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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

August 2004:

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:

Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well Under Way, but Expectations 
for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified:

GAO-04-925:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-925, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study:

In its transformation to a more responsive and mobile force, the Army 
plans to form 6 Stryker Brigade Combat teams equipped with a new family 
of armored vehicles known as Strykers. The Stryker—which provides 
transport for troops, weapons, and command and control—was required by 
the Army to weigh no more than 38,000 pounds and be transportable in 
theater by C-130 cargo aircraft arriving ready for immediate combat 
operations. The Army plans to equip its future force with a new 
generation of vehicles—Future Combat Systems—to also be transportable 
by C-130s.

GAO was asked to assess (1) the current status of Stryker vehicle 
acquisition, including the most current Stryker vehicle program and 
operating cost estimates; (2) the status and results of Stryker vehicle 
tests; and (3) the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker 
vehicles within a theater of operations. This report also addresses the 
transportability of the Army’s Future Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.

What GAO Found:

The acquisition of the Stryker vehicles is about two-thirds complete; 
with about 1,200 of 8 production vehicle configurations ordered and 800 
delivered to units. In addition, limited quantities of two 
developmental vehicles—the Mobile Gun System and the Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle prototypes—have also 
been ordered for testing. Stryker program costs have increased about 22 
percent from the November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to the December 
2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. Total program costs include acquisition 
costs—procurement, research, development, and test and evaluation—as 
well as military construction costs related to Strykers. The Army does 
not yet have reliable estimates of the Stryker’s operating costs 
because of limited peacetime use to develop data.

As of June 2004, testing of the eight production Strykers was mostly 
complete, with the vehicles meeting Army operational requirements with 
limitations. However, development and testing schedules of the two 
developmental Strykers have been delayed, resulting in an over 1-year 
delay in meeting the vehicles’ production milestones and fielding 
dates.

While the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of 
Strykers by C-130 aircraft in training exercises, in an operational 
environment, the Stryker’s average weight of 38,000 pounds—along with 
other factors such as added equipment weight and less than ideal flight 
conditions—significantly limits the C-130’s flight range and reduces 
the size force that could be deployed. These factors also limit the 
ability of Strykers to conduct combat operations immediately upon 
arrival as required. With the similar maximum weight envisioned for 
Future Combat System vehicles intended for the Army’s future force, the 
planned C-130 transport of those vehicles would present similar 
challenges.

Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in Nearly Ideal 
Flight Conditions: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) provide to Congress 
clarification of expected capabilities and limitations of C-130 
transport for Stryker vehicles and Future Combat System vehicles; and 
options for alternative transport. DOD partially concurred with our 
recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-925.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at 
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds 
Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and Operational 
Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable:

Tested Production Vehicles Generally Met Requirements, but Testing and 
Acquisition Schedules for Developmental Vehicles Have Been Delayed:

Army Demonstrated Required Stryker C-130 Transportability, but Contrary 
to Congressional Expectations, Operational Limits Significantly 
Challenge Routine C-130 Transport:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Scope and Methodology:

Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions:

Table 2: Stryker Vehicle Acquisition Status As of April 2004:

Table 3: Increases in Stryker Vehicle Program's Costs:

Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle:

Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from Stryker 
Evaluation Report:

Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total Load Weights at the 
National Training Center in April 2003:

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo Weighing 38,000 Pounds:

Figures:

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production 
Configurations:

Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two Developmental 
Configurations:

Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Is One 
of Two Developmental Configurations:

Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National 
Training Center:

Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in 
Nearly Ideal Flight Conditions:

Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle with Slat Armor in Iraq:

Abbreviations:

DOD: Department of Defense:

NBC: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical:

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:

RTD&E: Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation:

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report:

DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

August 12, 2004:

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman, Committee On Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Jim Saxton: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and 
Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

The U.S. Army is transforming its force to one expected to be more 
strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and able to effectively 
operate in all types of military operations. The first step in the 
Army's transformation was to form six Interim, or Stryker, Brigade 
Combat teams equipped with a new family of 10 armored vehicle 
configurations known as Strykers. Congressional appropriations for the 
Stryker vehicle program, in then-year dollars[Footnote 1] totaled $4.5 
billion from fiscal years 2000 through 2004. The President's budget 
request for fiscal year 2005 included $1.3 billion for the program, 
leaving $2.9 billion based on current estimates needed to complete 
funding of the $8.7 billion estimated total cost of the 
program.[Footnote 2] These program costs include acquisition costs---
procurement, research, development, and test and evaluation--as well as 
related military construction costs.

According to the Army's operational requirements,[Footnote 3] Stryker 
vehicles are to be transportable by C-130 aircraft within a theater of 
operation, arriving ready for combat operations. The capability of C-
130 transport is a key performance requirement for the vehicles and is 
central to the Army's rationale for creating Stryker brigades. The C-
130 is a four-engine, high-wing cargo aircraft that the U.S. Air Force 
primarily uses as a short-range transporter. The first Stryker brigade 
became operational in October 2003, at which time it was deployed to 
Iraq. Beginning in 2010, the Army plans to begin the transition to its 
future force--the Objective Force--and to equip this force with a new 
generation of vehicles known as Future Combat Systems,[Footnote 4] 
which are also, according to operational requirements,[Footnote 5] to 
be transportable in theater by C-130 air transport.

In your initial request, you asked us to review the Stryker vehicle's 
capabilities, performance, costs, and ability to meet operational and 
mission requirements. You later asked us to assess the transportability 
of Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft. We provided your offices our 
preliminary observations on these issues in October and November 2003 
and April 2004, and this report summarizes and updates the information 
provided in those meetings. Our objectives were to determine (1) the 
current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition, including the most 
current Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates; (2) the 
status and results of Stryker vehicle tests; and (3) the ability of C-
130 aircraft to transport Stryker vehicles within a theater of 
operations. We also address transportability of the Army's Future 
Combat Systems on C-130 aircraft.

To conduct our review of Stryker vehicle acquisition status, costs, and 
testing results, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents from 
the Army's Stryker Program Management Office and Test and Evaluation 
Command and reviewed Army and Department of Defense developmental, 
operational, and survivability test reports. In our assessment of the 
ability of C-130 airlift to transport Stryker vehicles, we reviewed a 
study of the C-130 aircraft's range and payload capabilities, and 
interviewed U.S. Army, Air Force, and Transportation Command officials. 
We determined that the data and documents we reviewed were sufficiently 
reliable to answer our objectives. We performed our review from July 
2003 through June 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. A more detailed description of our scope and 
methodology is presented later in the report. A list of related GAO 
products appears at the end of this report.

Results in Brief:

Acquisition of the Stryker production vehicles[Footnote 6] is about 
two-thirds complete, but overall program costs are higher than earlier 
estimates and vehicle operating cost estimates are not yet reliable. 
The Army has ordered more than 1,200--or 68 percent--of the 8 Stryker 
production vehicle configurations it plans to buy, along with limited 
quantities of the two developmental vehicle prototypes for testing. Of 
the production vehicles, 800 have been delivered to Stryker brigades. 
Estimated total costs for the Stryker vehicle program increased about 
22 percent, from the original November 2000 estimate, in then-year 
dollars, of $7.1 billion to the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion. 
The average acquisition cost per vehicle increased from $3.34 million 
to $4.13 million during the same time period. The largest increase in 
the Stryker program's cost estimate resulted from the cost of military 
construction, such as the cost of upgrading vehicle maintenance 
facilities for Strykers. However with the deployment of the first 
Stryker Brigade to Iraq, the Army did not have reliable estimates of 
Stryker vehicle operating costs because it does not yet have sufficient 
operational experience with the vehicles in peacetime.

