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Prices, and Dairy Policy Options' which was released on January 28, 
2005.

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

December 2004: 

Dairy Industry: 

Information on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy 
Options: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-50]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-50, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw 
milk, one-third of which were used in fluid milk products. Farmers, 
cooperatives, processors, and retailers receive a portion of the retail 
price of milk for their part in providing milk to consumers. During 
2002 and 2003, farm prices fell while retail prices did not similarly 
decline. This pattern raised concerns about a growing spread between 
farm and retail prices. Farm prices have since increased, reaching 
record highs in April 2004. As requested, GAO examined (1) the portion 
of retail milk prices received by farmers, cooperatives, processors, 
and retailers, how this changed over time, and the relationship between 
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors influence prices 
and affect the transmission of price changes among levels; and (3) how 
federal dairy program changes and alternative policy options have 
affected or might affect farm income and federal costs, among other 
considerations.

What GAO Found: 

Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received about 
46 percent, cooperatives 6 percent, wholesale processors 36 percent, 
and retailers over 12 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 2 
percent milk (the most common type of milk purchased) in the 15 U.S. 
markets GAO reviewed. During this period, in 12 of the 15 markets, the 
spread between farm and retail prices increased. However in some 
markets, the price spread between these levels increased and then 
moderated. Price changes at one level were most closely reflected in 
changes at adjacent levels of the marketing chain.

Farm, cooperative, wholesale, and retail milk prices are determined by 
the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are 
affected by the supply of raw milk and the demand for milk products 
such as fluid milk, cheese, and butter, as well as by federal and state 
dairy programs. At the cooperative level, prices are influenced by the 
cost of services that cooperatives provide, and the relative bargaining 
power of cooperatives and milk processors. At the wholesale and retail 
levels, input costs such as labor and energy, and the continued 
consolidation of firms influence milk prices.

Recent changes in federal dairy programs have affected farm income, 
federal costs, and other considerations. For example, the Milk Income 
Loss Contract program has supported some farm incomes but has exceeded 
initial cost estimates because of low farm prices. A number of options 
have been suggested to change federal dairy policies such as amending 
federal milk marketing orders and raising or eliminating the support 
price. In general, these options would have mixed effects depending 
upon whether milk prices were high or low over the short or long term. 
For example, options that increase farm income over the short term tend 
to increase milk production and lower farm prices over the long term. 
These options also tend to be costly for the federal government during 
periods of low prices.

Farm and Retail 2 Percent Milk Prices, October 2000 to May 2004: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

To continue informed decision-making, the Secretary of Agriculture 
should build on GAO’s analysis of the potential effects of various 
policy options as USDA proposes future changes or provides information 
to the Congress. USDA expressed concern about the practicality of some 
of the dairy policy options discussed. USDA did not comment on the 
report’s recommendation.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-50.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Lawrence J. Dyckman, 
(202) 512-3841, dyckmanl@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Analysis of Prices at Four Marketing Levels for 2 Percent 
Milk in Selected Markets: 

Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Milk Processors 
and Retailers: 

Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread: 

Correlation between Price Changes at the Four Marketing Levels: 

Comparison of Average Annual and Monthly Prices for 2 Percent Milk: 

Appendix III: Retail Prices for Four Kinds of Milk in Selected Markets: 

Appendix IV: Average Monthly and Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale 
and Retail Milk Prices in Selected Markets: 

Appendix V: Factors That Influence the Price of Milk as It Moves from 
the Farm to the Consumer: 

Market Forces, in Addition to Federal and State Policies, Influence 
Milk Prices at the Farm Level: 

Services Provided by Cooperatives, Market Structure, and Collective 
Action Can Influence the Price of Milk at the Cooperative Level: 

Input Costs, Service Levels, Innovations, and Market Structure 
Influence Wholesale Fluid Milk Prices: 

Retailing Costs, Consumer Demand, and Market Structure Changes Affect 
Retail Prices for Fluid Milk: 

Appendix VI: Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. Fluid 
Milk Market: 

Summary of Recent Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. 
Fluid Milk Market: 

Results on the Extent of Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission and Price 
Transmission Asymmetry: 

Results on Farm-to-Retail Speed of Adjustment and Price Transmission 
Asymmetry: 

Results for Retail-to-Farm Price Transmission and Price Transmission 
Asymmetry: 

Possible Causes of Asymmetry in the Extent and Speed of Price 
Transmission: 

Appendix VII: Effects of Recent Federal Dairy Program Changes and 
Alternative Policy Options: 

Recent Changes in Federal Dairy Programs Vary in Their Effects on 
Policy Considerations We Identified: 

Effects of Alternative Dairy Policies Differ under Various Scenarios: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Contacts: 

Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Portion of the Retail Price of a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk 
Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Processors, and Retailers 
for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 2: Changes in the Farm-to-Retail Price Spread for a Gallon of 2 
Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 3: Correlation between Farm Price Changes and Changes in 
Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent 
Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 4: Correlation between Cooperative Price Changes and Changes in 
Wholesale and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 
Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 5: Correlation between Wholesale and Retail Price Changes for a 
Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 6: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2000: 

Table 7: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2001: 

Table 8: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2002: 

Table 9: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2003: 

Table 10: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail 
Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2004: 

Table 11: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 12: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Boston, Massachusetts, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Table 13: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 14: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 15: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Dallas, Texas, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 16: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Denver, Colorado, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 17: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Miami, Florida, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 18: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Table 19: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 20: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Table 21: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 22: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Salt Lake City, Utah, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Table 23: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in San Diego, California, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Table 24: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Seattle, Washington, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Table 25: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Washington, D.C., October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Table 26: Average Ownership and Operating Costs by Region and Herd 
Size, 2000: 

Table 27: USDA's Milk Classes Used for Setting Milk Prices: 

Table 28: Change in Costs for Fluid Milk Processing Plants in Maine, 
1993 through 2000: 

Table 29: Supermarket Operating Costs as a Percentage of Sales and 
Gross Margin, 2003: 

Table 30: Growth of Supermarket Sales and Expenses during the Last 
Decade, 1993 through 2003: 

Table 31: Market Share of the Top Four Food Retailers in Selected 
Markets, 2003: 

Table 32: Overview of Fluid Milk Price Transmission Studies and Results 
on Price Transmission Asymmetry/Symmetry: 

Table 33: Recent Price Transmission Studies of the Fluid Milk Market: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Selected Milk Markets, Corresponding Defense Commissaries 
Used for Our Analysis, and Federal Milk Marketing Order Areas Prior to 
April 2004: 

Figure 2: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 3: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Boston, Massachusetts, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 4: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Charlotte, North Carolina, October 2000 through 
May 2004: 

Figure 5: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 6: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Dallas, Texas, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 7: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Denver, Colorado, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 8: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Miami, Florida, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 9: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 10: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 11: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for New Orleans, Louisiana, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 12: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 13: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Salt Lake City, Utah, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 14: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for San Diego, California, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 15: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Seattle, Washington, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

Figure 16: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Washington, D.C., October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 17: Retail Prices in Atlanta, Georgia, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 18: Retail Prices in Boston, Massachusetts, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 19: Retail Prices in Charlotte, North Carolina, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 20: Retail Prices in Cincinnati, Ohio, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 21: Retail Prices in Dallas, Texas, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 22: Retail Prices in Denver, Colorado, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 23: Retail Prices in Miami, Florida, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 24: Retail Prices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 25: Retail Prices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 26: Retail Prices in New Orleans, Louisiana, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 27: Retail Prices in Phoenix, Arizona, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 28: Retail Prices in Salt Lake City, Utah, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 29: Retail Prices in San Diego, California, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 30: Retail Prices in Seattle, Washington, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 31: Retail Prices in Washington, D.C., for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Figure 32: Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders: 

Figure 33: Number of Fluid Milk Processing Plants and Volume of Milk 
Processed per Plant, 1980 through 2002: 

Figure 34: Percentage of Retail Food Sales by Market Segment, 1993 and 
2003: 

Figure 35: Marketing Chain and Price Transmission for the U.S. Fluid 
Milk Industry: 

Figure 36: Potential Effects of Options to Change FMMOs on Various 
Policy Considerations: 

Figure 37: Potential Effects of Options to Change the Price Support 
Program on Various Policy Considerations: 

Figure 38: Potential Effects of Options to Extend MILC on Various 
Policy Considerations: 

Figure 39: Potential Effects of Adopting the NDEA on Various Policy 
Considerations: 

Figure 40: Potential Effects of Changing Trade Restrictions and Export 
Incentives on Various Policy Considerations: 

Figure 41: Potential Effects of Options to Facilitate Risk Management 
on Various Policy Considerations: 

Figure 42: Potential Effects of Options to Manage Raw Milk Supplies on 
Various Policy Considerations: 

AMS: Agricultural Marketing Service: 

CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation: 

DEIP: Dairy Export Incentive Program: 

FMMO: federal milk marketing order: 

FSA: Farm Service Agency: 

MILC: Milk Income Loss Contract: 

NDEA: National Dairy Equity Act: 

NEDC: Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact: 

NYC: New York City: 

UNY: Upstate New York: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

WTO: World Trade Organization: 

Letter December 29, 2004: 

Congressional Requesters:

In 2003, U.S. dairy farmers marketed nearly 19.7 billion gallons of raw 
milk for which they received approximately $21.2 billion. Roughly one-
third of these 19.7 billion gallons were ultimately sold to consumers 
as fluid milk (milk) products. The milk marketing chain that moves milk 
from the dairy farm to the consumer is composed of farmers, dairy 
cooperatives,[Footnote 1] wholesale milk processors,[Footnote 2] and 
retailers, and entities at each level receive a portion of the retail 
price of a gallon of milk for the functions they perform. These 
functions include producing, processing, distributing, and selling 
milk. During 2002 and 2003, farm prices were the lowest since 1979, 
while retail milk prices generally did not experience a similar 
decline.[Footnote 3] This disparity raised concerns about a growing 
price spread between farm and retail milk prices. However, in 2004, 
farm price trends have reversed, with farm prices reaching record 
highs.

Since the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and some 
states have operated programs designed to support dairy farmers by 
ensuring that farm prices do not fall below minimum levels. These 
programs include, among others, federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs), 
which use formulas to establish minimum farm prices in different 
marketing areas of the country; a price support program to sustain farm 
prices through a standing offer to purchase certain milk products at 
set prices; and trade restrictions or export subsidies to protect the 
U.S. milk industry from competition from foreign milk products or 
reduce supplies.

Low farm prices have generated interest in new federal policies to 
provide assistance to dairy farmers; however, the cost of these 
programs during periods of low prices has raised concerns. For example, 
in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm 
Bill), Congress authorized USDA to establish the Milk Income Loss 
Contract (MILC) program, which provides supplemental payments to 
farmers during periods of low prices.[Footnote 4] Depressed farm prices 
triggered $1.8 billion in MILC payments to dairy farmers in fiscal year 
2003. Additionally, USDA spent over $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2001 
through 2003 attempting to maintain minimum farm prices at a 
legislatively set level through the price support program.

Recent changes in milk prices have illustrated the volatility of milk 
price cycles. For example, as of April 2004, farm prices reached record 
highs as USDA announced a minimum price for raw milk used in 
manufacturing cheese that was approximately 36 percent higher, at 
$19.66 per hundredweight, than the March price of $14.49 per 
hundredweight, an increase of nearly $0.45 per gallon of milk.[Footnote 
5] This increase reflected a number of changed market conditions that 
decreased the amount of raw milk production, while also increasing the 
demand for some manufactured dairy products.[Footnote 6] However, high 
farm prices create incentives for farmers to produce more milk, which 
then tends to depress milk prices over the long term, thereby 
increasing concerns about farm viability in the future.

At your request, this report examines (1) what portion of the retail 
price of fluid milk is received by dairy farmers, dairy cooperatives, 
wholesale milk processors, and retailers in selected markets throughout 
the United States, how this distribution has changed over the period of 
our review (October 2000 through May 2004), and the relationships among 
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors, such as costs, 
influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer, 
as well as how these and other factors affect the extent to which 
changes in price are transmitted among levels as milk moves from the 
farm to the consumer; and (3) how changes in dairy policies and 
alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income, 
federal costs, economic efficiency,[Footnote 7] and consumer prices, 
among other policy considerations. It also updates other information on 
milk prices included in our June 2001 report.[Footnote 8]

To update our information on the pricing distribution among the various 
levels of the milk marketing chain, we analyzed milk prices in 15 
selected markets nationwide, ensuring that (1) these markets provided 
national geographic coverage; (2) at least one market was located in 
each of the federal milk marketing order areas, as they existed during 
the majority of the period from October 2000 through May 2004; (3) the 
selected markets included both state and federally regulated markets; 
and (4) these areas represented similar marketing areas for which we 
reported information in our June 2001 report.[Footnote 9] For these 15 
markets, we obtained data from USDA, the cognizant state milk control 
agency, the Department of Defense's Commissary Agency, and a private 
data collection company on the prices received by farmers, 
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers.[Footnote 10] We 
limited our data collection efforts to whole, skim, 2 percent, and 1 
percent milk as sales of these milk types constitute over 93 percent of 
fluid milk sales annually. We also confined our analysis to the prices 
of these milk types sold in gallon containers as milk sold in gallon 
containers accounts for about 65 percent of fluid milk products sold 
under FMMOs.[Footnote 11] We focused our detailed data analysis on 2 
percent milk sold in gallon containers, the largest volume of reduced-
fat milk sold nationwide. As a result, our analysis may not reflect 
pricing trends for all types of milk and package sizes.

To update our information on factors influencing milk prices, explore 
price transmission within the milk marketing chain, and examine the 
effects of federal dairy policy changes and alternative policy options, 
we contacted a number of national dairy experts in academia or 
representing federal and state agencies, cooperatives, processors, 
retailers, or industry groups. We also reviewed relevant legislation, 
studies, and other publications. We qualitatively analyzed the effects 
of recent changes in federal dairy programs, as well as alternative 
policy options, on various policy considerations as identified in 
previous GAO reports, relevant studies, and legislation, as well as 
through our conversations with dairy policy experts. These policy 
considerations included farm income, milk production, federal costs, 
price volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. Different 
stakeholders in the dairy policy arena may have alternative views on 
the relative importance of these policy considerations, as well as 
other considerations that we did not include, which could lead to 
differing perspectives on these options. We conducted our review from 
September 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. We did not independently verify 
the data we received from various sources. However, we discussed with 
these sources the measures they take to ensure the accuracy of data, 
and these measures seemed reasonable. Appendix I provides additional 
information on the scope and methodology of our review.

In summary, we found the following: 

* Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, farmers received 45.9 
percent, cooperatives 6.1 percent, wholesale milk processors 35.6 
percent, and retailers 12.5 percent of the retail price of a gallon of 
2 percent milk in the 15 markets we reviewed. However, these 
percentages varied widely depending on the specific market. For 
example, the farmers' portion ranged from 36.0 percent to about 58.6 
percent.

* Furthermore, during this time period, the price spread between farm 
and retail prices increased in 12 of the 15 markets we examined. 
However, in some of the 12 markets, the spread between farm and retail 
milk prices increased dramatically, and then moderated. In 9 of the 15 
markets, retail prices showed a statistically significant increase. In 
4 of the remaining markets, retail prices decreased over time, while in 
the other 2 markets, retail prices showed no statistically significant 
change. At the same time, farm prices decreased in 12 of the 15 markets 
and increased in the remaining 3 markets during the 44-month period. 
However, declines in farm prices, in most cases, began to reverse 
during the latter months of our period of analysis. Price changes 
generally correlated across levels in the marketing chain, with the 
strongest correlations occurring between adjacent levels. For example, 
in most of the markets we analyzed, changes in cooperative prices 
correlated strongly with changes in wholesale prices. However, changes 
in cooperative prices correlated less strongly with changes in retail 
prices.

* Prices at all levels of the milk marketing chain are determined by 
the interaction of a number of factors. For example, farm prices are 
determined primarily by factors affecting the supply of raw milk, such 
as costs of production; the demand for milk products, such as fluid 
milk, cheese and butter; and the effects of federal and state dairy 
programs. At the cooperative level, the difference between what 
cooperatives pay farmers for raw milk and the prices at which they sell 
raw milk to wholesale fluid milk processors is influenced by the types 
of services the cooperatives provide, the relative bargaining power of 
cooperatives and milk processors, as well as collective action taken by 
dairy cooperatives. Factors that affect the difference between what 
processors pay for this raw milk and the prices at which they sell 
fluid milk products to retailers include input costs, such as labor, 
energy, transportation and packaging; the level of services they 
provide to retailers; innovations in processing technology; and changes 
in the structure of the fluid milk processing industry, such as 
increases in the consolidation and market share of some firms. At the 
retail level, costs such as labor and energy, along with other factors 
such as consumer demand and the structure of the market, help determine 
the difference between what retailers pay for fluid milk products and 
the prices they charge consumers for those products.

* While price changes at one level of the milk marketing chain are 
generally reflected in price changes at other levels, several factors 
can influence the extent or speed at which these changes are reflected 
and whether price increases and decreases are reflected differently. 
For example, increasing concentration, resulting in greater market 
power at successive levels of the milk marketing chain, may provide 
entities an opportunity to influence how changes in prices are 
transmitted among the different levels. In addition, other factors, 
such as federal and state dairy policies, can affect prices in ways 
that can cause market participants to alter the way they transmit price 
changes between marketing levels. Some recent economic studies of the 
U.S. fluid milk market have found that these and other factors may 
cause retail milk prices to react more completely and quickly to farm 
price increases than to decreases.

* Recent changes in the FMMO program, adjustments to the prices of 
products purchased under the price support program, and the 
establishment of the MILC program have had various impacts on policy 
considerations such as dairy farm income, federal costs, and price 
volatility. Reforms to the FMMO system had mixed effects on farm income 
depending on the geographic location of the farmer, while the overall 
effects on all farmers are less clear. Further, recent adjustments to 
the prices of products purchased under the price support program have 
generally decreased federal costs but also decreased farm income during 
periods of low prices. Finally, government payments introduced through 
the MILC program have kept some small dairy farms in business, but the 
program has exceeded initial federal cost estimates because farm prices 
during 2002 and 2003 were lower than anticipated.

* A number of options that would modify existing policies or introduce 
alternative policies have been proposed or discussed. While we examined 
the potential impacts of these options on a range of policy 
considerations related to the dairy sector, we did not assess their 
overall economic or budgetary impacts or their consistency with U.S. 
international trade commitments or positions in ongoing negotiations. 
As a result, the purpose of this analysis is not to take a position for 
or against any of these options, but simply to discuss their likely 
effects on the policy considerations we identified. Various policy 
options could affect dairy policy considerations in different ways 
under different scenarios, such as periods of high or low prices. Also, 
short-term effects may differ from long-term effects. In general, 
options that increase farm income over the short term also tend to 
increase milk production and thus the potential for oversupply and 
lower average farm prices over the long term. For example, the dairy 
support price could be raised, which would limit the fall of farm 
prices and increase farm income in the short term. However, it would 
spur additional production and therefore reduce average farm prices 
over the long term. Such options also tend to be costly for the federal 
government during periods of low prices. Thus, extending the MILC 
program, which is scheduled to expire at the end of September 2005, 
would allow the federal government to continue to support farm income 
but could also increase federal costs if farm prices trend downward in 
the future. In some cases, options that increase the economic 
efficiency of federal dairy programs also increase price volatility 
because they allow clearer transmission of market price signals. For 
example, eliminating the price support program would increase 
volatility by removing the price floor on manufactured dairy products, 
but it would also increase economic efficiency by reducing incentives 
to allocate resources to surplus production. Also, to the extent that 
price changes at the wholesale level are passed through to the retail 
level, a number of options would likely have mixed effects on consumer 
prices depending upon the particular product under consideration (e.g., 
butter, cheese, or fluid milk).

As a result of recent farm bills, such as those in 1996 and 2002, USDA 
has studied different aspects of dairy policy, either to implement 
program changes mandated by the Congress or to provide information to 
the Congress on the effects of various dairy programs. For example, the 
2002 farm bill required USDA to conduct studies of dairy policy issues, 
including an economic evaluation of the effects of various elements of 
the national dairy policy and of terminating federal dairy programs 
relating to milk price support and supply management. One study 
required by this legislation, which addressed the subject of changing 
standards for fluid milk, was issued in August 2003.[Footnote 12] A 
second study, which included both an evaluation of the effects of 
various elements of the national dairy policy and the termination of 
federal milk price support and supply management programs, was provided 
to the Congress in September 2004.[Footnote 13]

This report is divided into nine appendixes. Appendix I describes in 
detail our objectives, scope, and methodology. Appendix II provides 
information on average milk prices at the farm, cooperative, wholesale, 
and retail levels; changes in farm and retail milk prices and how they 
affect the farm-to-retail price spread; and the extent to which price 
changes at one level of the milk marketing chain correlate with price 
changes at other levels. Appendix III compares retail prices of whole, 
2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk. Appendix IV provides the average 
monthly prices and annual prices of the four types of milk at each 
level of the milk marketing chain. Appendix V describes the factors 
that influence prices as milk moves from the farmer to the consumer. 
Appendix VI provides a technical review of recent research examining 
price transmission within the milk marketing chain. Appendix VII 
provides a qualitative analysis of the effects of recent changes in 
federal dairy programs and alternative dairy policy options that have 
been proposed or discussed. Appendix VIII presents USDA's comments and 
our evaluation of them. Appendix IX lists GAO contacts and contributors 
to this report.

Conclusions: 

The difference in price between what farmers receive for their raw milk 
and what consumers pay for fluid milk products has increased in recent 
years. This growing spread between farm and retail prices may be 
attributable to a number of factors at each level of the milk marketing 
chain, including supply and demand forces, changes in input costs to 
processing and retailing, and the continued concentration of 
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers. A variety of 
federal policies exist to influence the prices that farmers receive. 
However, the effects of these policies may not be uniform; they can 
affect different sizes of farms or regions of the country in different 
ways. Moreover, policies that benefit farm income may adversely affect 
other policy considerations such as economic efficiency and federal 
costs. Given the complexity of federal dairy policy, the decision to 
change existing policies or introduce new policies requires 
consideration of a variety of these potential effects. Examining the 
effects of policy alternatives on a variety of different policy 
considerations will help the Congress formulate federal dairy policy 
based on comprehensive analyses that consider these alternatives in 
relation to their effects on different considerations, farm sizes, and 
regions of the country. In addition, although recent USDA studies have 
examined some policy options, there are other potential policy options 
to consider, as discussed in this report.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To continue the facilitation of informed decision making by USDA and 
the Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture build on 
GAO's analysis of the potential effects of various dairy policy options 
as USDA proposes future changes to current dairy laws or regulations or 
provides information to the Congress in response to congressional 
proposals.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to USDA and DOD for their review and 
comment. We received written comments from USDA's Under Secretary for 
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services and Under Secretary for 
Marketing and Regulatory Programs, which are presented in appendix 
VIII. USDA also provided suggested technical corrections, which we have 
incorporated into this report, as appropriate. These technical 
corrections were offered by several USDA agencies, including the 
Agricultural Marketing Service, Economic Research Service, Farm Service 
Agency, and Office of the Chief Economist. DOD had no comments on the 
draft report.

In its written comments, USDA said the information provided in the 
report on milk prices at the farm, cooperative, and retail levels is 
valid. However, USDA said it has reservations regarding our use of 
prices paid for fluid milk at commissaries as an indicator of the 
wholesale price of fluid milk and that we should make clear the 
weaknesses of using commissary price data. USDA acknowledged, however, 
that there seems to be no viable alternative. During the course of our 
work, we were unable to obtain wholesale price data because these data 
are considered proprietary by industry officials. After consulting with 
USDA officials and other dairy experts, we determined that commissary 
price data were the best surrogate because commissaries generally sell 
milk at a standard 5 percent markup from cost. Based on USDA's 
comments, we expanded the discussion in the report of the potential 
limitations of using commissary data.

USDA said it largely agrees with the report's discussion of the factors 
that influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the 
consumer and the report's characterization of economic studies of price 
transmission in the U.S. fluid milk market. However, USDA expressed 
some concerns regarding the report's discussion of recent federal dairy 
program changes and alternative policy options. First, USDA said that 
this discussion appears to be a compilation of policy recommendations 
that are examined independently and qualitatively within the existing 
program structure. Our discussion of dairy policy options are not 
policy recommendations. As stated in the report, to identify these 
policy options and their potential impacts we relied heavily on a 
synthesis of the views of leading dairy experts and the results of an 
extensive literature search, including our review of more than 50 
studies and other publications. Time and resource constraints for 
completing our work precluded us from developing or contracting for the 
use of an economic model that would have provided quantitative 
estimates of these potential impacts. In addition, some of the policy 
options would have been difficult to model and quantify, such as the 
potential impacts of accelerating USDA's hearing and rulemaking process 
for amending FMMOs. The report also notes that we compared the policy 
options identified against a baseline scenario of policies in place as 
of August 2004. This baseline scenario existed at the start of our work 
and was needed to provide a consistent context for our analysis.

Second, USDA suggested that we make clear the caveats of this type of 
analysis. As noted in the report, we examined the impact of federal 
dairy program changes and policy options on six policy considerations: 
farm income, milk production, federal costs, price volatility, economic 
efficiency, and consumer prices. We acknowledge that other stakeholders 
may have different views on the importance of these policy 
considerations, or other considerations that we did not include in our 
analysis. The report also states that the potential effects of policy 
options on these considerations could vary depending upon economic 
conditions and other policy decisions. In this regard, we did not 
assess the options' overall economic or budgetary impacts, or their 
consistency with U.S. international trade commitments or positions in 
ongoing negotiations. In addition, the report does not identify a 
preferred option or combination of options. As indicated in the report, 
each option has varying potential impacts on the policy considerations 
used in our analysis. Despite these caveats, we believe this analysis 
is informative and helpful to congressional decision makers who must 
weigh competing interests in determining dairy policy.

USDA also said that in some cases the report mischaracterizes the 
operation of current programs and the effects that changes to current 
programs or the introduction of new programs would have on program 
outlays, producers, and consumers. For example, USDA noted that the 
report offers several options for improving the operation of the Dairy 
Export Incentive Program (DEIP), including expanding the use of this 
program. However, USDA indicated that expanding the use of DEIP is not 
a legitimate option because, under World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules, DEIP is bound by quantitative and monetary caps and product-
specific restrictions that limit its use to the current range of 
eligible dairy commodities. We do not agree that we mischaracterized 
the operation of this program. The report clearly states that USDA has 
announced and awarded subsidies under DEIP to the limits allowed by WTO 
rules for nonfat dry milk and various cheeses. Regarding expansion, the 
report discusses options suggested by dairy experts for the additional 
use of this program as an effective marketing tool, and does not call 
for expanding its use to exceed relevant WTO caps or restrictions. 
However, we have adjusted the language in the report to make this 
distinction clearer.

USDA also offered several comments regarding the FMMO program. Among 
these, USDA said that the report is incorrect in stating that the 
objective of this program is "to ensure an adequate level of milk 
production." According to USDA, this objective is associated with the 
Dairy Price Support Program. We have revised the report to reflect this 
clarification and added language suggested by USDA to better describe 
the FMMO program's objectives.

In addition, USDA raised concerns about the practicality of 
implementing some of the options discussed in the report, particularly 
(1) adopting a competitive pay price to establish class prices under 
the FMMO program and (2) combining Class III and Class IV into a single 
manufacturing class.[Footnote 14] Regarding the first, USDA said that 
it and a committee of academicians spent considerable time several 
years ago trying to devise a competitive price series that could be 
used to establish minimum class prices. However, this effort was 
unsuccessful. USDA said that our report does not identify or indicate 
how to create such a price series. Similarly, regarding combining Class 
III and Class IV, USDA notes that no specifics are offered in the 
report as to how milk in such a class would be priced. We acknowledge 
that the report does not explain how a competitive price series could 
be created or how milk would be priced if the classes were merged. 
However, these options were identified by stakeholders during the 
course of our work. Other options discussed in the report also may 
present challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report 
discusses those issues.

Finally, USDA said that it does not believe the hearing and rulemaking 
process it uses to modify FMMOs inhibits its ability to respond to 
changing market conditions or the marketing of new dairy products. 
However, as discussed in the report, some stakeholders cited the 
slowness of this process as a concern. In addition, the report 
discusses USDA's efforts to improve this process to more quickly 
respond to problems or needed changes while ensuring the promulgation 
of economically sound regulation.

USDA did not comment on the report's recommendation.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of the report to 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; the House 
Committee on Agriculture; other appropriate congressional committees; 
interested Members of Congress; the Secretary of Agriculture; the 
Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget; and other interested parties. Copies will also be made 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IX.

Signed by: 

Lawrence J. Dyckman: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe: 
Chair: 
Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Susan Collins: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable James M. Jeffords: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John F. Kerry: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Charles E. Schumer: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Arlen Specter: 
United States Senate:

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

In March 2003, Senator Snowe, Chair, Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship, joined by Senators Clinton, Collins, Dodd, Jeffords, 
Kennedy, Kerry, Leahy, Mikulski, Rockefeller IV, Sarbanes, Schumer, and 
Specter requested that GAO examine a number of issues concerning the 
pricing and marketing of milk in the United States. Specifically, they 
asked us to update the information contained in our 2001 report, 
entitled Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market 
Structure ([Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-561], 
June 15, 2001), and to address other issues. This report examines (1) 
what portion of the retail price of fluid milk is received by dairy 
farmers, dairy cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers 
in selected markets throughout the United States, how this distribution 
has changed over the period of our review, and the relationships among 
price changes at these levels; (2) how various factors, such as costs, 
influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer, 
as well as how these and other factors affect the extent to which 
changes in price are transmitted among levels as milk moves from the 
farm to the consumer; and (3) how changes in dairy policies and 
alternative policy options have affected or might affect farm income, 
federal costs, economic efficiency, and consumer prices, among other 
policy considerations.[Footnote 15] It also updates other information 
on milk prices included in our June 2001 report.

To update our information on the price distribution among the various 
levels of the milk marketing chain, we analyzed milk prices in 15 
selected markets nationwide: Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; 
Charlotte, North Carolina; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Denver, 
Colorado; Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, 
Minnesota; New Orleans, Louisiana; Phoenix, Arizona; Salt Lake City, 
Utah; San Diego, California; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, 
D.C.[Footnote 16] In selecting these markets, we ensured that (1) they 
provided national geographic coverage; (2) at least one market was 
located in each of the federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) as they 
existed during most of the period from October 2000 through May 2004; 
(3) the selected markets included both state and federally regulated 
markets; and (4) these areas represented similar marketing areas for 
which we reported information in our June 2001 report. For the 15 
markets, we collected data on the prices received by farmers, 
cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers for October 2000 
through May 2004. We limited our data collection efforts to the prices 
of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk because sales of these 
milk types constitute over 93 percent of fluid milk sales annually. We 
also confined our analysis to the prices of these milk types sold in 
gallon containers because milk sold in gallon containers accounts for 
about 65 percent of fluid milk products sold under FMMOs.[Footnote 17]

There is no precise method for calculating the price that farmers 
receive for raw milk that is ultimately processed and sold in fluid 
milk products because dairy farmers receive a blend price for their 
milk, which is the average price for milk used for fluid and 
manufactured products. Therefore, any calculation of the value received 
by farmers for raw milk that is to be used for fluid milk products is 
necessarily only approximate. To estimate a farm price for raw milk 
used in fluid milk products, we used data provided by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS). AMS developed an adjustment, which accounts for various charges 
such as hauling and marketing fees, that we subtracted from the 
announced cooperative Class I price to obtain the estimated farm price 
for raw milk used in fluid milk products for each of the selected 
markets in our review except San Diego, which is not part of the FMMO 
system.[Footnote 18] AMS's adjustment accounts for farm-to-plant 
hauling costs, cooperative dues and capital assessment, mandatory 
advertising and promotion costs, competitive and receiving credits, and 
a representative estimate of the value of reimbursements to 
cooperatives for the services performed for handlers and for 
transportation costs not covered by the order minimum price.[Footnote 
19] Most of the items that make up the adjustment are not available for 
the specific fluid milk market that we selected, but rather are based 
on information collected for milk used over wider geographical areas. 
Therefore, an order-wide value used for any of these items provides an 
estimate rather than the actual value for this item. Also, the values 
for two of the adjustment items--reimbursements to cooperatives for 
services performed for handlers and for transportation costs not 
covered by the order minimum price--were not readily available so they 
were estimated indirectly based on other reported data and, in some 
cases, on anecdotal information provided by industry members. However, 
despite these limitations, AMS believes that the estimated farm price 
is a good representation of the price that dairy farmers receive for 
raw milk used in fluid milk products. For the farm price for San Diego-
-a state-regulated market--we used mailbox price data collected by the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture. The mailbox price is the 
weighted average of the prices received by dairy farmers in the market 
for all of their raw milk sold and therefore is computed as the total 
net dollars received for milk divided by the total pounds of milk 
marketed.[Footnote 20] This price is likely to be lower than the price 
received for milk used for fluid purposes because the prices for milk 
used for manufacturing purposes are generally lower. However, it is the 
best measure we could obtain.

To determine cooperative prices, we used AMS data on announced 
cooperative prices to represent prices that wholesale milk processors 
paid to cooperatives. Wholesale milk processors in federally regulated 
markets generally purchase milk from cooperatives and pay the federal 
minimum price for milk plus premiums that are negotiated between 
cooperatives and wholesale milk processors. The announced cooperative 
price is the Class I milk price announced by the major cooperative in 
each of the markets. This price does not apply to all Class I sales in 
federally regulated markets and is not necessarily the price actually 
received for all of the milk sold by the major cooperative; the 
announced cooperative prices have not been verified by USDA as actually 
having been paid by processors. For San Diego, we used the minimum 
fluid prices established by the state of California. Data on the 
premiums paid in excess of these minimums were not available for this 
market. (See app. V for a detailed discussion of over-order premiums.)

To determine wholesale prices, we used the prices paid at Department of 
Defense Commissary Agency locations. The Defense Commissary Agency 
purchases milk under competitive and noncompetitive contracts with 
wholesalers. We used commissary prices as surrogates for privately 
established wholesale prices because (1) defense commissaries sell 
groceries at a standard 5 percent markup from cost to active and 
retired military personnel and (2) wholesale price data are considered 
proprietary by industry officials and were not available to us. The 
commissary network of stores ranks twelfth in the United States in 
sales volume for supermarket chains. We selected 39 different 
commissary locations near the 15 markets we reviewed, and the Defense 
Commissary Agency provided us with weekly prices paid by consumers at 
these locations for gallons of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim 
milk.[Footnote 21] We averaged these weekly prices to obtain monthly 
prices. We then adjusted these monthly prices to account for the 5 
percent markup. Where we had multiple commissary locations for a 
market, we averaged the adjusted monthly prices to obtain a wholesale 
price for the market. We recognize that these locations may not provide 
an ideal match with other price data analyzed for a given location; for 
example, in some markets the available commissary locations were not in 
close proximity to the selected marketing areas. Also, wholesale 
processors may provide these commissary locations with different levels 
of service than they do for retailers in these markets.[Footnote 22] In 
such cases, the prices paid by these commissaries for fluid milk may 
have been different than the prices that retailers in the selected 
markets paid to their wholesale suppliers. However, these were the best 
wholesale data that we could obtain. In those locations where 
commissaries sold more than one brand of milk, we used the price for 
the brand that had the highest sales volume for a particular period.

For retail prices, we contracted with Information Resources, Inc., a 
private data collection and analysis company, to obtain average weekly 
retail prices for whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk sold in 
gallon containers. These data represented a weighted average of prices 
at supermarkets with yearly sales exceeding $2 million for the markets 
included in our analysis. We then averaged these weekly prices to 
obtain monthly prices. We were unable to obtain data from some types of 
nonsupermarket retailers such as mass merchandisers, thus the retail 
pricing data that we present may not be representative of fluid milk 
prices at those locations. Figure 1 shows the locations of the 15 
selected markets, the corresponding commissaries, and the federal milk 
marketing order areas.

Figure 1: Selected Milk Markets, Corresponding Defense Commissaries 
Used for Our Analysis, and Federal Milk Marketing Order Areas Prior to 
April 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The Western Order was terminated as of April 1, 2004. However, 
because the order existed during the majority of our period of analysis 
we chose to include the data in this report. Farm and cooperative level 
prices for this order for April and May 2004 were provided by USDA 
based on what they would have been had the order still existed.

[End of figure] 

To determine (1) the portion of the retail price of a gallon of milk 
received by farmers, cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and 
retailers; (2) how changes in retail and farm prices affect the farm-
to-retail price spread; and (3) how price changes at any level of the 
marketing chain correlate to changes in prices at other levels, we 
limited our analysis to 2 percent milk, which currently represents the 
largest volume of reduced-fat milk sold nationwide. Therefore, our 
analysis of 2 percent prices may not necessarily reflect pricing 
patterns and trends for the other three kinds of milk. Appendix II 
includes graphs that show the relationships among the farm, 
cooperative, wholesale, and retail prices for a gallon of 2 percent 
milk for each of the 15 markets. Because farm and cooperative prices 
reflect a higher milkfat content than that in 2 percent milk, we 
adjusted these prices to reflect the value of removing milkfat and 
replacing it with skim milk.[Footnote 23] This adjustment allowed us to 
use farm and cooperative prices that were comparable to the wholesale 
and retail prices for our analysis.

To determine the degree that farm and retail prices had changed and the 
effect these changes had on the farm-to-retail price spread from 
October 2000 through May 2004 for each of the 15 markets, we used a 
statistical procedure to estimate farm-level and retail prices at the 
beginning and end of the period.[Footnote 24] We relied on estimated 
rather than actual prices to reduce the influence of the starting and 
ending months and years selected for our analysis in markets in which 
milk prices varied from month to month. We used the differences between 
the estimated initial and final prices to represent the changes during 
the period. When our statistical procedure did not find a consistent 
association between prices and time, we treated the difference in the 
estimated initial and final prices as zero. We calculated the change in 
the farm-to-retail price spread as the estimated retail price 
difference minus the estimated farm price difference.

To describe the relationship between price changes at any given level 
in the milk marketing chain and price changes at the other levels, we 
tested for correlations between price changes at the various levels for 
each of the 15 markets included in our analysis. Specifically, we 
calculated coefficients describing the degree of correlation between 
changes in farm prices and price changes at the cooperative, wholesale, 
and retail levels; price changes at the cooperative level and price 
changes at the wholesale and retail levels; and price changes at the 
wholesale and retail levels. In appendix II, we report those 
correlation coefficients and indicate which are statistically different 
from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.

To update information provided in our June 2001 report on the retail 
prices for four kinds of milk, we analyzed the retail price data that 
we obtained from Information Resources, Inc. We array these data in 
appendix III for each of the selected 15 markets for October 2000 
through May 2004.

To update information provided in our June 2001 report on average 
monthly and annual farm and cooperative prices, and wholesale and 
retail prices for different kinds of milk, we analyzed data obtained 
from USDA, the California Department of Food and Agriculture, the 
Department of Defense Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, 
Inc. We report these data in appendix IV for each of the selected 15 
markets for October 2000 through May 2004.

To update our information on the major factors influencing milk prices 
and explore price transmission within the milk marketing chain, we 
conducted more than 50 interviews with national dairy experts working 
with the federal and state governments,[Footnote 25] cooperatives,
[Footnote 26] processors,[Footnote 27] retailers,[Footnote 28] or 
industry groups,[Footnote 29] or in academia.[Footnote 30] We also 
reviewed a number of relevant studies and publications from USDA and 
other sources. Where possible, we obtained data on production costs, 
services provided by cooperatives, as well as inputs to processing and 
retailing. We also obtained information on concentration and market 
power at each level of the milk marketing chain. We present information 
on the factors influencing the price of milk in appendix V.

To compare the results and methodologies of various studies looking at 
the issue of price transmission in fluid milk marketing from the farm 
to the retail level, we performed a technical review of 14 academic 
studies conducted over the past 10 years, looking at model 
descriptions, assumptions, and results. We also spoke with the 
economists involved in these studies concerning their model results and 
the causes of differences in fluid milk price transmission across 
markets. The scope of these studies encompassed national, regional, and 
city-level models of fluid milk price transmission. Appendix VI 
provides a summary of our review of price transmission and the various 
price transmission studies.

To identify and examine the effects of federal dairy program changes 
and alternative policy options, we contacted many of the same dairy 
experts previously mentioned. We also conducted an extensive literature 
search and reviewed more than 50 relevant studies and other 
publications we identified. We qualitatively analyzed the effects of 
federal dairy program changes and policy options we identified on six 
main policy considerations: farm income, milk production, federal 
costs, price volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. We 
evaluated impacts on these policy considerations under both high-and 
low-price scenarios, over the short and long terms. We identified these 
policy considerations by reviewing previous GAO reports, relevant 
studies, and legislation, as well as through our conversations with 
dairy policy experts. Different stakeholders in the dairy policy arena 
may have alternative views on the relative importance of these policy 
considerations, as well as other considerations that we did not 
include, which could lead to differing perspectives on these options. 
In addition, the potential effects of policy options on these 
considerations could vary depending upon economic conditions and other 
policy decisions. We compared the dairy policy options we identified 
against a baseline scenario of the policies in place as of August 2004: 
FMMO regulations, a Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program that is 
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005, a price support 
program at $9.90 per hundredweight, a Dairy Export Incentive Program 
(DEIP), trade restrictions, and milk regulatory policies in some 
states. We include a discussion of the effects of recent federal dairy 
program changes and alternative policy options in appendix VII.

We conducted our review from September 2003 through October 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 
did not independently verify the data we received from various sources. 
However, we discussed with these sources the measures they take to 
ensure the accuracy of the data, and these measures seemed reasonable. 
Additionally, we consulted with the following dairy experts concerning 
the results of our analysis of price transmission within the milk 
marketing chain and the effects of changes in federal dairy programs 
and alternative policy options: 

* Ed Jesse, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison;

* Daniel Lass, Ph.D., Professor, College of Natural Resources and the 
Environment, University of Massachusetts, Amherst;

* Richard Sexton, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, University of California-Davis; and: 

* Mark Stephenson, Ph.D., Senior Extension Associate, Department of 
Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Analysis of Prices at Four Marketing Levels for 2 Percent 
Milk in Selected Markets: 

This appendix reports on our analysis of prices at four marketing 
levels for a gallon of 2 percent milk in 15 selected markets for 
October 2000 through May 2004. Our analysis includes information on (1) 
the portion of the retail price of a gallon of milk received by 
farmers, cooperatives, wholesale milk processors, and retailers; (2) 
how changes in farm and retail milk prices affect the farm-to-retail 
milk price spread; and (3) how price changes at any level of the 
marketing chain correlate with changes in prices at other levels.

We limited our analysis to gallons of 2 percent milk because sales of 
milk with reduced fat content account for nearly 52 percent of all 
sales of fluid milk and sales of 2 percent milk account for about 62 
percent of these reduced-fat sales. The farm and cooperative prices 
used in our analysis and presented in this appendix have been adjusted 
to reflect 2 percent milkfat. This analysis may not reflect pricing 
patterns and trends for other kinds of milk. We present complete data 
for prices for all four types of milk--whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and 
skim--in appendix III.

Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Milk Processors 
and Retailers: 

Between October 2000 and May 2004, on average, our data suggest that 
farmers received 45.9 percent, cooperatives 6.1 percent, wholesale 
processors 35.6 percent, and retailers 12.5 percent of the retail price 
of a gallon of 2 percent milk in the 15 markets we reviewed.[Footnote 
31] However, these percentages varied depending on the specific market. 
For example, the farmers' portion ranged from 36.0 percent to 58.6 
percent, while retailers in 12 markets received anywhere from 3.5 
percent to 44.1 percent.[Footnote 32] In comparison, the average 
percentages we reported in 2001 for the period March 1998 through 
September 2000 were 43 percent, 5 percent, 33 percent, and 19 percent, 
respectively, for farmers, cooperatives, wholesale processors, and 
retailers. Table 1 summarizes the price breakdown for each market.

Table 1: Portion of the Retail Price of a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk 
Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesale Processors, and Retailers 
for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Percent received by farmers: 42.7%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.4%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 34.8%; 
Percent received by retailers: 15.1%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 49.9%. 

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Percent received by farmers: 51.2%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 4.5%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 24.0%; 
Percent received by retailers: 20.4%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 44.4%. 

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Percent received by farmers: 41.1%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.5%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 46.6%; 
Percent received by retailers: 4.8%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 51.4%. 

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Percent received by farmers: 45.8%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.6%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 39.0%; 
Percent received by retailers: 7.7%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 46.7%. 

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Percent received by farmers: 55.9%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 5.3%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 49.5%; 
Percent received by retailers: (10.7%)[A]; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 38.8%. 

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Percent received by farmers: 39.4%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 4.5%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 25.7%; 
Percent received by retailers: 30.3%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 56.0%. 

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Percent received by farmers: 50.8%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 9.5%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 45.0%; 
Percent received by retailers: (5.3%)[A]; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 39.7%. 

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Percent received by farmers: 52.1%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.9%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 36.5%; 
Percent received by retailers: 3.5%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 40.0%. 

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Percent received by farmers: 58.6%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 7.8%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 64.1%; 
Percent received by retailers: (30.5%)[A]; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 33.6%. 

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Percent received by farmers: 36.8%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 9.5%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 36.6%; 
Percent received by retailers: 17.1%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 53.7%. 

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Percent received by farmers: 42.5%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.3%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 34.8%; 
Percent received by retailers: 19.4%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 54.2%. 

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Percent received by farmers: 44.8%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.6%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 43.0%; 
Percent received by retailers: 8.6%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 51.6%. 

Selected market: San Diego, California[B]; 
Percent received by farmers: 36.0%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 6.8%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 28.1%; 
Percent received by retailers: 29.1%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 57.2%. 

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Percent received by farmers: 36.7%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.2%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 16.0%; 
Percent received by retailers: 44.1%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 60.1%. 

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Percent received by farmers: 53.4%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 3.3%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 10.2%; 
Percent received by retailers: 33.1%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 43.3%. 

Selected market: Average for the 15 markets; 
Percent received by farmers: 45.9%; 
Percent received by cooperatives: 6.1%; 
Percent received by wholesale processors: 35.6%; 
Percent received by retailers: 12.5%; 
Subtotal received by wholesale processors and retailers: 48.0%. 

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

[A] Our analysis found that retailers in the Dallas, Miami, and 
Minneapolis markets received a negative return on a gallon of 2 percent 
milk for the 44-month period. Officials with one major retailer in the 
Dallas market indicated that a price war was occurring in Dallas during 
this time period. We were unable to obtain explanations for the 
negative returns in Miami and Minneapolis. These negative returns may 
be the result of problems with comparability between commissary and 
supermarket data.

[B] Figures for the San Diego market may understate the percent 
received by cooperatives and overstate the percent received by 
wholesale processors because the cooperative price data for this market 
did not include estimates of over-order premiums paid to cooperatives. 
On the other hand, figures for this market may overstate the percent 
received by cooperatives and understate the percent received by farmers 
because unlike the farm price data for other markets, the farm price 
data for San Diego represent a weighted average of milk sold for all 
uses. See appendix I.

[End of table]

Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread: 

From October 2000 through May 2004, the spread between farm and retail 
milk prices increased in 12 of the 15 markets.[Footnote 33] However, in 
some of the 12 markets, the spread between farm and retail milk prices 
increased dramatically and then moderated. In 9 of the 15 markets, 
retail prices showed a statistically significant increase. In 4 of the 
remaining markets, retail prices decreased over time; in the other 2 
markets, retail prices showed no statistically significant change. At 
the same time, farm prices decreased in 12 of the 15 markets and 
increased in the remaining 3 markets over the 44-month period. However, 
these declining farm prices began to moderate, or, in most cases, began 
to rise during the latter months of our period of analysis. Table 2 
provides these data for selected markets.[Footnote 34]

Table 2: Changes in the Farm-to-Retail Price Spread for a Gallon of 2 
Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Change in farm prices: $0.03; 
Change in retail prices: ($0.21); 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.24).

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.06); 
Change in retail prices: $0.12; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.18.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.05); 
Change in retail prices: $0.20; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.25.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.07); 
Change in retail prices: ($0.12); 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.05).

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Change in farm prices: $0.02; 
Change in retail prices: $0.24; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.22.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.06); 
Change in retail prices: $0.16; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.22.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.01); 
Change in retail prices: $0.25; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.26.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.03); 
Change in retail prices: $0.05; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.08.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.02); 
Change in retail prices: [A]; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.02.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.10); 
Change in retail prices: $0.16; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.27.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.07); 
Change in retail prices: ($0.01); 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.06.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.04); 
Change in retail prices: [A]; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.04.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Change in farm prices: $0.03; 
Change in retail prices: ($0.16); 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: ($0.19).

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.08); 
Change in retail prices: $0.10; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.18.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Change in farm prices: ($0.03); 
Change in retail prices: $0.28; 
Change in the farm-to-retail price spread: $0.32. 

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: Differences between changes in farm and retail prices may not add 
to the change in the farm-to-retail price spread due to rounding.

[A] No statistically significant change was observed in the price 
spread over the 44-month period.

[End of table]

Correlation between Price Changes at the Four Marketing Levels: 

We found that price changes generally correlated across levels in the 
marketing chain, with the strongest correlations occurring between 
adjacent levels. The values of correlation coefficients presented are 
estimates of the degree that price changes at one level in the milk 
marketing chain are associated with price changes at other levels. The 
higher the coefficient, the closer the association between changes in 
prices at different levels. Changes in cooperative prices, in general, 
were strongly correlated with changes in wholesale prices.[Footnote 35] 
However, changes in cooperative prices correlated less strongly with 
changes in retail prices. As discussed in appendix V, many factors 
other than farm or wholesale prices influence the retail price of fluid 
milk.

Correlation coefficients between prices at different marketing levels 
varied across markets. For example, correlations between cooperative 
and wholesale prices in individual markets range from a high of 0.982 
to a low of -0.031. We ranked the 15 markets by the extent of 
correlation between cooperative and wholesale prices. The correlation 
coefficient for the market that fell in the middle of this ranking was 
0.788. In comparison, the market in the middle of a similar ranking for 
the time period analyzed in our 2001 report had a lower correlation 
coefficient between these prices, 0.716. Similarly, correlations 
between cooperative and retail prices in individual markets range from 
a high of 0.879 to a low of 0.214. We did a comparable ranking of the 
15 markets by the extent of correlation between cooperative and retail 
prices. The correlation coefficient for the market that fell in the 
middle of this ranking was 0.588. In comparison, the market in the 
middle of a similar ranking for the time period presented in our 2001 
report again had a lower correlation coefficient between these prices, 
0.483. Tables 3 through 5 present data from our correlation analysis of 
price changes across marketing levels.

Table 3: Correlation between Farm Price Changes and Changes in 
Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent 
Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.525*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.537*.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.691*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.780*.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.995*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.693*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.983*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.589*.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.998*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.813*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.713*.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.932*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.428*.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: (0.024); 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.826*.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.683*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.881*.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.999*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.220; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.503*.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.993*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.784*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.863*.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.542*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.217.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.829*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.360*.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 0.407*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.432*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.341*.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.249.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Correlation coefficients for cooperative prices: 1.000*; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.962*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.810*.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we 
omitted the months for which data were missing.

