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entitled 'Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic
Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces' which
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Report to Congressional Committees:
July 2005:
Southeast Asia:
Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S.
Assistance to Foreign Security Forces:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-793]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-793, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and
security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts
certain security assistance funds from being provided to any units of
foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that units have
committed gross violations of human rights. GAO (1) describes the
nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) assesses the controls used to
achieve compliance with human rights restrictions on U.S. funding to
foreign security forces in these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S.
government’s national security assistance strategy.
What GAO Found:
The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from
fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.
U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security
forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit
has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance
extends these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces
and requires posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S.
sponsored training for possible violations. However, we found no
evidence that U.S. officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security
trainees—about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai
police—trained by Justice with State law enforcement assistance between
fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These candidates included a total of
32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-
forces police unit previously prohibited under State policy from
receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit’s prior human rights
abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs
managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to
improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of
human rights abuse allegations.
Foreign Police in U.S. Law Enforcement Training:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
State has not produced a clear and coherent national security
assistance strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to
address in 2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be
deprived of the information needed to make future decisions about these
programs. State’s 2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the
law. Among other shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs
would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be
coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD
planning documents, while not collectively providing a complete
national security assistance strategy, address some of the
legislation’s objectives.
What GAO Recommends:
The Secretary of State should (1) strengthen management controls for
vetting foreign security forces by clarifying existing guidance to
posts and (2) develop and periodically report to Congress an integrated
strategic plan for all U.S. government assistance that provides
training and equipment for foreign security forces. State commented
that its briefing to Congressional staff fully satisfied legislative
objectives. While an oral briefing is a good first step, a written plan
is needed for wider distribution and tracking progress.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-793.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202)
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under at Least
12 Programs:
Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Allowed Violations of State's Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to
Occur:
U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance
Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign
Security Forces:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security
Forces:
Appendix III: State Department National Security Assistance Strategy
Briefing:
Appendix IV: Other State and DOD Documents Address Some Objectives of
the Security Assistance Act of 2000:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, Fiscal
Years 2001-2004:
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees Not
Vetted, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal
Years 2001-2004:
Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 Addressed by
State's National Security Assistance Strategy:
Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA):
Table 8: Drawdown:
Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA):
Table 10: Economic Support Fund (ESF):
Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF):
Table 12: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE):
Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET):
Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET):
Table 15: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO):
Table 16: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP):
Table 17: DEA Training:
Table 18: FBI Training:
Figures:
Figure 1: U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Figure 2: State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Figure 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
Figure 4: State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents:
Abbreviations:
ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance:
CTFP: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency:
E-IMET: Expanded-IMET:
EDA: Excess Defense Articles:
ESF: Economic Support Fund:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FMF: Foreign Military Financing:
ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance
Program:
IMET: International Military Education and Training:
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:
JCET: Joint Combined Exchange Training:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
PACOM: U. S. Pacific Command:
PKO: Peacekeeping Operations:
Letter July 29, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
The executive branch has considered Southeast Asia as the "second
front" in the war on terrorism and has thus bolstered security
assistance[Footnote 1] to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand to
help deal with this threat. This assistance contributes to several U.S.
foreign policy and security goals, such as supporting the global war on
terror, promoting stronger bilateral relationships, strengthening self-
defense capabilities, and promoting greater respect for democracy and
human rights. However, to further human rights goals, Congress
restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any
units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that
units have committed gross violations of human rights.[Footnote 2]
To address congressional concerns about the coordination, planning, and
impact of security assistance programs, Congress passed the Security
Assistance Act of 2000.[Footnote 3] The Act encourages the Department
of State (State), in consultation with other agencies, to establish an
annual multiyear plan identifying overarching security assistance
objectives, the way programs will be combined at the country level to
achieve objectives, and the coordination of security assistance
programs with other U.S. government agencies.
This report, completed under the Comptroller General's Authority is
being addressed to you because of your committee's interest and
jurisdiction. The report (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S.
assistance to foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Thailand; (2) assesses the management controls used to achieve U.S.
agency compliance with the human rights restrictions on funding
provided to foreign security forces in the three countries; and (3)
assesses the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy.
To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent State, Defense, and
Justice planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and related
policies and procedures. We focused on State, DOD, and Justice programs
or activities providing assistance to foreign security forces in the
absence of an agreed-upon definition of security assistance within the
U.S. government. We also interviewed senior program officials from the
Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Justice in Washington, D.C;
Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We
discussed these programs with officials of foreign governments and
nongovernmental organizations. In addition, we interviewed DOD
officials at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu, Hawaii. We
reviewed relevant statutes and implementing guidelines, including the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the Arms
Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629), as amended, the Security Assistance
Act of 2000, the fiscal years 2001 to 2004 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act and the Department of Defense Appropriations Acts,
and the DOD Security Assistance Management Manual. To assess how the
U.S. government provides funding in compliance with human rights
restrictions, we inspected program files maintained at the U.S.
embassies in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila. We conducted this review
from July 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
The United States allocated[Footnote 4] about $265.7 million in
assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security
forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand through 12 programs
and activities managed by the Departments of State, Defense, or
Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of appropriated funds used for
procuring training and equipment as well as nonappropriated assistance,
such as transfers of excess military equipment taken from U.S. stocks.
State, DOD, and Justice collectively allocated $179.6 million (67.6
percent) to the Philippines; $47.5 million (17.9 percent) to Indonesia;
and $38.6 million (14.5 percent) to Thailand. Among the three agencies,
State provided most (80.2 percent) of the assistance in the three
countries from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. These countries used U.S.
assistance to acquire a variety of equipment, training, and related
services. For example, the Philippines acquired C-130 aircraft and UH-
1 helicopters to enhance the mobility of its armed forces, and also
used some U.S. assistance to support its defense reform program;
Thailand acquired UH-1s to enhance its ability to combat terrorism; and
Indonesia trained its security forces in civil-military relations,
civilian police authority, and human rights issues.
Weak management controls resulted in lapses in human rights vetting for
individual trainees at the three posts we visited and within
headquarters units. Recent foreign operations and DOD annual
appropriations acts restrict the provision of funds provided under the
acts to units of foreign security forces when there is "credible
evidence" that the unit has committed "gross violations" of human
rights. Additionally, State and DOD guidance extends these restrictions
to individuals as well as to units of foreign security forces, and
requires posts to establish vetting procedures to ensure compliance
with these restrictions. However, we found no evidence that the three
posts we visited vetted an estimated 6,900 law enforcement officials--
approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai
officials--trained as individuals with State's law enforcement
assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.[Footnote 5] The
trainees included 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a
notorious special-forces police unit that was previously prohibited
from receiving U.S. training funds under State policy because of the
unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting
in other training programs managed by DOD. For example, in the
Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD trainee files and estimated
that 87 percent of the trainee files would contain some evidence of
vetting, while 13 percent would contain no evidence of vetting. We also
found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that we randomly
sampled in the other two countries, although these results are not
projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some
agencies' management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters
units did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for human rights
vetting, nor did they clearly communicate these responsibilities in
writing to all employees, particularly law enforcement officials.
Second, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and
procedures covering all the agency representatives involved in the
vetting process prior to 2004, nor did they specify the documentation
and records retention requirements for these entities. Third, neither
State headquarters nor the three posts established systems to monitor
compliance with vetting requirements. State issued new guidance in
February 2005 intended to improve the efficiency of the human rights
vetting process. State announced that it had established a new human
rights database to be a clearinghouse of information of alleged human
rights abuses.
In examining the U.S. government's assistance to foreign security
forces in these countries, we found that State has not produced a
coherent national security assistance strategy that meets the
objectives that Congress encouraged State to include in this strategy.
The national security assistance strategy that State issued in 2003
addressed only two of the nine objectives included in the Security
Assistance Act of 2000. Among other shortfalls, the plan does not
identify the allocation of resources to accomplish objectives, the ways
in which programs would be combined at the country level to achieve
objectives, or the coordination of these programs with other U.S.
government agencies. State and DOD annually develop various country,
regional, and national strategy and planning documents that address
many of the Acts' objectives; these could be used as the basis for
developing an annual national security assistance strategy. As a result
of these strategic planning weaknesses, it may be difficult for State
and Congress to assess the contribution the U.S. assistance makes to
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as stemming terrorism,
promoting regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human
rights. In addition, the lack of a clear and coherent strategy may
inhibit Congress' ability to effectively allocate resources and deprive
it of the information it needs for future decisionmaking on these
programs.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, strengthen
management controls on vetting security forces by issuing consolidated
written guidance to posts and headquarters offices. This guidance
should assign clear roles and responsibilities for post and
headquarters offices and establish monitoring systems to verify that
required procedures are being carried out. We also are recommending
that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense and the Attorney General, jointly develop an integrated
strategic plan for all U.S. government assistance programs that provide
training and equipment for foreign security forces (military and
police).
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State, and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We
received written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State.
The Secretary of Defense concurred with the report's findings in
principle. Neither the Secretaries of Defense nor State commented on
the recommendations. The Secretaries of Defense and State, and the
Attorney General also provided us technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.
The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement
on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its
assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented
that any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and
practice, not as a matter of law. We agree with State's comment.
However, in reviewing State's application of its policy on human rights
vetting of individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted
in an estimated 6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance
without any evidence that they had first been vetted for gross
violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in our report
that State strengthen management controls on vetting to meet its stated
policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human
rights violators.
State also asserted that it has fully complied with congressional
intent regarding a national security assistance strategy. State
disagreed with our finding that the national security assistance
strategy met only two of nine objectives of the law. It stated that our
findings are based on incomplete information because many of the
objectives were met and discussed in a May 2003 oral briefing to
selected congressional committee staff. State also commented that its
briefing to congressional committees fully satisfied the committees
represented at the time, and that the absence of further requests for a
briefing relieved it of further reporting responsibilities. We disagree
with State's comments. The briefing was a good first step, but a
detailed written plan is needed for wider distribution, and for
providing documentation for tracking progress in moving forward.
Background:
As a foreign policy tool, the U.S. government provides assistance to
security forces (military and police) in more than 150 countries around
the world, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. State
provides assistance to foreign security forces through at least six
programs and activities. Appendix II provides additional details on
these programs.
* Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) is used to train foreign security
forces in anti-terrorism and terrorism response tactics.
* Economic Support Fund (ESF)is used primarily for economic assistance
to promote political or economic stability; however, some ESF is
allocated for training foreign security forces.
* Foreign Military Financing (FMF)is used to provide grants and loans
for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training
by foreign governments. This assistance is aimed at improving defense
capabilities and fostering stronger military relationships between the
United States and recipient nations.
* International Military Education and Training (IMET) is used to train
and educate foreign military forces and related civilian personnel.
Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), a variant of the regular IMET program, focuses
on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights training and education.
* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is used
primarily to support counter-narcotics, intelligence, border patrol,
and interdiction activities.
* Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports multilateral peacekeeping and
regional stability operations that are not funded through the United
Nations.
DOD provides a mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance to
foreign security forces through at least four programs or activities.
Appendix III provides additional details on these programs.
* Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are nonappropriated assistance in the
form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. The
President is authorized to transfer, with limitations, defense articles
declared as excess by the military departments to foreign governments
in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.
* Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that the President is
authorized to draw down from the stocks of any U.S. government agency
for emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance,
peacekeeping, anti-terrorist activities, and nonproliferation.
* Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a DOD
program used to provide funding to foreign military and related
civilian officials to attend U.S. military education institutions and
selected regional centers for nonlethal training.
* Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special
operations forces to train with foreign military forces, provided that
the training primarily benefits U.S. forces. The host nation's security
forces also derive a benefit.
The Department of Justice provides assistance to foreign security
forces through at least two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training activities in foreign
countries. DEA trains law enforcement officials and police to carry out
special counter-narcotics operations. The FBI also trains law
enforcement officials and police in these countries.
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Philippines and
Indonesia became central to the U.S. government's antiterrorism efforts
in Southeast Asia due to their strategic importance, Muslim
populations, and insurgency movements that use terrorist tactics. The
U.S. government has been concerned with radical Islamist groups in
Southeast Asia, particularly those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
other countries that are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist
network. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by
establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in
Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical
Islamist groups. According to the Congressional Research
Service,[Footnote 6] Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been
particularly vulnerable to anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. A
spate of violence in Thailand's Muslim provinces in early 2004
intensified the focus on Islamic extremism in southern Thailand. The
violence has forced Thai authorities to publicly re-evaluate the threat
of a Muslim separatist insurgency with financial and operational ties
to international Islamic terrorist groups.
According to the State Department's 2004 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, the three countries we reviewed face several human
rights challenges.[Footnote 7]
* The Philippines. According to State's human rights report for the
Philippines, the government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens. However, some elements of the country's security forces were
responsible for arbitrary, unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, and torture, and arbitrary arrest and
detention.
* Indonesia. State's human rights report for Indonesia stated that the
Indonesian government made progress in its transition from three
decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and
representative democracy. The government's human rights record remained
poor, however, and it continued to commit serious abuses. For example,
the report stated that "[S]ecurity force members murdered, tortured,
raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of
separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in
Papua. Some police officers occasionally used excessive and sometimes
deadly force in arresting suspects and in attempting to obtain
information or a confession. Retired and active duty military officers
known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or
were promoted to senior positions in the Government and the
(military)."
* Thailand. According to State's human rights report, the government of
Thailand generally respected the rights of its citizens, but there were
significant problems in some areas. For example, separatist violence in
southern Thailand resulted in the deaths of more than 180 persons at
the hands of security forces. In addition, no progress was reported in
investigations into the extrajudicial killings of approximately 1,300
suspected drug traffickers during the Thai government's 3-month "War on
Drugs" campaign from February through April 2003. However, the Thai
government maintains that the deaths were the result of disputes
between those involved in the drug trade.
Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under at Least
12 Programs:
U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Thailand was provided through at least 12 programs and activities
managed by State, DOD, and Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of
appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment, as well
as nonappropriated assistance such as transfers of excess military
equipment taken from U.S. stocks. The Philippines was the largest
beneficiary of this assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. U.S.
assistance to security forces in the Philippines largely supported the
Philippines Defense Reform--a comprehensive defense assessment to
develop a multi-year defense strategy, enhance mobility, and build
defense capacity. Restrictions on Indonesia prohibited it from
receiving military equipment; however, Indonesia received funding to
train its security forces. U.S. assistance to Thailand is used for
procuring equipment and training for such activities as counter
narcotics and antiterrorism.
State, DOD, and Justice Provide Assistance to Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand:
State, DOD, and Justice allocated[Footnote 8] a total of approximately
$265.7 million to train and equip security forces in the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. This amounted to
$179.6 million for the Philippines, $47.5 million for Indonesia, and
$38.6 million for Thailand. Figure 1 shows a comparison of U.S.
assistance for each of the three countries and illustrates that the
United States provided the Philippines with significantly more
assistance than Indonesia and Thailand.
Figure 1: U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: See footnote 8.
[End of figure]
State allocated most of the assistance, $212.9 million (80.2 percent),
while DOD allocated $52.2 million (19.6 percent), and Justice allocated
$518,000 (less than 1 percent). Figure 2 shows a comparison of
assistance by agency, illustrating that State allocated most of the
assistance to train and equip security forces in the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia.
Figure 2: State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: See footnote 8.
[End of figure]
This assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and was used
for procuring a variety of equipment, training, and services within
each country. Figure 3 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance by program
for each of the three countries. The FMF allocation for the Philippines
represented the largest single program across all three countries.
Figure 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: See footnote 8.
[End of figure]
Assistance to the Philippines Helped Support Defense Reform:
State, DOD, and Justice assistance to train and equip security forces
in the Philippines in fiscal years 2001 to 2004 totaled about $179.6
million and helped support the Philippines Defense Reform--a
comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense
strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Table 1 shows
the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some examples of
how the assistance was used.
Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, Fiscal
Years 2001-2004:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: State:
Program/activity: FMF;
Allocations: $115.8;
Examples of how assistance was used: Maintenance support for C-130s, UH-
1s, fast patrol craft, M-35 trucks; counterterrorism training for
maritime, ground, and air forces; support for Philippine Defense Reform
in fiscal year 2004.
Program/activity: PKO;
Allocations: $15.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Refurbish UH-1 helicopters,
procure spare parts for UH-1s and combat engineering spares and
support.
Program/activity: IMET;
Allocations: $8.6;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train in amphibious warfare,
combat strategies and intelligence, security assistance management,
defense resources management, and logistics held at U.S. military bases
and other institutions, such as the U.S. Army War College.
Program/activity: INCLE;
Allocations: $2.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Support training to develop an
effective civilian police force in the autonomous Muslim Region of
Mindanao. Some INCLE funding was used for an FBI assessment of the
Philippines fingerprint and processing system as part of a worldwide
effort to develop an international terrorist database.
Program/activity: ATA;
Allocations: $1.9;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train in terrorist crime scene
investigation, hostage negotiation, and mass casualty medical issues.
Agency: DOD:
Program/activity: EDA;
Allocations: $19.5;
Examples of how assistance was used: Provide cargo trucks and UH-IH
helicopters, armored personnel carriers, rifles, and magazine
cartridges--to be drawn from DOD stocks.
Program/activity: Drawdown;
Allocations: $10.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Provide defense articles and
services from U.S. Navy stocks for delivery to the Philippines Ministry
of Defense.
Program/activity: JCET;
Allocations: $4.7;
Examples of how assistance was used: Provide joint training for U.S.
Special Operations Forces and the Philippines' security forces.
Program/activity: CTFP;
Allocations: $2.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Provide courses in combating
terrorism and preparedness and consequence management to train military
forces in counterterrorism techniques and to work with other relevant
agencies.
Agency: Justice:
Program/activity: DEA & FBI;
Allocations: $0.1;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train law enforcement and police
in counter narcotics, money laundering, and other criminal activities
and assets forfeiture techniques.
Total;
Allocations: $179.7[A].
Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.
[A] Total may not correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding.
Note: See footnote 8.
[End of table]
Assistance to Indonesia Supported Training for Police Forces:
State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $47.5 million in
assistance to train Indonesian security forces in fiscal years 2001 to
2004; however, various congressional funding restrictions limited
Indonesia's eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training over
this period. State provided $43.3 million (91 percent of the country
total), including $23.2 million (49 percent) of the country total in
police training through the Economic Support Fund. DOD provided
military training through its Regional Defense Counterterrorism
Fellowship Program (CTFP). Indonesia is the single largest recipient of
this assistance worldwide. Table 2 shows the U.S. agency, program or
activity, allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was
used.
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: State:
Program/activity: ESF;
Allocations: $23.2;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train Indonesia's police forces in
management initiatives, administrative justice and maritime
enforcement, seaport and waterway security, human rights issues and the
rule of law, anticorruption, and in reconstituting civilian police
authority.
Program/activity: ATA;
Allocations: $14.8;
Examples of how assistance was used: Support counterterrorism training
facilities in Megamendung; conduct training courses in crisis response
and explosive incidents countermeasures; and support the formation of
the National-Level Counterterrorism Task Force known as "Task Force
88.".
Program/activity: INCLE;
Allocations: $4.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Assist with the transition of the
Indonesia police to a civilian-led police force since the separation of
the police forces from the national military, including technical
assistance and human rights training.
Program/activity: Expanded-IMET;
Allocations: $1.3;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train in civil- military
relations, resources management, and international defense management
to Indonesia's military forces (variant of the regular IMET program).
Agency: DOD:
Program/activity: CTFP;
Allocations: $4.2;
Examples of how assistance was used: Train to educate military forces
about combating terrorism, the laws of war, resource management and
budgeting, international defense management, and preparedness and
consequence management.
Total;
Allocations: $47.5.
Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.
Note: See footnote 8.
[End of table]
Assistance to Thailand Largely Supported Law Enforcement and Military
Training:
State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $38.6 million in
assistance for Thai security forces to procure a variety of defense
articles, services, and training supporting activities such as counter
narcotics, military training, antiterrorism, and force modernization.
The largest share of the money was used for training law enforcement
officials in counter narcotics operations and for providing the Thai
military with advanced training. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program
or activity, allocations, and some examples of how assistance was used.
Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal Years
2001-2004:
Dollars in millions.
Agency: State:
Program/activity: INCLE;
Allocations: $13.8;
Examples of how assistance was used: Supports law enforcement
investigations and prosecution of narcotics traffickers as well as
efforts to suppress illicit drug trafficking and retail sales.
Program/activity: IMET;
Allocations: $7.9;
Examples of how assistance was used: Trains military forces in courses
such as advanced supply management, amphibious planning, combat
strategies and intelligence training, international defense management,
joint combined war fighting, and military police training.
Program/activity: FMF;
Allocations: $4.2;
Examples of how assistance was used: Used toward the procurement of
military equipment such as communications equipment and small arms.
Program/activity: PKO; Dollars in millions: Allocations: $0.5;
Examples of how assistance was used: To purchase equipment for Thai
military peacekeeping and counterterrorism units.
Agency: DOD:
Program/activity: EDA;
Allocations: $6.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Approved and to be drawn from DOD
stocks including Cobra helicopters and utility helicopters.
Program/activity: JCET;
Allocations: $5.0;
Examples of how assistance was used: Training for U.S. Special
Operations Forces and Thai security forces.
Program/activity: CTFP;
Allocations: $0.8;
Examples of how assistance was used: Combating terrorism training
courses for Thai military forces.
Agency: Justice:
Program/activity: DEA and FBI;
Allocations: $0.4;
Examples of how assistance was used: Training for security forces in
counternarcotics and anti-criminal tactics.
Total;
Allocations: $38.6[A].
Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.
[A] Total may not correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding.
[End of table]
Note: See footnote 8.
Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Allowed Violations of State's Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to
Occur:
We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an
estimated 6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance
between fiscal years 2001 and 2004.[Footnote 9] The trainees included
32 Indonesian police from a notorious special-forces police unit that
was prohibited from receiving U.S. training funds under State policy
because of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better
evidence[Footnote 10] of vetting in DOD-implemented training programs.
For example, in the Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD trainee
files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee files contained some
evidence of vetting, while 13 percent contained no evidence of vetting.
We also found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that we
randomly sampled in the other two countries, although these results are
not projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some
agencies' management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters
units did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for vetting
foreign security forces, nor did they clearly communicate these
responsibilities to all employees involved in the process, especially
to law enforcement officials at posts. Second, prior to 2004, two of
the three posts did not establish written policies and procedures for
all of the offices involved in the vetting process, or specify the
documentation and records retention requirements for these units.
Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts established
systems to periodically monitor compliance with vetting requirements.
Laws and State Policy Restrict U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security
Forces:
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998
has included a provision, commonly referred to as the "Leahy
Amendment," that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in
these acts to any foreign security unit for which State has determined
there is credible evidence[Footnote 11] that the unit has committed
gross violations of human rights, unless certain conditions have been
met.[Footnote 12] DOD's appropriations acts have contained a similar
restriction on DOD- funded training since fiscal year 1999.[Footnote
13]
To implement these legislative restrictions, in June 1999 and February
2003, State directed all posts involved in providing security
assistance to foreign security forces to have procedures in place to
ensure compliance with the restrictions. Between 1999 and 2004, DOD and
State issued specific instructions to the posts on implementing these
restrictions for DOD-managed training programs. While the provisions
restrict funding to "any unit of the security forces of a foreign
country," State policy applies the restrictions to individual members
of security forces, as well. State and DOD guidance reflects this
policy.
Vetting candidates for human rights concerns commonly would include the
following steps, according to post officials, State headquarters
officials, and State guidance.[Footnote 14] First, the office at the
post sponsoring the training reviews biographical and service
information provided by the host government to determine if the
individual or unit has been involved in gross violations of human
rights. Second, the sponsoring office forwards the name to the
political affairs office at the post for its independent review. The
political affairs office or sponsoring office also circulates the
candidate's name to other relevant offices within the post.[Footnote
15] As part of this second step, the human rights officer or a foreign
service national assigned to the political office typically searches
newspaper articles or the Internet for evidence of the candidate's
involvement in gross violations of human rights. The political office
may also consult human rights nongovernmental organizations in-country
or national commissions on human rights for any information they have
on the candidate. Other offices at the post to whom the candidate's
name is sent are expected to review any information they have and
report the results of their search to the political office. Finally,
the post sends the candidate's name to State headquarters to be
distributed to relevant bureaus for final review and approval.
Foreign Security Officials Not Always Vetted for Possible Human Rights
Violations:
At the three posts we visited, we found lapses in human rights vetting
for foreign security forces, particularly in law enforcement training
programs. Table 4 shows the estimated number of law enforcement
personnel that U.S. officials estimated had received training but for
whom no vetting had occurred. U.S. officials based these estimates on
the sizes of the groups trained in each country for particular
programs.
Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees Not
Vetted, Fiscal Years 2001-2004:
Country: Philippines[A];
Estimated number of law enforcement trainees not vetted: 1,175.
Country: Indonesia[A];
Estimated number of law enforcement trainees not vetted: 4,000.
Country: Thailand[B];
Estimated number of law enforcement trainees not vetted: 1,760.
Country: Total;
Estimated number of law enforcement trainees not vetted: 6,935.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[A] Trainees were trained under Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance program.
[B] This number was derived by adding an estimated 1,439 trainees under
State's Narcotics Affairs Section and about 300 in-country trainees
under State's ATA program.
[End of table]
In addition, table 5 shows the results of a sample of trainee names
that we reviewed at each post to identify evidence of human rights
vetting.
Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal
Years 2001-2004:
Implementing agency: DOD:
Country: Philippines[A];
Number of trainees identified by post: 787;
GAO sample size by program/country: 107;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 93;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 14.
Country: Indonesia[B];
Number of trainees identified by post: 353;
GAO sample size by program/country: 10;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 10;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 0.
Country: Thailand[C];
Number of trainees identified by post: 795;
GAO sample size by program/country: 25;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 25;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 0.
Implementing agency: State:
Country: Indonesia[D];
Number of trainees identified by post: 297;
GAO sample size by program/country: 7;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 2;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 5.
Country: Thailand[E];
Number of trainees identified by post: 144;
GAO sample size by program/country: 15;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 13;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 2.
Country: Philippines Subtotal;
Number of trainees identified by post: 787;
GAO sample size by program/country: 107;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 93;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 14.
Country: Indonesia Subtotal;
Number of trainees identified by post: 650;
GAO sample size by program/country: 17;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 12;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 5.
Country: Thailand Subtotal;
Number of trainees identified by post: 939;
GAO sample size by program/country: 40;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 38;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 2.
Grand total;
Number of trainees identified by post: 2,376;
GAO sample size by program/country: 164;
Sample Results: Some vetting documented: 143;
Sample Results: No vetting documented: 21.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[A] We selected only DOD-managed programs and activities (IMET and FMF)
for our sample because the number of law enforcement trainees was not
available at the time of our visit to the post.
[B] This number is composed of trainees for CTFP, E-IMET, Asia-Pacific
Center, and other miscellaneous DOD-managed programs and activities.
[C] This number is composed of trainees for DOD-managed, IMET, FMS,
CTFP, and other miscellaneous programs.
[D] This number is composed of trainees for State's ATA program.
[E] Total number of trainees under State's Thailand ATA program was
708, which included 144 trainees sent to the United States for
training. We removed the 243 trainees from the ATA total that were not
security forces and thus not subject to human rights vetting. We also
removed 321 in-country trainees from the total. These 321 are accounted
for in table 4.
[End of table]
The Philippines. We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175
Filipino police forces receiving training under Justice's International
Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
(ICITAP)[Footnote 16] in fiscal year 2004 were vetted for evidence of
gross violations of human rights. A post official said that a foreign
service national in his office responsible for ICITAP performed some
vetting on these candidates, but could not document the important step
of coordinating with the political affairs office as required by State
guidance until late 2004. In addition, we reviewed 107 randomly
selected trainee files from an estimated total of 787 trainees in the
DOD-implemented programs[Footnote 17] and found some evidence of
vetting in most instances (93 files). The remaining 14 files contained
no evidence that vetting had occurred.
Indonesia. We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law
enforcement officials who received training under Justice's ICITAP were
vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October 2004.
These trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for
such training under the ICITAP, according to State officials. In
addition, our review of 10 randomly selected DOD trainee files from an
estimated total of 353 trainees showed some evidence of vetting in all
instances. Files for DOD-implemented training generally included
evidence that the Political Affairs Office was included in the vetting
process, indicating a more inclusive and independent post-wide review.
Post officials said that they had implemented new post-wide procedures
in late 2004 to improve the vetting process, and now vet candidates for
all post programs in accordance with earlier State guidance.
Thailand. We found no evidence that the approximately 1,760 Thai law
enforcement officials who received training under the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training programs
were vetted for possible human rights violations. In contrast, our
review of 25 randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated
total of 795 trainees in the DOD-implemented programs[Footnote 18]
showed some evidence of vetting. For example, DOD training files
generally included an initialed and dated checklist returned from the
Political Affairs Office, indicating the status of the post-wide
review.
However, the DOD official in Thailand responsible for IMET training
said that his office did not submit names of individuals to receive in-
country IMET training to the country team for vetting because officials
were not aware of this responsibility. According to 1999 DOD
guidelines, all individuals and units scheduled for in-country DOD-
implemented training should be vetted. Officials and post estimates
indicated that about half of the 795 trainees were trained in-country
between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. In technical comments on a draft of
this report, DOD stated that the post is now vetting all in-country
military training, but provided no evidence to support this.
Agencies Do Not Have Controls in Place to Help Ensure Compliance with
Human Rights Funding Restrictions:
Lapses in vetting occurred because the agencies did not assign clear
roles and responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; departments
and posts lacked clear and consistent vetting procedures; and State and
posts did not establish a system to monitor compliance with these
procedures. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government prescribes basic standards for management controls[Footnote
19] in the federal government. Internal control is an integral part of
an organization's management that provides reasonable assurance that an
entity achieves (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2)
reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.[Footnote 20]As a result, U.S. agencies did not
always vet foreign security forces for derogatory human rights
information before providing them with U.S.- funded training
opportunities.
Vetting Process Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities:
Neither State headquarters nor the three posts we visited had clear
roles and responsibilities established for vetting foreign security
forces receiving State funding from fiscal years 2001 and 2004 or for
monitoring posts' or State headquarters' compliance with vetting
procedures. As a result, officials at the posts we visited expressed
confusion over their vetting roles and responsibilities, especially
those related to law enforcement training programs.
According to GAO's internal control standards, an organization should
establish a positive control environment, including an organizational
structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities conducive to
sound management controls. However, State guidance did not establish a
single bureau to be responsible for implementing the vetting process or
for monitoring posts' compliance with vetting procedures. This was an
important omission because four State bureaus are involved in either
establishing policy or managing State-funded training programs: Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the
Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs.
State Lacks Clear Policies and Procedures for Vetting Foreign Security
Forces:
State lacked clear policies and procedures for human rights vetting in
several areas: (1) only the Manila post established postwide
procedures, as required, prior to 2004; (2) State established no
documentation and record retention requirements regarding vetting
documents; (3) the posts did not conduct a comprehensive review of all
candidates for assistance through a central focal point, such as the
political affairs office, before 2004; (4) State headquarters did not
specify whether posts needed to submit candidates' names to State
headquarters for additional review and approval. According to GAO's
internal control standards, policies and procedures help enforce
management directives and are integral to achieving effective results.
State's June 1999 and 2003 guidance directed all posts to establish
procedures to implement the human rights restrictions for all Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act-funded aid to security forces and DOD-
funded training. According to our internal control standards, policies
and procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to
achieving effective results. However, only Embassy Manila established
written procedures for human rights vetting as required prior to 2004.
Guidance issued in 1999 directed that posts report their procedures to
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor by a certain date, but
a Bureau official believed that posts had not done so. Nonetheless,
prior to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish written
policies and procedures for the vetting process. Two of the three posts
we visited--Manila and Jakarta--established new written procedures for
human rights vetting in the fall 2004; the Bangkok post had not yet
established written procedures at the time of our visit in March 2005.
In contrast, DOD and State issued more detailed supplemental guidance
to DOD officials at posts for DOD-funded training, including criteria
to apply in screening candidates and checklists to track vetting
processes.
State's 1999 and 2003 guidance also did not specify documentation and
record retention requirements for the documents used at posts or
headquarters in the human rights vetting process for Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded assistance. As a result, the Jakarta post was
unable to provide us with any documentation of post vetting conducted
for ICITAP between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. By contrast,
documentation for vetting candidates for DOD-implemented training
generally was more complete, and included check-lists, approving
signatures, and biographical information on nominees in separate
folders. DOD documentation was generally better because DOD had
established criteria and procedures for screening candidates in the
programs it manages. These procedures include a records retention
requirement of at least 10 years for specific programs.
State's guidance to the posts also stated that each post should
designate an embassy point of contact, such as political counselor, to
coordinate a comprehensive review of candidates for assistance by
relevant members of the country team. However, we found that such
coordination had not occurred before 2004 for Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training. For example, post
officials in Manila and Jakarta stated that designated embassy points
of contact began receiving names of candidates for law enforcement
training only in early 2004.
We found that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all
candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to
State headquarters for vetting by bureaus because State had not yet
written this procedure into guidance. Officials at State headquarters
said this procedure was required. During our efforts to clarify whether
this was a requirement, we asked State officials to identify the
written guidance specifically requiring posts to cable candidate names
back to Washington for further vetting. However, these officials could
not identify any specific language prior to February 2005 when State
headquarters issued new instructions to the posts. Officials at the
Embassy in Jakarta said they were not aware of this procedure, did not
cable names of candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-
funded training back to State headquarters, and wrote to State
criticizing this as a burdensome new procedure in 2005.