As of June 2004, the testing of the eight Stryker production vehicles 
is mostly complete with the vehicles meeting operational requirements 
with certain limitations, but the testing and acquisition schedules of 
the two developmental Strykers--the Mobile Gun System and Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance vehicles--have been 
delayed. The Stryker vehicle system evaluations by the Army and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) determined that the production 
vehicles met operational requirements with some limitations and, 
overall, support the key operational capabilities and effectiveness of 
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Delays in development and testing of 
the Mobile Gun System and NBC Reconnaissance vehicles will result in 
about a 1-to 2-year delay in meeting originally planned production 
decision milestones and fielding dates.

Although the Army has demonstrated the required transportability of 
Strykers by C-130s during training events, the C-130 has a limited 
capability to transport the Stryker vehicle in an operational 
environment except under favorable conditions. Because of the Strykers' 
average 38,000-pound weight, using C-130 aircraft to transport Strykers 
in an operational environment would limit flight range, the size force 
that could be deployed, and the ability to conduct operations 
immediately upon arrival--a key operational requirement for Stryker 
vehicles. Additional weight, such as from mission equipment or armor 
and less than ideal environmental conditions, poses significant 
challenges. For example, according to a study of C-130 transport of 
Army vehicles by the Military Traffic Management Command, 
Transportation Engineering Agency, an armored C-130H[Footnote 7] 
aircraft taking off in ideal conditions such as moderate air 
temperature could transport 38,000 pounds for a maximum range of 860 
miles. Adding just 2,000 pounds onboard the aircraft for associated 
cargo such as mission equipment or ammunition reduces the C-130 
aircraft's takeoff-to-landing range to only 500 miles. Furthermore, a 
C-130 with a 38,000-pound Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to 
take off at all from locations in higher elevations, such as 
Afghanistan, during daytime in the summer. Because of these 
constraints, equipment and supplies for the Strykers might need to be 
moved on separate aircraft, increasing the numbers of aircraft or 
sorties[Footnote 8] needed to deploy a Stryker force, deployment time, 
and the time it would take after arrival to begin operations. In 
addition, if fitted with additional armor for increased protection 
against weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, a Stryker vehicle 
would be unable to fit inside a C-130, and with added weight of the 
armor, the aircraft would be too heavy to take off. At the envisioned 
38,000-pound maximum weight of the Future Combat System vehicles, the 
planned C-130 transport of those vehicles for the Army's Future 
Objective Force would present the same challenges.

Given the challenges of C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles, the Army's 
operational requirements and congressional expectations for such 
transport, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, 
clarify for Congress (1) the expected deployment capabilities of 
Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft within a 
theater of operations and the types of operational missions using C-130 
transport of Stryker vehicles that would be achievable; (2) potential 
operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades given the limits 
of C-130 transport; and (3) options for, and availability of, 
alternative modes of transportation for transporting Stryker brigades 
within an operational theater. We are also recommending that the 
department include similar clarification for C-130 transport of Future 
Combat System vehicles.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD's comments are 
in the appendix and our evaluation of its comments is on page 29.

Background:

The Stryker family of vehicles consists of 10 eight-wheeled armored 
vehicles mounted on a common chassis that provide transport for troops, 
weapons, and command and control. Stryker vehicles weigh on average 
about 19 tons--or 38,000 pounds, substantially less than the M1A1 
Abrams tanks (68 tons) and the Bradley Fighting vehicle (33 tons), the 
primary combat platforms of the Army's heavier armored units. The C-130 
cargo aircraft is capable of tactical, or in-theater, transport of one 
Stryker vehicle; the Army's Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting vehicle 
exceed the C-130 aircraft's size and weight limits.

The Army's original operational requirements for Stryker 
vehicles[Footnote 9] included (1) the capability of entering, being 
transportable in, and exiting a C-130 aircraft; (2) the vehicle's 
combat capable deployment weight[Footnote 10] must not exceed 38,000 
pounds to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 miles; and (3) the Stryker 
vehicles must be capable of immediate combat operations after 
unloading.[Footnote 11] The Army's most current operational 
requirements for Stryker vehicles required the same vehicle weight and 
C-130 transport capabilities without reference to C-130 transport of 
1,000 miles. The Army has similar operational requirements for its 
Future Combat Systems' vehicles. The Army's April 2003 Operational 
Requirements document for the Future Combat Systems requires the 
vehicles' essential combat configuration to be no greater than 38,000 
pounds and have a size suitable for C-130 aircraft transport. A 
memorandum of agreement between the Air Force and the Army issued in 
2003,[Footnote 12] set procedures allowing C-130 transport of 38,000-
pound Stryker vehicles aboard Air Force aircraft, but required that the 
combined weight of the vehicles, other cargo, and passengers shall not 
exceed C-130 operational capabilities, which vary based on mission 
requirements, weather, airfield conditions, among other factors.

Eight of the 10 vehicle configurations are being acquired production 
ready--meaning they require little engineering design and development 
work prior to production. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations, the 
Mobile Gun System and the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle, are developmental 
vehicle variants--meaning that a substantial amount of design, 
development, and testing is needed before they can go into production. 
Table 1 provides descriptions of the ten Stryker vehicles. Three of the 
vehicles are shown in figures 1 to 3.

Table 1: Stryker Vehicle Descriptions:

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Anti-Tank Guided Missile 
vehicle; 
Description: Provides the brigade's primary tank-killing system. It 
reinforces the brigade reconnaissance squadron and provides long-range 
direct fires.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Commander's vehicle; 
Description: Provides the brigade with the means to receive information 
and data, analyze, prepare and transmit data; and control the forces/
functions carrying out combat missions.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Engineer Squad vehicle; 
Description: Provides maneuver/mobility support capabilities, which 
include obstacle clearing, in-stride breaching of surface mines, 
proofing of subsurface mines, and smoke generation for local 
protection.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Fire Support vehicle; 
Description: Provides automated enhanced surveillance, target 
acquisition, target identification, target tracking, target 
designation, position location, and communications functionality.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Infantry Carrier vehicle; 
Description: Provides protected transport and supporting fires for the 
infantry squad during dismounted assault. It carries an infantry squad 
with individual equipment.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Medical Evaluation vehicle; 
Description: The battalion aid station for brigade units, providing 
treatment for serious injury and advanced trauma cases.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Mortar Carrier; 
Description: Provides infantry units with screening obscurants, 
suppressive forces and on-call supporting fires. 120mm and 81mm 
variants provide responsive, accurate and lethal indirect fire support 
to the dismounted infantry assault.

Vehicle configuration: Production vehicles: Reconnaissance vehicle; 
Description: Provides force situational awareness, gathering and 
transmitting real time intelligence while moving throughout the 
battlefield in close, complex, and urban terrain.

Vehicle configuration: Developmental vehicles: Mobile Gun System; 
Description: Supports dismounted infantry and engages the enemy in 
close combat to clear opposition and permit rapid movement, allowing 
the force to maintain the initiative, occupy and/or secure key 
objectives, and defeat strong points.

Vehicle configuration: Developmental vehicles: Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance vehicle; 
Description: Provides on-the-move and remote near-real-time nuclear, 
biological, and chemical detection and surveillance. 

Source: U.S. Army.

[End of table]

Figure 1: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle Is One of Eight Production 
Configurations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 2: The Mobile Gun System Is One of Two Developmental 
Configurations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 3: The Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Is One 
of Two Developmental Configurations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one mechanized 
infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first two of 
six planned Stryker brigades. The first of these brigades, the 3rd 
Brigade, Second Infantry Division, became operational in October 2003, 
at which time the Brigade was deployed to Iraq. The second of the two 
Fort Lewis brigades became operational in May 2004, and plans are for 
it to deploy to Iraq in late 2004. The Army plans to form four more 
Stryker brigades from 2005 through 2008. The planned locations of the 
next four brigades are Fort Wainwright/Fort Richardson, Alaska; Fort 
Polk, Louisiana; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and a brigade of the 
Pennsylvania Army National Guard.