*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time 
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the 
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5 
percent).

[End of table]

Table 4: Correlation between Cooperative Price Changes and Changes in 
Wholesale and Retail Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 
Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.546*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.543*.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.694*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.775*.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.697*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.982*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.588*.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.818*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.725*.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.436*.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: (0.031); 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.823*.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.682*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.879*.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.228; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.499*.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.788*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.861*.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.540*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.214.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.830*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.360*.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.969*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.480*.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.939*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.250.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Correlation coefficients for wholesale prices: 0.962*; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.809*.

Source: GAO's analysis of cooperative price data provided by USDA (for 
the San Diego market, the Southern California Class I price data were 
provided by the California Department of Food and Agriculture), 
wholesale price data provided by the Defense Commissary Agency, and 
retail price data provided by Information Resources, Inc.

Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we 
omitted the months for which data were missing.

*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time 
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the 
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5 
percent).

[End of table]

Table 5: Correlation between Wholesale and Retail Price Changes for a 
Gallon of 2 Percent Milk for 15 Markets, October 2000 through May 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.319*.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.348*.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.746*.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.544*.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.802*.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.429*.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: (0.003).

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.744*.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.205.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.734*.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.419*.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.270.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.497*.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.183.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Correlation coefficients for retail prices: 0.778*.

Source: GAO's analysis of wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: In calculating the correlation coefficients for each market, we 
omitted the months for which data were missing.

*Indicates that the correlation coefficient estimated for this time 
period is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (i.e., the 
probability that the two price series are uncorrelated is less than 5 
percent).

[End of table]

Comparison of Average Annual and Monthly Prices for 2 Percent Milk: 

Tables 6 through 10 show the average annual price for a gallon of 2 
percent milk in the 15 markets for each of the four marketing levels 
during part of 2000, all of 2001, 2002, and 2003, and part of 2004. 
Figures 2 through 16 present average monthly data for the period 
October 2000 through May 2004 on farm, cooperative, wholesale, and 
retail prices for gallons of 2 percent milk in each of the 15 markets. 
Gaps in any of the lines shown in the figures indicate that data were 
unavailable for those months.

Table 6: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2000: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Farm price: $1.05; 
Cooperative price: $1.25; 
Wholesale price: $2.04; 
Retail price: $2.67.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Farm price: $1.25; 
Cooperative price: $1.35; 
Wholesale price: $1.96; 
Retail price: $2.23.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Farm price: $1.09; 
Cooperative price: $1.25; 
Wholesale price: $2.06; 
Retail price: $2.58.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Farm price: $1.03; 
Cooperative price: $1.21; 
Wholesale price: $[A]; 
Retail price: $2.24.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Farm price: $1.08; 
Cooperative price: $1.20; 
Wholesale price: $2.05; 
Retail price: $1.74.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Farm price: $0.99; 
Cooperative price: $1.11; 
Wholesale price: $1.73; 
Retail price: $2.45.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Farm price: $1.22; 
Cooperative price: $1.44; 
Wholesale price: $2.50; 
Retail price: $2.33.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Farm price: $1.05; 
Cooperative price: $1.18; 
Wholesale price: $1.79; 
Retail price: $1.94.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Farm price: $1.01; 
Cooperative price: $1.12; 
Wholesale price: $2.05; 
Retail price: $1.77.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Farm price: $1.02; 
Cooperative price: $1.22; 
Wholesale price: $2.25; 
Retail price: $2.61.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Farm price: $1.01; 
Cooperative price: $1.09; 
Wholesale price: $1.83; 
Retail price: $2.09.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Farm price: $0.98; 
Cooperative price: $1.06; 
Wholesale price: $1.97; 
Retail price: $2.25.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Farm price: $0.92; 
Cooperative price: $1.16; 
Wholesale price: $1.90; 
Retail price: $2.54.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Farm price: $1.02; 
Cooperative price: $1.10; 
Wholesale price: $1.47; 
Retail price: $2.56.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Farm price: $1.21; 
Cooperative price: $1.28; 
Wholesale price: $1.51; 
Retail price: $2.11.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: Averages for 2000 were calculated using data from October through 
December, the portion of 2000 included in our analysis.

[A] We were unable to obtain data from the Defense Commissary Agency to 
represent wholesale prices for 2 percent milk in the Cincinnati market 
during 2000.

[End of table]

Table 7: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2001: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Farm price: $1.14; 
Cooperative price: $1.34; 
Wholesale price: $2.50; 
Retail price: $2.68.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Farm price: $1.29; 
Cooperative price: $1.39; 
Wholesale price: $1.95; 
Retail price: $2.32.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Farm price: $1.18; 
Cooperative price: $1.34; 
Wholesale price: $2.32; 
Retail price: $2.62.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Farm price: $1.15; 
Cooperative price: $1.32; 
Wholesale price: $2.24; 
Retail price: $2.28.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Farm price: $1.17; 
Cooperative price: $1.28; 
Wholesale price: $2.15; 
Retail price: $1.98.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Farm price: $1.12; 
Cooperative price: $1.23; 
Wholesale price: $1.93; 
Retail price: $2.54.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Farm price: $1.31; 
Cooperative price: $1.53; 
Wholesale price: $2.56; 
Retail price: $2.40.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Farm price: $1.17; 
Cooperative price: $1.32; 
Wholesale price: $2.17; 
Retail price: $2.07.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Farm price: $1.14; 
Cooperative price: $1.27; 
Wholesale price: $2.21; 
Retail price: $1.73.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Farm price: $1.11; 
Cooperative price: $1.31; 
Wholesale price: $2.32; 
Retail price: $2.68.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Farm price: $1.14; 
Cooperative price: $1.21; 
Wholesale price: $1.91; 
Retail price: $2.42.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Farm price: $1.10; 
Cooperative price: $1.18; 
Wholesale price: $2.11; 
Retail price: $2.24.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Farm price: $1.05; 
Cooperative price: $1.25; 
Wholesale price: $2.04; 
Retail price: $2.84.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Farm price: $1.11; 
Cooperative price: $1.20; 
Wholesale price: $1.66; 
Retail price: $2.73.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Farm price: $1.34; 
Cooperative price: $1.42; 
Wholesale price: $1.71; 
Retail price: $2.30.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

[End of table]

Table 8: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2002: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Farm price: $1.04; 
Cooperative price: $1.22; 
Wholesale price: $2.01; 
Retail price: $2.47.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Farm price: $1.11; 
Cooperative price: $1.21; 
Wholesale price: $1.77; 
Retail price: $2.33.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Farm price: $1.01; 
Cooperative price: $1.22; 
Wholesale price: $2.55; 
Retail price: $2.59.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Farm price: $0.95; 
Cooperative price: $1.11; 
Wholesale price: $1.98; 
Retail price: $2.34.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Farm price: $1.08; 
Cooperative price: $1.17; 
Wholesale price: $2.19; 
Retail price: $2.03.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Farm price: $0.93; 
Cooperative price: $1.05; 
Wholesale price: $1.66; 
Retail price: $2.56.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Farm price: $1.17; 
Cooperative price: $1.41; 
Wholesale price: $2.56; 
Retail price: $2.36.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Farm price: $0.98; 
Cooperative price: $1.14; 
Wholesale price: $1.81; 
Retail price: $2.01.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Farm price: $0.95; 
Cooperative price: $1.10; 
Wholesale price: $2.38; 
Retail price: $1.95.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Farm price: $0.92; 
Cooperative price: $1.19; 
Wholesale price: $2.22; 
Retail price: $2.70.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Farm price: $0.94; 
Cooperative price: $1.02; 
Wholesale price: $1.88; 
Retail price: $2.59.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Farm price: $0.91; 
Cooperative price: $0.99; 
Wholesale price: $1.92; 
Retail price: $2.29.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Farm price: $0.88; 
Cooperative price: $1.06; 
Wholesale price: $1.84; 
Retail price: $2.66.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Farm price: $0.93; 
Cooperative price: $1.01; 
Wholesale price: $1.39; 
Retail price: $2.74.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Farm price: $1.16; 
Cooperative price: $1.23; 
Wholesale price: $1.44; 
Retail price: $2.28.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

[End of table]

Table 9: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices 
for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2003: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Farm price: $1.07; 
Cooperative price: $1.25; 
Wholesale price: $2.02; 
Retail price: $2.49.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Farm price: $1.14; 
Cooperative price: $1.25; 
Wholesale price: $1.79; 
Retail price: $2.33.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Farm price: $1.05; 
Cooperative price: $1.27; 
Wholesale price: $2.65; 
Retail price: $2.63.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Farm price: $0.98; 
Cooperative price: $1.16; 
Wholesale price: $2.00; 
Retail price: $2.34.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Farm price: $1.09; 
Cooperative price: $1.19; 
Wholesale price: $2.26; 
Retail price: $2.02.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Farm price: $0.97; 
Cooperative price: $1.08; 
Wholesale price: $1.68; 
Retail price: $2.55.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Farm price: $1.20; 
Cooperative price: $1.43; 
Wholesale price: $2.56; 
Retail price: $2.47.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Farm price: $1.01; 
Cooperative price: $1.19; 
Wholesale price: $1.87; 
Retail price: $2.00.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Farm price: $0.99; 
Cooperative price: $1.13; 
Wholesale price: $2.36; 
Retail price: $1.62.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Farm price: $0.94; 
Cooperative price: $1.24; 
Wholesale price: $2.22; 
Retail price: $2.68.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Farm price: $0.97; 
Cooperative price: $1.05; 
Wholesale price: $1.97; 
Retail price: $2.45.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Farm price: $0.95; 
Cooperative price: $1.03; 
Wholesale price: $1.99; 
Retail price: $2.14.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Farm price: $0.93; 
Cooperative price: $1.12; 
Wholesale price: $1.84; 
Retail price: $2.69.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Farm price: $0.95; 
Cooperative price: $1.04; 
Wholesale price: $1.46; 
Retail price: $2.88.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Farm price: $1.19; 
Cooperative price: $1.27; 
Wholesale price: $1.46; 
Retail price: $2.33.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

[End of table]

Table 10: Average Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail 
Prices for a Gallon of 2 Percent Milk in Selected Markets, 2004: 

Selected market: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Farm price: $1.18; 
Cooperative price: $1.35; 
Wholesale price: $2.21; 
Retail price: $2.54.

Selected market: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Farm price: $1.27; 
Cooperative price: $1.38; 
Wholesale price: $1.90; 
Retail price: $2.43.

Selected market: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Farm price: $1.13; 
Cooperative price: $1.35; 
Wholesale price: $2.84; 
Retail price: $2.87.

Selected market: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Farm price: $1.09; 
Cooperative price: $1.27; 
Wholesale price: $2.21; 
Retail price: $1.95.

Selected market: Dallas, Texas; 
Farm price: $1.20; 
Cooperative price: $1.30; 
Wholesale price: $2.47; 
Retail price: $2.13.

Selected market: Denver, Colorado; 
Farm price: $1.06; 
Cooperative price: $1.20; 
Wholesale price: $2.04; 
Retail price: $2.72.

Selected market: Miami, Florida; 
Farm price: $1.30; 
Cooperative price: $1.52; 
Wholesale price: $2.56; 
Retail price: $2.63.

Selected market: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Farm price: $1.15; 
Cooperative price: $1.31; 
Wholesale price: $2.13; 
Retail price: $2.13.

Selected market: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Farm price: $1.14; 
Cooperative price: $1.29; 
Wholesale price: $2.43; 
Retail price: $1.93.

Selected market: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Farm price: $1.03; 
Cooperative price: $1.33; 
Wholesale price: $2.15; 
Retail price: $2.87.

Selected market: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Farm price: $1.08; 
Cooperative price: $1.17; 
Wholesale price: $2.17; 
Retail price: $2.25.

Selected market: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Farm price: $1.07; 
Cooperative price: $1.14; 
Wholesale price: $2.16; 
Retail price: $2.19.

Selected market: San Diego, California; 
Farm price: $1.12; 
Cooperative price: $1.22; 
Wholesale price: $1.92; 
Retail price: $2.50.

Selected market: Seattle, Washington; 
Farm price: $1.06; 
Cooperative price: $1.15; 
Wholesale price: $1.74; 
Retail price: $2.59.

Selected market: Washington, D.C; 
Farm price: $1.31; 
Cooperative price: $1.39; 
Wholesale price: $1.66; 
Retail price: $2.56.

Source: GAO's analysis of farm and cooperative price data provided by 
USDA (for the San Diego market, the mailbox and Southern California 
Class I price data were provided by the California Department of Food 
and Agriculture), wholesale price data provided by the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and retail price data provided by Information 
Resources, Inc.

Note: The 2004 averages were calculated using data from January through 
May of that year, the portion of 2004 included in our analysis.

[End of table]

Figure 2: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Atlanta, Georgia, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Atlanta adjusted 
to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the 
prices paid by the commissaries at Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson, 
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price 
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Boston, Massachusetts, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Boston, Massachusetts, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the effective cooperative Class I price for Boston 
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content during the period that the 
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was effective (July 1997 through 
September 2001); the cooperative price after September 2001 is the 
announced cooperative Class I price for Boston adjusted to 2 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
commissary at Hanscom Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; 
and the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Boston market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Charlotte, North Carolina, October 2000 through 
May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Charlotte, North Carolina, the farm price is the USDA 
estimated farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for 
Charlotte adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the price paid by the Fort Bragg North Post Store, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Charlotte market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 5: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Cincinnati, Ohio, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Cincinnati 
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price 
paid by the commissary at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, adjusted for 
a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Cincinnati market. We were unable 
to obtain data from the Defense Commissary Agency to represent 
wholesale prices for 2 percent milk in the Cincinnati market during 
2000 and for January and February 2001.

[End of figure] 

Figure 6: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Dallas, Texas, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Dallas, Texas, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Dallas adjusted to 
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the 
prices paid by the two commissaries at Fort Hood, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Dallas market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 7: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Denver, Colorado, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Denver, Colorado, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Denver adjusted to 
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the 
prices paid by the commissaries at Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force 
Base, Buckley Air Force Base, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, adjusted 
for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Denver market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 8: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Miami, Florida, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Miami, Florida, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Miami adjusted to 
2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
commissary at the Naval Air Station, Key West, adjusted for a 5 percent 
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information 
Resources, Inc., for the Miami market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 9: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for 
Milwaukee adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the price paid by the commissary at the Naval Station Great Lakes, 
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price 
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Milwaukee market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Minneapolis, Minnesota, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for 
Minneapolis adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price 
is the price paid by the commissary at Fort McCoy, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Minneapolis market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for New Orleans, Louisiana, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For New Orleans, Louisiana, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for New 
Orleans adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the average of the prices paid by the Naval Support Activities, New 
Orleans; the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport; and Keesler 
Air Force Base commissaries, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the 
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for 
the New Orleans market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Phoenix, Arizona, the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Phoenix adjusted 
to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the 
prices paid by the commissaries at Luke Air Force Base and Davis- 
Monthan Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail 
price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the 
Phoenix market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Salt Lake City, Utah, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Salt Lake City, Utah, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Salt 
Lake City adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the price paid by the commissary at Hill Air Force Base, adjusted for a 
5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Salt Lake City market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 14: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for San Diego, California, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For San Diego, California, the farm price is the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture mailbox price adjusted to 2 percent 
milkfat content; the cooperative price is the Southern California Class 
I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at the Naval Base, 
San Diego; Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton; Naval Outlying Landing 
Field, Imperial Beach; Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar; Naval Air 
Station, North Island; and by the San Onofre Commissary, Camp 
Pendleton, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the 
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the San Diego 
market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 15: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Seattle, Washington, October 2000 through May 
2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Seattle, Washington, the farm price is the USDA estimated 
farm Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for 
Seattle adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is 
the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at the Naval Station 
Everett, Smokey Point Support Center; Fort Lewis; and McChord Air Force 
Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the 
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Seattle market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 16: Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale, and Retail Prices for a Gallon 
of 2 Percent Milk for Washington, D.C., October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: For Washington, D.C., the farm price is the USDA estimated farm 
Class I price adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Washington, D.C., 
adjusted to 2 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the 
average of the prices paid by the commissaries at Bolling Air Force 
Base; Walter Reed Army Medical Center; Fort Myer; Fort Belvoir; the 
Marine Corps Base, Quantico; Andrews Air Force Base; Aberdeen Proving 
Ground; the Naval Station, Annapolis; Fort Meade; and Fort Detrick, 
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price 
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Washington, D.C., 
market.

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Retail Prices for Four Kinds of Milk in Selected Markets: 

This appendix updates information provided in our June 2001 report on 
the average retail prices for whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim 
milk in 15 selected markets for October 2000 through May 2004. We found 
that retail pricing patterns varied significantly across markets. For 
example, in the Boston market from October 2000 through May 2004, the 
average price for 2 percent milk was generally the same as the average 
price for 1 percent milk; however, whole and skim milk prices were 
generally lower. On the other hand, for this period in the San Diego 
market, the average price of 2 percent milk was generally lower than 
the prices of whole and 1 percent milk, but higher than skim milk 
prices. Figures 17 through 31 provide information on the average retail 
price for the four kinds of milk in the 15 selected markets for October 
2000 through May 2004.

Figure 17: Retail Prices in Atlanta, Georgia, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information 
Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market.

[End of figure]

Figure 18: Retail Prices in Boston, Massachusetts, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Boston market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 19: Retail Prices in Charlotte, North Carolina, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Charlotte market.

[End of figure]

Figure 20: Retail Prices in Cincinnati, Ohio, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Cincinnati market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 21: Retail Prices in Dallas, Texas, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Dallas market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 22: Retail Prices in Denver, Colorado, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Denver market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 23: Retail Prices in Miami, Florida, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Miami market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 24: Retail Prices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Milwaukee market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 25: Retail Prices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Minneapolis market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 26: Retail Prices in New Orleans, Louisiana, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the New Orleans market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 27: Retail Prices in Phoenix, Arizona, for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Phoenix market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 28: Retail Prices in Salt Lake City, Utah, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Salt Lake City market.

[End of figure] 

Figure 29: Retail Prices in San Diego, California, for Whole, 2 
Percent, 1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the San Diego market.

Figure 30: Retail Prices in Seattle, Washington, for Whole, 2 Percent, 
1 Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Seattle market.

[End of figure]

Figure 31: Retail Prices in Washington, D.C., for Whole, 2 Percent, 1 
Percent, and Skim Milk, October 2000 through May 2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Washington, D.C., market.

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Average Monthly and Annual Farm, Cooperative, Wholesale 
and Retail Milk Prices in Selected Markets: 

This appendix updates information provided in our June 2001 report on 
average monthly and annual farm and cooperative prices of raw milk and 
on the average monthly and annual wholesale and retail prices for a 
gallon of whole, 2 percent, 1 percent, and skim milk. Tables 11 through 
25 provide these data for 15 selected markets over the period October 
2000 through May 2004.

Table 11: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Atlanta, Georgia, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.87; 
Retail: Skim: $2.75.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.76; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Average; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.66; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.86; 
Retail: Skim: $2.74.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.65; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.81; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.53; 
Retail: 2%: $2.69; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.76; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.45; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.52; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.63.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.81; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.66.

Average; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.55; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.26; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.47.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.21; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $2.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.51; 
Retail: Skim: $2.48.

Average; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.21; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.45.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.43.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.41; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.44; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.44; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.44; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.66; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.51; 
Retail: Skim: $2.46.

Average; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.92; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.46.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.39; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.02; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.87; 
Cooperative: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.64; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.50; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.45; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.85; 
Retail: Skim: $2.78.

Average; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11; 
Retail: Whole: $2.35; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.45.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Atlanta market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Atlanta for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid 
by the commissaries at Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Atlanta market. Prices may not 
average due to rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.

[End of table]

Table 12: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Boston, Massachusetts, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.03.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.26; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Average; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.21; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.25; 
Retail: Skim: $2.03.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.25; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.08.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.12.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.12.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.45; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.59; 
Cooperative: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.65; 
Cooperative: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.66; 
Cooperative: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.69; 
Cooperative: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.68; 
Cooperative: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.93; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.20.

Average; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.20.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Average; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.26; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.79; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.54; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89; 
Retail: Whole: $2.33; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.33; 
Retail: 2%: $2.39; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Average; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $2.35; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $2.01; 
Cooperative: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Average; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $ $2.12; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Boston market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the effective cooperative Class I price for Boston for 3.5 percent
milkfat content during the period that the Northeast Interstate Dairy 
Compact was effective (July 1997 through September 2001); the 
cooperative price after September 2001 is the announced cooperative 
Class I price for Boston for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale 
price is the price paid by the commissary at Hanscom Air Force Base, 
adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the price 
collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Boston market. Prices 
may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 13: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Average; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.54.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.57; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.44; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.52; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.57; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.32; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.54; 
Cooperative: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.57; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.39; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.33; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.46; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.63.

Average; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.59.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.63; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.57; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.54; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.65; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.58; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Average; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.61; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.53; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.65; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.58; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.52; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.64; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.57; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.54; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.57; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.54.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.69; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.83; 
Retail: Skim: $2.73.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.91; 
Retail: Whole: $2.78; 
Retail: 2%: $2.80; 
Retail: 1%: $2.88; 
Retail: Skim: $2.80.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.91; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.82; 
Retail: 1%: $2.90; 
Retail: Skim: $2.81.

Average; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.72; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.65; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.61.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.92; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.78; 
Retail: 2%: $2.79; 
Retail: 1%: $2.87; 
Retail: Skim: $2.78.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.82; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.80; 
Retail: Whole: $2.76; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.84; 
Retail: Skim: $2.77.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.78; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.69; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.83; 
Retail: Skim: $2.73.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.70; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.69; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.83; 
Retail: 1%: $2.92; 
Retail: Skim: $2.81.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.83; 
Cooperative: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $3.10; 
Wholesale: 2%: $3.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.84; 
Retail: Whole: $3.19; 
Retail: 2%: $3.21; 
Retail: 1%: $3.24; 
Retail: Skim: $3.21.

Average; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.77; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.74; 
Retail: Whole: $2.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.87; 
Retail: 1%: $2.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.86.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Charlotte market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated 
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Charlotte for 3.5 
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
Fort Bragg North Post Store, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the 
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for 
the Charlotte market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 14: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.94; 
Retail: 2%: $2.18; 
Retail: 1%: $2.25; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.93; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Average; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.92; 
Retail: 2%: $2.24; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: N/A; 
Wholesale: 2%: N/A; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.20; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.91; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $2.04.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $1.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $1.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $1.93; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $1.98; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $1.98; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $1.94; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.41.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.54; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $1.95; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.70; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.36; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.96; 
Retail: Whole: $2.02; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Average; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $1.94; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $1.96; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.44; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $1.91; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.00; 
Retail: Whole: $1.93; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.95; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.79; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: N/A; 
Retail: Whole: $1.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $1.85; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Average; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89; 
Retail: Whole: $1.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $1.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $1.84; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $1.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49; 
Retail: Whole: $1.84; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49; 
Retail: Whole: $1.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $1.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $1.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $1.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.45; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87; 
Retail: Whole: $1.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.15; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.08.

Average; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $1.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.08; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $1.63; 
Retail: 2%: $1.89; 
Retail: 1%: $1.88; 
Retail: Skim: $1.82.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $1.63; 
Retail: 2%: $1.87; 
Retail: 1%: $1.85; 
Retail: Skim: $1.80.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $1.46; 
Retail: 2%: $1.70; 
Retail: 1%: $1.60; 
Retail: Skim: $1.56.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.85; 
Cooperative: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.68; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.50; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.19; 
Retail: 1%: $2.14; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Average; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $ 2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $1.66; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Cincinnati market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated 
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Cincinnati for 3.5 
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
commissary at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 percent 
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information 
Resources, Inc., for the Cincinnati market. Prices may not average due 
to rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.

[End of table]

Table 15: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Dallas, Texas, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95; 
Retail: Whole: $1.79; 
Retail: 2%: $1.64; 
Retail: 1%: $1.75; 
Retail: Skim: $1.67.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $1.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.80.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $1.82; 
Retail: 1%: $2.02; 
Retail: Skim: $1.81.

Average; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95; 
Retail: Whole: $1.89; 
Retail: 2%: $1.74; 
Retail: 1%: $1.93; 
Retail: Skim: $1.76.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.95; 
Retail: Whole: $2.01; 
Retail: 2%: $1.89; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.87.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.02; 
Retail: 2%: $1.91; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $1.96; 
Retail: 2%: $1.85; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.84.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $1.92; 
Retail: 1%: $2.06; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $1.94; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.05; 
Retail: Skim: $1.98.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.02; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.54; 
Cooperative: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.04; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.19; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.14; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Average; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.06; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.03; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.01.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.15; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.02; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.11; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.14; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.02; 
Retail: 1%: $2.17; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.07.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $1.99; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.02; 
Retail: 2%: $1.97; 
Retail: 1%: $2.05; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Average; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.16; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.02; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.01; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.93.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $1.97; 
Retail: 1%: $2.04; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.96; 
Retail: 1%: $2.05; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $2.18; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.14; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.17; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.11; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.42; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.44; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.37; 
Retail: Whole: $2.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.06; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Average; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17; 
Retail: Whole: $2.11; 
Retail: 2%: $2.02; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.28; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26; 
Retail: Whole: $2.15; 
Retail: 2%: $1.96; 
Retail: 1%: $1.98; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.26; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $1.97; 
Retail: 1%: $1.96; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.42; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.89; 
Cooperative: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.74; 
Retail: Whole: $2.79; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.77; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Average; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.50; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.37; 
2.37: [Empty]; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.13; 
Retail: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.06.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Dallas market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Dallas for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid 
by the two commissaries at Fort Hood, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; 
and the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, 
Inc., for the Dallas market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 16: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Denver, Colorado, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Average; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.48; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.65; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.65; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.65; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.49; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.88; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87; 
Retail: Whole: $2.65; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Average; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.67; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.66; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.52; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.43; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Average; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.69; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.52; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.58; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.40; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.54; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.36; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.37; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.37; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.64; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.46; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.47; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.69; 
Retail: 1%: $2.97; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.99; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.42; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.93; 
Retail: Skim: $2.45.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Average; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.75; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.20.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.69; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.47; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.78; 
Retail: Whole: $2.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.79; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.85; 
Cooperative: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.66; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.48; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23; 
Retail: Whole: $3.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.90; 
Retail: 1%: $2.87; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Average; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.48; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.42.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Denver market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Denver for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid 
by the commissaries at Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force Base, Buckley 
Air Force Base, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Denver market. Prices may not 
average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 17: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Miami, Florida, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.46; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.46; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.47; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Average; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.50; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.50; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.57; 
Cooperative: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.60; 
Cooperative: $1.83; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.65; 
Cooperative: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.65; 
Cooperative: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.67; 
Cooperative: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.70; 
Cooperative: $1.92; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.68; 
Cooperative: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.44; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Average; 
Farm: $1.57; 
Cooperative: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.53; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.41; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.53; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.39; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.37; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.24.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: N/A; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.26; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.45; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Average; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.36; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.48; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.54; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.40; 
Retail: 1%: $2.41; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.48; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Average; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.67; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.41.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $2.02; 
Cooperative: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.66; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $3.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.97; 
Retail: 1%: $2.92; 
Retail: Skim: $2.86.

Average; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.53.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Miami market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Miami for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
commissary at the Naval Air Station, Key West, adjusted for a 5 percent 
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information 
Resources, Inc., for the Miami market. Prices may not average due to 
rounding. "N/A" indicates data not available.

[End of table]

Table 18: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $1.97; 
Retail: 2%: $1.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.87.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $1.98; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $1.99; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $2.00; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Average; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $1.98; 
Retail: 2%: $1.94; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.15; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.11; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11; 
Retail: Whole: $2.15; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.13; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.13; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.70; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $2.18; 
Retail: 2%: $2.12; 
Retail: 1%: $2.16; 
Retail: Skim: $1.99.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.55; 
Cooperative: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.13; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.01.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.11; 
Retail: 2%: $2.04; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Average; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $2.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.04; 
Retail: 1%: $2.04; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.02; 
Retail: 1%: $2.02; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.06; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.02; 
Retail: 1%: $2.05; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.04; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.02; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $1.99; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.04; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.02; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.99; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.99; 
Retail: 1%: $2.02; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Average; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.87.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.86.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.87.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.00; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.00; 
Retail: Skim: $1.87.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.05; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $1.97; 
Retail: Skim: $1.85.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.03; 
Retail: 2%: $1.93; 
Retail: 1%: $1.96; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.04; 
Retail: 2%: $1.94; 
Retail: 1%: $1.98; 
Retail: Skim: $1.84.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.15; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $2.11; 
Retail: Skim: $1.96.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.40; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $1.98.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.17; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.11; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Average; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.07; 
Retail: 1%: $2.04; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.85.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.05; 
Retail: Whole: $2.17; 
Retail: 2%: $2.08; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $2.01; 
Cooperative: $2.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.53; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.41; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Average; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
1.54: [Empty]; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.08; 
2.08: [Empty]; 
Retail: Whole: $2.22; 
Retail: 2%: $2.13; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.94.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Milwaukee market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated 
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Milwaukee for 3.5 
percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by the 
commissary at the Naval Station Great Lakes, adjusted for a 5 percent 
markup; and the retail price is the price collected by Information 
Resources, Inc., for the Milwaukee market. Prices may not average due 
to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 19: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01; 
Retail: Whole: $1.84; 
Retail: 2%: $1.74; 
Retail: 1%: $1.86; 
Retail: Skim: $1.68.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $1.79; 
Retail: 1%: $1.89; 
Retail: Skim: $1.71.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01; 
Retail: Whole: $1.79; 
Retail: 2%: $1.79; 
Retail: 1%: $1.92; 
Retail: Skim: $1.74.

Average; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.01; 
Retail: Whole: $1.82; 
Retail: 2%: $1.77; 
Retail: 1%: $1.89; 
Retail: Skim: $1.71.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.47; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $1.78; 
Retail: 2%: $1.73; 
Retail: 1%: $1.85; 
Retail: Skim: $1.68.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $1.68; 
Retail: 2%: $1.67; 
Retail: 1%: $1.80; 
Retail: Skim: $1.64.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $1.66; 
Retail: 2%: $1.69; 
Retail: 1%: $1.85; 
Retail: Skim: $1.70.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $1.67; 
Retail: 2%: $1.72; 
Retail: 1%: $1.86; 
Retail: Skim: $1.76.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.48; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $1.65; 
Retail: 2%: $1.70; 
Retail: 1%: $1.88; 
Retail: Skim: $1.75.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $1.68; 
Retail: 2%: $1.71; 
Retail: 1%: $1.91; 
Retail: Skim: $1.78.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $1.68; 
Retail: 2%: $1.73; 
Retail: 1%: $1.94; 
Retail: Skim: $1.80.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.11; 
Retail: Whole: $1.69; 
Retail: 2%: $1.75; 
Retail: 1%: $1.96; 
Retail: Skim: $1.82.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18; 
Retail: Whole: $1.69; 
Retail: 2%: $1.76; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $1.69; 
Retail: 2%: $1.74; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.82.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.64; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.74; 
Retail: 2%: $1.80; 
Retail: 1%: $2.05; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29; 
Retail: Whole: $1.66; 
Retail: 2%: $1.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.00; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Average; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.12; 
Retail: Whole: $1.69; 
Retail: 2%: $1.73; 
Retail: 1%: $1.92; 
Retail: Skim: $1.77.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29; 
Retail: Whole: $1.68; 
Retail: 2%: $1.74; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.81.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.29; 
Retail: Whole: $1.76; 
Retail: 2%: $1.87; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.86.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.86; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.85; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.19; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.84; 
Retail: 2%: $1.97; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $2.04; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $2.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $2.04; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.97; 
Retail: 2%: $1.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.78; 
Retail: 2%: $1.85; 
Retail: 1%: $2.14; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.72; 
Retail: 2%: $1.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.00; 
Retail: Skim: $1.78.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.83; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $2.17; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Average; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $1.95; 
Retail: 1%: $2.19; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.87; 
Retail: 2%: $1.96; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $1.92.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.30; 
Retail: Whole: $1.75; 
Retail: 2%: $1.79; 
Retail: 1%: $2.00; 
Retail: Skim: $1.78.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $1.57; 
Retail: 2%: $1.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $1.54.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.97; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.52; 
Retail: 2%: $1.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $1.46.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.44; 
Retail: 2%: $1.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.75; 
Retail: Skim: $1.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.43; 
Retail: 2%: $1.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $1.31.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.45; 
Retail: 2%: $1.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $1.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.52; 
Retail: 2%: $1.46; 
Retail: 1%: $2.84; 
Retail: Skim: $1.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.24; 
Retail: Whole: $1.51; 
Retail: 2%: $1.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.98; 
Retail: Skim: $1.39.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $1.53; 
Retail: 2%: $1.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.81; 
Retail: Skim: $1.48.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.66; 
Retail: 2%: $1.88; 
Retail: 1%: $2.55; 
Retail: Skim: $1.86.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.48; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.57; 
Retail: 2%: $1.88; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Average; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.36; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.27; 
Retail: Whole: $1.57; 
Retail: 2%: $1.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $1.56.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.65; 
Retail: 2%: $1.94; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.64; 
Retail: 2%: $1.91; 
Retail: 1%: $2.55; 
Retail: Skim: $1.93.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.60; 
Retail: 2%: $1.80; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $1.81.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.52; 
Retail: 2%: $1.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $1.63.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.99; 
Cooperative: $2.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2004; 
Average; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.31; 
Retail: Whole: $1.70; 
Retail: 2%: $1.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.87.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Minneapolis market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated 
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Minneapolis for 
3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the price paid by 
the commissary at Fort McCoy, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the 
retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for 
the Minneapolis market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 20: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
October 2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Average; 
Farm: $1.22; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.33; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.23; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.56; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.38; 
Cooperative: $1.58; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.42; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.58.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22; 
Retail: Whole: $2.67; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.67.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.48; 
Cooperative: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.79; 
Retail: Skim: $2.74.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.74.

Average; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21; 
Retail: Whole: $2.66; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.66.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.79; 
Retail: Skim: $2.73.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $2.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.77; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.76; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.31; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.18; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.63.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.61; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Average; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.17; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.61; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.61.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.64.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.67.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.22; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.80; 
Retail: 1%: $2.89; 
Retail: Skim: $2.80.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.37; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.25; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.81; 
Retail: 1%: $2.86; 
Retail: Skim: $2.80.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.10; 
Retail: Whole: $2.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.79; 
Retail: 1%: $2.83; 
Retail: Skim: $2.79.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.25; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.14; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97; 
Retail: Whole: $2.76; 
Retail: 2%: $2.81; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $2.78.

Average; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.30; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.15; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.79; 
Retail: Skim: $2.75.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.70.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.75; 
Retail: Skim: $2.70.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.85; 
Retail: 1%: $2.88; 
Retail: Skim: $2.80.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.78; 
Cooperative: $2.08; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.33; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $3.18; 
Retail: 2%: $3.25; 
Retail: 1%: $3.28; 
Retail: Skim: $3.18.

Average; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.87; 
Retail: 1%: $2.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.83.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the New Orleans market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated 
farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative 
price is the announced cooperative Class I price for New Orleans for 
3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the 
prices paid by the Naval Support Activities, New Orleans; the Naval 
Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport; and Keesler Air Force Base 
commissaries, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is 
the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the New Orleans 
market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 21: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Phoenix, Arizona, October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.44; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.17; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $1.82; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Average; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.23; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $2.46.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.26.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.49; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.20.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.48; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.38; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61; 
Retail: Whole: $2.41; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.53; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.50; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.08; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76; 
Retail: Whole: $2.47; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Average; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.41; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.66; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.52; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.53; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.78; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.75; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.36; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.00; 
Cooperative: $1.09; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.48; 
Retail: 2%: $2.57; 
Retail: 1%: $2.60; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.52; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.60.

Average; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.57; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.64; 
Retail: Skim: $2.54.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.13; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.49; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.61; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.06; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.43; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $2.48.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.97; 
Cooperative: $1.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.44; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.97; 
Cooperative: $1.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.43; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.51; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.06; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.97; 
Cooperative: $1.06; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.32; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.79; 
Retail: Whole: $2.44; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.45.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97; 
Retail: Whole: $2.67; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.85; 
Retail: Skim: $2.67.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.33; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.16; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Average; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $2.39; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $2.41.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $1.97; 
Retail: 2%: $2.11; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.98; 
Retail: Whole: $2.14; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.18; 
Retail: Skim: $2.03.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.83; 
Cooperative: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.33; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.14; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.65; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Average; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.97; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.16.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Phoenix market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Phoenix for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid 
by the commissaries at Luke Air Force Base and Davis-Monthan Air Force 
Base, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the 
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Phoenix market. 
Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 22: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Salt Lake City, Utah, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $2.60; 
Retail: 2%: $2.18; 
Retail: 1%: $2.17; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.39; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.18; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Average; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.81; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.17; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.21; 
Retail: 1%: $2.19; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.09.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $2.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.39; 
Cooperative: $1.48; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.93; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.18; 
Retail: 1%: $2.16; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.42; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.39; 
Retail: 2%: $2.19; 
Retail: 1%: $2.12; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.36; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.17; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.39; 
Retail: 2%: $2.13; 
Retail: 1%: $2.13; 
Retail: Skim: $2.00.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.44; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.37; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.85; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.20; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.48; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.39; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.39; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.21.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.22; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.91; 
Retail: Whole: $2.41; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.33; 
Retail: Skim: $2.22.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.14; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.90; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Average; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.84; 
Retail: Whole: $2.42; 
Retail: 2%: $2.24; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.24; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.41; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $2.41; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.02; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.39; 
Retail: 2%: $2.38; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.26; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.09; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.37; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.09; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.01; 
Retail: 1%: $1.94; 
Retail: Skim: $1.91.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.06; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.46; 
Retail: 2%: $2.42; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.44; 
Retail: 1%: $2.41; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $1.97; 
Retail: 1%: $1.99; 
Retail: Skim: $1.84.

Average; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.07; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.96; 
Cooperative: $1.04; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.03; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.94; 
Cooperative: $1.02; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.09; 
Retail: 1%: $2.07; 
Retail: Skim: $1.85.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.11; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.89.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $1.96; 
Retail: 2%: $2.00; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.83.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.04; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.01; 
Retail: Skim: $1.86.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.77; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.11.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.92; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.51; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.27; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.22; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.29; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.09; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.05; 
Retail: 1%: $2.06; 
Retail: Skim: $1.88.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.26; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.07; 
Retail: Whole: $2.03; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Average; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.82; 
Retail: Whole: $2.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.14; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.21; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.18; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.99; 
Retail: Whole: $2.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.08; 
Retail: Skim: $1.93.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.86; 
Retail: Whole: $1.96; 
Retail: 2%: $2.03; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.90.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.80; 
Retail: Whole: $1.99; 
Retail: 2%: $2.06; 
Retail: 1%: $2.13; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.20; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.78; 
Retail: Whole: $2.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.02.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.81; 
Cooperative: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.52; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.28; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.03; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.38.

Average; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.16; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.10; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.89; 
Retail: Whole: $2.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.19; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Salt Lake City market, the farm price is the USDA-
estimated farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for Salt 
Lake City for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price is the 
price paid by the commissary at Hill Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Salt Lake City market. Prices may 
not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 23: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in San Diego, California, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.51; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.95; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.79; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Average; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.95; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.93; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.91; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.94; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.57; 
Retail: 1%: $2.77; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.05; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.84; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.85; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.81; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.91; 
Retail: 2%: $2.85; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.15; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $3.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.94; 
Retail: 1%: $2.99; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $3.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.99; 
Retail: 1%: $3.04; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.19; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $3.22; 
Retail: 2%: $2.95; 
Retail: 1%: $3.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.23; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.13; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $3.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.95; 
Retail: 1%: $3.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.61.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.11; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.02; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $3.18; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.81; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.06; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.01; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.00; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $3.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.94; 
Retail: 1%: $3.08; 
Retail: Skim: $2.52.

Average; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.09; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.97; 
Retail: 2%: $2.84; 
Retail: 1%: $2.94; 
Retail: Skim: $2.47.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $3.05; 
Retail: 2%: $2.91; 
Retail: 1%: $2.94; 
Retail: Skim: $2.46.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.01; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.95; 
Retail: 2%: $2.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.93; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $2.85; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.98; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61; 
Retail: Whole: $2.76; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.94; 
Cooperative: $1.14; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.88; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.90; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.85; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.87; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.85; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.77; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $0.89; 
Cooperative: $1.08; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $0.91; 
Cooperative: $1.08; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.64; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $0.94; 
Cooperative: $1.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $0.92; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $0.92; 
Cooperative: $1.08; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.71; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Average; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.66; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $0.92; 
Cooperative: $1.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.68; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.84; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $0.89; 
Cooperative: $1.06; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50; 
Retail: Whole: $2.74; 
Retail: 2%: $2.63; 
Retail: 1%: $2.94; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.87; 
Cooperative: $1.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.72; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.70; 
Retail: 2%: $2.58; 
Retail: 1%: $2.78; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.88; 
Cooperative: $1.02; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.60; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.27.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.87; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.87; 
Cooperative: $1.04; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.68; 
Retail: 1%: $2.78; 
Retail: Skim: $2.30.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.82; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.84; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $3.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.98; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.04; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.73; 
Retail: Whole: $3.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $3.07; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.16; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.08; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.76; 
Retail: Whole: $3.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.86; 
Retail: 1%: $3.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.43.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.03; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.07; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.06; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.75; 
Retail: Whole: $3.12; 
Retail: 2%: $2.80; 
Retail: 1%: $3.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.94; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.98; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.97; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.93; 
Retail: Skim: $2.23.

Average; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.56; 
Retail: Whole: $2.87; 
Retail: 2%: $2.69; 
Retail: 1%: $2.94; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.04; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55; 
Retail: Whole: $2.64; 
Retail: 2%: $2.45; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.43; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.26; 
Cooperative: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.40; 
Retail: Whole: $2.55; 
Retail: 2%: $2.34; 
Retail: 1%: $2.76; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.48; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.76; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.63; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.85; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.41; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.34; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.25; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.83; 
Retail: Whole: $3.03; 
Retail: 2%: $2.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.93; 
Retail: Skim: $2.40.

Average; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.86; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.53; 
Retail: Whole: $2.72; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.77; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.21.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture, the Defense Commissary Agency, and 
Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the San Diego market, the farm price is the California 
mailbox price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the Southern California Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; 
the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid by the 
commissaries at the Naval Base, San Diego; Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Pendleton; Naval Outlying Landing Field, Imperial Beach; Marine Corps 
Air Station, Miramar; Naval Air Station, North Island; and by the San 
Onofre Commissary, Camp Pendleton, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and 
the retail price is the price collected by Information Resources, Inc., 
for the San Diego market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 24: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Seattle, Washington, October 
2000 through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.59; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31; 
Retail: Whole: $2.71; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.14; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.30; 
Retail: Whole: $2.83; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.58; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.33; 
Retail: Whole: $2.73; 
Retail: 2%: $2.57; 
Retail: 1%: $2.57; 
Retail: Skim: $2.45.

Average; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.59; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31; 
Retail: Whole: $2.76; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.55; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48; 
Retail: Whole: $2.62; 
Retail: 2%: $2.39; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Month: February; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.33; 
Retail: Whole: $2.98; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Month: March; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.64; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.36; 
Retail: Whole: $2.77; 
Retail: 2%: $2.52; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $2.29.

Month: April; 
Farm: $1.27; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.59; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.95; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.54.

Month: May; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51; 
Retail: Whole: $2.95; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.44.

Month: June; 
Farm: $1.41; 
Cooperative: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.84; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.57; 
Retail: Whole: $2.80; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.70; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Month: July; 
Farm: $1.44; 
Cooperative: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $3.14; 
Retail: 2%: $3.01; 
Retail: 1%: $2.85; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Month: August; 
Farm: $1.44; 
Cooperative: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.88; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61; 
Retail: Whole: $3.15; 
Retail: 2%: $2.99; 
Retail: 1%: $2.85; 
Retail: Skim: $2.71.

Month: September; 
Farm: $1.46; 
Cooperative: $1.54; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.89; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.62; 
Retail: Whole: $2.84; 
Retail: 2%: $2.65; 
Retail: 1%: $2.62; 
Retail: Skim: $2.43.

Month: October; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.92; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.92; 
Retail: 2%: $2.72; 
Retail: 1%: $2.69; 
Retail: Skim: $2.46.

Month: November; 
Farm: $1.47; 
Cooperative: $1.56; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.91; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.63; 
Retail: Whole: $3.01; 
Retail: 2%: $2.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Month: December; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32; 
Retail: Whole: $2.93; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.47.

Average; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.78; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.51; 
Retail: Whole: $2.92; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.67; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.15; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32; 
Retail: Whole: $3.18; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $2.67.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.60; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.32; 
Retail: Whole: $3.13; 
Retail: 2%: $2.86; 
Retail: 1%: $2.74; 
Retail: Skim: $2.62.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.12; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.29; 
Retail: Whole: $3.16; 
Retail: 2%: $2.91; 
Retail: 1%: $2.78; 
Retail: Skim: $2.68.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.11; 
Cooperative: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.35; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.28; 
Retail: Whole: $2.99; 
Retail: 2%: $2.66; 
Retail: 1%: $2.59; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.17; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.54; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.26; 
Retail: Whole: $3.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.48.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.07; 
Cooperative: $1.15; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.52; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.24; 
Retail: Whole: $3.08; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.54; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.12; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.27; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.21; 
Retail: Whole: $3.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.67; 
Retail: 1%: $2.69; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.43.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.10; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20; 
Retail: Whole: $3.01; 
Retail: 2%: $2.70; 
Retail: 1%: $2.71; 
Retail: Skim: $2.47.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $0.99; 
Cooperative: $1.07; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.45; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17; 
Retail: Whole: $3.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.77; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.56.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.34; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.19; 
Retail: Whole: $2.98; 
Retail: 2%: $2.73; 
Retail: 1%: $2.69; 
Retail: Skim: $2.41.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.02; 
Cooperative: $1.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.20; 
Retail: Whole: $2.98; 
Retail: 2%: $2.76; 
Retail: 1%: $2.75; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Average; 
Farm: $1.08; 
Cooperative: $1.16; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.52; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.39; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.24; 
Retail: Whole: $3.05; 
Retail: 2%: $2.74; 
Retail: 1%: $2.68; 
Retail: Skim: $2.50.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.03; 
Cooperative: $1.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.47; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.35; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.19; 
Retail: Whole: $3.12; 
Retail: 2%: $3.04; 
Retail: 1%: $2.91; 
Retail: Skim: $2.78.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.00; 
Cooperative: $1.08; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17; 
Retail: Whole: $3.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.92; 
Retail: 1%: $2.73; 
Retail: Skim: $2.53.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $0.96; 
Cooperative: $1.05; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.42; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.29; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.21; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.14; 
Retail: Whole: $2.97; 
Retail: 2%: $2.75; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.42.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.03; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.27; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.19; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.12; 
Retail: Whole: $3.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.49.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.04; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.16; 
Retail: Whole: $2.94; 
Retail: 2%: $2.81; 
Retail: 1%: $2.66; 
Retail: Skim: $2.45.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $0.96; 
Cooperative: $1.04; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.17; 
Retail: Whole: $3.00; 
Retail: 2%: $2.82; 
Retail: 1%: $2.76; 
Retail: Skim: $2.54.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $0.95; 
Cooperative: $1.04; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.45; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.18; 
Retail: Whole: $3.07; 
Retail: 2%: $2.86; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $2.55.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.05; 
Cooperative: $1.15; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.55; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.28; 
Retail: Whole: $3.11; 
Retail: 2%: $2.93; 
Retail: 1%: $2.90; 
Retail: Skim: $2.65.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.81; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54; 
Retail: Whole: $3.22; 
Retail: 2%: $3.00; 
Retail: 1%: $3.01; 
Retail: Skim: $2.72.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.85; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.88; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $3.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.98; 
Retail: 1%: $2.97; 
Retail: Skim: $2.69.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.35; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.82; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $3.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.89; 
Retail: 1%: $2.93; 
Retail: Skim: $2.63.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.30; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.99; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55; 
Retail: Whole: $2.75; 
Retail: 2%: $2.62; 
Retail: 1%: $2.49; 
Retail: Skim: $2.39.

Average; 
Farm: $1.09; 
Cooperative: $1.18; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.31; 
Retail: Whole: $3.03; 
Retail: 2%: $2.88; 
Retail: 1%: $2.80; 
Retail: Skim: $2.57.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.22; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.92; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.47; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.10; 
Cooperative: $1.20; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.65; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.81; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.13; 
Cooperative: $1.23; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.60; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.44; 
Retail: 2%: $2.46; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.28; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.90; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.76; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.64; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.46; 
Retail: Skim: $2.32.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.80; 
Cooperative: $1.89; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.38; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.24; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.96; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.13; 
Retail: Whole: $3.06; 
Retail: 2%: $2.88; 
Retail: 1%: $2.82; 
Retail: Skim: $2.61.

Average; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.69; 
Retail: 2%: $2.59; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Seattle market, the farm price is the USDA-estimated farm 
Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the cooperative price is 
the announced cooperative Class I price for Seattle for 3.5 percent 
milkfat content; the wholesale price is the average of the prices paid 
by the commissaries at the Naval Station Everett, Smokey Point Support 
Center; Fort Lewis; and McChord Air Force Base, adjusted for a 5 
percent markup; and the retail price is the price collected by 
Information Resources, Inc., for the Seattle market. Prices may not 
average due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 25: Prices for a Gallon of Milk in Washington, D.C., October 2000 
through May 2004: 

Year: 2000; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2000; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.09; 
Retail: 2%: $2.10; 
Retail: 1%: $2.09; 
Retail: Skim: $1.94.

Year: 2000; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.51; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.11; 
Retail: 2%: $2.12; 
Retail: 1%: $2.11; 
Retail: Skim: $1.97.

Average; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.67; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.51; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.42; 
Retail: Whole: $2.10; 
Retail: 2%: $2.11; 
Retail: 1%: $2.10; 
Retail: Skim: $1.95.

Year: 2001; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.54; 
Cooperative: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.62; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54; 
Retail: Whole: $2.21; 
Retail: 2%: $2.24; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2001; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.67; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.22; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.23; 
Retail: Skim: $2.04.

Year: 2001; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.43; 
Cooperative: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48; 
Retail: Whole: $2.21; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.05.

Year: 2001; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.49; 
Cooperative: $1.57; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.79; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.64; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2001; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2001; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.63; 
Cooperative: $1.70; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.93; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.77; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.65; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2001; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.63; 
Cooperative: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.25; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2001; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.64; 
Cooperative: $1.71; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.96; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.74; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.68; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.26; 
Retail: Skim: $2.10.

Year: 2001; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.65; 
Cooperative: $1.72; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.97; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.80; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.75; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.69; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2001; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.68; 
Cooperative: $1.76; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.78; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.37; 
Retail: 2%: $2.35; 
Retail: 1%: $2.34; 
Retail: Skim: $2.17.

