforms' capabilities. For 
the selected equipment items that are being heavily used for operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and received a green rating, such as the Army's 
AH-64A/D Apache helicopter and the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier jet, the 
services are using a combination of activities, including restoring the 
equipment to predeployment status, remanufacturing or recapitalizing 
the equipment, or procuring new equipment. For example, the Army is 
restoring the Apache helicopters being used in combat while 
concurrently remanufacturing the older AH-64A variants into newer AH- 
64D variants. In some cases, the services have funded plans that 
upgrade the equipment items to address structural or safety concerns 
and improve combat capabilities, such as for the Air Force's F-15 and F-
16 fighter aircraft and the Navy's DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class 
destroyers. For other items, the services modified their maintenance 
practices to increase efficiencies and address concerns. For example, 
the Air Force modified its stealth maintenance procedures on its B-2 
Spirit bomber, thus reducing the steps and time required to conduct it. 

Services Lack Complete Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans 
for Selected Equipment: 

The services have not developed or fully funded the long-term program 
strategies for 21 of the 30 selected equipment items. Title 10 U.S.C. § 
2437, which requires that DOD develop sustainment plans, applies to 
only 9 of the selected equipment items. We assessed 7 of the selected 
equipment items as red, only 2 of which will be covered by this 
statute, because the services' program strategies and funding plans to 
meet long-term requirements are not fully identified, studies to 
determine future system requirements are not complete, funding for 
maintenance or technological upgrades may not be available, or 
replacement systems were delayed or not identified, and in some cases, 
the selected equipment items may be unable to meet their long-term 
requirements. We assessed the long-term program strategies and funding 
plans of 14 of the selected equipment items in our review as yellow 
because they are experiencing similar gaps in their long-term program 
strategies and funding plans, but the consequences would be less 
severe. Alternatively, we assessed the long-term program strategies and 
funding plans of 9 of the 30 equipment items in our review as green, as 
shown in figure 1, because the services have program strategies and 
funding planned to improve or upgrade equipment capabilities and safety 
or replace the equipment items so that they can meet long-term 
requirements. Some of the services' long-term program strategies 
include improving or modernizing the equipment through upgrades, 
recapitalizing older models to newer ones, or replacing the equipment 
with newer, more modern equipment, including those associated with 
DOD's force structure changes. 

Table 4 below shows the primary reasons used to rate selected equipment 
items' long-term program strategies and funding plans and our 
assessment of those items as either red or yellow. As with incomplete 
near-term strategies, without complete long-term plans to ensure that 
all key equipment items can be sustained and modernized--and assessing 
the risk involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed--DOD 
may be unable to meet some future defense requirements. 

Table 4: Primary Reasons for Rating Long-term Program Strategies and 
Funding Plans as Yellow or Red for Selected Equipment Items: 

Reason: Future strategy and funding requirements are not fully 
identified; 
Yellow rating: Army; 
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck; 
* High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle; 
* Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles; 
Marine Corps: 
* M1A1 Abrams Tank; 
* Light Armored Vehicle; 
Red rating: Army; 
* Bradley Fighting Vehicle; 
* M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. 

Reason: DOD awaiting studies needed to develop strategies; 
Yellow rating: Air Force; 
* C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft; 
Red rating: Air Force; 
* KC-135 Stratotanker Aircraft. 

Reason: Availability of funding for maintenance and technological 
upgrades affecting strategies; 
Yellow rating: Marine Corps; 
* AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter; 
Navy: 
* DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer; 
* FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate; 
* LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship; 
* EA-6B Prowler Aircraft; 
Red rating: Navy; 
* P-3 Orion Aircraft; 
* Standard Missile-2. 

Reason: Replacement systems are delayed or not identified; 
Yellow rating: Marine Corps; 
* Assault Amphibian Vehicle; 
* AV-8B Harrier Jet; 
Navy: 
* F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft; 
Red rating: Marine Corps; 
* CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter; 
* CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter. 

Source: GAO analysis of military service data. 

[End of table] 

Future Strategy and Funding Requirements Are Not Fully Identified: 

At this time, DOD has not fully identified the future requirements or 
the long-term funding needs for seven of our selected equipment items, 
resulting in red or yellow assessments as shown in table 4, depending 
on the urgency or severity of the gaps in program strategies or funding 
plans. The Army's lack of identified future requirements and funding 
plans led us to assess its Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M113 Armored 
Personnel Carrier as red. In some cases, follow-on system requirements 
have not been established, but the services have plans to sustain the 
items until the replacement system is available, so we assessed these 
items as yellow. For example, the Marine Corps plans to replace its 
M1A1 Abrams tank and Light Armored Vehicle with the Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle, although at the time 
of our review, they had not completely identified the program 
requirements or funding needed for the replacement vehicle. However, 
they do have plans in place to ensure that both the M1A1 and Light 
Armored Vehicle are available until the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Expeditionary Force Fighting Vehicle is fielded and have received 
supplemental funding for these plans. 

The Army recently finalized the strategy for its wheeled vehicles, such 
as the HMMWV, but some procurement and recapitalization plans have not 
been fully funded or specific actions or time frames were not included. 
Therefore, we assessed the three Army wheeled vehicles' long-term 
program strategies and funding plans as yellow. For example, we noted 
that the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 
Modernization Strategy showed anticipated procurements for the HMMWV 
that were not reflected in DOD's 2006 budget request. Further, while 
the strategy notes that future block upgrades for the Family of Medium 
Tactical Vehicles are planned and describes the sustainment programs it 
will include, it does not identify any specific actions or time frames 
for these upgrades. 

DOD Awaiting Studies to Develop Strategies: 

DOD has not yet completed studies so that it can fully identify the 
program strategies and funding plans needed for 2 of the 30 selected 
equipment items assessed in this review. As shown in table 4, we 
assessed the long-term program strategy and funding plan for the Air 
Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft as red because the congressionally 
mandated study to determine its replacement has experienced, and may 
continue to experience delays. Meanwhile the KC-135 fleet, with an 
average age of about 44 years, continues to experience age-related 
problems and delays in fielding a replacement further exacerbate 
problems in maintaining the existing fleet over the long term. We 
assessed the long-term program strategy and funding plan for the Air 
Force's C-5 transport aircraft, with an average fleet age of about 26 
years, as yellow because the Air Force remains uncertain about the size 
of the final C-5 fleet and whether to fund some additional C-5 aircraft 
upgrades while awaiting completion of DOD's Mobility Capabilities 
Study. This study is expected to be completed in the summer of 2005; 
however, at the time this report was issued, results were not 
available. 

Availability of Funding for Maintenance and Technological Upgrades 
Affecting Strategies: 

The availability of funding for ongoing maintenance and technological 
upgrades in past and future years may affect the long-term program 
strategies and funding plans for seven of the selected equipment items. 
As shown in table 4, we assessed the long-term strategies and funding 
plans for two items, the Navy's P-3 Orion aircraft and the Standard 
Missile-2, as red because the limited funding for maintenance and 
technological upgrades may have serious consequences, such as 
negatively affecting their ability to meet war-fighting requirements. 
The Navy has identified a plan to address the obsolescence of the 
mission systems in the P-3 Orion aircraft over the long term, but at 
this time has not officially approved or funded this plan. In addition, 
the Standard Missile-2, which has recently seen improved readiness 
ratings because DOD increased operation and maintenance funding, is not 
scheduled for the same level of funding in the long term, which may 
reduce the number of available missiles. 

DOD budget decisions to reduce funding for maintenance and upgrades 
have the potential for adversely affecting five items, so we assessed 
the long-term program strategies and funding plans for these items as 
yellow. For example, decreases in the Navy's planned operation and 
maintenance funding across all surface ships in the fleet may result in 
deferred maintenance and may adversely affect the future material 
condition of the three classes of ships included in this review, the 
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry 
Class frigates, and the LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock ships. 

Long-Term Program Strategies Affected Because Replacement Systems for 
Selected Equipment Are Delayed or Not Identified: 

Replacement systems have either been delayed or are not yet identified 
for 5 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in this review and we 
rated these items as red or yellow as shown in table 4. Two of these 
items were assessed as red because of the urgency and severity of the 
delays impact on the services' capabilities and ability to meet future 
requirements. For example, we assessed the long-term program strategy 
and funding plan for the Marine Corps' CH-53E Super Stallion 
Helicopters as red because the Marine Corps has not identified a 
replacement for the CH-53E Super Stallion despite an initial fielding 
planned for 2015. According to officials, the Marine Corps must 
maintain enough CH-53E helicopters to support Marine Corps operations 
until the initial fielding of the Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft. 
Officials estimate that, if the current high usage rate and expected 
attrition rates hold true, the number of CH-53E helicopters may fall 
below the number necessary to remain in service until the Heavy Lift 
Replacement becomes available. 

The remaining three items' long-term program strategies and funding 
plans were assessed as yellow because the effect of the uncertainties 
or delays do not appear to be as urgent or severe. In some instances, 
delays and uncertainties affecting the sustainment programs of selected 
equipment items are related to DOD difficulties in acquiring their 
replacements. For example, uncertainty over the potential for delays in 
the Joint Strike Fighter Program affects the long-term strategy and 
funding for the Marine Corps' AV-8B Harrier jet and the Navy's F/A-18 
fighter aircraft and these systems were rated yellow.[Footnote 17] 

Some Selected Equipment Items Have No Long-Term Program Strategy and 
Funding Issues of Concern: 

We determined that 9 of the 30 selected equipment items examined in 
this review have no significant program or funding issues in the long 
term and therefore received green ratings as shown in figure 1. For 
example, the Air Force's F-15 aircraft upgrades are fully funded and 
designed to keep the aircraft viable and functioning through at least 
2025. In addition, the Marine Corps' plans provide sufficient numbers 
of Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles to equip all of its 
units in the long term. Moreover, the Army has reprogrammed funds from 
the cancellation of the Comanche program to fund other aviation 
modernization strategies, including those that improve the capability 
and lifespan of the CH-47D/F Chinook and the AH-64A/D Apache 
helicopters. 

Conclusions: 

Since our last review of the condition of selected military equipment 
in 2003, overall readiness rates for most selected equipment items have 
continued to decline and some of the services' near-and long-term 
program strategies lack complete sustainment and modernization plans or 
are not fully funded. Continued high use of these equipment items to 
support current operations and the advancing ages of the systems 
suggest that DOD will be challenged in meeting future equipment 
requirements without significant upgrades to its inventory. 
Furthermore, because activities to refurbish and replace vehicles, 
weapons, and equipment used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
being funded primarily through supplemental appropriations as opposed 
to being programmed in DOD's Future Years Defense Program, future 
funding is uncertain. Moreover, DOD faces challenges to sustain and 
modernize its current equipment while continuing these operations and 
transforming to a new force structure. DOD is currently conducting its 
Quadrennial Defense Review, which could change the future requirements 
for some military equipment. In light of these challenges, it is 
increasingly important that DOD focus its resources on the equipment 
items that are key to meeting future defense requirements. Without a 
more focused investment strategy, DOD runs the risk of a continued 
decline in future equipment readiness. While DOD is required to provide 
sustainment plans, including time frames and projected budgetary 
requirements, for some military equipment in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2437, this statute does not apply to many key military equipment 
items we reviewed. For example, those equipment items that do not have 
a replacement system in development are not covered by this statute. In 
fact, most of the equipment items that we assessed as red because of 
long-term strategy and funding issues were not covered by this statute. 
Without developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and 
identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, including 
those not already covered by law through the end of their expected 
useful lives, DOD risks not being able to meet some future equipment 
requirements. Furthermore, without communicating these plans and 
funding needs to Congress, lawmakers will not have the clear picture of 
DOD's progress on equipment sustainment and modernization they need to 
provide effective oversight over these processes. 

Recommendations: 

To ensure that DOD can sustain key equipment items to meet future 
equipment requirements and to provide greater visibility over key 
equipment items to Congress, we recommend that, after the department 
completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Services, take the 
following two actions: 

* Reassess the near-and long-term program strategies for sustaining and 
modernizing key equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10 
U.S.C. § 2437, to ensure that the plans are complete and that the items 
are sustainable until they reach the end of their serviceable life or a 
replacement system is fielded. Specifically, this reassessment should: 

* detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems 
until they are retired or replaced; 

* report the costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of 
key equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense 
Program; and: 

* identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the 
strategies, and the steps the department is taking to mitigate the 
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not 
fully funded. 

* Provide the information in the above recommendation to Congress at 
the same time the department submits its annual budget request, to 
ensure that Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective 
oversight over DOD's program strategies. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to report on program 
strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD's budget decisions 
address deficiencies related to key military equipment. We suggest that 
this report be provided in conjunction with DOD's annual budget 
submissions and reflect the results of the department's Quadrennial 
Defense Review. Specifically, as stated in our recommendations, the 
report should (1) detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key 
equipment systems until they are retired or replaced; (2) report the 
costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of key 
equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense Program 
and; (3) describe the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding 
the strategies, and the steps the department is taking to mitigate the 
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not 
fully funded. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our recommendation that it should reassess the near and long-term 
program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment after 
the department's Quadrennial Defense Review, but did not concur with 
our recommendation that the department report these plans to Congress. 
The department's written comments are reprinted in their entirety in 
appendix III. 

In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should 
reassess the near-and long-term program strategies for sustaining and 
modernizing key equipment, the department stated that, through its 
current budget processes, it is already executing an annual procedure 
to assess program strategies to ensure equipment sustainment and 
modernization that can support the most recent defense strategy. 
According to the department, these budget reviews consider strategies 
and costs to sustain and modernize equipment, and the risks incurred by 
not fully funding these strategies; therefore, the resulting budget 
reflects the department's best assessment of a balanced, fully funded 
budget that most efficiently accomplishes the national security mission 
within its limited resources. 

While we acknowledge that these budget processes may provide a 
department-level review of what is needed to accomplish the national 
security mission, the department's budget processes and the Future 
Years Defense Program do not provide detailed strategies that include 
identifying both the costs associated with sustaining and maintaining 
key equipment and the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding 
the strategies. Without detailed plans, the department does not have 
sufficient information to ensure that adequate funding is provided or 
that it is taking the necessary steps to mitigate risks associated with 
strategies that are delayed or are not fully funded. We continue to 
believe that the department, in conjunction with the military services, 
needs to develop a more comprehensive and transparent approach for 
assessing the condition of key equipment items, developing program 
strategies to address critical equipment condition deficiencies, 
prioritizing the required funding, and mitigating risks associated with 
delaying or not fully funding these strategies upon completion of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. Therefore, we continue to believe our 
recommendation has merit. 

The department did not concur with our second recommendation that the 
Secretary of Defense provide detailed strategies and costs of 
sustaining key equipments items and the associated risks in delaying or 
not fully funding these strategies in an annual report to Congress to 
ensure that Congress has the visibility it needs to provide effective 
oversight over DOD's program strategies. DOD believes that submitting 
an additional report concurrent with the annual budget would be a 
duplication of effort. 

We believe that the information included in the President's Budget does 
not provide Congress with sufficient information on the strategies, 
funding, and risks associated with maintaining key equipment items 
until their replacement systems are fielded. In our report, we identify 
a number of examples of inconsistencies between the program strategies 
and the funding needed to sustain and maintain key equipment items not 
reported in the department's budget documents. The department is not 
currently required to report sustainment plans for some of these 
critical items to Congress. We believe that Congress needs to be 
assured that DOD's budget decisions address deficiencies related to key 
military equipment that must be maintained and sustained until the end 
of their serviceable lives, including those currently not covered by 
Title 10 U.S.C§ 2437. Therefore, we have added a Matter for 
Congressional Consideration. 

Lastly, DOD provided technical comments concerning our assessments of 
specific equipment items in appendix II. We reviewed and incorporated 
these technical comments, as appropriate. In some instances, the data 
the department provided in its technical comments resulted from program 
and funding decisions that were made subsequent to our review. In one 
case, we changed our original color-coded assessment of a key equipment 
item based on these decisions. The Army approved the replacement for 
the OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and 
therefore we changed our original assessment of the Kiowa's long-term 
program strategy and funding plans from a yellow rating to a green 
rating. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512- 
8365 or by e-mail at solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Major contributors to this report are included in 
appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable John Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To update congressional committees on key equipment items that warrant 
immediate attention by the Department of Defense (DOD) and/or Congress, 
we conducted an analysis of 30 selected military equipment items. We 
performed an independent evaluation of the (1) condition of key 
equipment items and (2) services' near-and long-term program strategies 
and funding for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of these 
equipment items. 

This report follows our December 2003 report[Footnote 18] which 
assessed the condition, program strategy, funding, and wartime 
capability of 25 selected military equipment items. The current report 
increases the number of equipment items to 30, and instead evaluates 
the condition, near-term program strategy and funding plans, and long- 
term program strategy and funding plans of each system. These changes 
reflect the current operational environment, and the critical linkage 
between a successful program strategy and funding. We examined the near 
and long terms separately to delineate the impact of current operations 
on the near term and their possible effect on long-term 
transformational efforts. 

To select the 30 equipment items we reviewed, we included 18 of the 
equipment items reviewed in our December 2003 report, and based upon 
input from the military services, your offices, and our prior work, we 
judgmentally selected an additional 12 items. We did not include 7 of 
the 25 items from our previous review so that we could focus on other 
selected systems that we believed were more in need of examination. Our 
final selections included those items that the military services 
believed were most critical to their missions, and which have been in 
use for a number of years. The 30 equipment items include 9 from the 
Army, 6 from the Air Force, 7 from the Navy, and 8 from the Marine 
Corps. Our observations and assessments were made on active duty 
inventory as well as equipment in the National Guard and reserve 
forces; including reserve equipment represents another difference 
between this review and our December 2003 report. Our assessments apply 
only to the 30 equipment items we reviewed, and the results of our 
assessments cannot be projected to the entire inventory of DOD 
equipment. Because Section 805 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005--which amends Title 10 of the 
U.S. code (Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 805.)--does not apply to existing 
systems for which a replacement system will reach initial operational 
capability before October 1, 2008, we did not assess compliance with 
this section of the act. 

