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entitled 'Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security 
Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls 
Needed' which was released on September 8, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2005: 

Aviation Security: 

Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training Strengthened, but Better 
Planning and Internal Controls Needed: 

GAO-05-781: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-781, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Training flight and cabin crew members to handle potential threats 
against domestic aircraft is an important element in securing our 
nation’s aviation system. The responsibility for ensuring that crew 
members are prepared to handle these threats is a shared responsibility 
between the private sector—air carriers—and the federal government, 
primarily the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This report 
addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to develop guidance and standards 
for flight and cabin crew member security training and to measure the 
effectiveness of the training, (2) how TSA ensures domestic air 
carriers comply with the training guidance and standards, and (3) 
efforts TSA has taken to develop and assess the effectiveness of its 
voluntary self-defense training program. 

What GAO Found: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA enhanced 
guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew member security 
training with input from stakeholders. Specifically, TSA revised the 
guidance and standards to include additional training elements required 
by law and to improve the organization and clarity of the guidance and 
standards. Some stakeholders we interviewed and our own review 
generally found that the revised guidance and standards improved upon 
previous versions in terms of organization and clarity of the 
information provided. However, some stakeholders identified concerns 
about, for example, the reasonableness of applying parts of the 
guidance and standards to both flight and cabin crew members and the 
difficulty in implementing some of the standards without additional 
information or training tools from TSA. Additionally, TSA has not 
established strategic goals and performance measures for assessing the 
effectiveness of the training because it considers its role in the 
training program as regulatory. In this regard, TSA views the 
individual air carriers as responsible for establishing performance 
goals and measures for their training programs, but has not required 
them to do so. Without goals and measures, TSA and air carriers will be 
limited in their ability to fully assess accomplishments and target 
associated improvements. 

TSA recently took steps to strengthen its efforts to oversee air 
carriers’ flight and cabin crew security training to ensure they are 
complying with the required guidance and standards. For example, in 
January 2005, TSA added staff with expertise in designing training 
programs to review air carriers’ crew member security training 
curriculums and developed a standard form for staff to use to conduct 
their reviews. However, TSA lacks adequate controls for monitoring and 
reviewing air carriers’ crew member security training, including 
written procedures for conducting and documenting these reviews. TSA 
plans to develop written procedures, but has not established a 
timeframe for completing this effort. 

TSA has developed an advanced voluntary self-defense training program 
with input from stakeholders and implemented the program in December 
2004, as required by law. However, stakeholders and our own analysis 
identified concerns about the training design and delivery, such as the 
lack of recurrent training and the lack of a realistic training 
environment. Also, TSA has not yet established performance measures for 
the program or established a time frame for evaluating the program’s 
effectiveness. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct TSA 
to (1) establish strategic goals for crew security training, develop 
guidance and standards for air carriers to use to develop goals and 
measures for their training, and review air carriers’ goals and 
measures, (2) develop written procedures for monitoring air carriers’ 
crew security training, and (3) establish performance measures and a 
time frame for evaluating the effectiveness of the voluntary self-
defense training. TSA reviewed a draft of this report and generally 
agreed with GAO’s findings and recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-781. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 
512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

TSA Has Enhanced Guidance and Standards for Flight and Cabin Crew 
Security Training with Input from Stakeholders, but Better Planning Is 
Needed: 

Recent Progress Made to Strengthen Oversight of Flight and Cabin Crew 
Member Security Training Program, but Weaknesses Remain: 

TSA Developed and Implemented Crew Member Self-Defense Training, but 
Has Not Established Performance Measures or Evaluated Training 
Effectiveness: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: TSA's Deployment of an Advanced Voluntary Crew Member 
Self- Defense Training from December 2004 through September 2005, as of 
July 2005: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: List of Basic Crew Member Security Training Elements Required 
By Law: 

Table 2: List of Advanced Voluntary Crew Member Self-Defense Training 
Elements Required By Law: 

Table 3: Summary of Stakeholders' Concerns on TSA's Prototype Advanced 
Voluntary Self-Defense Training and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to 
the Concerns: 

Table 4: Crew Member Participation in Advanced Voluntary Crew Member 
Self-Defense Training from December 2004 through June 2005: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Number of Domestic Air Carriers by Carrier Group and 
Percentage of Passengers Flown Domestically by Carrier Group: 

Abbreviations: 

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

Vision 100Vision100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 6, 2005: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Co-Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

Training flight and cabin crew members (pilots and flight attendants) 
to handle potential threats against domestic commercial aircraft is an 
important element in securing our nation's aviation system. These 
flight and cabin crew members play a key role in ensuring the security 
of commercial aircraft and the safety of airline passengers and are the 
last line of defense in the event of an attempted terrorist attack 
onboard a commercial aircraft. The responsibility for ensuring that 
flight and cabin crew members are prepared to respond to these threats 
is a shared responsibility between the private sector--air carriers-- 
and the federal government, primarily the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). In an effort to strengthen aviation security, 
title 49 of the United States Code, section 44918, requires that air 
carriers develop and deliver a basic security training program for 
flight and cabin crew members in accordance with training elements 
prescribed in the law. The law also requires that TSA monitor and 
periodically review air carriers' training programs to ensure they 
adequately prepare crew members for potential threat conditions. 
Furthermore, the law requires TSA to develop and provide an advanced 
voluntary self-defense training program for flight and cabin crew 
members. Although there has not been another successful terrorist 
attack against commercial aircraft in the United States since September 
11, 2001, concerns remain about whether flight and cabin crew members 
are prepared to handle a potential hijacking and other threats to 
commercial aircraft. 

To determine the progress TSA has made in developing and monitoring 
flight and cabin crew security training, we examined TSA's efforts to 
develop guidance and standards for air carriers' flight and cabin crew 
security training, monitor air carriers' compliance with the guidance 
and standards, and develop and deliver advanced voluntary self-defense 
training for crew members. Specifically, this report addresses the 
following questions: (1) What actions has TSA taken to develop guidance 
and standards for flight and cabin crew security training and to 
measure the effectiveness of the training? (2) How does TSA ensure 
domestic air carriers comply with required training guidance and 
standards? (3) What efforts has TSA taken to develop, implement, and 
measure the effectiveness of advanced voluntary self-defense training 
for flight and cabin crew members?

In conducting our work, we reviewed TSA and Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) documentation related to flight and cabin crew 
member security training guidance and standards and advanced voluntary 
crew member self-defense training. The security training guidance 
provides detailed guidance from which air carriers must develop their 
flight and cabin crew security training programs. The security training 
standards set forth the specific requirements for crew member security 
training, such as the training elements that must be included in air 
carriers' basic and recurrent (refresher) crew member security training 
programs. We also interviewed officials from 19 domestic air carriers, 
2 air carrier associations, and 6 crew member labor organizations 
regarding security training guidance and standards, and advanced 
voluntary self-defense training.[Footnote 1] We selected domestic air 
carriers based on whether they were currently offering initial and/or 
recurrent security training[Footnote 2] and on the size of the air 
carrier in an effort to include a mixture of various domestic air 
carriers and air carriers of varying sizes. The size of an air carrier 
is based on the annual operating revenues and the number of revenue 
passenger boardings. We visited 8 of these air carriers to observe 
their training and to interview flight and cabin crew members about the 
training. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of domestic air 
carriers, the information we obtained from these interviews and visits 
cannot be generalized to all domestic air carriers. We also observed 
two sessions of TSA's advanced voluntary crew member self-defense 
training. Information obtained from our interviews and visits cannot be 
generalized to all air carriers and stakeholders. Additionally, we 
interviewed officials responsible for developing security training 
guidance and standards and reviewing air carriers security training 
programs at TSA headquarters. We also interviewed officials at the FAA; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS); Department of 
Defense (DOD); crew member labor organizations; and associations 
representing air carriers to obtain information on their involvement in 
the development of crew member security training guidance and standards 
and advanced voluntary crew member self-defense training. A more 
detailed description of our scope and methodology is contained in 
appendix I. 

We conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Building on the legislatively mandated guidance developed by FAA in 
January 2002 and corresponding standards, TSA enhanced guidance and 
standards for flight and cabin crew member security training with input 
from various stakeholders. However, TSA has not established strategic 
goals and performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of crew 
member security training, nor required air carriers to do so. TSA 
officials stated that they revised the guidance and standards for two 
main reasons. First, the law, as amended by the Vision 100---Century of 
Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), enacted in December 2003, 
required that air carriers include additional training elements in 
their basic crew member security training programs to prepare flight 
and cabin crew members for potential threat conditions.[Footnote 3] 
Second, TSA determined that the guidance and standards needed to be 
better organized and to more clearly define security training elements, 
in part due to feedback from air carriers, flight and cabin crew member 
labor organizations, and associations representing air carriers. Some 
stakeholders stated and our own review found that the organization of 
the previous security training standards were difficult to follow and 
lacked clarity in some areas. For example, the previous guidance did 
not define what constitutes life-threatening behavior, whereas the 
revised guidance provides both a definition of this behavior and 
examples. Although the revised guidance and standards were an 
improvement over the previous versions in terms of organization and 
clarity, some stakeholders identified concerns about the reasonableness 
of applying parts of the guidance and standards to both flight and 
cabin crew members, difficulty in implementing some of the standards 
without additional information or training tools from TSA, and the 
vagueness of some of the guidance and standards. For example, some of 
the training standards remain generalized to both flight attendants and 
pilots, rather than targeted to their specific job functions in 
responding to a security threat. Additionally, TSA has not established 
strategic goals and performance measures for the flight and cabin crew 
member security training program. The Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires, among other things, that agencies 
use outcome-oriented goals and measures that assess results of a 
program or activity compared to its intended purpose. TSA training 
officials stated that they decided not to develop strategic goals or 
performance measures for flight and cabin crew security training 
because the officials view their role in the training program as 
regulatory--that is, monitoring air carriers' compliance with the 
training guidance and standards established by TSA. In this regard, 
officials stated that it is the individual air carriers' responsibility 
to establish performance goals and measures specific to their security 
training programs. However, without overall strategic goals developed 
by TSA, air carriers do not have a framework from which to develop 
their individual performance goals and measures. Further, TSA has not 
explicitly required air carriers to develop performance goals and 
measures or provided air carriers with guidance and standards for doing 
so. The absence of performance goals and measures for flight and cabin 
crew security training limits the ability of TSA and air carriers to 
fully assess the accomplishments of the flight and cabin crew member 
security training program in adequately training crew members, and to 
target appropriate improvements. 

