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Report to the Secretary of Defense: 

September 2005: 

Defense Transportation: 

Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and Analyze Better Data to Assess 
Aircraft Utilization: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-819]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-819, a report to the Secretary of Defense: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, transportation method. From 
September 2001 to April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent 
about $9.5 billion using airlift to transport equipment, supplies, and 
troops for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
As of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent of all 
cargo and passengers transported for these operations. DOD has stated 
that high demand for available airlift assets requires the department 
to use airlift assets as efficiently as possible. However, DOD’s 
primary objective emphasizes delivering “the right items to the right 
place at the right time” over using aircraft capacity as efficiently as 
possible. 

Under the Comptroller General’s authority, GAO sought to determine 
whether DOD used capacity on strategic military aircraft transporting 
cargo and passengers between the United States and overseas theaters 
for OEF and OIF as efficiently as possible. 

What GAO Found: 

Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency 
responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and 
analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual 
missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use 
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about 
short tons transported and information about operational factors, such 
as weather and runway length, when planning and executing airlift 
missions. AMC does not capture data about these variables in a manner 
that allows officials to determine historically whether aircraft 
capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission planning files and 
the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is used to track 
mission data could provide some information about operational factors 
that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated with these 
data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD used 
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data 
about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, 
GAO calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft 
and compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload 
planning factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and 
more than 81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD’s 
payload planning factors, as shown in the table below. However, because 
data on operational factors that impact payloads were not available, 
GAO was not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient 
use of aircraft capacity. Without adequate information about 
operational variables and how these impact mission payloads, AMC 
officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to use 
aircraft more efficiently and whether operational tempo, cost, and wear 
and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, DOD officials do 
not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future airlift 
requirements for planning purposes. 

Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding AMC’s 
Payload Planning Factors: 

[See PDF for image] 

Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for 
mission planning because data were not available. Although the C-130, 
KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, GAO 
has included them in its analysis in those instances when AMC used 
these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have 
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, we use a 71.5 payload 
planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads). 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to improve DOD’s collection and analysis 
of information on operational factors that impact payloads transported 
on strategic airlift missions. DOD concurred with our recommendations. 
However, based on DOD’s comments, GAO has modified one recommendation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-819. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 
512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on 
Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for Strategic Airlift: 

Appendix III: Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft Capacity 
Utilized: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for 
Strategic Aircraft: 

Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and Definitions: 

Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding 
Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, October 2001 to September 
2004: 

Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum 
Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift: 

Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to 
September 2004: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, September 2001 to 
December 2004: 

Abbreviations: 

Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft: 

Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft: 

Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft: 

Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft: 

Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft: 

Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft: 

Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a C-17 in 
Support of OIF: 

Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17: 

Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo Can 
Decrease Payloads: 

Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to 
Accommodate Passengers: 

Letter September 29, 2005: 

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld: 
Secretary of Defense: 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

When deploying forces overseas for the United States, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) uses a variety of means to transport equipment, supplies, 
and troops to a theater of operations, including rail, trucks, ships, 
and aircraft. From September 30, 2001, through April 30, 2005, DOD 
spent more than $19 billion to transport equipment, supplies, and 
troops in support of the Global War on Terrorism, including Operations 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).[Footnote 1]Of this, DOD 
has spent about $9.5 billion to transport equipment, supplies, and 
troops for OEF and OIF via airlift, which is a fast and flexible, but 
expensive, transportation method relative to sealift. At the end of 
December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent (464,239 short 
tons) of the more than 3.4 million short tons transported via airlift 
and sealift for these operations.[Footnote 2] According to U.S. Air 
Force doctrine, high demand for limited airlift assets requires the 
department to use airlift as efficiently as possible while still 
meeting combatant commanders' delivery time frames. Because DOD 
emphasizes delivering the "right items to the right place at the right 
time" for the warfighter, this doctrine states that meeting mission 
needs is the Air Mobility Command's (AMC) primary objective, while the 
efficient use of aircraft capacity is a secondary goal. Nevertheless, 
United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and AMC officials are 
looking for ways to decrease costs and use aircraft capacity as 
efficiently as possible while continuing to meet mission needs. These 
officials acknowledge that they need information that helps decision 
makers understand whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently while 
meeting mission needs, especially when the pace of operations is high, 
and to plan for future airlift transportation needs. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller 
General. We sought to determine whether DOD used strategic military 
aircraft efficiently during OEF and OIF. Specifically, our objective 
was to assess the extent to which DOD used all available space and 
weight on these aircraft when transporting equipment and supplies--
hereafter referred to as "cargo"--and passengers for OEF and OIF to the 
extent possible. 

In performing our work, we reviewed applicable DOD guidance, 
interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials, and analyzed AMC aircraft 
mission data. For purposes of this report, we focused our review of 
strategic airlift missions on contingency and special assignment 
airlift missions in support of OEF and OIF.[Footnote 3] We excluded 
channel missions--scheduled flights over established worldwide routes 
on government-owned or chartered aircraft under the operational control 
of AMC that are used for cargo and troop movements--because these occur 
on a regular schedule, and it is possible that payloads would regularly 
be light. To obtain a better understanding of operational factors, such 
as weather, fuel considerations, and aircraft and airfield 
characteristics, that can impact payloads on individual missions, we 
reviewed a limited number of historical mission planning files for OEF 
and OIF and a Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES) data 
field that could provide some information about operational factors on 
individual missions. However, limitations associated with these data 
sources prevent using these for analysis to determine whether DOD used 
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of 
reliable data about operational factors, we obtained and analyzed 
strategic military airlift mission data for missions occurring from 
October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004, for the two operations to get 
an indication of how well AMC utilized aircraft capacity. To determine 
whether DOD used capacity on these aircraft as efficiently as possible, 
we analyzed whether payloads transported for OEF and OIF met historical 
average payloads, known as payload planning factors. We compared 
average payloads transported by each aircraft type to the payload 
planning factors for each aircraft type. We also assessed the 
reliability of these data by reviewing existing documentation related 
to the data sources, electronically testing the data to identify 
obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, and interviewing 
knowledgeable agency officials about the data. We determined the data 
were sufficiently reliable for calculating average payloads transported 
on each type of aircraft. However, data were not sufficiently available 
to determine how operational factors impacted payloads transported on 
individual missions. Without information about operational factors that 
impacted payloads on these airlift missions, we are unable to determine 
whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. We 
discussed our methodology with AMC officials who agreed that such an 
analysis was appropriate. We conducted our review from September 2004 
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology 
is presented in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Because the AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational 
factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know 
how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as 
efficiently as possible. According to U.S. Air Force doctrine, high 
demand for limited airlift assets requires the department to use 
airlift as efficiently as possible while still meeting combatant 
commanders' delivery time frames. Although the AMC collects data about 
short tons transported and information about operational factors, such 
as weather and runway length, as it plans and executes airlift 
missions, the command does not capture data about these factors in a 
manner that allows officials to determine historically whether DOD used 
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Historical mission 
planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System, a 
database that is used to track mission data, could provide some 
information about operational factors that impact mission payloads for 
individual missions. However, limitations associated with these data 
sources--such as the completeness and format of mission files and 
unknown accuracy of a Global Air Transportation Execution System data 
field--prevent using these for analysis of aircraft capacity used. 
Without information about operational factors that impacted payloads on 
these airlift missions, we are unable to determine whether DOD used 
aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data 
about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, we 
calculated the average payloads for each type of aircraft and compared 
these to payload planning factors--the historical average payloads 
transported on each type of aircraft. Our analysis of 14,692 strategic 
airlift missions flown in support of OIF and OEF showed that over 97 
percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 percent of C-17 missions 
carried payloads below the relevant payload planning factors for these 
types of aircraft. Also, nearly 19 percent of the missions did not meet 
the minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers to qualify 
for use of strategic airlift. However, AMC is required to provide 
airlift whenever cargo and passengers are approved for movement, even 
if minimum requirements for using strategic airlift are not met or the 
requirement will not use an aircraft's available capacity as 
efficiently as possible if this is the only way to accomplish the 
mission. Given the absence of information about operational factors 
that could explain why heavier payloads were not transported on 
specific missions, command officials do not know the extent to which 
opportunities exist to use aircraft capacity more efficiently. 
Potentially inefficient use of aircraft could cause higher operational 
tempo and may increase costs as well as wear and tear on aircraft. In 
addition, this lack of information could cause DOD to understate or 
overstate future lift requirements for planning purposes, and the right 
mix and number of aircraft may not be available for future 
contingencies. 