Year: 2001; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.69; 
Cooperative: $1.77; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.99; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.79; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.74; 
Retail: Whole: $2.38; 
Retail: 2%: $2.39; 
Retail: 1%: $2.40; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2001; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.73; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.57; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.60; 
Retail: Whole: $2.35; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.19.

Average; 
Farm: $1.56; 
Cooperative: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.68; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.61; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.12.

Year: 2002; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.54; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55; 
Retail: Whole: $2.36; 
Retail: 2%: $2.36; 
Retail: 1%: $2.35; 
Retail: Skim: $2.18.

Year: 2002; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.68; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.52; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.52; 
Retail: Whole: $2.33; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2002; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.65; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.50; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.15.

Year: 2002; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.33; 
Cooperative: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.64; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.43; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49; 
Retail: Whole: $2.30; 
Retail: 2%: $2.30; 
Retail: 1%: $2.30; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2002; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.31; 
Cooperative: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.63; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.48; 
Retail: Whole: $2.32; 
Retail: 2%: $2.31; 
Retail: 1%: $2.32; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2002; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.46; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.12.

Year: 2002; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.31; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2002; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.28; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2002; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.31; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.27; 
Retail: 2%: $2.27; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2002; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.21; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.54; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.34; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.12.

Year: 2002; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.25; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.57; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.41; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.37; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.44; 
Retail: Whole: $2.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.20; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.08.

Year: 2002; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.24; 
Retail: 2%: $2.25; 
Retail: 1%: $2.24; 
Retail: Skim: $2.09.

Average; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.61; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.44; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.41; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.47; 
Retail: Whole: $2.29; 
Retail: 2%: $2.28; 
Retail: 1%: $2.29; 
Retail: Skim: $2.13.

Year: 2003; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.24; 
Cooperative: $1.32; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.56; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.40; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.43; 
Retail: Whole: $2.20; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2003; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.20; 
Cooperative: $1.28; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.53; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.37; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.41; 
Retail: Whole: $2.19; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.08.

Year: 2003; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.50; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.18; 
Retail: 2%: $2.19; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2003; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.24; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.48; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.32; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.29; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.22; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.21; 
Retail: Skim: $2.07.

Year: 2003; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $1.17; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.23; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.22; 
Retail: Skim: $2.07.

Year: 2003; 
Month: June; 
Farm: $1.18; 
Cooperative: $1.25; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.49; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.33; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.38; 
Retail: Whole: $2.25; 
Retail: 2%: $2.22; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.06.

Year: 2003; 
Month: July; 
Farm: $1.19; 
Cooperative: $1.26; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.50; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.34; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.30; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.39; 
Retail: Whole: $2.28; 
Retail: 2%: $2.23; 
Retail: 1%: $2.20; 
Retail: Skim: $2.07.

Year: 2003; 
Month: August; 
Farm: $1.29; 
Cooperative: $1.36; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.58; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.43; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.38; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.45; 
Retail: Whole: $2.34; 
Retail: 2%: $2.29; 
Retail: 1%: $2.27; 
Retail: Skim: $2.14.

Year: 2003; 
Month: September; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.74; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.55; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.59; 
Retail: Whole: $2.50; 
Retail: 2%: $2.47; 
Retail: 1%: $2.42; 
Retail: Skim: $2.28.

Year: 2003; 
Month: October; 
Farm: $1.57; 
Cooperative: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.86; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.70; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.65; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.71; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.51; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35.

Year: 2003; 
Month: November; 
Farm: $1.58; 
Cooperative: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.87; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.71; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.72; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.53; 
Retail: 1%: $2.50; 
Retail: Skim: $2.34.

Year: 2003; 
Month: December; 
Farm: $1.53; 
Cooperative: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.83; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.67; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.63; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.70; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.55; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $2.37.

Average; 
Farm: $1.32; 
Cooperative: $1.39; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.62; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.49; 
Retail: Whole: $2.35; 
Retail: 2%: $2.33; 
Retail: 1%: $2.31; 
Retail: Skim: $2.16.

Year: 2004; 
Month: January; 
Farm: $1.36; 
Cooperative: $1.44; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.69; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.53; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.49; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.58; 
Retail: Whole: $2.59; 
Retail: 2%: $2.54; 
Retail: 1%: $2.51; 
Retail: Skim: $2.36.

Year: 2004; 
Month: February; 
Farm: $1.34; 
Cooperative: $1.42; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.46; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.55; 
Retail: Whole: $2.56; 
Retail: 2%: $2.50; 
Retail: 1%: $2.48; 
Retail: Skim: $2.33.

Year: 2004; 
Month: March; 
Farm: $1.37; 
Cooperative: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.50; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.45; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.54; 
Retail: Whole: $2.53; 
Retail: 2%: $2.48; 
Retail: 1%: $2.45; 
Retail: Skim: $2.31.

Year: 2004; 
Month: April; 
Farm: $1.51; 
Cooperative: $1.59; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.66; 
Retail: Whole: $2.58; 
Retail: 2%: $2.49; 
Retail: 1%: $2.43; 
Retail: Skim: $2.25.

Year: 2004; 
Month: May; 
Farm: $2.03; 
Cooperative: $2.11; 
Wholesale: Whole: $2.28; 
Wholesale: 2%: $2.12; 
Wholesale: 1%: $2.05; 
Wholesale: Skim: $2.04; 
Retail: Whole: $2.90; 
Retail: 2%: $2.78; 
Retail: 1%: $2.72; 
Retail: Skim: $2.51.

Average; 
Farm: $1.52; 
Cooperative: $1.60; 
Wholesale: Whole: $1.82; 
Wholesale: 2%: $1.66; 
Wholesale: 1%: $1.61; 
Wholesale: Skim: $1.67; 
Retail: Whole: $2.63; 
Retail: 2%: $2.56; 
Retail: 1%: $2.52; 
Retail: Skim: $2.35. 

[End of table]

Source: GAO's analysis of price data provided by USDA, the Defense 
Commissary Agency, and Information Resources, Inc.

Note: For the Washington, D.C., market, the farm price is the USDA-
estimated farm Class I price for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the 
cooperative price is the announced cooperative Class I price for 
Washington, D.C., for 3.5 percent milkfat content; the wholesale price 
is the average of the prices paid by the commissaries at Bolling Air 
Force Base; Walter Reed Army Medical Center; Fort Myer; Fort Belvoir; 
the Marine Corps Base, Quantico; Andrews Air Force Base; Aberdeen 
Proving Ground; the Naval Station, Annapolis; Fort Meade; and Fort 
Detrick, adjusted for a 5 percent markup; and the retail price is the 
price collected by Information Resources, Inc., for the Washington, 
D.C., market. Prices may not average due to rounding.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Factors That Influence the Price of Milk as It Moves from 
the Farm to the Consumer: 

The prices that farmers, cooperatives, wholesale processors, and 
retailers receive are determined by the interaction of many factors, 
such as forces affecting the supply of raw milk and manufactured and 
fluid milk products, consumer demand for manufactured and fluid milk 
products, federal and state dairy programs, the level of services 
provided by dairy cooperatives, market structure at various levels of 
the marketing chain, and other input costs of processing and retailing. 
Dairy farmers receive a price for raw milk, and each entity involved in 
the processing and marketing of fluid milk adds value to the product 
and retains a portion of the difference between the farm and retail 
prices. (This difference is known as the price spread.) This appendix 
examines the key factors that influence milk prices at the different 
levels of the marketing chain.

Market Forces, in Addition to Federal and State Policies, Influence 
Milk Prices at the Farm Level: 

Supply and demand forces, which in turn are influenced by federal and 
state dairy programs, determine farm prices for the raw milk that is 
sold for use in fluid milk and other dairy products.[Footnote 36] For 
example, in recent months, a variety of supply and demand forces have 
come together to significantly increase farm milk prices. On the supply 
side, the available supply of raw milk has been reduced by farmers 
cutting back production due to a previous period of low prices and by 
the closing of the Canadian border to replacement cows as a result of 
concerns about mad cow disease.[Footnote 37] On the demand side, 
consumer demand for nonfluid dairy products has increased as consumers 
resumed eating out following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and as 
dietary trends, such as the rising popularity of low-carbohydrate 
diets, have changed. While these forces have been driving recent price 
trends, federal and state dairy programs continue to influence milk 
prices. For example, major domestic programs such as federal milk 
marketing orders (FMMOs) and price supports help individual farmers who 
lack market power compared to other entities such as wholesale 
processors and retailers and help to ensure that farm prices do not 
fall below a minimum level. At the same time, U.S. import restrictions 
maintain domestic dairy prices at levels higher than average 
international market prices by limiting the quantities of milk products 
that are imported into the country.

Supply and Demand Forces Affect Farm Milk Prices: 

The quantity of raw milk that dairy farmers supply (production) is 
determined by the operating costs of producing that milk, such as feed 
and fuel,[Footnote 38] ownership costs for dairying equipment,[Footnote 
39] land costs, and labor costs, as well as the price that farmers 
expect to receive for milk (as based on demand). Of these costs, the 
2002 annual report on the costs of milk production in California, the 
largest milk producing state, showed that the highest cost is feed, at 
44 percent of milk production costs. Other major costs include 
replacement cows (14 percent), other operating expenses (13 percent), 
and labor (11 percent).[Footnote 40] Milk production can also vary 
seasonally, according to weather, and is affected by farmers' 
management practices.

In February 2004, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) published a 
report on the characteristics and costs of milk production in the 
United States, which found that dairy farmers in the West had a cost 
advantage over farmers in other regions because western operations were 
appreciably larger.[Footnote 41] Farms with 500 or more milk cows had 
substantially lower total operating and ownership costs, averaging 
$11.60 per hundredweight of milk sold. This cost advantage arises 
because as herd size increases, associated increases in fixed costs, 
such as capital investments, are spread proportionally over a larger 
amount of production, thereby lowering the fixed costs per 
hundredweight of milk produced. USDA found that the average herd size 
of low-cost operations was more than three times the size of high-cost 
operations.[Footnote 42] Table 26 shows the average ownership and 
operating costs by region and herd size in 2000.

Table 26: Average Ownership and Operating Costs by Region and Herd 
Size, 2000: 

Region: Arizona/Las Vegas, Pacific Northwest, California[A]; 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $11.58.

Region: Upper Midwest[B]; 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $14.40.

Region: Northeast[C]; 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $14.44.

Region: Central[D]; 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $18.09.

Region: Mideast/Southeast[E];
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $18.23.

Herd size: Small (<50); 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $17.98.

Herd size: Medium (50-199); 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $15.16.

Herd size: Large (200-499); 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $13.32.

Herd size: Industrial (>500); 
Ownership and operating costs per hundredweight: $11.60.

Source: USDA.

[A] States in this survey region included parts of Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.

[B] States in this survey region included Michigan and Wisconsin and 
part of Minnesota.

[C] States in this survey region included Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont and parts of Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

[D] States in this survey region included Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa 
and parts of Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South 
Dakota.

[E] States in this survey region included West Virginia and parts of 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.

[End of table]

The USDA study also reported that while milk is produced in all 50 
states, the top 5 milk-producing states in 2000--California, Wisconsin, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota--accounted for 53 percent of 
total milk produced. Growth in the importance of western regions as 
major sources of milk over the past 25 years is a significant feature 
of the United States dairy industry. For example, in 1975, midwestern 
states such as Iowa, Ohio, and Missouri were prominent among the top 10 
dairy producing states. By 2000, production in Idaho, New Mexico, and 
Washington State surpassed production in these traditional dairy 
states. Milk production is consolidating so that farms with larger 
numbers of cows account for a growing share of production. In 1993, 
farms with 100 or more cows accounted for 14 percent of all U.S. dairy 
farms, over half of all cows, and over 55 percent of the milk produced. 
As of 2000, these numbers had grown to 20 percent of all dairy farms, 
66 percent of all cows, and more than 70 percent of milk produced. 
Significantly, farms with 500 or more cows accounted for 3 percent of 
all dairy farms, but 35 percent of cows and 31 percent of milk produced 
in 2000.

The production of milk has unique characteristics that distinguish it 
from other agricultural products and that cause relatively small 
changes in supply or demand to result in relatively large changes in 
price, particularly at the farm level. Farmers employ specialized 
assets or equipment to produce milk, and they have limited ability to 
use their farms, cows, and equipment for other purposes during periods 
of low prices. This limited flexibility creates a relatively inelastic 
supply of milk with respect to price.[Footnote 43]

Demand for raw milk is mainly derived from consumer demand for fluid 
milk and manufactured milk products.[Footnote 44] Consumer demand for 
different fluid or manufactured milk products affects the price of raw 
milk used for other products because increased consumer demand for one 
particular product-causing more of that product to be produced--reduces 
the supply of raw milk available for other products, thus increasing 
the price that manufacturers of other products must pay to acquire raw 
milk. Over the long term, per capita demand for fluid milk products has 
been steadily declining, in large part because consumers have 
substituted carbonated soft drinks and other beverages for fluid milk. 
On the other hand, consumer demand for milk products has varied based 
on dietary considerations, such as the rising popularity of low-
carbohydrate diets and changes in food consumption patterns, such as an 
increase in the amount of food consumed away from the home. Despite 
some evidence that consumer demand for fluid milk has become more 
price elastic, it remains relatively price inelastic compared to the 
demand for many other products.[Footnote 45]

Given the relative inelasticities of milk supply and demand with 
respect to price, a number of sources indicated that recent changes in 
the amount of raw milk produced, when combined with changes in demand, 
have affected farm prices. After late 1999, farm prices began falling 
in response to the production surplus that existed at that time. In 
addition, a number of dairy experts indicated that following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prices began to fall even 
further as people stopped eating out as much, thereby reducing the 
demand for manufactured milk products such as cheese.[Footnote 46] This 
reduced consumption compounded the long-term decline in demand for 
fluid milk products. USDA reported that the combination of these supply 
and demand factors was responsible for the low farm prices that 
occurred during 2002 and 2003.

More recently, however, supply and demand conditions have changed to 
produce record high farm prices in 2004. For example, in response to 
low prices during 2002 and 2003, some farmers began to cut back on 
production by reducing the sizes of their herds. However, with the 
relative price inelasticity of milk supplies, one academic expert noted 
that it can take 12 to 18 months to achieve a supply response to low 
prices. During this time, the identification of a cow infected with mad 
cow disease in Alberta, Canada, in May 2003, led to a temporary U.S. 
ban on imports of Canadian beef and cattle. This ban included live 
animals, some of which would have been used as replacement cows in U.S. 
dairy herds. While some beef imports have resumed, USDA has not lifted 
restrictions on imports of live cattle.[Footnote 47] Consequently, in 
June 2004, a report by USDA's Economic Research Service noted that with 
relatively few expansions in late 2003 and the tight supplies of 
replacement cows, few dairy farmers could increase production in 
response to rising milk prices, a response that usually limits price 
increases.[Footnote 48]

Another factor in reducing milk production has been the lower amount of 
bST--a hormone used in milk production--available to U.S. 
farmers.[Footnote 49] USDA reported that about 2 percent of the U.S. 
milk supply can be attributed to the use of bST.[Footnote 50] However, 
in January 2004, Monsanto, the maker of the hormone, announced that its 
customers would receive only half their normal supply. This reduced 
availability began March 1 and is expected to continue through the end 
of 2004. Additionally, drought conditions in recent years have led to 
higher feed costs and have negatively affected the quality of the 
feed.[Footnote 51] Finally, some sources identified the National Milk 
Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working Together program as another 
factor leading to reduced raw milk supplies.[Footnote 52] Since the 
program began in July 2003, cooperatives have tried to reduce raw milk 
supplies by eliminating some dairy herds, decreasing production, and 
increasing exports. USDA estimates indicate that from January through 
June 2004, milk production in the top 20 dairy producing states 
averaged about 1 percent below production levels during the same period 
in 2003.

While these factors combined to reduce the available supply of raw 
milk, dairy experts indicated that demand for manufactured milk 
products has recovered during 2004. In part, they cited a general 
economic recovery as contributing to this increased demand. They also 
indicated that people have returned to consuming more food away from 
home, as they did prior to September 11, 2001. This recovery in demand, 
coming at a time of reduced milk supplies, pushed farm prices to record 
high levels in April and May of 2004. For example, USDA's market-based 
announced minimum price for milk to be used in manufactured products, 
such as cheese, was $19.66 and $20.58 per hundredweight in April and 
May of 2004, respectively. These prices compare with $9.41 and $9.71 
per hundredweight for April and May of 2003. More recently, these high 
prices have started to moderate; the comparable announced minimum price 
for June 2004 was $17.68. However, USDA has estimated that average 2004 
farm-level prices will be more than $3 per hundredweight higher than 
they were in 2003.

Federal and State Dairy Programs and Policies Influence Farm Prices: 

A complex system of programs and policies influences the price of raw 
milk used to produce fluid milk and manufactured products. USDA's milk 
marketing orders, as well as some states' dairy programs, attempt to 
stabilize milk marketing conditions by establishing minimum raw milk 
prices and other marketing rules, thus, these programs assist 
individual farmers and dairy cooperatives, which lack the market power 
of other entities such as wholesale milk processors.[Footnote 53] 
USDA's price support program attempts to ensure that farm prices do not 
fall below a minimum level, and, together with the Milk Income Loss 
Contract (MILC) program, provides a safety net for individual farmers 
during periods of low prices. These programs and other federal dairy 
policies operate in a broader context of trade restrictions, which can 
limit competition from imported dairy products and maintain U.S. prices 
above average international market prices.

Federal and State Milk Marketing Orders: 

In 2003, the price of about 67 percent of the fluid grade milk marketed 
by dairy farmers in the United States was regulated under the FMMO 
program, created in 1933 and administered by USDA.[Footnote 54] Under 
this program, USDA uses national dairy market price information to set 
the minimum prices that must be paid by processors for raw fluid grade 
milk in specified marketing areas, or orders.[Footnote 55] Figure 32 
shows a map of the current 10 FMMOs.

Figure 32: Map of Federal Milk Marketing Orders: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Under the FMMO program, USDA has a classified pricing system for 
setting minimum prices for milk on a monthly basis, based upon the 
intended use of the milk, as shown in table 27. While there is some 
variation among the methods used for setting prices in different 
orders, in general, FMMO class prices are determined by formulas with 
milk component values derived from wholesale dairy product prices. For 
example, Class III formulas use weekly average butter, cheese, and dry 
whey prices to determine values on a monthly basis for butterfat, 
protein, and nonfat solids. The Class IV formulas use weekly average 
butter and nonfat dry milk prices to determine values on a monthly 
basis for butterfat and nonfat solids, respectively. The Class II price 
is determined by adding a fixed amount--a Class II differential of 
$0.70 per hundredweight--to the advanced Class IV skim milk value, 
while the Class I price is determined by adding a Class I differential 
to the higher of the advanced Class III or IV skim milk 
values.[Footnote 56] The Class I differentials vary by order. These 
differentials were, and to some extent remain, designed to represent 
the cost of transporting milk from areas with a surplus--traditionally 
the Upper Midwest region--to areas with a deficit, when necessary to 
meet the demands for fluid milk products. Because these differentials 
vary among orders, Class I prices differ from one marketing order to 
another.

Table 27: USDA's Milk Classes Used for Setting Milk Prices: 

Class: I; 
Usage (examples): Fluid milk for drinking purposes.

Class: II; 
Usage (examples): Soft manufactured products, such as cream products, 
cottage cheese, ice cream, and yogurt.

Class: III; 
Usage (examples): Cream cheese, other spreadable cheeses, and hard 
cheese.

Class: IV; 
Usage (examples): Butter and dried milk products, such as nonfat dry 
milk.

Source: GAO presentation of USDA data.

[End of table]

Dairy farmers selling raw milk to manufactured or fluid milk processors 
regulated by an FMMO receive an average, or "blend," price that is the 
weighted average of the prices of Class I through IV milk. The weights 
are determined by the amount of milk sold in each class in the 
marketing order. The average price farmers receive, therefore, depends 
in part on the extent to which the total raw milk supply in a specific 
order is used to make fluid milk, as opposed to the three classes of 
manufactured products. Dairy farmers located in a milk marketing order 
sometimes ship their milk to another order to obtain a higher 
price.[Footnote 57] If the farmer meets the receiving milk marketing 
order's shipping requirements, all of that farmer's milk, not only the 
shipped milk, can qualify for that order's blend price.[Footnote 58] 
However, farmers must consider whether the benefit of receiving a 
higher blend price outweighs the cost of transporting a sufficient 
amount of milk to qualify for the receiving order's blend price.

To generate the money paid to farmers, processors pay into, or draw 
from, a federal order "pool" based on the value of the use for which 
they are buying the raw milk.[Footnote 59] Fluid milk processors are 
required to participate in the federal order pool if they are covered 
by one of the federal milk marketing orders. Processors of manufactured 
products are not required to participate in the pool. Under the 
classified pricing system, raw milk used in fluid products is valued 
more highly. Therefore, the fluid milk processors typically pay money 
to the pool, while those producing other products typically draw money 
from the pool. This draw represents a benefit to processors of 
manufactured milk products for serving as a reserve supply plant for 
that order's Class I market. In part, a processor's payment or draw 
depends on the producer price differential, a measure of the difference 
between the value of that processor's use of raw milk as determined by 
the market and the value if all of that processor's raw milk were used 
in Class III products. In times of significant price volatility, it is 
possible for the producer price differential to be negative, so that 
some processors of manufactured products would have to pay into the 
pool. In such cases, some of these processors choose not to participate 
in the pool, or de-pool their milk, because they would be required to 
pay into the pool instead of receiving a draw.

Some states, such as California, Maine, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia, have established their own minimum farm-level milk 
pricing programs that cover all or portions of their states. These 
states have established commissions or boards to perform functions 
similar to those of USDA. For example, Virginia's milk commission, 
created in 1934, establishes monthly farm prices to ensure dairy 
farmers an adequate return on their investment and to preserve market 
stability. Similarly, Nevada's dairy commission, established in 1955, 
sets minimum prices for raw milk sold to processing facilities located 
within that state.

Dairy Price Support Program: 

The dairy price support program, established in 1949, supports farm 
prices by providing a standing offer from USDA's Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) to purchase butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk at 
specified prices.[Footnote 60] The prices offered for these dairy 
products are intended to provide sufficient revenue so that processors 
of these products can pay farmers, on average, a legislatively set 
support price for raw milk. Since 1999, the support price has been set 
at $9.90 per hundredweight.[Footnote 61]

By offering to purchase as much butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk as 
processors offer to sell at specified prices, the price support program 
sets a floor on the price of these commodities and, thus, indirectly on 
the raw milk used to produce them. Because processors are not required 
to sell to the CCC and milk processing costs vary, farmers may receive 
prices that are either above or below the support price. However, 
manufactured product prices generally will not fall below the floor for 
very long. Also, because the price for raw milk used for fluid purposes 
under the FMMO program is based in part on the price of raw milk used 
for manufacturing purposes, the price support program indirectly 
influences the price that farmers receive for raw milk used for fluid 
purposes as well.

The Secretary of Agriculture can adjust--or tilt--the related CCC 
purchase prices for butter and nonfat dry milk and still achieve the 
target support price for raw milk used in manufactured products. These 
products are considered joint products manufactured from the same 100 
pounds of milk.[Footnote 62] Therefore, by increasing the support price 
of butter while lowering the support price of nonfat dry milk, or vice 
versa, USDA is able to adjust the CCC purchase prices, while 
maintaining the overall support price. The ability to adjust the 
relative purchase prices of these products is important for correcting 
imbalances in the CCC's purchases of milkfat (butter) and nonfat solids 
(nonfat dry milk). Failure to correct for such imbalances can create an 
incentive for farmers to expand production and may alter the flow of 
milk to alternative uses. The 1990 Farm Bill authorized the Secretary 
of Agriculture to adjust the tilt twice annually to limit the 
accumulation of significant government stocks of certain 
commodities.[Footnote 63]

As market prices rise, the support program allows the CCC to release 
its commodity stocks if the market price for a particular commodity 
exceeds that commodity's purchase price. In this respect, the program 
helps to decrease volatility in milk prices with regard to high-price 
periods as well as low-price periods.

Milk Income Loss Contract Program: 

In 2002, the MILC program began to provide countercyclical payments 
directly to farmers during periods of low prices.[Footnote 64] The MILC 
program provides support to farmers when the price of Class I milk in 
Boston falls below $16.94.[Footnote 65] MILC payments are equal to 45 
percent of the difference between $16.94 and the lower Boston Class I 
price. Farmers in all regions of the country have access to payments 
under this program, but only 2.4 million pounds of milk per farm are 
eligible for payments during each federal fiscal year. Farmers may 
choose the month that they begin accepting their payments.[Footnote 66] 
This discretion may enable farmers producing more than 2.4 million 
pounds of milk per year to target their MILC payments during the 
lowest-price periods of the year to maximize the MILC payments they 
receive before reaching the cap on eligible production.

Trade Restrictions and Export Incentives for Dairy Products: 

According to some government and academic experts, trade restrictions 
have the greatest effect of any federal policy on farm milk prices. 
Trade restrictions maintain U.S. prices above average international 
market prices by restricting the amount of imports, particularly of 
manufactured dairy products, that enter the country.[Footnote 67] In 
other countries, costs of production may be lower, or exports may be 
more heavily subsidized, possibly allowing these countries to export 
products to the United States at competitive prices. Thus, without 
trade restrictions, manufactured products from these other countries 
might enter the United States in greater quantities. This increased 
supply of manufactured products would be expected to decrease the 
demand for domestic raw milk and lead to lower farm prices. Without 
these trade restrictions, other dairy programs, such as the price 
support program, might not be feasible because lower manufactured 
product prices resulting from international competition could trigger 
an increase in purchases by the CCC, which could render the program 
prohibitively expensive.

The primary U.S. international trade restriction is the tariff-rate 
quota, which is the primary international trade restriction allowed 
under current international agreements. USDA's Foreign Agricultural 
Service uses licensing to administer a tariff-rate quota system for 
most dairy products. Under tariff-rate quotas, a low tariff rate 
applies to imports up to a specified quantity, and a higher tariff rate 
applies to any imports exceeding that amount. These higher over-quota 
tariff rates generally limit trade to within quota levels. Quota rates 
and quantities vary by product.

Another aspect of U.S. trade policy that affects farm prices is the 
Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), an initiative that aims to help 
exporters of certain U.S. dairy products-specifically, nonfat dry milk, 
butterfat, and various cheeses-meet prevailing world prices for 
targeted dairy products and destinations.[Footnote 68] A major 
objective of the program is to develop export markets for dairy 
products where U.S. products are not currently competitive. Under the 
program, the Foreign Agricultural Service pays cash to exporters as 
bonuses, allowing them to buy dairy products at U.S. prices and then 
sell them abroad at lower international prices. DEIP could affect farm 
prices primarily by increasing demand for dairy products through export 
subsidies.[Footnote 69] According to a 2002 report by the Congressional 
Research Service, past studies have indicated that DEIP subsidies have 
at times enhanced farm prices; for example, these studies indicated 
that DEIP subsidies enhanced farm prices by $0.30 to $0.50 per 
hundredweight in 1992.[Footnote 70] Additionally, in May 2003, the 
National Milk Producers Federation testified that the subsidies for 
5,000 metric tons of butterfat provided by DEIP in March 2003 increased 
wholesale butter prices by an estimated $0.06 per pound.[Footnote 71] 
This price increase boosted farm income by between $20 million and $30 
million. DEIP can also help lower government costs by reducing the 
amount of product purchased under the price support program to the 
extent that savings in the price support program exceed the costs of 
subsidies. Given recent market conditions, DEIP has primarily been used 
to encourage exports of nonfat dry milk and cheese,[Footnote 72] and 
for the most part, from 1998 through 2002 the program supported exports 
of these products to the maximum extent allowable under international 
trade commitment limits.[Footnote 73]

Services Provided by Cooperatives, Market Structure, and Collective 
Action Can Influence the Price of Milk at the Cooperative Level: 

Milk reaches the consumer through a variety of pathways; however, most 
milk produced by dairy farmers in the United States is marketed through 
dairy cooperatives.[Footnote 74] Dairy cooperatives can either sell, or 
arrange the sale of, raw milk purchased from farmers to wholesale milk 
processors, or they can process it into fluid and manufactured milk 
products and distribute them to retail outlets.[Footnote 75] As part of 
sales to wholesale milk processors, cooperatives negotiate with the 
processors for over-order premiums, which represent the difference 
between the prices charged to the wholesalers and regulated minimum 
prices, in areas with federal or state marketing orders or regulations. 
The difference between the price at which cooperatives sell raw milk to 
wholesale fluid milk processors and the farm price for fluid milk is 
influenced by the costs of services that cooperatives provide to their 
members and to their buyers, the relative market power of cooperatives 
and fluid milk processors, and the effects of collective action taken 
by dairy cooperatives in marketing their members' milk.

Costs of Services Provided by Cooperatives Influence Milk Prices: 

Over-order premiums, in part, compensate cooperatives for the services 
they provide to their members and on behalf of their members to 
wholesalers. Some distinctive features of cooperatives include member 
ownership and control, at-cost services for members, and distribution 
of income to members on the basis of patronage. Farmers join dairy 
cooperatives to guarantee a market outlet for their milk, to gain 
bargaining power to obtain the best price in the market, to have their 
milk marketed efficiently, with the assurance that their milk will be 
accurately weighed and tested, and to be effectively represented in 
legislative, regulatory, and public relations matters. Most dairy 
cooperatives require farmers to sign a 1-year membership agreement that 
commits them to market all their milk through the cooperative.[Footnote 
76]

Cooperatives operate like corporate businesses to perform services for 
their members. For example, Dairy Farmers of America, the largest dairy 
cooperative in the country, serves almost 23,000 members, producing 
about 21 percent and marketing about 33 percent of the milk in the 
United States. According to the cooperative's Web site, the cooperative 
provides a variety of services to its members, including the following: 

* insurance--medical programs, dental/vision plans, and life insurance 
available to members via a milk check deduction;

* direct deposit--direct deposit of members' milk checks, ensuring that 
farmers' pay checks will be available within 24 hours of the pay date;

* forward contracting--a marketing service that allows members to 
protect themselves against price volatility by locking in the future 
sale price of their milk several months before it is produced; and: 

* financing services--loan packages for cattle, equipment, and 
operating expenses.

In some cases, dairy farmers pay on a per-use basis for the services 
they receive. However, cooperatives may also try to offset the costs of 
their services through negotiations with wholesale milk processors for 
over-order premiums.

Over-order premiums also compensate dairy cooperatives for a number of 
services that they provide to fluid milk processors on behalf of their 
members. Generally, these services include (1) transporting milk from 
different milk-producing areas, (2) scheduling--or balancing--milk 
deliveries to coincide with demand, and (3) standardizing the component 
content of milk deliveries. Different cooperatives also provide 
additional services for fluid milk processors. For example, one 
cooperative we contacted noted the rigorous quality control procedures 
it performs on its members' milk. According to the cooperative 
official, these efforts allow the cooperative to market its members' 
milk as better quality, potentially helping the cooperative negotiate 
higher over-order premiums. Officials from another cooperative said 
that a major component of the costs of services provided by 
cooperatives is balancing the delivery of raw milk supplies to 
processors' plants. At certain times processors' plants have surging 
demand for raw milk, while at other times the plants are empty. In 
addition, supply disruptions, such as labor strikes, create significant 
balancing disruptions. In this environment, few, if any, fluid milk 
processing firms have the capital (plants to make cheese and other 
products during periods of low fluid demand) to assume the risks 
inherent in balancing, and so in most cases this responsibility is met 
by the cooperatives.

Relative Market Power of Cooperatives and Processors Influences Milk 
Prices: 

Historically, farmers produced and distributed fluid milk as well as 
some manufactured products. Milk is a highly perishable product that is 
bulky to transport. Traditionally, this left farmers dependent on local 
markets for the sale of their milk. The role of dairy cooperatives 
developed as farmers faced greater demand for fluid milk and dairy 
products and the number of farmers who processed and distributed their 
own milk products declined. Instead, specialized firms began taking on 
the role of processing fluid and manufactured milk products and 
marketing them for sale to consumers. However, in this environment, 
there were many more farmers than processors, so processors had the 
opportunity to bargain with different farmers to obtain a lower price 
for their raw milk supplies. In this situation, farmers were at a 
disadvantage. Consequently, cooperatives took on the role of collecting 
raw milk from farmers and distributing it to processors. By doing so, 
cooperatives helped to balance the bargaining power between farmers and 
processors. The 1922 Capper-Volstead Act provides limited antitrust 
immunity to cooperatives that meet certain requirements under certain 
conditions and gives farmers an opportunity to work together in setting 
raw milk prices, including bargaining for market premiums. Thus, over-
order premiums, in part, reflect market power acquired by cooperatives 
relative to processors.

Since our June 2001 report, the concentration of dairy cooperatives has 
increased, with the potential effect of enhancing their market power in 
negotiations with processors. In 2001, we reported that 83 percent of 
the milk produced in the United States was marketed by cooperatives. 
However, USDA recently reported that in 2002, the share of milk sold to 
processors and other distributors by cooperatives reached 86 percent of 
all the milk produced in the United States.[Footnote 77] Cooperatives 
attained this market share despite a 13 percent decrease in the number 
of dairy cooperatives between 1997 and 2002. During this time the 
amount of member-produced milk marketed by the eight largest dairy 
cooperatives grew from 52 to 63 percent of the total volume of milk 
marketed by cooperatives. This translated into an increase from 42 to 
52 percent of the total volume of milk produced in the United States.

A number of dairy experts cited the need to offset gains in market 
power made by increasingly concentrated firms at the wholesale 
processor and retail levels of the milk marketing chain as a key factor 
in the continued concentration of cooperatives. The greater the 
percentage of the milk supply that a cooperative markets, the greater 
its ability might be to obtain higher over-order premiums in 
negotiations with wholesale processors. On the other hand, one academic 
source questioned the extent to which increased concentration is 
enhancing the market power of dairy cooperatives, particularly over the 
long term. He noted that although Dairy Farmers of America has been 
consolidating its control over milk supplies in some regions, farmers 
and cooperatives have been able to command larger over-order premiums 
in the East and Upper Midwest regions--where the cooperative's presence 
is not as strong--than in the West, where milk supplies have been 
increasing. Other sources noted that competition still exists among 
cooperatives and independent dairy farmers and that this competition 
prevents even larger cooperatives from obtaining excessively high over-
order premiums.

Collective Action by Cooperatives Influences Milk Prices: 

Another factor in determining the over-order premiums received by 
cooperatives for raw milk is collective action taken by cooperatives. 
Cooperatives work together to try to set prices by coordination allowed 
under the protection afforded by the Capper-Volstead Act. For example, 
officials with Dairy Farmers of America said that a major factor in the 
price of milk at the cooperative level is the action of marketing 
agencies composed of cooperatives. Marketing agencies behave like 
cartels and announce prices for their cooperative members. In most 
cases these agencies set prices for raw milk used in fluid milk and 
other products. Most of the prices announced by the marketing agencies 
represent the minimum federal order prices; additional charges may be 
added representing the costs of services provided by the cooperatives 
to the processors.

Representatives of Dairy Farmers of America said that there are 
marketing agency agreements in most major markets except in the Pacific 
Northwest and that for the most part, cooperatives participate in 
marketing agencies. They further stated that the use of marketing 
agencies has become more common in recent years. The marketing agencies 
may also market milk for independent farmers. The officials noted that 
while cooperatives and independent farmers can choose not to 
participate in the marketing agencies, experience has shown that as 
more producers choose to market milk outside the system, the marketing 
agencies face significant competition and prices fall. Eventually, if 
the prices get low enough, the producers have an incentive to work 
together again.

In an alternative type of collective action, three cooperatives--the 
Dairylea Cooperative, Dairy Farmers of America, and St. Albans 
Cooperative Creamery--established a milk marketing organization called 
Dairy Marketing Services. According to a Dairy Marketing Services 
official, the organization was formed because the cooperatives realized 
that they needed more market power to compete with increasingly 
concentrated processors and retailers. Cooperatives such as Dairylea, 
or individual farmers, establish contracts with Dairy Marketing 
Services to market their milk. Dairy Marketing Services markets about 
16 billion pounds of milk annually for farmers in the Northeast area 
that extends from Maine to Maryland, and includes a small area in Ohio. 
The official estimated that this quantity represents about 45 percent 
of the milk marketed in the Northeast and is produced by some 10,000 to 
11,000 farmers.

The Dairy Marketing Services official stated that the organization has 
been able to carve a niche for itself in the milk marketing chain by 
convincing processors that it is more efficient for them to have Dairy 
Marketing Services arrange to have raw milk transported from the farm 
to the plant and allow the processors to focus on processing milk. As a 
result, Dairy Marketing Services has been able to obtain contracts from 
a number of major processors in the Northeast, including Dean Foods, 
Crowley Foods, and Kraft, to ensure an adequate supply of milk for 
their plants. Additionally, Dairy Marketing Services provides 
specialized services for farmers such as health insurance and workmen's 
compensation, a livestock purchasing service, and risk management 
operations for farmers engaged in forward contracting. Although we were 
unable to confirm the effects that Dairy Marketing Services' efforts 
have had, the official stated that the organization has provided higher 
over-order premiums and lower transportation charges for its 
participating cooperatives and farmers than would have otherwise been 
the case.

Input Costs, Service Levels, Innovations, and Market Structure 
Influence Wholesale Fluid Milk Prices: 

The difference between the price at which wholesale fluid milk 
processors sell fluid milk products to retail firms and the price they 
pay for raw milk is influenced by changes in input costs, such as fuel, 
labor, packaging, transportation, and capital expenses. These costs, in 
turn, are affected by recent innovations that have increased efficiency 
and lowered costs of fluid milk processing, as well as by the level of 
service that fluid milk processors provide to retailers. For example, 
in addition to shipping the products to retailers, some wholesalers 
provide in-store services, including unloading the milk on the store 
dock, restocking the dairy case, and removing outdated or leaking 
containers. The difference between what fluid milk processors pay for 
raw milk and the wholesale price they charge their retail customers is 
also influenced by continued structural change in the fluid milk 
processing industry, including a steady increase in firm consolidation 
and the market share of some firms. While there have been many reasons 
for these trends, the effects on the market and fluid milk prices at 
this level are unclear.

Input Costs, Service Levels, and Innovations Influence Wholesale Fluid 
Milk Prices: 

Several fluid milk processors stated that the cost of raw milk, and, in 
particular, the federal order minimum price, was the single most 
important influence on wholesale milk prices. We estimate that the 
price of raw milk ranges from about 60 to 70 percent of the wholesale 
price of 2 percent milk. As such, the wholesale price that processors 
charge would be directly linked to the Class I federal order price on a 
year-to-year basis, with adjustments for over-order premiums and other 
inputs. However, a variety of other input costs can also affect the 
price at which fluid milk processors sell fluid milk products to 
retailers. Some sources indicated that costs of inputs other than raw 
milk have been increasing in recent years.[Footnote 78] As one 
executive of a milk-processing firm explained, the primary input costs, 
apart from raw milk, include labor and energy. A 2002 study examining 
changes in fluid milk processing plants located in the state of Maine 
found that total processing costs rose at an annual rate of about 2.4 
percent (adjusted for inflation) from 1993 through 2000.[Footnote 79] 
The study indicated that economywide wage inflation plus a dramatic 
increase in health care premiums paid by employers drove labor costs 
above the costs of other inputs, such as land and building expenses and 
plant supplies. Equipment costs increased 10.9 percent per year with 
investments in plant automation and greater reliance on information 
technologies. Also, fuel costs increased by 4.6 percent per year, 
reflecting economywide trends in energy costs. Moreover, while the cost 
of operating capital constituted only 1.0 percent of processing costs, 
it increased substantially during this period due to an increase in the 
short-term lending rate. Table 28 displays the percentage change in 
fluid milk processing costs in Maine reported in this study for each 
cost category from 1993 through 2000.

Table 28: Change in Costs for Fluid Milk Processing Plants in Maine, 
1993 through 2000: 

Cost category: Electricity; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 5.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 1.6%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 12.0%. 

Cost category: Equipment; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 20.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 10.9%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 106.0%. 

Cost category: Fuel oil; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 4.6%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 37.0%. 

Cost category: Labor; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 31.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 3.7%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 29.0%. 

Cost category: Land and building; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 13.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 3.8%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 30.0%. 

Cost category: Operating capital; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 15.5%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 175.0%. 

Cost category: Product loss; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%; 
Annual rate of change: 0.4%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 3.0%. 

Cost category: Supplies; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 27.0%; 
Annual rate of change: (3.0%); 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: (19.0%). 

Cost category: Water and sewer; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 1.0%; 
Annual rate of change: (0.3%); 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: (2.0%). 

Cost category: Total; 
Percent of total cost in 2000: 100%; 
Annual rate of change: 2.4%; 
Total change from 1993 through 2000: 18.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from Dalton et al. (2002).

Note: Percentages calculated based on 2000 dollars. Percent of total 
cost in 2000 was calculated by GAO and is rounded to the nearest 
percent. Annual rates of change and total change from 1993 through 2000 
are from Dalton et al. (2002).

[End of table]

Changes in the level of service that some fluid milk processors provide 
their retail customers have increased the efficiency of the dairy 
supply chain, thus potentially influencing wholesale milk prices. For 
example, some fluid milk processors have begun to undertake supply-
chain management for their retail customers.[Footnote 80] According to 
a number of retailers and processors, supply-chain management commonly 
involves shared computer systems, which, in the vertical marketing 
chain, allow processors to more efficiently manage the processing and 
transporting of fluid milk products. One processor indicated that it 
uses an electronic data transfer system to manage supplies for certain 
retailers. In particular, this system allows the processor to contract 
for a certain number of loads of milk per day. Further, according to a 
recent presentation given by company officials, Dean Foods' national, 
refrigerated, direct-store-delivery system allows it to deliver fluid 
milk to its customers with increased route network efficiency and 
without customer disruption.[Footnote 81] Dean Foods operates 129 fluid 
processing plants in 39 states, servicing more than 150,000 customers 
coast to coast via its direct-store-delivery system of more than 6,000 
routes.[Footnote 82]

By allowing fluid milk products to move more efficiently from the 
processor to the retailer, these kinds of services help to ensure 
quality and reduce waste and costs along the supply chain. To the 
extent that processors benefit from the reduced costs of supplying 
retailers with fluid milk products, the provision of these services 
could have a downward effect on wholesale prices. On the other hand, 
these services could provide value to retailers for which they might be 
willing to pay a higher price when acquiring fluid milk products. 
Therefore, the net effect on wholesale prices of the level of service 
that processors provide to retailers is uncertain.

Additionally, innovations in technology can affect prices at the 
wholesale milk processing level. For example, changes in processing 
technology, such as more automated equipment, can improve the 
efficiency of processing operations and, to the extent that processing 
firms are successful at reducing their costs through innovative 
practices, they may be able to reduce their prices. A representative of 
one fluid milk processor explained that improvements in processing and 
packaging technology have doubled and tripled output. Also, a 
representative of one firm that processes milk for sale in its own 
retail stores stated that the firm has dedicated a large contingent of 
people toward the goal of reducing milk losses at its processing plants 
and has been successful at cutting these losses in half. He noted that 
a driving force behind these efforts is to try to alleviate increases 
in other input costs, such as labor.

With innovations in technology, the fluid milk processing industry has 
also invested in innovative new products. By developing products with 
extended shelf lives, processors can potentially save shipping costs, 
leading to lower wholesale prices. For instance, the dairy processing 
industry's collective investment in extended shelf life, ultra high 
temperature, and aseptic packaging technology allows fluid milk 
products to reach the end user more efficiently while maintaining 
quality.[Footnote 83] The benefits to processors and their retailers 
include the ability to ship these products longer distances because 
they are able to endure more stress than traditionally processed milk.

Market Structure in the Fluid Milk Processing Industry Can Influence 
Wholesale Prices: 

Since the 1960s, there has been long-term structural change in the 
wholesale fluid milk processing industry as a continuously declining 
number of firms have processed an increasing average volume of 
milk.[Footnote 84] Structural change in the processing industry has 
been driven by economies of size, technological changes, high 
concentration at other levels of the milk marketing chain, and rapid 
consolidation into fewer and fewer firms.[Footnote 85] While structural 
change can lead to lower prices due to cost reduction from greater 
efficiency in production, it can also lead to higher market 
concentration, particularly in individual markets. In general, high and 
increasing market concentration can result in greater market power, 
potentially allowing firms to increase prices above competitive levels. 
Accordingly, the net impact of increased market concentration on 
wholesale prices can be either positive or negative.

In recent years, through aggressive acquisitions of independent dairy 
processing plants, a handful of fluid milk processing firms have 
changed the market structure of the dairy industry at the wholesale 
level. These companies have generally pursued the business strategy of 
acquiring strong regional dairy processing plants so that they can 
strengthen their presence in existing markets, while expanding their 
geographic coverage to a national level. The acquisition and 
consolidation trend at the wholesale level has affected market 
structure by leading to higher market concentration for fluid milk 
processors in some markets. One common measure of market concentration 
is the four-firm concentration ratio-the percentage of sales by the top 
four firms in a market. According to the 1997 Census of Manufacturers, 
the market share for the top four fluid milk processors in the nation 
was about 21 percent. However, the market share for top fluid milk 
processors at the local level was significantly higher. For example, in 
our June 2001 report, we found that in Boston, Massachusetts, the 
market share of the top four fluid milk processors increased from 66 
percent in December 1997 to 88 percent in December 1999.[Footnote 86]

Since our last report in 2001 on fluid milk prices, this trend has 
continued, and there have been several significant mergers, 
acquisitions, and joint ventures that have further consolidated the 
industry. For example, in late 2001, Dean Foods merged with Suiza, 
Inc., bringing together the number one and two firms in terms of market 
share in the processing industry. Then, in July 2002, the Land O' Lakes 
dairy cooperative sold its fluid milk operations to Dean Foods. We 
estimate that these acquisitions and mergers gave Dean Foods about a 27 
percent market share nationally in fluid milk products in 2002. Others 
have estimated that Dean Foods' market share is about 35 percent 
nationally and approximately 70 percent in New England.[Footnote 87] As 
of 2002, we estimate that the market share of the top four fluid milk 
processors has increased to approximately 47 percent.[Footnote 88] As 
seen in figure 33, with increased concentration, the number of fluid 
milk processing plants has gone from 1,066 plants producing an average 
of 50.1 million pounds of milk per year in 1980 to 385 plants producing 
an average of 154.2 million pounds per year in 2002.

Figure 33: Number of Fluid Milk Processing Plants and Volume of Milk 
Processed per Plant, 1980 through 2002: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Such increased concentration of fluid milk processing firms, 
particularly in individual markets, can increase the price at which 
fluid milk is sold to retailers because market concentration can 
provide these firms greater market power. Thus, some analysts viewed 
the trend toward greater concentration in the wholesale market as a 
means toward greater dominance and market power in selling fluid milk 
to retailers. Further, they noted that increased market power can also 
benefit processors in their negotiations for raw milk supplies from 
cooperatives and independent farmers. For example, the exercise of 
market power could allow processors to negotiate more favorable supply 
contracts, which could drive down input prices and increase the spread 
between wholesale and retail prices. Other economists who study the 
causes of market concentration described a phenomenon called the 
"replication hypothesis"--as concentration grows at one marketing 
level, it is likely to be replicated at other marketing levels. For 
instance, high market concentration at the retail level can lead to 
greater concentration at the fluid milk processor level, and higher 
concentration in fluid milk processing can, in turn, lead to higher 
concentration at the cooperative level. One fluid milk processor that 
we spoke with stated that retail concentration has resulted in 
retailers preferring only one supplier, requiring a processor to have 
multiple plants in order to supply a retailer who serves many markets.

On the other hand, increasing concentration can lead to cost savings 
through efficiency gains, which may be passed on to retailers in the 
form of lower wholesale prices. For example, some economists viewed 
consolidation of processing firms as a result of increasing economies 
of scale and excess plant capacity. That is, processors decrease their 
costs per gallon for items like packaging or processing costs, as they 
increase the amount of milk they process.[Footnote 89] One dairy 
analyst reported that in plants ranging from a monthly volume of 90,000 
pounds per month to 30 million pounds per month processing costs 
decreased from about $1 per gallon to about $0.50 per gallon. In the 
end, the impact of market concentration on wholesale prices, either 
positive or negative, depends on whether market power or efficiency 
dominates.[Footnote 90]

Retailing Costs, Consumer Demand, and Market Structure Changes Affect 
Retail Prices for Fluid Milk: 

Three key factors that influence fluid milk prices at the retail level 
are retailing costs, consumer demand, and market structure. Recent 
increases in input costs such as labor and energy have been 
substantial. In an effort to hold down their retailing costs and remain 
competitive, some retailers are implementing supply-chain management 
and other innovations that increase efficiency. At the same time, 
consumers are purchasing a declining amount of traditional fluid milk 
and are increasing consumption of other beverages, such as soft drinks 
and bottled water. Market structure changes include continued 
consolidation in recent years through mergers and acquisitions among 
large food retailers at the national level and in many local markets, 
along with an increasing number of outlets that are competing with 
traditional supermarkets to sell fluid milk.

Costs of Retailing Influence the Price of Fluid Milk: 

Representatives of the Food Marketing Institute stated that after the 
wholesale costs of the milk, the primary costs that influence the 
retail price of fluid milk are related to labor and energy.[Footnote 
91] They added that all of these costs have been rising recently. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average hourly 
earnings for nonsupervisory food store employees went from $7.56 per 
hour in 1992 to $10.20 per hour in 2002. These payroll costs are the 
largest percentage of retail operating costs, followed by the second 
largest single category, employee benefits such as health 
insurance.[Footnote 92] Table 29 shows the breakdown of supermarket 
operating costs in 2003 as a percentage of total sales and gross 
margin.[Footnote 93]

Table 29: Supermarket Operating Costs as a Percentage of Sales and 
Gross Margin, 2003: 

Expenses: Depreciation and amortization; 
Percentage of sales: 1.3%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 4.7%. 

Expenses: Employee benefits; 
Percentage of sales: 3.5%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 12.7%. 

Expenses: Insurance; 
Percentage of sales: 0.3%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 1.1%. 

Expenses: Maintenance and repairs; 
Percentage of sales: 0.7%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 2.5%. 

Expenses: Other operating costs; 
Percentage of sales: 3.8%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 13.8%. 

Expenses: Payroll; 
Percentage of sales: 11.4%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 41.3%. 

Expenses: Property rentals; 
Percentage of sales: 1.8%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 6.5%. 

Expenses: Supplies; 
Percentage of sales: 1.1%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 4.0%. 

Expenses: Taxes and licenses; 
Percentage of sales: 0.4%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 1.4%. 

Expenses: Utilities; 
Percentage of sales: 1.3%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 4.7%. 

Expenses: Total expenses; 
Percentage of sales: 25.7%; 
Percentage of gross margin: 93.1%.

Source: GAO analysis of Food Marketing Institute data.

