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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

April 2004: 

FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: 

Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and 
Balance: 

GAO-04-328: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-328, a report to congressional requesters

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Because advisory committees are established to advise federal decision 
makers on significant national issues, it is essential that their 
membership be, and be perceived as being, free from conflicts of 
interest and balanced as a whole. GAO was asked to (1) describe the 
role of federal advisory committees in the development of national 
policies, (2) examine the extent to which existing guidance and 
policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for conflicts 
of interest and points of view ensure independent members and balanced 
committees, and (3) identify practices and measures that could help 
ensure independence and balance.

What GAO Found: 

Federal advisory committees play an important role in shaping public 
policy by providing advice on a wide array of issues, such as stem cell 
research, drinking water standards, space exploration, drug approvals, 
and federal land management. About 950 advisory committees perform peer 
reviews of scientific research; offer advice on policy issues; identify 
long-range issues; and evaluate grant proposals, among other functions. 

Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure 
the independence of members—that is, that they are free from 
significant conflicts of interest—and balance of federal advisory 
committees. For example, current limitations in the Office of 
Government Ethics’ (OGE) guidance are a factor in at least three 
agencies’ continuing a long-standing practice of appointing most or all 
members as “representatives”—expected to reflect the views of the 
entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-
interest reviews—even when the agencies call upon the members to 
provide advice on behalf of the government. Such members would be more 
appropriately appointed as “special government employees,” who are 
reviewed for conflicts of interest. OGE officials agreed with GAO that 
these agencies’ appointments of some members as representatives of 
their fields of expertise are not appropriate, and this practice avoids 
using the special government employee category that was created to help 
the government hire experts in various fields for such purposes. OGE 
guidance that representatives may speak for, among others, any 
recognizable group of persons should be clarified to state that they 
generally are not to represent an expertise. Also, to be effective, 
advisory committees must be, and be perceived as being, fairly balanced 
in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. However, the 
General Services Administration’s (GSA) guidance on advisory committee 
management does not address what types of information could be helpful 
to agencies in assessing the points of view of potential committee 
members, nor do agency procedures identify what information should be 
collected about potential members to make decisions about committee 
balance. Consequently, many agencies do not identify and systematically 
collect and evaluate information pertinent to determining the points of 
view of potential committee members, such as previous public positions 
or statements on matters being reviewed.

GAO identified promising practices and measures that can better ensure 
independence and balance and promote transparency in the federal 
advisory committee system, such as obtaining nominations from the 
public and making public information about how members are identified 
and screened. Wider use of these practices—particularly for committees 
addressing sensitive or controversial topics—could reduce the 
likelihood that committees are, or are perceived as being, biased or 
imbalanced. 


What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that GSA and/or OGE, as appropriate, give direction to 
agencies on: the proper use of representative appointments; information 
that would help ensure committees are, and are perceived as, balanced; 
and practices that would better ensure independence and balance and 
enhance transparency in the advisory committee process. GSA agreed with 
GAO’s findings and agreed to work with OGE to implement the 
recommendations. OGE agreed that representative appointments need 
review but disagreed that its guidance has limitations. GAO continues 
to believe the guidance could be improved to better ensure that 
agencies are appropriately appointing committee members.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Advisory Committees Play an Important Role in the Development of 
Federal Policies: 

Federal Guidance Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance: 

Promising Practices Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Federal Advisory Committees, by Authorizing Mechanism and 
Type, in Fiscal Year 2003: 

Appendix III: Information on the Department of Agriculture's National 
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods: 

Appendix IV: Information on the Department of Energy's Biological and 
Environmental Research Advisory Committee: 

Appendix V: Information on the Environmental Protection Agency's 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory 
Panel: 

Appendix VI: Information on the Department of Health and Human 
Services's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections: 

Appendix VII: Information on the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention's Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention: 

Appendix VIII: Information on the Food and Drug Administration's Food 
Advisory Committee: 

Appendix IX: Information on the National Institutes of Health's 
Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods: 

Appendix X: Information on the Department of the Interior's U.S. 
Geological Survey's Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee: 

Appendix XI: Information on the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's Space Science Advisory Committee: 

Appendix XII: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Office of Government Ethics: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human 
Services: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XVI: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XVII: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix XVIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Documentation That Agencies Systematically Collected on 
Potential Members of Selected Committees: 

Table 2: Factors Used by Agencies to Balance Selected Committees: 

Table 3: Authorizing Mechanism for Active Federal Advisory Committees in 
Fiscal Year 2003: 

Table 4: Active Federal Advisory Committees, by Type, in Fiscal Year 
2003: 

Table 5: Roster of the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as 
of December 2003: 

Table 6: Roster of the Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 
Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 30, 2003: 

Table 7: Roster of the Standing FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel with the 
Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of December 2003: 

Table 8: Roster of the Temporary (Ad Hoc) Members Serving on the June 17 
to 20, 2003, Meeting on Atrazine: 

Table 9: Roster of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Table 10: Roster of the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Table 11: Roster of the Food Advisory Committee with the Primary 
Employers and Areas of Expertise as of June 3, 2003: 

Table 12: Roster of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative 
Toxicological Methods with the Primary Employers, and Areas of 
Expertise as of December 30, 2003: 

Table 13: Roster of the Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory 
Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Table 14: Roster of the Space Science Advisory Committee Members with 
the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of December 30, 2003: 

Abbreviations: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

CODEX: Codex Alementarius Commission: 

CV: curricula vitae: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FACA: Federal Advisory Committee Act: 

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization: 

FDA: Food and Drug Administration: 

FIFRA: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1977: 

FSIS: Food Safety and Inspection Service: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point: 

HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 

ICCVAM: Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of 
Alternative Methods: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NIEHS: National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences: 

NIH: National Institutes of Health: 

OGE: Office of Government Ethics: 

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture: 

USGS: United States Geological Survey: 

WHO: World Health Organization: 

Letter April 16, 2004: 

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson: 
Ranking Minority Member, 
Subcommittee on Research: 
Committee on Science: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Brian Baird: 
House of Representatives: 

Federal advisory committees have been called the "fifth arm of 
government" because of the significant role they play in advising 
federal agencies, the Congress, and the President on important national 
issues.[Footnote 1] To be effective, these advisory committees must be-
-and, just as importantly, be perceived as being--independent and 
balanced. Specifically, individual committee members who provide advice 
to the government must be free from significant conflicts of interest-
-that is, they must be "independent." In addition, while it may be 
desirable to include experts on committees who have particular 
viewpoints, federal law requires each committee, as a whole, to be 
balanced in terms of the points of view and the functions to be 
performed. Recently, some appointments to scientific and technical 
advisory committees have generated controversy because of the 
perception by some scientists and others that these appointments were 
based on ideology rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one 
group of stakeholders over others.

In 1962, the Congress established the category of "special government 
employee" and made the conflict-of-interest rules for such employees 
less restrictive than for regular federal government employees to 
overcome obstacles in hiring outside experts for occasional service, 
such as on federal advisory committees. Members of federal advisory 
committees are often appointed as special government employees to 
provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best 
judgment. In contrast, members may also be appointed to federal 
advisory committees as "representatives" to provide stakeholder advice-
-that is, advice reflecting the views of the entity or interest group 
they are representing, such as industry, labor, or consumers.

Federal advisory committee members who are employees of the federal 
government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from 
conflicts of interest--which we refer to in this report as 
independence--and the committees as a whole must meet requirements 
pertaining to balance. Federal conflict-of-interest statutes (18 U.S.C. 
§§ 201), including the principal criminal financial conflict-of-
interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208), apply to regular and, in large 
part, special government employees. The Office of Government Ethics 
(OGE) is responsible for developing regulations and guidance for these 
statutory provisions. The criminal financial conflict-of-interest 
statute and related OGE regulations prohibit regular and special 
government employees from participating in a "particular 
matter"[Footnote 2] that may have a direct and predictable effect on 
their financial interest, unless granted a waiver. Members appointed as 
representatives who are neither regular nor special government 
employees are not subject to statutes regarding conflicts of interest. 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act[Footnote 3] (FACA) requires, among 
other things, that committee memberships be "fairly balanced in terms 
of points of view presented and the functions to be performed by the 
advisory committee." Courts have interpreted this requirement as 
providing agencies with broad discretion in balancing their committees. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing 
regulations and guidance regarding the establishment of advisory 
committees under FACA. In addition to OGE and GSA regulations and 
guidance, federal agencies have their own policies and procedures to 
establish and manage advisory committees.

You asked us to examine several issues regarding federal advisory 
committees. As agreed with your offices, this report (1) describes the 
role of federal advisory committees in the development of national 
policies; (2) examines the extent to which governmentwide guidance and 
agency-specific policies and procedures for evaluating committee 
members for conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent 
members and balanced federal advisory committees; and (3) identifies 
practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are 
perceived as being, independent and balanced.

To address these objectives, we reviewed OGE regulations and guidance 
to federal agencies regarding federal conflict-of-interest provisions 
and GSA regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding FACA. We 
reviewed the policies and procedures at six federal departments and 
agencies that make extensive use of scientific and technical advisory 
committees--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and 
Human Services (HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). Because HHS entities sponsor 26 percent of all federal advisory 
committees and 36 percent of all scientific and technical advisory 
committees, we also reviewed the policies and procedures at three HHS 
agencies that sponsor many advisory committees--the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). We reviewed the procedures 
used by these nine departments and agencies to identify, screen, and 
appoint members for committees so as to ensure that members are free of 
conflicts of interest (where conflict-of-interest requirements apply) 
and that committees are balanced. To better understand how agencies 
implement OGE and GSA governmentwide regulations and guidance as well 
as their own policies, we examined the management of one committee at 
each agency.[Footnote 4] We reviewed the confidential financial 
disclosure forms of the committee members who were appointed as special 
government employees, along with other information, and discussed with 
staff how the committees used this information. We did not, however, 
make any judgments on whether conflicts of interest existed or whether 
these panels were properly balanced. To identify practices that promote 
independence and balance, we examined the relevant policies and 
procedures of the National Academies;[Footnote 5] the nine committees 
and agencies examined in this review; and EPA's Science Advisory Board, 
which made a number of changes to its policies and procedures in 
response to our June 2001 report.[Footnote 6] We conducted our review 
from January 2003 through March 2004 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. For more details on the scope 
and methodology of our review, see appendix I.

Results in Brief: 

Approximately 950 federal advisory committees with about 62,000 members 
play an important role in shaping public policy by advising 
policymakers on a wide array of important and challenging issues. For 
example, advisory committees provide advice in the form of peer reviews 
of scientific research that may be used to support health, 
environmental, and safety regulations; recommendations about specific 
policy decisions; identification of long-range issues facing the 
nation; and evaluations of grant proposals, among other functions. 
Federal advisory committees have been established to work in broad 
areas of public policy, such as national security, the economy, the 
environment, and public health. Illustrative of the range of issues 
addressed by federal advisory committees are the current committees 
that advise agencies on matters related to AIDS research, food safety, 
hazardous waste cleanup, trade policy, and homeland security. Advisory 
committees are sometimes established specifically to address 
controversial issues about which the government believes it is 
beneficial to solicit the advice of individuals with the relevant 
background and/or expertise from outside the government. For example, 
some of the issues addressed by advisory committees are inherently 
controversial because they deal with sensitive personal and ideological 
matters, such as stem cell research and genetic engineering. Other 
committees address issues that are controversial because of their 
potential regulatory impact, such as food and drug approvals or 
environmental regulations.

Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure 
the independence of federal advisory committee members and the balance 
of federal advisory committees. For example, OGE guidance to federal 
agencies has shortcomings and does not adequately ensure that agencies 
appoint individuals selected to provide advice on behalf of the 
government as special government employees subject to conflict-of-
interest regulations. In addition, GSA guidance to federal agencies and 
agency-specific policies and procedures could be improved to better 
ensure that agencies collect and evaluate information that could be 
helpful in determining the viewpoints of potential committee members 
regarding the subject matters being considered and in ensuring that 
committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. Specifically, we 
found the following: 

* OGE guidance on the appropriate use of representative or special 
government employee appointments to advisory committees has limitations 
that we believe are a factor in three of the agencies we reviewed 
continuing the long-standing practice of essentially appointing all 
members as representatives. That is, we found that USDA, Energy,and 
Interior have appointed most or all members to their federal advisory 
committees as representatives--even in cases where the members are 
called upon to provide advice on behalf of the government and thus 
would be more appropriately appointed as special government employees. 
Because conflict-of-interest reviews are only required for federal or 
special government employees, agencies do not conduct conflict-of-
interest reviews for members appointed as representatives. As a result, 
the agencies cannot be assured that the real or perceived conflicts of 
interest of their committee members who provide advice on behalf of the 
government are identified and appropriately mitigated. Further, 
allegations that the members have conflicts of interest could call into 
question the independence of the committee and jeopardize the 
credibility of the committee's work.

* FACA requires that federal advisory committees be fairly balanced in 
terms of the points of view and the functions to be performed, and 
courts have interpreted this requirement as providing agencies with 
broad discretion in balancing their committees. In addition to the 
legal requirement for balance, it is important that committees are 
perceived as balanced in order for their advice to be credible and 
effective. However, GSA guidance does not address what types of 
information could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of 
view of potential committee members, nor do agency procedures identify 
what information should be collected about potential members to make 
decisions about committee balance. Consequently, many agencies do not 
identify and systematically collect and evaluate information pertinent 
to determining the points of view of committee members regarding the 
subject matters being considered. For example, of the nine departments 
and agencies we reviewed, only EPA consistently (1) collected 
information on committee members appointed as special government 
employees that enabled the agency to assess the points of view of the 
potential members and (2) used this information to help achieve 
balance. Without sufficient information about prospective committee 
members prior to appointment, agencies cannot ensure that their 
committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced.

We identified several promising practices for forming and managing 
federal advisory committees that can better ensure that committees are, 
and are perceived as being, independent and balanced. These practices 
include (1) obtaining nominations for committees from the public, (2) 
using clearly defined processes to obtain and review pertinent 
information on potential members regarding potential conflicts of 
interest and points of view, and (3) prescreening prospective members 
using a structured interview. In our view, these measures reflect the 
principles of FACA by employing clearly defined procedures to promote 
systematic, consistent, and transparent efforts to achieve independent 
and balanced committees. Some of the practices, such as seeking public 
comment on proposed committees, are particularly relevant to those 
committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics. In addition, 
we identified selected measures that could promote greater transparency 
in the federal advisory committee process and improve the public's 
ability to evaluate whether agencies have complied with conflict-of-
interest requirements and FACA requirements for balance, such as 
providing information on how the members of the committees are 
identified and screened and indicating whether the committee members 
are providing independent or stakeholder advice. Implemented 
effectively, these practices could help agencies avoid the public 
criticisms to which some committees have been subjected. That is, if 
more agencies adopted and effectively implemented these practices, they 
would have greater assurance that their committees are, and are 
perceived as being, independent and balanced.

Because the effectiveness of competent federal advisory committees can 
be undermined if the members are, or are perceived as, lacking in 
independence or if committees as a whole do not appear to be properly 
balanced, we are making 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide 
additional guidance to federal agencies. The broad categories of these 
recommendations include (1) clarifying the appropriate use of 
representative appointments; (2) systematically obtaining information 
that could help ensure committees are, in fact and in perception, 
balanced; and (3) adopting certain practices that can better ensure 
independent and balanced committees and increase transparency in the 
federal advisory process. While our report focuses primarily on 
scientific and technical federal advisory committees, the limitations 
in guidance and the promising practices we identified pertaining to 
independence and balance are pertinent to federal advisory committees 
in general, and thus our recommendations are directed to GSA and OGE 
because of their responsibilities for providing guidance to federal 
agencies on these matters.

GSA reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the 
findings relating to the areas directly under its purview. The agency 
committed to, among other things, continuing to work in partnership 
with OGE to address those areas under OGE's jurisdiction relating to 
FACA. GSA outlined a proactive approach to responding to the report's 
recommendations, including making changes to its on-line FACA database. 
OGE reviewed the draft report and also generally agreed with the 
problems we identified regarding appointments to federal advisory 
committees, but the agency disagreed that there are any limitations in 
its guidance that contribute to the problems and also reiterated the 
measures that OGE has taken to address this issue (most of which were 
highlighted in the draft report). OGE believes the agencies making 
inappropriate appointments are disregarding, rather than 
misinterpreting, the OGE guidance. While we recognize that there may be 
other reasons as well, we have identified the limitations in OGE's 
guidance as one factor in some agencies' continuing the long-standing 
practice of essentially appointing all committee members as 
representatives. We believe the effectiveness of OGE's and GSA's 
efforts to ensure that agencies make appropriate appointment decisions 
for members of their federal advisory committees will not improve until 
the limitations we identified in OGE's guidance on appointments are 
addressed. Our view is also that clear, unambiguous guidance would make 
it more difficult for agencies to misapply the guidance. GSA's and 
OGE's written comments are discussed further at the end of this report 
and their letters are provided in appendixes XII and XIII. Overall, the 
comments from the agencies whose advisory committee management policies 
and procedures we reviewed--EPA; Energy; HHS (and component agencies 
CDC, FDA, and NIH); Interior; NASA; and USDA--were generally positive 
about the draft report, viewing it as providing helpful information on 
federal advisory committee management. Four of these agencies also 
cited some specific concerns about, for example, the requirements for 
independence and assessing prospective members' points of view. We 
address these issues at the end of this report and provide the 
pertinent letters from these four agencies in appendixes XIV through 
XVII.

Background: 

In recent years, controversies regarding the federal advisory committee 
system have included concerns about the appointment of specific 
individuals to committees and agency decisions to create or terminate 
some committees. Although a variety of concerns have been raised, the 
overarching concern was that ideological bias was influencing the 
selection of experts for scientific and health advisory panels. 
Publications such as Science, The Lancet, and Chemical and Engineering 
News have published editorials and articles containing criticisms of 
decisions seen as injecting ideology into a committee system that 
should be nonideological. Further, some current and potential federal 
advisory committee members reported being asked about their political 
views in the context of decisions regarding their appointment or 
reappointment to committees.

A number of recent articles and editorials identified specific concerns 
about HHS committees that address controversial scientific and 
technical issues. Observers have alleged that some appointees either 
were unqualified for the position, had extreme views that were outside 
the mainstream of scientific thinking, or had personal conflicts of 
interest that should have disqualified them from serving on particular 
committees. Further, observers alleged that HHS has replaced large 
portions of the membership of ongoing committees as a way of obtaining 
committees that shared the administration's viewpoint about particular 
issues. Finally, concerns were raised that HHS had terminated some 
advisory committees with which the administration allegedly had 
ideological differences and replaced them with committees that had 
different charters and a largely new membership.

In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on 
organizational issues within NIH that included a discussion of the 
perceived politicization of the advisory committee appointment process. 
The report noted that these concerns had recently arisen within the 
scientific and health advocacy communities and were similar to concerns 
that were raised in the early 1970s. In response to the most recent 
concerns, the academy recommended, among other things, that 
appointments to NIH advisory committees be based solely on a person's 
scientific or clinical expertise or his or her commitment to and 
involvement in issues of relevance to the mission of the institute.

Also in 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest sent a 
letter to the director of OGE about its concerns that conflicts of 
interest were introducing biases into the federal advisory committee 
process at HHS, Interior, and other agencies.[Footnote 7] The center's 
letter, signed by 21 individuals, including public health advocates and 
members of academia, made a number of recommendations to OGE aimed at 
strengthening independence, transparency, and public trust in the 
federal advisory committee process. Further, the National Academies is 
examining the selection of scientists, engineers, and health 
professionals to federal advisory committees addressing science-based 
policy or reviewing research proposals. This study stems from its 
regular review of senior scientific technical appointments in the 
federal government as well as from concerns that scientists and others 
have raised to the academies about some federal advisory committee 
appointments and the appointment practices used by some agencies. A 
report is planned for November 2004.

The Federal Advisory Committee Act Sets Broad Requirements and 
Guidelines for Advisory Committees: 

The Congress enacted FACA in 1972 in response to two principal 
concerns: (1) that federal advisory committees were proliferating 
without adequate review, oversight, or accountability and (2) that 
certain special interests had too much influence over federal agency 
decision makers. In this act, the Congress articulated certain 
principles regarding advisory committees, including broad requirements 
for balance, independence, and transparency. Specifically, as 
previously discussed, FACA requires that the membership of committees 
be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be 
performed. Further, FACA requires that any legislation or agency action 
that creates a committee contain provisions to ensure that the advice 
and recommendations of the committee will be independent and not 
inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority (the agency) or 
any special interest. Finally, FACA generally requires that agencies 
announce committee meetings ahead of time and give notice to interested 
parties about such meetings. With some exceptions, the meetings are to 
be open to the public, and agencies are to prepare meeting minutes and 
make them available to interested parties.[Footnote 8]

FACA also set broad guidelines for the creation and management of 
federal advisory committees, most of which are created or authorized by 
the Congress. Agencies also establish committees using general 
statutory authority, and some are created by presidential directives 
(see app. II). Further, the act requires that all committees have a 
charter, and that each charter contain specific information, including 
the committee's scope and objectives, a description of duties, the 
period of time necessary to carry out its purposes, the estimated 
operating costs, and the number and frequency of meetings. As required 
by FACA, the advisory committee charters generally expire at the end of 
2 years unless renewed by the agency or by the Congress.[Footnote 9] 
The requirement encourages agencies to periodically reexamine their 
need for committees.

GSA, through its Committee Management Secretariat, is responsible for 
prescribing administrative guidelines and management controls 
applicable to advisory committees governmentwide. However, GSA does not 
have the authority to approve or deny agency decisions regarding the 
creation or management of advisory committees. To fulfill its 
responsibilities, GSA has developed regulations and other guidance to 
assist agencies in implementing FACA requirements, provides training to 
agency officials, and was instrumental in creating the Interagency 
Committee on Federal Advisory Committee Management. GSA also has 
created and maintains an on-line FACA database (available to the public 
at [Hyperlink, http: //www.fido.gov/facadatabase] www.fido.gov/
facadatabase) for which the agencies provide and verify the data, 
including committee charters, membership rosters, budgets, and in many 
cases links to committee meeting schedules, minutes, and reports. The 
database also includes information about a committee's classification 
(i.e., scientific and technical or national policy issue). According to 
the database, 208 committees with 7,910 members were classified as 
scientific and technical committees. In addition, 131 committees with 
over 41,000 members were classified as grant review committees--a 
category that also often addresses scientific and technical issues. 
Appendix II provides data on the classifications of the federal 
advisory committees in fiscal year 2003.

While the GSA's Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA guidance 
to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies and 
procedures for following FACA requirements. Under FACA, agency heads 
are responsible for issuing administrative guidelines and management 
controls applicable to their agency's advisory committees. Generally, 
federal agencies have a reasonable amount of discretion with regards to 
creating committees, drafting their charters, establishing their scope 
and objectives, classifying the committee type, determining what type 
of advice they are to provide, and appointing members to serve on 
committees.[Footnote 10] However, when the Congress authorizes an 
agency to establish a particular committee or a President establishes a 
committee, the agency may have less flexibility in establishing and 
managing the committee because such things as the committee's 
objectives, the types of expertise and backgrounds of members, and even 
the type of advice that is to be provided may be specified by the 
Congress or the President.

Finally, to assist with the management of their federal advisory 
committees, agency heads are required to appoint a committee management 
officer to oversee the agency's compliance with FACA requirements, 
including recordkeeping. Agency heads must also appoint a designated 
federal official for each committee to oversee the committee's 
activities. Among other things, the designated federal official must 
approve or call the meetings of the committee, approve the agendas 
(except for presidential advisory committees), and attend the meetings.

Criminal Financial Conflict-of-Interest Statute Applies to Some 
Advisory Committee Members: 

OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to 
follow in complying with the statutory conflict-of-interest provisions 
that apply to all federal employees, including special government 
employees serving on federal advisory committees. A special government 
employee is statutorily defined as an officer or employee who is 
retained, designated, appointed, or employed by the government to 
perform temporary duties, with or without compensation, for not more 
than 130 days during any period of 365 consecutive days. Many agencies 
use special government employees, either as advisory committee members 
or as individual experts or consultants. Special government employees, 
like regular federal employees, are to provide their own best judgment 
in a manner that is free from conflicts of interest and without acting 
as a stakeholder to represent any particular point of view.[Footnote 
11] Accordingly, special government employees appointed to federal 
advisory committees are hired for their expertise and skills and are 
expected to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of 
their own best judgment. Special government employees are subject to 
the federal financial conflict-of-interest requirements, although ones 
that are somewhat less restrictive than those for regular federal 
government employees.

The criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208) 
and related OGE regulations prohibit federal employees, including 
special government employees, from participating in "particular 
matters" that may have a direct and predictable effect on their 
financial interests or those interests of a spouse, minor child, or 
general partner. A particular matter is defined as one involving a 
deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of 
specific people or an identifiable class of people. Special government 
employees serving on federal advisory committees thus are prohibited 
from participating when the subjects they consider are particular 
matters in which the member has a financial interest. However, special 
government employees serving on federal advisory committees are 
provided with an exemption that allows them to participate in 
particular matters that have a direct and predictable effect on their 
financial interest if the interest arises from their nonfederal 
employment and the matter will not have a special or distinct effect on 
the employee or employer other than as part of a class. This exemption 
does not extend to the committee member's personal financial and other 
interests in the matter, such as stock ownership in the employer. If a 
committee member has a potential financial conflict of interest that is 
not covered under this or other exemptions, a waiver of the conflict-
of-interest provisions may be granted if the appointing official 
determines that the need for the special government employee's services 
outweighs the potential for conflict of interest or that the conflict 
is not significant. This standard for granting waivers is less 
stringent than the standard for regular government employees.

The principal tool that agencies use to assess whether nominees or 
members of advisory committees have conflicts of interest is the OGE 
Form 450, Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report, 
which special government employees are required to submit annually. The 
form 450 requests financial information about the committee member and 
the member's spouse and dependent children, such as the sources of 
income and the identification of assets, but it does not request filers 
to provide the related dollar amounts, such as salaries.[Footnote 12] 
For committees addressing broad or general issues, rather than 
particular matters, committee members hired as special government 
employees are still generally required to complete the confidential 
financial disclosure form.[Footnote 13]

Agencies appoint ethics officials who are responsible for ensuring 
agency compliance with the federal conflict-of-interest statutes. OGE 
conducts periodic audits of agency ethics programs to evaluate their 
compliance and, as warranted, makes recommendations to agencies to 
correct deficiencies in their ethics programs.

Under administrative guidance initially developed in the early 1960s, a 
number of members of federal advisory committees are not hired as 
special government employees, but are instead appointed as 
representatives. Members appointed to advisory committees as 
representatives are expected to represent the views of relevant 
stakeholders with an interest in the subject of discussion, such as an 
industry, a union, an environmental organization, or other such entity. 
That is, representative members are expected to represent a particular 
and known bias--it is understood that information, opinions, and advice 
from representatives are to reflect the bias of the particular group 
that they are appointed to represent.[Footnote 14] Because these 
individuals are to represent outside interests, they do not meet the 
statutory definition of federal employee or special government employee 
and are therefore not subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-
interest statute. According to GSA and OGE officials, reliable 
governmentwide data on the number of representative members serving on 
federal advisory committees are not available. However, data that 
agencies report to OGE on special government employees serving on 
federal advisory committees and to GSA on the number of federal 
advisory committee members indicate that only about 35 percent of the 
government's federal advisory committee members are appointed as 
special government employees.[Footnote 15]

Advisory Committees Play an Important Role in the Development of 
Federal Policies: 

Generally composed of individuals from outside of the federal 
government, federal advisory committees play an important role in the 
development of public policy and government regulations by providing 
advice to policymakers on a wide array of issues. In fiscal year 2003, 
54 agencies sponsored approximately 950 committees with about 62,000 
members to provide advice by performing peer reviews of scientific 
research; developing recommendations on specific policy decisions; 
identifying long-range issues facing the nation; and evaluating grant 
proposals, among other functions. Their advice--on issues such as stem 
cell research, space exploration, trade policy, drinking water 
standards, and drug approvals--can enhance the quality and credibility 
of federal decision making.

Advisory committees have been and continue to be involved in issues of 
great importance to the advancement of knowledge and the development of 
national policies and regulations. For example, Energy's decision to 
undertake the Human Genome Project was based in part on the 1987 
recommendation of the department's Health and Environmental Research 
Advisory Committee.[Footnote 16] As a result, Energy, working with NIH, 
successfully coordinated the multibillion-dollar research effort that 
succeeded in identifying all of the genes on every chromosome in the 
human body and determining their biochemical nature--leading the way to 
numerous advances in medical science.

Advisory committees provide agencies with advice in a variety of broad 
areas of federal policy, such as the environment, public health, and 
the economy. Committees provide agencies with advice about a wide array 
of specific issues, such as the management of federal lands, the 
development of alternative sources of energy, guidelines for assessing 
cancer risks, risk assessments of toxic chemicals, hazardous waste 
cleanup, the establishment of new standards for food safety, the 
delivery of health care services, and the effectiveness of new 
prescription drugs and medical devices. Recently, federal advisory 
committees were established to help agencies marshal the facts and 
weigh options in response to new national issues, such as information 
security and terrorist attacks.

Federal advisory committees are sometimes established specifically to 
address controversial issues about which the government believes it is 
necessary to solicit the advice of individuals with the relevant 
background and/or expertise from outside of the government. Some of the 
issues addressed by advisory committees are controversial because they 
touch upon inherently sensitive personal, religious, or ideological 
matters, such as stem cell research and genetic engineering. Other 
committees address issues that are controversial because of their 
potential regulatory impact on industries or consumers, such as in the 
case of food and drug approvals or environmental regulations.

To address controversial and other important matters, scientific and 
technical advisory committees--which are the primary focus of this 
report--play a number of different roles on behalf of agencies. One 
role of science committees is to advise agencies on how to address a 
set of particular problems. For example, the Advisory Committee on 
Foreign Animal and Poultry Diseases gives the Secretary of Agriculture 
information and advice on measures necessary to prevent and combat such 
threats as foot-and-mouth disease. The charter also charges the 
committee with providing advice on the prevention or management of 
other threats from foreign animal or poultry diseases. Recent 
recommendations from the committee addressed coordination between USDA 
and the Department of Homeland Security and support for a national food 
animal identification work plan.