Each equipment item was assessed individually on its condition, and 
near-and long-term program strategy and funding. To determine which 
equipment items require additional attention by the department, the 
military services, and/or Congress, we developed an assessment 
framework based on three criteria: (1) the extent of the existence of a 
problem or issue, (2) the severity of the problem or issue, and (3) how 
soon the problem or issue needs to be addressed. To indicate the 
existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified for the 30 
selected equipment items, we used a traffic light approach-red, yellow, 
or green-as follows: 

* Red indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress. 

* Yellow indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and that if 
left unattended may worsen. 

* Green indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
immediate action, or already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress. 

Individual assessments were based on systematic decisions with clear 
and, wherever possible, measurable criteria. Input from relevant 
officials--program managers, unit staffs, operators, maintainers, and 
engineers--was incorporated in every step of the process. 

We interviewed officials from components (active, guard, and reserve 
forces) of all four of the military services, two selected combatant 
commands, and several major service commands. We visited selected units 
and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment items during 
operation or under maintenance. We also discussed deployed and 
nondeployed equipment condition, program strategy, and funding with 
program managers and equipment operators and maintainers, and included 
these indicators where appropriate. The specific military activities we 
visited or obtained information from include the following: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, 
Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va; 

* U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill; 

* U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 
Ohio; 

* U.S. Air Force, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, 
Utah; 

* U.S. Air Force, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air Force 
Base, Okla; 

* U.S. Air Force, Pacific Command, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Air Force, Plans and Programs, Air Force Headquarters, 
Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Ga; 

* U.S. Air Force, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force 
Base, Ga; 

* U.S. Air National Guard, Headquarters, Andrews Air Force Base, Md; 

* U.S Air National Guard, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Army, Headquarters, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Army National Guard, Headquarters, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Army National Guard, 81st Brigade, Washington National Guard, 
Camp Murray, Wash; 

* U.S. Army National Guard, Hawaii National Guard, Ft. Ruger, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Army, Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Ala; 

* U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala; 

* U.S. Army, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Tex; 

* U.S. Army, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Lewis, Wash; 

* U.S. Army, First Army, Ft. Gillem, Ga; 

* U.S. Army, Fifth Army, Ft. Hood, Tex; 

* U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga; 

* U.S. Army, 4TH Infantry Division, Ft. Hood, Tex; 

* U.S Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Army Material Command, Ft. Belvoir, Va; 

* U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Ga; 

* U.S. Army Tank - Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich; 

* U.S. Army, III Corps, Ft. Hood, Tex; 

* U.S. Central Command, McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policies, Programs, Budgets, Joint 
and External Matters Branch, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch, 
Pentagon, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Installations and Logistics, Navy Annex, 
Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility 
Division, Navy Annex, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Air Wing, Miramar, Calif; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, 
Calif; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station, 
Patuxent River, Md; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Programs and Resources, Office of the Deputy 
Commandant, Pentagon, Arlington, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Reserve Command, New Orleans, La; 

* U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va; 

* U.S. Marine Corps, Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command, 
Warren, Mich; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander Electronic Attack Wing, Pacific, Whidbey Island, 
Wash; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10, Whidbey, 
Island, Wash; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Atlantic, Virginia Beach, 
Va; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander Strike Fighter Wing, Pacific, Lemoore, Calif; 

* U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; 

* U.S. Navy, Headquarters, Washington, D.C; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, Jacksonville, Fla; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Depot, North Island, Coronado, Calif; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md; 

* U.S. Naval Reserve Command, New Orleans, La; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Washington, D.C; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force--Atlantic, Norfolk, 
Va; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Force/US Naval Air Force--Pacific, San 
Diego, Calif; 

* U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, Calif; and: 

* U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii. 

Assessments on the condition of these 30 equipment items were based on 
a comparison of readiness metrics against service goals, and the 
existence, severity, or urgency of condition problems. We obtained data 
on equipment age, expected service life, mission capable 
rates,[Footnote 19] utilization rates,[Footnote 20] and various other 
metrics for fiscal years 1999 through 2004. Readiness metrics, such as 
material readiness rates and mission capable rates, were a primary 
component of our assessments. We were particularly cognizant not only 
of whether the equipment item met its readiness goals but, if it failed 
to meet this metric, we examined the gap between the readiness achieved 
by these equipment items and the services readiness objectives--and the 
significance of that difference. Equipment items were further evaluated 
against metrics such as utilization rates, cannibalization rates, 
failure rates, and depot maintenance data. We gauged the significance 
of the rates and data as they reflected on the item's condition. 
Further, this analysis also evaluated the extent to which each of the 
equipment items is being used for current operations, and their 
performance while deployed. Finally, we assessed specific problems with 
each item that may or may not have been captured in other metrics. 

Our evaluations of DOD's near-and long-term program strategy and 
funding plans were based on the existence of near-and long-term plans, 
and the extent to which there were gaps in funding for these plans as 
projected in DOD's Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).[Footnote 21] 
Both near-and long-term plans include sustainment, modernization, or 
recapitalization of the equipment items in order to meet mission 
requirements.[Footnote 22] Near-term plans are those that address 
current condition problems, as well as those projected until 2007; long-
term plans address issues anticipated from 2008 until the replacement 
system enters the inventory or until the system reaches the end of its 
expected service life. We first assessed whether near-and long-term 
plans were realistic and comprehensive. For our short-term assessment, 
we examined whether the plans meet near-term requirements and address 
issues related to current condition and the need for near- term 
technological upgrades. For our long-term evaluation, we considered if 
modernizations or sustainment plans were sufficient given the timing of 
the replacement and the expected service life of the equipment item. 
Next, we determined the extent to which there were gaps in funding for 
both near-and long-term programs as projected in the FYDP. We then 
considered whether the strategy and its funding, in the near and long 
term, addressed other concerns which might significantly affect the 
program. 

While we attempted to obtain consistent metrics for each of the three 
categories across all four of the military services, data availability 
varied significantly by service and type of equipment. Our assessments 
are based on the data available from multiple sources, and represent 
the problems and issues we identified at the specific point in time 
that we conducted our work. These can change quickly given current 
events. Although our assessments for each of the three categories-- 
condition, near-term program strategies and funding plans, and long- 
term program strategies and funding plans--are largely qualitative in 
nature and are derived from consensus judgments, our analyses are based 
on data and information provided by the military services and 
discussions with military service officials and program managers for 
the individual equipment items. We assessed the reliability of the 
services' equipment readiness data by (1) comparing key data elements 
to our observations of equipment items at selected units, (2) reviewing 
relevant documents, and (3) interviewing knowledgeable officials. We 
determined that the data obtained from DOD, the military services, and 
the combatant commands were sufficiently reliable for our use. We 
performed our review from July 2004 through July 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Assessments of Selected Equipment Items: 

For the 30 equipment items, each assessment provides the status of the 
equipment item at the time of our review. The profile presents a 
general description of the equipment item. Each assessment area-- 
condition, near-term program strategy and funding, and long-term 
program strategy and funding--includes a green, yellow, or red rating 
indicating the existence, severity, or urgency of problems identified 
based on our observations of each equipment item, discussions with 
service officials, and reviews of service-provided metrics. 

Army: 

Abrams M1A1/M1A2 Tank: 

First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army's main 
battle tank and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and 
firepower. Variants of the Abrams include the M1,[Footnote 23] M1A1, 
and M1A2 and there are a total of 5,848 tanks of all variants in the 
fleet. The M1A1 and M1A2 have a 120 mm main gun, a powerful turbine 
engine, and special armor. There are 5,109 M1A1 and M1A2 tanks in the 
inventory, and their estimated average age is 12 years. Officials state 
that in the future, the Army is planning to use only a two-variant 
fleet of the Abrams, consisting of the M1A1 Abrams Integrated 
Management and the upgraded M1A2 System Enhancement Program--the 
primary difference being the digital architecture of the System 
Enhancement Program variant. The M1 variant is expected to be phased 
out by 2015. The Abrams is expected to remain in the Army's inventory 
until at least 2045. 

Figure 2: Abrams Main Battle Tank: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as 
green because it consistently met its mission capable goal of 90 
percent from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 24] 
However, in this review we assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as 
yellow because, while it generally met or exceeded the Army's mission 
capable goal between fiscal years 1999 and 2003 as shown in figure 3 
below, the rates declined between fiscal years 2003 and 2004. According 
to program officials, the recent downward trend is a result of parts 
and technician shortages. Officials stated that the shortage in parts 
is driven by the number of vehicles either deployed or being reset to a 
predeployment condition and the shortage of technicians is primarily 
due to the number of deployed National Guard military technicians. 
Additionally, as of September 2004 there were a relatively small 
percentage of Abrams tanks, around 5 percent, deployed in support of 
operations in Iraq. Due to the high use in theater, these operations 
may accelerate the aging process of the tank fleet. 

Figure 3: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Abrams Tanks, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams 
tank as yellow because while the Army possesses plans for resetting 
tanks as they return from operations in Iraq and recapitalizing the 
fleet to ensure that the tank's systems remain updated, they continue 
to identify shortages of repair parts and technicians as major causes 
of decreased material readiness. Without adequately addressing these 
issues, the condition of the Abrams fleet could be significantly 
impacted in the near term. Another potential issue affecting the Abrams 
in the near term is a break in the production line, which is being used 
to retrofit a lesser variant Abrams to the M1A2 System Enhancement 
Program, occurring in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Army officials plan 
to mitigate this issue by providing $40 million to maintain critical 
skills at the production facilities until production resumes in fiscal 
year 2008. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Abrams 
tank as green because the Army has identified a plan to reduce the 
current inventory of 5,109 to about 3,000 tanks in keeping with current 
Army transformation plans and has programmed funding to recapitalize 
the remaining fleet. The Army plans to move to a two-variant fleet of 
the Abrams, the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management and M1A2 System 
Enhancement Program, which they plan to utilize until at least 2045. 
Officials believe this plan should reduce maintenance costs as the 
service will have reduced maintenance and logistics requirements from 
the current fleet arrangement. As noted in our previous report, the 
Army reduced the original number of recapitalized M1A2 System 
Enhancement Program tanks from 1,174 to 588. In the fiscal year 2006 
President's Budget, the Army identified funding to increase the number 
of M1A2 System Enhancement Program tanks to 803. This increase realigns 
the recapitalization funding with the Army's upgrade schedule so that 
they are on target to meet their current transformation plans. 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle: 

Brought into service in 1981, the Army uses the family of Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles to provide armored protection and transportation to 
infantry units. The Bradley is able to close with and destroy enemy 
forces in support of mounted and dismounted infantry and cavalry combat 
operations. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle family currently consists of 
two vehicles: the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry 
Fighting Vehicle. There are four variations of each of these two 
vehicles: the A0, A2, A2 Operation Desert Storm, and A3, each having 
different capabilities and technology. For example, the A3 variants 
possess all of the capabilities as the A2 variants, but utilize a 
digital architecture, which is compatible with the Army's net-centric 
warfare plans and the M1A2 System Enhancement Program Abrams tank. The 
Army currently maintains 6,583 M2 and M3 variants of the Bradley in 
their fleet and plans to use the Bradley Fighting Vehicle until at 
least 2045. 

Figure 4: Bradley Fighting Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the Bradley as yellow because, as shown in 
figure 5 below, the vehicles nearly met or exceeded the Army's 
readiness goal of 90 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2002; 
however, the mission capable rates showed a downward trend between 
fiscal years 2002 and 2004. According to officials, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom demands and efforts to reset the vehicles to their 
predeployment status have had a significant impact on repair parts 
availability. The National Guard has experienced further difficulty 
with availability of trained maintainers due to the high pace of 
operations that has resulted in the need to transfer personnel among 
units to fill shortages. Additionally, program officials stated that 
the composition of the fleet of Bradley Fighting Vehicles is 
insufficient to meet all of the Army's current requirements, especially 
those associated with training and predeployment exercises. However, 
the Bradley vehicles are able to meet all of their operational 
requirements. 

Figure 5: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley 
program as yellow because the Army does not currently possess a funding 
strategy through regular appropriations for developing the proper 
composition of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles fleet to meet the Army's 
near-term transformation requirements. The Army requested $1.4 billion 
in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
in order to accelerate the recapitalization of vehicles by producing 93 
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 others for the Army's 
modularity needs. Without having funding programmed for the A2 or the 
A3 variants of the Bradley, Army officials have begun planning for the 
fiscal year 2006 supplemental in order to fulfill Army transformation 
plans. Program officials stated that the Army is relying on 
supplemental funding and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
reprogramming actions in order to meet equipment requirements for the 
Army's transformation plans. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles as red because the Army plans to significantly 
increase the number of vehicles and change the composition of the fleet 
but has not established a long-term funding strategy. Officials stated 
that the Army plans to convert to a fleet of Bradley vehicles which 
will be aligned with the Abrams tank fleet. The A3, matched with the 
M1A2 System Enhancement Program tank, and a lesser variant, operating 
with the M1A1 Abrams Integrated Management tank, will make up the 
Army's future Brigade Combat Teams.[Footnote 25] Neither the A3 variant 
nor the lesser variants, which officials believe will be the A2 and the 
Operation Desert Storm variant, have long-term program funding 
identified. 

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier: 

The Army uses the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier in its primary mission 
of personnel transportation on the battlefield, though there are many 
other combat support missions for the family of vehicles, including 
command and control, cargo transportation, and battlefield obscuration. 
The Army originally introduced the M113 family of vehicles in 1960. The 
current fleet of M113A2 and A3 Personnel Carriers, totaling 7,579, has 
an average age of almost 16 years.[Footnote 26] Prior to operations in 
Iraq the Army planned to discontinue use of the M113; however, the Army 
now plans to utilize the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier through 2045 in 
accordance with its latest modularity plans. The A3 variant of the M113 
has a digital architecture, increased suspension, and is capable of 
carrying add-on-armor kits to provide additional protection for the 
troops. 

Figure 6: M113 Armored Personnel Carrier: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the M113 as green because, as shown in 
figure 7 below, the mission capable rates have been near the Army's 
goal of 90 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. As of September 
2004, the Army had 666 A2 and A3 variants in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
or roughly 10 percent of the combined fleet. The M113 family of 
vehicles has not experienced a significant decline in mission readiness 
as a result of recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The National 
Guard has generally maintained its M113 vehicles at a higher readiness 
rate than the active units of the Army. 

Figure 7: Average Mission Capable Rates for Army M113 Vehicles, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M113 as 
yellow because the Army has consistently relied on supplemental 
funding, congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming actions in 
order to complete modifications on the M113 family of vehicles. The 
Army requested $132 million in DOD's fiscal year 2005 supplemental 
funding request to Congress in order to recapitalize 368 M113s. This 
represents about 55 percent of the vehicles that were deployed to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in September 2004. Due to its armor protection, 
the M113 has been used in place of less armored vehicles, such as High 
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the M113 as 
red because the Army has not identified either a long-term procurement 
or maintenance strategy for the M113. The Army's funding strategy for 
the M113 family of vehicles has been impacted by the Army's plans to 
remove these vehicles from service. However, according to Army 
officials, the M113 family of vehicles will continue to play a 
significant role as the Army transitions into the new modular force. 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) is used extensively 
to provide transport capabilities for resupply of the combat vehicles 
and weapons systems used by heavy combat forces and support units. The 
five basic HEMTT variants are used to transport ammunition, petroleum, 
oils and lubricants, and missile systems, and can also serve as a 
recovery vehicle for other vehicle systems. There are approximately 
12,700 HEMTTs in the Army's inventory. The average age of the HEMTT 
fleet is about 15 years, and although the expected useful life is 20 
years, the HEMTTs are expected to remain in the Army's inventory 
through 2030. 

Figure 8: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green 
because the mission capable rates were close to the Army's goal for 
fiscal years 1998 to 2002.[Footnote 27] However, in this review we 
assessed the condition as yellow. While the fully mission capable rates 
for the HEMTTs were near the Army's goal from fiscal years 1999 through 
2003, the trend since fiscal year 2002 for both active and reserve 
components has been declining, as shown in figure 9 below. In one of 
the Army's fiscal year 2004 readiness reports to DOD, the high pace of 
operations and aging fleet were cited as factors affecting HEMTT 
readiness for the active component. The decline in readiness rates for 
the U.S. Army Reserves was attributed to the lack of maintenance 
technicians. Program management officials said that the failure to meet 
readiness goals was also due to parts problems. According to Army 
officials, approximately 12-15 percent of the HEMTT fleet is in theater 
and is being used at rates 10 times higher than during peacetime. In a 
February 2005 statement to congressional committees, Army officials 
stated that all wheeled vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan 
would be armored by March 2005. Despite concerns over armor protection, 
Army officials that we visited stated that the HEMTTs have performed as 
intended in theater without any significant issues. 