Although TSA has recently taken steps to strengthen its efforts to 
oversee air carriers' flight and cabin crew security training to ensure 
carriers are complying with required guidance and standards, TSA lacks 
adequate internal controls for monitoring and reviewing air carriers' 
flight and cabin crew member security training. The law requires TSA to 
monitor and periodically review air carriers' security training to 
ensure that the training is adequately preparing crew members for 
potential threat conditions. The law also requires TSA to consider 
complaints from crew members in determining when to review an air 
carriers' crew member security training program. Further, the 
Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, which describes the minimum level of quality acceptable for 
internal controls in government and the basis against which internal 
controls should be evaluated, calls for, among other things, that 
controls generally be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs 
during the course of normal operations, transactions and other 
significant events be documented clearly, and documentation be readily 
available for examination.[Footnote 4] TSA has recently taken several 
steps to strengthen its review of air carriers' crew member security 
training curriculum, including (1) adding staff with expertise in 
designing training programs to review the overall design of the air 
carriers' crew member security training curriculums, rather than solely 
ensuring that each of the training elements is discussed in the 
training curriculums; (2) developing a standard form for TSA inspectors 
and training staff to use to conduct and document their reviews of air 
carrier security training curriculums to ensure training requirements 
stated in the revised security training standards are included in the 
air carriers' security training and to enhance consistency in the 
review process; (3) requiring air carriers to obtain written 
participant feedback at the end of flight and cabin crew member 
security training to capture information on participants' overall 
satisfaction with the training; and (4) reorganizing the inspection 
staff into a newly created Office of Compliance and issuing position 
announcements to fill vacant TSA inspector positions, which should 
allow for greater monitoring of air carriers' flight and cabin crew 
security training programs. Although TSA made these recent 
improvements, the agency lacks adequate internal controls for 
monitoring and reviewing air carriers' crew member security training. 
Specifically, TSA does not have written procedures for (1) completing 
the standard form used by TSA inspectors and training staff in 
reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew security training 
curriculum; (2) conducting and documenting observations of air 
carriers' classroom delivery of flight and cabin crew security 
training--a function performed by TSA inspectors--and selecting the air 
carriers to visit; (3) ensuring that air carriers track flight and 
cabin crew members' completion of required security training; and (4) 
considering flight and cabin crew members' written feedback on security 
training and security-related complaints from flight and cabin crew 
members in determining when to review air carriers' flight and cabin 
crew security training. TSA officials stated that they plan to develop 
a handbook that documents procedures for TSA inspectors to use in 
reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew members security training 
as well as guidance for the training staff to use during their reviews. 
However, officials stated that they have not established a time frame 
for completing these efforts. Until TSA documents procedures for 
monitoring and reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew member 
security training, TSA will continue to lack a structure that provides 
reasonable assurance that TSA inspectors and training staff are 
performing thorough assessments of air carriers' security training. 

TSA has developed an advanced voluntary self-defense training program 
for flight and cabin crew members with input from key stakeholders and 
implemented the program in December 2004 as required by law. However, 
some stakeholders and our own analysis identified concerns about the 
training design and delivery, and TSA has not yet developed performance 
measures for the program or established a time frame for evaluating the 
program's overall effectiveness. In developing the advanced voluntary 
self-defense training program, TSA consulted with law enforcement 
experts, the Federal Air Marshal Service,[Footnote 5] air carriers, air 
carrier associations, crew member labor organizations, and other 
subject matter experts and self-defense experts. TSA also piloted the 
training course in five cities and made refinements to the course based 
on feedback from participants. For example, training participants 
stated that the course included too much lecture time and that the 
training course was too long, particularly given that crew members must 
attend the training on their own time and must pay for their travel, 
lodging, and meals. In response, TSA increased the amount of hands-on 
training and shortened the training program from 4 days to 3 days. 
During the first 7 months of the training program, participation in the 
training was relatively low, with only 474 flight and cabin crew 
members (39 percent of total capacity) attending the training. TSA 
officials attributed the low participation to crew members having a 
difficult time obtaining 3 consecutive days of leave to attend the 
training. Although TSA incorporated some stakeholder input into the 
course design, some stakeholders, including individuals identified as 
experts by TSA, and our own analysis identified several concerns 
regarding the training design and delivery, such as the lack of 
recurrent training, the lack of a realistic setting in which to conduct 
the training, and instructors' lack of knowledge of crew members' 
actual work environment. Our prior human capital work has found that in 
implementing a training program, an agency should ensure that 
implementation involves effective and efficient delivery of 
training[Footnote 6]--that is, the training should be conducted in a 
setting that approximates the participants' working conditions and be 
taught by individuals who are knowledgeable about the subject matter 
and work environment. Furthermore, TSA has not yet developed 
performance measures for the program or established a time frame for 
evaluating the program's overall effectiveness. TSA training officials 
stated that although they recognize the importance of measuring the 
effectiveness of the self-defense training program, they have not been 
able to undertake this effort due to resource constraints within which 
they are operating and numerous internal process improvements currently 
under way in TSA. Without performance measures and an evaluation of the 
program's effectiveness, TSA will not have meaningful information from 
which to determine whether the voluntary training program is achieving 
its intended results and to make any needed improvements. 

To assist TSA in further strengthening its flight and cabin crew 
security training program and to provide the tools necessary to monitor 
the delivery and accomplishments of the training, we are making a 
number of recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). These recommendations include directing the 
Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to develop 
a framework from which to assess the accomplishments of flight and 
cabin crew member security training, including establishing strategic 
goals for the training; developing guidance for air carriers to use in 
establishing performance goals and measures for their individual 
training programs; and reviewing air carriers' goals and measures as 
part of its monitoring efforts. We are also recommending that the 
Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, strengthen 
internal controls for monitoring and reviewing air carriers' flight and 
cabin crew member security training programs and for documenting the 
results of its monitoring efforts; and establish performance measures 
for the advanced voluntary crew member self- defense training program 
and a time frame for evaluating the effectiveness of the training. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland 
Security for its review and comment. DHS, in its written comments, 
generally concurred with the findings and recommendations in the 
report, and agreed that efforts to implement our recommendations are 
critical to a successful flight and cabin crew member security training 
program. DHS described some actions TSA has taken or planned to take to 
implement these recommendations. For example, DHS stated that TSA has 
begun to establish strategic goals for the flight and cabin crew member 
security training program. DHS also stated that TSA is in the process 
of developing a monitoring plan, to the extent that resources permit, 
and a handbook for reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew member 
security training programs. Additionally, DHS stated that TSA is 
currently working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
establish performance measures for use in OMB's Performance Assessment 
Rating Tool for TSA's flight security training. The full text of DHS's 
comments is included in appendix III. 

Background: 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President signed 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law on 
November 19, 2001, with the primary goal of strengthening the security 
of the nation's aviation system. ATSA created TSA as the agency 
responsible for securing all modes of transportation, including 
aviation.[Footnote 7] The President also issued the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security in July 2002. The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security sets forth a plan to strengthen homeland security through the 
cooperation of federal, state, local, and private-sector organizations 
in various areas. The National Strategy for Homeland Security aligns 
and focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission 
areas: (1) intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation 
security, (3) domestic counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical 
infrastructures and key assets, (5) defending against catastrophic 
threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and response. A theme of the 
national strategy is that homeland security is a shared responsibility 
among these stakeholders, not solely the responsibility of the federal 
government. In the case of flight and cabin crew member security 
training, air carriers and TSA both play an important role. Air 
carriers are responsible for developing and delivering security 
training programs for their crew members. TSA (and previously FAA) is 
responsible for developing the guidance and standards that air carriers 
are to use to design and deliver their security training and for 
monitoring air carriers' flight and cabin crew member security training 
programs for compliance with the guidance and standards.[Footnote 8] If 
TSA finds an air carrier to be noncompliant with developing and 
conducting the required flight and cabin crew member security training, 
TSA has a range of actions it can take, including imposing fines, and 
in extreme circumstances, force the air carrier to shut down its 
operations. 

The Bureau of Transportation Statistics reported that 105 domestic 
passenger air carriers were operating in the United States in 2004. Of 
the 105 air carriers, 12 (11 percent) are major air carriers that 
carried over 76 percent of the passengers in 2004. With a few 
exceptions for small aircraft, every commercial flight in the United 
States has at least two flight crew members and one cabin crew member 
onboard. These crew members are viewed as the last line of defense in 
what TSA describes as its layered security system, which includes 
perimeter security (e.g., airport security fencing), 100 percent 
passenger and checked baggage screening, hardened flight deck doors, 
armed federal air marshals, and armed pilots.[Footnote 9] Figure 1 
provides the number of domestic air carriers by carrier group (major, 
national, and regional) and the percentage of passengers flown 
domestically by carrier group during fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 10]

Figure 1: Number of Domestic Air Carriers by Carrier Group and 
Percentage of Passengers Flown Domestically by Carrier Group: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Federal guidance for air carriers to use to develop their flight and 
cabin crew security training programs has been in place for over 20 
years. FAA developed the crew member security training guidance, 
referred to as Common Strategy I, in the early 1980's in response to 
numerous hijacking incidents in the late 1970's. Common Strategy I 
generally instructed air carriers to develop training programs that 
called for flight and cabin crew members to cooperate with threatening 
passengers or hijackers and slow compliance with their demands. Based 
on this guidance, FAA also developed corresponding security training 
standards that set forth the requirements for flight and cabin crew 
member security training. Air carriers were required to incorporate the 
guidance and standards into their security training programs. FAA 
principal security inspectors and principal operations inspectors were 
responsible for monitoring air carriers' compliance with the security 
training standards. The nature of the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, however, demonstrated that the philosophy of Common Strategy 
I--to cooperate with hijackers--was flawed as it presumed that 
hijackers would not use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction. 

Following the events of September 11, 2001, section 107 of ATSA 
required FAA, in consultation with TSA and other stakeholders, to 
develop detailed guidance for flight and cabin crew security training 
programs within 60 days after the enactment of the act. FAA developed 
and issued security training guidance, in accordance with the 
requirements of ATSA, on January 19, 2002. In February 2002, TSA 
assumed responsibility for monitoring air carriers' security training 
for United States passenger air carriers and the air carrier security 
inspections function was transferred from FAA to TSA.[Footnote 11]

Following the enactment of ATSA, the President signed into law two acts 
that amended the flight and cabin crew training requirements codified 
at title 49 of the U.S. Code, section 44918--the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and Vision 100. The Homeland Security Act, enacted on November 
25, 2002, amended the law by, among other things, mandating that, if 
TSA updated training guidance, it must issue a rule to include elements 
of self-defense in the training programs.[Footnote 12] Vision 100, 
subsequently enacted on December 12, 2003, amended the flight and cabin 
crew security training law in its entirety to require that: 

* air carriers providing scheduled passenger air transportation carry 
out a training program that addresses the 10 elements listed in table 1;

* TSA approve the air carrier's training programs;

* TSA, in consultation with FAA, monitor air carrier training programs 
and periodically review an air carrier's training program to ensure the 
program is adequately preparing crew members for potential threat 
conditions;

* TSA, in consultation with FAA, order air carriers to modify training 
programs to reflect new or different security threats; and: 

* TSA develop and provide an advanced voluntary self-defense training 
program to provide both classroom and effective hands-on training in, 
at least, the six training elements listed in table 2. 