Acquisition of Stryker Production Vehicles Is about Two-thirds 
Complete, Though Overall Program Costs Have Increased, and Operational 
Cost Estimates Are Not Yet Reliable:

Acquisition of the eight Stryker production vehicle configurations is 
about two-thirds complete with about 68 percent of the over 1,800-
planned production vehicles ordered, and a low rate of production for 
the two developmental Strykers is scheduled for September 2004. 
Estimated program costs have increased because of, among other reasons, 
increases in the Army's estimate for related military construction, 
such as for the cost of building new Stryker vehicle maintenance 
facilities. However, the Army does not yet have reliable estimates for 
the Stryker's operating costs, such as for vehicle maintenance, because 
of limited peacetime operational experience with the vehicles.

About Two-thirds of Stryker Production Vehicle Acquisition Completed:

The Army is pursuing three acquisition schedules for the Stryker 
production and developmental vehicles. Since the November 2000 Stryker 
vehicle contract award,[Footnote 13] the Army has ordered 1,231 
production vehicles--about 68 percent--of the 1,814 production vehicles 
the Army plans to buy for the six Stryker brigades. Of the 1,231 
vehicles ordered, 800 have been delivered to the brigades, including 
all of the production vehicles for the first two Stryker brigades. The 
Army is currently fielding Stryker production vehicles for the third of 
the six planned brigades. The third brigade is to be fielded in Alaska.

Thus far, the Army has bought limited quantities of the developmental 
vehicle variants--8 Mobile Gun System and 4 NBC Reconnaissance 
vehicles--as prototypes and for use in testing at various test sites 
around the country. Of 238 Mobile Gun Systems the Army plans to buy 
overall, current plans are to buy 72 initially upon approval for low-
rate initial production scheduled for September 2004. The Army plans 
low-rate initial production of 17 NBC Reconnaissance vehicles also in 
September 2004. The Mobile Gun System is not scheduled to reach a full 
production decision until September 2006 at the earliest, while the NBC 
Reconnaissance vehicle is not scheduled to reach its full production 
decision until 2007. Table 2 below shows the status of Stryker vehicle 
acquisition as of April 2004.

Table 2: Stryker Vehicle Acquisition Status As of April 2004:

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Infantry carrier; 
Total planned quantities: 699; 
Quantities ordered: 445; 
Percent: 64%; 
Quantities delivered: 328; 
Percent of planned quantities: 47%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Reconnaissance; 
Total planned quantities: 393; 
Quantities ordered: 290; 
Percent: 74%; 
Quantities delivered: 140; 
Percent of planned quantities: 36%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Mortar carrier; 
Total planned quantities: 224; 
Quantities ordered: 127; 
Percent: 57%; 
Quantities delivered: 85; 
Percent of planned quantities: 38%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Medical evacuation; 
Total planned quantities: 114; 
Quantities ordered: 79; 
Percent: 69%; 
Quantities delivered: 47; 
Percent of planned quantities: 41%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Commander's; 
Total planned quantities: 112; 
Quantities ordered: 80; 
Percent: 71%; 
Quantities delivered: 41; 
Percent of planned quantities: 37%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Fire-Support; 
Total planned quantities: 108; 
Quantities ordered: 80; 
Percent: 74%; 
Quantities delivered: 39; 
Percent of planned quantities: 36%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Antitank guided 
missile; 
Total planned quantities: 88; 
Quantities ordered: 88; 
Percent: 100%; 
Quantities delivered: 88; 
Percent of planned quantities: 100%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Production vehicles: Engineer squad; 
Total planned quantities: 76; 
Quantities ordered: 42; 
Percent: 55%; 
Quantities delivered: 32; 
Percent of planned quantities: 42%. 

Production vehicle total; 
Total planned quantities: 1,814; 
Quantities ordered: 1,231; 
Percent: 68%; 
Quantities delivered: 800; 
Percent of planned quantities: 44%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Developmental vehicles: NBC 
Reconnaissance; 
Total planned quantities: 44; 
Quantities ordered: 4; 
Percent: 9%; 
Quantities delivered: 4; 
Percent of planned quantities: 9%. 

Vehicle configuration/variant: Developmental vehicles: Mobile Gun 
System; 
Total planned quantities: 238; 
Quantities ordered: 8; 
Percent: 3%; 
Quantities delivered: 8; 
Percent of planned quantities: 3%. 

Developmental vehicle total; 
Total planned quantities: 282; 
Quantities ordered: 12; 
Percent: 4%; 
Quantities delivered: 12; 
Percent of planned quantities: 4%. 

Total; 
Total planned quantities: 2,096; 
Quantities ordered: 1,243; 
Percent: 59%; 
Quantities delivered: 812; 
Percent of planned quantities: 39%. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

Note: Percentages are rounded.

[End of table]

Stryker Vehicle Program's Costs Have Increased from Earlier Estimates:

The Stryker vehicle program's total costs increased, in then-year 
dollars, from the original November 2000 estimate of $7.1 billion to 
the December 2003 estimate of $8.7 billion--or about 22 
percent.[Footnote 14] The increases occurred primarily due to revised 
estimates for the associated cost of military construction, such as 
that needed to upgrade maintenance and training facilities for a 
Stryker brigade, but were also due to lesser increases in procurement 
and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs for the 
vehicles--which together grew by about 8 percent from the original 
November 2000 estimate.

In then-year dollars, the estimated cost of military construction 
accounted for the largest increase in the Stryker program's cost 
estimate. In December 2003, the Army increased its estimate for 
military construction by about $1.01 billion over the original November 
2000 estimate, from $322 million to $1.3 billion. (See table 3.) As in 
all major Department of Defense acquisition programs, military 
construction costs are included in the program's total costs. According 
to the Army, the military construction cost estimate increased because 
the December 2003 estimate reflects (1) the identification of all five 
sites scheduled to receive Stryker brigades and (2) the total cost of 
upgrading or building maintenance and training facilities at these 
installations to accommodate a Stryker brigade. When the original 
estimate was made, only one site had been identified to receive a 
Stryker brigade and that estimate identified just the cost of 
maintenance facility upgrades.

Table 3: Increases in Stryker Vehicle Program's Costs:

Then-year dollars in millions:

Cost element: Military construction; 
November 2000 (original estimate): $322.2; 
December 2003: $1,333.3; 
Increase/decrease: $1,011.1.

Cost element: Procurement; 
November 2000 (original estimate): $6,290.0; 
December 2003: $6,679.8; 
Increase/ decrease: $389.8.

Cost element: Research, development, test, & evaluation; 
November 2000 (original estimate): $508.0; 
December 2003: $645.6; 
Increase/decrease: $137.6.

Total cost; 
November 2000 (original estimate): $7,120.2; 
December 2003: $8,658.7; 
Increase/ decrease: $1,538.5.

Total number of vehicles[A]; 
November 2000 (original estimate): 2131; 
December 2003: 2096; 
Increase/decrease: (35.0).

Average acquisition cost per vehicle[B]; 
November 2000 (original estimate): $3.34; 
December 2003: $4.13; 
Increase/decrease: $0.79. 

Source: U.S. Army.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative.

[A] Planned vehicle quantities are subject to change because of 
modifications to the Stryker Brigade's design.

[B] Total acquisition cost/number of vehicles.

[End of table]

The Stryker vehicle's procurement costs increased by about $390 
million. The largest factor in the increase of procurement costs was 
the higher than originally estimated costs of procuring add-on reactive 
armor,[Footnote 15] including the additional costs to equip six Stryker 
brigades with add-on armor, instead of four brigades as originally 
planned. Also, the cost of RDT&E increased about $138 million, from 
$508 million to $645.6 million. Most of the RDT&E cost increase is 
attributable to revised estimates for the cost of test and evaluation, 
development, and system engineering for the developmental vehicles. The 
average acquisition cost per vehicle increased by about $0.79 million, 
from $3.34 million to $4.13 million. The program costs and average 
acquisition cost per vehicle estimates reflect a reduction in the 
number of Strykers planned from 2,131 to 2,096. (See table 3 above.)