In 1990, the Congress authorized the creation of the Aquatic Nuisance 
Species Task Force to, among other things, coordinate federal efforts 
to address the threats posed by nonnative aquatic plants and 
animals.[Footnote 17] The task force operates as a federal advisory 
committee and is composed of 7 federal agency representatives and 13 
nonfederal members in an ex officio status. It reports to the 
Departments of the Interior and Commerce. Among the task force's 
accomplishments are a number of reports and publications on risk 
assessment, prevention initiatives, and control programs for such 
nonnative species as the brown tree snake and the green crab.

Some science advisory committees offer advice to agencies on specific 
regulatory decisions. For example, FDA established science advisory 
committees that offer advice on the licensing of specific drugs and on 
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. These committees play 
an important role in determining whether drugs and other medical 
products make it into the marketplace and can therefore have a 
significant impact on specific manufacturers as well as potential 
patients and consumers.

Other science advisory committees make recommendations to agencies on 
strategic planning efforts needed to address long-range issues facing 
the nation. Existing committees are exploring efforts to chart new 
directions in research in biology, physics, astronomy, and space 
exploration, to name just a few. For example, Energy's Basic Energy 
Sciences Advisory Committee issued a report in February 2003 entitled 
Basic Research Needs to Assure a Secure Energy Future.[Footnote 18] In 
that report, the committee stated its belief that a new national energy 
research program is essential and must be initiated with the intensity 
and commitment of the Manhattan Project. The report included a lengthy 
list of proposed research topics.

Advisory committees may be established to provide a peer review 
function. For example, a peer review group could be asked to review a 
body of scientific literature and offer its opinion on the adequacy of 
the scientific data that may be used to support regulatory actions. As 
an illustration, in 2001, EPA revised its standards for safe levels of 
arsenic in drinking water using, in part, the analysis and 
recommendations of two federal advisory committees--the National 
Drinking Water Advisory Council and the EPA's Science Advisory Board. 
This revised standard will have a far-reaching effect on both human 
health and the operation of public drinking water systems. Other peer 
review groups are asked to judge the merits of proposals submitted to 
national grant competitions. For example, the National Science 
Foundation, NIH, and other agencies use such groups to evaluate 
proposals submitted for possible funding by academic or clinical 
researchers covering a wide range of subject matter. After the peer 
review groups evaluate the proposals, other science advisory committees 
may make recommendations to the agencies regarding which proposals to 
fund.

Federal Guidance Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance: 

OGE and GSA governmentwide guidance and the policies and procedures of 
the nine departments and agencies we reviewed have limitations that 
reduce their effectiveness in ensuring that advisory committee members 
are independent and that advisory committees are, and are perceived as 
being, balanced. First, with respect to independence, OGE guidance on 
whether to appoint members to advisory committees as special government 
employees or representatives--a decision that determines whether an 
agency conducts a conflict-of-interest review--has limitations that we 
believe are a factor in three agencies' continuing their long-standing 
practice of essentially appointing all members as representatives. We 
found that USDA, Energy, and Interior appoint all or almost all members 
to their federal advisory committees as representatives,even when the 
members are called on to provide advice on behalf of the government on 
the basis of their best judgment.[Footnote 19] Because such members are 
not providing stakeholder advice, they would be more appropriately 
appointed as special government employees, subject to reviews for 
conflicts of interest. However, because conflict-of-interest reviews 
are only required for federal or special government employees, agencies 
do not conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as 
representatives. As a result, the agencies cannot be assured that the 
real or perceived conflicts of interest of their committee members' 
providing advice on behalf of the government are identified and 
appropriately mitigated. Further, allegations that the members have 
conflicts of interest could call into question the independence of the 
committee and jeopardize the credibility of the committee's work. 
Second, with respect to balance, GSA guidance does not address what 
types of information would be helpful in assessing the points of view 
of potential committee members with regard to the matters the 
committees will consider, nor do agency procedures identify what 
information the agencies believe should be collected about potential 
members--an important step that can help agencies ensure committees 
are, and are perceived as being, balanced. We found that many agencies 
do not consistently request information that would be helpful in 
assessing the overall balance of committee members' viewpoints--such as 
previous public positions the members may have taken on the matters 
being reviewed. Without adequate policies and procedures, agencies are 
vulnerable to allegations that committee members have conflicts of 
interest and that committees are imbalanced. Such allegations may call 
into question a committee's legitimacy and may jeopardize the work of 
otherwise credible and competent committees.

Reviews for Conflicts of Interest Are Not Always Performed: 

Some agencies appoint most or all members to their advisory committees 
as representatives, rather than as special government employees. 
However, some of these committee members appointed as representatives 
are asked to provide agencies with advice on behalf of the government 
without representing any particular point of view, and thus it appears 
that the members would be more appropriately appointed as special 
government employees. Because only regular and special government 
employees are subject to the conflict-of-interest statutes, agencies do 
not conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as 
representatives. Some committees thus have members who had they been 
appointed as special government employees would have undergone reviews 
for conflicts of interest, but they have not been reviewed for 
potential conflicts of interest because they were appointed as 
representatives.

Representative members and special government employees are supposed to 
serve different functions on advisory committees. In 1962, the Congress 
established the category of special government employee and amended the 
federal conflict-of-interest laws to overcome obstacles in hiring 
outside experts for occasional service. Special government employees 
are appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on 
behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment. 
Representative members, in contrast, are generally considered as those 
members of advisory committees who are "chosen for committee membership 
only to present the views of a private interest."[Footnote 20]

In 1982, in response to uncertainties regarding when agencies should 
appoint members to their advisory committees as special government 
employees or representatives, OGE developed guidance on the appropriate 
use of these two appointment categories for federal advisory 
committees.[Footnote 21] In this guidance, OGE noted that it disagreed 
with "an occasional flat assertion" by agencies that advisory committee 
members are never subject to the federal conflict-of-interest laws. The 
1982 guidance, which is still OGE's principal guidance on this 
issue,[Footnote 22] states that a "consultant or advisor whose advice 
is obtained by a department or agency from time to time because of his 
individual qualifications and who serves in an independent capacity is 
an officer or employee of the government"--that is, this person is a 
regular federal employee or a special government employee. In contrast, 
a consultant or advisor "who is requested to appear before a government 
department or agency to present the views of a non-governmental 
organization or group which he represents, or for which he is in a 
position to speak, does not act as a servant of the government and is 
not its officer or employee" but is a representative member. The OGE 
1982 guidance concludes by noting that if language used in the enabling 
legislation, executive order, charter, or other pertinent document does 
not specify whether the members are functioning as special government 
employees or representatives, it is fair to conclude that the member is 
a special government employee because this is the usual status of those 
appointed by agencies to serve the government.

OGE's most recent guidance that addresses representative appointments 
to advisory committees is its February 2000 summary of ethical 
requirements applicable to special government employees. This summary 
includes a paragraph discussing representative appointments, 
highlighting the fact that unlike special government employees and 
other federal employees, representatives are not expected to render 
disinterested advice to the government but are expected to "represent a 
particular bias." This document explains that representatives are 
described more fully in OGE's 1982 guidance and also refers readers to 
two 1993 advisory letters that (1) conclude that representatives can 
make policy recommendations to the government and (2) explain the 
difference between the two types of appointment as follows: 
representatives are asked to represent a particular bias, while special 
government employees are asked to provide their own best judgment 
without representing any particular point of view and in a manner that 
is free from conflict of interest.

In addition to developing the 2000 guidance on special government 
employees, OGE has taken steps to educate agencies about special 
government employee and representative appointments by participating in 
GSA's FACA management course that includes a session on ethics, 
conflict-of-interest, and financial disclosure issues. According to 
GSA, this class is conducted five times each year, reaching about 300 
advisory committee staff. According to OGE, the ethics training begins 
with a discussion of the special government employee/representative 
designation issue. The course material includes a discussion of 
representatives and also refers readers to OGE's 1982 guidance. 
Further, OGE provides training at annual ethics conferences for ethics 
officials in the executive branch.

Despite these efforts, a recent OGE staff study on agency management of 
federal advisory committees, summarized in a November 2002 memorandum, 
indicates that some uncertainties about appointments to federal 
advisory committees may continue to exist. That is, OGE found that four 
of the seven agencies it reviewed--Energy, Interior, the Commission on 
Civil Rights, and the Small Business Administration--appointed all, or 
nearly all, members as representatives.[Footnote 23] Further, the OGE 
memorandum expressed concern that these agencies may be purposely 
designating their committee members as representatives to avoid 
subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required for 
special government employees and may not be conducting conflict-of-
interest reviews for some committee members when they should have been 
conducted. The OGE memorandum concluded that further scrutiny and 
education about the proper designation of committee appointments was 
warranted. As a result, at the next annual conference for agency ethics 
officials in March 2003, OGE included a session, Ethics Management 
Tools for Your Federal Advisory Committee, which was principally 
devoted to "designation" issues involving appointments to federal 
advisory committees.[Footnote 24] In addition, in May 2003, OGE issued 
new audit guidelines for its periodic reviews of agency ethics programs 
that provide for additional focus and review of appointment 
designations for individuals serving on committees, councils, boards, 
and commissions. Finally, as previously mentioned, OGE officials 
conduct a segment on ethics that addresses the appointments of 
representatives and special government employees during GSA's FACA 
management course.

Nonetheless, three of the agencies we reviewed--USDA, Energy,[Footnote 
25] and Interior--appoint most or all of the members to their federal 
advisory committees as representatives.[Footnote 26] Upon examining 
some of the specific committees at these agencies, we found that these 
agencies appoint members as representatives even when the members are 
called on to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of 
their best judgment, rather than to represent views of outside 
organizations. Specifically, USDA, Energy, and Interior have committees 
comprised entirely of representative members where, on the basis of the 
agencies' descriptions of the type of advice that the members are to 
provide, the use of special government employees seems more 
appropriate, such as in the following cases: 

* USDA's National Advisory Committee for Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods.[Footnote 27] According to its charter, the purpose of the 
committee is to provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food 
safety agencies on the development of an integrated national system to 
monitor food safety from farm to final consumption in order to ensure 
the safety of domestic, imported, and exported foods.

* Energy's Biological and Environmental Research Advisory Committee. 
According to the committee's designated federal official, the 
department uses the committee to obtain independent scientific advice 
on Energy's Biological and Environmental Research Program. The 
committee addresses issues such as genomics, the health effects of low-
dose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental 
remediation, and climate change research. In addition to reviewing 
scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range research 
plans and priorities and appropriate levels of funding.

* Interior's Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee. 
According to the committee's designated federal official, members are 
selected to provide their independent advice to the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) on matters relating to the survey's role in the National 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, which is a multiagency strategic 
program to reduce risks to lives and property resulting from 
earthquakes. The committee is to review the USGS National Earthquake 
Hazards Reduction Program's roles, goals, and objectives; assess its 
capabilities and research needs; provide guidance on achieving major 
objectives; and establish and measure performance goals. (As discussed 
below, in January 2004, Interior officials determined that the members 
of this committee should be appointed as special government employees, 
and the officials said that the committee would not meet again until 
the appointments as special government employees have been made.): 

In contrast, we found that EPA, HHS, and NASA appoint members as 
special government employees to committees that provide advice on 
behalf of the government about scientific and technical issues similar 
to those addressed by the committees discussed above. Consequently, 
these agencies do evaluate committee members who provide advice on 
behalf of the government for potential conflicts of interest.

USDA, Energy, and Interior have 30 other committees with about 750 
members that are classified as scientific and technical 
committees.[Footnote 28] In addition, some committees in other 
categories, such as national policy advisory committees, also address 
scientific and technology issues--subject matters for which advice on 
behalf of the government on the basis of members' best judgment, rather 
than stakeholder advice, is typically sought. In speaking with USDA, 
Energy, and Interior officials about the basis for their decisions to 
essentially appoint all advisory committee members as representatives, 
we learned that this practice is long-standing and firmly rooted in 
agency cultures--that is, it represents the way these agencies have 
traditionally staffed their federal advisory committees. The agencies 
we reviewed generally have not developed sufficient policies, 
procedures, or guidance for their staff to use when determining which 
type of appointment is appropriate for individual committees. For 
example, the guidance of some agencies, such as USDA and Interior, does 
not address the types of appointments that may be made. Others, such as 
NASA and Energy, recognize in agency policies and procedures that 
members can be either special government employees or representatives. 
However, few of the agencies that have policies identifying the types 
of appointments specify criteria that should be used when deciding 
whether the members should be appointed as either special government 
employees or representatives.

In our view, shortcomings in the OGE 1982 guidance regarding members of 
federal advisory committees and the conflict-of-interest statutes may 
(1) contribute to the agencies' overreliance on representative 
appointments to their advisory committees and (2) limit the 
effectiveness of OGE's and GSA's education efforts on appointments to 
advisory committees. Specifically, we found the following shortcomings 
in the 1982 guidance, which OGE cites as its most complete discussion 
on the use of representative appointments: 

* The OGE guidance is overly broad in describing the groups for which 
representatives may speak. That is, the guidance indicates that 
representatives may speak for firms or an industry; for labor or 
agriculture; or for "any other recognizable group of persons including, 
on occasion the public at large." We found that Energy, Interior, and 
USDA appoint some members to their committees on the basis that they 
represent various scientific or technical fields, such as biology or 
toxicology. However, appointing individuals as representatives of a 
broad category of people, such as a field of expertise, appears to 
generally be more consistent with providing advice on behalf of the 
government on the basis of the individual's best judgment, rather than 
acting as a stakeholder to represent the views of a nongovernment 
entity or group with an interest in the matter. At our exit conference, 
OGE officials agreed that, generally, it is not appropriate to appoint 
committee members as representatives on the basis of their expertise. 
Further, this approach to classifying members does not recognize and 
essentially avoids using the special government employee category, 
which was specifically created to facilitate the government's ability 
to retain the services of experts in various fields for such purposes 
as temporary service on federal advisory committees.

* The conclusion section of the OGE guidance implies that when the term 
"representative" is used in authorizing legislation, or other such 
documents, members should be classified as representatives, despite the 
fact that this term may be used for more generic purposes, such as to 
direct the balance of a committee. The guidance states that the 
decision to make representative appointments to federal advisory 
committees can be indicated in enabling legislation, executive orders, 
committee charters, or other pertinent documents by "the use of words 
to characterize [committee members] as the representatives of 
individuals or entities outside the government who have an interest in 
the subject matter assigned to the committee." However, the use of some 
form of the terms "represent" or "representative" in these documents 
does not always clearly indicate that the members are to be appointed 
to serve as representatives; sometimes these terms are used to define 
committee composition or balance. For example, some of the documents 
use the term "representative" to identify fields of expertise or 
employment background needed--specifying, that is, the expertise and 
points of view deemed pertinent. Some of the documents do not state 
that the representatives identified have an interest in the matter (as 
the guidance quoted above calls for) or that they are to speak for 
their organizations; thus the documents using the term "representative" 
are sometimes ambiguous. Unlike the guidance on identifying committee 
members appointed as special government employees--"by the use of words 
to command the members to exercise individual and independent 
judgment"--the guidance on identifying representative members does not 
specify the nature of the advice to be provided (e.g., stakeholder 
advice).

* The OGE guidance states that the fact that someone is appointed to a 
committee on the recommendation of an outside organization tends to 
support the conclusion that the person has a representative function. 
However, a number of committees solicit recommendations from outside 
organizations when appointing special government employees in order to 
achieve appropriate balance and expertise on their committees. Thus, 
the guidance does not take into account a common practice that agencies 
use to identify potential committee members and may overemphasize the 
weight that agencies should give to this factor when determining what 
constitutes a representative appointment.

Officials at EPA and NASA also said that the OGE guidance on 
representative appointments is ambiguous in some respects. They believe 
it would be very helpful for agencies to have clear criteria for 
representative appointments. Further, the officials said that training 
on the issue of appointments to advisory committees has limitations. 
Specifically, the EPA and NASA officials said that, in their view, the 
FACA management course does not sufficiently clarify when appointments 
should be made as special government employees and when they should be 
made as representatives. These officials also noted that the agencies' 
ethics officials generally are not the ones who make decisions on the 
appropriate appointment category; rather, appointment type is viewed 
more as a FACA management issue. Thus, agency officials managing 
federal advisory committees may look to GSA more than to OGE for 
clarification on appointment questions. For example, an official at EPA 
who has served a detail at GSA said that GSA regularly receives calls 
from agencies with questions about the distinction between the two 
types of appointments. We believe these circumstances highlight the 
importance of both the coordination between GSA and OGE to ensure that 
GSA is prepared to respond to questions about appointments and the GSA 
FACA management training directed at agency staff who manage federal 
advisory committees.

Although the FACA management course manual provides useful information 
on appointments to committees, we identified some limitations in this 
material as well. For example, the introductory sentence on 
appointments states that determining the status of an individual 
serving on a federal advisory committee is "largely a matter of 
personnel classification and should be coordinated with an agency's 
personnel office." In our view, this statement minimizes the importance 
of examining the type of advice that the individual is being asked to 
provide as a key determinant of the status of an individual (i.e., the 
type of appointment to be made). In this regard, in December 2003 
officials at OGE told us that they have now concluded (1) that agencies 
should decide at the outset whether the members of each committee are 
going to be representatives or special government employees and (2) 
that this decision should be part of the chartering process. In 
addition, the GSA manual is not clear and unambiguous on the role of 
representative members, stating that, in general, representative 
members of advisory committees "serve as representatives of outside 
entities and may [emphasis added] represent the views of a particular 
industry or group (e.g., labor, agriculture or other similar group of 
interests)." In contrast, OGE guidance states that representatives are 
to represent the views of identified entities or groups. Finally, the 
GSA manual highlights some OGE criteria from its 1982 guidance document 
that, as discussed above, we believe need clarification.

The consequences of appointing advisory committee members as 
representatives when they are in fact asked to provide advice on behalf 
of the government without representing any particular outside entity's 
or group's point of view exposes the relevant committees to potentially 
serious problems. Because representative members are not subject to 
reviews for potential conflicts of interest, allegations of conflicts 
of interest may call into question the integrity of the committee and 
jeopardize the credibility of the committee's work.

Some agencies do address the potential conflicts of interest of their 
representative members to some extent. For example, Interior's Bureau 
of Land Management prohibits its advisory committee members from 
participating in any matter in which they, a spouse, or dependent child 
have a direct interest and requires the members to disclose any direct 
or indirect interest in leases, licenses, permits, contracts, or claims 
and related litigation that involve lands or resources administered by 
the bureau. However, this policy does not require the representative 
members to identify any other financial interests. Interior officials 
also told us that the department has begun inserting standard language 
into its committee charters briefly stating the ethics obligations of 
the members, whether they are special government employees or 
representatives. The charters for committees with representative 
members will include a statement that "a member may not participate in 
matters that will directly affect, or appear to affect, the financial 
interests of the member or the member's spouse or minor children, 
unless authorized by the designated federal official."[Footnote 29]

In January 2004, Interior officials also said that the department has 
begun working with its committee management officers to develop 
training and distribute materials to heighten committee members' 
awareness of applicable ethical obligations and to develop and 
institute the appropriate screening mechanisms. Similarly, Energy does 
not require representative members to provide information on their 
financial interests and affiliations but does tell representative 
members in letters appointing them to committees that they "are 
required to recuse themselves from participating in any meeting, study, 
recommendation, or other committee activity that could have a direct 
and predictable effect on the companies, organizations, agencies, or 
entities with which they are associated or in which they have financial 
interest." Interior and Energy policies thus rely on committee members' 
correctly identifying and voluntarily disclosing such circumstances. In 
contrast, USDA requires its representative members to provide 
information about their employment and sources of income in excess of 
$10,000 but does not ask for information about other financial assets 
that may affect impartiality, such as stock holdings. However, if these 
members should have been, and actually were, appointed as special 
government employees, none of these approaches would be adequate to 
ensure that the members did not have conflicts of interest requiring 
mitigation.

At the start of our review, Interior officials told us that they had 
begun to review their appointment classifications for their 115 
advisory committees as a result of the November 2002 OGE study. The 
officials noted that many of their committees addressing federal land 
management issues are not scientific and technical in content and, in 
their view, are appropriately staffed with representative members. In 
January 2004, Interior officials acknowledged that it was appropriate 
to change the nature of some committee members' appointments upon 
reexamination of any underlying legislation and the purpose of the 
committees. The officials said the department has been reviewing the 
appointments to committees as their charters expire, and that the 
department has appointed special government employees to a few advisory 
committees during the past year.[Footnote 30] Regarding the earthquake 
studies committee discussed above, in January 2004 the department 
examined the appointments while renewing the charter and determined, on 
the basis of its review of the committee's authorizing legislation, 
that the members of this committee should properly serve as special 
government employees. This committee has been operating for 2 years 
with members appointed as representatives. Interior officials said the 
change in appointments will be reflected in the charter and in the 
pending appointment letters, and the committee will not be active again 
until these changes are made.

While noting that it now believes the authorizing language for the 
earthquake committee clearly calls for the appointment of the members 
as special government employees, the officials said that other 
committees that address scientific and technical issues specifically 
call for the appointment of representatives, such as Interior's 
National Cooperative Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee. This 
committee, comprised primarily of officials from five federal agencies, 
is to review and provide advice on a 5-year plan for the geologic 
mapping program that the Secretary of the Interior is required to 
prepare. In our view, while the statute calls for the committee to 
include two representatives from the state geological surveys and one 
each from "academia" and "the private sector," it does not clearly and 
unambiguously call for these individuals to be appointed as 
representative members rather than special government employees. As 
previously discussed, the term "representative" may be used in a 
variety of ways and may be used in a more generic manner to describe a 
committee's composition. The term "representative" does not necessarily 
indicate that members should be stakeholders speaking for entities with 
an interest in the matter, nor is it clear in this case that academia 
or the private sector would have a specific point of view that could be 
represented. We believe the department could choose to appoint these 
members as special government employees to obtain their advice, if 
Interior decided that nonstakeholder advice was appropriate in light of 
the committee's function. On the other hand, if the department wants to 
obtain stakeholder advice from the nonfederal committee members 
regarding the government's 5-year geologic mapping program plan, the 
representative members should be clearly informed about the specific 
interest and points of view they are to represent.

On this point, Interior officials acknowledged that their advisory 
committee members themselves are not always clear on whether they are 
to provide stakeholder advice or advice on behalf of the government. 
For example, during our review we learned that this question was raised 
at the initial meeting of the earthquake committee in 2001, at which 
point in time the representative members were told that they were 
charged with providing advice on behalf of the government, guidance 
indicating that the representative members were to function as special 
government employees. To be certain that committee members are clear on 
their roles in the future, Interior officials said that the department 
has begun to ensure that letters appointing individuals to advisory 
committees clearly inform the member of their status as either a 
special government employee or a representative. Further, if the 
members are to serve as representatives, they are to be clearly 
informed of the constituencies they are to represent before the 
committee. Clearly, this is an important fact to communicate to the 
committee members.

GSA officials also told us that appointment information is relevant and 
important to understanding the work of the various committees. The 
officials agreed that information on the nature of the advice being 
provided--and, in the case of representative appointments, of the 
entities or groups represented--that is not currently available to the 
public would be useful and informative. They further indicated that the 
GSA FACA database, which is available to the public and which 
identifies the members of the advisory committees, could be expanded to 
include, for each committee member, the type of appointment and the 
entity or group represented.

Information That Can Help Agencies Ensure Committees Are Balanced Is 
Not Systematically Gathered and Evaluated: 

Many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate 
information that can help them determine the points of view of their 
potential committee members regarding the subject matters the 
committees will consider and thus better ensure that committees are, 
and are perceived as being, balanced. FACA requires that committees be 
fairly balanced both in terms of the points of view represented and the 
functions to be performed. Courts have interpreted the FACA requirement 
for committee balance as providing agencies with broad discretion in 
balancing their committees. In addition to the legal requirement for 
balance, it is important that committees are perceived as being 
balanced in order to be credible and effective. However, GSA guidance 
does not address what types of information could be helpful to agencies 
in assessing the points of view of potential committee members, nor do 
agency procedures identify what information should be collected about 
potential members to make decisions about committee balance. Many 
agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate 
information that would be helpful in determining the points of view of 
committee members relevant to the subject matters the committees will 
consider. For example, of the nine departments and agencies we 
reviewed, only EPA consistently collected information on committee 
members who were appointed as special government employees in order to 
assess the points of view of the potential members and used this 
information to help achieve balance.

Assessing the points of view of individual members is fundamental to 
ensuring that committees as a whole are, and are perceived as being, 
fairly balanced in terms of points of view because agencies must first 
know whether the members have particular viewpoints or whether they may 
have--or may reasonably be perceived as having--certain biases. For 
example, only financial interests and affiliations during the prior 
year are considered pertinent for conflict-of-interest purposes, but 
financial and other relevant affiliations--extending beyond the 12-
month period--may identify a potential bias or point of view that 
agencies should consider both in selecting individual members and 
balancing the committees as a whole. Even when a legal conflict of 
interest does not exist, a committee member may be so closely aligned 
with a point of view or an organization that his or her ability to 
provide objective and impartial advice is impaired or appears to be 
impaired. Such circumstances in which a person's impartiality may be 
called into question, sometimes referred to as an "apparent conflict of 
interest" and a "perceived conflict of interest," are important for 
agencies to be aware of because the perception of bias that can harm 
the reputation of advisory committees is independent of the legal 
definition of a conflict of interest.[Footnote 31] In some cases, 
however, agencies may find it helpful to include individuals with known 
biases, perspectives, or affiliations to serve on certain advisory 
committees in order to ensure that the relevant points of view are 
considered.[Footnote 32] In these cases, the issue of the overall 
balance of viewpoints on the committees is heightened in the sense of 
an agency's ability to ensure that the committee is balanced with 
respect to points of view. When agencies are unaware of the viewpoints 
and biases of its members, they cannot adequately ensure that the 
committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced as a whole.

Agencies typically rely on two sources to collect data about committee 
members who were appointed as special government employees: curricula 
vitae (CV) or résumés and the OGE form 450, the confidential financial 
disclosure form. Agencies generally collect CVs[Footnote 33] or résumés 
that may provide some information pertinent to assessing points of 
view, such as professional affiliations and published articles. Some 
agencies may also perform Internet searches for background information 
on candidates. However, these sources vary in content and reliability 
and may not be sufficient to consistently provide the information 
needed to assess for points of view.[Footnote 34]

The form 450, which does collect specific information in a systematic 
manner, was developed specifically for reviews for potential financial 
conflicts of interest. Some of the information on this form, however, 
also is relevant to assessing the overall balance of viewpoints on a 
committee. The form 450 requires potential committee members (and 
returning members at least annually) to provide information on sources 
of income and assets, liabilities, and outside positions during the 
prior year and on existing employment agreements or arrangements, such 
as promises of future employment and leaves of absence.[Footnote 35] 
The information on income sources, honoraria, and outside positions 
held during the prior year may be important to assessing for points of 
view.[Footnote 36] For example, a university professor who is also an 
official of an environmental advocacy organization may reasonably be 
viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as representing an 
environmental rather than an unaligned "academic" perspective. 
Similarly, a university professor who is also an official of a 
toxicology institute that receives funding from chemical companies or 
who provided expert legal testimony for a corporation may reasonably be 
viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as providing an industry 
perspective.

Importantly, while the form 450 can provide some pertinent information 
for assessing points of view, it was neither designed for nor does it 
provide sufficient information for this purpose. Specifically, as our 
review of EPA's Science Advisory Board demonstrated,[Footnote 37] the 
form 450--designed for financial conflict-of-interest reviews--
solicits information covering only the prior year and does not request 
other information relevant to assessing points of view, such as: 

* previous public statements or positions on the matter being reviewed, 
including statements in articles, testimony, or speeches;

* positions taken in various legal forums, particularly in providing 
expert legal testimony, on the matter;

* research conducted on the matter;

* interests of their employers or clients in the matter; and: 

* sources of funding for research or other activities.

However, such information is helpful to understand the points of view 
of potential committee members and therefore to assess how an 
individual member's participation on the committee would affect overall 
committee balance. For example, it is helpful for agencies to be aware 
of public pronouncements that candidates have made on matters relevant 
to their committees so that they can assess how such individuals may be 
viewed in terms of impartiality. In those instances where an agency 
selects a member for their expertise who may have a viewpoint that is 
aligned with an industry or environmental interest, without the 
information that would reveal the existing viewpoint, the agency would 
not be aware of whether including a member with a different viewpoint 
would be beneficial in terms of the public's perception of committee 
balance.

In addition, the extent to which a committee member's employment is 
funded by a grant or grants from the sponsoring agency is a reasonable 
factor to consider in assessing the member's impartiality in terms of 
independence from the agency. On this point, the Office of Management 
and Budget recently highlighted in its proposed rule on peer review 
procedures that the independence of scientists conducting peer reviews 
for agencies while at the same time receiving funding from these 
agencies might be called into question. Similarly, the 2003 report by 
the National Academies on organizational issues within NIH recommended 
that a substantial portion of a committee's scientific membership 
should consist of persons whose primary source of research support is 
derived from a different NIH center or institute or from outside of NIH 
in order to achieve sufficient independence from the agency.[Footnote 
38] Officials at EPA and FDA told us that they try to avoid appointing 
to committees members who receive agency grants for work that is 
related to matters before the committee. In contrast, Energy and NASA 
officials said it would be difficult for them to find for some 
committees the scientific and technical experts they need who do not 
also receive grants from their agencies. We are not suggesting that 
having grants or contracts with the sponsoring agency should disqualify 
individuals from serving on federal advisory committees, but rather 
that agencies should consider the support they provide to potential 
members since this does present potential issues of independence from 
the agency.

Agencies generally have even less information to evaluate the 
viewpoints of their representative members because representatives are 
not required to complete the form 450. Consequently, agencies generally 
do not collect information relating to the financial interests of the 
representative members. Although representatives are not subject to the 
financial conflict-of-interest rules, their financial interests could 
affect their viewpoints. An EPA official acknowledged that for some 
representative committees, it may be important to consider this 
information, depending on the work of the committees. However, another 
EPA official expressed a concern that asking representative members--
who are not paid for their services--for financial information, such as 
is obtained from those retained as special government employees, could 
have a chilling effect on the willingness of people to serve on 
advisory committees as representatives.[Footnote 39]

Regarding special government employees, we found that although agencies 
have generally collected forms 450 from these employees, the forms are 
not always collected in time for them to be of any use in also 
evaluating the points of view of potential committee members. For 
example, some agencies, such as NASA and CDC, do not collect the form 
450 until the agency has made decisions about appointments. (We 
recognize that the form 450 was designed to assess for conflicts of 
interest and that agencies are not required to also use it to assess 
for points of view; however, as previously discussed, the form 
nonetheless can provide some valuable information to agencies regarding 
the viewpoints of an individual.): 

Of the nine committees we reviewed, only EPA's Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel 
consistently collected information relevant to assessing the points of 
view of prospective members and considered this information in 
selecting members for its peer review panels.[Footnote 40] Agencies 
with committees served by special government employees generally 
collected information from CVs and résumés and on the form 450, which, 
as discussed above, has limitations in terms of assessing the points of 
view of committee members. Agencies with representative members either 
collected only CVs or, in the case of USDA, collected some additional 
information about sources of income. (See table 1.): 

Table 1: Documentation That Agencies Systematically Collected on 
Potential Members of Selected Committees: 

Department/Agency: Agriculture/Food Safety and Inspection Service; 
Committee name: National Advisory Committee for Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods[B]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: USDA form AD-755[A].