Table 1 lists the minimum training elements required by law, as enacted 
by ATSA and as amended by Vision 100, for basic crew member security 
training. 

Table 1: List of Basic Crew Member Security Training Elements Required 
By Law: 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: 
Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Crew 
communication and coordination; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Appropriate 
responses to defend oneself; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Use of 
protective devices assigned to crew members; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Psychology 
of terrorists to cope with hijacker behavior and passenger responses; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: (Live) 
situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Flight deck 
procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend the aircraft; 
ATSA: Yes; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: Recognizing 
suspicious activities; 
ATSA: No; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: The proper 
commands to give passengers and attackers; 
ATSA: No; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: The proper 
conduct of a cabin search, including explosive device recognition; 
ATSA: No; 
Vision 100: Yes. 

Source: ATSA and Vision 100. 

[End of table]

Table 2 lists the training elements that TSA must include in an 
advanced voluntary self-defense training program for flight and cabin 
crew members under the law, as amended by Vision 100. 

Table 2: List of Advanced Voluntary Crew Member Self-Defense Training 
Elements Required By Law: 

Legislative requirements for crew member security training: 

Deterring a passenger who might present a threat. 

Advanced control, striking, and restraint techniques. 

Training to defend oneself against edged or contact weapons. 

Methods to subdue and restrain an attacker. 

Use of available items aboard the aircraft for self-defense. 

Appropriate and effective responses to defend oneself including the use 
of force against an attacker. 

Source: Vision 100. 

[End of table]

Over the years, our work on best practices in training has found that 
generally high-performing organizations follow certain key steps in 
developing and measuring the effectiveness of training 
programs.[Footnote 13] These steps include: 

* planning--developing a strategic approach that establishes priorities 
and leverages investments in training to achieve agency results and 
identify the competencies--commonly referred to as knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and behaviors--needed to achieve organizational missions and 
goals, and measure the extent to which their employees possess these 
competencies;

* design and development--identifying specific initiatives that the 
agency will use, along with other strategies, to include individual and 
organizational performance;

* implementation--ensuring effective and efficient delivery of training 
opportunities in an environment that supports learning and change; and: 

* evaluation--assessing the extent to which training efforts contribute 
to improved performance and results. 

TSA Has Enhanced Guidance and Standards for Flight and Cabin Crew 
Security Training with Input from Stakeholders, but Better Planning Is 
Needed: 

TSA Enhanced Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training Guidance 
and Standards with Input from Stakeholders, but Stakeholders Continue 
to Have Concerns: 

Building on the legislatively mandated guidance developed by FAA and 
the corresponding standards, TSA enhanced crew member security training 
guidance and standards with input from stakeholders in accordance with 
the law, as amended by Vision 100. TSA policy and training officials 
stated that they revised the guidance and standards for two main 
reasons. First, the law required that air carriers include additional 
training elements in their basic crew member security training programs 
to prepare flight and cabin crew members for potential threat 
conditions.[Footnote 14] Second, TSA determined that the guidance and 
standards needed to be better organized and to more clearly define 
security training elements, in part due to feedback from air carriers, 
flight and cabin crew member labor organizations, and associations 
representing air carriers.[Footnote 15] For example, stakeholders we 
interviewed and our own review found that the organization of the 
previous security training standards was difficult to follow in that 
several requirements were addressed in multiple sections of the 
document rather than focused in a single section. During the summer of 
2003 and May 2004, TSA established two internal working groups 
comprised of representatives of its policy, training, regulatory, and/
or legal offices. One working group was responsible for revising the 
security training guidance, and the other working group was responsible 
for revising the corresponding security training standards--the 
standards from which air carriers must train their flight and cabin 
crew members. TSA officials stated that these working groups determined 
the reasonableness and appropriateness of the security training 
elements contained in the existing guidance and standards in place at 
that time and what additional training elements were needed. 

During the development of the revised guidance and standards, TSA 
provided external stakeholders[Footnote 16] with two opportunities to 
provide comments. In July 2004, the first comment period, TSA convened 
a meeting of external stakeholders to present an overview of the draft 
revised guidance and standards and to provide copies of the documents 
for their review and comment. TSA initially requested that stakeholders 
provide comments on the draft revised guidance and standards within 2 
weeks. However, in response to stakeholder concerns about the short 
comment period, TSA extended the comment period for an additional 2 
weeks. After consolidating all stakeholder comments, TSA's internal 
working group reviewed the comments to determine which to incorporate 
in the guidance and standards. In August 2004, the second comment 
period, TSA convened additional meetings with external stakeholders-- 
one meeting with air carrier associations and another with crew member 
labor organizations--to review each of the stakeholders' comments and 
to discuss changes made to the revised guidance and standards in 
response to these comments.[Footnote 17] In September 2004, TSA 
provided the stakeholders with a 30-day comment period on the revised 
guidance and standards. After receiving comments and determining which 
of the suggested changes to include in the revised guidance and 
standards, TSA issued the finalized guidance and standards to air 
carriers on January 3, 2005. 

Stakeholders we interviewed and our own analysis of revisions made to 
the guidance and standards generally found the revised guidance and 
standards to be better organized and to provide some additional clarity 
on security training requirements for crew members. For example, we 
found that the previous standards only implicitly addressed the 
requirement for training on the psychology of terrorists and addressed 
it in multiple sections in the document. In contrast, the revised 
standards organized information on this requirement in a single section 
and clearly identified the requirement as "psychology of terrorists." 
Additionally, the previous guidance did not define what constitutes 
life-threatening behavior, whereas the revised guidance provides both a 
definition of this behavior and examples. 

Although TSA made these enhancements, stakeholders we interviewed and 
stakeholders identified by TSA provided concerns about the 
reasonableness of applying parts of the guidance and standards to both 
flight and cabin crew members, the difficulty in implementing some of 
the standards without additional information or training tools from 
TSA, and the vagueness of some of the guidance and standards. Our 
interviews with officials from 19 air carriers and 8 representatives 
from aviation associations and crew member labor organizations, after 
the revised guidance and standards were finalized in January 2005, also 
identified similar concerns. Regarding the applicability of the 
standards to flight and cabin crew members, officials from 9 of the 19 
air carriers that we interviewed stated that some of the training 
standards remained generalized to both pilots and flight attendants, 
rather than targeted to their specific job functions in responding to a 
security threat. For example, TSA requires both pilots and flight 
attendants to have annual hands-on training on how to use restraining 
devices. However, 2 of the 19 air carriers we interviewed stated that 
training pilots annually on how to use restraining devices is not 
necessary because pilots are trained to stay inside the flight deck at 
all times, even when an incident occurs in the aircraft cabin. TSA 
officials stated that all crew members need annual hands-on training on 
how to use restraining devices because off-duty flight crew members 
frequently fly, and if an incident occurs in the aircraft cabin, they 
will know how to use the devices. One crew member labor organization 
agreed with TSA's position, stating that incidents could occur in which 
pilots may need to apply the restraints. Additionally, the crew member 
labor organization official stated since pilots in command are the 
security coordinators on flights, they must be familiar with the 
strategies, tactics, and techniques that flight attendants may use in 
defense of themselves, the passengers, and the aircraft. 

Additionally, some stakeholders expressed concerns about the difficulty 
in implementing some of the standards without additional information or 
training tools from TSA. For example, officials from 12 of the 19 air 
carriers we interviewed stated that TSA had not provided sufficient 
training materials or tools to enable them to deliver certain elements 
of the security training. These air carriers stated that although they 
requested the additional information or tools, TSA responded that air 
carriers were responsible for identifying and providing the required 
tools needed to deliver the security training. A labor union 
organization official stated that relying on training organizations and 
air carriers to develop the training materials "perpetuates the 
disparate quality and breadth of training available throughout the 
industry, which does little to assure a common strategy approach to 
securing United States skies." Additionally, officials from 4 of the 19 
air carriers we interviewed expressed concerns that TSA did not take 
into consideration that some air carriers do not have the expertise and 
personnel to conduct the annual basic self-defense training. TSA 
responded that basic self-defense training is legislatively required 
and the Federal Air Marshal Service, FBI, and other agencies are 
willing to work with the air carriers on their overall flight and cabin 
crew security training. TSA officials further stated that the air 
carriers should have an established line of communication with these 
agencies, but if the air carriers are seeking a point of contact, TSA 
would provide agency contact information. According to a Federal Air 
Marshal Service official, a Federal Air Marshal Service liaison meets 
periodically with the air carriers and aviation industry associations 
representing the air carriers and crew members to discuss overall 
communications including flight and cabin crew training issues. 

Furthermore, 9 of 27 stakeholders (air carriers, associations 
representing air carriers, and crew member labor organizations) we 
interviewed were concerned about the lack of definition, guidance, and 
clarity for parts of the revised security training guidance and 
standards. For example, the crew member security training standards 
require that crew members demonstrate proficiency in various security 
training elements, such as the use of protective and restraining 
devices and proper conduct of a cabin search. However, the standards do 
not define proficiency. Officials from a crew member labor organization 
stated that without clear, measurable training objectives for 
individual air carrier training departments to determine crew member 
proficiency and training objectives, the likelihood that training 
quality and content will vary from air carrier to air carrier 
increases. TSA training officials stated that air carriers, in 
conjunction with their training departments, are required to develop a 
method for determining crew member proficiency in the required training 
elements. TSA officials stated that the air carriers developed the 
training program, not TSA, and are therefore in the best position to 
define proficiency. TSA officials stated that their training staff's 
review of the training materials include verifying that there are 
opportunities built into the training for flight and cabin crew members 
to demonstrate proficiency in the required elements. TSA officials 
further stated that air carriers should have the latitude to tailor 
their desired level of proficiency for the various standards to their 
individual operations. We found, however, that without standards for 
proficiency, which commonly serve as criteria for success in training 
programs, TSA will only be able to document training activity, and not 
the results of the training, i.e., whether the intended knowledge was 
in fact transferred to the training participants at a level acceptable 
to TSA. 

TSA Has Not Established Strategic Goals or Performance Measures for 
Crew Member Security Training: 

TSA has not established strategic goals or performance measures for 
flight and cabin crew member security training, nor required air 
carriers to do so. GPRA requires that agencies use outcome-oriented 
goals and measures that assess results, effects, or impacts of a 
program or activity compared to its intended purpose. GPRA also 
requires federal agencies to consult with key stakeholders--those with 
a direct interest in the success of the program--in developing goals 
and measures. Strategic goals explain the results that are expected 
from a program and when to expect those results. These goals should be 
expressed in a manner that could be used to gauge success in the 
future. Performance measures (indicators used to gauge performance) are 
meant to cover key facets of performance and help decision makers 
assess program accomplishments and improve program performance. With 
respect to flight and cabin crew security training, strategic goals 
would represent the key outcomes that TSA expects air carriers to 
achieve in providing flight and cabin crew member security training, 
and performance measures would gauge to what extent air carriers are 
achieving these outcomes. 