Monitoring System Not Established to Assess Posts' Compliance with
State Policies:
We found that no headquarters office within State currently is charged
with the responsibility of monitoring the posts' compliance with
State's human rights vetting procedures. However, our internal control
standards state that an organization should continually monitor as part
of ongoing operations to assess the quality of performance over time.
State and post officials are uncertain which office has the overall
responsibility for monitoring human rights vetting activities. Some
officials said that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
had this responsibility, while others cited the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs or the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Officials in each bureau were unaware of which office had this
responsibility. We found that State's guidance to the posts between
1997 through 2005 contained no provision that accorded this role and
responsibility to any office. State provided no evidence that any unit
at State headquarters was fulfilling this function.
Without a monitoring system in place, State could not identify
instances where a post was not complying with required procedures or
instances where confusion about requirements existed.
* In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human
rights abuses were trained on six separate occasions under ICITAP
between July 2002 and March 2003. However, in testimony to the House
International Relations Committee in March 2003, then-Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that no such
brigade members "currently participate in the ICITAP police program,"
at the time when such individuals were participating in this training.
State sought to correct this situation by issuing written guidance to
the post in November 2003.
* No one at State headquarters was aware that the three posts did not
consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by
bureaus, although officials at headquarters said this was required. In
reviewing cable traffic related to human rights vetting from the three
posts, we found that the Jakarta Embassy had not cabled State
headquarters with names of any candidates for further vetting.
State Issued New Guidance to Improve Vetting Practices in February
2005:
State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the
efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it
had established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation
System (ACES), to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human
rights abuses. According to the guidance, data will come from sources
currently used for human rights vetting, such as post reporting, press,
nongovernmental organizations, national human rights commissions, and
other sources. Users at posts and at State headquarters will be able to
enter a comment on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor will check information for completeness and accuracy.
As ACES becomes populated with data, it could become an important tool
for posts and State to make human rights vetting more efficient and
effective, as well as to facilitate human rights monitoring and
reporting in general, according to the guidance. The guidance stated
that posts will enter incidents of alleged human rights abuses into
ACES whenever they occur or are reported to post. This step will
replace the requirement that posts report alleged abuses via cable and
keep track of allegations at post. Finally, the guidance established
some roles and responsibilities for offices at main State, particularly
when differences arise over credibility of evidence or the response to
such evidence.
However, this new system does not address all the deficiencies that we
found at the three posts and adds an additional resource concern. For
example, the guidance does not assign a monitoring role to any main
State office or procedures to ensure posts' compliance with vetting
procedures. In addition, because ACES will be a classified system,
foreign national employees at posts will not be allowed access to it.
Foreign nationals currently play an important role in entering and
maintaining the available human rights vetting data at posts but would
not be allowed to do so using the ACES database. Consequently, the new
system might require cleared U.S. post officials to assume database
duties that could not be conducted by foreign nationals. To date, State
guidance has not addressed the potential for either shifting
responsibilities from foreign to U.S. employees at posts or adding more
U.S. personnel for this task.
U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance
Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign
Security Forces:
The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national
security assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in
achieving stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism,
promoting regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human
rights. State's National Security Assistance Strategy, provided to
Congress in May 2003, meets two of nine objectives of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000. The strategy does not, however, identify how
resources will be allocated to accomplish objectives, how programs will
be combined at the country level to achieve objectives, or how security
assistance programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government
agencies. In addition, the strategy fails to discuss performance
measures that are necessary to track the achievement of goals and
objectives. State and DOD have produced a variety of other national,
regional, and country-level strategic planning documents, but these
documents do not collectively satisfy the act's objectives.
State's National Security Assistance Strategy Addresses Two of Nine
Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000:
State's National Security Assistance Strategy meets two objectives of
the Security Assistance Act of 2000; it is consistent with the U.S.
National Security Strategy[Footnote 21]and identifies overarching
security assistance objectives (see table 6). State's strategy,
however, does not cover the other seven objectives of the act.
Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 Addressed by
State's National Security Assistance Strategy:
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Multiyear plan for security
assistance programs?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Consistent with the
National Security Strategy of the U.S.?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: Yes.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Coordinated with the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Prepared in consultation
with appropriate agencies?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Identifies overarching
security assistance objectives and how programs will contribute to
achieving these objectives?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: Yes.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Identifies primary and
secondary security assistance objectives for individual countries?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Identifies how resources
(time, employees, funds) will be allocated to accomplish primary and
secondary objectives?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Addresses how security
assistance programs will be combined at the country level to achieve
objectives?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives: Details how security
assistance programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government
assistance programs managed by DOD and other agencies?
Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy: No.
Source: GAO analysis of State document.
[End of table]
The Security Assistance Act of 2000 was designed to address previous
shortcomings[Footnote 22] in security assistance planning by providing
Congress with a clear and coherent multiyear plan for security
assistance programs, on a country-by-country basis. The act urged State
to submit to Congress a plan, prepared in consultation with other
agencies, that identified overarching security assistance objectives,
the role specific programs would play in achieving them, and resource
allocations for each country. Further, the Security Assistance Act of
2002[Footnote 23] required State to brief Congress on its plans and
progress in formulating and implementing the strategy, and to provide a
description on the actions taken to include such programs as IMET, FMF,
and EDA, as well as other assistance programs to foreign security
forces in the strategy.
In response to the acts of 2000 and 2002, State prepared a 16-page
PowerPoint document entitled, "National Security Assistance Strategy
Briefing" and used it to brief selected congressional committees in May
2003 (see app. III for the briefing). State officials in the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs said that the briefing constitutes State's
current National Security Assistance Strategy and that, through
negotiations with congressional committee staff, State was exempted
from annually updating the strategy, as urged in the law. We reviewed
the briefing to determine the extent to which the strategy addresses
the nine objectives of the acts and found the following.
* The strategy is not a multiyear plan since it was prepared only once
and does not discuss outyear program plans.
* The strategy was not prepared in coordination with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A State
official reported that the briefing was given together with
representatives from DSCA and OSD and provided us with OSD's six-page
briefing on "DOD Security Cooperation." However, in reviewing State's
strategy, we did not find evidence that it was coordinated with OSD or
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
* Despite congressional direction, the strategy was not prepared in
consultation with other appropriate agencies. The briefing indicates
that the coordination process begins at the country level, includes DOD
priorities, occurs through State roundtables and an excess defense
articles coordinating committee, and through "day-to-day coordination."
However, State does not further detail whether it coordinates with
other appropriate agencies that provide assistance to foreign security
forces, such as Justice.
* The strategy does not discuss specific security assistance objectives
for each program on a country-by-country basis. Key countries such as
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (among others) are identified
but the strategy does not identify which programs and security
assistance tools are being implemented in those countries.
* The strategy does not discuss the resources needed or used for the
various programs and how they will be combined at the country level to
achieve objectives. The outline accompanying the briefing asserts that
State's bureau and mission performance plans discuss how military
assistance tools contribute to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals at
the regional and country level, respectively. However, the strategy
does not incorporate key activity and resource information from these
documents;
* Although the strategy lists key countries, it does not address how
the various programs are to be combined within each country to achieve
objectives. As mentioned, we identified at least 12 programs that
provide assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. However, the strategy does not discuss how
programs funded by State's Bureau of International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement in Thailand, for example, are combined with DOD's
in-country counternarcotics activities.
* Finally, the strategy does not detail how security assistance
programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government assistance
programs managed by DOD and other agencies. Specifically, it does not
identify all other forms of assistance provided to foreign security
forces under at least three different funding sources--State, Defense,
and Justice. State officials said they are aware of related programs
funded by DOD and Justice that provide assistance to foreign security
forces, but that they do not consider those programs "security
assistance" and would not include them in a National Security
Assistance Strategy.
In addition, the strategy fails to discuss the performance
measures[Footnote 24] that can be used to assess progress towards
achieving goals. Our prior work has emphasized that agencies should
link strategic planning to performance measures, and that performance
measures can better inform--or justify--how resources should be
allocated to accomplish program objectives. Officials in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand acknowledged that it is difficult to generate
quantitative performance measures for some security assistance
programs, but highlighted several qualitative measures, or "big wins"
in the region that help illustrate the effectiveness of U.S. security
assistance programs. For example, a senior U.S. official in Thailand
stated that Thai security forces are very supportive of the U.S.
government's war on terrorism and of reducing the demand for drugs. In
the Philippines, U.S. government officials highlighted the positive
impact U.S. government security assistance programs have had on the
Philippine Defense Reform effort.
Although not reflected in State's strategy, some efforts have been made
to develop more quantifiable measures. For example, State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs includes
quantitative measures for programs in its official interagency or
intergovernmental agreements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. Also, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Program
Assessment Rating Tool (PART)[Footnote 25] uses performance measures to
evaluate some of State's programs that provide assistance to foreign
security forces (and other federal government programs). As part of the
executive budget formulation process, PART evaluators assess programs
by applying 25 questions under four broad topics: (1) program purpose
and design, (2) strategic planning, (3) program management, and (4)
program results (i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and
annual goals).[Footnote 26] The 2004 PART reviews of State's ATA
program and Security Assistance Programs to the Western Hemisphere were
rated as "effective" and "moderately effective," respectively.[Footnote
27] However, we found that the latter review has limitations because it
identifies multiple programs, but rates them as one unit of analysis.
We reported in January 2004 that inherent challenges exist in assigning
a single rating to programs that have multiple purposes and goals. In
addition, the report cited that PART has merit but remains "a work in
progress that needs considerable revisions to be an objective, evidence-
based assessment tool."[Footnote 28]
DOD's unified commands operate a Theater Security Cooperation
Management Information System (TSCMIS) to track training and other
activities with foreign security forces in their regional areas of
responsibility. Officials can use the system to assess the effect of
DOD events on country-level goals and objectives. U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM) officials reported that TSCMIS captures and stores key program
data, but due to resource constraints, they are uncertain whether
information is consistently entered into the system or maintained. In
addition, the assessments are conducted by activity managers and
country directors and are therefore not independent reviews of
programs.
Related State and DOD Documents Address Selected Objectives of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000:
State and DOD annually develop various country, regional, and national
strategy and planning documents that address some objectives of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000. Figure 4 illustrates how these
documents relate to each other. Appendix IV contains a detailed
analysis of how other State and DOD planning documents address
objectives of the act. Although none of these documents constitute a
single, multiyear national security assistance strategy that covers all
agency programs, we found that they offer the potential for developing
the comprehensive assistance strategy called for in the act.
Figure 4: State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The U.S. National Military Strategy is guided by the goals and
objectives contained in the President's "National Security Strategy"
and serves to implement the Secretary of Defense's 2004 "National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America."
[End of figure]
We found that some State planning documents address certain objectives
of the act. For example, State develops annual Mission Performance
Plans (MPP) for each of its overseas posts. The 2006 MPPs for
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand address some objectives of the
Security Assistance Act because they contain information on some
programs that provide assistance to foreign security forces, are
generally consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United
States, and are prepared in consultation with appropriate agencies at
each post. State also prepares annual regional level Bureau Performance
Plans (BPPs) that are consistent with the National Security Strategy of
the United States, and to some extent, address how combining resources
and programs will achieve regional objectives.