[End of table]

Table 30 displays the sales and expense growth as a percentage of sales 
for the supermarket industry during the last decade, from 1993 through 
2003. During this time, total employment costs increased by 12.0 
percent, including a 10.7 percent increase in payroll expenses; the 
cost of supplies also increased by 10.0 percent.

Table 30: Growth of Supermarket Sales and Expenses during the Last 
Decade, 1993 through 2003: 

Supermarket sales (dollars in billions): Sales from supermarkets with 
more than $2 million in annual sales; 
1993: $292.0; 
2003: $432.8; 
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 48.2%.

Retailing costs as a percentage of sales: Payroll expenses; 
1993: 10.3%; 
2003: 11.4%; 
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 10.7%.

Total employment cost; 
1993: 13.3%; 
2003: 14.9%; 
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 12.0%.

Supplies; 
1993: 1.0%; 
2003: 1.1%; 
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 10.0%.

Utilities; 
1993: 1.2%; 
2003: 1.3%; 
Percent change: 1993 through 2003: 8.3%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Food Marketing Institute data.

[End of table]

A 2003 study that was more specific to retailer costs related to fluid 
milk sales noted that these costs include both direct and indirect 
costs.[Footnote 94] Direct costs are those for electricity, labor, 
store equipment, and fluid milk. Indirect costs include corporate, 
division, and store overhead. While the study found variation in the 
indirect costs, such as store overhead, there was less variation across 
retail stores in direct costs.

Increasing per unit costs have led some retailers to try to improve 
efficiency and reduce total costs. As mentioned in the discussion of 
factors influencing fluid milk prices at the wholesale level, some 
retailers are reducing costs by working with their wholesale suppliers 
to achieve supply-chain management. For example, officials with Wal-
Mart noted that the firm has tried to reduce its costs and maintain its 
everyday-low-pricing strategy for consumers through: 

* a computerized system called Collaborative Planning Forecast 
Replenishment that allows processors to track stock levels at Wal-Mart 
locations and schedule deliveries to specific locations;

* direct-store-delivery of the majority of its fluid milk products to 
increase the efficiency of its supply chain;[Footnote 95] and: 

* changes to its shipping practices, such as not putting labels on its 
cases, that have allowed Wal-Mart to save time and money.

Another retailer indicated that it is trying to improve the way it 
stocks its shelves to cut costs. A representative indicated that the 
retailer has invested in retrofitting its stores to use a device called 
a "bossy cart," which allows store employees to move 80 gallons of milk 
into the milk case in one shelf-stocking.

Consumer Demand Influences Retail Fluid Milk Pricing: 

Consumer demand, driven by factors such as taste, convenience, and 
health, influences the retail price of milk. Moreover, since fluid milk 
represents approximately 3 percent of total supermarket sales, it is an 
important category for store performance, and retailers have an 
incentive to price their products competitively. However, over time, 
fluid milk consumption has gradually declined, with per capita demand 
for milk trending downward at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per year. This 
downward trend stems from several key factors including increasing 
consumption of substitute drinks such as carbonated soft drinks, juice 
drinks, coffee, teas, soy products, and bottled water. Also, there has 
been an increasing trend toward more eating outside the home, reducing 
the demand for fluid milk sold in food stores. Within the fluid milk 
category, whole milk has gone from being 92 percent of fluid milk 
consumed in 1960 to about 35 percent in 2001. Private labels represent 
the largest portion of the market, about 60 percent.[Footnote 96] More 
recently, however, there has been growth in the development of 
innovative value-added dairy products. These new innovations include 
dairy products for medicine/health (such as low-carbohydrate products), 
multipack drinks such as single-serve and vending drinks, and organic 
dairy products.

In response to trends in consumer demand for fluid milk products, 
retailers from high-end supermarkets to mass merchandisers use diverse 
pricing strategies, and no single approach applies to any group. 
However, according to some retail executives, one method that retailers 
are currently using is category management. Using this strategy, a 
retailer would not focus on how much 1 percent, 2 percent, or whole 
milk it sells, but rather on how much is sold from the entire dairy 
case.[Footnote 97] Accordingly, category managers would view product 
assortment strategically, evaluating the performance of entire groups 
of related dairy products. The goal is to maximize the sales for the 
entire category, which requires continual adjustment to match consumer 
demand. To accomplish this goal, managers may feed scanner data and 
other market information into computer models that make product 
assortment decisions.

A related issue influencing the retail price of fluid milk is the price 
elasticity of demand, that is, the sensitivity of fluid milk 
consumption to changes in price. For many years, empirical studies have 
indicated that milk prices were very price inelastic, meaning that 
there was little change in demand in response to a change in price. 
Most studies suggest that overall, the demand for milk is still price 
inelastic. However, some recent studies suggest that the demand for 
milk is not as price inelastic as it was previously.

Moreover, some researchers have found that for many fluid milk 
products, demand is elastic, or that there is a greater change in 
demand relative to a change in price for certain types of milk. One 
study reported that price elasticities varied considerably by container 
size, type (such as white or flavored), and fat content of the 
milk.[Footnote 98] For instance, the study found that the demand for 
whole milk, skim milk, and low fat milk in half-gallon containers was 
price elastic. This research also suggested that carbonated soft drinks 
are the chief substitute or competitor for fluid milk products, while 
water is a complement in consumption.[Footnote 99] In another study, 
researchers found that the elasticities of demand for skim/low fat and 
whole milk brands are different.[Footnote 100] Demand for skim/low fat 
milk was found to be more price elastic than demand for whole milk, 
suggesting that retailers could increase overall fluid milk sales by 
lowering the prices of skim/low fat milk relative to prices for whole 
milk.

Retail Market Structure Can Influence Fluid Milk Prices: 

As with the fluid milk processing industry, there have been trends of 
increasing consolidation and concentration at the retail level during 
recent years, especially among retail firms in some individual markets. 
Structural change and increased consolidation at the retail level of 
the milk marketing chain could lead to lower retail prices as 
individual retailers experience increased efficiencies in their 
operations. On the other hand, high levels of concentration can result 
in greater market power, potentially allowing firms to increase market 
prices above competitive levels.[Footnote 101] Also, greater market 
concentration at this level could increase a retailer's buying power 
with fluid milk processors, potentially lowering costs. Depending upon 
whether these lower costs are passed on to consumers, this can either 
lower retail milk prices or increase the spread between wholesale and 
retail prices.

According to USDA, since 1996, almost 4,700 supermarkets, representing 
$75.5 billion in sales, were acquired by other firms. Major mergers and 
acquisitions that have occurred in the retail food market in recent 
years include the following: 

* In 1998, Kroger, the nation's largest supermarket chain, acquired 
Fred Meyer, and Albertsons acquired American Stores, the second-largest 
at that time.

* In 2000, Delhaize America, operator of the Food Lion chain of stores, 
purchased Hannaford Brother's Shop 'n Save supermarkets in New England 
to become the eighth-largest food retailer at that time.

* In 2001, Kroger purchased supermarkets in Oklahoma and Texas from 
Winn-Dixie.

* In 2001, Safeway made several acquisitions including Genuardi's 
Family Market stores (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware), 
Randall's food markets (Houston, Texas), and Dominick's supermarkets 
(Chicago metropolitan area).

* In 2004, Albertsons, the third-largest U.S. food retailer, purchased 
Shaw's, the eleventh-largest at the time.

In June 2001, we reported that, for the 100 largest U.S. cities, the 
combined average market share of the top four firms increased from 69 
percent in 1992 to 72 percent in 1998, with some variation depending 
upon the particular market area.[Footnote 102] An official of one large 
supermarket chain noted that because of Wal-Mart's large presence in 
the market, other companies' slices of the "demand pie" got thinner, 
providing an incentive to expand and buy out other companies. According 
to USDA data, the top four firms among all food retailers in 2003 were 
Kroger, Wal-Mart, Albertsons, and Safeway.[Footnote 103]

Consolidation in food retail chains has led to high levels of 
concentration in individual metropolitan markets. Table 31 displays 
market concentration, as measured by the four-firm concentration ratio, 
in the 15 markets that we used in this report to analyze the spread 
between retail and farm milk prices.[Footnote 104] While this threshold 
varies, some economists have characterized a market with a four-firm 
concentration ratio of 60 percent or greater as a "tight oligopoly" or 
highly concentrated.[Footnote 105] In 2003, the levels of concentration 
varied by metropolitan market, with the percentage of the market held 
by the four largest firms ranging from 62.8 percent in the Minneapolis/
St. Paul area to 84.9 percent in Denver, with an overall unweighted 
average of 73.9 percent. Moreover, for the 15 markets that we analyzed, 
the overall average four-firm concentration ratio for 1998 that we 
reported in 2001--74 percent--is comparable to the 2003 average.
[Footnote 106]

Table 31: Market Share of the Top Four Food Retailers in Selected 
Markets, 2003: 

Retail markets: Atlanta, Georgia; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 78.2%. 

Retail markets: Boston, Massachusetts; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 70.1%. 

Retail markets: Charlotte, North Carolina; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 82.0%. 

Retail markets: Cincinnati, Ohio; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 79.4%. 

Retail markets: Dallas, Texas; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 67.3%. 

Retail markets: Denver, Colorado; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 84.9%. 

Retail markets: Miami, Florida; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 81.6%. 

Retail markets: Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 63.2%. 

Retail markets: Minneapolis, Minnesota; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 62.8%. 

Retail markets: New Orleans, Louisiana; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 74.7%. 

Retail markets: Phoenix, Arizona; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 80.2%. 

Retail markets: Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 67.6%. 

Retail markets: San Diego, California; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 68.8%. 

Retail markets: Seattle, Washington; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 71.8%. 

Retail markets: Washington, D.C; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 76.5%. 

Retail markets: Average; 
Four-firm market share, 2003: 73.9%. 

Source: GAO presentation of USDA/ERS data.

Note: Four-firm market shares are for supermarkets and super centers 
only. Smaller grocery stores and convenience stores are excluded.

[End of table]

At the same time, the traditional dominance of supermarkets in food 
sales has been challenged by competition from new mass merchandisers 
and super centers such as Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target. These retailers 
tend to offer lower prices and often purchase their inventories in 
large quantities to pass on low prices to consumers. According to a 
recent USDA report, even the larger conventional food stores do not 
have the same buying power as these large general merchandisers. They 
also tend to grow by new investment in stores rather than through 
mergers and acquisitions, in contrast to traditional supermarkets. 
Figure 34 displays the change in food sales by market segment of food 
retailers between 1993 and 2003. Sales from supermarkets decreased from 
63 percent to 58.3 percent during this time period. However, sales from 
warehouse clubs and super centers increased from 3.6 percent to 9 
percent, while those of convenience stores and drug stores also 
increased--from 11.9 percent to 13.6 percent. Overall, sales from 
nontraditional food retailers--warehouse clubs and super centers, mass 
merchandisers, and convenience and drugstores--went from 17.2 percent 
in 1993 to 24.4 percent in 2003.

Figure 34: Percentage of Retail Food Sales by Market Segment, 1993 and 
2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Within the fastest-growing segment, warehouse clubs and super centers, 
the largest food retailer is Wal-Mart, followed by Target and Meijer's, 
while the second fastest growing segment includes the major drug 
chains, such as Walgreen's and CVS. As of 2003, Wal-Mart super center 
sales reached $103.2 billion, with estimated grocery sales of $41.3 
billion.[Footnote 107] According to a recent ACNielsen study, while all 
U.S. households still shop in traditional grocery stores, the annual 
number of trips to such stores continues to decline.[Footnote 108] In 
contrast, super centers have shown strong gains in household 
penetration as well as gains in the number of trips per year. In dairy, 
however, conventional food stores still offer a larger selection of 
milk products. A recent study by researchers at Cornell and Oklahoma 
State Universities on dairy case management found that the number of 
milk products offered was highest in supermarkets (74) and lowest in 
drug stores (16).[Footnote 109] While the volume of milk products was 
highest for mass merchandisers, the number of products (24) was similar 
to convenience stores (22). The authors explained that historically, 
mass merchandisers concentrated on moving a large volume of product 
with a limited variety.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. Fluid 
Milk Market: 

This appendix summarizes the findings of 14 economic studies of price 
transmission in U.S. fluid milk markets. These studies estimated the 
extent to which price changes at one level, such as the farm level, are 
transmitted to other levels, such as the retail level, and the time in 
which these price changes are transmitted. Many of the studies found a 
difference, or asymmetry, in either the extent or speed of price 
transmission, depending on whether the initial price change was an 
increase or a decrease (see table 32).[Footnote 110] Some of the 
studies analyzed possible causes for price asymmetry and often 
identified the presence of noncompetitive markets as a contributing 
factor.[Footnote 111] Although most studies estimated how prices are 
transmitted from the farm to the retail level, a few also estimated how 
price changes are transmitted from the retail level back to the farm 
level.

Table 32: Overview of Fluid Milk Price Transmission Studies and Results 
on Price Transmission Asymmetry/Symmetry: 

Author: Carman and Sexton; 
Year: Forth-coming 2005; 
Model: Econometric model based on Houck (1977); 
Period of study: 1999-2003; 
Geographic area: Nine western U.S. cities[B]; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry in certain milk types and markets; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in timing in CA markets.

Author: Sexton, Xia, and Carman; 
Year: 2004; 
Model: Hotelling framework; 
Econometric model; 
Period of study: 1999-2003; 
Geographic area: Nine western U.S. cities[C]; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in timing.

Author: Capps, Jr; 
Year: 2004; 
Model: Houck econometric model and error correction model; 
Period of study: 1994-2002; 
Geographic area: Seven U.S. cities[D]; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry in majority of cities.

Author: Linkow, Gould and Stiegert; 
Year: 2004; 
Model: Asymmetric friction model; 
Period of study: 1997-2004; 
Geographic area: Ten U.S. cities[E]; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry.

Author: Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill; 
Year: 2004; 
Model: New Empirical Industrial Organization model; 
Period of study: 1996-2000; 
Geographic area: Boston; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: N/A.

Author: Lass; 
Year: 2004; 
Model: Econometric model based on Kinnucan and Forker (1987); 
Period of study: 1982-2002; 
Geographic area: New England; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Post-compact asymmetry[F]; 
Additional results: Pre-compact same as 2001.

Author: Wang; 
Year: 2003; 
Model: Structural econometric model based on Emerick (1994); 
Period of study: 1971-1997; 
Geographic area: National; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run; Symmetry retail to farm.

Author: Romain, Doyon, and Frigon; 
Year: 2002; 
Model: Marketing margin, econometric model; 
Period of study: 1980-1997; 
Geographic area: Upstate New York (UNY) and New York City (NYC); 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry UNY and NYC prior to price-gouging law; 
only NYC after the law[G]; 
Additional results: Same results in short run.

Author: Dhar and Cotterill; 
Year: 2002; 
Model: Two-stage market channel model; 
Period of study: 1996-1998; 
Geographic area: Boston; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: N/A.

Author: Lass, Adanu, and Allen; 
Year: 2001; 
Model: Econometric model based on Kinnucan and Forker; 
Period of study: 1982-1997; 
Geographic area: New England; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Symmetry; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run.

Author: Frigon, Doyon, and Romain; 
Year: 1999; 
Model: Marketing margin, econometric model; 
Period of study: 1980-1997; 
Geographic area: Northeast U.S; UNY and NYC; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Symmetry in all markets except asymmetry in NYC after law[G]; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in all markets in short run.

Author: Carman; 
Year: 1998; 
Model: Econometric model based on Houck; 
Period of study: 1985-1997; 
Geographic area: Three California cities[H]; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Symmetry; 
Additional results: Asymmetry in short run.

Author: Emerick; 
Year: 1994; 
Model: Structural econometric model based on Houck; 
Period of study: 1971-1991; 
Geographic area: National; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry; 
Additional results: Symmetry in short run.

Author: Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar; 
Year: 1994; 
Model: Econometric model; 
Period of study: 1983-1990; 
Geographic area: National; 
Results on price transmission asymmetry/symmetry(long run)[A]: 
Asymmetry. 

Source: GAO analysis using various sources (see table 33).

[A] These results indicate farm-to-retail price asymmetry or symmetry.

[B] These cities include the four California markets of Sacramento, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego and the five non-California 
markets of Seattle, Portland, Salt Lake City, Denver, and Phoenix.

[C] The cities are the same as in Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005).

[D] These metropolitan markets include Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, 
Dallas, Hartford, St. Louis, and Seattle.

[E] These metropolitan markets could not be disclosed.

[F] The Compact refers to the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact.

[G] This law refers to the New York milk price-gouging law of 1991 
(codified at NY Gen. Bus. §396-rr).

[H] These three California cities include Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and Sacramento.

[End of table]

How prices are transmitted within the milk marketing chain is important 
to policy makers because it affects both farmers and consumers. Farmers 
may be concerned with price transmission because they may believe 
increases in retail prices are not fully passed back to the farm level, 
while decreases are passed on. Consumers and farmers may believe that 
decreases in farm prices are not fully passed along to the retail 
level, while increases are passed on. Figure 35 illustrates price 
transmission through the vertical milk marketing chain; the arrows show 
how price signals are transmitted in both directions between marketing 
levels.

Figure 35: Marketing Chain and Price Transmission for the U.S. Fluid 
Milk Industry: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The first section of this appendix is a detailed table summarizing the 
models, data, and key assumptions used in each study, and each study's 
results. The second and third sections discuss the farm-to-retail 
results, including evidence of price asymmetry, with respect to the 
extent of price transmission and the speed of price transmission. The 
fourth section discusses the retail-to-farm results on price 
transmission. The last section discusses the studies' findings 
regarding factors that might cause price asymmetry.

Summary of Recent Economic Studies of Price Transmission in the U.S. 
Fluid Milk Market: 

While most of the studies summarized in table 33 use, as a basis for 
their models, the standard Houck (1977)[Footnote 112] and Kinnucan and 
Forker (1987) models to identify price asymmetry,[Footnote 113] others 
use newer methods such as the error correction model, which some 
researchers believe provides a more appropriate specification for 
examining asymmetric price transmission.[Footnote 114] Most of the 
studies estimated only "forward" price transmission, or price 
transmission from the farm to the retail level, but we also report on 
one study that estimated "backward" price transmission, from the retail 
level to the farm. The studies also differed in whether they estimated 
short-run or long-run price transmission asymmetry or both.[Footnote 
115] We take all of these differences into account in interpreting the 
studies' overall conclusions and discussing their results.

Table 33: Recent Price Transmission Studies of the Fluid Milk Market: 

Author/Study/Year: Carman and Sexton, "Supermarket Fluid Milk Pricing 
Practices in the Western United States," Agribusiness, forthcoming 
2005; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Econometric model based on 
the farm-to-retail price transmission model of Houck (1977) for whole, 
skim, 1 percent, and 2 percent milk. Estimated time lags using an Almon 
distributed lag model; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Average monthly prices for nine California and non-California metro 
markets, 1999-2003; 
Farm prices: California: Class I California milk prices; 
Other states: FMMO Class I prices; 
Retail prices: ACNielsen average monthly retail prices; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Market 
power based on hypothesis tests of parameter size, parameter tests for 
asymmetry, and a departure from cost differences of fluid milk products 
due to different fat contents; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: California and non-California: 
Contemporaneous to 3-month period; 
California markets: Some evidence of price symmetry and some of price 
asymmetry, depending on market and product; 
Non-California markets: Price transmission in almost all markets was 
asymmetric; 
Degree of price transmission: 
California: Sacramento: Increases: 72%-122%; Decreases: 52%-97%; 
Los Angeles: Increases: 60%-115%; Decreases: 75%-106%; 
San Francisco: Increases: 65%-115%; Decreases: 49%-94%; 
San Diego: Increases: 56%-109%; Decreases: 58%-110%; 
Non-California: Seattle: Increases: 57%-72%; Decreases: 39%-64%; 
Portland: Increases: 3%-25%; Decreases: 4%-30%; 
Phoenix: Increases: 5%-59%; Decreases: 6%-63%; 
Salt Lake City: Increases: 39%-56%; Decreases: 54%-83%; 
Denver; Increases: 43%-56%; Decreases: 40%-55%; 
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Analysis revealed 
evidence of market power in fluid milk pricing in each of the nine 
metro markets analyzed; 
In Portland, estimated retail price coefficients did not respond to 
farm prices; 
In non-California markets, only 3 of 40 estimated coefficients were 
consistent with perfect competition in pricing; 
Addition of retail skim milk, 1 percent, and 2 percent led to different 
results than previous analysis of only whole milk.

[End of Carman and Sexton]

Author/Study/Year: Sexton, Xia, and Carman, "Horizontal Differentiation 
with Differential Input Costs: Retail Prices for Milk by Fat Content." 
Paper presented at the annual AAEA meetings, Denver, Colorado, 2004.
[B]; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Theoretical model based on 
Hotelling framework of horizontally differentiated products with 
differential costs. Econometric estimation -seemingly unrelated 
regression-of a differentiated product, market competition model using 
metropolitan retail markets for whole and skim milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Average monthly prices for nine California and non-California cities. 
California data, 1999-2003; 
Non-California data, 2000-2003; 
Farm prices: Class I prices from California Dairy Information Bulletin 
and FMMO Class I component prices; 
Retail prices: California Dairy Information Bulletin; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Three 
competition scenarios examined for retail fluid milk markets: perfect 
competition, monopoly, and oligopoly; 
Skim milk (low-cost) and whole milk (high-cost) represent products with 
differential costs transmitted differently in different competition 
scenarios; 
Farm prices do not contain over-order premiums; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: 
California: Los Angeles and San Diego have longer transmission periods 
than Sacramento and San Francisco; 
Non-California: Prices are transmitted gradually for Denver, Salt Lake 
City, Portland, and Phoenix, while prices in Seattle are transmitted 
quickly, within 1 month; 
Degree of price transmission: N/A; 
Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Competition results: 
California: Results suggest oligopoly scenario for Sacramento, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles markets. Some evidence of oligopoly scenario 
for San Diego market; 
Non-California: Results suggest oligopoly scenario for Phoenix, Salt 
Lake City, and Seattle markets. Model also suggests Denver market is 
closer to oligopoly, while Portland is closer to monopoly scenario.

[End of Sexton, Xia, and Carman] 

Author/Study/Year: Capps, Jr., "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price 
Transmission Associated with Whole Milk and Two Percent Milk in 
Selected U.S. Cities: A Comparison of the Conventional Houck Approach 
and the Error Correction Model Approach." Working paper, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, 2004; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: The standard Houck 
econometric price transmission approach is compared to the error 
correction model using co-integration procedures. Model estimates 
results for whole milk and 2 percent milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Monthly data from January 1994 to October 2002 for seven U.S. cities: 
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Hartford, St. Louis, and Seattle; 
Farm prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service; 
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: 
Elasticities of price transmission are calculated for each product and 
market; 
The model does not include any other marketing input costs; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Houck method: Price asymmetry: 
Whole Milk: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Dallas, and 
Hartford;
Whole Milk: Symmetric: St. Louis and Seattle; 
2 percent: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Hartford; 
2 percent: Symmetric: Dallas, St. Louis, and Seattle; 

Houck method: Elasticity of price transmission (ranges): 
Whole milk: Increases: (+0.23)-(+0.58); 
Whole milk: Decreases: (-0.02)-(+0.12); 
2 percent: Increases: (+0.11)-(+0.46); 
2 percent: Decreases: (-0.06)-(+0.25); 

Error correction model: Price asymmetry: 
Whole Milk: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas; 
Whole Milk: Symmetric: St. Louis; 
2 percent: Asymmetric: Atlanta, Chicago, and Seattle; 
2 percent: Symmetric: St. Louis and Dallas. 

Error correction model: Elasticity of price transmission (ranges): 
Whole milk: Increases: (+0.24)-(+0.35);
Whole milk: Decreases: (-0.03)-(+0.06); 
2 percent: Increases: (+0.05)-(+0.29);
2 percent: Decreases: (-0.006)-(+0.12); 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Author notes that 
results suggest there is a possible market failure due to a highly 
concentrated retail sector, with the exception of St. Louis and 
Seattle.

[End of Capps, Jr.]

Author/Study/Year: Linkow, Gould, and Stiegert, "Retail Consolidation, 
Market Concentration, and Farm-Retail Price Asymmetry in the U.S. Fluid 
Milk Market." Working paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Authors use an asymmetric 
friction model that accounts for the existence of menu costs (the costs 
of repricing products). Estimated model uses the price of private label 
whole milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Weekly panel data from 1997--2004 for 10 metropolitan fluid milk 
markets; 
Farm prices: FMMO Class I announced cooperative price; 
Retail prices: IRI retail price data; 
private label (store brand) whole milk.[C]; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Price 
asymmetry and menu costs are allowed to vary by city; 
Includes a marketing cost index variable based on a paper by Romain et 
al., (2002); 
Includes a measure of market concentration and a measure of spatial 
market concentration; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: Asymmetric-Farm price decreases are passed on 
less completely than increases; 
Responses to price increases do not differ considerably across cities. 
Responses to price decreases do differ across cities; 
Degree of price transmission: N/A. 

[End of Linkow, Gould, and Stiegert]

Author/Study/Year: Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill, "Dairy Compact, Market 
Power, and Milk Prices in Boston." Working paper, Department of 
Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Connecticut, 2004; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: The New Empirical Industrial
 Organization structural model of Appelbaum (1982) that includes 
measures of market power and price transmission. The model tests for 
values of these variables with and without the Northeast Interstate 
Dairy Compact (NEDC).[D]; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Weekly data from 1996-2000 for Boston metropolitan fluid milk market; 
Farm prices: The higher of the FMMO Class I prices or Compact Class I 
prices, plus over-order premiums; 
Retail prices: Computed from IRI retail data by dividing total sales by 
total volume.[C]; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: 
Assesses retail prices under four scenarios: NEDC, no NEDC, with 
perfect competition, and oligopoly; 
estimates market power and market conduct variables; 
Assumes cost-plus pricing between processors and retailers in the 
Boston area; 
Model does not estimate the timing of price transmission; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: N/A; 
Degree of price transmission: Increases: 68%; 
Transmission elasticities were estimated at 0.331 pre-Compact and 
0.2911 post-Compact; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Retail price increases 
due to market power outweighed impact of NEDC by nearly 7 times; 
Both the pre-and post-NEDC retail price markup over marginal cost (the 
competitive benchmark) is about 25% of the retail fluid milk price; 
Market conduct-supermarkets do not ignore each other's actions; 
MILC program provides benefits to farmers, consumers, and retailers at 
the expense of taxpayers.[E].

[End of Chidmi, Lopez, and Cotterill]

Author/Study/Year: Lass, "Impacts of the Northeast Dairy Compact on New 
England Prices Revisited: New Data, New Lessons." Working paper, 
Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 
2004.[D]; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Update of the previous 2001 
econometric mark-up model of Kinnucan and Forker (1987) allowing for 
rising and falling farm prices and different speeds of adjustment; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Monthly time-series price data for New England (Boston and Hartford), 
1982 to 2002; 
Farm prices: FMMO Class I price for the New England market; 
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service retail price series 
for Boston and Hartford; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Longer 
data series than 2001 paper with time periods split into pre and post-
Compact; 
a pre-1997 period and a 1997-2002 period; 
Parameters of the pre-and post-Compact periods were tested to determine 
changes in price transmission; 
Assumes constant returns to scale and a competitive market beyond the 
farm gate; 
Included variable to measure changes in processing costs using USDA's 
Food Marketing Cost Index; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: Pre-Compact period: Results 
were consistent with original findings (Lass et al., 2001); price 
asymmetry in the short run and symmetry in the long run; 
Post-Compact period: 
Short run: Price asymmetry; 
Long run: Price asymmetry; 
Degree of price transmission: N/A; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Boston: There was 
greater variation in farm prices without the Compact, leading to higher 
retail prices; 
Hartford: There was greater variation in farm prices without the 
Compact, with greater increases in retail prices.

[End of Lass]

Author/Study/Year: Wang, Price Transmission and the Role of Federal 
Dairy Policy in U.S. Dairy Markets. Master's thesis, Cornell 
University, 2003; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Structural econometric model 
using a simultaneous system of equations of national dairy prices, 
including farm and retail fluid milk. Models both farm-to-retail and 
retail-to-farm price transmission. Model based on a previous one by 
Emerick (1994); 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
National in scope; uses national monthly average data from 1971-1997; 
Farm prices: Announced cooperative Class I price; 
Retail prices: U.S. retail price from Bureau of Labor Statistics-USDA; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: 
Competitive fluid milk market and constant returns to scale; 
Policy variable for changes in price support in 1980s; 
Price lags chosen from dairy market literature; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry: Short run: 
(1 month): Asymmetric; 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry: Long run: (3 
months): Asymmetric; 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Short 
run: Increases: 94%; 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Short 
run: Decreases: 31%; 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Long 
run: Increases: 83%; 
1988-1997 Period: Farm-to-retail: Degree of price transmission: Long 
run: Decreases: 64%; 

1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Timing/price asymmetry: Short run: (1 
month): Asymmetric; 
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Timing/price asymmetry: Long run: (3 
months): Symmetric; 
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Short 
run: Increases: 94%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Short 
run: Decreases: 2%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Long 
run: Increases: 40%;
1988-1997 Period: Retail-to-farm: Degree of price transmission: Long 
run: Decreases: 34%;

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Decreases in dairy 
price supports in the mid-1980s led to greater asymmetric price 
transmission and more volatility in the post-1988 period than in the 
pre-1988 period for fluid milk and nonfat dry milk. 

[End of Wang]

Author/Study/Year: Romain, Doyon, and Frigon, "Effects of State 
Regulations on Marketing Margins and Price Transmission Asymmetry: 
Evidence from the New York City and Upstate New York Fluid Milk 
Markets," Agribusiness, 2002; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Marketing margin model that 
includes quantity of commodity marketed and marketing costs combined 
with the Houck (1977) model. It includes variables measuring cumulative 
increases and decreases in farm-level prices. The Akaike Information 
Criterion was used to determine the appropriate lag structure; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Monthly data from 1980 -1997 for Upstate New York (UNY) and New York 
City (NYC) markets; 
Farm prices: UNY and NYC prices are the FMMO Class I prices; 
Retail prices: UNY and NYC prices are from the New York State 
Department of Agriculture; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Model 
allows for testing of constant returns to scale; 
Model allows for asymmetry of other marketing costs; 
Model includes state policy variables-such as deregulation of milk 
distribution in NYC and the NYC price-gouging law.[F]; 
Model does not account for over-order premiums in farm prices; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: 
Short run: Asymmetric-NYC and UNY before price-gouging law; 
Asymmetric-NYC after price-gouging law; 
Long run: Asymmetric-UNY and NYC, before price-gouging law; 
Asymmetric-NYC after price-gouging law; 

Price transmission elasticities: NYC: Before the price-gouging law: 
Increasing elasticities: 0.70; 
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: Before the price-gouging law: 
Decreasing elasticities: 0.30; 
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: After the price-gouging law: 
Increasing elasticities: 0.52; 
Price transmission elasticities: NYC: After the price-gouging law: 
Decreasing elasticities: 0.43; 

Price transmission elasticities: UNY: Before the price-gouging law: 
Increasing elasticities: 0.62; 
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: Before the price-gouging law: 
Decreasing elasticities: 0.49; 
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: After the price-gouging law: 
Increasing elasticities: 0.52; 
Price transmission elasticities: UNY: After the price-gouging law: 
Decreasing elasticities: 0.51; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Model results indicate 
constant returns to scale; 
NYC experienced price asymmetry in the long run prior to 1991, before 
the price-gouging law came into effect, but much less thereafter; 
The deregulation of milk distribution to NYC in 1987 allowed Farmland 
Dairies' entry into the NYC market and significantly reduced marketing 
margins.

[End of Romain, Doyon, and Frigon] 

Author/Study/Year: Dhar and Cotterill, "Price Transmission in 
Differentiated Product Market Channels: A Study of the Boston Fluid 
Milk Market and the Northeast Dairy Compact," Food Marketing Policy 
Center, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University 
of Connecticut, 2002; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: A two-stage structural 
market channel model of the Boston milk market using a nonlinear model 
of costs and demand. The model looks at the Boston fluid milk processor 
and retailer market channels; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Monthly average data for Boston market from March 1996 to July 1998; 
Farm prices: Boston FMMO Class I fluid milk price; 
Retail prices: IRI data for aggregate retail and top 4 supermarket 
chains in the Boston market.[C]; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Model 
allows for both vertical and horizontal market channel effects; 
Model allows for the identification of cross-firm pass-through rates; 
Authors specify three different oligopoly games; 
Study does not test for the timing of price transmission or price 
transmission asymmetry; 
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and: degree of price 
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: N/A; 
Degree of price transmission (ranges): 
Processor-to-wholesale: 55%-65%; 
Wholesale-to-retail: 54%-62%; 
Firm-specific transmission: 32%-47%; 
Industrywide transmission: 88%-100%; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Competition between 
retailers was lessened due to focal point pricing and the Compact; 
Industrywide and firm-specific cost shocks were not identical, nor did 
the latter aggregate to the former. 

[End of Dhar and Cotterill] 

Author/Study/Year: Lass, Adanu, and Allen "Impacts of the Northeast 
Dairy Compact on Retail Prices," Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Review, 2001; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Econometric model based on 
the basic markup model of Kinnucan and Forker (1987) allowing for 
rising and falling farm prices and different speeds of adjustment; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Monthly time-series price data for New England (Boston and Hartford), 
1982 to 1997; 
Farm prices: Class I FMMO price for the New England market; 
Retail prices: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service retail price series 
for Boston and Hartford; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Uses 
national data to determine the lag structure for fluid milk-uses lags 
of 1 and 2 months; 
Model uses impacts of price transmission to determine the impact of the 
Compact; 
Assumes constant returns to scale and a competitive market beyond the 
farm gate; 
Includes variable to measure changes in processing costs using USDA's 
Food Marketing Cost Index; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: Boston: Retail prices 
increased most rapidly in the current period; for declines, the 
greatest decreases occurred after a one-period lag; 
Hartford: Current period effects of rising farm prices were greater 
than current period falling farm prices; 

Boston and Hartford:
Short run: Price asymmetry; 
Long run: Price symmetry; 

Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Boston: Degree of price transmission: 58% average; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Boston: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: SR: 0.46: 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Boston: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: LR: 0.35; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Boston: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: SR: 0.14; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Boston: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: LR: 0.35; 

Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Hartford: Degree of price transmission: 48% average; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Hartford: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: SR: 0.30; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Hartford: Elasticities: Rising elasticity: LR: 0.33; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Hartford: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: SR: 0.15; 
Degree of price transmission and elasticities of price transmission: 
Hartford: Elasticities: Falling elasticity: LR: 0.25; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: In the long run, 
increases in margins were primarily accounted for by other factors, 
such as processing costs, rather than the Compact; 
Impact of the Compact on retail prices was less than the over-order 
premium, suggesting that less than the full amount of the premium was 
passed on to consumers. 

[End of Lass, Adanu, and Allen] 

Author/Study/Year: Frigon, Doyon, and Romain, "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail 
Transmission in the Northeastern Fluid Milk Market," Food Marketing 
Policy Center, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of Connecticut, 1999; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Hybrid of the marketing cost 
model, which includes the quantity of commodity marketed and costs, 
with the Houck model, which includes variables of cumulative increases 
and decreases in farm-level prices; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Northeast United States, Upstate New York (UNY), and New York City 
(NYC) markets using monthly data, 1980-1997; 
Farm prices: UNY and NYC prices are the Class I FMMO prices; 
for Northeast United States-FMMO Class I average prices of the four 
FMMO regions at that time; 
Retail prices: UNY and NYC prices from New York State Department of 
Agriculture; Northeast United States prices from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: 
Competitive market and constant returns to scale assumptions are 
relaxed; 
A variable for market concentration, the four-firm concentration ratio, 
included for UNY and NYC; 
Model allows for marketing costs; 
Model includes policy variables such as the NYC price-gouging law; 
Model does not account for over-order premiums in farm prices; 
Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and: degree of price 
transmission[A]: Timing/price asymmetry: 
Short run: Asymmetry existed for UNY after 2 months, and still existed 
in NYC and the Northeast United States after 3 months; 
Long run: After 4 months, the Northeast United States, UNY, and NYC 
(postgouging law) fully adjusted. Only NYC (pregouging law) had not 
adjusted; 
Symmetry existed in all regions in the long run except NYC prior to 
1991; 
Degree of price transmission: N/A; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: NYC experienced price 
asymmetry in the long run prior to 1991, before the price-gouging law 
came into effect; 
Variable for market concentration was found insignificant for both UNY 
and NYC. Authors believed that the problem of consumer information was 
the predominant cause of asymmetric price transmission. 

[End of Frigon, Doyon, and Romain] 

Author/Study/Year: Carman, "California Milk Marketing Margins," Journal 
of Food Distribution Research, 1998; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Response of retail-level 
milk prices to changes in farm prices using Houck's (1977) model for 
estimating nonreversible functions. The model is estimated using prices 
for whole milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
Three California market areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Sacramento. Monthly data, January 1985 to March 1997; 
Farm prices: Class I prices for Northern and Southern California from 
California Dairy Information Bulletin; 
Retail prices: California Dairy Information Bulletin; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Uses 
lags of 1 month for price increases and 2 months for price deceases; 
Uses an index of marketing costs from the USDA/Economic Research 
Service marketing cost index; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: Short run: Asymmetric-Unlike price increases, 
there was a significant 1-month lag between farm price decreases and 
total retail price decreases for each city; 
Long run: Symmetric-Retail milk price changes were not significantly 
different for increases and decreases of farm prices; 

Degree of price transmission: 
Sacramento: Increases: (111%-112%); Decreases: (110%-117%); 
San Francisco: Increases: (117%-118%); Decreases: (94%-103%); 
Los Angeles: Increases: (76%-88%); Decreases: (62%-94%); 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: For five of the six 
equations, the one-for-one price transmission process is consistent 
with constant dollar markup pricing; 
For Los Angeles, tests showed that retailers were maintaining prices 
by absorbing some cost increases, and reducing prices less than farm 
prices decreased.

[End of Carman] 

Author/Study/Year: Emerick, An Econometric Analysis of Dairy Market 
Price Transmission Processes. Master's thesis, Cornell University, 
1994; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Structural econometric model 
based on Houck's method (1977) using a simultaneous system of 32 
equations and a distributed lag formulation. The model estimates price 
transmission for five dairy products, including fluid milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
National scope-national monthly average data series, 1971-1991; 
Farm prices: Announced cooperative Class I price; 
Retail prices: U.S. average city retail fluid milk price from Consumer 
Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Price 
lags chosen from knowledge of the dairy market-lag length 2 months for 
farm price increases and decreases; 
Models both farm-to-retail and retail-to-farm price transmission 
results; 
Model uses slope and intercept dummy variables used to separate time 
periods into 1977-1988 and 1988-1991 to account for government support 
price decreases and greater price volatility; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Farm-to-retail: Timing/price asymmetry; 
Short run (Immediate): Symmetric; 
Long run (2 months): Asymmetric; 

Degree of price transmission; 
Short run: Increases: 45%; Decreases: 41%; 
Long run: Increases: 107%; Decreases: 55%; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Author estimates 
causality for fluid milk using data from 1971-1991 and finds it 
multidirectional; 
Since 1988, different retail price responses (asymmetric) occur 1 and 2 
months after the initial farm-level price change. Author notes this may 
be due to greater volatility causing difficulties in determining the 
"appropriate" price at wholesale or retail; 
Asymmetry is not a short-run phenomenon in most other dairy products 
including retail butter, wholesale nonfat dry milk, and retail ice 
cream.

[End of Emerick] 

Author/Study/Year: Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar, Determinants of the Farm-
to-Retail Milk Price Spread, Economic Research Service, USDA, 1994; 

Model Description: Type of economic model: Statistical techniques 
similar to those used by Hahn's (1989, 1990) markup model in his study 
of price transmission. Estimates price transmission for whole milk; 

Model Description: Scope of model and price data used: 
National average quarterly data, 1983-1990 for farm, wholesale, and 
retail levels; 
Farm prices: Class I FMMO prices from AMS/USDA plus over-order 
premiums; 
Wholesale prices: Firm-level private cost-accounting company data for 
30 companies across the country; 
Retail prices: Bureau of Labor Statistics data based on retail prices 
in 91 areas; 

Model Description: Additional assumptions/variables/limitations: Unlike 
other studies, includes the wholesale market level in the model; 

Price Transmission Results: Timing/symmetry and degree of price 
transmission[A]: 
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Asymmetric; 
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Farm price increases: 
wholesale price adjusted in three quarters; 
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-wholesale: Farm price decreases: 
wholesale price adjusted in one quarter; 

Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Asymmetric; 
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Farm price increases: retail 
price adjusted in one quarter; 
Timing/price asymmetry: Farm-to-retail: Farm price decreases: retail 
price adjusted in 10 quarters; 

Degree of price transmission: Retail price adjustment: Asymmetric; 
Farm price increases: 173%; 
Farm price decreases: 92%; 

Price Transmission Results: Other model results: Wholesale prices 
exhibit short-run asymmetric responses to farm prices, while retail 
prices exhibit short-run and long-run, or irreversible, price 
adjustments; 
In this study, wholesale milk price adjustments were more rapid for 
farm price decreases than for farm price increases. 

[End of Hansen, Hahn, and Weimar]

[A] The degree or level of price transmission is represented by the 
percentage of full price pass-through from farm to retail. Some 
studies, however, measured instead the elasticity of price 
transmission, which is defined as the percentage change in the retail 
price of a product due to a 1 percent change in the corresponding farm 
price. As noted in the table, some studies do not measure the degree of 
price transmission or the elasticity of price transmission and only 
report on the timing and symmetry of transmission.

[B] The AAEA is the American Agricultural Economics Association.

[C] IRI stands for Information Resources, Inc.

[D] The Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was a pricing program 
established by the 1996 Farm Bill that set a minimum price for raw milk 
to be used for and sold as fluid milk in the New England states of 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont. This program expired on September 30, 2001.

[E] The Milk Income Loss Contract program (MILC) is similar to the 
Compact, in that it is based on the Boston raw milk price and provides 
a partial subsidy to dairy farmers; however, it is funded through 
taxpayers rather than processors.

[F] The New York City price-gouging law (codified at NY Gen. Bus. §396-
rr) imposed a duty on the New York Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Markets to determine if prices of fluid milk are unconscionably 
excessive whenever the retail price of fluid milk exceeds 200 percent 
of the price for Class I fluid milk. The New York State Legislature 
passed this law, in part, because of a perceived lack of response in 
retail milk prices to decreases in farm prices.

[End of table]

Results on the Extent of Farm-to-Retail Price Transmission and Price 
Transmission Asymmetry: 

On both national and regional or citywide levels, the majority of the 
fluid milk studies that we identified found evidence of farm-to-retail 
price transmission asymmetry in price levels. While the studies 
estimated a wide range of price transmission levels, in general, the 
estimates of price transmission for initial farm price increases were 
greater than for farm price decreases.

National Level Results: 

The fluid milk price transmission studies that we identified using 
national aggregate data estimated a wide range of price transmission 
levels and generally found evidence indicating asymmetric price 
transmission--farm price increases were more fully transmitted to 
retail prices than farm price decreases. Using national average farm 
and retail prices for whole milk, Emerick (1994) and Wang (2003) 
developed two similar studies that identified the degree of price 
transmission nationally. While both studies used similar models, the 
Wang study used somewhat more recent data. Taken together, both 
studies' short-run results suggest that about 45 percent to 94 percent 
of farm price increases were passed along to the retail level, while 
only 31 percent to 41 percent of farm price decreases were similarly 
passed along. These studies estimated that in the long run, 
transmission levels for price increases ranged from 83 percent to 107 
percent, while transmission levels for price decreases ranged from 55 
percent to 64 percent. Both researchers found price asymmetry in the 
long run, but Wang also found price asymmetry in the short run. In his 
study of seven metropolitan markets across the country using data from 
1994 to 2003, Capps Jr. (2004) also identified price asymmetry in a 
majority of selected fluid milk markets for whole and 2 percent milk. 
Measuring the level of price transmission by using the elasticity of 
price transmission, he estimated elasticities for farm price increases 
ranging from 0.23 to 0.58 for whole milk and 0.11 to 0.46 for 2 percent 
milk. For farm price decreases, these elasticities were much lower, 
ranging from -0.02 to 0.12 for whole and -0.06 to 0.25 for 2 percent, 
respectively.[Footnote 116],[Footnote 117] Similarly, in Linkow et al. 
(2004), using an asymmetric friction model of 10 metropolitan markets 
across the country, the authors found evidence of price asymmetry--
retail prices were more responsive to cooperative farm price increases 
than decreases.

Regional and City-Level Results: 

Many studies that used regional or city-level data also estimated a 
wide range of price transmission levels as well as asymmetric price 
transmission. In an econometric model for whole, skim, 1 percent, and 2 
percent milk, Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005) estimated farm-to-
retail price transmission for nine metropolitan markets in the Western 
United States. Estimated levels of price transmission for all types of 
fluid milk combined for the California markets ranged from 56 percent 
in San Diego to 122 percent in Sacramento for price increases, and from 
49 percent in San Francisco to 110 percent in San Diego for price 
decreases. For the non-California markets, for both increases and 
decreases, the estimated levels of price transmission were much lower, 
ranging from 3 percent in Portland to 72 percent in Seattle for price 
increases and 6 percent in Phoenix to 83 percent in Salt Lake City for 
price decreases. The authors also noted that none of their price 
transmission parameters for all types of fluid milk for Portland was 
statistically different from zero, indicating no evidence that retail 
prices responded to farm price changes in this market.

Several researchers have also estimated farm-to-retail price 
transmission for markets in the Northeast United States. Lass et al. 
(2001) estimated price transmission in reference to the Northeast 
Interstate Dairy Compact for the Boston and Hartford metropolitan 
areas. For price increases, they found that the level of price 
transmission for a farm price increase was 58 percent for Boston and 48 
percent for Hartford. While Lass et al. only found price asymmetry in 
the short run, in a subsequent study, using more recent data, Lass 
(2004) found price asymmetry in the short run and in the long run. 
Using the New Empirical Industrial Organization approach, Chidmi, 
Lopez, and Cotterill (2004) found a similar result: a degree of price 
transmission of 68 percent for farm price increases for the Boston 
market.[Footnote 118] Within the same study, the authors also note that 
Cotterill (2003), in other research for Boston, estimated a pass-
through rate of between 20 and 26 percent for price decreases, 
suggesting price asymmetry in this market. In another study of the 
Boston market, using a two-stage market channel model, Dhar and 
Cotterill (2002) found that the firm-specific price pass through rate 
was 32 to 47 percent, while industrywide pass through was 88 to 100 
percent for price increases.[Footnote 119]

In yet another study of the Northeast market, Romain et al. looked at 
price asymmetry before and after the imposition of the New York price-
gouging law in 1991 and tested for price asymmetry using the elasticity 
of price transmission. Before the price-gouging law, they found that a 
1 percent increase in the farm price translated into a 0.70 percent and 
0.62 percent increase in retail prices in New York City and Upstate New 
York, respectively, while a 1 percent decrease translated into a 0.30 
percent and 0.49 percent decrease in these markets. After the law went 
into effect, they found that a 1 percent increase in the farm price 
translated into a 0.52 percent increase in retail prices in both New 
York City and Upstate New York, while a 1 percent decrease translated 
into a 0.43 percent and 0.51 percent decrease in these markets, 
respectively. Therefore, long-run price asymmetry was significant in 
both regions prior to the price-gouging law, but remained statistically 
significant only in New York City afterwards, though at a much lower 
level.

Results on Farm-to-Retail Speed of Adjustment and Price Transmission 
Asymmetry: 

We identified fewer studies that examined the speed of adjustment and 
related price asymmetry, or differences in the time required for farm 
and wholesale level price increases and decreases to be passed through 
to the retail level. Hansen et al. (1994), using national aggregate 
price data for whole milk, estimated that it took 3 months after the 
wholesale price increased for the retail milk price to increase, but 
that it took 30 months for the retail price to adjust to wholesale 
price decreases. In another study using national data, Wang (2003), 
using a structural model, found that, for farm price increases, retail 
prices adjusted more quickly in the first month after the increase and 
more slowly in subsequent periods. Conversely, for farm price 
decreases, the speed of price adjustment was slower in the initial 
month and increased in the following months, implying speed of 
adjustment asymmetry.

Nearly all of the studies of regional or metropolitan price 
transmission found asymmetry in timing--the price adjustment process 
for price decreases much exceeded that for farm price increases. Carman 
(1998) found a 1-month lag for price decreases and no lag for price 
increases in the California markets. In a later study, Carman and 
Sexton (forthcoming 2005) found that for the majority of cities they 
analyzed, the time lags estimated for price decreases generally 
exceeded those for price increases. For the four types of fluid milk, 
Carman and Sexton found that farm price decreases generally took from 1 
to 3 months to be transmitted to the retail level, while price 
increases took no more than 1 month. In the California markets, the 
authors found that, in general, retail prices responded more quickly to 
farm price increases than to decreases. Lass et al. (2001) found that 
for the Boston and Hartford markets, retail price adjustments to rising 
farm prices were much more rapid than similar adjustments to falling 
farm prices. Lass (2004) also found evidence of slower price 
transmission to the retail level when farm prices were falling. For 
markets in the Northeast, Frigon et al. (1999) reported short-run 
asymmetry in price adjustment for several markets: price adjustment was 
complete in Upstate New York after 2 months and in New York City and 
the Northeast United States after 3 months. The authors concluded that 
short-run asymmetry seemed to be milder in Upstate New York, because it 
lasted for only 2 months. In the long run, after 4 months, the 
Northeast United States, Upstate New York, and New York City (after 
enactment of the gouging law) markets had fully adjusted, with only the 
New York City (before enactment of the gouging law) market not fully 
adjusting.

Results for Retail-to-Farm Price Transmission and Price Transmission 
Asymmetry: 

Using data from 1971 through 1991, Emerick (1994) tested for causality 
in fluid milk pricing between the farm and retail levels and found that 
it was bidirectional. That is, the author found that for these data, in 
addition to farm price changes affecting retail prices, retail price 
changes also affect prices at the farm level. However, this 
specification resulted in some parameter values for retail-to-farm 
price transmission that were inconsistent with economic expectations. 
In a later study, Wang (2003) estimated results for retail-to-farm 
price transmission. In the short run, which was estimated to be 1 
month, the author found that price increases were immediately passed on 
to the farm level with a level of transmission of 94 percent, while 
price decreases were passed on at a level of 2 percent. However, in the 
longer run, which was estimated as 3 months, price increases were 
passed through at a level of 40 percent, while price decreases were 
passed through at a level of 34 percent. In the long-run specification, 
neither increases nor decreases in price were fully passed through. 
Thus, while the author found price asymmetry in the short run, she 
found price symmetry in the long run for retail-to-farm level price 
changes. As in Wang's farm-to-retail analysis, increases in the retail 
price were passed through nearly fully in the initial month, and then 
decreased substantially. However, although decreases in the retail 
price were not passed on initially, they were passed on at an 
increasing rate in the following months.