Department/Agency: Energy; 
Committee name: Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 
Committee[B]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No.

Department/Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Committee name: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Scientific Advisory Panel; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: Yes[C]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: Structured; 
telephone interview.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Committee name: Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research
Protection; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; 
Committee name: Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/Food and Drug 
Administration; 
Committee name: Food Advisory Committee; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: Yes[D]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: Structured telephone interview[E].

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/National Institutes of 
Health; 
Committee name: Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative 
Toxicological Methods; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No.

Department/Agency: Interior/U.S. Geological Survey; 
Committee name: Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee[B]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No.

Department/Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Committee name: Space Science Advisory Committee; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Curriculum vitae or résumé: 
Yes[F]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: OGE form 450: Yes[F]; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Conflict-of-interest 
financial disclosure form: Alternative form approved by OGE: No; 
Documentation that agencies systematically collected on 
potential members of selected committees: Other data collection 
instrument: No. 

Sources: Data collected from agencies' committee management offices, 
designated federal officials, or other agency officials responsible for 
nominating members of committees.

[A] USDA requires members of its advisory committees to file a USDA 
form AD-755. This form requests information on the individual's primary 
employment, sources of income over $10,000, and other matters related 
to the individual's background in agriculture.

[B] Members were appointed as representatives not subject to conflict-
of-interest reviews.

[C] The EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel uses the EPA form 3110-48 
in lieu of the OGE form 450. The EPA form requests more detailed 
information from members about their affiliations and association with 
the work of the committee.

[D] FDA requires members of its Food Advisory Committee to file a form 
450 during the appointment process. However, if the Food Advisory 
Committee, or any other FDA advisory committee, plans to discuss 
"particular matters" of specific applicability, the agency will require 
members to file an FDA form 3410 prior to the meeting. The form 3410 
requests more specific information about a member's affiliation with 
particular companies identified by FDA that might be affected by the 
committee's deliberations during a specific meeting.

[E] See footnote 40.

[F] The designated federal official for the NASA Space Science Advisory 
Committee requests short biographical sketches from prospective 
members. Agency officials consider these sketches when deciding whom to 
appoint. After the agency has decided to appoint an individual, it 
requests a copy of a curriculum vitae and a completed form 450.

[End of table]

Regarding the EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel, this advisory 
committee convenes about six panels annually to address scientific and 
technical issues. For example, we reviewed one such panel that was (1) 
evaluating the range of developmental effects associated with the 
exposure of amphibians to the pesticide atrazine and (2) determining 
the significance of these effects for risk assessment and the likely 
threshold exposure value for eliciting these effects. The executive 
director of this committee said that candidates with known positions or 
biases generally are not selected for the panels--that is, the agency 
does not select individuals previously associated with the agency, 
regulated industries, or stakeholder communities. In addition, the 
agency generally does not select individuals with a stated position on 
the particular matter being reviewed. The FIFRA Scientific Advisory 
Panel defines balanced membership as including the necessary areas of 
technical expertise, different scientific perspectives within each 
technical discipline, and the collective breadth of experience needed 
to address the agency's charge. In order to evaluate potential members, 
the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel uses CVs and the EPA alternative 
disclosure form that asks committee members to provide information 
needed to assess impartiality, such as information about compensated 
expert testimony and sources of research and project funding during the 
prior 2 years. The form also asks candidates to consider all relevant 
information over the past 5 years and to identify and describe any 
reason that they may be unable to provide impartial advice on the 
matter to be considered by the panel.

The executive secretary of the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel told us 
that EPA's alternative financial disclosure form--developed to address 
the limitations we identified in our report on EPA's Science Advisory 
Board--has greatly facilitated their ability to consistently obtain 
relevant information. The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel also asks 
potential members several standard questions that we identified in our 
prior report as relevant to assessing impartiality, such as whether 
they have made any oral or written public statement on the issue before 
the panel.[Footnote 41] As a result of obtaining and reviewing this 
information in order to select members and ensure appropriate committee 
balance overall, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel is in a position 
to make informed choices. By systematically collecting relevant 
background information on all candidates, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory 
Panel is in a position to ensure that its panels are balanced in terms 
of the points of view represented. We also found that FDA often 
collects similar information on an alternative form that provides some 
pertinent information for assessing points of view, but the agency does 
not use this information to assess the overall balance of the 
committees. That is, FDA generally uses the form 450 in reviewing 
candidates for appointments to committees and uses the alternative form 
to review for conflicts of interest for specific meetings that involve 
particular matters.

In addition, agencies that have collected forms 450 for special 
government employees for the purpose of conflict-of-interest reviews 
may not use the information available to them on the forms that--
although designed for conflict-of-interest reviews--could also be 
helpful in evaluating the points of view committee members may have. 
For example, the Director of the White House Liaison Office at HHS, who 
developed the committee roster for the Secretary's Advisory Committee 
on Human Research Protections that the Secretary of HHS approved, said 
that she did not review the forms 450 in selecting members.[Footnote 
42] She viewed the task of reviewing the forms 450 as the purview of 
the agency ethics officials who would determine whether financial 
conflicts of interest existed. In response to our questions about 
whether affiliations with law firms, identified by some members on the 
forms 450, may be relevant to consider in terms of their points of 
view, she said that she did not need to know the particulars about the 
legal work since she did not consider such information relevant to 
selection decisions. Further, she said that she did not consider 
particular points of view candidates may have in making selections. For 
example, we asked her if she considered the point of view of one member 
who had publicly stated disagreement on religious grounds with certain 
research that is included in the committee's charter, and she said she 
did not. The Director stated that she nominated members to the 
Secretary for his approval primarily on the basis of their expertise 
and also considering several demographic factors (gender, race, and 
geographic location) to the extent these additional factors did not 
impinge on the department's ability to pick qualified members. She 
noted that these factors reflect the department's written policies and 
procedures.[Footnote 43]

Officials at other agencies said they considered similar factors in 
balancing the other eight committees we examined. Specifically, 
officials indicated that they focused on expertise, demographic 
characteristics, and employment history as factors to assess points of 
view as it affects balance. (See table 2.) As previously discussed, 
FACA does not elaborate on how agencies are to ensure that advisory 
committees are fairly balanced in terms of the expertise and the points 
of view of the members, nor does it provide criteria for assessing 
balance.[Footnote 44] Thus, agencies have considerable discretion in 
determining how they will meet the requirement for achieving balanced 
committees.

Table 2: Factors Used by Agencies to Balance Selected Committees: 

Department/Agency: Agriculture/Food Safety and Inspection Service; 
Name of committee: National Advisory Committee on Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes.

Department/Agency: Energy; 
Name of committee: Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 
Committee; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes.

Department/Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; 
Name of committee: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Scientific Advisory Panel; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: No; 
Employment sector: No.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services; 
Name of committee: Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: [Empty].

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; 
Name of committee: Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: No.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/Food and Drug 
Administration; 
Name of committee: Food Advisory Committee; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes.

Department/Agency: Health and Human Services/National Institutes of 
Health; 
Name of committee: Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative 
Toxicological Methods; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes.

Department/Agency: Interior/U.S. Geological Survey; 
Name of committee: Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: No; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes.

Department/Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
Name of committee: Space Science Advisory Committee; 
Expertise: Yes; 
Ethnicity: Yes; 
Gender: Yes; 
Geography: Yes; 
Employment sector: Yes. 

Sources: Information on the criteria considered to balance committees 
came from designated federal officials, committee management officials, 
or other agency officials responsible for nominating or appointing 
members of committees.

[End of table]

In discussing their selection criteria, most officials reported that in 
selecting members for these science and technical committees, they 
focused first and foremost on expertise. Some agency officials said 
that they do not consider a balance of points of view as relevant to 
science and technical committees, believing that the appropriate focus 
for such committees is obtaining the appropriate balance of required 
expertise. We do not disagree that this focus is appropriate, 
particularly for committees that address scientific and technical 
issues. While courts have interpreted FACA as giving agencies broad 
discretion in how to balance their committees, in our view, the 
integrity of these committees' advice would be better served if 
agencies were to consider additional information about potential 
members' points of view. For example, experts in a given field of 
expertise may have varying scientific perspectives that agencies could 
consider for balancing the committee. Along these lines, the FIFRA 
Scientific Advisory Panel defines balance as including different 
scientific perspectives within each technical discipline.

Second, the officials most commonly related "points of view" to 
demographic factors, such as race, gender, or geographic locations--
that is, defining a balance of points of view in terms of demographic 
diversity. While important, these criteria alone do not provide a 
robust understanding of the points of view and potential biases the 
members may bring to the committee vis-à-vis the specific matters the 
committees will address. That is, these approaches may achieve 
demographic diversity, but they cannot ensure an appropriate balance of 
viewpoints relative to the matters being considered by the committees. 
Third, some of the officials also identified the primary employment 
affiliation as a factor relevant to achieving a balance of points of 
view. For example, a factor in committee balance for one committee is 
the breakdown of members employed by universities, private industry, 
and federal and state agencies. We agree the primary employment 
affiliation may be an important consideration for a number of 
committees to ensure a balance of points of view. However, as we 
illustrated in our work at EPA's Science Advisory Board, the staff 
director of the board viewed some academics as aligned either with 
industry or environmental perspectives and some experts affiliated with 
industry as representing an environmental perspective on the basis of 
information about their other affiliations. Additional information 
about the candidates' viewpoints and potential biases would better 
ensure that the committees are, and are perceived as being, fairly 
balanced in terms of points of view--and that no one interest or 
viewpoint dominates. Along these lines, NIH officials told us that the 
information EPA collects to evaluate potential committee members would 
be very helpful to them in selecting members and ensuring that 
committees are balanced as a whole.

Finally, we note that other practices agencies use in forming new 
committees and in selecting replacement members for existing committees 
can help them better ensure that their committees are appropriately 
balanced. These include steps agencies take to identify potential 
candidates and to seek feedback on proposed committee membership. 
Appendixes III through XI provide information on the nine committees we 
reviewed, including how the agencies identified candidates and whether 
they requested public comments on the committee membership. These and 
other practices are discussed in the next section.

Promising Practices Could Better Ensure Independence and Balance: 

Some agencies use practices when forming and managing their committees 
that can better ensure that federal advisory committee members are 
independent and that committees are balanced. These practices include 
(1) obtaining nominations for committee members from the public, (2) 
using clearly defined processes to obtain and review pertinent 
information on potential members regarding potential conflicts of 
interest and impartiality, and (3) prescreening prospective members 
using a structured interview. In our view, these measures constitute 
promising practices because they reflect the principles of conflict-of-
interest provisions and FACA by employing clearly defined procedures to 
promote systematic, consistent, and transparent efforts to achieve 
independent and balanced committees. Although these practices for 
obtaining and reviewing pertinent information to assess for conflicts 
of interest and impartiality are broadly applicable, some of the 
practices, such as seeking public comment on proposed committees, are 
most particularly relevant to those committees addressing sensitive or 
controversial topics. If more agencies adopted and effectively 
implemented these practices, we believe they would have greater 
assurance that their committees are, and are perceived as being, 
independent and balanced. In addition, we have identified selected 
measures that could promote greater transparency in the federal 
advisory committee system.

Obtaining Nominations from the Public: 

When seeking to appoint members to their federal advisory committees, 
agencies often use a combination of methods to obtain nominations for 
potential committee members. Agencies typically rely on relevant 
program officials in the agency, officials from other agencies, members 
of professional organizations, and authors of relevant scientific and 
technical literatures as ways to identify potential committee members. 
Some agencies also seek nominations from the public by using widely 
available resources, such as the Federal Register and agency Web sites, 
to broaden the pool of candidates from which committee members may be 
drawn. The latter approach is a systematic and transparent method of 
obtaining nominations and can provide agencies with greater assurance 
that a range of relevant experts and/or stakeholders capable of 
creating impartial and balanced committees are identified.[Footnote 45]

In addition to their other methods of obtaining nominations from 
colleagues, professional associations, and the like, we believe 
agencies should also routinely consider obtaining nominations from the 
public because this practice can both (1) help agencies identify 
qualified candidates and (2) alleviate any perception that they are 
choosing from a narrow pool of candidates that may not provide the 
appropriate expertise and points of view. It may be particularly 
relevant to solicit nominations from the public for committees that 
address sensitive or controversial issues. Obtaining nominations from 
the public may require more time and effort than less formal approaches 
to identifying committee members and may also involve a publishing 
cost. However, by actively engaging the public and all interested 
parties in the process in an open and transparent manner, the agency's 
credibility may be enhanced.

Using Clearly Defined Processes to Screen for Conflicts of Interest and 
Points of View: 

As previously discussed, many agencies do not consistently collect 
information that could be helpful in determining the viewpoints of 
potential members and ensuring that committees are, and are perceived 
as being, balanced. However, the National Academies and EPA have 
developed clear processes that, if effectively implemented, can provide 
them with greater assurance that relevant conflicts of interest and 
biases are identified and addressed, and that committees are 
appropriately balanced in terms of points of view because they have 
identified and evaluated the necessary information before committees 
are finalized.

Specifically, the processes used by the National Academies and EPA's 
Science Advisory Board clearly and consistently: 

* identify the information they deem necessary to assess candidates for 
independence and to balance committees,

* explain to the candidates why the required information is important 
to protect the integrity of the committee's work,

* request public comment on proposed committee membership, and: 

* require evaluation of the overall balance of committees before 
committees are finalized.

Overviews of the processes used by the National Academies and the 
Science Advisory Board are provided below.

The National Academies: 

In 2001, we reported that to help balance their committees and 
safeguard their credibility, the National Academies provide prospective 
members with a document that offers a succinct, straightforward 
discussion of what constitutes potential conflicts of interest and 
biases and explains what information they are required to provide to 
the National Academies on a standard form.[Footnote 46] In 2003, the 
National Academies updated their procedures covering conflicts of 
interest and bias, issuing their Policy on Committee Composition and 
Balance and Conflicts of Interest for Committees Used in the 
Development of Reports. In explaining the need for obtaining background 
information about prospective members, the National Academies emphasize 
that the work of their committees must be, and must be perceived as 
being, free of any significant conflict of interest[Footnote 47] and 
uncompromised by bias. The National Academies state that allegations of 
conflict of interest or lack of balance and objectivity can undermine 
the conclusions of fully competent committees. The academies continue 
to request the following information from potential members on a 
standard form: [Footnote 48]

* organizational affiliations,

* financial interests,

* research support,

* government service, and: 

* public statements and positions.

In addition, prospective committee members are asked to identify and 
describe any other circumstances in their background or present 
connections that might reasonably be construed as unduly affecting 
their judgment or that might be reasonably viewed as creating an actual 
or potential bias or conflict of interest or the appearance of a bias 
or conflict of interest. Further, the National Academies post 
information about panel candidates on a Web site for public comment, 
allowing the public the opportunity to identify any real or perceived 
conflicts or biases associated with individual members and the ability 
to raise issues regarding the balance of viewpoints on the proposed 
committee. Lastly, the National Academies do not finalize their 
committee selections until officials have reviewed and evaluated 
information provided by prospective members and comments received from 
the public regarding the proposed makeup of the committee. As we 
previously reported, this process has proven beneficial to the 
academies in selecting balanced peer review panels.[Footnote 49]

EPA's Science Advisory Board: 

EPA's Science Advisory Board staff office has also developed a 
systematic process to obtain and evaluate the information it needs to 
assess potential members for potential conflicts of interest and to 
properly balance the range of expertise and viewpoints on the board. As 
previously discussed, federal committee members serving as special 
government employees are subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-
interest statute. The staff office uses the alternative form that EPA 
developed, form 3110-48, for special government employees serving on 
advisory committees to collect information that enables the agency to 
evaluate potential members for legal conflicts of interest and also 
helps the agency in assessing for impartiality and points of view. The 
staff office also contacts prospective panelists and asks them five 
standard questions to help the office assess the panelists' points of 
view, such as whether they have made any public statements on the 
issues that the panels will consider. The staff office uses this 
information to help ensure that any legal conflicts of interest are 
identified and appropriately mitigated and to help ensure that 
committees as a whole are balanced in terms of points of view.

EPA's form 3110-48 explains that the information being requested is 
needed so that EPA ethics officials can make an informed judgment 
regarding any conflict of interest or appearance of lack of 
impartiality. The Science Advisory Board staff office further explains 
how it uses the information that it collects in its brochure entitled 
Overview of the Panel Formation Process at the Environmental Protection 
Agency Science Advisory Board. As previously discussed, the information 
that EPA collects on the form 3110-48 includes sources of income and 
assets, liabilities, outside positions, consulting activities, sources 
of research support or project funding, and compensated expert 
testimony. Further, similar to the National Academies, EPA requests 
potential members to identify and describe on the form any reason they 
may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters before the 
committee and any reason their impartiality in the identified matter 
might be questioned. The Science Advisory Board staff office also 
searches independently for background information on prospective 
members to understand their qualifications and points of view. Also, 
like the National Academies, EPA uses a public notice process to obtain 
comments on proposed candidates for its Science Advisory Board. That 
is, the staff office publishes the names and biographical sketches of 
candidates for its committees on the board's Web site, requesting the 
public to provide information, analysis, or documentation that it 
should consider in evaluating the candidates. The staff office does not 
finalize their committee selections until officials have reviewed and 
evaluated the information provided by the candidates, any other 
information the public may have provided, and information gathered by 
the staff independently on the background of each prospective member. 
According to a designated federal official for the board, the public 
comment period is a last check in the screening process that can 
identify information about prospective candidates, such as publicly 
stated positions on matters related to the committee, that the staff 
office would want to verify and evaluate prior to making panel 
selections. He said the staff office has received feedback that the 
biographical sketches are helpful, and he believes this practice 
enhances the public's perception of the board's panel formation 
process.

Prescreening Prospective Members Using a Structured Interview: 

EPA's FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel has a committee formation process 
similar to that of the Science Advisory Board that also identifies the 
specific information the staff will discuss in interviews with 
prospective members. Although the purposes of the structured interview 
include assessing the interest, availability, and expertise of the 
potential member, a primary focus is on evaluating potential financial 
conflicts of interest and biases. In addition, the interview provides 
EPA with the opportunity to explain the ethical obligations of 
committee members and discuss in detail the information that members 
would have to provide on the EPA form 3110-48 before they could be 
appointed to the committee. This process is efficient because it 
enables the panel to quickly identify those individuals who meet its 
criteria for independence and impartiality.[Footnote 50] Further, 
prospective members who subsequently complete the form 3110-48 will be 
better prepared to complete the form accurately. We note that the 
panel's interview protocol, including the structured interview itself, 
is available on its Web site. Thus, prospective members and the public 
are informed of the processes and the issues that will be discussed 
with all prospective members. The panel's approach to obtaining 
relevant information from prospective committee members is systematic, 
consistent, and transparent. Further, we believe it unlikely that 
agencies formalizing and publicizing their processes for obtaining 
information from prospective committee members would approve questions 
that are generally inappropriate in a professional working environment, 
such as questions about party affiliation or political viewpoints that 
some committee members at other agencies have reported being asked.

Selected Measures Could Promote Greater Transparency in the Federal 
Advisory Committee System: 

In light of recent controversies surrounding the perceived 
politicization of federal advisory committees, we identified several 
other measures to improve transparency in the federal advisory 
committee system. Although none of these measures can ensure that 
committee members are independent and that committees are balanced, we 
believe each of these alternatives has the potential to increase public 
understanding of the process of appointing advisory committee members 
and make more transparent the operations of federal advisory 
committees.

In the interest of transparency, agencies could make public the 
following information about each of their advisory committees: 

* The committee formation process: how members are identified and 
screened, and how committees are assessed for balance.

* Whether members are appointed as special government employees and are 
speaking as independent experts, or whether members are appointed as 
representatives and speaking as stakeholders.

* Whether committees arrive at decisions through a voting process or by 
consensus.

There are several contexts in which agencies could make this 
information available to the public. Specifically, the information 
could be: 

* written in the committee's charter;

* posted on the GSA on-line database;

* posted on the agency or committee's Web site;

* announced at committee meetings; or: 

* identified on committee work products (reports, studies, or 
recommendations).

It is in the public interest to disclose such basic information about 
federal advisory committees. Further, we believe that taking such 
measures to make information about committees available to the public 
would help educate interested parties about the formation of committees 
and better enable them to evaluate whether agencies have complied with 
conflict-of-interest requirements and the FACA requirements for 
balance. Given recent well-publicized accusations of biases and 
conflicts of interest, efforts to improve the transparency of the 
federal advisory committee system can only serve to inspire greater 
public trust in the process and enhance the credibility of committees' 
work.

Along these lines, we have identified two additional measures to 
promote transparency that may warrant consideration: (1) public 
disclosure of information concerning conflict-of-interest waivers and 
(2) internal disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and sources 
of bias among committee members prior to the initiation of committee 
work.

Agencies may grant waivers to special government employees who have 
potential conflicts of interest if the agency determines that either 
(1) the conflict is insignificant or (2) the need for the member's 
expertise outweighs the conflict. The financial conflict-of-interest 
statute requires that agencies provide limited information to the 
public about waivers upon request; namely, that an agency has granted a 
waiver and the basis on which it was granted. The statute does not 
require, however, that agencies proactively notify the public about 
waivers, either during advisory committee meetings, in meeting minutes, 
or in committee products. Our review of selected committees found that 
agencies typically did not disclose this information. In contrast, FDA 
has had a practice of providing at the beginning of meetings a summary 
disclosure of any waivers granted to members for that meeting. The 
disclosure identifies which members have received waivers and whether 
the waivers were granted on the basis that conflict was insignificant 
or that the need for the expertise outweighed the potential conflict. 
Because information about the conflicts pertained to information that 
members provide to agencies on confidential financial disclosure forms 
that are protected under the Federal Privacy Act, details about the 
conflicts were not provided. Thus, the public and others could not 
evaluate the impact of the conflict on a person's ability to provide 
impartial advice. In February 2002, as a result of a statutory 
requirement, FDA issued for public comment a draft guidance document 
describing its policy of disclosing specific information with respect 
to waivers granted for particular matters of specific applicability--
that is, when members have a direct relationship with the products, 
interests, and issues under the review of the committee. Under this 
policy, FDA discloses not only the existence of a waiver but also 
information on the committee member's interests that constitute a 
conflict.[Footnote 51] To address the constraints imposed by the 
Federal Privacy Act, FDA requires committee members to sign a consent 
form giving FDA permission to publicly disclose this information before 
members receive a waiver. According to FDA officials, committee members 
have generally been willing to sign the consent forms and to disclose 
this information. We believe the practice of publicly disclosing the 
issuance of conflict-of-interest waivers to committee members increases 
transparency and can also increase the credibility of the committee 
process by allowing the public to know when a potential conflict exists 
and why the agency saw fit to grant the member a waiver. Further, the 
application of this practice could be expanded to include not only 
particular matters of specific applicability (in which a particular 
company or individual is likely to be affected by the matter) but also 
to other particular matters (in which, for example, an industry or 
group of persons is likely to be affected).

The National Academies have a policy of asking their committees to 
engage in an internal discussion about members' work experiences, 
affiliations, and other circumstances that might pose a potential 
conflict of interest. The academies believe that an internal disclosure 
of this information promotes transparency and serves to increase the 
credibility of the committees' work. We agree that a confidential 
discussion among committee members regarding real or perceived 
conflicts of interest and biases can provide committee members with 
important background information that can enable them to better 
evaluate the perspectives of their fellow committee members. 
Understandably, extending such a practice to federal advisory 
committees, and in particular to members appointed as special 
government employees, raises privacy questions because special 
government employees are under no obligation to disclose such 
information to fellow committee members or the public. However, we 
believe that the possibility of requiring members to disclose 
background information, affiliations, and other sources of potential 
conflicts of interest and biases among individual committee members at 
an internal disclosure session prior to the committee's beginning its 
work warrants study.

Conclusions: 

For federal advisory committees to be successful, the members must be 
independent and the committees balanced--that is, they must be able to 
provide, and be perceived as providing, credible and balanced advice. A 
spectrum of scientists and other experts perceive recent appointments 
to some science and technical committees as being influenced more by 
ideology than expertise. Independent of the facts and specific issues 
involved, this perception alone is problematic. The perception of the 
federal advisory committee system as politicized can jeopardize the 
value of an individual committee's work; discourage the participation 
of scientists, experts, and other potential members on future advisory 
committees; and call into question the integrity of the federal 
advisory committee system itself. Because allegations of conflict of 
interest and bias can undermine the work of otherwise credible and 
competent committees and threaten the integrity of the federal advisory 
committee system, the best interests of the government are served by 
governmentwide guidance and agency-level policies and procedures for 
addressing potential conflicts of interest and ensuring that committees 
are, and are perceived as being, balanced. However, federal guidance in 
these key areas has limitations that reduce its effectiveness.

First, OGE guidance on representative appointments can be strengthened 
to better ensure that agencies are appropriately appointing committee 
members. Unless certain ambiguities in the guidance are clarified, some 
agencies may continue to appoint members providing advice on behalf of 
the government as representatives and not conduct reviews of potential 
conflicts, thereby leaving the specific committees and the federal 
advisory committee system itself vulnerable to potential criticism if 
potential conflicts of interest are identified. Clarifications that are 
needed to ensure that representative appointments are made only when 
the individuals are, in fact, asked to provide advice representing the 
positions of the stakeholders they are representing include specifying 
that representative appointments generally are not appropriate for 
individuals who are to provide advice on the basis of their expertise. 
Justifying representative appointments on this basis avoids using the 
special government employee category, which was specifically created to 
facilitate the government's ability to hire various experts for just 
such a purpose as serving on federal advisory committees. The guidance 
should also clarify that the use of the term "representative" in a 
statute or charter may be used in a generic sense and does not 
necessarily mean the members are to be appointed as representatives who 
are to provide stakeholder advice. Again, in considering which type of 
appointment is appropriate, the focus should be on the nature of the 
advice to be provided. That is, individuals who are appointed to 
federal advisory committees to provide advice on behalf of the 
government (i.e., individuals who are not providing stakeholder advice) 
should be appointed as special government employees. Finally, one of 
the first steps agency officials should take in establishing new 
committees is to determine, in consultations with agency ethics 
officials, the appropriate appointment category for members. These 
decisions should be reviewed as committee charters are renewed every 2 
years.

Second, GSA could provide guidance that would assist agencies in 
identifying the kinds of information they should systematically collect 
in order to determine the viewpoints of prospective committee members 
for the purpose of ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as 
being, balanced. Although the type of information relevant to each 
committee might differ in some respects, more systematic information 
collection and evaluation can support better, and more informed, 
committee appointments.

Improving existing federal guidance and agency procedures and 
incorporating the revised guidance into the FACA management course 
should enable federal agencies to better ensure that (1) potential 
conflicts of interest of committee members have been identified and 
appropriately mitigated upfront and (2) committees are appropriately 
balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. 
Along these lines, alternative procedures used to create and manage 
advisory committees at some federal agencies and the National Academies 
constitute promising practices that can better ensure independence and 
balance. Procedures such as obtaining nominations for committee members 
from the public, reviewing more pertinent information regarding 
members' points of view, and prescreening prospective members using a 
structured interview would help agencies establish more systematic and 
consistent methods of achieving independent and balanced committees. 
Consistent with FACA's principle of transparency, agencies could also 
adopt selected measures to make public more information regarding how 
they form and manage their committees. We believe it is in the best 
interest of both the public and the government to disclose more 
information about the formation and operation of the advisory 
committees--for example, how the members are identified and screened, 
and whether members are serving as representatives of an identified 
interest or as special government employees to provide independent 
advice. In light of recent concerns about biases and conflicts of 
interest, adopting more clearly defined procedures to screen and 
appoint committee members and to increase transparency in the advisory 
committee process would constitute important steps toward protecting 
the integrity of the federal advisory committee system and maintaining 
public confidence in the work of federal advisory committees.

Because this report identifies improvements to guidance and promising 
management practices that generally apply to all federal agencies that 
sponsor advisory committees and not just to the nine agencies addressed 
in this report, we are directing our recommendations to OGE and GSA in 
their roles as providers of governmentwide guidance on federal ethics 
and advisory committee management requirements. Our expectation is that 
all 54 federal agencies that currently sponsor federal advisory 
committees could benefit from the improved guidance and management 
practices.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To better ensure that federal agencies correctly and consistently 
comply with federal requirements when appointing federal advisory 
committee members, we recommend that the Director of the Office of 
Government Ethics revise its 1982 guidance to federal agencies defining 
representative appointments to federal advisory committees. The 
guidance should: 

* clarify that classes of expertise generally are not a "recognizable 
group of persons" for purposes of making representative appointments;

* consistently state that appointments as representatives are limited 
to circumstances in which the members are speaking as stakeholders for 
the entities or groups they represent; and: 

* clarify that the term "representative" in statutes and charters may 
also be used more generically to identify the appropriate balance of 
points of view or expertise and may not be specifying that 
representative appointments be used, and revise the directions on 
specifying representative appointments to focus on the type of advice 
representatives are to provide--that is, stakeholder advice.

To ensure that agencies' appointments to federal advisory committees 
are appropriate, we further recommend that the Director of the Office 
of Government Ethics and the GSA Committee Management Secretariat: 

* direct federal agencies to review their representative appointments 
to federal advisory committees either as the 2-year charters expire or, 
for those committees with indefinite charters, within 1 year to 
determine if the appointments are appropriate and to reappoint members 
as special government employees, where appropriate, and: 

* direct agency committee management officials to consult with agency 
ethics officials in making decisions about the type of appointments 
that should be made for each committee.

To better ensure that the agency staff managing federal advisory 
committees understand when to appoint committee members as 
representatives and when to appoint them as special government 
employees, we recommend that GSA and OGE revise the training materials 
for the FACA management course, incorporating the additional OGE 
guidance as recommended above, and ensure that the course materials 
highlight the fact that appointment decisions should be based on the 
type of advice the committee members are to provide.