We are making recommendations to improve the department's collection 
and analysis of information on operational factors that impact payloads 
transported on aircraft used for strategic airlift. DOD provided 
written comments on a draft of this report and concurred with each of 
our recommendations. Based on DOD's written comments, we modified one 
recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments on this report, 
and we made changes where appropriate. We have reprinted DOD's comments 
in appendix IV. 

Background: 

TRANSCOM, located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is a unified 
combatant command that provides air, land, and sea transportation for 
DOD, both in peacetime and wartime.[Footnote 4] AMC, one of TRANSCOM's 
three component commands, provides strategic airlift, among other 
services--such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet through which contracted 
commercial aircraft support DOD airlift requirements in emergencies 
when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft-
-for deploying, sustaining, and redeploying U.S. forces 
worldwide.[Footnote 5] Strategic airlift moves cargo and passengers 
between the continental United States and overseas theaters or between 
overseas theaters. AMC operates military aircraft that constitute the 
U.S. strategic airlift fleet, including the C-5, C-17, and C-141 
aircraft (app. II describes each aircraft).[Footnote 6] In addition, 
AMC can use aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-135, 
for transporting cargo. Although the C-130 is primarily used for 
intratheater airlift missions, AMC sometimes uses it in a strategic 
airlift role to transport cargo from the United States to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being moved into the theater 
and assigned to the United States Central Command. AMC's Tanker Airlift 
Control Center plans, schedules, and tracks tanker and airlift 
worldwide. The Fusion Cell, a division within AMC's Tanker Airlift 
Control Center, was created following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, to provide senior decision makers with information 
about the movement of air mobility assets, especially for those 
missions associated with contingency operations. The Fusion Cell is 
charged with collecting and analyzing cargo and passenger data from 
completed missions using TRANSCOM-and AMC-owned and controlled 
databases, such as the Global Transportation Network, GATES, and the 
Global Decision Support System, and ensuring data quality.[Footnote 7]

TRANSCOM uses the combatant commander's delivery date at the final 
destination as well as information about the number and type of troops 
and cargo--the requirement--needed to accomplish a specific mission to 
determine the appropriate type of transportation needed to meet that 
date, develop feasible transportation schedules for deploying forces, 
assign ports of embarkation, and determine the best mode of 
transportation. AMC uses 15 short tons or 100 passengers as the minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift and may combine cargo loads to meet 
this requirement. However, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever 
cargo and passengers are approved for movement even if minimum 
requirements for using strategic airlift are not met or the requirement 
will not use an aircraft's available capacity as efficiently as 
possible if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. If airlift 
is required, TRANSCOM tasks AMC with assigning and scheduling airlift. 
TRANSCOM reserves the use of airlift for (1) short notice and emergency 
requirements, (2) intelligence-related or sensitive cargo, and (3) when 
operational security considerations preclude the use of sealift. AMC 
assigns aircraft to move cargo and passengers based on (1) mission 
urgency and sensitivity, (2) cargo and passenger characteristics, and 
(3) other special factors. Currently, DOD transports the majority of 
cargo by sealift, as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Percentage of Cargo Transported by Sealift and Airlift for 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, September 2001 to 
December 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

AMC officials use the average historical payload transported on each 
type of aircraft (see table 1), known as payload planning factors, to 
develop broad estimates of the types and number of aircraft initially 
needed to meet mission requirements. The payload planning factors are 
generally less than the maximum payload capacity, including the weight 
of unit personnel, equipment, and material that an aircraft can carry, 
known as the allowable cabin load. 

Table 1: Payload Planning Factors and Allowable Cabin Loads for 
Strategic Aircraft: 

In short tons. 

Aircraft type: C-5; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 61.3; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 10.2; 
Allowable cabin load: 89.0. 

Aircraft type: C-17; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 45.0; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 18.0; 
Allowable cabin load: 65.0. 

Aircraft type: C-130; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 12.0; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 16.0; 
Allowable cabin load: 17.0. 

Aircraft type: C-141; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 19.0; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 24.0; 
Allowable cabin load: 30.0. 

Aircraft type: KC-10; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 32.6; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 13.6; 
Allowable cabin load: 60.0. 

Aircraft type: KC-135; 
Payload planning factor: Cargo: 13.0; 
Payload planning factor: Passenger: 9.2; 
Allowable cabin load: 18.0. 

Source: United States Air Force. 

Notes: The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or 
only passengers, not a mixture. For all aircraft types except the C-5, 
mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors in between the 
cargo and passenger payloads listed above. Because C-5s have separate 
compartments for passengers and cargo, the mixed payload planning 
factor would be the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads (71.5 short 
tons). Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered 
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in 
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift 
roles. 

[End of table]

The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on 
Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained: 

Because AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational 
factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know 
how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as 
efficiently as possible. Historical mission planning files have 
limitations that prevent DOD officials from using the files to 
determine whether AMC used aircraft efficiently. In addition, data on 
operational factors captured in the GATES database are not useful 
because codes that could provide AMC officials with information about 
why aircraft flew with the payloads they did are neither well-defined 
nor comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of the data cannot 
be determined. In the absence of data about operational factors that 
impact payloads on individual missions, we calculated the average 
payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to the 
payload planning factors. Our analysis of AMC data showed that more 
than 86 percent of these missions flew with payloads that were lighter 
than established payload planning factors, and some of these did not 
meet the minimum requirement of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed 
to qualify for use of strategic airlift. However, because AMC lacks 
data to determine how operational factors impact payloads, we are not 
able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an 
aircraft's capacity. 

Historical Mission Planning Files Have Limitations That Prevent Their 
Use to Determine Whether AMC Used Aircraft Capacity as Efficiently as 
Possible: 

Historical mission planning files identify mission data and operational 
factors that may impact aircraft payloads, but we found limitations 
with using these files to determine whether AMC used an aircraft's 
capacity as efficiently as possible. We reviewed 25 historical mission 
planning files for OEF and OIF to gain an understanding of how 
operational factors could impact payloads. We found these files were 
not retained in a format that facilitates manipulation of data for 
analysis to determine whether an aircraft's capacity was used 
efficiently, and the files were not always complete or accurate. 
Although the historical mission planning files contain some information 
that could help identify operational factors that impacted aircraft 
payloads, the data are not easy to manipulate for analysis because the 
historical mission planning files are paper based. Currently, AMC 
stores the files in binders and boxes categorized by the operation, 
such as OEF, and the month and year of the flight. Officials told us 
that this organization system makes it difficult to access data for 
specific missions. 

We also found that some of the files we reviewed were incomplete or 
inaccurate. For instance, 3 of the 25 mission files we reviewed were 
missing load plans that AMC officials use to identify appropriate 
aircraft with which to transport cargo and passengers. According to a 
command official, time constraints, among other factors, can impact 
whether load plans were sent to AMC. An official told us that units 
sometimes make changes to the load plans and do not inform AMC, which 
could cause aircraft to be underutilized if the allowable cabin load of 
the available and scheduled aircraft is too large for the size and 
weight of the requirement to be moved. AMC officials did not provide 
data on the frequency with which units make such changes. However, 
because of concerns about the accuracy of load plans, especially from 
units that do not deploy frequently, AMC officials told us that they 
always call units before scheduling aircraft to request load plans and 
confirm the accuracy of validated Time Phased Force and Deployment Data 
that identify the forces, sequence, and priority of unit deployments; 
the locations of ports of debarkation for a specific unit; and the 
number of pieces of cargo, cargo dimensions, and numbers and weights of 
passengers. 

