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Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists' which 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

June 2005: 

Elections: 

Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain 
Accurate Voter Registration Lists: 

GAO-05-478: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-478, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about 
state processes for verifying voter registration lists. States base 
voter eligibility generally on the voter’s age, U.S. citizenship, 
mental competence, and felon status. Although states run elections, 
Congress has authority to affect the administration of elections. The 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) sets a deadline for states to have 
a statewide voter registration list and list verification procedures. 
For this report, GAO selected seven states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and 
WI) to represent a range of characteristics relevant to voter 
registrations, such as whether a statewide voter list existed prior to 
HAVA. This report discusses how these states verify voter registration 
eligibility; the challenges they face in maintaining accurate voter 
lists; the progress toward implementing HAVA registration requirements; 
and identifies federal data sources that might be used to help verify 
voter registration eligibility. 

What GAO Found: 

The methods used in seven selected states to verify voter eligibility 
and ensure accuracy of voter registration lists were varied and include 
relying on registrant self attestation, return mailings, and checking 
against lists of felony convictions or deceased individuals. Election 
officials from the selected states described some challenges that may 
be resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, such as reducing duplicates 
within the state. Other challenges—identifying duplicate registrations 
in other states or having insufficient information to match other data 
sources with voter registration lists—may continue to be issues. 

The seven states are in different phases of implementing HAVA statewide 
voter registration lists and eligibility verification requirements. 
Arizona implemented its statewide voter list by the January 1, 2004, 
deadline, and the other six states applied for a January 1, 2006, 
waiver. Of those six states, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin awarded 
contracts to develop new voter lists that are designed to address HAVA 
requirements. Michigan has had a statewide list since 1998, and 
officials believe it is near HAVA compliant. California election 
officials are still considering how to meet these HAVA requirements, 
and in New York, legislation was passed in May 2005 to create the state 
voter registration lists. 

Federal data sources have the potential to help state election 
officials identify registrants who may be convicted felons or non-
citizens. While the potential number identified may be small, an 
election can be decided by a few votes. Regarding felons, U.S. 
Attorneys are required to notify state election officials of federal 
felony convictions, but the information was not always easy for 
election officials to interpret or complete. Federal jury services 
generally do not now, but might feasibly be able to notify elections 
officials when potential jurors drawn from local voter registration 
lists claim to be non-citizens. 

Federal Juror Qualification Questionnaire: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

To help assure voter lists are accurate, GAO recommends that U.S. 
Attorneys provide notices of federal felony conviction in a 
standardized format, and that the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts study the feasibility of sharing certain citizenship-related 
U.S. district court juror information with state election officials. 
Officials at these federal agencies agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-478. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., 
at (202) 512-8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but 
Methods Vary by State: 

Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration 
Eligibility: 

The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA Statewide 
Voter Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification Requirements: 

Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials in 
Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter Registration 
Lists: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That 
Include Information on Non-Citizens: 

Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at 
Selected States and at the Federal Level: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts: 

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications: 

Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration 
Requirements in Six States: 

Table 3: State Selection Factors: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof 
of Citizenship: 

Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration Attestations 
Regarding Criminal Status: 

Figure 3: Process for Verifying Voter Registration Applicant 
Information with SSA: 

Figure 4: Federal Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship 
Information: 

Abbreviations: 

AAMVA: American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators: 

AOUSC: Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DMF: Death Master File: 

EAC: Election Assistance Commission: 

FEC: Federal Election Commission: 

HAVAHelp America Vote Act: 

HAVV: Help America Vote Verification program: 

INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service: 

MVA: motor vehicle agency: 

NCOA: National Change of Address: 

NVRA: National Voter Registration Act of 1993: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General: 

QVF: Qualified Voter File: 

SAVE: Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

June 10, 2005: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner: 
Chairman: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about 
state election administration and processes for verifying voter 
registration lists. In managing the voter registration process and 
maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election 
officials must balance two goals--(1) minimizing the burden on eligible 
persons of registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are 
accurate, i.e., limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible 
registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter 
registration lists. This report focuses on the second goal--the efforts 
of state and local election officials in seven states to ensure that 
voter registration lists are accurate. 

In addition to this report, we also plan to issue reports this year on 
other specific election issues--voter access to the polls; how the nine 
states without Help America Vote Act (HAVA) waivers[Footnote 1] have 
implemented voter registration requirements as of January 1, 2004; 
electronic voting security; and the Department of Defense's 
implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program for Overseas 
Military Personnel in 2004. These reports respond to congressional 
requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In addition, given 
concerns raised about the November 2004 election process, we are 
undertaking a broader, more comprehensive study of election 
administration and processes related to the November 2004 general 
election. This more comprehensive study will address activities and 
challenges--people, processes, and technology--associated with each 
major stage of election administration to include registration, 
absentee and early voting; Election Day preparation and activities, and 
vote counting and certification, similar to a report we issued in 
October 2001.[Footnote 2]

All states set certain eligibility requirements to register and vote. 
States establish voter eligibility requirements that generally include 
that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the day of the election, 
is a citizen of the United States, is mentally competent, and meets 
state requirements regarding felon status. Ensuring that only eligible 
persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for election 
officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction size, 
mobility of voters, and community diversity. In larger jurisdictions 
the task of identifying and removing registrants who have died can be 
substantial. For example according to Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention records, almost 300 persons died in the first week of 2005 
in the city of Los Angeles. Communities with large student or military 
populations must manage registrants constantly moving in or out of a 
jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must handle 
substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in 
communicating voter registration requirements. 

After the events surrounding the November 2000 election, HAVA was 
enacted.[Footnote 3] It requires states, among other things, to (a) 
implement an interactive computerized statewide voter registration 
list; (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing the voter list 
against state records on felons and deaths; (c) match applicant 
information on voter registration lists with information in state motor 
vehicle agency's records; and (d) match voter registration applicant 
information on voter registration lists with Social Security 
Administration (SSA) records, as appropriate. 

This report addresses current and planned voter registration processes 
in seven selected states for verifying voter registration lists. 
Specifically, this report answers the following questions: (1) How do 
state election officials verify voter registration eligibility and 
ensure voter registration lists are accurate? (2) What challenges do 
they face in maintaining accurate voter lists? (3) What progress have 
these states made toward meeting HAVA requirements to have voter 
registration verification procedures? (4) What federal data sources, 
other than those identified in HAVA, might be used to help verify voter 
registration eligibility?

To address the first three objectives, we selected a nonprobability 
sample of seven states--Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin to represent a range of voter-registration 
factors. Our selection includes states in various stages of development 
of their statewide databases, variations in election administration, a 
range in the percent of the population of foreign born, and is 
geographically diverse. We also considered other characteristics that 
might affect the implementation of HAVA, such as same day registration 
in Wisconsin, or New York, with a large population who live in New York 
City who may not have driver's licenses for verification. Our goal was 
not to target a particular state, but rather to identify a range of 
issues facing states in implementing HAVA requirements and assuring 
accurate voter registration lists. In these seven states, we 
interviewed state election officials and election officials in 14 local 
voting jurisdictions--two in each of these states. Additional 
information on our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. 

In these seven states, we also interviewed motor vehicle agency 
(MVA)[Footnote 4]officials because voters can submit voter registration 
applications at MVA offices, and MVAs have a role under HAVA to assist 
states with verification of voter registration information. In 
addition, we reviewed relevant state voting laws, voter registration 
documents, and reports related to voting processes. We interviewed 
officials at the SSA and obtained documentation on how they are 
addressing SSA's HAVA verification requirements. To identify potential 
federal data sources to verify voter registration, we gathered 
information from state election and county jury administrators, and 
from officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 
and the Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and we 
reviewed relevant reports. We also obtained information on voter fraud 
allegations from DOJ, from U.S. Attorneys in our selected states and 
from state and local election officials and District Attorneys for the 
local election jurisdictions we visited. See appendix I for additional 
information on our objectives, scope, and methodology. Our work was 
done between January 2004 and May 2005 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

State and local election officials we interviewed in the seven states 
said they use a combination of methods and information to verify voter 
eligibility and ensure the accuracy of voter registration lists. These 
included using computer programs that only accept registrants of an 
eligible age and those who live at an address within the jurisdiction, 
confirmation mailings to registrants, and information from state vital 
statistics or court officials on persons who are deceased or have been 
convicted of a felony. 

HAVA provisions, when fully implemented, should help address some 
challenges state election officials face in obtaining timely, accurate, 
and complete information to identify ineligible voter registrants, but 
other challenges may remain. Having a statewide voter registration list 
and matching the list with state vital statistics and felon data, as 
required by HAVA provisions, could reduce the number of duplicate 
registrations within a state and provide more timely identification of 
ineligible registrants. HAVA provisions may not affect other data 
challenges, such as identifying registration duplications or deceased 
individuals outside the state, or identifying non-citizens. 

Progress to meet HAVA requirements in the seven states we visited 
varied. One state, Arizona, implemented its statewide voter list by the 
January 1, 2004, deadline, and the other six states applied for and 
received a waiver to defer their implementation of these provisions 
until January 1, 2006. Of those six states, Michigan has a statewide 
list that has been operational since 1998 and state officials believe 
they are near compliance with HAVA requirements. Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin awarded contracts to develop the voter lists intended to 
encompass HAVA requirements. California and New York are working toward 
meeting the January 2006 deadline, but California is still evaluating 
its strategy for creating a statewide database that is HAVA compliant, 
and legislation approving the creation of New York's state voter 
registration list was not passed until May 2005. The extent to which 
states verified applicant information with state motor vehicle agencies 
and compared voter lists with state records for deaths and felons 
varied in that some had agreements to verify information and some did 
not. As of March 2005, six of the states we visited still needed to 
sign an agreement with SSA to verify voter registrant information 
against Social Security records. The seventh state, Virginia, is not 
subject to this HAVA requirement because it is permitted to require 
voter registrants to provide their full social security number. This 
number can be used with SSA's online verification system. 

We identified two federal data sources that have the potential to help 
state and local election officials ensure that their voter lists are 
accurate. The number of potentially ineligible voter registrants 
identified by these two federal sources may be small but could be 
important in determining the outcome of a close election. 

First, U.S. Attorneys are, by law, to send notice to state election 
officials upon conviction of felonies in federal court. State 
officials, in turn, are to forward it to local election officials in 
the jurisdiction where the convicted offender resides. The law does not 
establish a standardized time frame or format for forwarding the 
federal felony conviction information. Of the 19 U.S. Attorneys' 
offices covering the seven states we visited, 16 reported that the 
notices were being sent to election officials but not in a standardized 
format and 3 reported that they were implementing or modifying their 
processes to provide this information on felony convictions in U.S. 
district courts. According to state and local election officials with 
whom we spoke in the seven states, federal felony information was not 
always provided in a standard format or timely, and the information was 
sometimes difficult to interpret, such as the length of the sentence, 
or incomplete. 

Second, federal jury administrator questionnaires identify individuals 
who claim to be non-citizens when asked to serve as a juror in federal 
district court.[Footnote 5] The federal district courts are not 
required to provide election officials with this information, but 1 of 
the 14 federal district courts we surveyed does so. One source that the 
federal district courts use to draw the potential jurors' names is 
local voter registration lists that should only contain names of 
citizens. Federal jury administrators were mixed in their opinions on 
the feasibility of providing this information, some citing staff 
resource constraints. 

To assist state election officials in maintaining accurate voter 
registration lists, we are recommending that U.S. Attorneys provide 
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a more 
standardized format to make it easier for election officials to 
interpret the conviction information, such as the length of the 
sentence, and help ensure that information is complete and timely. We 
also recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts[Footnote 6] study the feasibility of sharing certain citizenship-
related U.S. district court juror information with state election 
officials. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and 
comment. In their responses, officials at both DOJ and AOUSC 
acknowledged the importance of maintaining accurate voter registration 
lists, and agreed with our report recommendations. Sections of the 
report were also provided to other federal agencies and states we 
visited to confirm the accuracy of the information. Clarifications and 
specific technical comments on the draft were incorporated as 
appropriate into the final report. 

Background: 

The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and 
federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both 
their own elections and federal elections. States regulate various 
aspects of the elections process, including, for example, ballot 
access, registration procedures, absentee voting requirements, 
establishment of polling places, provision of election day workers, and 
counting and certifying the vote. The states in turn incur the costs 
associated with these activities. Although the states are responsible 
for running elections, Congress has authority to affect the 
administration of elections. Congress' authority to regulate elections 
depends upon the type of election. With regard to federal elections, 
Congress has constitutional authority over both congressional and 
presidential elections. In addition, with respect to federal, state, 
and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments authorize 
Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory acts. 

Congress has passed legislation regarding the administration of 
elections, both for federal elections and in certain cases at the state 
level. Most recently HAVA was enacted in 2002. HAVA established, among 
other things: (1) a program to provide funds to states to replace punch 
card or lever voting systems used in federal elections, (2) the EAC to 
assist in the administration of federal elections and to otherwise 
provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election 
laws and programs, and (3) certain minimum election administration 
standards for states and units of local government with responsibility 
for the administration of federal elections. The act fixed enforcement 
authority on the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any 
state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry out the specified 
uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration 
requirements under HAVA.[Footnote 7]

Regarding the administration of elections, HAVA created federal 
mandates, staggered deadlines for implementing these mandates, and 
authorized about $3.86 billion over several fiscal years in election 
reform appropriations. HAVA required that states create plans detailing 
how they will meet the requirements and guidelines of the act. Among 
the requirements, section 303 mandated a computerized statewide voter 
registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for 
conducting elections for federal office in each state. States and 
territories were to implement a computerized statewide voter 
registration database by January 1, 2004. States could apply to the EAC 
by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until January 1, 
2006. Nine states and one territory--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and 
Guam--did not apply for a waiver. 