To better ensure that federal advisory committee members providing 
stakeholder advice, and thus serving as representative members exempt 
from federal financial conflict-of-interest statutes, do not have other 
unknown points of view or biases, we recommend that OGE and GSA direct 
agencies to determine, for each relevant committee, the potential for 
such other biases and to take the appropriate steps to ensure their 
representative members do not have such biases. At a minimum, 
representatives should receive ethics training and be asked whether 
they know of any reason their participation on the committee might 
reasonably be questioned--for example, because of any personal benefits 
that could ensue from financial holdings, patents, or other interests.

To better ensure that agencies have robust information to establish 
committees that are balanced in terms of points of view and the 
functions to be performed, we recommend that GSA provide guidance to 
agencies regarding what background information might be relevant in 
assessing committee members' points of view. Relevant information for 
these purposes could include previous or ongoing research, public 
statements or positions on the matter being reviewed, the interest of 
the employer or clients in the matter, participation in legal 
proceedings, and work for affected entities. In addition, potential 
committee members should be asked if there is any reason they might be 
unable to provide impartial advice on the matter or matters before the 
committee, or if they know of any reason their impartiality on the 
matter or matters might be questioned.

To better ensure that the committee members, agency and congressional 
officials, and the public understand the nature of the advice provided 
by federal advisory committees, we recommend that GSA issue guidance 
that agencies should: 

* identify the committee formation process used for each committee, 
particularly how members are identified and screened and how committees 
are assessed for overall balance;

* state in the appointment letters to committee members whether they 
are appointed as special government employees or representatives; in 
cases where appointments are as representatives, the letters should 
further identify the entity or group that they are to represent;

* identify each member's appointment category on the GSA FACA database; 
for representative members, the entity or group represented should also 
be identified; and: 

* state in the committee products the nature of the advice provided--
that is, whether the product is based on independent advice or 
consensus among the various identified interests or stakeholders.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided copies of a draft of this report to the two agencies, GSA 
and OGE, to whom we address our recommendations to provide additional 
guidance to federal agencies, and to the agencies whose advisory 
committee management policies and procedures we reviewed: EPA; Energy; 
HHS (with copies to CDC, FDA, and NIH); Interior; NASA; and USDA.

In commenting on the draft report, GSA agreed with the findings 
relating to those areas under its purview. Further, GSA generally 
agreed with our recommendations to OGE and GSA and outlined a proactive 
approach to addressing those that pertain to GSA, including making 
changes to its on-line FACA database, and to working with OGE on those 
that pertain to OGE's responsibilities. GSA stated that it expects to 
complete all necessary actions directly under its purview and those to 
be achieved collaboratively with OGE and other agencies during fiscal 
year 2005. GSA's comments are provided in appendix XII.

In its comments, OGE acknowledged that some agencies may be 
inappropriately using representative appointments. Further, in 
responding to our finding that several agencies believe representatives 
may be appointed to represent their fields of expertise, OGE agrees 
with us that such appointments are inappropriate--but does not agree 
that any limitations in its guidance are a factor in the misuse of 
representative appointments. Instead, OGE believes some agencies may be 
purposely designating their committee members as representatives to 
avoid subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required 
for special government employees--that is, agencies understand the 
guidance and are simply disregarding it. Thus, OGE disagrees with us 
that its guidance should directly address this apparent 
misinterpretation of its guidance by clarifying, for example, that 
classes of expertise are not a "recognizable group of persons" for 
purposes of making representative appointments. OGE states that its 
1982 guidance accurately represents a decades old, executive branch 
interpretation of the definition of special government employees, and 
that our report does not provide adequate support for a recommendation 
that the guidance be modified. We disagree. Unless OGE clarifies the 
issues our report has identified, progress will likely continue to be 
slow or nonexistent--remembering that the 1982 guidance itself was 
developed to address uncertainties regarding the appropriate uses of 
representative and special government employee appointments. We believe 
that clearer guidance would make it more difficult for agencies to 
misapply the guidance. Further, unambiguous guidance would better 
assist agency staff managing committees and better support oversight by 
agency ethics officials, OGE, and others, such as inspectors general 
and GAO. In addition, OGE's response that clarifications are not needed 
does not acknowledge the views of other federal agencies, presented in 
the draft report, that OGE guidance is ambiguous in some respects. For 
example, EPA and NASA officials stated that having clear criteria for 
representative appointments would be helpful to agencies. In addition, 
we note that Interior states in its comments to us on the report that 
"GAO's generalization that representation of fields of expertise is not 
appropriate ignores the importance of such representation to some 
committees." On the basis of this statement, we do not believe Interior 
appreciates that expert advice can be appropriately obtained by the 
appointment of special government employees. In addition, NASA's and 
Energy's comments on the report also support the appointment of 
representatives to represent fields of expertise. We believe these 
statements illustrate the need for clarifications to OGE guidance on 
representative and special government employee appointments to federal 
advisory committees. Finally, in our view, if agencies are continuing 
to make inappropriate appointments decades after criteria and guidance 
were developed, it is not unreasonable to take another look at the 
guidance. OGE's comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in 
more detail in appendix XIII.

In commenting on the draft, officials from EPA and USDA agreed with the 
substance of the report, providing only technical comments that we 
incorporated into the draft as appropriate. USDA indicated that the 
report is a helpful and comprehensive review of issues that can be used 
as a resource for agencies that rely on the advice of federal advisory 
committees.

HHS provided consolidated written comments (including its component 
agencies CDC, FDA, and NIH). HHS said the report will be useful in 
evaluating current practices for appointing members to serve on federal 
advisory committees and also noted that the report provides a number of 
interesting ideas for determining balance in points of view and 
ensuring transparency in the committee process. HHS said that it finds 
the report's recommendations of great value and indicated that NIH has 
volunteered to work with GSA to assist them in implementing the 
recommendations. At the same time, HHS expressed its belief that 
members of scientific advisory committees should be selected because of 
their expertise, background, and personal experience, rather than 
through a "process seeking out some indefinable range of personal 
opinion"--characterizing points of view as both undefinable and open to 
misinterpretation. However, the draft and final reports do not espouse 
a "process seeking out some indefinable range of personal opinion" but 
rather identify processes that include an evaluation of potential 
members' points of view relevant to the subject matters advisory 
committees will consider while focusing on the relevant expertise 
needed. The examples of agency processes provided in the report include 
targeted evaluations of points of view by asking potential members a 
few questions, such as whether they have made public statements or 
taken public positions on the issue or matters the committee will 
consider. They also ask potential members to identify and describe any 
reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters before 
the committee and any reason their impartiality in the identified 
matter might be questioned. In our view, agencies that do not 
proactively and transparently address the relevant points of view of 
prospective committee members regarding the matters the committees will 
consider are more likely to be subject to questions about committee 
balance from the public and potential users of the committees' products 
than those agencies that use such processes. We continue to believe 
that the credibility of advisory committees, in particular those that 
address sensitive and controversial issues, depends in part upon 
agencies' ability to identify and balance points of view held by 
members and prospective members that are relevant to the work of the 
committee. HHS's comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in 
more detail in appendix XIV.

In written comments, Interior agreed with much in the report and 
indicated that it contains many useful recommendations that can be used 
to enhance the successful use of advisory committees. Interior 
identified one overarching concern with the draft report, however. That 
is, Interior said our report gave the incorrect impression that FACA 
requires individuals on committees to be free of conflicts of interest, 
noting that FACA requires that committees, rather than individuals, not 
be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or any 
special interest. The draft and final reports acknowledge this FACA 
requirement in the background section. However, the draft and final 
reports also explicitly state that our focus was on (1) the 
requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that are 
included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes and (2) the FACA 
requirement for committee balance. Further, in the introduction, we 
state that "federal advisory committee members who are employees of the 
federal government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom 
from conflicts of interest--which we refer to in this report as 
independence--and committees as a whole must meet the requirements 
pertaining to balance." We further highlight the key provisions of the 
federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied with unless 
granted a waiver in one section of the report and the FACA requirements 
for balance in another. Interior's comments and our evaluation of them 
are discussed in more detail in appendix XV.

In commenting on the draft report, NASA said that our conclusion that 
agencies could benefit from additional guidance to better ensure 
independence, balance, and transparency is sound. However, NASA 
supports the appointment of federal advisory committee members as 
representatives of their fields of expertise on the basis that some 
experts would not be able to serve as special government employees due 
to financial conflicts of interest. We believe this perspective 
provides additional support for our view that OGE needs to provide 
additional guidance on the appropriate use of representative 
appointments, including clarifying that fields of expertise generally 
are not a recognizable group of persons for purposes of making 
representative appointments. NASA's comments and our evaluation of them 
are discussed in more detail in appendix XVI.

In commenting on the draft report, Energy's Office of Science expressed 
its concern that we were recommending a "one-size-fits-all" approach 
that would diminish the effectiveness of the office's advisory 
committees. In addition, the office said that our interpretation of the 
term "representative" is unpersuasive and would be an unsound basis of 
guidance for the department. We do not believe that we are recommending 
a "one-size-fits-all" approach to advisory committee management. We 
recognize that there are many types of committees that serve different 
functions. Nevertheless, we believe that there are certain requirements 
in FACA and the conflict-of-interest statutes that must be met by all 
committees. With regard to the suggestions we made for selecting 
committee members, we note that they were described as "promising 
practices" that could be useful to agencies. They were not 
recommendations. As for the term "representative," we continue to 
believe that our interpretation of the OGE guidance is correct and that 
our interpretation is supported by OGE's comments on our draft report. 
In particular, we believe that it is inappropriate for agencies to 
appoint members as "representatives" of a field of expertise, as 
Energy's Office of Science indicates it will continue to do. Energy's 
comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in 
appendix XVII.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 
days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Interior; the 
Administrators of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the General 
Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. We 
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http: //www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-
3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix XVIII.

Signed by: 

Robin M. Nazzaro, 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report (1) describes the role of federal advisory committees in 
the development of national policies; (2) examines the extent to which 
governmentwide and agency-specific policies and procedures for 
evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of 
view ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees; and 
(3) identifies practices that could better ensure that committees are, 
and are perceived as being, independent and balanced.

To describe the role of federal advisory committees in the development 
of national policies, we reviewed committee charters, reports, and Web 
pages available through the General Services Administration's (GSA) on-
line Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) database. We discussed the 
FACA database with the GSA staff that developed and maintain the 
database. Our discussion included issues such as data entry access, 
quality control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the 
data. We determined that the data on the overall universe of advisory 
committees were reliable for the purposes of this report, including 
describing the variety of issues the committees address.

To examine the extent to which current policies and procedures for 
evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of 
view ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees, we 
reviewed the relevant policies and procedures at six federal 
departments and agencies that make extensive use of federal advisory 
committees--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and 
Human Services (HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). These agencies were among the 11 that used the most science and 
technical committees in 2003.[Footnote 52] Because HHS entities manage 
26 percent of all federal advisory committees and 36 percent of the 
scientific and technical committees, we also reviewed the policies and 
procedures at three HHS entities that sponsor many federal advisory 
committees--the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). We reviewed the policies and procedures used by these 
nine departments and agencies to manage federal advisory committees. 
These policies, in some cases, address appointments of committee 
members as special government employees or representatives and address 
how agencies identify, screen, and appoint members so as to ensure that 
they are free of conflicts of interest and that the committees are 
balanced. We interviewed committee management officials, designated 
federal officials, and agency staff on committee management issues.

Further, to better understand how the agencies implement their policies 
and procedures as well as the Office of Government Ethics's (OGE) and 
GSA's governmentwide regulations and guidance, we examined the 
management of one committee at each of the nine departments and 
agencies. We selected a nonprobability sample[Footnote 53] of nine 
committees that address scientific and technical issues using the 
following criteria: selected committees had to examine issues that are 
national in scope and scientifically complex, could have regulatory 
implications, and/or could be potentially controversial either because 
of the issues that they address or because the committee had been the 
subject of allegations regarding membership. For these nine committees, 
we reviewed the confidential financial disclosure forms of the 
committee members appointed as special government employees and 
discussed with staff how the committees used this information with 
respect to conflict-of-interest and/or balance determinations. To learn 
more about how agencies screen individuals for membership, we also 
examined other materials that agencies collected about them, such as 
their curricula vitae (CV) and résumés. The focus of our review was on 
the adequacy of federal policies and procedures to ensure independence 
and balance, and we did not make any judgments on whether conflicts of 
interest existed or whether the committees we examined were properly 
balanced. The way in which the agencies managed these particular 
committees cannot be generalized to represent the way in which the 
agencies manage all of their committees.

To determine if conflict-of-interest evaluations were performed as 
required by OGE guidance, we reviewed the relevant guidance and 
discussed with agency officials their use of representative and special 
government employee appointments. The purpose of the discussions was to 
determine whether the representative appointments were appropriately 
used because representative members are not required to undergo 
conflict-of-interest reviews. For the three departments that used 
representative appointments almost exclusively, we identified the 
committees the agencies categorize as addressing scientific and 
technical matters for which advice on behalf of the government on the 
basis of best judgment is often sought, rather than stakeholder advice. 
For the individual committees selected for review at each agency 
(described above), we examined the committee statutes and charters and 
interviewed agency officials to determine whether the representative 
members were asked to provide stakeholder or nonstakeholder advice.

To determine if agencies collect sufficient information to assess the 
points of view of its committee members appointed as special government 
employees, we assessed whether agencies systematically collected 
background information on committee members in addition to the OGE form 
450 used to evaluate for potential financial conflicts of interest and 
CVs or résumés. We identified other information that is helpful in 
assessing points of view and thus to ensuring that the committees 
achieve a proper balance of viewpoints.

Further, in examining the extent to which the regulations and guidance 
on evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and 
impartiality ensure independent and balanced federal advisory 
committees, we reviewed the OGE regulations and guidance to federal 
agencies regarding federal conflict-of-interest provisions and GSA 
regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding FACA. We 
interviewed OGE staff who are responsible for auditing agencies' ethics 
programs and who assist agencies in resolving conflict-of-interest 
issues. These staff members also address issues related to the 
appointment of special government employees and representative members 
to federal advisory committees. We interviewed the director and other 
officials from GSA's Committee Management Secretariat to learn about 
FACA requirements, GSA regulations, and other GSA guidance documents 
designed to assist agencies in managing their committees. We also 
discussed with GSA officials how agencies use the GSA FACA database to 
provide information to the public about committee membership and 
activities.

To identify practices that could better ensure that committees are, and 
are perceived as being, independent and balanced, we examined the 
relevant policies and procedures of the National Academies;[Footnote 
54] the nine committees and agencies examined in this review; and EPA's 
Science Advisory Board, which had implemented a number of relevant 
changes to its policies and procedures in response to our June 2001 
report.[Footnote 55]

We conducted our review from January 2003 through March 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Federal Advisory Committees, by Authorizing Mechanism and 
Type, in Fiscal Year 2003: 

This appendix provides information on the ways that advisory committees 
have been authorized, the functional categories of the committees as 
reported by agencies to GSA, and the number of federal advisory 
committee members.

Presidents, the Congress, and federal agencies can create federal 
advisory committees. As shown in table 3, most of the federal advisory 
committees operating in fiscal year 2003 were required or authorized by 
the Congress, some were created by the agencies, while the fewest 
committees were created by presidential directives.

Table 3: Authorizing Mechanism for Active Federal Advisory Committees 
in Fiscal Year 2003: 

Authorizing mechanism: Required or authorized by the Congress: 
Required by the Congress via statute; 
Number of committees: 421.

Authorizing mechanism: Required or authorized by the Congress: 
Specifically authorized by statute but created at the discretion of an 
agency; 
Number of committees: 213.

Subtotal; 
Number of committees: 634.

Authorizing mechanism: Created by an agency under general statutory 
authority; 
Number of committees: 271.

Authorizing mechanism: Presidential directive; 
Number of committees: 43.

Authorizing mechanism: Total; 
Number of committees: 948. 

Source: GSA FACA database.

[End of table]

Sponsoring agencies broadly classify their advisory committees 
according to the types of issues they address, using one of the 
following seven general categories defined in GSA's federal advisory 
committee database: scientific and technical program, nonscientific 
program, national policy issue, grant review, grant review-special 
emphasis panel,[Footnote 56]regulatory negotiation, and "other." 
According to GSA's fiscal year 2003 database (see table 4), 208 of the 
948 active committees were categorized as scientific and technical 
committees. However, in addition to these, committees in other 
categories also address scientific and technical issues, particularly 
the grant review committees. There were 131 grant review committees 
with over 41,000 members in 2003. Further, some committees placed in 
the national policy, regulatory negotiation, and "other" categories 
also address scientific and technical issues.

Table 4: Active Federal Advisory Committees, by Type, in Fiscal Year 
2003: 

Type of committee: Grant review; 
Number of committees: 102; 
Number of members: 22,517.

Type of committee: Grant review - special emphasis panel[A]; 
Number of committees: 29; 
Number of members: 19,226.

Type of committee: National policy issue advisory board; 
Number of committees: 152; 
Number of members: 3,834.

Type of committee: Nonscientific program advisory board; 
Number of committees: 298; 
Number of members: 5,470.

Type of committee: Other; 
Number of committees: 152; 
Number of members: 3,323.

Type of committee: Regulatory negotiation; 
Number of committees: 7; 
Number of members: 217.

Type of committee: Scientific and technical program advisory board; 
Number of committees: 208; 
Number of members: 7,910.

Type of committee: Total; 
Number of committees: 948; 
Number of members: 62,497. 

Source: GSA FACA database.

[A] NIH defines a special emphasis panel as a committee that functions 
both as an initial review group performing the scientific and technical 
peer review of applications and cooperative agreement applications and 
as reviewers of contract proposals and concept reviews. The membership 
is fluid, and individuals are designated to serve for only the meeting 
they are requested to attend.

[End of table]

The committees in fiscal year 2003 had more than 62,000 members, the 
majority of whom were members of grant review and special emphasis 
panels.[Footnote 57] Overall, federal advisory committees range in size 
from under 10 members to over 9,000, with an average of about 48 
members.[Footnote 58] The committees classified as scientific and 
technical had 7,910 members and an average committee membership size of 
about 22 members.[Footnote 59] Federal advisory committee members come 
from a wide range of professional backgrounds and include scientists, 
medical doctors and other health care professionals, academics, 
lawyers, engineers, corporate executives, state and local government 
officials, members of nongovernmental organizations, community 
activists, and representatives from the public at large, among others. 
Some members are federal employees, often from agencies other than the 
sponsoring agency.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Information on the Department of Agriculture's National 
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods: 

This appendix contains information about the National Advisory 
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods. Although this 
committee is cosponsored by USDA, HHS, and the Departments of Defense 
and Commerce, USDA is responsible for the overall management of the 
committee. Within USDA, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) 
manages this committee, and the Secretary of Agriculture appoints the 
members.

Purpose of the committee: According to its charter, the purpose of the 
committee is to provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food 
safety agencies for use in the development of an integrated national 
food safety systems approach from farm to final consumption to ensure 
the safety of domestic, imported, and exported foods.

Number of members: 29 (see table 5).

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: The members are appointed as 
representatives and are not required to file OGE financial disclosure 
forms for USDA review for potential conflicts of interest. USDA does, 
however, require all committee members to submit a USDA form AD-755, 
which is to provide information about members' current employment and 
sources of income greater than $10,000 in the last calendar year, other 
than their primary employment.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to FSIS 
officials, the agency solicits nominations through notices in the 
Federal Register, FSIS Constituent Updates (an electronic newsletter 
sent to over 300 organizations and individuals), the FSIS Web site, and 
press releases. Officials said these notices serve to reach interested 
parties and stakeholders--that is, persons from state and federal 
governments, industry, consumer groups, and academia.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to FSIS officials, 
the most important factor used to balance the committee is the 
expertise identified in the charter: microbiology, risk assessment, 
epidemiology, public health, food science, and other relevant 
disciplines. Membership is also balanced in terms of points of view by 
the approximately equal proportions of members appointed from 
government, industry, and academia. Committee staff also tries to 
balance committee membership in terms of demographic indicators, such 
as ethnicity and gender, as well as in terms of geographical 
distribution.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 5: Roster of the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as 
of December 2003: 

Academic institutions:

Committee member: Dr. Larry Beuchat; 
Primary employer: University of Georgia, Center for Food Safety and 
Quality Enhancement; 
Areas of expertise: Food science.

Committee member: Dr. Catherine Donnelly; 
Primary employer: University of Vermont, Department of Nutrition and 
Food Science; 
Areas of expertise: Food microbiology and Listeria.

Committee member: Dr. Stephanie Doores; 
Primary employer: Pennsylvania State University, Department of Food 
Science; 
Areas of expertise: Food science, especially dairy science.

Committee member: Dr. Lee-Ann Jaykus; 
Primary employer: North Carolina State University; 
Areas of expertise: Microbiology and microbial risk assessment.

Committee member: Dr. Carol Maddox; 
Primary employer: University of Illinois, College of Veterinary 
Medicine; 
Areas of expertise: Veterinary microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. Eli Perencevich; 
Primary employer: University of Maryland School of Medicine; 
Areas of expertise: Public Health.

Committee member: Dr. John Sofos; 
Primary employer: Colorado State University, Department of Animal 
Science; 
Areas of expertise: Microbiology and E. coli.

Companies or industry-affiliated organizations: 

Committee member: Dr. Gary Ades; 
Primary employer: Most recently employed by Foster Farms; 
Areas of expertise: Food safety and quality assurance.

Committee member: Mr. Dane Bernard; 
Primary employer: Keystone Foods LLC; 
Areas of expertise: Food production, food processing, CODEX,[A] and 
HACCPb.

Committee member: Dr. Peggy Cook; 
Primary employer: Tyson Foods, Inc.; 
Areas of expertise: Food microbiology, food chemistry, serology, 
microbial genetics, and management.

Committee member: Dr. Mahipal Kunduru; 
Primary employer: Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc.; 
Areas of expertise: Food safety and microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. Roberta Morales; 
Primary employer: Research Triangle Institute; 
Areas of expertise: Microbiology, veterinary medicine, and risk 
assessment.

Committee member: Ms. Virginia Scott; 
Primary employer: National Food Processors Association; 
Areas of expertise: Foodborne disease bacteria, microbiology, extended 
shelf life of refrigerated foods, and food safety.

Committee member: Dr. Robert Seward; 
Primary employer: American Meat Institute; 
Areas of expertise: Food microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. Katherine Swanson; 
Primary employer: Most recently employed by General Mills, Inc.; 
Areas of expertise: Food production and food microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. David Theno; 
Primary employer: Jack in the Box, Inc.; 
Areas of expertise: HACCP[B] and animal science.

Committee member: Dr. R. Bruce Tompkin; 
Primary employer: ConAgra Refrigerated Foods (retired); 
Areas of expertise: Microbiology and food safety.

Federal, state, and foreign government agencies: 

Committee member: Dr. David Acheson; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food 
and Drug Administration; 
Areas of expertise: E. coli, public health, and medicine.

Committee member: Dr. Frances Downes; 
Primary employer: Michigan Department of Community Health; 
Areas of expertise: Public health and laboratory food testing.

Committee member: Dr. Daniel Engeljohn; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and 
Inspection Service; 
Areas of expertise: Animal science, meat science, and HACCP[B].

Committee member: Dr. Jeff Farrar; 
Primary employer: California Department of Health Services; 
Areas of expertise: Public health, epidemiology, and veterinary 
medicine.

Committee member: Mr. Spencer Garrett; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Commerce National Marine Fisheries 
Service; 
Areas of expertise: Food hygiene, HACCP,[B] and seafood public health.

Committee member: Dr. Patricia Griffin; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention; 
Areas of expertise: Epidemiology.

Committee member: Dr. Robin King; 
Primary employer: U.S. Army Veterinary Corps; 
Areas of expertise: Veterinary science and food microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. John Kvenberg; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food 
and Drug Administration; 
Areas of expertise: HACCP,[B] risk management, and Listeria control.

Committee member: Dr. Anna Lammerding; 
Primary employer: Health Canada; 
Areas of expertise: Risk assessment.

Committee member: Dr. John Luchansky; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research 
Service; 
Areas of expertise: Food microbiology and toxicology.

Committee member: Ms. Angela Ruple; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Commerce National Seafood 
Inspection Laboratory; 
Areas of expertise: Food science and microbiology.

Committee member: Dr. Donald Zink; 
Primary employer: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food 
and Drug Administration; 
Areas of expertise: Food microbiology, food science, food safety, 
infectious diseases, and epidemiology. 

Source: USDA.

[A] CODEX: Codex Alimentarius Commission. The Codex Alimentarius 
Commission was created in 1963 by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) of the United Nations to 
develop food standards, guidelines, and related texts, such as codes of 
practice under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program. The main 
purposes of this program are protecting the health of consumers and 
ensuring fair trade practices in the food trade and promoting 
coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

[B] HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point. HACCP is a 
systematic program for preventing hazards that could cause foodborne 
illnesses by applying science-based controls from raw material to 
finished products. The program was first developed for the space 
program and currently is being adopted by FDA and USDA.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Information on the Department of Energy's Biological and 
Environmental Research Advisory Committee: 

This appendix contains information about the Biological and 
Environmental Research Advisory Committee, which is managed by Energy 
staff in the Office of Biological and Environmental Research. The 
members are appointed by the Secretary of Energy.

Purpose of the committee: The advisory committee reviews and makes 
recommendations on Energy's biological and environmental research 
program, addressing issues such as genomics, the health effects of low-
dose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental 
remediation, and climate change research. In addition to reviewing 
scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range plans 
and priorities and the appropriate levels of funding.

Number of members: 23 (see table 6).

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: Because the members are appointed as 
representatives, they are not required to file OGE financial disclosure 
forms for Energy review for potential conflicts of interest.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to the 
committee's designated federal official, the department received 
nominations from agency staff in the Office of Science.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the committee's 
designated federal official, the primary criterion used to balance the 
committee is expertise. He also considers gender, ethnicity, and 
geography and tries to achieve a balance of representatives from 
industry, academia, and the national laboratories.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 6: Roster of the Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 
Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 30, 2003: 

Colleges, universities, and medical centers: 

Committee member: Keith Hodgson, Ph.D (chair); 
Primary employer: Stanford University; 
Area of expertise: Structural biology.

Committee member: James Adelstein, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Harvard Medical School; 
Area of expertise: Education, health risk, and medicine.

Committee member: Michelle Broido, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Pittsburgh; 
Area of expertise: Atmospheric science, ecology, education, 
environmental remediation, global change, and structural biology.

Committee member: David Burgess, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Boston College; 
Area of expertise: Developmental and molecular biology and education.

Committee member: Carlos Bustamante, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of California at Berkeley; 
Area of expertise: Bioengineering and molecular and structural biology.

Committee member: Charles DeLisi, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Boston University; 
Area of expertise: Bioengineering, biomedical science, biotechnology, 
computational and molecular biology, education, genomics, mathematics, 
and informatics.

Committee member: Raymond Gesteland, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Utah; 
Area of expertise: Biotechnology, education, genomics, and molecular 
biology.

Committee member: Willard Harrison, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Florida; 
Area of expertise: Analytical chemistry.

Committee member: Steven Larson, M.D.; 
Primary employer: Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center; 
Area of expertise: Biomedical science, education, and medicine.

Committee member: Jill Merisov, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for 
Genome Research; 
Area of expertise: Computational biology, computer modeling, genomics, 
mathematics, and informatics.

Committee member: Louis Pitelka, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Maryland Center for Environmental 
Science; 
Area of expertise: Ecology and global change.

Committee member: Janet Smith, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Purdue University; 
Area of expertise: Computational and structural biology.

Committee member: James Tiedje, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Michigan State University; 
Area of expertise: Environmental remediation, biotechnology, 
microbiology, and molecular biology.

Committee member: Barbara Wold, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: California Institute of Technology; 
Area of expertise: Biotechnology, developmental and molecular biology, 
and genomics.

Companies: 

Committee member: Jonathan Greer, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Abbot Laboratories; 
Area of expertise: Biotechnology and computational and structural 
biology.

Committee member: James Mitchell, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Lucent Technologies; 
Area of expertise: Analytical chemistry.

Committee member: Nonprofit research institution.

Committee member: Leroy Hood, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Institute for Systems Biology; 
Area of expertise: Bioengineering, biomedical sciences, biotechnology, 
developmental and molecular biology, and genomics.

Professional associations: 

Committee member: Eugene Bierly, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: American Geophysical Union; 
Area of expertise: Atmospheric science and global change.

Committee member: Richard Hallgren, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: American Meteorological Society; 
Area of expertise: Computer modeling and global change.

Committee member: Roger McClellan, D.V.M.; 
Primary employer: Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology; 
Area of expertise: Health risk and toxicology.

DOE national laboratory: 

Committee member: Lisa Stubbs, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; 
Area of expertise: Biotechnology, genomics, and molecular biology.

Federally funded research organization: 

Committee member: Warren Washington, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: National Center for Atmospheric Research; 
Area of expertise: Computer modeling and global change.

Other: 

Committee member: Robert Fri; 
Primary employer: Resources for the Future; 
National Academy of Sciences; 
Area of expertise: Education and global change. 

Source: Department of Energy.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Information on the Environmental Protection Agency's 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory 
Panel: 

This appendix contains information about the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel. The 
committee is managed by EPA staff, and the members are appointed by the 
Deputy Administrator of EPA.

Purpose of the committee: The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel provides 
advice, information, and recommendations on pesticides and pesticide-
related issues regarding the impact of regulatory actions on health and 
the environment of regulatory actions. The objectives include providing 
advice and recommendations on (1) scientific studies and issues in the 
form of a peer review, (2) methods to ensure that pesticides do not 
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," and (3) 
guidelines to improve the effectiveness and quality of scientific 
testing and of data submitted to EPA.

Number of members: There are 7 permanent members on the standing 
committee (see table 7). These members are appointed for 4-year terms 
and serve on a number of individual peer review panels. The FIFRA 
Scientific Advisory Panel establishes between 5 and 7 peer review 
panels each year to address a variety of specific topics.[Footnote 60] 
These committees are comprised of permanent members and ad hoc expert 
consultants. Meeting panels typically consist of approximately 15 
members.