DOD also produces annual country and regional planning documents that
address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act. For example,
DOD's annual country-specific security assistance plans for the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act
because they are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the
United States, include some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to
foreign security forces and how the assistance will be combined and
contribute to achieving certain "end states." Similarly, DOD's Theater
Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) are prepared by DOD's unified
commands and include regional security assistance and other activities
for the current year, plus the next 2 fiscal years.[Footnote 29]
PACOM's fiscal year 2004 TSCP addresses selected objectives of the act.
It is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy, is
coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and includes discussion of certain security cooperation
activities.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State observed that our report
does not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot
project, which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for
security assistance strategic planning. We were not informed in the
course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be
developed and deployed.
Conclusion:
U.S. agencies do not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds
are being used to train and equip only foreign security forces with
good human rights backgrounds. Because they have weak internal
controls, the agencies inconsistently apply human rights vetting
requirements. Improved internal controls would provide greater
assurance that all individuals are properly vetted for human rights
issues before receiving U.S. assistance. State has not produced a clear
and coherent national security assistance strategy meeting the
objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. As a result, it may
be difficult for Congress to assess the contributions that U.S.
security assistance programs make to broader U.S. foreign policy
objectives and to have assurance that the programs' objectives are
being met. Without an integrated strategy for U.S. security assistance
that, at a minimum, addresses the nine elements of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000, the potential exists for uncoordinated
approaches, duplication of efforts, or gaps in coverage. As a result,
State and Congress will be deprived of an important source of
information for making future resource allocations and program
decisions. Since a number of related State and DOD strategic planning
processes are already in place, the agencies could use the plans
produced under these related processes as the basis for producing a new
strategy that fully meets the objectives of the Security Assistance Act
of 2000.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security
assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and
State policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice take
the following three actions to strengthen management controls by
issuing new consolidated guidance for vetting foreign security units.
As part of these new controls, posts and headquarters units should
establish:
* the roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for
vetting foreign candidates for human rights consideration;
* written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the
vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention
policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how long
vetting files should be maintained; and:
* monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these
procedures are being carried out properly.
To help provide both State and Congress with the information needed on
how U.S. security assistance programs help support U.S. foreign policy
and security objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of State take
the following actions using existing plans and strategies within State
and DOD as the basis for developing an integrated strategic plan for
all U.S. government assistance programs that provide training,
equipment, or technical assistance to foreign security forces (military
and police). This multiyear plan should be periodically reported to
Congress in response to the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which
urged the Secretary of State to develop a multiyear security assistance
plan. In addition, the strategy should:
* be coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any
other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces;
* identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign
security forces, regardless of their funding source;
* describe all related resource allocations used to support program
goals, and;
* incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures
designed to determine the extent to which country programs contribute
to broader U.S. foreign policy and security objectives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We
received written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State
that are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Attorney General also provided us with technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
The Secretary of Defense concurred with our report in principle.
However, in technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted
that our report states that DOD assistance programs in Indonesia and
Thailand are "100 percent compliant" with human rights vetting
requirements. We disagree with DOD's comment because our report did not
conclude that DOD programs in Indonesia and Thailand were "100 percent
compliant." Instead, our draft report stated that all 35 of the limited
sample of trainee files we reviewed in these two countries showed some
evidence of human rights vetting. The small sample size of the DOD-
sponsored trainees relative to the much larger sample of law
enforcement trainees precluded us from projecting our findings to the
entire universe of DOD-sponsored trainees. Furthermore, DOD later
acknowledged in its comments on the draft report that in-country
trainees in Thailand--about half of the 795 trainees for fiscal years
2001 to 2004--were not vetted during the period we reviewed.
The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement
on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its
assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented
that any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and
practice, not as a matter of law. We agree with State's comment.
However, in reviewing State's application of its policy on human rights
vetting of individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted
in an estimated 6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance
without any evidence that they had first been vetted for gross
violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in our report
that State strengthen its management controls on vetting to meet its
stated policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross
human rights violators.
State also commented that it has fully complied with congressional
intent regarding a national security assistance strategy. State
disagreed with our finding that the national security assistance
strategy met only two of nine objectives of the law. It said that our
findings are based on incomplete information because many of the
objectives were met and discussed in a May 2003 oral briefing with
selected Congressional staff, and that the absence of further requests
for a briefing on the national security assistance strategy or
additional requirements relieved it of further obligations. We disagree
with State's comments. The documents, which State identified as
representing a national security assistance strategy, met only two of
nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting this
strategy. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written
plan is needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation
for tracking progress in moving forward.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, and the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and State. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at h
[Hyperlink, http://gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or at [Hyperlink, christoffj@gao.gov].
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mitch McConnell:
Chairman:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles H. Smith:
Chairman:
The Honorable Donald M. Payne:
Ranking Member Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and
International Operations:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Leach:
Chairman:
The Honorable Eni F. H. Faleomavaega:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Kolbe:
Chairman:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign
security forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we met
with officials of the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice in
Washington, D.C., responsible for administering various aspects of U.S.
assistance programs to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S.
Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy and
foreign government officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta,
Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We also obtained the statutory
authorizations for these programs from program officials and from our
independent legal searches. We obtained data on the nature and extent
of the activities funded by these programs in Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand from program officials and State and DOD Web
sites. We reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State
and DOD by comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources
to check for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also
interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to
assess how it was developed and maintained. We found the data
sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of program
funding.
To assess the extent to which the three posts included in our review
complied with human rights vetting requirements from 2001 to 2004, we
reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State and DOD
officials in Washington, D.C., and at the three posts, and how these
procedures were implemented at each post. We also interviewed relevant
officials in Washington, PACOM, and the three posts, and discussed
vetting requirements and processes. At each post, we asked the relevant
post officials to identify the total number of foreign security
officials trained under all programs provided under the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act and DOD appropriations act subject to the
Leahy restrictions from 2001 to 2004. We then randomly selected and
reviewed program files for those officials. We reviewed the files for
compliance with human rights vetting requirements as set forth in
legislation and State policy guidance. To conduct the file review, we
used a data collection instrument to systematically capture whether key
steps in the post's human rights vetting process occurred, such as
whether the political affairs office at each post was involved.
We were able to estimate that 87 percent of files for DOD trainees in
the Philippines had some documentation subject to a sampling error of
plus or minus 10 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval
surrounding this estimate ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent.
However, due to small sample sizes for the other agencies in the other
countries, we were unable to make other reliable estimates about the
percentage of files for which some vetting occurred. The small sample
sizes occurred because, after we had drawn our sample, U.S. officials
told us that no files existed for several large groups of trainees,
including approximately 4,000 trainees under the ICITAP program in
Indonesia and 1,439 trainees from the Narcotics Affairs Section in
Thailand. In addition, after we had drawn our sample, we were told
about other groups of trainees that had not been vetted. As a result,
our estimates for the numbers of trainees for which no vetting occurred
are based on officials' estimates of the numbers of trainees that had
taken the training that should have been vetted, not the file review we
conducted. To assess the reliability of the estimates on trainees that
had not received training, we interviewed officials, and compared the
estimates they provided with other available information. While we
found that some of the components in the estimates were less precise
than others, we determined that these estimates were sufficiently
reliable to indicate that many thousands of trainees had not been
vetted.
In addition, to obtain a general understanding of the human rights
situation in each country, we also met with State human rights
officers, national commissions on human rights in each country, as well
as representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with human
rights issues. Specifically, in the Philippines we met with Task Force
Detainees; in Indonesia, we met with The Commission for Involuntary
Disappearance and Victims of Violence, Voice of Human Rights in
Indonesia, and the National Forum for the Commission on Human Rights in
Papua; and in Thailand we met with Forum Asia and Human Rights Watch.
In addition, we met with nongovernmental organizations in Washington,
D.C., to understand the general human rights situation on countries
included in our review: Amnesty International, East Timor Action
Network, Human Rights Watch, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center
for Human Rights.
To assess the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy,
we met with State, DOD, and Justice officials in Washington, D.C.,
responsible for managing and administering U.S. assistance to foreign
security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in
Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy officials in Manila, the
Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We analyzed key
planning documents from State and DOD to determine the extent to which
they addressed the nine strategic objectives of the Security Assistance
Act of 2000, that urged State to develop a multiyear National Security
Assistance Strategy. As part of this assessment, we analyzed State's
Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans for each post we visited, and
the Bureau Performance Plan for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific
Affairs. We also assessed PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan,
reviewed three other unified command's theater security cooperation
plans, and assessed security assistance plans for the three countries
included in our review. To address the extent to which State and DOD
have performance measures for programs that train and equip foreign
security forces, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed OMB's 2004
and 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool assessments, DOD's Theater
Security Cooperation Management Information System, and Justice's
Letters of Agreement with other agencies and with the three countries
included in our review.
We conducted this review from June 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security
Forces:
We use the term "allocations" to describe the broad mix of appropriated
and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security
forces in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted
for 83 percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of
Excess Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13
percent of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 4
percent of the total. Expenditures data were used for the DOD's JCET
program and Justice's DEA and FBI training activities because separate
appropriations and country allocation data does not exist.
Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA):
Managing unit(s): The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance implements and manages ATA
with policy guidance from the State Department Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.
Description of activities: The ATA program supports a variety of
activities to help fight terrorism by building the capacity of key
countries abroad to fight terrorism; establishing security
relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen
cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; sharing modern effective anti-
terrorism techniques; and leading training courses covering such areas
as law enforcement, protection of national leadership, control of
borders, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis management.
ATA by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Indonesia: $14,786,000;
Philippines: $1,939,000; Thailand: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L.
87-195, as amended, 22 USC §2349a.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 8: Drawdown:
Managing unit(s): The Department of Defense, Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the agency tasked to execute DOD drawdown.
DSCA coordinates Defense, State, the National Security Council, and
others to develop drawdown packages. DSCA works with the military
services to identify available defense articles and services and
monitors the progress of deliveries.
Description of activities: Drawdown is the transfer of in-stock defense
articles and services from the inventory of the DOD, as well as any
agency of the U.S. government, to foreign countries and international
organizations in response to unforeseen military emergencies,
humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics
requirements.
Drawdown by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004)[A]; Philippines:
$10,000,000; Indonesia: $0; Thailand: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §§2318 and 2348a.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[A] Funds are not appropriated for drawdown.
[End of table]
Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA):
Managing unit(s): The military departments determine excess defense
articles and recommend an allocation of excess assets to the Excess
Defense Articles Coordinating Committee. The Committee is co-chaired by
the DOD's DSCA and State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office
of Regional Security and Arms Transfers. The Coordinating Committee
approves allocation of EDA and the military departments work with the
foreign government to execute the transfer.
Description of activities: EDAs are nonappropriated assistance in the
form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense
articles declared as excess by the military departments can be offered
to foreign governments.
EDA by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004)[A]; Philippines:
$19,504,000; Thailand: $5,972,000; Indonesia: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §2321j.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[A] Funds are not appropriated for drawdown.
[End of table]
Table 10: Economic Support Fund (ESF):
Managing unit(s): U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
administers the program in foreign countries. USAID transfers some ESF
funds to State for administering certain activities.
Description of activities: The ESF promotes economic and political
stability in strategically important regions where the U.S. has special
security interests. The funds are generally provided as grants or loans
provided on a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic
purposes, such as infrastructure and development projects.