Section 303 also requires states to perform list maintenance on a 
regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the voter registration 
list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with state agency 
records on felony status and death. In addition, states are required to 
verify voter registration information. For federal elections, a voter 
registration application may not be processed or accepted by a state 
unless it contains the applicant's driver's license number, the last 4 
digits of the social security number if there is no driver's license 
number, or the state must create a unique identification number if the 
voter has neither number. Certain state laws allow voter registration 
applications to require the applicant to provide their full social 
security numbers on applications.[Footnote 8] Voter registration 
information is to be matched with motor vehicle records or social 
security records, depending on the information provided by the 
applicant. The state motor vehicle authority must enter into an 
agreement with SSA to verify the applicant information when the last 4 
digits of the social security number are provided rather than a 
driver's license or state identification number. SSA must develop 
methods to verify the accuracy of information provided and whether the 
name, date of birth, and the last 4 digits of a social security number 
match SSA records, including whether the individual is deceased. 

HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration 
of elections. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
(NVRA),[Footnote 9] for example, was enacted to establish registration 
procedures designed to "increase the number of eligible citizens who 
register to vote in elections for Federal office…," "protect the 
integrity of the electoral process…" and "ensure that accurate and 
current voter registration lists are maintained." NVRA contains 
provisions regarding what information is sought on the voter 
registration application for federal elections. To enable state 
election officials to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to 
administer voter registration and other parts of the election process, 
the act requires that the voter registration application include a 
statement about each eligibility requirement to be able to vote, 
specifically including citizenship. It further requires an attestation 
that the applicant meets each such requirement to vote and requires the 
signature of the applicant under penalty of perjury. 

In addition, NVRA created requirements for how states maintain voter 
registration lists for federal elections. The act requires states to 
keep such voter registration lists accurate and current, such as 
identifying persons who have become ineligible due to death or change 
of residence to outside the jurisdiction. At the same time, the act 
requires list maintenance programs to incorporate specific safeguards, 
for example, that they be uniform, non-discriminatory, and in 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act. The removal of registrants for 
non-voting or for having moved can only be done after meeting certain 
requirements provided in the act. The act also allows for removal of 
registrants from registration lists at their own request, when a 
registrant has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, or by reason of 
mental incapacity where such removals are allowed by state law. 

Voter registration qualifications based on age, citizenship, criminal 
status, mental competence, and residence were established in all seven 
states we reviewed, except for Michigan, which does not have a mental 
competency requirement. Table 1 summarizes the eligibility 
qualifications in the selected states. 

Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications: 

AZ; 
Age: At least 18 years old on or before the next general election; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person 
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of the 
felon's pre-existing registration. 1[ST] time felons otherwise eligible 
may reregister when discharged, or probation is complete. With more 
than 1 felony conviction after an absolute discharge, a felon must have 
a judge reinstate voting rights; 
Mental competence: Not be currently declared an incapacitated person by 
a court of law; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: State resident in county at least 29 
days before election. 

CA; 
Age: At least 18 years of age at the time of the next election; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: A person in prison or on parole for the conviction of 
a felony is not entitled to register and cancellation of the felon's 
pre-existing registration will be triggered. Once the sentence is 
complete, including parole, a felon who is otherwise eligible may 
reregister. Voting rights may also be restored by the governor; 
Mental competence: Not currently judged mentally incompetent by a court 
of law; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: California resident and registered at 
least 15 days prior to an election. 

MI; 
Age: At least 18 years old by the next election; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Persons confined in jail after conviction and 
sentencing are not eligible to register or vote. Prior to trial or 
conviction and sentence, persons confined in jail may register at their 
prior address. Upon release, person who is otherwise eligible may 
register or reregister.[B]; 
Mental competence: Not a state eligibility disqualification; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: Michigan resident and at least a 30-
day resident of the city or township, by election day. 

NY; 
Age: At least 18 years old by the date of the election; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person 
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may register 
or reregister after a pardon or restoration of rights by the governor 
of the state where such conviction took place (or the President for 
federal felony conviction), completing the maximum sentence of 
imprisonment, or when they are discharged from parole; 
Mental competence: Not currently judged incompetent by order of a court 
of competent judicial authority; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident of the state and of the 
county, city, or village for at least 30 days before an election. 

TX; 
Age: At least 17 years and 10 months old to register and must be 18 to 
vote; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person 
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may reregister 
when their sentence has been fully discharged or have been pardoned or 
otherwise released from the resulting disability to vote; 
Mental competence: Have not been declared incompetent by final judgment 
of a court of law; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: Be a resident of the county in which 
the application for registration is made. 

VA; 
Age: At least 18 years old by the next general election; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person 
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may qualify to 
register or reregister if their civil rights have been restored by the 
governor or other appropriate authority; 
Mental competence: Not currently declared mentally incompetent by a 
court of law; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident of VA and of the precinct 
in which he/she wants to vote and registered no later than 29 days 
before the general election. 

WI; 
Age: At least 18 years old; 
Citizenship: U.S. citizen; 
Felon status[A]: Persons convicted of a felony are disqualified from 
voting. Voting rights are restored upon completion of the term of 
imprisonment, probation, or parole, or through a pardon; 
Mental competence: Not have been found by a court to be incapable of 
understanding the objective of the electoral process; 
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident in an election district or 
ward of the state for at least 10 days before an election. 

Source: GAO summary of information verified by states. 

[A] This table may not reflect the full range of possible measures 
available under state law. Other measures, such as reversals, set- 
asides, or pardons may be available under specific state laws to 
restore civil rights for convicted felons. In addition, this table does 
not reflect other non-felony convictions, such as bribery, that may 
serve to disenfranchise an individual under state laws. 

[B] This provision of Michigan law applies not just to convicted felons 
who are confined in a jail but to all persons who are confined in a 
jail as a result of non-felony offenses for which they have been 
convicted and sentenced. 

[End of table]

Registering more than once is explicitly addressed in some state laws. 
For example, under Virginia law, the intentional registration to vote 
at more than one residence address at the same time, whether such 
registrations are within Virginia or in Virginia and any other state or 
U.S. territory, is prohibited.[Footnote 10] In New York, it is illegal 
to register or attempt to register as an elector in more than one 
election district for the same election, or more than once in the same 
election district.[Footnote 11] While federal law does not explicitly 
prohibit being registered to vote more than once, such as in more than 
one state, various federal laws could apply to certain types of 
wrongful activities that might result in such multiple registrations 
related to a federal election. For example, knowingly or willfully 
providing false information (e.g., name, address, or period of 
residence) to establish eligibility to register to vote with respect to 
a federal election is prohibited.[Footnote 12]

Voters are not now required to register in all jurisdictions in 
Wisconsin. Currently, only municipalities with a population of 5,000 or 
more are required to register voters.[Footnote 13] About 75 percent of 
the voting age population lives in the municipalities that have some 
form of voter registration. Voters may also register in Wisconsin on 
Election Day at the polling place. Under "same-day registration" 
potential voters are required to complete a registration form that 
includes a certification as to their eligibility[Footnote 14], and 
present an acceptable proof of residency. The municipal clerk for a 
jurisdiction is responsible for verifying that each person allowed to 
vote was properly registered, and sends a postcard confirming 
registration to the person, or a 1st class letter if the registration 
cannot be confirmed. If the letter is undelivered or an improper 
address was provided, municipal clerks are to notify the district 
attorney.[Footnote 15] In jurisdictions without registration, the 
voting officials enter the full name and address of voters on a poll 
list in the order they voted. 

States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but 
Methods Vary by State: 

State and local election officials in the seven states we reviewed 
reported that specific steps are taken to verify eligibility when an 
applicant applies to register and that voter registration lists are 
also reviewed periodically to identify registrants who may no longer be 
eligible, such as those who have moved, have been convicted of a 
felony, or are deceased. Officials in the seven states use a 
combination of methods, including computer programming, return 
mailings, and information from state vital statistics to identify 
registrants who should be removed from voter rolls. Self-attestation is 
included in every voter registration application in the seven states we 
visited but varies by the terms used and format of the attestation. All 
voter registration application forms in the seven states we visited 
asked applicants to certify with their signature that the information 
provided is correct and true. The forms ask the applicant to attest to 
their age, citizenship, and residency. The format asking for additional 
information varied in the seven states. 

Verification of age: 

To determine eligibility based on age, all states we reviewed, except 
Texas, required applicants to declare, swear, affirm, or attest on the 
voter registration application that they meet state age requirements. 
In addition, officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York City 
said that their voter registration computer system is programmed to 
calculate the age of the applicant, based on the date of birth the 
registrant provides, and reject applications of individuals who will be 
younger than 18 years of age on the day of the next election. 
Michigan's computer system accepts registrations from voters who are at 
least 17-½ years of age; however, the names will not appear on a 
precinct list until the voter has reached the age of 18. In addition, 
Arizona and Michigan election officials match their voter registration 
applications against the state motor vehicle agency's records to verify 
the information. 

California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to "flag" voter 
registration applications for election officials if they have concerns 
about a voter registration applicant's age. According to the MVA 
manual, if the birth date on the voter registration form does not agree 
with the birth date on documentation, clerks are to note "BD" on the 
voter registration form so election officials will know to verify the 
birth date. However, neither of the local election officials we spoke 
with in this state recalled having an application flagged by the MVA 
for closer review of an applicant's age. None of the officials in other 
states (excluding Wisconsin, which is not currently subject to the NVRA 
requirement to register voters at motor vehicle agencies because of 
certain NVRA exemption provisions for states allowing voters to 
register on Election Day) reported having a policy for motor vehicle 
agency clerks to share eligibility concerns. 

Verification of citizenship: 

All election officials we spoke with told us that non-citizens are not 
permitted to vote in elections, including non-federal 
elections.[Footnote 16] Citizenship eligibility was based on applicant 
self-attestation in all seven states, with application blocks that must 
be checked by the applicant specifically affirming U.S. citizenship. 
Five of the states require applicants to swear, affirm, or attest that 
they are U.S. citizens in addition to checking the block. In Texas 
applicants affirmed that they understood giving false information is 
perjury and a crime under state and federal law. In Wisconsin, 
applicants are to certify that they meet all the voter registration 
requirements, and, according to Wisconsin state law, the municipal 
clerk or board of election commissioners may require naturalized 
applicants to show their naturalization certificates. New York State 
election officials said that their state law entitles any voter to 
challenge a person's right to vote if they think that voter is not a 
citizen. 

As with age, California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to 
"flag" voter registration applications if citizenship status is in 
question by writing "US" on the corner of the form. According to the 
manual, when immigration documents provided to a MVA staff do not 
confirm citizenship, the staff is to remind the customer of the voter 
registration eligibility requirements. If the customer still desires to 
submit a voter registration application, the staff places the notation 
on the form. No other state that we visited has this provision. Many of 
the motor vehicle officials we spoke with stated a view that it was up 
to state election officials to determine a registrant's eligibility to 
vote, not the motor vehicle agency, and that all applications are 
forwarded to election officials. 

In Arizona, a ballot initiative passed in November 2004 that will 
require proof of citizenship to register to vote (and identification 
upon voting). The registration requirement does not apply to those who 
are currently registered, or when a registrant changes their 
registration address within a single county. Arizona's Secretary of 
State, as of March 4, 2005, was determining which forms of 
identification will be acceptable as proof. According to Arizona draft 
procedures released for public comment, acceptable identification 
included: 

* a copy of a birth certificate that verifies citizenship,

* a copy of pertinent passport pages of a U.S. passport,

* a copy of naturalization documents,

* selected Bureau of Indian affairs documents, and: 

* Arizona driver's license or non operating license issued after 
October 1, 1996, or the equivalent government document from another 
state if the agency indicates on the applicant's driver license or 
nonoperating license that the person has provided satisfactory proof of 
U.S. citizenship. 

Figure 1 shows sections of the draft proposed application requiring 
citizenship information that was made available for public comment. 
According to local election officials in one Arizona jurisdiction, mail 
applications will not be processed without citizenship documentation. 
The applicants will be sent a letter asking for documentation, and the 
letter will include a list of documents that are acceptable as proof of 
citizenship. 

Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof 
of Citizenship: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Some local election jurisdictions receive information from county jury 
administrators to help identify potential non-citizens on voter 
registration lists. County jury pools are drawn from a variety of 
sources, which may include voter registration lists. In five of the 
states we visited, county jury administrators use voter registration 
lists, and potential jurors are asked to indicate citizenship status on 
jury service screening questionnaires. In 4 of the 10 local 
jurisdictions in those five states, election officials said they 
receive notification from county jury administrators when a potential 
juror claimed to be a non-citizen as a justification for being excused 
from jury duty. None of the local election officials said that they 
receive notifications from federal jury administrators. 

In addition to the state or local election jurisdiction efforts to help 
ensure registrants are eligible based on citizenship, Federal Election 
Commission (FEC)[Footnote 17] officials noted that some federal 
measures have been adopted to discourage non-citizens from registering 
to vote. Measures include: 

* possible deportation, under immigration laws, for knowingly making a 
false statement about citizenship status to register;

* the NVRA requirement that applications list eligibility requirements 
(including citizenship);

* the prohibition in federal law on governmental use of a voter 
registration card for a federal election as proof of U.S. citizenship; 
and: 

* the HAVA requirement that a statement identifying eligibility 
requirements, including citizenship, be included on voter registration 
applications. 

Nevertheless, the FEC officials noted that non-citizens may be 
encouraged to register to vote because the I-9 form used to provide 
proof of employment eligibility and its implementing 
regulations[Footnote 18] includes, among other documents, the voter 
registration card as an acceptable document for employment identity 
purposes. 

