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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

June 2004: 

FEDERAL AIRCRAFT: 

Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper 
Cost Effective Operations: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-645] 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-645, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Federal civilian agencies own and operate a fleet of aging aircraft, 
many of which may soon need to be replaced. Agencies manage their 
fleets with help from guidance and policies issued by the General 
Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). Numerous audit reports have disclosed that agencies lacked 
accurate cost data and had acquired aircraft without adequate 
justification. GAO reviewed (1) the composition and costs of the 
federal aircraft fleet; (2) the systems and controls agencies use to 
ensure that they effectively and efficiently acquire and manage their 
aircraft fleets; and (3) the operations, maintenance, safety 
standards, and safety records for federal aircraft.

What GAO Found: 

GAO could not accurately determine the number of government-owned 
aircraft and total costs of federal aircraft program operations, 
because it found that GSA’s database was unreliable. Although the 
database showed federal agencies owned nearly 1,400 aircraft and that 
agencies reported spending over $700 million to operate and maintain 
federally-owned and contracted aircraft in fiscal year 2002, GAO found 
it understated the cost of federal aircraft operations by at least $568 
million over the past 3 years. This is because some agencies did not 
report all the required information. GAO also found there was no 
requirement for the agencies to report other aircraft costs such as 
depreciation. 

The systems and controls GAO reviewed provide limited assurance that 
agencies are cost effectively acquiring and managing their aircraft 
fleets. All seven aircraft programs GAO examined failed to implement 
some key principles of fleet management planning, as outlined in GSA, 
OMB, and other federal guidance. GAO found that programs did not 
consistently prepare long-term fleet management plans to identify fleet 
requirements and aircraft that best meet those requirements. GAO also 
found that these programs rarely prepared OMB Circular A-76 studies to 
assess whether the private sector could provide aviation services at a 
lower cost, and often did not perform cost benefit analyses before 
acquiring aircraft. Finally, GAO found that programs did not use a full 
range of aviation metrics to measure and assess the effectiveness of 
their aircraft operations and rarely prepared OMB Circular A-126 
studies to periodically assess the continuing need for their aircraft 
operations. GAO also found that OMB provides limited oversight over 
compliance with Circulars A-76 and A-126, leaving it up to each program 
to determine whether to complete the reviews.

Although exempt from many federal safety requirements, federal 
aircraft programs GAO reviewed developed their own operations, 
maintenance, and safety standards to help ensure safe operations. 
However, the use of oversight to evaluate the safety of the programs 
and help identify potential issues before they become safety problems 
varied greatly. Two programs that GAO visited subjected themselves to 
reviews by Federal Aviation Administration inspectors and two others 
utilized GSA-sponsored safety teams to review their operations. 
Historically, these GSA-sponsored reviews have found that similar 
safety issues existed at several programs. These issues included having 
an insufficient number of instructors to conduct aviation training, 
lack of a formal general maintenance manual, lack of trained personnel 
to accomplish assigned missions, and flight crews not thoroughly 
planning flights. The remaining three programs relied on internal 
reviews of their operations. GAO also identified 183 accidents and 
incidents occurring in federally owned or contracted aircraft over the 
past 9 years that resulted in 91 fatalities. GAO found that most of 
these were caused by human factors such as pilot error and occurred in 
contracted aircraft.

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that GSA strengthen the accuracy and reliability of 
data in the federal aircraft database, help programs develop more cost-
effective fleet management planning systems, and assist programs in 
strengthening the safety oversight of their operations. GAO also 
recommends that OMB review and clarify its guidance for cost 
effectively acquiring and managing government aircraft. Departments of 
Agriculture, Energy, Interior, Justice, Transportation, GSA and OMB 
commented on a draft of this report; in general, they agreed with GAO’s 
findings and recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-645.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact JayEtta Hecker, at (202) 
512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Total Federal Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Costs Are Unknown 
Because Existing Data Are Incomplete and Inaccurate: 

Federal Aircraft Programs Lack Comprehensive Systems to Ensure Cost-
effective Acquisition and Fleet Management Decisions: 

Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Operational and Safety 
Standards, but Oversight Is Voluntary and Varied: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Federal Aircraft Fleet Information: 

Appendix III: Review of FAIRS Internal Controls: 

Appendix IV: Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Inspection 
Program: 

Appendix V: Department of Justice, Justice Prisoner and Alien 
Transportation System: 

Appendix VI: Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service: 

Appendix VII: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Aircraft 
Program: 

Appendix VIII: Federal Aviation Administration, Hangar 6 Program: 

Appendix IX: Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration: 

Appendix X: Department of State, International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Program: 

Appendix XI: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Agriculture: 

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: FAIRS Data Problems for Major Aircraft Programs, Fiscal Years 
2000 through 2002: 

Table 2: Analysis of Internal Controls for the FAIRS System: 

Table 3: Causes and Contributing Factors to the 183 Federal Aircraft 
Accidents and Incidents, April 1995 - October 2003: 

Table 4: Number of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Years 
2000-2002: 

Table 5: Average Age of Federal Aircraft by Agency, Fiscal Year 2002 
(in years): 

Table 6: Total Flight Hours of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, 
Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 7: Total Cost of Federal Aircraft Programs, Fleet Aircraft and 
Commercial Aviation Services Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 8: Cost of Federal Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 9: Cost of Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 10: Analysis of Data Stewardship Controls: 

Table 11: Analysis of Systems Controls: 

Table 12: Cost and Utilization of Flight Inspection Aircraft, Fiscal 
Years 2000-2002: 

Table 13: Documentation Supporting Four Flight Inspection Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Table 14: Cost and Utilization JPATS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation 
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 15: Documentation Supporting Four JPATS Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Table 16: Cost and Flight Hours FWS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation 
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 17: Documentation Supporting Four FWS Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Table 18: Causes and Contributing Factors of U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Aircraft Accidents: 

Table 19: Cost and Flight Hours USDA Forest Service Aircraft and 
Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 20: Documentation Supporting Four USDA Forest Service Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Table 21: Causes and Contributing Factors of USDA Forest Service 
Aircraft Accidents: 

Table 22: Cost and Utilization of Hangar 6 Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-
2002: 

Table 23: Documentation Supporting Acquisition of Current and Recently 
Disposed Hangar 6 Aircraft: 

Table 24: Cost and Utilization of DEA Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 25: Documentation Supporting 6 DEA Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Table 26: Cost and Flight Hours INL/A Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Table 27: Documentation Supporting Four Recent INL/A Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Table 28: Causes and Contributing Factors of the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aircraft Accidents: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Aviation Fleet Management Planning Process: 

Figure 2: Implementation of Key Fleet Management Planning Principles: 

Figure 3: Federal Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents and Incidents, April 
1995 - October 2003: 

Figure 4: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Mission April 
1995 - October 2003: 

Figure 5: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Aircraft Owner: 

Figure 6: Types of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Year 
2002: 

Figure 7: Age of Federal Aircraft in Fiscal Year 2002: 

Figure 8: Hierarchy of Criteria Used to Review Controls over GSA's 
FAIRS 
System: 

Figure 9: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 
- October 2003: 

Figure 10: USDA Forest Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 - October 
2003: 

Figure 11: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs Accidents, April 1995 - October 2003: 

Abbreviations:

AMD: Aviation Management Directorate: 

ARMS: Aviation Resource Management Survey: 

ARO: Aviation Resident Offices: 

AVN: Aviation Systems Standards: 

BICE: Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 

CAS: Commercial Aviation Services: 

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DOI: Department of the Interior: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DOS: Department of State: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAIRS: Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FWS: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

ICAP: Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy: 

INL/A: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
Office of Aviation: 

IPT: Integrated Product Team: 

JPATS: Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System: 

JRC: Joint Resources Council: 

MOA: memorandum of agreement: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board: 

OA: Aviation Division: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture: 

Letter June 18, 2004: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins, Chairwoman: 
Committee on Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold: 
United States Senate: 

Federal civilian agencies own and operate a fleet of aging aircraft, 
many of which are well past the age when aircraft become increasingly 
unreliable, more costly to operate and maintain, and potentially 
unsafe. These agencies' programs have historically reported spending 
several hundred million dollars each year on government-owned and 
leased or contracted aircraft obtained from the private sector to 
perform important and sometimes dangerous missions, such as aerial 
firefighting, illicit drug eradication, and wildlife control. Since 
1977, numerous audit reports and studies have repeatedly disclosed that 
the programs lacked accurate information on aircraft costs, 
inappropriately used aircraft for nonmission activities, and spent 
millions of dollars acquiring aircraft without adequate justification. 
Additionally, studies have disclosed that federal government aircraft 
operations are exempted from many of the safety regulations applicable 
to commercial aircraft and that these operations are not subject to 
most aspects of Federal Aviation Administration oversight. The safety 
of federal government aircraft operations drew national attention in 
the summer of 2002 when the wings of two aircraft under contract to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service fell off in midflight, 
causing both aircraft to crash and kill a total of five crewmembers.

You asked us to assess the oversight and management of federal 
agencies' aircraft programs by providing information on (1) the 
composition of the federal aircraft fleet and how much it costs to 
operate and maintain; (2) the extent to which federal agencies have 
systems and controls in place to ensure that they are effectively and 
efficiently acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets; and (3) the 
operations, maintenance, safety standards, and safety records for the 
federal aircraft fleet. In conducting this review, we analyzed fleet 
data that the General Services Administration (GSA) centrally collects 
and maintains for both federal civilian aircraft and for aircraft and 
related services supplied by the private sector.[Footnote 1] We also 
assessed the internal controls and reliability of this data to 
determine whether they contain accurate information about the fleet of 
aircraft and the costs to operate and maintain it. We found information 
in the database was not sufficiently complete and accurate to determine 
the composition and cost of federal aircraft programs, however, we used 
the information to provide descriptive information and summary 
statistics to show the relative magnitude of the federal programs.

To obtain information on the systems and controls for acquiring and 
managing aircraft fleets, we selected seven programs in five agencies 
for review. According to GSA's data at the time we began our review: 
these agencies owned over 70 percent of federal civilian aircraft used 
for federal missions and accounted for over 85 percent of federal 
aircraft program costs. For each of the seven aircraft programs we 
selected we reviewed the systems and controls they were currently using 
to help ensure they acquire and manage their aircraft cost effectively 
and operate and maintain their aircraft safely. The seven programs were 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (USDA Forest 
Service), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of 
the Interior (DOI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the 
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) in the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation (INL/A) in the Department of 
State (DOS), and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Flight 
Inspection and Washington Flight Program (Hangar 6) in the Department 
of Transportation (DOT). The seven programs we selected were some that 
had the greatest number of aircraft, historically incurred the most 
costs, or covered a wide variety of aviation missions. We selected four 
to six aircraft in each program and asked program officials to provide 
documentation to support their acquisition decisions. In judgmentally 
selecting these aircraft we considered such factors as whether the 
aircraft were airplanes or helicopters, the make and model of the 
aircraft, and the date the program acquired the aircraft. We also 
reviewed and analyzed data on accidents that occurred between April 
1995 through October 2003 contained in the National Transportation 
Safety Board's (NTSB) aviation accident database. Based on interviews 
with NTSB officials and testing of the data, we determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More 
information on our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. We 
conducted our work from February 2003 through May 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief: 

We were unable to accurately determine the composition and costs of the 
federal aircraft fleet because we found the governmentwide aircraft 
database maintained by GSA to be unreliable because it was incomplete 
and inaccurate. According to this database, the federal fleet consisted 
of about 1,400 aircraft, and federal programs reported spending about 
$290 million in fiscal year 2002 in operations and maintenance costs 
for their fleet aircraft. It also showed that programs reported 
spending an additional $416 million on aviation services such as 
aircraft contracted from the private sector. However, on the basis of 
our review of the database and more detailed reviews of select aircraft 
programs, we estimated that, at a minimum, the database likely 
understates total program costs by at least $568 million over the 
period 2000 through 2002, or an average of about $190 million per year. 
The database understates the cost of the federal aircraft fleet because 
some programs did not report all the required costs. For example, we 
identified instances where programs had not reported any costs for 
their aircraft and did not report costs for fuel or pilot salaries. We 
also found four federally owned aircraft that were not included in the 
database. In addition, we identified additional costs that programs are 
not required to report that we believe would make the cost data more 
complete and accurate. For example, requiring programs to report 
depreciation, self-insurance, and financing costs would provide a more 
complete view of the costs associated with operating the federal 
aircraft fleet. Further, we determined that a number of internal 
controls on the database system were missing, and other controls did 
not always function effectively, which may have allowed invalid data to 
be recorded.

Systems and controls for the federal aircraft programs we reviewed 
provide limited assurance that agencies are cost effectively acquiring 
and managing their aircraft fleets. We found that programs we reviewed 
did not consistently implement federal fleet management guidance to (1) 
determine program mission and flight hour requirements and the number 
and type of aircraft needed over the long term, (2) ensure that they 
acquired the appropriate aircraft at the least possible cost, and (3) 
track key aviation information regarding aircraft performance, such as 
whether an aircraft is available when needed. We found that only two of 
the seven programs we reviewed had identified their long-term aviation 
requirements and determined the most effective mix of aircraft to meet 
these needs. In addition, although the programs we reviewed generally 
had processes in place for making decisions on acquiring aircraft, they 
did not always use the available tools to assist them in making their 
decisions. For example, under certain circumstances, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), pursuant to OMB Circular A-76, requires 
programs to conduct an analysis to determine if the private sector 
could provide the services at a lower cost. However, we found that 
programs conducted this analysis for only 3 of the 28 aircraft we 
examined. In general, program officials said they did not do so because 
they consider their operations to be inherently governmental in nature 
and not subject to that requirement. OMB staff stated they do not 
independently validate these decisions and allow aircraft program 
managers to determine when they should complete A-76 reviews. In 
addition, cost benefit analyses, which are useful in helping to 
determine the most cost-effective aircraft model to acquire were not 
regularly conducted. Although each of the programs we reviewed tracked 
aspects of aircraft performance, such as whether their aircraft are 
available when needed, the information tracked did not include a full 
range of statistical information to assess their aircrafts' 
performance. Additionally, six of the seven programs did not prepare 
periodic OMB Circular A-126 reviews of the continuing needs of their 
fleets. Similar to the A-76 required reviews, OMB staff stated they do 
not ensure that programs complete these reviews; rather, they leave it 
up to each program to determine whether or not they are needed.

The seven programs we reviewed required their aircraft operations to 
comply, at a minimum, with the FAA basic rules governing all civil 
flight operations and developed operations, maintenance, and safety 
standards specific to their aircraft programs to help ensure safe 
operations. These standards address, for example, operational issues 
associated with pilot qualifications and training requirements; the 
need for a maintenance inspection program and a means of tracking 
maintenance actions; and the need for safety guidelines and minimum 
flight crew requirements. In addition, some of the programs developed 
standards significantly above the minimum applicable FAA requirements 
and required compliance with portions of the more restrictive FAA civil 
aircraft regulations. One area where we found considerable differences 
among the programs was in the use of oversight. For example, the two 
FAA programs we reviewed were subjected to the same level of inspection 
that FAA requires of civil operations. Two other programs subjected 
themselves to external oversight of their operations by the GSA-
sponsored Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy, and the remaining 
three programs subjected themselves to internal reviews. Although 
programs have taken these steps to mitigate the risks of their 
dangerous missions, the operations have resulted in some accidents or 
incidents.[Footnote 2] Our review of safety data for all federal 
programs found 183 accidents and incidents involving federally owned, 
operated, or contracted aircraft between April 1995 and October 2003 
that resulted in 91 fatalities. Our review of accident reports for 
these accidents found that most accidents (1) were caused by human 
factors such as pilot error, (2) occurred during dangerous missions 
such as fire suppression and complex training maneuvers, and (3) 
occurred in contracted aircraft.

This report includes recommendations to the Administrator, General 
Services Administration, and the Director, Office of Management and 
Budget, to strengthen the accuracy and completeness of data in the 
federal aircraft database, to help agencies improve fleet management 
and aircraft acquisition decisions, and to help agencies strengthen the 
safety oversight of their operations. We received written and oral 
comments on a draft of this report from the Departments of Agriculture, 
Energy, Interior, Justice, and Transportation, and the General Services 
Administration and the Office of Management and Budget; in general the 
agencies concurred with our findings and recommendations.

Background: 

Federal civilian agencies have aircraft programs that utilize a wide 
variety of aircraft, ranging from helicopters to large jet airliners to 
accomplish their missions. These programs use aircraft that they own 
and aircraft they obtain from the private sector through commercial 
aviation service contracts to perform activities such as aerial 
firefighting, illicit drug eradication, and passenger transportation. 
The individual agencies and their programs are responsible and 
accountable for aircraft acquisition, management, use, cost accounting, 
and safety. Although the agencies and programs have independent 
responsibility and accountability for managing their programs, OMB and 
GSA provide guidance and regulations for the agencies to follow.

OMB has issued two circulars that directly affect the management of 
agency aircraft programs. Circular A-126 provides the basic guidance 
for management of aircraft programs and for travel on government 
aircraft.[Footnote 3] The purpose of Circular A-126 is to minimize cost 
and improve the management and use of government aviation resources. 
The circular prescribes policies for acquiring, managing, using, 
accounting for the costs of, and disposing of aircraft. According to 
the circular, agencies should not have more aircraft than they need to 
fulfill their mission, and they should periodically review the cost 
effectiveness of their entire fleet of owned aircraft. The circular 
also instructs agencies to comply with Circular A-76 before purchasing, 
leasing, or otherwise acquiring aircraft. Circular A-76 establishes 
policy for the competition of commercial activities, including the use 
of aircraft.[Footnote 4] The circular provides guidance for use in 
preparing cost comparisons involving the provision of aircraft or 
aviation support services with agency-owned resources or through the 
private sector. The purpose of the comparison is to ensure that 
aviation services cannot be obtained from the private sector more cost 
effectively. It also states that agencies should consider that, 
although an activity may be inherently governmental, the tools needed 
to perform the activity are not necessarily inherently governmental.

OMB Circular A-126 also sets out responsibilities for GSA regarding 
aircraft management. Under the circular, GSA: 

* maintains an office to coordinate policy for federal aircraft 
management;

* develops generic federal aircraft information system standards;

* identifies ways to acquire, manage, and dispose of aircraft in a 
cost-effective manner;

* assists agencies in establishing systems to comply with cost 
accounting and cost analyses requirements; and: 

* reviews agencies' internal policies for compliance with OMB guidance.

In implementing the circular, GSA employs a small group of individuals 
to help it establish governmentwide policy on the operation of aircraft 
by the federal government--including policies for managing the 
acquisition, use, and disposal of aircraft that the agencies own or 
hire. GSA publishes its regulatory policies in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (C.F.R.).[Footnote 5] GSA also established the Interagency 
Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP) as a working group to advise it in 
developing or changing aircraft policies and information requirements. 
Under GSA's direction, ICAP has established several subcommittees, 
comprising representatives from the various aircraft programs, which 
work on regulatory, data management, aircraft acquisition, and safety 
issues. GSA, in conjunction with ICAP, also publishes a number of other 
guides and manuals to help agencies manage the acquisition, use, and 
disposal of their aircraft. These publications include the U.S. 
Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide, which contains information 
on how agencies should account for aircraft costs; the Fleet 
Modernization Planning Guide, which aids programs in developing cost-
effective fleet replacement plans; and the Safety Standards Guidelines 
for Federal Flight Programs, which agencies can use to help create 
their own agency-specific safety standards and operations and 
maintenance manuals.

In addition to establishing governmentwide aircraft policy, OMB 
Circular A-126 requires GSA to maintain a system to track aircraft cost 
and usage data. GSA deployed the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting 
System (FAIRS) in April 2000 in an attempt to improve upon the 
shortcomings of a previous data system. The FAIRS system replaced the 
Federal Aviation Management Information System that was antiquated and 
had limited data collection and analysis capabilities. All civilian 
federal agencies that own or hire aircraft must report data into the 
FAIRS system. FAIRS is an Internet-based system that is accessed 
through a secure Web site. Each individual agency is responsible for 
entering the data into FAIRS, and GSA is responsible for developing, 
operating, and maintaining the computer-based system itself. GSA uses 
the data contained in the FAIRS system to prepare its annual report on 
the status of federal government aircraft, which includes information 
on the costs and use of the aircraft fleet. The most recent report for 
the period of this study details fiscal year 2002 operations.[Footnote 
6]

When federal agencies use aircraft to carry out their missions, the 
aircraft are generally flown as "public use" aircraft and are exempted 
from many FAA regulatory requirements that are applicable to "civil 
use" aircraft. Although all aircraft operations must follow applicable 
sections of 14 C.F.R. Part 91, which sets out basic rules governing all 
flight operations, public aircraft operators do not have to comply with 
FAA safety regulations, including maintenance rules and pilot 
certification standards. Therefore, the federal agencies have sole 
responsibility for providing the safety oversight of those operations. 
The definition of what constitutes a public use operation has been 
modified over the years, but public use operations include, but are not 
limited to, law enforcement, firefighting, search and rescue, 
biological or geological resource management, and aeronautical 
research. When agencies use aircraft for nonmission purposes such as 
passenger transportation, they are no longer considered to be public 
use and FAA subjects the federal aircraft programs to the same 
operations, maintenance, and safety standards as those that apply to 
civil operators.

Total Federal Aircraft Operating and Maintenance Costs Are Unknown 
Because Existing Data Are Incomplete and Inaccurate: 

We were unable to accurately determine the composition and costs of the 
federal aircraft fleet because there is no reliable central source of 
this information. Although GSA maintains a governmentwide aircraft 
database, we found this information to be incomplete and inaccurate. 
GSA's FAIRS system showed that in fiscal year 2002, the federal 
government owned about 1,400 aircraft and, including the cost of 
aviation services obtained through the private sector, reported 
spending about $706 million to operate and maintain federal aircraft 
programs.[Footnote 7] However, according to the results of our 
analysis, GSA's management controls do not provide reasonable assurance 
that the FAIRS system provides an accurate accounting of the 
composition and cost of the federal aircraft fleet, which calls into 
question the information published in GSA's annual report. Our review 
of the FAIRS data showed that the data are incomplete and inaccurate 
because several agencies did not accurately report all of the costs 
captured by FAIRS and did not report all aircraft to FAIRS. As a result 
of these shortcomings, we found that GSA's annual reports on the cost 
of federal aircraft programs likely understate total program costs by 
at least $568.7 million over the period fiscal year 2000 through fiscal 
year 2002, or an average of about $190 million per year. In addition, 
agencies are not required to report some costs, such as depreciation 
and financing costs, which further understates total aircraft program 
costs, and some of the data reliability controls directed at ensuring 
that the FAIRS data are sound were not working as designed.

Agencies Reported Incomplete or Inaccurate Information: 

On the basis of our analysis of the data contained within the FAIRS 
system and information obtained from the seven programs we reviewed, we 
found that agencies reported incomplete or inaccurate information. 
Reasons they did not report certain information included not 
understanding the FAIRS reporting requirements, finding no compelling 
reason to report, and agency mistakes resulting in some missing 
information. Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of the data 
contained within the FAIRS system.

Table 1: FAIRS Data Problems for Major Aircraft Programs, Fiscal Years 
2000 through 2002: 

Dollars in millions.

Department of Agriculture (USDA Forest Service): Problems identified/
status: Forest Service-provided data exceeds FAIRS data for fiscal 
years (FY) 2000 - 2002. FAIRS aircraft program costs understated; 
2000: $16.5; 
2001: $30.3; 
2002: $39.4.

Department of Agriculture (USDA Forest Service): Problems identified/
status: USDA Forest Service overstated Commercial Aviation Services 
(CAS) hours by about 4,000. However, cost data did not change so there 
was no impact on total program costs; 
2000: None; 
2001: None; 
2002: None.

Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: JPATS costs 
understated. JPATS reported $52.8 million in FY 2000, $67.4 million in 
FY 2001, and $49.5 million in FY 2002 to FAIRS. JPATS officials stated 
that the agency's program costs were $78.4 million in FY 2000, $78.0 
million in FY 2001, and $72.4 million in FY 2002. Aircraft program 
costs understated; 
2000: $25.6; 
2001: $10.6; 
2002: $22.9.

Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: DEA did not report 
costs or hours associated with aircraft leased through a private 
contractor. Aircraft were flown by DEA pilots. DEA officials estimated 
that the program spent about $2 million per year for the use of these 
aircraft. Aircraft program costs understated; 
2000: $2.0; 
2001: $2.0; 
2002: $2.0.

Department of Justice: Problems identified/status: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) did not report for certain aircraft. Impact on 
total program costs unknown. All aircraft conduct sensitive missions 
and FAIRS data is restricted to FBI use only. Total aircraft program 
costs understated; 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

Department of the Interior: Problems identified/status: Three DOI 
aircraft not included in inventory. DOI officials stated that they do 
not include the three aircraft because they perform undercover 
operations. DOI continues to exclude the aircraft from FAIRS. Aircraft 
program costs understated; 
2000: $0.1; 
2001: $0.1; 
2002: $0.1.

Department of the Interior: Problems identified/status: DOI does not 
report cost of pilots when they perform a dual role on the flight 
(e.g., serve as a biologist in addition to piloting the aircraft). 
Total aircraft program costs understated; 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: One National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Gulfstream aircraft not reported in inventory. Aircraft recently added 
to fleet inventory. FAA operates aircraft and is required to report 
cost and hour data. Federal aircraft fleet understated by one aircraft; 
2000: None; 
2001: None; 
2002: None.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: No cost data reported for FY 2002. In FYs 2000 and 2001 NASA 
reported between $75.5 million and $79.3 million respectively. GSA 
officials working with NASA to comply with FAIRS reporting 
requirements. Aircraft program costs understated by an estimated $75 to 
$80 million in FY 2002; 
2000: None; 
2001: None; 
2002: $75.0.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Problems identified/
status: Many reported costs averaged across aircraft. Analysis of NASA 
aircraft and complete FAIRS inventory by cost category not meaningful. 
No impact on total program costs; 
2000: None; 
2001: None; 
2002: None.

National Science Foundation: Problems identified/status: FAIRS 
reporting for FYs 2001 and 2002 are incomplete. Agency reported 
inconsistent data across years. Aircraft program costs understated for 
FYs 2001 and 2002; 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

National Science Foundation: Problems identified/status: Crew costs 
not reported (aircraft flown by military crews.) Total aircraft 
program costs understated; 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

Department of State: Problems identified/status: No cost data reported 
for FY 2001; 
FY 2002 data understated. In FYs 2000 and 2002, agency reported $20.7 
million and $91.7 million respectively. Agency officials estimated that 
program costs were $150 to $180 million per year. Aircraft program 
costs understated by between $58 and $150 million per year; 
2000: $129.3; 
2001: $150.0; 
2002: $58.3.

Department of State: Problems identified/status: Cost data for FYs 
2000 and 2002 inconsistently reported. Results in unreliable cost 
category analysis. No impact on total program cost; 
2000: None; 
2001: None; 
2002: None.

Department of State: Problems identified/status: Numerous costs not 
reported to FAIRS. Costs of fuel, chemicals, salaries, and overhead are 
not reported. Agency officials stated that only costs directly 
associated with aircraft are reported. Total aircraft program costs 
understated (impact captured above.); 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

Department of Transportation: Problems identified/status: FAA did not 
report cost or hours for NASA Gulfstream aircraft. (The aircraft had 
been missing from the inventory, and was recently added.) GSA officials 
stated that FAA would report costs and hours for FY 2003. Aircraft 
program costs understated; 
2000: $1.5; 
2001: $1.5; 
2002: $1.5.

Overall FAIRS data: Problems identified/status: Number of aircraft 
understated. GSA and program officials compared FAIRS inventory 
information to agency data and discovered 65 aircraft that should have 
been included in FAIRS. Many of the aircraft identified were classified 
as nonoperational. Magnitude of impact on cost and hour data unknown, 
but likely understated; 
2000: Unknown; 
2001: Unknown; 
2002: Unknown.

Minimum total estimated understatement[A]; 
2000: $175.0; 
2001: $194.5; 
2002: $199.2.

FAIRS reported costs; 
2000: $661.5; 
2001: $613.1; 
2002: $705.6.

Minimum percentage understated; 
2000: 26%; 
2001: 32%; 
2002: 28%. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS data.

[A] Our analysis showed that this amount represents the minimum amount 
that FAIRS data are understated.

[End of table]

In addition to our findings of incomplete or inaccurate information 
being reported, in January 2004, GSA and the agencies reviewed the 
aircraft contained in the FAIRS database and found that numerous 
aircraft were missing from the database. According to GSA, agencies 
found that a number of aircraft were assigned erroneously within and 
among agencies and that a number of aircraft, particularly 
nonoperational aircraft, were not recorded in FAIRS. According to 
preliminary fiscal year 2003 data, GSA and the agencies discovered an 
additional 65 aircraft that were not included in the FAIRS inventory 
(not including the three DOI aircraft that remain missing from the 
inventory.)

Agencies Are Not Required to Report Some Important Costs: 

Our review of the FAIRS data requirements for aircraft programs found 
that the system does not capture several cost elements that directly 
relate to the costs of operating aircraft programs. OMB Circulars A-126 
and A-76 and GSA's cost accounting guidelines recognize costs such as 
depreciation, self-insurance, and financing costs as important costs of 
acquiring and operating aircraft and require programs to include them 
when preparing various cost analyses. However, FAIRS has made no 
provision that programs identify and report these costs because GSA 
designed FAIRS to capture only the day-to-day costs associated with 
operating aircraft.

The impact of not capturing these costs can potentially represent a 
significant annual expense that is not included in GSA's annual report 
on the aircraft program costs. For example, generally accepted 
accounting principles recognize depreciation as a "cost of doing 
business"--a way to recoup the value of an asset as it is consumed. In 
this way, the organization can capitalize the lost value of an asset in 
planning its future replacement. Given the age and diverse nature of 
the federal aircraft fleet, it is not possible to determine the total 
amount of annual depreciation that would be reported to FAIRS. However, 
given the size and value of the fleet, it could represent a significant 
annual expense. For example, in 2002, a contractor estimated that it 
could cost JPATS about $117 million to purchase a fleet of seven used 
large transport aircraft. The depreciation expense of this fleet could 
total several million dollars per year over the anticipated 10 years 
that JPATS plans to use these aircraft.

We also found that GSA's cost accounting guidelines do not require that 
agencies report the costs associated with self-insurance. Aviation 
activity involves risks and potential casualty losses and liability 
claims. These risks are normally covered in the private sector through 
the purchase of an insurance policy. The government is self-insuring; 
the Treasury's general fund is charged for losses and liability claims. 
Circular A-76 requires agencies to include a self-insurance cost when 
performing A-76 calculations. Finally, the costs associated with 
financing are not captured. For the purpose of capturing finance costs, 
OMB instructs agencies to use the borrowing rate announced by the 
Department of the Treasury for bonds or notes whose maturities 
correspond to the useful life of the asset.

FAIRS Data Reliability Controls Could Be Improved: 

In developing the FAIRS system, GSA implemented a number of data 
reliability controls and issued guidance designed to help ensure that 
FAIRS data are complete and accurate. Some of these controls are 
specific controls built into the FAIRS system. Others relate to GSA's 
role as a "central data steward"--a central agency that collects and 
reports aircraft program data. GSA has a responsibility to provide the 
most accurate information possible. We tested a number of the controls 
that GSA employs and found some to be effective or partially effective 
and some ineffective or missing. Table 2 summarizes our review of both 
existing and missing internal controls that apply to the FAIRS system 
and GSA's responsibility as a data steward.

Table 2: Analysis of Internal Controls for the FAIRS System: 

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Only agency-authorized and 
GSA-trained persons can access FAIRS; 
Partially effective controls: Triggers prevent improper entry, review, 
correction, or approval of aircraft inventory, cost, and use data; 
Ineffective controls: Only the FAIRS administrator should be able to 
change approved inventory data; 
Missing controls: FAIRS should not allow a reviewer to enter new 
aircraft inventory or cost and use data.

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Triggers allow only an 
agency-authorized user to enter new or correct disapproved data; 
Ineffective controls: Only agency-authorized reviewer should be able to 
mark CAS cost and use data as approved; 
Missing controls: FAIRS should not allow negative aircraft cost and 
use data to be accepted.

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Triggers allow only records 
without errors on aircraft cost and use data to be uploaded via batch 
processing; 
Ineffective controls: Approved CAS cost and use data should only be 
changed with the assistance of the FAIRS administrator; 
Missing controls: Users should not be able to enter a disposal date 
that is prior to the acquisition date for an aircraft.

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Only agency-authorized 
reviewer can review and mark aircraft cost and use data as approved; 
Missing controls: Use data entered should not be greater than the 
maximum number of hours available for the reporting period.

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Approved federal aircraft 
cost and use data can only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS 
administrator. 

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Status automatically 
changes to awaiting review or system accepted, not reviewed after 
specific time frames. 

FAIRS systems controls: Effective controls: Control access to report 
and data in FAIRS and make corrections as proposed by agencies. 

Data stewardship controls: Effective controls: Provide agencies with 
guidance on data requirements including the Cost Accounting Guide and 
the FAIRS Users Manual; 
Partially effective controls: Provide technical assistance to agencies 
in establishing their cost accounting systems; 
Missing controls: GSA should foster the concept of full costing for 
agencies' cost accounting systems.

Data stewardship controls: Effective controls: Provide draft of annual 
report to agencies for comment and proposed changes; 
Partially effective controls: Require agencies to use prescribed data 
elements for reporting aircraft cost data; 
Missing controls: GSA should check agencies' cost accounting systems 
for compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide.

Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Verify that 
aircraft cost and use data collected from agencies are in compliance 
with reporting requirements; 
Missing controls: GSA should routinely check data agencies report to 
FAIRS for completeness and accuracy.

Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Establish 
data entry and approval procedures and edit checks to promote validity 
and reliability of data; 
Missing controls: GSA should ensure periodic audit coverage by the 
Office of Inspector General or internal auditors to promote quality of 
aircraft data.

Data stewardship controls: Partially effective controls: Systematically 
perform analytical reviews of cost and use data reported to FAIRS; 
Missing controls: GSA should ensure that changes to prior periods and 
annual report are disclosed in subsequent reports. 

Sources: GAO analysis of FAIRS internal controls and GSA aircraft 
program guidance.

[End of table]

Appendix III contains additional information on the criteria we used to 
analyze GSA's controls over data reliability and the results of that 
analysis.

Our review found that the system effectively ensured that only agency-
designated personnel had access to the agency's data. Alternatively, we 
found that the control designed to ensure that each aircraft entered 
has a unique inventory code assigned to it that allows each aircraft in 
the database to be differentiated was not functioning properly at the 
time of our test. The control is designed to ensure that once entered 
and approved, the data cannot be changed without the use of approved 
approaches. During our tests we created a new aircraft record, approved 
the data, and were able to change the information. GSA officials stated 
that they have taken steps to correct the malfunctioning controls and 
have a continuing agreement with Computer Sciences Corporation, the 
FAIRS contractor to establish additional controls for the FAIRS system.

Our review also found that although the internal controls currently 
available in the system are fairly robust, a number of the controls 
were missing, and other controls did not always function effectively. 
As a result, the controls as a whole could not ensure that the data 
contained in the system are complete and accurate. For example, we 
found that GSA did not routinely audit the agency-generated data to 
help ensure that all aircraft and related costs and flight hours that 
should be reported to FAIRS were included. In addition, we found that 
GSA does not check agencies' compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide 
or conduct oversight of agencies' cost accounting systems to compare 
the data in these systems with the data reported to FAIRS. Some 
agencies ask GSA for advice on policies and the operation of their cost 
accounting systems, and GSA provides the assistance when requested. A 
GSA official stated that the agency has the responsibility to develop 
policies and provide consultation to agencies that report to FAIRS, but 
it lacks the resources necessary to ensure that the agencies completely 
and accurately report. The official added that he would prefer 
additional resources to oversee the agencies reporting information into 
FAIRS but also said that it would be more effective for the agencies to 
routinely audit the aircraft and related cost and use data that they 
report.

GSA is responsible for collecting information on the federal 
government's use of aircraft and issues an annual report that provides 
information on the composition of the federal fleet and the costs that 
agencies incur in conducting aircraft operations. GSA helps agencies to 
identify, compile, analyze, and report aircraft program data but does 
not have systematic oversight of the agencies' cost accounting systems-
-the primary source for the cost data that GSA collects. As the central 
agency that collects and reports aircraft program data, GSA has a 
responsibility to provide the most accurate information possible. The 
Joint Financial Management Improvement Program's Framework for Federal 
Financial Management Systems identifies GSA as a "central data steward" 
with responsibility to ensure that the data used to support 
governmentwide managerial functions and reporting are complete and 
accurate. Specifically, the document states that although the 
information is dependent on the integrity of data provided by program 
agencies, GSA must still perform adequate verification to ensure that 
data collected comply with reporting standards.

In 2002, GSA hired Conklin and deDecker Associates, an aviation 
information services consultant, to analyze FAIRS cost data to 
determine, among other things, the extent to which the data could be 
used for detailed cost analyses and developing aviation performance 
measures. The contractor's preliminary study found that missing and 
inconsistent FAIRS data, combined with the ways in which different 
agencies report data into FAIRS, made it impossible to draw useful 
conclusions. The study also found that the FAIRS reporting requirements 
were vague and allowed agencies to report inconsistent or incomplete 
data. The contractor provided several recommendations on how the 
quality of the data could be improved and GSA has awarded a contract to 
Computer Sciences Corporation to enhance and modify FAIRS with many of 
the recommendations identified in the performance measures study. These 
enhancements include requiring four mandatory cost categories (crew, 
fuel, maintenance, and overhead); the adding of two aircraft 
utilization measures; and clarifying the definitions of several cost 
elements. GSA and ICAP recognized that the FAIRS system would change 
over time and adopted a process to address potential enhancements to 
the system. They meet periodically to review and prioritize 
improvements and, after enhancements have been approved, GSA plans to 
make the improvements to the FAIRS system as funding permits.

Federal Aircraft Programs Lack Comprehensive Systems to Ensure Cost-
effective Acquisition and Fleet Management Decisions: 

A comprehensive aircraft fleet management planning process can help 
federal aircraft programs ensure that they acquire, manage, and 
modernize their aircraft in a cost-effective manner. This process is 
based on determining a program's long-term fleet requirements, 
acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft, and continually 
assessing the fleet's ability to meet a program's mission requirements. 
Our review of seven programs found that none of them had fully 
implemented such a systematic process to ensure cost effective fleet 
management decisions. However, some had sporadically taken measures, 
such as developing a fleetwide replacement plan, preparing cost benefit 
analyses on some aircraft, and implementing some statistics to assess 
their fleet's performance. In addition, officials from some of the 
programs said that their ability to make cost-effective acquisition 
decisions is constrained by budget scoring rules presented in OMB 
Circular A-11, because it can limit their method of acquiring aircraft 
to either purchasing them outright or entering into more costly short-
term operating leases.

Federal Guidance Outlines Three Key Fleet Management Planning 
Principles: 

According to federal guidance, sound fleet management decisions should 
be based on a comprehensive process that relies on three key 
principles: (1) assessing a program's long-term fleet requirements, (2) 
acquiring the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft to meet those 
requirements, and (3) continually assessing fleet performance to 
determine if needs are being effectively met. These overarching 
principles are detailed in guidance that GSA, OMB, and the Department 
of Energy (DOE) have made available to federal aircraft programs. 
Specifically, GSA has developed a fleet modernization planning guide 
and associated workshops, which outlines key aspects of sound fleet 
planning. This guidance stresses the need for aircraft programs to 
determine mission requirements, identify aircraft alternatives, 
perform financial analyses of alternatives, and select the most cost-
effective mix of fleet aircraft. OMB Circulars A-76 and A-126 highlight 
the need to make cost-effective aircraft acquisition decisions, and 
Circular A-126 requires programs to periodically assess the cost-
effectiveness of their fleets. In addition, the DOE's aircraft program 
has developed a comprehensive aviation performance management program, 
which outlines nearly 40 statistical measures or metrics that aviation 
officials can use to continually assess their fleet's operating, 
maintenance, supply, crew, mission equipment, safety, and cost 
performance. Through ICAP, DOE has made the details of their program 
available to other programs.

Figure 1 displays the fleet management planning process, showing that 
it is a continuous cycle of planning and analyses.

Figure 1: Aviation Fleet Management Planning Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The first phase of the fleet management planning process begins when 
aircraft program managers do a strategic assessment of long-term fleet 
requirements. According to GSA's guidance, this is the foundation of 
fleet management, because it identifies future workload requirements 
that serve as the basis for aircraft needs. The assessment process 
includes specific analyses, such as an assessment of the number of 
flight hours needed to meet mission requirements over a minimum of a 5-
year period and the capability of existing aircraft to cost effectively 
meet those requirements. The guidance recommends that, if shortfalls in 
the current fleet of aircraft are identified, managers should determine 
the optimal mix of aircraft to meet anticipated flight hour and mission 
requirements and develop a proposed fleet acquisition or replacement 
plan to achieve the desired mix of aircraft. This plan could include an 
anticipated schedule and time frames for disposing of inadequate 
aircraft and procuring replacements.

According to GSA's guidance, after identifying potential aircraft and 
developing a proposed fleet replacement plan, aviation managers should 
develop a series of analyses to identify and acquire the most cost-
effective aircraft to meet mission needs. These analyses include 
preparing A-76 studies to determine whether the aviation operations 
should be performed by the government or contracted to the private 
sector and life cycle cost analyses to ensure that the most cost-
effective aircraft are procured. A life cycle cost analysis provides 
managers with important information concerning the total cost of an 
aircraft over its full life. It takes into account not only the costs 
of acquiring aircraft, but also the cost of operating and maintaining 
them over their useful life. Such information and analyses are crucial 
to making sound acquisition decisions. Once analyses are completed, 
aviation managers should obtain senior management approval and then 
acquire needed aircraft or commercial aviation services.

The final phase of the fleet management process centers on assessing 
the performance of the aircraft fleet in meeting mission needs. To 
accomplish this, managers should develop a set of aviation performance 
measures and a process to routinely review and analyze these measures 
to gauge their fleet's performance. These measures include statistics 
to assess the reliability of the aircraft fleet, determine whether 
costs are too high, and determine whether there are systematic 
maintenance issues that require attention. Managers should also 
periodically conduct an OMB Circular A-126 review of the cost 
effectiveness of their entire fleet. Finally, managers should 
incorporate the results of their performance metrics analyses and their 
periodic Circular A-126 reviews into their long-term fleet planning 
process and make adjustments to their fleets as needed.

Programs Made Limited Use of Key Principles in Fleet Management 
Planning: 

Of the seven programs we reviewed, we found no program fully 
implementing all of the key aspects of fleet management planning. We 
found only two of the seven programs had performed long-term, strategic 
reviews of their mission requirements and optimal fleet mix. Rather, 
most of the programs we reviewed engaged in a limited form of long-term 
planning. In addition, we found none of the seven programs were 
regularly completing Circular A-76 studies to determine whether their 
aircraft should be owned or operated by the federal government or a 
contractor. The programs could provide cost-benefit reviews only about 
one-third of the time documenting the aircraft they selected was the 
most cost-effective aircraft to perform the needed tasks. Similarly, we 
found that none of the seven programs in our review had developed a 
comprehensive system that included a full-range of aviation statistics 
to track the effectiveness of their aircraft, and only one that 
evaluates the continuing need for their aircraft under OMB Circular A-
126.

Figure 2 displays our assessment of whether the programs we reviewed 
had implemented the key concepts of fleet management planning when 
acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets. In general, we found that 
FAA's Flight Inspection, DOJ's JPATS, USDA Forest Service, and FWS 
programs had implemented many of the key concepts of fleet management 
planning when acquiring and managing their fleets. In contrast, FAA's 
Hangar 6, DEA, and DOS's INL/A programs made less frequent use of these 
key concepts when acquiring and managing their fleets. Summaries of how 
the agencies we reviewed implemented the key principles of fleet 
management planning follow the chart. Detailed information on the 
programs we reviewed can be found in appendixes IV through X.

Figure 2: Implementation of Key Fleet Management Planning Principles: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Most Programs Made Limited Use of Long-term Strategic Planning: 

Overall, federal aircraft programs we reviewed generally engaged in 
limited long-term strategic planning for the purpose of assessing and 
determining their fleet requirements. For example, only two of the 
seven programs we reviewed had produced a comprehensive long-term plan 
that identified future mission requirements and a recommended mix of 
aircraft to meet those requirements. In 2002, FAA's Flight Inspection 
program issued a study that evaluated the program's future workload; 
how many flight hours it would take to meet that workload; and what the 
optimal, most cost-effective mix of aircraft would be to perform the 
program's mission. The study resulted in a recommendation to replace 
much of the current fleet with smaller, more efficient aircraft. FAA 
officials stated that they hope to implement these recommendations, if 
funding is available. Similarly, in 1997 DOJ's JPATS program completed 
a comprehensive strategic plan estimating how many and what type of 
prisoners the program would need to transport over a 5-year period, the 
program's resources needed to perform this task, and what mix of 
aircraft would be best-suited for the program's future needs. This 
study also resulted in a recommendation to replace many current JPATS 
aircraft with more efficient aircraft. DOJ officials stated that they 
have been trying to implement these recommendations but have been 
delayed due to budgetary and contracting concerns. Although these two 
programs have recently produced long-term strategic plans for the 
aircraft fleet, neither has a mechanism in place to regularly produce 
such plans.

Three of the other programs we reviewed had recently produced some 
long-term fleet plans, but nothing as comprehensive as the Flight 
Inspection or JPATS programs. For example, although the FWS has not 
produced a long-term strategic fleet plan for its entire fleet of 57 
aircraft, in 2003 it produced a long-term assessment and fleet 
replacement plan for the portion of its fleet of aircraft used to 
survey migratory bird routes. This plan recommended replacing nine 
outdated aircraft by purchasing nine new aircraft beginning in 2005. 
Also, in the Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-10) for the 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7), the 
conferees directed that DEA produce a 5-year strategic plan for its 
aircraft program. The plan includes some recommendations on replacing 
portions of its fleet, including its aging OH-6 helicopters, but did 
not include a detailed analysis of how many flight hours would be 
required of its fleet and what mix of aircraft would be best suited to 
DEA's mission. Finally, the USDA Forest Service completed two 
replacement studies for its fleet of Beech Baron planes that direct 
other aircraft fighting forest fires but USDA Forest Service officials 
indicated they have not done such a study for the USDA Forest Service's 
entire fleet of aircraft.

The remaining two programs we reviewed (DOS-INL/A and FAA's Hangar 6) 
did not engage in long-term planning that estimated the future, long-
term mission requirements for their programs and what mix of aircraft 
was best suited for these requirements. These programs had general 
ideas about the future mission requirements of their programs and when 
particular aircraft in their fleets would need to be replaced. However, 
these programs had not performed a comprehensive, fleetwide analysis of 
these issues and had not studied the optimal fleet mix for their future 
requirements.

During the course of our review, GSA identified DOE as an example of a 
federal aircraft program that had successfully implemented the key 
principles of fleet management. For example, DOE officials stated they 
implemented a comprehensive long-term planning process in which DOE 
strategically assesses its aircraft program's long-term fleet 
requirements. In 2001, DOE published the results of their planning 
process. According to DOE officials, this document, the Comprehensive 
Aviation Program Study, recommended selling five aircraft and acquiring 
two others. DOE plans to perform this type of study every 5 years and 
update the study on an ongoing basis in the interim.

Programs Use Differing Methods for Justifying and Making Cost-effective 
Aircraft Acquisition Decisions: 

Each of the seven aircraft programs we reviewed used different methods 
to justify their needs to acquire aircraft and used different amounts 
of documentation to ensure the most cost-effective aircraft was 
acquired--an important principle of comprehensive fleet management. 
These processes range from programs that require formal cost-benefit 
analyses and review by officials outside the aircraft program before 
acquiring an aircraft to those that have an informal process in which 
aircraft are acquired as needed with only limited analysis required. 
For example, FAA's Flight Inspection program uses a process that all 
FAA programs are subject to when they acquire capital assets. Under 
this process, the acquiring program prepares an analysis documenting 
the need for the aircraft and recommending the most cost-effective 
aircraft to acquire. After that, an outside group, independent of the 
acquiring program, reviews this documentation to determine if the 
acquisition is justified. Conversely, the DOS's INL/A program uses no 
set criteria or documentation to approve an aircraft acquisition and 
there is no outside, independent review of their decisions.