Limited Peacetime Operational Experience Makes Operating Cost Estimates 
Unreliable:

The Army does not have reliable estimates of Stryker vehicle operating 
costs because, with the first Stryker brigade's deployment to Iraq, it 
lacks sufficient peacetime operational experience with the vehicles. 
The Army considers 3 years of actual peacetime operational cost data to 
be sufficient for reliable estimates.[Footnote 16] Since none of the 
production vehicles have 3 years of peacetime operating experience, 
reliable operating cost estimates will not be available until 2005 at 
the earliest. With the Mobile Gun System and NBC Reconnaissance 
vehicles still in development, it will be several years before these 
vehicles are fully fielded and sufficient data are available for 
reliable estimates of their operating costs.

According to the Army, current Stryker vehicle operating cost 
estimates, shown in table 4 below, are engineering estimates based in 
part on operating costs for another vehicle in the Army's inventory--
the M-113 armored personnel carrier.[Footnote 17] The estimates assume 
peacetime operations.

Table 4: Operating Cost Estimates per Vehicle:

Fiscal year 2004 constant dollars: 

Vehicle configuration: Medical Evaluation vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $12.27.

Vehicle configuration: Reconnaissance vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $16.48.

Vehicle configuration: Infantry Carrier vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $17.19.

Vehicle configuration: Fire Support vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $18.78.

Vehicle configuration: Commander's vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $21.33.

Vehicle configuration: Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $22.05.

Vehicle configuration: Engineer Squad vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $25.66.

Vehicle configuration: Mortar Carrier; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $28.96.

Vehicle configuration: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance 
vehicle; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $35.62.

Vehicle configuration: Mobile Gun System; 
Cost per-mile estimate: $69.76. 

Source: U.S. Army Stryker Program Office.

Note: Estimates are based, in part, on costs of Army's M-113 armored 
personnel carrier.

[End of table]

Vehicle operating costs include the cost for maintenance, repair, and 
the cost of consumable and repairable parts. The Army calculates 
vehicle cost per mile by tracking vehicle mileage and the actual costs 
of consumable or replaceable parts used.[Footnote 18] However, the 
short time frame from fielding the first Stryker brigade's production 
vehicles--May 2002 through January 2003--and the brigades' deployment 
to Iraq in October 2003, limited the amount of time and miles the 
vehicles were in peacetime service. Similarly, fielding of Stryker 
vehicles for the second brigade was completed in January 2004. While 
the Army collected operational cost and mileage data for both brigades, 
there were insufficient actual operating costs and miles on the 
vehicles to make reliable estimates. Consequently, until the Army can 
collect more actual peacetime operating cost data for the production 
vehicles, it will not be able to determine actual vehicle operating 
costs and make reliable operating cost estimates for these vehicles. 
Similarly, reliable operating cost estimates for the Mobile Gun System 
and NBC Reconnaissance vehicle will not be available until after 2006 
when they are scheduled to begin full production and fielding.

Tested Production Vehicles Generally Met Requirements, but Testing and 
Acquisition Schedules for Developmental Vehicles Have Been Delayed:

According to Army and OSD test reports[Footnote 19], the tested Stryker 
production vehicles met operational requirements with certain 
limitations and, overall, support the key operational capabilities and 
force effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The separate 
developmental testing schedules of the Mobile Gun System and NBC 
Reconnaissance vehicles have been delayed, resulting in delays in 
meeting planned production milestone dates. Delay in the Mobile Gun 
System's development was due in part to shortfalls in meeting 
performance requirements of the vehicle's ammunition autoloader system. 
The NBC Reconnaissance vehicle's development schedule was delayed 
pending OSD approval of an updated technology readiness 
assessment[Footnote 20] for the vehicle and its nuclear, biological, 
and chemical sensor systems.

Following Testing, Army and OSD Indicate Stryker Production Vehicles 
Met Operational Requirements, with Limitations:

Following the Army's completion of live-fire tests and evaluation for 
seven production vehicles in February 2004 and its ongoing test 
evaluation of the eighth, the Army stated that the Stryker production 
vehicles met operational requirements, with limitations; and OSD 
approved full production.[Footnote 21]

The Army's System Evaluation Report for the Stryker production decision 
concluded that overall, the Stryker family of vehicles is effective, 
suitable, and survivable, and supports the key operational capabilities 
and force effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The report 
concluded that the Stryker production vehicle configurations met 
operational requirements with limitations. For example, in the area of 
lethality, the report noted that four Stryker vehicle configurations 
have a remote weapons station that provides effective protective and 
supporting fires for dismounted maneuver. However, limitations of the 
remote weapons station's capability to provide accurate and continuous 
fires at night and while moving reduce its effectiveness and lethality. 
Similarly, while the Stryker vehicles contribute to force protection 
and meet survivability requirements, there are inherent and expected 
survivability limitations as in any armored vehicle system. Table 5 
lists some of the operational requirements of the vehicles and excerpts 
of selected performance capabilities and limitations from the Army's 
Stryker system evaluation report.

Table 5: Selected Performance Capabilities and Limitations from Stryker 
Evaluation Report:

Operational requirement: Lethality; 
Overall assessment: The Stryker family of vehicles provides significant 
firepower capabilities giving the Striker Combat Brigade Team commander 
the ability to shape the battle. Four variants have a remote weapons 
station that provides effective protective and supporting fires for 
dismounted maneuver; 
Examples of limitations: While the remote weapons station provides 
effective protective and support fires, its capability to provide 
accurate and continuous fires is limited at night and while moving.

Operational requirement: Logistics supportability; 
Overall assessment: Stryker vehicles are logistically supportable and 
require significantly less petroleum supplies than an equivalent heavy 
brigade; 
Examples of limitations: An augmentation of personnel is needed to 
sustain a brigade's Stryker vehicle maintenance workload.

Operational requirement: Mobility; 
Overall assessment: Stryker has good on and off-road mobility. Its off-
road mobility is comparable to other Army wheeled vehicles but less 
than tracked vehicles; 
Examples of limitations: Fully loaded in temperatures above 100 degrees 
Fahrenheit, power train cooling is insufficient, limiting the Stryker's 
ability to operate for extended periods in soft soil or sand or to 
climb prolonged grades.

Operational requirement: Reliability and maintainability; 
Overall assessment: Except Engineer Squad vehicles, Stryker family of 
vehicles meets operational reliability requirements; 
Examples of limitations: All vehicle configurations experienced a 
significant number of unscheduled maintenance actions.

Operational requirement: Survivability; 
Overall assessment: Stryker vehicles contribute to force protection and 
meet survivability requirements; 
Examples of limitations: There are inherent and expected survivability 
limitations. Specific ballistic survivability results are classified. 

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command.

[End of table]

The OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, found that six 
Stryker production vehicles are operationally effective for employment 
in small-scale contingency operations and operationally suitable with 
certain limitations.[Footnote 22] OSD found that the Engineer Squad 
vehicle is not operationally suitable because of poor reliability. 
However, in its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD determined 
that the operational capabilities provided by the Engineer Squad 
vehicle supported its continued production in light of planned fixes, 
operational work-arounds, and planned follow-on testing. It also 
determined that corrective actions are needed to address survivability 
and ballistic vulnerability limitations of the vehicles, such as 
ensuring basic armor performance and reducing exposure of Stryker 
personnel.