Verification of criminal status: 

In six of the seven states we visited, the eligibility of applicants, 
in terms of criminal status, was based on the self-certification signed 
by registration applicants. In Arizona, Texas, and Virginia, the 
application includes language specifically certifying eligibility based 
on criminal status. In New York and Wisconsin, applicants certify to a 
general statement that they meet all the requirements to register for 
their state, which includes a restriction based on criminal status. 
California uses both specific and general attestations. Michigan 
applicants do not attest to their criminal status, but voting is 
prohibited only for those serving time in prison or jail. According to 
election officials, they do not accept voter registrations or absentee 
ballots from prison addresses. Examples of the at testation language 
used on voter registration applications are presented in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration Attestations 
Regarding Criminal Status: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Officials in Arizona, California, New York, Texas, and Virginia said 
they receive state court information on felony convictions to remove 
voter registrants no longer eligible to vote based on a criminal 
conviction. Court information on felons in these states was provided to 
election officials in different formats and at different intervals. The 
data came in either paper or electronic format depending on the 
location. State election officials in two states said that the format 
varied by county within their states. Election officials in the five 
states reported receiving information at different intervals, such as 
weekly, monthly, intermittently, or biannually. 

State election officials in six of the seven states and 9 of the 14 
local election officials said that they received information on federal 
felony convictions. Most election officials said the information was 
received on a sporadic or intermittent basis, in a paper format. 

Michigan election officials do not receive information from state 
courts on felony convictions. Officials there told us that state felony 
conviction information was not needed because they only restrict the 
right to vote while the person is incarcerated. Local election 
officials in Wisconsin said they do not receive state felony conviction 
information. The Wisconsin state election official said that felon 
records are diffused and difficult to compare with voter lists. 
Wisconsin plans to create a statewide database that will consolidate 
criminal records from 17 different correctional databases, the state 
election official said. However, the system will not be available by 
the January 1, 2006, HAVA deadline, according to the state election 
official. 

The laws in five of the states we visited (California, New York, Texas, 
Wisconsin, and Arizona), for first-time felony convictions, allow 
felons to gain eligibility to vote when a felony sentence is completed-
-which can include time on probation, parole, payment of fines, or 
supervision related to the conviction. States do not require proof that 
the non-incarcerated segments of a sentence be completed, according to 
all of the officials we spoke with and state regulations we reviewed in 
those states. 

Verification of mental competence: 

Six of the seven states we visited have a state law that disqualifies 
persons legally declared to be mentally incompetent or incapacitated 
from registering to vote and cancels the voter's registration upon such 
adjudication. Michigan's constitution has provided that the legislature 
may, by law, exclude persons from voting because of mental 
incompetence, but no such law has been enacted. Wisconsin limits 
disqualifications based on mental incompetence to those where a court 
specifically determines that the registrant is incapable of 
understanding the objective of the electoral process. State and local 
election officials in Arizona, California, New York, Texas, and 
Virginia reported that courts notify registrars periodically when 
adjudications on mental incompetence are made. Two rural jurisdictions 
reported that family members or caretakers sometimes notify the 
registrar of mental competency adjudications. In one Texas 
jurisdiction, the election official said that the court sends a notice 
to the county elections office, which in turn sends a letter to the 
voter confirming the voter's removal from the registration list. 

Verification of residency: 

Officials we spoke with in the seven states said that in addition to 
initially checking that an applicant resides in the jurisdiction 
(either by using an automated address file or manually checking), they 
also use a variety of sources to periodically verify their voter lists 
for registrants who may have moved. The National Change of Address 
(NCOA) list[Footnote 19] is used by Virginia state officials on a 
yearly basis and used in at least one of the local election 
jurisdictions we visited in Arizona, California, New York, and 
Virginia. How often the national list was checked varied, but of the 
eight jurisdictions using this source, five said they checked on an 
annual basis. Twice a year, New York county election officials send 
their voter lists to state officials for comparison with the NCOA list, 
according to a state election official. Election officials in every 
state said returned mail was used, either at the state or local 
election level--some on a daily basis, others intermittently, annually, 
or before a major election. Ensuring that registrants live in an 
election jurisdiction is generally a task for local election officials 
but can be part of a statewide system, as in Michigan, where the voter 
registration system electronically assigns the voter's jurisdiction 
based on the address provided by the registrant. Residency is further 
verified by the mailing of a non-forwardable voter identification card 
to each new registrant in Michigan.[Footnote 20]

Identification of duplicate registrations: 

For duplicate registrations, election officials said that existing 
voter lists are checked by election officials before adding a new 
registrant or are checked periodically. In the case of Arizona, 
Michigan, and Virginia, the statewide voter registration system enables 
jurisdictions to identify duplicates statewide. California and Texas 
state election officials said they compare local jurisdiction records 
and will notify local officials of potential duplicates. New York and 
Wisconsin primarily check for duplicates within the election 
jurisdiction. Some officials also reported periodically checking 
against other data sources, noted below. Officials reported using 
varying combinations of name, address, and other identifying 
information collected on the application to identify existing 
registrations, such as social security number in Virginia. In Michigan, 
election officials demonstrated how the states voter registration file 
has computer software with a search capability to identify similar 
names as potential duplicates. These similar names are researched 
manually to determine whether they are actually duplicates. 

The data sources state and local election officials reported checking 
to identify duplications and ensure that registrants reside in the 
election district varied in terms of what information was used, and the 
frequency of use. Sources included: 

* National Change of Address List,

* return mailings of non-deliverable mail,

* individuals reporting an address change,

* notice from other election jurisdictions or state election officials 
of a change, and: 

* a check against state MVA records. 

Identification of deceased registrants: 

State vital statistics offices in six of the seven states reported that 
they provide data periodically--from weekly to quarterly--to election 
officials to identify registrants who have died. In addition to state 
vital statistics, state and local officials said they use various 
sources of data to identify deceased voter registrants on their 
registration lists. Data sources included: 

* county Vital Statistics Office records,

* newspaper obituaries, and: 

* miscellaneous sources, such as family members, city vital statistics 
offices, funeral homes, the U. S. Postal Service, probate courts, and 
MVAs. 

Wisconsin local and state election officials said that state vital 
statistics are not currently used to identify deceased registrants. 
Local election officials said they review obituaries to identify 
deceased persons. 

Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration 
Eligibility: 

Ensuring that voter lists are accurate is a task that has challenged 
election officials across the country for some time and was also a 
concern of election officials in the seven states we visited. Officials 
in one jurisdiction characterized voter registration lists as dynamic 
and constantly changing. In larger jurisdictions the task of 
identifying and removing registrants who died can be substantial; for 
example, according to Center for Disease Controls and Prevention 
records, almost 300 persons died in the first week of 2005 in the city 
of Los Angeles. If verification information is available to officials 
at all, then quality considerations become a factor, such as the 
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the data. Some challenges 
faced by election officials, particularly identifying duplicates in 
other jurisdictions within the state, may be reduced with the 
implementation of the HAVA-required statewide, computerized voter 
registration lists; but the data availability and quality 
considerations may continue to be issues. 

FEC reports have documented problems in maintaining accurate voter 
registration lists. The reports are mandated by Congress to document 
the impact of NVRA provisions, including provisions to ensure that 
voter lists are accurate by removing those who are no longer 
eligible.[Footnote 21] The number of states identifying problems has 
diminished since the NVRA was first implemented. The FEC reported in 
1998 that officials in 26 states reported problems including duplicate 
registrations, inaccurate information for matching, and the difficulty 
of removing names without confirmation.[Footnote 22] The number of 
states identifying voter list maintenance challenges to FEC dropped 
from 26 in 1998 to 6 states in the 2001-2002 report, with the most 
commonly reported change being that states implemented or enhanced 
their computerized voter registration lists. 

Some of the concerns highlighted below remain problems for election 
officials and may not be addressed by a statewide voter list. Based on 
a national survey of local election officials, we reported in 
2001[Footnote 23] on the challenge of continually updating and deleting 
information from voter registration lists, and the concerns of election 
officials in obtaining accurate and timely information to keep voter 
lists accurate. 

Voter registration list maintenance challenges that were identified by 
officials in the seven states we visited, and in the prior reports are 
described below. 

* Deceased Persons: The timeliness of death data was a concern 
identified by state level election officials in all but Wisconsin and 
Arizona and by local election officials in three of the jurisdictions 
we visited.[Footnote 24] Concerns echoed many of the same issues raised 
in earlier reports. For example, Texas officials said that the health 
data they receive identifying deaths is about 3 to 4 months old, 
resulting in some deceased voters remaining on the voter registration 
list possibly through an election period. Another concern raised by a 
local Michigan official was the lack of birth dates on some state death 
records, resulting in difficulty identifying which voter of several 
with the same name actually passed away. Identifying deaths occurring 
outside of the state was a problem raised by election officials at the 
state and local levels in New York, and by local officials in one 
Arizona jurisdiction. Local New York officials said that when residents 
spend part of the year in other parts of the country and pass away 
there, they may not get a record of death in a timely manner. The 1998 
FEC report highlighted this as an issue, noting the problem of 
identifying residents who die outside of the state or local 
jurisdiction because they may not be identified in vital statistics 
reports they receive.[Footnote 25]

* Citizenship: The concern for election officials we spoke with 
regarding a registrant's eligibility based on citizenship was the 
reliance on self-attestation. As stated by the FEC, the challenge for 
states is to develop procedures that maintain the integrity of the 
election process without penalizing the majority of applicants, who are 
law abiding citizens.[Footnote 26] Two types of standard sources of 
identification, such as a driver's license, state identification or 
social security numbers are not useful because neither are evidence of 
citizenship. Other sources, such as a passport or birth certificate 
more clearly indicate citizenship. However, these sources may not be 
available, or conveniently at hand for all who would like to register 
to vote, according to a review by election officials in 
Philadelphia.[Footnote 27]

* Criminal Information: Criminal information is often incomplete, not 
timely, or difficult to decipher. One state official and six local 
election officials we visited stated concerns about the timeliness or 
accuracy of the criminal information they receive for removing 
ineligible persons from the voter registration list. For example, New 
York officials said that the birth date on conviction notifications was 
sometimes not included, which meant there could be multiple matches on 
the same name. Wisconsin officials do not receive data from state 
courts on felony convictions, the state and local officials in one 
jurisdiction said. Lack of complete information is a concern that has 
been raised in jurisdictions outside the ones we visited. For example, 
a recent audit of the voter list in the City of St. Louis reported 
identifying over 900 possible voting felons on the City's voters list 
that were not identified by city election officials, primarily because 
the information they had to identify the felons was 
incomplete.[Footnote 28]Auditors reported that a primary reason so many 
were not removed was that election officials only received conviction 
reports from the local court and not from other sources, such as the 
state or county. Other officials we interviewed stated that the 
information they did receive on felony convictions, particularly from 
federal sources, was not useful because it was old, had limited 
matching criteria, or was in different formats and hard to decipher. 

In addition to a need for more complete or useful information on 
convictions, it may be difficult for election officials to determine 
when a convicted felon is eligible to reregister. In five of the seven 
states we visited, and many others around the country, [Footnote 29] 
felons may reregister after serving their sentence, which could include 
parole or probation if applicable under that state's law. Arizona (for 
one felony conviction), California, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin 
officials cancel a voter's registration based on court notification of 
a felony conviction, but officials noted that they relied on an 
applicant's attestation of eligibility to reregister because no 
verification is required to document the completion of a felon's 
sentence. Arizona (for persons convicted of two or more felonies) and 
Virginia require that felons have their rights restored before they can 
register to vote--by a judge in Arizona after more than one felony 
conviction and by the Governor in Virginia. Arizona does not require 
proof of restoration. Virginia's application asks specifically if 
voting rights have been restored and the date when they were restored. 
Arizona officials said they looked into the feasibility of the court 
system notifying the Secretary of State when someone was released from 
prison, completed probation, and paid any fine or restitution. However, 
all three events are not clearly defined according to these Arizona 
officials, and no workable solution was found. Michigan restores voting 
rights upon release from incarceration. 

* Duplicate Registrant: Officials in 7 of the 21 state and local 
election jurisdictions we spoke with had some concern with the 
timeliness or accuracy of the data they receive to identify duplicate 
registrants or verify registrants reside within the jurisdiction. The 
matching and validation of names are complex and made more so when 
considering aliases and name changes, as are matches such as "Margie L. 
Smith" with "Margaret Smith" according to a Wisconsin study.[Footnote 
30] The study estimated that even a 1 percent error rate on a match 
validating names, driver license numbers, etc., could generate tens of 
thousands of bad matches. Officials from several states that do not 
have a statewide database noted that there was no way to identify 
duplicates outside their jurisdiction. New York state election 
officials said there is currently no way to systematically clear 
duplicates in the state. Officials rely on voters to identify if they 
have registered elsewhere. This problem was documented in the review of 
the City of St. Louis voter registration list, where auditors reported 
identifying about 13,600 potential duplicates on voter lists in other 
election jurisdictions in Missouri.[Footnote 31] Followup would be 
needed to determine which registrations were actual duplicates. 

None of the officials we spoke with reported that they check for voter 
registration duplication in other states. Texas state election 
officials said they only received information from other states when 
the other state's application asks where the person was previously 
registered, the person completes that portion of the form, and the 
information is forwarded to Texas. Texas does not forward information 
on new applicants from other states because the Texas application only 
asks for prior city and county in Texas. Local election officials in 
Arizona, Michigan, and Texas said they sometimes get reports of 
registrants relocating from other states. According to an EAC 
Commissioner in April 2005 (also the Chair for the EAC) making 
statewide voter registration systems compatible would be extremely 
costly, and HAVA does not address interactivity among states.[Footnote 
32]

* Residency of Registrants: Election officials we contacted identified 
a number of challenges to ensuring voter registrants reside within an 
election jurisdiction, including matching problems based on missing 
information or variation in how an address is listed, no street numbers 
in rural areas, new streets, redistricting, or untimely forwarding of 
new addresses. Officials in one local Arizona jurisdiction said 
residency issues are complex because not all the properties in the 
county have addresses. In one Wisconsin jurisdiction, election 
officials said they may not get notice for 4 or 5 months that a 
registrant within their jurisdiction has moved to another jurisdiction 
and, therefore, no longer meets the residency requirement (during this 
time the voter could also be registered twice). Michigan officials are 
considering using a Geographic Information System to improve their 
ability to identify and map eligible addresses for specific 
jurisdictions. Election officials reported to the FEC in 1998 and 2002 
that the process required for removing registrants who have moved from 
the jurisdiction was a problem, for example, citing the cost of 
confirmation mailings and people not providing forwarding 
addresses.[Footnote 33] Furthermore, some state officials surveyed for 
our 2001 report stated that matches with the Postal Service's NCOA or 
information from state motor vehicle agencies had potential drawbacks, 
such as the verification costs or incomplete information. For example, 
the NCOA files may not identify registrants who have moved if the voter 
did not submit a change of address form. In addition, according to some 
of these state officials, the names of ineligible registrants remained 
on the list because officials could not obtain verification required to 
remove them. 