ESF by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Indonesia: $23,200,000;
Philippines: $0; Thailand: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §2346 et. seq.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF):
Managing unit(s): Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the implementing
agency.
Description of activities: FMF provides grants and loans to foreign
governments and international organizations for the acquisition of U.S.
defense equipment, services, and training. FMF assists the militaries
of friendly countries to promote bilateral, regional, and multilateral
coalition efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism; improve
military capabilities to contribute to international crisis response
operations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises; contribute
to the professionalism of military forces to include the rule of law
and military subordination to civilian control; enhance
interoperability of military forces, maintain support for
democratically elected governments; and to support the U.S. industrial
base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and
services.
FMF by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004): Philippines: $115,745,000;
Thailand: $4,171,000; Indonesia: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L.
90-629, as amended, 22 USC §2763.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 12: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE):
Managing unit(s): Department of State, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) administers the program.
INL uses interagency agreements with 16 other U.S. government agencies,
including USAID, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, DEA,
FBI, and the Coast Guard, to carry out INCLE activities.
Description of activities: Development and coordination of U.S.
international drug and crime policies and programs through bilateral,
regional, and global initiatives that build law enforcement
capabilities of foreign governments. These efforts center on two
primary goals: (1) ensuring that international trafficking in drugs,
persons, and other illicit goods are disrupted and criminal
organizations dismantled; and (2) encouraging states to cooperate
internationally to set up and implement antidrug and anticrime
standards.
INCLE by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Thailand: $13,795,000;
Indonesia: $4,000,000; Philippines: $2,000,000.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §2291.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET):
Managing unit(s): Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs has authority over the program; DSCA is the implementing
agency.
Description of activities: The IMET program provides training to
military and related civilian personnel. IMET training exposes foreign
students to U.S. military organizations and procedures and the manner
in which military organizations function under civilian control. IMET
aims to strengthen democratic and civilian control of foreign
militaries, improve their understanding of U.S. military doctrine and
operational procedures, and to enhance interoperability. IMET
facilitates the development of professional and personal relationships,
which aim to provide U.S. access and influence to foreign governments.
IMET by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Philippines: $8,561,000;
Thailand: $7,940,000; Indonesia: $1,275,000.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §2347.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET):
Managing unit(s): Department of Defense, Special Operations Command.
Description of activities: JCET activities involve training U.S.
Special Operations Forces with foreign forces to ensure readiness
regarding language, culture, knowledge of foreign environments, combat
and combat support, and instructor skills. Training ranges from land
navigation, first aid, basic rifle marksmanship, leadership techniques,
and special operations techniques and tactics. The primary purpose of
JCET is to train U.S. Special Operations Forces. Benefits to the host
nation forces are incidental.
JCET by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Thailand: $5,040,000;
Philippines: $4,730,00; Indonesia: $0.
Legal authority for the program: National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, as amended, (P.L. 102-190), 10 U.S.C.
§2011.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 15: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO):
Managing unit(s): Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs has authority over the program and the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency is the implementing agency.
Description of activities: PKO funding supports multilateral
peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded
through the UN. PKO funding enhances the ability of other countries to
participate in voluntary peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and
supports regional peacekeeping operations for which neighboring
countries take primary responsibility.
PKO by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Philippines: $15,000,000;
Thailand: $500,000; Indonesia: $0.
Legal authority for the program: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, 22 USC §2348.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 16: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP):
Managing unit(s): Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict.
Description of activities: The CTFP provides education and training to
foreign military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and other
foreign security officials involved in combating terrorism. Foreign
students attend U.S. military educational institutions and selected
regional centers for non-lethal training. CTFP is used to bolster the
capacity of friendly foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict
or disrupt the activities of terrorist networks ranging from weapons
trafficking and terrorist-related financing to actual operational
planning by terror groups.
CTFP by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Indonesia: $4,200,00;
Philippines: $2,000,000; Thailand: $769,000.
Legal authority for the program: Defense Appropriations Acts of 2002
(P.L. 107-117) and 2004, (P.L. 108-87).
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 17: DEA Training:
Managing unit(s): Drug Enforcement Administration, International
Training Section.
Description of activities: DEA's International Training Section offers
basic and advanced drug enforcement seminars, International Narcotics
Enforcement Managers Seminars, specialized training including training
for Special Investigations Units, and offers instruction at the
International Law Enforcement Academies. These activities aim to
improve law enforcement capabilities of foreign law enforcement
agencies to encourage and assist them in developing self-sufficient
counter narcotics programs.
DEA training by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Thailand:
$398,000; Indonesia: $61,000; Philippines: $51,000.
Legal authority for the program: Department of Commerce and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-77; Consolidated
Appropriation Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199).
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
Table 18: FBI Training:
Managing unit(s): Federal Bureau of Investigation International
Training Assistance.
Description of activities: The FBI's international training assistance
includes several activities: country capabilities/needs assessments;
training of foreign officials carried out in foreign countries;
training of foreign officials conducted in the United States; FBI
instructor development; training at International Law Enforcement
Academies in Budapest, Hungary and Bangkok, Thailand; and through the
Mexican/American Law Enforcement Training Initiative and the Pacific
Rim Training Initiative.
FBI training by country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004); Philippines:
$109,000; Thailand: $11,000; Indonesia: $0.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: State Department National Security Assistance Strategy
Briefing:
[See PDF for images]
[End of slide presentation]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Other State and DOD Documents Address Some Objectives of
the Security Assistance Act of 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800:
JUL 18 2005:
In reply refer to: 1-05/008928-A-P:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S.Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report (05-793), SOUTHEAST ASIA: Better Human Rights Reviews and
Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security
Forces, dated June 22, 2005 (GAO Code 320284).
DoD acknow ledges receipt of the draft report and we concur with the
report in principle. The recommendations in this report are for the
State Department in consult with the DoD and other executive agencies.
Enclosed are technical/editorial comments for your review and
consideration. Should you have any questions or require additional
clarification, please contact Lt Col Paul K. Bartlett, at (703) 601-
3717. or Ms. Nancy Morgan. at (703) 601-3715.
Signed by:
RIchard J. Millies:
Acting Director:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
JUL 12 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "SOUTHEAST
ASIA: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for
Assistance to Foreign Security Forces," GAO Job Code 320284.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Scott Kwak, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Political and Military
Affairs, at (202) 647-7769.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Leslie Holen:
PM - Elena Kim-Mitchell;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report SOUTHEAST ASIA: Better
Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance to
Foreign Security Forces: (GAO-05-793 GAO Code 320284):
The State Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment
on the draft Report "SOUTHEAST ASIA: Better Human Rights Reviews and
Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance to Foreign Security Forces."
These programs cover a range of important initiatives in vital
Departmental strategic goals of regional stability, counterterrorism,
and international crime and drugs. The Department is committed to
executing its security assistance programs in a coherent, efficient
manner that complies with the law and helps the United States
Government achieve its foreign policy goals.
GENERAL COMMENTS:
Background and Assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand:
The timeframe of the Report, 2001-2004, coincides with the Global War
on Terror (GWOT), during which time the USG significantly increased
funding to fight terrorism around the world. As important allies in the
GWOT, funding to Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand in particular has
increased substantially. For a more balanced report, GAO should
consider the security assistance provided as well as the Departments'
and posts' staffing levels prior to the GWOT. Such an analysis would
likely reveal that the increase in assistance without a commensurate
increase in staff placed an undue burden on the Department, felt most
strongly at posts, to develop and carry out expanded vetting
procedures.
Management Controls for Vetting Human Rights:
In general, we think it is important to point out that whereas there is
always room for improvement in the implementation of certain Leahy
vetting procedures, the State Department is operating its assistance
programs in full compliance with the law. The Leahy provision applies
only to "units" of foreign security forces. Any Leahy vetting of
individuals for gross human rights violations is carried out strictly
as a matter of policy, not as a matter of law. Indeed, the vetting of
individuals identified for individual training reflects a policy
decision by the Department of State to take additional measures to
avoid the provision of U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights
violators, whether inside or outside the security unit setting. In
fact, Senator Leahy's staff on several occasions have expressed
appreciation for the seriousness with which the Department takes
responsibilities for vetting.
U.S. Embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand have reviewed
their human rights vetting procedures for law enforcement training and
brought them into compliance with Department guidance. The State-run
International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) fully comply with human
rights vetting requirements. ILEA Bangkok, as well as other ILEA
institutions, follow the ILEA standard operating procedures in order to
comply with congressional mandates. Human rights vetting procedures
have been in place since ILEA Bangkok's inception, which includes the
timeframe of the GAO's review (2001-2004). In addition, law enforcement
training for Filipino security forces at the ILEA and those sponsored
by Diplomatic Security's office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (DS/ATA)
have been fully incorporated in the Mission's human rights vetting
process since ILEA Bangkok's inception in 1999. Records that the
Mission vetted hundreds of individuals between 1999 and 2004 were made
available for the GAO team during their time at Embassy Manila.
With regard to the establishment of clear vetting policies and
procedures, the Department acknowledges the need for continued
improvement, especially as it concerns better oversight of
implementation at posts. The Department has provided a clear
articulation of Department vetting policies to posts, as set out in
2003 STATE 34981 and previous guidance. Furthermore, some oversight is
provided through the established channel of periodic OIG inspections at
posts. However, the Department purposely chose to allow flexibility for
posts to decide how to implement Department guidelines to accommodate
for the vast differences in post circumstances, staffing levels and
workloads at various posts. The guidance is specific enough for posts
to carry out vetting, while being flexible enough for each post to
implement it for maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
Recognizing the significant workload thorough vetting requires, State
has developed a comprehensive, custom-designed database, the Abuse Case
Evaluation System (ACES), which, as the Report acknowledges, we believe
will become an important tool for increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of human rights vetting. Guidance on transitioning from the
old system to the new system is provided in 05 STATE 21314 and on the
website we have established, .
We note that the GAO report recommends centralizing oversight of posts'
compliance with vetting requirements in a single bureau or office.
Since assistance programs are managed and directed by several different
Bureaus and agencies, centralization of authority for vetting
requirements in one bureau is complicated by dispersed funding
authorities as well as staff and resource constraints. For these
reasons, ultimate responsibility for vetting rests with regional
bureaus and posts. Full deployment and functionality of ACES should
mitigate the need for centralization in one bureau; however, as
mentioned in the Report, administration of this system may require
additional staff and resources in DRL and certain posts. Discussions of
the new vetting guidance to be implemented in 2005 highlighted the fact
that posts will need to bear the primary responsibility for
implementing vetting procedures, since posts program the funds, have
close access to the most information about individuals in security
forces, and select individuals and units for assistance. The new
vetting guidance imposes a uniform standard as it instructs posts to
deny assistance or seek guidance from the Department if derogatory
information is found at post on an individual or unit proposed for
assistance.
National Security Assistance Strategy:
The GAO report asserts that the U.S. government lacks a clear and
coherent multi-year national security assistance strategy, and that the
strategy provided to Congress in May 2003 meets only two of nine
objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. However, despite
repeated discussions to clarify the term "security assistance" as
interpreted by statute, GAO apparently continues to define security
assistance more broadly, to include a wide range of programs and
activities supporting foreign military and police forces. This
undermines the basis for GAO's assessment that the Department did not
fully comply with section 1501 requirements of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY2003, to brief appropriate congressional
committees regarding a national security assistance strategy. The
Department has traditionally used the term security assistance to
include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and
Excess Defense Article (EDA). Congressional intent for this term, and
for what was expected in the strategy, was clear since section 1501
referred to section 501(b) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000,
which directed that the strategy cover assistance provided through FMF,
IMET, and EDA. Therefore, the briefing included each of these programs
and was deemed to be wholly satisfactory by the Committees represented
at the time. Since there have been no further requests for a briefing
on the national security assistance strategy, the Department continued
to understand that there were no additional requirements from Congress
in this regard.