To gain a better understanding of how the programs we reviewed 
justified and documented their aircraft acquisitions, we asked program 
officials to provide us documentation on 28 of the aircraft they 
acquired.[Footnote 8] These aircraft had a combined initial acquisition 
value of over $129 million.[Footnote 9] Specifically, we asked program 
officials to provide A-76 reviews for the aircraft we selected. OMB 
Circular A-76 requires federal programs to perform an analysis of 
whether or not an aircraft they are acquiring should be owned and/or 
operated by the federal government or contracted out to a private 
entity. The circular also requires that programs provide the results of 
this review to GSA and OMB. The overarching principles of fleet 
management planning and modernization would also indicate that programs 
should complete a cost-benefit analysis before acquiring any aircraft. 
We found that programs had completed A-76 reviews for only 3 of the 28 
aircraft whose documentation we reviewed. Only the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (once) and the USDA Forest Service (twice) had completed an 
A-76. In all other cases, programs stated that the aircraft we had 
selected were considered by agency officials to be exempt from OMB 
Circular A-76 requirements because the aircraft performed inherently 
governmental missions, were replacements for existing aircraft, or had 
been mandated by Congress.

However, Circular A-76 explicitly states that programs should file A-76 
reviews in most instances because, although the mission of the program 
may be inherently governmental, the aircraft does not necessarily have 
to be government owned or operated. In addition, we found that some of 
these programs had hired contractors to perform the same aviation 
functions for them, which contradicted their views that the missions 
were inherently governmental, and thus needed to be completed by 
government employees using government-owned aircraft. Furthermore, 
Circulars A-76 and A-126 require programs to meet its requirements 
whenever they acquire an aircraft and does not make a distinction as to 
whether the aircraft is a replacement of an existing aircraft or an 
addition to the fleet. GAO and several Offices of Inspectors General 
have repeatedly found aircraft programs that do not complete A-76 
reviews before acquiring their aircraft.[Footnote 10] Despite the 
circular's requirements, OMB staff stated that they do not verify the 
material in A-76 studies that programs submit nor do they ensure that 
such studies are completed. Also, OMB staff stated that they rely on 
program officials to determine whether they need to prepare A-76 
reviews or decide the requirements do not apply to their programs 
because their operations are inherently governmental.[Footnote 11] As 
we have previously reported, OMB does not view its role as requiring 
agencies to undertake A-76 cost comparisons, and it has not 
consistently worked with agencies to ensure that provisions of A-76 are 
being effectively implemented.[Footnote 12] In addition, we reported 
that A-76 has not appeared to be a high priority within OMB or civilian 
agencies and, as a result, little effort has been taken to use the A-76 
process.

In addition to A-76 reviews, another way federal aircraft programs can 
help ensure that they acquire the most cost-effective aircraft to meet 
their needs is to perform a cost-benefit analysis that includes a life 
cycle cost analysis on any aircraft a program is considering acquiring. 
GAO and several agencies' Offices of Inspectors General have 
recommended that programs perform these cost-benefit analyses prior to 
acquiring aircraft. Despite this, we found that, in general, programs 
had performed such analyses for only one-third of the programs' 
aircraft we selected and that five of the seven programs we reviewed 
had added at least one aircraft without performing such a study. FAA's 
Flight Inspection program and the USDA Forest Service were the most 
consistent as far as preparing such studies. In contrast, the remaining 
programs had either performed such analyses in only some instances, or, 
as was the case with DOS's INL/A operation and DEA, they did not 
document or could not locate their analyses.

Programs Did Not Have Comprehensive Systems for Assessing Fleet 
Performance: 

We found that programs were implementing the final key principle of 
fleet management--assessing fleet performance--to varying degrees. 
Overall, we found that none of the seven programs we reviewed had 
established a wide range of statistical goals or targets that were 
routinely tracked to judge the effectiveness of their aircraft. These 
statistics could include data on whether a particular part on an 
aircraft has failed several times, how frequently pilots are flying 
aircraft, or how long it takes to repair a particular malfunction. Five 
of the seven programs we reviewed tracked some statistics but did not 
include a full range that focused on all aspects of their aircraft 
programs. Generally, these programs focused on performance indicators 
measuring how often an aircraft was disabled and unable to fulfill its 
mission. The remaining two programs--FAA's Hangar 6 and the FWS--do not 
routinely track any performance indicators on their aircraft. In 
contrast to these programs, DOE has implemented a comprehensive 
performance management system that tracks nearly 40 performance 
indicators. The Director of DOE's Office of Aviation Management stated 
that DOE aviation staff frequently review these indicators and would be 
able to discover issues that they otherwise might not. For instance, 
DOE staff would be able to identify if delivery of certain parts was 
consistently slow, keeping their aircraft grounded longer than they 
needed to be. They would then be able to make changes to address the 
problem.

Having a system of performance measures in place can also help a 
program fulfill the requirements of another OMB circular designed to 
assist programs in assessing their operations. OMB Circular A-126 
requires continuing needs analyses in which programs periodically 
assess the cost-effectiveness of their operations and determine whether 
their aircraft are still necessary. However, we found that six of the 
seven programs we reviewed were not performing these continuing needs 
analyses, stating that they were exempt from the requirements or did 
not know about them. Only the FWS had completed an A-126 review. Much 
like A-76 reviews, OMB staff stated they do not verify the information 
in A-126 reviews nor ensure that agencies complete the reviews as the 
circular directs.

Budget Scoring Rules May Cause Agencies to Select Costly Shorter-term 
Leases, Which Can Potentially Increase Long-term Acquisition Costs: 

With the average age of the federal aircraft fleet exceeding 25 years 
and nearly 45 percent being older than 30 years, many federal aircraft 
programs may soon need to spend millions of dollars acquiring new or 
replacement aircraft. As program managers proceed through this process, 
they will be faced with the decision of whether to (1) purchase the 
aircraft outright; (2) use a lease-purchase arrangement in which 
programs make payments for a period of years, at the end of which they 
would own the aircraft; or (3) use short-or longer-term operating 
leases.[Footnote 13] During the course of our review, officials from 
some aircraft programs indicated that, when budgetary constraints 
precluded the purchase of aircraft, they have attempted to use lease-
purchase or long-term lease options. However, they said that federal 
budget scoring guidelines as presented in OMB Circular A-11 have 
effectively precluded these options.[Footnote 14] As a result, 
programs are left with either continuing to use their existing fleet 
or entering into short-term operating leases, which increase the cost 
of their acquisitions by millions of dollars.

To effectively allocate resources, Congress needs to know and vote on 
the full cost of any program it approves at the time a funding decision 
is made. Thus, scorekeeping rules require that budget authority for the 
cost of purchasing an asset--whether it be outright federal purchase or 
lease-purchase--be recorded in the budget when it can be controlled, 
that is, up front so that decision makers have the information needed 
and an incentive to take the full cost of their decisions into account. 
Under budget scoring rules, if a program uses a lease-purchase, it must 
have budget authority in an amount equal to the present value of the 
total lease payments for the asset. Scoring the full costs up-front 
permits Congress to compare a lease-purchase with an outright purchase. 
However, this scoring results in pressures to use operating leases, 
because if a program uses an operating lease, it needs up-front budget 
authority to cover only the first year lease payments plus any 
cancellation costs. Therefore, a program could spread the budgetary 
impact of acquiring the use of an asset over a number of years using an 
operating lease.

As we have reported in the past, purchasing assets is typically the 
least costly option, followed by the lease-purchase option, which is 
more expensive than purchasing assets, but less costly than using 
short-term operating leases.[Footnote 15] While short-term operating 
leases are more costly over time compared with other options, they add 
much less to a single year's total appropriation, making them a more 
attractive option from an agency's perspective, particularly when it 
believes that funds for ownership would not be made available. With 
regard to acquiring aircraft, a GSA consultant's 2003 study showed the 
cost impact of these different acquisition methods.[Footnote 16] 
According to the study, the net cost of acquiring a $10 million 
aircraft, after subtracting the residual value of the aircraft after 10 
years, would be about $3.5 million. This same aircraft would have a 
10-year net cost of about $5.5 million if acquired though a 5-year 
lease-purchase, $9.6 million by using a 10-year operating lease, and 
$18 million by using a series of ten 1-year operating leases.[Footnote 
17]

Officials at several programs we visited stated that if they had 
sufficient budget authority they would not need to finance aircraft, 
and their first choice would be to purchase aircraft, because it costs 
less in the long run. As a result, officials indicated that if funding 
is not available for purchasing an aircraft, their options are limited 
to using more costly shorter-term leases that can meet the operating 
lease definition spelled out in Circular A-11 or continue to fund the 
operation and maintenance of older, less reliable aircraft until 
funding becomes available to acquire new ones. For example, in 2003 FAA 
Hanger 6 decided they needed two replacement aircraft. Since funding 
was not available to purchase these aircraft they entered into two 1-
year leases, with four 1-year renewable options. A study for FAA's 
Hanger 6 program estimated that the net cost of purchasing the two 
aircraft would be about $7.7 million, after subtracting the residual 
value of the aircraft after 10 years. If they were to acquire these 
aircraft though lease-purchase they estimated the net cost of about 
$10.7 million.[Footnote 18] The study estimated the cost of acquiring 
these aircraft through operating leases over the 10-year period to be 
about $21.3 million--$13.6 million and $10.6 million more than the 
outright purchase and lease-purchase options, respectively. JPATS is 
also in the process of acquiring replacement aircraft. A study 
examining the cost of acquiring seven large transport aircraft 
estimated that it could cost about $117 million to purchase the 
aircraft, about $137 million to use lease-purchase, about $183 million 
for a 7-year lease, and $208 million for seven 1-year leases.[Footnote 
19]

OMB staff told us that purchasing an aircraft is more cost effective 
than various lease options because a program can avoid financing costs, 
so programs should purchase aircraft, rather than finance them. They 
indicated that if the aircraft acquisition is a high enough priority, 
program officials should work through the budget process to obtain the 
funding needed to acquire it.

Decision makers have struggled with this matter since the scoring rules 
were established and the tendency for agencies to choose operating 
leases instead of ownership became apparent. We have suggested the 
alternative of up-front scoring of those leases that are perceived by 
all sides as long-term federal commitments so that all options are 
treated equally.[Footnote 20] Although this could be viable, there 
would be implementation challenges if this were pursed, including the 
need to evaluate the validity of agencies' requirements. Another 
option, which was recommended in 1999 and discussed by GAO, would be 
for agencies to establish capital acquisition funds to pursue ownership 
where it is advantageous, from an economic perspective.[Footnote 21] 
Finding a solution for this problem has been difficult; leasing to meet 
long-term needs results in excessive costs to taxpayers and does not 
reflect a sensible approach to capital asset management.

Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Operational and Safety 
Standards, but Oversight Is Voluntary and Varied: 

The federal aircraft programs included in our review had developed 
operations, maintenance, and safety standards specific to their 
programs even though their public use operations are exempted from many 
regulatory requirements that apply to "civil use" aircraft. The 
programs required their aircraft operations to comply, at a minimum, 
with FAA's basic rules governing all civil flight operations, and some 
of the programs required their aircraft operations to develop standards 
beyond the basic rules and comply with more restrictive FAA aircraft 
regulations. Although federal aircraft programs had developed various 
standards without being required to do so, the use of oversight to help 
ensure the safety, effectiveness, and efficiency of the programs varied 
greatly. We found that each agency is responsible for managing its 
aircraft programs, writing standards based on the ICAP safety standards 
guidelines, and instituting an oversight process. Although the federal 
agencies have taken steps to mitigate the risks of their dangerous 
missions, it is not possible to eliminate the risk and, as a result, 
the operations have resulted in some accidents. Our review of accident 
data for all federal programs found 183 accidents and incidents from 
April 1995 through October 2003. Most of these accidents occurred 
during dangerous missions, such as fire suppression and complex 
training maneuvers, and were generally the result of pilot error.

Federal Aircraft Programs Have Developed Standards That Exceed Federal 
Requirements: 

Federal aircraft programs operate and maintain aircraft that are 
engaged in some of the most dangerous types of flight possible. For 
example, USDA Forest Service pilots often fly 150 feet above ground 
level at roughly 175 miles per hour when dropping fire retardant in an 
effort to suppress forest fires. Despite the inherently dangerous 
nature of some of their missions, federal aircraft are exempt from most 
safety requirements that apply to civil and commercial aircraft, with 
the exception of the airspace rules referred to in certain sections of 
C.F.R., Part 91, that all aircraft operators must follow.[Footnote 22] 
For example, operators of public aircraft are not required to have an 
FAA pilot or medical certificate ensuring they are able and medically 
fit to operate aircraft; pilots who fly civil aircraft must have these 
minimum credentials.

Recognizing that the inherently dangerous nature of their missions 
require a focus on safety, each aircraft program we reviewed had 
voluntarily developed systems specific to their programs to help ensure 
safety. These systems set a level of standards to address the 
operational, maintenance, and safety issues associated with operating 
the aircraft programs. The operations standards generally covered 
program policies and procedures, pilot qualifications, and crew 
training and proficiency requirements. The maintenance standards 
provided procedures for maintaining the programs' aircraft, which 
included maintenance management responsibilities, personnel 
qualifications, maintenance and inspection procedures, and a means of 
tracking maintenance actions. Finally, the safety standards established 
guidelines for the protection and preservation of personnel and 
property against injury and loss. They covered items such as aircraft 
accident investigation and reporting requirements, mission risk 
assessment processes, mission safety guidelines, and program safety 
review requirements.

Each of the programs that we reviewed developed specific operations, 
maintenance, and safety standards governing a wide variety of aircraft 
operations. Because of the differences in the missions, the standards 
for each aircraft program were developed specific to the program's 
mission. Based on our review of these standards, and discussions with 
program officials, we found that the standards federal aircraft 
programs had developed exceeded the requirements for public use 
operations. Each of the programs we reviewed also voluntarily adopted 
ICAP's Safety Standards Guidelines for Federal Flight Programs. The 
standards outline five major components of an effective aviation safety 
system--management/administration, operations, maintenance, training, 
and safety.

In addition, we found some of the programs developed standards 
significantly above the basic operating rules set out in 14 C.F.R. Part 
91 and required compliance with the more restrictive FAA aircraft 
regulations, 14 C.F.R. Part 135.[Footnote 23] For example, FAA made a 
policy decision to comply with Part 135 regulations prescribed for 
civil operations. Still, two of the federal aircraft programs developed 
requirements to operate above the requirements of Part 91 but do not 
comply with all of the higher standards of Part 135 and 14 C.F.R. Part 
121.[Footnote 24] To illustrate, JPATS officials said their operations 
and safety standards attempt to mirror those in Part 121 relating to 
air carrier operations but cannot meet all of the standards of Part 
121 because of the associated costs of maintaining maintenance and 
parts facilities at each location their aircraft visit. Thus, JPATS 
met some of the Part 121 standards, such as pilot qualifications and 
training requirements, but its maintenance is conducted at the less 
restrictive Part 91 level.

Agencies Use Differing Approaches to Aircraft Program Oversight: 

FAA is generally considered the federal government's expert for 
overseeing and regulating aircraft safety, operations, and maintenance. 
In the interest of public safety, FAA regulates civil aircraft 
requiring that operators, pilots, crew, and maintenance personnel 
comply with general standards and procedures. In addition, FAA's flight 
inspectors examine the operations, maintenance, and airworthiness of 
commercial aircraft. As a result of these inspections, aircraft can be 
grounded until corrective actions are taken to address the inspector's 
findings. However, FAA's responsibilities for flight safety do not 
reach to the aircraft used for public use operations by federal 
agencies.[Footnote 25]

Because there are no regulatory requirements for oversight of federal 
aircraft programs, it is left to each program to determine the best 
oversight process for making certain that it is complying with its 
policies and safety standards. An oversight process can help ensure 
that each federal aircraft program continues to operate as safely as 
possible. We found that some programs chose to undergo external 
oversight voluntarily, while others relied on self-enforcement. For 
example, the two FAA programs, Hangar 6 and Flight Inspection, both 
undergo safety reviews from FAA's Flight Standards Service staff. 
Flight Standards is the organization within FAA that has oversight 
responsibilities for all civil aviation operations. FAA officials 
stated that the Flight Standards Service subjects FAA's aircraft 
programs to the same level of scrutiny and inspection that it gives the 
commercial industry.

Two programs we reviewed, JPATS and INL/A had established program 
requirements that require them to undergo GSA's Aviation Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS) reviews. JPATS has a requirement to complete 
an ARMS review every 4 years, and DOS's INL/A has an ARMS review 
requirement for each of its site locations on a periodic basis. An ARMS 
review, coordinated through ICAP, is an evaluative process for safety 
and accident prevention used for discovering deficiencies in federal 
aircraft programs in the areas of operations, training, and facilities. 
The criteria used in the ARMS reviews are derived from the ICAP Safety 
Standards Guidelines. In implementing a review to assess a program's 
operations, ICAP forms a safety team that generally includes FAA 
personnel to ensure the team has adequate safety expertise. Between 
1991 and 2002, ICAP completed 22 ARMS reviews. Although the evaluative 
results of program-specific ARMS reviews are not publicly available, 
GSA performed a trend analysis of the 10 ARMS reviews completed between 
1997 and 2002 found many of the same safety issues existed at several 
programs. These issues included having an insufficient number of 
instructors to conduct aviation training, not having a formal general 
maintenance manual, lack of trained personnel to accomplish assigned 
missions, and flight crews not thoroughly planning flights.

In contrast, the USDA Forest Service, DEA, and FWS subject themselves 
to internal reviews of their operations. Each FWS region undergoes a 
program review performed by the Department of the Interior's National 
Business Center-Aviation Management Directorate (AMD) every 5 years. 
This review involves a broad examination of FWS' aircraft program 
administration, training, operations, and safety systems in each 
region. FWS officials said the AMD program review is considered an 
external oversight process, and they believe AMD's inspections and 5-
year reviews are sufficient. The USDA Forest Service and DEA elected to 
undergo program reviews that are initiated and performed internally. 
DEA officials stated that their internal safety and training reviews 
are conducted using guidelines established by outside agencies. In 
addition, DEA plans to undergo an ARMS review in the next year and an 
internal DEA Office of Inspections review in July 2004.

Although the programs are responsible for the oversight of their public 
use operations, we found that some confusion exists over what party is 
responsible for ensuring that contractors are meeting operations, 
maintenance, and safety requirements. Government regulations require 
that when federal aircraft programs enter into contractual agreements 
with commercial operators to fulfill their missions, they include 
operational, maintenance, and safety requirements in the agreements. 
For example, 2 years ago two USDA Forest Service contracted aircraft 
crashed after their wings came detached during flight. The USDA Forest 
Service had included maintenance requirements in its contracts for the 
air tankers that required compliance with Part 135 maintenance 
standards. USDA Forest Service officials said they believed that 
because they had required Part 135 compliance, it was FAA's 
responsibility to ensure that the contractors were meeting those 
maintenance requirements. However, FAA officials stated that when 
federal aircraft programs use contracted aircraft to fulfill a public 
use mission, it is the responsibility of the agencies to monitor the 
contractors. Consequently, neither the USDA Forest Service nor FAA were 
ensuring that the contractors were meeting the maintenance and safety 
standards set forth in the contracts.

A blue ribbon panel formed after the accidents concluded that until new 
contracting processes are implemented and backed by FAA's participation 
and oversight, this situation would likely continue. FAA officials told 
us that they would consider providing safety inspections to federal 
agencies on a reimbursable, resource-available basis if an agency 
requested this service. In addition, NTSB investigated these accidents 
and found that oversight of aircraft used in firefighting operations 
was not adequate to ensure safe operations. On April 23, 2004, NTSB 
issued a letter to the Departments of Agriculture and Interior--federal 
agencies that routinely conduct firefighting operations--and FAA that 
concluded the firefighting agencies must ensure the continuing 
airworthiness of firefighting aircraft and monitor the adequacy of 
maintenance programs used for these aircraft.[Footnote 26] NTSB made a 
number of recommendations to these agencies to ensure the continued 
airworthiness of aircraft used in firefighting operations. Subsequent 
to this letter, USDA Forest Service and DOI determined they do not have 
in-house expertise to certify the airworthiness of these aircraft and, 
therefore, decided to ground the planes and cancel all existing 
contracts for air tanker services.

Federal Aircraft Programs Are Required to Report Accidents and 
Incidents: 

Federal aircraft programs are required to report to the NTSB when 
accidents or incidents occur.[Footnote 27] Since 1995, NTSB has had 
authority to investigate and determine probable cause of all federal 
aircraft accidents or incidents.[Footnote 28] We identified 183 
accidents and incidents occurring from April 1995 through October 2003 
involving federally owned and contracted aircraft that resulted in 91 
fatalities. Figure 3 shows the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents 
and incidents reported to NTSB during the period April 1995 through 
October 2003.[Footnote 29]

Figure 3: Federal Fatal and Nonfatal Accidents and Incidents, April 
1995 - October 2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

We found three primary categories of causes of federal aircraft 
accidents and incidents identified by NTSB: (1) human factors, 
including pilots, maintenance staff, flight crews, and management; (2) 
environmental factors, including light conditions, terrain, objects, 
and weather; and (3) mechanical malfunction, including structure and 
systems failure, fuel exhaustion, and engine failure. In addition to 
the primary causes, NTSB often finds other contributing factors that 
may have lead to an accident or incident. Table 3 identifies the 
primary cause and contributing factors that NTSB determined for the 
federal aircraft accidents and incidents.

Table 3: Causes and Contributing Factors to the 183 Federal Aircraft 
Accidents and Incidents, April 1995 - October 2003: 

Human: Pilot; 
Primary cause: 103; 
Contributing factor: 3; 
Total: 106; 
Percentage of accidents: 58%.

Human: Maintenance; 
Primary cause: 6; 
Contributing factor: 7; 
Total: 13; 
Percentage of accidents: 7%.

Human: Crew; 
Primary cause: 2; 
Contributing factor: 7; 
Total: 9; 
Percentage of accidents: 5%.

Human: Management; 
Primary cause: 0; 
Contributing factor: 9; 
Total: 9; 
Percentage of accidents: 5%.

Human: Other; 
Primary cause: 2; 
Contributing factor: 3; 
Total: 5; 
Percentage of accidents: 3%.

Human: Subtotal; 
Primary cause: 113; 
Contributing factor: 29; 
Total: 142; 
Percentage of accidents: 78%.

Environment: Light conditions; 
Primary cause: 0; 
Contributing factor: 6; 
Total: 6; 
Percentage of accidents: 3%.

Environment: Terrain; 
Primary cause: 1; 
Contributing factor: 19; 
Total: 20; 
Percentage of accidents: 11%.

Environment: Object; 
Primary cause: 3; 
Contributing factor: 12; 
Total: 15; 
Percentage of accidents: 8%.

Environment: Weather; 
Primary cause: 2; 
Contributing factor: 35; 
Total: 37; 
Percentage of accidents: 20%.

Environment: Subtotal; 
Primary cause: 6; 
Contributing factor: 72; 
Total: 78; 
Percentage of accidents: 43%.

Mechanical: Structure and systems; 
Primary cause: 14; 
Contributing factor: 8; 
Total: 22; 
Percentage of accidents: 12%.

Mechanical: Fuel; 
Primary cause: 4; 
Contributing factor: 5; 
Total: 9; 
Percentage of accidents: 5%.

Mechanical: Engine; 
Primary cause: 10; 
Contributing factor: 11; 
Total: 21; 
Percentage of accidents: 11%.

Mechanical: Subtotal; 
Primary cause: 28; 
Contributing factor: 24; 
Total: 52; 
Percentage of accidents: 28%.

Unknown: Cause not identified; 
Primary cause: 4; 
Contributing factor: 0; 
Total: 4; 
Percentage of accidents: 2%.

Unknown: Ongoing investigation; 
Primary cause: 32; 
Contributing factor: 0; 
Total: 32; 
Percentage of accidents: 18%.