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 
committee members are required to file financial disclosure forms. As 
discussed in this report, the EPA form 3110-48, an OGE-approved 
alternative disclosure form, is used. In addition, as also is discussed 
in this report, FIFRA staff interview potential candidates using a 
structured interview format to assess the interest, availability, and 
appropriateness of candidates to serve on individual committees. The 
structured interview includes a discussion of financial conflicts of 
interest (statutory conflicts and appearance problems), impartiality, 
and a review of the information that is requested on the form 3110-48.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: No waivers have been granted to current 
members.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1977 requires the EPA 
Deputy Administrator to select the 7 members of the standing Scientific 
Advisory Panel from nominees provided by NIH and the National Science 
Foundation. The committee's management also routinely solicits 
nominations for ad hoc expert consultants on the agency's Web site and 
through notices in the Federal Register.

Criteria used to balance the committee: Technical expertise is the 
primary criterion used to balance the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel 
committees. The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel defines balanced 
membership as including the necessary areas of technical expertise, 
different scientific perspectives within each technical discipline, and 
the collective breadth of experience needed to address the agency's 
charge.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: As required by 
statute, the advisory committee's management posts the names, 
professional affiliations, and selected biographical data of nominees 
proposed for appointment as permanent members in the Federal Register 
and on its Web site for public comment, providing instructions on how 
to submit comments regarding the nominees. Unlike the standing 
committee, nominees considered for temporary service at particular 
meetings are not subject to public comment prior to their appointment.

Table 7: Roster of the Standing FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel with 
the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of December 2003: 

Universities and medical centers: 

Committee member: Stuart Handwerger M.D.; 
Primary employer: Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center; 
Areas of expertise: Endocrinology, toxicology, and veterinary medicine.

Committee member: Steven G. Heeringa, Ph.D.[A]; 
Primary employer: University of Michigan, Institute for Social 
Research; 
Areas of expertise: Biostatistics.

Committee member: Gary E. Isom, Ph.D.[A]; 
Primary employer: Purdue University, School of Pharmacy and Pharmacal 
Sciences; 
Areas of expertise: Neurotoxicology and clinical pediatric research.

Committee member: Fumio Matsumura, Ph.D.[A]; 
Primary employer: University of California at Davis, Institute of 
Toxicology and Environmental Health; 
Areas of expertise: Biochemical toxicology.

Committee member: Mary Anna Thrall, D.V.M.[A]; 
Primary employer: Colorado State University, Department of 
Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology; 
Areas of expertise: Veterinary pathology and veterinary clinical 
pathology.

Committee member: Stephen Roberts, Ph.D.[A]; 
Primary employer: University of Florida, Center for Environmental & 
Human Toxicology; 
Areas of expertise: Human toxicology.

Federal agency: 

Committee member: Christopher Portier, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: National Institutes of Health, National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences; 
Areas of expertise: Human health risk assessment.

Source: EPA.

[A] Members participated in the June 17 to 20, 2003, meeting on 
atrazine.

[End of table]

Table 8: Roster of the Temporary (Ad Hoc) Members Serving on the 
June 17 to 20, 2003, Meeting on Atrazine: 

Universities: 

Committee member: Joel Coats, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Iowa State University, Department of Entomology; 
Area of expertise: Environmental toxicology (fate and effects of 
pesticides in environment).

Committee member: Robert J. Denver, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: The University of Michigan, Department of Ecology and 
Evolutionary Biology; 
Area of expertise: Amphibian development.

Committee member: James Gibbs, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: State University of New York - Syracuse; 
Area of expertise: Amphibian biological monitoring, conservation 
biology, and herpetology.

Committee member: Sherril L. Green, D.V.M, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Stanford University School of Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Xenopus husbandry[A].

Committee member: Darcy B. Kelley, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Columbia University; 
Area of expertise: Developmental biology.

Committee member: Gerald A. LeBlanc, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: North Carolina State University; 
Area of expertise: Aquatic toxicology.

Committee member: Carl Richards, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Minnesota Duluth, Minnesota Sea Grant 
College Program; 
Area of expertise: Aquatic biology.

Committee member: David Skelly, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Yale University, School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies; 
Area of expertise: Field amphibian ecology.

Foreign organizations: 

Committee member: Peter Delorme, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Health Canada (Canadian Federal Government); 
Area of expertise: Environmental toxicology (aquatic) and environmental 
risk assessment.

Committee member: Werner Kloas, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Department of Inland Fisheries, Leibniz-Institute of 
Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Berlin, Germany; 
Area of expertise: Xenopus[A] development and anuran (frog/toad) 
endocrinology. 

Source: EPA.

[A] Xenopus laevis is a species of frog that, along with the mouse, 
rat, fruit fly, and other species of animals and plants, serves as a 
model organism for biomedical research.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Information on the Department of Health and Human 
Services's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections: 

This appendix contains information about the Secretary's Advisory 
Committee on Human Research Protections. The committee replaced the 
National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, established in 
2000, whose charter HHS did not renew when it expired in 2002.[Footnote 
61] HHS officials chose to revise the charter of the initial committee 
primarily by adding populations potentially affected by human research 
protections, appointing new members to provide advice to the Secretary. 
The committee is sponsored and generally managed by the Office of 
Public Health Service, but the members are appointed by the HHS 
Secretary.[Footnote 62] The nominating and selection processes in 2002 
and 2003 were managed by the HHS Office of White House Liaison.

Purpose of the committee: According to its charter, the committee is to 
advise the HHS Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Health on 
matters pertaining to the continuance and improvement of functions 
within the authority of HHS directed toward protections for human 
subjects in research. Specifically, the committee is to provide advice 
relating to the responsible conduct of research involving human 
subjects with particular emphasis on: 

* special populations, such as neonates and children, prisoners, and 
the decisionally impaired;

* pregnant women, embryos, and fetuses;

* individuals and populations in international studies;

* populations in which there are individually identifiable samples, 
data, or information; and: 

* investigator conflicts of interest.

In addition, the committee is responsible for reviewing selected 
ongoing work and planned activities of the Office of Human Research 
Protections and other offices/agencies within HHS that are responsible 
for human subjects protection. These evaluations may include but are 
not limited to a review of assurance systems, the application of 
minimal research risk standards, the granting of waivers, education 
programs sponsored by the Office of Human Research Protections, and the 
ongoing monitoring and oversight of institutional review boards and the 
institutions that sponsor research.

Number of members: 11 (see table 9).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 
committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms 
for HHS's review for potential conflicts of interest. These forms were 
reviewed by the cognizant committee management officer who consulted 
with the designated federal official and the Office of General Counsel 
ethics division. In June 2003, after the members had been appointed to 
the committee, the committee management officer identified some 
potential conflicts of interest stemming from investments that she and 
the Office of General Counsel believed required mitigation, such as 
waivers. She also requested that the designated federal official 
determine whether other potential conflicts required waivers if the 
appointed members work for institutions involved in research 
activities/studies/projects that may impact human research 
protections.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Waivers were not issued before the 
committee's first meeting in July 2003. The nine waivers granted were 
finalized on January 16, 2004.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: HHS policies and procedures do not 
address the disclosure of waivers to the public. HHS does not 
proactively disclose the issuance of waivers to the public at committee 
meetings.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to the 
Director of the Office of White House Liaison, she asked a couple of 
individuals at the Association of American Medical Colleges for 
nominations for this committee. The Director said that an Office of 
Public Health Service staff member familiar with the previous committee 
also assisted in identifying nominees from the previous slate to serve 
on the new committee. In addition, she said that HHS received self-
nominations and also used names from NIH's database, particularly the 
group that was solicited for the Secretary's Advisory Committee on 
Genetics, Health, and Society.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the agency 
official responsible for nominating members for the committee, the 
factors she considered in balancing the committee were expertise along 
with geographic, gender, and racial diversity. After HHS announced the 
committee membership in January 2003, the National Organization for 
Rare Disorders and some members of the predecessor advisory committee 
expressed concern that the regulated research industry was 
overrepresented and that there were no consumer or patient advocates on 
the committee. A week later, HHS added a member with a background in 
patient advocacy.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 9: Roster of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Medical and academic institutions: 

Committee member: Dr. Celia B. Fisher; 
Primary employer: Fordham University; 
Area of expertise: Bioethics.

Committee member: Dr. Nigel Harris; 
Primary employer: Morehouse School of Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Rheumatology and antiphospholipid research.

Committee member: Dr. Robert G. Hauser; 
Primary employer: Abbott Northwest Hospital; 
Area of expertise: Cardiology.

Committee member: Dr. Nancy L. Jones; 
Primary employer: Wake Forest University School of Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Biochemistry and pathology.

Committee member: Ms. Susan Kornetsky; 
Primary employer: Children's Hospital, Boston, MA; 
Area of expertise: Clinical research compliance and public health.

Committee member: Dr. Mary Lake Polan; 
Primary employer: Stanford University School of Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Reproductive endocrinology and infertility.

Committee member: Dr. Ernest D. Prentice; 
Primary employer: University of Nebraska Medical Center; 
Area of expertise: Cell biology, anatomy, and regulatory Compliance.

Company, law firm, and professional organization: 

Committee member: Mr. Thomas Adams; 
Primary employer: Association of Clinical Research Professionals; 
Area of expertise: Medical trade association management.

Committee member: Mr. Mark Barnes; 
Primary employer: Ropes & Gray Law Firm; 
Area of expertise: Health care law and Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 regulation and compliance.

Committee member: Dr. Felix A Khin-Maung-Gyi; 
Primary employer: Chesapeake Research Review, Inc.; 
Area of expertise: Human subject protection, bioethics, and pharmacy.

Committee member: Patient advocacy organization.

Committee member: Dr. Susan L. Weiner; 
Primary employer: The Children's Cause, Inc.; 
Area of expertise: Developmental psychology. 

Source: HHS.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Information on the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention's Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention: 

This appendix contains information about the Advisory Committee on 
Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention. The committee is sponsored and 
generally managed by CDC, but the members are appointed by the HHS 
Secretary.[Footnote 63] The nominating and selection processes in 2002 
and 2003 were managed by the HHS Office of White House Liaison.

Purpose of the committee: The Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 
Poisoning Prevention provides advice and guidance to the Secretary; the 
Assistant Secretary for Health; and the CDC Director, regarding new 
scientific knowledge and technological developments and their practical 
implications for childhood lead poisoning prevention efforts. The 
committee also reviews and reports on childhood lead poisoning 
prevention practices and recommends improvements in national childhood 
lead poisoning prevention efforts.

Number of members: 12 (see table 10).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 
committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms 
for HHS and CDC review for potential conflicts of interest. CDC's 
designated federal official, a conflict-of-interest specialist in the 
CDC's Committee Management Office, and the director of CDC's Management 
Analysis and Services Office reviewed the completed forms for the 
current members of the committee.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: None granted to current members.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to the 
Director of the Office of White House Liaison and the designated 
federal official for the committee, nominations were generally 
solicited informally, such as during conversations. According to the 
Director, HHS received nominations from the Dean of the St. Francis 
Hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma; the Chancellor of Columbia University; 
Senator Thad Cochran; and the Deputy Secretary's office. They also used 
the Internet to search for candidates associated with successful lead 
poison reduction programs in large cities.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the Office of 
White House Liaison, the department and agency worked to find potential 
appointees and balance the committee on the basis of expertise as well 
as gender, ethnicity, and geography to the extent these additional 
factors did not impinge on the department's ability to pick qualified 
members.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 10: Roster of the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Medical institutions: 
 
Committee member: William Banner, M.D.; 
Primary employer: The Children's Hospital at St. Francis in Tulsa OK; 
Area of expertise: Toxicology, critical care medicine, and pediatrics.

Committee member: Helen Binns, M.D., M.P.H.; 
Primary employer: Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University; 
Area of expertise: Pediatric lead poisoning detection and public health.

Committee member: Carla Campbell, M.D., M.S.; 
Primary employer: Children's Hospital of Philadelphia; 
Area of expertise: Lead poisoning and toxicology.

Committee member: Ing Kang Ho, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Mississippi Medical Center, School of 
Graduate Studies in the Health Sciences; 
Area of expertise: Pharmacology and toxicology.

Committee member: Sergio Piomelli, M.D.; 
Primary employer: Columbia University College of Physicians and 
Surgeons; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics.

State and local health agencies: 

Committee member: Walter S. Handy, Jr., Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Cincinnati Health Department; 
Area of expertise: Clinical psychology and public health policy.

Committee member: Jessica Leighton, Ph.D., M.P.H.; 
Primary employer: New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene; 
Area of expertise: Public policy and childhood lead poisoning.

Committee member: Tracey Lynn, D.V.M., M.S.; 
Primary employer: Alaska Department of Health Services; 
Area of expertise: Environmental public health.

Committee member: Kevin U. Stephens, Sr., M.D., J.D.; 
Primary employer: Department of Health, City of New Orleans, LA; 
Area of expertise: Obstetrics and gynecology, public health, medicine, 
and law.

Private medical practice: 

Committee member: Catherine M. Slota-Varma, M.D.; 
Primary employer: Pediatrician in private practice; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics.

Private nonprofit organization: 

Committee member: Richard Hoffman, M.D.; 
Primary employer: Director, Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains; 
Area of expertise: Public health.

University: 

Committee member: Kimberly Thompson, Sc.D.; 
Primary employer: Harvard University School of Public Health; 
Area of expertise: Risk analysis and health policy. 

Source: HHS.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: Information on the Food and Drug Administration's Food 
Advisory Committee: 

This appendix provides information about the Food Advisory Committee. 
The committee is managed by FDA. The members are appointed by FDA's 
Associate Commissioner for External Relations.

Purpose of the committee: The committee is to provide advice to the 
Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, and to the 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs and other appropriate officials as 
needed, on emerging food safety, food science, nutrition, and other 
food-related health issues that FDA considers of primary importance for 
its food and cosmetics programs. The committee may be charged with 
reviewing and evaluating available data and making recommendations on 
matters such as those relating to the following: broad scientific and 
technical food-or cosmetic-related issues, the safety of new foods and 
food ingredients, the labeling of foods and cosmetics, nutrient needs 
and nutritional adequacy, and safe exposure limits for food 
contaminants. The committee may also be asked to provide advice and 
make recommendations on ways of communicating to the public the 
potential risks associated with these issues and on approaches that 
might be considered for addressing the issues.

Number of members: 25 (see table 11).

Type of appointment: With the exception of nonvoting industry 
representatives, all committee members are special government 
employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 
committee members are required to file the OGE confidential financial 
disclosure form 450. Members are required to update this form annually. 
In addition, for meetings that involve particular matters of general or 
specific applicability, members also complete an FDA form 3410, which 
requires them to report interests directly related to the topic of 
discussion. The designated federal official does an initial screening 
and officials from FDA's Ethics and Integrity Branch clear the members 
for conflicts of interest.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: During the last year, waivers were 
granted seven times for members to participate in specific meetings. 
FDA granted the waivers on the basis that the need for these 
individuals' expertise outweighed the potential conflicts of interest.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: The type of waiver and the names 
of members who have received waivers for particular meetings are read 
into the record by the designated federal officer at the beginning of 
the public meeting. Public disclosure of the substance of waivers 
issued is only required in cases where the meetings deal with 
particular matters of specific applicability. When such waivers are 
issued, the members who receive them are asked to sign a consent 
document authorizing FDA to provide a description of the nature and the 
magnitude of the financial interests being waived for the public 
record.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: FDA solicits 
nominations through notices in the Federal Register. According to the 
committee's designated federal official and an agency document 
identifying the sources of the nominations, the agency obtained 
nominations from (1) FDA and HHS officials; (2) interest groups and 
trade associations and other interested parties, including the American 
Society for Nutritional Services, the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, the Association of Food and Drug Officials, and officials at 
the Center for Health Policy at the University of Oklahoma and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and (3) individuals who 
nominated themselves in response to the Federal Register notice.

Criteria used to balance the committee: Committee managers reported the 
following five criteria used to achieve balance: (1) scientific 
expertise representing a range of scientific interpretation; (2) 
demographic characteristics, including geographic distribution, 
gender, and ethnicity; (3) differing levels of experience on advisory 
committees; (4) stakeholder representation (e.g., consumers, industry, 
and academicians); and (5) membership on advisory committees that is 
used to help ensure that the agency has balance by not repeatedly 
appointing a limited set of people either for a particular committee or 
for various committees the agency has on related topics. Temporary 
voting members may be added to enhance balance.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 11: Roster of the Food Advisory Committee with the Primary 
Employers and Areas of Expertise as of June 3, 2003: 

Universities and medical centers: 

Committee member: Alex D.W. Acholonu, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Alcorn State University; 
Area of expertise: Microbiology and parisitology.

Committee member: Douglas L. Archer, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Florida, Department of Food Science & 
Human Nutrition; 
Area of expertise: Microbiology, food science, and food law.

Committee member: Jonathan A. Arias, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Maryland, Center for Biosystems; 
Area of expertise: Molecular biology.

Committee member: Fred McDaniel Atkins, M.D.; 
Primary employer: National Jewish Medical; 
and Research Center; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics and allergies.

Committee member: Jeffrey Blumberg, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Tufts University; 
Area of expertise: Pharmacology and biostatistics.

Committee member: Bob B. Buchanan, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of California, Berkeley, Department of 
Plant and Microbial Biology; 
Area of expertise: Molecular plant biology.

Committee member: Francis Fredrick Busta, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Minnesota, Department of Food Science 
and Nutrition; 
Area of expertise: Food science and microbiology.

Committee member: Nancy M. Childs, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Saint Joseph's University; 
Area of expertise: Food marketing.

Committee member: Johanna Dwyer, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Tufts University; 
Schools of Medicine and Nutrition; 
Area of expertise: Public health and nutrition.

Committee member: Lawrence J. Fischer, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Michigan State University, Institute for 
Environmental Toxicology; 
Area of expertise: Toxicology.

Committee member: George M. Gray, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Harvard University, School of Public Health; 
Area of expertise: Risk analysis and toxicology.

Committee member: Rachel K. Johnson, Ph.D., M.P.H., R.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Vermont, Department of Nutrition and 
Food Sciences; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics and nutrition.

Committee member: Anne R. Kapuscinski, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Minnesota, Department of Fisheries and 
Wildlife; 
Area of expertise: Conservation biology.

Committee member: Ken Lee, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Ohio State University, Department of Food Science; 
Area of expertise: Food science and processing.

Committee member: Harihara Mehendale, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Louisiana at Monroe, College of 
Pharmacy; 
Area of expertise: Toxicology.

Committee member: Sanford A. Miller, Ph.D. (Chair); 
Primary employer: Virginia Polytechnic and State University; 
Area of expertise: Chemistry, toxicology, and food science.

Committee member: Abigail A. Salyers, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign; 
Area of expertise: Microbiology and gene transfer.

Committee member: Michael W. Shannon, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Children's Hospital, Boston, MA; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics and toxicology.

Committee member: J. Antonio Torres, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: Oregon State University; 
Area of expertise: Food science and processing.

Committee member: Steven Zeisel, MD, Ph.D.; 
Primary employer: University of North Carolina, School of Health & 
Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Pediatrics.

Nonprofit associations: 

Committee member: Annette Dickinson, Ph.D. (industry representative); 
Primary employer: Council for Responsible Nutrition; 
Area of expertise: Dietary supplements.

Committee member: Goulda Angella Downer, Ph.D. (consumer 
representative); 
Primary employer: Metroplex Health and Nutrition Services; 
Area of expertise: Nutrition and epidemiology.

Committee member: Douglas Gurian-Sherman, Ph.D. (consumer 
representative); 
Primary employer: Center for Science in the Public Interest; 
Area of expertise: Genetic engineering.

State agency: 

Committee member: Marion H. Fuller, D.V.M.; 
Primary employer: Florida Department of Agriculture, Division of Food 
Safety; 
Area of expertise: Veterinary medicine federal-state relations.

Industry association: 

Committee member: Brandon Scholz; 
Primary employer: Wisconsin Grocers Association; 
Area of expertise: Industry representative. 

Source: USDA.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IX: Information on the National Institutes of Health's 
Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods: 

This appendix contains information about the Scientific Advisory 
Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods, which is sponsored and 
managed by NIH. Members are appointed by the Director of the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.

Purpose of the committee: The committee provides advice to the Director 
of the National Institute of Environmental Heath Sciences (NIEHS); the 
Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative 
Methods (ICCVAM); and the National Toxicology Program Center regarding 
statutorily mandated functions, including: 

* reviewing and evaluating new; revised; or alternative test methods, 
including batteries of tests and test screens that may be acceptable 
for specific regulatory uses;

* facilitating appropriate interagency and international harmonization 
of acute or chronic toxicological test protocols that encourage the 
reduction, refinement, or replacement of animal test methods;

* facilitating and providing guidance on the development of validation 
criteria; validation studies; and processes for new, revised, or 
alternative test methods and helping to facilitate the acceptance of 
such scientifically valid test methods and awareness of accepted test 
methods by federal agencies and other stakeholders; and: 

* submitting ICCVAM test recommendations for the test methods reviewed 
by ICCVAM, through expeditious transmittal by the HHS Secretary (or the 
designee of the Secretary), to each appropriate federal agency, along 
with the identification of specific agency guidelines; recommendations; 
or regulations for test methods, including batteries of tests and test 
screens, for chemicals or a class of chemicals within a regulatory 
framework that may be appropriate for scientific improvement, while 
seeking to reduce, refine, or replace animal test methods.

The committee also provides advice to the Director of the NIEHS and the 
National Toxicology Program Center on activities and directives 
relating to the National Toxicology Program Center, such as on 
priorities and opportunities for alternative test methods that may 
provide improved prediction of adverse health effects compared with 
currently used methods or advantages in terms of reduced expense and 
time, reduced animal use, and reduced animal pain and distress.

Number of members: 15 (see table 12).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 
committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms 
for review for potential conflicts of interest. The NIH committee 
management officer performed a first-level review of the financial 
disclosure forms, followed by a second-level review by the designated 
federal officer. The NIH's Deputy Ethics Counselor performed the final 
review.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Fourteen of 15 members received waivers 
because NIH determined that the need for their expertise outweighed the 
potential conflicts. One of the 15 members received a waiver because 
the conflict was deemed not significant.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: According to the designated 
federal officer, the issuance of waivers to committee members was not 
disclosed to the public. For example, the waivers were not discussed at 
any committee meetings. According to the NIH committee management 
officer, the agency sends its waivers to the HHS Ethics Counsels 
assigned to NIH, who then sends them to OGE.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The Director of 
the Environmental Toxicology Program, NIEHS, asked the members of the 
ICCVAM for nominations to the advisory committee and also asked for 
nominations from former members and ad hoc advisors of the committee. 
The Director also requested nominations from two stakeholder groups 
that regularly attend committee meetings, the Doris Day Animal League 
and the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the committee 
management officer and the designated federal officer, the legislation 
that created the committee gives direction regarding membership that 
focuses on expertise and work affiliations, and NIH uses these factors 
to achieve committee balance. Specifically, the legislation calls for 
members to come from an academic institution; a state government 
agency; an international regulatory body; or any corporation developing 
or marketing new, revised, or alternative test methodologies, including 
contract laboratories. The legislation also specifies that there shall 
be at least one knowledgeable representative having a history of 
expertise, development, or evaluation of new, revised, or alternative 
test methods from each of the following categories: (1) personal care, 
pharmaceutical, industrial chemicals, or agricultural industry; (2) any 
other industry that is regulated by one of the federal agencies on 
ICCVAM; and (3) a national animal protection organization established 
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The 
committee management officer also told us that NIH considered 
ethnicity, gender, and geography in balancing the committee membership.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 12: Roster of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative 
Toxicological Methods with the Primary Employers, and Areas of 
Expertise as of December 30, 2003: 

Universities: 

Committee member: Dr. Daniel Acosta, Jr.; 
Primary employer: University of Cincinnati, College of Pharmacy; 
Area of expertise: In vitro toxicology, pharmacology, and development 
of in vitro cellular models.

Committee member: Dr. Nancy Flournoy; 
Primary employer: University of Missouri-Columbia, Department of 
Statistics; 
Area of expertise: Biostatistics, applied stochastic processes, and 
statistical theory.

Committee member: Dr. Alan M. Goldberg; 
Primary employer: Johns Hopkins University, Center for Alternatives to 
Animal Testing, Bloomberg School of Public Health; 
Area of expertise: Neurotoxicology, in vitro toxicology, and 
alternative models.

Committee member: Dr. Sidney Green, Jr.; 
Primary employer: Howard University, Department of Pharmacology, 
College of Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Pharmacology, genetic toxicology, and regulatory 
toxicology.

Committee member: Dr. A. Wallace Hayes; 
Primary employer: Harvard University, School of Public Health; 
Area of expertise: General toxicology, biochemical toxicology, and in 
vitro models.

Committee member: Dr. Nancy A. Monteiro-Riviere; 
Primary employer: North Carolina State University, Department of 
Clinical Sciences, College of Veterinary Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Dermal toxicology, biochemical toxicology, and in 
vitro models.

Committee member: Dr. Steven H. Safe; 
Primary employer: Texas A & M University, Departments of Veterinary 
Physiology and Pharmacology, College of Veterinary Medicine; 
Area of expertise: Environmental estrogens, toxicology, and 
biochemistry.

Committee member: Dr. Carlos Sonnenschein; 
Primary employer: Tufts University School of Medicine, Department of 
Anatomy and Cellular Biology; 
Area of expertise: Environmental toxicology, medicine, environmental 
estrogens, and reproductive toxicology.

Companies: 

Committee member: Dr. Jack H. Dean; 
Primary employer: Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc.; 
Area of expertise: Molecular biology, regulatory toxicology, 
toxicogenomics, and immunotoxicology.

Committee member: Dr. Rodger D. Curren; 
Primary employer: Institute for In Vitro Sciences, Inc.; 
Area of expertise: In vitro toxicological testing.

Committee member: Dr. Jacqueline H. Smith; 
Primary employer: Chesapeake Consulting Team; 
Area of expertise: Pharmacology, environmental toxicology, regulatory 
toxicology, and the petroleum industry.

Nonprofit associations: 

Committee member: Dr. Martin L. Stephens; 
Primary employer: The Humane Society of the United States; 
Area of expertise: Animal welfare and environmental toxicology.

Committee member: Dr. Peter Theran; 
Primary employer: Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals/American Humane Education Society; 
Area of expertise: Internal medicine, laboratory animal medicine, 
animal welfare, and comparative medicine.

State agency: 

Committee member: Dr. Calvin C. Willhite; 
Primary employer: State of California, Department of Toxic Substance 
Control; 
Area of expertise: Reproductive toxicology, pharmacology, risk 
assessment and management, and regulatory toxicology.

Other: 

Committee member: Dr. Katherine A. Stitzel; 
Primary employer: Veterinarian (Retired); 
Area of expertise: Acute toxicity, in vitro methods, and regulatory 
toxicology. 

Source: HHS.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix X: Information on the Department of the Interior's U.S. 
Geological Survey's Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee: 

This appendix provides information about the Scientific Earthquake 
Studies Advisory Committee. The committee is managed by the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS), and members are appointed by the Secretary of 
the Interior.

Purpose of the committee: The advisory committee was established under 
the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 (Pub. L. No. 
106-503, Title II) to advise the Director of USGS on matters relating 
to the USGS's participation in the National Earthquake Hazards 
Reduction Program, a multiagency strategic program to reduce risks to 
lives and property resulting from earthquakes. The committee is to 
provide advice on the USGS Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program's 
roles, goals, and objectives; capabilities and research needs; guidance 
on achieving major objectives; and establishing and measuring 
performance goals.

Number of members: 9 (see table 13).

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: In 2001, the committee members were 
appointed as representatives and were not required to file OGE 
financial disclosure forms for Interior review for potential conflicts 
of interest. In January 2004, Interior reevaluated the appointments and 
determined that the members should be appointed as special government 
employees. Interior said that the committee would not conduct further 
meetings until the appointments had been changed.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable in 2001.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The Earthquake 
Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 requires the Director of 
USGS to obtain nominations from the National Academy of Sciences, 
professional societies, and other appropriate organizations. The 
Director obtained nominations from the academy, the Geological Society 
of America, the Seismological Society of America, the American Society 
of Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Professional Geologists, 
the American Geophysical Union, and the Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the statute that 
established the advisory committee, the selection of individuals for 
the committee is to be based solely on established records of 
distinguished service and the USGS Director is required to ensure that 
"a reasonable cross-section of views and expertise is represented." 
According to the designated federal official, the primary factor for 
selection was expertise in fields such as geology, seismology, 
engineering, and public safety. In addition, according to department 
officials, the agency also considered gender, geography, and employment 
sector.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: USGS sought 
feedback from the National Academies on its slate of proposed members.

Table 13: Roster of the Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory 
Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 
December 2003: 

Universities: 

Committee member: Dr. Daniel P. Abrams; 
Primary employer: Universities: University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign; 
Universities: Engineering.

Committee member: Dr. Thomas H. Jordan; 
Primary employer: Universities: University of Southern California, 
Department of Earth Sciences; 
Universities: Seismology, geodynamics, tectonics, geodesy, and marine 
geology.

Committee member: Dr. Paul Segall; 
Primary employer: Universities: Stanford University, Department of 
Geophysics; 
Universities: Earthquake physics.

Committee member: Dr. Robert B. Smith; 
Primary employer: Universities: University of Utah, Department of 
Geology and Geophysics,; 
Universities: Geology.

Committee member: Dr. Sharon L. Wood; 
Primary employer: Universities: University of Texas, Ferguson 
Structural Engineering Laboratory; 
Universities: Engineering.

Companies: 

Committee member: Dr. Lloyd Cluff; 
Primary employer: Universities: Pacific Gas and Electric Company; 
Universities: Earthquake hazard assessment.

Committee member: Mr. Ronald T. Eguchi; 
Primary employer: Universities: ImageCat, Inc.; 
Universities: Earthquake risk analysis.

State agencies: 

Committee member: Ms. Mimi Garstang; 
Primary employer: Universities: Missouri Geological Survey; 
Universities: Earthquake hazard analysis in the eastern United States 
and state-level mitigation policy.

Committee member: Dr. Jonathan G. Price; 
Primary employer: Universities: Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology; 
Universities: Seismology and earthquake hazard analysis in the western 
United States. 

Source: Interior.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix XI: Information on the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's Space Science Advisory Committee: 

This appendix provides information about the Space Science Advisory 
Committee. The committee is managed by the Office of Space Science, and 
members are appointed by NASA's Associate Administrator for Space 
Science.

Purpose of the committee: The NASA Space Science Advisory Committee is 
to draw on the expertise of its members and other sources to provide 
advice and make recommendations to the Administrator of NASA on plans, 
policies, programs, and other matters pertinent to the agency's space 
science responsibilities.