Mobile Gun System Development and Testing Schedule Ongoing but Delayed:

Although developmental testing is ongoing, the development and testing 
schedule of the Mobile Gun System has been delayed, resulting in more 
than a 1-year delay in meeting planned production decision milestone 
dates, with initial limited production to start in September 2004. The 
delay in the Mobile Gun System's development was due in part to 
shortfalls in meeting performance requirements of the vehicle's 
ammunition autoloader system. At the time of our review, the Mobile Gun 
System was undergoing additional testing to find a fix for the 
autoloader, in preparation for a low-rate production decision. The 
Mobile Gun System is scheduled for production qualification testing 
through July 2004, production verification testing starting in October 
2005, and live-fire test and evaluation starting in November 2005 
through September 2006. The Army's earlier Mobile Gun System 
acquisition schedule was to complete developmental testing and have a 
low-rate initial production decision in 2003 and begin full production 
in 2005. Current Army plans are to buy limited quantities of Mobile Gun 
System vehicles upon OSD approval of low-rate initial production 
planned for September 2004. A full-rate production decision for the 
Mobile Gun System is currently scheduled for late in 2006.

The Mobile Gun System has a 105mm cannon with an autoloader for rapidly 
loading cannon rounds without outside exposure of its three-person 
crew. The principal function of the Mobile Gun System is to provide 
rapid and lethal direct fires to protect assaulting infantry. The 
Mobile Gun System cannon is designed to defeat bunkers and create 
openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass 
to accomplish their missions. According to the Army's Stryker Program 
Management Office, the autoloader system was responsible for 80 percent 
of the system aborts during initial Mobile Gun System reliability 
testing because of cannon rounds jamming in the system. As of February 
2004, the Army was planning additional testing and working with the 
autoloader's manufacturer to determine a solution. A functioning 
autoloader is needed if the Mobile Gun System is to meet its 
operational requirements because manual loading of cannon rounds both 
reduces the desired rate of fire and requires brief outside exposure of 
crew. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition decision, OSD required the 
Army to provide changes to the Mobile Gun System developmental exit 
criteria within 90 days, including the ability to meet cost and system 
reliability criteria.

NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Development Schedule Delayed:

Although its developmental testing is also ongoing, the development 
schedule of the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle has also been delayed, and 
its production is now scheduled to occur about two years later than 
planned. The delay was primarily due to additional time needed to 
develop and test the vehicle's nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor 
systems. As a result, low-rate initial production, previously scheduled 
for December 2003, will not occur until September 2004. A full-rate 
production decision, which had previously been scheduled for June 2005, 
will not occur until July 2007. In its March 2004 Stryker acquisition 
decision, OSD required the Army to provide within 90 days an updated 
technology readiness assessment for the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and 
its nuclear, biological, and chemical sensor systems. At that time, OSD 
will make a determination as to whether the vehicle is ready for 
production.

Army Demonstrated Required Stryker C-130 Transportability, but Contrary 
to Congressional Expectations, Operational Limits Significantly 
Challenge Routine C-130 Transport:

Although the Army demonstrated during training events that Stryker 
vehicles can be transported short distances on C-130 aircraft and 
unloaded for immediate combat, the average 38,000 pound weight of 
Stryker vehicles, other cargo weight concerns, and less than ideal 
environmental conditions present significant challenges in using C-130s 
for routine Stryker transport. Similar operational limits would exist 
for C-130 transport of the Army's Future Combat Systems because they 
are also being designed to weigh about 38,000 pounds.

In addition, much of the mission equipment, ammunition, fuel, 
personnel, and armor a Stryker brigade would need to conduct a combat 
operation might need to be moved on separate aircraft, increasing the 
numbers of aircraft or sorties needed to deploy a Stryker force, adding 
to deployment time and the time it would take after arrival to begin 
operations. Yet, the Army's weight requirement and C-130 transport 
requirements for the vehicles, and information the Army provided to 
Congress in budget documents and testimony, created expectations that 
Stryker vehicles could be routinely transported by C-130 aircraft 
within an operational theater.

Stryker's C-130 Short-Distance Deployability Was Demonstrated in 
Operational Evaluations:

In a December 2003 report on the first Stryker Brigade's design 
evaluation,[Footnote 23] we reported that the Stryker Brigade 
demonstrated the ability to conduct tactical deployments by C-130 
aircraft. At the National Training Center in April 2003, we observed 
the brigade conduct a tactical movement by moving a Stryker infantry 
company with its personnel, supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via seven 
C-130 aircraft flying 35 sorties from Southern California Logistics 
Airfield to a desert airfield on Fort Irwin about 70 miles 
away.[Footnote 24] Figure 4 shows a Stryker vehicle being offloaded 
from a C-130 at the National Training Center.

Figure 4: Stryker Vehicle Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National 
Training Center:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

A team from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of the Director 
for Operational Test and Evaluation and the Army's Test and Evaluation 
Command also observed the Stryker vehicle's deployment and recorded the 
weight of the vehicles and the total load weight onboard the aircraft. 
The average weight for the eight production vehicle configurations was 
just less than 38,000 pounds, while the total load weight--including a 
3-days' supply of fuel, food, water, and ammunition--averaged more than 
39,100 pounds. Table 6 shows the weight of eight-production vehicles 
and their total load weight recorded at the time of the April 2003 
National Training Center deployment. We noted in our December 2003 
report,[Footnote 25] however, that while the tactical deployment of 
Stryker vehicles by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, the Army had yet 
to demonstrate under various environmental conditions, such as high 
temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker vehicles can be 
tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.

Table 6: Stryker Production Vehicle and Total Load Weights at the 
National Training Center in April 2003:

Vehicle configuration[A]: Commander's; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 36,660; 
Total load weight[C]: 38,130.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Reconnaissance; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 37,090; 
Total load weight[C]: 38,350.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Fire-Support; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 37,220; 
Total load weight[C]: 37,850.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Infantry Carrier; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 37,630; 
Total load weight[C]: 39,940.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Medical Evacuation; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 37,930; 
Total load weight[C]: 38,570.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Engineer Squad; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 38,450; 
Total load weight[C]: 39,500.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Mortar Carrier; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 38,940; 
Total load weight[C]: 39,990.

Vehicle configuration[A]: Antitank Guided Missile; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 39,980; 
Total load weight[C]: 40,820.

Average weight; 
Vehicle weight[B]: 37,988; 
Total load weight[C]: 39,144. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[A] The NBC Reconnaissance vehicle and the Mobile Gun System were in 
developmental testing and did not participate in this exercise.

[B] Vehicle weight is the weight of each vehicle during a Stryker C-130 
deployment that was conducted as part of the Stryker Brigade 
Operational Evaluation at the National Training Center in April 2003. 
The vehicle weights are not final and may change slightly as the make-
up of their associated equipment packages is finalized.

[C] Total load weight is the weight of each vehicle during the April 
2003 deployment with a 3-days' supply of fuel, food, water, ammunition, 
and crew. The Anti-Tank Guided Missile's total load weight included a 
four-man crew.