Four local election officials believed that self-certification is 
sufficient because of the penalties for falsely registering, or did not 
believe that ineligible voters were of concern. State and local 
election officials who we interviewed said that they have had few voter 
registration fraud[Footnote 34] allegations pertaining to eligibility 
requirements. Many of the jurisdictions we visited said that they have 
reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations to 
appropriate agencies for investigation. We contacted District Attorneys 
covering election jurisdictions in the seven states, and they reported 
that they prosecuted some cases related to ineligible registrants or 
voter fraud. For example, in California, a state with an investigative 
unit dedicated to voter fraud issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations 
for fraudulent voter registration opened from January 2001 to May 2004 
were sent to the District Attorney for prosecution. Of the 15 cases, 
the outcome had been determined in 11 cases (6 cases declined for 
prosecution, 5 were prosecuted and the individuals were convicted). In 
four cases, the outcome is yet to be determined. See appendix III for 
additional information on allegations of voter registration fraud. 

HAVA requirements for having a statewide voter registration list and 
matching with other state databases are expected to improve the 
accuracy of voter lists, particularly for identifying duplicates in 
other jurisdictions within the state. Election officials we spoke with 
for our 2001 report and those we spoke with recently for this report 
stated that statewide voter lists helped in solving some accuracy 
problems. Michigan officials stated that when its statewide database 
was first created in 1998, over 600,000 duplicate voter registration 
records were eliminated. Arizona local officials said that their 
concerns about the timeliness and accuracy were less, now that state 
election officials managed the process through the statewide voter 
list. For example, state Vital Statistics data are received more 
frequently so that registrants who have died can be more quickly 
removed. For some jurisdictions, such as those in Wisconsin that do not 
receive death or felony information, the HAVA requirements to match the 
statewide voter list with state records on felons and death are to 
provide information not now available for removing ineligible 
registrants. 

Some concerns, such as timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the 
data used to match against voter lists, may continue to be issues, even 
after the HAVA requirements are fully implemented. For example, the 
1998 FEC report noted that states making good faith attempts to remove 
from the registry the names of persons no longer eligible to vote 
(e.g., deceased persons, ineligible felons, and those who have moved) 
are stymied when they receive inaccurate, incomplete, or out-of-date 
information. These concerns might continue with the voter registration 
lists as, for example, Virginia officials stated that there is a 3- 
month delay in receiving vital statistics data on deceased persons 
because that is how long it takes for processing. Virginia officials 
also identified a need for state standards for the exchange of 
information from state to state regarding voters who move from one 
state to another. 

Even in states with a statewide system for comparison, duplicate 
registrations can be added. As one local Michigan election official 
stated, if the system does not recognize that the registrant is already 
on the registration list, a new voter record is created. For example, 
Micky Jones and J. William Jones, Jr., might not be recognized as the 
same individual. A 2003 audit by the Michigan Office of the Auditor 
General identified approximately 24,000 potential duplicates in the 
state voter registration list, and about 10,000 registered voters with 
inaccurate birth dates. State agency officials attributed the 
duplicates as registrations that remain to be verified as the result of 
inaccurate or incomplete data received during the conversion of records 
to the state voter list in 1998, and the federal and state requirements 
that must be followed before records can be removed. Further, officials 
noted that tens of thousands of duplicates from voters moving within 
Michigan have been prevented by the voter registration system. 

The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA Statewide 
Voter Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification Requirements: 

In the seven states we visited, progress varied in carrying out HAVA 
requirements to (1) implement a computerized statewide voter 
registration list; (2) verify voter application information with state 
MVA or SSA records and (3) match the voter list with state records on 
deaths and felony convictions. Six of the seven states (except Arizona) 
applied for a waiver of these requirements until January 1, 2006. The 
six states that applied for a waiver said they plan to meet the 2006 
requirements deadline; however, their progress varies. 

Computerized Voter Registration List Completion Closer in Some States 
Than Others: 

Arizona, which did not request a waiver, implemented a statewide voter 
list which became operational in December 2003, prior to the HAVA 
January 1, 2004, deadline. Of the six states visited that requested a 
waiver until 2006, Michigan had a statewide voter registration 
database, called the Qualified Voter File (QVF) that has been 
operational since 1998. According to a state election official, 
Michigan has about 90 percent of the changes in place to meet HAVA 
requirements. Still remaining is a change to match QVF data to SSA 
data. Contracts have been awarded for development of statewide 
computerized voter registration lists in Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin, with completion by the January 1, 2006, deadline as part of 
the contracts. Virginia currently has a statewide database but is 
replacing it to be fully compliant with all state and federal laws 
governing voter registration and elections, according to the request 
for proposals for the new system. States are eligible to receive 
federal payments to meet HAVA requirements (which may be used to 
develop or modify a statewide voter registration list) after complying 
with certain requirements, such as filing a state plan and 
appropriating funds to match up to 5 percent of the federal funding the 
state would receive. Table 2 details selected activities that the six 
states are to implement related to the statewide voter registration 
list. 

Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration 
Requirements in Six States: 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: CA; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: To be 
determined; 
State awarded contract (date of contract): To be determined. 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: MI; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Not 
applicable (there will be no request for proposal); 
State awarded contract (date of contract): Not applicable. 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: NY; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: No; 
State awarded contract (date of contract): No. 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: TX; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes; 
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Oct. 2004). 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: VA; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes; 
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Mar. 2004). 

States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database 
deadline: WI; 
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes; 
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes; 
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes; 
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Nov. 2004). 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table]

The contracts in Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have been designed to 
help the states implement functions specified under HAVA for creating a 
unified statewide voter list, as well as other functions. For example, 
Virginia's contract for a new system supports the conduct of elections 
as well as voter registration functions. Texas' voter registration 
database is to include additional capabilities that can create jury 
summons, jury lists, and track jurors and jury payments. Wisconsin's 
contract includes poll worker management requirements, including for 
example, poll worker training information, certification level, and 
attendance. 

California may not meet the HAVA voter registration list deadline, 
according to the California State Auditor. A December 2004 state audit 
concluded that California is at risk of failing to meet certain HAVA 
requirements, for example, to provide a fully functioning statewide 
voter registration database by the HAVA deadline, and questioned the 
use of some HAVA funds.[Footnote 35] Based on the state report, the EAC 
initiated a special audit in January 2005 to investigate potential 
misuse of HAVA funds in California. 

California's Final HAVA Plan[Footnote 36] identified a need to modify 
the existing statewide database or establish a new database to be in 
compliance with HAVA. The state issued a request for information in 
July 2004 to gather information on alternatives to replace the current 
statewide list "Calvoter" with a system that meets HAVA requirements. 
In late April 2005, the plan was to modify the Calvoter system rather 
than replace it. However, according to the state's new HAVA 
Coordinator, as of May 11, 2005, the new Secretary of State is 
revisiting the earlier HAVA plans and evaluating the approach they will 
take in meeting HAVA compliance. The administrator said they realize 
there is a January 1, 2006, deadline, and the statewide database is a 
priority. 

In New York, legislation directing the creation of a statewide voter 
list was signed May 3, 2005. The next step, according to a state 
election office official, is to obtain consultant services to develop a 
request for proposal for a contractor to create the statewide voter 
list. The state board of elections is to establish rules and 
regulations needed for compliance by July 1, 2005. While state 
officials will give their best effort to meeting the January 1, 2006, 
deadline, it will be difficult, the official said. According to the 
legislation, New York's voter list will be created by combining the 
existing voter lists maintained by each local board of election into a 
single integrated list, and the state will update it regularly. 

Progress to Verify Voter Applications with MVA Has Been Made in Most of 
the Seven States We Visited, but Verification Has Not yet Taken Place 
with SSA: 

HAVA requires that voter registration applicants for federal elections 
provide an identification number that can be matched with other records 
for verification.[Footnote 37] Applicants are to be asked for their 
state driver's license or state identification number obtained through 
state MVAs, or (if an applicant does not provide either state number) 
the last 4 digits of their social security number for this purpose. An 
eligible applicant who does not have a state driver's license, state 
identification card, or a social security card can still register to 
vote. In those cases, election officials are required to assign the 
registrant a unique identification number. Of the six states we 
reviewed that requested waivers, several have moved forward in 
arranging for verification of voter registration applicants with state 
MVA records. Election and MVA officials in Arizona, Michigan, and New 
York have agreements for voter registration applications to be verified 
with motor vehicle agency records. In Michigan, because both functions 
are under the Secretary of State, the agreement is between units within 
the Secretary of State's office and has been in place since 1997. 
Arizona election officials and the state MVA agreed in June 2002 to 
verify information from voter registration applicants. Depending on how 
the Arizona county decides to proceed, the entire voter list or just 
information on new applicants is to be sent to the Secretary of State 
and matched with MVA records on a daily basis. The match is sent back 
to each county to resolve any discrepancies. Each record is to be given 
a code indicating the type of follow-up needed, if any, for that voter 
registrant. 

In fall 2004, election officials said that New York began matching 
voter registration applications under an interim process where counties 
send the information for verification to the MVA. According to these 
officials, when the statewide list is in operation the matching will be 
done by state officials, but the results will be sent to local election 
officials for resolving any discrepancies, as is the case now under the 
interim process. California's HAVA Administrator said the connectivity 
of the statewide database with other state agency records was part of 
the strategy being considered by the Secretary of State. 

Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin included matching with motor vehicle 
agency records as part of their database development contracts. Texas 
defines the validation of voter driver's license numbers by the MVA as 
a key feature of their new system. Virginia's contract requires 
matching voter applicant information with the MVA records on a real- 
time basis. The MVA is 1 of 10 agencies that the Virginia system is to 
interface with. Wisconsin's voter registration system contract requires 
the contractor to prepare a document describing the interface strategy 
for matching the voter registration list with other state agencies' 
data. 

HAVA requires that MVAs enter into an agreement with SSA to match 
selected voter registrant information with SSA records when a voter 
registration applicant provides their 4-digit social security number 
for verification purposes. Of the seven states we reviewed, Virginia is 
not subject to this HAVA requirement because of a HAVA exemption for 
certain states such as Virginia that require applicants to provide 
their full social security number on their voter registration 
application, and the state can decide to use SSA's online verification 
system.[Footnote 38] None of the remaining six states have signed 
agreements with the SSA to verify voter applicant information. An 
Arizona motor vehicle agency official said that they expect the 
agreement with SSA will be signed in June 2005,[Footnote 39] and the 
remaining five states requested a waiver from this requirement until 
January 2006. A Social Security administrator reported that, as of 
February 2005, only Iowa and Idaho had signed agreements. 

To implement the HAVA verification requirement, SSA developed a new 
program using only 4 digits. This program--called the Help America Vote 
Verification program (HAVV)--receives voter registration "transactions" 
through an arrangement with the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators (AAMVA). All requests from states for voter registration 
verification are electronically sent to AAMVA, which then sends them to 
SSA.[Footnote 40] For each transaction, SSA compares a voter 
registration applicant's name, date of birth, and last 4-digit social 
security number against SSA records. SSA records have a "death 
indicator" if SSA has been notified that the person with that social 
security number is deceased. Based on the match, a result code is 
assigned for the transaction, and the result is returned to AAMVA, 
which forwards results to state motor vehicle agencies who, in turn, 
provide the results to election officials. Only one of the codes 
indicates a one-to-one match between the voter registrant information 
and SSA records. However, six other codes may be generated for the 
registrant indicating some combination of multiple matches with the 
registrant or that the matching records indicate at least one of the 
matches is deceased. Figure 3 graphically describes the HAVV process. 

Figure 3: Process for Verifying Voter Registration Applicant 
Information with SSA: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

SSA stated that there were too many variables to predict the number of 
SSA verifications that might be processed, but based on the numbers in 
Iowa, the only state to use HAVV as of February 2005, about 1 percent 
of applicants provided the 4-digit number. The HAVV verification 
service is for new voter registration applicants, not for voters 
already on state voter registration rolls. Of the 7,231 voter 
registration transactions sent to SSA by Iowa in 2004 for verification, 
4,631 (64 percent) were returned as "one unique match-no death 
indicator present," and another 14 transactions were "one unique match-
-death indicator." No unique match was found for the remaining 2,586 
transactions, according to SSA records. According to SSA, agency 
records and verification procedures are normally based on using the 
full 9-digit social security number. When that number is paired with 
specific individual information, the result is a unique match. With 
only the last 4 digits of the social security number, the match results 
may not be unique. Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they 
are facing is that SSA is not specifying what voter information was not 
matching, (i.e., was the mismatch in name, date of birth, or 4-digit 
social security number). Without this information they are not able to 
efficiently resolve the non-matching problems. An SSA official said 
that the HAVV system is not able to provide this detail. 