TSA training officials stated that they decided not to develop 
strategic goals or performance measures because they view their role in 
the crew member security training program as purely regulatory--that 
is, monitoring air carriers' compliance with the training guidance and 
standards established by TSA. In this regard, TSA is the regulatory 
agency responsible for determining whether the security training 
program is adequately preparing flight and cabin crew members for 
potential threat conditions. TSA training officials also stated that 
due to the varying nature of the air carriers' training programs, TSA 
believes that it is the individual air carriers that are responsible 
for establishing goals and performance measures specific to their 
security training programs and for using the results to make program 
improvements.[Footnote 18] However, without overall strategic goals 
established by TSA in collaboration with air carriers, air carriers do 
not have a framework from which to develop their individual performance 
goals and measures. Furthermore, TSA has not explicitly required air 
carriers to develop performance goals and measures or provided them 
with guidance and standards for doing so. Without guidance and 
standards, the 84 individual air carriers may establish inconsistent 
performance goals and measures. Additionally, the absence of 
performance goals and measures for flight and cabin crew security 
training limits the ability of TSA and air carriers to fully assess the 
accomplishments of the flight and cabin crew member security training 
and to target program improvements. 

Recent Progress Made to Strengthen Oversight of Flight and Cabin Crew 
Member Security Training Program, but Weaknesses Remain: 

TSA Has Recently Taken Steps to Strengthen Oversight Efforts of Air 
Carriers Security Training: 

TSA has recently taken steps to improve its oversight of air carriers' 
crew member security training. One step includes adding staff with 
training expertise to review air carriers' crew member security 
training curriculums to determine whether there is evidence that each 
applicable training standard is being met. When we began our review, 
TSA's review of air carriers' crew member security training programs 
was solely the responsibility of the principal security 
inspectors.[Footnote 19] These TSA inspectors were responsible for 
conducting a regulatory review to determine whether air carriers' crew 
member security training curriculums met the requirements set forth in 
the standards. Beginning in January 2005, TSA began using training 
staff with expertise in designing training programs to review the 
overall design of the air carriers' crew member security training 
curriculum, how the information is to be conveyed, the expected setting 
of the practice environment, and the way in which the information is to 
be presented--and to ensure that the security training curriculum 
satisfies the required security training standards. TSA inspectors are 
responsible for identifying which standards apply to each of the air 
carriers, based on their knowledge of the air carrier's flight 
operations, size of aircraft, and presence or absence of international 
routes. TSA officials stated that between January 2005, when the 
revised guidance and standards were issued, and August 2, 2005, the 
training staff were involved in the review of the 71 security training 
curriculums that had been submitted to TSA.[Footnote 20]

In January 2005, TSA took another step to strengthen its review of air 
carriers' flight and cabin crew member security training by developing 
a standard form for TSA inspectors and training staff to use to conduct 
and document their reviews of air carriers' security training 
curriculums. Also, TSA developed an internal memorandum, dated January 
5, 2005, that generally describes the review process TSA inspectors and 
training staff are to use when reviewing air carriers' crew member 
security training curriculums. The standard form, which lists the 
required training elements, is used by TSA inspectors to document the 
requirements stated in the revised security training standards that 
apply to a particular air carrier, and by the training staff to verify 
that air carrier's initial and recurrent training plans include the 
applicable requirements and to document their comments.[Footnote 21] 
Prior to the development of this form, there were no documented 
procedures for how the inspections were to be conducted or a standard 
form for TSA inspectors to use to document their reviews of air 
carriers' crew member security training curriculums. Additionally, TSA 
lacked complete documentation of its reviews of air carriers' security 
training. Specifically, although TSA officials stated that TSA 
inspectors reviewed all 84 air carriers' revised security training 
curriculums in response to January 2002 guidance and the corresponding 
standards, TSA was only able to provide us documentation related to 11 
reviews.[Footnote 22] The Comptroller General's Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should document 
all transactions and other significant events and should be able to 
make this documentation readily available for examination. With the 
development of a standard form for reviewing air carriers' security 
training curriculums in January 2005, TSA was able to provide us with 
documentation for all 18 of the reviews of air carriers' security 
training curriculums that TSA inspectors and training staff had 
conducted between January 2005 and April 20, 2005.[Footnote 23]

Additionally, in January 2005, TSA began requiring air carriers to 
obtain participant feedback at the end of crew member security 
training.[Footnote 24] According to our human capital work,[Footnote 
25] participant feedback can be useful in providing the agency with 
varied perspectives on the effect of the training. However, TSA 
training officials stated that they are not certain how, if at all, 
they will use the participant feedback in conducting oversight of air 
carriers' crew member security training programs. TSA officials stated 
that it is the responsibility of the individual air carriers to assess 
the results of participant feedback and to make changes to improve the 
security training as necessary. In May 2005, TSA training officials 
acknowledged that it would be useful for its inspectors to review 
participant feedback on an annual basis to assess flight and cabin crew 
members' views of their air carriers' security training programs and to 
identify trends within and across air carriers. The official 
acknowledged that these results could provide TSA inspectors 
information they could use to prioritize their reviews of air carriers' 
crew member security training. However, the official stated that 
reviewing the participant feedback is a resource intensive process that 
also requires a certain level of expertise and is not feasible for TSA 
to undertake at this time. Without plans for reviewing participant 
feedback, TSA is not making use of available information on possible 
deficiencies in the quality of air carriers' security training programs 
or identifying best practices that could be shared. 

Furthermore, TSA is taking steps to address a staffing shortage among 
its TSA inspector workforce to enable greater monitoring of air 
carriers' flight and cabin crew member security training. Specifically, 
on April 1, 2005, TSA reorganized its inspection staff into a newly 
created Office of Compliance.[Footnote 26] TSA officials stated that 
this reorganization should help address the staffing shortfalls that 
previously existed. TSA also issued position announcements in an effort 
to fill vacant inspector positions. TSA officials stated that they had 
about 23 TSA inspectors onboard when the inspection function 
transferred from FAA to TSA in February 2002. As of February 2005, TSA 
had 15 inspectors onboard, 5 of whom were in the position for less than 
5 months. Between January 2004 and September 2004, the TSA inspector 
workforce ranged from about 7 to 14 inspectors. TSA officials stated 
that a number of these staff subsequently left TSA because of 
advancement opportunities within the Department of Homeland Security 
and personal reasons. As part of TSA's monitoring efforts, TSA 
inspectors periodically visit air carriers to observe classroom 
delivery of flight and cabin crew member security training and to 
review air carrier records documenting flight and cabin crew member 
completion of required security training. TSA officials stated that 
with the existing inspector workforce, they were only able to conduct 
observations of about 25 of air carriers' classroom delivery of flight 
and cabin crew member security training during fiscal year 
2004.[Footnote 27] Although TSA is not required to observe the 
classroom delivery of all air carriers' flight and cabin crew member 
security training on an annual basis, TSA officials stated that these 
observations allow them to determine whether security training is being 
delivered consistent with air carriers' approved security training 
curriculums and to identify potential problems with the training 
delivery. 

TSA Has Not Fully Developed Procedures for Monitoring Air Carriers' 
Crew Member Security Training: 

While TSA has taken steps to strengthen its oversight of air carriers' 
crew member security training, TSA has not fully developed procedures 
for monitoring this training. TSA is required by law to monitor and 
periodically review air carriers' security training to ensure that the 
training is adequately preparing crew members for potential threat 
conditions. The Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control in 
the Federal Government calls for controls generally to be designed to 
assure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal 
operations and that transactions and other significant events be 
documented clearly and the documentation be readily available for 
examination.[Footnote 28] We identified weaknesses in TSA's controls in 
these areas with regard to monitoring and reviewing air carriers' 
flight and cabin crew security training. 

First, although TSA recently developed a standard form for its 
inspectors and training staff to use in reviewing air carriers' flight 
and cabin crew member security training, TSA has not developed 
procedures for completing this form. TSA officials acknowledged that 
there are no documented procedures or criteria for staff to use to 
complete the standard form or for determining which standards apply to 
individual air carriers and whether or not to approve an air carrier's 
security training curriculum.[Footnote 29] The lack of written 
procedures may result in inconsistent assessments of the air carriers' 
security training curriculums and inconsistent application of the 
standards to air carriers. Formal procedures for reviewing air 
carriers' flight and cabin crew security training could provide 
standardization when TSA inspectors and training staff assess the air 
carriers' security training curriculum. 

Second, TSA does not have documented procedures for conducting and 
documenting observations of air carriers' classroom delivery of flight 
and cabin crew member security training. During fiscal year 2004, 
according to TSA officials, TSA inspectors visited about 25 air 
carriers to observe crew member security training and review files, 
such as records documenting crew members' completion of required 
security training.[Footnote 30] TSA officials stated that they did not 
have sufficient resources to visit all 84 air carriers to observe their 
security training. We requested records documenting TSA inspectors' 
visits to air carriers to assess the completeness and consistency of 
these reviews. However, TSA officials stated that they were unable to 
provide us with the requested documentation. Without written procedures 
to guide TSA inspectors in observing security training and assessing 
the results of their observations, its inspectors may not conduct 
comprehensive and consistent reviews. Additionally, without a mechanism 
for documenting and maintaining TSA inspectors' reviews of air 
carriers' security training delivery in a standard format, TSA lacks 
the ability to track the results of these reviews and identify 
patterns, including strengths and weaknesses, in training delivery 
within and across air carriers. In June 2005, a TSA official stated 
that TSA inspectors will monitor at least one flight and cabin crew 
member training class per year to ensure the curriculum is being 
followed. TSA inspectors are to provide the results of the monitoring 
to the principal operations inspector via memo or email. TSA officials 
stated that inspections of monitoring crew member security training 
will be maintained in a database, but TSA has not established a time 
frame for completing this database or documented procedures for this 
process. 

Additionally, although the law requires TSA to consider complaints from 
crew members in determining when to review air carriers' flight and 
cabin crew member security training programs, TSA does not have 
procedures for considering such complaints. TSA inspection officials 
stated that they were not aware of any instances in which crew members 
had complained to TSA about security. However, in the event that TSA 
does receive complaints from crew members in the future, it is 
important that TSA have established and documented procedures to inform 
its inspectors of how to consider the complaints in reviewing air 
carriers' security training programs. TSA officials stated that 
complaints from flight and cabin crew members will be directed to their 
Office of Transportation Security Policy for review and all decisions 
regarding flight and cabin crew member security training program 
modifications or policy changes will be evaluated and disseminated by 
this office. The officials also stated that if the complaints involve 
the training delivery process, the TSA inspectors may be required to 
increase the frequency of on-site inspections based upon an evaluation 
of the seriousness of the complaints that are received. 