Possible Causes of Asymmetry in the Extent and Speed of Price 
Transmission: 

Even fewer economic studies have provided evidence on what causes price 
transmission and price transmission asymmetry. For the U.S. fluid milk 
market in particular, we found few studies that examined factors 
affecting the extent of price transmission and price transmission 
asymmetry. While two major explanations are cited in the economic 
literature as central to explaining price transmission and transmission 
asymmetry--noncompetitive markets and adjustment costs--there are 
several others cited, including the role of government policies, 
spatial market competition, substitution in processing technology, 
asymmetric information, economies of scale, and differentiated 
products. However, only the presence of noncompetitive markets and the 
effects of government policies were examined in the studies of price 
transmission that we identified.

Noncompetitive Markets: 

In general, economic research has found that a higher degree of market 
power can reduce the degree of price transmission.[Footnote 120] 
Particularly relevant to the fluid milk market, researchers have also 
shown that the number of vertical stages and the extent to which a 
market varies from the competitive norm both influence the degree of 
price pass through.[Footnote 121] Of the 14 studies that we examined, 
only 5 explored the role of competition in combination with the degree 
of price transmission and price transmission asymmetry in the milk 
marketing chain. In particular, 2 of these studies examined market 
power stemming from product differentiation of different milk types. 
The evidence from these studies is somewhat mixed. While 1 study did 
not find a linkage between market concentration and price transmission, 
other studies using a variety of methods did find evidence of either a 
lack of price transmission or price transmission asymmetry in markets 
that also possessed a degree of market power.

Carman and Sexton (forthcoming 2005), using multiple analytical 
techniques, found that fluid milk markets in the Western United States 
that displayed noncompetitive pricing also tended to lack price 
transmission and show price asymmetry. Using monthly data from 1999 
through 2003, the authors (1) analyzed the effects of horizontal 
differentiation among fluid milk types by ranking milk with different 
fat contents for different markets based on the costs that would be 
predicted under perfect competition, (2) performed correlation analysis 
between changes in the monthly farm and retail prices of milk with 
different fat contents, with a lack of correlation indicating the 
exercise of market power, and (3) analyzed price transmission, along 
with the estimated price transmission coefficients, to determine 
competition in the market.

In the first analysis, rank values for all milk types did not conform 
with price expectations, with the exception of whole milk for all the 
months in Seattle. Moreover, except in Portland, they found that the 
rankings of retail milk prices for whole, skim, 1 percent, and 2 
percent milk provided evidence of not being based on costs, as would be 
expected in perfect competition. For the price correlations, the 
results indicated that only a few product pairs in the nine markets 
have a high degree of interdependence, as one would expect for close 
substitutes. Low correlations ranging from nearly complete independence 
to moderate independence for at least one pair of products were evident 
in each market. For instance, retail price changes for skim milk 
appeared independent of other milk prices in Sacramento, Seattle, 
Portland, Salt Lake City, and Denver. The authors explained that these 
correlations all indicated pricing that was inconsistent with 
competitive pricing.

For the price transmission analysis, the estimated results differed 
among the California markets, depending on the city and type of milk. 
For instance, in certain California markets, such as Los Angeles and 
San Diego, farm price decreases lagged farm price increases by 2 to 3 
months, depending on the product, indicating price asymmetry in timing. 
Some of these price coefficients were consistent with competitive 
pricing and others were not. However, price transmission estimates for 
other metropolitan regions in the West (Seattle, Portland, Phoenix, 
Salt Lake City, and Denver) provided stronger evidence of 
noncompetitive pricing, and some also indicated price adjustment 
asymmetry, such as Salt Lake City and Phoenix. For these markets, only 
3 of the 40 estimated price transmission coefficients were consistent 
with perfect competition.

Using another model of horizontal product differentiation, a subsequent 
study by Sexton, Xia, and Carman (2004) econometrically estimated the 
timing of fluid milk price transmission and tested for market power for 
four California and five non-California cities from 1999 to 2003. While 
the results were somewhat mixed, hypothesis tests for the cities 
indicating oligopoly or monopoly scenarios also displayed more gradual 
price transmission results than those indicating more competitive 
scenarios, suggesting a link between noncompetitive market structures 
and a lack of price transmission.

Chidmi et al. (2004) estimated price transmission and market power for 
the Boston fluid milk market using the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization approach and data from 1996 through 2000. The empirical 
results of the model, in particular the conjectural variation 
elasticity, suggest that participants in this market may possess market 
power and that supermarkets do not ignore each other's actions.
[Footnote 122] Although the model did not account for speed of 
adjustment, the authors estimated a price transmission level of 68 
percent, suggesting that market power is associated with incomplete 
price transmission. A study by Frigon et al. (1999) includes a measure 
of market power, the four-firm concentration ratio, in its model of 
price transmission for Upstate New York and New York City. However, 
this variable did not prove to be significant. Later, in a similar 
study (Romain et al., 2002), the authors explain that their results of 
price asymmetry prior to 1991 in New York City were evidence that 
middlemen in the fluid milk market were exercising market power prior 
to the price-gouging law. The authors found that price asymmetry 
decreased after the law went into effect. They acknowledged, however, 
that to rigorously address the issue of a noncompetitive market, an 
alternative market power model would have to be developed.

Government Policies: 

Two studies looked at the effects of national government intervention 
on price transmission. Emerick (1994) and Wang (2003) both examined the 
question of whether changes in dairy policy, especially the reduction 
in the dairy price support level that began in the mid-1980s, had 
changed the nature of price transmission for dairy products. Both 
authors basically came to the same conclusions. Emerick noted that 
asymmetry is more likely to have occurred since 1988, adding that the 
greater price volatility may have caused some difficulties for 
retailers and wholesalers in determining the "appropriate" price. Wang, 
using additional data through 1997, found that reductions in the price 
support level tend to have a large impact on the fluid milk and nonfat 
dry milk price transmission relationships. In the fluid milk market, 
the farm-to-retail price transmission process became asymmetric, with 
the greater price volatility in the post-1988 period. While the degree 
of price transmission increased for both increases and decreases in 
price, it increased proportionately more for increases than for 
decreases.

Six of the studies examined price transmission in conjunction with 
other state and federal policies and programs, such as the New York 
price-gouging law and the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Four 
studies, Lass et al. (2001), Lass (2004), Chidmi et al. (2004), and 
Dhar and Cotterill (2002), estimated price transmission while the 
Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact was in effect. Lass et al. found 
that processors and/or retailers did not fully pass through their price 
increases and, in fact, may have absorbed part of the cost of the 
Compact's over-order premium. In his 2004 study, Lass explained that 
the greater variation in farm prices that occurs without the Compact 
would actually lead to higher retail prices because of the larger 
estimated impacts on retail prices of increasing farm prices than 
decreasing farm prices. Dhar and Cotterill disagreed and contended in 
their study that the risk reduction benefit from the Compact was 
completely overpowered by a shift toward tacit collusion in the post-
Compact period. In the studies of New York markets (Frigon et al., 
1999, and Romain et al., 2002) that looked at the effect of the price-
gouging law, researchers found that after the law took effect, price 
asymmetry was not present or was present at much lower levels.

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Effects of Recent Federal Dairy Program Changes and 
Alternative Policy Options: 

Recent changes in federal dairy programs vary in their effects on 
policy considerations that we identified, such as farm income, milk 
production, federal costs, price volatility, economic efficiency, and 
consumer prices.[Footnote 123] A number of options have been proposed 
or discussed to further modify existing programs or introduce 
alternative policies, all of which could affect these policy 
considerations in different ways. The likely effects of these program 
modifications or alternative policies are influenced by prevailing 
conditions, such as high and low dairy prices, and may be different in 
the short and long terms.

Recent Changes in Federal Dairy Programs Vary in Their Effects on 
Policy Considerations We Identified: 

Since 2000, three major changes have taken place in federal dairy 
programs. First, in response to legislative requirements, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reformed the federal milk marketing 
order (FMMO) system. Second, USDA adjusted the relative purchase prices 
of butter and nonfat dry milk under the price support program. Finally, 
Congress authorized and USDA established the Milk Income Loss Contract 
(MILC) program. These changes had mixed effects on the policy 
considerations included in our analysis. Reforms to the FMMO system had 
mixed effects on farm income, depending on the geographic location of 
the farmer, while the overall effects on all farmers are less clear. 
Because of their effect on fluid milk prices, changes in the price 
support program tended to reduce the level of support for farm income 
and reduce federal costs, but increase economic efficiency. 
Introduction of the MILC program typically had the opposite effects, 
while maintaining production.

Federal Milk Marketing Order Reforms: 

In carrying out requirements in the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform Act of 1996 to reform FMMOs, USDA conducted extensive research 
and held public hearings. Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) 
officials indicated that as a result of this process USDA implemented 
reforms to the FMMO system in January 2000 that were consistent with 
the findings of its research. Its major reforms included: 

* consolidating the number of marketing orders from more than 30 to 
11;[Footnote 124]

* changing the classified pricing structure by creating a new class for 
manufactured milk products, Class IV, with the "higher of" the 
advanced[Footnote 125] Class III or Class IV skim milk values as the 
basis--or mover[Footnote 126]--for Class I prices; reducing the lag 
between the Class I and Class III and IV price announcements; and 
establishing a fixed differential of $0.70 per hundredweight to be 
added to the advanced Class IV skim milk value in determining the price 
to be paid for milk used in Class II products;

* introducing a new product formula pricing system; and: 

* relaxing restrictions on pooling milk in some marketing 
orders.[Footnote 127]

USDA implemented additional reforms to the classified pricing system in 
April 2003 that modified aspects of the Class III and IV pricing 
formulas.[Footnote 128]

Federal Order Consolidation: 

In response to the legislative requirement, USDA reduced the number of 
FMMOs to 11, which were typically combinations of pre-existing 
orders.[Footnote 129] For example, the Central Order is a combination 
of several smaller marketing orders in the central part of the United 
States. According to USDA's final regulatory impact analysis for the 
order reforms, these consolidation decisions were based on structural 
factors such as milk movement, the number of market participants, and 
natural boundaries.[Footnote 130]

USDA officials and other dairy experts told us that nationally, the 
prices received by farmers for their raw milk did not change much as a 
result of FMMO consolidation. One academic study reported that order 
consolidation probably increased the economic efficiency of the FMMO 
system by more closely aligning areas where raw milk is marketed by 
dairy farmers with areas where it is distributed as fluid milk 
products. Additionally, the study noted that consolidation helped to 
reduce the amount of market distortion created by order regulation.

However, the magnitude of the effects on farm income varied among 
orders because, in some cases, the consolidation combined orders that 
had substantially different raw milk utilization rates for the 
manufactured and fluid products in the various milk classes, 
particularly Class I (fluid milk). As a result, some dairy farmers 
experienced higher or lower utilization of their raw milk in Class I 
products than they had in the past. Changes in utilization rates are 
significant because farmers receive a blend price for their milk based 
on the utilization rates for the different milk classes within an 
order; thus, farmers in orders where Class I utilization rates 
increased generally saw their incomes increase, while farmers in orders 
where the Class I utilization rates decreased generally had their 
incomes reduced.

The changes in utilization rates associated with FMMO consolidation 
were particularly evident in the Western Order. When USDA created the 
Western Order, it combined the Great Basin and the Southwestern Idaho-
Eastern Oregon Orders. These orders had substantially different Class I 
utilization rates. In 1999, the Great Basin Order had a Class I 
utilization rate of 51 percent, while the Southwestern Idaho-Eastern 
Oregon Order had a Class I utilization rate of 8 percent. When these 
orders were combined into the Western Order, the resulting Class I 
utilization rate was estimated to be about 23 percent, lowering income 
for the farmers in the Great Basin Order who had previously received 
much higher blend prices. To address this and other concerns, Dairy 
Farmers of America, a cooperative representing a number of farmers in 
the Western Order, requested that USDA hold a hearing to reform the 
order's provisions. USDA made some changes based on the concerns 
presented at the hearing; however, the revised order provisions did not 
receive the two-thirds approval necessary to be adopted, and USDA 
terminated the order as of April 1, 2004, stating that the continuation 
of the existing Western Order would not be in conformance with declared 
policy.[Footnote 131]

Elimination of the Western Order has raised concerns that increased 
amounts of Idaho milk, which had been pooled on the Western Order, 
would be pooled on the Upper Midwest Order. Based on past experience, 
this would reduce the Class I utilization rate and lower the blend 
price for Upper Midwest farmers. However, dairy experts had mixed views 
on whether additional orders would be terminated. In particular, one 
industry expert noted that it remains unclear whether farmers in the 
former Western Order will be able to receive higher prices for their 
milk without their order. Some of these farmers, particularly those 
that had been in the Great Basin Order, could benefit by not having to 
pool their Class I milk. On the other hand, one source stated that 
these farmers could face increased shipping requirements to pool their 
milk on a remaining order. Additionally, some experts stated that 
without FMMOs farmers and cooperatives do not have the market power to 
obtain high prices for their raw milk in negotiations with processors.

Classified Pricing Structure Changes: 

FMMO reform changed the structure of the classified pricing system by 
creating a new Class IV, representing the minimum price that processors 
pay for raw milk used in butter, nonfat dry milk, and other dry milk 
powders.[Footnote 132] Additionally, the new mover of Class I prices 
became the "higher of" the advanced Class III or Class IV skim milk 
values. Use of the "higher of" mover was intended to enable fluid milk 
processors to attract milk from butter, nonfat dry milk, and cheese 
processors by helping to ensure that the blend price would exceed both 
the Class III and IV prices. USDA also reduced the lag period--the time 
between when the Class I price is announced and the Class III and IV 
prices are announced--from approximately 8 weeks, to 6 weeks. Class I 
prices are announced in the month preceding the month to which they 
apply, based on the "higher of" the advanced Class III and IV skim milk 
values.[Footnote 133] However, the Class III and IV prices that 
determine the price of raw milk used to manufacture these products are 
not announced until the Friday on or before the 5th of the month 
following the month to which they apply. Consequently, there is a 6-
week lag between these two price announcements. Further, USDA 
established that the minimum prices paid for skim milk used in Class II 
products would be the advanced Class IV skim milk and butterfat values, 
plus a fixed differential of $0.70 per hundredweight.[Footnote 134] In 
its March 1999 regulatory impact analysis, USDA concluded that these 
changes would help to eliminate situations in which prices of milk used 
in manufactured products rise above the price of milk used in fluid 
milk products and thus make the Class I mover more representative of 
current market conditions.

Academic researchers and an industry official indicated that the 
creation of Class IV continued disincentives that were present prior to 
the 2000 reforms to shift milk to its highest-valued use. Previously, 
separate minimum prices were established for raw milk used in 
manufactured products that are now included in the new Class IV. Raw 
milk used in the production of butter was priced under Class III, which 
also included cheese and other products. However, nonfat dry milk was 
priced in a separate Class III-A. According to AMS officials, the 
development of Class III-A was necessary because manufacturers were 
unable to sell nonfat dry milk at market prices that would allow them 
to pay the Class III minimum price for their raw milk. They noted that 
for a classified pricing system to work, the minimum class prices must 
be below the market clearing prices for products produced with that raw 
milk (taking into account the cost of other inputs to these products). 
However, one study found that the creation of Class IV 
institutionalized separate pricing for nonfat dry milk.[Footnote 135] 
By separating out the price for nonfat dry milk (the lowest-valued 
use), the classified pricing system might maintain production of nonfat 
dry milk even when market signals indicate that raw milk should be used 
to manufacture cheese as the higher-valued use.

Additionally, a 2004 study sponsored by the American Farm Bureau 
Foundation for Agriculture (American Farm Bureau) reported that 
creating a separate Class IV and then basing Class I prices on the 
"higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk values, has reduced 
the influence that cheese prices traditionally had over other prices in 
the FMMO system, and thus partially isolated Class I prices from market 
forces.[Footnote 136] For example, in every month from January 2000 
through July 2001, advanced Class IV skim milk values were higher than 
advanced Class III skim milk values. However, as of 2000, utilization 
of milk for Class IV products across all federal orders averaged 7 to 8 
percent, while Class III products accounted for about 45 percent of 
milk utilization.[Footnote 137] According to the American Farm Bureau 
study, without the advanced Class III skim milk value as the mover for 
Class I prices, when the Class IV price exceeds the Class III price, 
similar price signals are no longer received by farmers in relatively 
high Class I utilization markets and in high Class III utilization 
markets. This difference occurs because during these times farmers in 
high Class I utilization markets are receiving their price signals 
based on the high Class IV prices, which are heavily influenced by the 
price support program during periods of excess production and low 
manufacturing product prices. Therefore, farmers in high Class I 
utilization areas receive higher farm prices than would otherwise be 
the case, and higher prices encourage increased production by these 
farmers. However, the higher production levels of these farmers puts 
downward pressure on the Class III prices and causes regional 
inequities in farm income.

Furthermore, because Class I prices are now more closely related to the 
level at which the price support program sustains nonfat dry milk 
prices, proposed changes to the price support program have become much 
more controversial. Prior to the 2000 FMMO reforms, Class I prices were 
based on the Class III price, which, as noted previously, did not 
include nonfat dry milk. However, with the 2000 reforms, the level of 
support provided by the price support program for nonfat dry milk 
prices directly influences the Class IV price. During periods when the 
Class IV price is higher than the Class III price, changing the price 
support program in such a way that Class IV prices are reduced will 
cause the Class I price to similarly fall, thus having a greater impact 
on the overall blend prices received by farmers.

Introduction of a New Product Formula Pricing System: 

As part of FMMO reform, USDA introduced a new product formula pricing 
system that established minimum prices for raw milk based on milk 
component values for butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and other 
solids. These values are derived from the wholesale prices of cheddar 
cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, and dry whey as announced in weekly 
surveys conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service.[Footnote 138] The minimum prices also factor in allowances 
based on estimates of manufacturing costs for these products and 
product yield factors representing the amount of a particular product 
that can be manufactured from specified quantities of the underlying 
components. Seven of the 11 orders (primarily the Northern orders) 
adopted the new product formula pricing system, while the other four 
orders (primarily the Southern orders) use a pricing system that bases 
milk prices on skim milk and butterfat.[Footnote 139]

During much of the time that classified pricing has been part of the 
federal order system, the formulas used to set minimum prices paid to 
farmers were based on competitive pay prices. The pay price was known 
as the Minnesota-Wisconsin price, and it represented the results of 
state surveys of competitive market prices for Grade B milk paid by 
manufacturing plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin. However, with a 
reduction in Grade B milk production, this milk was very thinly traded 
and the pricing series became less representative of the value of Grade 
A milk used for manufacturing.[Footnote 140]

According to a number of dairy experts, the change from a competitive 
pay to a product formula pricing system that incorporates fixed 
manufacturing allowances has enhanced the effects of price volatility 
on dairy farmers.[Footnote 141] As noted in appendix V, there are a 
variety of input costs to the manufacturing process, including labor, 
energy, and capital. With product formula pricing, manufacturing 
allowances, which are supposed to compensate for these other input 
costs, and product yield factors are fixed. To the extent that changes 
in these other input prices are reflected in the prices at which 
manufacturers sell their products, fixed manufacturing allowances will 
allow changes in other input costs to more readily affect the minimum 
raw milk prices paid to farmers.

Dairy experts also indicated that the fixed manufacturing allowances in 
the product pricing formulas reduced economic efficiency by reflecting 
raw milk supply and demand conditions less clearly. Moreover, one large 
processor stated that the manufacturing allowances in the pricing 
formulas are too low and do not adequately represent the costs of 
manufacturing.[Footnote 142] Regardless of the market price of cheese, 
butter, or nonfat dry milk, the fixed manufacturing allowances provide 
manufacturing plants with the same net returns from 100 pounds of raw 
milk. Therefore, when market conditions reflect higher prices for one 
of these products, relative to the others, manufacturers have less of 
an incentive to shift production to the higher-valued use because any 
gains they might have realized from selling a higher-priced product 
would be negated by the fact that their manufacturing allowance is 
fixed.[Footnote 143] The 2004 American Farm Bureau study noted that 
prior to the introduction of the new product formula pricing system, 
manufacturers that produced butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk 
competed more aggressively for raw milk. The study found that if the 
prices of nonfat dry milk and butter, for example, were depressed 
relative to cheese prices, cheese manufacturers would attract milk away 
from the manufacturers of these other products. Therefore, raw milk 
would more readily move to its highest-valued use.[Footnote 144]

Further, some dairy experts noted that the additional volatility 
introduced by the fixed manufacturing allowances in the new product 
formula pricing system, when combined with the disincentives these 
allowances and separate manufacturing classes create against shifting 
milk to its highest-valued use, might have contributed to negative 
producer price differentials[Footnote 145] and de-pooling.[Footnote 
146] Negative producer price differentials can occur because with the 
6-week lag between the Class I and Class III and IV price 
announcements, rapid increases in the manufactured product prices from 
which Class III and IV prices are derived can raise these prices above 
the Class I price.[Footnote 147] USDA officials noted that the change 
to a "higher of" mover for Class I prices and the reduction of the lag 
period were designed to reduce the frequency of negative producer price 
differentials. However, to the extent that the fixed manufacturing 
allowances have introduced additional volatility into the pricing 
system, and the disincentives created by these fixed manufacturing 
allowances and separate manufacturing classes have prevented raw milk 
supplies from moving to their highest-valued use, negative producer 
price differentials and de-pooling have continued.

During times when the producer price differential is negative, some 
processors of manufactured products who normally receive a draw from 
their federal order pool to pay farmers instead have to pay into the 
pool. In such circumstances, many of these processors choose to de-pool 
because by doing so, they gain a competitive advantage over those that 
remain and have to pay into the pool.[Footnote 148] One study on FMMO 
pooling issues reported that since June 2003, negative producer price 
differentials and de-pooling have become more common.[Footnote 149] The 
study noted that the producer price differential in the Upper Midwest 
Order was negative from July through November 2003 and reached a record 
low level in April 2004 of $4.11 per hundredweight. For example, cheese 
prices in the Upper Midwest Order began to rise sharply in mid-July 
2003; thus the advanced Class III skim milk value that served as the 
Class I mover for August did not include these higher prices. However, 
the Class III price that was announced in August did include these 
higher prices, creating a negative producer price differential. As a 
result, a number of cheese processors de-pooled in August, reducing the 
order's Class III utilization, which is usually around 75 to 77 
percent, to just 8.4 percent. Nationally, negative producer price 
differentials were reported for this month in the 7 FMMOs that used the 
new product formula pricing system. For the 11 FMMOs existing at the 
time, de-pooling resulted in 33 percent less milk being pooled compared 
to the same month in the prior year.

De-pooling reduces the overall value of the federal order pool and 
increases differences in the abilities of processors to pay for raw 
milk. As a result, dairy farmers do not receive uniform prices. Farmers 
marketing milk with processors who are able to de-pool may receive 
higher prices and thus an increase in farm income, while farmers 
marketing milk with processors who do not de-pool may receive lower 
prices. According to the June 2004 University of Wisconsin study, this 
situation represents an inequity and is contrary to one of the stated 
purposes of the FMMO system: orderly marketing conditions.

Relaxed Pooling Provisions: 

In some cases, the 2000 FMMO reforms resulted in more relaxed pooling 
provisions. AMS officials noted that when USDA consolidated the 
marketing orders, the pre-existing orders each had its own pooling 
provisions, such as minimum amounts of raw milk required to be shipped 
to processing plants participating in that order's pool to qualify for 
its blend price or restrictions on rejoining the pool after de-
pooling.[Footnote 150] AMS officials indicated that where two orders 
were combined that had different pooling provisions, USDA applied the 
more liberal pooling standard to the combined order to prevent farmers 
from being shut out of the consolidated order pool.

According to AMS reports from 2000 and 2001, relaxed pooling provisions 
contributed to the pooling of more distant raw milk to receive other 
orders' attractive blend prices. Pooling was easier because most of the 
milk that was pooled from outside individual federal orders was not 
required to actually be shipped to those orders. Therefore, distant 
farmers were able to share in an order's blend price without incurring 
substantial transportation costs for shipping milk. For example, under 
the Upper Midwest Order's pooling provisions, an Idaho dairy 
cooperative could choose to ship raw milk from some of its Idaho 
farmers to a processing plant that participates in the Upper Midwest 
Order. All subsequent milk deliveries of those designated farmers would 
be priced under the Upper Midwest Order, even if only one day's 
production was actually shipped to the participating processing plant. 
Other deliveries from these farmers would stay in Idaho for processing. 
In 2001, USDA reported that raw milk from California was pooled on the 
Central, Upper Midwest, and Western Orders. However, most of this 4 
billion pounds of milk was actually processed in California plants that 
are not regulated by the federal order system. Also during 2001, large 
volumes of raw milk from Minnesota and Wisconsin were pooled on the 
Central, Mideast, and Northeast Orders, while increasing amounts of raw 
milk from Idaho were pooled on the Upper Midwest Order.

According to some dairy experts, the increased pooling of milk across 
orders has had mixed effects on farm income. Those farmers who were 
able to have their milk pooled on distant orders that had higher blend 
prices received an increase in their farm income after accounting for 
the costs of transporting their milk. However, farmers in the receiving 
orders had their farm income reduced as milk from outside the orders 
reduced the value of the pool that could be shared among farmers in the 
receiving orders. The combination of more milk pooled on these orders 
and constant sales of higher-valued Class I and II products decreased 
the weighted average value of the orders' pools by decreasing the 
utilization rates of the higher-valued classes.

In response to this loss in value, participants in some orders 
petitioned USDA to hold hearings to address relaxed pooling provisions. 
For example, through the hearing process, the Central and Mideast 
Orders tightened their pooling provisions to control the large 
quantities of milk from Minnesota and Wisconsin that were being pooled 
on these two orders. With these tightened provisions, those seeking to 
pool milk on the Central or Mideast Orders have to ship more milk per 
year or meet other requirements to become eligible to share in the 
receiving orders' blend prices. A number of dairy experts indicated 
that these changes have significantly reduced the incentive for distant 
pooling on these orders.

2003 Classified Pricing Reforms: 

USDA made additional reforms to the classified pricing system that went 
into effect in April 2003, modifying aspects of the Class III and IV 
pricing formulas. The principal changes in 2003 were increasing the 
manufacturing allowance in the formula that established a price for the 
other solids component of milk used in Class III products; eliminating 
the lower bound of zero on the Class III other solids component 
price;[Footnote 151] reducing the product yield for the nonfat solids 
components of milk used in Class IV products; and altering the Class 
III protein formula to prevent Class III prices from being lowered by 
rising butter prices. The 2003 changes were partly the result of a 
court-ordered injunction against the implementation of other changes 
that USDA had proposed based on the 2000 requirement that USDA 
reconsider the Class III and IV pricing formulas.

An analysis by researchers at the University of Wisconsin before 
implementation of the changes indicated that the differences from many 
of these changes would not be dramatic.[Footnote 152] However, the 
researchers estimated that the changes would increase Class III prices 
by as much as $0.57 per hundredweight. More specifically, the study 
found that the 2003 changes would eliminate the negative effect that 
rising butter prices were having on the Class III price. Under the 
prior protein price formula, a $0.10 per pound increase in the butter 
price would lower the Class III price by $0.04 per hundredweight. The 
researchers found that the revised formula instead yields about a $0.04 
per hundredweight increase in the Class III price for a $0.10 per pound 
increase in the butter price. The study also reported that the new 
protein price formula would make it somewhat less likely that the 
advanced Class IV skim milk value rather than the advanced Class III 
skim milk value would consistently serve as the mover for Class I 
prices.[Footnote 153] Increased Class III prices would most likely 
benefit farmers in areas where cheese is an important commodity and 
where processors do not typically pay premiums in excess of federal 
order minimum prices.

Dairy Price Support Program Adjustments: 

Since 2000, USDA twice adjusted--or tilted--the purchase prices of 
butter and nonfat dry milk as part of its efforts to administer the 
dairy price support program. The first tilt occurred in May 2001, when 
USDA reduced the nonfat dry milk purchase price by approximately $0.10 
per pound (to $0.90 per pound) and increased the butter purchase price 
by about $0.20 per pound (to approximately $0.85 per pound). USDA 
adjusted the tilt again in November 2002 by reducing the nonfat dry 
milk purchase price another $0.10 per pound (to $0.80 per pound) and 
increasing the butter purchase price approximately $0.20 per pound (to 
$1.05 per pound). USDA took these actions because the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) was accumulating large stocks of nonfat dry milk, 
leading to high purchase and storage costs for USDA, as well as 
significant market distortions.

As a result of the 2000 FMMO reforms, the federal order class prices 
and the level of support provided by the price support program for 
nonfat dry milk were tied more closely. Many dairy experts noted that, 
subsequently, tilts became more politically controversial because they 
can have a greater negative effect on the FMMO class prices. Lowering 
the purchase price of nonfat dry milk while raising the purchase price 
of butter decreases the overall Class IV price when market prices for 
nonfat dry milk are at the level of the purchase price and market 
prices for butter are above the level of the purchase price. When the 
advanced Class IV skim milk value is serving as the mover for the Class 
I price, this reduction in Class IV prices also reduces Class I prices. 
Further, because the advanced Class IV skim milk value serves as the 
basis for Class II prices, Class II prices are similarly reduced. This 
scenario occurred during both the May 2001 and November 2002 tilts. A 
representative of one dairy cooperative stated that these impacts were 
particularly pronounced in areas with high Class I utilization rates, 
such as the Northeast and Southeast.

According to a report published by the International Trade Commission 
in May 2004, estimates of the actual impacts of these tilts on farm 
prices varied.[Footnote 154] The study presented a USDA estimate that 
the November 2002 tilt reduced fiscal year 2003 average milk prices 
from $12.10 to $11.90 per hundredweight. While USDA reported that this 
decrease lowered the amount of raw milk produced and thus was partially 
offset by an increase in butter prices from reduced production, it 
still led to a loss in net farm income of $192 million.[Footnote 155] 
Alternatively, the study reported that the National Milk Producers 
Federation estimated that the two tilts ultimately lowered farm prices 
by $0.19 per hundredweight in 2001, $0.48 per hundredweight in 2002, 
and $0.76 per hundredweight in 2003. With these price reductions, the 
organization projected that farm income would fall by $156 million in 
2001, $816 million in 2002, and about $1.3 billion in 2003. Another 
study cited by the International Trade Commission's report estimated 
that the 2002 tilt could have decreased average milk prices by $0.16 
per hundredweight, reducing production by 814 million pounds and farm 
income by $371 million. However, that study also found that these 
impacts varied substantially, depending upon the assumption of high or 
low prices and the effects of other government programs.

While the tilts reduced farm income and raw milk production, a number 
of dairy experts indicated that USDA's tilts have increased economic 
efficiency and reduced federal costs associated with the dairy price 
support program. Additionally, some experts noted that by maintaining 
nonfat dry milk prices at artificially high levels, the price support 
program was inducing surplus production of nonfat dry milk. In some 
cases, nonfat dry milk was produced specifically for sale to the 
government at the CCC purchase price. From the beginning of October 
2000 through the end of May 2001, the CCC purchased approximately 330 
million pounds of nonfat dry milk (more than 40 percent of national 
production), and government purchase costs exceeded $340 million. 
Furthermore, in 2002, the CCC stocks of nonfat dry milk were equivalent 
to two-thirds of domestic production and exceeded annual domestic 
consumption by more than 30 percent. By reducing the purchase price of 
nonfat dry milk, USDA reduced the incentive to produce surplus nonfat 
dry milk. The International Trade Commission study reported that while 
production of nonfat dry milk continued to rise between 2001 and 2002, 
after the second tilt production declined by about 5 percent between 
2002 and 2003. The tilts also helped to reduce federal costs associated 
with purchasing and storing nonfat dry milk.

Some sources also indicated that the tilts affected the balance of 
trade in dairy products between the United States and its trade 
partners. The International Trade Commission study reported that during 
the majority of the period from January 1998 to November 2002, U.S. 
prices for nonfat dry milk exceeded international market prices by more 
than $500 per metric ton. Consequently, domestic manufacturers had an 
incentive to import alternative dairy protein products such as milk 
protein concentrates. By lowering the purchase price of nonfat dry milk 
through the tilts, USDA decreased this incentive because domestic 
manufacturers could obtain nonfat dry milk more cheaply.

Introduction of the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program: 

With the introduction of the MILC program in 2002, dairy farmers began 
receiving payments on milk production up to 2.4 million pounds annually 
when the Class I price in Boston dropped below $16.94 per 
hundredweight. MILC payments are equal to 45 percent of the difference 
between $16.94 and the lower Boston Class I price. From the program's 
inception, MILC payments were made every month from the retroactive 
start date of December 2001 through August 2003 because there was an 
extended period of depressed farm prices, which reached a 25-year low 
in early 2003. Prices temporarily recovered from September through 
December 2003, so no MILC payments were made in those months; however, 
payments resumed during January and continued through April 2004. 
During the spring of 2004, farm milk prices reached record highs and 
remained strong through the fall of 2004, so no MILC payments were 
required for the remainder of fiscal year 2004.

As a result of depressed farm milk prices during 2002 and 2003, federal 
costs associated with MILC payments exceeded original estimates. Based 
on market conditions in March 2002, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimated total federal costs of the MILC program at $963 million over 
the life of the program (i.e., about 4 years). However, 1 year later, 
the Congressional Budget Office revised its total cost estimate for the 
MILC program to $4.2 billion. USDA distributed approximately $1.8 
billion in MILC payments to dairy farmers in fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 
156] Thus, the cost of MILC through fiscal year 2003 alone exceeded the 
previously estimated total costs for the entire 4-year period through 
2005 by about $800 million. The Congressional Budget Office's March 
2004 estimate for total MILC program costs was $3.8 billion, somewhat 
lower than the 2003 estimate because of higher farm milk prices in 
2004.[Footnote 157]

Many dairy experts indicated that by providing income support during 
low-price periods, the MILC program has helped keep some farmers, 
particularly smaller farmers, in business.[Footnote 158] For example, 
some academic experts noted that some farmers received MILC checks of 
about $20,000 to $25,000, and others said that despite low prices, 
fewer farmers exited the market in 2003 than in previous years. USDA 
officials indicated that these payments delayed the supply response to 
low prices and maintained depressed milk prices over a longer period of 
time. By providing direct payments when prices were low, MILC obscured 
market signals that would normally cause farmers to decrease 
production, and continued high levels of production retained downward 
pressure on milk prices. To the extent that these lower farm prices 
were passed on through the retail level, consumers may have experienced 
lower prices for dairy products.

Despite this effect, dairy experts stated that smaller farmers receive 
a net benefit from MILC because those with about 100 to 130 cows can 
have all of their production covered under the 2.4 million-pound annual 
cap. In contrast, larger farmers do not receive net benefits from MILC 
because the negative farm income effects of reduced milk prices are 
greater than the payments they receive under the production cap. A 
couple of dairy experts noted that the break-even size, at which MILC 
payment benefits just offset the negative farm income effects of 
prolonged low prices, is about 400 cows. Because the effects of MILC 
vary by producer size, they also vary regionally. States with many 
small dairy farmers, such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Vermont, have 
received greater proportional benefits from MILC. However, the MILC 
program has disadvantaged states with larger producers, such as western 
states.

Effects of Alternative Dairy Policies Differ under Various Scenarios: 

A number of options have been proposed or discussed to further modify 
existing programs and policies or introduce alternative ones, all of 
which could affect the policy considerations we identified in different 
ways. These options span a range of existing and potential federal 
dairy programs and policies, including FMMOs, price supports, MILC, 
target price deficiency payments, the proposed National Dairy Equity 
Act, trade restrictions and export incentives, risk management, and 
supply management. Current international trade agreements and ongoing 
negotiations can have implications for certain of these policy options, 
such as price supports, export incentives, and trade 
restrictions.[Footnote 159] The purpose of this analysis is not to take 
a position for or against any of these options or to analyze them in 
terms of their overall economic impacts, but simply to discuss their 
likely effects on the policy considerations we identified. The likely 
effects of these alternatives sometimes differ under various scenarios, 
such as high or low prices, and may be different in the short and long 
terms.

In general, options that increase farm income over the short term also 
tend to increase milk production and thus the potential for oversupply 
and lower average farm prices over the long term.[Footnote 160] These 
options also tend to be costly for the federal government during 
periods of low prices. In some cases options that increase the economic 
efficiency of federal dairy programs also increase price volatility 
because they allow clearer transmission of market price 
signals.[Footnote 161] Further, to the extent that price changes at the 
wholesale level are passed through to the retail level, a number of 
options would likely have mixed effects on consumer prices depending 
upon the particular product under consideration (e.g., butter, cheese, 
or fluid milk). The potential impacts of the options also vary 
according to the size of the producer and region of the country. In 
general, options that affect farm income without respect to farm size 
or cost of production could further shift production towards larger, 
western farms. Production shifts toward larger farms could increase the 
potential for oversupply in the market, because such farms have a 
greater capacity to increase production in response to policy 
incentives. In some cases, options that reduce support for farm income 
could have disproportionately negative impacts on smaller farmers, who 
often have higher costs of production.[Footnote 162]

Change the Federal Milk Marketing Order Program: 

Dairy experts have cited a number of concerns with FMMOs, including 
that with the increasing ability to transport milk products longer 
distances, the differences in Class I differentials provide incentives 
for overproduction in some regions; that recent revisions to the 
classified pricing system enhanced the effects of price volatility on 
dairy farmers; that changes in pooling restrictions increased the flow 
of milk between different regions of the country, which disrupts the 
market; that consolidation of the FMMOs combined some areas of the 
country that were not part of the same natural "milksheds;" and that it 
takes too long to change the federal order system through the USDA 
hearing process. A number of options have been proposed or discussed to 
modify the FMMO program, including revising the classified pricing 
system, making administrative changes such as tightening pooling 
provisions, or eliminating FMMOs altogether. Figure 36 shows the 
effects of various options to change the FMMO program over the short 
and long terms.

Figure 36: Potential Effects of Options to Change FMMOs on Various 
Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Revise Classified Pricing: 

Academic, industry, and government sources cited a variety of concerns 
with recent reforms in the classified pricing system, including that 
these changes enhance the effects of price volatility on farmers; 
lessen the transmission of market price signals; reduce incentives for 
market participants to shift milk to its highest-valued use; discourage 
innovation; and contribute to de-pooling during periods of price 
volatility. A number of options exist to revise the classified pricing 
system, including basing the class pricing formulas on competitive pay 
prices instead of product prices, combining Class III and IV into a 
single manufacturing class of milk, and changing the Class I mover from 
being the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk values to 
a weighted average of these prices.

Use Competitive Pay Prices Instead of Product Formula Pricing: 

One option to reform the classified pricing system would be to return 
to a system of competitive pay prices as the basis for the minimum 
prices that manufacturers pay for raw milk. As indicated by AMS 
officials, the change to a product formula pricing system has enhanced 
the effects of price volatility on the prices that farmers receive for 
their raw milk. The AMS officials, as well as academic and industry 
sources, noted that competitive pay prices for raw milk would be a 
better basis for the minimum class prices. However, the officials noted 
that the lack of good data is a major challenge to developing a 
competitive pay system that is more broadly based than the old 
Minnesota-Wisconsin price series.[Footnote 163]

In an earlier report, we compared the concept of a competitive pay 
system to a product formula pricing system, among other 
options.[Footnote 164] We found that while a product formula pricing 
system would be superior to other mechanisms in reflecting national 
prices of manufactured dairy products, the accuracy of price levels 
under the system would depend on a number of factors, including whether 
the manufacturing allowances--deductions made for the costs of 
manufacturing different dairy products--are accurate. Setting accurate 
manufacturing allowances is difficult because individual plants could 
have different cost structures. As noted earlier, we heard from several 
academic, industry, and government sources that the fixed manufacturing 
allowances in the current product pricing formulas have negative 
impacts on the economic efficiency of the classified pricing system by 
reflecting supply and demand conditions less clearly.[Footnote 165]

On the other hand, we found that while a competitive pay system for 
Grade A milk was similar to a product formula pricing system in that it 
would generally reflect national prices of manufactured dairy products, 
it would more readily reflect national supply and demand conditions for 
raw milk used for manufacturing. Also, it would more accurately reflect 
competitive pressures from the fluid milk market because Grade A milk 
is used to meet shortages in areas of the country with high Class I 
utilization. Furthermore, we reported that a competitive pay system 
would be better than a product formula pricing system at self-adjusting 
automatically because the competitive system would be based on actual 
reported prices. Therefore, a competitive pay system could improve the 
economic efficiency of the classified pricing system by providing 
clearer market price signals.

AMS officials stated that if it were possible to obtain adequate data, 
returning to a competitive pay system would introduce greater stability 
into farm milk prices because basing the price formulas on competitive 
pay prices allows manufacturers' margins to be set outside the federal 
order system. According to the officials, when manufacturing costs 
increase, manufacturers tend to decrease their margins; they then 
increase their margins when costs go back down. The AMS officials also 
stated that to the extent the effects of price volatility are reduced 
by eliminating fixed manufacturing allowances, raw milk production 
would increase, holding average milk prices constant.

Combine Class III and IV: 

A second option discussed by some of the academic and industry sources 
we contacted would be to combine Class III and IV into a single 
manufacturing class.[Footnote 166] While an objective of USDA's FMMO 
reforms, including developing separate manufacturing classes on which 
to base fluid milk prices, was to avoid situations in which the price 
of milk used in manufactured products rises above the price of milk 
used in fluid products; as we noted earlier, this change has muted 
market price signals and has reduced incentives to move milk to its 
highest-valued use. However, an academic source indicated that a 
potential challenge in combining Class III and IV is identifying an 
appropriate formula that considers the products in an expanded class. 
In addition, AMS officials cited this issue noting that one barrier 
would be finding a way to price the lowest-valued use, nonfat dry milk, 
so that manufacturers of this product would be able to afford to pay 
the minimum class price to farmers.

A number of industry and academic sources said that combining Class III 
and IV into a single manufacturing class would allow milk to move to 
its highest-valued use. With a separate Class IV, processors of butter 
and nonfat dry milk can pay less for their raw milk supplies under 
certain market conditions, which can stimulate additional allocation of 
raw milk into Class IV products. Under such conditions, by reducing 
these market distortions, combining Class III and IV might help to 
increase the economic efficiency of the classified pricing 
system.[Footnote 167] It could also help to limit the decline in market 
prices caused by overproduction of nonfat dry milk and thus reduce the 
federal costs of CCC purchases of this commodity. Over the long term, 
limiting overproduction incentives will help all farmers by maintaining 
higher average farm prices. However, these benefits could be limited by 
constraints on the extent to which raw milk is free to move between 
different uses. Some USDA officials have indicated that manufacturing 
capacity for different products varies by region and that manufacturing 
plants are often specialized. In addition, fixed supply agreements 
within the dairy industry may not allow manufacturers significant 
freedom to shift raw milk between uses in response to price signals in 
the short term.

Combining Class III and IV could have mixed impacts by region on farm 
income because with a combined manufactured product price, high prices 
for one particular use of milk would offset low prices for other uses 
in creating a weighted average price. Utilization rates for the 
different manufacturing uses vary among orders, and farmers whose 
average blend prices might be higher based on utilization of their raw 
milk for a higher-valued use under a separate class price scenario 
could experience lower average returns under a combined class price 
scenario if the price of their higher-valued use were weighted down by 
the inclusion of the lower-valued use. Conversely, farmers whose 
average blend prices might be lower based on utilization of their raw 
milk for a lower-valued use under a separate class price scenario could 
experience higher average returns under a combined class price 
scenario. For example, in regions with higher Class IV utilization, the 
loss of a separate Class IV could result in lower average farm income 
during periods when Class IV prices would otherwise be higher than 
Class III prices. In regions with higher Class III utilization, 
however, the loss of a separate Class IV could result in higher average 
farm income during periods when Class III prices would otherwise be 
lower than Class IV prices.

Change Class I Mover: 

If Class III and IV prices are kept separate, a third option to modify 
classified pricing would be to use a weighted average of Class III and 
IV prices as the mover for Class I prices. This option would tie fluid 
milk prices more closely to market related manufacturing prices, 
particularly when prices of Class III products are depressed relative 
to Class IV products. One academic study that modeled the price 
volatility impacts of using a weighted average of Class III and IV 
prices to set Class I prices reported that using the weighted average, 
rather than the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk 
values, slightly decreases the volatility of farm prices, largely 
through a more substantial decrease in the volatility of the Class I 
price.[Footnote 168] As a result of this reduced volatility, the study 
estimated that the average Class I price would decline by roughly $0.40 
per hundredweight, causing an average farm price decline of $0.09 per 
hundredweight. The study found that there would be essentially no 
change in the volatility of other class prices or product prices.

These effects are likely to vary by region. As the Class I price is 
expected to decrease more than the average farm price, the effects of 
this option could be more significant in regions with high Class I 
utilization of raw milk. The reduction in farm prices could cause a 
marginal downward supply adjustment over the long term, the effects of 
which would also be stronger in high Class I utilization areas. The 
effects of reduced prices on farm income could be partially offset by 
increased MILC payments as long that program remains in existence. 
Increased MILC payments would raise federal costs, particularly during 
periods of low prices. However, this option could also help USDA 
minimize the costs of the price support program by making it less 
controversial to adjust the tilt between butter and nonfat dry milk 
purchase prices because these prices would no longer exert as great an 
influence on the Class I price.

AMS officials cautioned, however, that this option could increase the 
likelihood that manufactured product prices would rise above blend 
prices, leading to more frequent negative producer price differentials 
and de-pooling.[Footnote 169] The officials noted that the purpose of 
implementing the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV skim milk 
values provision was to reduce the frequency of negative producer price 
differentials. They said that implementing an option that reduces blend 
prices makes it more likely that the value of one of the manufacturing 
class prices will rise above the blend price. The officials also 
indicated that consumers may benefit from lower prices to the extent 
that the Class I and blend price decreases are transmitted through the 
milk marketing chain. One AMS official questioned the extent to which 
this option would reduce the volatility of Class I prices, noting that 
since January 2000 the volatility of Class I prices would have been 
about the same under a weighted average mover.

Change the Administration of FMMOs: 

Another set of options to modify FMMOs involves changing their 
administration. Pooling provisions could be tightened by increasing the 
amount of milk that must be shipped to an order to qualify for that 
order's blend price or by placing restrictions on de-pooling. 
Alternatively, federal order reform could be reconsidered by splitting 
up some of the consolidated orders. Finally, USDA may be able to 
shorten the time between a hearing request and implementation of a 
final decision.

Tighten Pooling Provisions with Increased Minimum Shipment 
Requirements: 

Federal order reforms relaxed the pooling provisions of many orders, 
which negatively affected some farmers by diluting their Class I 
utilization rates and lowering their blend prices as increased amounts 
of distant milk were pooled on their orders. In response, participants 
in some orders called for hearings to tighten their pooling provisions, 
often by increasing the minimum amount of milk that must be delivered 
to processing plants participating in their pool to qualify for the 
blend price. With the end of the Western Order, the concern that some 
milk formerly pooled on that order could be pooled on the Upper Midwest 
Order led two groups of dairy cooperatives operating there to request a 
hearing to tighten the order's pooling provisions.[Footnote 170]

According to some AMS officials, restricting the pooling of raw milk 
through increased shipping requirements would not have a significant 
national impact. However, they said there could be mixed regional 
effects on farm income and production. Farmers in areas seeking to pool 
milk to other orders would generally see a negative impact on their 
farm incomes because they would incur greater transportation costs 
trying to share in the value of another order's pool and would, 
therefore, pool less milk in other orders. However, farmers in the 
receiving order could see an increase in their farm income because with 
less milk pooled from outside the order, their pool would retain more 
of its value and they would receive higher blend prices. In each case, 
there could be localized production effects depending upon whether 
farmers experience an increase or a decrease in their farm income. The 
AMS officials stated that tightening pooling provisions would have 
minimal effects on price volatility because the tighter provisions 
would not change overall supply and demand conditions. However, the 
officials also indicated that the economic efficiency of the FMMO 
system would increase to the extent that reducing the amount of milk 
pooled on distant orders would reduce the amount of money spent on 
transporting milk. Because impacts on national production levels are 
likely to be limited, impacts on federal costs would be minimal.

Tighten Pooling Provisions with Restrictions on De-Pooling: 

A second option for tightening federal order pooling provisions is to 
place additional restrictions on those who choose to de-pool. As noted 
earlier, price volatility leading to negative producer price 
differentials and de-pooling can negatively affect those who remain in 
a federal order pool because the overall value of the pool is 
reduced.[Footnote 171] Some orders restrict de-pooling by preventing 
milk handlers who choose to de-pool from re-pooling for a specific 
period of time.[Footnote 172] One such restriction recently proposed by 
cooperatives in the Upper Midwest Order would limit a processor's 
pooled milk in any month to a specified percentage of that processor's 
pooled milk in the previous month. Under that restriction, if a 
processor partially de-pooled in one month, it could only partially re-
pool in the subsequent month. If it fully de-pooled, it would have to 
wait a month before it could re-pool.

Restricting de-pooling would have mixed effects on farm income. Because 
de-pooling allows some processors to pay farmers higher prices, some 
farmers would be harmed if de-pooling were restricted. Conversely, 
those farmers who are harmed by de-pooling could benefit if more of the 
pool value were retained during periods of volatile prices. While 
nonuniform farm prices do not help to achieve orderly marketing, 
restricting de-pooling could make this problem worse if it encourages 
some processors to leave the order system permanently. In that case, 
the reserve supply of milk for fluid production would shrink, and 
orders would have to increase minimum shipping requirements for 
remaining pooled processors and dairy cooperatives. If restricted de-
pooling actually caused fewer processors to be associated with the 
federal order system, volatility in fluid milk prices could increase 
because with less milk available in reserve to supply the Class I 
market, seasonal or episodic fluctuations in milk supply and demand 
could have greater price impacts. However, an AMS official indicated 
that in general processors benefit over the long term from being 
pooled, and so restrictions on de-pooling would not necessarily 
decrease the supply of milk available for fluid milk products. If the 
supply of milk available for fluid milk products did not decrease, then 
the volatility of fluid milk prices would not increase. The effects of 
restricted de-pooling on other policy considerations, such as federal 
costs or consumer prices, are unclear.

Split Up Consolidated Federal Orders: 

A third option to revise the administration of FMMOs is to split up 
some of the consolidated orders where the combination of orders with 
different utilization rates of the different classes of milk has 
created problems. Many industry, academic, and government sources 
stated that federal order consolidation has had some significant 
regional effects, including the demise of the Western Order. One source 
stated that because of order consolidation, some orders have become so 
large that they include milk that would not normally be in the milkshed 
for particular marketing areas. This increases the potential that some 
farmers' blend prices will decrease with lower utilization rates of raw 
milk in Class I products. To address this problem, USDA is currently 
considering a proposal to split up the Southeast Order and create a 
"Mississippi Valley" Order.[Footnote 173]

Splitting up certain orders could have mixed effects on farm income. In 
cases in which experts have cited problems with federal order 
consolidation, the problems developed because two previously existing 
orders that had largely different Class I utilization rates were 
combined. With the additional milk pooled under the consolidated order, 
farmers that had been in the order with the higher Class I utilization 
rate saw a decrease in their blend price. However, farmers that had 
been in the order with the lower Class I utilization rate experienced 
an increase in their blend price. Therefore, splitting up the 
consolidated orders in these instances would affect farmers differently 
depending on the Class I utilization rates of the new orders. AMS 
officials indicated that splitting up orders would affect the 
distribution of farm income but would not affect overall production and 
therefore would have minimal impacts on federal costs. They also noted 
that splitting up orders could increase the movement of milk because 
having smaller orders makes farm prices more closely reflect local 
supply and demand conditions. Therefore, to the extent that smaller 
orders would increase the blend prices in some areas, this option could 
create incentives to transport more milk to those areas.