Most state election officials we spoke with were still determining the 
process they would follow when a voter registration sent to SSA (or to 
their MVA) for verification was returned with something other than one 
live match (e.g., several live matches or a death indicator for the 
match). In Iowa, the only state to have used the SSA verification 
system as of February 2005, officials said they first tried reentering 
the data with variations of the name and date of birth (i.e., Bill for 
William) and ensuring numbers that can be mistaken are correct. Iowa 
officials said that they send a letter to registrants asking them to 
clarify or come in and reregister. Arizona and Wisconsin said that a 
matching protocol still needed to be worked out, but any inconsistent 
or questionable matches would be resolved by local election officials. 
AAMVA officials and some of its members identified the variation in 
names as a factor in finding no match with SSA records. For example, 
the Virginia MVA representative said that when the MVA matched its 
entire driver's license database with SSA using the full social 
security number, most of the 3 percent of mismatches were women who had 
registered using their married name but had not changed their name with 
the SSA. 

SSA is to be reimbursed by the states and territories required to 
verify voter applicants with SSA for certain HAVV costs, which could 
include, for example development, start-up, and maintenance, as well as 
for voter registration applicant verifications.[Footnote 41] HAVV 
development and start-up costs estimated by SSA are approximately $1.3 
million, and yearly maintenance is estimated to be about $200,000. 
Development and ongoing costs are divided among the entities based on 
the proportionate share of national HAVA funds received by the state or 
territory. For verification, SSA's current fee is $0.0062 per record. 
In addition, a fee for AAMVA services is to be added by AAMVA. SSA 
estimated HAVV development reimbursement costs for Arizona, California, 
Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin to be approximately $25,000, 
$163,000, $49,000, $95,000, and $27,000, respectively. (States that 
collect full social security number for voter registration, including 
Virginia, are exempt from HAVV costs because they may take advantage of 
existing verification programs.)

Some States Already Meet HAVA Requirement to Match Registration List 
with State Records on Deceased Persons and Felons: 

Election officials in four of the states we visited--Arizona, Michigan, 
New York, and Texas--foresaw no need to change their processes to meet 
HAVA requirements regarding identifying registrants who are 
deceased.[Footnote 42] State officials in all of these states but 
Wisconsin reported receiving State Vital Statistics information on 
deceased individuals for matching against voter lists. Arizona reported 
that the State Department of Health Services provides monthly death 
data via computer-to-computer match of records to the statewide voter 
database. Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, and Texas state 
officials said the vital statistics information is forwarded to each 
jurisdiction for verification. Virginia officials said that, once the 
new database is in place, there will be an automated interface with 
state vital statistics and with the SSA Death Master File (DMF). 
Jurisdictions in Michigan receive information on deceased individuals 
from the county and state vital statistics offices. 

In California and Wisconsin, officials reported that the match of state 
death records with the state voter registration list would be addressed 
when their statewide database was complete. California is still 
determining its strategy for database matching, according to a state 
official. Wisconsin's request for proposal states that information from 
the state vital statistics office will be integrated using a system the 
state recently implemented for integrating state databases, but the 
details are to be defined with input from the vendor selected to 
develop the voter registration database. 

To identify ineligible registrants based on felon status, New York and 
Texas election officials said they already compare voter registration 
records and state information on felons. Michigan election officials 
said that they are in compliance because voting is restricted only for 
those who are incarcerated. Arizona election officials said they 
receive some felony information in a paper format now and are working 
with the Arizona State Supreme Court to obtain information on felonies 
electronically on a weekly basis. Similarly, Virginia has an electronic 
matching component in its statewide voter registration database 
contract. Wisconsin officials told us that records of felony 
convictions are diffused among 17 different correctional databases with 
some in paper form. A state official said that the state has plans to 
create a single state prison database that would be matched against the 
state voter registration list, but the database might not be complete 
by January 1, 2006. An election official in California said that the 
connectivity of state databases with a state voter list is part of what 
is currently being considered in planning for the state list. 

Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials in 
Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter Registration 
Lists: 

Some federal data sources may help election officials identify 
ineligible registrants. Although the number of ineligible registrants 
may be small, identifying these ineligible voters may be important when 
an election is close. To assist in identifying ineligible felons, 
federal law requires U.S. Attorneys to notify state election officials 
of felony convictions in district courts. In the district courts 
serving the seven states we visited, 16 U.S. Attorney offices report 
sending notices to election officials and 3 offices reported that they 
were implementing or modifying their processes to provide this 
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts. According to 
state and local election officials with whom we spoke in the seven 
states, federal felony information was not always provided in a 
standard format and the information was sometimes difficult to 
interpret, untimely, or incomplete. A second source to identify 
ineligible voter registrants could be the federal jury administrators. 
Although not required to share information with election officials, the 
jury administrators could help identify potential voter registrants who 
are non-citizens on the basis of information potential jurors provide 
when identifying themselves as non-citizens on their jury service 
questionnaire. Other federal data sources--DHS databases and SSA's 
Death Master File--might identify additional ineligible voter 
registrants; however, the potential is limited because of difficulties 
such as matching information from these sources with voter registrant 
information. 

U.S. Attorneys Are Required to Provide Information on Felons Convicted 
in Federal Court to Election Officials but Have Not Done So 
Consistently: 

Under federal law,[Footnote 43] U.S. Attorneys are required to give 
written notice of felony convictions in federal district courts to the 
chief state election official of the offender's state of residence upon 
conviction of the offender. The law also requires the state election 
officials to notify the election officials of the local jurisdiction in 
which an offender resides of federal felony convictions. In the year 
ending March 31, 2004, 74,642 criminal defendants were convicted and 
sentenced in U.S. district courts. According to the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, of the 69,023 federal offenders for whom sentencing data 
were available, 59,554 were sentenced to prison in fiscal year 2003. 

The U.S. Attorney notification to state officials is required to 
include: 

* the name of the offender,

* the offender's age and residence address,

* the date of entry of the judgment,

* a description of the offenses of which the offender was convicted, 
and: 

* the sentence imposed by the court. 

EOUSA provided us information on how 19 U.S. Attorneys' offices in the 
seven states we visited were implementing the law, which became 
effective in 1993. Sixteen of the offices reported that they were 
sending notices of certain felony convictions in U.S. district courts 
to state election officials. Officials in three U.S. Attorneys' offices 
reported that they were implementing or modifying their processes to 
provide this information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts. 
According to an EOUSA official, one U.S. Attorneys' office expects to 
have a fully functioning notification system in place in the future but 
no specific time frame was provided. A second U.S. Attorneys' office is 
instituting a policy to consistently provide conviction data, according 
to EOUSA. In the third U.S. Attorneys' office, EOUSA said the support 
staff person assigned to each felony case will e-mail required 
information to the state election official. This U.S. Attorneys' office 
reported to EOUSA that it has modified the criminal case intake form to 
include the defendant's state of residence to help ensure that the 
information is available upon conviction. The same office also reported 
that it is now working on new quality control procedures for case 
management data. When completed, a list of felons is to be created and 
felony conviction notices are to be sent to state election officials. 
In all of the above cases no timeframe for implementation was provided. 

The law does not require standardized formats or time frames for 
reporting the federal felony conviction data. In the 16 U.S. Attorneys' 
offices that reported sending notices to state election officials, when 
the information was sent varied, for example monthly, bi-weekly (when 
there are a significant number of convictions to report), bi-monthly, 
quarterly, several times a year, upon receipt of the judgment and 
commitment order, and 6 months from the date of sentencing or later if 
the case is on appeal, according to these U.S. Attorney's office 
officials. What information was sent to election officials also varied 
(the judgment and commitment order or the judgment and commitment order 
with a notification letter) as did the process. For example: 

* The designated paralegal prepares a monthly printout of the required 
information, which is forwarded to the responsible assistant U.S. 
Attorney to produce and send the information to the appropriate state 
officials. 

* The supervisory legal assistant collects judgment and commitment 
orders and mails them to the appropriate state agency. 

* The judgment and commitment order is copied and then routed to the 
first assistant U.S. Attorney, who reviews the order and then sends it 
to the secretary to the U.S. Attorney. The secretary forwards the 
judgment and commitment order directly to the election board of the 
secretary of state. 

* The judgment and commitment orders are collated by month of 
imposition, sorted for approximately 6 months, and then compared to the 
appellate docket to determine whether a defendant has appealed. If the 
defendant has appealed, the judgment and commitment order is retained 
and periodically checked to determine the outcome of the appeal. If 
there is no appeal or when the appellate process is completed, the 
judgment and commitment order is sent to the state election authority 
for the state the defendant claims as his or her last residence. 

State and local election officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions we 
visited told us that they had concerns about the timeliness or accuracy 
of the federal felony conviction notices they received. Election 
officials told us that notices are not easy for them to use, such as 
determining the length of sentence. They also said birth dates on 
records were sometimes missing, which can lead to multiple matches on 
the same name. 

Federal Jury Administrators in the U.S. District Courts Have 
Information about Non-Citizens Taken from Voter Registration Lists That 
Could Be Shared with Election Officials: 

Jurors must be U.S. citizens to serve on a jury in U.S. district court. 
The federal jury administrators we surveyed by phone in all 14 U.S. 
court districts that cover the local election jurisdictions we visited 
asked about citizenship status on questionnaires sent to prospective 
jurors.[Footnote 44] Figure 4 provides an example of a juror 
qualification questionnaire from the Eastern District of Virginia. 

Figure 4: Federal Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship 
Information: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

All of the jury administrators[Footnote 45] for the U.S. district 
courts told us they use voter registration lists to draw names for the 
jury pool. Ten of the 14 district court administrators said they use 
only voter registration lists, while the other 4 use voter lists in 
conjunction with other sources.[Footnote 46]

According to officials of the AOUSC, it would be under penalty of 
perjury to deliberately make false statements about citizenship on the 
questionnaire, although the extent to which the matter is pursued is up 
to each U.S. district court. Generally, districts we surveyed did not 
verify claims of non-citizenship; however, two districts verified 
prospective juror claims of non-citizenship. The Eastern District of 
Virginia called prospective jurors to gather verbal confirmation of 
citizenship status and the Eastern District of Michigan requires that 
immigration documentation be provided to verify non-citizen status. 

AOUSC officials and federal jury administrators we spoke with generally 
did not have exact data on the number of people called for jury service 
that responded that they were non-citizens. Consequently, no 
information was available from federal jury administrators in six U.S. 
district courts, but federal jury administrators in eight U.S. district 
courts provided either exact numbers or estimates. Of the eight 
district courts, four federal jury administrators said no one had been 
disqualified from jury service because they were not U.S. citizens. In 
the other four district courts: 

* a federal jury administrator in one U.S. district court estimated 
that 1 to 3 percent of the people out of a jury pool of 30,000 over 2 
years (about 300 to 900 people) said they were not U.S. citizens;

* a federal jury administrator in a second U.S. district court 
estimated that less than 1 percent of the people out of a jury pool of 
35,000 names each month (less than 350 people) said they were not U.S. 
citizens;

* a federal jury administrator in a third U.S. district court estimated 
that about 150 people out of a jury pool of 95,000 names over 2 years 
said they were not U.S. citizens; 
and: 

* a federal jury administrator in a fourth U.S. district court 
estimated that annually about 5 people typically claimed non- 
citizenship in a jury pool of about 50,000 individuals. 

Of the 14 U.S. district courts contacted, only the jury administrator 
for the Eastern District of Virginia provided feedback to voter 
registration authorities if a prospective juror claimed not to be a 
U.S. citizen. Of the 13 U.S. district courts that do not currently 
provide feedback, none planned to do so in the future. However, the 
federal jury administrators' opinions on the feasibility of providing 
this form of feedback were mixed. For example, 7 of the 11 district 
officials who commented on feasibility indicated that providing 
feedback to election officials regarding non-citizens is currently 
possible while 4 other federal jury administrators claimed the 
responsibility would be difficult due to staffing resource constraints. 
According to an AOUSC official, there is no Judicial 
Conference[Footnote 47] policy that instructs the courts to notify 
election officials when it is determined that a potential juror is not 
a U.S. citizen. 

At the county level, some county jury administrators share information 
with election officials about people who ask to be excused from jury 
service because they are not U.S. citizens. Jurors for county courts 
are also drawn from a variety of sources, sometimes including voter 
registration lists. Other sources county officials cited for their jury 
pools included state drivers' licenses, state identification cards, 
social services department information, employment department 
information, and state tax rolls. Similar to federal district courts, 
county jury administrators determine if a person qualifies for jury 
service based on citizenship by specifically asking on a form if the 
person is a citizen. Jury officials in three county court jurisdictions 
in New York and Texas require people who claim non-citizenship to 
furnish proof in the form of immigration documents. One of those 
jurisdictions will allow a notarized statement in lieu of immigration 
papers, and another jurisdiction would accept a letter from an 
immigration attorney. 

Of the 10 locations we visited where county jury 
administrators[Footnote 48] draw the names of potential jurors from a 
pool that includes names taken from voter registration lists, five 
county jury administrators said they provided feedback to election 
officials when a potential juror claimed not to be a citizen as a 
reason to be excused from jury duty. With respect to county jury 
administrators who use more than one source for their jury pool, one 
county jury administrator said that she could not determine if the 
potential juror was drawn from the voter registration list or the other 
sources used for selection, and therefore could not provide feedback. 
However, a county jury administrator for another county court in the 
same state that also used multiple sources for the jury pool said they 
provide feedback to election officials on all people who claim non- 
citizenship as a reason to be excused from jury duty. 

In one local election jurisdiction that receives feedback from county 
jury administrators, election officials estimated that they have 
removed about 500 people who were self-identified as non-citizens 
during jury selection from the voter registration lists since 2000. 
This jurisdiction had 889,000 registrants in 2004. For example, during 
2003, the county jury administrator for this jurisdiction had 1,693 
people ask to be excused from jury duty because they were not citizens. 
Of those, election officials sent letters requesting documentation of 
citizenship to 413 people. As a result of the process, they removed 83 
people who were identified as non-citizens from the voter registration 
lists. Other examples include: 

* A county jury administrator for one county court estimated they 
annually refer to election officials about 2,000 names of jurors who 
identified themselves as non-citizens to be excused from jury duty. The 
election officials in this jurisdiction said that they remove about 400 
to 500 names a year from the voter registration list because the 
registrants are not citizens (out of between 3 and 4 million 
registrants). 