Figure 9: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army HEMTTs, Fiscal 
Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the HEMTT as yellow 
because the Army's near-term strategy for sustaining, modernizing, and 
procuring HEMTTs has not been fully funded. In addition, the program 
received significant funding from supplemental appropriations and a 
congressional adjustment in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the 
remanufacture and upgrade program has continued at a slower pace than 
planned, and at the time of the fiscal year 2006/2007 budget estimate 
submission, the impact of modularity changes on the final acquisition 
objective was still unknown. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and 
Trailer Modularity and 
Modernization Strategy[Footnote 28] has been updated several times and 
has undergone significant changes. In addition, the strategy states 
that while investment is not sufficient to meet the Army's goals, it 
does address its most critical requirements. In fiscal year 2004 the 
family of heavy tactical vehicles, which includes the HEMTTs, was 
authorized an additional $47 million in supplemental funding and 
another $39 million in congressional adjustments and DOD's fiscal year 
2005 supplemental funding request for $74.3 million was to replace 
combat losses and procure additional vehicles to equip, backfill, and 
modularize various Army units. The Army is planning to include another 
request for additional HEMTTs in DOD's fiscal year 2006 supplemental 
budget request. The Extended Service Program, which the Army uses to 
remanufacture and upgrade existing HEMTTs, has continued at the slower 
pace noted in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 29] but the 
justification for an additional $90.3 million included in the fiscal 
year 2005 supplemental funding request cited the program's importance 
to the Army's modularization efforts. Finally, while the Army's 
acquisition objective for HEMTTs has continued to increase, it still 
may not meet the Army's modularity requirements. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the HEMTT as 
yellow because the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 
Modernization Strategy for both procurement and 
recapitalizations[Footnote 30] has not been fully funded and the Army's 
plans and funding for procurement, recapitalization, and sustainment of 
its oldest models are continuing to evolve. The strategy has been 
updated several times and has undergone significant changes. The June 
2005 version of the strategy concluded with a statement that while 
investment is adequate to address the Army's most critical 
requirements, it still falls short of the Army's goals. In addition, 
the goals have changed significantly. For example, in the fiscal year 
2006/2007 budget estimate, dated February 2005, the Army acquisition 
objective for HEMTTs was 14,269, but in July 2005 the goal was 17,850. 
Funding plans also continue to change. In our December 2003 report, we 
noted that the Army had reduced funding for the recapitalization 
program which was used to upgrade HEMTTs. Currently, the June 2005 
version of the strategy shows that the Army plans to recapitalize 4,726 
HEMTTs between fiscal years 2012 and 2018. However, past history shows 
that this may not occur. For example, while the fiscal year 2003 budget 
estimate shows that the Army originally planned to recapitalize 608 
HEMTTs in fiscal year 2004, the fiscal year 2005 budget estimates show 
that only 129 were recapitalized. The Army's plans to eliminate its 
oldest HEMTT models, which can reduce fleet operating and support 
costs, have also been scaled down. In a fiscal year 2004 draft, the 
strategy stated that 9,200 of the oldest HEMTT models would be 
eliminated by fiscal year 2018. In a 2005 version however, that number 
was reduced to 7,728. In addition to receiving regular appropriations 
for procuring, recapitalizing, and sustaining HEMTTs, the Army is also 
relying on funds received through OSD's reprogramming actions to 
support its long-term strategy for HEMTTs. The June 2005 version of the 
Army's strategy shows that between fiscal years 2006 and 2011, an 
additional 3,559 HEMTTs and other heavy vehicles will be procured with 
funds received through OSD's reprogramming actions. 

High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

The High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) is a light, 
highly mobile, diesel-powered, four-wheel-drive vehicle that has six 
configurations: troop carrier, armament carrier, shelter carrier, 
ambulance, missile carrier, and Scout vehicle. There are approximately 
120,000 HMMWVs in the Army's inventory. HMMWVs entered the Army's 
inventory in 1985. Currently, the average age of the HMMWV fleet is 
about 13 years and the expected service life of HMMWVs is 15 years. The 
HMMWV represents 50 percent of the Army's total tactical truck fleet. 

Figure 10: High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the HMMWV as green because, as shown in 
figure 11, it exceeded the Army's fully mission capable goal from 
fiscal years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve 
components. However, Army officials noted that the HMMWVs supporting 
Operation Iraqi Freedom are experiencing usage (i.e., operational 
tempo)[Footnote 31] that is six times their normal peacetime usage 
rate. HMMWV production has now transitioned primarily to the Up-Armored 
platforms to enhance force protection and mobility for deployed units. 
While the Up-Armored variant is built to support the weight of the 
vehicle's armor, Army officials have expressed concern regarding the 
long-term impact from the stress placed on the frame, engines, and 
transmissions by the additional weight of add-on armor that the HMMWVs 
were not reinforced to handle. DOD has initiated a Stress Study to try 
and quantify the effects of high usage, additional weight, and harsh 
operating conditions on future maintenance/replacement needs of 
vehicles such as the HMMWV. In February 2005, in a statement to 
congressional committees, Army officials stated that all wheeled 
vehicles being used in Iraq and Afghanistan would be armored by March 
2005. 

Figure 11: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army High Mobility 
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the HMMWV as 
yellow because the Army has not fully funded its Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and the Army 
Acquisition Objective continues to change. In the near term, in 
addition to receiving regular appropriations, the Army has received 
additional funding for HMMWVs from supplemental appropriations and 
congressional adjustments. In fiscal year 2004, the Army received $239 
million of supplemental funds and about $39 million in congressional 
adjustments. In fiscal year 2005 the Army requested almost $290 million 
in supplemental funds to procure HMMWVs to activate units and to supply 
existing units. An additional $31 million in supplemental funds was 
requested to replace combat losses and another $123 million was 
requested to begin recapitalizing older HMMWV models and converting 
them to newer models capable of accepting the add-on armor. The June 
2005 version of the Army's strategy shows that it is planning to 
request additional supplemental funding in fiscal year 2006. The Army's 
Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs has increased significantly since 
2001. In the Army's fiscal year 2002 amended budget estimate, submitted 
in June 2001, the Army's Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs was about 
121,000 whereas in an April 2004 version of the Army's plan, the Army 
was projecting a need for 145,000 HMMWVs. Currently, neither the fiscal 
year 2006/2007 nor the June 2005 version of the Army's plan show the 
Army's Acquisition Objective for HMMWVs. Army officials noted in an 
August 2004 version of the strategy that they had resourced all known 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements and their projected battle 
losses. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the HMMWV as 
yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy. In 
addition, the Army's initial plans for the HMMWV recapitalization 
programs have been significantly reduced. The June 2005 version of the 
Army's strategy shows anticipated procurement requirements of about 
30,000 vehicles between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. However, the Army's 
fiscal year 2006/2007 budget request is only for about 18,000 vehicles 
during those years. The Army is planning on using funds resulting from 
OSD reprogramming actions to procure the additional 12,000 vehicles 
needed to meet requirements for those fiscal years. In the long term, 
according to an August 2004 version of the strategy, the Army plans to 
eliminate about 45,000 of its oldest models by fiscal year 2018. About 
19,000 of the oldest models would be converted to newer models capable 
of handling add-on armor kits in order to provide better soldier 
protection through a recapitalization program. However, those plans, 
and the associated costs, continue to change. For example, a February 
2005 version of the strategy estimated a cost of about $1.8 billion to 
recapitalize 20,114 HMMWVs for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, but the 
Army's fiscal year 2006/2007 budget request, dated February 2005, 
contained about $1.9 billion in order to recapitalize 17,694 vehicles 
during those years. The June 2005 version of the Army's plan shows an 
estimated cost of about $2 billion to recapitalize 16,522 HMMWVs 
between fiscal years 2008 and 2011. 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

The Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) is a series of vehicles 
based on a common chassis which vary by payload and mission 
requirements. It is currently the only medium fleet vehicle that is in 
production with state-of-the-art technology. The FMTV includes the 
Light Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 2.5-ton capacity in both the cargo 
and van models and the Medium Tactical Vehicle with a 5-ton capacity in 
the cargo, tractor, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV is the 
replacement for the obsolete and maintenance-intensive 2.5-and 5-ton 
trucks, some of which have been in the Army's inventory since the 
1960s. The FMTV's missions include performing local and line hauling, 
unit resupply, and other missions in combat, combat support, and combat 
service support units. FMTVs are rapidly deployable and can operate in 
various terrains and in all climatic conditions. The commonality of 
parts across the various models is intended to reduce both the 
logistics burden and operating and support costs. The FMTVs entered the 
Army inventory in 1996 and currently there are approximately 19,400 
vehicles with an average age of about 6 years. The average useful life 
is expected to be between 20 and 22 years. 

Figure 12: 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the FMTV as green because, as shown in 
figure 13, it exceeded the Army's fully mission capable goal from 
fiscal years 1999 through 2004 for both the active and reserve 
components with the exception of the National Guard in fiscal year 
2000. Despite operating during GWOT operations at a rate that is nine 
times higher than in peacetime, officials stated that the FMTVs are not 
experiencing any problems. However, in response to concerns about 
armored protection, Army officials, in a February 2005 statement to 
congressional committees, stated that all wheeled vehicles being used 
in Iraq and Afghanistan would be armored by March 2005. 

Figure 13: Average Fully Mission Capable Rates for Army Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as 
yellow because the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer 
Modularity and Modernization Strategy is not fully funded and states 
that although planned investment is adequate to address critical 
requirements, it still falls short of the Army's goals. According to an 
April 2004 version of the strategy, the Army did not consider it to be 
either cost or operationally effective to recapitalize older model 
vehicles. Instead, the Army's plan is to meet readiness and operational 
shortfalls through replacement with newer, technologically improved 
vehicles. However, this plan will not fill the Army's goals in the near 
term. For example, the fiscal year 2005 budget estimate states that 
procurement of FMTVs through fiscal year 2005 will only fill 
approximately 32 percent of the Army's Acquisition Objective for FMTVs. 
Funding for FMTVs in the near term relies on supplemental 
appropriations, congressional adjustments, and OSD reprogramming 
actions, in addition to regular appropriations. For example, in fiscal 
year 2004, the FMTV program was authorized about $3.4 million from 
DOD's supplemental funding request and received another $34 million as 
a congressional adjustment. DOD's fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding 
request included $217 million for the Army to procure FMTV trucks to 
replace those lost in theater and to support modularity requirements. 
The Army also added an additional $122.5 million in the fiscal year 
2005 supplemental funding request to meet modularity requirements and 
to replace combat losses of the 2.5-ton FMTV vehicles. The June 2005 
version of the plan shows that for fiscal year 2006, the Army is not 
planning to request supplemental funding, but in fiscal year 2007, they 
are planning to use additional funds received as a result of OSD 
reprogramming actions to procure additional FMTVs to fill unit 
shortfalls. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the FMTV as 
yellow because again, the Army has not fully funded its Tactical 
Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy and 
although an April 2004 version of the strategy states that an 
incremental upgrade modernization strategy that will include a 
combination of field modernizations and new procurement is envisioned, 
no specific actions or time frames are identified. The June 2005 
version of the Army's plan shows that, between fiscal years 2008 and 
2011, the Army is planning to continue using OSD reprogrammed funds to 
procure FMTVs in order to fill unit shortfalls. In addition, the June 
2005 plan shows that the Army plans to remove 25,000 of the old model 
2.5-ton and 5-ton trucks from the inventory. FMTV production has been 
done in phases. As reported in an April 2004 version of the strategy, 
the first two phases together will deliver over 20,000 vehicles. The 
third phase is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2005 and the fourth 
phase, an outgrowth of vehicle component design and integration under 
ongoing program technology/insertion efforts, does not have an 
identified start date but is planned to begin shortly after the 
completion of the current production contract. 

AH-64 A/D Apache Helicopter: 

The Apache is a multimission aircraft designed to perform rear, close, 
deep operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance, and 
security during the day, at night, and in adverse weather conditions. 
There are two Apache variants: the AH-64A, which entered service in 
1984, and the AH-64D Longbow, an improved version of the AH-64A, which 
entered service in 1998. The Army plans to convert most of the AH-64A 
helicopters into AH-64D models, and to improve the safety features on 
the remaining AH-64A models. In total, there are about 703 Apache 
helicopters in the Army's inventory: 263 A models and 440 D models. The 
average fleet age of the A model is about 13 years, and the average age 
of the D model fleet is about 4 years. 

Figure 14: AH-64 Apache Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

Our assessment of the Apache's condition as yellow is unchanged since 
our prior report. As shown in figure 15, the average mission capable 
rates for the AH-64A models have been below the Army's goal between 
fiscal years 1999 and 2004, and the average mission capable rates for 
the AH-64D fleet have been above goal for 3 of the 6 years. In our 
December 2003 report, safety restrictions were cited as the cause of 
not meeting mission capable goals but since then, all of the issues 
have been addressed throughout the fleet.[Footnote 32] However, 
according to officials, elevated flying hours in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
coupled with the harsh environment, continue to increase demands for 
limited spare parts and for maintenance for such items as engines and 
rotor blades. Officials further stated that the peacetime usage rate 
for the AH-64 is 15 hours a month and the actual number of flight hours 
is averaging 31 hours per month in Iraq and 55 per month in 
Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, officials stated that the AH-64 
is capable of conducting its mission and, between February 2003 and 
December 2004, its mission capable rates in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
exceeded the Army's goal. 

Figure 15: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army AH-64 A/D 
Apache Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the Apache 
as green because the Army has recapitalization and sustainment 
strategies, both of which are funded. As stated in our December 2003 
report, the Apache Recapitalization Program addresses cost, 
reliability, and safety problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and 
obsolescence. The Army is continuing to remanufacture the AH-64A models 
to AH-64D models with the remaining helicopters beginning conversion 
during fiscal year 2005. In addition, Apaches that have been deployed 
are being returned to predeployment conditions through a combination of 
unit and contractor actions. The Army received an additional $321.1 
million in the fiscal year 2005 supplement to replace 13 Apaches that 
were lost in theater. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Apache 
as green because the Army's modernization strategy to improve combat 
capability and aircraft safety appears likely to allow the Apache to 
remain in service until 2040 and, as we reported previously, is 
consistent with the Army's stated requirements. A total of 597 AH-64A 
models will be converted to AH-64D models by fiscal year 2010. All 
remaining AH-64A models are scheduled to receive additional reliability 
and safety modifications as part of the Army's response to concerns of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress. There are plans 
for additional upgrades to AH-64D models and funding to support the 
Army's current long-term strategy has been programmed through fiscal 
year 2020. 

CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter: 

The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed 
for transporting cargo, troops, and weapons, and is the only Army 
helicopter that can operate at high altitudes. By 1994, all CH-47 
models were upgraded to the CH-47D version, which comprises the Army's 
heavy lift fleet. The CH-47D will be replaced by the CH-47F, a 
remanufactured version of the CH-47D with a new digital cockpit and 
modified airframe to reduce vibrations. The CH-47F was approved for 
full-scale production in November 2004, and officials state the Army 
plans to convert the entire fleet by fiscal year 2018. There are 395 CH-
47D models and 3 CH-47F models in the Army inventory, but the CH-47F 
models are not assigned to units. The average age of the CH-47D model 
is about 17 years. Army aircraft generally have life cycles of 20 
years. 

Figure 16: CH-47D Chinook Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

Our assessment of the CH-47D's condition as red is unchanged since our 
prior report.[Footnote 33] Mission capable rates for the fleet, as 
shown in figure 17, were consistently below service goals for fiscal 
year 1999 through fiscal year 2004. Officials stated that the aircraft 
is currently being flown in Iraq and Afghanistan three times more than 
planned peacetime rates, with the CH-47D flying 200 hours in 6 months 
when it was originally planned to fly 200 hours in 18 months. 
Deployment cycles for the CH-47D are often longer than other equipment. 
While most Army helicopters remain in theater for about a year, 
officials report that some CH-47D helicopters have been in theater for 
almost 2 ½ years. This usage, particularly in a desert environment, has 
increased the amount of maintenance and number of parts needed to 
sustain the aircraft, which in turn has negatively impacted overall 
readiness. According to officials, current shortages of CH-47D 
helicopters and the requirement to fill nearly simultaneous competing 
priorities with limited resources may require additional CH-47D 
helicopters to remain in theater as stay-behind equipment. Despite 
these challenges, officials state that the CH-47D has proven itself in 
theater. For example, between February 2003 and December 2004 the CH- 
47D's mission capable rates in Afghanistan exceeded the Army's goal. 

Figure 17: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army Chinook CH-47D/ 
F Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the Chinook as yellow 
because the Army has plans to address the issues affecting the current 
condition but has yet to implement all of the solutions. Officials 
stated that the components that affect readiness the most can be 
repaired at the depot; however, the emphasis (e.g., transportation 
priorities) is on pushing parts to units but not necessarily returning 
the broken parts to the depot for repair. According to officials, the 
Army is working in coordination with depot personnel to become more 
efficient at identifying and returning the broken parts for repair, as 
well as developing relationships with original equipment manufacturers 
to allow for a faster replacement of spare parts. However, whether 
these efforts will be successful and the degree to which they resolve 
parts shortages remains to be seen. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the CH-47 as green 
because the Army has and is funding a modernization strategy to improve 
the CH-47 capability and lifespan. The Army plans to have a final CH- 
47F fleet size of 452 aircraft, to include 397 CH-47F aircraft that 
were remanufactured from the CH-47D and 55 new build CH-47F aircraft. 
Officials stated that conversion from the CH-47D to the CH-47F adds 
about 20 years to the service life of an aircraft, as well as improving 
performance and reducing overall operations and sustainment costs. 

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter: 

The Kiowa is a multimission armed reconnaissance helicopter designed to 
support combat and contingency operations. Deliveries of the OH-58D 
began in 1985, and the last new one was delivered to the Army in 1999. 
There are 354 Kiowa helicopters in the Army's inventory, and their 
average age is about 13 years. While the expected service life for an 
OH-58Ds is 20 years, the Army plans to retire the entire OH-58D fleet 
by fiscal year 2013 and to replace it with the Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopter. 