Despite these limitations, the mission planning files are the only 
combined source of mission information that includes load plans, 
diplomatic clearances, and air refueling requests and shows what was 
planned to be transported on an aircraft used for OEF and OIF. An AMC 
official told us that the historical mission planning files capture 
operational data that could be valuable for helping DOD understand the 
implications of moving to a lighter and faster force and projecting 
airlift assets needed to transport this force. 

One AMC Database Is Also Not Useful for Assessing Whether Aircraft 
Capacity Was Used as Efficiently as Possible: 

Operational data captured in one of AMC's databases, GATES,--the 
"system of record" database that provides AMC with automated capability 
to process and track cargo and passenger airlift data and facilitates 
payment for services--is also not useful for assessing whether AMC used 
an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. When GATES was 
automated in 2000, command officials retained a data field called "Load 
Message Utilization" that consists of 13 codes that could provide AMC 
officials with information about why an aircraft flew with the payloads 
it did. AMC requires GATES users to manually enter a primary and, if 
relevant, a secondary code from the 13 codes presented in table 2 
before transmitting mission data to AMC, although the command does not 
review or use this information for analysis. 

Table 2: Load Message Utilization Data Field Codes and Definitions: 

Code: A; 
Pallet positions or seats not fully used due to substitute aircraft 
that provided more pallet positions or seats than the aircraft 
originally scheduled. 

Code: B; 
Excess seats. Scheduled or programmed passenger airlift capability in 
excess to station requirements. 

Code: C; 
Gained from previous station. All programmed seats used. Additional 
capability available to an en route station due to previous stations 
not using allocated seats. 

Code: D; Late passenger cancellations or no-show passengers. 

Code: E; 
Insufficient processed or palletized cargo on hand for downline 
stations, including cargo for other destinations that is authorized to 
be transshipped at downline stations (to be used if sufficient cargo is 
in the port, but not yet processed or movement ready). 

Code: F; 
Low port level. Insufficient cargo in port (both processed and 
unprocessed), for downline stations, including cargo for other 
destinations which is authorized to be transshipped at downline 
stations. 

Code: G; 
Additional crew members. Used when additional crew members preclude use 
of installed passenger seats or pallet positions. 

Code: H; 
Unsuitable cargo. Hazardous or other special handling cargo which 
precludes optimum utilization of cargo space or passenger seats. 

Code: J; 
Light pallets or cargo. All pallet positions used, but allowable cabin 
load not fully utilized due to light pallets or rolling stock or 
pallets with overhang which precludes full utilization of space. 

Code: K; 
Space block. Space not fully used due to passenger or cargo space 
blocks for downline stations. 

Code: V; 
Aircraft fully utilized, cargo mission only. Used when the percent 
utilized is 95 to 100 percent. Use the following formula: 
Payload/Allowable cabin load x 100 = percent utilized. 

Code: W; 
Aircraft fully utilized, passenger missions only. Used when 95 percent 
or more of available passenger seats were used for space required 
(duty) passengers. 

Code: Z; 
No other code applies. Provide short explanation in remarks. 

Source: GATES Data Dictionary. 

[End of table]

Although command officials could use some information captured in the 
"Load Message Utilization" data field to understand why aircraft flew 
with specific payloads, codes in this data field are neither well 
defined nor comprehensive, and the accuracy and reliability of the data 
are not known. There may be similar data fields in other transportation 
information systems such as the Global Transportation Network and 
Global Decision Support System that could be used to capture 
operational data. However, we are unaware of similar fields in these 
databases that could be modified for this use. 

According to AMC officials, some of the codes are not well defined and 
are inconsistently interpreted and applied by users. For example, the 
"V" code indicates that the aircraft is considered fully utilized only 
if the payload is 95 to 100 percent of the allowable cabin load. 
However, as we previously reported, an aircraft may be fully utilized 
with lighter payloads if the maximum volume of cargo that will fit into 
an aircraft is reached before the maximum cargo weight is 
reached.[Footnote 8] AMC officials told us that most airlifted cargo 
loads reach maximum volume before reaching maximum weight. 
Additionally, an AMC official who reviewed the "Load Message 
Utilization" codes believes that users may have inappropriately applied 
the codes. We were not able to determine the extent to which users may 
have done this because we could not determine the reliability of data. 

We also found that the codes are not as comprehensive as they could be. 
For example, there are no codes to indicate that an aircraft was fully 
utilized because the maximum volume of cargo that could fit into the 
aircraft was reached before the maximum cargo weight was reached. In 
addition, there are no codes that indicate if payloads were decreased 
to accommodate poor weather conditions; airfield characteristics, such 
as short runways; or aircraft characteristics, such as structural 
fatigue. Finally, no codes identify whether an aircraft's capacity was 
underutilized because the only available aircraft was too large for the 
size and weight of the requirement to be moved within the time frame 
required. Although GATES users could enter such information using the 
"Z" code and associated remarks, this would not guarantee consistent 
remarks or allow for AMC officials to manipulate these data for 
analysis. 

Finally, we were unable to assess the reliability or accuracy of "Load 
Message Utilization" data. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Manual recognizes that data quality is directly linked to data 
collection and entry at the port of embarkation and requires 
appropriate commander emphasis to ensure accuracy, aerial port 
supervisors are not required to review the "Load Message Utilization" 
code for accuracy prior to transmission to AMC. AMC officials told us 
that although they require this data field to be completed by users, 
AMC does not use this information and officials do not verify or 
validate the data entered in this data field. According to AMC 
officials, GATES users frequently use the "Z" code (no other code 
applies) as a placeholder. 

Analysis of AMC Data Showed That a Significant Number of Strategic 
Airlift Missions Flew with Payloads Lighter Than Established Planning 
Factors: 

Our analysis of 14,692 strategic airlift missions for OEF and OIF 
showed that more than 86 percent flew with payloads that were lighter 
than established payload planning factors; nearly 19 percent did not 
meet the minimum requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers needed 
to qualify for use of strategic airlift; and average payloads for 
strategic airlift missions were less than historical average payloads. 
For example, we found that over 97 percent of missions on C-5 aircraft, 
nearly 98 percent of missions on C-130 aircraft, and 80 percent of 
missions on KC-135 aircraft had payloads that were below the payload 
planning factors for these types of aircraft, as shown in table 3. In 
contrast, almost 19 percent of C-17 missions, about 18 percent of KC-10 
missions, and 26 percent of C-141 missions met or exceeded the relevant 
payload planning factors. 

Table 3: Number and Percentage of Missions Below, Meeting, or Exceeding 
Payload Planning Factors, by Plane Type, October 2001 to September 
2004: 

Type of aircraft: C-5; 
Number of missions: 4,425; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 71.5; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 4,305; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 97.3%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
120; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 2.71%. 

Type of aircraft: C-17; 
Number of missions: 8,909; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 45.0; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 7,263; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 81.5%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
1,646; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 18.5%. 

Type of aircraft: C-130; 
Number of missions: 551; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 12.0; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 539; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 97.8%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
12; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 2.2%. 

Type of aircraft: C-141; 
Number of missions: 511; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 19.0; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 378; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 74.0%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
133; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 26%. 

Type of aircraft: KC-10; 
Number of missions: 186; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 32.6; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 152; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 81.7%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
34; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 18.3%. 

Type of aircraft: KC-135; 
Number of missions: 110; 
Payload planning factor: (in short tons): 13.0; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 88; 
Percentage of missions below the payload planning factor: 80.0%; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
22; 
Percentage of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning 
factor: 20%. 

Total; 
Number of missions: 14,692; 
Number of missions below the payload planning factor: 12,725; 
Number of missions meeting or exceeding the payload planning factor: 
1,967. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: This analysis does not consider operational factors used for 
mission planning because data were not available. Although the C-130, 
KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered strategic airlift aircraft, we 
have included them in our analysis in those instances when AMC used 
these aircraft in strategic airlift roles. Because C-5 aircraft have 
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, we use a 71.5 payload 
planning factor (the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads) rather 
than the 61.3 short tons published in Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403. For a 
C-5 aircraft to be fully utilized, DOD would need to fully utilize 
available space in both the cargo and passenger compartments. 