TSA officials stated that they plan to develop a handbook for its 
inspectors and guidance for its training staff to use in monitoring and 
reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew member security training 
to help provide assurance that standardized monitoring occurs. However, 
TSA has not established a time frame for completing these efforts. 

TSA Developed and Implemented Crew Member Self-Defense Training, but 
Has Not Established Performance Measures or Evaluated Training 
Effectiveness: 

In December 2004, as required by law, TSA implemented an advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training program for flight and 
cabin crew members after obtaining stakeholder input.[Footnote 31] 
Participation in the voluntary training course has been relatively low, 
with only 474 flight and cabin crew members (39 percent of total 
capacity) attending the training during the first 7 months of the 
program. TSA training officials attributed the low participation to 
crew members having a difficult time in obtaining 3 consecutive days of 
leave to enable them to participate in the training. Additionally, 
although TSA incorporated some stakeholder concerns into the course 
design, some stakeholders, including individuals identified as experts 
by TSA and our own analysis identified concerns regarding the training 
design and delivery, including the training's voluntary nature, the 
setting's lack of realism, the training's lack of recurrence, and the 
instructor's lack of knowledge of crew members' actual work 
environment. TSA has not developed performance measures for the program 
or established a time frame for evaluating the program's overall 
effectiveness, including the effectiveness of the training design and 
delivery. 

TSA Developed and Implemented Advanced Voluntary Self-Defense Training 
in Consultation with Stakeholders, but Participation in Training 
Remains Low: 

TSA developed and implemented an advanced voluntary self-defense 
training program for flight and cabin crew members in consultation with 
key stakeholders by December 12, 2004, as required by law. TSA 
consulted with law enforcement personnel, security experts with 
expertise in self-defense training, representatives of air carriers, 
flight attendants, labor organizations representing flight attendants, 
terrorism experts, Federal Air Marshal Service officials, and 
educational institutions offering law enforcement training programs, in 
developing the self-defense training program and determining how to 
apply the training elements specified by law. [Footnote 32] According 
to TSA officials, in 2002, in anticipation of having to develop a 
mandatory self-defense training program as required by the Homeland 
Security Act,[Footnote 33] TSA established a working group comprised of 
law enforcement experts, Federal Air Marshals,[Footnote 34] and other 
subject matter experts, such as aviation security experts and self- 
defense/martial arts training experts, to assess what elements should 
be included in the training. This working group collaborated on the 
overall program design and delivery, including the program goals and 
objectives and the course content and delivery method. The working 
group's efforts were placed on hold in 2003 when TSA was advised that 
legislation would be enacted to make the training a voluntary program 
to be provided by TSA, rather than a mandatory training program to be 
delivered by individual air carriers. After the enactment of Vision 100 
in December 2003, TSA continued its efforts to develop an advanced 
voluntary self-defense training program until the program's official 
implementation in December 2004, building on the input of the initial 
working group. The overall goal of the advanced voluntary crew member 
self-defense training, as defined by TSA, is to enable crew members to 
develop a higher level of competency in self-defense tactics to prevent 
or reduce the possibility of injury or death to one's person or the 
takeover of an aircraft. TSA also established several objectives for 
the training, including: 

* recognize potential threats before an act of violence occurs;

* interpret behaviors that lead to potential hostile acts;

* conclude appropriate courses of action crew members must take to 
avert hostile actions intended to injure crew members or passengers or 
to take over an aircraft; and: 

* apply appropriate individual self-protection measures and self- 
defense tactics to prevent or reduce the possibility of injury or death 
to one's person or the takeover of an aircraft. 

Prior to implementing the voluntary training in December 2004, TSA 
piloted the prototype advanced voluntary self-defense training in 
August and September 2004 in five cities with major airline hubs and 
refined the training based on comments from participants.[Footnote 35] 
The participants provided positive feedback in four areas, including 
(1) the repetitive moves taught throughout the course made the self- 
defense tactics easy to learn; (2) the training prepared them mentally 
and physically to defend themselves and provided a good foundation in 
self-defense; (3) the small class size and instructor to student ratio 
of 1 to 8 was conducive to a productive learning environment;[Footnote 
36] and (4) the location of the training facility and lodging was well 
received. TSA also received feedback on changes that could be made to 
enhance the training. Table 3 provides a summary of the stakeholders' 
concerns on TSA's prototype advanced voluntary self-defense training 
and actions taken by TSA in response to the concerns. 

Table 3: Summary of Stakeholders' Concerns on TSA's Prototype Advanced 
Voluntary Self-Defense Training and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to 
the Concerns: 

Comments: Training course was too long; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Decreased the 
number of training days from 4 to 3. 

Comments: Too much lecture time; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Increased the 
amount of hands-on training from about 70 percent to 85 percent of the 
total course time. 

Comments: Lack of aircraft cabin or cockpit to promote realistic 
training scenarios; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Encouraged 
instructors to attempt to simulate the aircraft cabin through creative 
means, such as creating an aisle using chairs and having participants 
perform the tactics within the confines of the chairs. 

Comments: Some instructors were not knowledgeable in aviation 
terminology, and aircraft environment, or the airline industry; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Advised the 
contractor to consider hiring instructors with flight attendant and 
pilot experience. 

Comments: Lack of communication in getting the notice out about the 
class scheduling; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Committed to 
providing more advance notice in announcing the official training. 

Comments: Lack of information on recurrent training; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: Although TSA 
has not ruled out recurrent training in the future, TSA is currently 
not planning to conduct such training because the law only requires TSA 
to provide the advanced voluntary crew member self-defense training. 
Under the basic flight and cabin crew member security training program, 
air carriers are to provide instructions on basic defensive techniques. 

Comments: Crew members' exposure to potential liability if a crew 
member hurts someone when using techniques taught in the self-defense 
training to address an incident onboard an aircraft; 
Action taken by TSA in response to stakeholder concerns: TSA advises 
crew members participating in the advanced voluntary crew member self-
defense training program of the liability protection offered by 49 
U.S.C. § 44903(k), which shields individuals, including crew members, 
from liability in the event they take action to defend themselves or 
others based upon a reasonable belief that an act of criminal violence 
or aircraft piracy was occurring or about to occur on board the 
aircraft. 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews with stakeholders. 

[End of table]

As of June 2005, a total of 474 crew members had participated in the 
training in 51 classes. During the initial deployment of the advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training in December 2004, 
participation was only about 14 percent of the total capacity being 
utilized, and about 38 percent of total enrolled participants actually 
attended the training course. Participation increased in January 
through March 2005, but declined in April through June 2005, with only 
23 percent of total capacity utilized in June 2005. TSA plans to offer 
46 additional advanced voluntary self-defense training courses during 
the remainder of fiscal year 2005 in 10 cities.[Footnote 37] According 
to TSA officials, TSA estimated that approximately 21,700 crew members 
will participate in the training, based on information obtained from 
air carrier associations and crew member labor organizations. Table 4 
provides information on flight and cabin crew member participation in 
the advanced voluntary self-defense training from December 2004 through 
June 2005.[Footnote 38]

Table 4: Crew Member Participation in Advanced Voluntary Crew Member 
Self-Defense Training from December 2004 through June 2005: 

Month: December 2004; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 4; 
Class capacity: 96; 
Number enrolled: 34; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 35%; 
Number attended: 13; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 38%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 14%. 

Month: January 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 8; 
Class capacity: 192; 
Number enrolled: 115; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 60%; 
Number attended: 75; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 65%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 39%. 

Month: February 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 10; 
Class capacity: 240; 
Number enrolled: 159; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 66%; 
Number attended: 144; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 91%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 60%. 

Month: March 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 10; 
Class capacity: 240; 
Number enrolled: 135; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 56%; 
Number attended: 123; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 91%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 51%. 

Month: April 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 7; 
Class capacity: 168; 
Number enrolled: 63; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 38%; 
Number attended: 49; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 78%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 29%. 

Month: May 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 8; 
Class capacity: 192; 
Number enrolled: 61; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 32%; 
Number attended: 48; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 79%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 25%. 

Month: June 2005; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 4; 
Class capacity: 96; 
Number enrolled: 41; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 43%; 
Number attended: 22; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 54%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 23%. 

Total; 
Number of classes in which training took place: 51; 
Class capacity: 1224; 
Number enrolled: 608; 
Percentage of capacity enrolled: 50%; 
Number attended: 474; 
Percentage of enrolled attended: 78%; 
Percentage of total capacity attended: 39%. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

[End of table]

TSA officials stated that the low participation rate in December 2004 
was largely due to the short advance notice they provided stakeholders 
regarding the training. TSA announced the availability of the December 
2004 training courses 6 days before the training was to take place. 
This short notice significantly restricted the ability of flight and 
cabin crew members to participate in the training because they 
generally submit their scheduling bids 30 days prior to their work 
schedule.[Footnote 39] TSA attributed the short notice provided to the 
length of time it took to reallocate funds from other TSA programs to 
enable implementation of the advanced voluntary self-defense training 
program.[Footnote 40] TSA provided crew members with more than 30 days 
notice for the remaining sessions. However, TSA training officials 
stated that participation continued to remain low in January 2005 due 
to crew members calling in sick, crew members being called for flight 
duty at the last moment, and inclement weather. TSA training officials 
stated that although they projected that crew member participation 
would increase over time, crew member participation decreased in June 
2005 due to crew members having a difficult time obtaining 3 
consecutive days of leave to attend training. TSA training officials 
also stated that based on their experience with the Federal Flight Deck 
Officer training program, crew members' ability to obtain leave for the 
purpose of attending training may be associated with seasonal 
variances, with low participation usually occurring during the spring 
and summer months. Stakeholders, including air carriers and crew member 
labor organizations, attributed the low participation to crew members 
having to attend the training on their own time and pay the cost of 
travel, lodging, and meals. TSA training officials stated that they 
were continuing to gather information from flight and cabin crew 
members through the training contractor in an effort to identify the 
causes for the low participation and, ultimately, to try to address 
these causes. 

Stakeholders Identified Concerns about the Self-Defense Training Design 
and Delivery: 

Stakeholders, including individuals that TSA identified as subject 
matter experts, and our own analysis identified concerns with the 
design and delivery of the advanced voluntary crew member self-defense 
training.[Footnote 41] These concerns include the training's voluntary 
nature, the setting's lack of realism, the training's lack of 
recurrence, and the instructor's lack of knowledge of crew members' 
actual work environment. These same concerns were identified by 
stakeholders in response to the prototype self-defense training. As 
previously stated, our prior human capital work has found that in 
implementing a training program, an agency should ensure that 
implementation involves effective and efficient delivery of training-- 
that is, the training should be conducted in a setting that 
approximates the participants' working conditions and taught by 
individuals who are knowledgeable about the subject matter and work 
environment. 