Figure 18: OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the Kiowa as green because the mission 
capable rates have been consistently above service goals for calendar 
years 1999 through 2004. As seen in figure 19, the OH-58D has remained 
at or above the 80 percent mission capable rate. Further, 96 OH-58Ds 
have deployed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have 
exceeded their planned flight hours; specifically, peacetime average 
usage for the OH-58D is about 20 hours per month, but the actual flight 
hours for deployments has averaged between 80 and 100 hours per month. 
The Army attributes higher readiness rates of the OH-58D in part to 
simple design and a lighter airframe. For example, the OH-58D's mission 
capable rates in Iraq between February 2003 and December 2004 almost 
met the Army's goal. In addition, routine maintenance is performed on 
the Kiowa after every 40 hours of operation instead of the 300-400 
hours for other aircraft, and the original equipment manufacturer, Bell 
Helicopter, conducts the depot-level repairs. 

Figure 19: Fleet Average Mission Capable Rates for Army OH-58D Kiowa 
Helicopters, Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the OH-58D 
as green because the Army's plans and funding will allow the aircraft 
to meet its requirements in the near term. The OH-58D reset and safety 
enhancement programs, which are fully funded, include safety 
enhancements, weight reduction, and other maintenance actions. Funding 
for the Kiowa since fiscal year 1999 has been near Army 
requests.[Footnote 34] Additionally, due to the planned replacement of 
the Kiowa beginning in fiscal year 2008, public law limits funds that 
can be spent on the aircraft to basic sustainment, maintenance and 
safety measures.[Footnote 35] For that reason Kiowa battle losses are 
not being replaced; however, according to the Army, the existing fleet 
is sufficient to meet requirements over the next 1-3 years, even at 
higher usage rates. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the Kiowa as 
green because the Army has a funded strategy to field its replacement, 
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. According to the Army, this 
aircraft is a relatively inexpensive armed aerial platform that will 
integrate a commercial off the shelf aircraft with non-developmental 
mission equipment packages to the extent possible. The Army's 
acquisition objective is to have a fleet of 368 armed reconnaissance 
aircraft. The plan is for the Kiowa to be phased out of the Army's 
inventory beginning in fiscal year 2008 as the Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopter is fielded. 

Marine Corps: 

M1A1 Abrams Tank: 

First delivered to the Marine Corps at the beginning of Operation 
Desert Storm, the Abrams is the Marine Corps' main battle tank and 
destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower provided by 
a powerful turbine engine and a 120 millimeter main gun. The Marine 
Corps possesses only one variant of the Abrams, the M1A1. The M1A1 
variant fleet consists of a depleted uranium turret version and a 
"Plain Jane" version, which lacks the enhanced armor. There are 403 
M1A1 tanks in the inventory, and the estimated average age is 16 years. 
The Marine Corps plans to use the M1A1 as its main battle tank until it 
is replaced by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of 
Fighting Vehicles which is planned to be fielded in 2025. 

Figure 20: M1A1 Abrams Tank: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the Abrams tank fleet as red because the 
Marine Corps has failed to meet its stated readiness goal of 90 percent 
on several occasions during the fiscal years 1999 to 2004 period and, 
as shown in figure 21, recent readiness trends indicate a steady 
decline away from the readiness goal. Marine Corps officials attribute 
the decline of the condition of the tank fleet to the demand on 
equipment as a result of operations in support of the Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Marine Corps manpower levels. Since 2003, the Marine Corps 
has deployed tanks to Operation Iraqi Freedom, a theater where 
equipment has been used aggressively in rugged environments. Shortages 
of maintenance personnel are a result of the transfers of personnel to 
units that are deploying and unit staffing levels. 

Figure 21: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps M1A1 
Abrams Tanks, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1 
Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not fully 
funded its tank remanufacture program and has identified additional 
unfunded priorities for fiscal year 2006. The Marine Corps is 
conducting a remanufacture program on the M1A1 tank that is intended to 
improve the quality of the existing equipment by applying all equipment 
modifications and replacing worn components. The Marine Corps has fully 
funded the remanufacture of 79 tanks during fiscal year 2005; however, 
it only identified funding for about 33 percent of the scheduled tank 
remanufactures during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Marine officials 
believe that they will be able to meet all remanufacturing requirements 
because the tank program has identified similar funding requirement to 
Marine Corps Logistics Command in the past and has received sufficient 
funding to meet the remanufacture needs. The Marine Corps identified 
$77 million in unfunded priorities for the Abrams program in fiscal 
year 2006. The majority of this amount, $40 million, is to support 
continued depot maintenance operations and the remainder is to procure 
Firepower Enhancement Program suites, which increase the detection, 
recognition, and identification of targets. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the M1A1 
Abrams tank fleet as yellow because the Marine Corps has not completely 
identified the program requirements or funding for its replacement 
system, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of 
Fighting Vehicles; however, they are taking steps to increase the 
service life of the M1A1. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles is scheduled to be the 
replacement for the Abrams tank and other Marine Corps ground fighting 
systems. In order to extend the life of the current fleet of Abrams 
tanks, the Marine Corps has identified funding for 80 percent of the 
scheduled tank remanufactures during fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The 
Marine Corps has tentatively established plans to conduct a Service 
Life Extension Program for the M1A1 fleet in future years. As this 
program is to start in years beyond the current Future Years Defense 
Program budget, no funding has been identified currently. The Service 
Life Extension Program may be essential to ensure that the current 
fleet of Abrams tanks remains serviceable until the replacement vehicle 
is fielded. 

Light Armored Vehicle - C2 and 25 Variants: 

The LAV-C2 Command and Control and the LAV-25 are two variants from the 
family of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) that we included in our review. 
Both variants are all-terrain, all-weather vehicles with night 
capabilities and can be fully amphibious within 3 minutes. The LAV-C2 
variant is a mobile command station providing field commanders with the 
necessary resources to command and control Light Armored Reconnaissance 
units. The average age of the LAV-C2 is 18 years and there are 50 in 
the inventory. The LAV-25 provides rapid maneuverability, armor 
protection, and firepower to the Light Armed Reconnaissance units. The 
average age of the LAV-25 is 19 years and there are 407 in the 
inventory. The family of Light Armored Vehicles is expected to be 
replaced by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Expeditionary Family of 
Fighting Vehicles. 

Figure 22: Light Armored Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

In our previous report we assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green 
because the Marine Corps had initiated a fleet-wide Service Life 
Extension Program to extend the service life of the vehicle.[Footnote 
36] However, in this review we assessed both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25 
variants of the Light Armored Vehicles and we assessed the condition of 
these vehicles as yellow. While the material readiness rates[Footnote 
37] for the two variants were near the readiness goal of 85 percent 
between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 23); the overall material 
readiness rate trend declined during this period. Marine Corps 
officials stated that despite the fact that the vehicles did not meet 
the Marine Corps' readiness goal they were able to fulfill all mission 
requirements during this period. However, the vehicle's high usage in 
support of contingency operations has placed a strain on the supply 
system and has led to shortages of key Light Armored Vehicle 
components, such as struts and drive train components. 

Figure 23: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps LAV-25 and 
LAV C-2, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Light 
Armored Vehicle as yellow because although a service life extension 
program and some upgrades are planned and funded, there are some 
essential program requirements that remain unfunded. A service life 
extension program designed to improve the quality and extend the life 
of the vehicles has already been performed on a majority of the 
vehicles. In addition to the service life extension program, the LAV-C2 
and LAV-25 are planned to receive upgrades to address capabilities 
deficiencies. The upgrade to the LAV-C2 will enhance communications 
capabilities, affording more commonality with other vehicles and 
helicopter systems. The upgrade to the LAV-25 will enhance target 
recognition and the lethality upgrade will increase the fire power of 
the vehicle's 25-millimeter main gun. A program is also funded to 
address any obsolescence issues. Additionally, as a result of force 
structure changes, the Marine Corps is establishing five new light 
armored reconnaissance units and has received fiscal year 2005 
supplemental appropriations to purchase new upgraded vehicles to equip 
these units and begin upgrades on the legacy fleet. However, the Marine 
Corps has identified $113 million as an unfunded requirement that is 
needed to complete the standardization of the older LAVs. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Light 
Armored Vehicle as yellow because while the Marine Corps has not 
completely identified the requirements for its replacement system or 
established associated program strategy or funding, the completion of 
the near-term plans may help the Marine Corps sustain its fleet of LAVs 
until the replacement is fielded. Both the LAV-C2 and the LAV-25 
upgrades to address capabilities deficiencies have achieved or will 
achieve initial operational capability by fiscal year 2009. 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle: 

Three variants represent the family of Assault Amphibian Vehicles 
(AAV). The AAVs are armored full-tracked landing vehicles. The 
Personnel variant carries troops from ship to shore and to inland 
objectives and there are 930 in the inventory. The C2 Command and 
Communications variant provides a mobile task force communication 
center in water operations and from ship to shore and to inland areas 
and there are 76 in the inventory. The Recovery variant recovers 
similar or smaller sized vehicles. It also carries basic maintenance 
equipment to provide field support maintenance to vehicles in the 
field. There are 51 Recovery variants in the inventory. The average age 
of the vehicle is 28.6 years. All of the AAVs will be remanufactured 
under the Reliability, Availability and Maintainability/Rebuild to 
Standard upgrade program, which began in 1998 to lengthen the vehicle's 
expected service life. The fleet of AAVs is scheduled to be replaced by 
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle beginning in 2010. 

Figure 24: Assault Amphibian Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

Our assessment of the condition of the AAV fleet as yellow is unchanged 
since our prior report.[Footnote 38] Although the fleet material 
readiness rates varied by vehicle type and by year, as shown in figure 
25, the overall readiness trend for the fleet during the fiscal years 
1999 to 2004 period declined. Despite the declining material readiness, 
Marine Corps officials stated that the AAVs were able to meet all 
operational requirements. Wartime utilization rates for the vehicles in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom were as high as 11 times the normal peacetime 
rate. 

Figure 25: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Assault 
Amphibian Vehicles, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the near-term program strategy and funding 
of the AAV fleet as yellow because while the Marine Corps is completing 
the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard 
upgrade on all of the remaining 377 vehicles in its fleet, this upgrade 
only returns the vehicle to its original operating condition and does 
not add any upgraded capability. While Marine Corps officials stated 
that the vehicles have been able to perform all of their operational 
requirements, the AAVs lack some capabilities in areas such as target 
acquisition (day and night) and land/water mobility, which are needed 
to carry out their warfighting doctrine--Operational Maneuver from the 
Sea. The Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to 
Standard upgrade program for 327 of the 377 vehicles has been funded 
through regular Marine Corps procurement appropriations, supplemental 
appropriations, and congressional adjustments over the past few years. 
Funding for the conversion of the remaining 50 vehicles, plus 8 for 
future replacements of combat losses, was included in the fiscal year 
2005 supplemental request. In addition to funding the upgrades, the 
requested procurement will also fund engineering changes to help 
sustain the AAV fleet and purchase add-on armor. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AAV fleet 
as yellow because while the Marine Corps will have completed an 
extensive upgrade of the fleet with the Reliability, Availability, and 
Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard program, the timely fielding of the 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle remains in question. DOD reduced 
funding, thus delaying the initial fielding of the Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicle to fiscal year 2010, 4 years past the original date. 
Operators and maintainers we spoke with are concerned about the delay 
because the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to 
Standard program is expected to help the AAV fleet serve until the 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is fully fielded, but the current rate 
of usage in Operation Iraqi Freedom could significantly shorten the 
serviceable life of the current fleet. Officials expect that all 
Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to Standard 
vehicles will need to go through an Inspect and Replace Only As 
Necessary maintenance program[Footnote 39] since they will have to stay 
in the fleet longer than expected. 

Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement: 

The Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is a family of trucks 
with 7-ton capacity that consists of six variants. Comprising the 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet is a standard 7-ton cargo 
variant, an extended bed 7-ton vehicle, a dump truck, and a wrecker. 
The MTVR began replacing two aging variants of 5-ton vehicles in fiscal 
year 2002. The MTVR is capable of moving personnel and cargo cross 
country in support of maneuver units. The MTVR has increased 
capabilities compared to the 5-ton truck and is capable of being 
delivered by cargo aviation assets. 

Figure 26: Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition as green because, as can be seen in figure 
27, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement fleet has met the Marine 
Corps' stated material readiness goal of 85 percent for the 2 years 
that data were available, fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Though the MTVRs 
are being aggressively used in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
officials stated that they are fairly easy to maintain and there are 
sufficient repair parts to meet current requirements. Officials also 
attribute much of the Marine Corps' success at keeping high material 
readiness rates to the maintenance personnel. 

Figure 27: Average Material Readiness Rates for Marine Corps Medium 
Tactical Vehicle Replacement Fleet, Fiscal Years 2003 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as 
green because, despite experiencing some combat losses and the lack of 
funding to replace these losses, the Marine Corps has made plans to 
meet 7-ton vehicle demands of the Marine Corps in the short term. The 
Marine Corps possesses an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity 
contract with Oshkosh Trucks, which allows it to increase the number of 
vehicles in the fleet without negotiating a new contract. The Marine 
Corps has utilized this contract to procure an additional 1,850 MTVR 
upgrade armor kits, which will be used to provide additional protection 
to deploying Marine Expeditionary Units and as a reserve for Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades. In the fiscal year 2006 Unfunded Programs List, 
the Marine Corps identified $1.4 million to procure seven new MTVRs 
that will help replace actual and projected combat losses. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the MTVR as 
green because the Marine Corps plans provide sufficient numbers of 
MTVRs to equip all Marine Corps units in the long-term. Marine Corps 
officials stated that they have plans to reconstitute equipment 
returning from deployment and may rotate equipment between deploying 
units and prepositioned forces. The officials believe that these 
actions could balance out the usage rates of the fleet and therefore 
maintain the fleet's life expectancy. As discussed in the near-term 
program strategy and funding, the Marine Corps possesses an indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity contract with the original equipment 
manufacturer and program officials believe the Marine Corps can source 
equipment in the future to meet requirements. 

AV-8B Harrier Jet: 

The AV-8B Harrier Jet's mission is to attack and destroy surface 
targets during day and night conditions and to escort assault support 
aircraft. It has a short takeoff and vertical landing capability to 
enable it to deploy and operate from amphibious assault ships and 
remote tactical landing sites. There are 154 in inventory (131 combat 
capable aircraft, 17 noncombat capable training aircraft, and 6 
aircraft in storage), with an average age of 9 years. The Joint Strike 
Fighter is expected to replace the AV-8B beginning in 2012. 

Figure 28: AV-8B Harrier Jet: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the AV-8B as yellow because it 
consistently failed to meet the Marine Corps' mission capable rate goal 
of 76 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 (see fig. 29 below). 
However, despite missing the mission capable goal, the mission capable 
trend showed some improvement through fiscal year 2003. Further, the AV-
8B aircraft nonmission capable rates for maintenance and supply also 
showed improvement during that time frame. Marine Corps officials 
commented favorably on the aircraft's performance in support of 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the aircraft's wartime 
utilization was about one and one-half times the normal peacetime rate. 
A defense panel has analyzed past problems with the aircraft and they 
have recommended improvements to maintenance cycles and technician 
availability. 

Figure 29: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AV-8B 
Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as 
green because the Marine Corps has several initiatives and programs 
established and funded to improve the capabilities, safety, and 
reliability of the aircraft. The Marine Corps has procured, either 
through upgrades or remanufacture, 93 aircraft with radar/night attack 
which increases the ability of the aircraft to complete assigned 
missions in a greater variety of weather and light conditions. 
Officials also report that they have fully equipped all AV-8B aircraft 
with LITENING pods which increase image resolution for ground 
targeting. The Marine Corps has also developed new maintenance 
practices and policies that will increase readiness and decrease 
downtime spent in maintenance. According to Marine Corps officials, as 
a result of these policies the Marine Corps has seen an approximately 
66 percent increase in the serviceable life of the aircraft. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the AV-8B as 
yellow given the potential for delays in the Joint Strike Fighter 
program which will require the AV-8B to fly longer than expected. 
Increasing program costs and unproven critical technologies could 
further delay the Joint Strike Fighter program's initial entry into 
service, which is currently planned for 2012 with complete fielding in 
2024. The Marine Corps currently plans to fly the AV-8B until the 2011- 
2020 time frame. Marine Corps officials note that funding is sufficient 
to execute the long-term program strategy for the AV-8B through the 
Future Years Defense Program. 

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter: 

The AH-1W Super Cobra is a day/night, marginal weather, Marine Corps, 
attack helicopter that provides en route escort and protection of troop 
assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault 
phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. There are 179 
aircraft in the inventory with an average age of 15 years. 

Figure 30: AH-1W Super Cobra: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

As in our prior report,[Footnote 40] we assessed the condition of the 
AH-1W Super Cobra as yellow because the aircraft consistently failed to 
meet its mission capable rate goal of 85 percent during the fiscal year 
1999 to 2004 period, as shown in figure 31. Despite the aircraft's low 
mission capable rates, officials stated that the AH-1W was able to meet 
all of its mission requirements during this period. Further, the AH-1W 
upgrade program may decrease maintenance needs due to parts commonality 
with other Marine Corps utility helicopters. The AH-1W has served in 
both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
deployed mission capable rates were higher than for those aircraft that 
were not deployed. The aircraft wartime utilization is about two times 
that of peacetime operations. The Marine Corps rotates the Super Cobras 
out of these theaters and conducts depot-level maintenance on the 
aircraft upon their return. 