* In another county court, a county jury administrator estimated that, 
annually, about 5 people at most who were drawn from the voter 
registration lists (which includes about 130,000 registrants in 
November 2004) claim non-citizenship as a reason to be excused from 
jury duty. 

In one jurisdiction, election officials receiving jury service 
information commented that they must follow up on each referral, and 
sometimes people may have wrongly claimed non-citizenship in order to 
be excused from jury duty. Election officials will generally mail a 
notification to the registrant asking them to verify the information to 
remain on the voter registration list. Those who do not reply are 
removed. Non-response on the part of a registrant does not necessarily 
mean that they are not citizens. 

DHS Databases Contain Selected Information on Non-Citizens, but the 
Usefulness May Be Limited: 

Federal law provides a statutory framework that requires non-citizens 
entering or residing in the United States to provide certain 
identification information. This information was historically provided 
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which when 
abolished, had its functions transferred to various components within 
DHS on March 1, 2003. DHS maintains multiple databases containing 
information on non-citizens within its component agencies: the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Appendix II 
shows examples of the databases identified by DHS officials. 

DHS officials said that the usefulness of their information to identify 
non-citizens on voter registration lists may be limited because of 
system constraints for commonly used data matching identifiers (such as 
name, birth date, address, social security number, and alien number) 
that are needed for a match and the need for law enforcement to verify 
the information. For example, the matching of databases may not always 
be reliable because matching on names alone may produce multiple 
matches on the same name, depending on whether there is middle initial, 
middle name, or simply the same common name. As an example of 
restrictions on usage for data matching identifiers, DHS officials said 
that address information on non-citizens in some DHS databases, which 
these officials believe is important for voter registration, was not 
always reliable in the databases because it was self-reported 
information and would require verification. We recently reported on the 
limited usefulness of self-reported address information by non-citizens 
in some DHS databases.[Footnote 49] We reported that 16 of 17 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents interviewed did not use the 
change of address data in one of the DHS databases to help locate the 
non-citizens as part of their investigations because the agents said 
that the change of address information, which is self-reported data, is 
often unreliable. 

We identified two instances where DHS databases were used to help 
identify non-citizens for voter eligibility purposes. In the first 
instance, in the late 1990s, DHS officials noted that a match was 
performed between information on non-citizens in then INS files and 
voter registration records at the request of a House Committee that 
oversaw the results of a California congressional election being 
contested. The data-matching effort sometimes produced multiple name 
matches in INS databases for a single name from the voter registration 
list. For example, in documentation of the California matching effort, 
1 name from the voter registration list matched with 44 names in the 
INS databases. According to DHS officials, the effort to investigate 
those matches was extremely labor intensive and required immigration 
officials to manually pull non-citizen records from around the world to 
determine the identity of the individual from the match. DHS officials 
said the initial matching of the database was unreliable because of the 
lack of common data identifiers, usually only name and date of birth, 
and the accuracy of those identifiers. Common names were especially 
problematic in producing multiple matches on the same name. Address 
information, which DHS officials believe is important for voter 
registration, was not always reliable in the databases on non-citizens, 
as mentioned previously. 

In the second instance, California state election officials said that 
they tried a database-sharing pilot program with INS in the mid-1990s 
to investigate allegations of ineligible voters. At the time, the state 
election officials said that INS officials advised them that their data 
might not be reliable for their purposes. In a letter to the House 
Chairman regarding the matching of voter registration information and 
INS data, the INS Commissioner wrote that the data sharing was by names 
and date of birth, and there would be no match if the person's name on 
the state voter registration rolls is different that what it is in the 
INS system. In addition, the INS Commissioner wrote that a match does 
not necessarily mean the person is not eligible to vote. According to 
California state election officials, their experience confirmed that 
indeed the reliability of the data was poor for their purposes and that 
they could not use them. 

While matching of voter registration lists with DHS databases could be 
problematic, the California Secretary of State's office has been 
exploring the possibility of using the DHS Systematic Alien 
Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to pursue specific 
allegations of voter ineligibility. The SAVE Program was developed to 
allow federal, state, and local government agencies to obtain 
information they need on immigration status in order to determine an 
applicant's or recipient's eligibility for many public benefits. The 
SAVE Program also administers an employment verification pilot program, 
in cooperation with SSA, to help employers verify the work 
authorization of their newly hired employees. As proposed by the 
California Secretary of State, the use of SAVE would involve querying 
individual voter names on the basis of specific allegations or 
challenges that a registered voter was a non-citizen. This proposal 
does not involve matching entire voter registration lists with DHS 
databases. 

SAVE is more inclusive than other databases (containing over 60 million 
alien records) and could provide election officials the means to 
identify some non-citizens; however, according to DHS officials, it has 
limitations. For example, DHS officials said that the SAVE Program is 
set up to query information based on the number on the alien's Arrival 
and Departure Record form (I-94) or an alien's DHS assigned "A" number. 
It is a web-based system, and records are normally queried one at a 
time, although processing multiple records using the SAVE program is 
possible. Because voter registration is limited to U.S. citizens, voter 
registration records would not contain alien or form I-94 numbers. The 
SAVE Program can be queried by a social security number, name, and date 
of birth if the alien's "A" number or I-94 number are unknown. However, 
DHS officials emphasized that the system is alien-number-driven. Also, 
DHS officials opined that using the SAVE Program would require 
additional verification of the person's identity, either automated or 
manual, as a precautionary measure before removing a person from a 
voter registration list based on a match. 

To facilitate investigations of alleged non-citizens having registered 
to vote, the California Secretary of State's Office has proposed 
accessing the SAVE Program. An official in the State's Election Fraud 
Investigation Unit saw this as a time-and effort-saving tool. Rather 
than contacting a DHS agent to obtain information and waiting for a 
response that, according to this official, sometimes could be months in 
coming, the unit could make direct queries through the SAVE Program. 
DHS has provided the California Secretary of State with a memorandum of 
understanding to allow this process to proceed, but as of February 
2005, California officials said that the Secretary of State had not 
signed the memorandum. 

Use of SSA Database to Identify Deceased Registrants Has Matching and 
Timeliness Limitations: 

The DMF consolidates death records across the country and potentially 
could be used by election officials to identify voters on their 
registration lists that died in another state.[Footnote 50] While about 
2.7 million people die in the United States each year and about 2 
million are SSA beneficiaries, matching difficulties and the timeliness 
and completeness of the data may lessen DMF's usefulness to election 
officials. 

Matching voter registration records with DMF records requires that the 
sets of records contain at least some of the same identifiers for an 
individual. The social security number is the primary way to identify a 
unique individual in SSA's databases, but only seven states allow the 
full social security number to be collected for voter registration 
purposes. One of the states we visited (Virginia) collects the 9-digit 
social security number as part of the voter registration application, 
and election officials there said that they plan to use the DMF for 
verification when the statewide, computerized voter registration list 
has been developed. Even without the full social security number, 
matching can still be done with other identifiers in the DMF, such as 
name, date of birth, or address, but problems, such as people using 
different names for voter registration than on social security records, 
currency of addresses, and the number of people on a national basis 
with similar names, may make matching difficult. One study[Footnote 51] 
of the DMF suggested that without a correct social security number, 
researchers would need to consult other sources of mortality 
information. 

Timeliness and completeness may also lessen the usefulness of the DMF 
for identifying deceased voter registrants. According to a 2001 SSA 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report, some states had been 
taking over 200 days to report.[Footnote 52] SSA officials told us that 
the information is untimely for a number of reasons, such as manual 
recordkeeping or outdated computer systems at the state level. Under 
SSA's ongoing Electronic Death Registration initiative, SSA plans to 
receive death reports within 5 days of death. SSA estimates the 
initiative will be complete in 2012, but recent federal legislation may 
provide grants for computerizing state records that could affect SSA's 
ability to meet the completion date sooner. In addition to timeliness 
considerations, a 2003 OIG report stated that the completeness of the 
DMF is not consistent, citing research indicating younger deceased 
persons were less likely to be included.[Footnote 53] The OIG report 
further stated that the DMF does not contain every decease social 
security number holder and also includes individuals who are not 
actually deceased. 

Conclusions: 

State and local election officials face many challenges in maintaining 
accurate voter registration records. Because voter registration lists 
are dynamic and constantly changing, officials turn to a variety of 
sources to identify registrants who may be ineligible to vote. HAVA 
included provisions directed at maintaining accurate voter registration 
lists that included, among other things, requirements for states to 
develop a computerized, interactive statewide voter registration list 
and to match that list against other state databases and records. 
However, after provisions are implemented, states will continue to face 
challenges to maintain accurate voter registration lists and verifying 
voter eligibility, particularly identifying out-of-state registration 
duplicates and deceased registrants. Thus, the effect of HAVA's voter 
registration reform initiatives is yet to be determined. 

Election officials we contacted in seven selected states noted that 
they experienced specific problems verifying voter registration 
application information related to felony convictions and citizenship 
status. We found two federal information sources that could provide 
election officials information on federal felony convictions or 
citizenship status requirements. The number of potentially ineligible 
voter registrants identified by these two federal sources may be small 
but could be important in determining the outcome of a close election. 
One, the U.S. Attorneys, is already required to provide state election 
officials with information about felony convictions, but the 
information could be provided in a more standardized format to ensure 
that the information is easier for election officials to interpret and 
more complete and timely. 

The second information source that could help identify potential 
ineligible voters is federal jury administrators. Although not required 
to share information with election officials, the jury administrators 
could help identify potential voter registrants who are non-citizens on 
the basis of information potential jurors provide when identifying 
themselves as non-citizens on their jury service questionnaire. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To assist state election officials in identifying individuals on voter 
registration lists who may be ineligible to vote because of their felon 
or non-citizen status, we are recommending the following two actions: 

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the U.S. Attorneys to 
provide information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a 
more standardized format to make it easier for election officials to 
interpret the conviction information, such as the length of the 
sentence, and to help ensure information on felons is complete and 
timely. 

We recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
determine the feasibility and steps necessary to implement a 
requirement that U.S. district court jury administrators provide notice 
to state election officials of potential jurors who identify themselves 
as non-citizens on their jury qualification questionnaire. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and 
comment. The Director of EOUSA in her comments agreed with our 
recommendation. She acknowledged that maintaining accurate voter lists 
is an important goal and that an EOUSA working group has been tasked to 
develop a standardized process for the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices to 
send felony conviction information in the best format for use by state 
election officials. AOUSC's Director agreed with our recommendation and 
stated that this matter would be brought to the attention of district 
courts. Despite resource shortages in the federal courts and the fact 
that most juror are screened by local and state courts, the AOUSC 
Director acknowledged the public interest in ensuring that non-citizens 
are not afforded the privilege of voting. Written comments from AOUSC 
and DOJ are included in appendices IV and V. Sections of the report 
were also provided to SSA, DHS, and states we visited to confirm the 
accuracy of the information. Technical comments from the federal 
agencies and states that we reviewed were incorporated, as appropriate, 
in the report. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide 
copies of this report to the Attorney General, Department of Justice; 
Director, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts; Ranking Minority 
Members, House Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims; Chairman and Ranking Minority 
Member, Senate Committee Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; 
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Government 
Reform; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules 
and Administration; and Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House 
Committee on House Administration. Copies of this report will also be 
made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-8777 or at jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff contributing to this 
report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

William O. Jenkins, Jr.: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to describe: (1) the processes in selected states 
to verify that voter registration applicants met state eligibility 
criteria and to help ensure that voter registration lists are accurate; 
(2) the challenges officials face in maintaining voter lists; (3) the 
implementation status of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) voter 
registration verification procedures in selected states; and (4) 
potential data sources for verifying voter registration eligibility. 

We selected the following states using a non-probability sample: 
Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. Our selection of states took into consideration several 
voter registration-related factors. We sought to select states that 
represented differences in terms of the stage of development of their 
statewide databases and had unique characteristics that might affect 
the implementation of HAVA. For example, Wisconsin has same day 
registration; Arizona has on-line voter registration; Michigan has a 
reputation as a model for registration practices; and New York State 
may have to rely on social security number verification procedures more 
than other states because it has a large population who live in New 
York City and may not have driver's licenses for verification. We also 
selected states to provide geographic diversity and variation in 
election administration--some administer elections at the county level 
and others at lower levels such as city or townships. States also 
varied in the size of the immigrant populations, of interest because of 
the citizenship requirement for voter registration. Our goal was not to 
target a particular state, but rather to identify a range of issues 
facing states in implementing HAVA requirements and assuring accurate 
voter registration lists. Information from these seven states is not 
generalizable to all states. Table 3 describes characteristics in each 
state. 

Table 3: State Selection Factors: 

State: Arizona; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* No statewide database prior to HAVA; 
* Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification 
requirements deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8; 
* Voter registration administered at county level; 
* Has implemented an on- line voter registration process. 

State: California; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election 
lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire list; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2; 
* Voter registration administered at county level. 

State: Michigan; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* Unified statewide database; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3; 
* Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level; 
* Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle 
licensing functions. 

State: New York; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* No statewide database prior to HAVA; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4; 
* Voter registration administered at county level; 
* Expected higher use of social security records for registrant 
verification due to fewer drivers in New York City. 

State: Texas; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election 
lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access to entire list; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9; 
* Voter registration administered at county level. 

State: Virginia; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* Unified statewide database; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1; 
* Voter registration administered at county level; 
* May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration 
verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA). 