Number of members: 17 (see table 14).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: NASA uses the OGE form 450 to collect 
financial information from committee members. The forms are collected 
and reviewed after the Associate Administrator has concurred with the 
appointment decisions. The forms 450 are reviewed and approved by the 
committee's designated federal official and the Office of General 
Counsel. On the basis of these reviews, the Office of General Counsel 
sometimes sends cautionary letters to members indicating that they may 
need to recuse themselves if the committees address matters that relate 
to their financial interests.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: No current members have 
waivers.[Footnote 64]

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to the 
committee's designated federal official, NASA gathered nominations from 
staff within the agency's Office of Space Science.

Criteria used to balance the committee: The committee's designated 
federal official told us said that in addition to considering the 
nominees' areas of expertise relative to the four themes of the Office 
of Space Science, he also considers their gender, ethnicity, geography, 
and institutional affiliation.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None sought.

Table 14: Roster of the Space Science Advisory Committee Members with 
the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of December 30, 2003: 

Universities: 

Committee member: Dr. David Deamer; 
Primary employer: University of California at Santa Cruz; 
Area of expertise: Astrobiology.

Committee member: Dr. Jonathan Grindlay; 
Primary employer: Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Committee member: Dr. Fiona Harrison; 
Primary employer: California Institute of Technology; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Committee member: Dr. Roderick Heelis; 
Primary employer: University of Texas at Dallas; 
Area of expertise: Solar physics.

Committee member: Dr. Garth Illingworth; 
Primary employer: University of California at Santa Cruz; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Committee member: Dr. Andrew Klein; 
Primary employer: Oregon State University; 
Area of expertise: Nuclear engineering.

Committee member: Dr. Jonathan Lunine; 
Primary employer: University of Arizona; 
Area of expertise: Planetary exploration.

Committee member: Dr. John Mustard; 
Primary employer: Brown University; 
Area of expertise: Astrobiology.

Committee member: Dr. David Spergel; 
Primary employer: Princeton University; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Federal research facilities: 

Committee member: Dr. Judith Karpen; 
Primary employer: U.S. Naval Research Laboratory; 
Area of expertise: Solar physics.

Committee member: Dr. Edward Kolb; 
Primary employer: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Committee member: Dr. Jeremy Mould; 
Primary employer: National Optical Astronomy Observatory; 
Area of expertise: Astrophysics.

Committee member: Dr. Michelle Thompson; 
Primary employer: Los Alamos National Laboratory; 
Area of expertise: Sun-earth connections.

For profit company: 

Committee member: Dr. Andrew Christensen (chair); 
Primary employer: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Area of expertise: Sun-earth connections.

Committee member: Private, nonprofit research organizations.

Committee member: Dr. Heidi Hammel; 
Primary employer: Space Science Institute; 
Area of expertise: Planetary science.

Committee member: Mr. Martin Kress; 
Primary employer: Battelle Memorial Institute; 
Area of expertise: Space policy.

Private museum: 

Committee member: Dr. Paul Knappenberger; 
Primary employer: Adler Planetarium; 
Area of expertise: Education and public outreach. 

Source: NASA.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix XII: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

GSA:

GSA Administrator:

March 24, 2004:

The Honorable David M. Walker 
Comptroller General:

United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Walker:

Enclosed are comments on the draft report entitled "Federal Advisory 
Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure 
Independence and Balance.":

GSA agrees that additional guidance and best practices suggestions 
relating overall to the Federal advisory committee appointment and 
membership processes could help agencies to ensure that committees are 
perceived to be independent and have fairly balanced membership. The 
General Services Administration (GSA) remains committed to these key 
policy goals of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and believes 
that they should be implemented consistently across the executive 
branch. GSA also believes that such guidance should be of sufficient 
detail and clarity to ensure the utmost compliance with FACA and other 
related or impacted statutes and regulations. GSA is in general accord 
with the findings in the draft report relating to those areas directly 
under the purview of GSA.

We are committed to our strong partnership with the Office of 
Government Ethics (OGE) to address both those areas under OGE's 
jurisdiction relating to FACA and the appointment and membership 
processes that are under the decision making authority of individual 
agencies. GSA will consult frequently with OGE and executive agencies 
in developing enhanced guidance that will achieve not only the best 
solutions, but also reflect the consensus of agencies that sponsor a 
wide variety of advisory committees.

GSA is taking a proactive approach, to include changes to its shared 
FACA Database management and reporting system, and some activities 
already are underway. The enclosed comments indicate our overall plan 
in the major areas of continuing dialogue with 
OGE, incorporating changes to current interagency training, issuing 
more detailed guidance to enhance data collection, and improving the 
agency consultation process with GSA in the establishment of new 
discretionary Federal advisory committees.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Stephen A. Perry 
Administrator:

Enclosure:

Comments of the General Services Administration on The General 
Accounting Office's Draft Report, "Federal Advisory Committees: 
Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and 
Balance" (GAO-04-328):

Overall GAO Recommendation:

GAO is recommending that OGE and GSA provide additional guidance to 
federal agencies with regards to clarifying the appropriate use of 
representative appointments; systematically obtaining relevant 
information to ensure committees are, and are perceived as, balanced; 
and adopting some promising practices and measures that would better 
ensure independence and balance and make the formation and operation of 
advisory committees more transparent.

General GSA Comments:

As addressed in the report, because Federal advisory committees are 
established to advise executive agencies on significant issues and play 
an important role in the development of Federal policies, their 
membership should be perceived as being free from conflicts of interest 
and be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and 
the functions to be performed. Prior to issuing any new guidance, to 
include best practices suggestions, GSA intends to consult specifically 
with the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), and executive branch 
departments and agencies generally, as substantial parts of these 
processes reside in the area of OGE's regulatory and interpretive 
jurisdiction, or are within the purview of each individual agency's 
decisionmaking authority with respect to membership selection and 
appointments. GSA's ongoing partnership with OGE extends both to 
ensuring that GSA's Governmentwide issuances relating to the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) are consistent with all statutes and 
regulations for which OGE is responsible, and also to the use of OGE 
staff in the delivery of the ethics and conflicts of interest portions 
of GSA's interagency FACA management training.

Additional comments are provided below relating to specific actions 
that already are underway or planned to address the findings upon which 
the GAO's recommendations are based. Several of these actions were 
discussed in general with GAO's staff during the course of its review, 
to include proposed changes to GSA's shared FACA Database management 
and reporting system. We expect to complete all necessary actions 
directly under the purview of GSA and those achieved collaboratively 
with OGE and other agencies during fiscal year 2005.

GAO Finding:

Additional government wide guidance could help agencies better ensure 
the independence and balance of federal advisory committees.

GSA Comments:

GSA generally agrees that additional guidance and best practices 
suggestions relating overall to the Federal advisory committee 
appointment and membership processes could help agencies to ensure that 
committees are perceived to be independent and free from conflicts of 
interest, and that committee membership, as contemplated by FACA, will 
be fairly balanced.

GAO Finding:

Also, to be effective, advisory committees must be, and be perceived as 
being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be 
performed. However, GSA's guidance on advisory committee management 
does not address what types of information could be helpful to agencies 
in assessing the points of view of potential committee members to make 
decisions about committee balance.

GSA Comments:

GSA proposes to provide additional guidance within the format of a 
comprehensive template describing the various factors for, and 
illustrating the various components of what, in GSA's opinion, would 
comprise a plan for fairly balanced membership consistent with FACA. 
Secretariat staff work on this template was begun during the course of 
this GAO review, with baseline information already obtained from 
selected FACA Committee Management Officers (CMOs) on their agencies' 
current plans.

GAO Finding:

Consequently, many agencies do not identify and systematically collect 
and evaluate information pertinent to determining the points of view of 
potential committee members, such as previous public positions or 
statements on matters being reviewed.

GSA Comments:

GSA believes that a collaborative approach, sponsored by the Committee 
Management Secretariat among CMOs in the form of a focus subgroup under 
the ambit of GSA's standing Interagency Committee on Federal Advisory 
Committee Management (IAC), would address this issue best initially. It 
is the Secretariat's opinion that current practices should be shared 
first, so that all agencies are aware of what options exist that might 
improve a given agency's membership selection and appointment process, 
and what new initiatives are feasible and pertinent to a particular 
agency, given the existing wide variety of types of advisory 
committees. This effort is planned for discussion at the next scheduled 
IAC meeting.

Specific GAO Recommendations for GSA Action Contained in the Draft 
Report:

(The Director of OGE and) the GSA Committee Management Secretariat 
(should) direct federal agencies to review their representative 
appointments to federal advisory committees either as the 2-year 
charters expire or, for those committees with indefinite charters, 
within one year to determine if the appointments are appropriate, and 
to reappoint members as special government employees, where 
appropriate, and direct agency committee management officials to 
consult with agency ethics officials in making decisions about the type 
of appointments that should be made for each committee.

GSA Comments:

GSA proposes to address this both in consultation with OGE and in the 
Secretariat's proposed IAC subgroup. We believe this collaboration will 
best define the specific method and process by which the executive 
branch may address this procedure most effectively on a Governmentwide 
basis, consistent with the specific authorities and responsibilities of 
OGE, GSA, and individual executive agencies. Further, GSA believes, 
based on its current guidance and from information provided in its 
interagency training, that a firm basis already exists for enhancing 
consultations between CMOs and Designated Agency Ethics Officials 
(DAEOs).

We recommend that GSA (and OGE) revise the training materials for the 
FACA management course, incorporating the additional OGE guidance as 
recommended above....

GSA Comments:

GSA agrees in principle, but if any revisions are to be made in the 
ethics and conflicts of interest portions, GSA would do so following 
consultation with OGE. Any appropriate revisions would reflect the 
decisions made by OGE.

We recommend that (OGE and) GSA direct agencies to determine, for each 
relevant committee, the potential for such other biases and take 
appropriate steps to ensure their representative members do not have 
such biases.

GSA Comments:

GSA believes that addressing this recommendation initially is 
principally within the purview of OGE, and intends to consult further 
with OGE accordingly.

We recommend that GSA provide guidance to agencies regarding what 
background information might be relevant in assessing committee 
members' points of view.

GSA Comments:

GSA intends to provide additional guidance in several ways.

(1) GSA will coordinate with OGE staff that delivers the ethics and 
conflicts of interest portions of GSA's interagency FACA management 
training course. The appropriate content revisions will be made 
pursuant to OGE's decisions with respect to the recommendations 
contained in the final version of this GAO report that relate to the 
subject matter of the course under OGE's regulatory and interpretive 
jurisdiction. We also expect to obtain with OGE, the necessary input of 
the affected executive branch agencies under whose purview rests 
decisionmaking authority for individual membership selection and 
appointments.

(2) GSA intends to issue, as an adjunct to its formal guidelines on 
Federal advisory committee management, at 41 CFR Part 102-3, a 
suggested best practice guideline in the form of a comprehensive 
template describing the various factors for, and illustrating the 
various components of what, in GSA's opinion, would comprise a plan for 
fairly balanced membership consistent with FACA. Such template likely 
will include all suggested and recommended factors deriving from the 
experience of executive agencies, to include agency program needs, the 
technical qualifications and expertise of individuals, stakeholder, 
organizational, and interested party viewpoints, congressional and 
public concerns, 
demographic and diversity factors as appropriate, and others. Such 
template would be used by agencies to address the fair balance 
requirement in FACA for an advisory committee's membership that is 
under the discretion of an agency and not otherwise determined by 
statute or Presidential directive.

(3) GSA, through its Committee Management Secretariat staff, intends to 
review and discuss with selected individual CMOs, their respective 
agency practices in the areas of membership identification, 
solicitation, nomination, and selection, and how their agencies 
interact in this process with both specific stakeholders and the public 
at large. Best practices will be shared within the FACA management 
community through the IAC, which is comprised of all executive agency 
CMOs.

We recommend that GSA issue guidance that agencies should identify the 
committee (membership) formation process for each committee...; state 
in the appointment letters to committee members whether they are 
appointed as special government employees (SGEs) or representatives 
(and the latter's organizations)...; identify each member's appointment 
category in the GSA FACA Database...; (and) state in the committee 
products the nature of the advice provided (independent or 
consensus)... 

GSA Comments:

GSA believes that addressing these several discreet recommendations 
initially will require further consultation on its part with OGE and 
the affected executive agencies, and will so do accordingly. GSA does 
propose at this time to modify its shared FACA Database management and 
reporting system by the addition of a single field to the Members Table 
to identify each member's current appointment category (SGE or 
Representative Member). Also, the system has the capability of 
incorporating additional membership specificity and appointment 
information with certain fields and displays, and additional linkages 
to information posted by individual agencies on the Internet. 
Furthermore, the Committee Management Secretariat will review its 
current on-line consultation process for the establishment of new 
discretionary Federal advisory committees to determine what 
enhancements may be made to the ability of CMOs to upload certain 
information to the FACA Database contemporaneously for public view.

[End of section]

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Office of Government Ethics: 

United States Office of Government Ethics: 


March 17, 2004:

Robin M. Nazzaro 
Director:

Natural Resources and Environment 
United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Nazzaro:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) proposed report, Federal Advisory Committees: Additional 
Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure_ Independence and Balance 
(GAO-04-328). The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) shares the concern 
expressed in the report that members of Federal advisory committees 
follow all applicable ethical requirements under Federal law. We 
therefore welcome the contribution made by the proposed report to 
efforts that OGE is making in this area.

As you know, OGE recently undertook its own "single-issue review" of 
Federal advisory committee management, which was completed in November 
2002. Based on information gathered in that review, we agree with the 
conclusion of the proposed report that officials in some agencies may 
be misidentifying certain advisory committee members as 
"representatives," as opposed to special Government employees (SGEs). 
OGE believes that it is crucial that agencies correctly apply the 
criteria for distinguishing between SGEs, who are generally subject to 
financial disclosure and other ethical requirements applicable to 
Federal employees, and representatives, who are not Federal employees 
at all and therefore are not subject to Federal ethics requirements. As 
described in more detail in section B below, OGE has already undertaken 
a number of measures to address this issue, such as training, legal 
guidance, and new guidelines for OGE reviews of agency ethics programs. 
In addition, OGE has and continues to work with the General Services 
Administration (GSA) in close coordination and partnership on a variety 
of matters that concern Federal advisory committees.

OGE does not agree, however, with GAO's conclusion that the problems 
identified in the proposed report are attributable to inadequacies in 
the legal guidance provided by OGE with respect to the distinction 
between SGEs and representatives. As we explain in 
section A below, OGE's guidance accurately represents a longstanding 
executive branch interpretation of the definition of SGE in 18 U.S.C. § 
202. Moreover, with respect to GAO's three specific recommendations, 
OGE does not believe that the proposed report fully describes OGE's 
guidance or the reasonable inferences that agency officials can fairly 
draw from this guidance. Indeed, the proposed report itself contains 
suggestions that the problems experienced at some agencies may be 
attributable to factors other than a misunderstanding of OGE's 
guidance.

A. GAO Recommendations Regarding the Adequacy of OGE Guidance:

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that most of the statements 
in OGE Informal Advisory Opinion 82 x 22 to which GAO takes exception 
did not originate in the OGE memorandum itself. Rather, as 82 x 22 
makes clear, the basic criteria for distinguishing between SCEs and 
representatives are reproduced verbatim from a memorandum issued by 
President Kennedy in 1963, shortly after enactment of the legislation 
creating the SGE category. This Presidential memorandum, which was 
drafted by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, 
has long been accorded great weight "as a contemporaneous 
interpretation of the conflict of interest laws by the Department 
charged with construing them." 2 Op. O.L.C. 151, 155 n.3 (1978). For 
over 40 years, the criteria derived from this memorandum have provided 
guidance to the executive branch in the interpretation of the 
definition of SGE, and any recommendation to alter the content of that 
advice bears a significant burden of persuasion, which we do not think 
is met by the proposed report.

1. Recognizable Group of Persons:

GAO's first objection is that the language of the guidance is "overly 
broad" in indicating that an individual may be considered a 
representative, as opposed to an SGE, if the individual speaks for a 
"recognizable group of persons." The proposed report concludes that 
this language has led some agency officials to believe that this 
language permits the appointment of non-SGEs "to represent various 
technical fields, such as biology and toxicology.":

We do not believe that any reasonable interpretation of the phrase 
"recognizable group of persons" would include "field of expertise." It 
is simply not logical to say that a field or area of expertise is a 
"group of persons." Moreover, any such interpretation would require 
taking a single phrase out of a larger textual context that makes 
abundantly clear that the thrust is that 
representatives are appointed to speak in a representative capacity for 
organizations and groups that have a stake in a matter.[NOTE 1] There 
is little evidence in the proposed report that any agencies who may 
have incorrectly appointed experts as representatives did so on the 
basis of a legitimate interpretation of a particular phrase in 82 x 22. 
Indeed, the proposed report itself contains evidence that some agencies 
may not be engaging at all in the analysis described in 82 x 22. The 
proposed report states that the agencies appointed members as 
representatives based on longstanding practice and agency culture, 
without any policies identifying criteria for distinguishing between 
representatives and SGEs. It is hard therefore to understand how such 
practices themselves are derived from a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the criteria. Furthermore, the report specifically 
indicated that a recent OGE report on the same subject expressed 
concern that certain agencies "may be purposely designating their 
committee members as representatives to avoid subjecting them tho the 
financial disclosure statements required for special government 
employees." This suggests a possible basis for improper designations 
other than misunderstanding of the criteria described in 82 x 22.

2. Ambiguity of "Represent" and its Cognate Forms:

The proposed report also states that 82 x 22 "implies that when the 
term `representative' is used in authorizing legislation, or other such 
documents, that members should be classified as representatives, 
despite the fact that this term may be used for more generic purposes, 
such as to direct the balance of a committee." The proposed report 
states that, contrary to this purported implication in the OGE 
guidance, "the use of some form of the terms represent or 
representative in these documents does not always clearly indicate that 
the members are to be appointed to serve as representatives.":

OGE's guidance does not imply that any use of the word "represent" or 
its cognate forms in a statute or other document means that the members 
of the committee are not SGEs. To the contrary, 82 x 22 provides 
specific examples of documents using such terms and concludes that the 
given committees nevertheless are comprised of SGEs. The OGE guidance 
discusses one particular committee document that used the term 
"represent" in a generic sense to describe the required technical 
expertise for membership, 
and OGE expressly concluded that the members of this committee were to 
be treated as SGEs, "[w]hatever the degree of contradiction produced by 
the use of `represent'" (BRAC committee). Memorandum 82 x 22 also 
includes an example of legislation referring to points of view 
"represented" on a particular committee and nevertheless concludes that 
this committee was comprised of SGEs (FPUPAC committee) . Yet another 
example in 82 x 22 concerns a statute that made the members of a 
particular committee "representatives of their practicing colleagues," 
and OGE still concluded that these members were SGEs (NPSRC committee). 
Finally, 82 x 22 discusses the language of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) itself and states that the statutory phrase 
"points of view represented" in FACA "asserts a standard of fairness 
but is short of being a command that every advisory committee must 
consist of individuals who represent the interests of persons or 
entities outside the Government." Far from implying that the use of 
"represent" or "representative" automatically rules out SGE; status, 82 
x 22 makes clear that careful attention to all relevant factors is 
required in order to determine whether the committee members are 
actually intended to serve as representatives of interest groups.

3. Effect of Recommendation by Outside Organization:

The proposed report takes issue with the statement in 82x 22 that 
"[t]he fact that an individual is appointed by an agency to an advisory 
committee upon the recommendation of an outside group or organization 
tends to support the conclusion that he has a representative function." 
According to GAO, "this guidance does not take into account a common 
practice that agencies use to identify potential committee members and 
overemphasizes the weight agencies may give to this factor when 
determining what constitutes a representative appointment.":

OGE does not understand how the statement that outside recommendation 
"tends to support" the conclusion of representative status can be taken 
as "overemphasizing" this factor. Indeed, the intentionally moderate 
phrase "tends to support" would seem to indicate just the opposite. If 
this factor were intended to be determinative, the guidance would have 
said so expressly, as it does in the case of two other factors listed. 
The outside recommendation factor is just one of several enumerated 
items that must be considered in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, and we believe nothing in 82 x 22 fairly suggests 
otherwise.

In sum, while OGE may agree that some agencies are not adequately 
performing the analysis required by 82 x 22, we do not believe that any 
such problems reasonably can be attributed to the 
language used in 82 x 22 and the other official documents that have 
contained the same criteria ever since the 1962 SGE legislation was 
first implemented. As discussed below, we agree that measures may be 
undertaken --and indeed some already have been undertaken --to address 
this matter. We do not believe, however, that the measures should 
include interference with a set of criteria that represent a 
contemporaneous construction of a criminal statute that has guided the 
executive branch for over four decades.

B. OGE Efforts to Address the Issue:

OGE has devoted considerable attention to educating ethics officials 
and other individuals involved in FACA management on issues related to 
special Government employees (SGEs) and representatives. While some of 
OGE's continuing efforts in this area involve collaborative efforts 
with GSA, OGE has pursued other initiatives to strengthen ethics 
awareness about this important issue. What follows is a short 
description of some of OGE's training, awareness, and auditing efforts:

1. Improved OGE Program Audit Guidelines:

As the proposed report notes, OGE formally issued new audit guidelines 
in 2003 that provided for additional focus and review of advisory 
committee appointment designations. In particular, these guidelines 
were immediately implemented and provided for additional focus and 
inquiry by OGE's agency program reviewers on whether individuals who 
serve as members of committees, councils, boards,* commissions, or 
other groups were properly being designated as SGEs or representatives. 
After these guidelines were implemented, at least one of our program 
reviews in 2003 included a specific recommendation that the agency 
reassess the status of employees and members serving on one of its 
advisory committees.

2. Continuing GSA Support and Coordination:

In September 2003, OGE submitted substantial comments on a proposed GSA 
template for improving the process of establishing Federal advisory 
committees in the executive branch. This proposed template, to be 
provided to executive branch agencies and other offices involved in the 
formation of advisory committees contained suggested language for 
legislation creating advisory committees. Some of the comments that OGE 
made to the template were specifically focused on handling the 
preliminary determination of whether an advisory committee member will 
be serving as an employee or non-employee representative. Once 
completed, the template will better enable executive branch agencies 
and other persons or 
entities involved in establishing Federal advisory committees to 
appropriately consider member status issues when creating these 
committees. The template is still in a draft form and OGE will continue 
to work with GSA on preparing the final template.

3. GSA FACA Training Support:

The proposed report states that changes should be made to the training 
materials used at GSA's FACA Management Training Course to address 
concerns about the overall adequacy of OGE guidance on the SGE/
representative designation issue. The course provides 20 pages of 
written materials on ethics, including five pages devoted to issues 
involving the status of members serving on these committees. For the 
reasons noted above, we believe the suggested changes to the text arise 
from an unreasonable interpretation of OGE guidance. Much of the 
guidance for distinguishing between SGE's and representatives comes 
from a Presidential memorandum that was issued shortly after enactment 
of the legislation creating the SGE category. Because much of the 
course material dealing with the SGE/representative distinction comes 
from that memorandum, we would not support any changes that would be 
inconsistent with the weight of that contemporaneous interpretation of 
the SGE category.

Nevertheless, OGE will continue to work with GSA to modify these 
materials to make clearer for attendees the SGE/repre-sentative 
distinction. In addition, OGE instructors at the course will continue 
to ensure that the content of these course materials dealing with this 
issue are fully discussed with course attendees.

4. OGE Ethics Conferences:

Almost every year since 1996, OGE has presented a session on FACA 
issues at its annual ethics conference. For example, a session at the 
2003 conference was principally devoted to "designation" issues 
involving Federal advisory committees. The session discussed recent 
reviews conducted by both OGE and GAO involving the management of 
Federal advisory committees at several agencies and some of the issues 
raised by those reviews. In particular, during the conference panel 
session, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Committee Management 
Officer discussed his agency's process for designating advisory 
committee members within the VA.

5. Additional SGE Guidance and Training Materials:

Since publishing OGE informal advisory opinion 82 x 22, OGE has issued 
other advisory opinions that have discussed SGE and/or representative 
status (e.g. , 87 x 12, 88 x 16, 90 x 5, 90 x 22, 92 x 25, 93 x 14, 93 x 
30 & 95 x 8). Most recently, in February 2000 OGE issued a summary 
regarding "Conflict of Interest and the Special Government Employee," 
which was subsequently issued as OGE Informal Advisory Opinion 00 x 01. 
A substantial portion of this summary is dedicated to explaining the 
concept of what is an SGE, and distinguishing SGE's from non-employees 
such as representatives and independent contractors. Ethics officials 
were asked to disseminate the summary to other components within their 
organizations (such as regional offices) who they thought might 
encounter questions pertaining to SGEs.

6. Continuing Review:

Finally, many of the issues regarding SGE/representative designations 
can be better addressed when Federal advisory committees are being 
created. In this regard, OGE monitors and comments on proposals to 
create advisory committees to ensure that SGE/Representative 
designation issues are fully considered.

Conclusion:

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on the proposed report. 
As noted above, OGE recognizes the importance of correctly applying the 
criteria for distinguishing between advisory committee members who are 
serving as SGEs and members who are serving as representatives, and has 
devoted considerable attention to this issue. We therefore welcome your 
contribution to our continued efforts in this area.

If you need any further assistance regarding any particular item 
discussed in this letter, please contact OGE Associate General Counsel 
Vincent Salamone or OGE Associate General Counsel Richard Thomas. Their 
telephone number is 202-482-9300.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Marilyn L. Glynn, 
Acting Director:

NOTES: 

[1] GAO itself has relied on the same phrase, without apparent 
misunderstanding. See Decision of the Comptroller General, B-192734 
(1978). 

The following are GAO's comments on the Office of Government Ethics 
letter dated March 17, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. We continue to believe that OGE's ongoing efforts to encourage 
agencies to evaluate whether appointments should be made as special 
government employees or representatives would prove more effective if 
clear, unambiguous guidance addressing the limitations we identified 
were available to agency staff.

The draft and final reports present the OGE guidance as a factor in 
some agencies' inappropriately appointing some members as 
representatives and acknowledge OGE's concern that some agencies may be 
doing so to avoid the conflict-of-interest reviews. Unless OGE 
clarifies the limitations in the guidance identified in our report, we 
believe progress in moving agencies toward appropriate appointments 
will likely continue to be slow or nonexistent--remembering that the 
1982 guidance was issued because of confusion over the proper use of 
representative appointments. Unambiguous guidance would help all 
agencies implement it; would support more effective oversight by ethics 
officials, including OGE, and by Inspectors General; and would make it 
more difficult for any agency to misapply the guidance and misidentify 
certain advisory committee members as "representatives.": 

2. The clarifications we identified do not change the criteria but 
rather amplify them to address areas where continued confusion or 
misuse has occurred. The 1982 guidance was developed to address 
uncertainties regarding when agencies should appoint individuals as 
either special government employees or representatives. In our view, 
the findings in our report indicate that additional clarifications are 
warranted. Along these lines, we note that when OGE's staff determined 
in 2002 that some agencies use only representative appointments, they 
suggested that additional training materials may be appropriate. The 
staff suggested a communication to agency ethics officials to assist 
them in making the determination for their committee members. Our draft 
and final reports recommend revisions to the guidance and the training 
materials.

3. Given that agencies are appointing representatives to represent 
their individual fields of expertise and that OGE agrees this use of 
representative appointments is not appropriate, we believe OGE should 
revise its guidance to clarify that such appointments generally are not 
appropriate. (We note that an exception would be if a committee were 
considering an issue that would impact a particular group, for example, 
physicists or biologists--a case in which a group of experts would be 
stakeholders in the matter being considered.) Instead, OGE's response 
is to state that it is not logical to say that a field or area of 
expertise is a "group of persons" and to disagree that clarification to 
its guidance may be warranted to eliminate this practice. It is 
possible, as OGE suggests, that some agencies understand the guidance 
and are simply disregarding it. However, we believe ambiguities in the 
OGE guidance may provide agencies with some "cover" to support their 
interpretations. In such cases, clear guidance would make it more 
difficult for them to continue to misapply it. In addition, we direct 
OGE's attention to the responses to this report from Interior, NASA, 
and Energy (see apps. XV, XVI, and XVII), which suggest that 
clarifications to the guidance regarding the appointment of 
representatives to represent fields of expertise may be necessary.

4.On the basis of our work at several agencies and our review of the 
OGE guidance, we continue to believe some clarification is needed vis-
à-vis the use of the term "represent" and its cognate forms. As the 
draft and final reports state, OGE's direction to agencies in making 
decisions regarding representative appointments is to use "words to 
characterize them as the representatives of individuals or entities 
outside the government who have an interest in the subject matter 
assigned to the committee." Notably missing from OGE's specific 
direction to agencies is a focus on the nature of the advice they will 
be giving--that is, that they are to represent stakeholder views. This 
is in contrast to OGE's direction to agencies regarding special 
government employees that does focus on the fact that they are to 
exercise individual and independent judgment. Although OGE's guidance 
does provide helpful examples to agencies in examining statutory 
language to determine whether committee members are actually intended 
to serve as representatives of interest groups, we believe that 
language in the conclusions section of the guidance that directs 
agencies how to indicate the type of appointment contradicts the 
examples that OGE cites. We have clarified the final report to indicate 
that we were specifically discussing the conclusions section of the OGE 
guidance. We also note that OGE developed these conclusions in 1982--
that is, it is not citing the 1962 guidance the agency is hesitant to 
revise. Overall, we believe that clarifications, but not departures 
from the criteria regarding appointments, are needed.

We point OGE also to the comments from the Interior (see app. XV) on 
the matter of the term representative. Interior stated that "GAO agrees 
that the statute authorizing the National Cooperative Geologic Mapping 
Advisory Committee' calls for the committee to 
include…representatives,' but then goes on to say that the statute does 
not "clearly and unambiguously call for these members to be appointed 
as representatives rather than special government employees.'." 
Interior then characterized our statements as a contradiction and said 
that the Secretary of the Interior "reasonably may interpret such a 
statute by relying on its plain language….". In our draft and final 
reports, we indicate that it is not clear what point of view the 
private sector and academia members could be called upon to provide if 
appointed as representatives, and the statute did not appear to clearly 
mandate that they be appointed as representatives--that is, it may be 
using the term generically. We continue to believe that the statute 
does not clearly and unambiguously call for representative appointments 
and that this example underscores the need for OGE clarification as we 
recommend.