Figure 31: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps AH-1W 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the AH-1W as 
yellow because while the Marine Corps has established a program to 
remanufacture the current fleet of AH-1W Super Cobras to a more capable 
AH-1Z, they may experience a shortage of AH-1Ws during the 
remanufacturing process. Officials stated that they may be short as 
many as 40 AH-1Ws due to operational requirements and forecasts for 
future attrition. Marine Corps officials further stated that if there 
is a shortfall, it would largely occur in the reserves due to the 
current operational requirements for the active squadrons. This could 
seriously impact the reserve air wing's ability to train pilots and 
meet operational requirements in the future. Additionally, the Marine 
Corps identified $50 million in unfunded requirements for engineering 
efforts associated with the remanufacturing program. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the AH-1W 
Super Cobra as yellow because, as discussed in the near-term program 
strategy and funding, the Marine Corps potentially faces many years of 
AH-1W shortages as the remanufacturing effort and future operational 
requirements place demands on the fleet. According to Marine Corps 
officials, if the upgrade program remains on schedule, the entire fleet 
of AH-1W will be upgraded to the AH-1Z by fiscal year 2017. 

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter: 

The CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter provides all-weather, day/night, and 
night vision goggle assault transport of combat troops, supplies, and 
equipment during amphibious operations ashore. The total inventory of 
CH-46Es is 223 and the average age is 36 years. The Marine Corps plans 
to replace the fleet of CH-46E with the MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft 
beginning in 2007. 

Figure 32: CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

In our previous report, the CH-46E received a red rating because the 
aircraft consistently failed to meet mission capable goals.[Footnote 
41] However, in this review we rated the condition of the CH-46E as 
yellow because although the mission capable rate trend is declining as 
shown in figure 33, rates were near the goal of 80 percent between 
fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Further, deployed mission capable rates 
were higher than nondeployed aircraft. Marine Corps officials noted 
that the CH-46E was able to meet mission requirements for operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the aircraft's wartime utilization was three 
times the normal peacetime rate. To help improve the condition of the 
aircraft, the Marine Corps has completed an analysis on the airframe 
and all major aircraft subsystems and has established a calendar-based 
depot maintenance cycle. Additionally, as of the end of August 2005, 
234 engine upgrades have been completed. The engine upgrade is expected 
to improve capability and reduce maintenance requirements. However, 
Marine Corps officials stated that sustainment of the aircraft is still 
a concern due to its age and the fact that the aircraft may have to be 
in service longer due to fielding delays and funding cuts for the MV- 
22. 

Figure 33: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-46E 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E 
as red because the Marine Corps may be unable to meet its near-term 
operational requirements due to aircraft and potential repair part 
shortages caused by the age of the aircraft. Despite funding upgrades 
and modifications to the CH-46E to improve its safety, reliability, and 
survivability, repair parts may not be available through normal 
procurement lines because some of the original production lines have 
been closed. The Marine Corps is planning to rely on retiring aircraft 
to provide replacement parts for operating aircraft. Due to fielding 
delays of the MV-22, the CH-46E will not be retired at the pace 
anticipated and, according to Marine Corps officials this could lead to 
some repair parts shortages. Given the continued demands to support 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, pilot training, and the current 
scheduled fielding of the MV-22, the Marine Corps may be short one CH- 
46E squadron for a period of 2 years starting in January 2006. Marine 
Corps officials stated that this squadron is necessary to support 
current contingency operations and operational plans developed at 
combatant command headquarters. They also stated that they are 
considering options to mitigate these issues by engineering repair 
parts to extend the serviceable life of aircraft components and 
utilizing other types of aircraft to fill in for the decommissioned 
squadron. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding for the CH-46E 
as red because delays in the MV-22 fielding will force the CH-46E to 
continue flying much longer than planned and this could impact the 
Marine Corps' ability to support future operations. DOD reduced 
procurement funding for the MV-22 aircraft in its 2006 budget request, 
which delays the full authorized fielding of all MV-22 squadrons until 
fiscal year 2016 versus 2011. This delay will force some squadrons, 
especially in the reserves, to continue to fly the older CH-46E despite 
the fact that it may not be able to support Marine Corps operational 
doctrine. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, a Marine Corps war- 
fighting doctrine, calls for forces to cross great distances to engage 
an enemy. These requirements currently exceed the capabilities of the 
CH-46E. 

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter: 

The CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter provides assault support by 
transporting heavy weapons, equipment (such as High Mobility Multi- 
Wheeled Vehicles and Light Armored Vehicles), supplies, and troops. The 
CH-53E is capable of in-flight refueling. The average age is 17 years 
and there are 147 CH-53Es in the inventory. The expected replacement 
for the CH-53E is the Heavy Lift Replacement, but the requirements are 
still being determined. The Heavy Lift Replacement is expected to enter 
service in 2015. 

Figure 34: CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We rated the condition of the CH-53E as yellow because the aircraft did 
not meet its mission capable goal of 70 percent in some years and 
between fiscal years 2003 and 2004 the mission capable rates declined 
as shown in figure 35. The aircraft wartime utilization is about two 
times that of peacetime operations, and the aircraft mission capable 
rates for deployed aircraft are higher than those for aircraft that are 
not deployed. According to Marine Corps officials, fatigue issues 
related to age, as well as structural cracks in the tail boom area of 
the aircraft, have been ongoing problems with the CH-53E fleet. The 
higher-than-expected usage rates in Operations Iraqi and Enduring 
Freedom have accelerated the need to repair these areas. The Marine 
Corps is addressing the structural cracks and engine upgrades through 
several programs. The engine upgrades are expected to improve 
capability and reduce maintenance requirements. Further, despite the 
declining readiness rates, officials stated that the CH-53E was able to 
meet all operational requirements. 

Figure 35: Average Mission Capable Rates for Marine Corps CH-53E 
Helicopters, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as 
yellow because, although the Marine Corps has several initiatives 
underway that will help sustain and improve capabilities of the CH-53E, 
some of the upgrades and safety issues are on the service's fiscal year 
2006 unfunded program list. The Marine Corps has received funding from 
congressional adjustments and supplemental appropriations to fully 
outfit their CH-53E squadrons with aircraft armor systems, but it lacks 
sufficient funds to upgrade all engines or completely field diagnostic 
systems. According to Marine Corps officials, the diagnostic systems 
assist maintainers by identifying maintenance issues ahead of scheduled 
maintenance programs and will reduce the maintenance man hours required 
to support the aircraft. The Marine Corps identified $30.6 million for 
these diagnostic systems and engine upgrades as unfunded priorities in 
fiscal year 2006. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We rated the long-term program strategy and funding of the CH-53E as 
red because the requirements for the Heavy Lift Replacement, the 
replacement aircraft for the CH-53E, are still being established 
despite an initial fielding planned for 2015. According to officials, 
the Marine Corps must maintain at least 120 CH-53Es until the initial 
fielding of the Heavy Lift Replacement in order to support Marine Corps 
operations. Repair of the structural cracks found in the aircraft is 
critical to maintaining an adequate inventory of CH-53Es until the 
Heavy Lift Replacement becomes operational. Officials estimate that, if 
the current high usage rate and estimates of attrition hold true, the 
number of CH-53Es may fall below the number necessary to remain in 
service until the Heavy Lift Replacement becomes available unless 
required funding and maintenance are available. 

Navy: 

DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer: 

Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (DDG-51 class) provide multimission 
offensive and defensive capabilities and can operate independently or 
as part of a carrier strike group, surface action group, or 
expeditionary strike group. The primary missions of the Arleigh Burke 
Class Destroyers are the destruction of enemy cruise missiles, 
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and to attack land targets in 
support of joint or combined operations. The first ship of this class 
was commissioned in 1991. The Navy plans to build 62 ships of this type 
and 47 of these platforms have been commissioned to date. The average 
age of DDG-51s in the fleet is 6.45 years. The final DDG-51 class ship 
will be delivered in fiscal year 2011. 

Figure 36: DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 class as yellow due to 
maintenance issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth 
limitations experienced by this ship class. Similarly, this ship class 
received a yellow rating in our previous report.[Footnote 42] Each year 
a number of ships in the DDG-51 class are evaluated by Navy inspectors; 
most of the DDG-51 class ships inspected in recent years have done well 
in important inspection areas, such as the destroyer's electrical and 
combat systems. However, areas such as the environmental protection 
systems and damage control systems performed poorly in these 
evaluations. For example, watertight doors are problematic in this type 
of ship and generally are in poor condition in all surface ships. In 
addition, the DDG-51 also has issues with corrosion, insufficient 
bandwidth for Web-based communication, and cracks on its bow, or the 
front, of the ship. Sufficient bandwidth is critical to the ability of 
these ships to operate with the rest of the Navy, which relies heavily 
on the internet for day-to-day operations. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51 
class as green because the Navy has an effective strategy to address 
near-term condition and concerns and sufficient funding is available 
for these plans. The Navy strategy identifies classwide deficiencies, 
prioritizes their importance, and then addresses the most significant 
issues. The Navy closely monitors corrosion, and has taken preventative 
measures to reduce its impact. Finally, the Navy will install Super 
High Frequency capabilities in the DDG-51 class to improve bandwidth 
limitations, and a review of the bow cracks is in progress. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the DDG-51 
class as yellow because the Navy has a strategy to address long-term 
condition and concerns, but it is not fully funded. The Navy plans a 
Midlife Modernization to ensure that the DDG-51 class of ships remains 
a relevant fleet asset for its full life expectancy. The fully funded 
modernizations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2010, and include 
upgrades to DDG-51 combat systems that may reduce personnel costs. 
However, the Navy has reduced planned future operation and maintenance 
funding across all surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have 
the potential to affect the material condition of the DDG-51 class, and 
cause higher costs in later years to make up for deferred maintenance. 
The DDG-51 class is expected to remain in the fleet until fiscal year 
2046. 

FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate: 

Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates (FFG-7 class) are surface combatants 
with antisubmarine warfare and limited antiair warfare capabilities. 
Frigates conduct escort for amphibious expeditionary forces, protection 
of shipping, maritime interdiction, and homeland defense missions. 
There are 30 FFGs in the fleet, with an average age of 20.8 years. The 
FFG-7 class is expected to remain in service until 2019. There is no 
planned replacement for this ship; however, the Littoral Combat Ship 
will perform many of the missions currently performed by these ships. 

Figure 37: FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of FFG-7 class as yellow, the same rating it 
received in the last report,[Footnote 43] due to maintenance issues 
related to major ship systems and bandwidth limitations experienced by 
this ship class. These frigates operate using diesel engines and these 
systems' older engines need more maintenance than modern gas turbine 
engines. Additionally, the water and ventilation systems must be 
replaced to ensure that the ship can operate until it reaches the end 
of its required service life. Each year a number of ships in the FFG-7 
class are evaluated by Navy inspectors, and they have also found 
shortfalls in damage control equipment and the environmental protection 
systems of these ships. Moreover, these frigates have only a limited 
amount of bandwidth and this affects their ability to operate with the 
rest of the Navy, which relies heavily on electronic communications for 
its day-to-day operations. Naval inspectors determined that other 
systems on board FFG-7 class ships were in good condition, including 
its propulsion and combat systems. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding for the FFG-7 
class as yellow because the Navy's near-term plan to correct FFG-7 
class condition problems does not address all issues. The Navy has 
decided not to install a Super High Frequency communication system on 
these ships to improve their access to bandwidth and improve their 
access to Web-based communication. Instead, these ships will continue 
to operate with a limited amount of available bandwidth in the future, 
despite the Navy's increasing use of the internet to share operational, 
training, and personnel data. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term strategy of the FFG-7 class as yellow because 
of plans to decrease future operation and maintenance funding. The Navy 
plan to modify and modernize the FFG-7 fleet will be complete by fiscal 
year 2011; however, these modifications may not address all of the 
problems that may arise in the aging FFG-7 class. DOD intends to 
decrease the amount of operation and maintenance funding available for 
its surface ships in the future, which may limit the Navy's ability to 
address any emerging maintenance issues. While all surface ships will 
likely have maintenance funding cuts, the FFG-7 class and other older 
ships may be the most affected by these shortfalls. 

LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship: 

Austin-class amphibious transport dock ships (LPD-4 class) are warships 
that embark, transport, and land elements of a Marine landing force and 
its equipment. Austin class ships also act as helicopter refueling 
stations and limited casualty receiving and treatment ships. There are 
currently 11 LPD-4 class ships in the inventory with an average age of 
37 years. The LPD-4 class ships are expected to remain in the fleet 
until 2014. The San Antonio-class LPD-17 is beginning to replace the 
LPD-4 class in fiscal year 2005. 

Figure 38: LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 class as yellow due to 
maintenance issues related to major ship systems and bandwidth 
limitations experienced by this ship class. The LPD-4 received the same 
yellow rating 
in our previous report.[Footnote 44] Insufficient air conditioning is a 
habitability concern on many LPD-4 class ships, especially given 
current operations in high-temperature regions. The LPD-4 class also 
has issues with electrical systems, propulsion, and insufficient 
bandwidth for Web-based communication. Sufficient bandwidth is critical 
to the ability of these ships to operate with the rest of the Navy, 
which relies heavily on the internet for day-to-day operations. While 
these maintenance issues are significant, some LPD-4 class ships have 
completed an Extended Sustainability Program that addressed the most 
severe maintenance problems affecting this class. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4 
class as yellow because the Navy has a plan to address near-term 
condition and concerns, but it excludes those ships scheduled to 
decommission within 5 years and the decommission dates have 
historically slipped. The Navy is in the midst of an Extended 
Sustainability Program that corrects serious LPD-4 class deficiencies, 
for example, its inadequate onboard electrical system. The Navy has 
selected 5 of 11 LPD-class ships for this program, and will have 
completed 4 by the end of fiscal year 2005. The ships that will not 
undergo the Extended Sustainability Program are all within 5 years of 
decommissioning, and therefore can only undergo normal repairs and 
maintenance. In the past, this decommissioning date has been moved back 
by several years, but ships have retained their decommissioning status-
-thus preventing any upgrades or modernizations. This will lead to a 
wide variance of condition between different ships in the LPD-4 class. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the LPD-4 
class as yellow because of plans to decrease future operation and 
maintenance funding, and uncertainty concerning the LPD-4's service 
life. The Navy has reduced planned future operation and maintenance 
funding across all surface ships in the fleet. These reductions have 
the potential to affect the material condition of the LPD-4 class. 
Additionally, procurement of the LPD-4 class replacement, the LPD-17 
class, has been reduced from 12 ships to 9. However, the Navy 
requirement remains the same--the ability to transport two and a half 
Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft: 

The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft with 6 models: 
the F/A-18 A, B, C, and D, also known as the Hornet; and the E and F 
also known as the Super Hornet. The capabilities of the Hornet and 
Super Hornet include fighter escort, fleet air defense, force 
projection, and close and deep air support. The current inventory of F/ 
A-18's is 914: A, 123; B, 28; C, 396; D, 139; E, 102; and F, 126. The 
average age in years is: A, 18.5; B, 20.2; C, 12.7; D, 12.1; E, 2.5; 
and F, 2.4. The Navy plans to gradually replace the Hornet with the 
Super Hornet and the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Figure 39: F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as green given that it 
generally is available in sufficient numbers to meet Navy requirements 
and though mission capable goals vary, all models are close to or 
exceed mission capable goals between calendar years 1999 and 2004, as 
shown in figure 40. Additionally, all variants of the F/A-18 
consistently meet their daily availability requirements. In our 
previous study, the condition of the F/A-18 was rated yellow because it 
missed its mission capable goals, but including the daily availability 
factor in our analysis improved its rating to green. However, both the 
Hornet and Super Hornet have deficiencies with fuel systems and the 
Super Hornet also has deficiencies with cockpit canopies, all of which 
degrade mission capable rates. In addition, the Navy is beginning a 
long-term effort to replace the overstressed center section of the 
Hornet fuselage, the center barrel. This effort addresses the 
predictable rate of wear and deterioration on the aircraft due to 
factors such as carrier takeoff and landings and increases the expected 
service life of the aircraft. The aircraft is not available for 
operations during the 1 year scheduled for this process. According to 
officials, during this period the Navy takes advantage of aircraft time 
out of service to conduct scheduled maintenance and other modifications 
on those aircraft. 

Figure 40: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy F/A-18 Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as 
yellow because some funding is not identified for their program 
strategy, which includes important Hornet modernizations, and the Super 
Hornet lacks critical spare parts. The Navy is unable to fund improved 
detection and targeting systems for the Hornet, for example, the 
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared system, and the Joint 
Helmet Mounted Cueing System. Similarly, the Super Hornet will, in the 
near term, experience shortfalls in the availability of Government 
Furnished Equipment: equipment directly acquired by the government and 
subsequently made available to a contractor. These equipment shortfalls 
for the Super Hornet include extra fuel tanks and bomb racks. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the F/A-18 as 
yellow because of the uncertain status of its replacement, the Joint 
Strike Fighter, and the complexity of the center barrel replacement 
effort. The Navy has plans to maintain enough operational F/A-18 
aircraft to meet the Navy's tactical air requirements until the Joint 
Strike Fighter is available by replacing the center barrels of 40 
Hornets per year, a challenging goal given the complex nature of this 
effort. The Joint Strike Fighter is already behind schedule and a 
number of its critical technologies are immature, indicating that it 
may be delayed even further. Program officials confirmed that another 
delay in arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter would require the F/A-18 
program to seek other alternatives to meet requirement goals, such as 
to replace more center barrels on Hornets, manage the normal wear and 
tear on the aircraft, or procure additional Super Hornets. Moreover, 
center barrel stress is not the only factor used when determining the 
expected service life of an aircraft; flying hours and takeoff and 
landings also impact the F/A 18's life expectancy. If Hornets are 
required to operate longer than currently planned, these aging aircraft 
may not be available in sufficient numbers to meet Navy requirements 
for tactical aircraft. 