State: Wisconsin; 
Voter registration-related characteristics: 
* No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions currently do 
not maintain voter registration rolls; 
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements 
deadline of January 1, 2004; 
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6; 
* Voter registration administered at municipal level; 
* Allows Election Day voter registration. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table]

Within each state, we selected two local jurisdictions using a 
nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria included population size, 
the proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election 
officials, suggestions by state election officials, and proximity to a 
motor vehicle office. Local jurisdictions included: 

* Mariposa County, Arizona;

* Gila County, Arizona;

* Los Angeles County, California;

* Yolo County, California;

* Detroit, Michigan;

* Delta Township, Michigan;

* New York City, New York;

* Rensselaer County, New York;

* Bexar County, Texas;

* Webb County, Texas;

* Arlington County, Virginia;

* Albemarle County, Virginia;

* Madison, Wisconsin; and: 

* Franklin City, Wisconsin. 

To describe state voter registration processes and challenges 
(objectives 1 and 2), we conducted semi-structured on-site interviews 
with state and local election officials, and supplemented the 
interviews with phone and email updates. We are relying on testimonial 
evidence because most states (all but Arizona in our sample) obtained 
an extension for implementing HAVA and, therefore, data were not 
available to assess the status of implementation. Our interviews 
included questions on registration processes, any voter registration 
fraud allegations, and discussion of challenges identified by officials 
in maintaining voter roll accuracy. Because so many voter registrations 
originate with applications from motor vehicle agencies, interviews 
were conducted with motor vehicle agency officials in the same 
jurisdictions regarding their voter registration procedures. In 
Michigan, where we spoke only with Secretary of State officials, the 
Secretary of State's office is responsible for elections and driver's 
licenses. We also reviewed current HAVA plans, relevant reports, and 
documents related to the voter registration process in seven states. 

State level election officials were provided an opportunity to verify 
the accuracy of information regarding their particular state. All but 
one state responded. 

In addition to asking state election officials about allegations of 
voter registration fraud, we interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Criminal Division officials, and obtained a list of election fraud 
active matters from 2002-2004, filed by U.S. Attorneys and Public 
Integrity section attorneys (the section that handles election issues 
within DOJ). We also contacted U.S. Attorneys responsible for the 
states we reviewed for any additional cases handled locally by those 
offices. We contacted District Attorneys in the counties for the local 
election districts we visited and asked for information regarding 
actions related to ineligible voter registration. We also asked state 
and local election officials if they had referred any reported 
incidents of voter registration fraud or irregularities to county, 
state, or federal officials since January 2003. District attorney and 
state and local election official reports of fraud related to voter 
registration were based on the recall of the officials, except in 
California, where the state fraud unit routinely catalogs allegations 
and their disposition. 

To describe the HAVA implementation status in the seven states 
(objective 3), we reviewed HAVA plans to develop a statewide voter 
registration database and to verify voter registration lists against 
motor vehicle agency and Social Security Administration records. We 
also included questions on the status of the database and verification 
procedures in the semi-structured interviews with state and local 
election, and state motor vehicle officials. We interviewed and 
obtained documents from the Social Security Administration on how that 
agency was addressing HAVA verification requirements. 

To identify potential data sources for verifying voter registration 
eligibility (objective 4), we reviewed and summarized sources currently 
used for verification in the selected states and localities, and 
discussed potential verification sources with state and local election 
officials. 

We then gathered additional information on the forwarding of federal 
felony convictions to state election officials from the Executive 
Office for U.S. Attorneys. We requested information from the 19 U.S. 
Attorney Offices corresponding to the seven selected states--Arizona, 
California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin--we 
visited. The 19 U.S. Attorneys' Offices were the District of Arizona, 
the Central District of California, the Eastern District of California, 
the Northern District of California, the Southern District of 
California, the Eastern District of Michigan, the Western District of 
Michigan, the Eastern District of New York, the Northern District of 
New York, the Southern District of New York, the Western District of 
New York, the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of 
Texas, the Southern District of Texas, the Western District of Texas, 
the Eastern District of Virginia, the Western District of Virginia, the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, and the Western District of Wisconsin. 

We contacted federal jury administrators by phone in the 14 U.S. court 
districts that covered those same local election jurisdictions and 
requested information on reporting between federal jury administrators 
and election officials. The 14 district courts were: District of 
Arizona, Central District of California, Eastern District of 
California, Eastern District of Michigan, Western District of Michigan, 
Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York, Northern 
District of New York, Southern District of Texas, Western District of 
Texas, Eastern District of Virginia, Western District of Virginia, 
Eastern District of Wisconsin, and Western District of Wisconsin. 

We also contacted 14 county court jurisdictions by phone that covered 
the same election jurisdictions and requested information on reporting 
between county jury administrators and election officials. The 14 local 
courts were: Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Gila County 
Superior Court; Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County; 
Superior Court of California, Yolo County; Third Judicial Circuit Court 
of Michigan; Eaton County Courts; New York County Courts; Rensselaer 
County Courts; Texas Office of Court Administration, Bexar County; 
Texas Office of Court Administration, Webb County; 17th Judicial 
District of Virginia; 16th Judicial Circuit of Virginia; Dane County 
Courts; and Milwaukee County Courthouse. 

We requested information on data regarding citizenship from officials 
in the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection, 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. We also reviewed selected federal and local 
agency reports with relevant information. 

Our work was performed between January 2004 and May 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That 
Include Information on Non-Citizens: 

Name: Asylum Pre-screening System; Description: The Asylum Pre- 
screening System provides case tracking for asylum pre-screening 
credible fear claims that are presented during the expedited removal 
process. 

Name: Computer-Linked Application Management Information System, 
Version 3; 
Description: The Computer-Linked Application Management Information 
System, Version 3, is a high-speed transaction processing system with 
client server and mainframe components. It is designed to support the 
processing (receipt, adjudication, and notification) pertaining to all 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service benefits applications and 
petitions, except naturalization (see Computer Linked Application 
Information System, Version 4 ). Pertinent information is uploaded to 
the Central Index System. 

Name: Computer Linked Application Information System, Version 4; 
Description: The Computer Linked Application Information System, 
Version 4, is a nationally-deployed Client-Server, workflow-driven case 
management system that supports the processing of naturalization 
applications. Pertinent information is uploaded to the Central Index 
System. 

Name: Central Index System; 
Description: The Central Index System provides automated information on 
individuals of interest and identifies the location of an alien's 
hardcopy A-file. It also provides information for federal and state 
entitlement programs and is a single centralized source of data for 
many mission functions. Data is routinely captured in the Central Index 
System via daily data uploads from the Computer-Linked Application 
Management Information System, Versions 3 and 4. 

Name: Employment Authorization Document System; 
Description: The Employment Authorization Document System is an 
antiquated stand-alone personal computer system used to capture data at 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service field offices. In combination 
with Polaroid camera pictures, it generates a standardized 
identification document issued to aliens who are authorized to be 
temporarily employed in the U.S. Data is electronically consolidated 
from the stand-alone devices throughout each workweek and uploaded to 
the Computer-Linked Application Management Information System, Version 
3, and subsequently to the Central Index System (see above) for 
nationwide terminal inquiry access. 

Name: Marriage Fraud Amendment Act System; 
Description: A centralized, mainframe case tracking system that 
supports the adjudication of petitions covered by the Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Amendment Act of 1986. 

Name: Refugee, Asylum & Parole System; 
Description: A centralized mainframe system that provides full case 
tracking and management capability for asylum casework. 

Name: Reengineered Naturalization Application Casework System; 
Description: A centralized, mainframe system reengineered from the 
Naturalization Application Case-processing System. It no longer takes 
new naturalization applications (see Computer Linked Application 
Information System, Version 4), but continues to process applications 
for citizenship (N600), and applications for duplicate certificates 
(N565). 

Name: Deportable Alien Control System; 
Description: One nationwide database of deportation and detention 
information that operates on computer hardware owned by the federal 
government and is accessible through the network of user terminal 
across the country. It automates many of the clerical docket control 
functions associated with the arrest, detention, and deportation of 
illegal aliens. 

Name: The Juvenile Alien Management System; 
Description: This database tracked juvenile aliens in the removal 
process. This system is no longer used and supported. Juvenile case 
tracked in the Juvenile Alien Management System had been recorded in 
DACS. 

Name: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System; 
Description: An internet-based system that provides tracking and 
monitoring functionality, with access to accurate and current 
information on nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors and their 
dependents and the approved schools and designated programs sponsor in 
the United States that host these individuals. 

Name: The Student and School System; 
Description: With the implementation of the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System , this database previously utilized by 
legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service fell into disuse. The 
data in this system has not been updated since the Student and Exchange 
Visitor Information System came online. The Student and School System 
was official retired on September 30, 2004, and is no longer available. 

Name: Arrival and Departure Information System; 
Description: The Arrival and Departure Information System provides a 
Department of Homeland Security intranet accessible web-based browser 
application that correlates information from multiple sources to show 
the person's travel history, current immigration status, and overstay 
information. The Arrival and Departure Information System currently 
receives, filters, processes, matches and stores biographic and 
biometric border crossing information for all non-citizens, air and sea 
travelers entering and departing the United States and status update 
information for aliens within the United States. 

Name: Non-Immigrant Information System; 
Description: An online, automated central repository of information 
designed to track and maintain the status of all foreign visitors and 
immigrants. This system provides information on arrivals and 
departures, to support the controlled admission of non-immigrants to 
the United States through ports of entry and to track non-immigrant 
departures for identifying information. 

Name: Enforcement Case Tracking System; 
Description: An automated system that supports the Border and 
Transportation Security in the accomplishment of its law enforcement 
mission. The Enforcement Case Tracking System comprises numerous 
modules for specific processing needs--needs such as identifying, 
apprehending, detaining, and removing aliens illegally in the United 
States, filing administrative and criminal charges against aliens who 
commit illegal acts; and seizing contraband associated with illegal 
alien activity. 

Name: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology[A]; 
Description: An automated system that collects, maintains, and shares 
information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign 
nationals who travel to the United States.[A] Among other things, the 
program is designed to identify foreign nationals who (1) have 
overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, 
extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be 
apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. On January 5, 
2004, Department of Homeland Security began operating the first stage 
of its planned United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology at 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry. 

Name: Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE); 
Description: An automated system responsible for administering programs 
involving customer access to information contained in the Department of 
Homeland Security's Verification Information System database. The 
Verification Information System database is a nationally accessible 
database of selected immigration status information on over 60 million 
records. The SAVE Program enables federal, state, and local government 
agencies to obtain immigration status they need in order to determine 
an applicant's or recipient's eligibility for many public benefits. The 
SAVE Program also administers, in cooperation with SSA, employment 
verification pilot programs that enable employers to quickly and easily 
verify the work authorization of their newly hired employees. 

Source: GAO summary of Department of Homeland Security information 
provided by United States Citizenship and Immigration Service, 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection 
officials. 

[A] For more information on this program, see GAO, Homeland Security: 
First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but 
Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004). 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at 
Selected States and at the Federal Level: 

In California, the only state with an investigative unit dedicated to 
voter fraud issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations for fraudulent 
voter registration opened from January 2001 to May 2004 were sent to 
the District Attorney for prosecution. Of the 15 cases, the outcome had 
been determined in 11 cases (6 cases declined for prosecution; 5 were 
prosecuted and the individuals were convicted). In four cases, the 
outcome is yet to be determined. Similarly, the California 
investigative unit opened for investigation 29 allegations of non- 
citizens either registering or voting, 1 case of a non-citizen voting 
was sent to a District Attorney for prosecution, but the District 
Attorney declined it. At the federal level, DOJ attorneys initiated at 
least 61 election fraud investigations or matters (an alleged possible 
criminal occurrence that still has to be investigated) from 2000 to 
2003. Of those cases, 15 involved voter registration or ineligible 
voters: 

Election officials in seven of the locations we visited reported that 
they have referred reported instances of voter registration fraud 
allegations to appropriate agencies, such as the District Attorney and 
the U.S. Attorney for investigation. Election officials referred 
allegations of voter registration fraud such as the following to the 
appropriate agencies for investigation: 

* A Texas local jurisdiction referred to the State Board of Elections 
an allegation that state officials investigated where 27 people were 
registered at one address. The investigation revealed that the location 
was an orphanage, and the registrants were resident workers. 

* Texas local jurisdictions reported referring to their local District 
Attorney instances of (1) an individual trying to register using the 
names of 42 deceased individuals, (2) the receipt of many voter 
registration applications from the same address, and (3) a non-citizen 
who incorrectly believed she could vote in a school board election if 
she was a property owner. 

* One Arizona local jurisdiction reported that between 1997 and 2003, 
23 cases had been prosecuted by local District Attorneys or the U.S. 
Attorney for election-related violations and petition forgeries. Eleven 
of the 23 cases were for petition forgery. 

* Local jurisdictions in California and Michigan each reported 
instances of voter registration drive irregularities such as altering 
or falsifying registration forms. Election officials in California 
referred the matter to the Secretary of State's office for 
investigation and Michigan officials referred the matter to the local 
county prosecutor. 

* One New York jurisdiction reported referring an allegation made by an 
ex-spouse to the U.S. Attorney that the former spouse was not a 
citizen. 

* One Arizona local jurisdiction official referred to the District 
Attorney an instance of a person trying to vote before being officially 
sworn in as a U.S. citizen. 

In deciding to investigate allegations of voter registration fraud 
given the competing demands for investigative and prosecutorial 
resources, local and federal prosecutors reported they take various 
factors into consideration. District Attorneys in jurisdictions we 
visited gave various reasons for not pursuing allegations. One District 
Attorney reported that they were unable to investigate the allegations 
of voter registration fraud because they could not compel a person to 
provide proof of citizenship based only on an allegation. A District 
Attorney in another jurisdiction reported that registration allegations 
are not pursued because they are victimless and non-violent crimes. 
Another District Attorney said that registration issues are not one of 
the county's priorities. 