In the case of the advanced voluntary self-defense training program, 13 
of the 33 stakeholders expressed concerns about the voluntary nature of 
the training and stated that the training should be mandatory. Six of 
these 13 stakeholders stated that the program's voluntary nature is 
inconsistent with TSA's revised security training guidance that seeks 
to establish a common strategy that would enable individuals involved 
in an incident onboard an aircraft to know what others involved will be 
thinking and doing. These same stakeholders stated that because the 
training is not mandatory, if some crew members have had the self- 
defense training while others have not, a breakdown in communication 
could occur. TSA training officials stated that because the security 
training standards require all crew members to receive training on how 
to communicate and coordinate during a disturbance, they are not 
concerned about the voluntary nature of the self-defense training 
program. 

Additionally, 14 of the 33 stakeholders expressed concerns about the 
lack of a realistic training setting during the delivery of advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training. The self-defense 
techniques are taught in an open-space setting, unlike the narrow 
aisles crew members have to work within on an actual aircraft. In the 
two training sessions we observed in two different cities, participants 
had to be constantly reminded by the instructors of the restricted 
training space because participants repeatedly made defensive moves, 
such as spins and wide kicks, which could not be performed inside an 
aircraft cabin. Our prior human capital work has found that for 
learning to be successful, the training environment--training facility 
and equipment--should be favorable to successful learning.[Footnote 42] 
TSA officials stated they examined the possibility of purchasing 
aircraft simulators for the self-defense training and found that it 
would cost TSA about $100,000 per simulator. Officials stated that they 
have advised the instructors to try to create a setting, using chairs, 
tape, or other means, to simulate the narrow aisles on an aircraft. We 
informed TSA that in the two training sessions we attended, instructors 
did not use these techniques. TSA officials stated that they would 
follow up with the instructors to ensure they use these techniques. 

Fifteen of the 33 stakeholders also expressed concerns about the lack 
of recurrent self-defense training given that self-defense skills are 
difficult to sustain if not consistently practiced over time. 
Stakeholders stated that a 3-day, one-time self-defense training course 
would not enable crew members to develop proficiency in self-defense. 
TSA officials responsible for developing the advanced voluntary 
training program stated that the self-defense training is not intended 
to make participants proficient in self-defense. Rather, the training 
is intended to enable crew members to develop a higher level of 
competency in self-defense tactics by extending their knowledge and 
skills in the use of self-defense techniques and improvised 
weapons.[Footnote 43] TSA officials also stated that the key benefit of 
the training is a change in the mindset of participants that enables a 
greater awareness of threat conditions onboard an aircraft and in their 
daily lives. Additionally, they stated that it is the responsibility of 
the individual participants to practice the various self-defense 
techniques they were taught. Furthermore, they stated that although TSA 
is not currently offering a recurrent training program, it has not 
ruled out the possibility of recurrent training in the future. Eleven 
of the 33 stakeholders also expressed concerns that the self-defense 
training could give participants a false sense of security. For 
example, two stakeholders stated that the false sense of security lies 
in the participants who take the course once and expect to be skilled 
and proficient using the self-defense techniques without realizing that 
they may not be capable of following through when an incident occurs. 

Finally, 6 of the 33 stakeholders, including subject matter experts and 
crew member labor organizations, identified concerns about the lack of 
knowledge instructors had about the crew members' actual working 
environment. While some stakeholders commended the instructors for 
their technical knowledge of crew members' actual work environment, 
others expressed concerns that some instructors lacked technical 
knowledge and expertise of the aviation industry. For example, a 
training participant we interviewed stated that the instructor did not 
understand how safety devices onboard an aircraft operate. The 
instructor suggested inflating an emergency raft while inflight to 
protect the flight deck. However, according to the training 
participant, inflating an emergency raft in flight could injure or kill 
passengers and crew members. Our prior human capital work found that 
the use of instructors who are knowledgeable of the subject matter and 
experienced in aviation industry issues can help provide assurance that 
instructors can effectively transfer these skills and knowledge to 
others. TSA officials stated that they advised the training contractor 
to hire instructors with law enforcement, martial arts/self-defense, 
and aviation backgrounds. Additionally, TSA provided the instructors 
with training on aviation terminology so instructors could better 
communicate with the students throughout the course. 

TSA officials stated that they were aware of the stakeholder concerns 
regarding the self-defense training course. The officials stated that 
their ability to address these concerns is limited by funding 
constraints and competing priorities. TSA officials further stated that 
they will continue to work with the contractor that is delivering the 
training to obtain any information that would be beneficial to the 
design and implementation of the training program. 

TSA Has Not Established Performance Measures or a Time Frame for 
Evaluating Training Effectiveness: 

TSA has not yet developed performance measures for the advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training program or established a 
time frame for evaluating the program's overall effectiveness. Our 
prior human capital work on best practices in training has found that 
generally, high-performing organizations evaluate the effectiveness of 
their training programs and use the results to target performance 
improvements.[Footnote 44] In February 2005, TSA began conducting end- 
of-course evaluations--participant feedback--of the training and is 
planning to assess these evaluations to ensure the training is 
consistently achieving results over time. Additionally, TSA will use 
the results to modify the training, if appropriate. Although these 
evaluations should enable TSA to assess participants' views on the 
training facilities, materials, and instructors, they will not enable 
TSA to determine whether the training increased the participants' 
knowledge and skills. TSA officials stated that they recognize the 
importance of developing performance measures and evaluating the 
effectiveness of the program to ensure that it is consistently 
achieving the goals and target performance improvements. Although TSA 
plans to undertake these efforts, it has not established time frames 
for doing so. TSA officials stated that the numerous internal process 
improvements currently under way in TSA that compete for time and 
resources will affect how soon the agency can establish performance 
measures and conduct an evaluation of the training program. Without 
performance measures and an evaluation of the program's overall 
effectiveness, TSA will not have meaningful information with which to 
determine whether the training program is actually enabling crew 
members to develop a higher level of competency in self-defense 
tactics--the intended goal of the training program. 

Conclusions: 

It has been less than 4 years since TSA assumed responsibility for 
aviation security. During this period, TSA implemented numerous 
initiatives to strengthen the various layers of security in commercial 
aviation. These efforts have largely focused on passenger and checked- 
baggage screening--among the first lines of defense in preventing 
terrorist attacks on commercial aircraft. TSA has recently taken steps 
to ensure that flight and cabin crew members--the last line of defense-
-are prepared to handle potential threat conditions onboard commercial 
aircraft. The revised guidance and standards TSA developed for air 
carriers to follow in developing and delivering their flight and cabin 
crew member security training is a positive step forward in 
strengthening security onboard commercial aircraft. However, guidance 
and standards alone do not provide assurances that the training 
delivered by air carriers is achieving TSA's intended results. TSA 
views its role in flight and cabin crew member security training as 
regulatory, and that air carriers are responsible for measuring the 
success of their individual training programs. We agree that air 
carriers have responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of their 
training programs. However, we believe that overall responsibility for 
ensuring that flight and cabin crew members are prepared to respond to 
terrorist threats must be shared between the air carriers and TSA. In 
supporting this partnership, TSA should establish strategic goals for 
the flight and cabin crew security training program so that air 
carriers can develop their security programs, and measure the 
effectiveness of these programs, based on desired results, or goals, 
clearly defined by TSA. Without strategic goals to inform air carriers 
of what is expected from their training programs, and in the absence of 
guidance and standards to help ensure that air carriers establish 
consistent performance goals and measures, it will be difficult for TSA 
and the air carriers to gauge the success of training programs over 
time and to determine how to direct improvement efforts most 
effectively. 

Additionally, while we are encouraged by the recent steps TSA has taken 
to improve its monitoring and review of air carriers' security training 
programs, without enhanced controls, such as written procedures for TSA 
staff to follow in conducting and documenting their reviews, TSA lacks 
reasonable assurance that its monitoring and review efforts will be 
conducted in a consistent and complete manner. Furthermore, a key 
source of information on the effectiveness of air carriers' security 
training is participant feedback on the training. TSA's recent 
requirement that air carriers obtain written feedback from flight and 
cabin crew members at the end of security training is a step in the 
right direction. However, without a process in place for considering 
this information during its oversight efforts, TSA is not effectively 
utilizing available information that could assist it in prioritizing 
and focusing its monitoring and review activities. 

Through developing and implementing the advanced voluntary self-defense 
training program, TSA took another step forward in its efforts to 
prepare flight and cabin crew members to handle potential threat 
conditions onboard commercial aircraft. However, TSA has not yet 
established performance measures or a timeframe for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the training program, including the training design 
and delivery. Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 to focus the federal government on achieving results and 
providing objective, results-oriented information to improve 
congressional decision making. Without performance measures or a method 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the training, TSA may not have 
information with which to systematically assess the program's 
strengths, weaknesses, and performance. Performance measures and an 
evaluation of the program's effectiveness can assist TSA in focusing 
its improvement efforts and provide Congress with information to assess 
the impact of an advanced voluntary self-defense training program. 

Recommendations: 

To help provide TSA management with reasonable assurance that its 
security training guidance and standards for flight and cabin crew 
members are preparing crew members for potential threat conditions, and 
to enable TSA and air carriers to assess the accomplishments of the 
security training and target program improvements, we recommend that 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the 
Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to take 
the following three actions: 

* establish strategic goals for the flight and cabin crew member 
security training program, in collaboration with air carriers, and 
communicate these goals to air carriers to explain the results that are 
expected from the training;

* develop guidance and standards for air carriers to use in 
establishing performance goals and measures for their individual flight 
and cabin crew member security training programs to help ensure 
consistency in the development of goals and measures; and: 

* review air carriers' goals and measures as part of its monitoring 
efforts to help ensure that they are linked to strategic goals 
established by TSA and to assess whether the training programs are 
achieving their intended results. 

To strengthen TSA's internal controls and help ensure that air carriers 
are complying with TSA's guidance and standards, we also recommend that 
the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, 
establish a time frame for finalizing written procedures for monitoring 
and reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew security training. 
These procedures should address the process for completing flight and 
cabin crew member curriculum review forms, determining which standards 
apply to individual air carriers and whether or not to approve an air 
carrier's training curriculum, conducting and documenting observations 
of air carriers' classroom delivery of security training, reviewing air 
carriers' security training goals and measures, and considering 
security related complaints from flight and cabin crew members. As part 
of its efforts to develop written procedures, TSA should examine ways 
to incorporate participant feedback into its monitoring and review 
efforts. 