Subtotal; 
Primary cause: 36; 
Contributing factor: 0; 
Total: 36; 
Percentage of accidents: 20%. 

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB accident data.

Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal to the total number of 
accidents and incidents because a single accident or incident could 
have none or multiple contributing factors. In addition, percent 
columns do not add to 100 because a single accident could have more 
than one category of causes or contributing factors.

[End of table]

The table shows that human factors caused or contributed to 142, or 78 
percent, of all federal aircraft accidents and incidents. Pilot error 
was the most frequently cited primary cause, contributing to 58 percent 
of all federal aircraft accidents and incidents we reviewed. Our review 
of safety reports and discussions with agency officials confirmed that 
pilot and crew error have historically been a safety challenge. 
Examples of pilot error included operating at inadequate speeds, not 
following procedures, and lack of experience. There also appeared to be 
a link between pilot error and environmental factors and mechanical 
failure. For example, more than half of the 103 accidents and incidents 
caused by pilot error were due to the pilots' actions during adverse 
weather conditions; while in close proximity to objects and terrain, 
such as power lines and trees; or during mechanical breakdown.

We also found that the number of accidents and incidents varied by the 
nature of the mission. For example, 98 of the 183 accidents and 
incidents, or 54 percent, occurred during firefighting missions, law 
enforcement, and training operations (see fig. 4). These missions 
involve such activities as abrupt and sharp turns; low-level 
maneuvering; excessively slow or fast speeds; and landings on water and 
ice-covered runways and lakes.

Figure 4: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Mission April 
1995 - October 2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Repositioning involves moving an aircraft from one location to 
another for future use.

[End of figure] 

We also found that a higher proportion of federal aircraft accidents 
and incidents occurred during the flight of the mission, compared with 
approach and landings, when most of the commercial aircraft accidents 
occur. Overall, about 34 percent of the 183 accidents and incidents 
occurred during the maneuvering phase of the mission, such as dropping 
fire retardants, capturing animals, enforcing drug laws, and crop 
dusting. For example, 12 of the 17 or 71 percent of predator control 
accidents and incidents occurred during the maneuvering phase of 
flight.[Footnote 30] Predator control missions require pilots to turn 
at sharp angles and fly at aggressively fast speeds to chase and 
capture a predator in close proximity to trees and other terrain.

Finally, we found that about half of the 183 accidents and incidents 
occurred in privately owned aircraft that were under government 
contract. We reviewed the data to determine whether the accidents or 
incidents occurred more frequently with aircraft owned and operated by 
the federal government or with commercial aviation services obtained 
from the private sector. Although we were not able to determine 
ownership in all 183 accidents and incidents, we were able to identify 
95 accidents and incidents (or 51 percent) that occurred in privately 
owned aircraft (see fig. 5).

Figure 5: Classification of Accidents and Incidents by Aircraft Owner: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In reviewing the NTSB data we found that privately owned aircraft under 
government contract completed a majority of the search and rescue, 
firefighting, crop protection, predator control, and passenger/cargo 
missions. For example, according to our analysis, 79 percent of the 44 
USDA Forest Service accidents and incidents during the timeframe 
occurred in privately owned aircraft. According to a USDA Forest 
Service official, the safety of contracted aircraft has been a 
longstanding issue, because the contracting process assumed that FAA's 
certification ensured the aircraft's safety. In contrast, the owners of 
the aircraft were responsible for maintaining their own safety. Two 
highly publicized accidents that occurred during firefighting 
highlighted safety issues associated with the government's use of 
contractor-supplied aircraft. According to a study commissioned by the 
USDA Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management following 
these accidents, the contracting process for acquiring the services of 
privately owned aircraft is limited, because it does not require 
contractors to operate their aircraft in accordance with maintenance 
and inspection schedules tailored to the conditions of 
firefighting.[Footnote 31]

Conclusions: 

In order to cost effectively manage federal aircraft programs, managers 
need accurate and complete cost data and a systematic process for 
determining aircraft fleet requirements and the best mix of aircraft to 
meet those requirements. Developing accurate cost and usage data is a 
critical first step to conducting meaningful assessments of federal 
aircraft programs. Since 1992, OMB Circular A-126 has directed GSA to 
operate a governmentwide aircraft management information system to 
collect, analyze, and report on the aircraft that programs own or hire 
and the usage of those aircraft. GSA has developed the FAIRS system to 
fulfill its requirements under the circular. FAIRS was designed to 
correct many of the problems inherent in the system it replaced. 
However, FAIRS data is insufficient for conducting detailed analyses or 
drawing useful conclusions on the condition and performance of federal 
aircraft operations because it does not capture the full costs 
associated with acquiring, operating, and maintaining federal aircraft. 
Existing FAIRS reporting guidance is vague and allows programs latitude 
in what cost elements to report. Also, the system provides no mechanism 
to ensure programs adhere to reporting requirements. This results in 
some programs excluding specific items, such as pilot salaries and fuel 
costs; and other programs excluding the entire costs of their aircraft 
programs--items totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. In addition, 
the design of the FAIRS system itself excludes important aircraft 
program costs such as those associated with acquiring and financing 
aircraft. By excluding the cost of acquiring aircraft, this system does 
not capture a significant portion of aircraft program costs. Further, 
the FAIRS system lacks sufficient internal controls to maintain data 
integrity. We found that some controls over the entry, review, and 
approval of FAIRS data were ineffective.

Developing accurate and reliable cost data for federal aircraft 
programs is only one part of a system to ensure cost-effective 
management and use of aircraft. Federal aircraft programs are, or soon 
will be, facing decisions about what to do with their aging fleets. A 
substantial portion of the federally owned aircraft fleet is 
approaching or past the age when aircraft become increasingly 
unreliable and more costly to operate; thus, programs will be faced 
with spending considerable sums on modernizing and upgrading their old, 
inefficient fleets. Federal aircraft programs will need to make cost-
effective decisions on how best to modernize their fleets in order to 
stretch their available funding as far as possible and in accordance 
with applicable budget scoring rules. However, some agencies have not 
developed adequate systems to acquire and manage their aircraft fleets 
in the most cost-effective manner. Programs have continued to spend 
millions of dollars acquiring aircraft without completing required OMB 
reviews or consistently performing cost benefit analyses. Officials 
from many of these programs believe that they are exempt from meeting 
OMB requirements to assess the cost effectiveness of their aircraft 
acquisitions and operations, despite repeated studies calling for them 
to complete such reviews. OMB provides limited oversight of the 
applicable circulars and leaves it up to the programs' discretion to 
determine whether and when to complete required reviews. In addition, 
programs lack comprehensive performance management systems that could 
help them prioritize those aircraft in greatest need of replacement. In 
meeting these future needs, a wide range of guidance and analytical 
tools is available to these programs, including OMB circulars, GSA 
fleet management guidance, and lessons learned from other programs such 
as FAA and DOE. By utilizing these available tools, program managers 
can begin developing comprehensive fleet management planning processes, 
which will help them identify needed replacements and provide added 
assurance that their replacement decisions are the most cost effective 
for the government.

In addition, each of the programs we reviewed subjected themselves to 
varying levels of safety and accident prevention oversight. FAA's two 
programs are examined by the same organization that inspects civil 
aviation operations, and two other programs have had aspects of their 
operations reviewed through use of GSA's ICAP Aviation Resource 
Management Surveys. Historically, these GSA-sponsored reviews have 
found that many of the same safety issues existed at several programs. 
The three other programs have relied on internal reviews of their 
operations. While it was beyond the scope of our review to evaluate the 
adequacy of these varying approaches to oversight, a comprehensive 
oversight system can play a key role in identifying potential issues 
before they become safety problems.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In order to improve the completeness and accuracy of the FAIRS database 
so that it captures all aircraft program costs and is useful for 
conducting detailed analyses of the condition and performance of the 
federal aircraft fleet, we are making the following three 
recommendations to the Administrator of GSA: 

* Clarify existing FAIRS guidance to agencies to identify those cost 
elements that all aircraft programs should report to the FAIRS system, 
make the reporting of those elements mandatory, and develop a mechanism 
to ensure that agencies comply with reporting requirements.

* Expand existing FAIRS guidance to require that programs report 
additional aviation costs associated with acquiring aircraft, not 
currently required, which would provide more complete and accurate data 
on the composition and cost of the federal aircraft fleet and, thus, 
enhance GSA's annual report on federal aircraft operations. At a 
minimum, agencies should be required to report acquisition, financing, 
and self-insurance costs.

* Conduct periodic testing of the FAIRS database to ensure that 
existing systems controls are working as designed and work with ICAP to 
identify, develop, and implement additional controls as necessary.

In order to ensure that federal aircraft programs have the capability 
to make sound fleet management decisions, we are making the following 
recommendation to the Administrator of GSA: 

* Direct the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy to work with its 
members to develop a model fleet management planning process. At a 
minimum, this process should include guidance to help agencies 
strategically assess long-term fleet requirements, acquire the most 
cost-effective aircraft to meet those requirements, and continually 
assess fleet performance.

Given the wide variety of oversight provided these programs and the 
important role oversight can play in helping enhance safety, we are 
making the following recommendation to the Administrator of GSA: 

* Direct the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy to examine the 
oversight being provided to federal aircraft programs and provide 
additional guidance, as necessary, on areas where enhanced oversight 
could improve the safety of federal aircraft operations.

In order to help ensure that federal aircraft programs are being 
managed in the most cost effective manner, we are making the following 
recommendation to the Director, OMB: 

* Review current guidance relating to the acquisition and management of 
federal aircraft, including those associated with OMB Circulars A-76 
and A-126, and develop additional guidance, as necessary, for agencies 
and OMB to achieve greater consistency in the management of federal 
aircraft programs.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from GSA, DOJ, 
USDA, and DOI. We received oral comments from DOE and OMB. We received 
comments via e-mail from DOT. NTSB and DOS did not provide comments on 
the report.

The General Services Administration generally agreed with the findings 
and noted that improvements are needed in the management of federal 
aircraft programs across the board but did not indicate whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the specific recommendations. In addition, GSA 
offered several observations on our report. First, GSA commented that 
the draft report's title obscures the audit's scope, findings, and 
recommendations and suggested we revise the title to Federal Aviation: 
Further Improvements Needed in Acquisition, Cost Accounting, 
Performance Measurement and Oversight. We did not make this suggested 
change for several reasons. In our opinion, the term "aviation" 
encompasses factors beyond aircraft, such as air traffic control 
systems and the National Airspace; therefore, we do not believe it 
accurately portrays that this report is about aircraft operated by the 
federal government. In addition, the term "Federal Aviation" could 
imply that this report is about FAA, when it encompasses many federal 
agencies. Finally, we believe that the remainder of the report's title 
accurately reflects the report's key findings and recommendations. 
Second, GSA agreed that FAIRS cost data is too understated at this 
point to draw concrete conclusions about cost effectiveness and 
stressed that the quality of the data is improving each year. It also 
stated that aircraft inventory and flight hour data are more accurate 
and useful. We recognize that FAIRS is an enhancement over the prior 
system and that GSA has worked to improve the data it contains. We 
believe that our recommendation to improve the FAIRS system and its 
controls will further aid GSA's efforts. With regard to the inventory 
and flight hour data, we agree with GSA's assessment that it is more 
accurate and useful than the cost data contained in the system. Third, 
GSA commented that there were inconsistencies in the report's 
presentation of accident and incident data. We agree with GSA's comment 
and have revised the report to clarify the accident and incident data. 
Finally, GSA commented that the draft report correctly highlights that 
many parties are responsible for effectively implementing and managing 
federal aircraft programs including GSA, OMB, other agencies, and 
Congress. However, GSA opposes interfering in other agencies' internal 
management controls for which the agencies are accountable. We agree 
that no one party bears responsibility for effective federal aircraft 
programs; therefore, some of our recommendations are directed at the 
ICAP where all responsible parties can work together to improve the 
management and use of federal aircraft. GSA also provided several 
technical comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. GSA's 
written comments are reproduced in appendix XI.

The Department of Justice generally agreed with much of the report, but 
expressed concerns regarding the implications of some statements 
contained in the report. First, the department stressed that DEA's 
long-term planning examined only a portion of its fleet because it did 
not have the financial resources or ability to identify specific 
milestones for its aircraft in that time frame. Also, it stated that 
the nature of DEA's mission was constantly changing, which makes it 
impossible to know how many flight hours its aircraft will need to 
perform. Instead, DEA focused its 5-year strategic plan on what could 
realistically be accomplished within a 5-year period. While we 
recognize that all government agencies have limited funding and 
changing mission requirements, we believe that preparing a strategic 
assessment of mission and fleet requirements is the foundation of 
effective fleet management because such analysis can identify future 
workload requirements, which define aircraft needs. We further believe 
that having such a plan allows agencies to respond proactively to 
existing and future needs and meet them as funding becomes available. 
We encourage DEA to emulate the best practices of programs that have 
prepared such a strategic assessment, such as FAA Flight Inspection and 
DOJ's JPATS programs. Second, the department commented that it believes 
that DEA's aircraft program is exempt from OMB Circular A-76 reviews 
because the majority of its missions are inherently governmental and 
require the use of law enforcement officers or other specialized DEA 
employees. As we point out in this report, GAO has observed a long 
history of noncompliance with OMB Circular A-76 and DEA, in particular, 
has previously indicated its aviation function is exempt from OMB 
Circular A-76 requirements because of the nature of its missions. 
Specifically, in our 1983 report on federal civilian aircraft programs, 
DEA stated that it is not realistic to expect drug law enforcement 
aircraft services to be provided by the private sector. Its rationale 
was that law enforcement needs are specialized and need to be available 
on demand. At that time, we agreed with DEA that law enforcement is a 
specialized area, but our position was, and remains, that all agencies 
must comply with OMB Circular A-76 in determining whether aircraft can 
be provided by the private sector. Also, DEA's argument is incongruous 
with INL/A's routine use of a contractor to fly aircraft used in drug 
eradication, interdiction, and surveillance missions. The department's 
long-standing noncompliance with OMB Circular A-76 is an example of why 
we have recommended OMB review its guidance and make necessary 
clarifications on this matter. Finally, the department further 
clarified DEA's internal safety review process and provided additional 
information regarding planned external safety reviews of DEA's aviation 
operations. We have incorporated this information in the body of this 
report. The department also provided technical comments that we have 
incorporated where appropriate. The department's written comments are 
reproduced in appendix XII.

The Department of Agriculture agreed with virtually all of the comments 
that specifically identified a USDA Forest Service need for improvement 
and indicated that, in most cases, it believed it had complied with the 
requirements of OMB Circulars A-76 and A-126 but realized it could 
improve in the areas outlined in the draft report. The department 
agreed with GAO's concerns about GSA's FAIRS database and believed the 
draft report provided an accurate assessment of USDA Forest Service 
aviation cost data. Finally, it welcomed the suggested improvements to 
FAIRS and would like to be an active participant in making improvements 
to the FAIRS database. The department's written comments are reproduced 
in appendix XIII.

The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the findings and 
recommendations contained in the report but offered clarifying comments 
to information that pertains to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 
First, FWS expressed concerns regarding our finding that inaccurate 
aviation cost data hampers the cost-effective operation of federally 
owned aircraft because GAO based its assessment on data contained in 
the FAIRS system rather than agency-specific data. FWS indicated it 
does not use the information in GSA's database and, as a result, the 
shortcomings of the FAIRS cost data do not impact the agency's ability 
to cost effectively manage its aircraft fleet. While we recognize that 
FWS does not utilize FAIRS data to manage its aircraft fleet, our 
findings are based on the extent to which agencies used a comprehensive 
system of key fleet management principles that include an analysis of 
aircraft program cost data, as well as numerous other factors such as 
long-term planning, cost-benefit analysis, and performance management 
data. Second, while FWS agreed that it does not routinely track any 
performance indicators, both FWS and DOI commented that reports are 
available that track the daily utilization of individual aircraft that 
could be used to monitor trends in utilization. As this report points 
out, having information available on the utilization of aircraft can 
provide valuable data on the performance of aircraft--data that can 
support analytically-based fleet management decisions. As such, 
utilizing these reports can only serve to aid the department and FWS in 
managing its aircraft program. The department also provided technical 
comments that we have incorporated where appropriate. The department's 
written comments are reproduced in appendix XIV.

OMB representatives agreed with the facts, conclusions, and 
recommendations of the report. With regard to the recommendation 
directed to OMB, its staff suggested that we slightly modify our 
original recommendation that it develop new guidance to one that 
recommends they review existing guidance and identify any actions 
needed to help ensure more consistency in the management of federal 
aircraft programs. We agreed and have modified the recommendation to 
OMB. OMB also provided technical comments that we incorporated where 
appropriate.

The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated where appropriate.

Officials from the Department of Energy agreed with the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations in the report and provided comments on 
a few issues. First, the officials agreed with GAO's presentation of 
the impact that OMB Circular A-11 has and will continue to have on 
programs' ability to modernize their aging aircraft fleets. The 
officials also stated that this issue merits further scrutiny from OMB 
because of the potential to add sizable unnecessary costs to aircraft 
programs. We agree that this issue is important and believe our 
discussion adequately describes the challenges facing aircraft programs 
as they attempt to modernize their fleets. Secondly, these officials 
wanted to highlight the fact that internal safety reviews can be an 
adequate mechanism for ensuring program safety if the review is 
performed by qualified staff with the requisite safety and technical 
expertise to oversee aviation operations. Although not cited in this 
report, they believe DOE's own internal program could be a model for 
other agencies to follow. Finally, DOE officials suggested that GAO 
recognize that FAIRS is an improvement over the previous federal 
aircraft database and has the ability to be an effective management 
tool if agencies would consistently follow reporting requirements and 
utilize the data in decision making. We agree that FAIRS has the 
potential to assist agencies in cost effectively managing their 
aircraft operations.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to congressional committees with responsibilities for the activities 
discussed in this report; to the Secretaries of the agencies we 
reviewed; and to the Administrators of the bureaus and offices we 
reviewed. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [Hyperlink, 
heckerj@gao.gov]. Individuals making key contributions to this report 
are listed in appendix XV.

Signed by: 

JayEtta Z. Hecker: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To provide information on the composition of the federal fleet and how 
much it costs to operate and maintain, we examined both the General 
Services Administration's (GSA) Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting 
System (FAIRS) computer system and its underlying data to attempt to 
determine the reliability of the information that the system provides. 
We analyzed GSA's FAIRS data reporting requirements, the computer-based 
system's internal controls, and the data that agencies reported into 
the system. Where possible, we compared the data that the agencies 
reported with that from their internal cost accounting systems. We 
conducted interviews with GSA officials responsible for operating and 
maintaining the FAIRS system and agency officials responsible for 
reporting the data and ensuring its accuracy. In addition, we 
interviewed an industry expert who specializes in aircraft program cost 
accounting. For this report, we are using FAIRS data for fiscal years 
2000 through 2002. Although agencies were required to submit their 
fiscal year 2003 FAIRS data by December 31, 2003, GSA had not finalized 
the data by the time we completed our analysis.

As part of our effort to examine GSA's FAIRS systems, we reviewed the 
extent and quality of controls over federal aircraft data. In doing so, 
we sought to determine whether (1) GSA had management controls in place 
to provide reasonable assurance that the FAIRS data included in its 
report were valid and reliable and (2) FAIRS data were sufficiently 
reliable for our intended use. We identified and evaluated GSA's 
management controls over the processes to collect, analyze, and report 
costs, use, and numbers of government aircraft. We did not audit the 
data that agencies submit to FAIRS, nor did we audit the data produced 
by FAIRS or the information included by GSA in its annual reports. We 
conducted background research and site visits; interviewed GSA 
officials, and collected and reviewed documentation on GSA and FAIRS to 
gain an understanding of GSA's operations and FAIRS processes, its 
inherent and control risk factors, and existing management controls. We 
documented our understanding of the processing of aircraft inventory, 
cost, and use data in FAIRS and the identified internal controls in a 
process flowchart. For each relevant process identified, we assessed 
the overall effectiveness of existing controls by conducting a walk-
through of the system and performing control testing--physical 
observation of how controls actually operated. Further, we evaluated 
the results of our analyses and testing to conclude whether GSA 
management controls provide reasonable assurance that the FAIRS data 
included in GSA's annual report are valid and reliable. We found 
information in the database was not sufficiently reliable to accurately 
determine the composition and cost of federal aircraft programs, 
however, we used the information to provide descriptive and summary 
statistics. As a result, we developed recommendations for improving or 
establishing management controls to help assure FAIRS data quality.

To determine the extent to which federal programs have systems and 
controls in place to ensure that they are effectively and efficiently 
acquiring and managing their aircraft fleets, we identified key 
principles of aircraft fleet management/modernization planning and 
assessed the extent to which the programs had implemented these 
principles. In doing so, we reviewed the systems and controls that 
seven specific aircraft programs in five agencies were currently using 
to help ensure they acquire and manage their aircraft cost effectively 
and operate and maintain their aircraft safely. The seven programs were 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration and the Justice Prisoner and Alien 
Transportation System in the Department of Justice, the Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation 
in the Department of State, and the Federal Aviation Administration's 
Flight Inspection and Washington Flight Program in the Department of 
Transportation. We selected these five agencies because, according to 
GSA's data at the time we began our review; they owned over 70 percent 
of federal civilian aircraft and accounted for over 85 percent of 
federal aircraft program costs. Also, the seven programs we selected 
were some that had the greatest number of aircraft, historically 
incurred the most costs, or covered a wide variety of aviation missions 
(for detailed information on the seven programs, see appendixes IV 
through X.)

As a part of our review of these programs, we interviewed officials 
knowledgeable in fleet management at GSA, the various programs we 
reviewed, and GSA's primary aviation consultant, and we reviewed and 
analyzed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), GSA, and Department 
of Energy (DOE) guidance on cost effectively acquiring and managing 
federal government aircraft. Based on the results of our interviews and 
our analysis of these documents, we identified key principles of a 
sound fleet management planning process, which we discussed with GSA 
officials and GSA's primary aviation consultant. In addition, we 
compared the systems and controls in place at each of the seven 
programs we reviewed with the key fleet management principles outlined 
in the available guidance. In doing so, we interviewed officials to 
determine whether they had strategically assessed and identified the 
optimal mix of aircraft to meet their programs' long-term mission 
needs. We also identified the internal review and approval processes 
for justifying aircraft acquisitions at each of the seven programs. We 
also selected a nonprobabilistic sample of four to six aircraft in each 
program and asked program officials to provide documentation to support 
their acquisition decisions. The criteria for which we based our 
selection of the 32 aircraft consisted of factors such as whether the 
aircraft were airplanes or helicopters, the make and model of the 
aircraft, and the date the program acquired the aircraft. Finally, we 
interviewed officials at each of the programs to determine whether they 
had implemented a comprehensive aviation performance management system. 
During the course of our review, officials at some of the programs 
expressed concerns about the impact of OMB Circular A-11 on their 
abilities to cost effectively modernize their aircraft fleets. To learn 
more about the impact of this circular, we held discussions with OMB 
staff and reviewed a study prepared by GSA's consultant on this topic.

We also reviewed the operations, maintenance, safety standards, and 
safety records for the federal fleet. To determine what systems federal 
aircraft programs use to ensure safe operations, maintenance, and 
safety standards, we interviewed GSA officials and representatives from 
each of the selected aircraft programs. Further, we obtained 
documentation from the selected aircraft programs and performed site 
observations regarding the standards they use for their operations, 
maintenance, and safety programs. We also subjectively selected 
aircraft from the selected aircraft programs for detailed review and 
completed data collection instruments pertaining to maintenance and 
inspections of the aircraft. For each aircraft selected, we reviewed 
available maintenance and inspection records, and discussed the pilots' 
qualification requirements to operate the aircraft with program 
officials. We also interviewed officials from the Aerial Firefighting 
Industry Association, the Flight Safety Foundation, and the Helicopter 
Association International to obtain information on safety within 
federal, civil, and commercial aviation operations. However, we did not 
test for compliance with each programs' standards as it relates to 
their operations, maintenance, and safety programs. We also analyzed 
GSA, Congressional Research Service, and congressional committee 
reports on safety standards for federal aircraft programs.