Accelerate USDA's Hearing Process: 

Some experts suggested that USDA's federal order hearing system is too 
slow to effectively respond to problems and changing market conditions. 
The American Farm Bureau study reported that it can take 2 or more 
years from the time USDA receives a request for a hearing or direction 
from the Congress before USDA implements the rules of a final decision. 
The study noted that within this long time frame, either the industry 
may have struggled under faulty rules or, by the time final rules are 
effective, industry changes may have occurred rendering the final rule 
obsolete. For example, a couple of industry sources stated that the 
dairy industry is changing rapidly, with a number of new products 
coming onto the market. They indicated that USDA would have difficulty 
regulating these products because it takes too long to get a decision 
on the class under which they would be priced.

USDA faces a number of challenges in shortening the time between 
receiving a hearing request and implementing the rules of a final 
decision, while still ensuring the promulgation of economically sound 
regulation.

* The USDA hearing process is set forth by law.[Footnote 174] Before 
issuing or amending marketing orders, the Secretary of Agriculture must 
conduct a formal on-the-record rulemaking proceeding. USDA must notify 
the public and provide an opportunity for a public hearing and 
comments. Before an order regulation or amendment to a milk marketing 
order can become effective, it must meet certain requirements including 
that it be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected dairy 
farmers in the order, or dairy farmers who produce at least two-thirds 
of the milk produced in that order.

* If individual parties do not agree with the USDA decision, they can 
seek review of that decision in federal court. For example, after the 
2000 FMMO reforms, several industry groups received an injunction that 
prevented USDA from implementing new pricing rules that would have 
established separate Class III and IV butterfat prices. In response, 
USDA issued a revised decision, but these new rules were not 
implemented until April 2003.

* Making informed decisions about changes in complex federal dairy 
policy can be time-consuming. For example, such decisions require 
thorough analysis and possibly modeling. In addition, AMS officials 
indicated that hearing participants are not always ready on time, and 
keeping a stricter schedule could result in an incomplete hearing 
record. Furthermore, they stated that it is difficult to compile the 
hearing transcripts quickly and accurately. However, they noted that 
USDA has recently begun evaluating its transcript contracts using an 
approach that considers timeliness and accuracy.

* The politicized nature of dairy policy makes it difficult to agree on 
proposed changes to FMMOs. Because FMMO provisions affect cooperatives 
and processors in different ways, these entities may not always agree 
on a proposed change. Moreover, given regional differences in 
production and utilization, farmers in different regions may not agree 
on changes in federal dairy policy.

AMS officials said that delays are also caused by the lack of available 
judges and attorneys who deal with milk pricing issues. The officials 
said that increasing the speed of the decision-making process is likely 
to increase federal costs because more of these resources would be 
required. USDA officials indicated that they do not believe the hearing 
process inhibits the ability of FMMOs to respond to changing market 
conditions or the marketing of new dairy products.

Eliminate FMMOs or Classified Pricing: 

Rather than trying to reform the FMMO system, some dairy experts have 
considered the possibility of eliminating FMMOs and thus the classified 
pricing system.[Footnote 175] To the extent that manufactured product 
prices stay above the level of the price support program, market forces 
would set prices for all uses of milk. In a 1988 report on 
FMMOs,[Footnote 176] we found that the production and marketing 
conditions used to justify federally guaranteed milk prices under 
marketing orders no longer existed because most milk being produced is 
now Grade A and is eligible to serve the fluid milk market during 
periods of supply and demand imbalance.[Footnote 177] Also, our study 
noted that improvements in refrigeration and the transportation system 
have made it less expensive to rely on milk supplies from other 
markets. Further, we reported that the differences in Class I 
differentials--which were, in part, intended to represent the costs of 
producing and transporting milk from areas with a surplus to areas with 
a deficit--actually bear little relationship to differences in either 
production or transportation costs for milk, thereby providing 
incentives for overproduction in certain regions. A 2002 University of 
Wisconsin study argued that this overproduction has hurt farmers in 
areas with low Class I utilization through an overall reduction in the 
price of milk used for manufacturing purposes.[Footnote 178]

Academic and USDA studies have generally concluded that without the 
classified prices established by FMMOs, fluid milk processors would 
likely pay lower average prices to farmers, which would decrease farm 
income in high fluid milk utilization areas, especially in the short 
term. Estimates of impacts on farm prices varied among studies. For 
example, the American Farm Bureau study estimated that average farm 
prices for raw milk would fall by about $0.50 per hundredweight during 
the first couple of years following federal order elimination.[Footnote 
179] Another study, published by USDA, estimated that eliminating the 
federal order system would decrease Class I prices an average of $0.95 
per hundredweight over the period from 2002 through 2007.[Footnote 180] 
Further, the 2002 University of Wisconsin study estimated that farm 
prices would decrease around $0.05 to $0.10 per hundredweight. AMS 
officials indicated that farmers would likely reduce production to the 
extent they receive lower average farm prices.

The effects of FMMO elimination could be different based on farm size. 
Some of the academic and industry sources we contacted noted that 
farmers are at a disadvantage in terms of market power within the dairy 
industry. Without the pooling of milk proceeds and the payment of 
uniform blend prices, larger farms would have increasing incentives to 
establish contracts directly with processors, and processors would 
increase their efforts to procure milk directly from larger farms 
closer to their own plants. Smaller and more distant farms could be 
more likely to be bypassed. Also, to the extent that dairy cooperatives 
are unable to cover the costs of balancing and other services they 
provide, processors may be able to deflect the costs of these 
operations back to farmers.

Studies also indicated that the magnitude of these effects could vary 
by region. Without classified pricing, the prices of raw milk used in 
fluid milk products are likely to fall, while the prices of raw milk 
used in manufactured products are likely to rise. As a result, farmers 
in regions with higher utilization of raw milk for fluid purposes, such 
as the Northeast, would be worse off without classified pricing, while 
farmers in regions with high utilization of raw milk for manufacturing 
purposes, such as the Upper Midwest, could be better off without 
classified pricing. For example, the American Farm Bureau study 
reported that states with less than 20 percent fluid utilization of raw 
milk would have higher average farm prices with the elimination of 
federal orders, while those states with fluid utilization of raw milk 
in excess of 35 percent have higher farm prices with the federal order 
system in place.

In the short term, to the extent that lower farm prices paid for raw 
milk used in fluid products are passed on to consumers, fluid milk 
consumption could marginally increase. The American Farm Bureau study 
estimated a 2.5 percent increase in fluid milk demand, while the USDA 
study estimated a 2 percent increase. On the other hand, the University 
of Wisconsin study reported that the combination of less milk 
production and more fluid milk consumption would reduce the amount of 
raw milk available for manufactured products and increase manufactured 
product prices accordingly.[Footnote 181] To the extent that 
manufactured product prices increase, consumers may buy less of these 
products.

Over the long term, increased prices for milk used in manufactured 
products could limit reductions in both farm income and production 
resulting from elimination of FMMOs and classified pricing. In fact, 
the American Farm Bureau study found that once a supply adjustment 
occurs, average milk prices would return to levels similar to those 
prior to FMMO elimination. However, to the extent that farmers in areas 
with high manufacturing use experience higher prices for their milk, 
the incentive to produce more milk could limit potential increases in 
manufacturing product prices. In the end, some decline in production 
could be expected over the long term because the overproduction 
incentive resulting from the classified pricing system would be 
removed.

Eliminating FMMOs and classified pricing could also affect other 
federal dairy policies and, therefore, affect federal costs. If MILC 
payments were still based on the relationship between what fluid milk 
processors pay to acquire milk in Boston and a target price of $16.94, 
MILC payments would likely increase in size and frequency.[Footnote 
182] At the same time, elimination of FMMOs could decrease federal 
costs related to the price support program because an increase in 
manufactured dairy product prices resulting from eliminating classified 
pricing could reduce the need for dairy commodity purchases by the CCC. 
However, it is unclear whether this effect would be large enough to 
offset additional payments under the MILC program.

Some AMS officials also indicated that farmers could experience 
increased price volatility without FMMOs. In the absence of minimum 
class prices, greater price volatility could result, in part, from 
seasonal production variation or short-term factors, such as holidays 
or weather events. Further, while some sources questioned the extent to 
which a state regulatory system, such as California's, could continue 
to exist in the absence of the federal classified pricing system, 
others indicated that state regulation of milk could increase if the 
federal system were eliminated. A couple of industry sources that we 
contacted indicated that an increase in the number of states that 
regulate milk could make it more difficult for them to do business and 
would be a less efficient system of regulation.

On the other hand, eliminating FMMOs and classified pricing could also 
provide greater incentives for product innovation. Without classified 
pricing, the market would price products more openly based on supply 
and demand and would increase the incentives for processors to develop 
alternative dairy products. To the extent that alternative products 
generate new demand for milk, this innovation could benefit farmers. 
For example, a recent study by researchers at Cornell University on the 
assignment of new products under a classified pricing system found 
significant difficulties.[Footnote 183] The study reported that the 
assignment of a new product to a higher-priced class increases farm 
income in the short run; however, the incentive to increase production 
provided by the use of raw milk in this higher-priced class and reduced 
demand for raw milk stemming from these higher prices can offset farm 
income gains in the long run. Furthermore, the study found that whether 
the new product detracts from sales of existing fluid milk products 
could also affect whether assignment to a higher-priced class increases 
net revenues to farmers. One USDA representative stated that a number 
of new products, such as low-carbohydrate milk beverages, have recently 
entered the market. In some cases, according to the representative, 
these products are intended to compete with Class I products but are 
formulated to avoid regulation as Class I products. Processors seek to 
avoid having these products regulated as Class I products because they 
would then be required to pay more for raw milk. Conversely, farmers 
want these products classified as Class I products so that their raw 
milk used in these items will be priced at the higher level.

Some sources suggested that classified pricing could be eliminated 
without eliminating FMMOs altogether. In this case, FMMOs might 
continue to perform functions such as pooling revenue, auditing, 
verifying weights and milk components, and collecting statistical 
information. A few dairy experts indicated that these particular 
aspects of the FMMO system benefit the dairy industry. While some of 
these functions might be picked up by the private sector if FMMOs were 
eliminated, they would come at a cost to dairy farmers.

Retaining FMMOs while eliminating classified pricing would probably 
lessen the impacts of deregulating raw milk prices but would be 
unlikely to change the direction of most effects or who benefits. For 
example, while farm income would still fall without classified pricing, 
continuing to pool revenues through FMMOs, if possible, could help 
cooperatives negotiate over-order premiums because pooling could help 
cooperatives maintain their market power relative to processors. Thus, 
farm income might fall by less than it would if FMMOs were eliminated 
entirely. Moreover, by continuing to pool revenues, retaining FMMOs 
could limit increases in price volatility resulting from the 
elimination of classified pricing. In addition, the orders would 
continue to aim to ensure equitable treatment for producers and 
processors. Maintaining orders is not likely to change the fact that 
farmers in regions with high fluid milk utilization would experience 
greater reductions in farm income from eliminating classified pricing 
than farmers in regions with high manufacturing utilization. Production 
would still adjust downward in response to lower milk prices, and 
retail fluid milk prices would also decrease to the extent that lower 
prices for raw milk used in fluid milk products are passed on to the 
consumer. However, to the extent that cooperatives are able to maintain 
higher over-order premiums by retaining FMMOs, these production and 
consumer price effects might be less than they would be if orders were 
eliminated entirely. Effects on federal costs would still be mixed.

Change the Dairy Price Support Program: 

Dairy experts have raised several concerns about the price support 
program in recent years, including that the support level is too low to 
adequately support farmers; that the program provides incentives to 
overproduce milk and certain commodities purchased by the CCC; that 
USDA has not managed the program to maintain the established support 
price during periods of low market prices; that there are additional 
costs of selling dairy products to the government, which diminish the 
effectiveness of the support price; and that the program stifles 
innovation in the industry. Accordingly, a number of options have been 
discussed to modify the price support program, including raising the 
overall level of the support price (and thus the related commodity 
purchase prices), making administrative changes such as allowing the 
CCC to purchase a wider range of dairy products, and eliminating the 
program altogether.[Footnote 184] Figure 37 shows the effects of 
various options to change the dairy price support program under low-and 
high-price scenarios over the short and long terms.

Figure 37: Potential Effects of Options to Change the Price Support 
Program on Various Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Raise the Level of the Support Price: 

One option for modifying the dairy price support program is to raise 
the support price and the related commodity purchase prices. Many dairy 
experts indicated that the support price has fallen below the costs of 
production for most farmers and, therefore, is not providing an 
effective safety net during periods of low prices. Additionally, 
sources cited the reduction in the support price as a factor in 
increasingly volatile milk prices. For example, one academician we 
contacted stated that recent volatility in milk prices has resulted 
from the virtual elimination of the price support system as an 
effective price floor during periods of low milk prices. The price 
support program also worked to reduce price volatility during periods 
of high milk prices by releasing CCC stocks of purchased dairy 
commodities when market prices reached 110 percent of the support 
price.[Footnote 185] However, without purchasing sufficient quantities 
of manufactured dairy products, the program does not perform this 
balancing function.

According to an economist with USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA), 
raising the support price would increase farm income and, thus, raw 
milk production. The economist indicated that this option, by raising 
the floor for milk prices, would also reduce price volatility; however, 
increased purchases of dairy products would mean higher federal costs 
for the price support program. Similarly, the American Farm Bureau 
study found that while raising the support price would reduce price 
volatility, it could create a situation in which the CCC purchases 
surplus dairy products in most years. The FSA economist noted that 
these federal costs might be offset, at least in part, by a reduction 
in payments under the MILC program. The economist also said that 
consumer costs would likely be higher, on average, because increasing 
the support price would limit the fall of prices for manufactured 
products.

The FSA economist also noted that increasing the support price would 
decrease the economic efficiency of federal dairy policies, 
particularly to the extent that a higher support price stimulates 
increased production. Under this scenario, increased production would 
represent an allocative inefficiency because resources would go into 
producing milk that is not needed to supply the market. Some sources 
cited examples of how high support prices under the program led to 
misallocation of resources into surplus milk production. For example, 
from 1977 to 1981, the support price for Grade A milk rose from $8.26 
to $13.10 per hundredweight, and annual government expenditures on 
dairy price supports increased from a few hundred million dollars to 
over $2 billion.

Change the Administration of the Price Support Program: 

A number of options have been proposed or discussed to change the 
administration of the dairy price support program. These options 
include allowing the CCC to purchase a wider range of products, 
adjusting commodity purchase prices based on market conditions, and 
setting commodity purchase prices to reflect cost differences between 
selling to the CCC and selling in the marketplace.

Allow the CCC to Purchase a Wider Range of Products: 

One potential modification to the administration of the price support 
program would be to allow the CCC to purchase a wider range of products 
than butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk. Some dairy experts and 
studies indicated that by focusing on the purchase of a few specific 
commodities, the price support program distorts the market by providing 
incentives to overproduce these commodities, while at the same time 
dampening incentives for innovation in the dairy industry. 
Manufacturers that develop innovative products incur more risk because 
they will not be able to sell their products to the government if they 
cannot obtain a market price high enough to cover their costs. One 
cooperative representative said that while nonfat dry milk contains 
protein and calcium--both valuable components that could be used in 
other products, such as protein bars--manufacturers continue to produce 
nonfat dry milk in excess quantities because that is what the 
government is buying. A number of other sources, including industry 
representatives, academicians, and a report by the International Trade 
Commission, noted that by purchasing nonfat dry milk, the price support 
program may be impeding development of a domestic milk protein 
concentrate industry by creating disincentives to shift raw milk 
supplies to innovative products.

USDA officials cautioned that in order for a product to function well 
as a price support product, it must (1) represent a major use of milk; 
(2) have enough extra capacity to absorb a substantial amount of milk; 
(3) be storable for long periods; and (4) have an active, liquid 
wholesale market. Given these conditions, it is questionable whether 
some alternative products, such as protein bars, would be effective as 
price support products. Furthermore, the officials argued that 
requiring the price support program to incur the risk of product 
innovation through this approach would alter the fundamental purpose of 
the program--supporting farm prices.

If the CCC were to purchase a wider range of products, manufacturers 
would have greater incentives to use milk in alternative ways because 
the price support program would decrease the risks of trying to produce 
and market a greater number of products. Consumers could benefit as 
innovative products gained easier access to the market, causing 
consumer prices to fall. However, one FSA economist stated that this 
option would greatly increase the complexity of the price support 
program, potentially increase federal costs, and require new 
legislation. Moreover, he noted that this change would require close 
coordination between trade policies and the price support program. For 
example, without tariff-rate quotas on some products such as milk 
protein concentrates, the CCC could end up supporting additional 
imports if the purchase prices were set too high. The economist stated 
that this option could reduce production of nonfat dry milk but would 
be less likely to affect price volatility.

Adjust Commodity Purchase Prices Based on Market Conditions: 

A second potential modification would be to adjust--or tilt--commodity 
purchase prices based on market conditions. Some dairy experts, as well 
as academic studies, reported that because USDA does not tilt CCC 
purchase prices frequently enough to maintain a balance between butter 
and nonfat dry milk purchase prices that is based on current economic 
conditions, the price support program has distorted the market with 
unclear price signals and induced surplus production of certain goods 
(notably nonfat dry milk). Therefore, some experts indicated that 
tilting prices based on established criteria would be better. For 
example, one dairy processor recommended changing the balance of butter 
and nonfat dry milk purchase prices automatically if the ratio of CCC 
purchases of butter and nonfat dry milk falls outside a certain range. 
Similarly, the American Farm Bureau study suggested that to achieve the 
support program's objectives without distorting the market and 
increasing government costs, changes to commodity purchase prices 
should be based on market conditions so that they would not be subject 
to political pressure.

Basing the tilt of commodity purchase prices on market conditions would 
increase the economic efficiency of the price support program by 
reducing the price distortions that lead to surplus production of goods 
that are not required to supply the market. Falling market prices for a 
particular commodity suggest that the quantity supplied temporarily, at 
least, exceeds the quantity demanded. If the CCC continues to buy the 
commodity in significant amounts while the market price remains low, it 
distorts the market by providing an incentive to produce that commodity 
purely for the purpose of selling it to the government. This incentive 
not only delays a market response to the lower commodity price but also 
prevents that milk from going toward a higher-valued use. Moreover, a 
study by researchers at the University of Wisconsin found that tilts 
make it more likely that fluid milk prices will be driven by cheese 
prices because the price support program would no longer be supporting 
the manufacturing prices of Class IV products above market 
levels.[Footnote 186] This study reported that tightening the 
relationship between cheese prices and Class I prices improves market 
signals to dairy farmers because nationally, as noted earlier, a 
greater percentage of raw milk is used in Class III products (cheese) 
than in Class IV products (butter and nonfat dry milk).

According to one FSA economist, lowering the purchase price of a 
particular commodity in the short term could reduce farm income; 
however, by encouraging production levels to respond more quickly to 
low price periods, tilting CCC purchase prices to reflect market 
conditions could maintain higher farm prices over the long term. The 
economist also indicated that this change could decrease federal costs 
for purchasing and storing dairy products. The consumer price effects 
of market-based tilts are less clear. For example, if market butter 
prices are high and market nonfat dry milk prices are low, a market-
based response would indicate that USDA should raise the CCC butter 
price and lower the CCC nonfat dry milk price. However, further price 
adjustments could result in the CCC purchase price for butter exceeding 
the market price, which could trigger CCC purchases of butter and raise 
the market price even higher. In such cases, assuming that price 
changes at the wholesale level are passed on through the retail level, 
consumers would benefit from lower prices on some commodities, while 
potentially experiencing higher prices on others. The net effect to 
consumers would then depend on the relative price changes for these 
products and the quantities of each that were purchased.

Reflect Cost Differences in Selling to the CCC: 

A third option to change the administration of the price support 
program would be to set CCC purchase prices to reflect cost differences 
in selling to the CCC versus selling in the marketplace. In recent 
years market prices have fallen below the support price level in some 
months. For instance, between July 2002 and June 2003, the Class III 
milk price was below the $9.90 target level in 9 months. Although FSA 
officials indicated that USDA is required to set product purchase 
prices in such a way that only the average annual farm milk price, not 
the monthly price, is at the support price, the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill) simply states that the price of 
milk should be supported at $9.90 per hundredweight.[Footnote 187] 
Concerns over USDA's management of the price support program led to 
language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 requiring the 
Secretary of Agriculture to more diligently support the farm price of 
milk.[Footnote 188] Some dairy experts and studies indicated that one 
reason that market prices sometimes fall below the CCC support price is 
because there are additional costs of selling to the government that 
are not reflected in the commodity purchase prices. Therefore, the 
effective support price is actually below $9.90 because with higher 
costs of selling to the government, the market price has to fall below 
the CCC purchase price before processors are better off selling to the 
CCC than to the market. Some of these additional costs include 
packaging for longer-term storage, meeting stricter grading standards, 
and a time lag between when the product is made and when it is approved 
for sale to the federal government. An FSA economist estimated that 
these cost differences amount to about $0.04 to $0.05 per pound for 
cheese.[Footnote 189]

One option for reflecting the differences in cost between selling dairy 
products to the government and selling in the marketplace would be to 
raise the CCC purchase prices of these products to reflect the 
additional costs of manufacturing product for sale to the 
government.[Footnote 190] This would help ensure that manufacturers 
receive a price for their products that allows them to return at least 
$9.90 per hundredweight (the support price) to farmers. One FSA 
economist indicated that this change could cause farmers to marginally 
increase production, leading to increased CCC purchases. Increased CCC 
purchases, in addition to higher purchase prices, would increase the 
federal costs of the price support program and, at the same time, 
higher manufactured product prices could translate into higher consumer 
prices. However, it is difficult to estimate the added costs of selling 
to the CCC because these costs are likely to vary widely among 
different manufacturers. Thus, raising the product purchase prices 
could provide unwarranted benefits to some manufacturers while still 
being insufficient to induce sales to the government by some others. In 
addition, according to one academic study, there is no clear evidence 
that higher selling costs are the major barrier in selling to the 
government. Some experts have put forth the possibility that fixed 
contracts between dairy product manufacturers and their buyers may 
prevent manufacturers from selling to the government.

An alternative way to reflect the differences in cost between selling 
dairy products to the government and selling them in the market place 
would be to require the CCC to alter product specifications and payment 
terms to conform to those used on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the 
Exchange).[Footnote 191] An FSA economist stated that some changes to 
product specifications are already being considered and have been put 
out for comment to the dairy industry.[Footnote 192] The economist 
stated that while these proposed changes will help bring CCC product 
specifications into greater conformance with market standards, some 
differences would remain. Most notably, the CCC requires that products 
be storable for up to 3 years, a longer period than is generally 
required in the market. To the extent that this proposal reduces 
additional costs of selling manufactured dairy products to the CCC by 
more closely aligning product specifications with market standards, it 
could induce greater manufactured product sales to the CCC and would 
keep market prices higher. Therefore, aligning these specifications 
could increase farm income, provide a marginal production stimulus, and 
raise federal costs related to additional CCC purchases. Also, this 
option would not necessarily prevent the Exchange prices from falling 
below CCC purchase prices because if there are barriers other than 
costs (such as contractual obligations) that prevent manufacturers from 
selling to the government, these barriers would still exist.[Footnote 
193]

Eliminate Dairy Price Supports: 

Another policy option would be to eliminate the price support program 
altogether and rely on alternatives available to farmers to assist them 
in managing risk of low and/or highly volatile prices for their milk. A 
number of dairy experts have argued that the support price has been set 
so low at $9.90 per hundredweight that it is not having significant 
impacts. Thus some academicians, as well as USDA, have studied the 
potential effects of eliminating the program.

In the short term, eliminating the program would have a greater impact 
if market prices were at or below the level of the support price. The 
May 2004 USDA study estimated that eliminating the price support 
program would cause wholesale prices of nonfat dry milk to decline by 
15 to 20 percent over the first couple of years.[Footnote 194] For 
subsequent years, the study estimated that prices would recover 
somewhat to 10 percent below baseline levels. Further, the study 
estimated that the decline in nonfat dry milk prices would encourage 
diversion of this milk to alternative uses, leading to lower prices for 
these alternative uses. Generally, lower prices would reduce farm 
income and potentially lead to lower consumer prices. Farmers would 
likely respond to these lower prices by producing less milk.

According to an FSA economist, eliminating the price support program 
would increase economic efficiency by allowing market price signals to 
be transmitted more clearly. The economist also stated that volatility 
in milk prices would increase. He noted that the combination of 
increased volatility and reduced farm income would force less efficient 
farmers to exit production. This exit would increase the economic 
efficiency of national resource allocation by enhancing current shifts 
in production to more efficient dairy farms. He added that in the 
absence of a price support program, new entrants to dairy production 
would likely be larger, more efficient operations. The FSA economist 
also said that eliminating the price support program would provide a 
cost savings for the federal government because the CCC would no longer 
have to purchase or store dairy commodities. These savings would be 
greater during periods when farm prices are low because when they are 
high, even if the program remains in effect, the government purchases 
fewer dairy products and incurs less cost. However, when farm milk 
prices are low, savings from eliminating the price support program 
could be partially offset by increased payments under the MILC program 
for as long as that program continues.

Over the long term, reduced production would mitigate some of the 
impacts of eliminating the price support program, because reduced 
supplies lead to increased prices (assuming demand stays the same). 
However, the USDA study estimated that even with the positive price 
effects resulting from reduced production, farm income would still 
decrease by approximately $3.5 billion over the long term. 
Additionally, without CCC purchases of dairy commodities, USDA would be 
unable to balance high market prices by releasing these stocks, thereby 
contributing to increased price volatility over the long term.

Extend the Milk Income Loss Contract Program: 

The MILC program has benefited many smaller dairy farmers during the 
most recent period of low farm prices by providing them income support. 
However, by providing support to some farmers who otherwise might have 
exited the dairy industry, the program has slowed the normal downward 
supply response to lower farm prices and kept aggregate production 
higher during this period than it otherwise would have been. The MILC 
program is scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005. If it is 
not extended in some form, aggregate production is likely to respond 
more rapidly to future low-price periods because smaller farmers are 
likely to exit production at greater rates than they did during the 
most recent period of low farm prices. With this more rapid production 
response, farm prices would likely start rising again sooner than in 
the recent past when the MILC program has been in place. However, 
although production levels in the short term would likely decrease more 
during low-price periods, in the long term aggregate production might 
not decrease substantially because higher average farm prices would 
stimulate additional production from the dairy farmers that stay in 
business. In addition, by allowing the MILC program to expire, the 
government can avoid the costs of the payments to farmers that the 
program provides.

There are several options to maintain the benefits of the MILC program 
to some dairy farmers by extending it beyond 2005. One option is to 
extend MILC at its current target price and eligible production limit. 
A second option, a proposal introduced in the Senate in the 108TH 
Congress, would extend MILC through fiscal year 2007 with an increase 
in the eligible production cap from 2.4 million pounds to 4.8 million 
pounds.[Footnote 195] A third option would extend MILC with a lower 
target price but a higher or no eligible production limit. Figure 38 
shows the effects of various policy options to extend the MILC program 
under low-and high-price scenarios over the short and long terms.

Figure 38: Potential Effects of Options to Extend MILC on Various 
Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Extend MILC in Its Current Form: 

One analysis conducted by a researcher at the University of Missouri 
estimated that compared to a baseline estimate in which the MILC 
program expires in 2005, extending the MILC program through 2012 in its 
current form would result in greater milk production and lower farm 
prices.[Footnote 196] Production was estimated to be 0.8 billion pounds 
higher in 2006 and to average 1.4 billion pounds per year higher from 
2008 through 2012. The estimated price difference was also greater in 
the longer term than initially.[Footnote 197] Greater production and 
lower farm prices are consistent with the expectation that extending 
the MILC program would keep some smaller dairy farmers in the industry 
who otherwise might exit after 2005 if the MILC program is allowed to 
expire then. This study also estimated that due to the MILC payments, 
farm income would increase if the program were extended, despite lower 
farm prices. Initially, in 2006, the estimated increase in farm income 
was $0.43 per hundredweight, and even in 2012, when the estimated farm 
price was $0.50 per hundredweight below what it would be if MILC 
expires after 2005, the estimated increase in farm income was $0.08 per 
hundredweight. In addition, extending MILC in its current form would 
increase federal costs. This study estimated that, on average, annual 
government costs from 2006 through 2012 would be about $1.2 billion 
higher than if the MILC program expires after 2005.[Footnote 198]

According to an FSA economist, lower farm prices resulting from 
extending MILC in its current form could be passed on as lower retail 
prices for consumers. However, the economist indicated that the effects 
on price volatility are less clear. He added that the extension of the 
MILC program as currently designed would continue to favor smaller 
farmers over larger farmers, because a greater percentage of smaller 
farmers' production is eligible for MILC payments. Thus, in general, 
the MILC program would continue to benefit farmers in the eastern and 
upper midwestern states over farmers in the western states. Therefore, 
for a given level of milk production and to the extent that larger 
farmers in the West are more efficient than smaller farmers in the 
East, extension of the MILC program as currently designed would reduce 
the economic efficiency of the allocation of dairy production resources 
nationally compared to the allocation that would occur if MILC expires.

Extend MILC with a Higher Cap or with No Cap: 

An alternative proposal has been introduced in the Senate in the 108TH 
Congress that would extend the MILC program at its current target price 
but increase the cap on eligible production. The University of Missouri 
study examined the impacts of a similar option in which the cap on 
eligible production is removed in 2003 and MILC is extended through 
2012 without a cap.[Footnote 199] This study estimated that extending 
MILC without a cap would result in a larger increase in production and 
a larger decrease in farm prices than extending MILC with a cap. For 
example, production in 2006 was estimated to be 2.3 billion pounds per 
year higher than if MILC is allowed to expire or 1.5 billion pounds 
greater than if MILC is continued in its current form. Greater 
production and lower farm prices are consistent with the expectation 
that making all milk eligible for MILC payments would provide farmers 
who might otherwise exit the industry after 2005 (if MILC is allowed to 
expire) an even greater incentive not to leave than is provided by 
extending MILC in its current form. As with the previous option, this 
study estimated that due to MILC payments, farm income would increase 
if MILC were extended without a cap despite lower farm prices. 
Initially, in 2006, the estimated increase in farm income would be 
$0.63 per hundredweight, and even in 2012, when the farm price was 
estimated to be $1.05 per hundredweight below what it would be if MILC 
expires after 2005, the estimated increase would be $0.18 per 
hundredweight. Moreover, this study estimated that farm income would be 
higher with this option than with extending MILC in its current form 
because the additional payments to farmers due to eliminating the cap 
would more than offset the additional farm price reduction resulting 
from greater production. Extending MILC without a cap would increase 
federal costs even more than extending MILC in its current form. This 
study estimated that, on average, annual government costs from 2006 
through 2012 would be about $2.5 billion higher than if the MILC 
program expires after 2005, more than $1 billion per year more than was 
estimated if MILC is extended in its current form.[Footnote 200]

An FSA economist indicated that consumers would likely benefit from 
reduced retail prices under this scenario. Additionally, without the 
cap on eligible production levels, the equity concerns about MILC would 
be eliminated because the program would no longer favor smaller farmers 
over larger farmers. However, the FSA economist also indicated that in 
addition to the inefficiencies of increased surplus milk production, 
this alternative would reduce economic efficiency of milk production 
compared to allowing MILC to expire after 2005 to the extent that it 
provided incentives for production by smaller producers with higher 
costs of production.

Extend with Lower Target Price and Higher or No Cap: 

A third alternative, considered in the American Farm Bureau study, is 
to extend MILC with a lower target price and a higher or no cap on 
eligible production. The study argued that the $16.94 per hundredweight 
target price is too high because MILC payments are triggered any time 
the Class I mover is less than $13.69 per hundredweight; at this target 
price, MILC payments could be expected in most months given that from 
1990 through 1999 the Class I mover averaged $12.28 per hundredweight 
and was below the $13.69 threshold in 104 of 120 months. The analysis 
concluded that a target level for MILC payments of a Class I mover at 
$12.00 per hundredweight or lower would help to make the program more 
marketbased. Further, expanding the cap or eliminating it completely 
would help to make the program more equitable among farmers of 
different sizes.

The effects of extending MILC in the absence of a cap on eligible 
production depend significantly on the level of the target price. If 
the target price were set too high, it would stimulate surplus 
production. During periods of low prices, the government would have to 
contribute additional MILC payments to counteract the effects of lower 
prices. Additional production would also decrease manufactured product 
prices, potentially increasing the costs of the dairy price support 
program because these prices would be more likely to reach the support 
level. At the same time, these lower prices could provide benefits for 
consumers. While a lower target price without a cap would treat farmers 
with different sized herds the same way, it might not provide enough 
payments to keep farmers in areas with high costs of production from 
exiting during periods of low prices. Therefore, this option could 
increase the economic efficiency of national dairy production, while 
also accelerating shifts in dairy production to the West.

Introduce a New Target Price Deficiency Payment Program: 

Some dairy experts indicated that in lieu of maintaining both the dairy 
price support and MILC programs, operating one new target price 
deficiency payment program could be a better alternative.[Footnote 201] 
USDA and other dairy experts stated that having both the price support 
and MILC programs is problematic, particularly during periods of low 
prices. As noted in the American Farm Bureau study, the idea behind 
establishing a target price deficiency payment program is to allow 
markets to work to clear dairy products at market prices and then, when 
the market price is below the target price, to pay farmers based on the 
difference between these prices. But with both dairy programs in force, 
MILC maintains and encourages surplus milk production that must then be 
purchased by the CCC under the price support program. This market 
distortion adds to the costs of both programs.

Under a new target price deficiency payment program, dairy farmers 
would receive a payment when the market price of Class III milk 
products drops below a specific target level. Thus, the program would 
establish a floor on farm income through a countercyclical payment to 
dairy farmers instead of a floor on manufactured product prices with 
purchases by the CCC.[Footnote 202] Instead of providing an incentive 
for manufacturers to continue producing a particular product that the 
CCC is purchasing, the program would allow the market to clear a 
wholesale product price and then pay farmers the difference if the 
price were too low. This option would provide manufacturers the 
incentive to shift raw milk supplies to their highest-valued use, 
further promoting the development of new and innovative products. This 
option could also potentially reduce federal costs, depending on the 
level of the target price; one expert estimated that with a target 
price of $10.50 per hundredweight for Class III milk, the government 
would have spent $300 million less than under the MILC program since 
its inception in December 2001. With a target price of $10.00 per 
hundredweight for Class III milk, these savings would have reached $1.2 
billion.

Notwithstanding these potential benefits, dairy experts indicated that 
a new target price deficiency payment program could have its own 
challenges depending upon how it is designed. In particular, such a 
program would require some key decisions regarding price level and 
regional differences, and whether to cap program benefits based on 
payments or quantities of production.

Set Price Level and Consider Regional Differences: 

Some dairy experts said that a problem with the target price deficiency 
payment approach is that it would be hard to determine the appropriate 
target price without creating distortions in production incentives. If 
the target price were set too high, it would have the same effect as 
setting the support price too high: it would lead to excess production 
by supporting farm income at higher levels than would be available if 
farmers received market prices. Long-term overproduction would place 
additional downward pressure on market prices and increase federal 
costs for the program. If the target price were set at a low level to 
avoid stimulating production and increasing government costs, it might 
not maintain adequate support for farm income, and could increase price 
volatility. Additionally, by influencing domestic production levels, 
which in turn influence U.S. market prices, the level of the target 
price can affect the incentives of other countries to export 
manufactured products to the United States. However, these incentives 
are also affected by the export subsidies and lower production costs of 
some other countries.

The difficulty in setting the appropriate target price is exacerbated 
by regional differences in costs of production. A certain Class III 
target price might provide adequate support during periods of low 
prices based on the costs of production in one region, but not in 
another. However, increasing the target price to provide adequate 
support for higher-cost regions would not only support production in 
areas where it is less economically efficient to do so, but would also 
provide greater benefits to farmers in lower-cost regions. These higher 
benefits would increase the incentives to overproduce in those areas. 
Given current trends in the United States, this scenario would 
encourage the western shift in dairy production.

Place Cap on Payments or Production: 

Another challenge in designing a target price deficiency payment 
program would be to determine whether to cap the program's benefits 
either by limiting the payment a farmer could receive or by limiting 
the quantity of milk production on which a farmer would be eligible to 
receive payments. The MILC program calls for payments equal to 45 
percent of the difference between $16.94 and the Boston Class I per 
hundredweight price and has a production cap (2.4 million pounds of 
production per dairy operation each fiscal year). These controls have 
helped to keep federal costs lower than they otherwise would have been 
during periods of depressed prices by limiting incentives for 
overproduction. However, the production cap has targeted the program's 
benefits primarily to smaller farmers, raising questions of equity.

If a target price deficiency payment program were implemented without 
any controls, the risk of market distortions and increased federal 
costs from establishing a target price level that is too high could 
increase substantially. At the same time, a couple of researchers noted 
that establishing the target price deficiency payment program without a 
production cap could encourage farmers to enhance the efficiency of 
their dairy operations. With a cap limiting eligible production, 
farmers have less incentive to adopt new technologies that would 
increase production. However, whether or not a cap is placed on 
eligible production, the program is likely to confer benefits to 
farmers in varying degrees. If the program did not cap eligible 
production, farmers who could increase their production efficiency with 
new technology might have more of an incentive to do so. But the 
farmers who would be most likely to take advantage of this incentive 
would be larger farmers who may be more efficient, and might have the 
resources and access to capital to undertake such an investment. 
Conversely, capping eligible production would target benefits to 
smaller farmers in the same way as MILC.

Adopt the National Dairy Equity Act: 

To address concerns about the pending expiration of the MILC program 
and provide additional support to dairy farmers, the National Dairy 
Equity Act of 2004 (NDEA) has been introduced in the House and the 
Senate.[Footnote 203] This proposed legislation would change the 
federal regulation of milk marketing through the establishment of 
regional dairy marketing areas in which boards created to administer 
these areas would set minimum prices that processors would have to pay 
for raw milk used to make fluid milk products sold in those 
areas.[Footnote 204] The NDEA would have a similar effect as the MILC 
program in that it might lead to higher incomes for some dairy farmers. 
However, concerns have been raised about its impact on farm incomes in 
some regions, retail fluid milk prices, coordination of milk prices 
across regions, and existing trade agreements. Figure 39 shows the 
effects of adopting the NDEA over the short and long terms.

Figure 39: Potential Effects of Adopting the NDEA on Various Policy 
Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Elements of the NDEA: 

The NDEA would create five marketing areas that together would 
encompass the entire nation. States in the Northeast,[Footnote 205] 
Southern,[Footnote 206] and Upper Midwest[Footnote 207] regions would 
automatically be participating in the marketing area program 
established by the NDEA upon enactment of the legislation. States in 
the Intermountain[Footnote 208] and Pacific[Footnote 209] regions could 
become participating states by providing written notice to the 
Secretary of Agriculture. The NDEA would authorize each region's board 
to set an "over-order" minimum price for Class I sales that exceeded 
the FMMO Class I price in that region, with an initial maximum of 
$17.50 per hundredweight, subject to approval by farmers within the 
region in a referendum.[Footnote 210] Although the boards would have 
discretion in setting the over-order price, the legislation directs the 
boards to consider several factors including the: 

* balance between production and consumption of milk and milk products 
in the regulated area;

* costs of milk production in the regulated area;

* prevailing price for milk outside the regulated area;

* purchasing power of the public; and: 

* price necessary to yield a reasonable return to an eligible farmer.

The NDEA would establish a fund in the U.S. Treasury to carry out the 
program. During months in which a region's over-order price exceeded 
the FMMO Class I minimum price in Boston, processors would be required 
to pay the Secretary of Agriculture an amount equal to the difference 
between those two prices, known as the over-order premium, times the 
quantity of milk purchased for use in Class I products. The Secretary 
would deposit these amounts into the U.S. Treasury fund, and the fund 
would make payments to each board, which would distribute the payments 
to eligible farmers in its region.[Footnote 211] Each month the board 
would receive at a minimum an amount equal to the over-order premium 
times 50 percent of the milk produced in that region.[Footnote 212] The 
proposed legislation would require CCC funds to be transferred to the 
fund when necessary to allow the fund to make the required payments; 
according to one analysis, such contributions would typically be 
necessary because only one of the proposed dairy marketing areas has a 
Class I utilization rate equal to 50 percent or higher.

The NDEA also would require boards to compensate the CCC for any 
additional costs of CCC purchases of milk products resulting from 
increases in milk production that exceed the national average growth 
rate. To manage overproduction of milk that could result from the NDEA, 
the NDEA would authorize boards to take action, including developing 
and implementing incentive-based supply management programs.

In addition, the NDEA would link participation in the dairy marketing 
areas with participation in the current MILC program. Farmers who 
participate in the new program would not be able to continue to receive 
MILC payments. If states in the Intermountain and Pacific regions chose 
not to participate in the NDEA program, farmers in those states could 
continue to receive MILC payments, and the NDEA would extend the 
authorization period for the MILC program until the end of September 
2007. States in the other regions, which would become participants upon 
enactment of the NDEA, could withdraw their participation. If they did, 
farmers in those states could also continue their MILC payments through 
the end of September 2007. Individual farmers in states that 
participated in the NDEA program could choose not to participate in the 
new program and would then be able to continue receiving MILC payments. 
However, those farmers would not be able to extend their payments 
beyond September 2005 and would not be eligible for subsequent 
participation in the NDEA program.

Impacts of the NDEA: 

Although the NDEA may lead to higher incomes for some dairy farmers, 
academicians and industry participants have raised many concerns about 
the proposed legislation's impacts. These concerns include regional 
divisiveness due to lower incomes for dairy farmers in some regions, 
higher retail prices, reduced coordination of dairy prices across 
regions, and potential conflict with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules.

The NDEA could lead to higher incomes for farmers in participating 
states when milk prices are relatively low because processors would 
have to pay the over-order prices set by the boards for Class I milk; 
however, the total effect on farmers would depend on what happens to 
the price of milk used for manufacturing purposes as well.[Footnote 
213] To the extent that higher blend prices stemming from higher Class 
I prices lead farmers to increase milk production, the result could be 
lower prices for Class III and IV milk both in participating and 
nonparticipating states. Even if all states participated in the dairy 
marketing areas, the large differences in Class I utilization rates 
across regions imply that different regions would be affected 
differently by the combination of higher Class I prices and lower Class 
III and IV prices, and farmers in regions with low Class I utilization 
rates might see a decline in their incomes. If some states do not 
participate, their farmers would be even worse off because unless these 
farmers pool milk in states that are included in the marketing areas, 
they would not receive any benefits of higher Class I prices. In a 
report that we issued in September 2001[Footnote 214] in which we 
analyzed the inter-regional impacts of various scenarios in which some 
states were grouped in dairy compacts that functioned like the NDEA's 
dairy marketing areas, we reported that one effect of compacts was to 
reduce farm income in noncompact regions. We estimated this effect to 
be minimal when we examined the impact of the Northeast Interstate 
Dairy Compact because the six New England states included in that 
Compact produced only 3 percent of the nation's milk. However, we 
estimated that the effect was somewhat greater in a scenario in which 
states producing 27 percent of the nation's milk supply were included 
in compacts.

To the extent that the NDEA would result in fluid milk processors 
paying more to buy their milk from farmers, the NDEA would also lead to 
increases in retail fluid milk prices. In our report on compacts, we 
reported that several studies concluded that the Northeast Interstate 
Dairy Compact resulted in higher retail prices for fluid milk in New 
England, with estimated impacts ranging from $0.03 to $0.20 per gallon. 
Higher retail prices could have a greater effect on retail sales in 
upcoming years than occurred in the past, as some dairy experts believe 
that the demand for fluid milk has become more responsive to price 
changes, given the increasing number of beverages that are considered 
substitutes for fluid milk, among other reasons. Consequently, 
retailers with whom we spoke generally opposed the NDEA. Furthermore, 
declines in fluid milk sales would cause more milk to be available for 
manufacturing purposes, which would further depress the prices for 
Class III and IV milk.

Several academicians told us that they believed the NDEA would also 
create regional distortions because price-setting in each dairy 
marketing area would be controlled by its board, and prices for raw 
milk used in fluid products would no longer be closely linked to prices 
for raw milk used in manufactured products. This would be a major 
change from the current system in which Class I prices are set based on 
differentials added to the "higher of" the advanced Class III or IV 
skim milk values, with the differentials still somewhat reflective of 
the costs of transporting milk from the Upper Midwest, a key dairy 
surplus region. Before the 1960s, Class I prices in different orders 
were not coordinated, and the resulting disorderly marketing system led 
to the coordinated system that we now have. Adopting the decentralized 
price-setting system of the NDEA risks losing the advantage of more 
orderly marketing that the coordination of the 1960s brought to the 
dairy industry.

Concerns about whether the NDEA would make U.S. dairy policy less 
consistent with existing agreements under the WTO arise because of the 
effects of the NDEA on milk production and, hence, U.S. milk prices. As 
indicated previously, recent U.S. commitments under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are leaning in the direction of more 
liberalized trade. To the extent that the NDEA provides a subsidy for 
U.S. milk production and reduces the prices of manufactured dairy 
products, the act would reduce the competitiveness of imported 
products.

We identified one study that estimates the effects of the NDEA on milk 
production, farm prices, and government costs compared to a baseline 
scenario that did not include the NDEA.[Footnote 215] This study 
estimated that the NDEA would increase milk production compared to the 
baseline by an average of about 7.6 billion pounds per year during the 
period from 2006 through 2013. The increased production would result in 
estimated declines in Class III and IV prices from the baseline such 
that average milk prices would be $1.17 per hundredweight below the 
baseline estimate. The estimated annual average increase in federal 
costs for payments to the boards was $1.7 billion.[Footnote 216]

Change Trade Restrictions and Export Incentives: 

Recent concerns about the effects of imported dairy products, most 
notably milk protein concentrates, on U.S. dairy prices have 
highlighted the importance of U.S. trade policy--trade restrictions and 
subsidy programs--as a foundation for domestic dairy policies. Several 
policy options related to international trade in dairy products have 
been suggested. As noted previously, current international trade 
agreements and ongoing negotiations can have implications for certain 
policy options that have been suggested. These options include (1) 
increasing trade restrictions, specifically for imports of milk protein 
concentrates;[Footnote 217] (2) relaxing trade restrictions; (3) 
introducing domestic subsidies for products significantly affected by 
international trade competition, specifically establishing a subsidy 
program for domestic production of milk protein concentrates; and (4) 
changing the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), either by using it 
more effectively or by eliminating it. Those options that succeed in 
limiting imports or encouraging exports of manufactured dairy products 
could support higher farm income, production levels, and consumer 
prices. These options may also reduce federal costs if higher farm 
prices reduce costs to the price support program to a greater degree 
than the cost of these trade options. Figure 40 shows the effects of 
options to change trade restrictions and export incentives over the 
short and long terms.

Figure 40: Potential Effects of Changing Trade Restrictions and Export 
Incentives on Various Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Increase Trade Restrictions/Establish a Tariff-Rate Quota for Milk 
Protein Concentrates: 

One international trade policy that has been proposed is to increase 
trade restrictions within the constraints of existing international 
trade agreements. More specifically, a bill entitled the Milk Import 
Tariff Equity Act[Footnote 218] has been introduced in the Congress 
that would impose tariff-rate quotas on dairy protein products such as 
milk protein concentrates and certain casein products. Import quotas 
prior to the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture did not cover 
milk protein concentrates and casein.[Footnote 219] Therefore, no 
tariff-rate quota was established for these products after the 
agreement was implemented. The May 2004 report by the International 
Trade Commission showed that U.S. imports of some dairy proteins 
increased significantly from 1998 through 2000 and then declined. Some 
of these protein imports displaced domestic dairy proteins, 
particularly those used in making processed cheese products not covered 
by the Food and Drug Administration's standards of identity.[Footnote 
220]

The International Trade Commission report concluded that imports of 
milk protein concentrates to the United States have the effect of 
lowering U.S. farm prices either directly or indirectly, depending upon 
whether U.S. market prices for manufactured dairy products are above or 
at the level of the support price. If U.S. prices are above the support 
price, then imports of dairy proteins could directly lower the market 
prices of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese to the extent these 
proteins can be imported at lower prices than proteins available in the 
domestic market. In turn, lower product prices could reduce the prices 
received by U.S. farmers for their raw milk. If U.S. prices are at the 
support price, then imports of dairy proteins could indirectly affect 
U.S. market prices. Increasing imports of proteins when U.S. market 
prices for manufactured dairy products are at the support price will 
cause the CCC to purchase more nonfat dry milk as this alternative 
protein source is displaced in the market. Eventually, these increasing 
stocks could cause USDA to lower the purchase price of nonfat dry milk 
in an attempt to reduce federal costs. This adjustment would then lower 
prices for manufactured dairy products, in turn decreasing the prices 
received by U.S. farmers for their raw milk.[Footnote 221]

Because introducing tariff-rate quotas on milk protein concentrate and 
casein would likely reduce imports of these products, federal costs due 
to CCC purchases and storage of nonfat dry milk under the price support 
program would likely decrease. When U.S. market prices are above the 
purchase prices established by the price support program, a reduction 
in imports could maintain prices of some products, such as cheese, at 
higher levels due to reduced domestic supply of dairy proteins used in 
these products. Higher product prices could increase farm prices and 
thus stimulate additional production. These effects could be more 
significant in regions of the United States where raw milk is used to a 
greater extent in the manufacturing of Class III products. (If U.S. 
trading partners successfully challenge tariff-rate quotas on dairy 
proteins, compensation such as increased market access for other 
products could be required, reducing the benefits to U.S. dairy 
farmers.) Because production adjustments tend to lag behind price 
changes, this additional production could delay adjustments to lower 
market prices in the future. Therefore, to the extent that the 
exclusion of imports masks market price signals that would exist 
without the exclusion, this policy option would decrease economic 
efficiency. Additionally, to the extent that changes in the 
manufacturing prices of dairy products are passed on through the retail 
level, consumers could experience higher prices for some products (such 
as cheese) and lower prices for other products (such as 
butter).[Footnote 222]

Relax Trade Restrictions: 

A second option is to relax trade restrictions by reducing or 
eliminating tariffs on dairy products. Trade restrictions such as 
tariff-rate quotas support domestic programs such as the FMMO 
classified pricing system and the dairy price support program by 
limiting the available supply of dairy products to take advantage of 
higher U.S. market prices. Unilaterally relaxing U.S. trade 
restrictions would likely increase imports of manufactured products as 
foreign producers seek to take advantage of the higher prices available 
in the U.S. market. Despite higher transportation costs for imported 
products, some manufacturers might be able to import certain dairy 
products from U.S. trading partners at prices below U.S. market prices 
either because those partners provide export subsidies (as the European 
Union does) or because they have lower milk production costs (as 
Australia and New Zealand do). Relaxing trade restrictions such as 
tariff-rate quotas is unlikely to increase imports of fluid milk 
products because of health restrictions, transportation costs, and the 
perishable nature of these products.