[End of table]

However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors 
impact payloads (see app. III for details on some of these factors), we 
are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use 
of an aircraft's capacity. 

Our analysis also showed that about 4 percent (524) of strategic 
airlift missions carried no cargo and nearly 19 percent (2,734) of all 
strategic airlift missions transporting cargo and passengers for OEF 
and OIF did not meet the minimum requirements for use of strategic 
airlift, resulting in light payloads and, potentially, underutilization 
of aircraft (see table 4). Missions that did not meet minimum 
requirements for strategic airlift carried an average of about 5 short 
tons of cargo and 26 passengers. 

Table 4: Missions Carrying No Cargo and Not Meeting the Minimum 
Requirements for Use of Strategic Airlift: 

Type of aircraft: C-5; 
Number of missions: 4,425; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 49; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 123; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 21; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 131. 

Type of aircraft: C-17; 
Number of missions: 8,909; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 185; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,175; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 36; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 468. 

Type of aircraft: C-130; 
Number of missions: 551; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 80; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 48; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 112; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 237. 

Type of aircraft: C-141; 
Number of missions: 511; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 4; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 175; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 6; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 181. 

Type of aircraft: KC-10; 
Number of missions: 186; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 2; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 20; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 3; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 99. 

Type of aircraft: KC-135; 
Number of missions: 110; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 21; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 46; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 5; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 31. 

Total; 
Number of missions: 14,692; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 341; 
Operation Enduring Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,587; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions with no cargo: 183; 
Operation Iraqi Freedom: Number of missions not meeting minimum 
requirement for strategic airlift: 1,147. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered 
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in 
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift 
roles. 

[End of table]

However, because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors 
impact payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads 
indicate efficient use of an aircraft's capacity. 

Although aerial port officials may know why individual flights flew 
empty or with light payloads, AMC does not collect these data, and 
available data collected by AMC were not sufficient to determine why 
this occurred. AMC officials told us that data show that some aircraft 
flew empty, possibly because the command tracks mission data for 
aircraft without cargo on board that were moved into the theater and 
assigned to the United States Central Command. According to these 
officials, the lack of technology at austere locations also prevents 
capturing mission data, including payloads transported. AMC officials 
further explained that although their databases also track classified 
missions, they do not capture payloads or other data for these 
missions. 

There may be legitimate reasons why AMC flew missions that did not meet 
minimum requirements for the use of strategic airlift. For instance, 
aircraft transporting light but bulky cargo could have light payloads. 
Charleston Air Force Base officials told us that they had transported 
rolls of bubble wrap to package Patriot missiles for return to the 
United States by airlift. For this mission, the payload was light, but 
the aircraft was fully utilized because the rolls used all available 
locations where cargo can be placed. AMC officials also told us that 
they attempt to use capacity as efficiently as possible by scheduling 
an aircraft that is sufficient for the size and weight of the 
requirement to be moved, scheduling en route stops to consolidate 
smaller loads, and negotiating delivery dates when possible. However, 
unlike commercial cargo carriers such as Federal Express, AMC officials 
cannot decline to deliver a customer's order if it does not fully 
utilize the aircraft. AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo 
and passengers are approved for movement even if minimum requirements 
for using strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not 
fully utilize an aircraft's available capacity. A command official also 
told us that DOD guidance permits the use of strategic airlift even if 
the minimum requirements of 100 passengers or 15 short tons of cargo 
are not met if this is the only way to accomplish the mission. 
Therefore, AMC may fly aircraft with reduced payloads in order to meet 
combatant commanders' delivery time frames. While we believe this may 
cause aircraft to be underutilized, AMC officials emphasized that the 
command's primary objective is to deliver "the right items to the right 
place at the right time" and that optimizing capacity is a secondary 
goal. Furthermore, according to a command official, DOD established 
these minimum requirements as a way to identify large enough loads to 
justify sending a C-141 or C-17 aircraft to complete a mission. 

However, without information about operational factors that impacted 
the payloads on these airlift missions, we are unable to determine 
whether DOD used an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. In 
the absence of such data, we calculated the average payloads for each 
type of aircraft and compared these to relevant payload planning 
factors to get an indication as to how well AMC utilized aircraft. We 
found that aircraft payloads for OEF and OIF were, on average, less 
than historical average payloads. Table 5 shows the average payloads 
transported for both OEF and OIF by each type of strategic aircraft and 
how they compare to each aircraft's payload planning factor. 

Table 5: Payloads Transported by Type of Aircraft, October 2001 to 
September 2004: 

In short tons. 

Type of aircraft: C-5; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 47.8; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 48.0; 
Average payload for both operations: 47.9; 
Payload planning factor: 71.5[A]. 

Type of aircraft: C-17; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 27.5; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 29.8; 
Average payload for both operations: 28.3; 
Payload planning factor: 45.0. 

Type of aircraft: C-130; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 4.5; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 5.4; 
Average payload for both operations: 5.0; 
Payload planning factor: 12.0. 

Type of aircraft: C-141; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 15.7; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 16.6; 
Average payload for both operations: 16.5; 
Payload planning factor: 19.0. 

Type of aircraft: KC-10; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 12.9; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 17.9; 
Average payload for both operations: 17.3; 
Payload planning factor: 32.6. 

Type of aircraft: KC-135; 
Average payload for Operation Enduring Freedom: 6.5; 
Average payload for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 7.6; 
Average payload for both operations: 6.9; 
Payload planning factor: 13.0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Although the C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 are not considered 
strategic airlift aircraft, we have included them in our analysis in 
those instances when AMC used these aircraft in strategic airlift 
roles. 

[A] The payload planning factor assumes loads contain only cargo or 
only passengers, not a mixture. For all aircraft types except the C-5, 
mixed loads usually would have payload planning factors in between the 
cargo and passenger payloads listed in table 1. Because C-5s have 
separate compartments for passengers and cargo, the mixed payload 
planning factor would be the sum of the cargo and passenger payloads 
(71.5 short tons). 

[End of table]

Because AMC lacks data to determine how operational factors impact 
payloads, we are not able to determine whether these payloads indicate 
efficient use of an aircraft's capacity. 

In general, in the absence of information about operational factors 
that could explain why heavier payloads were not transported, command 
officials do not know whether and where opportunities existed to use an 
aircraft's capacity more efficiently or if there is the opportunity to 
reduce operational tempo, costs, and wear and tear on aircraft. By not 
collecting information about and analyzing the factors that impact 
aircraft capacity utilized, DOD officials could also be understating 
lift requirements for planning purposes, and the right mix and number 
of aircraft may not be available for future contingencies. 

Conclusions: 

Because DOD emphasizes delivering the "right items to the right place 
at the right time" over the efficient use of an aircraft's capacity, 
AMC has a reason for underutilizing aircraft capacity on some missions. 
However, we believe that AMC officials need more data about operational 
factors, which can also impact aircraft capacity, and that these data 
need to be maintained in a manner allows officials to determine whether 
DOD used an aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. 
Furthermore, we believe it is important that reliable and complete data 
are collected to allow DOD and the Congress to make informed decisions 
about future airlift requirements. We have reported that a key factor 
contributing to the usefulness of data is the degree to which officials 
are confident that information is credible.[Footnote 9] Useful 
practices for helping decision makers assess the quality and value of 
data include assessing the reliability and verifying and validating 
data to ensure that they adequately represent actual performance. Such 
data could help officials make informed decisions about the capacity of 
aircraft utilized when transporting cargo on strategic missions as well 
as planning for future strategic lift requirements. Because they do not 
collect information about and analyze the factors that impact payloads, 
DOD officials do not have adequate information about aircraft capacity 
and do not know whether capacity is utilized to the maximum extent 
possible. Potentially inefficient use of aircraft capacity could cause 
higher operational tempo and may increase cost as well as wear and tear 
on aircraft. In addition, this lack of information could cause DOD to 
understate or overstate future lift requirements for planning purposes, 
and the right mix and number of aircraft may not be available for 
future contingencies. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help officials determine whether they used an aircraft's capacity as 
efficiently as possible and improve the reliability and completeness of 
data on operational factors that can impact payloads, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to 
direct the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to take the following two 
actions: 

* Revise and clarify relevant data fields in GATES, and work with DOD 
entities that support other transportation information systems, such as 
the Global Transportation Network and service deployment systems, to 
capture comprehensive, well-defined data on operational factors that 
impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to 
review these data fields for accuracy. These factors include--but are 
not limited to--number of pallet positions used, cargo dimensions, 
fueling decisions, and altitude constraints. 