EA-6B Prowler Aircraft: 

The EA-6B Prowler provides Electronic Attack and Anti-Radiation Missile 
capabilities against enemy radar and communications systems. The 
Prowler's primary mission is to support strike aircraft and ground 
troops by jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications. The 
current inventory is 119 with an average age of 21.9 years. The Prowler 
fleet consists of carrier-based squadrons, and land-based expeditionary 
squadrons. The expeditionary capability will be replaced by the Air 
Force's B-52 electronic jammer suites, while the EA-18G Super Hornet 
Airborne Electronic Attack aircraft will begin to replace the carrier- 
based capabilities in 2009. 

Figure 41: EA-6B Prowler: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow, as we did in our 
previous report,[Footnote 45] because it consistently misses the Navy's 
mission capable goal of 73 percent between calendar years 1999 and 
2004, as shown in figure 42, due to a number of maintenance problems. 
However, Navy officials believe the EA-6B will meet its daily 
availability requirements later this year. Much of this improvement is 
due to replacement of the center wing, which had shown signs of fatigue 
due to the stress of operations, on a number of these aircraft. The 
Navy will have completed this complex effort, which removed aircraft 
from the fleet for a number of months, on enough Prowlers to meet their 
requirements. Despite this improvement, the EA-6B's mission capable 
rates have been degraded by problems with communications equipment, 
canopies, and wings. Other problems with fuel cells and environmental 
control systems have also diminished mission capable rates. The EA-6B's 
utilization rates have also been high, given its role as a high-demand 
asset in current operations. 

Figure 42: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy EA-6B Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as 
yellow because the Navy has not funded all of its short-term 
requirements. The Navy has plans to address the major degraders of 
mission capable rates; however, not all of these plans are fully 
funded. Navy plans include replacing aging center wing sections in the 
EA-6B fleet. The condition of the Prowler fleet will continue to 
improve in the near term because of this funded initiative. 
Additionally, EA-6B officials have been working with manufacturers to 
correct canopy deficiencies and have resolved this problem. Current 
Navy plans for purchasing canopies are also fully funded for all 
aircraft. However, currently no plans or funding have been identified 
to correct communications equipment issues. Furthermore, the Navy has 
not fully funded equipment that improves the EA-6B's ability to use its 
unique electronic warfare capabilities to counter an emerging threat. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the EA-6B as 
yellow because only a limited number of aircraft will receive an 
upgrade that is critical to transition the EA-6B fleet to the EA-18G 
aircraft. In the long term, the Navy has outlined an effective strategy 
to modernize and replace the Prowler. This strategy includes wing 
replacement and Improved Capability III upgrades on the EA-6B. The 
Prowler's capabilities will be replaced by the EA-18G and Air Force B- 
52 electronic jammer suites. However, this strategy has not been fully 
funded. Specifically, the Navy has a stated requirement to provide the 
Improved Capability III upgrade on 21 aircraft, but has only funded the 
upgrade for 14 aircraft. This improved third-generation capability is a 
significant technology leap beyond the EA-6B's current jamming 
capabilities, and according to program officials, an important 
component in the Navy's transition to the EA-18G. Moreover, aircraft 
with this capability will be used by the Marine Corps until 2015, at 
which time they plan to replace their EA-6B aircraft with a version of 
the Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is already behind 
schedule and a number of its critical technologies are immature, 
indicating that it may be delayed even further. 

P-3 Orion Aircraft: 

The P-3 Orion is a four-engine turboprop antisubmarine and maritime 
surveillance aircraft. It provides undersea warfare; antisurface 
warfare; and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to naval and joint 
commanders. There are 173 aircraft in the fleet and their average age 
is 24.4 years. The Navy will replace P-3 capabilities with the Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft in 2013, and the Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance Un-manned Aerial Vehicle. 

Figure 43: P-3 Orion Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the P-3 as red because it has consistently 
missed its mission capable goals by a significant percentage, as shown 
in figure 44, and the Orion is not available in sufficient numbers to 
meet day-to-day Navy requirements. Overall, the condition of the P-3 
has been primarily degraded by the effect of structural fatigue on its 
airframe and the obsolescence of communication, navigation, and primary 
war-fighting systems. To address airframe issues, specifically cracks 
in the aircraft's wings, the Navy has instituted a special structural 
inspection and repair program. A number of aircraft are currently 
undergoing these special structural inspections and repairs, and are 
not available for fleet operations. Moreover, the obsolescence of the 
communication, navigation, and war-fighting systems resulted in only 
about 26 percent of these aircraft being rated as fully capable of 
performing all of their missions last year. 

Figure 44: Average Mission Capable Rates for Navy P-3 Aircraft, 
Calendar Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as 
yellow because the Navy's near-term plans do not address all condition 
and obsolescence issues. However, the Navy will have completed enough 
structural inspections and repairs to ensure that there are sufficient 
P-3 Orions available to meet day-to-day requirements next year. While 
this mitigates serious airframe issues, obsolescence of electronics and 
avionic systems will continue to degrade the ability of this aircraft 
to fulfill all of its missions. The Navy will address some of these 
obsolescence issues in the short term, such as installing an improved 
high-frequency radio. However, other needed improvements have not been 
funded, for example, efforts to improve the aircraft's over the horizon 
communications and upgrades for the aircraft's missile defense system. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the P-3 as 
red because while the Navy has identified what can be done to address 
the obsolescence of the mission systems over the long term, this 
program has not been approved or funded. The Navy plan, known as the 
Anti-submarine Maritime Improvement Program, ensures the continued 
relevance of the P-3 mission systems until the Multi-mission Maritime 
Aircraft is operational. This improvement program has not been fully 
approved, nor has it been funded. The obsolescence of its mission 
system may have a significant impact on its war-fighting capabilities. 
Moreover, it is still not certain that the fixes identified for the P- 
3 airframe will ensure that sufficient numbers of this aircraft will be 
available until it is fully replaced in 2019. 

Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile: 

The Standard Missile-2 is a medium to long-range, shipboard surface-to- 
air missile. The primary mission of the Standard Missile-2 is fleet 
area air defense and ship self-defense; its secondary mission is 
antisurface ship warfare. There are four different blocks of the 
Standard Missile-2 in service (III, IIIA, IIIB, and IV). The 
inventories of these blocks are classified, but over 88 percent of the 
inventory is greater than 11 years of age, and some blocks are older 
and less capable than others The capabilities of the Standard Missile- 
2 will be replaced by the Standard Missile-6 Extended Range Active 
Missile beginning in fiscal year 2009. 

Figure 45: Standard Missile-2 Surface-to-Air Missile: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile-2 as yellow because 
it has consistently failed to meet its asset readiness goal of 87 
percent. The asset readiness goal is the missile equivalent of the 
mission capable goal. Timely certifications of missiles--assessments of 
equipment condition and necessary repair and replacement of missile 
components--are critical to these readiness rates. These certifications 
must be done approximately every 4 years and a missile is not ready for 
issue until certified. These assessments have not been done at a rate 
sufficient to meet asset readiness goals. In GAO's previous study, the 
condition of the Standard Missile-2 was rated red; however, the asset 
readiness rates of these missiles have improved since that time. 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy and funding of the Standard 
Missile-2 as green because the Navy has a plan to address near-term 
condition, and the missile's inventory meets Navy requirements in the 
near term. The Navy has been able to deliver a more maneuverable 
version of this missile--the Block IIIB-MU--ahead of schedule. In 
addition, the Navy has increased the amount of operation and 
maintenance funding over the next couple of years to maintain the asset 
readiness rate close to the goal. Both of these steps will allow the 
Navy to meet inventory requirements in the near term. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy and funding of the Standard 
Missile-2 as red because future funding shortfalls will significantly 
affect missile availability. The Navy plans to meet requirements by 
procuring new missiles and modernizing existing ones. However, the new 
procurements and missile modernizations are not in sufficient numbers 
to allow the Navy to meet inventory requirements in the long term. 
Furthermore, the operation and maintenance funding planned for the long 
term is not sufficient for the Navy to meet asset readiness goals. 
Funding for certifications was limited until fiscal year 2004; 
subsequently, increased funding improved assets readiness rates. 
Funding will be limited again beginning in fiscal year 2007, affecting 
the long-term availability and ready-for-issue rate of the Standard 
Missile-2. While the Standard Missile-6 is currently ahead of schedule, 
this weapon will not be available in a timely manner or in sufficient 
numbers to allow the Navy to meet long-term inventory requirements. 

Air Force: 

For the six Air Force aircraft in this appendix, fiscal year 2004 data 
are through July 2004. 

F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle: 

There are two types of F-15 aircraft: the F-15 Eagle (A-D variants) and 
the F-15E Strike Eagle. The F-15 A and F-15C are single-seat, 
supersonic fighter aircraft used for air-to-air combat, and the B and D 
variants are their dual-seat training counterparts. The F-15E Strike 
Eagle is a dual-seat, supersonic fighter aircraft used for both air-to- 
air combat and air-to-ground combat. There are 513 F-15 Eagles and 221 
F-15E Strike Eagles in the Air Force inventory, and the average age 
depends upon the variant, with F-15 Eagles ranging from about 21 years 
to 26 years, and the F-15E Strike Eagles averaging about 12 years. The 
F/A-22 is the designated replacement for the F-15 Eagle. The Air Force 
plans to retire most of the F-15 Eagle fleet, retaining 179 F-15C/D 
variants beyond 2015 to augment the F/A-22 through 2025, while 
maintaining the entire fleet of F-15Es through at least 2025. 

Figure 46: F-15 Eagle: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the condition of the F-15 C/D and F-15E as green because 
mission capable rates have been near the Air Force's stated goal and 
have either improved or remained constant between fiscal years 1999 and 
2004. The Air Force's stated goal depends on the variant, and ranges 
from 79 percent to 82 percent. As shown in figure 47, mission capable 
rates for the F-15 C/D and F-15 E variants, which are expected to 
remain in the fleet after retirement of the older F-15 aircraft, have 
increased to about 79 percent. Officials stated that cracks and issues 
related to the age of the aircraft are the most common problems 
affecting the aircraft, but noted that the Air Force is addressing 
these issues through programmed depot maintenance. Officials also 
stated that the F-15 is a viable and capable system, noting that the F- 
15E models were used during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Figure 47: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-15 Eagle and 
Strike Eagle Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-15 and F-15E as 
green because the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to 
address known problems, to include retirement of the older F-15 C/D 
variants. For capability and reliability upgrades, the Air Force has 
funded and is currently implementing replacements and upgrades for a 
variety of different systems on 179 F-15C/D variants, to include 
engines, radars, and various structural improvements. For the F-15E, 
the Air Force has funded modernization of different systems--computer 
processors, avionics, and software--which is collectively known as a 
Suite 5E upgrade. This upgrade, which is fully funded for the F-15E 
fleet, is scheduled to occur from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 
2011, and is expected to increase the survivability and weapons 
delivery capability of the aircraft. Officials also stated that 
technological obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources are a 
concern for the entire F-15 fleet; however, they also stated that it is 
manageable, and were confident that the Air Force had the correct 
procedures to address the issue. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-15 fleet as green 
because the Air Force near-term upgrades are fully funded and designed 
to keep the aircraft that will remain in the fleet viable and 
functioning through at least 2025. The F/A-22 Raptor is the F-15 
Eagle's designated replacement, and officials stated that delays to its 
fielding schedule will not impact the retirement schedule of the F-15 
fleet. Retirements for the F-15A/B aircraft are scheduled to begin in 
fiscal year 2005 with a total of 84 retirements expected to occur 
through fiscal year 2009, and retirement of 26 F-15 C/D aircraft is 
scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009. The F/A-22 is expected to 
achieve operational capability in December 2005, and the entire fleet 
of 179 aircraft is currently scheduled to be procured through fiscal 
year 2008. Officials stated that the effect of changes in the F/A-22 
fleet composition on further F-15 C/D aircraft retirements beyond 
fiscal year 2009 remains to be seen, as the total structure of the 
combat air fleet will be reviewed during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense 
Review. 

F-16 Fighting Falcon: 

The F-16 is a compact, multirole fighter with air-to-air combat and air-
to-surface attack capabilities. There are four F-16 variants - the A 
and C models are designed for one pilot, while the B and D models are 
two-seat tandem cockpit aircraft, which are used for training and can 
also be flown individually. Of the four variants, the F-16 C and D 
models incorporate the latest technology and have the capability to 
suppress or destroy enemy air defenses. The Air Force currently has 
1,353 F-16 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 15 
years. The Air Force plans to retire the A and B variants because they 
are not expected to be structurally viable past 2008, although the 
specific schedule has yet to be published. The Air Force also plans to 
replace the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 2013. 

Figure 48: F-16 Fighting Falcon: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

Consistent with the findings of our December 2003 report,[Footnote 46] 
we assessed the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable 
rates have been near the Air Force's stated goal and have remained 
relatively constant. For the A/B variants, mission capable rates were 
about 72 percent with an Air Force stated goal of 75 percent in fiscal 
year 2004 and, as shown in figure 49, mission capable rates for the C/ 
D variants were about 76 percent compared to a goal of 81 percent. 
Officials stated that the most significant factor affecting the F-16 is 
cracks, which occur mostly on older aircraft and because of the stress 
caused by repeatedly landing without dropping its two 2,000 pound 
bombs. Despite these concerns, the Air Force has plans to address 
cracking. Further, although the rates for all variants are below the 
goals, officials stated the F-16 was able to meet operational 
requirements. 

Figure 49: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force F-16 Fighting 
Falcon Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the F-16 as green 
because the Air Force has developed and funded a strategy to address 
known problems. As we noted in our December 2003 report, structural 
issues related to age and use are affecting the F-16. To address these 
concerns, the Air Force began a structural augmentation program that 
strengthens the airframe in areas prone to cracking, namely the wings 
and fuselage. The structural augmentation program is expected to affect 
over 1200 of the aircraft and be completed by 2013. Other near-term 
initiatives that are being implemented to improve combat capabilities 
include the common configuration implementation program, which 
incorporates improvements to targeting, communications, and computer 
systems, and improvements to radar, avionics, and targeting systems. 
Officials stated that these programs are currently funded and being 
implemented, although not for the entire F-16 fleet. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the F-16 as green 
because current and projected funding for aircraft modernizations 
identified in the near-term program strategy are designed to ensure 
longer-term viability for the next 15 years. Although the Air Force has 
yet to publish an F-16 retirement schedule, officials indicate that the 
older variants will be retired, as will be reflected in future budget 
documents. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the designated replacement 
for the F-16 but, according to officials, the retirement of the older F-
16 variants will not be affected by the F-35 fielding schedule, since 
operational capability of the Air Force F-35 aircraft is not expected 
to occur until fiscal year 2013 and the exact quantity remains to be 
determined. 

B-1 Lancer Bomber: 

The B-1 Lancer Bomber is a long-range, high-speed, large payload global 
attack aircraft that was originally designed for nuclear missions but 
was transitioned to a conventional role. In 2002, the Air Force began 
consolidating the fleet, reducing the B-1 inventory from 93 to 67 
aircraft and transferring all remaining B-1 bombers to the active 
component. Beginning operations in 1986, the average age of the B-1 is 
about 17 years. The Air Force plans to keep the B-1 in use through at 
least 2040,[Footnote 47] so there are no immediate plans to replace the 
aircraft. 

Figure 50: B-1 Lancer Bomber: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the condition of the B-1 as yellow because mission capable 
rates were below the Air Force stated goal most of the time between 
fiscal years 1999 and 2004. As shown in figure 51, mission capable 
rates have increased between 1999 and 2004. Parts shortages were 
identified as a reason keeping rates below goals, and officials 
identified generators, automatic pilot controllers, and various pump 
and hydraulic systems as the items that were most often in short 
supply. After consolidation of the B-1 fleet in fiscal year 2002, the 
numbers of parts in the supply system increased as parts were taken 
from retired B-1 aircraft. To compensate for the smaller fleet size, 
the Air Force increased the mission capable goals from 67 percent in 
fiscal year 2002 to 76 percent in fiscal year 2003. The increase in the 
goal occurred as B-1 usage to support operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan increased. Although the aircraft's mission capable rate was 
about 69 percent in fiscal year 2004, the rate for deployed aircraft 
was 80 percent. Additionally, officials noted that the B-1 is capable 
of accomplishing the Air Force's current needs. 

Figure 51: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-1 Lancer 
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because 
the Air Force has planned and funded programs to address the near-term 
sustainment issues affecting the aircraft. According to officials, the 
forecasted number of flight hours serves as the basis for funding 
planned maintenance activity and expected number of parts required for 
the aircraft. The fluctuations in the fleet size, coupled with the 
increase in usage for operations overseas, caused instability in the 
supply chain and increased the difficulty in efficient planning of 
maintenance cycles. For the near term, the Air Force has addressed this 
concern by increasing the number of forecasted flight hours for fiscal 
year 2005, which increases the funding for supply and maintenance 
activities and is expected to correct the disparity. In addition to 
addressing near-term sustainment issues, the Air Force has already 
funded and will complete plans to increase the sustainability and 
wartime capabilities of the B-1, to include the planned fielding of 
increased munitions capabilities, and upgrades to the central computer 
systems and radar. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-1 as green because 
the Air Force has a proactive strategy to address anticipated shortages 
and deficiencies in the aircraft, and has funded modernization efforts 
to meet requirements. Although a newer system in the Air Force's fleet, 
officials stated that technology has advanced significantly since the B-
1 was fielded in the 1980s, resulting in a reduction in the number of 
manufacturers that make the original B-1 component parts. For example, 
the original computer technology in the B-1 used processors that, while 
cutting edge at the time, are slower than home computer processors. To 
address these issues, the Air Force has funded efforts to modernize and 
upgrade B-1 components, to include cockpit flight instrument displays 
and navigation systems. In addition to resolving potential supply chain 
concerns, these upgrades are also expected to enhance the aircraft's 
combat capability. 