Increased imports could put pressure on the CCC to purchase larger 
quantities of manufactured dairy products, thereby increasing federal 
costs.[Footnote 223] At some point these pressures could become 
unsustainable, leading to a reduction in the support price or the end 
of the price support program and to a decline in the price of milk used 
for manufacturing purposes. Moreover, because the price of milk used in 
fluid milk products is based on the price of milk used in manufactured 
products, a decline in the prices of manufactured products from 
increased imports could lower average farm prices. As long as MILC is 
authorized, these lower prices could trigger additional MILC payments 
to farmers, further increasing government costs.

In the short term, increased imports could cause U.S. prices to fall, 
resulting in a decline in farm income for U.S. dairy farmers. With 
reduced farm income, production would also decrease as less efficient 
farmers exit production. Over the long term, the decline in production 
could cause farm prices to rebound toward the levels that existed 
before trade restrictions were relaxed. Similarly, in the short term, 
lower farm prices are likely to lead to lower consumer prices for fluid 
milk and other dairy products, but as farm prices rise toward their 
previous levels due to production decreases, consumer prices for fluid 
milk and other dairy products would likely rise as well. Economic 
efficiency will increase with relaxed trade restrictions because such 
relaxation will allow market price signals to be more visible than with 
restrictions in place. These signals will lead to increased imports 
when it is cheaper to substitute increased imports for some domestic 
dairy production. Additionally, the economic efficiency of U.S. dairy 
production resource allocation could increase with relaxed trade 
restrictions as the reduction in domestic production is more likely to 
come from less efficient domestic farmers.

Subsidize Domestic Milk Protein Concentrate Production: 

Another proposed option is to support the development of domestic 
casein and milk protein concentrate production. Under the proposed U.S. 
Dairy Proteins Incentive Program, the CCC would make subsidy payments, 
on a bid basis, to entities that produce and market dairy proteins from 
skim milk.[Footnote 224] The proposed legislation would provide, among 
other things, that receipt of a payment is contingent upon the end use 
of the dairy proteins produced; that no applicant receives a payment if 
the contract submitted for review would undercut domestic prices for 
milk, nonfat dry milk, or dairy proteins; and that the sale of the 
dairy proteins represents a new use of domestically produced dairy 
proteins.

This program's potential impact on domestic dairy protein production 
depends on the relative profitability of these proteins, which, in turn 
depends on production costs and demand. The International Trade 
Commission's May 2004 study on milk protein products found that, given 
disincentives inherent in the price support program and constraints on 
U.S. demand for dairy proteins other than nonfat dry milk, the 
profitability of domestic protein production could be limited. For 
example, the study reported that the price support program creates a 
disincentive for U.S. processors to produce dairy proteins other than 
nonfat dry milk because by purchasing nonfat dry milk the price support 
program reduces the financial risk of manufacturing that product. 
Processors of other proteins would need to invest in production 
facilities and then market their product without the benefit of a 
standing government offer of support. The study found that only under 
the most favorable conditions (high skim milk protein yield[Footnote 
225] and low variable costs) would it be beneficial for U.S. processors 
to begin producing milk protein concentrate instead of nonfat dry milk. 
Even then, positive returns were only for milk protein concentrates 
with protein concentrations above 70 or 80 percent.[Footnote 226]

The classified pricing system could create an impediment to the 
development of a domestic protein industry depending upon how milk 
protein concentrate is classified. Based on analysis presented in the 
International Trade Commission's report, classification under a higher-
valued class would require producers of milk protein concentrate to pay 
more for their raw milk supplies, thus reducing their profits.[Footnote 
227] In addition, the report noted that since May 2002, the CCC has had 
a program to provide incentives to convert nonfat dry milk held in its 
stocks to casein. Under this program, the CCC accepts competitive bids 
for CCC-owned nonfat dry milk stocks for the manufacture of casein. 
However, while USDA has accepted some bids, in many cases processors' 
bids have been so low that USDA has rejected them.

Finally, the International Trade Commission's report found that while 
milk protein concentrate is considered a useful additive to standardize 
protein content, the limitation on its use inherent in the Food and 
Drug Administration's standards of identity further restrict domestic 
milk protein concentrate production. This limitation keeps the market 
for milk protein concentrates relatively small in comparison to the 
market for other dairy proteins. Given these restrictions, the 
International Trade Commission estimated that the total U.S. market for 
milk protein concentrate is 40,000 to 50,000 metric tons per year. A 
new production facility in New Mexico reportedly is capable of 
producing 16,000 tons annually. Therefore, barring a large drop in 
imports or changes to the standards of identity, the demand for milk 
protein concentrate would have to increase substantially to induce 
additional domestic production.

To the extent that the proposed program can overcome these challenges, 
it could provide incentives for manufacturers to produce alternative 
dairy proteins domestically. Should these proteins replace some nonfat 
dry milk production, they could reduce federal costs for the price 
support program. However, the overall impact on federal costs would 
depend on whether these reductions are offset by the cost of the 
subsidy program itself. Various dairy experts disagree as to whether 
subsidizing domestic dairy protein production would result in a net 
increase or decrease in federal costs. For example, a study that was 
published in May 2004 by researchers at Cornell University concluded 
that reduced costs to the price support program would not be great 
enough to offset the cost of the subsidy program.[Footnote 228] 
Conversely, an analysis by the National Milk Producers Federation found 
that a protein subsidy program providing assistance up to $2.30 per 
hundredweight of skim milk would result in a net cost savings for the 
federal government. The study by Cornell University researchers also 
estimated that a subsidy program for casein and milk protein 
concentrate would raise average milk prices by $0.40 per hundredweight, 
yielding an increase in farm income of $913 million. These increases 
would have greater impacts on farm income and milk production in areas 
of the country with higher Class IV utilization, such as the West.

Also, should these proteins replace some nonfat dry milk production, 
the resulting effects on the prices that consumers pay for products 
made with dairy proteins could be mixed. If dairy protein prices 
increase with reduced imports, consumer prices for those products for 
which they are an ingredient (such as cheese), could also increase to 
the extent that these price changes are passed through. However, 
additional production resulting from higher farm prices could lower 
consumer prices for butter. Over the long term, increased domestic 
production of casein and milk protein concentrate could lower their 
production costs and also the costs of other products for which they 
are ingredients. With the subsidy program in place, the economic 
efficiency of resource allocation would likely decrease as the 
government provides incentives for the production of proteins that 
could potentially be supplied more cheaply through imports.

Change the Dairy Export Incentive Program: 

Some dairy experts indicated that DEIP can help reduce government 
expenditures by allowing USDA to subsidize exports rather than purchase 
products and maintain high stock levels through the price support 
program. However, in some cases, academic experts indicated that under 
current market conditions the impact of DEIP on U.S. prices is limited. 
For example, one source noted that with CCC purchases of nonfat dry 
milk at over 800 million pounds in 2002, and with over 1 billion pounds 
of CCC stocks on hand, DEIP currently has no impact on U.S. prices. 
Also, WTO commitments have limited the scope of DEIP. For example, in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture the United States committed 
to reducing the quantity of subsidized exports by 21 percent and the 
value of these exports by 36 percent over the period from 1995 to 2000. 
Therefore, a couple of alternative policy options have been discussed 
with regard to DEIP, using it more effectively or eliminating it 
entirely.

Use DEIP More Effectively: 

Some dairy experts suggested that the government could make greater use 
of DEIP.[Footnote 229] The American Farm Bureau study concluded that 
DEIP may be underutilized, noting that it is difficult to develop 
foreign markets unless a commitment is made to serving the market. Such 
a commitment is more difficult if a given product is made available 
only when it is in surplus. The study criticized USDA for (1) being 
slow to invite and accept bids and (2) concentrating on products in 
surplus. Other dairy experts indicated that invitations for DEIP bids 
may be announced too late in the year for potential exporters to 
participate in the program due to seasonal sales patterns. To improve 
the effectiveness of DEIP, the American Farm Bureau study recommended 
three potential changes: 

* Exporters should be encouraged to submit bids for products and 
countries that offer the greatest potential for longer-term market 
development. USDA should use DEIP in conjunction with the Foreign 
Agricultural Service to coordinate export assistance programs to fully 
develop markets.

* USDA should consider DEIP bids for any eligible products and not base 
acceptance primarily on removing surplus products from the domestic 
market. Bids should be accepted for products that may have the greatest 
market development potential and do not violate WTO subsidization 
volume limits.

* USDA needs to act under shorter time frames in reviewing and 
accepting DEIP bids to maximize the volume allowable under WTO rules.

USDA indicated that it has announced and awarded subsidies under the 
DEIP program up to the limits allowed by WTO rules for nonfat dry milk 
and cheese and that DEIP-assisted exports of butterfat have varied 
depending on market conditions. USDA also noted that the Foreign 
Agricultural Service has worked closely with the dairy industry to 
ensure that national and annual DEIP assistance optimizes longer-term 
market development prospects and minimizes any potential detrimental 
effects on the U.S. market. For example, a Foreign Agricultural Service 
official stated that the Service generally tries to wait until the 
market for a particular product, such as butterfat, is in surplus 
before inviting bids for DEIP export subsidies. The official said that 
if the market is not in surplus, subsidized exports would increase U.S. 
market prices for products manufactured with butterfat, such as ice 
cream. USDA further indicated that expanding the use of DEIP is not 
possible as the program is bound by quantitative and monetary caps 
under WTO rules. Finally, USDA noted that the bid review and acceptance 
process occurs within a time span equivalent to less than one working 
day. Specifically, another Foreign Agricultural Service official stated 
that USDA responds to all bid proposals by 10: 00 a.m. on the next 
business day after the proposals are submitted.

To the extent that USDA could identify ways to make greater use of 
DEIP, the effects on the dairy industry of increased exports of U.S. 
dairy products could be similar to the effects of an increase in 
demand.[Footnote 230] In the short term, greater demand for dairy 
products would increase wholesale prices, raising farm prices and, to 
the extent that these changes are passed on to consumers, retail 
prices. While higher retail prices could cause marginal declines in 
domestic consumption, higher farm prices over the long term could 
stimulate additional production, which could put downward pressure on 
wholesale and retail prices. Under such a scenario, price volatility 
could decrease as the government balances swings in domestic 
manufactured product prices by adjusting its level of support for DEIP. 
However, economic efficiency would decrease to the extent that 
increased use of DEIP induces additional production that would not have 
occurred without the government program. Finally, in relation to 
federal costs, while increased use of DEIP could increase federal costs 
for the program, these increases might be offset by decreases in the 
costs of purchasing and storing commodities under the price support 
program. Further, greater competition for milk supplies used in 
manufactured products could increase Class I prices, decreasing MILC 
payments while the MILC program remains in existence.

Eliminate DEIP: 

Eliminating DEIP could lower U.S. market prices and increase government 
costs, specifically for nonfat dry milk.[Footnote 231] For example, the 
May 2004 USDA study estimated that exports of nonfat dry milk under 
DEIP account for approximately 9 percent of total U.S. production. The 
study further found that in comparison to just eliminating the price 
support program, eliminating DEIP as well would reduce wholesale nonfat 
dry milk prices another 5 percent below baseline levels. Under this 
scenario, the study reported that for 2002 through 2007, farm income 
would decline by approximately $5.3 billion and payments required under 
the MILC program would increase by approximately $900 million. 
Therefore, while ending DEIP would eliminate the costs of the subsidies 
provided by the program, these cost savings could be offset by 
increased MILC expenditures. Also, should DEIP be eliminated without 
eliminating the price support program, there would be an increase in 
federal costs for purchases of commodities that would otherwise have 
been exported.

The American Farm Bureau study reported that in the short term 
eliminating DEIP would cause dairy products formerly exported under the 
program to be commercially exported. However, the study found that over 
the long term dairy product prices in the U.S. market would be too high 
relative to world prices to allow formerly subsidized products to move 
as commercially exported products. In the short term, a decline in the 
prices of some manufactured products formerly exported under DEIP, such 
as nonfat dry milk and cheese, would lower the blend prices farmers 
receive which, in turn, would cause a decline in milk production. This 
reduced production could cause butter prices to increase. However, the 
overall effect is a decrease in both average milk prices and milk 
supplies. With lower prices for some manufactured dairy products and 
higher prices for others, consumer prices may rise or fall depending on 
the extent to which these price changes are passed on by retailers. In 
other respects, the elimination of DEIP could increase price volatility 
because USDA would lose an outlet to help balance surplus production. 
However, the supply adjustment could marginally increase economic 
efficiency as excess supply is wrung out of the market. Further, to the 
extent that DEIP is providing incentives for nonfat dry milk production 
rather than production of other dairy products, elimination of these 
incentives would also marginally increase economic efficiency.

Facilitate Risk Management for Dairy Farmers: 

The increased volatility in farm milk prices has increased dairy 
farmers' interest in managing the risk that low prices will reduce farm 
incomes. Risk management alternatives to stabilize dairy farmers' 
incomes can take many forms. These include, among others, increased use 
of forward contracting to guarantee prices, such as through USDA's 
Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program;[Footnote 232] revenue insurance 
policies that pay farmers when dairy proceeds fall below specified 
levels; and tax-deferred savings incentives that encourage setting 
money aside during higher income years that could be withdrawn during 
lower income years. Figure 41 shows the effects of options to 
facilitate risk management under low-and high-price scenarios over the 
short and long terms.

Figure 41: Potential Effects of Options to Facilitate Risk Management 
on Various Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Continue Dairy Forward Pricing Program: 

Forward contracting of milk--entering into a contract with a processor 
or cooperative to sell milk in the future at a guaranteed price--is one 
way for farmers to manage the risk that volatile prices create for 
their income. Although forward contracting may prevent farmers from 
benefiting from price increases, this risk management tool stabilizes 
their income and ensures that the price they receive does not fall 
below the contracted price. In this respect, forward contracting, like 
the MILC program, limits the decline in farm income from a fall in farm 
milk prices.

Most, but not all, dairy cooperatives offer their members the ability 
to enter into forward contracts to guarantee the prices members will 
receive for their milk. One option that could allow dairy farmers to 
make more use of forward contracting to manage their price risk would 
be to extend and expand the Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program to 
cover Class I milk. The program was mandated by the Congress in 1999 
and is scheduled to expire at the end of 2004.[Footnote 233] Under the 
pilot program, farmers are not allowed to enter into forward contracts 
for Class I milk. However, if the program were extended or made 
permanent, it could also be expanded to allow forward contracting on 
all classes of milk.

The forward contracting pilot program offers farmers who sell to 
proprietary processors an option to enter into fixed-price forward 
contracts by providing processors with an exemption from paying the 
otherwise required FMMO minimum prices. (Dairy cooperatives are already 
exempt from paying the FMMO minimum prices.)[Footnote 234] Normally, 
when either cooperatives or proprietary processors buy milk from 
farmers under forward contracts, they can offset their risk that farm 
prices might be lower at the end of the contract period (in which case 
they would pay more for milk than their competitors who buy later at 
the lower price) with a futures market transaction in which they would 
gain an amount equivalent to the decrease in the farm price of 
milk.[Footnote 235] However, when prices rise during the contract, the 
cooperatives or processors will lose money on the futures market 
transactions and cannot afford to pay farmers more than the contracted 
price. The pilot program encourages proprietary processors to enter 
into forward contracts with farmers by exempting these processors from 
having to pay farmers the relevant order minimum price for the portion 
of their milk that is under forward contract. Without this program, 
proprietary firms might not readily enter into forward contracts 
because if they offset their risk of a price decline in the futures 
market and the prices were to rise above the contract price, they might 
have insufficient funds--including their futures market loss--to pay 
their forward-contracted farmers the minimum price.

Some cooperatives have opposed proposed legislation that would make 
permanent the authority for forward contracting by proprietary 
processors on the grounds that allowing those processors to pay farmers 
less than the minimum price could undermine the federal order pricing 
system. However, one academic analysis of options to address price 
volatility indicated that this exemption would not undermine the 
federal order pricing system because while proprietary processors could 
pay farmers less than the minimum price, these processors would still 
have to pay minimum class prices into their federal order 
pools.[Footnote 236] Another academician told us that even if allowing 
forward contracting on Class I milk caused farmers to receive lower 
minimum prices in return for reduced risk, neither that price reduction 
nor any other rationale would be a good reason for not making fluid 
milk eligible for forward contracting by those farmers who want to 
enter into such contracts.

In October 2002,[Footnote 237] USDA released a report that examined the 
performance of the pilot program from its inception, in September 2000, 
through March 2002. The report found that the average monthly price 
received for milk sold under forward contracts authorized by the pilot 
program was lower than the average monthly price that would have been 
received for that same milk if it had not been under contract by about 
$0.50 per hundredweight, but that the variation in price for milk sold 
under forward contracts was much less. At times the contract price 
exceeded the price that would have been received without the contracts, 
and at times it was lower. More recent USDA data show that the contract 
price exceeded the price that would have been received without the 
contracts in each month from April 2002 through July 2003, but for the 
remainder of 2003 the contract price was lower. On average, for the 
entire period from April 2002 through December 2003, the contract price 
was about $1.40 per hundredweight higher.

Participation in the program during the period covered by the USDA 
report was relatively small and was concentrated most heavily in the 
Upper Midwest Order, which has a low Class I utilization rate. More 
recent USDA data show that participation remained relatively low 
through the end of 2003. Farmers in orders with high Class I 
utilization rates had less opportunity to participate because Class I 
milk was ineligible, so it is uncertain whether participation rates in 
those orders would have been higher if farmers were allowed to enter 
into forward contracts for Class I milk. One academic source also noted 
that even if the program were expanded to include Class I milk, fluid 
milk processors might be reluctant to engage in forward contracting for 
this milk because there is no good hedge in the futures market for 
Class I prices. In addition, the USDA study reported that participating 
farmers were generally more accustomed to using risk management tools 
than were nonparticipants. Farmer education on using forward 
contracting may be important to increase participation.

Provide Revenue Insurance: 

Another option to help dairy farmers manage their price risk is revenue 
insurance. Revenue insurance allows farmers to protect themselves 
against loss of revenue from, for example, low market prices, high feed 
prices, or reduced production due to natural disasters. Revenue 
insurance can stabilize farm income, reducing the need for direct 
payments such as under the MILC program, during periods of low prices. 
Whether there would be a savings to the government would depend on 
whether the subsidies required to induce farmers to participate in the 
insurance program would offset the savings from reduced direct income 
support. Overall production could increase with this type of option 
because the revenue insurance would step in when prices are low 
representing in effect, a countercyclical payment. With this type of 
income support, downward supply adjustments during periods of low 
prices might not happen as quickly. Consumers would then benefit from 
prolonged periods of low prices to the extent that price changes are 
passed through the retail level.

USDA's Risk Management Agency currently operates several pilot programs 
in selected states, using three different approaches to revenue 
insurance. Although none of these programs applies to dairy farming, 
they could, in theory, be extended to cover dairy farmers. Doing so 
could be difficult, however, because the complexity of the dairy 
industry and the variation in management expertise among farmers would 
make it hard to estimate the probability of losses, a calculation that 
is necessary for pricing the insurance.

Institute Tax-Deferred Savings: 

Tax-deferred savings accounts allow farmers to manage fluctuations in 
farm income by accumulating cash reserves during higher income years 
with deferral of some tax liability. Farmers could then withdraw from 
these accounts in lower income years and, in essence, receive tax 
benefits if they accumulated funds in these accounts. One study 
suggested that farmers might be more comfortable with this risk 
management tool than with forward contracting because these accounts 
resemble individual retirement accounts and other familiar tax-deferred 
savings vehicles.

Similar to revenue insurance, this option has the potential for 
reducing direct income support payments from the government, such as 
MILC payments, by stabilizing farm income during periods of low prices. 
However, whether these accounts worked as a risk management tool would 
depend on whether the authorization of these new accounts--with their 
tax benefits--led to substantial additional savings by farmers in 
higher income years, or whether the new accounts were simply funded 
with savings that would have been made anyway in other, not tax-
favored, accounts. Also, like revenue insurance, withdrawals from tax-
deferred savings would represent, in effect, countercyclical payments 
during periods of low prices. Thus withdrawals from tax-deferred 
savings accounts could maintain overall production by dampening supply 
adjustments during periods of low prices. Similarly, consumers would 
benefit from the prolonged periods of low prices to the extent that 
price changes are passed through the retail level.

Many issues would have to be resolved to start this type of account, 
such as the amount that farmers would be allowed to deposit in any 
year, whether the government would match any funds deposited, and 
whether there would be restrictions on farmers' ability to withdraw 
funds from the accounts based on price drops or income losses. Canada 
and Australia both offer these accounts, and they were first proposed 
in the United States in 1996. Since then, there have been several 
proposals to adopt them here, but none has been implemented.

Manage Raw Milk Supplies: 

According to one dairy expert, given the long-term declining demand for 
fluid milk as well as the increasing productivity of dairy farmers, the 
best way to maintain farm income is through some form of effective 
supply management. Following periods of excess supply in the 1980s, the 
U.S. government introduced supply management initiatives, such as the 
Dairy Termination Program.[Footnote 238] Other options, such as 
production quota systems, have been tried by different dairy-producing 
nations. Thus, a number of options have been discussed to try to manage 
dairy supplies, including reintroducing a program similar to the 
earlier Dairy Termination Program, or establishing mandatory supply 
controls through quota allocations, as has been done in other 
countries. Figure 42 shows the effects of options to manage raw milk 
supplies under low-and high-price scenarios over the short and long 
terms.

Figure 42: Potential Effects of Options to Manage Raw Milk Supplies on 
Various Policy Considerations: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The figure does not indicate the degree of increase or decrease 
for each policy consideration as it relates to a policy option. In 
addition, as discussed in this appendix, limitations affecting some 
policy options could affect the degree of an option's potential impact 
on a policy consideration.

[End of figure] 

Reintroduce the Dairy Termination Program: 

One option that has been discussed to manage milk supplies is to 
reintroduce the Dairy Termination Program.[Footnote 239] This program 
was first tried as part of the Food Security Act of 1985. Under the 
Dairy Termination Program, farmers submitted competitive bids for the 
minimum raw milk price per hundredweight for which they would be 
willing to comply with the program requirements. If their bids were 
accepted, farmers were required to sell for slaughter or export their 
entire herds and not participate in dairying for the next 5 years. The 
program was in effect from April 1986 through September 1987 and 
resulted in the removal of more than 1 million cows, or about 9 percent 
of the national dairy herd in 1985. In total, this culling of the 
national dairy herd was estimated to decrease milk supplies by about 
39.4 billion pounds between 1986 and 1990 at a cost of more than $1.8 
billion.[Footnote 240] California farmers accounted for the largest 
portion of this reduced production, but farmers in southeastern states 
had the highest rates of participation.

In a 1989 report looking at the effects of the Dairy Termination 
Program, we indicated that it was unlikely to have a lasting effect on 
milk production, given that some participants would likely return to 
production after the 5-year waiting period.[Footnote 241] In the short 
term, high market prices resulting from lower levels of production 
reduced federal purchases of surplus dairy products. In 1989, we 
estimated that these reduced purchases provided a net cost savings to 
the government of $2.4 billion for fiscal years 1986 through 1990. 
However, over the long term, we predicted that increased production 
would bring the return of excess milk supply.

The effects of reintroducing this supply management alternative would 
depend on a variety of factors. In particular, the effects on federal 
costs and milk production would depend heavily on how much farmers 
needed to be paid to terminate their herds and agree not to produce for 
a specific period of time. Farmers' decisions about whether to 
participate in a new Dairy Termination Program at a certain price would 
rest on the individual profitability of dairy farms, the long-term 
production outlook of the individual farmer, and the expectation of 
certain market conditions. For example, with today's high market 
prices, farmers may be unlikely to agree to stop production except at 
payment levels that could make the program prohibitively expensive. 
During low-price periods, the program could potentially reduce supply 
to a level that reduces overall government costs for both the price 
support program and the MILC program, as long as the latter program 
remains in existence. In either case, the program would likely increase 
price volatility and consumer prices, although higher consumer prices 
for manufactured products could be mitigated by additional imports. 
Given the fact that farmers in southeastern states had the highest rate 
of participation in the Dairy Termination Program, a reintroduction of 
this program is likely to strengthen western shifts in production. As 
compared to western farmers, eastern farmers tend to have lower 
profitability and higher costs of production. Consequently, they are 
more likely to participate in this kind of program and less likely to 
return to production after the program, because their re-entry costs 
are higher. Thus, a new Dairy Termination Program could have disparate 
regional effects.

Establish a Production Quota System: 

A second option that has been discussed for supply management is to 
implement a quota system, as has been done in Canada and in the 
European Community.[Footnote 242] Under this option, production would 
be controlled by allocating production shares, or quota shares, 
limiting how much milk each dairy farmer could market. Such quota 
shares could be set based on a farmer's historical marketing level. Any 
milk marketed over the allocated quota shares would be priced far below 
the cost of production. Quota shares could be traded and increased over 
time as additional supplies are needed.

A quota system would help manage supply by taking away incentives to 
increase production based on the benefits provided by government 
programs, such as MILC or the price support program. Moreover, compared 
to other supply management alternatives, a quota system has a greater 
likelihood of achieving long-term supply management, because production 
incentives would continue to be limited by the number of quota shares 
available in the system. With more effective supply management, federal 
costs for other programs such as MILC and the price support program 
would be reduced. Additionally, federal costs for administering a quota 
system are relatively low. In the short term, price volatility might 
increase, but as the market adjusts to a stabilized production level, 
long-term price volatility could be reduced.

Nonetheless, there are some drawbacks to implementing a quota system. 
As quota shares reduced production, consumer prices could increase. 
While demand for fluid milk products is relatively price inelastic, 
higher prices could reduce long-term consumption by providing 
incentives to purchase substitute goods. Also, the distribution of 
quotas would provide a substantial benefit to current farmers to the 
detriment of farmers who might try to enter the system in the future, 
entrenching geographical production patterns and stifling incentives 
for technological enhancements. Given the high production costs in some 
areas and the greater efficiency of larger, newer dairy operations, 
this would represent an economic inefficiency because milk would not be 
produced and marketed as cheaply as possible. However, this drawback 
could be limited to the extent that a well-functioning market is 
established to trade quota shares. If participation costs in this 
market were kept low, farmers would still realize incentives to adopt 
technology enhancements. The most efficient dairy farmers' willingness 
to pay for additional quota shares would represent their cost advantage 
over less efficient farmers plus some assessment of risk. To the extent 
that this willingness to pay was greater than the profits realized by 
less efficient farmers, these less efficient farmers would have an 
incentive to sell their quota shares to more efficient farmers. Thus, 
in the long term, the quota system might not hamper increased economic 
efficiency if trade is relatively easy.

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY: 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250:

OCT 22 2004:

Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman: 
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment Team: 
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW., Room 2T23A: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Dyckman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report - "Dairy Industry: Information 
on Milk Prices, Factors Affecting Prices, and Dairy Policy Options" 
dated September 16, 2004. This letter provides a summary of our general 
comments on the draft report.

We believe that the information provided on milk prices at the farm, 
cooperative, and retail levels is valid. However, we would note that 
farm-level milk prices were not "record" low in 2002 and 2003, but 
rather the lowest since 1979. In addition, farm-level milk prices 
reached a record high in May 2004, which was the primary factor leading 
to record high retail prices for fluid milk during the summer of 2004. 
For calendar year 2004, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects 
the all-milk price will be record high and up more than $3 per 
hundredweight from the previous year. We continue to have reservations 
regarding the use of prices paid for fluid milk at commissaries as an 
indicator of the wholesale price of fluid milk but there seems to be no 
viable alternative. It is important that readers of this report are 
aware of this weakness in the data.

We largely agree with the discussion on the factors that influence the 
price of milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer and the 
characterization of economic studies of price transmission in the U.S. 
fluid milk market. USDA's Federal Milk Order Program, the Dairy Price 
Support Program, the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and the 
Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program affect farm and retail prices 
for fluid milk and dairy products. Other USDA programs, such as 
domestic and international food assistance programs and tariff rate 
quotas on imports of dairy products administered by USDA, also 
influence farm and retail prices for milk and dairy products. In many 
instances, changing one or more of these programs would alter the 
performance of other programs administered by USDA.

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Bill) 
mandated that USDA conduct two studies including an economic evaluation 
of the effects of various elements of national dairy policy and of 
terminating Federal milk price support and supply management programs 
and allowing States to manage milk prices and supply. USDA combined 
these two studies into one report to provide a comprehensive economic 
evaluation of the effects of alternative dairy policies. That report 
combined the work of more that 20 researchers from 10 universities with 
information provided by researchers at USDA and was submitted to 
Congress on September 10, 2004. The USDA report provides quantitative 
estimates of the effects on producers and consumers and the cost of 
Federal programs under various policy scenarios.

Appendix VII of the draft report provides a qualitative, indeterminate 
discussion of the effects of recent Federal dairy program changes and 
alternative policy options. This appendix seems to be a compilation of 
policy recommendations that are examined independently and within the 
existing program structure. GAO should make it clear to the reader the 
caveats of this type of analysis. In some instances, this section of 
the report mischaracterizes the operation of current programs and the 
effects that changes to current programs or the introduction of new 
programs would have on program outlays, producers, and consumers. These 
concerns are as follows:

MILC Program - The draft report indicates that producers may maximize 
payments by reorganizing their farming operation to increase production 
eligible for payments and by choosing the month in which they are 
eligible to receive payments. Under the 2002 Farm Bill, USDA is 
required to use the same definition of farming operation as used in 
previous dairy market loss payment programs. We have no evidence to 
indicate that farmers are abusing the program by reorganizing their 
farming operations. In addition, USDA regulations prohibit a producer 
from selecting a month to receive payments if the month has already 
begun or changing a previously selected start month after the 15' of 
the month before the month selected. Furthermore, once monthly payments 
begin, the producer has no discretion in determining which month or 
months to receive payments.

DEIP - The draft report contains several options for improving the 
operation of DEIP. However, the reliance by GAO on the American Farm 
Bureau study appears to have led to several misconceptions. The DEIP is 
administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) - an agency 
within USDA. Since 1995, USDA has continually exported under the DEIP 
the maximum amount of cheese and nonfat dry milk permitted under World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules, while DEIP assisted exports of 
butterfat have varied depending on market conditions. FAS has worked 
closely with the dairy industry to ensure that our country and annual 
allocations optimize our longer-term market development prospects and 
minimize any potentially detrimental effects on our domestic market. 
Expanding the use of the DEIP is not a legitimate option. Under the WTO 
trading rules, the DEIP is not only bound by quantitative and monetary 
caps, but also product-specific restrictions that limit its use to the 
current range of eligible commodities. Further, given that the bid 
review and acceptance process occurs within a time-span equivalent to 
less than one working day, we believe the process is timely and 
efficient.

Dairy Price Support Program - We believe the Dairy Price Support 
Program has been effective in supporting the price of milk. We continue 
to work with the dairy industry to monitor the operation of the program 
to ensure that the price of milk is being supported at $9.90 per 
hundredweight as mandated by the 2002 Farm Bill. USDA has no authority 
to eliminate the program and has not proposed or is not considering any 
proposal to eliminate the program. Elimination of the price support 
program would require Congress to amend the 2002 Farm Bill.

Federal Milk Order Program - GAO correctly captures an objective of the 
Federal Milk Order Program which is to stabilize milk marketing 
conditions between farmers and the first buyers of milk. However, it is 
a misstatement to suggest that a Federal milk order objective is "to 
ensure an adequate level of milk production." That objective is the 
objective of the Dairy Price Support Program. Federal milk orders help 
assure an adequate supply of milk for fluid use in areas where 
demanded, but that supply may come from local or distant producers, 
whoever can fill the supply most efficiently. The minimum Federal milk 
order prices established at a location under the orders may cover the 
costs of an adequate local production or they may not. The minimum 
prices are limited by the cost of supplying that market from non-local 
sources. Economic forces generate prices above the minimum prices in 
most markets.

We agree with GAO that there are several marketing conditions occurring 
within the purview of Federal milk orders which can not be considered 
orderly. Price inversions and negative producer price differentials, 
and the incentives they create to market milk outside of the Federal 
milk order system (de-pooling) are noted. We also agree that the cause 
of these disorderly marketing conditions is price volatility in 
wholesale dairy product markets. However, Federal milk orders cannot 
directly address price volatility in wholesale dairy product markets. 
Therefore, GAO's options for changing Federal milk orders fail to 
address the underlying source of disorderly marketing conditions for 
milk and dairy products.

Federal milk orders provide separate classes for milk used in the 
production of butter and nonfat dry milk and for milk used in the 
production of cheese. Minimum prices for milk in these classes are 
priced by product price formulas which include fixed make allowances. 
GAO concludes that because of this pricing method, "manufacturers do 
not have an incentive to shift production to the higher-valued uses 
because any gains they might have realized for selling a higher-priced 
product would be negated by the fact that their manufacturing allowance 
is fixed." This rationale fails to recognize that in 2002 about 86 
percent of nonfat dry milk, 71 percent of butter, and 40 percent of 
total cheese was manufactured by cooperatives. Twelve cooperatives, 
including the four largest, own all three types of plants. Regardless 
of manufacturing costs in the formula, it is in the best interest of a 
cooperative and its members if the cooperative shifts milk into the use 
that returns the highest value to its membership taking into account 
pool draws and product price premiums. While these adjustments may be 
slow to occur, they do occur as evidenced by the changing relationship 
of the Class III and Class IV prices.

What may retard the shifting of milk to the highest valued use is that 
as there are fewer and larger manufacturing plants. As transportation 
costs rise, the cost of transporting milk to a plant making higher 
valued products may more than offset benefits that would be received 
from making the higher valued product. As the use of reverse osmosis 
and ultra-filtration technologies expand in the industry, the 
transportation cost factor will be substantially reduced.

GAO proposes adopting a competitive pay price to establish class prices 
under Federal milk orders. This option was considered prior to 
implementation of Federal milk order reform on January 1, 2000. USDA 
and a committee of academicians spent considerable time trying to 
devise a competitive price series that could be used to establish 
minimum class prices under Federal milk orders. However, no such 
competitive price series could be identified by either the committee or 
USDA, and GAO does not identify or indicate how to create such a price 
series.

GAO also proposes combining Class III and Class IV into a single 
manufacturing milk class. Again, no specifics are offered as to how 
milk in such a class would be priced. Depending upon the price 
established for that class, the manufacturers of butter and nonfat dry 
milk, or of cheese, occasionally could be required to account to the 
pool for a greater value than the value returned by wholesale product 
markets which could lead to disorderly marketing conditions.

In the section on eliminating the Federal Milk Order Program, GAO 
indicates that an objective of Federal milk orders is to provide for a 
local supply of fresh milk. This is not an objective Federal milk 
orders. In USDA's response to a 1988 GAO study, we stated: "The 
objectives of Federal milk orders are to promote orderly marketing 
conditions in fluid milk markets, to improve the income situation of 
dairy farmers by establishing minimum milk prices, to supervise the 
terms of trade in milk markets in such manner as to achieve more 
equality of bargaining between producers and milk handlers, and to 
assure consumers adequate supplies of good quality milk at reasonable 
prices."

Federal milk orders help assure an adequate supply of milk for fluid 
use in areas where demanded, but that supply may come from local or 
distant producers, whoever can provide fluid milk most efficiently. The 
Class I price surface does in fact reflect the cost of moving milk from 
surplus to deficit markets as estimated by academicians at Cornell 
University (Pratt, et al, "A Description of the Methods and Data 
Employed in the U.S. Dairy Sector Simulator, Version 97.3," Department 
of Agricultural Resource and Managerial Economics, Cornell University, 
July 1997).

Federal milk orders continue to accomplish their stated objectives and 
for that reason the program continues to be supported by the majority 
of producers and fluid milk processors. As milk marketing has changed 
and marketing problems have developed, the industry has come to USDA to 
request amendments to the program to address their concerns. Through 
the formal hearing process, orders have continued to evolve and remain 
current and vital to the industry. We do not believe that the 
rulemaking process inhibits the ability of USDA to respond to changing 
market conditions or the marketing of new dairy products.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to review the draft report. We 
request that our letter be cited in the GAO report. Detailed comments 
on the draft report by USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, Farm 
Service Agency, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural 
Service, and Office of the Chief Economist were provided earlier.

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

J. B. Penn: 
Under Secretary: 
Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services:

Signed by: 

Bill Hawks: 
Under Secretary: 
Marketing and Regulatory Programs: 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Agriculture's 
letter dated October 22, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. We revised the report to reflect that farm prices during 2002 and 
2003 were the lowest since 1979.

2. We revised the report to reflect that USDA has estimated that 
average 2004 farm prices will be more than $3 per hundredweight higher 
than they were in 2003.

3. We agree that there are limitations on the use of commissary data as 
a proxy for proprietary wholesale data. However, as noted in USDA's 
comments, there seems to be no viable alternative. We revised the 
report to further discuss the limitations of using these data.

4. During the course of our work, USDA declined to provide us with a 
draft of its study. Although USDA indicates that it submitted its study 
to the Congress on September 10, 2004, we were unable to obtain a copy 
until early October 2004, well after we had provided a draft of our 
report to USDA for review and comment. Because of this timing, we were 
unable to fully consider and analyze the results of USDA's study and 
related documents. Furthermore, although USDA notes that it developed 
quantitative estimates of the effects on producers (dairy farmers) and 
consumers and the cost of various federal programs under various policy 
scenarios, the scope of USDA's analysis was more limited than the range 
of policy options discussed in our report.

5. We agree that the potential effects of various policy options in 
appendix VII are examined independently and qualitatively within the 
existing program structure. Our discussion of dairy policy options are 
not policy recommendations. As stated in the report, to identify these 
policy options and their potential impacts we relied heavily on a 
synthesis of the views of leading dairy experts and the results of an 
extensive literature search, including our review of more than 50 
studies and other publications. Time and resource constraints for 
completing our work precluded us from developing or contracting for the 
use of an economic model that would have provided quantitative 
estimates of these potential impacts. In addition, some of the policy 
options would have been difficult to model and quantify, such as the 
potential impacts of accelerating USDA's hearing and rulemaking process 
for amending FMMOs. The report also notes that we compared the policy 
options identified against a baseline scenario of policies in place as 
of August 2004. This baseline scenario existed at the start of our work 
and was needed to provide a consistent context for our analysis.

6. Regarding caveats, as noted in the report, we examined the impact of 
federal dairy program changes and policy options on six policy 
considerations: farm income, milk production, federal costs, price 
volatility, economic efficiency, and consumer prices. We acknowledge in 
the report that other stakeholders may have different views on the 
importance of these policy considerations or other considerations that 
we did not include in our analysis. The report also states that the 
potential effects of policy options on these considerations could vary 
depending upon economic conditions and other policy decisions. In this 
regard, we did not assess the options' overall economic or budgetary 
impacts, or their consistency with U.S. international trade commitments 
or positions in ongoing negotiations. As indicated in the report, each 
option has varying potential impacts on the policy considerations used 
in our analysis. Despite these caveats, we believe this analysis is 
informative and helpful to congressional decision makers who must weigh 
competing interests in determining dairy policy.

7. We have made some technical corrections and clarifications in light 
of USDA's comments, but we do not agree that we mischaracterized the 
operation of current programs or the effects that changes to current 
programs or the introduction of new programs would have on program 
outlays, producers (dairy farmers), and consumers. See also our 
responses in comments 8 through 19 below.

8. Although during the course of our work, USDA officials suggested 
that it was possible that dairy farmers might divide their holdings to 
make more of their milk eligible for compensation through the MILC 
program, we deleted this discussion from the report in light of USDA's 
comment that it has no evidence that farmers have done this.

9. We correctly state in the report that farmers may choose the month 
that they begin accepting their payments. However, in response to 
USDA's comment we revised the report to clarify that farmers' 
discretion on when they receive MILC payments is limited by USDA's 
regulations for implementing this program. Specifically, these 
regulations prohibit a farmer from selecting a month to receive 
payments if the month has already begun, if the month has already 
passed, or during which no milk was produced. A farmer also cannot 
change a previously selected start month after the 15TH of the month 
before the month selected. Once monthly payments begin, a farmer has no 
discretion in determining in which month or months to receive payments.

10. The discussion of expanding the use of DEIP in the draft report did 
not suggest that WTO rules, including quantitative and monetary caps 
and product-specific restrictions, be violated. Rather, this discussion 
identified ways in which dairy experts suggested that DEIP might be 
used more effectively as a marketing tool. However, we have revised the 
language in the report to more fully reflect USDA's views and to 
minimize confusion as to what we mean by increasing the use of DEIP as 
a marketing tool without exceeding WTO caps.

11. We revised the language in the report to clarify that USDA has not 
proposed or considered any proposal to eliminate the Dairy Price 
Support Program. However, USDA analyzed the potential effects of 
eliminating this program in the study it prepared in response to the 
2002 Farm Bill mandate.

12. We agree with USDA that ensuring an adequate level of milk 
production is not an objective of the FMMO program. We revised the 
report accordingly and added language suggested by USDA to better 
describe the FMMO program's objectives.

13. We agree that price volatility contributes to disorderly market 
conditions, and we revised the report to better explain the potential 
causes of price volatility. We also agree that FMMOs cannot directly 
address price volatility in wholesale dairy markets. However, by 
setting minimum prices that must be paid to farmers for raw milk, the 
FMMOs can affect the extent to which price volatility is reflected in 
the prices that farmers receive.

14. We revised the report to reflect that cooperatives owning the 
capacity to produce multiple products may still have an incentive to 
shift milk to the higher-valued use, in order to provide greater 
returns to their members. We also expanded our discussion of other 
factors that might influence how milk is used, such as transportation 
costs and changes in processing technology.

15. We acknowledge that the report does not explain how a competitive 
pay price series could be created for use in the FMMO program. However, 
this option was identified by stakeholders during the course of our 
work. Other options discussed in the report also may present 
challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report 
discusses those issues. Nonetheless, we revised the report to reflect 
that USDA and a panel of academicians attempted to devise a competitive 
pay price series but ultimately were unsuccessful. We also revised the 
report to note that a key difficulty in developing a competitive pay 
price series is the need for data that are not already influenced by 
the FMMO classified pricing system.

16. We acknowledge that the report does not explain how, after 
combining Class III and Class IV, milk would be priced in the expanded 
class. However, this option was identified by stakeholders during the 
course of our work. Other options discussed in the report also may 
present challenging implementation issues and in many cases the report 
discusses those issues. Nonetheless, we revised the report to reflect 
that a barrier to combining Class III and IV is identifying an 
appropriate pricing formula that considers the products in an expanded 
class.

17. We revised the report to reflect this clarification and added 
language suggested by USDA to better describe the FMMO program's 
objectives.

18. We agree with USDA that any area's supply of fluid milk can come 
from local or distant farmers. USDA noted that the Class I price 
surface, generated from different minimum Class I prices in different 
locations, reflects the cost of moving milk from surplus to deficit 
markets. However, as we pointed out in a 1988 report, when the price 
surface does not also account for regional differences in production 
costs, it can result in incentives for overproduction in certain 
regions. Furthermore, the Class I price surface that resulted from the 
2000 federal order reform differs from USDA's recommended option.

19. The report accurately reflects the views of some stakeholders that 
the slowness of USDA's hearing and rulemaking process used to modify 
FMMOs inhibits the agency's ability to respond to changing market 
conditions or the marketing of new products. The report also discusses 
challenges USDA faces to improving this process while ensuring the 
promulgation of economically sound regulation. Further, the report 
notes that USDA has made efforts to improve the hearing process, 
particularly in the way it evaluates its contracts for hearing 
transcripts.

[End of section]

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Contacts: 

Lawrence J. Dyckman, (202) 512-3841; 
James R. Jones, Jr., (202) 512-9839: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individuals named above, Jay Cherlow, Barbara El 
Osta, Joshua Habib, Eileen Harrity, Christopher Murray, and Cynthia 
Norris made key contributions to this report. Important contributions 
were also made by Beverly Ross, Jena Sinkfield, and Amy Webbink.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products: 

Dairy Industry: Estimated Economic Impacts of Dairy Compacts. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-866] 
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001.

Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market 
Structure. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-561] 
Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001.

Fluid Milk: Farm and Retail Prices and the Factors That Influence Them. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-730T] 
Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2001.

Dairy Products: Imports, Domestic Production, and Regulation of Ultra-
filtered Milk. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01- 326] 
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2001.

Dairy Industry: Information on Prices for Fluid Milk and the Factors 
That Influence Them. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-4] 
Washington, D.C.: October 8, 1998.

Dairy Industry: Information on Marketing Channels and Prices for Fluid 
Milk. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-98-70] 
Washington, D.C.: March 16, 1998.

Dairy Programs: Effects of the Dairy Termination Program and Support 
Price Reductions. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OCE-93-1] 
Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1993.

Federal Dairy Programs: Insights Into Their Past Provide Perspectives 
on Their Future. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-90-88] 
Washington, D.C.: February 28, 1990.

Milk Pricing: New Method for Setting Farm Milk Prices Needs to Be 
Developed. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED- 90-8] 
Washington, D.C.: November 3, 1989.

Dairy Termination Program: An Estimate of Its Impact and Cost-
Effectiveness. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-89-96] 
Washington, D.C.: July 6, 1989.

Milk Marketing Orders: Options for Change. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-88-9] 
Washington, D.C.: March 21, 1988.

Overview of the Dairy Surplus Issue--Policy Options for Congressional 
Consideration. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-85-132] 
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1985.

Effects and Administration of the 1984 Milk Diversion Program. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-85-126] 
Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1985. 

(360384): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] Dairy cooperatives are member-owned organizations that assist 
producers in marketing their milk. Cooperatives provide a variety of 
services for their members such as ensuring adequate raw milk supplies 
to meet processors' needs, transporting milk, quality assurance, and 
standardizing milk composition.

[2] Wholesale milk processors include bottlers and major retail food 
chains with bottling plants, and cooperatives that process, package, 
and distribute fluid milk for sale to retailers. Our review did not 
include other entities that market milk at the wholesale level.

[3] In this report, farm prices are the prices paid for raw milk 
supplies. After the milk has been processed into a fluid milk beverage, 
references to "milk prices" are retail milk prices.

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).

[5] A hundredweight is a unit of measure equal to 100 pounds of, in 
this case, raw milk. Approximately 11.6 gallons of fluid milk can be 
made from 100 pounds of raw milk.

[6] Recent evidence suggests that retail milk prices have also begun 
rising with the recovering farm prices.

[7] There can be different kinds of economic efficiency effects. 
Government policies may be more or less economically efficient 
depending upon the extent to which they prevent the transmission of 
market price signals and lead to a misallocation of resources into 
excess production. Policies may also be more or less efficient 
depending upon the extent to which they affect the distribution of 
production between farmers with high or low costs of production.

[8] GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Milk Prices and Changing Market 
Structure, GAO-01-561 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2001).

[9] The beginning of our period of analysis corresponds to the end of 
the data presented in our previous report, GAO-01-561. The end point 
represents the most recent month for which data were available from all 
of our sources.

[10] We were unable to obtain actual data on the prices received by 
wholesale milk processors because these data are considered 
proprietary. As a proxy for these data we used data obtained from the 
Defense Commissary Agency on the prices at which it sold milk. 
Commissary prices reflect a 5 percent markup above the prices at which 
the commissaries purchase milk from wholesale suppliers. We obtained 
data from 39 different commissary locations near the 15 markets in our 
analysis.

[11] This estimate is based on USDA data for the month of November for 
selected years between 1991 and 2001, which were the most recent data 
we could obtain.

[12] USDA/Agricultural Marketing Service, Raising the Minimum Nonfat 
Solids Standard to the National Average in Raw Milk: A Study of Fluid 
Milk Identity Standards (Washington, D.C.: August 2003).

[13] USDA, Economic Effects of U.S. Dairy Policy and Alternative 
Approaches to Milk Pricing, (Washington, D.C.: July 2004). This study 
combined the results of work by more than 20 researchers from 10 
universities, as well as information provided by researchers at USDA.

[14] Under the FMMO program, a classified pricing plan provides 
different classes and minimum prices for milk depending on how it is 
used. Milk used in fluid products is placed in Class I. Milk used for 
various manufactured products is placed in Classes II through IV. Class 
II includes soft products, such as cottage cheese, ice cream, and 
yogurt. Class III includes spreadable and hard cheeses. Class IV 
includes butter and dried milk products, such as nonfat dry milk.

[15] This report does not specifically address consolidation and 
concentration trends in the dairy industry and what is known about the 
impact of concentration on milk prices, as the 2001 report did. 
However, the report discusses market concentration as one of the 
factors that influence the price of milk as it moves from the farm to 
the consumer. (See app. V.)

[16] Portions of some of these market areas lie in adjacent states.

[17] This estimate is based on USDA data for the month of November for 
selected years between 1991 and 2001. It was the most recent data we 
could obtain.

[18] Under the federal milk marketing orders, a classified pricing plan 
provides different classes and minimum prices for milk depending on how 
the milk is used. Milk used in fluid products is placed in Class I, 
which is the highest-priced class. Milk used for various manufactured 
products is placed in lower-priced classes.

[19] Handler is the federal order term for cooperatives, processors, or 
dealers of milk who commonly purchase raw milk and sell pasteurized 
milk and milk products. See 7 C.F.R. §1000.9 for a more complete 
definition.

[20] The mailbox price information collected by the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture does not account for all of the 
various factors that influence farm prices. As a result, it does not 
provide as good a measure of the price that farmers receive based on 
the value of their milk as the AMS adjustment does for the FMMO markets 
where it is available.

[21] The 39 commissary locations were selected either because they were 
within the marketing area for one of our 15 selected markets (as 
defined by our source for retail pricing data, Information Resources, 
Inc.), or because they were the closest location available.

[22] In addition to shipping the products to stores, some wholesalers 
provide in-store services, including unloading the milk on the store 
dock, restocking the dairy case, and removing outdated or leaking 
containers.

[23] For San Diego, we used prices that were adjusted for 2 percent 
milkfat and 10 percent nonfat milk solids so that they were comparable 
with the prices of retail milk sold in California.

[24] We used a regression procedure for each market to determine 
whether the price could be reliably predicted as a function of time for 
both farm-level and retail prices. This procedure allowed us to 
estimate initial and final prices for farm-level and retail prices that 
take into account the variability in these price series during the 44-
month period. This regression procedure was done on time and time-
squared because we observed that prices generally fell for part of the 
period and then rose. Including the time-squared variable in the 
regression provided a better fit for the data. A statistically 
significant relationship indicates that we found a consistent 
association, either up or down, between price and time. For 
statistically significant relationships, we calculated a final price 
estimate (computed for the last month of our data series) and compared 
to an estimated price calculated for the first month. In the absence of 
a statistically significant relationship-when no consistent 
association was found-we treated initial and final estimates of price 
the same, even if actual beginning and final prices differ.