Furthermore, assertions that the national security assistance strategy
presented in the oral 2003 briefing meets only two of nine objectives
set forth in the Security Assistance Act of 2000 are based on
incomplete information. Most of these assertions are based primarily on
the PowerPoint slides that accompanied the briefing (equating the
slides with the strategy), and not the briefing itself. Several of the
objectives were in fact met and discussed in the briefing (see
Corrections below), including the development of a multi-year plan for
assistance programs, coordination and consultation with other agencies,
identification of primary and secondary objectives, and more.
One component of the Department's strategy not discussed in the report
is the Global Affairs Dashboard, a project of the Office of Strategic
and Performance Planning in the Bureau of Resource Management. When
fully developed and deployed, the Dashboard will draw on the
performance and planning database to graphically display, by country,
region, program or strategic goal or objective, the fiscal and human
resources devoted to the particular analytical element. This will
enable clearer and more comprehensive analysis of where, for example,
FMF, IMET and PKO as well as other FOAA funded assistance has been, or
is requested to be, spent. The Dashboard may become, with appropriate
management attention, a useful tool for security assistance strategic
planning.
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS:
Assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand and Management
Controls:
* The report incorrectly and repeatedly refers to IMET and FMF as DoD
programs (see footnote Apg. 19, for example). These are FOAA programs
and as such, the State Department has set vetting procedures for them.
In addition, DoD sets its own procedures for training it carries out.
Page 3, 17: The report maintains that State applies the Leahy guidance
"to individuals as well as foreign security units." This application is
true, however, only in cases in which the individuals have been
selected for individual training such as IMET. The legislation does not
require the vetting of individuals when the training in question is
unit based. It should also be clarified that any vetting of individuals
is done as a matter of State policy and practice, not as a matter of
law.
Page 8: the report states that "the [Thailand] Government's human
rights record worsened with regard to extrajudicial killings and
arbitrary arrests." This language is present in the 2003 human rights
report, but not in the 2004 report. In 2004, our assessment was: "The
Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were significant problems in some areas."
Pages 4, 16, and 22: References to a lack of formal policies to govern
vetting procedures at Embassy Manila are incorrect. Vetting documents
and records at post available from 2000 spell out the formal policy,
which has been in place since 1999. The policy is detailed in cable
2000 Manila 230, which was written in response to 1999 State 240150
requesting procedural clarification of the Human Rights Vetting
process. During the recent GAO visit, Mission outlined 2004
improvements in the working level checklist of procedures implemented
at Mission's own initiative in fall 2004. All of these documents were
made available for the GAO team during their review at Embassy Manila.
* Page 12, Figure 3 of the report is incorrect. No EDA articles were
transferred to Indonesia.
Page 12, Figure 3 incorrectly indicates no CTFP allocation for
Indonesia. Table 2 on page 14 correctly shows this figure at $4.2
million.
Page 13, Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the
Philippines Fiscal Years 2001-2004 should reflect that ATA allocations
were $7.8 million (vice $1.9 million). Under the heading "Examples of
how Assistance Was Used," the entry should read "Provided training in
crisis response, hostage negotiation, terrorist crime scene
investigation, financial underpinnings of terrorism, vital installation
security, post-blast investigation, cyber-terrorism investigation, and
mass casualty 'medical issues."
* Page 14, Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia
Fiscal Years 2001-2004, ATA allocations were $19.1 million (vice $14.8
million).
* Page 15, Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand,
Fiscal Years 2001-2004, should have an entry for ATA with an allocation
of $4.2 million, and under the heading "Examples of How Assistance Was
Used," the following should be added: "Training provided in airport
security management, officer survival, hostage negotiation,
surveillance detection, crisis management, explosive incident
countermeasures, mass transit security, explosive detector dogs and
handlers, and cyber-terrorism investigation."
Page 16, line 5: "We found similar outcomes for DoD vetting in the
other two countries" contradicts table 5 on page 19 which shows vetting
was completed for 100 percent of the DoD sample for those two
countries.
Page 17, second paragraph, second to last sentence is incorrect.
Replace ", as well." with "only when the individual is the unit to be
trained (i.e. for IMET courses)."
* Page 17 states that post officials, State headquarters officials, and
State guidance all have the same understanding of vetting procedures
and who is responsible at each step. This contradicts the overall
finding that the Department did not issue sufficiently clear guidance
on vetting procedures.
Page 17: In Jakarta, it is not the responsibility of the political
section to obtain clearances from all other sections but that of the
initiating office to obtain clearances from other offices i.e.
Political, Regional Affairs, Consular (if the person is traveling), and
RSO and keep the record of receiving such clearances.
* Page 18, Table 4, footnote B: Clarification that the GAO report
indicates that about 300 in-country ATA trainees from Thailand were not
vetted. Those not vetted were participants in the WMD First Responder
seminar, the Mail Security course, and some Cyber-Terrorism courses.
Appropriate human rights vetting procedures are documented for all
other ATA training events in Thailand.
* Page 19, Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts,
Fiscal Years 2001-2004 indicates that 210 trainees were identified by
Indonesia. ATA records indicate 705 students received ATA training from
2001 through 2004. This table does not identify the year of training
nor reflect the specific organization responsible for the delivery of
the training. Additionally, the "unit" from which students were
selected is unclear.
* Page 20 and summary: When the Department informed Embassy Jakarta
that BRIMOB personnel could not be trained in November 2003, ICITAP
immediately ceased training. It should be noted that the training was
focused on encouraging more professional, accountable behavior.
* Page 31: The report states that ATA is rated as "effective," and the
"Security Assistance Programs to the Western Hemisphere" are rated as
"moderately effective." This is somewhat confusing, because ATA is
rated based on its organization-wide performance, not effectiveness
geographically. It also implies a relationship between ATA and WHA
Security Assistance that we are not sure was intended.
* Page 40, Table 7: In Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) under "ATA by
country (fiscal years 2001 to 2004)" the entry should read "Indonesia:
$19,097,363 (vice $14,786,000) Philippines: $7,806,000 (vice
$1,939,000) and Thailand: $4,250,000 (vice $0)."
National Security Assistance Strategy:
* Page 26: The Report's assertion that State's National Security
Assistance Strategy addresses only two objectives of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000 is based on incomplete information. The
assessment was made after reviewing briefing slides used during the
briefing, and does not take into consideration the accompanying verbal
presentation.
* Page 28: The claim that State's Security Assistance Strategy is not
multiyear is incorrect. The Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) are multi-
year plans. The 5T' slide (pg. 46) of the presentation identifies that
BPPs outline activities for two fiscal years (since increased to three
fiscal years) in the future. When added to programs being executed
during the current year, the result is a four year plan.
* Page 28: The claims that State's Security Assistance Strategy is
neither coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, nor prepared in consultation with appropriate agencies are
incorrect. Representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff and the regional
combatant commanders are active participants in State's annual Security
Assistance Roundtables, where security assistance goals and objectives
are developed and fine-tuned. Roundtable participants maintain
consistent communication throughout the year as the programs are
executed, and OSD's Principal Director for Strategy participated in the
presentation to Congress.
* Page 29: The claims that State's Security Assistance Strategy does
not include primary and secondary security objectives for individual
countries, resource allocations to accomplish primary and secondary
objectives, how security assistance programs are combined at the
country level, and how programs are coordinated with other USG agencies
are incorrect. All of these aspects were covered verbally in the
presentation as the briefer discussed slides 6 through 11 and 13.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter
dated July 12, 2005.
GAO Comments:
1. State commented that the Leahy provisions apply only to units, not
individuals, of foreign security forces, and said that applying human
rights restrictions at the individual level is a matter of policy.
State also asserted that it takes additional measures to avoid the
provision of U.S. assistance to individuals suspected of gross human
rights violations, whether inside or outside the security unit setting.
However, our work showed that State's policy is not being effectively
implemented. We found that an estimated 6,900 individuals received U.S.
training assistance without any evidence that they had first been
vetted for gross violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended
in the report that State strengthen its management controls to meet its
stated policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross
human rights violators.
2. State said that U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Thailand reviewed their human rights vetting procedures and brought
them into compliance with Department guidance. We agree that embassies
in Manila and Jakarta wrote their human rights vetting procedures
during the course of our review to bring them into compliance with
State guidance. However, Embassy Bangkok does not have written
procedures and is not in compliance with State guidelines. More
importantly, State lacks a system for monitoring compliance with its
guidelines. As discussed in our report, we found that no headquarters
office within State is currently charged with the responsibility of
monitoring the posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting
procedures and recommended that such a monitoring mechanism be
established to verify that these procedures are being carried out
properly. Such a system would help eliminate the major gaps in vetting
we found at the three posts we visited.
State further commented that the State-run International Law
Enforcement Academies and Philippines ATA programs have been fully
incorporated in human rights vetting procedures since 1999. However,
this comment is not relevant to our main finding that we found no
evidence that about 6,900 foreign security forces were vetted for human
rights concerns before receiving U.S. law enforcement training under
ICITAP.
3. State acknowledged the need for continued improvement, especially
concerning better oversight of the implementation of posts' procedures.
It noted that some oversight is provided through the periodic Inspector
General inspections. State said that it purposely allows the posts
flexibility in deciding vetting guidelines. We contacted the State
Inspector General and found that their periodic post inspections have
not included assessments of State's human rights vetting process at any
of the three posts. We found that State had conducted an inspection at
only one post--Embassy Bangkok--between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.
4. We disagree with State's comments that (1) central oversight of
posts' compliance with vetting requirements in a single office is not
needed, and (2) its new database system will mitigate the need for
centralization in one bureau. As stated in our report, no office within
State is charged with the overall responsibility of monitoring posts'
compliance with human rights vetting requirements, which has led to
lapses in the vetting process across all three posts. Currently, four
different bureaus within State share some responsibility for
implementing these requirements. This has resulted in confusion in the
field and gaps in implementing departmental vetting policies. State's
guidance issued to the posts between 1997 through 2005 did not assign
this role and responsibility to any one office. A central focal point
would help identify instances where a post was not complying with
required procedures or instances where confusion about requirements
existed. The new database, alone, will not solve the vetting problems
we identified or replace the need for designating an office with the
express responsibility of monitoring how posts implement their human
rights vetting requirements.
5. We disagree with State's statement that our decision to include a
full range of programs and activities supporting foreign military and
police forces within the scope of our review undermined our assessment
of State's compliance with the Security Assistance Act. As officials
with State's Bureau of Legal Affairs repeatedly stated, there is no
statutory definition of "security assistance," or even a commonly
agreed-upon definition within the federal government. In the absence of
a legal definition, and for the purposes of our report, we defined
security assistance as U.S. government assistance to train and equip
foreign security forces (military and police). Although State officials
indicated that it traditionally considers security assistance to
include FMF, IMET, EDA, and PKO programs, the Security Assistance Act
of 2002 states that FMF, IMET and EDA as well as other similar training
programs to foreign security forces shall be included in State's
briefing on the strategy. It will be difficult for State to craft a
comprehensive security assistance strategy, as called for in our
report, without including at least the 12 related programs and
activities described in our report.