5. Seeking recommendations for advisory committee members from outside 
groups or organizations does not tend to support either representative 
or special government employee status. As noted in the draft and final 
reports, obtaining outside nominations is a common practice for 
committees appointing special government employees; thus, it is not 
used only for representative appointments. We think it would be 
appropriate for the OGE guidance to reflect current practices regarding 
nominations to federal advisory committees and avoid the potential of 
agencies' giving undue weight to this criterion.

6. We are only recommending clarifications to OGE's guidance, not 
changes to the fundamental principles or criteria upon which OGE based 
its guidance. See also comment 2 above.

7. Our draft and final reports highlight the various efforts OGE 
discusses below. However, we believe the effectiveness of these efforts 
will continue to be reduced until OGE's guidance on appointments is 
clarified.

8. OGE has subsequently clarified this comment. The program review 
cited in the comment led to a recommendation that an agency reassess 
the status of employees serving on a federally chartered corporation 
and not on a federal advisory committee.

9. We have not evaluated the template that was still in draft form 
during our review.

10. OGE does not explain its view that the clarifications to the GSA 
FACA management training course that we identified in the report 
represent an unreasonable interpretation of OGE guidance. We continue 
to believe the suggestions our draft and final reports highlight would 
improve the effectiveness of the training sessions. For example, the 
GSA materials state that representatives may (emphasis added) represent 
the views of a particular industry or group. It is not clear to us why 
OGE would object to revising the FACA training materials to be 
consistent with OGE's guidance that representatives are expected to 
"represent a particular bias.": 

11. The draft and final reports identify the session at the 2003 OGE 
Ethics Conference cited in OGE's letter.

12. The draft and final reports cite the most significant and 
comprehensive OGE guidance documents addressing representative 
appointments, including OGE Informal Advisory Opinion 00 x 01 
highlighted by OGE in its comments. (In the report text, we refer to 
this guidance as OGE's February 2000 guidance, and we have added a 
legal citation to it in a footnote.) We note that this opinion includes 
one paragraph addressing representative appointments and states that 
representatives are described more fully in OGE Informal Advisory 
Letter 82 x 22, the guidance document cited in our draft and final 
reports as OGE's principal guidance on the issue of appointment 
categories for federal advisory committees.

13. We support OGE's commitment to monitor and comment on appointments 
to newly created committees. However, in light of evidence that some 
appointments to existing committees are inappropriate, we believe it is 
appropriate to also review the appointments for approximately 950 
advisory committees that are currently active.

[End of section]

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human 
Services: 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES	
Office of Inspector General:

Washington, D.C. 20201:

MAR 19 2004:

Ms. Robin M. Nazzaro 
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment 
United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Nazarro:

Enclosed are the Department's comments on your draft report entitled, 
"Federal Advisory Committees - Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies 
Better Ensure Independence and Balance." The comments represent the 
tentative position of the Department and are subject to reevaluation 
when the final version of this report is received.

The Department provided several technical comments directly to your 
staff.

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft 
report before its publication.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Dara Corrigan:

Acting Principal Deputy Inspector General:

Enclosure:

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is transmitting the Department's 
response to this draft report in our capacity as the Department's 
designated focal point and coordinator for General Accounting Office 
reports. OIG has not conducted an independent assessment of these 
comments and therefore expresses no opinion on them.

COMMENTS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ON THE U.S. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE'S DRAFT REPORT, "FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: 
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND 
BALANCE" (GAO-04 328):

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on the GAO's draft report. The Department 
strives to abide by the General Services Administration's (GSA) 
guidelines and the General Administration Manual that describes the 
Department's advisory committee policies.

This report will be useful in evaluating current practices for 
appointing members to serve on Federal advisory committees. In 
addition, GAO has provided a number of interesting ideas for 
determining balance in points of view and ensuring transparency in the 
advisory committee process.

Although we agree in principle that the information the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) collects on their potential nominees may be 
useful in the selection process, we also believe that a few of the 
practices identified may have unintended consequences.. We are 
concerned about the collection of background information on prospective 
members to understand their points of view.

We believe both the scientific community and the public at large is 
more comfortable with a process that seeks to achieve balance through a 
mix of expertise, background, and personal experience, rather than 
through a process based on seeking out some indefinable range of 
personal opinion. In many cases, points of view can be misinterpreted 
based on the frame of reference of the individual reviewing the 
nominee, either the public, Federal staff, or both. Also, we feel that 
this type of activity may make Federal agencies more vulnerable to 
litigation if potential nominees think that they were not selected 
because of their points of view rather than their expertise. We think 
this practice might not be acceptable to our nation's scientific 
community.

We feel that it is more appropriate to base the selection of members on 
the scientific expertise needed for each committee. For instance, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has a vast number of scientific and 
technical advisory committees. NIH first seeks balance in the area of 
scientific expertise but also considers several other factors: 
geographic, ethnic, gender, minority status, bias, and orderly 
rotation, that helps to ensure that committees are balanced in terms of 
points of view. For example, when NIH seeks to recruit scientists to 
serve on a committee looking at human genetics issues, they try to 
recruit a diverse group of individuals with varied backgrounds to bring 
balance to this committee. Therefore, NIH might look for experts with 
specialties in human genetics, ethics, law, psychology, molecular 
biology, public health, social sciences, bio-terrorism, forensics, 
healthcare, and other relevant fields. We believe that such diversity 
in the selection process would invariably ensure diverse points of view 
and balance.

HHS agrees with GAO's recommendation that advisory committee operations 
and member appointments should be a transparent process. We believe in 
the public notification process and feel that the public should be 
privy to advisory committee activities. We also agree that it is in the 
best interest of both the public and the Government to disclose 
information about the 
formation and operation of advisory committees. Although the public 
notice process to obtain comments on proposed candidates might be 
feasible for some HHS committees, it would not be workable for all of 
them. Unlike EPA with 24 committees, HHS had 234 active committees in 
2003 and various subcommittee structures within these committees. Some 
HHS agencies are limited by legislation in terms of the appointment 
process. For example, most of NIH's national advisory councils are 
established under Section 406 (284a] (c) of the Public Health Service 
Act. This law requires that the Secretary, HHS, fill all national 
advisory council vacancies within 90 days from the date the vacancy 
occurs. Soliciting public input could gravely delay each committee's 
ability to meet the requirements of this law, accomplish its charge and 
appoint its members. It could also seriously increase administrative 
costs for staff and contract support to handle this function.

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires that membership be 
"fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the 
functions to be performed by the advisory committee." This is reflected 
in the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) advisory committee 
regulations (see 21 CFR 14.40(f)(2)). The FDA has 31 of the HHS 
advisory committees, all highly technical. The draft report also states 
that, for science and technical committees, viewpoint balance is 
appropriately achieved by obtaining a variety of scientific expertise 
and perspectives. FDA agrees and its advisory committee regulations 
have adopted this approach. For technical committees, the agency must 
ensure that prospective members have expertise in the subject matter 
with which the committee is concerned and that they have diverse 
professional education, training, and experience (see 21 CFR 
14.80(b)(1)(i)). However, the draft report implies that agencies should 
also screen for policy views, as a way to ensure impartiality. FDA does 
not screen for policy views on technical committees; rather, its 
approach follows the National Academy of Sciences' recommendation that 
appointments to scientific advisory committees be based solely on a 
person's scientific or clinical expertise or his or her commitment to 
and involvement in issues of relevance to the agency's mission. While 
FDA does not screen for policy views on technical committees, 
prospective members are subject to conflict of interest restrictions, 
as established by Congress, and the agency may remove a member who 
demonstrates a bias that interferes with the ability to render 
objective advice (see 21 CFR 14.80(f)).

GAO's draft report cites EPA as the benchmark to which all other 
agencies should aspire. A previous GAO report criticized the advisory 
committee practices of EPA. It was the FDA that assisted in the 
remediation of the EPA advisory committees. The draft report does not 
recognize this effort on the part of FDA.

In the interest of transparency, GAO's draft report states that 
agencies could make more information available on the operations of 
advisory committees. FDA's selection process is clearly spelled out in 
its regulation as well as in every Federal Register notice calling for 
'nominations. On a product specific meeting, a disclosure form with a 
scope and type of conflict is disclosed and signed by the member. For a 
general matters meeting, it is disclosed that waivers are granted and 
the impact will be minimized by the fact that large segments of 
industry will be impacted in the same way. FDA regulations also state 
that if the discussion turns specific, either additional waivers will 
be issued or the meeting will cease. FDA may be the only 
agency that posts, on the web, a Conflict of Interest algorithmic 
document that demonstrates exactly how the agency makes decisions 
relative to the scope and magnitude of a conflict.

FDA stands behind its work to ensure that the advisory committees are 
balanced, not only demographically, but by scientific point-of-view. In 
addition, FDA makes every effort to ensure that all its committees have 
its stakeholders represented i.e., academics, industry, patient 
advocates and consumer advocacy groups. FDA is secure in the knowledge 
that it makes every effort to have an open process of member 
recruitment, of conflict of interest matters and of balance to achieve 
the recruitment of the best scientists to provide the most cutting edge 
scientific advice for its regulatory process.

It is departmental policy to avoid excessively long individual service 
on advisory committees. The 2002 roster for Childhood Lead Prevention 
and Poisoning Advisory Committee included twelve individuals serving 
expired terms, some of them serving on terms overdue since 1998. As 
noted in the report, the Office of the White House Liaison has enforced 
that all advisory committee members serve no longer than 180 days 
beyond the expiration of their terms to ensure a proper turnover of 
committee members, which the Department believes contributes to 
maintaining independent and balanced advisory committees.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity to be a part of this review and 
find the report's recommendations of great value. HHS advisory 
committees play an integral role in developing health and science 
policy for the nation and the world and determining the scientific 
merit of future research. We will continue to review and evaluate each 
of the ideas presented in the report to identify those that may be 
implemented for our advisory committees. In addition, since the NIH has 
145 of the HHS advisory committees, they have volunteered to work with 
GSA to assist them in implementing the 12 recommendations noted in the 
report. 

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Health and Human 
Services's letter dated March 19, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. The draft and final reports identify processes that include an 
evaluation of potential members' points of view relevant to the subject 
matters advisory committees will consider while focusing on the 
relevant expertise needed. Thus, it is not accurate to characterize the 
report as espousing "a process based on seeking out some indefinable 
range of personal opinion." The examples in the report of agency 
processes include targeted evaluations of points of view that ask 
potential members if they have made public statements or taken 
positions on the issue or matters the committee will consider, 
including expert legal testimony on the issue or matters. The processes 
cited also ask the potential members to identify and describe any 
reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters before 
the committee and any reason their impartiality in the identified 
matter might be questioned. We have added the phrase "regarding the 
subject matters being considered" in several other places in the final 
report in which we discuss determining the viewpoints of potential 
members for further clarity on this point. The report also points out 
that if agencies use a systematic, consistent, and transparent approach 
to obtaining relevant information from prospective committee members, 
it is unlikely they would approve questions that are generally 
inappropriate in a professional working environment, such as questions 
about party affiliations or political viewpoints that some committee 
members have reported being asked. In our view, agencies that do not 
proactively and transparently address the relevant points of view of 
prospective committee members regarding the matters the committees will 
consider are more likely to be subject to questions about committee 
balance from the public and users of the committees' products than 
those agencies that use such processes. That is, even if agencies 
choose to either not identify or acknowledge relevant public positions 
its committee members have taken on matters the committees will 
consider, others are often aware of such positions and are likely to 
raise questions about them. Such circumstances can have a negative 
impact on the credibility of the specific committees involved and on 
federal advisory committees overall. We believe this practice has been 
the case regarding some HHS federal advisory committees about which 
scientists and others have expressed concerns. Finally, in terms of 
HHS's concern that obtaining information on relevant points of view 
might not be acceptable to the nation's scientific community, our 
report shows that both the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain 
such relevant information from its prospective members.

2. The report identifies the practice of soliciting public input on 
nominations to advisory committees, used by the National Academies and 
some federal advisory committees, as one that can be helpful in 
ensuring an appropriate balance of points of view of committees, 
particularly those that address sensitive and controversial matters. 
Agencies can determine whether to use this tool on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, we do not disagree with HHS's comment that obtaining 
comments on proposed candidates might be feasible for some HHS 
committees but not workable for all of them.

3. Although we agree with HHS that FDA should emphasize technical 
qualifications when selecting advisory committee members, we also 
believe that it is important for agencies to assess prospective members 
for viewpoints that they have that are relevant to the work of the 
committee (see also comment 1). HHS says that FDA follows the National 
Academy of Sciences' recommendation that the appointment of members to 
scientific advisory committees be based primarily on expertise and 
involvement in relevant issues. This report notes that the academies 
also seek to determine, through a few simple questions, whether there 
is any reason to believe that the impartiality of members or 
prospective members might be questioned.

4. EPA made changes in how it manages the Science Advisory Board in 
response to the specific recommendations in our 2001 report.[Footnote 
65] We did not attempt to determine any role FDA may have had in 
assisting EPA, but we note that EPA, unlike FDA, revised its processes 
for achieving overall balance in terms of points of view, expressly 
integrating it with its reviews for potential conflicts of interest and 
obtaining relevant information prior to the appointment of committee 
members.

5.We agree that FDA provides useful information about its selection 
process, but we continue to believe that FDA and the other agencies 
could improve their processes for balancing committees. The draft and 
final reports highlight FDA policies for public notice of waivers. We 
note that the selection and waiver processes used by FDA are not used 
by HHS, CDC, and NIH.

[End of section]

Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

United States Department of the Interior:

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
Washington, DC 20240:

MAR 18 2004:

Christine Fishkin 
Assistant Director 
Natural Resources and Environment 
United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Re: DOI Comments on GAO Draft Report on Advisory Committees:

Dear Ms. Fishkin:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the GAO's draft report 
entitled, "Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help 
Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance.":

We agree with much in the report; it contains many useful 
recommendations that can be used to enhance the successful use of 
advisory committees. However, the Department has a number of general 
and specific concerns with the GAO analysis.

Enclosed please find DOI's response. If you have any additional 
questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

P. Lynn Scarlett:

Department of the Interior Comments on GAO Draft Report on Advisory 
Committees:

Following are the Department's response to the GAO's draft report 
entitled, "Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help 
Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance.":

We agree with much in the report; it contains many useful 
recommendations that can be used to enhance the successful use of 
advisory committees. However, we note that the GAO's focus on 
scientific advisory committees ignored the wide ranging purposes and 
programs for which advisory committees are used in many agencies, such 
as managing public lands and natural resources. As a result, many of 
the report's recommendations and observations about independence and 
balance of committees, while useful, have limited applicability in non-
science settings. GAO should clearly identify the purpose and scope of 
this report as focusing on science committees.

The Department strongly disagrees with GAO's basic approach to the 
concept of balance that is required under the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA). The GAO's approach reflects neither actual 
experience nor practical considerations associated with creating, 
staffing, and managing advisory committees under the FACA. On page one, 
and throughout the report, GAO repeats the basic point that 
"Specifically, individual committee members providing advice to the 
government must be free from significant conflicts of interest - that 
is, they must be independent." It is not clear exactly where the 
report's apparent requirement that individual committee members be 
"independent" originates. In Section 5 of the FACA, Congressional 
committees are directed to "...assure that the advice and 
recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately 
influenced by the appointing authority or any special interest, but 
will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent 
judgment." Though this statutory requirement, by its terms, is not 
applicable to discretionary committees established by agency heads, it 
is repeated verbatim in the GSA regulations at 41 C.F.R. § 102-
3.105(g), as a responsibility of agency heads for committees they 
establish. An "independent" committee member is simply never discussed.

The report's focus on "independence" of individual committee members 
has several practical and conceptual difficulties. First, it does not 
accurately reflect the FACA's and the regulations' requirement that the 
advisory committee itself remain free from inappropriate influence and 
that its recommendations result from its independent judgment. There is 
no guarantee that a committee made of "independent" members will also 
be a committee that is not inappropriately influenced by the appointing 
authority, or that the committee is acting on its independent judgment. 
The more logical way to implement these provisions would focus on the 
operation of the committee itself , ensuring that the appointing 
authority does not mandate any particular results from the committee 
members and that the committee is not structured in such a way as to 
give any special interest control over its advice. For example, 
although consensus is often desired on advisory committees, mandating a 
unanimous vote in support of committee advice would enable a single 
member to thwart other members of the committee by refusing to support 
the other member's preferred advice. This would not only be 
inappropriate influence, but it would also prevent the committee from 
giving its independent judgment, as it would make the committee 
potentially beholden to a single member.

The report unnecessarily focuses on a requirement for membership that 
does not exist, i.e., "independence." The report therefore detracts 
from addressing the membership requirement that does exist: that the 
committee be fairly balanced in its membership in the points of view to 
be represented and the functions to be performed. Once again, this 
requirement only goes to the balance of the committee as a whole, 
though the balance may only be addressed by reference to the "points of 
view" of individual committee members, i.e., there is balance on a 
committee when a member with a particular "point of view" is on a 
committee with others with differing or conflicting points of view. The 
relevant question is how to determine what "point of view" to attribute 
to a member and how to distinguish one point of view from another, to 
reasonably assure balance on the committee as a whole. Using 
"independence" as a criteria for membership at best does not help this 
analysis, and at worst it confuses the issue and hinders an agency in 
seeking the requisite balance on its committees.

The report defines "independence" as freedom from "significant 
conflicts of interest," a definition that appears to conflate the 
ethics requirements applicable to Federal employees (including SGEs) 
and some concern over complaints about certain advisory committee 
members into an entirely new, inappropriate, and unworkable standard. 
There is nowhere in the ethics rules that states that even full-time 
Federal employees must be free from "conflicts of interest," let alone 
"significant conflicts of interest." The system instead is set up to 
identify the financial interests that may lead to conflict (primarily 
via financial disclosure reports), and then instructs employees: 1) to 
avoid participating personally and substantially in particular matters 
that may directly and predictably affect their financial interests (18 
U.S.C. § 208); and 2) to avoid "participating" in a particular matter 
involving specific parties in circumstances where a reasonable person 
may question their impartiality (5 C.F.R. § 2635.502). In each case, 
the agency may nonetheless authorize participation. Further, " 
substantial" conflicts (those materially impairing the employee's 
performance of official duties or requiring disqualification too often) 
are dealt with by divesting the interest. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.403(b). 
The report attempts to short-circuit this system by imposing the vague 
"independence" standard on advisory committee members, as some sort of 
appointment requirement.

The report's emphasis on the "independent" committee member standard 
ignores the agencies' ability to work with committee members to ensure 
that they do not violate the ethics rules. As set forth in the system 
described above, the question of whether or not a member should 
participate in a particular committee function is properly resolved on 
a case-by-case basis, evaluating the nature of the committee action and 
the nature of the financial interest involved. For example, it is not 
clear when casting one vote out of a number of committee member votes 
that results in a committee's advice to a Federal agency will be 
"personally and substantially" participating in a matter sufficient to 
trigger the conflict of interest statute. The question of whether a 
particular piece of advice will "directly and predictably" affect a 
financial interest also should be closely considered. Should an actual 
conflict exist, the agency should be able to determine whether to 
authorize participation, as it could with other matters in which 
employees are involved. Accordingly, the report should focus more on 
how an agency may effectively address ethics-related issues in terms of 
participation of members in committee activities and in terms of how to 
articulate, achieve, and publicly support the fair balance of its 
committees.

Imposing "independence" as an appointment requirement does not help an 
agency bring the requisite balance to a committee. It will necessarily 
be very difficult, and ultimately not worthwhile, to attempt to 
determine whether a committee member or the committee member's "point 
of view" is "independent," whatever that means. The report recommends 
that agencies identify and systematically collect and evaluate 
information pertinent to determining "points of view" of committee 
members. Scientific advisory committee members are generally chosen for 
their expertise and objective understanding of the science involved and 
not on the basis of perceived "points of view." This is not really the 
relevant question. The relevant question is whether a committee has 
balance in terms of the points of view to be represented and the 
functions to be performed. The report would be more useful if it would 
focus on suggestions regarding how to help agencies define and achieve 
such balance in points of view when exercising their discretion in 
committee appointments.

Departmental officials have informed your staff of the many steps we 
have taken over the past 18 months to improve the way we identify and 
appoint advisory committee members as special government employees. I 
understand that this information was shared with you at one of your 
initial meetings at the Department in June of 2003. The draft report 
repeatedly states, however, that this information was provided only in 
January of this year. It is important that GAO properly acknowledge the 
efforts the Department is undertaking in this area.

Our other specific comments are set forth below.

P. 4: Last sentence: It is inaccurate to single out three agencies to 
say they "do not conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members 
appointed as representatives." First, it is unlikely that any agency 
does this for representatives, not just these three. Second, given the 
differing levels of ethics screening that may be done (such as for BLM 
Resource Advisory Councils), the more accurate statement is that 
agencies do not collect and review OGE Form 450s (or other approved 
form) for representatives. We recommend that this substitution be made 
throughout the report or else define "conflict-of-interest reviews" as 
a term of art meaning use of the OGE Form 450 or similar form.

P. 8: Last paragraph, second sentence: GAO ignores the authority of 
agency heads to exercise discretion under their organic statutes to 
create advisory committees that are not expressly authorized by 
Congress or by a president.

P. 16: The definitions on this page and on page 17 should be clarified 
as early as possible in the report to ensure that readers understand 
the two categories of membership (representatives and special 
government employees).

P. 20: Last paragraph: GAO significantly misconstrues DOI's "agency 
culture," not only on this page but throughout the draft report. With 
the majority of its committees advising the Secretary on the management 
of public lands, DOI historically has strongly believed that its 
committees members should represent local stakeholders. Thus the 
practice of appointing representatives is based on decisions strongly 
rooted in DOI's authorities, responsibilities and philosophies. 
Ignoring the appropriate use of representatives, GAO 
repeatedly assumes without factual support that most representatives 
should have been appointed as SGEs.

P. 21: GAO's generalization that representation of fields of expertise 
is not appropriate ignores the importance of such representation to 
some committees. However, we agree that agencies have proper guidance 
in how and when to use such expertise.

P. 24: First paragraph: Reference to DOI's efforts to add ethics 
language to all FACA charters misleadingly suggests that DOI began this 
effort in January 2004. GAO is aware that DOI began this effort in 2003 
in response to OGE's 2002 study.

P. 25: First paragraph: In paraphrasing DOI officials regarding the 
tendency "to err on the side of continuing with representative 
appointments," GAO omitted important information that was presented in 
the same discussion. That is, where the purpose of the committee is to 
advise the Secretary on the management of public lands or other 
resources, the Department firmly believes the views of local 
stakeholders are essential to sound and useful advice. In such cases, 
DOI is likely to continue to appoint representatives. In doing so, it 
does not "err," especially if an authorizing statute does not restrict 
the Secretary's discretion to do so. Rather, GAO errs by invoking OGE's 
guidance without regard to the stated purpose of the advisory 
committee.

Second paragraph: GAO agrees that the statute authorizing the National 
Cooperative Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee "calls for the 
committee to include ... representatives," but then goes on to say the 
statute does not "clearly and unambiguously call for these members to 
be appointed as representatives rather than special government 
employees." Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, the Secretary 
reasonably may interpret such a statute by relying on its plain 
language, especially where the Secretary desires representative advice 
to assist a committee's function.

P. 27 - 35: The report continually confuses the distinctly separate 
concerns for balance and avoiding financial conflicts of interest. 
Additionally, GAO's positions regarding a committee's balance and 
perceived objectivity when compared to points of view of its members 
are simply unrealistic and impractical, and unrelated to the actual 
functioning of advisory committees. The kinds of inquiries into the 
biases and points of view of potential appointees recommended by GAO is 
intrusive, of little practical utility, and will turn qualified 
individuals away from government service. GAO apparently has a single 
concept of how to achieve balance and seems to ignore the FACA's 
requirement that committees be balanced based on the function they are 
called upon to perform. Further, representatives are placed on 
committees precisely because of their stated representative interests; 
because they are not subject to the ethics rules, it is illogical to 
assert that their participation is improper on the basis of bias. GAO's 
view that agencies cannot properly balance their committees without 
understanding all perceived biases of all members is simply fallacious. 
Finally, as the report notes on p. 37, courts have interpreted the FACA 
as giving agencies broad discretion on how to balance their committees.

Additionally, the report should note that a committee of 
representatives may obtain "expert 
advice" from individuals with scientific or technical expertise. For 
example, a scientific or technical expert may be invited to a meeting 
of the committee or its working groups to provide expert guidance to 
assist the representatives in formulating their advice to the federal 
government. Describing such options might help organizations and others 
to understand that representative membership can also be effective in 
providing useful, technically accurate, and unbiased advice to the 
federal government.

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of the Interior's 
letter dated March 18, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. This report states, as did the draft, that while our report focuses 
primarily on scientific and technical federal advisory committees, the 
limitations in guidance and the promising practices we identified 
pertaining to independence and balance are pertinent to federal 
advisory committees in general. This report and the draft also 
identified the wide range of issues addressed by federal advisory 
committees, including managing federal lands and natural resources.

2. The background section of the report and the draft acknowledged the 
FACA requirement that committees not be inappropriately influenced by 
the appointing authority or any special interest. However, the draft 
report also clearly stated that in addressing independence, our focus 
was on the requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that 
are included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes, unless 
specifically noted otherwise. In our introduction, we state that 
"federal advisory committee members who are employees of the federal 
government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from 
conflicts of interest--which we refer to in this report as 
independence--and committees as a whole must meet the requirements 
pertaining to balance." Thus, we use the term "independence" as 
shorthand for the conflict-of-interest requirements to which individual 
committee members must adhere. We further highlight the key provisions 
of the federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied 
with, including a description of the ability of an individual who has a 
conflict of interest to nonetheless participate on a committee if 
granted a waiver. Alternatively, an individual may divest the financial 
interest.

We note that all federal employees are prohibited not only from holding 
financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of 
duty, as Interior suggests in its comments, but also from engaging in 
outside employment or activities that conflict with their official 
duties and responsibilities. See 18 U.S.C. § 208, 5 C.F.R. §§ 
2635.101(b)(2), and 2635.101(a)(10). Further, employees are also 
required to avoid any action that creates the appearance that they are 
violating the law or ethics standards. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14). It 
is precisely because these obligations are imposed only on employees 
that it is crucial to ensure that FACA committee members are 
appropriately characterized as "representatives" or special government 
employees. Both special government employees and representatives should 
be evaluated for biases to ensure that the FACA committees as a whole 
are balanced. Special government employees must also be subject to a 
conflict-of-interest review, including an analysis of whether their 
nongovernment activities and employment present a conflict or create 
"the appearance that they are violating…ethics standards." 5 C.F.R. § 
2635.101(b)(14).

3. We agree that the question of whether a member should participate in 
a particular committee function (or whether they should be appointed to 
a particular committee) is properly resolved on a case-by-base basis, 
evaluating the nature of the committee action or work and the nature of 
the financial interest involved. Further, the draft and final reports 
recognize that agencies may grant waivers to members to serve on 
advisory committees upon determining that either (1) the conflict is 
insignificant or (2) the need for the member's expertise outweighs the 
conflict. The draft and final reports also discuss some promising 
practices regarding the disclosure of such waivers to the public and 
among committee members.

4. The draft and final reports discuss in considerable detail 
information that can help agencies ensure committees are balanced and 
provide examples of promising practices that would better ensure the 
balance of advisory committees.

5. We agree that a relevant question for federal advisory committees is 
whether a committee has balance in terms of points of view to be 
represented and the functions to be performed. Our report provides 
examples of promising practices used by other agencies and the National 
Academies that can help agencies define and achieve an appropriate 
balance of points of view.

6. Our draft and final reports state that at the start of our review, 
Interior officials told us that they had begun to review their 
appointment classifications for the 115 advisory committees as a result 
of the November 2002 OGE study. The draft and final reports also state 
that the department has been reviewing the appointments to committees 
as their charters expire. We do indicate that in January 2004, Interior 
officials acknowledged that it was appropriate to change the nature of 
some appointments upon reexamination. This was the first time any 
results of the reviews were communicated to us. Further, Interior 
notified us of the decision to change the appointments to the 
earthquake studies committee on January 16, 2004, subsequent to our 
meeting on January 12, 2004.

7. We revised the report to indicate that agencies do not conduct 
conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as representatives 
because conflict-of-interest reviews are only required for federal or 
special government employees. Thus, we removed any unintended 
implication that other agencies do more than the three we are reporting 
on in this report in terms of representative appointments. In our draft 
and final reports we indicate that the ethics screening vis-à-vis 
representatives done by one bureau of the department (Bureau of Land 
Management) is not sufficient to constitute a conflict-of-interest 
review for those appointed as special government employees. In this 
section, we are discussing those members who were appointed as 
representatives but who would be more appropriately appointed as 
special government employees.

8. We modified the language in the report to more clearly describe the 
authorities under which committees may be formed.

9. The draft and final reports define the two categories of 
appointments on page 1.

10. The draft and final reports state on page 1 that members of federal 
advisory committees may be appointed as (1) special government 
employees to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of 
their best judgment or (2) representatives to provide stakeholder 
advice. We do not take issue with representative appointments when the 
members are, in fact, appointed to represent a particular interest or 
view of an entity or group with an interest in the matter before the 
committees, and they are fully informed as to the point of view or 
interest they are to represent. Further, the reports state that 
Interior officials noted that many of their committees addressing 
federal land management issues are not scientific and technical in 
content and, in their view, are appropriately staffed with 
representative members. The reports do indicate that committees 
classified as scientific and technical, as well as others that address 
scientific and technical issues, are those for which advice on behalf 
of the government on the basis of members' best judgment is typically 
sought, rather than stakeholder advice. Interior has 11 committees with 
288 members that are classified by the agency as scientific and 
technical committees in GSA's FACA database, and some other committees 
not so classified also address scientific and technical issues.

11. We are not certain what Interior means in stating that "GAO's 
generalization that representation of fields of expertise is not 
appropriate ignores the importance of such representation to some 
committees." However, the comment does suggest that Interior continues 
to believe that it is appropriate to appoint members to represent their 
field of expertise as representatives, rather than as special 
government employees. We and OGE disagree with this interpretation of 
OGE's guidance on appointments to advisory committees. Representatives 
are to espouse a particular point of view of a party with an interest 
in the matter, whereas experts having specific expertise provide advice 
on behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment. Thus, 
experts in various fields are more appropriately appointed as special 
government employees. (Subsequent to sending its comment letter, 
Interior clarified that the second sentence of this comment should read 
"However, we agree that agencies should have proper guidance in how and 
when to use such expertise.".): 

12. We have removed the reference to January 2004 in this instance, 
reporting that Interior officials told us that they have begun to 
insert standard language in the charters regarding the ethics 
obligations of the members. See also comment 6.