[25] Federal government sources included officials from USDA's AMS, 
Economic Research Service, and Farm Service Agency.

[26] Cooperatives we contacted included Dairy Farmers of America; 
California Dairies, Inc; Agri-Mark; Land O'Lakes, Inc; and Prairie 
Farms.

[27] Fluid milk processors and processors of manufactured dairy 
products that we contacted included HP Hood LLC and Leprino Foods, as 
well as cooperatives and retailers that process and manufacture these 
products.

[28] Retailers that we contacted included Wal-Mart, Albertsons, the H. 
E. Butt Grocery Company, and Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.

[29] Industry groups that we contacted included the National Milk 
Producers Federation, the International Dairy Foods Association, and 
the Food Marketing Institute.

[30] Academic dairy experts that we contacted included professors from 
Cornell University, North Carolina State University, Ohio State 
University, Texas A&M University, University of Connecticut, University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, and the University of California-Davis.

[31] These figures represent unweighted averages of the percentages for 
each market.

[32] See explanatory note (a) to table 1. In some places (3 out of 15 
markets), retailers experienced negative returns.

[33] The price spread of a commodity represents differences in prices 
between two levels of the marketing chain. These differences reflect 
the costs incurred and profits received through adding value by 
processing, transporting, and distributing a commodity.

[34] The values used to calculate the changes in farm and retail prices 
in table 2 are based on statistical estimates of initial and final 
prices for these two levels, not the actual prices recorded in the 
first and last month of the period for which we have data. The method 
for calculating these estimates is described in appendix I. The changes 
in the farm-to-retail price spread are the differences between the 
changes in retail and farm prices from October 2000 to May 2004 and 
consequently are determined from the statistically estimated initial 
and final prices for the retail and farm levels.

[35] As discussed in appendix I, farm prices were estimated by 
subtracting out certain cost factors, provided by USDA, from the 
announced cooperative Class I prices. To the extent that these factors 
do not change much over time, it would be expected that price changes 
at the farm level would closely correlate with price changes at the 
cooperative level, except for San Diego. As discussed in appendix I, we 
estimated the farm and cooperative prices differently in San Diego 
because California is not part of the federal milk marketing order 
system. The approach that we used for San Diego would not be expected 
to generate a similarly close correlation between farm and cooperative 
prices. Because farm prices for raw milk used for fluid purposes are 
not directly observed but are derived from cooperative prices, 
correlations of wholesale and retail prices with cooperative prices 
provide a better picture of the price relationship across levels in the 
milk marketing chain.

[36] Each year the United States processes about 7 billion gallons of 
the approximately 20 billion gallons of raw milk into fluid milk 
products, such as flavored milks, buttermilk, whole, 2 percent, 1 
percent, and skim milk. The rest of the raw milk supply is used to 
produce manufactured products, such as butter, ice cream, yogurt, 
powdered milk, and cheese.

[37] Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as 
mad cow disease, is a degenerative neurological disease affecting the 
central nervous system in cattle.

[38] Operating costs include major inputs such as feed, veterinary 
services and medicine, bedding and litter, marketing, fuel, lubricant, 
electricity, repairs, and interest on operating expenses.

[39] Ownership costs include the annualized cost of maintaining the 
capital investment (depreciation and interest) in dairy facilities and 
equipment, and costs for non-real estate property taxes and insurance.

[40] This labor estimate includes salary, benefits, and all employer 
taxes for hired labor. If family labor were also included, labor would 
represent over 12 percent of total production costs.

[41] S.D. Short, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Characteristics and 
Production Costs of U.S. Dairy Operations. Resource Economics Division, 
Economic Research Service, Statistical Bulletin Number 974-6, February 
2004.

[42] The USDA study defined low-cost producers as the 25 percent of 
milk producers with costs of $12.17 or less per hundredweight of milk 
sold. High-cost producers were defined as the 25 percent of milk 
producers with costs of $18.79 or more per hundredweight of milk sold.

[43] Price elasticity of supply refers to the percentage change in the 
quantity supplied relative to a percentage change in the price received 
for a product, in this case raw milk. Supply is price elastic when a 
proportional change in the quantity supplied of a product exceeds the 
proportional change in its price; supply is price inelastic when a 
proportional change in the quantity supplied of a product is less than 
a proportional change in its price.

[44] Demand for raw milk is also influenced by the costs of 
transporting, processing, and marketing raw milk to produce dairy 
products for retail sale.

[45] Price elasticity of demand refers to the percentage change in the 
quantity demanded relative to a percentage change in the price of a 
product, in this case fluid milk products. Demand is price elastic when 
a proportional change in the quantity demanded of a product exceeds the 
proportional change in its price; demand is price inelastic when a 
proportional change in the quantity demanded of a product is less than 
a proportional change in its price.

[46] According to USDA officials, a decline in the restaurant business 
began in mid-2001 and may have been related to other economic factors, 
such as falling stock market values and corporate scandals.

[47] Canadian feedlot operators have filed a class-action lawsuit 
against the United States under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.

[48] "Dairy Markets Adjust, But Are Expected to Remain Tight," 
Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook, ERS, LDP-M-120, June 2004.

[49] USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service indicated that 
use of bovine somatotropin (bST) typically increases average milk yield 
by 10 pounds per cow per day over the course of the cow's entire 
lactation, or as long as bST continues to be used.

[50] "Meat Markets Roiled by Disease Outbreaks," Livestock, Dairy, and 
Poultry Outlook, ERS, LDP-M-116, February 2004.

[51] Poor quality feed can reduce milk production and may require 
farmers to supplement their feed, thereby raising overall feed costs.

[52] This initiative is funded by an assessment of $0.05 per 
hundredweight of milk that participating farmers market. The National 
Milk Producers Federation estimates a $0.59 per hundredweight increase 
in farm income from the program through September 2004. However, while 
some dairy experts indicated that the program has reduced raw milk 
supplies and thus benefited farmers' income, they also indicated that 
this estimate could be overstated.

[53] According to USDA, the objectives of FMMOs are to promote orderly 
marketing conditions in fluid milk markets, to improve the income 
situation of dairy farmers by establishing minimum milk prices, to 
supervise the terms of trade in milk markets in such manner as to 
achieve more equality of bargaining between farmers and processors, and 
to assure consumers adequate supplies of good quality milk at 
reasonable prices.

[54] The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended and reenacted in 
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, established the 
federal marketing order agreements.

[55] Dairy farmers sell two grades of milk. Grade A may be used for 
fluid consumption or in manufactured products. Grade B may be used only 
for manufactured products. Farmers producing Grade A milk must adhere 
to higher sanitation requirements than for Grade B milk. Prior to World 
War I, much of the milk marketed by farmers did not meet Grade A 
standards. However, by 1999, only about 3 percent of all milk marketed 
in the United States did not meet Grade A standards.

[56] Basing Class I and II prices on the advanced Class III and IV skim 
milk values ensures that minimum prices of raw milk used in these 
products will be known in the month preceding the month to which they 
apply.

[57] Farmers not located in a federal order can also ship their milk 
into a federal order. While farmers can ship milk independently, 
generally it is dairy cooperatives acting on behalf of their farmer 
members that assemble and ship milk to processors.

[58] Each order has its own requirements, such as the minimum amount of 
raw milk required to be shipped to processing plants participating in 
that order to qualify for its blend price. Entities regulated by the 
FMMO program have the ability to petition USDA for a hearing to amend 
order regulations, including the requirements that outside farmers must 
meet when shipping their milk to another order.

[59] The term "pool" is used interchangeably to refer to both the 
amount of money generated by applying the minimum federal order class 
prices to the amount of milk used in each class within an order and the 
raw milk associated with the order for which farmers and processors are 
able to share payments from the amount of money generated by the order 
system.

[60] The dairy price support program was established by the 
Agricultural Act of 1949, legislation that also expanded the CCC's role 
as a government-owned entity to carry out price support activities for 
a variety of agricultural commodities.

[61] The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
required that the support price be reduced $0.15 per year from $10.35 
in 1996 to $9.90 per hundredweight in 1999.

[62] In fact, most of the butter manufactured in the United States is 
produced independent of nonfat dry milk; however, the assumption 
correctly implies that the relative price relationship between butter 
and nonfat dry milk must conform to relative yields from raw milk.

[63] Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-624 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §7251(d)). Butter/nonfat dry milk tilts 
were common in the early 1990s--several tilts were made between April 
1990 and July 1993--to account for market conditions in which butter 
was in surplus relative to nonfat dry milk.

[64] The MILC program, also known as the National Dairy Market Loss 
Assistance Payment program, was authorized in the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002. USDA began accepting applications for the 
MILC program in August 2002 (payments were made retroactively to 
December 1, 2001) and will continue to do so until September 30, 2005.

[65] This price is the same price that was in place when the Northeast 
Interstate Dairy Compact was effective. The compact included the six 
New England states--Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Legislative authority for the compact 
expired at the end of September 2001. MILC serves as an alternative to 
regional dairy compacts and ad hoc emergency payments to farmers.

[66] However, this discretion is limited. USDA regulations prohibit a 
farmer from selecting a month to receive payments if the month has 
already begun, if the month has already passed, or during which no milk 
was produced. A farmer also cannot change a previously selected start 
month after the 15TH of the month before the month selected. 
Furthermore, once monthly payments begin, the farmer has no discretion 
in determining which month or months to receive payments.

[67] Between January 1998 and June 2004, U.S. prices remained above 
average international market prices reported by USDA's Foreign 
Agricultural Service for four dairy commodities whose prices are 
tracked internationally: butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, and whole 
milk powder. During this time, U.S. prices averaged between 103 to 125 
percent higher for butter, 44 to 58 percent higher for cheese, 24 to 35 
percent higher for nonfat dry milk, and 62 to 74 percent higher for 
whole milk powder.

[68] The Dairy Export Incentive Program was introduced in the Food 
Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, Title I, §153 (1985) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §713a-14) and has been reauthorized since then 
in successive farm bills. Most recently, the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 extended the program to 2007.

[69] As is the case with other export subsidy programs, the degree to 
which demand is increased under a program such as DEIP depends on the 
degree to which the exports under the program are additional to those 
that would have occurred in the absence of the program.

[70] However, the Congressional Research Service study also noted that 
while DEIP may help to raise farm prices when milk markets are 
relatively balanced, the program would not be likely to have such 
impacts when supplies are relatively tight because the industry would 
not be willing to give up products for export that were needed to 
supply the domestic market. Geoffrey S. Becker, "Agricultural Export 
Programs: The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP)," Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, September 18, 2002.

[71] This testimony was for the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Department Operations, 
Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry.

[72] DEIP assisted exports of butterfat have varied depending on market 
conditions.

[73] In some years, such as 1998 and 1999, actual shipments appeared to 
exceed the World Trade Organization (WTO) maximum. This excess occured 
because of provisions that enabled unused quantities from previous 
years to be rolled over into future years. Limits established by U.S. 
trade agreements are explained in greater detail in appendix VII.

[74] Dairy farmers who produce the raw milk used in fluid and 
manufactured products can (1) market it through dairy cooperatives, (2) 
sell it directly to wholesale milk processors, or (3) process it for 
direct sale to consumers.

[75] See GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Prices for Fluid Milk and 
the Factors That Influence Them, GAO/RCED-99-4 (Washington, D.C.: 
October 8, 1998) and GAO, Dairy Industry: Information on Marketing 
Channels and Prices for Fluid Milk, GAO/RCED-98-70 (Washington, D.C.: 
March 16, 1998) for more information on the role of cooperatives and 
other entities in the marketing of fluid milk.

[76] Typically, these agreements are self-renewing.

[77] K. Charles Ling, Marketing Operations of Dairy Cooperatives, 2002, 
USDA/Rural Business-Cooperative Service, Research Report 201, February 
2004.

[78] We could not identify any recent studies that have examined milk 
processing and distribution costs on a national level.

[79] T.J. Dalton, G.K. Criner, and J. Halloran, "Fluid Milk Processing 
Costs: Current State and Comparisons," Journal of Dairy Science, Vol. 
85, No. 4 (2002): 984-991. The study used cost-engineering methods to 
look at four state-of-the-art fluid milk processing plants in Maine 
ranging from 335,000 gallons per week to 600,000 gallons per week.

[80] Supply-chain management is an attempt to coordinate processes 
involving producing, shipping, and distributing products, generally 
performed only by large corporations with large suppliers.

[81] Dean Foods Company, Presentation at the Consumer Analyst Group of 
New York Conference, Scottsdale, Arizona, February 17, 2004. Available 
online at http://www.deanfoods.com/investors.

[82] Dean Foods Annual Report (2001), 18.

[83] Aseptic packaging, commonly called "drink boxes," is the result of 
a beverage and liquid food system that allows perishable food products 
to be distributed and stored without refrigeration for periods up to 
six months or more. It is used to preserve and package everything from 
milk, juice, and drinks of all kinds to scrambled egg mix, tomato 
sauce, soups, and other liquid foods.

[84] Structural change is characterized by broad and long-term changes 
in key industry characteristics, frequently including consolidation and 
changes in concentration, methods of vertical coordination, and the mix 
of products and services offered by firms in an industry.

[85] Don P. Blayney and James J. Miller, "Concentration and Structural 
Change in Dairy Processing and Manufacturing," Paper presented at the 
10TH Annual Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, Memphis, 
Tennessee, April 2003.

[86] See GAO-01-561, appendix VI, for more information on consolidation 
at the wholesale milk processor level.

[87] As a result of a divestiture plan stemming from the Dean-Suiza 
merger, the second largest fluid milk processor, the National Dairy 
Holdings Group, was created.

[88] We estimated the four-firm concentration ratio using expert 
opinion from conversations with dairy experts at USDA on the leading 
four fluid milk processing firms, estimates of company sales from the 
August 2003 Dairy Foods Magazine, "The Dairy 100: The List," and the 
total value of shipments from the 2002 Economic Census, Industry Series 
(September 2004) for fluid milk manufacturing. We also adjusted company 
sales listed in Dairy Foods, per company annual statements and expert 
opinion, for the percent of sales that would account for products such 
as ice cream and cheese. To make our estimate consistent with the 1997 
Economic Census four-firm concentration ratio, we also included the 
same categories for fluid milk manufacturing, such as cottage cheese 
and yogurt, along with fluid milk processing, that went into this 
calculation. This figure does not include the sales that firms may have 
from various joint ventures.

[89] See T.J. Dalton, G.K. Criner, and J. Halloran, "Fluid Milk 
Processing Costs: Current State and Comparisons," Journal of Dairy 
Science, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2002, 984-991. Also, Day 3 of the Hearing on 
Pacific Northwest and Arizona/Las Vegas Producer-Handlers, September 
25, 2003, including the exhibit on "Cost Structure of Fluid Milk Plants 
of Various Sizes."

[90] One study that we identified, however, that separated market power 
and cost-efficiency effects on the prices in 33 food processing 
industries from 1972 to 1992, found that the market power effect 
dominated in fluid milk manufacturing. Rigoberto A. Lopez, Azzedine M. 
Azzam, and Carmen Liron-Espana, "Market Power and/or Efficiency: A 
Structural Approach" Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 20, March 
2002: 115-126.

[91] The Food Marketing Institute is a trade association that 
represents segments of the retail food industry such as supermarkets. 
The Food Marketing Institute does not represent convenience stores.

[92] As table 29 shows, the category "other operating costs" is 
somewhat larger than "employee benefits," but according to the Food 
Marketing Institute, it is a catch-all category including items such as 
travel, equipment rentals, communication, and services purchased.

[93] The gross margin is a firm's sales revenue minus the costs of 
acquiring products, expressed as a percentage of sales.

[94] George Criner, "Milk Retail Costs and Margins." Paper presented at 
the Northeast Dairy Policy Summit Meeting, November 17-18, 2003, 
University of Connecticut, Storrs.

[95] For most other products, Wal-Mart officials said that the retailer 
maintains a network of approximately 30 food distribution centers.

[96] Private label refers to products that are "store brands" and have 
labels that represent the retailer. These products may be produced by 
manufacturers that also produce national brands or by retailers who own 
their own manufacturing operations.

[97] Different retailers may define the dairy case differently 
depending on the market that they serve. The dairy case may include 
products such as fluid milk, cottage cheese, creamers, yogurt, butter, 
and eggs as well as a variety of new "value added" dairy products. A 
recent study by Cornell University on dairy case management found that, 
on average, stores used approximately 37 different milk products in 
their dairy cases.

[98] Oral Capps, Jr., "Demand and Marketing Analyses for Fluid Milk 
Products by Type and by Package Size." Presentation at the 2004 Dairy 
Forum, Boca Raton, Florida, January 2004.

[99] If products are substitutes, an increase in the price of one would 
increase the demand for the other. A complement in consumption means 
that the products are consumed in conjunction with one another. An 
increase in price for one product would decrease the demand for the 
complementary product.

[100] Tirtha Dhar and Tom Cox, "Strategic Implications of Retail 
Pricing in the U.S. Fluid Milk Market." Paper prepared for presentation 
at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, 
Montreal, Canada, July 27-30, 2003.

[101] Economic studies of the relationship between price and market 
concentration in food retailing have found mixed results. Carolyn 
Dimitri, Abebayehu Tegene, and Phil R. Kaufman, U.S. Fresh Produce 
Markets: Marketing Channels, Trade Practices, and Retail Price 
Behavior, Agricultural Economic Report Number 825, Economic Research 
Service, USDA, September 2003.

[102] These were defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas. See GAO-01-561, appendix VI, for more information on 
concentration among retail firms.

[103] Sales by Wal-Mart and other super centers and mass merchandisers 
are not included in the supermarket category. Super centers are defined 
as a large combination supermarket and discount general merchandise 
store, with grocery products accounting for up to 40 percent of selling 
area.

[104] The four-firm concentration ratio in a market is the share of 
sales made by the four largest sellers.

[105] William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, 
3RD ed. Prentice Hall, 1990. While a useful tool for categorizing the 
degree of competition in a market, a numerical cut-off of a 
concentration index, such as the four-firm concentration ratio, is not 
generally considered a precise demarcation between various categories 
of the degree of competition in a market. The Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice use an index of market concentration, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, in combination with a number of other 
market factors, in determining the potential anticompetitive effects of 
a proposed merger. Economic studies of various markets, however, have 
found that the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index are highly correlated.

[106] While very similar, some of the 15 market areas for our 2001 
report for retail concentration in 1998 did not exactly match those in 
our present data for 2003 due to a realignment of MarketScope's 
metropolitan market area definitions.

[107] Wal-Mart super center sales for 2003 were taken from Supermarket 
News, SN's Top 75 (supplement), January 12, 2004. The estimate of 
grocery sales was provided by USDA. These grocery sales represent about 
40 percent of total super center sales.

[108] "ACNielsen Study Finds Grocery Stores Continuing to Lose Share of 
Customer Shopping Trips," news release, ACNielsen, May 4, 2002, 
http://www.acnielsen.com/news/american/us/2002/200220504.htm (accessed 
September 9, 2004).

[109] Todd M. Schmit, Harry M. Kaiser, and Chanjin Chung, The Dairy 
Case Management Program: Does It Mooove More Milk? National Institute 
for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation, Department of Applied 
Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, January 
2004. Specifically, this study evaluated the Dairy Case Management 
Program operated by the American Dairy Council in the Northwestern 
Hudson Valley Market in New York State.

[110] More generally, a recent article in the economics literature 
looking at 77 consumer and 165 producer goods suggested that asymmetric 
price transmission is a broad phenomenon, and that prices rise faster 
than they fall in about two-thirds of the markets that were examined. 
See S. Peltzman, "Prices Rise Faster than they Fall," Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 3, 466-502.

[111] Other factors identified included the costs of changing prices, 
government policies, spatial market competition, asymmetric 
information, economies of scale, and differentiated products.

[112] James P. Houck, "An Approach to Specifying and Estimating 
Nonreversible Functions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59 
(1977): 570-572. In the Houck model (1977), changes in the retail price 
are linked to increases and decreases in the farm level price as well 
as changes in other marketing costs. Also, the estimated parameters on 
the farm-level price increases and decreases can be tested to determine 
if retail price movements in response to farm price changes are 
symmetric or asymmetric.

[113] H.W. Kinnucan and O.D. Forker, "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price 
Transmission for Major Dairy Products," American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 69 (1987): 285-292. Kinnucan and Forker combine 
the mark-up model proposed by Heien (1980) and the approach used by 
Houck (1977) to estimate asymmetric functions using a dynamic approach 
for fluid milk, cheese, butter, and ice cream.

[114] A recent study by von Cramon-Taubadel and Fahlbusch (1994) points 
out that in the case of cointegration between two time series, an error 
correction model, extended by the incorporation of asymmetric 
adjustment terms, provides for a more appropriate specification for 
testing for asymmetric price transmission. See S. von Cramon-Taubadel 
and S. Fahlbusch, "Identifying Asymmetric Price Transmission with Error 
Correction Models." Poster session at the European Association of 
Agricultural Economists European Seminar in Reading, UK, 1994.

[115] Short-run asymmetry occurs when increasing and decreasing prices 
have different immediate responses when the farm price is changed. 
Long-run asymmetry occurs when increasing and decreasing farm prices 
have different responses over the full adjustment period. For most of 
the studies that we examined, both the short run and long run 
represented fairly short time horizons. For example, the short run 
typically extended from the current month to one month out, while the 
long run was usually from 2 to 4 months. Nevertheless, in most of the 
studies, the long run was the time required for the lag structure to 
run its course.

[116] The elasticity of price transmission from the farm to retail 
level is the percentage change in the retail price of a product due to 
a 1 percent change in the corresponding farm price.

[117] While these elasticity estimates are ones obtained from using the 
Houck method, the author found similar results, although smaller, using 
a time-series, cointegration approach: the error correction model (see 
table 33).

[118] The New Empirical Industrial Organization is an approach that 
focuses primarily on the relationship between prices and marginal costs 
that has been used to identify and estimate the degree of oligopoly 
market power in a market. Specifically, the Chidmi et al. study is a 
structural oligopoly model that measures market power, demand, marginal 
cost, and the farm-to-retail price transmission.

[119] This approach is a cost-pass through model consisting of a two-
stage vertical market system where there are two processors at the 
first stage and two retailers at the second stage. Within these stages 
the authors assume different conduct and game theoretic assumptions. 
This study, however, did not address price asymmetry because it did not 
estimate the extent to which price decreases were passed through.

[120] S. McCorriston, C. W. Morgan, and A. J. Rayner, "Processing 
Technology, Market Power, and Price Transmission," Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, 185-201. Steve 
McCorriston, "Why Should Imperfect Competition Matter to Agricultural 
Economists?" European Review of Agricultural Economists, Vol. 29, No. 
3, 2002, 349-371.

[121] Steve McCorriston and Ian M. Sheldon, "The Effect of Vertical 
Markets on Trade Policy Reform." Working paper, September 1994. Also, 
S. M. McCorriston and I. M. Sheldon, "Agricultural Policy Reform in 
Successive-Oligopolistic Markets: A General Framework," University of 
Exeter and Ohio State University, December 1995.

[122] For this model, the conjectural variation elasticity, a measure 
of market conduct and firm interdependence within the market, was 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.

[123] There can be different kinds of economic efficiency effects. 
Government policies may be more or less economically efficient 
depending upon the extent to which they prevent the transmission of 
market price signals and lead to a misallocation of resources into 
excess production. Policies may also be more or less efficient 
depending upon the extent to which they affect the distribution of 
production between farmers with high or low costs of production.

[124] The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
required USDA to consolidate the number of marketing orders. Two 
marketing orders were discontinued between 1996 and 1999, so 31 orders 
were actually consolidated.

[125] Basing Class I and II prices on the advanced Class III and IV 
skim milk values ensures that minimum prices of raw milk used in these 
products will be known in the month preceding the month to which they 
apply.

[126] The mover links the dairy price support program to the FMMO 
system, so that changes in one program are reflected in the other. The 
dairy price support program maintains the prices of manufactured 
products throughout the United States regardless of whether a 
particular area is part of the FMMO system. By using these manufactured 
product prices as the basis for other milk class prices, the FMMO 
system aims to ensure that its minimum prices will reflect the level of 
support provided by the price support program.

[127] In addition to these major reforms, USDA made other changes, 
including modifying the system of differentials used to determine Class 
I prices. USDA increased Class I differentials in 21 markets, ranging 
from $0.01 per hundredweight in New England (Boston) and New York/New 
Jersey (New York City), to $0.50 per hundredweight in the Upper Midwest 
(Minneapolis). Class I differentials in 4 markets were not changed. 
Class I differentials in 8 markets were reduced, ranging from $0.04 per 
hundredweight in the Ohio Valley (Columbus) to $0.18 in Eastern 
Colorado (Denver). In general, these changes retained the existing 
Class I pricing surface in markets east of the Rocky Mountains. USDA 
originally proposed an alternative set of differentials, but the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000 required adoption of the 
differentials noted above.

[128] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000 also required USDA to 
reconsider the Class III and IV pricing formulas that were implemented 
with the 2000 reforms. USDA conducted a hearing on the issue in May 
2000. The reforms implemented in April 2003 stemmed from the changes 
USDA proposed as a result of this hearing.

[129] In some cases the new orders included areas previously 
unregulated by the FMMO system.

[130] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Federal Milk Marketing Order 
Reform: New England et al., Final Decision, Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, Dairy Programs, March 1999.

[131] After USDA holds a hearing, it may decide to issue proposed 
amended regulations for notice and comment. At the end of the 
administrative process, USDA issues a final rule, and those covered by 
the order must vote to adopt the order in its amended form. The amended 
order must be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected dairy 
farmers, or dairy farmers who produce at least two-thirds of the milk 
produced in that order. In addition, the amended order will not become 
effective until the handlers of at least 50 percent of the milk covered 
by the order have signed a marketing agreement, or until a hearing has 
been held and the Secretary of Agriculture makes particular 
determinations that the marketing order should nonetheless be 
effective.

[132] Over time, the number of classes has varied by order, from at 
least two, to seven or eight. Class I use has consistently been defined 
as the milk going into fluid milk products. Class II includes soft 
manufactured products such as ice cream and yogurt, Class III includes 
cheese, and Class IV includes butter and nonfat dry milk.

[133] Advanced values are derived from formulas that use weighted 
average prices of butter, cheese, dry whey, and nonfat dry milk 
reported by the National Agricultural Statistics Service on the Friday 
on or before the 23RD of the month preceding the month to which the 
prices apply. There is a 1-week lag in reporting by the Service, so the 
advanced values are usually based on the commodity prices for the first 
two weeks of the preceding month.

[134] Class II butterfat is priced by adding $0.007 per pound to the 
monthly Class III/IV butterfat price. Consequently, Class II skim milk 
is advanced priced but Class II butterfat is not.

[135] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "The Butter-Powder Tilt," Marketing and 
Policy Briefing Paper Number 72, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2001.

[136] David Anderson, Bob Cropp, Wilson Gray, Joe Outlaw, and Mark 
Stephenson, "Milk Pricing Policy Options and Consequences," an Analysis 
for the American Farm Bureau Foundation for Agriculture, February 2004.

[137] According to a USDA official, Class IV use averages about 12 
percent across all federal orders and is much higher than 12 percent in 
several orders.

[138] Whey is the water and solid components of milk that remain after 
the curd is removed in cheese-making. It contains about 93.5 percent 
water and 6.5 percent lactose, protein, minerals, enzymes, water-
soluble vitamins, and traces of fat.

[139] Raw milk quality is also factored into the pricing formulas in 
all but two orders.

[140] As a result of declining Grade B milk production, the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price was replaced by the basic formula price in the mid-
1990s. The basic formula price established the minimum prices for raw 
milk by updating the Minnesota-Wisconsin competitive pay price series 
with wholesale product price information on the value of cheese, 
butter, and nonfat dry milk. This system was in place from June 1995 
through December 1999.

[141] This is not to say that the FMMO classified pricing system is 
causing additional volatility in milk prices. As noted by AMS 
officials, an historical review of milk prices shows that price 
volatility existed well before the product pricing formulas were 
introduced in 2000. AMS officials indicated that there are several 
causes of price volatility including: the level of support provided by 
the price support program, exposure to international trade, and the 
responses to changes in prices by farmers and consumers. However, 
according to a number of dairy experts, the fixed manufacturing 
allowances in the new product formula pricing system have more readily 
transmitted price volatility within the classified pricing system and 
thus enhanced its effects.

[142] AMS officials indicated that USDA has been working with 
researchers at Cornell University to collect manufacturing plant costs, 
which these officials believe will assist them in establishing the 
proper level of manufacturing allowances should the dairy industry 
propose a change.

[143] Other factors that could affect the incentive to shift milk to a 
higher-valued use include transportation costs and changes in 
processing technology. In addition, when cooperatives own the capacity 
to produce butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk, they may still have an 
incentive to shift milk to the higher-valued use despite fixed 
manufacturing allowances, in order to provide greater returns to their 
members.

[144] One source also noted that by not providing incentives to shift 
milk to its highest-valued use, the product formula pricing system 
could discourage the development of innovative dairy products.

[145] The producer price differential represents the difference between 
the value of milk established by the classified pricing system as paid 
by processors and the weighted average value of milk as paid to farmers 
for milk components (butterfat, protein, and other solids). The 
producer price differential is calculated by multiplying the volume of 
each class of milk used in the order by its announced price to obtain a 
total classified value of milk for that order, and then subtracting the 
total value of milk paid to farmers for butterfat, protein, and other 
solids on a per hundredweight basis.

[146] This presumes that minimum prices are the effective prices.

[147] Rapidly rising Class IV prices are a remote possibility at this 
time due to the surplus of nonfat dry milk.

[148] Processors may remain in a federal order pool despite negative 
producer price differentials for a variety of reasons. For example, 
Class I processors are not allowed to de-pool under FMMO regulations.

[149] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "Federal Milk Marketing Order Pooling, 
Depooling, and Distant Pooling: Issues and Impacts," Marketing and 
Policy Briefing Paper Number 85, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2004.

[150] Because these provisions are established on an order-by-order 
basis, the minimum shipping percentages vary by order. In federal milk 
orders with relatively high Class I use, such as the Southeast and 
Florida Orders, the shipping percentage requirements are higher than in 
orders with relatively low Class I use, such as the Upper Midwest 
Order. Shipping requirements may also vary by months of the year. In 
orders where milk production tends to vary a lot seasonally, the 
minimum shipping requirements may be greater during low production 
months.

[151] The Class III other solids component price (per pound) is 
calculated by taking the difference between the dry whey price reported 
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service and a manufacturing 
allowance of $0.159, multiplied times a product yield factor of 1.03. 
The lower bound of zero, or "snubber," was designed to prevent the 
price of other solids components from being negative should the market 
price for dry whey fall below the manufacturing allowance. Removing 
this lower bound created the possibility that the other solids 
component price could actually lower the Class III price during periods 
of low market prices for dry whey, which in fact, occurred from April 
to June of 2003. However, because other solids comprise a small 
percentage of the overall component value of Class III milk, the effect 
of this change was minor.

[152] Bob Cropp, Brian Gould, and Ed Jesse, "Federal Milk Marketing 
Order Reform: November 2002 Final Decision on Class III/IV Formulas," 
Marketing and Policy Briefing Paper Number 79, Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
November 2002.

[153] However, the study noted that Class III prices would have been 
the driver in only one additional month between January 2001 and 
November 2002.

[154] U.S. International Trade Commission, Conditions of Competition 
for Milk Protein Products in the U.S. Market, Publication 3692 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2004). The U.S. International Trade Commission 
is an independent federal agency. Its purpose is to assist in the 
administration of trade laws and to protect U.S. industry, as well as 
to provide advice and research on trade issues.

[155] The USDA estimate also factored in the benefits provided by the 
introduction of the Milk Income Loss Contract program.

[156] This included retroactive payments made for production in fiscal 
year 2002.

[157] The $3.8 billion estimate comprises actual outlays of about $1.8 
billion in fiscal year 2003 and forecasts of $935 million in fiscal 
year 2004, $963 million in fiscal year 2005, and $77 million in fiscal 
year 2006. Some MILC payments will extend into fiscal year 2006 for 
milk produced in fiscal year 2005. USDA noted that its estimate of MILC 
payments for fiscal year 2004 is $300 million, much less than the 
Congressional Budget Office's estimate.

[158] While MILC has helped some farmers to weather low price periods, 
USDA officials stated that the program has not necessarily changed the 
long-term strategy of farmers to exit production. When making a 
decision to remain in production, farmers have to weigh a number of 
considerations in addition to MILC payments, particularly costs and 
market conditions.

[159] In the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Trade Organization (WTO) members, 
including the United States, made commitments to improve market access, 
reduce export subsidies, and limit and in some cases reduce trade-
distorting domestic agricultural supports. For example, Uruguay Round 
commitments on domestic agricultural subsidies include annual aggregate 
ceiling levels for certain types of direct government support, which 
include price supports for dairy products. The United States and other 
WTO members are currently engaged in another round of multilateral 
trade negotiations that began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, where they 
reaffirmed their commitment to agricultural trade liberalization, and 
in July 2004, WTO members agreed on a framework to guide negotiations 
on agriculture. The U.S. negotiating position has emphasized 
harmonizing, reducing, and further disciplining agricultural 
subsidies. In the interim, existing Uruguay Round commitments will 
continue at established levels. WTO members found to be in violation of 
these commitments can be subject to retaliatory measures, such as 
punitive tariffs on exports.

[160] Small surpluses or shortages in the short term may be the result 
of market corrections and may not represent inefficiencies in the 
allocation of production resources.

[161] The level of price volatility could influence both the supply and 
demand for milk products. For example, manufacturers of products using 
dairy ingredients might purchase larger quantities of these ingredients 
if prices are more stable.

[162] To evaluate the impacts of various options on policy 
considerations such as farm income, milk production, and federal costs, 
we compared these options against a baseline scenario of the policies 
in place as of August 2004: FMMO regulations, a MILC program that is 
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2005, a price support 
program at $9.90 per hundredweight, a Dairy Export Incentive Program 
(DEIP), trade restrictions, and milk regulatory policies in some 
states.

[163] With declining Grade B milk production, any alternative 
competitive pay system would have to include Grade A milk. 
Consequently, a key challenge in developing a good competitive pay 
price series is obtaining data that are not already influenced by the 
FMMO classified pricing system. AMS officials noted that during FMMO 
reform and consolidation, AMS commissioned a blue-ribbon committee of 
academics to evaluate various milk pricing methods. Although the 
committee's preference was for a competitive pay price series, they 
were unable to develop or suggest a way of creating such a series.

[164] GAO, Milk Pricing: New Method for Setting Farm Milk Prices Needs 
to Be Developed, GAO/RCED-90-8 (Washington, D.C.: November 3, 1989).

[165] Another alternative modification to the classified pricing system 
would be to raise the manufacturing allowances; however, the accuracy 
of any adjustment that does not change according to market forces would 
eventually decrease. Further, the problem of trying to develop an 
allowance that adequately represents costs of production in an 
environment of widely varying cost structures would still exist.

[166] Class I includes fluid milk products, Class II includes soft 
manufactured products such as ice cream and yogurt, Class III includes 
cheese, and Class IV includes butter and nonfat dry milk.

[167] As discussed later in this appendix, this distortion could also 
be reduced by changing the price support program.

[168] Charles F. Nicholson and Thomas Fiddaman, "Dairy Policy and Price 
Volatility." Paper presented at the 10TH Annual Workshop for Dairy 
Economists and Policy Analysts, Memphis, Tennessee, April 2003.

[169] AMS officials noted that other alternatives, not discussed in 
this appendix, that could prevent negative producer price differentials 
include eliminating the advanced Class I price announcement and setting 
minimum prices for all classes in advance.

[170] This hearing took place in August 2004.

[171] Changes in federal dairy policy that reduce price volatility, 
such as increasing the level of support provided by the price support 
program, would help to reduce instances of negative producer price 
differentials and de-pooling.

[172] Handler is the federal order term for cooperatives, processors, 
or dealers of milk who commonly purchase raw milk and sell pasteurized 
milk and milk products. See 7 C.F.R. §1000.9 for a more complete 
definition.

[173] Also under consideration are alternative proposals that would 
merge the Southeast and Appalachian Orders, as well as add areas to the 
merged orders.

[174] 7 U.S.C. §608(c).

[175] This would be such a major change in federal dairy policy that 
its impacts are uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in the 
differences in the estimated impacts of various empirical studies that 
considered this alternative. AMS officials indicated that without the 
FMMO system of minimum prices set for milk based on wholesale dairy 
product prices, it is unclear whether or not a structure would evolve 
that similarly transmits wholesale price signals to farmers.

[176] GAO, Milk Marketing Orders: Options for Change, GAO/RCED-88-9 
(Washington, D.C.: March 21, 1988).

[177] Dairy farmers sell two grades of milk. Grade A may be used for 
fluid consumption or in manufactured products. Grade B may be used only 
for manufactured products. Farmers producing Grade A milk must adhere 
to higher sanitation requirements than for Grade B milk. The FMMO 
system was developed to ensure an adequate supply of Grade A milk to 
meet the fluid milk needs of consumers.

[178] Tom Cox, Bob Cropp, Randy Fortenbery, and Ed Jesse, "Rethinking 
Dairyland Chapter 3: The Effects of Federal Dairy Programs on the 
Competitiveness of Dairying in Wisconsin," Marketing and Policy 
Briefing Paper Number 78C, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, September 2002.

[179] This analysis assumed that a fluid milk premium of $0.50 per 
hundredweight would remain nationally and that California would make no 
changes to its state milk marketing system. If the assumption of a 
fluid milk premium is dropped, the study showed a farm price decrease 
of closer to $0.70 per hundredweight during the first couple of years 
following FMMO elimination.

[180] J. Michael Price, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Effects of U.S. 
Dairy Policies on Markets for Milk and Dairy Products, Market and Trade 
Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Technical Bulletin 
Number 1910, May 2004. This analysis assumed a national fluid milk 
premium of $1.30 per hundredweight. According to the USDA study, this 
change is in the effective Class I price. Since Class I prices and 
prices for raw milk used for manufacturing purposes would move in 
opposite directions with elimination of the FMMO program, the change in 
average prices would be less than $0.95 per hundredweight.

[181] The May 2004 USDA study estimated that manufactured product 
prices would increase by 2 percent above the study's baseline estimate 
for the period 2002 through 2007.

[182] Should the MILC program not be extended beyond fiscal year 2005, 
this scenario would only exist in the short term.

[183] Andrew M. Novakovic, Charles F. Nicholson, and Mark W. 
Stephenson, "Assignment of New Products Under Classified Pricing: A 
Conceptual Dynamic Model of Class Assignment Outcomes," Cornell 
University, January 2004.

[184] Changes in the dairy price support program could potentially 
conflict with the U.S.'s WTO commitments.

[185] USDA indicated that currently, the price support program allows 
the CCC to release its commodity stocks if the market price for a 
particular commodity exceeds that commodity's purchase price.

[186] Bob Cropp and Ed Jesse, "The Butter-Powder Tilt," Marketing and 
Policy Briefing Paper Number 72, Department of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 2004.

[187] USDA also averages the Class III and Class IV prices in 
determining if the $9.90 per hundredweight support price has been met.

[188] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 required the Secretary 
of Agriculture to more diligently support the farm price of milk at the 
farm bill-mandated support price of $9.90 per hundredweight or lose 
funding for the administration of the program. Pub. L. No. 108-199 
§780.

[189] The FSA economist also stated that there are minimal cost 
differences for Class IV products (butter and nonfat dry milk). An 
academic expert indicated that with the exception of April to June 
2003, the Class IV price has not dropped below the support price.

[190] The National Milk Producers Federation has asked the CCC to 
increase its purchase prices for cheese by $0.056 per pound.

[191] The Chicago Mercantile Exchange is a central marketplace with 
established rules and regulations where buyers and sellers trade 
agreements known as futures contracts to, for example, buy or sell a 
commodity at a future date.

[192] USDA put the proposed draft Announcement Dairy 6 out to the dairy 
industry for comment on April 5, 2004. The proposal includes a number 
of changes such as increasing lot quantities for manufactured dairy 
product purchases, as well as changing commodity, packaging, and 
marking specifications.

[193] Another proposed alternative would be to have the CCC place bids 
for commodity purchases on the Exchange as a better way to provide a 
price floor for manufactured products. However, because the CCC cannot 
entirely change its product standards to conform to industry 
requirements, an FSA economist indicated that this alternative is not 
feasible.

[194] The study established a baseline assumption whereby CCC purchases 
of nonfat dry milk averaged approximately 17 percent of total U.S. 
production over the period 2002 through 2007. Purchases of other 
commodities were assumed to be minimal. However, this assumption was 
based on a nonfat dry milk purchase price of $1.01 per pound. The 
actual purchase price was lowered to $0.80 per pound and, thus, the 
study may overstate the effects of eliminating this program.

[195] The draft legislation is known as the Milk Income Loss Contract 
Extension, S. 2609 (2004). A bill that would extend authorization for 
the MILC program to 2007, but would not increase the eligible 
production cap, has been introduced in the House, H.R. 3990 (2004). 
Additionally, a separate bill, S. 2825 (2004), was introduced in the 
Senate. Section 426 of this proposed legislation would extend 
authorization for the MILC program to 2007, increase the target price 
for the MILC program from $16.94 per hundredweight to $17.10, and 
eliminate a provision for determining whether producers are on separate 
dairy operations for purposes of determining payment eligibility. 
However, the bill would not change the MILC program's eligible 
production cap of 2.4 million pounds.

[196] Scott Brown, "The Effect on the United States Dairy Industry of 
Removing Current Federal Regulations," Report Number 03-03, Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute, University of Missouri, April 
2003. Both the baseline estimate and the estimate for the MILC 
extension scenario are based on the assumption that the price support 
program, federal milk marketing orders, import restrictions, and the 
Dairy Export Incentive Program remain in effect.

[197] Although, as discussed above, one might expect that the price and 
production differences would become smaller over time, according to the 
author of this study the model assumes competitive markets and, 
therefore, does not fully capture long-term adjustments.

[198] However, the baseline assumption for farm milk prices was lower 
than the prevailing prices of the past few months and, according to the 
study's author, with higher assumed farm prices, the effect on 
government costs of extending the MILC program would be less. The 
accuracy of the other estimates also depends on the accuracy of the 
market prices assumed in the baseline.

[199] Because the University of Missouri study's baseline included a 
MILC program through 2005, its results can only be used as estimates of 
the impact of extending MILC with a higher cap compared to letting MILC 
expire for years beyond 2005. The study's results comparing this option 
with the study's baseline for 2003 through 2005 are estimates of the 
difference between having a MILC program with no cap and one with the 
current cap.

[200] However, the baseline assumption for farm prices was lower than 
the prevailing prices of the past few months and, according to the 
study's author, with higher assumed farm milk prices, the effect on 
government costs of extending the MILC program would be less. The 
accuracy of the other estimates also depends on the accuracy of the 
market prices assumed in the baseline.

[201] The MILC program is a target price deficiency payment program.

[202] A countercyclical payment is a payment provided during periods of 
low prices.

[203] This proposed legislation was introduced in the 108TH Congress as 
S. 2525 and H.R. 4597.

[204] In earlier legislation, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform Act of 1996, Congress authorized the six New England states to 
enter into an agreement called the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 
which was implemented in July 1997. The Compact functioned similarly to 
the proposed dairy marketing boards of the NDEA in that it supplemented 
the FMMOs and state programs by setting the monthly minimum price to be 
paid for raw milk used for fluid milk marketed in the six-state area. 
The authorization for the Compact expired on September 30, 2001.

[205] States in this region include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

[206] States in this region include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and West Virginia.

[207] States in this region include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

[208] States in this region include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.

[209] States in this region include Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, 
and Washington.

[210] The NDEA would allow the maximum to increase over time in 
accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department 
of Labor.

[211] Other payments from the fund would include compensation for 
administrative costs that USDA or the boards incur in carrying out the 
program, increased costs of specified federal nutrition programs that 
might result from the program, and increased costs that the states 
might occur due to the program in carrying out the Child Nutrition Act 
of 1996. Boards could also collect assessments from processors in their 
region not to exceed $0.03 per hundredweight to cover the boards' 
administrative costs.

[212] Each month the board would receive the greater of (1) this amount 
or (2) the amount of payments made by processors to the fund for 
purchases of Class I milk that will be sold in the region during the 
month.

[213] Even the extent to which income from Class I sales might rise 
from the NDEA is hard to estimate because it is unclear to what extent 
the over-order premiums that processors would be required to pay for 
Class I milk might be replacements for market-driven over-order 
premiums that would exist without the NDEA.

[214] GAO, Dairy Industry: Estimated Economic Impacts of Dairy 
Compacts, GAO-01-866 (Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2001).

[215] Scott Brown, "An Introductory Examination of the National Dairy 
Equity Act," in Dairy Policy and Product Innovation, 11TH Annual 
Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, April 15-16, 2004.

[216] These estimates were developed under a particular set of 
assumptions, including that all states would participate in the NDEA 
and that over-order prices were set relatively high. These estimates, 
as acknowledged in the study, are likely to cause the estimated effects 
of the NDEA to be larger than if, alternatively, it had been assumed 
that few states participated and the over-order prices were relatively 
low.

[217] Milk protein concentrate is a concentrated milk protein product 
that contains both of the major forms of protein found in milk: casein 
and whey. The protein content of this product can vary considerably 
from 42 to over 90 percent.

[218] This proposed legislation was introduced in the 108TH Congress as 
S. 560 and H.R. 1160.

[219] As a result of the agreement, the United States committed to 
convert quotas and fees that had been established pursuant to section 
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 into tariffs in the form 
of tariff-rate quotas. Further, the United States agreed not to use 
section 22 in the future against imports from other WTO members. 
Virtually all section 22 quotas were converted to tariff-rate quotas in 
1995.

[220] Standards of identity were introduced under the 1938 Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and are enforced by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Standards of identity define food products by 
establishing what ingredients must or may be used in the food 
manufacturing process, as well as the quantity of such ingredients. In 
most cases, milk protein concentrate is not accepted for use in cheeses 
covered by the standards of identity.

[221] Despite its conclusion that imports of dairy proteins to the 
United States could lower manufactured product prices, the 
International Trade Commission was unable to conclude that these 
imports actually caused USDA to tilt commodity purchase prices in May 
2001 and November 2002. The International Trade Commission found that 
between 1996 and 2002, CCC stocks of nonfat dry milk grew from zero to 
1 billion pounds. However, of this amount, the commission estimated 
that only 25 to 35 percent of the stocks came from nonfat dry milk that 
had been displaced by imports of dairy proteins. Therefore, 66 percent 
of the increase in CCC stocks was due to factors other than imports.

[222] Butter prices could decrease as higher production levels, among 
other things, increase the supply of butterfat.

[223] The extent to which increased imports put pressure on the CCC to 
increase its purchases depends on the extent to which increased imports 
replace commercial sales of domestically produced dairy products.

[224] A bill to create this program was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives as H.R. 4223 on April 27, 2004. The bill defines dairy 
proteins as whey, whey protein concentrate, casein, or milk protein 
concentrate.

[225] The protein content of raw milk can change with the age of the 
cow, seasonally, and with feeding and management practices.

[226] The International Trade Commission reached these conclusions by 
estimating the price, cost, and returns for U.S. producers who produce 
nonfat dry milk and sell it to the CCC. The Commission then compared 
the result with what producers in its survey had earned from producing 
and selling milk protein concentrate.

[227] However, USDA officials noted that this may be a moot issue 
because they believe milk protein concentrates will be classified as 
Class IV products.

[228] Phillip M. Bishop and Charles F. Nicholson, "Dairy Market Impacts 
of U.S. Milk Protein Imports and Trade Policy Alternatives," Department 
of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell Program on Dairy Markets 
and Policy, R.B. 2004-08, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. (May 2004).

[229] As an alternative to government export subsidies, the National 
Milk Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working Together program 
includes, among other things, an export subsidy element.

[230] As is the case with other export subsidy programs, the degree to 
which demand is increased under a program such as DEIP depends on the 
degree to which the exports under the program are additional to those 
that would have occurred in the absence of the program.

[231] The degree to which the U.S. market would be affected depends on 
the degree to which the exports under DEIP would be eliminated if the 
program were eliminated.

[232] Trading in milk futures and options represents another 
alternative for farmers to reduce the risks associated with price 
volatility by locking in prices, or setting price floors, for future 
production. This alternative would remain available to farmers even if 
some dairy programs, such as the dairy price support program, were 
eliminated.

[233] Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Senate to make permanent the authority for 
the Dairy Forward Pricing program, H.R. 3308 (2003) and S. 2565 (2004).

[234] As a practical matter, it could be difficult for cooperatives to 
continue paying their members less than the regulated minimum price for 
an extended period of time because farmers could choose to market their 
milk with a different cooperative. However, farmers' ability to switch 
cooperatives could be limited by the extent to which individual 
cooperatives dominate milk marketing over a wide area.

[235] Most forward contracts for milk are for a base Class III price, 
which in multiple component pricing orders, is the sum of milk 
component values per hundredweight of milk at standardized test. Class 
III milk futures and options contracts are actively traded on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. To offset their price risk from the 
forward contracts to buy milk, proprietary processors and cooperatives 
can take an equal but opposite position in the futures market by 
selling futures contracts for an equivalent amount of Class III or IV 
milk. Then, if the price of farm milk falls during the life of the 
contract, when the contract period ends, their gain in the futures 
market will equal their loss from buying milk under a fixed-price 
forward contract rather than buying after the price fell.

[236] Bob Cropp, "Innovations To Address Price Risk Management and 
Price Volatility" in Dairy Policy and Product Innovation, 11TH Annual 
Workshop for Dairy Economists and Policy Analysts, April 15-16, 2004.

[237] "A Study of the Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program and Its 
Effect on Prices Paid Producers for Milk," prepared for the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and the House 
Committee on Agriculture by Dairy Programs, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

[238] Another initiative was the Milk Diversion Program. Both of these 
programs were in effect for only a short time.

[239] The National Milk Producers Federation's Cooperatives Working 
Together program, started in July 2003, is an industry-led supply 
management initiative. Among other things, it includes a herd 
retirement element similar to the Dairy Termination Program.

[240] Over one-third of this cost was funded by an industry assessment.

[241] GAO, Dairy Termination Program: An Estimate of Its Impact and 
Cost-Effectiveness, GAO/RCED-89-96 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 1989).

[242] California also has a quota system; however, it does not function 
as a supply management program. In California, milk receipts are 
pooled, and those farmers who own quota shares get $1.70 per 
hundredweight more than the California butter/nonfat dry milk/cheese 
price for the number of quota shares they own. The original allocation 
of quota shares was made in 1969 based on Class I sales, and because 
not many additional quota shares have been allocated, quota shares 
currently cover about 25 percent of California's milk production. Most 
farmers have some quota shares, but some larger newer operations have 
come into the system without a quota. While the California quota shares 
are traded through brokers, people are not allowed to purchase them for 
investment purposes. Purchasers have to be farmers, and the quota 
shares come with minimum shipping requirements. One representative of a 
major California dairy cooperative said that the effect of the quota 
system is purely a way to distribute the proceeds of California's 
classified pricing system.

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