To examine the safety record of federal agencies we developed a 
database of aviation accidents and incidents, which occurred from April 
1995 through October 2003, based on an analysis of the National 
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database. To 
ensure that the NTSB's database was complete and up-to-date, we 
conducted literature searches to identify federal aviation accidents, 
we collected accident data from the agencies that participate in the 
Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy, and included accidents that 
NTSB identified for its public aircraft accident study. Where possible, 
we developed information on the agency involved, the type of mission, 
type of aircraft, accident severity, and flight operation among others. 
We identified summary data on these elements and, where possible, 
sought to identify trends in the data. We confirmed our analysis 
methodology with officials from NSTB. Based on interviews with NTSB 
officials and testing of the data, we determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Federal Aircraft Fleet Information: 

To determine the composition of the federal aircraft fleet and how much 
it costs to operate and maintain, we examined data that the agencies 
reported into the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System 
(FAIRS). We reviewed data for fiscal years 2000-2003, however, fiscal 
year 2003 was not complete enough to include in our analysis. 
Therefore, this section provides information for fiscal years 2000--
2002.[Footnote 32] Our review found four aircraft that should have been 
listed in the database but were not. This represented an understatement 
of about 0.3 percent. In addition, our review found discrepancies 
between the flight hours that agencies reported to FAIRS and the 
information we obtained directly from the seven flight programs we 
reviewed. Our review of the cost information in the database found it 
to be incomplete and inaccurate. We found that the cost data 
significantly understates the true cost of federal aircraft programs. 
Therefore, while FAIRS is the only comprehensive source of data on the 
federal government's use of aircraft, care should be taken in drawing 
conclusions based on the information. We are reporting the data in the 
following tables and figures for information purposes only.

Composition of the Federal Aircraft Fleet: 

Eleven federal agencies owned aircraft during fiscal years 2000-2002. 
In addition, the Department of Agriculture and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration own a number of aircraft that are loaned to 
nonfederal entities.[Footnote 33] Table 4 contains detailed information 
on the composition of the federal fleet.

Table 4: Number of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Years 
2000-2002: 

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
2000: 89; 
2001: 93; 
2002: 77.

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
2000: 14; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 13.

Agency: Department of Energy; 
2000: 31; 
2001: 30; 
2002: 24.

Agency: Department of Justice; 
2000: 331; 
2001: 347; 
2002: 348.

Agency: Department of State; 
2000: 163; 
2001: 158; 
2002: 204.

Agency: Department of the Interior; 
2000: 94; 
2001: 98; 
2002: 94.

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
2000: 131; 
2001: 137; 
2002: 137.

Agency: Department of Transportation; 
2000: 52; 
2001: 52; 
2002: 52.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2000: 107; 
2001: 108; 
2002: 108.

Agency: National Science Foundation; 
2000: 14; 
2001: 14; 
2002: 13.

Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2000: 9; 
2001: 9; 
2002: 9.

Agency: Subtotal; 
2000: 1,035; 
2001: 1,060; 
2002: 1,079.

Agency: Loaned to the states; 
2000: 236; 
2001: 235; 
2002: 289.

Total; 
2000: 1,271; 
2001: 1,295; 
2002: 1,368.

Source: FY2000-2002 FAIRS reports.

Note: Several aircraft programs were transferred to the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security began reporting 
to FAIRS in fiscal year 2003.

[End of table]

According to FAIRS, in fiscal year 2002, the federal aircraft fleet was 
composed of 236 different makes and models of aircraft produced by 45 
different manufacturers. The fleet is composed of aircraft that are 
classified as either airplanes or helicopters.[Footnote 34] Figure 6 
shows the types of aircraft in the federal fleet in fiscal year 2002.

Figure 6: Types of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, Fiscal Year 
2002: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The federal aircraft fleet contains generally older aircraft--nearly 45 
percent are 30 years or older. In fiscal year 2002, the average age of 
aircraft in the fleet was 26 years old. Figure 7 shows the age of 
federal aircraft grouped in 10-year increments.

Figure 7: Age of Federal Aircraft in Fiscal Year 2002: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: Includes aircraft on loan to the states.

[End of figure] 

The Department of Agriculture and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration had the oldest aircraft--an average of 32 years in 
fiscal year 2002. Table 5 shows the average age of aircraft in the 
federal fleet during fiscal year 2002.

Table 5: Average Age of Federal Aircraft by Agency, Fiscal Year 2002 
(in years): 

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
2002: 32.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2002: 32.

Agency: National Science Foundation; 
2002: 28.

Agency: Department of Justice; 
2002: 25.

Agency: Department of State; 
2002: 24.

Agency: Department of the Interior; 
2002: 20.

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
2002: 20.

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
2002: 19.

Agency: Department of Transportation; 
2002: 18.

Agency: Department of Energy; 
2002: 17.

Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2002: 16.

[End of table]

Source: FY 2002 FAIRS report.

Note: Includes aircraft on loan to the states.

Federal Aircraft Utilization: 

To determine the extent to which federal aircraft are utilized, we 
examined the flight hours reported to the FAIRS system. FAIRS does not 
collect or maintain information on the usage of aircraft that are 
loaned to the states. For the purposes of FAIRS, agencies track the 
amount of time that an aircraft is airborne. Table 6 contains 
information on aircraft utilization.

Table 6: Total Flight Hours of Aircraft Owned by Federal Agencies, 
Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
2000: 26,337; 
2001: 24,897; 
2002: 26,756.

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
2000: 2,869; 
2001: 3,002; 
2002: 3,800.

Agency: Department of Energy; 
2000: 8,090; 
2001: 8,286; 
2002: 9,057.

Agency: Department of Justice; 
2000: 101,387; 
2001: 82,887; 
2002: 107,373.

Agency: Department of State; 
2000: 19,818; 
2001: 29,149; 
2002: 32,294.

Agency: Department of the Interior; 
2000: 21,805; 
2001: 17,792; 
2002: 19,486.

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
2000: 38,223; 
2001: 30,021; 
2002: 44,907.

Agency: Department of Transportation; 
2000: 15,253; 
2001: 19,824; 
2002: 23,582.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2000: 20,024; 
2001: 19,592; 
2002: 15,545.

Agency: National Science Foundation; 
2000: 933; 
2001: 4; 
2002: 731.

Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2000: 3,274; 
2001: 3,133; 
2002: 2,874.

Agency: Total; 
2000: 258,013; 
2001: 238,587; 
2002: 286,405.

[End of table]

Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.

Aircraft Program Costs: 

In attempting to determine the cost of federal aircraft programs, we 
analyzed aircraft program costs contained in the FAIRS system. Table 7 
shows the total costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for fiscal years 
2000 through 2002.

Table 7: Total Cost of Federal Aircraft Programs, Fleet Aircraft and 
Commercial Aviation Services Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Dollars in millions.

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
2000: $230.1; 
2001: $182.0; 
2002: $280.0.

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
2000: 6.5; 
2001: 6.1; 
2002: 8.6.

Agency: Department of Energy; 
2000: 21.7; 
2001: 21.8; 
2002: 33.6.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency[A]; 
2000: 0.4; 
2001: 0.2; 
2002: 0.3.

Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency[A]; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: < 0.1.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services[A]; 
2000: 2.4; 
2001: 1.4; 
2002: 0.9.

Agency: Dept. of Housing and Urban Development[A]; 
2000: < 0.1; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: 0.0.

Agency: Department of Justice; 
2000: 80.8; 
2001: 124.6; 
2002: 83.8.

Agency: Department of State; 
2000: 20.7; 
2001: 33.7; 
2002: 91.7.

Agency: Department of the Interior; 
2000: 80.1; 
2001: 78.1; 
2002: 96.2.

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
2000: 41.9; 
2001: 29.9; 
2002: 50.1.

Agency: Department of Transportation; 
2000: 76.0; 
2001: 47.4; 
2002: 49.1.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2000: 75.5; 
2001: 79.3; 
2002: Not reported.

Agency: National Science Foundation; 
2000: 21.7; 
2001: 6.0; 
2002: 8.3[B].

Agency: National Transportation Safety Board[A]; 
2000: < 0.1; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: 0.0.

Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2000: 3.4; 
2001: 2.7; 
2002: 2.8.

Agency: U.S. Arctic Research Commission[A]; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: < 0.1; 
2002: 0.0.

Total[C]; 
2000: $661.5; 
2001: $613.1; 
2002: $705.6.

Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.

[A] Several agencies do not own aircraft and use commercial aviation 
services exclusively.

[B] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the 
Office of Polar Programs.

[C] Totals may not add due to rounding.

[End of table]

Table 8 shows the costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for fleet 
aircraft during fiscal years 2000 through 2002.

Table 8: Cost of Federal Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Dollars in millions.

Department of Agriculture; 
2000: $8.3; 
2001: $2.3; 
2002: $11.2.

Department of Commerce; 
2000: 6.4; 
2001: 5.7; 
2002: 8.0.

Department of Energy; 
2000: 19.6; 
2001: 20.3; 
2002: 21.5.

Department of Justice; 
2000: 57.9; 
2001: 76.0; 
2002: 53.2.

Department of State; 
2000: 20.7; 
2001: 33.7; 
2002: 91.7.

Department of the Interior; 
2000: 6.4; 
2001: 6.3; 
2002: 5.6.

Department of the Treasury; 
2000: 41.7; 
2001: 29.8; 
2002: 50.1.

Department of Transportation; 
2000: 70.4; 
2001: 40.6; 
2002: 43.7.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2000: 75.5; 
2001: 76.2; 
2002: Not reported.

National Science Foundation; 
2000: 2.9; 
2001: < 0.1; 
2002: 2.3[A].

Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2000: 3.1; 
2001: 2.5; 
2002: 2.8.

Total[B]; 
2000: $312.9; 
2001: $293.5; 
2002: $289.9.

Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.

[A] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the Office 
of Polar Programs.

[B] Totals may not add due to rounding.

[End of table]

Agencies sometimes acquire commercial aviation services from the 
private sector. Some agencies that do not own their own aircraft still 
use aircraft and are required to report those costs to FAIRS. 
Therefore, the number of agencies reporting commercial aviation 
services costs is greater than the number of agencies in table 8. 
Table 9 shows the costs that agencies reported to FAIRS for commercial 
aviation services during fiscal years 2000 through 2002.

Table 9: Cost of Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Dollars in millions.

Department of Agriculture; 
2000: $221.8; 
2001: $179.7; 
2002: $268.9.

Department of Commerce; 
2000: < 0.1; 
2001: 0.4; 
2002: 0.5.

Department of Energy; 
2000: 2.1; 
2001: 1.4; 
2002: 12.2.

Environmental Protection Agency[A]; 
2000: 0.4; 
2001: 0.2; 
2002: 0.3.

Federal Emergency Management Agency[A]; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: < 0.1.

Department of Health and Human Services[A]; 
2000: 2.4; 
2001: 1.4; 
2002: 0.9.

Dept. of Housing and Urban Development[A]; 
2000: < 0.1; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: 0.0.

Department of Justice; 
2000: 23.0; 
2001: 48.6; 
2002: 30.7.

Department of State; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: 0.0.

Department of the Interior; 
2000: 73.7; 
2001: 71.7; 
2002: 90.6.

Department of the Treasury; 
2000: 0.1; 
2001: < 0.1; 
2002: 0.0.

Department of Transportation; 
2000: 5.6; 
2001: 6.7; 
2002: 5.4.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: 3.1; 
2002: 0.0.

National Science Foundation; 
2000: 18.8; 
2001: 6.0; 
2002: 6.0[B].

National Transportation Safety Board[A]; 
2000: < 0.1; 
2001: 0.0; 
2002: 0.0.

Tennessee Valley Authority; 
2000: 0.3; 
2001: 0.2; 
2002: < 0.1.

U.S. Arctic Research Commission[A]; 
2000: 0.0; 
2001: < 0.1; 
2002: 0.0.

Total[C]; 
2000: $348.3; 
2001: $319.6; 
2002: $415.6.

Source: FY 2000-2002 FAIRS reports.

[A] These agencies do not own aircraft and use commercial aviation 
services exclusively.

[B] The National Science Foundation did not report costs for the 
Office of Polar Programs.

[C] Totals may not add due to rounding.

[End of table]

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Review of FAIRS Internal Controls: 

The General Services Administration (GSA) developed the Federal 
Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS) to fulfill its 
responsibilities for maintaining a management information system to 
collect, analyze, and report information on the inventory, cost, and 
usage of government aircraft. In order ensure the system contains 
accurate and complete information, GSA must have effective controls 
over the system and data it contains. Our review found, that overall, 
GSA's internal control system did not have sufficient, effective 
control procedures in place to provide reasonable assurance that the 
FAIRS data included in the annual GSA report are valid and reliable. We 
found data stewardship controls and systems controls over validity and 
reliability of data ranging in effectiveness from in-place-and-working-
as-expected to in-place-but-not-working (ineffective).[Footnote 35] 
More importantly, we identified specific control procedures that should 
be in place but did not exist. Any management controls that are 
partially effective, ineffective, or nonexistent increase the risk for 
nonvalid, incomplete, or inaccurate data entering the system.

Requirements for GSA to Maintain Effective Control over the FAIRS 
System: 

As a governmentwide operational data steward for central agency data, 
GSA should comply with requirements that are applicable to federal 
agencies that manage governmentwide programs and to central data 
stewards' information systems, such as FAIRS. Furthermore, federal 
agencies that use aircraft to accomplish their missions and GSA, as 
management coordinator for federal aircraft, should also comply with 
requirements in federal regulations and authoritative guidance 
specifically crafted both for the management and operations of federal 
agencies' aircraft programs and for the implementation and use of cost 
accounting and information systems. These requirements are spelled out 
in numerous documents such as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
circulars, financial accounting standards, government internal control 
and auditing standards, and FAIRS manuals. Figure 8 outlines the 
framework of criteria applicable to GSA's management of the FAIRS 
system.

Figure 8: Hierarchy of Criteria Used to Review Controls over GSA's 
FAIRS System: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

As the figure shows, GSA must follow numerous requirements in 
administering the FAIRS system. The controls needed to meet these 
requirements and thereby ensure validity and reliability of data in the 
FAIRS system can be grouped into two main categories. The first 
category is data stewardship controls, which are procedures that a 
central agency needs to institute to ensure that agencies capture and 
report valid and reliable data. They include items such as procedures 
to ensure that all agencies comply with data reporting requirements and 
tests to ensure that reported data is accurate. The second category is 
system controls, which are controls over FAIRS to ensure proper 
operation of the system and accurate data processing. These include 
items such as mechanisms to ensure that the system does not accept 
invalid data entries.

GSA Needs More Effective Data Stewardship Controls: 

To meet its data stewardship responsibilities, GSA should have certain 
procedures in place to ensure that the aircraft inventory, cost, and 
use data that agencies generate and report to FAIRS are valid and 
reliable. Our review found that GSA had a range of data stewardship 
controls in place, but that many of them were only partially effective. 
For example, GSA does not ensure that all agencies report their costs 
in compliance with reporting requirements. GSA officials stated that 
they work with agencies to help them understand the cost reporting 
requirements and urge them to comply. However, we found one agency 
lumped all of their costs under one cost element, instead of breaking 
out its costs among multiple cost elements as required by the Cost 
Accounting Guide. As a result, cost data reported by this agency did 
not contain detail needed for accurate compilation and analyses in 
FAIRS.

We also found that GSA had not implemented several other data 
stewardship controls. For example, GSA does not review the agencies' 
cost accounting systems or require that agencies' auditors review those 
systems for compliance with GSA's Cost Accounting Guide. Also, GSA does 
not routinely test agencies' data for completeness and accuracy. While 
GSA confirms FAIRS data with agency officials prior to releasing its 
annual report, GSA does not compare FAIRS data with agencies' 
information systems. Further, agencies routinely make changes to 
existing FAIRS data after GSA's annual report is issued. GSA, however, 
does not disclose the changes that agencies made in subsequent annual 
reports. Table 10 displays our analysis and evaluation of data 
stewardship controls by effectiveness of the controls.

Table 10: Analysis of Data Stewardship Controls: 

Effective (control in place and working): Provide agencies with 
guidance on data requirements including the Cost Accounting Guide and 
the FAIRS Users Manual; 
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Provide technical assistance to agencies in establishing their 
cost accounting systems; 
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): None; 
Missing (control not in place): GSA should foster full costing for 
agencies cost accounting systems.

Effective (control in place and working): Provide draft of annual 
report to agencies for comment and proposed changes; 
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Require agencies to use prescribed data elements for reporting 
aircraft cost data; 
Missing (control not in place): GSA should check accounting systems 
for compliance with the Cost Accounting Guide.

Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Verify that aircraft cost and use data collected from agencies 
are in compliance with reporting requirements; 
Missing (control not in place): GSA should routinely check data that 
agencies report to FAIRS for completeness and accuracy.

Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Establish data entry/approval procedures and edit checks to 
promote validity and reliability of data; 
Missing (control not in place): Changes to prior annual reports should 
be disclosed in subsequent annual reports.

Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Systematically perform analytical reviews of cost and use data 
reported to FAIRS.

Source: GAO analysis GSA's data stewardship controls.

[End of table]

GSA Lacks Effective FAIRS Systems Controls: 

GSA has incorporated numerous system controls in FAIRS to help maintain 
data integrity once the aircraft inventory, cost, and use data are 
input into the system and even after the issuance of the annual report. 
However, we found that some of the controls in place were not effective 
and other control procedures that should exist were missing or not in 
place. For example, certain controls over who should review, correct, 
and approve data were ineffective. Further, we found controls to 
prevent input of negative values for aircraft costs and hours do not 
exist. Table 11 depicts our analysis of systems controls by 
effectiveness of controls.

Table 11: Analysis of Systems Controls: 

Effective (control in place and working): Only agency-authorized and 
GSA-trained persons can access FAIRS; 
Partially effective (control in place, but only working to a certain 
extent): Triggers prevent improper entry, review, correction, or 
approval of aircraft inventory, cost and use data; 
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Only the FAIRS 
administrator should be able to change approved inventory; 
Missing (control not in place): FAIRS should not allow reviewer to 
enter new aircraft inventory or cost and use data.

Effective (control in place and working): Triggers allow only an 
agency-authorized user to enter new, or correct disapproved data; 
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Only agency-authorized 
reviewer should be able to mark and use data as approved; 
Missing (control not in place): FAIRS should not allow negative 
aircraft cost and use data to be accepted.

Effective (control in place and working): Triggers allow only records 
without errors on aircraft cost and use data to be uploaded via batch 
processing; 
Ineffective (control in place, but not working): Approved CAS cost and 
use data should only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS 
administrator; 
Missing (control not in place): Disposal date entered should not be 
prior to the acquisition date.

Effective (control in place and working): Only agency-authorized 
reviewer can review and mark aircraft cost and use data as approved; 
Missing (control not in place): Use data entered should not be greater 
than the maximum number of hours available for the reporting period.

Effective (control in place and working): Approved federal aircraft 
cost and use data can only be changed with the assistance of the FAIRS 
administrator. 

Effective (control in place and working): Status automatically changes 
to awaiting review or system accepted, not reviewed after specific time 
frames. 

Effective (control in place and working): Control access to report and 
data in FAIRS and make corrections as proposed by agencies. 

Source: GAO analysis of GSA's system controls.

[End of table]

Policy Issues Affecting GSA's Controls over FAIRS Data: 

GSA officials expressed concerns about a variety of issues affecting 
their ability to implement controls to ensure that agencies report 
complete and accurate information to FAIRS. This included the validity 
and reliability of data generated and reported by the agencies and in 
FAIRS, their data sources and related cost accounting systems, GSA 
management resources, aircraft management policies, regulations and 
authoritative guidance, and advisory oversight. Specifically, because 
the U.S. Government Aircraft Cost Accounting Guide does not require 
that agencies report depreciation, self-insurance cost, or finance 
costs to FAIRS, agencies do not include them in the costs they report 
to FAIRS and, therefore, the costs of federal aircraft programs GSA 
includes in its annual report do not reflect full costing. GSA 
officials told us that they are concerned that problems with cost 
accounting throughout the government make it difficult to determine the 
full costs associated with federal aircraft programs.

GSA officials brought up two examples of deficiencies by aircraft 
program managers that adversely affect data reliability in FAIRS: (1) 
some agencies do not have cost accounting systems that capture aviation 
costs by the same categories or in the same detail as FAIRS and (2) 
some agencies do not collect aircraft costs quarterly. Furthermore, GSA 
officials expressed concern about the incomplete and inaccurate nature 
of the federal aircraft cost data in FAIRS. At the same time, one 
official acknowledged that GSA shared a responsibility for the 
agencies' data quality, but he said GSA had very limited resources to 
exert program oversight. The officials also supported changes to 
policies and authoritative guidance for increased resources to meet 
oversight requirements.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Inspection 
Program: 

Program Description: 

The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Flight Inspection Program 
is one of six FAA flight programs, each of which utilizes government-
owned aircraft and or commercial aviation services to fulfill its 
mission. The Flight Inspection Program's mission is to help ensure the 
integrity of airspace systems in the U.S. and abroad through inspection 
and testing of navigational aids and flight procedures at public, 
private, and military facilities. The Flight Inspection Program 
accomplishes this through airborne inspection and testing of ground-
based equipment, satellite, and electronic signals in space that pilots 
used to safely navigate their aircraft. This mission requires that FAA 
operate aircraft with special communication and navigation devices that 
allow it to perform required inspections.

The Flight Inspection Program is headquartered in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, where FAA centrally manages flight operations and aircraft 
maintenance. FAA also maintains an aircraft hangar and maintenance and 
repair facilities in Oklahoma City. The program has six domestic flight 
inspection field offices located throughout the country from which FAA 
aircraft are dispatched to inspect and test the U.S. airspace 
system.[Footnote 36] The domestic flight inspection function includes 
inspection of U.S. military facilities and is governed by a memorandum 
of agreement (MOA) with the Air Force. Under the MOA, the Air Force 
provides FAA with staffing to support military contingency flight 
inspection missions. The program also has an international flight 
inspection field office located in Oklahoma City from which FAA 
aircraft conduct missions outside of the United States. These 
international missions include inspection of U.S. military facilities 
overseas, which are also governed by the MOA, as well as inspection of 
foreign airspace systems for countries that agree to reimburse FAA.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

The Flight Inspection Program currently operates a fleet of 30 
government-owned airplanes; composed of four different makes and 
models. The average age of these aircraft is about 14 years. The 
program does not contract for commercial aviation services. Table 12 
below shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the overall 
cost of and utilization of the Flight Inspection Program fleet aircraft 
has increased since fiscal year 2000, reflecting the increased workload 
of the program.

Table 12: Cost and Utilization of Flight Inspection Aircraft, Fiscal 
Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
Costs: $26,142,084; 
Flight hours: 11,617.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
Costs: $30,850,449; 
Flight hours: 14,030.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
Costs: $29,749,417; 
Flight hours: 15,014.

Total; 
Costs: $86,741,950; 
Flight hours: 40,661.

Source: GAO's analyses of FAIRS database.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Fleet management planning in the Flight Inspection Program comprises a 
mix of short-and long-range planning to help ensure the program has a 
cost-effective mix of aviation resources to achieve its mission. FAA 
officials indicated that flight operations managers perform short-range 
planning on a continual basis by assessing workload requirements and 
assigning available aircraft to meet those requirements. Managers try 
to ensure that they have the optimal mix of fleet aircraft spread 
around the country. Short-range fleet planning also requires managers 
to coordinate with the Air Force to ensure that sufficient aircraft are 
available to meet military needs under the MOA. Managers perform long-
range planning, and such planning is designed to ensure the program has 
the most cost-effective mix of aircraft to meet its long-term mission 
requirements. Program officials completed the most recent long-range 
plan in July 2002.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

In 1999 FAA created the Aircraft Fleet Modernization Integrated Product 
Team (IPT) to help ensure that aircraft acquisition decisions are 
justified and based on defined mission requirements. Therefore, when 
Flight Inspection Program managers determine they need to acquire an 
aircraft, they begin the aircraft acquisition process by providing the 
IPT with a mission needs justification for acquiring the aircraft. 
Working with Flight Inspection Program managers, the IPT will prepare a 
requirements document that provides initial justification for acquiring 
an aircraft. Once the requirements document is approved by FAA's 
Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services, IPT officials 
indicated they begin assessing the life cycle costs of different 
options, such as purchasing or leasing new aircraft or rehabilitating 
existing aircraft. Staff from FAA's finance office then independently 
reviews the life cycle cost analyses and, if it concurs that the 
assumptions underlying the aircraft requirements are justified, it 
forwards a procurement request to FAA's Joint Resources Council (JRC). 
This is a headquarters group of Associate Administrators that controls 
the funding for major capital projects. If this council authorizes 
funding, the FAA Administrator must make a final approval, and then the 
procurement process can begin.