* Systematically collect and analyze information on operational factors 
that impact payloads transported on strategic airlift missions to 
identify ways that DOD may be able to use an aircraft's capacity as 
efficiently as possible. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix IV. In commenting on a draft 
of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. It also 
provided technical comments, which we included in the report as 
appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to revise and clarify GATES data 
fields to capture a more comprehensive, well-defined list of 
operational factors that impact payloads for individual missions. In 
concurring with our recommendation, DOD made two additional comments. 
First, DOD noted that some contingency missions are often processed 
through service deployment systems and that other systems are also used 
to collect data regarding aircraft utilization. We agree with DOD that 
contingency missions are processed through systems other than GATES. 
However, as noted in our report, we used data on completed missions 
obtained from the Tanker Airlift Control Center's Fusion Cell database, 
which compiles and validates data obtained from GATES as well as the 
Global Transportation Network and the Global Decision Support System. 
AMC officials agreed with this methodology and these sources for our 
analysis. Second, DOD stated that data shortfalls are not only in GATES 
and that data such as altitude constraints, fueling decisions, and 
other operational decisions conducted outside the aerial ports do not 
belong in GATES. We agree with DOD that GATES is not a full-spectrum 
airfield and airlift planning and execution system, and that GATES may 
not be the only system that could capture the necessary information 
needed for a more comprehensive analysis of aircraft utilization. 
During the course of this review, we were not made aware of data fields 
in other information systems that captured information similar to the 
"Load Message Utilization" field in GATES. As a result, we focused our 
recommendation on GATES to identify how improvements could be made to 
transportation information systems to capture data on operational 
factors that could provide a more comprehensive picture of how well AMC 
and the combatant commanders are utilizing aircraft. In response to 
DOD's comments, we also reviewed user guides and data dictionaries for 
these other systems and identified a number of data fields that could 
provide additional operational data. However, in further discussions, 
DOD officials told us that data in these fields are not always easily 
accessible or complete and reliable. Therefore, to recognize that there 
may be other systems that could also be used to capture operational 
data, we have revised our recommendation for DOD to revise and clarify 
data fields in GATES and any other transportation information systems. 

DOD concurred with our second recommendation to systematically collect 
and analyze information on operational factors that impact payloads 
transported on strategic airlift missions and stated that AMC's Tanker 
Airlift Control Center already collects and analyzes mission data from 
several transportation information systems, including allowable cabin 
load utilization by aircraft type. As noted in our scope and 
methodology, for our analysis of aircraft utilization we used data 
obtained from the Tanker Airlift Control Center's Fusion Cell database, 
which compiles data obtained from GATES as well as the Global 
Transportation Network and the Global Decision Support System. However, 
this database did not include the operational data we believe is needed 
by DOD to analyze and better understand how operational factors impact 
these payloads, to determine whether all available space and weight on 
these aircraft was used in light of such operational factors, and to 
plan for future airlift transportation needs. 

DOD also stated that any audit of contingency aircraft utilization must 
include the Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process. We 
acknowledge that this process plays an integral role in determining 
what needs to be moved and how it is moved. However, our objective was 
to determine how efficiently AMC utilized its airlift assets after that 
validation process is completed; therefore, the process is outside of 
the scope of our review. As we discuss in the background and appendix 
III, AMC is required to provide airlift whenever cargo and passengers 
are approved for movement even if minimum requirements for using 
strategic airlift are not met or the requirement will not use an 
aircraft's available capacity as efficiently as possible, if this is 
the only way to accomplish the mission. This means that if a combatant 
commander puts forward a requirement through the Time Phased Force 
Deployment Data validation process and it is designated by TRANSCOM for 
airlift, AMC will fly the mission, even if it does not meet the minimum 
requirements or allow the most efficient use of capacity. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal agency to 
submit a written statement on actions taken to address our 
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the 
House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the 
date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the 
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first 
request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of 
this report. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; 
the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5140 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov]. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Sincerely yours,

William Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) used an 
aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible while transporting cargo 
and passengers for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and defense transportation 
regulations and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the following 
offices, commands, and services: 

* 13th Corps Support Command, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

* 3rd Army Corps, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

* 437th Aerial Port Squadron, Charleston Air Force Base, South 
Carolina. 

* 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Killeen, Texas. 

* 819th Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron 
Engineer, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. 

* Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. 

* I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California. 

* II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, Arlington, 
Virginia. 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 
Arlington, Virginia. 

* United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, 
Florida. 

* United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. 

* United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. 

* United States Army Installation Management Agency, Arlington, 
Virginia. 

* United States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. 

To gain an understanding of how operational realities can affect 
aircraft payloads, we reviewed a limited number of historical mission 
planning files. The files that we reviewed were sometimes missing load 
plans that would assist in explaining operational factors that may have 
impacted payloads. When load plans were present in the mission files, 
AMC officials were able to identify a number of factors that could 
plausibly impact mission payloads; however, they could not be certain 
that these factors did impact payloads when the mission was executed. 
We also reviewed information about the "Load Message Utilization" data 
field in the Global Air Transportation Execution System and discussed 
the reliability and accuracy of these data with AMC and aerial port 
officials. We determined that this data field was not sufficiently 
reliable for this purpose. We also met with officials concerning AMC's 
Global Transportation Network and Global Decision Support System. 

We limited our review of airlift missions to strategic contingency 
missions and special assignment airlift missions for the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps as well as joint missions flown on AMC-
owned and AMC-operated aircraft in support of OEF and OIF. The U.S. 
strategic airlift fleet includes the C-5, C-17, C-130, and C-141 
aircraft. Because aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and KC-
135, are also capable of transporting cargo for strategic airlift 
missions, we also included these aircraft in our analyses. We initially 
obtained mission data for 37,622 airlift missions[Footnote 10]occurring 
from October 1, 2001, to September 30, 2004 from AMC's Fusion Cell. 

Because we focused on strategic missions, we excluded intratheater 
missions from our analyses. In addition, we excluded channel missions-
-regularly scheduled flights on government-owned or chartered aircraft 
under the operational control of AMC that are used for cargo and troop 
movements--because these occur on a regular schedule, and it is 
possible that payloads would regularly be light. We also excluded 
missions on commercial aircraft because these are not owned by AMC. By 
applying our selection criteria identified earlier, we narrowed the 
number of missions that we reviewed to 14,692. To assess the 
reliability of these data, we (1) reviewed existing documentation 
related to the data sources, (2) electronically tested the data to 
identify obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, and (3) 
interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the data. We 
determined that the Fusion Cell's data were sufficiently reliable to 
summarize the actual cargo and passenger payloads. We then compared 
Fusion Cell average payload data for OEF and OIF strategic aircraft 
with payload planning factors and determined whether payloads for OEF 
and OIF met the payload planning factors. We also calculated the 
average total short tons transported on each type of aircraft, and 
determined the percentage of aircraft that carried short tons in excess 
as well as below the payload planning factors. Additionally, we 
determined the number of missions that did not meet the minimum 
strategic airlift requirements of 15 short tons or 100 passengers. DOD 
guidance permits the use of strategic airlift even if minimum payload 
and passenger requirements are not met if this is the only way to 
accomplish the mission. Furthermore, AMC is required to provide airlift 
whenever cargo and passengers are validated for movement even if the 
minimum requirement to use strategic airlift is not met. However, we 
were not able to determine the reasons why the minimum requirement was 
waived for nearly 19 percent of all missions we reviewed. We also 
identified a number of missions that carried no cargo or passengers; 
however, we were not able to identify all of the reasons why these 
aircraft flew empty. 