[End of table]

Weight Presents Significant Challenges for C-130 Transport of Stryker 
Vehicles, Making Requirements and Expectations Difficult to Meet:

The weight of Stryker vehicles presents significant challenges for C-
130 aircraft transport because, as a general rule U.S. Air Force air 
mobility planning factors specify an allowable C-130 cargo weight of 
about 34,000 pounds for routine flight. With most Stryker vehicles 
weighing close to 38,000 pounds on board, the distance--or range--that 
a C-130 aircraft could fly is significantly reduced when taking-off in 
high air temperatures or from airfields located in higher elevations. 
In standard, or nearly ideal, flight conditions--such as day-time, low 
head-wind, moderate air temperature, and low elevation--an armored C-
130H with a cargo payload of 38,000 pounds can generally expect to fly 
860 miles from takeoff to landing. Furthermore, according to a Military 
Traffic Management Command's Transportation Engineering Agency study of 
C-130 aircraft transportability of Army vehicles,[Footnote 26] a C-
130's range is significantly reduced with only minimal additional 
weight, and ideal conditions rarely exist in combat scenarios. The C-
130 aircraft's range may be further reduced if operational conditions 
such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route deviations exist 
because more fuel would be consumed under these conditions. Even in 
ideal flight conditions, adding just 2,000 pounds onboard the aircraft 
for associated cargo such as mission equipment, personnel, or 
ammunition reduces the C-130 aircraft's takeoff-to-landing range to 500 
miles. In addition, the more than 41,000-pound weight of the Mobile Gun 
System would limit the C-130 aircraft's range to a maximum distance of 
less than 500 miles. Figure 5 shows the affects of cargo weight on an 
armored C-130H aircraft's flight range in nearly ideal flight 
conditions.

Figure 5: Cargo Payload and Range of an Armored C-130H Aircraft in 
Nearly Ideal Flight Conditions:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The addition of armor to the Strykers would pose additional challenges. 
With removable armor added to Strykers, the vehicles will not fit 
inside a C-130. To provide interim protection against rocket-propelled 
grenades, the Stryker vehicles of the brigade that deployed to Iraq in 
October 2003, were fitted with Slat armor weighing about 5,000 pounds 
for each vehicle (see fig. 6). By 2005, the Army expects to complete 
the development of add-on reactive armor--weighing about 9,000 pounds 
per vehicle--for protection against rocket-propelled grenades. With 
either type of armor installed, a Stryker vehicle will not fit inside a 
C-130 aircraft cargo bay. Regardless, with the added weight of the 
armor even in ideal flight conditions, the aircraft would be too heavy 
to take off.

Figure 6: Stryker Vehicle with Slat Armor in Iraq:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Furthermore, according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command's 
Stryker System Evaluation, in less than favorable flight conditions, 
the Air Force considers routine transport of the 38,000-pound cargo 
weight of a Stryker vehicle on C-130 aircraft risky, and such flight 
may not be permitted under the Air Force's flight operations risk 
management requirements if other transport means are available. In two 
theaters where U.S. forces are currently operating--the Middle East and 
Afghanistan, high temperatures and elevation can reduce C-130 aircraft 
range if carrying a 38,000-pound Stryker vehicle. Table 7 shows the 
reduced C-130 aircraft transport range due to daytime average summer 
temperatures of more than 100 degrees Fahrenheit in Iraq and high 
temperatures and elevations in Afghanistan. From two locations in 
Afghanistan (Bagram at 4,895 feet elevation and Kabul at 5,871 feet 
elevation) during daytime in the summer, a C-130 with a Stryker vehicle 
on board would not be able to take off at all. In winter from these 
same locations, its flight range would be reduced to 610 miles 
departing from Bagram and to 310 miles departing from Kabul. These same 
weight concerns would also apply to the Army's Future Combat Systems 
vehicles, which according to the Army's operational requirements should 
be no larger than 38,000 pounds and be transportable by a C-130.

Table 7: Analysis of C-130 Range from Selected Airfields in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan When Carrying Cargo Weighing 38,000 Pounds:

Flight ranges in nautical miles: 

Kuwait City, Kuwait; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 710; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 710; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Tallil Air Base, Iraq; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 760; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Baghdad, Int'l, Iraq; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 760; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 760; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Balad Air Base, Iraq; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 760; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 760; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Mosul Air Base, Iraq; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 660; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Doha, Qatar; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 760; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 760; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 860; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Bagram, Afghanistan[A]; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 0; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 510; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 610; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860.

Kabul, Afghanistan[A]; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 0; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 110; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 310; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 610.

Kandahar, Afghanistan; 
Flight range (summer): Day: 360; 
Flight range (summer): Night: 760; 
Flight range (winter): Day: 760; 
Flight range (winter): Night: 860. 

Source: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Army Evaluation Center.

[A] Elevation, temperature, and terrain prevent takeoff with cargo 
weighing 38,000 pounds.

[End of table]

Additionally, the Mobile Gun System, expected to weigh over 41,000 
pounds, is probably too heavy to transport a significant distance via 
C-130 aircraft. Furthermore, the C-130 aircraft cannot transport many 
of a Stryker brigade's vehicles at all. Stryker vehicles make up a 
little more than 300 of the over 1,000 vehicles of a Stryker brigade, 
and many of the brigade's support vehicles, such as fuel trucks, are 
too large or heavy for C-130 transport.

C-130 Airlift for Stryker Brigades Could Increase Force Deployment Time 
and Time Needed to Start Operations upon Arrival--a Key Operational 
Requirement and Expectation:

Because a C-130's range is limited by weight and a Stryker's weight 
exceeds limits for routine C-130 loading, a tactical movement of 
significant distance of a Stryker brigade via C-130 aircraft in less 
than ideal conditions could necessitate moving much of the mission 
equipment, ammunition, fuel, personnel, and armor on separate aircraft. 
Such use of separate aircraft for moving Stryker vehicles and 
associated equipment, personnel, and supplies increases the force 
closure,[Footnote 27] or deployment, time and might limit the deployed 
forces' ability to be capable of immediate combat operations upon 
arrival--one of the Army's key operational requirements for the Stryker 
vehicles--because aircraft would arrive at different times and 
potentially different locations. In combination, a 38,000-pound Stryker 
vehicle, and the associated equipment, personnel, or armor that would 
have to be transported on separate aircraft are likely to increase the 
number of aircraft or sorties that would be needed to deploy a Stryker 
force. For example, if a decision were made to use a Stryker's add-on 
armor for a tactical mission, at about 9,000 pounds for each vehicle's 
armor, it would take at least one additional C-130 aircraft sortie to 
transport the armor for about four vehicles. Or, because of potential 
limits of the availability of C-130 lift assets, the size of a Stryker 
force and number of Stryker vehicles that could be tactically deployed 
would have to be reduced.

At the National Training Center in April 2003, we observed, upon 
landing, an infantry company unload the vehicles from the C-130 
aircraft, reconfigure them for combat missions, and move onward to a 
staging area. All Stryker variants except one reconfigured into combat 
capable modes within their designated time standard. Once reconfigured, 
units of the Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct 
immediate combat operations. However, this was a short-range movement 
with only seven aircraft and did not require fitting armor on the 
vehicles. In an operational mission, depending on the size of the 
Stryker force deployed, using separate C-130 aircraft for transporting 
vehicles and associated people and equipment could significantly 
increase force deployment time because of the increased numbers of 
aircraft sorties needed. Upon arrival, it would also increase the time 
needed to reconfigure and begin operations because the vehicles, 
equipment, and personnel on different aircraft might arrive at 
different times or at different airfield locations. In addition, if a 
decision were made to use add-on armor for a mission, the armor would 
need to be installed after arrival, adding an average of about 10 hours 
per vehicle in reconfiguration time to install the armor.

The capability of transporting Stryker vehicles on C-130 aircraft, 
despite its challenges and limitations, is a major objective of the 
Army's transformation to a lighter more responsive force. As such, the 
Army's weight and C-130 transport requirements for the vehicles, as 
well as information the Army provided to Congress, created expectations 
that Stryker vehicles could be routinely transported within an 
operational theater by C-130 aircraft. For example, in several 
congressional hearings since 2001, senior Army leadership testified 
that Stryker vehicles would be capable of transport by C-130 
aircraft.[Footnote 28] In addition, annual budget justifications, which 
the Army submits to Congress for Stryker vehicle acquisition, highlight 
the C-130 transport capability of Stryker-vehicle-equipped Brigade 
Combat Teams.