To gain a better understanding of how the Flight Inspection Program has 
traditionally justified their aircraft acquisitions and the type of 
documentation used to support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked 
program officials to provide documentation on four aircraft that they 
acquired. Since the Flight Inspection Program had not identified a need 
for new aircraft for a number of years, justifications for all four of 
the aircraft pre-dated FAA's creation of the IPT and its review 
process. Results from our review of these four aircraft are summarized 
in table 13.

Table 13: Documentation Supporting Four Flight Inspection Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type): Learjet 60; 
(airplane); 
Acquisition date: January 5, 1996; 
Purchase price: $19,035,000; 
Justification: Aircraft needed to improve cost, reliability, and range 
over existing aircraft; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Beechcraft B300 (airplane); 
Acquisition date: October 21, 1988; 
Purchase price: [A]; 
Justification: [A]; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].

Aircraft (type): Challenger CL-600 (airplane); 
Acquisition date: August 8, 1997; 
Purchase price: $30,112,000; 
Justification: Aircraft needed to improve cost, reliability, and range 
over existing aircraft; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): British Aerospace BAe-800A (airplane); 
Acquisition date: October 1, 1991; 
Purchase price: $0; 
Justification: Obtained from U.S. Air Force to perform military flight 
inspection; 
A- 76 study completed: N/A; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A. 

Source: GAO's analysis of GSA and FAA data.

[A] The program officials were unable to provide this information 
because they said records had been destroyed due to the length of time 
since the aircraft was purchased.

[End of table]

During our review, we learned that one of these aircraft was originally 
obtained by the U.S. Air Force and transferred at no cost to FAA, so we 
determined that our questions did not apply to that specific aircraft 
acquisition. As the table shows, the program officials were able to 
provide limited documentation supporting their justification for 
acquiring the remaining three aircraft. Specifically, program officials 
did not complete any A-76 studies, but they did complete cost benefit 
analyses for two of these three aircraft. Regarding completing A-76 
studies, in commenting on a draft of this report, FAA officials 
stressed that they determined they were exempt from completing reviews 
for these aircraft and that officials followed applicable agency policy 
in effect at the time they acquired these aircraft.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

Program managers track a number of aviation metrics to monitor the 
operation and maintenance of their aircraft. To help ensure that 
aircraft are available to accomplish their missions, the Flight 
Inspection Program's Maintenance and Engineering Division has 
implemented a fleet reliability program. According to FAA officials, 
this program not only judges the effectiveness of flight inspection 
aircraft, it is designed to improve effectiveness and reliability by 
making appropriate adjustments to the maintenance program based on 
fleet performance. FAA officials said the program has the following 
five objectives: 

* ensure safety and reliability levels of the aircraft and its 
equipment,

* restore safety levels when a safety weakness is detected or has 
occurred,

* obtain information necessary to improve the reliability of parts and 
appliances,

* allow aircraft systems and components/parts to dictate the 
appropriate maintenance process and intervals, and: 

* provide economic criteria to reduce maintenance costs and increase 
aircraft availability.

Under this program, flight inspection officials indicated that 
maintenance staff established three key performance measures and 
associated performance goals and a system to track their ability to 
meet these goals. The three measures are dispatch reliability, 
scheduled completion rate, and aircraft availability. Dispatch 
reliability is the percentage of scheduled flights that depart within 
30 minutes of scheduled departure times. The program's goals are 95 
percent for domestic flights and 90 percent for international flights. 
Schedule completion rate is the percentage of scheduled flights 
completed without a mechanical cancellation. The program's goals are 95 
percent for domestic flights and 90 percent for international flights. 
Aircraft availability is the total number of aircraft that are 
currently available to meet mission requirements. The program's goal is 
to have 22 of the 30 fleet aircraft available for use at any time. 
Maintenance staff produces a quarterly report comparing actual fleet 
performance with these goals. Program managers indicated that they 
track other operational statistics such as total flight hours, average 
daily flight hours, and cost per flight hour for each aircraft, and 
these measures can help determine if other Flight Inspection goals have 
been met, such as reducing the amount of en route time. In terms of 
assessing the cost-effectiveness of aircraft, Flight Inspection 
officials indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB 
Circular A-126.

Safety Statistics: 

The Flight Inspection Program has not had any National Transportation 
Safety Board reportable accidents or incidents since 1995.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Department of Justice, Justice Prisoner and Alien 
Transportation System: 

Program Description: 

In 1995, the air fleets of the U.S. Marshals Service and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) merged to create the 
Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). Operated by 
the U.S. Marshals Service, JPATS supports the federal judiciary by 
scheduling and transporting thousands of prisoners and criminal and 
administrative aliens each year to courts, hearings, and detention 
facilities around the country. JPATS also provides regular 
international flights for the removal of deportable aliens. JPATS' 
primary customers are the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP), and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE); 
but military and other civilian law enforcement agencies, including 
state agencies, also use JPATS to transport their prisoners.

JPATS transports prisoners and aliens for its customers on a cost-
reimbursable basis; charging each customer a portion of its total fixed 
and variable costs based on the number of persons it transports for 
each customer on a given aircraft. JPATS accomplishes nearly all its 
air movements with aircraft that the U.S. Marshals Service owns or 
leases, including Boeing 727s, McDonnell Douglas 82s, and several 
smaller jets. JPATS is headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, where a 
scheduling center and business management office are maintained. The 
seat of the air operations is located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with 
operational hubs in Mesa, Arizona; Alexandria, Louisiana; Anchorage, 
Alaska; and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

JPATS currently has a fleet of 10 government-owned aircraft, 4 of which 
it uses to conduct flight operations, and 6 of which JPATS is 
attempting to dispose of through sale. The 4 aircraft comprise three 
different makes and models. The average age of all 10 aircraft is 28.5 
years, and the average age of the 4 aircraft in use is 20.75 years.

Table 14 shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the total 
cost of JPATS' fleet aircraft fluctuated during the period, while total 
flight hours declined. Also, JPATS' use of commercial aviation services 
has increased during the period. Fluctuations in the total cost data on 
fleet aircraft are partially attributable to JPATS taking out of 
service some large aircraft and relying more on commercial aviation 
services.

Table 14: Cost and Utilization JPATS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation 
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $29,809,437; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 6,109; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $22,957,056; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 5,988; 
Total JPATS program: Costs: $52,766,493; 
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 12,097.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $41,733,772; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 5,449; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $25,699,656; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,010; 
Total JPATS program: Costs: $67,433,428; 
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 11,459.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $18,892,169; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 4,630; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $30,585,593; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,805; 
Total JPATS program: Costs: $49,477,762; 
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 11,435.

Fiscal years: Total; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Costs: $90,435,378; 
JPATS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 16,188; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $79,242,305; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 18,803; 
Total JPATS program: Costs: $169,677,683; 
Total JPATS program: Flight hours: 34,991. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Fleet management planning at JPATS focuses on a mix of short and long-
range planning, and is designed to help ensure that JPATS has a cost-
effective mix of aviation resources to meet its customers' 
requirements. According to JPATS officials, short-range fleet planning 
is performed on an annual basis and is tied to the annual budget 
process. In developing short-range plans, JPATS and its three primary 
customers--BOP, U.S. Marshals, and BICE--determine the projected 
workload for an upcoming year, and determine whether the current mix of 
aircraft is adequate to cost effectively meet anticipated requirements. 
Based on anticipated budget amounts, the organizations agree on a final 
mix of aircraft and on a final expected number of prisoner and alien 
movements. According to JPATS officials, long-range fleet planning is 
done on a periodic, as needed basis, and helps JPATS ensure they have 
most appropriate aircraft to meet their long-term mission requirements. 
JPATS completed its most recent long-range fleet plan in 1997.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

JPATS officials indicated that their current process for justifying 
aircraft acquisitions was put into place about three years ago. This 
process begins when managers from a variety of JPATS offices, including 
business, operations, and security, along with managers from JPATS 
major customers, identify a need for additional aircraft. At this time, 
JPATS will prepare technical specifications of potential new aircraft 
and either contract for independent analyses or conduct in-house 
studies to determine the type and quantity of aircraft to acquire and 
whether to purchase or lease specific aircraft. During this time, JPATS 
conducts many meetings, process reviews, and cost-benefit and 
alternative analyses, according to JPATS officials. This typically 
would include preparing a life cycle costing of various aircraft 
acquisition options, but officials indicated that there is no specific 
requirement about the level of analyses needed to justify acquisition 
decisions. Once JPATS reaches a conclusion about a specific option, it 
forwards its recommendation to the JPATS Executive Committee for review 
and approval. The committee is JPATS' board of directors, is chaired by 
the Assistant Attorney General, and includes senior managers from the 
U.S. Marshals Service, the BOP, BICE, and the Office of Detention 
Trustee. If the committee approves the aircraft acquisition, and 
funding is available, JPATS can acquire the aircraft.

To gain a better understanding of how JPATS has traditionally justified 
aircraft acquisitions, including the type of documentation used to 
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked JPATS officials to 
provide documentation on four aircraft that it acquired. Results from 
our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 15.

Table 15: Documentation Supporting Four JPATS Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type): Airplane 1; 
Acquisition date: May 11, 2000; 
Purchase price: $971,000; 
Justification: Obtained to temporarily backfill for retired Sabreliner 
while waiting for Hawker funding; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].

Aircraft (type): Airplane 2; 
Acquisition date: November 19, 1996; 
Purchase price: $4,268,000; 
Justification: Needed a larger aircraft to meet customer needs after 
JPATS formed; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].

Aircraft (type): Airplane 3; 
Acquisition date: December 3, 2001; 
Purchase price: $8,000,000; 
Justification: Obtained as a long- term replacement for Sabreliner; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Airplane 4; 
Acquisition date: April 19, 1995; 
Purchase price: $1,994,950; 
Justification: Enabled U.S. Marshals Service (prior to JPATS) to use 
owned aircraft rather than charter for missions; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No. 

Source: GAO analysis of JPATS documentation and interviews.

Note: Information on aircraft type is not included because DOJ 
considers it to be sensitive law enforcement information.

[A] JPATS officials stated they completed cost-benefit studies for 
these aircraft but could not find them.

[End of table]

As the table shows, JPATS officials were able to provide only limited 
documentation supporting their justification for acquiring these 
aircraft. Specifically, JPATS did not complete any A-76 studies and 
could provide a cost benefit review for only one of the four aircraft. 
It should be noted that for several, more recent planned acquisitions, 
JPATS has completed detailed cost-benefit analyses, which they believe 
is happening more consistently since they implemented the Executive 
Committee approval process in 1999.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

JPATS officials indicated that they rely on eight performance metrics 
to monitor and assess their program. These metrics are composed of a 
combination of cost and performance metrics that JPATS routinely track 
and generally report on an annual, biannual, or monthly basis. These 
metrics include cost per flight hour, aircraft availability, and total 
flight hours per aircraft. Officials indicated that these metrics 
provide data to help managers assess the performance of each aircraft. 
JPATS officials stated that these metrics are used internally to assess 
the program, and are provided to each major customer so they can 
perform their own analyses of the program. In addition, JPATS officials 
indicated that they prepare a monthly report of operations, which 
includes a monthly income statement, and that such data is used to 
track cost performance and compare it with budgets. These reports are 
also shared with JPATS' major customers, and the information is used to 
make any changes in rates that JPATS charges. Officials indicated that, 
due to their ongoing analyses, they do not believe it is necessary to 
perform periodic assessments of their fleet to comply with OMB Circular 
A-126.

Safety Statistics: 

From April 1995 through October 2003, JPATS experienced one nonfatal, 
noninjury accident and one noninjury incident, both of which occurred 
during 2000. The accident occurred while landing during a training 
mission, and the incident occurred while transporting 86 federal 
prisoners. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
aircraft accident data, the accident was a result of the pilot's 
improper remedial action and his failure to maintain directional 
control of the airplane during landing. The incident occurred as a 
result of a material failure of a wing flap section due to inadequate 
maintenance according to results of a NTSB investigation.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service: 

Program Description: 

The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS') mission is working with others to 
conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, plants and their 
habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people. To help 
accomplish this mission, FWS uses aircraft to conduct a variety of 
activities, including wildlife surveys, aerial photography, radio 
telemetry, fire reconnaissance, and law enforcement. Aircraft are used 
to support the Refuge, Migratory Bird Management, Fisheries and Habitat 
Conservation, Endangered Species, and Law Enforcement programs. The FWS 
aircraft program is headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and is 
directed by a National Aviation Manager. The program has seven Regional 
Aviation Managers spread throughout Alaska and the Lower 48 States who 
manage aircraft operations in their regions. As part of the Department 
of Interior (DOI), the FWS program falls under the policies and 
oversight of DOI's National Business Center-Aircraft Management 
Directorate (AMD). As a centralized aviation management oversight and 
support office for all DOI aviation activities, AMD establishes policy, 
oversees aviation safety, provides contract services, and maintains 
accounting and financial information for all aircraft use within 
DOI.[Footnote 37]

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

The FWS currently operates a fleet of 57 government-owned aircraft, 36 
that are located in Alaska and 21 in the Lower 48 States. Of these 
aircraft, 56 are airplanes, and one is a helicopter, and the average 
age of 54 of these aircraft is about 22 years.[Footnote 38] Table 16 
shows that according to data in the FAIRS database, the overall cost of 
these fleet aircraft has declined slightly since fiscal year 2000, 
while utilization has fluctuated. FWS' cost and utilization of 
commercial aviation services also fluctuated over the period.

Table 16: Cost and Flight Hours FWS Aircraft and Commercial Aviation 
Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,626,980; 
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 10,936; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $3,836,388; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 8,928; 
Total FWS program: Costs: $6,463,368; 
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 19,864.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,532,318; 
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 9,610; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $3,407,924; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 5,811; 
Total FWS program: Costs: $5,940,242; 
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 15,421.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $2,467,529; 
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 11,579; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $4,078,422; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 6,037; 
Total FWS program: Costs: $6,545,951; 
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 17,616.

Fiscal years: Total; 
FWS owned aircraft: Costs: $7,626,827; 
FWS owned aircraft: Flight hours: 32,125; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $11,322,734; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 20,776; 
Total FWS program: Costs: $18,949,561; 
Total FWS program: Flight hours: 52,901. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

Note: FWS officials stated that the FAIRS database was a subset of the 
data AMD maintained and that, therefore, was not the most accurate 
source of the use and cost of FWS aircraft. Also, there are three FWS 
aircraft used for undercover operations that are not listed in FAIRS 
and, therefore, not included in the table.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Fleet management planning at FWS focuses on a mix of mid-to-long-range 
planning and is designed to help ensure that FWS has a cost-effective 
mix of aviation resources to achieve its mission. With respect to 
midrange planning, FWS, along with the other bureaus and AMD staff, 
develop a 5-year fleet replacement plan at an annual meeting of 
aviation managers. The plans outlines which specific aircraft the 
bureaus would like to replace for each of the next 5 years. According 
to the FWS National Aviation Manager, aircraft chosen for replacement 
are typically older aircraft or aircraft that have accumulated a 
significant amount of flight hours. The plan is updated each year and 
adjusted as aircraft are disposed or refurbished and as funding for 
replacement aircraft becomes available. In addition to this ongoing 
midrange planning, FWS also undertakes some long-range fleet planning. 
The manager said that, while FWS has not prepared a strategic 
assessment of its entire fleet, it has performed long-range assessments 
as fleet needs warrant. For example, FWS recently developed a long-term 
plan for replacing its entire fleet of nine migratory bird amphibious 
survey aircraft.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

The FWS Program Managers, National Aviation Manager, and Regional 
Aviation Managers are responsible for determining whether FWS needs to 
acquire additional aircraft. These managers can identify aircraft that 
need to be replaced either through the 5-year replacement planning 
process or by identifying additional aircraft that are needed to meet 
mission requirements. FWS can acquire aircraft or aviation services 
through purchase, lease, or through contracting for commercial aviation 
services. With respect to purchasing or leasing new aircraft, once a 
need is identified, FWS managers are responsible for preparing an A-76 
analysis to determine whether it is more cost-effective to purchase the 
aircraft and operate it with government pilots or to use some other 
combination of acquisition methods. This could include leasing an 
aircraft and operating it with government pilots or contracting out the 
entire operation. The National Aviation Manager said there was no 
specific requirement to conduct a life cycle cost analysis of different 
options. Once completed, the study would be sent to AMD for review. The 
AMD review focuses on whether the studies have been done correctly and 
whether the assumptions are accurate and sufficient to justify the 
aircraft acquisition. After the study is finalized, AMD will begin a 
competitive bid contracting process and ultimately select the best 
value option.

To gain a better understanding of how FWS has traditionally justified 
their aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to 
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked the FWS National 
Aviation Manager to provide documentation on four aircraft that FWS 
acquired for the Lower 48 States. Results from our review of these four 
aircraft are summarized in table 17.

Table 17: Documentation Supporting Four FWS Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type): Bell 206B; 
(helicopter); 
Acquisition date: April 10, 2001; 
Purchase price: $661,319; 
Justification: Replaced aircraft that crashed; 
needed for waterfowl law enforcement; 
A-76 study completed: Yes; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Cessna 206G (airplane); 
Acquisition date: August 29, 2000; 
Purchase price: $199,900; 
Justification: Replaced aircraft that was damaged; 
needed for migratory bird management program; 
A-76 study completed: No[A]; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].

Aircraft (type): Aircraft 3[B] (airplane); 
Acquisition date: April 4, 1990; 
Purchase price: $81,358; 
Justification: Replaced aging Cessna 206 aircraft used for law 
enforcement; 
A-76 study completed: No[C]; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.

Aircraft (type): Partenavia P68 (airplane); 
Acquisition date: April 19, 2002; 
Purchase price: $617,723; 
Justification: Replaced existing Cessna 185 single engine aircraft with 
twin-engine aircraft to increase mission effectiveness; 
A-76 study completed: No[D]; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[D]. 

Source: GAO analysis of FWS documentation and interviews.

[A] FWS officials stated that since this aircraft replaced one that had 
undergone justification and cost benefit analysis, and because studies 
had been completed for similar aircraft, documentation was not required 
for this replacement aircraft.

[B] Information on aircraft type is not included because DOI considers 
it to be sensitive law enforcement information.

[C] Program officials believe this aircraft was exempt from the A-76 
process because it is used for law enforcement operations.

[D] FWS officials stated that an A-76 justification and cost benefit 
analysis were performed for the initial aircraft purchased in this 
program, but not this particular aircraft.

[End of table]

As the table shows, the National Aviation Manager provided 
documentation on one A-76 study and a cost benefit analyses for one of 
the four aircraft. The other aircraft acquisitions were primarily 
justified based on A-76 studies from the older aircraft these newer 
ones were replacing or on A-76 and cost benefit analyses for other 
similar aircraft that FWS had acquired.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

According to the National Aviation Manager, FWS does not have an 
aviation metric performance management system. As the national manager, 
he does not routinely measure and track metrics such as aircraft 
dispatch reliability and aircraft availability. The manager stated that 
FWS maintenance personnel periodically monitor aircraft utilization 
data and will spot any issues such as increased maintenance problems. 
In commenting on a draft of this report, AMD indicated it has a report 
available that tracks the daily utilization, by aircraft, which could 
be used to monitor trends in utilization, or monitor how frequently an 
aircraft is flying. In addition, AMD stated that it has reporting tools 
which identify by aircraft, by month, by day, the number of hours the 
aircraft has been utilized, but does not currently track the aircraft's 
daily operational status. Operational status had been tracked in the 
past, through the daily availability charged to the aircraft, but was 
replaced with a monthly availability charge to reduce the paperwork and 
reconciliation burden that was identified in the field as resources 
have declined. Tracking the daily operational status is something that 
had been and can be done, but it takes a tremendous commitment of 
resources and time by the user agencies in the field that are also 
tasked with completing their mission, with fewer people. Further, every 
5 years, AMD contracts for a review of the cost effectiveness of all 
the bureaus' fleet aircraft, to comply with OMB Circular A-126. FWS 
aircraft are part of this review, which helps AMD and its bureaus 
identify any aircraft that are too expensive to operate.

Safety Statistics: 

Between April 1995 and October 2003, FWS had 13 accidents, 2 of which 
were fatal, and resulted in 3 fatalities. Figure 9 illustrates the 
number of both fatal and nonfatal accidents by year.

Figure 9: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 
- October 2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

FWS accidents occurred more often during the landing phase of flight 
and on a variety of missions, including research and development, 
predator control, training, and passenger transportation missions. 
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft 
accident data, the most common causes of FWS accidents were personnel 
related. NTSB attributed the cause of 9 out of the 13 accidents to 
pilot error. Environmental related factors such as strong winds and icy 
terrain were the leading contributing factors. Table 18 summarizes the 
number of accidents that NTSB attributed to personnel, environment, and 
mechanical factors by primary cause and other contributing factors.

Table 18: Causes and Contributing Factors of U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Aircraft Accidents: 

Personnel factors; Primary cause: 9.

Environment factors; Contributing factor: 11.

Mechanical factors; Primary cause: 2.

Not determined; Primary cause: 2.

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.

Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal the total number of 
accidents because a single accident may have none or multiple 
contributing factors.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VII: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Aircraft 
Program: 

Program Description: 

The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service 
is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation's 
forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future 
generations. USDA Forest Service aircraft, either owned or contracted, 
are mostly used to fight forest fires through reconnaissance and 
photography, transporting personnel and materials to fight fires, and 
dropping retardant and water directly on fires. USDA Forest Service 
also utilizes their aircraft for such missions as law enforcement, 
forest health monitoring, and range management. USDA Forest Service 
also provides firefighting training to other federal, state, and local 
agencies, and contractors.

The USDA Forest Service aircraft program operates within the Department 
of Agriculture and has its operational headquarters in Boise, Idaho, 
and its administrative headquarters are in Washington, D.C., where the 
Director of Fire/Aviation Management is located. The program is divided 
into nine regions. In each region, a Regional Aviation Officer manages 
the Fire and Aviation Management program of that region. According to 
USDA Forest Service officials, their aircraft program is the largest 
nonmilitary governmental aircraft program in the world, and their 
aircraft program spent approximately $207 million in fiscal year 2000 
on aviation services. This number can vary a great deal depending on 
the severity of the fire season. In fiscal year 2000, about 97 percent 
of total program spending went to private operators that the USDA 
Forest Service contracts with to fight fires and perform other 
logistical support. The remaining 3 percent was spent on USDA Forest 
Service-owned aircraft. Contractors are responsible for providing 
maintenance for their own aircraft. USDA Forest Service contracts out 
maintenance services for its owned aircraft to maintenance providers 
located near where the individual aircraft are stationed.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

The USDA Forest Service owns and operates a fleet of 44 operational 
aircraft, mostly located throughout the Western United States. Of these 
aircraft, 42 are airplanes and 2 are helicopters. The average age of 
these aircraft is approximately 27 years. There is wide variation in 
the age of USDA Forest Service aircraft, with the oldest being a 1944 
DC-3 used to drop firefighters into areas surrounding the fires, and 
the newest, a 2000 Cessna used for aerial photography. In addition to 
these aircraft, in 2003 USDA Forest Service took possession of 25 Cobra 
helicopters that the U.S. Army gave to them. These aircraft are being 
used for spare parts and only one is operational. The nonoperational 
Cobras are not included in the aircraft statistics listed here.