We conducted our review from September 2004 through July 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Air Mobility Command Aircraft Used for Strategic Airlift: 

The AMC is responsible for providing global airlift services and air 
refueling operations. To carry out its mission, the command has a 
strategic airlift fleet comprised of the C-5, C-17, and C-141. In 
addition, AMC can use aerial refueling aircraft, such as the KC-10 and 
KC-135, for transporting cargo. Although the C-130 is primarily used 
for intratheater airlift missions, AMC sometimes uses it in a strategic 
airlift role to transport cargo from the United States to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, especially if the aircraft is being moved into the theater 
and assigned to the United States Central Command. This appendix 
briefly describes these aircraft (figs. 2 through 7 are photographs of 
the various aircraft). 

C-5 Aircraft: 

Figure 2: C-5 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The C-5 is one of the largest aircraft in the world. It can carry 
outsize and oversize cargo over intercontinental ranges and can take 
off or land in relatively short distances. A C-5 with a cargo load of 
135 short tons can fly 2,150 nautical miles, off-load, and fly to a 
second base 500 nautical miles away from the original destination 
without aerial refueling. With aerial refueling, the aircraft's range 
is limited only by crew endurance. The C-5 can carry nearly all of the 
Army's combat equipment, including large heavy items such as the 74-ton 
mobile scissors bridge. Ground crews can load and off-load the C-5 
simultaneously at the front and rear cargo openings. The landing gear 
system permits lowering of the parked aircraft so the cargo floor is at 
truck bed height or to facilitate vehicle loading and unloading. The 
aircraft length is about 247 feet, its height is approximately 65 feet, 
and its wing span is about 223 feet. 

C-17 Aircraft: 

Figure 3: C-17 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The C-17 aircraft is capable of transporting substantial payloads over 
long ranges without refueling. The C-17 is intended to deliver cargo 
and troops directly to forward airfields near the front lines or to 
main operating bases; fly into small, austere airfields; land on short 
runways; transport outsize cargo, such as tanks; and air-drop troops 
and equipment. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 
3,000 feet long and 90 feet wide. With a payload of 80 short tons and 
an initial cruise altitude of 28,000 feet, the C-17 has an unrefueled 
range of approximately 2,400 nautical miles. The aircraft length is 174 
feet, its height is about 55 feet, and its wing span is almost 170 
feet. The C-17 will be AMC's primary military airlift aircraft once the 
C-141s are retired from service. 

C-141 Aircraft: 

Figure 4: C-141 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The C-141 was AMC's first jet aircraft designed to meet military 
standards as a troop and cargo carrier, and is used to airlift combat 
forces over long distances, deliver those forces and their equipment 
either by landing or airdrop, resupply forces, and transport the sick 
and wounded from a hostile area to medical facilities. The aircraft 
length is approximately 168 feet, its height is about 39 feet, and the 
wing span is 160 feet. The Air Force retired its C-141s from the active 
duty inventory in September 2004 and began transferring C-141s to the 
Air Reserve and Air National Guard forces in July 1986. DOD plans to 
retire C-141s used by the Air Reserves and Air National Guard before 
2006. 

C-130 Aircraft: 

Figure 5: C-130 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The C-130 is the primary transport aircraft for air-dropping troops and 
equipment into hostile areas. Other roles include airlift support, 
Antarctic ice resupply, and aeromedical missions. Using its aft loading 
ramp and door, the C-130 can accommodate oversized cargo, including 
utility helicopters and six-wheeled armored vehicles, as well as 
standard palletized cargo and military personnel. Additionally, the C-
130 can be rapidly reconfigured for various types of cargo, such as 
palletized equipment, floor-loaded material, airdrop platforms, 
container delivery system bundles, vehicles and personnel, or 
aeromedical evacuation. In an aerial delivery role, it can airdrop 
loads up to 21 short tons or use its high-flotation landing gear to 
land and deliver cargo on rough, dirt strips. The C-130 has a length of 
about 97 feet, a height of approximately 38 feet, and a wing span of 
about 132 feet. Depending on the aircraft model, the C-130 can carry a 
maximum of 6 to 8 pallets, 92 to 128 combat troops, or a combination of 
any of these up to the cargo compartment capacity or maximum allowable 
weight. 

KC-10 Aircraft: 

Figure 6: KC-10 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Although the KC-l0's primary mission is aerial refueling, it can 
combine the tasks of a tanker and cargo aircraft by refueling fighters 
and simultaneously carrying the fighter support personnel and equipment 
on overseas deployments. The KC-10 can transport up to 75 people and 
nearly 85 short tons of cargo a distance of about 4,400 miles without 
refueling. The large cargo-loading door can accommodate most Air Forces 
fighter unit support equipment. Powered rollers and winches inside the 
cargo compartment permit moving heavy loads. The cargo compartment can 
accommodate loads ranging from 27 pallets to a mix of 17 pallets and 75 
passengers. The aircraft's length is almost 182 feet. It has a height 
of approximately 58 feet and a wing span of about 165 feet. 

KC-135 Aircraft: 

Figure 7: KC-135 Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The KC-135's principal mission is air refueling. However, a cargo deck 
above the refueling system can transport a mixed load of passengers and 
cargo. The KC-135 can carry up to 41.5 short tons of cargo or 37 
passengers. The aircraft length is about 136 feet, its height is 
approximately 42 feet, and it has a wing span of nearly 131 feet. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Operational Factors That Can Affect Aircraft Capacity 
Utilized: 

The extent to which an aircraft's capacity is utilized on any mission 
depends on the interrelationship of a number of operational factors, 
including (1) operating constraints, such as the flight distance and 
aircraft availability; (2) environmental factors, such as airfield 
altitude and temperature; and (3) DOD policies, including regulations 
for use of strategic airlift and initiatives to improve the supply 
distribution process. This appendix describes some of these factors. 

Operational Constraints: 

There are several operational factors that can affect the capacity 
utilized, including (1) aircraft availability, (2) aircraft 
characteristics, (3) cargo characteristics and loading configuration, 
and (4) route and fuel needs, among other factors. According to AMC 
officials, these factors, among others, contribute to capacity 
limitations. 

Aircraft Availability: 

Because airlift aircraft are normally in high demand and usually highly 
tasked, they are reserved for movement of forces and cargo critical to 
the successful execution of campaign plans. However, competing demands 
can limit the availability of aircraft to meet specific mission needs, 
forcing AMC planners to potentially use larger aircraft, such as the C-
5, to transport payloads that cannot maximize the available space. 
Operational tempo and the number of aircraft undergoing maintenance and 
assigned for training needs and crew certification drive the total 
number of aircraft available to AMC officials at any given time. User 
requirements and threat situations may allow little or no flexibility 
in the delivery times, locations, and load configurations. Although 
exact numbers fluctuate daily, AMC generally has about 85 C-5 and C-17 
aircraft available daily for strategic airlift missions. However, 
special events and maintenance problems can reduce the number and type 
of aircraft available for these missions. Officials told us that at the 
beginning of OEF, 17 C-5 aircraft were broken and grounded at Guam for 
maintenance. Efforts to improve the readiness rate of C-5 aircraft from 
65 percent reduce the availability of these aircraft further and 
increase the need for C-17s. According to an AMC official, three C-17s 
are needed to replace each C-5. Because C-17 aircraft are also being 
used for intratheater airlift in Iraq, United States Central Command 
officials expressed concern about having enough C-17s to meet strategic 
airlift demands. 