13. On the basis of a January 2004 discussion with Interior officials, 
we understood the officials to say that in reviewing their appointment 
designations as committee charters expire, the agency was erring on the 
side of representative appointments when the information relevant to 
the committee was ambiguous on the issue of appointments. However, in 
its comments, Interior officials said they disagreed with our 
characterization of their previous comments, and we have deleted the 
statement from the report. In its comments, Interior officials said 
that the agency was likely to continue to appoint representatives to 
committees whose purpose is to advise the Secretary on the management 
of public lands or other resources as they are seeking the views of 
local stakeholders in these instances. As noted above, we do not take 
issue with representative appointments when the members are, in fact, 
appointed to represent a particular interest or view of an entity or 
group with an interest in the matter before the committees, and they 
are fully informed as to the point of view or interest they are to 
represent.

14. Interior states that "GAO agrees that the statute authorizing the 
National Cooperative Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee 'calls for the 
committee to include…representatives,' but then goes on to state that 
the statute does not 'clearly and unambiguously call for these members 
to be appointed as representatives rather than special government 
employees.'." Interior then characterizes our statements as a 
contradiction and said that the Secretary of the Interior "reasonably 
may interpret such a statute by relying on its plain language….". In 
our draft and final reports, we indicate that the statute did not 
appear to clearly mandate that the members be appointed as 
representatives--that is, it may be using the term "representative" 
generically--and we further noted that is not clear what point of view 
the private-sector and academia members could be called upon to provide 
if appointed as representatives. We continue to believe this statute 
does not clearly and unambiguously call for representative appointments 
and that this example underscores the need for OGE clarification 
regarding the use of the term representative, as we recommend.

15. As the draft and final reports state, FACA requires that all 
committees be balanced overall in terms of both points of view 
represented and the function to be performed. In our view, in order for 
advisory committees to be effective, it is important that they are, and 
are perceived as being, balanced. The draft and final reports identify 
processes that include an evaluation of potential members' points of 
view relevant to the subject matters advisory committees will consider 
while focusing on the relevant expertise needed. The examples in the 
reports of agency processes that include such targeted evaluations of 
points of view ask potential members if they have made public 
statements or taken positions on the issue or matters the committee 
will consider, including expert legal testimony on the issue or 
matters. They also ask the potential members to identify and describe 
any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters 
before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the 
identified mater might be questioned. We disagree with Interior's view 
that these inquiries would be intrusive, of little practical utility, 
and would turn qualified individuals away from government service. We 
also disagree with Interior's view that we are saying that agencies 
need to understand all perceived biases of advisory committee members. 
As shown above, the information identified as relevant to members' 
points of view is targeted and focuses on their points of view relevant 
to the subject matter to be considered. We disagree that such inquiries 
will turn qualified individuals away from government service, evidenced 
by the fact that the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain such 
relevant information from its prospective members. Finally, we 
recognize that representatives are placed on committees because of 
their stated stakeholder interests and do not assert that participation 
of representatives is improper.

16. We agree that committees, whether composed of representatives or 
special government employees, may invite outside experts to provide 
information or guidance. However, that does not affect the obligation 
agencies have to make appropriate decisions about appointing members as 
either representatives or special government employees.

[End of section]

Appendix XVI: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

Office of the Administrator 
Washington, DC 20546-0001:

March 26, 2004:

Ms. Robin M. Nazzaro 
Director:

Natural Resources and Environment 
United States General Accounting Office 
Room 2T23:

441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Nazzaro:

NASA has reviewed the draft GAO report, Federal Advisory Committees: 
Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and 
Balance (GAO-04-328). Advisory committees serve an important role for 
NASA and the agency appreciates the effort to strengthen the 
independence and balance of these committees.

The overall conclusion that agencies could benefit from additional 
guidance to better ensure independence, balance, and transparency is 
sound. However, NASA is concerned about the implications of the finding 
that would limit the use of representative appointments for advisory 
committees to those persons who represent specific organizations, 
rather than a community at large (e.g., industry, education, or a 
particular field of scientific research). It is important that NASA 
retain the flexibility to use representatives who do not represent 
specific stakeholders. This is because individual stakeholder 
organizations would not necessarily be in a position to represent the 
overall interests of a broader community, and neither would their 
employees. Finally, since each community at large is itself comprised 
of individual organizations or stakeholders (for example, particular 
universities or trade groups, in the case of education), advisory 
committee members appointed as Special Government Employees rather than 
representatives would be precluded by the conflict of interest laws 
from participating in any discussion relating to their own 
organization, and by extension their community at large. This would 
effectively eliminate the perspective they were appointed to provide.

In conclusion, in order to permit agencies to receive the views of 
entire communities, not just individual organizations, the draft 
recommendation should be modified to request that the Office of 
Government Ethics' guidance allow for the appointment of 
representatives of stakeholder communities as well as individual 
stakeholder organizations. Mr. Andrew Falcon, NASA's 
Advisory Committee Management Officer, is available to discuss this 
matter further, and can be reached at (202) 358-2465.

I look forward to receiving a copy of the final report when available.

Cordially,

Signed by: 

Frederick D. Gregory, Deputy Administrator: 

The following are GAO's comments on the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's letter dated March 26, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. NASA's comments support the appointment of federal advisory 
committee members as representative of their fields of expertise on the 
basis that some experts would not be able to serve as special 
government employees due to financial conflicts of interest. First, 
this view conflicts with OGE's and our view that representatives are 
not appropriately appointed to represent fields of expertise (see 
comment 2 below). Second, this view does not recognize that agencies 
may grant waivers to members to serve on advisory committees upon 
determining that either (1) the conflict is insignificant or (2) the 
need for the member's expertise outweighs the conflict.[Footnote 66] 
Our draft and final reports discuss waivers and some promising 
practices regarding the disclosure of such waivers to the public and 
among committee members.

2. NASA also recommends that the OGE guidance allow for the appointment 
of representatives of "stakeholder communities" as well as individual 
stakeholder organizations. NASA identifies those that may represent a 
community as industry, education, or a particular field of expertise. 
We note that OGE guidance on representative appointments states that 
representatives may speak for stakeholders--that is, firms or an 
industry, labor or agriculture, or for any other recognizable group of 
persons with an interest in the matter under consideration. Thus, we 
believe that NASA can appoint experts as representatives to provide the 
views of, for example, the aerospace industry--if these experts are to 
provide stakeholder advice on matters in which the aerospace industry 
has an interest. If, however, NASA wants such experts to provide advice 
on behalf of the government on the basis of their individual and expert 
judgment, the appointments would be appropriately made as special 
government employees. These individuals would then be reviewed for 
potential financial conflicts of interest; if conflicts were 
identified, the conflicts would require mitigation. Regarding NASA's 
support for representatives providing the views of "stakeholder 
communities," we continue to believe that fields of expertise generally 
are not appropriately considered to be stakeholder communities. 
Specifically, fields of expertise may be defined as a stakeholder 
community only in instances where the subject matter a committee is 
addressing would have a particular impact on a field of expertise--for 
example, biologists, teachers, or doctors--but not in cases where the 
experts are called upon to provide expert advice on the basis of their 
individual judgment.

[End of section]

Appendix XVII: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Dr. Robin M. Nazzaro 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment 
General Accounting Office 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Department of Energy 
Office of Science 
Washington, DC 20585:

APR 01 2004:

Office of the Director:

Dear Dr. Nazzaro:

In response to your letter of March 3, 2004 inviting comment on the 
proposed report Federal Advisory Committees Additional Guidance Could 
Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance (the Report), the 
Department of Energy (DOE) is pleased to submit three general sets of 
comments:

1. We are concerned about the implications of the "one-size-fits-all" 
approach that is being advocated in this Report. In particular, the 
special role that the Office of Science's six standing Advisory 
Committees play, within the U.S. scientific enterprise is not 
recognized and their overall effectiveness could be diminished if GAO 
recommendations are followed.

2. The suggestions made by GAO to change the way that DOE selects 
Advisory Committee members should be implemented only if they would 
result in clearly defined benefits for DOE programs. Without that clear 
articulation of benefits, which we believe is absent in this Report, 
DOE should continue to select members according to our specific needs 
and circumstances.

3. GAO's interpretation of the term "representative" is unpersuasive and 
would be an unsound basis of guidance for the Department.

"One-Size-Fits-All" Approach:

The Report correctly notes that DOE views members of its scientific 
Advisory Committees as representatives, in contrast to persons who 
provide individually-centered advice on behalf of the government who 
should become special government employees and concludes that this 
practice:

". . . exposes the relevant committees to potentially serious problems. 
Because representative members are not subject to reviews for potential 
conflicts of interest, allegation of conflicts of interest may call 
into question the integrity of the committee and jeopardize the 
credibility of the committee's work.":

Report at 23 [NOTE 1]:

While this critique of government-wide Advisory Committees, generally, 
may be meritorious, applying it to DOE's Office of Science (SC) 
Advisory Committees appears to stem from a misunderstanding of SC's 
unique structure and how its scientific advisory committees assist in 
accomplishing DOE's vital national missions. This critique also fails 
to note the many self-regulating mechanisms inherent within the SC 
Advisory Committee structure that greatly diminish, or even eliminate, 
the potential for conflicts of interest.

DOE's basic research portfolio, which is managed by SC, is organized 
according to scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry, mathematics, 
etc.). This organizational structure - which is manifested through SC's 
budget categories, office structures, personnel assignments, etc. - is 
critical to understanding why SC's Advisory Committee members are 
inherently representative.

The reason we say this is that SC's Advisory Committees are focused on 
the health of specific scientific disciplines. It might surprise you to 
learn that although more than 50% of SC's research dollars go to DOE's 
national laboratories, only 15% of the total membership of SC's 
Advisory Committees comes from those laboratories. The majority of 
representatives come from universities (65%), non-profits and other 
parts of the U.S. scientific community who have a stronger interest in 
the overall health of the disciplines that they represent than in the 
institutions that perform the research. As an example, the Nuclear 
Science Advisory Committee's charter states:

"Committee members shall be appointed with a view towards achieving 
balanced representation of the various subfields involved in basic 
nuclear science research by the Secretary of Energy following 
nomination by the Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy, 
with concurrence of the Assistant Director, Mathematical and Physical 
Sciences Directorate, National Science Foundation.":

As a final note on this subject, we would invite you to speak 
individually with the SC Advisory Committee Chairs and Members and ask 
them if they believe that a Member's potential conflict of interest 
would escape the attention of other 
Committee Members or the SC professional program managers for very 
long. We believe you would find that conflicts of interest are simply 
not an issue for the reasons cited above.

Selection of Committee Membership:

The Report urges agencies to obtain Committee members via a public 
process such as Federal Register notice. Here too, we believe that a 
one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate.

In certain areas pertinent to its Advisory Committees, DOE funds and/or 
directly conducts all or virtually all United States research. This is 
particularly true for SC's Advisory Committees in Nuclear Physics, 
Fusion and High Energy Physics. These Committees provide advice to SC 
programs that support 90-100% of total Federal R&D in these scientific 
disciplines.

Their knowledge of their fields is such that the SC program managers 
and Advisory Committee Members know the research areas and credentials 
of all of the leading scientists in their field. In addition, the 
program managers are often aware of the personal biases, work ethic and 
degree of frankness that key players may bring to the Advisory 
Committee so that they are especially well qualified to select a 
balanced committee. A public selection process would not result in the 
selection of more appropriate members nor a more balanced committee. 
For this reason alone, DOE's current selection practice should be 
maintained.

But there is another compelling reason that DOE's processes for 
selection of Advisory Committees should not be changed - neither GAO 
nor any other study group has ever provided a rationale for change that 
would result in higher quality advice from the SC Advisory Committees. 
SC Advisory Committees, for the most part, have been in existence for 
decades. They perform their functions admirably and it is deemed a 
great honor within the U.S. scientific community to serve - without 
compensation - on these Committees. To our knowledge, no one who 
understands how they truly function has ever asserted that these 
Committees are anything less then superb and appropriate for the work 
that they do and the role that they perform within DOE and the U.S. 
scientific enterprise. Changing them for change's sake (or to force 
uniformity upon Federal advisory committees with widely ranging 
purposes) would be a serious error and could have significant (and 
adverse) consequences for the way that science is conducted in the 
United States.

Meaning of the Term "Representative":

The Report, at 21, states that "Office of Government Ethics guidance is 
overly-broad in that it states representatives may speak for an 
industry, or for labor or agriculture, or for any other recognizable 
group of persons including, on occasion, the public at large. We are 
concerned about the implications of this statement.":

DOE has certain Advisory Committees that it views as clearly 
representational in that they do speak for industries such as the 
National Coal Council and the National Petroleum Council, all of whose 
members are affiliated with energy companies or entities that have an 
organizational interest in the matters before the Councils. The 
Environmental Management Site Specific Advisory Board, which has many 
members who speak for the local public at large, was established to 
serve as a channel for communicating advice from the communities 
impacted by DOE activities. DOE is concerned that the report 
inadvertently and unnecessarily calls into question the use of 
representatives on these committees.

The Report, at 22, states that "at times the terms `represent' or 
`representative', when included in legislation or executive orders 
regarding the membership of advisory committees, does not always 
clearly indicate that the members are to be appointed to serve as 
representatives; sometimes these terms are used to define committee 
composition or balance." The Report does not cite the authority for its 
statement.

DOE is not persuaded of the soundness of this view as a source of 
guidance for the Department. Congress or the President use words like 
"expert" or "expertise" where it is intended for the members to be 
appointed as special government employees. Agencies should not be 
called on in this area to violate one of the basic rules of statutory 
construction and thereby to question the plain meaning of words.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Raymond L. Orbach, 
Director:

Office of Science:

NOTES: 

[1] DOE does not uniformly conclude that members of its advisory 
committees are "representative". When a member is selected for his or 
her expertise, as contrasted to being a representative, the member is 
appointed as a special government employee. For example, earlier this 
year, the Department determined that several individuals who were to be 
appointed to the Environmental Management Advisory Committee were 
selected because of their expertise in certain areas. These individuals 
will be serving on this Committee as special government employees.

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's letter 
dated April 1, 2004.

GAO Comments: 

1. The first issue that Energy identifies as being of concern vis-à-vis 
its perception of "GAO's advocacy of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach" 
is, in essence, the governmentwide application of OGE's criteria for 
representative appointments. That is, while Energy does not disagree 
that it may be generally inappropriate to appoint advisory committee 
members to represent various fields of expertise, the department 
believes it is appropriate for its Office of Science to do so on the 
basis of the agency's "unique structure." Specifically, Energy says 
that the Office of Science's advisory committee members are inherently 
representative because the department's basic research portfolio is 
managed according to scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry, 
mathematics) and the related advisory committees are "focused on the 
health of specific scientific disciplines." In our view, the 
department's research structure is not unique and does not provide a 
basis for appointing experts providing advice on the basis of their 
best judgment as representatives. For example, both the National 
Science Foundation and NASA manage research portfolios by scientific 
disciplines, and they generally appoint members to their scientific and 
technical advisory committees appropriately as special government 
employees.[Footnote 67] We believe Energy's comments support our view 
that OGE needs to clarify its guidance on representative appointments.

2. The second issue that Energy views as our advocacy of a "one-size-
fits-all" approach concerns obtaining input on the "selection of 
committee membership." Energy does not specify whether it is addressing 
(1) nominations for committee membership from the public, (2) comments 
on proposed committee membership, or (3) both of these practices. In 
any event, the draft and final reports identify these as promising 
practices that are particularly relevant to those committees addressing 
sensitive or controversial issues, and not as practices that should be 
applied to all committees.

3. Energy states that our interpretation of the term representative is 
unpersuasive and would be an unsound basis of guidance for the 
department. In elaborating on this perspective, the department makes 
two points. First, the department states that it has certain advisory 
committees, such as the National Coal Council and the National 
Petroleum Council, that it views as clearly representational in that 
the members do speak for energy companies or entities that have an 
organizational interest in the matter. Energy expresses concern that 
the report inadvertently and unnecessarily calls into question the use 
of representatives on these committees. We disagree. The draft and 
final reports state on page 1 that members of federal advisory 
committees may be appointed as (1) special government employees to 
provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best 
judgment or (2) representatives to provide stakeholder advice. We do 
not take issue with representative appointments when the members are, 
in fact, appointed to represent a particular interest or view of an 
entity or group with an interest in the matter before the committees, 
and they are fully informed as to the point of view or interest they 
are to represent. Second, Energy questions our view that use of the 
terms "represent" or "representative" regarding the membership of 
advisory committees does not always clearly indicate that the members 
are to be appointed to serve as representatives. In its comments on the 
draft report, OGE stated that its guidance does not imply that any use 
of the word "represent" or its cognate forms in a statute or other 
document means that the members of the committees are not special 
government employees. Further, OGE stated that its guidance makes clear 
that careful attention to all relevant factors is required in order to 
determine whether the committee members are actually intended to serve 
as representatives of interest groups. While OGE disagreed with our 
recommendation that its guidance needed to be clarified to state that 
the term representative in statutes and charters may be used more 
generically to identify the appropriate balance of points of view or 
expertise and may not be specifying that representative appointments be 
made, we believe Energy's comments on this point provide additional 
support for our recommendation.

4. The draft and final reports state that USDA, Energy, and Interior 
appoint most or all of the members to their federal advisory committees 
as representatives. We believe this statement accurately describes 
Energy's appointments. For example, our draft and final reports state 
that in April 2003, Energy's Acting Assistant General Counsel for 
General Law told us that all but one of the department's committees use 
only representatives members; we indicated that this one committee 
expired in June 2003. In its comments on the draft report, Energy 
identifies another committee for which DOE appointed several members in 
2004 as special government employees.

[End of section]

Appendix XVIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Robin Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841 Christine Fishkin, (202) 512-6895: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those individuals named above, Lindsay Bach, Ross 
Campbell, Bernice Dawson, John Delicath, Judy Pagano, and Amy Webbink 
made key contributions to this report.

(360290): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] In this view, federal advisory committees follow the executive, 
legislative, judicial, and regulatory "arms" of government. Hearings on 
S. 1637, S. 2064, S. 1964 before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 92nd 
Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 12 (1971).

[2] A particular matter is one that involves deliberation, decision, or 
action that is focused on the interests of specific people or a 
discrete and identifiable class of people. 5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(1).

[3] Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (classified at 5 U.S.C. 
app. 2).

[4] We selected a nonprobability sample of nine committees that address 
scientific and technical issues using criteria described in appendix I. 
Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences 
about a population because some elements of the population being 
studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part 
of the sample.

[5] The National Academies consist of four private, nonprofit 
organizations that advise the federal government on scientific and 
technical matters: the National Academy of Sciences, the National 
Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National 
Research Council. 

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA's Science Advisory Board 
Panels: Improved Policies and Procedures Needed to Ensure Independence 
and Balance, GAO-01-536 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2001).

[7] The Center for Science in the Public Interest is a consumer 
advocacy organization that conducts research and advocacy programs on 
health and nutrition.

[8] The President or head of an agency may determine that a meeting be 
closed if, for example, the meeting will include discussions of 
classified information, reviews of proprietary data submitted in 
support of federal grant applications, or deliberations involving 
considerations of personal privacy. 

[9] Several of Interior's committees do not expire because the 
legislation creating them exempts them from the biennial charter 
expiration.

[10] In response to Executive Order 12838 directing agencies to reduce 
by at least one-third the number of discretionary committees, the 
Office of Management and Budget established a maximum number of 
discretionary advisory committees for each agency. 

[11] Office of Government Ethics Letter to the Chairman of a National 
Commission, June 24, 1993 (93 x 14).

[12] Some agencies, such as EPA and FDA, have developed alternative 
confidential financial disclosure forms that request additional 
information on activities and affiliations, such as expert legal 
testimony.

[13] Special government employees who serve in excess of 60 days above 
a certain salary level, however, must file a public disclosure form.

[14] EPA noted in its comments on our draft report that in the case of 
a small category of advisory committees that EPA uses, known as 
regulatory negotiation committees, representative members may bind 
their organization to take a course of action.

[15] The estimate of the percentage of special government employees is 
based on data that agencies (1) provide to OGE regarding the number of 
special government employees serving on federal advisory committees and 
(2) provide on the GSA FACA database on the total number of federal 
advisory committee members. This estimate does not include advisory 
committee members serving on NIH "special emphasis panels," which are 
not standing committees but rather involve one-time reviews of various 
science and technical funding applications to NIH (grants, cooperative 
agreement applications, etc.). If these individuals were included in 
the estimate above, the percentage of advisory committee members 
appointed as special government employees would be reduced to about 25 
percent.

[16] This committee is currently called the Biological and 
Environmental Research Advisory Committee.

[17] The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 
1990 codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4741.

[18] Basic Research Needs to Assure a Secure Energy Future: A Report 
from the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee, prepared by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, TN: February 2003).

[19] OGE data indicate that some other agencies, such as the Small 
Business Administration and the Department of Justice, also rely 
exclusively on representative appointments to federal advisory 
committees. OGE staff told us the agency did not examine whether 
representatives appointed to those agencies' committees provided 
independent or stakeholder advice.

[20] See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Applicability 
of 18 U.S.C. § 219 to Representative Members of Federal Advisory 
Committees (Sept. 15, 1999). 

[21] Memorandum 82 x 22, Members of Federal Advisory Committees and the 
Conflict-of-Interest Statutes, July 9, 1982.

[22] This guidance has been amplified by several other documents in 
later years including Advisory Letter 93 x 14 to the Chairman of a 
National Commission, June 24, 1993; Advisory Letter 93 x 30 to the 
Executive Director of a Federal Commission, October 22, 1993; and 
Advisory Opinion 00 x 1, Memorandum dated February 15, 2000.

[23] OGE reviewed the management of advisory committees at the 
Departments of Energy, the Interior, the Army, and Education; the 
Commission on Civil Rights; the National Endowment for the Arts; and 
the Small Business Administration.

[24] OGE also addressed the designation issue at a session of its 2004 
annual conference.

[25] In April 2003, Energy's Acting Assistant General Counsel for 
General Law told us that all but one of the department's committees use 
only representative members. The one committee that appointed special 
government employees was the National Nuclear Security Administration 
Advisory Committee, which was established in June 2001 and expired in 
June 2003.

[26] Coincidentally, our review included two of the departments (Energy 
and Interior) included in OGE's staff study. OGE found that the Small 
Business Administration and the Commission on Civil Rights also appoint 
most or all committee members as representatives. OGE data indicate 
that some other agencies, such as the Departments of Justice and State, 
also rely primarily on representative appointments to federal advisory 
committees.

[27] According to USDA, the committee is cosponsored with HHS, the 
Department of Defense, and Commerce but is managed by USDA. 

[28] In total, these agencies have 189 federal advisory committees with 
4,517 members.

[29] The charters will also state that compensation from employment 
does not constitute a financial interest of the member so long as the 
matter before the committee will not have a special or distinct effect 
on the member or the member's employer, other than as part of a class. 

[30] The department appointed members of the Flight 93 Advisory 
Commission and the Jimmy Carter National Historic Site Advisory 
Commission as special government employees in September 2003 and 
January 2004, respectively.

[31] Under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502, impartiality is considered in some 
cases in conjunction with particular matters. For example, a special 
government employee should not participate in a particular matter 
involving a specific party where the employee knows the matter will 
have a direct and predicable effect on the financial interest of a 
member of their household and where the employee determines that the 
circumstances would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the 
relevant facts to question their impartiality in the matter, unless the 
employee has received authorization from an agency designee.

[32] For scientific committees, the relevant points of view may be 
different scientific perspectives.

[33] CVs are most pertinent to assessing expertise, generally providing 
information on education, employment experience, professional 
memberships, service on boards or journals, and publications and 
presentations.

[34] Typically, members are rotating off committees periodically and 
thus issues of overall balance need to be revisited whenever membership 
changes are made. While special government employees serving on 
advisory committees are required to provide forms 450 at least 
annually, CVs and résumés may be collected once and not updated over 
the years that the members serve on the committees.

[35] Income includes salaries, fees, and honoraria of the individual 
and his or her spouse and dependent children. Assets producing more 
than $200 in income during the prior year also are to be reported, such 
as rent, interest, dividends, and capital gains. Information is 
requested on the sources of income and the identification of assets but 
not on the related dollar amounts.

[36] Some relevant affiliations would not be identified because the 
form 450 only requests information covering the immediate prior 12 
months. 

[37] GAO-01-536.

[38] National Research Council, Institute of Medicine, the National 
Academies, Enhancing the Vitality of the National Institutes of Health: 
Organizational Change to Meet New Challenges, 2003.

[39] Special government employees may or may not be paid for their 
services, depending on the policy of the agency that is sponsoring the 
committee.

[40] In January 2004, FDA officials said the agency uses a standard 
form to collect information from potential appointees early in the 
selection process that provides information similar to what EPA 
collects. We reviewed the form and its instructions and note that this 
effort is directed at potential conflicts of interest; it is not clear 
the extent to which the information is used to balance points of view. 
Further, FDA officials said they could not provide copies of the forms 
for the FDA committee we reviewed because the designated federal 
official had left the agency.

[41] These questions were not added to EPA's confidential financial 
disclosure form, the purpose of which is to support reviews for 
potential financial conflicts of interest.

[42] This committee replaced a committee established by the prior 
administration. In this case, HHS did not renew the committee charter 
when it expired in 2002, instead HHS opted to create a new committee 
with a revised charter.

[43] The Director of the White House Liaison at HHS also managed the 
appointments to another committee we reviewed, the CDC Advisory 
Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention. She recommended 10 
new members to the Secretary for appointments made in 2002 and 2003 to 
replace members with expiring terms.

[44] In its July 19, 2001, final rule on advisory committee management, 
GSA did provide a list of factors to consider in achieving a balanced 
advisory committee membership, such as the advisory committee's mission 
and the geographic, ethnic, social, economic, or scientific impact of 
the advisory committee's recommendations. 

[45] Some of the committees and agencies that publish Federal Register 
notices seeking nominations include EPA's Science Advisory Board; EPA's 
FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel; all committees managed by FDA, such as 
the Food Advisory Committee; and a number of committees managed by 
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, such as the National 
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods. USDA also 
sought nominations using an announcement on the agency and advisory 
committee Web pages and in a weekly newsletter sent to interested 
organizations and individuals. EPA's Science Advisory Board also uses 
its Web site as a vehicle for soliciting nominations to its peer review 
committees.

[46] GAO-01-536.

[47] Members of committees of the National Academies are not subject to 
the same conflict-of-interest provisions as are members of FACA 
committees sponsored by federal agencies. The National Academy of 
Science is required to make its best effort to ensure that no committee 
member has a conflict of interest that is relevant to the functions to 
be performed, unless the conflict is publicly disclosed and the academy 
determines that it is unavoidable. The academies define a conflict of 
interest as any financial or other interest that conflicts with the 
service of an individual because it (1) could impair the individual's 
objectivity or (2) could create an unfair competitive advantage for any 
person or organization.

[48] Potential members complete one of three similar forms covering 
background information and confidential conflict-of-interest 
disclosure, depending on the type of study involved: program reviews 
and evaluations, general scientific and technical studies and 
assistance, and studies related to government regulations.

[49] GAO-01-536.

[50] FDA also has a form that agency staff may use to conduct a 
preliminary interview "to identify obvious conflicts of interest that 
may preclude appointment." This form is called the Prospective Special 
Government Employee Personal Data Sheet (Preliminary Informal 
Interview), form FDA 2725a (July 1992).

[51] According to EPA, the staff office for the Science Advisory Board 
actively avoids granting waivers, preferring to choose another panelist 
instead. However, in the event that EPA grants a waiver, the designated 
federal official discloses that information at the start of meetings. 
EPA would disclose only the name of the individual and the type of 
waiver granted--not the details of the conflict.

[52] In fiscal year 2003, the six agencies we reviewed sponsored 477 of 
948 active federal advisory committees. They sponsored 126 of the 208 
scientific and technical committees.

[53] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population. This is because, in a nonprobability 
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or 
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

[54] The National Academies consist of four private, nonprofit 
organizations that advise the federal government on scientific and 
technical matters: the National Academy of Sciences, the National 
Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National 
Research Council.

[55] U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA's Science Advisory Board 
Panels: Improved Policies and Procedures Needed to Ensure Independence 
and Balance, GAO-01-536 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2001).

[56] HHS uses the term "special emphasis panel" for some of its grant 
review panels at NIH. Of the 29 special emphasis panels in fiscal year 
2003, NIH sponsored 24 panels.

[57] Although these panels may have several hundred members and may 
hold dozens or more meetings in a year, the members do not all attend 
all of the panels' meetings. Instead, each member might be called upon 
to attend one meeting per year to review a narrowly focused set of 
grant proposals. This practice is in contrast to the practice of other 
categories of committees in which the members are invited to attend 
each of a generally small number of meetings held each year.

[58] This average was calculated after subtracting the 6 largest 
committees, including HHS's Center for Scientific Review Special 
Emphasis Panel, which in fiscal year 2003 maintained a roster of 9,080 
members and held over 1,100 meetings. Five other advisory committees 
had over 1,000 members. If those committees are counted, the average 
size of the committees is about 66 members.

[59] This average was calculated after subtracting the membership of 
the 2 largest science committees, both sponsored by the Department of 
Transportation--RTCA, Inc. (with 2,718 members) and the Intelligent 
Transportation Society of America (with 570 members).

[60] In this review, we examined the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel on 
atrazine (see table 8).

[61] As noted in this report, FACA requires that advisory committee 
charters expire at the end of 2 years unless renewed by the agency.

[62] HHS and its components, such as CDC, FDA, and NIH, had 247 federal 
advisory committees in fiscal year 2003. While the heads of the various 
component agencies generally appoint committee members, according to 
the Director of the Office of the White House Liaison, the HHS 
Secretary appoints the members to about 30 percent of the committees. 

[63] See appendix 6, footnote 2. 

[64] According to an ethics official in NASA's Office of General 
Counsel, NASA issues very few (five or fewer) waivers each year. 

[65] GAO-01-536.

[66] This view also provides support that OGE clarification on this 
issue is needed so that agencies can make appropriate decisions 
regarding representative appointments to federal advisory committees.

[67] NASA's comments in response to this report indicate that NASA 
does, at least in some cases, appoint members to represent their 
expertise. Unlike Energy, NASA cites issues related to conflicts of 
interest as a basis for doing so.

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