According to data in the FAIRS database, the cost and utilization of 
USDA Forest Service fleet aircraft and commercial aviation services 
have fluctuated over the past 3 years. Costs and utilization of both 
fleet aircraft and commercial aviation services were significantly 
higher in fiscal years 2000 and 2002 than in fiscal year 2001. 
According to USDA Forest Service officials, this was primarily due to 
increased mission requirements resulting from the severe fire seasons 
those years. USDA Forest Service officials also indicated that costs 
rose in fiscal year 2002 due to increases in the costs of fuel and fire 
retardant. Table 19 shows the cost and utilization of program aircraft 
and commercial aviation services for fiscal years 2000-2002.

Table 19: Cost and Flight Hours USDA Forest Service Aircraft and 
Commercial Aviation Services, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $6,240,844; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 12,967; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $219,131,950; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 102,910; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $225,372,794; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 115,877.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $4,747,609; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 10,503; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $176,140,267; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 78,240; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $180,887,876; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 88,743.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $8,395,422; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 12,920; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $264,483,933; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 102,385; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $272,879,355; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 115,305.

Fiscal years: Total; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Costs: $19,383,875; 
USDA Forest Service owned aircraft: Flight hours: 36,390; 
Commercial aviation services: Costs: $659,756,150; 
Commercial aviation services: Flight hours: 283,535; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Costs: $679,140,025; 
Total USDA Forest Service program: Flight hours: 319,925. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Fleet management planning at USDA Forest Service is mainly focused on 
the contracted commercial aviation aspect of their operations. This 
planning is mainly used to decide how to allocate their contracts 
during the following fire season. Each winter, the staff at each USDA 
Forest Service regional office study the past fire season in their 
area, look at long-term weather patterns, and use computer modeling to 
estimate how severe the upcoming fire season will be in their region. 
They then submit a budget request to the aircraft program headquarters. 
The headquarters staff reviews all the regions' budget requests and 
allocates an amount to each region based on funding availability. The 
same process holds true for USDA Forest Service-owned aircraft. If USDA 
Forest Service regional staff discovers a need to replace or 
rehabilitate an aircraft, the regional staff notifies headquarters and, 
if funding is available, or if Congress authorizes special funding, a 
replacement or rehabilitation can go forward. However, according to the 
USDA Forest Service Operations Manager, it is likely that the USDA 
Forest Service will replace its owned aircraft with leased aircraft 
when they need to be replaced, at least for the next few years because 
funding for buying new aircraft is not expected.

Prior to 2003, the USDA Forest Service did not engage in long-term 
strategic planning for its aircraft program. However, due to accidents 
in the 2002 fire season, the bureau decided to begin looking more 
critically at its aviation operation. One result of this critical 
evaluation was a 5-year strategic plan that includes sections on 
safety, security, training, quality assurance, aircraft fleet, and cost 
effectiveness. The plan will be updated annually to adjust for changing 
conditions.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

With respect to purchasing or leasing new aircraft, once a need is 
identified, USDA Forest Service regional managers are responsible for 
preparing an A-76 analysis to determine whether it is more cost-
effective to purchase the aircraft and operate it with government 
pilots or to use some other combination of acquisition methods. Once 
completed, the study is sent to USDA Forest Service headquarters for 
review and approval. If headquarters approves funding, USDA Forest 
Service regional staff will solicit bids. USDA Forest Service does not 
perform A-76 reviews when they solicit commercial aviation services.

To gain a better understanding of how the acquisition process works, 
and the type of documentation used to support aircraft acquisition 
decisions, we asked USDA Forest Service staff to provide documentation 
on four aircraft that they acquired relatively recently. Results from 
our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 20.

Table 20: Documentation Supporting Four USDA Forest Service Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type): Cessna C550; (airplane); 
Acquisition date: June 8, 2001; 
Purchase price: $5,184,000; 
Justification: Determined need for infrared scanning; 
A-76 study completed: Yes; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Beechcraft E90; (airplane); 
Acquisition date: January 28, 1995; 
Purchase price: $576,870; 
Justification: Determined need for lead plane in firefighting; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.

Aircraft (type): Beechcraft A100 (airplane); 
Acquisition date: April 13, 1993; 
Purchase price: $0; 
Justification: Replaced older aircraft; 
A-76 study completed: Yes; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Bell; 206A (helicopter); 
Acquisition date: July 20, 1988; 
Purchase price: $0; 
Justification: Determined need for training helicopter; 
A-76 study completed: No[A]; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No. 

Source: GAO analysis of USDA Forest Service documentation and 
interviews.

[A] Forest Service officials stated they completed an A-76 review for 
this aircraft but could not locate it.

[End of table]

As the table shows, the USDA Forest Service operations manager was able 
to provide detailed documentation supporting its justification for 
acquiring two of the four aircraft selected. For these two aircraft, 
USDA Forest Service officials provided an A-76 study and extensive 
studies documenting the need for these aircraft and evaluating the 
costs and benefits of acquiring different models of aircraft. For the 
Bell helicopter, the operations manager could not provide documentation 
from the time the helicopter was acquired. However, he provided a cost-
benefit analysis completed a few years after the aircraft was acquired 
justifying the continued operation of the aircraft. Each analysis 
performed for each of these three aircraft included a discussion of the 
life cycle costs different options would incur. For the remaining 
aircraft, the Beechcraft E90, the operations manager stated that the 
task it performed was mandated by federal law, so USDA Forest Service 
staff did not feel an A-76 review or cost benefit analysis was 
warranted in that case.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

According to the USDA Forest Service operations manager, the USDA 
Forest Service tracks a limited number of statistics documenting the 
performance of aircraft they own. The metrics they track include cost 
per flight hour, fuel usage and costs, and time down for maintenance. 
Regional staff review these statistics, usually once a year, to 
evaluate how their aircraft are performing and to spot potential 
maintenance or operational problems early. For certain aircraft, such 
as those used for training, these statistics are reviewed on a more 
regular basis, as the information on costs is needed to set the rates 
charged to other agencies that may use the aircraft. These reports are 
also used when determining whether or not it is time to replace USDA 
Forest Service existing aircraft. In terms of assessing the cost-
effectiveness of aircraft, USDA Forest Service officials indicated that 
they have not periodically reviewed the cost-effectiveness of their 
entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB Circular A-126.

Safety Statistics: 

From April 1995 through October 2003, the USDA Forest Service has had 
44 accidents with 11 resulting in 20 fatalities. Figure 10 shows the 
number aircraft accidents by year and indicates that 1996, 2001, and 
2002 had the highest number of accidents. According to both a USDA 
Forest Service official and the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, the high 
number of accidents in 2000 through 2002 likely reflects that these 
years also had severe fire seasons.

Figure 10: USDA Forest Service Aircraft Accidents, April 1995 - October 
2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Most of the accidents occurred during the maneuvering phase of 
difficult firefighting missions such as retardant drops and external 
load operations. Retardant drops involve dropping a chemical agent 
along the perimeters of a fire to keep it contained. External load 
operations require helicopters to fill a water bucket while hovering 
above a water source to aid suppressing the fire.

According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident data, 
the most common causes of USDA Forest Service accidents were personnel 
related. NTSB attributed the cause of 24 out of the 44 accidents to 
pilot error or crew error, and the cause of one accident to an 
inadequate maintenance inspection. Table 21 summarizes the causes of 
USDA Forest Service accidents, as determined by NTSB.

Table 21: Causes and Contributing Factors of USDA Forest Service 
Aircraft Accidents: 

[See PDF for image]

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.

Note: Contributing factor columns may not equal the total number of 
accidents because a single accident may have none or multiple 
contributing factors.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: Federal Aviation Administration, Hangar 6 Program: 

Program Description: 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintains an executive 
transportation function out of Hangar 6 at Washington Reagan National 
Airport near Washington, D.C. According to FAA officials, this service, 
commonly referred to as Hangar 6, utilizes four aircraft to transport 
passengers and cargo to locations throughout the world for which 
commercial service is either unavailable or not cost effective. Such 
missions include transporting staff of other agencies when Hangar 6 
aircraft are available to do so. Also, Hangar 6 transports National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) "go team" members to crash sites and 
flies FAA staff to special events when commercial service would be too 
time consuming. Furthermore, because commercial airlines cannot 
transport explosive materials, Hangar 6 transports explosives used in 
the Transportation Security Administration's canine training program. 
In addition, FAA headquarters personnel also use Hangar 6 aircraft to 
ensure that they have enough hours of flight time for their pilot 
certificate to stay current, and Hangar 6 aircraft are available to 
assist in emergencies, such as in transporting air marshals to guard 
flights after September 11, 2001. Hangar 6 employs 10 pilots and 8 
maintenance workers. Hangar 6 officials stated that they need 12 pilots 
to fully utilize their aircraft and that the planes are not fully 
utilized because of a lack of qualified pilots.

FAA leases two aircraft at Hangar 6 from the Cessna Finance 
Corporation. This company provides heavy maintenance for these 
aircraft. Of the remaining two aircraft at Hangar 6, one is owned by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which loans 
the plane to FAA, and FAA owns the fourth aircraft outright. FAA 
contracts out the heavy maintenance on these two aircraft on a set 
maintenance schedule.

Hangar 6 receives its funding through several sources. First, it 
receives an annual appropriation from Congress that has averaged 
approximately $5.6 million over the past 3 years. This includes about 
$1,080,000 it receives from NASA annually to defray the operational 
cost of the NASA aircraft FAA operates. In addition, other agencies 
that use Hangar 6 aircraft to transport their staff pay Hangar 6 about 
$1 million per year.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

As stated above, Hangar 6 operates a fleet of four airplanes composed 
of three separate makes and models for its missions. With the exception 
of the aircraft on loan from NASA, Hangar 6 acquired all of its current 
aircraft when new. The average age of Hangar 6's aircraft is about 10 
years, although two of their four aircraft entered service in 2003.

According to Hangar 6 data entered into the FAIRS database, the overall 
cost and utilization of aircraft has remained relatively stable since 
fiscal year 2000. Table 22 shows the cost and utilization of program 
aircraft for fiscal years 2000-2002.

Table 22: Cost and Utilization of Hangar 6 Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-
2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $3,814,127; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,323.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $3,623,100; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,318.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $4,386,898; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 1,366.

Fiscal years: Total; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Costs: $11,824,125; 
Hangar 6 operated aircraft[A]: Flight hours: 4,007. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

[A] Hangar 6 has not reported any cost or flight hours data for the 
NASA-owned G-III.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Hangar 6 is part of FAA's Aviation Systems Standards (AVN) group. 
Hangar 6 officials stated that their long-term strategic planning is 
incorporated into AVN's long-term strategic planning process. However, 
in the most recent AVN strategic plan, there is no mention of Hangar 6. 
The 1988 AVN strategic plan was the most recent one FAA provided us 
mentioning Hangar 6. Hangar 6 officials stated that since their 
operation is so small, they are able to spot future needs early and 
without a formal long-term planning process.

Hangar 6 engages in some short-term fleet planning. For example, Hangar 
6 officials stated that they discuss the capital needs of their program 
each year at the AVN strategic planning meeting. Also, when Hangar 6 
staff identifies an upcoming need to acquire an aircraft, they can 
perform studies to determine how best to fill their needs. FAA may 
perform these studies or they can hire outside consultants to do the 
studies. For example, when two Hangar 6 aircraft were reaching the end 
of their lease, Hangar 6 officials performed a market survey, which 
asked potential customers how much they would use Hangar 6 aircraft 
under various scenarios. Based on the results of the survey, they hired 
Conklin and de Decker Associates to determine what aircraft best met 
the needs of their customers and to perform a cost-benefit analysis of 
these options.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

When Hangar 6 officials determine a need exists to acquire a new 
aircraft, they must identify a potential funding source. Unless Hangar 
6 was to receive a special congressional appropriation, they would have 
to use their existing program funds to pay for the aircraft. If the 
funds come out of Hangar 6's Facilities and Equipment funds (as funding 
for FAA capital assets usually does), according to FAA rules, Hangar 6 
must submit their proposal to the Integrated Product Team (IPT) for 
review, just as the Flight Inspection program does, as was discussed 
earlier. However, Hangar 6 officials stated that they have not used 
Facilities and Equipment funding to acquire aircraft.

However, if Hangar 6 uses operating funds to acquire an aircraft, 
officials stated they are exempt from the Investment Analysis process 
to determine the best option to meet their needs. In this instance, 
they only need to obtain the approval of the directors of the Aviation 
Systems Standards Division and the FAA Administrator. Also, there is no 
requirement to evaluate the life cycle cost of aircraft acquisition 
options and no IPT review is required when using operating funds to 
acquire an aircraft. One FAA manager admitted that this represented a 
loophole in the acquisition process.

To gain a better understanding of how Hangar 6 traditionally justified 
their aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to 
support aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked officials to provide 
documentation on 6 aircraft that Hangar 6 either currently operates or 
recently returned to the lessee. Results from our review of these 
aircraft are summarized in table 23.

Table 23: Documentation Supporting Acquisition of Current and Recently 
Disposed Hangar 6 Aircraft: 

Aircraft (type): Gulfstream G-IV; 
Acquisition date: May 25, 1989; 
Purchase or lease price: Unknown; 
Justification: Aircraft purchased through congressional mandate; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.

Aircraft (type): Gulfstream G-III; 
Acquisition date: September 26, 2002; 
Purchase or lease price: Unknown[A]; 
Justification: Unknown[A]; 
A-76 study completed: Unknown[A]; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[A].

Aircraft (type): Lear Jet 45; 
Acquisition date: August 6, 1992; 
Purchase or lease price: $7.86 million lease over 10 years; 
Justification: Accident investigations and support of other agencies' 
operations; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560 XL; 
Acquisition date: March 2003; 
Purchase or lease price: $11 million lease over 10 years; 
Justification: To replace aircraft for which lease were expiring; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560 XL; 
Acquisition date: March 2003; 
Purchase or lease price: $11 million lease over 10 years; 
Justification: To replace aircraft for which lease was expiring; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: Yes.

Aircraft (type): Cessna Citation 560; 
Acquisition date: June 1, 1992; 
Purchase or lease price: $8.4 million lease over 10 years; 
Justification: Accident investigations; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B]. 

Sources: GAO analysis of GSA data and interviews with FAA.

[A] NASA owns the Gulfstream G-III that Hangar 6 operates. FAA had no 
documents relating to the purchase of this aircraft.

[B] FAA stated that they completed cost-benefit analyses for these 
aircraft but disposed of the records.

[End of table]

As the table shows, Hangar 6 officials provided some documentation 
showing the justification for acquiring the current and recent aircraft 
but no A-76 analyses for the aircraft. Also, they provided cost-benefit 
analyses on their most recent acquisitions, which included a life cycle 
cost analysis. Hangar 6 does not have any documentation on the NASA-
owned aircraft they operate because NASA originally purchased the 
aircraft and retains the acquisition documentation for it. 
Nevertheless, Hangar 6 officials stated that they did not perform an 
analysis of the operational or financial impact acquiring this aircraft 
would have on their operations.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

Hangar 6 has no specific measures or metrics that they use to 
periodically measure the performance of their aircraft. Hangar 6 staff 
annually reviews statistics for its aircraft, such as aircraft 
downtime, maintenance costs, and total flight hours, in order to adjust 
aircraft utilization levels. Hangar 6 staff stated that their program 
is small enough that all staff maintains an intimate knowledge of all 
of Hangar 6's aircraft, so a formalized system is unnecessary. Also, 
Hangar 6 officials stated that they would use an aircraft's past 
history when deciding on what is the best aircraft for them to acquire. 
In terms of assessing the cost-effectiveness of aircraft, Hangar 6 
officials indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB 
Circular A-126.

Safety Statistics: 

The Hangar 6 operation did not have any accidents reportable to the 
National Transportation Safety Board from April 1995 through October 
2003.

[End of section]

Appendix IX: Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration: 

Program Description: 

The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Aviation Division (OA) 
provides support to DEA's operational and intelligence elements within 
the rest of DEA in order to detect, locate, identify, and assess 
illicit narcotics-related trafficking activities; to dismantle drug 
trafficking organizations and cartels in the United States and foreign 
countries; and to assist other federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies involved in the deterrence of illicit narcotics-
related activities. Also, DEA assists foreign governments with 
operational and logistical drug enforcement activities.

OA's Office of Aviation Operations is headquartered out of a secured 
facility on the grounds of Alliance Airport in Ft. Worth, Texas. 
Alliance Airport has three runways, one of which is over 7,000 feet 
long and can handle the largest jets in operation today. DEA also 
maintains 37 other aviation locations throughout the world. These 
include 30 domestic and 7 overseas locations, such as Miami; Seattle; 
Ft. Worth; Bogotá, Colombia; and Lima, Peru. Minor maintenance is 
performed at the aircraft's location, but DEA contracts with Vertex-L3 
Aerospace to perform heavy maintenance on their aircraft at Alliance 
Airport in Ft. Worth.

A DEA Special Agent in Charge is assigned to administer OA. Also, DEA 
has four Aviation Resident Offices (ARO) within the United States that 
oversee the major metropolitan areas of Houston (South Central ARO), 
Los Angeles (Western ARO), Miami (Southeastern ARO), and Newark/New 
York (Northeastern ARO). Other areas are managed by Area Supervisors 
who are based at the Office of Aviation Operations, with the exception 
of the Southeastern Aviation Group whose Area Supervisor is based at 
the Southeastern ARO. Additionally, the Aviation Intelligence Group and 
the Operational Support Group, which are based at the Office of 
Aviation Operations, provide air intelligence and aviation support to 
all domestic field divisions through the use of specialized aircraft. 
OA receives funding directly through budgetary appropriations to DEA.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

DEA's fleet consists of 107 aircraft, including 50 single engine and 14 
twin-engine turboprop fixed wing airplanes, 29 single engine and 12 
twin-engine helicopters, and two twin-engine jets. DEA acquired 20 of 
these aircraft through seizure. Of the 107 aircraft, 6 are leased and 5 
are unserviceable and are being kept for parts. DEA's aircraft have an 
average age of 19.65 years.

According to the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS) 
database, both the cost and hours flown for DEA's aircraft have 
remained relatively steady since fiscal year 2000 (see table 24).

Table 24: Cost and Utilization of DEA Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
Costs: $14,465,542; 
Flight hours: 22,898.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
Costs: $15,842,357; 
Flight hours: 22,957.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
Costs: $14,453,567; 
Flight hours: 23,633.

Total; 
Costs: $44,761,466; 
Flight hours: 69,488.

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Currently, DEA has contracted with Conklin and deDecker Associates to 
perform a long-term strategic plan to evaluate the performance and 
composition of its aircraft fleet. Also, in the Conference Report (H.R. 
Conf. Rep. 108-10) for the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 
(P.L. 108-7), the conferees directed that DEA complete a 5-year master 
plan for its aircraft fleet. This plan evaluated the utilization of the 
current fleet and reviewed potential replacement scenarios. The plan 
states that most DEA aircraft have a useful life of no more than 25 
years. Therefore, many portions of DEA's fleet will need to be replaced 
or rehabilitated in the next several years. DEA officials, however, 
stated implementing such plans is often difficult because of budgetary 
levels or new mission requirements; therefore, when doing strategic 
planning, they focus on shorter time frames than other organizations 
might.

DEA's officials stated that OA is an organization that must respond to 
the needs of DEA field elements. According to the Aviation Division's 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, because of this, they respond to 
needs regardless of cost, much like a fire department, although they 
use competitive bids and other cost saving procedures to try to keep 
costs down.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

Once funding for aircraft assets is approved, DEA's Aviation Division 
compiles a "One-Year Advance Procurement Plan" that includes a 
discussion of the need to be filled. OA then prepares a Statement of 
Work identifying the DEA needs to be filled and requests bids from 
private companies for aircraft to fill these needs. A technical 
evaluation panel then is created to determine the best aircraft to fill 
the need. Cost is considered in this evaluation but is not necessarily 
the determining factor. Occasionally, Congress will mandate that DEA 
purchase a particular type of aircraft and include funds to do so. This 
bypasses the normal budget process.

To gain a better understanding of the traditional acquisition process 
for DEA aircraft, and the type of documentation used to support 
acquisition decisions, we asked DEA to provide documentation on several 
of their aircraft. Results from this request are summarized in table 
25.

Table 25: Documentation Supporting 6 DEA Aircraft Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type)[A]: Helicopter 1; 
Acquisition date: August 16, 1993; 
Purchase price: $159,398; 
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft; affordable; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 1; 
Acquisition date: October 11, 2001; 
Purchase price: $3,304,760; 
Justification: Need for cargo and passenger transportation; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 2; 
Acquisition date: February 13, 2002; 
Purchase price: $8,600,000; 
Justification: Need for passenger transportation; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 3; 
Acquisition date: April 25, 2002; 
Purchase price: $379,575; 
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type)[A]: Airplane 4; 
Acquisition date: December 20, 1999; 
Purchase price: $4,458,749; 
Justification: Need for twin- engine aircraft; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B].

Aircraft (type)[A]: Helicopter 2; 
Acquisition date: October 15, 2001; 
Purchase price: $1,606,374; 
Justification: Need for surveillance aircraft; 
A-76 completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DEA documents and interviews.

[A] Information on aircraft type is not included because DOJ considers 
it to be sensitive law enforcement information.

[B] According to DEA, cost-benefit analyses for these aircraft were 
performed, but not written down or recorded.

[End of table]

As table 25 shows, DEA was able to provide detailed information about 
the acquisition date and purchase price for the selected aircraft, but 
not the other information we requested. DEA does not complete any 
analyses to comply with Circulars A-76 and A-126. DEA officials stated 
that they are "mission exempt" from these requirements since they are a 
law-enforcement agency. Therefore, no analysis is completed of whether 
or not an aircraft would be more cost-effective if a private contractor 
operated it for DEA, and there is no requirement to perform an analysis 
of an aircraft's life cycle costs prior to acquiring it. However, 
periodically, DEA will hire a consultant to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of a portion of their fleet. For instance, in 1996 DEA hired 
Conklin and de Decker Associates to analyze the cost-effectiveness of 
their turboprop fleet. This is similar to an A-126 review. DEA staff 
determine their needs on an ongoing basis, and the justification and 
cost-benefit calculations for individual aircraft are not recorded 
formally. DEA officials provided no studies or documents that assess 
the projected costs over the life of an aircraft versus those of a 
similar model (also known as life cycle cost analysis).

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

DEA's contractor, Vertex L-3 Aerospace, tracks certain aspects of DEA 
aircraft performance in a detailed fashion. They collect information on 
such statistics as operational readiness, cost per flight hour, and 
total maintenance costs. They track these statistics for each model of 
aircraft and produce quarterly spreadsheets showing the trends for each 
aircraft and each model. These spreadsheets are provided to several DEA 
staff members with responsibility for various areas of the aviation 
operation. These staff members meet quarterly to evaluate the 
contractor's performance and decide upon any incentive payments for 
good performance.

Also, other DEA staff members are charged with reviewing these 
statistics and determining if action needs to be taken regarding 
specific aircraft, such as additional unscheduled maintenance, 
contacting the manufacturer, or taking the aircraft out of service 
because of a safety issue. These staff members have input when DEA is 
deciding on what aircraft are best suited to fill its future needs so 
that past trends can be taken into account. When new aircraft are being 
acquired, the technical evaluation panel looks at the past performance 
of aircraft already in the DEA fleet to see if similar aircraft should 
be acquired or avoided.

Safety Statistics: 

From April 1995 through October 2003, the DEA had three accidents and 
one incident. The accidents occurred in 1998 and 2001, and the incident 
occurred in 2002. In the 1998 occurrence, a DEA helicopter descended 
into the ground during a training mission, and this resulted in one 
fatality. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
aircraft accident data, this accident was a result of the instructor 
pilot's failure to control the helicopter during a demonstrated 
autorotation. Contributing to the accident were the lack of Instructor 
Pilot Standardization Procedures and Specific Flight Demonstration 
Procedures. According to DEA, they have addressed these deficiencies 
and altered flight procedures accordingly by restricting procedures for 
aircraft operation both in training and on missions. Both 2001 
accidents occurred while on law enforcement missions, and were both due 
to mechanical failure. The 2002 incident took place during a 
positioning flight, and NTSB is still investigating the cause.