Aircraft Characteristics: 

Aircraft characteristics, such as the size and shape of the aircraft's 
cargo compartment and strength of the aircraft floors and ramps, 
operational tempo, and chronological age, can impact an aircraft's 
capacity and the payload that can be transported. Aircraft have weight, 
height, and width restrictions that can limit the amount or type of 
cargo that can be transported. For example, the maximum weight limit on 
a C-5 ramp is 7.5 short tons, and some locations within the aircraft 
require a 14-inch safety aisle to allow aircrew members clearance while 
securing cargo. Our review of mission planning files showed that 
sometimes cargo was not placed on the aircraft ramps because of weight 
constraints, thereby leaving some available space unused. Moreover, 
aircraft differ on what they can carry. For instance, the C-5 and C-17 
can carry all cargo types as well as troops, while the C-141 can carry 
troops, cargo loaded on a standard-sized pallet (bulk), and oversized 
cargo--nonpalletized cargo that is larger than bulk, such as vehicles. 
In addition, an aircraft's contours can limit the height of pallets and 
rolling cargo placed in certain areas. For example, the KC-10 has a 
rounded cargo compartment that requires pallets be built to accommodate 
this shape; as a result, the pallets may have less cargo on them than 
they could theoretically transport. 

The high operational tempo, number of flying hours, and the 
chronological age of aircraft can limit the payload that an aircraft 
can carry because these factors contribute to structural fatigue, 
corrosion, cracking, wear and tear on systems, and aircraft 
obsolescence. For example, United States Central Command officials told 
us that C-17 aircraft are being used extensively for both intratheater 
and strategic airlift for OIF, causing the aircraft to wear out and 
reach their retirement dates sooner than expected. As a result, these 
aircraft cannot carry payloads as heavy as would be expected. 

Cargo Characteristics and Loading Configuration: 

Cargo dimensions, characteristics, and placement in an aircraft can 
impact capacity utilized. AMC categorizes cargo as (1) bulk--liquid or 
dry cargo that can be loaded on a standard-sized pallet without 
exceeding the pallet's dimensions; (2) oversized--nonpalletized rolling 
stock that is larger than bulk that exceeds the dimensions of a 
standard-sized pallet, but can be transported on a C-5, C-17, C-141, C-
130, or KC-10; and (3) outsized--cargo that exceeds dimensions of 
oversized cargo and requires the use of a C-5 or C-17 aircraft. When 
scheduling airlift, AMC attempts to match cargo dimensions with the 
appropriate type of aircraft; however, a specific type of aircraft may 
not be available. Cargo characteristics can also affect aircraft 
capacity utilized. For example, ammunition is dense cargo that can be 
loaded with little wasted space, but helicopters are large, light, and 
irregularly shaped, and thus use cargo space less efficiently, as shown 
in figure 8. 

Figure 8: Unloading of a HH-60G Pave Hawk Helicopter from a C-17 in 
Support of OIF: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: A single Pave Hawk helicopter takes up most of a C-17's cargo 
compartment and uses multiple pallet positions. Thus, the helicopter's 
dimensions do not permit loading the C-17 to its maximum allowable 
cabin load. 

[End of figure] 

Further, if hazardous material is transported, other types of cargo and 
passengers may not be loaded on the aircraft. If enough hazardous 
material is not available at the aerial port, payloads may be lighter. 
Each aircraft also has a specific number of positions--referred to as 
pallet positions--where cargo or passengers can be placed. For example, 
the C-5 aircraft has 36 pallet positions, and the C-17 has 18. Aerial 
ports--airfields that have been designated for the sustained air 
movement of personnel and cargo as well as authorized ports for 
entrance into or departure from the country where located--track the 
placement of cargo and passengers on the aircraft and the number of 
pallet positions used for each mission. The dimensions and type of 
cargo can require the use of more than one position, decreasing the 
amount of cargo or number of passengers that can be transported. 
Although all pallet positions on an aircraft may be used, the pallets 
may still have space for additional cargo to be placed on them. As a 
result, all pallet positions may appear to be used, but the pallets may 
not have met weight or volume limits. Cargo dimensions may also require 
the use of multiple partial pallet positions. In addition, all 
airlifted cargo must be secured in place using rollers and tie-downs, 
as shown in figure 9. 

Figure 9: Loadmasters Chain Down Cargo on a C-17: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Some cargo must be transported in containers or with two or more 
pallets linked together. To secure these items, additional space on the 
aircraft may be needed, thus limiting the placement of additional cargo 
on board. Also, large equipment, such as helicopters, can take up a lot 
of space and result in lighter payloads. For example, in figure 10 (an 
actual load plan used during OEF), the total payload for cargo and 
passengers was approximately 30 short tons. Of this, the two 
helicopters took up about half of the C-17's cargo hold and accounted 
for about 19 short tons of the C-17's payload. Also, one helicopter's 
tail hangs over the ramp, preventing the use of this area. According to 
this load plan, it appears that the space available on the aircraft was 
efficiently used assuming that there was no additional cargo available 
to be loaded that would meet the ramp's weight limitations. 

Figure 10: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting How Placement of Cargo Can 
Decrease Payloads: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11 (an actual load plan used during OEF) shows how the presence 
of passengers can impact aircraft capacity utilized. When passengers 
are present, cargo must be placed down the center of the aircraft to 
provide an aisle for passengers. For this load plan, the total payload 
was approximately 23 short tons. 

Figure 11: Actual C-17 Load Plan Depicting Placement of Cargo to 
Accommodate Passengers: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Fuel Considerations: 

Aircraft range and payloads are greatly affected by a mission's fuel 
requirements. As the distance increases, the fuel requirements increase 
and the allowable payload decreases. For instance, if an aircraft must 
divert around a country because it does not have permission to fly over 
that nation's airspace or it must fly at higher altitudes due to 
security concerns, the aircraft may need to carry more fuel and less 
cargo and passengers. We have reported that an aircraft's range is 
significantly reduced with only minimal additional weight or due to 
security concerns. For example, for Stryker brigades every additional 
1,000 tons of weight to be airlifted reduces aircraft range by 250 
nautical miles and adds 15 aircraft loads.[Footnote 11] We have also 
reported that a C-130 aircraft's range may be reduced if operational 
conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route 
deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these 
conditions. Even under ideal flight conditions, such as daytime, low 
headwind, moderate air temperature, and low elevation, adding just a 
ton onboard the aircraft for associated cargo such as mission 
equipment, personnel, or ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's 
takeoff-to-landing range to 500 miles. Sometimes, the amount of cargo 
and distances involved in strategic airlift operations make air 
refueling necessary. AMC officials told us that air refueling is 
routinely done for aircraft flying to Iraq; Afghanistan; and Ramstein 
Air Base, Germany. Air refueling may reduce the aircraft's initial fuel 
requirement, allow for heavier cargo loads, increase aircraft range, 
and reduce the need for ground refueling. If refueling is not possible 
at the off-load station, such as in Khandahar, Afghanistan, potential 
payloads could be reduced or additional enroute stops could be 
required. 

Environmental Factors: 

Environmental factors, such as altitude, pressure, weather, and 
temperature, can also affect the capacity utilized on an aircraft by 
forcing planners and operators to adjust mission payloads and timing to 
ensure effective, efficient, and safe mission accomplishment. High 
altitudes could prevent the use of certain types of aircraft or require 
lighter payloads and less fuel so that the aircraft can take off. For 
example, the Sierra Army Depot in Amadee, California, is located at a 
high altitude, and it is difficult for C-5s to get the lift they need 
to take off if carrying more than 30 short tons; this payload is about 
42 short tons less than the payload planning factor. As a result, AMC 
officials try not to use C-5 aircraft at this and similar locations 
unless C-17 aircraft are not available. AMC also needs to consider 
temperature changes during the winter and summer months. For instance, 
the allowable cabin load for aircraft flying into Rota Naval Base, 
Spain during the summer decreases by about 10 to18 short tons because 
the temperature is too high for aircraft to maintain enough lift. 

DOD Policies: 

Some DOD transportation-related policies, such as the pure pallet 
initiative and the primacy of commanders' decisions, may result in 
lighter payloads. DOD officials told us that the lighter payloads are 
acceptable in some instances because initiatives reduce risk and 
customer wait time in theater and AMC must meet commanders' time frames 
for delivery of cargo and passengers. 