During our review, Army officials acknowledged the significant 
challenges and limitations of meeting expectations for transporting 
Stryker vehicles--and beyond 2010, the Future Combat Systems--on C-130 
aircraft in terms of limited flight range, the size force that could be 
deployed, and the challenges of arriving ready for combat. The 
officials, however, believe that the capability to transport Stryker 
vehicles or the Future Combat Systems' vehicles on C-130 aircraft, even 
over short distances, offers the theater combatant commanders an 
additional option among other modes of intratheater transportation--
such as C-17 aircraft, sealift, or driving over land--for transporting 
Stryker brigades and vehicles in tactical missions. In addition, the 
officials believe that the ability to transport elements of a Stryker 
brigade as small as a platoon[Footnote 29] with four Stryker vehicles-
-as a part of an operational mission of forces moving by other means, 
greatly enhances the combatant commander's war-fighting capabilities.

Conclusions:

In less than 4 years from the November 2000 Stryker vehicle contract 
award, the Army is well under way in fielding the eight production 
vehicle configurations, and Stryker vehicles are already in use in 
military operations in Iraq. However, program costs have increased, 
largely because of the cost of military construction related to Stryker 
vehicle needs, and delays in developing and testing the two remaining 
variants will delay their fielding and use.

Furthermore, although the Army has successfully demonstrated that 
Stryker vehicles can be transported on C-130 aircraft during training 
events, routine use of the C-130 for airlifting Stryker vehicles, for 
other than short-range missions with limited numbers of vehicles, would 
be difficult in theaters where U.S. forces are currently operating. 
Therefore, the intended capability of Stryker brigades to be 
transportable by C-130 aircraft would be markedly reduced. The Army's 
operational requirements and information the Army provided to Congress 
created expectations that a Stryker vehicle weight of 38,000 pounds--
and a similar weight for Future Combat System vehicles--would allow 
routine C-130 transport in tactical operations. Consequently, 
congressional decision makers do not have an accurate sense or 
realistic expectations of the operational capabilities of Stryker 
vehicles and Future Combat Systems.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, take the 
following two actions:

1. Provide to Congress information that:

* clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intratheater deployment 
capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles and describes 
probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport of 
Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a combat 
capable C-130 deployable Stryker force;

* describes operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades 
given the limits of C-130 transport; and:

* identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of 
transportation--such as C-17 aircraft--for transporting Stryker 
brigades within an operational theater.

2. Provide the Congress similar clarification concerning the 
operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical airlift 
capabilities of Future Combat System vehicles, considering the limits 
of C-130 aircraft transportability.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 
partially concurred with our recommendations. The department also 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where 
appropriate.

DOD concurred that operational requirements for airlift capability for 
brigade transport need clarification and stated that the ongoing 
Mobility Capabilities Study, scheduled for completion in the spring of 
2005, will include an assessment of the intratheater transport of Army 
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and address the recommendations of this 
report. In responding to our recommendation to provide information to 
Congress concerning C-130 transport of Stryker-equipped brigades, the 
department partially concurred and stated that the Army has studied C-
130 transportability in depth. While we agree that the Army has studied 
C-130 transportability of Stryker vehicles--including the limitations 
that we point out in this report--their comments provide no assurance 
that this information will be provided to Congress, and we believe 
Congress needs this type of information to have an accurate sense of 
the operational capabilities of Stryker brigades. The department also 
partially concurred with our recommendation to provide to Congress 
similar clarification concerning the operational requirements and 
expected C-130 tactical airlift capabilities of Future Combat System 
vehicles, considering the limits of C-130 aircraft transportability. 
The department noted in its response that the Army is currently 
considering many factors, including C-130 tactical airlift capability 
limits, as it reviews Future Combat Systems Unit of Action capability 
requirements. The department also stated that the Mobility Capabilities 
Study would include intratheater transport of Army units of action--the 
Army's Future Combat Systems-equipped future force.

Given the ongoing congressional interest in the implications of the 
Army's requirements for C-130 transport of Stryker vehicles and Future 
Combat System ground vehicles, we agree that the information the 
Congress would need, if addressed in the Mobility Capabilities Study 
and provided to Congress, would meet the intent of our recommendations. 
With the Mobility Capabilities Study not scheduled for completion until 
the spring of 2005, we will assess at that time the adequacy of the 
study's assessment of intratheater transport of Army Stryker-and Future 
Combat System-equipped units. The Senate Armed Services Committee has 
directed GAO to monitor DOD's processes used to conduct the Mobility 
Capabilities Study, and to report on the adequacy and completeness of 
the study to the congressional defense committees no later than 30 days 
after the completion of the study.[Footnote 30]

The appendix contains the full text of the department's comments.

Scope and Methodology:

To determine the current status of Stryker vehicle acquisition and the 
latest Stryker vehicle program and operating cost estimates, we 
analyzed documents on Stryker vehicle acquisition plans, contract 
performance requirements, and costs and interviewed officials from the 
Army Program Executive Office/Stryker Program Management Office, 
Warren, Michigan. To determine Stryker program costs, we reviewed the 
DOD approved December 2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and 
interviewed Stryker Program Management Office officials. For our 
analysis of Stryker vehicle-operating costs, we reviewed the Army's 
mileage cost estimates and the Army's methodology for calculating costs 
per mile. We did not verify source information the Army used in its 
calculations.

To determine the status and results of Stryker vehicle tests, we 
reviewed the results of Stryker vehicle developmental and survivability 
testing from the Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, 
Virginia, and the Army Developmental Test Command, Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland. We also reviewed the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation 
Command, Army Evaluation Center's Stryker System Evaluation Report and 
OSD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation's Operational Test and 
Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report for the Stryker 
family of vehicles.

To determine the ability of C-130 aircraft to transport Stryker 
vehicles within a theater of operations, we reviewed a Military Traffic 
Management Command's, Transportation Engineering Agency study of the C-
130 aircraft's range and payload capabilities and interviewed U.S. 
Army, Air Force and Transportation Command officials. We notified U.S. 
Central Command of our objective to review plans for C-130 aircraft 
transport of Stryker vehicles within the command's area of operations, 
but Central Command officials determined that this was an Army issue, 
rather than a combatant command's issue.

Our review was conducted from July 2003 through June 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees 
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We are 
also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8365, or Assistant Director, George Poindexter, 
at (202) 512-7213. Major contributors to this report were Kevin 
Handley, Frank Smith, and M. Jane Hunt.

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:

AUG 09 2004:

Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Solis:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, `MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles 
Is Well Underway but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 
Aircraft Need to Be Clarified,' dated July 13, 2004 (GAO Code 350418/
GAO-04-925).

The report recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, 
clarify the operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical 
airlift capabilities of Stryker brigades and Future Combat System 
vehicles, considering the limits of C-130 aircraft transportability.

The Department concurs that operational requirements for airlift 
capability for brigade transport need clarification. We are currently 
exploring the transport issues in the ongoing Mobility Capabilities 
Study, scheduled for completion in the spring of 2005.

This study includes an assessment of the intra-theater transport of 
Army brigade combat teams. This study will address the recommendations 
of your report. Detailed comments on the report are enclosed.

Signed for: 

Glenn F. Lamartin: 
Director: 
Defense Systems:

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JULY 13, 2004 GAO CODE 350418/GAO-04-925:

"MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: Fielding of Army's Stryker Vehicles Is Well 
Underway but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft 
Need to Be Clarified"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Army and the Air Force, provide 
to Congress information that:

* Clarifies the expected C-130 tactical intra-theater deployment 
capabilities of Stryker brigades and Stryker vehicles, and describes 
probable operational missions and scenarios using C-130 transport of 
Stryker vehicles that are achievable, including the size of a combat 
capable C-130 deployable Stryker force.

* Describes operational capability limitations of Stryker brigades 
given the limits of C-130 transport; and:

* Identifies options for, and the feasibility of, alternative modes of 
transportation - such as C-17 aircraft-for transporting Stryker 
brigades within an operational theater.