In addition, to help ensure that the advanced voluntary crew member 
self-defense training is achieving its intended results, we recommend 
that the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, 
establish performance measures for the advanced voluntary crew member 
self-defense training program and a time frame for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the training, including the effectiveness of the 
training design and delivery. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On 
August 29, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report, 
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS generally concurred 
with the findings and recommendations in the report, and agreed that 
efforts to implement our recommendations are critical to a successful 
flight and cabin crew member security training program. With regard to 
our recommendations that TSA establish strategic goals for the flight 
and cabin crew member security training program and develop guidance 
and standards for air carriers to use in establishing performance goals 
and measures for their individual flight and cabin crew member security 
training programs, DHS stated that TSA has begun efforts to establish 
strategic goals for the program and, air carriers would benefit from 
additional guidance--that is, guidance in addition to the flight and 
cabin crew security training standards--to use in establishing 
performance goals and measures for their individual flight and cabin 
crew security training programs. While TSA has established standards 
for air carriers' to use in developing their flight and cabin crew 
security training, these standards do not include strategic goals for 
the training nor provide any guidance for establishing performance 
goals and measures. In addition, at the time of our review, TSA had not 
begun developing strategic goals for flight and cabin crew security 
training. Therefore, we cannot assess the extent to which the goals TSA 
is currently developing satisfy our recommendation. With respect to our 
recommendation that TSA establish a time frame for finalizing written 
procedures for monitoring and reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin 
crew security training, DHS stated that TSA is in the process of 
developing a monitoring plan, to the extent that resources permit, and 
a handbook for reviewing air carriers' flight and cabin crew member 
security training programs. DHS further stated that the handbook is 
currently under development and will be completed and ready for 
implementation in fiscal year 2006. Finally, regarding our 
recommendation that TSA establish performance measures for the advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training program and a time frame 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the training, DHS stated that TSA 
is working with OMB to establish performance measures for use in OMB's 
Performance Assessment Rating Tool for flight security training and 
will finalize these measures using fiscal year 2005 data as the 
baseline. According to DHS, these measures will provide TSA with 
information that can be used in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
advanced voluntary crew member self-defense training. DHS also stated 
that TSA has begun to reach out to stakeholders to obtain feedback on 
this training. TSA's successful completion of these ongoing and planned 
activities should address the concerns we raised in this report. We 
also provided relevant sections of this report to FAA, FBI, and DOD for 
their review, and incorporated their technical comments into the report 
as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 2 days 
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration and 
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made available 
at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To determine the progress TSA has made in developing and monitoring 
flight and cabin crew security training, we examined TSA's efforts to 
develop guidance and standards for air carriers' flight and cabin crew 
security training, monitor air carriers' compliance with the guidance 
and standards, and develop and deliver advanced voluntary self-defense 
training for crew members. Specifically, this report addresses the 
following questions: (1) What actions has TSA taken to develop guidance 
and standards for flight and cabin crew security training and to 
measure the effectiveness of the training? (2) How does TSA ensure 
domestic air carriers comply with required training guidance and 
standards? (3) What efforts has TSA taken to develop, implement, and 
measure the effectiveness of advanced voluntary self-defense training 
for flight and cabin crew members?

To determine the actions TSA has taken to develop guidance and 
standards for flight and cabin crew security training and to measure 
the effectiveness of the training as well as how TSA ensures domestic 
air carriers comply with required training guidance and standards, we 
obtained and analyzed relevant legislation, guidance, and standards 
developed by TSA and FAA, and TSA records documenting its reviews of 
air carriers' security training programs. We reviewed the security 
training guidance and standards to determine whether they contained the 
statutory requirements for flight and cabin crew security training of 
49 U.S.C. § 44918, as established by the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, and as amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. We also 
interviewed TSA training, policy, and inspections officials to identify 
their reasons for revising the guidance and standards and the process 
they used to revise these documents and ensure air carriers' compliance 
with the guidance and standards. Additionally, we compared TSA's 
process for monitoring and reviewing air carrier compliance with flight 
and cabin crew security training guidance and standards to standards 
for internal control in the federal government. To assess stakeholder 
involvement in the development of the guidance and standards and 
identify any stakeholder concerns, we interviewed officials from the 
FAA, FBI, FAMS, DOD, crew member labor organizations, and associations 
representing air carriers. At eight domestic air carriers we visited, 
we interviewed air carrier officials to obtain their views on the 
security training guidance and standards and TSA's efforts to ensure 
air carriers' compliance with the guidance and standards and to observe 
the flight and cabin crew initial or recurrent (refresher) security 
training. We selected these domestic air carriers based on whether they 
were currently offering initial and/or recurrent security training and 
on the size of the air carrier in an effort to include a mixture of 
various domestic air carriers and air carriers of varying sizes. The 
size of an air carrier is based on the annual operating revenues and 
the number of revenue passenger boardings. Finally, we conducted phone 
interviews with representatives of 11 additional domestic air carriers-
-which we selected using the same criteria we used to select the 8 air 
carriers to visit--to obtain their views on the flight and cabin crew 
member guidance and standards and TSA's monitoring of air carriers' 
compliance with these standards. Because we selected a nonprobability 
sample of domestic air carriers, the information we obtained from these 
interviews and visits cannot be generalized to all domestic air 
carriers. 

To determine the efforts TSA has taken to develop, implement, and 
measure the effectiveness of advanced voluntary self-defense training 
for flight and cabin crew members, we obtained and analyzed relevant 
legislation, TSA's course training manual for the self-defense 
training, and feedback provided by flight and cabin crew members who 
participated in the prototype training. We also interviewed TSA 
training officials responsible for designing and implementing the 
voluntary advanced crew member self-defense training program. 
Additionally, we observed the final training in two cities. 
Furthermore, we interviewed relevant stakeholders, including 
representatives of air carriers; labor organizations representing 
flight attendants and pilots as well as individual flight attendants 
and pilots; aviation industry associations representing air carriers; 
individuals identified as subject matter experts or self-defense 
training experts; and federal officials at the FBI, FAMS, and FAA to 
determine whether TSA consulted them when developing the crew member 
self-defense training. We identified subject matter experts or self- 
defense training experts based on recommendations from TSA and crew 
member labor organizations. We also interviewed representatives of the 
19 domestic air carriers mentioned above to obtain their views on the 
design and delivery of the advanced voluntary crew member self-defense 
training. We assessed the extent to which TSA incorporated stakeholder 
input into the training program, and the basis for TSA's decisions on 
which stakeholder input to incorporate into the training. Finally, we 
assessed TSA's efforts to develop the training programs relative to our 
guidance for assessing training and development efforts in the federal 
government. 

We conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: TSA's Deployment of an Advanced Voluntary Crew Member Self-
Defense Training from December 2004 through September 2005, as of July 
2005: 

Note: c = cancelled class. Crew member self-defense training was 
cancelled due to low participation. 

Training location: Alexandria, Virginia; 
December 2004; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Miami, Florida; 
December 2004; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Chicago, Illinois; 
December 2004: [C]; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Fort Worth, Texas; 
December 2004; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Wilmington, California; 
December 2004; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April: [C]; 
2005: May: [C]; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Aurora, Colorado; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Broomall, Pennsylvania; 
2005: January: [C]; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April: [C]; 
2005: May: [C]; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September: No class currently scheduled. 

Training location: Decatur/Clarkston, Georgia; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April: [C]; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: San Francisco, California; 
2005: January; 
2005: February; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Training location: Tempe, Arizona; 
2005: March; 
2005: April; 
2005: May; 
2005: June: [C]; 
2005: July: [C]; 
2005: August; 
2005: September. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

August 26, 2005: 

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Berrick: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on draft report GAO-05-781 SU, 
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done to 
identify areas for improvement in the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA's) review of flight and cabin crew security 
training. We generally concur with the report and its recommendations 
and appreciate the discussion of challenges, and related on-going and 
planned work designed to fully meet our responsibilities. 

The report acknowledges the substantial progress TSA has made in 
reviewing the cabin crew security training plans of numerous air 
carriers, in addition to developing and delivering a voluntary crew 
member self-defense training program. However, there are areas within 
the report about which DHS would like to comment. 

DHS agrees that efforts to implement the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office's five recommendations are critical to a successful flight and 
cabin crew security program. Strategic goals and objectives provide the 
framework guiding the actions that make up the flight and cabin crew 
member security training program. TSA has already begun efforts to 
establish strategic goals for this program. 

While Appendix XIII of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
(AOSSP) outlines the standards for the program, DHS concurs that air 
carriers would benefit from additional guidance to use in establishing 
performance goals and measures for their individual flight and cabin 
crew security training programs. 

The TSA Office of Compliance is in the process of developing a 
monitoring plan for new and revised Air Carrier Basic Crew Member 
Security Programs, to the extent that resources permit. A Principal 
Security Inspector's (PSI) handbook, currently under development, will 
define specific objectives, required paperwork, PSI assessment 
protocols, and guidance for curricula reviews. It is anticipated that 
the handbook will be completed and ready for implementation commencing 
in FY 2006. 

With regard to voluntary crew member self-defense training, TSA's 
Office of Workforce Performance and Training is working in concert with 
the Office of Management and Budget to establish performance measures 
for use in the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for Flight 
Security Training. The program is currently finalizing its performance 
measures and will use FY 2005 data as the baseline for those measures. 
These measures will provide the program with information that can be 
used in evaluating the effectiveness of the crew member self-defense 
training. Additionally, TSA has begun efforts to reach out to 
stakeholders for feedback. Combined with the compilation of data from 
Level 1 evaluations, these two efforts are significant first steps in 
gathering valuable information concerning effectiveness, design, and 
delivery. 

In summary, DHS appreciates your review of the flight and cabin crew 
member security training program and thanks you for the thorough 
analysis and discussion that comprises this report. We continue to be 
cognizant of the areas upon which we can improve. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777: 

Acknowledgements: 

In addition to the contact named above, Katherine Davis, Kimberly 
Gianopoulos, Sally Gilley, Stan Kostyla, Tom Lombardi, Gary Malavenda, 
Maria Strudwick, Carol Willett, and Su Jin Yon made key contributions 
to this report. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] Foreign air carriers operating to and from the United States are 
not regulated under the mandates of the Aircraft Operator Security 
Program (under which domestic air carriers operate) but are subject to 
the security requirements of 49 C.F.R. part 1546. Foreign air carriers 
operating under part 1546 must maintain a security program that TSA 
accepts as providing passengers a level of protection similar to the 
level of protection provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same 
airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 44906. Further, foreign air carriers must 
abide by the standards and recommended practices established by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, which adopted expanded 
security training requirements for crew members in March 2002 that are 
similar to those found in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 107, 115 Stat. 611, 610-11 (2001). 

[2] Initial security training is provided to newly hired flight and 
cabin crew members as well as crew members returning from a leave of 
absence of more than 3 years. Recurrent security training is annual 
refresher training provided to all flight and cabin crew members. 