[End of section]

Appendix X: Department of State, International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Program: 

Program Description: 

The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs Office of Aviation (INL/A) is responsible for 
assisting host nations eradicate illicit drug crops and detect, 
monitor, and interdict drug trafficking operations. The crops INL/A 
seeks to eradicate include marijuana, coca, and opium poppy. To 
accomplish these missions, INL/A uses helicopters and airplanes in 
South America and Pakistan. Through its contract with DynCorp, INL/A 
undertakes aerial eradication of illicit drug crops in Colombia, 
supports manual eradication of drug crops in Peru and Bolivia, and 
provides border security in Pakistan. The operations in Colombia are 
often times in hostile environments, which can place aircraft and 
personnel under small arms fire. The programs aviation operations are 
headquartered and managed at Patrick Air Force Base located in Florida. 
As the aircraft program's contractor, DynCorp performs major 
maintenance and initial pilot training at Patrick Air Force Base and 
flies and maintains U.S. aircraft and trains foreign personnel at 
various locations in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Training for some of 
the spray aircraft is also conducted at Kirtland Air Force Base in New 
Mexico. This training helps simulate the mountainous environments of 
Colombia.

Aircraft Fleet and Operating Statistics: 

According to INL/A officials, the program has 154 operational aircraft, 
consisting of 33 airplanes and 121 helicopters. These aircraft are 
composed of 10 major makes and models, and the average age of all INL/
A aircraft, including nonoperational aircraft, is about 26 years. Many 
of these aircraft were previously in military service, and over 110 of 
these aircraft were acquired since January 2002 as funding for this 
program increased dramatically in support of Plan Colombia.[Footnote 
39] Table 26 shows that, according to data INL/A entered into the FAIRS 
database, the overall cost and utilization of fleet aircraft also has 
significantly increased since fiscal year 2000.

Table 26: Cost and Flight Hours INL/A Aircraft, Fiscal Years 2000-2002: 

Fiscal years: 2000; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $20,724,587; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 19,820.

Fiscal years: 2001; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $33,696,589; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 20,824.

Fiscal years: 2002; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $91,672,382; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 32,306.

Total; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Costs[A]: $146,093,588; 
INL/A owned aircraft: Flight hours: 72,950.

Source: GAO analysis of FAIRS database.

Note: INL/A reported total commercial aviation services costs and 
flight hours of $880 and 1 flight hour respectively during this period.

[A] An INL/A official stated that total program costs were probably 
close to $200 million annually, but that an exact figure could not be 
determined due to the complex nature of the program's financial 
transactions involving foreign governments and embassies.

[End of table]

Aircraft Planning Process: 

Fleetwide planning for INL/A aircraft is primarily short-term in nature 
and revolves around identifying aircraft capability to meet current and 
next-year mission requirements. Officials at Patrick Air Force Base 
indicated that this short-term focus is due to the nature of the 
program's mission requirements, which are greatly affected by broader 
international drug control priorities. Officials indicated that INL/A 
has never undertaken any long-term strategic assessment to determine 
potential mission requirements and the optimal mix of aircraft to meet 
such requirements. As such, officials could not provide a long-term 
fleet management plan that identified anticipated aircraft 
requirements, and strategies for ensuring the program had the most 
cost-effective mix of aircraft. Officials indicated that they intend to 
prepare a long-term plan in the near future.

Aircraft Acquisition Process: 

INL/A officials stated that program managers in the field are 
responsible for identifying any shortfalls in aircraft capabilities and 
whether additional aircraft are needed. If new aircraft requirements 
are identified, field managers and the Chief of Operations at Patrick 
Air Force Base develop a justification. The justification must be 
reviewed and approved by the Program Director at Patrick Air Force Base 
and then by the Department's Assistant Secretary responsible for the 
INL/A. Once all approvals and funding are obtained, contracting 
officials in Washington, D.C., proceed with a procurement. A program 
manager in Washington, D.C., indicated that this was somewhat of an 
informal process; there were no set criteria for the type and extent of 
documentation required to develop a justification and obtain final 
approval. Typically, once a need is identified, the Chief of Operations 
tasks DynCorp to prepare a study and come up with a recommendation on a 
specific aircraft to purchase. The Chief of Operations then 
incorporates this into a power point presentation, which he uses to 
obtain funding approval from officials in either Washington, D.C., or 
an embassy.

To gain a better understanding of how INL/A has traditionally justified 
its aircraft acquisitions and the type of documentation used to support 
aircraft acquisition decisions, we asked officials to provide 
documentation on four aircraft that INL/A recently acquired. Results 
from our review of these four aircraft are summarized in table 27.

Table 27: Documentation Supporting Four Recent INL/A Aircraft 
Acquisitions: 

Aircraft (type): Cessna 208B; (airplane); 
Acquisition date: May 13, 2002; 
Purchase price: $1,200,000; 
Justification: Needed for increasing training missions, replaces 
existing C212; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.

Aircraft (type): Air Tractor 802 (airplane); 
Acquisition date: January 24, 2002; 
Purchase price: [A]; 
Justification: Congress mandated increased crop spraying under Plan 
Colombia; 
A-76 study completed: No; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: No.

Aircraft (type): Sikorsky UH-60; (helicopter); 
Acquisition date: July 1, 2002; 
Purchase price: [A]; 
Justification: Directed by Congress under Plan Colombia; 
A-76 study completed: N/A; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A.

Aircraft (type): Bell UH-1H II (helicopter); 
Acquisition date: June 1, 2002; 
Purchase price: [A]; 
Justification: Directed by Congress under Plan Colombia; 
A-76 study completed: N/A; 
Cost benefit analysis provided: N/A. 

Source: GAO analysis of INL/A documentation and interviews.

[A] INL/A officials did not provide us with requested information on 
the purchase price.

[End of table]

During our review, we learned that one of these aircraft was recently 
acquired by the U.S. military and provided to INL/A under Plan 
Colombia, and Congress mandated INL/A acquire another of these 
aircraft. Therefore, we determined that our questions did not apply to 
these specific aircraft acquisitions. As the table shows, INL/A was 
able to provide only limited documentation supporting its aircraft 
acquisition decisions for the remaining two aircraft. Specifically, 
INL/A could not provide any OMB Circular A-76 cost comparison studies. 
Further, INL/A officials could not provide any detailed study or cost 
benefit analyses supporting these acquisitions. While they indicated 
they had prepared Power Point presentations to obtain funding approval, 
they could not locate or provide these documents.

Aviation Metrics and Performance Management: 

As part of its contract with DynCorp, INL/A officials indicated they 
have established operational readiness requirements for its aircraft. 
This requirement is designed to ensure that DynCorp keeps the aircraft 
mission capable and a flies them a sufficient number of hours to 
achieve its mission. To help evaluate DynCorp's performance, INL/A 
maintains an information system which tracks, on a monthly basis, 
operational readiness for each group of aircraft at each location. An 
official indicated the operational readiness is the primary aviation 
metric that it used to help manage its operations, and help spot if 
aircraft are having problems in meeting mission requirements. In terms 
of assessing the cost effectiveness of aircraft, INL/A officials 
indicated that they have not periodically reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of their entire fleet of aircraft to comply with OMB 
Circular A-126.

Safety Statistics: 

From April 1995 through October 2003, INL/A had five accidents with 
three resulting in a total of three fatalities. Figure 11 shows the 
number of both fatal and nonfatal accidents from 1995 to 2003.

Figure 11: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs Accidents, April 1995 - October 2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The accidents occurred during crop eradication, training, and 
maintenance ferry missions at various phases of flight including the 
maneuvering, descent, cruise, and climb phases.

According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft 
accident data, the causes of the accidents varied. Pilot error 
contributed to three accidents. In two cases, NTSB does not list the 
cause. NTSB did not list the cause of the 2001 fatal accident because 
the pilot and the plane are missing. Another fatal accident occurred 
during a crop eradication flight in Colombia. NTSB does not list a 
final cause for this accident because the Government of Colombia has 
primary authority to conduct this accident investigation. Table 28 
summarizes the number of accidents that NTSB attributed to personnel, 
environment, and mechanical factors by primary cause and other 
contributing factors.

Table 28: Causes and Contributing Factors of the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aircraft Accidents: 

Personnel factors; Primary cause: 2; Contributing factor[A]: 1.

Environment factors; None.

Mechanical factors; Primary cause: 1.

Not determined; Primary cause: 2.

Source: GAO analysis of NTSB aircraft accident data.

[A] Contributing factors columns may not equal to the total number of 
accidents, because a single accident could have none or multiple 
contributing factors.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix XI: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

GSA:

GSA Office of Governmentwide Policy:

MAY 14 2004:

Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Hecker:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft General 
Accounting Office (GAO) Publication GAO-04-645, "Federal Aircraft: 
Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management Planning Hamper 
Cost Effective Operations." Our markup is enclosed. Following are some 
general comments.

The draft report's title obscures the audit's scope, findings, and 
recommendations. We suggest a clearer title such as "Federal Aviation: 
Further Improvements Needed in Acquisition, Cost Accounting, 
Performance Measurement, and Oversight". As defined by regulation, 
Federal aircraft are those aircraft that the Federal Government owns. 
Therefore, your title inadvertently excludes the many aircraft the 
Federal Government leases, contracts, charters, and rents. Our data, 
though not entirely complete, reveals that about 50% of annual 
operating costs is spent on these commercial aircraft. Additionally, 
about 50% of annual operating costs attributed to Federally-owned 
aircraft is spent in the commercial sector for aircrews, maintenance, 
fuel, facilities, and other products and services. As your draft report 
shows, improvements are needed across the board.

Regarding the Federal Aviation Interactive Reporting System (FAIRS), we 
agree that the cost data is too understated at this point to draw 
concrete conclusions about cost effectiveness. However, we have seen 
incremental improvements each year largely as a result of our data 
stewardship actions like training, technical assistance, and data 
reconciliation. In fact, our 2003 cost data is very close to the 
estimates in your draft report. Our 2004 cost data should be even 
better, as we have recently made improvements to FAIRS including 
additional internal controls and mandatory cost elements. We are 
confident that the inventory and flight hour data are more accurate and 
useful. For example, the inventory data persuasively shows that we have 
an aging fleet badly in need of modernization. Our flight hour data 
convincingly shows that the aircraft support law enforcement, fire 
fighting, resources management, scientific research, humanitarian 
assistance, and many other vital missions.

In the safety area, we are pleased that you found that all the agencies 
examined produced evidence of strong programs, even though their 
oversight processes varied. We also note that in several places in the 
draft report you refer to "183 accidents" from 1995 to 2003, and in 
several others you refer to "183 accidents and incidents" over the same 
period. As you know, the criteria for accidents are much different from 
the criteria for incidents, and the causal factors and other 
conclusions can also be quite different. We ask that you clarify this.

Finally, the draft report correctly highlights the "gap" between 
Federal aviation policies and operations - namely enforcement. 
Enforcement is a responsibility at all levels of Federal aviation 
including General Services Administration, agencies that operate 
aircraft, OMB, and pertinent congressional oversight committees. We 
look forward to working with all responsible parties involved to help 
"close the gap". However, we oppose interfering in other agencies 
internal management controls for which they are accountable. Our 
specific steps will, of course, be included in action plans generated 
as the audit process unfolds.

If you have questions or need further information, please contact Mr. 
Peter Zuidema, Director, Aircraft Management Policy, (202) 219-1377, or 
peter.zuidema@gsa.gov.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

G. Martin Wagner: 
Associate Administrator:

Enclosure: 

[End of section]

Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice:

Washington, D.C. 20530:

May 20, 2004:

JayEtta Z. Hecker:

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Hecker:

On April 26, 2004, the General Accounting Office (GAO) provided the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) a copy of its draft report entitled Federal 
Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet Management 
Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations (GAO-04-645/540051) with a 
request for comments. We appreciate the opportunity to review the draft 
report. While the Department agrees with much of the report, we are 
concerned by the implications of several statements contained therein. 
The following formal comments will clarify such information and we 
request that they be incorporated into the final report.

First on page 22 of the report, the GAO states that "in 2003, Congress 
mandated that DEA produce a 5-year strategic plan for its aircraft 
program. The plan included some recommendations on replacing portions 
of its fleet, including its aging OH-6 helicopters, but did not include 
a detailed analysis of how many flight hours would be required of its 
fleet and what mix of aircraft would be best suited to DEA's mission."

In its 5-Year Plan for Aviation Support (FY 2003 to FY 2008) DEA's 
recommendation focused on replacement and modernization of the portion 
of its fleet that could reasonably be accomplished by FY 2008. DEA does 
not have the aircraft replacement base resources for a complete 
turnover of the fleet to an ideal mix of aircraft within five years, or 
the luxury of scheduling a date certain for the replacement of each of 
its aircraft. Instead, DEA chose to focus on planning for what could 
realistically be accomplished within a five-year period. The report 
responded to a Congressional Reporting Requirement in which the five-
year period was the parameter specified by the House Commerce, Justice, 
State and the Judiciary Appropriations Subcommittee.

Additionally, it should be noted that DEA's changing focus makes it 
impractical to attempt to estimate flight hours per year. As the 
Aviation Division responds to the needs of DEA's field divisions, 
flight hours as well as the types of missions performed vary. The 
Aviation Division's operational funds are applied to different aircraft 
based upon the fluctuating needs of DEA. For this reason, the program 
is funded as a collective operation requiring managers to apportion 
resources to meet changing priorities.

On page 24 of the report, the GAO noted that "Circular A-76 explicitly 
states that programs should file A-76 reviews in most instances because 
although the mission of the program may be inherently governmental, the 
aircraft does not necessarily have to be government owned or operated. 
In addition, we found that some of these programs had hired contractors 
to perform the same aviation functions for them, which contradicted 
their views that the missions were inherently governmental, and thus 
needed to be completed by government employees using government owned 
aircraft."

The Department believes that the Aviation Division is exempt from A-76 
reviews due to the nature of the work being performed by DEA. While 
there are instances where contract employees are utilized for missions 
that could possibly be performed by a commercial entity, these 
instances are exceptions to the norm and would not justify an aircraft 
used only for commercial purposes. The majority of missions performed 
by the Aviation Division are inherently governmental and require the 
use of law enforcement officers or other specialized DEA employees. 
These missions include but are not limited to surveillance missions, 
undercover use of aircraft, and prisoner transportation. The process of 
determining the cost for this type of mission commercially is 
irrelevant because it simply cannot be accomplished by civilian 
personnel.

Finally on page 34, the GAO reports that "the USDA Forest Service, DEA, 
and FWS subject themselves to internal reviews of their operations... 
The USDA Forest Service and DEA elected to undergo program reviews that 
are initiated and performed internally."

It is extremely important to note that DEA's internal reviews in the 
areas of safety and training use guidelines established by outside 
agencies. The reviews are not arbitrarily defined nor are they 
conducted solely upon DEA guidelines. Additionally, the Aviation 
Division plans to undergo an ARMS (Aviation Resources Management 
Survey) review in the next year and will undergo an internal DEA Office 
of Inspections review in July 2004, in part, utilizing ARMS guidelines 
and checklists.

We hope these comments will be beneficial in preparing your final 
report. If you have any questions concerning the Department's comments 
in this matter, please feel free to contact Vickie L. Sloan, Director, 
Audit Liaison Office, Justice Management Division on (202) 514-0469.

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

Paul R. Corts: 
Assistant Attorney General for Administration: 

[End of section]

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Department of Agriculture: 

United States Department of Agriculture: 
Forest Service: 
Washington Office:

14th & Independence SW 
P.O. Box 96090 
Washington, DC 20090-6090:
File Code: 5700:

Date: MAY 21 2004:

Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Hecker:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report on federal 
aircraft GAO-04-645, "Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses in Fleet 
Management Planning Hampering Cost Effective Operations."

We are continually attempting to improve the systems, which assist us 
in cost effective operations and believe the report assists us in 
accomplishing those goals. The following comments on the draft report 
are consolidated from those received from within the Forest Service.

We agree with virtually all of the comments that specifically identify 
a Forest Service need for improvement. We believe that in most cases we 
have complied with OMB Circular A-76 and A-126 but realize we can 
improve in the areas outlined in the draft report.

We share GAO's concerns about the Federal Aviation Interactive 
Reporting System (FAIRS). We believe it is a good starting point toward 
improved reporting. However, it is our opinion that the FAIRS is 
difficult to use and could be designed more efficiently. For example, 
FAIRS currently captures over one hundred cost elements, making it 
cumbersome and unwieldy.

In conclusion, we believe the GAO draft report on federal aviation has 
provided an accurate assessment of Forest Service cost data. We welcome 
the suggested improvements to FAIRS and would like to be an active 
participant in any future updates.

Contact Larry Brosnan at 202-205-1497 with any further questions.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

DALE N. BOSWORTH: 
Chief: 

[End of section]

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

United States Department of the Interior:
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
Washington, D.C. 20240:

MAY 21 2004:

Ms. JayEtta Z. Hecker:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Hecker:

Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior the opportunity 
to review and comment on the draft U.S. General Accounting Office 
report entitled, "Federal Aircraft: Inaccurate Cost Data and Weaknesses 
in Fleet Management Planning Hamper Cost Effective Operations," (GAO-
04-645) dated April 26, 2004. In general, we agree with the findings 
that pertain to the Department, except as indicated in the enclosure. 
Although the recommendations are not directed to the Department, we 
generally agree with them.

The enclosure provides comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
and the National Business Center. We hope our comments will assist you 
in preparing the final report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Paul Hoff

For the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section]

Appendix XV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

JayEtta Z. Hecker (202) 512-2834 Gerald L. Dillingham (202) 512-2834 
Glen Trochelman (312) 220-7729: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those individuals named above, Kimberly Berry, Vashun 
Cole, Michael LaForge, David Lehrer, David Lichtenfeld, Miguel Lujan, 
and Ray Sendejas made key contributions to this report.

(540051): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] GSA does not collect or maintain information on Armed Forces, 
Executive Office of the President, or U.S. intelligence-gathering 
aircraft programs and, thus, these programs are not part of our review.

[2] An accident is an occurrence associated with the operation of an 
aircraft in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in 
which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An incident is an 
occurrence other than an accident, which affects or could affect the 
safety of operations.

[3] OMB Circular A-126, "Improving the Management and Use of Government 
Aircraft," May 1992.

[4] OMB Circular A-76, "Performance of Commercial Activities," May 
2003.

[5] 41 C.F.R. Pt. 102-33, (2003).

[6] General Services Administration, Report on the Status of Federal 
Government Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2002, Aircraft Management Policy 
Division, undated.

[7] Appendix II summarizes federal fleet information from the GSA FAIRS 
system.

[8] We initially selected 32 aircraft for our review, but because 
agencies had acquired 4 of these aircraft at the direction of Congress, 
or through an interagency transfer, we excluded them from our review. 
Therefore, we reviewed the documentation of 28 aircraft.

[9] Program officials could not provide the acquisition price for six 
of the aircraft we reviewed.

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Improvements Are Needed in 
Managing Aircraft Used by Federal Civilian Agencies, LCD-77-430 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 1977); U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Federal Civilian Agencies Can Better Manage Their Aircraft and Related 
Services, GAO/PLRD (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1983); President's 
Council on Integrity and Efficiency Combined Report on the Federal 
Civilian Agencies' Aircraft Management Programs, December 16, 1996. 
This study summarized the reports of 20 Offices of Inspectors General 
that were completed between 1994 and 1996. 

[11] OMB staff stated that they do require federal agencies to submit a 
list of activities they perform that are not inherently governmental, 
as required by the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (P. 
L. 105-270) so that private contractors are aware of activities on 
which they could potentially bid.

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and 
Implementation Issues, GAO/T-GGD-98-146 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 
1998).

[13] An operating lease gives the federal government the use of an 
asset for a specified period of time, but the ownership of the asset 
does not change. OMB Circular A-11 identifies six criteria that a lease 
must meet to be considered an operating lease. The circular defines a 
lease-purchase as a type of lease in which ownership of the asset is 
transferred to the government at or shortly after the end of the lease 
term. It defines a capital lease as any lease other than a lease-
purchase that does not meet the criteria of an operating lease. 

[14] Scorekeeping guidelines as agreed upon and used by the House and 
Senate Budget Committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and OMB 
measure the effects of legislation on the deficit. They are presented 
in OMB Circular A-11.

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance and Accountability 
Series, High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property, GAO-03-122 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003).

[16] "Impact of the FAR and OMB Circular A-11 on Lease vs. Lease-to-
purchase Decisions," Conklin and deDecker Associates, (July 9, 2003).

[17] The net cost of the purchase and lease-purchase options includes 
the residual value of the aircraft, estimated to be $6.5 million at the 
end of 10 years.

[18] The net cost of the purchase and lease-purchase options includes 
the residual value of the aircraft, estimated to be $12.4 million at 
the end of 10 years.

[19] The study did not include a calculation of any aircraft residual 
values for the purchase or lease-purchase options.

[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Public Buildings: Budget 
Scorekeeping Prompts Difficult Decisions, GAO/T-AIMD-GGD-94-43 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1993).

[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Accrual Budgeting: Experiences of 
Other Nations and Implications for the United States, GAO/AIMD-00-57 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 18, 2000).

[22] 14 C.F.R. pt. 91 prescribes air traffic and general operating 
rules governing flight operations.

[23] 14 C.F.R. pt. 135 prescribes rules specifically governing certain 
commuter, on-demand (air taxi), and charter flight operations.

[24] 14 C.F.R. pt. 119 prescribes rules specifically governing 
scheduled air carrier common carriage or commercial charter service 
operations using large aircraft--aircraft capable of carrying more than 
20 passengers or a maximum payload of 6,000 pounds or more. 14 C.F.R. 
pt. 121 prescribes rules governing the domestic, flag, and supplemental 
operations of (pt. 119) scheduled air carrier common carriage or 
commercial large aircraft charter service operators. 

[25] When agencies operate aircraft for purposes that are not defined 
as public use operations, such as passenger transportation, those 
operations are subject to the FAA regulations applicable to civil 
aircraft operations.

[26] National Transportation Safety Board: Safety Recommendation (A-04-
29 through A-04-33), April 23, 2004.

[27] NTSB defines aircraft "Accidents" as an occurrence associated with 
the operation of an aircraft in which any person suffers death or 
serious injury or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An 
"Incident" is an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the 
operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of 
operations.

[28] The Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1994 (P.L. 103-411) 
gave NTSB jurisdiction to investigate all accidents involving public 
aircraft, except those operated by the Armed Forces or by a U.S. 
intelligence agency. 

[29] It is customary to cite accident rates--for example, accidents per 
100,000 flight hours--however, because there is a lack of accurate 
federal public use flight hours, we did not compute accident rates.

[30] Predator control refers to the operation of an aircraft for 
control of predators such as coyotes by capture and/or eradication.

[31] Blue Ribbon Panel, Federal Aerial Firefighting: Assessing Safety 
and Effectiveness (December 2002). 

[32] FAIRS data frequently change as program officials input and edit 
data on an as needed basis. The data presented in this section are from 
the General Service Administration's (GSA) published reports unless 
otherwise indicated.

[33] Although the federal government owns the aircraft that are loaned 
to the states, it does not operate the aircraft. Therefore, while the 
loaned aircraft are included in the inventory, they are not included in 
utilization or cost analyses.

[34] There is currently one glider in the fleet that is nonoperational. 
GSA classifies this aircraft as a piston engine aircraft.

[35] The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program's Framework for 
Federal Financial Management Systems defines a "central data steward" 
as having the responsibility to assure that data used to support 
government wide functions and reporting are complete and accurate. 

[36] Domestic flight inspection field offices are located in Atlantic 
City, Atlanta, Battle Creek, Oklahoma City, Sacramento, and Anchorage.

[37] Eight bureaus in DOI have aircraft programs. The bureaus are the 
Bureau of Land Management, FWS, National Park Service, Minerals 
Management Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation, 
U.S. Geological Survey, and Office of Surface Mining.

[38] AMD does not report data to FAIRS on three aircraft because they 
perform undercover operations, thus we had data on only 54 of the 57 
aircraft. 

[39] In July 2000, the United States agreed to provide about $860 
million for fiscal years 2000 to 2001 to support Plan Colombia, the 
Colombian government's $7.5 billion, 6-year counter narcotics plan. 
This amount was in addition to previously programmed U.S. assistance of 
over $300 million for the same period and almost doubled U.S. counter 
narcotics assistance to Colombia compared with fiscal year 1999 levels.

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