RESPONSE: Partially Concur: Stryker-C-130 transportability has been 
studied in depth by the Army. Additionally, the Department is currently 
exploring the mobility capabilities required to support the National 
Military Strategy with an ongoing Mobility Capabilities Study. This 
study includes an assessment of the intra-theater transport of Army 
brigade combat teams within the context of the Defense Planning 
Scenarios and associated Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The existing 
Army assessments and the Mobility Capability Study should provide the 
clarification needed for this recommendation. The results for the 
Mobility Capability Study will be available in spring 2005.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the 
Air Force, provide the Congress similar clarification concerning the 
operational requirements and expected C-130 tactical airlift 
capabilities of Future Combat System vehicles, considering the limits 
of C-130 aircraft transportability.

RESPONSE: Partially concur: The Army is currently considering many 
factors; including C-130 tactical airlift capability limits, as they 
review Future Combat Systems Unit of Action capability requirements. 
The Army analysis is ongoing as is the Department's Mobility 
Capabilities Study, which is exploring the mobility capabilities 
required to support the National Military Strategy, to include intra-
theater transport of Army units of action within the context of the 
Defense Planning Scenarios and associated CONOPS. The Mobility 
Capability Study will be available in spring 2005. 

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Defense Acquisitions: The Army's Future Combat Systems' Features, 
Risks, and Alternatives. GAO-04-635T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2004.

Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements 
for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for 
Future Brigades. GAO-04-188. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003.

Issues Facing the Army's Future Combat Systems Program. GAO-03-1010R. 
Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2003.

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army 
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 
Infantry Carrier vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily 
Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should 
Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's 
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2003.

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of 
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May 
17, 2002.

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its 
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.: 
November 16, 2001.

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems 
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Then-year dollar amounts for a particular year reflect the cost 
prevailing during that year. 

[2] Appropriations included operations and support costs of $121 
million through fiscal year 2005 for contractor support and maintenance 
of the vehicles. After 2005 and through the life cycle of the vehicles, 
operations and support costs are to be included in the Army's 
Operations and Maintenance budget account.

[3] Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family 
of Stryker Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone III Decision (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 19, 2004). 

[4] According to the Army, the Objective Force is the force that 
achieves the objectives of the Army's transformation. The Army further 
states that this future force will capitalize on advances in science 
and technology enabling the Army to equip its forces with Future Combat 
Systems to include manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, 
and munitions. These vehicles and systems are expected to be a fraction 
of the weight of existing heavy fighting vehicles to improve 
transportability.

[5] Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document for the 
Future Combat Systems (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2003). 

[6] Eight of 10 Stryker vehicle configurations are considered 
production ready because these vehicles have already undergone system 
development and engineering. Two of the 10 vehicle configurations are 
developmental because design, development, and testing are needed 
before they can go into production. 

[7] The current C-130 inventory is mostly comprised of various 
configurations of the E and H models. C-130 armor protects the aircraft 
in hostile areas from weapons such as small arms and rocket-propelled 
grenades. The armor adds about 1,600 pounds to the weight of the 
aircraft.

[8] In air operations, a sortie is defined as an operational flight by 
one aircraft.

[9] Department of Army, Operational Requirements Document For A Family 
of Interim Armored Vehicles, Prepared for Milestone II Decision 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2000).

[10] According to Army contracting officials, combat capable deployment 
weight is the weight of Stryker vehicles along with any equipment for 
the vehicles, such as communications systems or weapons that allow the 
capability to conduct combat operations immediately after unloading 
from an aircraft. 

[11] The Army's Test and Evaluation Command defined "immediate" to mean 
between 15 and 40 minutes upon off-loading from the aircraft, depending 
on the vehicle variant.

[12] Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Air Force and 
United States Army for Air-Transport of the Stryker, signed by General 
Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and General John P. 
Jumper, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 
2003).

[13] On November 16, 2000, the Army awarded a contract for Interim 
Armored vehicles, now called Stryker Vehicles, to General Motors 
General Dynamics Defense Group L.L.C; a joint venture of General Motors 
Defense-Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems. In 2003 General 
Dynamics Land Systems bought General Motors Defense-Canada.

[14] This information was included in DOD's Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) submitted to the Congress for the period ending December 31, 
2003. The SAR summarizes the latest estimates of cost, schedule, and 
technical status of major defense acquisition programs. 

[15] Stryker vehicles are built from ballistic steel and covered with 
ceramic armor that can withstand 14.5mm ammunition. For added 
protection against rocket-propelled grenades, the vehicles are designed 
to carry removable add-on reactive armor. The add-on armor is currently 
in development and will not be available until 2005. Strykers currently 
deployed to Iraq are fitted with slat armor to protect against rocket-
propelled grenades. 

[16] The Army uses peacetime operational cost data, rather than data 
collected during operations such as in Iraq, because peacetime data is 
more representative of actual long-term operating costs. 

[17] The Army used operating costs of the M113 for its Stryker vehicle 
operating cost estimates because the M113 is a medium-weight armored 
personnel carrier that has been in the Army's inventory for a number of 
years. Therefore, the Army had historical peacetime operating costs for 
the vehicle.

[18] Operating costs do not include petroleum, oil, and lubricant 
costs. 

[19] Army Test and Evaluation Command, U.S. Army Evaluation Center, 
System Evaluation Report for the Stryker Family of Vehicles, for 
Milestone III Decision, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004) and OSD Office of 
the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Operational Test & 
Evaluation and Live Fire Test & Evaluation Report on the Stryker Family 
of Vehicles, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2004).

[20] A technology readiness assessment provides information to DOD 
acquisition officials on the maturity of technologies used in or 
proposed for a system at the time of acquisition milestones such as 
low-rate initial production. 

[21] In its March 2004 Stryker Acquisition Decision Memorandum, OSD 
delegated to the Army Acquisition Executive a decision on Mortar 
Carrier production pending successful assessment of live-fire test 
results of the Mortar Carrier (B) mounted vehicle variant. The Mortar 
Carrier vehicle has two configurations: the Mortar Carrier (A), which 
carries mortars for dismounted use, and the Mortar Carrier (B), which 
has an integrated mounted mortar system. 

[22] The Mortar Carrier vehicle was not evaluated by the OSD Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), because its live-fire tests 
were not completed at the time DOT&E conducted its evaluation.

[23] GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative 
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues 
Remain for Future Brigades, GAO-04-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 
2003).

[24] In a later event in May 2003 during the Stryker Brigade 
operational evaluation, we also observed a Stryker infantry company--
consisting of 21 Stryker vehicles and 5 other trucks and trailers; 188 
soldiers; and 3 days of food, water, ammunition, and fuel to support 
the company--travel from the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort 
Polk, Louisiana, to a nearby airfield using seven C-130s flying 25 
sorties over a distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing at the 
airfield, the company moved to a tactical assembly area and onward to 
conduct a combat operation. 

[25] GAO-04-188.

[26] Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering 
Agency, C-130E/H/J/J-30 Transportability of Army Vehicles (Sept. 11, 
2002). The Military Traffic Management Command is a component command 
of the U.S. Transportation Command, which manages the Department of 
Defense's transportation system. The Military Traffic Management 
Command was renamed Surface Deployment and Distribution Command in 
January 2004.

[27] Force closure is the process of a unit arriving at a specified 
location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated 
location, and ends when the last element arrives.

[28] See, for example, Army Modernization and Transformation In Review 
of the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2003: Hearings on 
S. 2225 Before the Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 107TH Cong. 15 (2002) (statement of General John M. Keane, 
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army).

[29] A Stryker brigade platoon could consist of about 16 to 44 people, 
depending on its organizational mission.

[30] S. Rep No. 108-260 at 126 (2004).

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