6. We disagree that the absence of further requests for a briefing on
the national security assistance strategy somehow changed the intention
of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 to have an annual report to
Congress. The Security Assistance Act of 2000 urged State to provide an
annual strategy while the 2002 act mandated a status briefing on the
development of that strategy. We understand that State fulfilled its
requirement to brief the committees on the progress of the strategy, as
called for in the 2002 act, but we disagree that a lack of request for
additional briefings altered the intention of the 2000 act, which urged
State to provide an annual National Security Assistance Strategy to
Congress.
7. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is
needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for
tracking progress in moving forward.
8. We agree with State's observation that our report does not include
information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which
State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security
assistance strategic planning. Although we were not informed in the
course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be
developed and deployed, we support all State efforts to develop better
strategic planning tools for U.S. security assistance programs. We have
revised the report to reflect this new information.
9. We have made changes in the body of the report to reflect State's
comment that the draft incorrectly referred to IMET and FMF as DOD
programs, when they are Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded
programs.
10. The draft report already reflected the distinction between State
policy and the law.
11. We have updated the report to reflect State's comment.
12. We agree with State's comment that Embassy Manila had written
procedures for human rights vetting prior to 2004 and made changes in
the report to reflect this comment. However, we disagree with State's
comment that Embassy Manila provided us with all relevant documents
during our visit in March 2005, including an October 2000 cable
outlining post human rights vetting procedures. In fact, the post
provided us only with the procedures in effect since late 2004.
13. We have revised the graphic to reflect State's comment that no EDA
articles were transferred to Indonesia.
14. We have revised the graphic to correct the value for CTFP.
15. State commented that ATA allocations should be $7.8 million, rather
than $1.9 million, for the Philippines; $19.1 million, rather than
$14.8 million, for Indonesia; and $4.2 million, rather than zero, for
Thailand. In subsequent discussions with State officials, they said
that these figures represent "either obligations or expenditures," and
not allocations, as we requested. We could not verify the numbers that
they provided through agency comments and State was not able to provide
us with corrected values for the allocations. As a result, we made no
changes to the report and reported the available ATA country
allocations as presented in State's Congressional Budget
Justifications.
16. We revised our report language to reflect State's comment.
17. State misinterpreted our generic description of the human rights
vetting process, which was not intended to imply that all State
officials share a common understanding of vetting policies and
procedures. During our fieldwork at the three posts, we found major
gaps in the implementation of State's vetting procedures.
18. We have changed the report to reflect State's comment that it is
the responsibility of the initiating office in Jakarta, not the
political section, to obtain clearances from all other sections.
19. State asserts that some of the 300 ATA in-country trainees in
Thailand who were not vetted were not members of the security forces
and thus should be excluded from the table. However, we carefully
separated out non-security forces from our review before assessing
compliance with human rights vetting procedures. Our numbers were based
on our file review in Embassy Bangkok and discussion with the ATA
Program Director. This analysis showed that of 708 ATA trainees between
2001 and 2004; 144 were security forces sent to the United States, 321
were security forces trained in Thailand, but not vetted; and 243 were
non-security forces trained in Thailand for whom vetting was not
required.
20. We disagree with State's comment that the number of Indonesian
trainees from 2001 through 2004 is 705. We revised the incorrect figure
(210) in our report to reflect the number (297) provided by the post in
its "DS/ATA Indonesia Summary Sheet."
21. We disagree with State's comment that we may be implying a
relationship between the ATA program and all security assistance
programs to the western hemisphere, based on our discussion of PART
ratings in our draft report. We did not intend to imply a relationship
between the two programs. As stated in our draft report, the 2004 PART
conducted two separate reviews. One review was for the ATA program,
which it rated as "effective." The other review was for all security
assistance programs to the Western Hemisphere, which were rated as
"moderately effective."
22. State contends that the National Security Assistance Strategy is a
multiyear plan because the Bureau Performance Plans are multiyear
documents. The Bureau Performance Plans are different documents and
serve a different purpose as indicated in our report. We acknowledge in
the report that the Bureau Performance Plans are consistent with the
National Security Strategy of the United States, and to some extent
address how combining resources and programs will achieve regional
goals as called for in the act. However, the Bureau Performance Plans
do not constitute a National Security Assistance Strategy.
23. State said that it coordinated development of the National Security
Assistance Strategy with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and other appropriate agencies. We acknowledge that State's
annual roundtables and other communications are useful in developing
and "fine-tuning" security assistance goals and objectives. However, we
did not find anyone in those offices who participated in developing the
National Security Assistance Strategy --the briefing slides, outline,
and oral presentation. One State official earlier had said that DOD
officials were involved only in presenting a briefing on EDA as part of
State's Strategy briefing and a separate briefing on DOD's security
cooperation efforts.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Stephen M. Lord, Assistant
Director; Jeffrey D. Phillips; Ann M. Ulrich; Jonathan Ban; Matthew
Helm; Lynn Cothern; Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key
contributions to this report.
(320284):
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as
U.S. government assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign
security forces (military and police).
[2] This restriction, commonly referred to as the "Leahy amendment,"
first appeared in the 1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and
Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) and only applied to funds
appropriated to State's International Narcotics Control program. It was
broadened in fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under
the 1998 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations
Act (P.L. 105-118). In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262),
which applied to funds appropriated under the act. The two provisions
have appeared each year since in the annual Foreign Operations
Appropriations Acts and the Department of Defense Appropriations Acts,
respectively.
[3] See P.L. 106-280, 22 §USC 2305.
[4] We use this term to describe the broad mix of appropriated and
nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces in
these three countries.
[5] An estimated 9,470 foreign security officials were trained under
State and DOD programs during this period.
[6] Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, CRS Report
for Congress, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, RL31672 (Washington, D.C.:
May 5, 2004).
[7] For Indonesia, see
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41643.htm. For the
Philippines, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41657.htm.
For Thailand, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41661.htm.
[8] We use the term "allocations" to describe the broad mix of
appropriated and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign
security forces in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations
accounted for 83.8 percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in
the form of Excess Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks
accounted for 13.4 percent of the total; and DOD and Justice
expenditures accounted for 3.9 percent of the total. Expenditures data
were used for DOD's JCET program and Justice's DEA and FBI training
activities because separate appropriations and country allocation data
do not exist.
[9] This number includes approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,175
Filipino, and 1,760 Thai law enforcement officials out of an estimated
9,470 total foreign security forces at the three posts.
[10] For purposes of our review, we said that we found "some evidence"
of vetting when we found documents indicating that the political
affairs office was involved in the post vetting process.
[11] "Credible evidence" was not defined in the appropriations
provisions. However, with regard to the meaning of "evidence," State
directed the posts to report language accompanying the fiscal year 1999
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that indicated that the conferees
do not intend that the evidence must be admissible in a court of law.
As to the definition of "credible," while State retains authority for
all final decisions, State directed that posts should apply a rule of
reason and that State seeks information deserving of confidence as a
basis for decisionmaking.
[12] Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations
Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act for 2005 (P.L. 108-447,
§553) states that: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be
provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed
gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and
reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such
country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members
of the security forces unit to justice." The provision has also
appeared in prior Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-
118, §570 (FY98); P.L. 105-277, §568 (FY99); P.L. 106-113, § 564
(FY2000); P.L. 106-429, §563 (FY2001); P.L. 107-115, §556 (FY2002);
P.L. 108-7, § 553 (FY2003); P.L. 108-199, § 553 (FY2004)).
[13] The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2005
states that: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used
to support any training program involving a unit of the security forces
of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible
information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a
gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps
have been taken." (P.L. 108-287 §8076) Similar provisions have also
appeared in prior DOD appropriations acts. See P.L. 105-262, §8130
(FY1999); P.L. 106-79, §8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, §8092 (FY2001);
P.L. 107-117, §8093 (FY2003); P.L. 107-248, §8080 (FY2003); P.L.
108087, §8077 (FY2004).
[14] This describes the general process of human rights vetting. There
are slight differences in details depending on whether the assistance
involves units or individuals and on whether funding is from the
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act or DOD Appropriations Act for DOD
training.
[15] In technical comments on this report, DOD stated that at Embassy
Jakarta, the sponsoring office, not the political affairs office,
circulates candidate information to other offices at post for their
review. However, DOD also offered contradictory information when it
stated that there is no difference in the details of the process
whether the funding source is Foreign Operations Appropriations Act or
DOD Appropriations Act for DOD training. In fact, DOD has additional
procedures to cable candidate information for DOD-funded training
programs (e.g., JCETS and CTFP) to State headquarters, DOD
headquarters, and the Pacific Command.
[16] ICITAP is funded by State's International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement program, but implemented by Justice.
[17] These programs all involved training under IMET, FMF, or CTFP.
[18] The programs included FMF, IMET, and CTFP.
[19] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
(GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Nov. 1999).
[20] Under these standards, management control is defined as consisting
of five interrelated components: (1) Control environment. Management
should establish a supportive environment for internal control and
assign authority and responsibility clearly throughout the organization
and clearly communicate this to all employees. (2) Risk Assessment.
Management needs to formulate an approach for assessing risk and decide
upon the internal control activities required to mitigate those risks
and achieve efficient and effective operations, reliable financial
reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. (3) Control
activities. Policies and procedures are needed to help ensure that
management's directives to mitigate risks are carried out. These
activities include accurate and timely recording of transactions and
events. (4) Information and communication. Relevant and reliable
information should be recorded and communicated to management and
others within the agency who need it and in a form and within a time
frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. (5)
Monitoring. Internal control monitoring assesses the quality of
performance over time and ensures that the findings of audits and other
reviews are promptly resolved.
[21] The U.S. National Security Strategy is prepared by the President,
through the National Security Council. Its purpose is to define a
strategy for maintaining U.S. security. It centers on the core national
security objectives of preserving peaceful relations with other states,
political and economic freedom, and respect for human dignity.
[22] The Conference Report attached to the 2000 Security Assistance Act
expressed concern that the prior planning process had been "entirely
insufficient and…run on an ad hoc basis," without a "clearly
articulated organizing principle" or a "coherent set of benchmarks or
measurements against which the success of individual programs with
various countries can be measured." See House Conference Report No. 106-
868, accompanying the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106- 280).
[23] P.L. 107-228, §1501.
[24] Performance measures provide a succinct and concrete statement of
expected performance for subsequent comparison with actual performance.
In general, performance measures are a tabulation, calculation,
recording of activity or effort, or assessment of results compared with
intended purpose, that can be expressed quantitatively or in another
way that indicates a level or degree of performance.
[25] PART was developed as a key element of the President's Management
Agenda and is intended to assess and improve program performance so
that the federal government can achieve better results.
[26] Additional questions are unique depending on the type of program
(e.g., competitive grant, regulatory based, direct federal, etc.)
[27] PART uses five rating categories to assess programs: (1)
effective, (2) moderately effective, (3) adequate, (4) ineffective, and
(5) results not demonstrated.
[28] GAO. Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's
Program Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, GAO-04-
174 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004).
[29] We reviewed TSCP's for four of DOD's nine unified commands--U.S.
Central Command, European Command, Joint Forces Command, and Pacific
Command.
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