[3] 49 U.S.C. § 44918. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), enacted in November 2001, created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and mandated the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to develop a detailed guidance for a scheduled passenger air 
carrier flight and cabin crew member training program. FAA continued to 
be responsible for overseeing flight and cabin crew members' security 
training until TSA assumed that responsibility pursuant to ATSA. 
Subsequently, the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act 
(Vision 100), enacted in December 2003, revised the basic security 
training program requirements and mandated that TSA develop and 
implement an advanced voluntary self-defense training program for crew 
members. Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 603, 117 Stat. 2490, 2563-65. Together, 
these acts mandated actions for TSA, FAA, and air carriers to 
strengthen flight and cabin crew security training under § 44918, 
including the development of security training guidance and standards. 

[4] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 
1999). 

[5] The Federal Air Marshal Service provides air security and promotes 
public confidence in our nation's civil aviation system through the 
deployment of Federal Air Marshals who are specially trained civil 
aviation security specialists that are deployed onboard aircraft to 
protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist activities on 
both domestic and international flights. 

[6] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2004). 

[7] ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of 
Transportation (DOT). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, signed into law on November 25, 2002, 
transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department of Homeland 
Security. FAA continued to be responsible for overseeing flight and 
cabin crew members' security training until TSA assumed that 
responsibility pursuant to ATSA. On or about February 17, 2002, TSA 
assumed responsibility for flight and cabin crew members' security 
training. Initially, however, TSA was neither staffed nor organized to 
meet that responsibility on that date. Accordingly, while TSA "ramped 
up" its operations FAA's Office of Aviation Security, while being 
largely absorbed into TSA, continued to assist TSA in its new roles as 
regulator and overseer. 

[8] The flight and cabin crew security training implemented by air 
carriers pursuant to their security programs, the corresponding 
guidance and standards, and the related oversight discussed in this 
report are the responsibility of TSA, and not of FAA, which is 
responsible for approved training programs required under 14 C.F.R. 
part 121. 

[9] Pilots (commercial, charter, and all cargo aircraft) who volunteer 
to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officers Program are trained 
and armed to protect the aircraft cockpit. The pilots are deputized as 
federal flight deck officers. 

[10] The Bureau of Transportation Statistics defines major carriers as 
those with over $1 billion in annual operating revenues, national 
carriers as those with $100 million to $1 billion in annual operating 
revenues, and regional (large and medium air carriers) as those with up 
to $100 million in annual operating revenues. 

[11] TSA currently oversees about 84 air carriers. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics data show that there were 105 commercial 
passenger air carriers in fiscal year 2004. TSA officials stated that 
this difference of 21 air carriers may be due to air carriers merging 
or going out of business. 

[12] TSA, however, took no action pursuant to § 1403 of the Homeland 
Security Act. TSA maintained the standards prescribed by ATSA until the 
passage of Vision 100, which prompted TSA to revise crew member 
security training guidance and standards. 

[13] GAO-04-546G and GAO, Human Capital: Selected Agencies' Experiences 
and Lessons Learned in Designing Training and Development Program, GAO-
04-291 (Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004). 

[14] The additional elements that Vision 100 required air carriers to 
include in their basic crew member security training programs are (1) 
proper commands to give passenger and attackers, (2) recognizing 
suspicious activities, and (3) proper conduct of a cabin search, 
including explosive device recognition. 

[15] TSA convened a 2-day working session in the summer of 2003 with 
representatives from all the associations on a number of topics related 
to flight and cabin crew security training. Information collected 
during these sessions, and ultimately the legislative elements set 
forth in Vision 100, triggered TSA to revise the common strategy and 
the standards. 

[16] These external stakeholders included representatives of air 
carriers, associations representing air carriers (Air Transport 
Association and Regional Airline Association), crew member labor 
organizations (Association of Flight Attendants and Air Line Pilots 
Association), and federal agencies, such as the Federal Aviation 
Administration, Federal Air Marshal Service, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Department of Defense North American Airspace 
Defense Command. According to a Federal Air Marshal Service official, 
Federal Air Marshal Service officials attended meetings at TSA related 
to the flight and cabin crew security training to ensure that the TSA 
training was not in conflict with the Federal Air Marshal Service 
operations. 

[17] TSA officials stated that in the past crew member labor 
organizations had not been provided the opportunity to review and 
provide comments on the security training standards. 

[18] In 2004, the House Appropriations Committee, in its report 
accompanying H.R. 4567--the fiscal year 2005 DHS appropriations bill-- 
directed that TSA expeditiously promulgate basic, performance-based 
training requirements for flight attendant security training. In May 
2005, the House Appropriations Committee's report accompanying H.R. 
2360--the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations bill--expressed concern 
with TSA's lack of progress in developing minimum regulatory standards 
for basic, industrywide flight attendant security training programs and 
stated that it expects TSA to report on the status of these performance-
based training requirements no later than July 16, 2006. 

[19] For this report, we refer to TSA principal security inspectors as 
TSA inspectors. 

[20] As of August 2, 2005, TSA officials stated that TSA received 73 
air carriers' security training curriculums. Of the 73, 71 curriculums 
were reviewed by the training staff and 63 were approved by the TSA 
inspectors. Ten security training curriculums remain with the TSA 
inspectors for modifications. 

[21] According to TSA officials, not all of the requirements apply to 
all air carriers. For example, if an air carrier is not hiring new crew 
members, the requirements for initial security training would not apply 
to that air carrier. 

[22] Officials from 15 of the 19 air carriers we interviewed reported 
that their training curriculums developed in response to the January 
2002 standards were reviewed and approved by TSA. 

[23] TSA officials stated that they had received 18 of the 84 air 
carriers' security training curriculums as of April 20, 2005. 

[24] TSA provided air carriers with a sample form they could use to 
develop their end of the course participant evaluation. The sample form 
solicited feedback in a number of areas, such as the appropriateness of 
the security training course material and design, the instructor's 
knowledge of the content of the course material, whether training 
exercises simulate tasks needed to perform the job, and the relevancy 
of the training to improve knowledge or skills to accomplish crew 
members' job functions. 

[25] GAO-04-546G. 

[26] TSA inspectors were previously located in the Aviation Regulatory 
Inspections Division, which has been merged into the newly established 
Office of Compliance. 

[27] TSA officials also stated that overseeing air carriers' crew 
member security training is a small function relative to other TSA 
inspector responsibilities. For example, TSA inspectors spend much of 
their time responding to air carriers' security incidents such as air 
carriers' failure to conduct required cabin searches or security 
situations involving hostile passengers. 

[28] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[29] TSA's inspectors generally determine which standards apply to a 
particular air carrier. If air carriers are not hiring new crew 
members, then they will not submit an initial security training 
curriculum but only submit the recurrent security training curriculum 
to TSA for review and approval. The training staff review the air 
carriers' security training curriculum to ensure that the curriculum 
satisfies the security training standards. According to air carrier 
officials, initial security training is provided to newly hired flight 
and cabin crew members as well as crew members returning from leave of 
absence of more than 3 years. Recurrent security training is annual 
training provided to all flight and cabin crew members. 

[30] TSA relies on air carriers to track flight and cabin crew members' 
completion of required security training. TSA officials stated that 
when conducting site visits to observe air carriers' crew member 
security training, they may, but are not required to, review air 
carriers' records of crew member training completion, although not 
required to do so by law. However, officials stated that air carriers 
are accountable for their crew members' completion of required security 
training. All 19 air carriers we interviewed stated that they maintain 
information on their flight and cabin crew members' security training 
completion using either training records and/or a database to track the 
information electronically. 

[31] TSA refers to this program as Crew Member Self-Defense Training. 
As with the TSA's basic flight and cabin crew security training 
program, this advanced voluntary self-defense training program and its 
related oversight is not the responsibility of FAA. 

[32] Section 44918, as amended by Vision 100, required TSA to address 
several training elements in the advanced voluntary crew member self- 
defense training, including (1) deterring a passenger who might present 
a threat; (2) advanced control, striking, and restraint techniques; (3) 
training to defend oneself against edged or contact weapons; (4) 
methods to subdue and restrain an attacker; (5) use of available items 
aboard the aircraft for self-defense; and (6) appropriate and effective 
responses to defend oneself including the use of force against an 
attacker. 

[33] The amendments to § 44918 made by Vision 100 superseded those of 
the Homeland Security Act, which required TSA, in updating its training 
guidance, to issue a rule mandating the inclusion of self-defense 
elements into the training program delivered by air carriers. 

[34] According to Federal Air Marshal Service officials, Federal Air 
Marshal Service officials attended meetings at TSA related to the crew 
member self-defense training to ensure that the TSA training was not in 
conflict with the Federal Air Marshal Service procedures. 

[35] The prototype training was held in Alexandria, Virginia; 
Wilmington, California; Fort Worth, Texas; Miami, Florida; and Chicago, 
Illinois. Crew member self-defense training in Chicago was cancelled 
due to low participation. TSA used a training contractor to deliver the 
training and provide the training facilities. 

[36] The classes are limited to 24 volunteer crew members per site to 
ensure an instructor to student ratio of 1 to 8. 

[37] The ten cities include Alexandria, Virginia; Miami, Florida; 
Chicago, Illinois; Fort Worth, Texas; Wilmington, California; Broomall, 
Pennsylvania; Decatur/Clarkston, Georgia; San Francisco, California; 
Aurora, Colorado; and Tempe, Arizona. TSA officials stated that they 
selected the cities in which to deliver the training based on whether 
there was a major airline hub within or nearby the city. Appendix II 
provides information on TSA actual and planned deployment of advanced 
voluntary crew member self-defense training from December 2004 through 
September 2005. 

[38] Section 44918, as amended by Vision 100, requires that TSA develop 
and deliver an advanced voluntary crew member self-defense program to 
all flight and cabin crew members. TSA officials defined voluntary as 
not only allowing crew member to choose whether they want to attend the 
training, but also allowing them to observe and not participate in the 
hands-on portion of the training. 

[39] Scheduling bids are tentative crew member flight schedules, leave, 
and vacation times. 

[40] Congress has not appropriated funds for the advanced voluntary 
crew member self-defense training program. In fiscal year 2004, TSA 
reallocated $500,000 from other training programs to support the 
development of advanced voluntary crew member self-defense training. In 
fiscal year 2005, TSA reallocated $2 million from other programs to 
support the delivery of this training. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee Report, which accompanied H.R. 2360--the fiscal year 2006 DHS 
appropriations bill, as passed by the Senate--would provide $3 million 
for voluntary flight crew training. 

[41] We interviewed 33 stakeholders regarding TSA's advanced voluntary 
self-defense training program, including individuals TSA identified as 
subject matter experts and representatives of air carriers, air carrier 
associations, crew member labor organizations, and four federal 
agencies. 

[42] GAO-04-546G. 

[43] TSA defines improvised weapons as items commonly found aboard an 
aircraft, such as coffee pots, beverage carts, wine bottles, and fire 
extinguishers. 

[44] GAO-04-546G and GAO-04-291. 

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