B-2 Spirit Bomber: 

The B-2 is a multirole heavy bomber with stealth characteristics, 
capable of employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was 
produced in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth) 
capability to complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth 
capability enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air 
Force has 21 B-2 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is 
about 10 years. The B-2 was deployed to support both Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The B-2 is expected 
to remain in the Air Force's inventory until 2058, so there are no 
immediate plans to replace the aircraft. 

Figure 52: B-2 Spirit Bomber: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

For the reasons associated with maintenance of stealth characteristics 
that we identified in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 48] we 
continue to assess the condition of the B-2 as yellow. As shown in 
figure 53, the B-2 did not consistently meet the Air Force mission 
capable goal of 50 to 51 percent between fiscal years 1999 and 
2004.[Footnote 49] Officials stated that the small B-2 fleet size 
increases the difficulty in achieving goals, noting that a change in 
the mission capable status of one aircraft results in about a 7 percent 
change in the overall mission capable rate; however, when viewing other 
metrics, the B-2 condition is comparable with other bombers. 
Maintenance of stealth characteristics continues to be the primary 
driver of lower mission capable rates, and the Air Force is continuing 
to implement solutions. Despite difficulties associated with stealth 
maintenance, the B-2 is capable of accomplishing its wartime missions, 
achieving mission capable rates of 64 percent for Operation Enduring 
Freedom and 73 percent during the initial months of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 

Figure 53: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force B-2 Spirit 
Bombers, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because 
the Air Force has developed and funded the strategy for sustaining the 
B-2 inventory. The Air Force funded and continues to implement its 
Alternate High Frequency Material modification, which reduces the 
number of steps and the overall length of time required to conduct 
stealth maintenance. Thus far, three aircraft have received the 
modification, and the entire fleet has been funded and scheduled to 
receive the upgrade by the end of the decade. Other areas of concern 
include cracking on the aft deck and cracking in the windshield. For 
the aft deck cracks, officials stated that the extremely high 
temperatures from the engine cause the cracking, and have fielded kits 
to stiffen the aft decks, making them less affected by the extreme 
heat. For windshield cracks, officials stated that redesigning the 
spacing of drill holes will address the problem; delivery of the new 
windshields is scheduled to begin in late 2005. Additionally, the Air 
Force has funded and is implementing improvements in B-2 connectivity 
and interoperability, to include integrating advanced weapons. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Green (indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or 
issues at the time of our review or that any existing problems or 
issues we identified are either not severe enough in nature to warrant 
additional action or are already being addressed by DOD, the military 
services, and/or Congress). 

We assessed the long-term program strategy for the B-2 as green because 
the Air Force is addressing immediate issues for the aircraft while 
concurrently developing and funding longer-term solutions. In addition 
to continuing efforts to address stealth maintenance and aft deck 
cracks, the Air Force is also addressing the issue of diminishing 
manufacturing sources. Officials stated that technological advancements 
and the small size of the B-2 fleet are a disincentive for 
manufacturers to continue making B-2 unique parts. To compensate, the 
Air Force is modernizing components and systems within the B-2, 
developing internal processes to contract out management of B-2 unique 
parts, and closely monitoring all parts to ensure that the supply chain 
has ample time to adjust. 

C-5 Galaxy Transport: 

The C-5 Galaxy is the largest Air Force transport aircraft, and can 
carry large cargo items over intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and 
can take off and land in relatively short distances. The C-5 is one of 
only two aircraft that can carry very large military equipment. With 
aerial refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew 
endurance. The first C-5 was delivered in 1970. There are 112 C-5 
aircraft in the Air Force's inventory, and their average age is 26 
years. Although the C-5 is expected to remain in service through 2040, 
the exact length of service and composition of the C-5 fleet is 
dependent upon the Mobility Capabilities Study[Footnote 50] and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, which were not completed at the time of our 
review. 

Figure 54: C-5 Galaxy Transport Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

For the reasons identified in our December 2003 report,[Footnote 51] we 
continue to assess the condition of the C-5 as yellow. As shown in 
figure 55, mission capable rates for the C-5 consistently remained 
below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. Officials 
stated that the size and age of the aircraft make the C-5 maintenance 
intensive, and provided the example of fatigued metal and adhesives, 
which take time to replace. They further stated that the age of the C- 
5 makes it difficult to find manufacturing sources for some parts, 
particularly avionics and engine components. Additionally, the avionics 
systems and engines are noncompliant with upcoming global airspace and 
air traffic requirements, potentially limiting where and how the 
aircraft can be used. Despite these challenges, officials stated that 
the C-5 can currently perform its missions, including providing 
transport for tsunami relief efforts and moving supplies for operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Figure 55: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force C-5 Galaxy 
Transport Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the near-term program strategy for the C-5 as yellow 
because of delays and funding shortages in key modernization efforts. 
The two modernizations for the C-5 are to improve avionics and engines; 
avionics upgrades must occur before engine modernization can begin. 
When complete, the programs are expected to address many manufacturing 
source issues, ensure compliance with global air traffic standards, and 
increase the aircraft's capability. However, officials stated that the 
avionics upgrades are experiencing software integration problems, 
resulting in a delay of at least 3 months and cost increases of $20 
million. Since engine modernization is predicated on avionics upgrades, 
the costs for engine modernization have also increased by $30 million. 
Additionally, after a projectile attack damaged a C-5 during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, officials stated that defensive systems became a top 
priority, and the Air Force requested and received funding through 
fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriations to upgrade defenses 
against infrared guided surface-to-air missiles for 51 C-5 aircraft. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the Air Force's long-term strategy for the C-5 as yellow 
because requested funding is inconsistent with long-term requirements 
to sustain and modernize the inventory. With upgrades to avionics and 
engines, officials stated that the C-5 could last through 2040. The Air 
Force has requested funding for engine upgrades for the entire fleet of 
112 C-5 aircraft; however, the Air Force has only funded the 
procurement and installation of avionics upgrades for 59 aircraft, 
resulting in 53 aircraft not receiving the necessary avionics upgrades 
to support the new engines. Officials stated that the Air Force remains 
uncertain about the size of the final C-5 fleet and whether to fund the 
remaining C-5 upgrades, but will have a better idea following the 
completion of the Mobility Capabilities Study. 

KC-135 Stratotanker: 

The KC-135 is among the oldest aircraft in the Air Force's inventory 
and represents 90 percent of the aircraft in the tanker fleet. Its 
primary mission is air refueling fixed-wing aircraft and it supports 
Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft. There are three KC- 
135 variants currently in the fleet: the E, R, and T models. Each model 
is a reengined version of the original KC-135A. Of these three 
variants, the E model belongs to the Air Force Reserve and Air National 
Guard. The first KC-135 was delivered in June 1957. There are 531 KC- 
135 aircraft in the Air Force's inventory and the average age is about 
44 years. Currently, there is no replacement: 

Figure 56: KC-135 Stratotanker: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Condition: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

Consistent with our December 2003 report,[Footnote 52] we assessed the 
condition of the KC-135 aircraft as yellow because, as shown in figure 
57, it has not met its mission capable goals and issues associated with 
age and corrosion continue to be a concern. Officials stated that age 
is the primary driver of KC-135 maintenance issues, and that 
maintainers discover new problems with the aircraft every time it 
undergoes scheduled depot maintenance. Age-related issues with the 
aircraft include fuel bladder leaks, parts obsolescence, and problems 
with the landing gear's steel brakes. Corrosion has regularly been 
discovered in new areas on the aircraft, requiring increased amounts of 
depot maintenance time. The Air Force has yet to determine the extent 
of problems caused by newly discovered corrosion. The older variants 
also have a higher incidence of problems; for example, the Air Force 
removed 29 KC-135E aircraft from flight status due to engine strut 
problems and corrosion. 

Figure 57: Average Mission Capable Rates for Air Force KC-135 
Stratotanker Aircraft, Fiscal Years 1999 - 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Yellow (indicates the existence of a problem or issue that warrants 
attention by DOD, the military services, and/or Congress, and if left 
unattended may worsen). 

We assessed the Air Force's near-term strategy for the KC-135 as yellow 
because age-related maintenance issues are expected to increase and the 
severity of potential age-related issues remains unknown. Although 
officials stated that maintenance problems with the aircraft are 
currently manageable during programmed depot maintenance, they expect 
the number of maintenance man-hours to increase by 2.5 percent each 
year. Officials also stated that the severity of potential problems 
from newly discovered corrosion remains unknown, so the potential for 
additional maintenance requirements is likely to occur. Officials 
further stated that the effects of KC-135 operations to support Iraq 
and Afghanistan are still unknown, but the Air Force has instituted 
additional inspections and procedures to address potential effects 
associated with higher usage. The only major modification for the KC- 
135, Global Air Traffic Management avionics system upgrades, remains on 
schedule and is fully funded. 

Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding: 

Red (indicates a problem or issue that is prevalent and severe enough 
to warrant immediate attention by DOD, the military services, and/or 
Congress). 

We assessed the Air Force's long-term strategy for the KC-135 as red 
because the future of the KC-135 fleet and the Air Force's tanker 
strategy are unknown. Before acquiring new tankers, the Air Force must 
complete a Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives, which is a study 
to narrow the field of possible future tanker options. Originally 
scheduled for completion in December 2004, the analysis has been 
delayed until at least August 2005. Regardless of the option, officials 
stated that all recapitalization efforts will require use of the KC-135 
in the near term and delays in fielding a replacement exacerbate 
problems in maintaining the existing fleet over the long term, as well 
as delaying modernization efforts that are predicated on the 
replacement time line. In fiscal year 2005, $100 million was 
appropriated for a tanker replacement transfer fund, and $9.7 billion 
has been requested for the tanker replacement program in DOD's 2006 
Future Years Defense Program. For the six Air Force aircraft in this 
appendix, fiscal year 2004 data are through July 2004. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Agency Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000: 

SEP 26 2005: 

Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-05-978 `MILITARY READINESS: DOD Needs to Identify and 
Address Gaps and Potential Risks in Program Strategy and Funding 
Priorities for Selected Equipment,' dated August 24, 2005 (GAO Code 
350548). 

The DoD partially concurs with one recommendation, and nonconcurs with 
one recommendation. Specific comments on each recommendation are 
enclosed. Technical comments regarding the assessments made in the 
appendices are also provided in the attachment. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. 

Signed by: 

Nancy L: Spruill:
Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis: 

Enclosure: As Stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED August 24, 2005 GAO CODE 350548/GAO-05-978: 

"MILITARY READINESS: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and 
Potential Risks in Program Strategy and Funding Priorities for Selected 
Equipment" 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that, after the Department 
completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of the Services, reassess the near 
and long-term program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key 
equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C. 2437, to 
ensure that the plans are complete and that the items are sustainable 
until they reach the end of their serviceable life or a replacement 
system is fielded. Specifically, this reassessment should: 

* detail the strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems 
until they are retired or replaced; 

* report the costs associated with the sustainment and modernization of 
key equipment and identify these funds in the Future Years Defense 
Program; and: 

* identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully funding the 
strategies, and the steps the Department is taking to mitigate the 
associated risks, for those strategies that are delayed or are not 
fully funded. (Pages 32/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Through the current Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) processes, the Department 
is already executing an annual procedure to reassess program strategies 
to ensure equipment sustainment and modernization can support the most 
recent Defense strategy. The PPBE process ensures that, at the 
corporate Department of Defense level, the Future Years Defense Program 
developed each year balances operational, recapitalization/ 
modernization, maintenance, manning, and facilities requirements in 
order to accomplish the national defense mission. The review for the FY 
2007 President's Budget is already taking place, and does not require 
completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review in order to reassess 
equipment sustainment and modernization plans. Reviews consider 
strategies and costs to sustain and modernize equipment, and the risks 
incurred by not fully funding those strategies. The resulting 
President's Budget reflects the Department's best assessment of a 
balanced, fully funded budget that most efficiently accomplishes our 
national security mission, within our limited resources. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
provide the information bulleted in Recommendation 1 in an annual 
report to Congress at the same time the Department submits its annual 
budget request. (Page 32/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. The annual Defense Budget represents a 
balanced program, within the resources available, as a result of the 
process described in the DoD response to Recommendation 1. The 
strategies to sustain and modernize key equipment systems, and the 
costs associated with the sustainment and modernization are already 
provided in the budget documentation submitted with each year's 
President's Budget. The draft recommendation would also require the 
Department to identify the risks involved in delaying or not fully 
funding the strategies. When the Department submits the President's 
Budget, the overall strategy for accomplishing the national defense 
mission is fully funded. The risks associated with alternative resource 
allocations for specific equipment systems have been fully considered. 
Allocating additional resources to equipment programs may require 
diversion of resources from other functional areas, such as personnel, 
construction, or research and development. The overall balance of the 
Defense program, within limited resources, is our foremost concern. 
Each year's President's Budget attempts to reflect this balance, and 
our budget documentation details the strategies and costs. Therefore, 
all key equipment items will be fully funded, within available 
resources, at appropriate levels to accomplish our mission. Submitting 
an additional report concurrent with the annual budget would be a 
duplication of effort. 

Technical Comments DRAFT GAO Report GAO-05-978, GAO Code 350548: 

AIR FORCE TECHNICAL COMMENTS: 

F-16 Fighting Falcon: 

Issue: Page 105, Condition paragraph, line 6. Draft Report States: The 
sentence reading: "Officials stated that the most significant factor 
affecting the F-16 cracks, which occur mostly on older aircraft because 
of the stress caused by repeatedly landing without dropping its twelve 
2,000 pound bombs." is incorrect. 

Change to read: Officials stated that the most significant sustainment 
factor affecting the F-16 are structural cracks resulting from frequent 
operations near maximum gross weight limitations, with older aircraft 
being more susceptible. 

At absolute minimum, need to change "twelve" to "two" as an F-16 
aircraft is incapable of carrying 24,000 pounds of bombs. 

C-5 Galaxy Transport: 

Issue: Page 111, general paragraph, line 3. 

Delete the sentence: "The C-5 provides a unique capability in that it 
is the only aircraft that can carry any piece of Army equipment, 
including a 74-ton mobile bridge" and replace with "The C-5 is one of 
only two aircraft in the Air Force inventory that can carry outsized 
equipment." Rationale: Many aircraft can carry Army equipment. However, 
the C-5 and C-17, which are complementary, are the only two weapon 
systems capable of transporting Army outsized equipment. 

Issue: Page 111, general paragraph, line 9. 

Delete: ", which is expected to be complete in the summer of 2005," 
Rationale: Study has not completed. 

Issue: Page 111, paragraph on "Condition," line 2. 

Delete the sentence: "As shown in figure 54, mission capable rates for 
the C-5 consistently remained below the Air Force stated goal of 75 
percent between fiscal years 1999 and 2004" and replace with "As shown 
in figure 54, mission capable rates for the C-5 consistently remained 
below Air Force goals between fiscal years 1999 and 2004." 

Rationale: It is best to discuss low mission capable rates in general 
terms since there are wide variances between users. For instance, the 
Air Force wartime goal is 75 percent while peacetime goals vary between 
active duty units (75%) and reserve component units (55%). 

B-2 Spirit Bomber: 

Issue: Page 110, Near-Term Program Strategy and Funding, line 10. 

Change the last sentence to read: "For windshield crack, officials 
stated that redesigning the spacing of drill holes will address the 
problem: delivery of new windshields is scheduled to begin in late 
2005." 

Rationale: The new B-2 windshields will not be delivered by the end of 
2005. 

Issue: Pages 109-110. 

Comment: The entire B-2 section focuses on sustainment issues and does 
not address any of the plans/programs to increase the combat 
capabilities of the B-2. This does not provide a complete picture of 
the B-2 program. 

B-1B Lancer Bomber: 

Issue: Pages 107-108. 

Comment: Change all references from B-1B to B-1. 

Rationale: The Air Force has changed the aircraft's name to B-1. 

Issue: Page 108, Long-Term Program Strategy and Funding, line 8. 

Change sentence to read: "To address these issues, the Air Force has 
funded effort to modernize and upgrade B-1 components, to include 
cockpit flight instrument displays and navigation systems." 

Rationale: The Vertical Situation Display (VSD) modification replaces 
the pilot and copilot's flight instrument displays, not all situational 
displays. 

Issue: Page 107, Paragraph l, line 6. 

Change sentence to read: "keep the B-1B in use through at least 2040." 

Rationale: This is the correct service life projection and is 
consistent with the DODIG Exit Briefing. 

F-15 Eagle and Strike Eagle: 

Pages 102, Paragraph 1, Line 7: 

Change sentence: "ranging from about 21 years to 27 years," to read 
"Ranging from about 21 to 26 years". 

Rationale: This is the correct service life projection and is 
consistent with DODIG Exit briefing. 

KC-135 Stratotanker: 

Issue: Pages 115, Paragraph 1, Line 5. 

Delete sentence: "..they expect the number of maintenance man-hours to 
increase by 2.5 percent each year." 

Rationale: This statement is not verifiable. 