Pure Pallet Initiative: 

While DOD's pure pallet initiative delivers palletized cargo to 
customers in the theater more quickly, it can result in lighter pallets 
and payloads. Initiated in March 2004 at Dover Air Force Base, 
Delaware; Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; and Ramstein Air 
Base, Germany, DOD's pure pallet initiative is intended to simplify and 
speed up airlift shipments into the United States Central Command's 
area of responsibility by building and shipping individual aircraft 
pallets with cargo for a single customer. The pure pallet initiative 
decreases the time needed on the receiving end to distribute palletized 
cargo to individual customers by transferring the sorting of cargo to 
the originating aerial port. Normally, a customer's cargo is loaded 
onto an aircraft pallet with cargo for other customers within the same 
region. Under this system, a single pallet could contain cargo for 
dozens of customers. The pallet would be broken down when it arrived at 
the destination aerial port, sorted, repalletized, and distributed to 
individual customers. When a pure pallet arrives at the deployed aerial 
port, it can be pulled from the aircraft and immediately handed off to 
the customer or placed on a truck or another aircraft for transport to 
remote locations. In addition, the initiative recognizes that in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, aerial ports are restricted as to the amount of cargo 
processing facilities, amount of equipment, and number of people 
because of the threat of attack. However, DOD officials acknowledge 
that having enough cargo to fill an entire pallet is problematic. To 
maximize pallet and aircraft utilization, the aerial ports can hold 
cargo for up to 5 days for the Army and up to 3 days for the Marine 
Corps. However, cargo is palletized when it reaches 120 hours of port 
hold time or enough cargo is available to fill a pallet causing it to 
either cube out or weigh out. As we reported in April 2005,[Footnote 
12] the result is potentially longer processing times at the 
originating aerial ports in order to reduce customer wait time in 
theater. AMC tracks pure pallet weights each week, aiming for an 
average of 1.4 short tons per pallet. AMC data show that all three 
aerial ports generally met or surpassed the average pure pallet weight 
goals. 

Combatant Commander Decisions: 

According to AMC officials, the most efficient way to move passengers 
and cargo is not always the most appropriate during contingency 
operations. During OEF and OIF, combatant commanders frequently 
required AMC to transport troops with their equipment on the same 
aircraft. According to AMC officials, it would have been more efficient 
to move the troops on one aircraft and transport their equipment on a 
second aircraft immediately following the first. However, commanders 
fear that passengers would arrive at their destinations and equipment 
sent on the second aircraft would be delayed due to maintenance 
problems or, if sent on a military aircraft, the mission might be 
canceled. As a result, AMC may fly aircraft with reduced payloads in 
order to meet combatant commanders' delivery time frames. However, 
these decisions take into account the expected situation at the 
destination; some units, such as special operations forces and the 
Marines, immediately require their equipment, so separating passengers 
and equipment is not the preferred transportation method. Although the 
aircraft may be underutilized, AMC is meeting its primary objective to 
deliver "the right items to the right place at the right time."

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS: 
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500: 

SEP 12 2005: 

Mr. William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect 
and Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization," dated August 
11, 2005 (GAO Code 350587/GAO-05-819). 

The DoD concurs with the draft report recommendations. We agree to the 
benefits of improving the Global Air Transportation and Execution 
System (GATES), but emphasize other systems also are used to collect 
data regarding aircraft utilization. We also feel that Time Phased 
Force Deployment Data process should be included in an audit of 
aircraft utilization. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact 
Colonel Michael Friedlein, Deputy, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense, Transportation Policy, 703-601-4461 ext 109. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jack Bell: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT -DATED AUGUST 11, 2005 GAO CODE 350587/GAO-05-819: 

"DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION: Air Mobility Command Needs to Collect and 
Analyze Better Data to Assess Aircraft Utilization"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Commander, Air 
Mobility Command, to revise and clarify relevant Global Air 
Transportation and Execution System (GATES) data fields to capture a 
more comprehensive, well-defined list of operational factors that 
impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to 
review those data fields for accuracy. Those factors include -but are 
not limited to -number of pallet positions used, cargo dimensions, 
whether pallets were heavy or light, fueling decisions, and altitude 
constraints. (Pages 18-19/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. It should be noted that all contingency missions 
are not processed through GATES. They are also processed through 
Service deployment systems. Additionally, GAO Report Data shortfalls 
for contingency missions can't be isolated to GATES. Altitude 
constraints, fueling decisions and other operational decisions 
conducted outside the aerial ports do not belong in GATES. GATES serves 
as an aerial port cargo and passenger management manifesting system, 
not as a full-spectrum airfield and airlift planning and execution 
system. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the Commander, Air 
Mobility Command, to systematically collect and analyze information on 
operational factors that impact payloads transported on strategic 
airlift missions to identify ways that DoD may be able to use an 
aircraft's capacity as efficiently as possible. (Page 19/GAO Draft 
Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Tanker/Airlift Control Center (TACC) already 
monitors and collects data on every contingency mission under Air 
Mobility Command's operational control. After aircraft departure, 
personnel in the TACC Fusion Cell are analyzing and gathering cargo and 
passenger data from several systems including the Global Transportation 
Network (GTN), GATES, and the Global Decision Support System (GDSS) to 
compile mission accomplishment data that includes Allowable Cabin 
Limits utilization by aircraft type. This further highlights that GATES 
is not the only system for information on aircraft utilization. 
Additionally, any audit of contingency aircraft utilization must 
include Time Phased Force Deployment Data validation process. 

[End of section]

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William M. Solis (202) 512-5140: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact name above, Ann Borseth, Assistant Director; 
Krislin M. Bolling; Virginia A. Chanley; Karen N. Harms; Linda S. 
Keefer; Ronald La Due Lake; Renee McElveen; Maria-Alaina I. Rambus; 
Vanessa R. Taylor; and Robert K. Wild also made key contributions to 
this report. 

(350587): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] OEF began in October 2001 in Afghanistan and OIF began in March 
2003 in Iraq. 

[2] A short ton is equivalent to 2,000 pounds. 

[3] Contingency missions involve deployment, sustainment, and 
redeployment by airlift. Special assignment airlift missions are 
aircraft operated to satisfy a requirement needing special pickup or 
delivery at locations other than those with regularly scheduled service 
or to satisfy a requirement needing special consideration because of 
the number of passengers, weight or size of the cargo, urgency, or 
sensitivity of movement. 

[4] An unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more 
services and has a broad and continuing mission. 

[5] TRANSCOM's other component commands are the Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command that is responsible for providing global surface 
distribution services, and the Military Sealift Command that provides 
ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies and ammunition to 
sustain U.S. forces worldwide. 

[6] The Air Force retired its C-141s from the active duty inventory in 
September 2004. DOD plans to retire C-141s used by the Reserves and Air 
National Guard before 2006. 

[7] TRANSCOM's Global Transportation Network collects and integrates 
information from a number of transportation systems to support 
transportation planning and decision-making. GATES provides AMC with 
automated capability to process and track cargo and passenger airlift 
data and facilitates payment for services. AMC's Global Decision 
Support System provides aircraft schedules, arrival and departure, and 
aircraft status data to support in-transit visibility of aircraft and 
aircrews. 

[8] GAO, C-17 Globemaster: Support of Operation Joint Endeavor, GAO-97-
50 (Washington, D.C. Feb. 14, 1997). 

[9] GAO, Defense Management: Tools for Measuring and Managing Defense 
Agency Performance Could Be Strengthened, GAO-04-919 (Washington, D.C. 
Sept. 13, 2004). 

[10] When selecting missions to analyze, we used the mission leg with 
the greatest short tons on board, including passenger weight. The 
approximately 170,000 mission legs that AMC flew during this time frame 
resulted in 37,622 unique missions prior to application of our 
selection criteria. Based on discussions with Fusion Cell staff 
clarifying our analysis results, we eliminated 6 missions from our 
analysis that showed improbably high payloads. 

[11] GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines 
Needed for Army Stryker Brigades, GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C. June 30, 
2003), and Military Transformation: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles 
Is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 
Aircraft Need to Be Clarified, GAO-04-925 (Washington, D.C. Aug. 12, 
2004). 

[12] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability 
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 
(Washington, D.C. Apr. 8, 2005). 

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