District Attorneys in the local jurisdictions we visited reported 
initiating matters or cases since January 1, 2004, pertaining to 
ineligible persons registering to vote. Three jurisdictions reported 
prosecuting one case each, two reported having matters still under 
investigation, and two reported that they did not prosecute the matter. 

Within the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorneys and the Public 
Integrity Section (PIN) are responsible for enforcing federal criminal 
laws applicable to federal election fraud offenses, among other things. 
PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys' 
investigations and prosecution of federal election fraud. A senior PIN 
official said the decision to pursue an allegation depends on a number 
of factors. When an allegation is received, it is evaluated in terms of 
factors such as quality of the witnesses, quality of evidence, 
historical problems in the area, resources, coordinating with state 
Attorney General's office priorities, and the priority of election 
crimes within the responsibilities of the Department of Justice. U.S. 
Attorneys and PIN attorneys initiated at least 61 election fraud 
matters, or investigations, related to election years 2000 through 
2003. Most of the 61 matters related to elections held in 2002. 
(Matters were initiated in 28 states and 1 U.S. territory and ranged 
from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory over the 4-year period.) Of 
these election fraud matters, 15 related to voter registration or 
ineligible voters. According to PIN, many of the 61 matters resulted in 
indictments and subsequent convictions. A PIN official told us that 43 
voter registration matters are currently under investigation and 
another 7 have been closed related to the November 2004 federal 
election. According to the Criminal Division, the information provided 
by PIN does not include all election fraud investigations that the U.S. 
Attorneys have initiated because (1) U.S. Attorneys are not required to 
consult with PIN for preliminary investigations as opposed to grand 
jury investigations, which require consultations; (2) PIN did not track 
election fraud investigations prior to October 2002; and (3) election 
fraud investigations are sometimes initiated under non-election 
statutes. 

In addition to the PIN election fraud matters, we asked the 19 U.S. 
Attorney Offices that cover the seven states we visited the number of 
fraud matters or investigations they had in 2003 and 2004 relating to 
ineligible voter registration. Five offices reported investigating 
allegations. Three offices reported that among them there were four 
ongoing investigations. One office reported that they investigated a 
matter, but no prosecution arose from the investigation. Another office 
reported that they declined to prosecute a number of investigations 
(number not tracked) that involved aliens who registered to vote. 
Rather than prosecute, they allowed administrative procedures regarding 
deportation to occur. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts: 

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544:

LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM: Director:
CLARENCE A. LEE, JR.: Associate Director:  

May 31, 2005:

Mr. William O. Jenkins: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW, Room 6482: 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

Thank you for the opportunity to to review and comment on the draft 
report entitled "Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local 
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists" (GAO-05-
478).

We appreciate the public interest in ensuring that those who are not 
citizens and are ineligible to vote are not afforded that privilege. As 
the report indicates, the vast majority of potential jurors are 
screened in the state and local courts rather than in federal courts, 
and thus it is through their own court systems' juror pools that these 
courts are likely to identify registered voters who are not citizens. 
Nevertheless, despite resource shortages in the federal courts, as 
recommended, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts will bring 
this matter to the attention of the district courts and encourage them 
to identify and report to appropriate election officials instances when 
person identify themselves to the federal courts as non-citizens 
through the juror qualification process. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Leonidas Ralph Mecham: 
Director: 

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice: 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys: 
Office of the Director: 

RFK Main Justice Building, Room 2261: 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20530: 
(202) 510-1121

Mr. William O. Jenkins, Jr.:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. Street, NW, Room 6482: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Jenkins: 

This letter provides comments from the Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys (EOUSA) on the Government Accountability Office's 
(GAO) report regarding the maintenance of accurate voter registration 
lists. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments for 
publication in the final report. 

Maintaining accurate voter registration lists is an important goal. The 
United States Attorneys take seriously their obligations under Section 
8(g) of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g), 
to provide felony conviction data and other information to appropriate 
state election officials. While your report correctly notes that the 
law does not require any standardized format or time frame for 
providing the conviction information, your report also notes that the 
sampling of United States Attorneys' Offices that were surveyed 
utilized a variety of data formats and time frames to provide 
conviction data to election officials. Each of the 94 United States 
Attorneys' Offices is unique, and they range in size from twenty to 350 
lawyers. Therefore, it is not surprising that different offices may use 
different administrative procedures to comply with this obligation. 
However, we understand that some data formats may be more accessible to 
state election officials than others, and we appreciate that finding 
the best format to provide this data to state election officials is 
important. As a result, EOUSA has tasked a working group to develop a 
standardized process for the 94 United States Attorneys' Offices to 
provide complete and timely information to state election officials in 
order to ensure accurate voter registration lists. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. If you 
have any questions regarding the above, please contact David L. Smith, 
Legislative Counsel, Counsel to the Director's Staff, at (202) 514-
2121. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Mary Beth Buchanan: 
Director: 

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact mentioned above, Orin B. Atwater, Carla 
Brown, Grace Coleman, Michele Fejfar, Daniel Garcia, Richard Griswold, 
Geoffrey Hamilton, Monica Kelly, Jean McSween, Jean Orland, Emmy Rhine, 
Sandra Sokol, and Linda Watson contributed to this report. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] While HAVA established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to 
have a statewide voter registration list and verification procedures, 
it also provided that states could request a waiver to extend the 
deadline to January 1, 2006. Nine states did not request a waiver, 40 
states and the District of Columbia did request and receive waivers, 
and 1 state (North Dakota) is not covered by the HAVA requirement 
because it does not have a voter registration requirement for 
individuals voting in federal elections. 

[2] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across 
the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

[3] Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 

[4] States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different 
names. For purposes of this report, we will generically refer to them 
as "motor vehicle agencies."

[5] Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by federal 
jury administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool 
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of 
registered voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers' 
licenses, in the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete 
questionnaires to help determine whether they are qualified to serve on 
a jury. U.S. citizenship is a qualification to be a juror. 

[6] The AOUSC is the administrative arm of the federal judiciary. The 
agency provides service to the federal courts in three essential areas: 
administrative support, program management, and policy development. 

[7] These sections relate to voting system standards (section 301), 
provisional voting and voting information requirements (section 302), 
computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, and 
requirements for voters who register by mail (section 303). 

[8] Seven states--Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia--require full social security numbers 
on applications for voter registration. HAVA provides that for states 
using full social security numbers on applications in accordance with 
section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the HAVA voter registration 
verification requirements are optional. 

[9] Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 

[10] Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-1004. 

[11] NY CLS Elec. § 17-104. 

[12] 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c). 

[13] Changes made in 2003 to Wisconsin's election laws will require 
voter registration in every municipality, regardless of size. This 
registration requirement first applies to the 2006 spring primary 
election. 

[14] Wisconsin has voters self-certify as follows: "I (name) hereby 
certify that to the best of my knowledge, I am a qualified elector, 
having resided at (address) for at least 10 days immediately preceding 
this election, and that I am not disqualified on any grounds from 
voting, and I have not voted, at this election." In addition to 
Wisconsin, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming allow 
same day registration. 

[15] The Wisconsin Joint Legislative Audit Committee has an ongoing 
audit of voter address verifications based on allegations of 
inappropriate election procedures in Milwaukee to verify same day voter 
registration eligibility in the November 2004 election. According to 
Joint Legislative Audit Committee official, the report is due for 
completion by the fall of 2005. 

[16] New York state election officials said that until 2003, when the 
administration of school elections was transferred to the New York City 
Department of Education, non-citizens with a student in a New York City 
school were allowed to vote in school board elections. 

[17] Prior to HAVA, the FEC's Office of Election Administration was the 
federal focal point for election administration issues. This office was 
transferred to the EAC as part of HAVA. 

[18] 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2-Verification of Employment Eligibility. 

[19] The U.S. Post Office National Change of Address list is compiled 
from change of address forms filed by individuals who have moved and 
want their mail forwarded to their new address. 

[20] In Michigan, the address for a state identification card or 
license and voter registration must be the same. These files are linked 
to automatically update each file of the addresses changes. 

[21] Section 9 of the NVRA requires the FEC to report to Congress by 
June 30 of each odd-numbered year. A Report to the 108th Congress: The 
Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the 
Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2001-2002, is the most 
recent report. HAVA transferred responsibility for the report to the 
EAC. 

[22] NVRA covers 44 states and the District of Columbia, according to 
DOJ. In the 1998 FEC survey, 43 of the 45 responded. The report was 
silent regarding whether similar issues existed beyond the 26 states' 
reporting problems. 

[23] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across 
the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

[24] Officials were asked in general terms about data considerations. 
We did not determine if the same issues existed in other jurisdictions 
if it was not mentioned. 

[25] Implementing the NVRA: A Report to State and Local Election 
Officials on Problems and Solutions Discovered 1995-1996., Federal 
Election Commission, March 1998, pp.5 -19. 

[26] Federal Election Commission March 1998, pp 5 - 25. 

[27] Administration of Voter Registration, Qualification of Applicants 
and Registrants Verification of Citizenship, March 2001, City 
Commissioner's Office, Philadelphia County. 

[28] Board of Election Commissioners, City of St. Louis., Office of the 
State Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004. Potential felons on the City 
of St. Louis voter list were identified by matching the voter list with 
convictions outside the City, based on matches of name, date of birth, 
and full or partial SSN where available. Auditors noted that each 
instance had to be investigated thoroughly before taking legal action 
or removing registrants from the voter list. 

[29] Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States. The 
Sentencing Project, April 2005, identifies 35 states where felons may 
reregister after the completion of their sentence. 

[30] Project Charter: Statewide Voter Registration System prepared for 
the Wisconsin State Election Board, May 15, 2003, by Virchow Krause and 
Company. 

[31] Office of the State Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004. 

[32] EAC Commissioner and Chair Gracia Hillman, speaking at the 
Commission on Federal Election Reform hearing held on April 18, 2005, 
at American University, Washington, D.C. 

[33] Federal Election Commission, March 1998, pp.5 - 43; Federal 
Election Commission, 2001-2002, pp.19 - 20. 

[34] Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the electoral processes 
for (1) registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating 
ballots; or (3) canvassing and certifying election results. Types of 
fraudulent conduct include, among others, voting by ineligibles, voting 
more than once, voter impersonation, intentional disruption of polling 
process either physically or by corrupting tabulating software, or 
destroying ballots or voter registrations. 

[35] Office of the Secretary of State: Clear and Appropriate Direction 
Is Lacking in Its Implementation of the Federal Help America Vote Act, 
California State Auditor, December 2004, report number 2004-139. 

[36] My Vote Counts, California's Plan for Voting in the 21st Century,. 
Secretary of State, September 2003. 

[37] HAVA section 303 (a)(5)(A). Section 303 (a)(5)(B) requires state 
election officials to verify the accuracy of the voter registration 
application information by matching it with the state motor vehicle 
agency database records. 

[38] Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Virginia require full social security numbers on voter registration 
applications and the state MVAs have existing agreements with SSA for 
verifying against SSA records using the complete number. The agreements 
would need to be modified to reflect use for voter registration 
verification purposes. 

[39] An Arizona Department of Transportation official said the agency 
computer programmers needed to implement the Memorandum of 
Understanding and are working on other projects that they expect will 
be available in June 2005. 

[40] With the exception of the covered U.S. territories, such as Guam 
and Puerto Rico, that do not have connections with AAMVA. 

[41] 42 U.S.C. § 405(r). 

[42] HAVA requires the state to coordinate the computerized list with 
state agency records on felony status and death. 

[43] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g). This provision was enacted into law in 
1993 in section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act. 

[44] County courts commonly used the term jury services to describe the 
officials responsible for jury selection, whereas U.S. district courts 
generally used the term jury administrators to describe the officials 
responsible for the juries, according to AOUSC officials. For the 
purposes of the report, we will use the term county jury administrators 
for county jurisdictions and federal jury administrators for the 
federal court system. 

[45] Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by jury 
administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool 
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of 
registered voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers' 
licenses, in the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete 
questionnaires to help determine whether they are qualified to serve on 
a jury. U.S. citizenship is a qualification to be a juror. 

[46] Of the remaining courts, three use both voter registration lists 
and MVA records. One uses voter registration, MVA, and state 
identification records. Officials in each of the four federal district 
courts that use more than one source for selecting jurors stated that 
they can identify from which source(s) a name is drawn. As currently 
configured, the jury pool lists do not specify sources, therefore, to 
determine whether a name was taken from a particular source, such as 
the voter registration list, would require manually comparing the jury 
pool list to each source. 

[47] The fundamental purpose of the Judicial Conference is to make 
policy with regard to the administration of the U.S. courts. The 
Director of AOUSC implements the policies of the Judicial Conference as 
part of the performance of his duties as the administrative officer of 
the courts of the United States. 

[48] Jury services officials in the other four court jurisdictions in 
two states--Michigan and Wisconsin--said that the jury pool is drawn 
only from their state's department of motor vehicles driver's licenses 
and state identification cards, and they do not use voter registration 
lists. 

[49] GAO, Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual 
Address Reporting Requirement Is Questionable, GAO-05-2004 (Washington, 
D.C.: January 2005). 

[50] The DMF contains over 76 million records of deceased individuals 
enrolled in the U.S. Social Security program. For an individual, the 
DMF record can contain the person's social security number, name, date 
of birth, date of death, state or county and zip code of last payment 
residence, and zip code for the lump sum payment, if the information is 
available. 

[51] Use of the Social Security Administration Death Master File for 
Ascertainment of Mortality Status Population Health Metrics: 2004; 
2:2,. March 5, 2004. 

[52] Effectiveness of the Social Security Administration's Death 
Termination Process (A-09-02-22023), September 2001. State and federal 
sources supply some death information to SSA, but most deaths are 
reported to SSA by friends, relatives, and funeral homes. 

[53] The Social Security Administration's Efforts to Process Death 
Reports and Improve its Death Master File, January 2003, Office of the 
Inspector General, Social Security Administration. 

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