NAVY TECHNICAL COMMENTS: 

AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter: 

Issue: Page 21, Table 4. 

Comment: We do not understand the basis for the $63.6 million unfunded 
requirement listed in Table 4. It is assumed that $50 million is the 
same requirement to fund NRE for Build new Z called out on page 80. 
NAVAIR has requested clarification from the GAO audit team and is 
awaiting their reply. 

Comment: Page 79, the correct inventory for AH-1W is 179, not 180. 

AV-8B Harrier Jet: 

Comment: Page 77, the correct inventory for AV-8B is 154, not 156. 

CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter: 

Comment: Pages 9, 20, and 23 include statements regarding the lack of 
repair parts due to aircraft age. The first-time fill rate for H-46 
spares is at historic highs. Also, the A/C sortie rate and Mission 
Capable rates compare favorably with any other rotary wing A/C in the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise. This would not be possible if there were 
spare part availability problems. While a CH-46E parts problem in the 
future cannot be ruled out, it's supply support posture is currently 
green. 

Issue: Page 81, "Condition" paragraph. 

Comments: The paragraph references 180 engine upgrades. The actual 
number of upgrades is 234, as of 30 August 2005. 

Issue: Page 82, "Near-term Program Strategy and Funding paragraph. 

Comments: The statements about repair parts shortages and availability 
are misleading. First-time fill rates for supply parts are at 
historically high levels and the high readiness levels in OIF bear this 
out. While original production lines have been shut down at the OEM, we 
still have sources for all key repair parts. If a source goes away, a 
new one would be qualified. This is a common occurrence in aviation 
industrial support. 

CH-53E Super Stallion Helicopter: 

Issue: Page 5, "Results in Brief' paragraph, 3rD sentence. 

Draft Report States: "For example, the Marine Corps' CH-53E helicopter 
received a red rating for its near-term program strategy and funding 
plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term 
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages". 

Change to Read: "For example, the Marine Corps' CH-53E helicopter 
received a red rating for its long-term program strategy and funding 
plan because the service may be unable to meet its near-term 
requirements due to potential aircraft and repair parts shortages". 
Table 1 on page 7, and page 85 of Appendix 11 state the near-term 
program strategy and funding plan as yellow. 

Issue: Page 20, Table 3. 

Comment: Table 3 utilizes the reason, "Strategy not funded in DOD's 
fiscal year 2006 budget" to categorize the CH-53E. This is not entirely 
accurate. Sustainment strategy for the CH-53E is funded to start FY2006 
and continue throughout the FYDP. 

Issue: Page 84, "Condition" paragraph. 

Comments: This paragraph implies that high utilization has caused 
structural cracks; this is not correct. The tail pylon crack has been 
an ongoing issue long before OIF/OEF operations, as well as a fatigue 
issue concerning the transition section bulkhead that is related to 
aircraft flight hours. OIF and OEF operations and increased utilization 
have accelerated the need to repair these areas, and repair kits are 
available, but the operations have not caused the issues. 

Issue: Page 85, "Near-term Program Strategy and Funding paragraph, last 
sentence. Comments: The funding identified for diagnostic systems and 
engine upgrades as unfunded 2006 priorities is actually $31.0 million, 
not $35.6 million. The additional $4.6 million includes other unfunded 
issues. 

Issue: Page 85, "Long-term Program Strategy and Funding" paragraph. 

Comments: Heavy Lift Replacement requirements are stable, and were 
approved through the JROC in December 2004. 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft: 

Issue: Page 92, First Paragraph, inventories. 

Comment: The correct inventory for F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet is 914, 
not 904. For other models: F/A-18A -123, not 142; F/A-18B - 28, 
correct; F/A-18C - 396, correct; F/A-18D - 139, not 141; F/A-18E -102, 
not 93; F/A-18F -126, not 104. 

Issue: Page 92, "Condition" paragraph. 

Comment: The last two sentences should be amended and an additional 
sentence added as follows (changes in italics and bolded): 

"This effort addresses the predictable rate of wear and deterioration 
on the aircraft due to factors such as carrier take-off and landings 
and contributes to overall life extensions. The aircraft is not 
available for operations during the 1 year scheduled for this process." 
During this period the Navy takes advantage of aircraft time out of 
service to conduct scheduled maintenance and other modifications on 
those aircraft. 

Issue: Page 93, "Long-term Program Strategy and Funding" paragraph. 

Comment: The ending of the last paragraph should read: 

"Program officials confirmed that another delay in arrival of the Joint 
Strike Fighter may require the FIA-18 program to seek other 
alternatives to meet requirement goals, such as, replace more center 
barrels on Hornets, management of aircraft fatigue life, or additional 
procurement of super hornets. Moreover, fatigue life is not the only 
factor used when determining the expected service life of an aircraft; 
flying hours and takeoff and landings also impact the F/ A 18's life 
expectancy. If Hornets are required to operate longer.." 

P-3 Orion Aircraft: 

Issue: Pages 98 and 99. 

Comment: Some of the impact statements may, if taken out of context, 
seem misleading. For example, the first sentence of the Condition 
paragraph states, "The Orion is not available in sufficient numbers to 
meet day-to-day Navy requirements." This statement should be addressed 
by CNAF. It's possible that the Fleet is meeting deployed requirements, 
but not all at-home training requirements. Does this mean they are not 
meeting day-to-day requirements? Also, the impact statements are valid 
only for the snapshot in time that the interviews were conducted. For 
example, the P-3 is rated as red for long-term program strategy and 
funding. Since we can only comment to Congress on program of record 
(PB06, in this case), then the statement that shows the AMIP program 
"has not been fully approved, nor has it been funded," (page 99) is 
only partially true. Part of the program has Navy support, but through 
the NAVCOMPT07 budget cycle, a cycle not yet recognized by OSD or 
Congress, and therefore not part of the Program of Record. The bottom 
line is that the program has evolved naturally over the preceding 7 
months and the statements are correct if they have a caveat that 
identifies the snapshot in time of the interviews (around January 
2005). 

ARMY TECHNICAL COMMENTS: 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle/Abrams Tank: 

Issue: Page 9, Line 15. 

Draft Report States: "For example, the Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
received a red rating because the Army has not fully identified the 
future requirements and funding for this item." Comment: The GAO report 
uses only the Base budget as a measurement for funding strategy. The 
report mentions the use of supplemental funding and PBD 753 but does 
not refer to it in any explanations of the system strategies. Both (and 
the M113) were heavily funded through PBD 753, as indicated by the PBD 
direction below. 

(U) Abrams/Bradley Upgrade. The Army currently has three distinct 
variants of the Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicle fleets. The 
additional funding coupled with Base programs improves the Army's Heavy 
Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) modular force/modernization posture to 16 
(MIA2 SEP/M2A3 Bradley)/ 14 (MIA I AIM/M2A2 ODS Bradley)/ 5 (MIA I 
Heavy Armor/M2A2 Bradley) HBCTs. Funding provides the Army with a more 
balanced lethal, survivable and sustainable heavy combat force. 

(U) M113, Selected Procurement and MODS Procures 1,075 M113A3 Family of 
Vehicles (FOV) - M1068A3, M577A3, M113A3, and M1064A3 to meet M113 
shortfalls in 30 HBCTs, 12 FIRES BDEs, 12 Mine Clearance Companies, 70 
Sapper Companies, and 56 Mobility Augmentation Companies. 

OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter: 

Issue: Page 26. Table 5. 

Draft Report States: "Replacement systems are delayed or not 
identified." 

Comment: The Chief of Staff approved the requirement for 368 Armed 
Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to replace the obsolete OH-58D fleet 
during the FY05-11 period. The First Unit Equipped date is Sept 08 and 
the source selection board went with the Bell version for the ARH (it 
was signed about three weeks ago). The report should be updated with 
this current information. 

CH-47D/F Chinook Helicopter: 

Issue: Page 60, Condition: line 7. 

Comment: "While most Army helicopters remain in theater.." This line 
suggests the entire deployed CH-47 fleet remained in theater for more 
than one rotation. This is not true. To date only one CH-47 Heavy 
Helicopter Company (12 aircraft) left their aircraft in theater for 
back to back rotations; however, current shortages of CH-47 aircraft 
and the requirement to fill nearly simultaneous competing priorities 
with limited resources may require additional SBE of CH-47 aircraft. 

OSD COMMENTS: 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle: 

Issue: Page 22 and 45. 

Draft Report States: "For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion in 
the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to purchase 93 new Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles and recapitalize 554 others.." 

Recommended Change: "For example, the Army requested $1.4 billion in 
the fiscal year 2005 supplemental in order to accelerate 
recapitalization of the Bradley Fighting Vehicles; producing 93 
vehicles to replace combat losses and 554 to meet the needs of Army 
modernization..", or remove the BFV as an example entirely. 

Rationale: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle is no longer in production; the 
FY 2005 supplemental pays for recapitalization of vehicle hulls to 
replace combat losses, reduce fleet age, or upgrade the existing fleet 
to meet the needs of modularity. The logic behind this example is 
flawed as BFV recapitalization is part of the Army modularity/ 
modernization plan. Part of that plan is paid for initially with 
supplemental funding, and starting in FY 2007 it will be incorporated 
into the base budget. 

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier: 

Issue: Page 47, Army M113 inventory. "The Army originally introduced 
the M113 in 1960 and the current fleet of A2 and A3 variants, totaling 
6,672, has an average age of almost 16 years." Recommended Change: "The 
Army originally introduced the M113 in 1960 and the current fleet of A2 
and A3 variants, totaling approximately 16,000, has an average age of 
almost 16 years." Rationale: The GAO report appears to have only 
included the A3 variant, not the A2 which they referenced in the same 
sentence. The average age is very close to that already listed even 
though the inventory dramatically increased. 

Assault Amphibian Vehicle: 

Issue: Page 71, AAV equipment. "The average age of the vehicle is 28.6 
years" Recommended Change: "The average age of the vehicle is 19 years 
which includes compensating for a 1985 Service Life Extension Program 
(SLEP) which reset the age to zero or restarted the age calculations." 

Rationale: The military undertakes upgrades, SLEPs and other 
modifications that in some cases restarts the age calculations or in 
others extends the service life. In this case, the GAO did not take 
that into account in listing the original average age. 

AV-8B Harrier Jet: 

Issue: Page 77, AV-8B. "There are 156 in inventory" 

Recommended Change: "There are a total of 154 aircraft broken out as 
follows: 131 combat capable aircraft, 17 non-combat capable training 
aircraft, and 6 in storage." 

Rationale: There are 131 combat capable AV-8B's; 38 original night 
attack, and 93 radar variants (both original and remanufactured). The 
16 active 2-seat trainer aircraft, TAV-813's, are not combat capable 
and should not be included in combat assumptions. An additional 
unsupportable 5 single seat and 1 TAV-8B, are in storage and may be 
upgraded in the near future. 

F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet Aircraft: 

Issue: Page 93, F/A-18A Near-Term Program Strategy. "The Navy is unable 
to fund improved detection and targeting systems for the (legacy) 
Hornet, for example, the Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared 
system, and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System." 

Recommended Change: Remove the sentence: 

Rationale: The Navy has fully funded the Advanced Targeting Forward 
Looking Infrared system (ATFLIRS) for legacy Hornets (all Super Hornets 
have the ATFLIR) so the GAO statement is incorrect. The JHMCS is fully 
funded for FA-18 aircraft lots 13 and higher. Lots 12 and below (about 
25% of the total FA-18A,B,C,D Hornets) are not funded and will decided 
upon in the FY2008 budget. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals also 
made major contributions to the report: David Schmitt, Assistant 
Director; Patricia Lentini; Vipin Arora; Janine Cantin; Alissa Czyz; 
Barbara Hills; Barbara Gannon; Stanley Kostyla; Josh Margraf; Brian 
Mateja; Kimberly Mayo; Jim Melton; Kenneth Patton; Malvern Saavedra; 
and John Trubey. 

(350548): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, 
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 
(Washington, D.C.: December 2003). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 805 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2437). 

[3] Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the 
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106 
(2003); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L No. 108- 
287, (2004); and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13. 

[4] Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that 
indicate the equipment can perform at least one and potentially all of 
its designated missions. 

[5] Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming 
days. 

[6] If we were able to collect data on deployed mission capable rates 
for the selected equipment items, we discussed this information in the 
relevant appendix section. 

[7] Sustaining refers to maintaining the equipment to prolong its 
operations; modernizing refers to upgrading equipment items or 
replacing specific parts; and replacing refers to complete replacement 
of one equipment item with a new equipment item, e.g., the Marine Corps 
plans to replace the CH-46E with the MV-22 Osprey. 

[8] The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department's official 
projection of the forces and resources needed to support the programs 
approved by the Secretary of Defense for the biennial budget years and 
the following 4 years. 

[9] The military services report readiness on selected military 
equipment based upon mission capable or operational readiness rates. 

[10] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive internal review 
of its forces, resources, and programs that DOD performs every 4 years. 
The next review is scheduled to be completed in February 2006. 

[11] Appendix II contains our detailed assessments for each of the 30 
equipment items. 

[12] The only question that appeared in both reports concerned the 
condition of equipment. In the earlier report, strategy and funding 
were assessed separately. See GAO-04-112. 

[13] An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a 
war-time 1-year period versus 1,000 miles under a normal peacetime 
operational tempo. 

[14] In early 2005, officials stated that all vehicles entering Iraq 
would have armor. 

[15] This act applies or will soon apply to the following equipment 
items included in our review based upon the replacement system 
beginning development: Marine Corps' M1A1, Light Armored Vehicle, 
Assault Amphibian Vehicle, AV-8B Harrier jet, and CH-53E; the Navy's F/ 
A-18, EA-6B, and P-3; and the Air Force's F-16. 

[16] 10 U.S.C. § 2241, note provides that, except for safety 
modifications, funds should not be used for the modification of an 
aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that the military department 
concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years after 
completion of the modification. 

[17] GAO reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems 
with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and 
performance shortfalls. In our most recent study of these problems, GAO 
assessed 54 programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter, and found 
that the majority of the programs assessed are costing more and taking 
longer to develop. See, GAO, Defense Acquisition: Assessment of 
Selected Major Weapons Programs, GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: March 
2005). 

[18] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, 
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003). 

[19] Mission capable rates are measures of material condition that 
indicate the equipment can perform at least one and potentially all of 
its designated missions. 

[20] Utilization rates refer to flying hours, tank miles, and steaming 
days. 

[21] The Future Years Defense Program reflects the department's 
official projection of the forces and resources needed to support the 
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense for the biennial budget 
years and the following 4 years. 

[22] We did not independently verify or validate the requirements as 
part of this audit. 

[23] There are 739 M1 tanks in the Army's inventory averaging 20 years 
in age and they are found primarily in the National Guard. The M1 is 
similar to the M1A1 and M1A2 except that it possesses a 105 mm cannon 
and lacks the special armor protection. Due to its age and limited 
usage, our analysis did not include this variant. 

[24] GAO, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, 
Funding Priorities, and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2003). 

[25] Brigade Combat Teams are the foundation of the Army's new 
modularized force structure. 

[26] There are approximately 15,785 vehicles that use the common M113 
chassis. However, our analysis only focused on the M113A2 and A3 
personnel carriers. 

[27] GAO-04-112. 

[28] The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity and 
Modernization Strategy lays out a comprehensive strategy for meeting 
modularity requirements and modernizing the current tactical wheeled 
vehicle fleet. 

[29] GAO-04-112. 

[30] The HEMTT Extended Service Program is a recapitalization program 
that supports modularity by remanufacturing and upgrading existing 
HEMTT vehicles. 

[31] An operational tempo of 6:1 equates to putting 6,000 miles in a 
wartime 1-year period versus 1,000 miles under a normal peacetime 
operational tempo. 

[32] The five restrictions identified in last year's report were 
aircraft Teflon bushings, transmissions, the main rotor blade attaching 
pins, generator power cables, and the auxiliary power unit clutch. The 
bushings, rotor blade attaching pins, and power cable issues have been 
resolved. The corrections for the transmission should be completed 
across the fleet by 2009 and the clutch should be completed in July 
2005. 

[33] GAO-04-112. 

[34] Fiscal year 2003 funding authorizations were about 7 percent less 
than requested, and fiscal year 2004 funding authorizations were about 
11 percent more than requested. 

[35] 10 U.S.C. § 2241, note. This law provides that, except for safety 
modifications, funds should not be used for the modification of an 
aircraft, weapon, ship, or other equipment that the military department 
concerned plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within 5 years after 
completion of the modification. 

[36] GAO-04-112. 

[37] The material readiness rate reflects the operational capability of 
Marine Corps ground equipment and is comparable to mission capable 
rates. 

[38] GAO-04-112. 

[39] During an Inspect and Replace Only As Necessary maintenance 
program, vehicles are disassembled and inspected for deficiencies and 
only those deficiencies that are identified are repaired or replaced. 

[40] GAO-04-112. 

[41] GAO-04-112. 

[42] GAO-04-112. 

[43] GAO-04-112. 

[44] GAO-04-112. 

[45] GAO-04-112. 

[46] GAO-04-112. 

[47] Officials state that the calculated service life for a B-1 is 
18,000 hours, and they estimate that the fleet would reach that point 
in 2040. 

[48] GAO-04-112. 

[49] The Air Force did not have a mission capable goal for the B-2 in 
fiscal year 1999. 

[50] The Mobility Capabilities Study is a DOD effort to address the 
size of the required number of mobility airframes and aircrews 
necessary to support implementation of the National Defense Strategy. 

[51] GAO-04-112. 

[52] GAO-04-112 

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